UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES 
 
 SCHOOL OF LAW 
 LIBRARY
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 v! 
 

 
 CASES 
 
 ON 
 
 THE LAW OF AGENCY
 
 To accompany this volume : 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF AGENCY. By ERNEST 
 W. HUFFCUT.
 
 , 
 
 CASES 
 
 ON 
 
 THE LAW OF AGENCY 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 ERNEST W. HUFFCUT 
 M 
 
 PEOFESSOR OF LAW IN CORNELL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
 BOSTON 
 LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY 
 
 1896
 
 Copyright, 1895, 
 BY EKNEST W. HCFFCUT. 
 
 UNIVERSITT PRESS: 
 JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE, U.S.A.
 
 NOTE. 
 
 THE cases which follow are arranged in accordance 
 with the analysis of the editor's work on the Law of 
 Agency in this series. The section number printed be- 
 fore the title of a case refers to the section of the text- 
 book where the point involved in the case is discussed. 
 This arrangement has rendered unnecessary any annota- 
 tion of the cases themselves. 
 
 Statements of fact have often been rewritten and 
 abridged. Portions of opinions irrelevant to the point 
 under discussion are omitted, but such omissions are 
 always indicated. 
 
 No head-notes have been used : but the cases are 
 grouped under topics in such a manner that the student 
 will know what he has to search for in the case without 
 knowing what the result of his search is to be. 
 
 E. W. H. 
 
 CORNELL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 
 
 December, 1895
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 TABLE OF CASES xiii 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 PRELIMINARY TOPICS 1 
 
 1. Distinction between agent and servant .... 1 
 
 2. Construction of words descriptive of service in 
 
 statutes 3 
 
 3. Same representative as both agent and servant . . 9 
 
 PART I. 
 
 FORMATION OF THE RELATION. 
 
 II. FORMATION OF THE RELATION BY AGREEMENT . . 12 
 
 1. Agreement by contract or conduct necessary . . 12 
 
 2. Consideration necessary as between principal and 
 
 agent 18 
 
 3. Competency of parties 18 
 
 a. Infant principals 18 
 
 b. Insane principals 24 
 
 c. Married women as principals 29 
 
 d. Unincorporated societies as principals ... 29 
 
 e. Competency of agent 30 
 
 4. Form of contract of appointment 32 
 
 a. Under the Statute of Frauds 32 
 
 b. In execution of sealed instruments .... 35 
 
 III. FORMATION OF THE RELATION BY RATIFICATION . . 39 
 
 1. Act must be performed in behalf of existing prin- 
 
 cipal 39 
 
 2. Assent may be express or implied 47
 
 Vill TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 3. Silence may amount to ratification 57 
 
 4. Assent must be in toto and unconditional ... 63 
 
 5. Assent must be free from mistake or fraud . . . 66 
 
 6. Right of third party to recede before ratification . 73 
 
 7. Competency of principal 84 
 
 8. Form of ratification 85 
 
 9. Legality of act ratified 88 
 
 10. Legal etfects of ratification 94 
 
 IV. FOKMATION OF THE RELATION BY ESTOPPEL . . . 101 
 
 V. FORMATION OF THE RELATION BY NECESSITY . . 110 
 
 VI. TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY 126 
 
 1. By accomplishment of purpose 126 
 
 2. By revocation 130 
 
 3. By change affecting subject-matter 137 
 
 4. By death 141 
 
 5. By insanity 144 
 
 6. Irrevocable agencies 144 
 
 PART II. 
 
 LEGAL EFFECT AS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. 
 
 VII. OBLIGATIONS OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT .... 151 
 
 1. Compensation for authorized act 151 
 
 2. Compensation for unauthorized act 153 
 
 3. Compensation for gratuitous service .... 154 
 
 4. Compensation after revocation of agency . . . 155 
 
 5. Compensation after renunciation of agency . . 160 
 
 6. Compensation where agent acts for both parties 164 
 
 7. Reimbursement and indemnity 170 
 
 VIII. OBLIGATIONS OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL .... 177 
 
 1. Obedience 177 
 
 2. Prudence 179 
 
 3. Good faith 182 
 
 4. Accounting 185 
 
 5. Appointment of sub-agents 188 
 
 6. Obligations of gratuitous agents 199
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PART III. 
 
 LEGAL EFFECT AS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND THIRD 
 PARTIES. 
 
 Page 
 
 IX. CONTRACTS OF AGENT IN BEHALF OF A DISCLOSED 
 
 PRINCIPAL 203 
 
 1. Contracts apparently authorized 203 
 
 2. Factors 223 
 
 3. Brokers 226 
 
 4. Auctioneers 226 
 
 5. Attorneys-at-law 227 
 
 6. Bank cashiers 228 
 
 X. CONTRACTS OF AGENT IN BEHALF OF UNDISCLOSED 
 
 PRINCIPAL 232 
 
 1. Liability of undisclosed principal: general rule . 232 
 
 2. Same : exception as to state of accounts . . . 237 
 
 3. Same: exception based on election 246 
 
 4. Same: exception as to sealed instruments . . 248 
 
 5. Same: exception as to negotiable instruments . 253 
 
 6. Rights of undisclosed principal: general rule . 253 
 
 7. Same : exception as to state of accounts . . . 257 
 
 8. Same : exception as to exclusive credit to agent . 260 
 
 XI. ADMISSIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF AGENT . . . 265 
 
 XII. NOTICE TO THE AGENT 271 
 
 XIII. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR TORTS OF AGENT . 282 
 
 1. Liability for torts generally 282 
 
 2. Fraud for benefit of principal 282 
 
 3. Fraud for benefit of agent: fictitious stock . . 290 
 
 4. Fraud for benefit of agent: fictitious bills of 
 
 lading 299 
 
 5. Fraud for benefit of agent : forged telegram . 306 
 
 6. Liability for crimes of agent 311 
 
 7. Liability for torts of sub-agent 314 
 
 8. Liability of public principal 319 
 
 9. Liability of public charity 321
 
 X TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 XIV. LIABILITY OF THIRD PERSON TO PRINCIPAL . . . 326 
 
 1. Liability upon contracts 326 
 
 2. Liability for money paid under duress, mistake, 
 
 etc 326 
 
 3. Liability for property diverted by agent . . . 328 
 
 4. Liability for collusive fraud 334 
 
 5. Liability in equity for trust funds diverted by 
 
 agent 341 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 LEGAL EFFECT AS BETWEEN AGENT AND THIRD 
 PARTIES. 
 
 XV. CONTRACT RELATIONS BETWEEN AGENT AND THIRD 
 
 PARTY 347 
 
 1. Liability of agent upon an unauthorized con- 
 
 tract 347 
 
 2. Liability of agent who acts for incompetent 
 
 principal 354 
 
 3. Liability of agent who acts for fictitious prin- 
 
 cipal 355 
 
 4. Liability of agent to whom exclusive credit is 
 
 given 356 
 
 5. Liability of agent who acts for a foreign prin- 
 
 cipal 359 
 
 6. Liability of agent who executes sealed contract 
 
 in his own name 360 
 
 7. Liability of agent who executes negotiable in- 
 
 strument in his own name 360 
 
 a. Construction from signature alone .... 360 
 
 b. Construction from signature and recitals . 363 
 
 c. Construction from signature and marginal 
 
 headings 369 
 
 d. Tndorsers of bills and notes 377 
 
 8. Liability of agent who executes simple contract 
 
 in his own name 380 
 
 9. Liability of agent arising from interest in sub- 
 
 ject-matter 383 
 
 10. Where neither principal nor agent is bound . . 384
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XI 
 
 Page 
 
 11. Liability of agent for money received through 
 
 mistake or fraud 385 
 
 12. Liability of third person to agent 388 
 
 XVI. TORTS BETWEEN AGENT AND THIRD PARTY . . . 389 
 
 1. Liability of agent for non-feasance .... 389 
 
 2. Liability of agent for misfeasance 397 
 
 INDEX 403
 
 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. 
 
 Ahern . Baker, 34 Minn. 98 129 
 
 Allen v. Bryson, 67 Iowa, 591 18, 154 
 
 Atlee v. Bartholomew, 69 Wis. 43 84, n. 
 
 Baird v. Shipman, 132 111. 16 393 
 
 Baker v. New York Nat. Ex. Bk., 100 N. Y. 31 . . . 188, 341 
 
 --Baldwin Bros. v. Potter, 46 Vt. 402 186 
 
 Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467 352, 385 
 
 Bank of Batavia v. N. Y. &c. Ry. Co., 106 N. Y. 195 303 
 
 Barwick v. Eng. Joint Stock Bk", L. R. 2 Ex. 259 282 
 
 Benjamin v. Dockham, 134 Mass. 418 110 
 
 - Bentley v. Doggett, 51 Wis. 224 212 
 
 Beymer v. Bonsall, 79 Pa. St. 298 246 
 
 Biggs v. Evans, 1894, 1 Q. B. 88 330 
 
 Blackstone v. Buttermore, 53 Pa. St. 266 133 
 
 Bolton Partners v. Lambert, L. R. 41 Ch. D. 295 75 
 
 Bradish v. Belknap, 41 Vt. 172 109, 135 
 
 Bradlee v. Boston Glass Mfy., 16 Pick. (Mass.) 347 363 
 
 Bray v. Gunn, 53 Ga. 144 100, 179 
 
 Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357 248, 360, 382, 388 
 
 British Mut. Bk. Co. v. Charnwood Forest Ry. Co., L. R. 18 Q. B. D. 714 . 290 
 
 Bronson's Executor v. Chappell, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 681 101, 206 
 
 Brookshire r. Brookshire, 8 Tredell's Law (N. C.), 74 130 
 
 Broughton v. Silloway. 114 Mass. 71 226 
 
 Bunker v. Miles, 30 Me. 431 185 
 
 Byrne v. Massasoit Packing Co., 137 Mass. 313 . 211 
 
 Cannell v. Smith, 142 Pa. St. 25 164 
 
 Carpenter v. Ins. Co., 135 N. Y. 298 280 
 
 Casco Nat. Bk. v. Clark, 137 N. Y. 307 374 
 
 Central Trust Co. v. Bridges, 16 U. S. App. 115 12 
 
 Chipman v. Foster, 119 Mass. 189 373 
 
 Combs v. Scott, 12 Allen (Mass.), 493 68 
 
 Comfort 0. Graham, 87 Iowa, 295 355 
 
 Commercial Bank v. Norton, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 501 188 
 
 Commonwealth v. Keller, 140 Mass. 441 311 
 
 Commonwealth v. Wachendorf, 141 Mass. 270 312 
 
 Conkeyt). Bond, 36 N. Y. 427 183
 
 XIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. 
 
 Page 
 
 Constant v. University of Rochester, 111 N. Y. 604 274 
 
 ^-Cutter r. Gillette, 163 Mass. 95 155 
 
 D'Arcy v. Lyle, 5 Binney (Pa.), 441 172 
 
 Davis v. Maxwell, 12 Met. (Mass.) 286 163 
 
 Daylight Burner Co. v. Odliu, 51 N. H. 56 208. 225, n. 
 
 Delauey v. Kochereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123 389 
 
 Delano v. Case, 121 111. 247 199 
 
 - Dempsey t>. Chambers, 154 Mass. 330 94, 282 
 
 Distilled Spirits, The, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 356 271 
 
 Dodge v. Hopkins, 14 Wis. 630 81 
 
 Drew v. Nunn, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 661 24, 109, 144 
 
 Eberts v. Selover, 44 Mich. 519 63 
 
 Elledge v. Railway Co., 100 Cal. 282 269 
 
 Farmers' Loan Trust Co. . Wilson, 139 N. Y. 284 143, n. 
 
 Fifth Ave. Bk. v. Forty-second St. &c. Ferry Co., 137 N. Y. 231 ... 295 
 
 Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. St. 624 321 
 
 Flesh v. Lindsay, 115 Mo. 1 1, 29 
 
 Fradley v. Hyland, 37 Fed. Rep. 49 240 
 
 Frankland v. Johnson, 147 111. 520 366 
 
 Friedlander v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 130 U. S. 416 299 
 
 Gardner v. Gardner, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 483 37 
 
 Geisinger v. Beyl, 80 Wis. 443 182 
 
 Gelatt v. Ridge! 117 Mo. 553 99, 153 
 
 Gordon v. Bulkeley, 14 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.), 331 35 
 
 ^Guelich v. Nat. State Bank, 56 Iowa, 434 195 
 
 Gwilliam v. Twist, 1 Q. B. D. 557 ; 64 L. J. Rep., Q. B. 474 121 
 
 Haluptzok v. Great Northern Ry., 55 Minn. 446 314 
 
 Hand v. Cole, 88 Tenn. 400 3 
 
 Hartley & Minor's Appeal, 53 Pa. St. 212 132 
 
 Haskeil v. Starbird, 152 Mass. 117 287 
 
 Heath v. Nutter, 50 Me. 378 85 
 
 Hegenmyer v. Marks, 37 Minn. 6 186, 280, 339 
 
 Heinema"nn v. Hoard, 50 N. Y. 27 179 
 
 -Hipgins v. Moore, 34 N. Y. 417 215, 226 
 
 Higgins v. Senior, 8 Mees. & Wels. 834 380 
 
 Hitchcock . Buchanan, 105 U. S. 416 371 
 
 Howell r. Graff. 25 Neb. 130 206 
 
 Hubbard v. Tenbrook, 124 Pa. St. 291 233 ' 
 
 Humble v. Hunter, 12 Q. B. Rep. 310 262 
 
 Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 174 146 
 
 Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 371 253, 326 
 
 -Huntley v. Mathias, 90 N. C. 101 203, 282 
 
 Hyatt v. Clark, 118 N. Y. 563 52
 
 TABLE OP CASES REPORTED. XV 
 
 Page 
 
 Irvine v. Watson, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 414 237 
 
 Isham v. Post, 141 N. Y. 100 . . . , 200 
 
 Johnson v. Dodge, 17 III. 433 32 
 
 Johnson o. Hurley, 115 Mo. 513 105, 206 
 
 Jones v. Avery, 50 Mich. 326 , . . . . 8 
 
 Kayton v. Barnett, 116 N". Y. 625 232 
 
 Kaulback r. Churchill, 59 N. H. 296 359 
 
 Keenan v. Southworth, 110 Mass. 474 319 
 
 Kelley v. Newburyport Horse R. R. Co., 141 Mass. 496 70 
 
 Kelly v. Thuey, 102 Mo. 522 356, 3S 8 
 
 Kiugsley v. Davis, 104 Mass. 178 247 
 
 Kozel v. Dearlove, 144 111. 23 87 
 
 Kroeger v. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. St. 311 347 
 
 La Farge v. Kneeland, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 456 385 
 
 Laing v. Butler, 37 Hun (N. Y. S. C.), 144 245 
 
 Long v. Thayer, 150 U. S. 520 141, 384 
 
 Lyon v. Kent, 45 Ala. 656 30 
 
 McArthur v. Times Printing Co., 48 Minn. 319 42 
 
 -McCauley . Brown, 2 Daly (N. Y. C. P.), 426 329 
 
 McClintock v. Oil Co., 146 Pa. St. 144 78 
 
 M'Cord v. Western Union Tel. Co., 39 Minn. 181 306 
 
 McCormick v. Joseph, 83 Ala. 401 279 
 
 McCrary v. Ruddick, 33 Iowa, 621 151 
 
 Mclntyre v. Park, 11 Gray (Mass.), 102 86 
 
 .Mayor, &c., of Salford v. Lever, 1891, 1 Q. B. 168 334 
 
 Mechanics' Bk. v. Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 326 369 
 
 -Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. (U. S. ) 604 228 
 
 Milford Borough v. Milford Water Co., 124 Pa. St. 610 88 
 
 Montague v. Forwood, 1893, 2 Q. B. D. 351 257 
 
 Montross i. Eddy, 94 Mich. 100 167 
 
 -Moore v. Appleton, 26 Ala. 633 ,170 
 
 Morse . State, 6 Conn. 9 313 
 
 Moulton v. Bowker, 115 Mass. 36 227 
 
 Noeckeri>. People, 91 111. 494 313 
 
 Northumberland Ave. Hotel Co., In Re, L. R. 33 Ch. D. 16 39 
 
 Patterson v. Lippincott, 47 N. J. L. 457 21, 352 
 
 Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Cowell, 28 Pa. St. 329 57 
 
 Philpot v. Bingham, 55 Ala. 435 18, 84 
 
 Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38 223, 330 
 
 -Powers v. First Nat. Bank, 6 Mont. 251 192 
 
 Rendell v. Harriman, 75 Me. 497 253, 360 
 
 Riehl v. Evansville Foundry Ass'n, 104 Ind. 70 188, 344
 
 XVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED. 
 
 Pag* 
 
 Roland r. Coleman & Co., 76 Ga. 652 144 
 
 Rowe r. Rand, 111 Ind. 206 126,388 
 
 *Short f. Millard, 68 III. 292 130,166 
 
 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518 . 9, 282 
 
 Soubegan Nat. Bk. r. Boardman, 46 Minn. 293 377 
 
 State c. McCance, 110 Mo. 398 313 
 
 Stevenson r. Mortimer, Cowp. 805 326, 388 
 
 Stewart r. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500 141, n 
 
 Strasser v. Conklin, 54 Wis. 102 47 
 
 Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64 158 
 
 Swim t>. Wilson, 90 Cal. 126 399 
 
 Talmage r. Bierhause, 103 Ind. 270 221 
 
 Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. McMurray, 98 lud. 358 Ill 
 
 Terry v. Birmingham Nat. Bk., 99 Ala. 566 168 
 
 Thompson . Barnum, 49 Iowa, 392 . 328 
 
 Timberlake t;. Thayer, 71 Miss. 279 160 
 
 Trustees, &c , of Easthampton v. Bowman, 136 N. Y. 521 66 
 
 Turner v. Goldsmith, 1891, 1 Q. B. 544 137 
 
 Vicksburg, &c. R. v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99 270 
 
 Walter v. James, L. R. 6 Ex. 124 73 
 
 Watteau r. Fenwick, 1893, 1 Q. B. 346 235 
 
 Weber v. Weber, 47 Mich. 569 397 
 
 Wellington v. Jackson, 121 Mass. 157 93 
 
 Western Pub. House v. Dist. Tp. of Rock, 84 Iowa, 101 45 
 
 Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Aughey, 144 Pa. St. 398 50, 289 
 
 White v. Miller, 71 N. Y. 118 265 
 
 Whitney v. Merchants' Express Co., 104 Mass. 152 177 
 
 Willcox v. Arnold, 162 Mass. 577 29 
 
 Williamson v. Cambridge R. Co., 144 Mass. 148 268 
 
 Wilson r. Dame, 58 N. H. 392 153 
 
 Wilson v. Smales, 1892, 1 Q. B. 456 384 
 
 Winchester v. Howard, 97 Mass. 303 260 
 
 Woolfe v. Home, L. R 2 Q. B. D. 355 227, 383 
 
 Workman r. Wright, 33 Oh. St. 405 90 
 
 Wright v. Boynton, 37 N. H. 9 190 
 
 Yordy v. Marshall County, 86 Iowa, 340 270
 
 CASES ON AGENCY. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRELIMINARY TOPICS. 
 1. Distinction between agent and servant. 
 
 4-6.] FLESH v. LINDSAY. 
 
 115 MISSOURI, 1. 1893. 
 
 ACTION against Jane Lindsay and her husband for damages 
 caused to plaintiffs' building by the negligence of Jane 
 Lindsay in the repair of her adjoining building, whereby a 
 party wall collapsed and fell. The court instructed the jury 
 that if the}' found that F. & Co. were the agents of Jane 
 Lindsay for the purpose of causing alterations in her build- 
 ing, then their act is her act, and she is responsible for the 
 alterations and changes, without the intervention of an agent. 
 Verdict and judgment for plaintiffs against Jane Lindsay. 
 
 BURGESS, J. . . . It is also contended by defendant 
 that a married woman can have no agent unless she is pos- 
 sessed of a separate estate, and such seems to be the law as 
 announced in the case of Wilcox v. Todd, 64 Mo. 390 ; 
 Hall v. Callahan, 66 Mo. 316 ; Hard v. Taubman, 79 Mo. 
 101 ; Henry v. Sneed, 99 Mo. 407. But may she not have 
 a servant to repair her property and preserve it from decay 
 and destruction ? An agent is defined to be a person duly 
 authorized to act on behalf of another, or one whose un- 
 authorized act has been duly ratified. 1 American and 
 
 1
 
 2 INTRODUCTION. [CH. L 
 
 English Encyclopedia of Law, p. 333 ; Evans on Agency 
 [Ewell's Ed.] sec. 1 ; 1 Sweet's Law Dictionary. Servant is 
 defined by Mr. Webster as follows: "One who serves or 
 does service voluntarily or involuntarily ; a person who is 
 employed b}- another for menial offices or for other labor, 
 and is subject to his command ; a person who labors or 
 exerts himself for the benefit of another, his master or em- 
 ployer ; a subordinate helper." We take it then that the 
 persons engaged in or about the repairing, changing, and re- 
 modelling the building of Mrs. Lindsay were her servants, 
 even if she could not have an agent in regard to her fee- 
 simple property. 
 
 Section 6868, Revised Statutes, 1889, supra, provides, 
 that the annual products of the wife's realty may be attached 
 or levied upon, for any debt or liability created . . . for the 
 cultivation and improvement of such real estate. By this it 
 is clearly implied that the wife's realty may be improved, and 
 who is to do it if she does not? The very fact that she js 
 permitted by law to hold property in fee, implies that she 
 ma3 T improve, repair and remodel it as the exigencies of the 
 case and the advance of the times may require, and that for 
 that purpose she may cmplo} T servants, for whose careless- 
 ness and negligence in the manner of its doing she and her 
 husband should be held jointly liable. As was said in the case 
 of Merrill v. St. Louis, 83 Mo. 244, ' ' The law imposes upon 
 every owner of property the duty of so using it as not to 
 injure the property or the persons of others." Should a mar- 
 ried woman who owns property worth thousands of dollars, 
 and who may have an impecunious and insolvent husband, 
 be permitted to so use her property as to destroj* that of 
 others, and there be no redress therefor? If she is not in 
 such case answerable for negligence to &ny one who has been 
 injured by its improper management, who is so answerable? 
 A vast amount of property is now held by married women in 
 this State, as it is held in the case at bar, and the policy of 
 the law is that those who thus own it beneficially should 
 answer for the tortious or negligent management of it.
 
 4-6.] HAXD V. COLE. 3 
 
 We hold that both at common-law and under the statute 
 the defendant and her husband are jointly liable for the 
 damages which accrued to plaintiffs in this case by reason 
 of the carelessness and negligence of defendant's servants 
 (if such was the case) in remodelling and changing the 
 building. 
 
 As Mrs. Lindsay could have no agent in regard to her 
 property as held by this court, the court committed error in 
 instructing the jury that " If Farrar & Co., or Charles Farrar, 
 were the agents of Jane Lindsay for the purpose of causing 
 the alterations and changes in question to be made, their act 
 was her act, and she is responsible for the alterations and 
 changes in her said building as if she had made the contract 
 for such alterations and changes in person, without the inter- 
 vention of an agent." . . . 
 
 In no event is Mrs. Lindsay alone to be held liable for the 
 damages sued far, **"* ol ' ' g Iig h1pjn conjunction with her 
 husband. 
 
 For the error of the court in giving instructions for plaintiff 
 as herein indicated, and in rendering judgment against Mrs. 
 Lindsay and not against her husband, the cause will be re- 
 versed and remanded to be proceeded with in accordance 
 with the views herein expressed. 
 
 Reversed and remanded. 
 
 2. Construction of words descriptive of service in statutes. 
 
 4-6.] HAND v. COLE. 
 
 88 TENNESSEE, 400. 1890. 
 
 ACTION against stockholders for individual liability im- 
 posed by statute. Defence, that plaintiff is not within the 
 contemplation of the statute. Judgment for plaintiff. De- 
 fendants appeal.
 
 4 INTRODUCTION. [CH. I. 
 
 FOLKES, J. This is an action at law to recover of the 
 defendants, individually, the wages claimed to be due plain- 
 tiff by the Nashville Plow Company, an insolvent manufac- 
 turing corporation, chartered under Section 11 of the General 
 Incorporation Act of 1875. 
 
 Under the case as made in the record, the only question 
 presented is, whether the plaintiff, who was a travelling sales- 
 man or drummer in the employ of the company, can claim 
 the benefit of said Act, as being one of the persons in favor 
 of whom the Legislature has given an individual right of 
 recourse over upon the stockholder. 
 
 Section 11 of said Act provides for the creation of mining, 
 quarrying, and manufacturing companies, and contains this 
 clause : " The stockholders are jointly and severally liable, 
 individually, at all times, for all moneys due and owing to 
 the laborers, servants, clerks, and operatives of the company, 
 in case the corporation becomes insolvent." 
 
 The proof shows that for a salary of $100 per month, pay- 
 able as wanted, the plaintiff had been on the road for about 
 twenty-three weeks, and at the factory fourteen or fifteen 
 weeks, during the time of his employment, being out and in 
 alternately, and for varying periods, as directed and required 
 by the company ; that while on the road he sold goods by 
 sample or photograph, made collections, settled claims, and 
 generally did any and every thing which is understood to be 
 within the duties of a drummer working on a salary, subject 
 to the direction and control of the general manager of the 
 com pan}'. When not on the road he worked in the stock, 
 shipping and receiving goods, moving and handling stock, 
 etc. He also made sales in the city and collected bills, when 
 so instructed. There is due him salar}' for five and four- 
 fifths months, during which time he was on the road and at 
 the factory about half each. 
 
 Does this character of employment and service bring him 
 within the benefit of the clause of the Act above quoted ? 
 While there is no doubt of the power of the Legislature to 
 impose this increased liability upon the stockholder, where it
 
 4-6.] HAND V. COLE. 5 
 
 is done in the Act creating the corporation, vet T being in 
 derogation of the common law, such statutes f so far as con- 
 cerns such liability, are to he strictly construed. " They are 
 a wide departure from established rules, and though founded 
 on considerations of public polic}' and general convenience, 
 are not to be extended beyond the plain intent of the words 
 of the statute," as said by Mr. Cook in his work on Stock 
 and Stockholders, sec. 214. 
 
 Again, this author says, in speaking of the statutory 
 liability of stockholders for debts of the corporation due its 
 servants or laborers: "There has been great difficulty in 
 determining what persons are to be classed under these 
 terms, but the courts are not inclined to give a broad appli- 
 cation to the words." 
 
 It must also be borne in mind that while the Legislature 
 has in such Acts manifested a purpose to guard and protect 
 the wages of a certain class, it does not follow that the class 
 should be extended by any liberality of construction so as to 
 include persons not named. The courts should be slow to 
 enlarge the class b}- any latitudinous construction, not only 
 upon the considerations above stated, but for the further 
 reason that the Legislature is not to be presumed to place 
 unnecessary burdens upon the corporations of its creation. 
 They serve a most valuable purpose in developing and build- 
 ing up the resources of the State. B}' means of the aggrega- 
 tion of capital the}* are able to accomplish great, and much 
 to be desired, benefits to the public, which individual means 
 and effort would be unable to achieve. 
 
 With these general principles to direct us, we are to ascer- 
 tain, as each case arises, what employe is or is not within the 
 language of the Act. In arriving at a satisfactory conclusion 
 we find but little aid and comfort from the adjudged cases 
 from the courts of other States, the same language receiving 
 very different construction at the hands of different courts 
 of equall}' high authortty, as a citation of some of them 
 will show. The following persons have been held not to fall 
 within the terms "servants or laborers:" The secretary of
 
 6 INTRODUCTION. [OH. I. 
 
 a manufacturing company, 37 N. Y. 640 ; a civil engineer, 
 84 Pa. St. 168; a consulting engineer, 38 Barb. 390; an 
 assistant engineer, 39 Mich. 47 ; an overseer on a planta- 
 tion, 84 N. C. 340 ; a bookkeeper and general manager, 
 90 N. Y. 213. These cases seem to rest upon the idea that 
 the terms named have reference only to persons who perform 
 menial or manual labor, or, rather, to persons whose chief 
 employment is to perform such labor, and not to embrace 
 the higher class named in the authorities just cited, although 
 each of the persons named did perform more or less of 
 manual labor as incident to their employment. 
 
 On the other hand, a master mechanic or machinist em- 
 ployed by the year was held to be embraced under a statute 
 protecting " clerks, servants, or laborers," 67 Wis. 590. 
 
 But, without further naming the cases, we refer the curious 
 to note 1, sec. 215, Cook on Stock, where a number of cases 
 are to be found. 
 
 The statute under consideration, as we have seen, uses the 
 words " laborers, servants, clerks, and operatives." We do 
 not deem it necessary to define the terms "laborer" or 
 " operative," as it ma} r be said to be clear, under the prin- 
 ciples of construction that are to govern us, that they do not 
 include the travelling salesman on a salarj r of $100 per 
 month. Whether he would be embraced under the term 
 " servants " it would be difficult to say. He would be, if we 
 were at liberty to accept the term in its broadest sense, as 
 defined by Mr. Wood in his work on Master and Servant, 
 viz.: "The word servant, in our legal nomenclature, has a 
 broad significance and embraces all persons, of whatever 
 rank or position, who are in the employ and subject to the 
 direction and control of another in an} r department of labor 
 or business. Indeed, it may in most cases be said to be 
 synon3-raous with employe." That it is, however, not used 
 in that sense in the statute is shown by the fact that other 
 terms are used which would be altogether unnecessaiy and 
 idle if it were meant to be S3'nonymous with emplo}^. We 
 would have no room for the words " laborers," " clerks," or 
 " operatives."
 
 4-6.] HAND V. COLE. 7 
 
 We are Of opinion, and so decide T ^at. t.liP plninfjff ia 
 embraced within the term " clerk " as used in the statute. 
 Webster defines clerk as, " An assistant in a shop or store, 
 who sells goods or keeps accounts." Bouvier says he is, "A 
 person in the employ of a merchant, who attends to only 
 part of his business, while the merchant himself superin- 
 tends the whole ; or, a person employed in an office to keep 
 accounts or records." Rapalje sa3 r s, in Business Law : " An 
 assistant, employed to aid in any business, mercantile or 
 otherwise, subject to the advice and direction of his em- 
 ploj'er." 
 
 That "clerk" embraces and includes " salesman " seems 
 beyond all doubt. If the term includes the salesman who 
 remains in the shop or store, we can see no reason why it 
 does not include the salesman on the road, under like terms 
 of employment. Each makes sales, collects accounts, handles 
 goods, and acts under the instructions of the employer. 
 
 It is worthy of note that the Act of 1875, ch. 142, "To 
 provide for the organization of corporations," creates an 
 individual liability upon the stockholder to employes in dif- 
 ferent companies in different language, and some of the cor- 
 porations created are left without any provision at all on the 
 subject. Thus, " cotton compress and warehouse," Section 1 2, 
 has same provision as we have been considering for mining 
 and manufacturing, viz., " laborers, servants, clerks, and 
 operatives ; " Section 18, as to hotel companies, the terms are 
 " laborers, servants, and clerks ;" Section 21, as to printing 
 and publishing companies, the language is, "journeyman for 
 wages due, and all other servants and employes ; " Section 
 22, as to transfer and omnibus companies, " to servants and 
 agents ; " Section 24, as to steamboat and packet companies, 
 " to hands and other employes ; " while there is no provi- 
 sion at all on the subject as to railway, turnpike, telegraph, 
 cemetery, insurance, street railway, building associations, 
 pawnbroker, levee, banks, nor immigration and real estate 
 companies. 
 
 Whatever may have been the purpose of the Legislature in
 
 8 INTRODUCTION. [CH. I. 
 
 making these distinctions, they do not materially help us to 
 a decision of the case in hand, and we have referred to it 
 merely as a matter of interest in connection with the sub- 
 ject of statutory liability of stockholders so far as concerns 
 employes. 
 
 There was no error in the action of the circuit judge, and 
 his judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount of 
 the wages or salary shown to be due by the corporation, will 
 be affirmed against the stockholders sued herein, with interest 
 and costs. 
 
 4-6.] JONES v. AVERY. 
 
 50 MICHIGAN, 326. 1883. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT against defendant as stockholder to recover 
 under a statute making stockholders personally liable "for 
 all labor performed " for corporations. Judgment for 
 defendant. 
 
 GRAVES, C. J. The plaintiff, claiming to be a judgment 
 creditor of the " Condensed Oil Manufacturing Company" 
 for services rendered to the company, and that collection by 
 execution had failed, prosecuted this action against the de- 
 fendant as a stockholder to compel him to make payment. 
 The trial judge ordered a verdict against the plaintiff. The 
 alleged judgment against the corporation was before a 
 justice, and was given on a confession made by the president 
 and without a showing of authority from the directors. 
 Whether this confession was sufficient to confer jurisdiction 
 may be open to some discussion, but the point is now 
 waived. 
 
 The circuit judge was of opinion that the plaintiff's debt 
 was not a labor debt within the meaning of the provisions 
 on which the plaintiff relies, Const., article 15, 7 ; 
 Comp. L. 2852 and hence that the defendant was not 
 liable for it.
 
 4-6.] SINGER MANUFACTURING CO. V. RAHN. 9 
 
 We think this view is correct. The plaintiff's connection 
 with the company and the nature of his occupation were 
 fully explained by him as a witness. He said : " The kind 
 of labor I rendered to the said company was that of travel- 
 ling salesman or agent, selling their goods. My duties con- 
 sisted in soliciting orders for the sale of the company's 
 goods from customers, who were using those or similar 
 goods in different towns through the country. I carried 
 samples with me always ; I carried this assortment of 
 samples with me to each customer or man I solicited. I 
 was to receive a salary or compensation at the rate of $1,000 
 per year; that was my agreement." 
 
 From this it seems evident to the court that he was not a 
 labor-performer for the corporation in the sense contemplated 
 in the provisions for holding stockholders liable. He had no 
 part in carrying on the establishment, nor in the manufacture. 
 He was a mere outside agent or representative of the com- 
 pany to bring business to it, upon a salary. As regards 
 the present question, his position was nearer the position of 
 an officer of the corporation than that of a laborer. 
 
 The judgment is affirmed with costs. 
 
 3. Combination of functions of agent and servant in the 
 same representative. 
 
 4-6.] SINGER MANUFACTURING CO. v. RAHN. 
 132 UNITED STATES, 518. 1889. 
 
 ACTION for damages for personal injury. Verdict and 
 judgment for plaintiff. Writ of error by defendant. 
 
 The complaint alleged that the driver of the wagon which 
 caused the injury was a servant of defendant company. De- 
 fendant denied this, and on the trial put in evidence the 
 contract between itself and the driver. The terms of this 
 contract appear in the opinion.
 
 10 INTRODUCTION. [CH. L 
 
 GRAY, J. The general rules that must govern this case 
 are undisputed, and the only controversy is as to their appli- 
 cation to the contract between the defendant company and 
 Corbett, the driver, by whose negligence the plaintiff was 
 injured. 
 
 A^ master is liable to third persona injured by negligent 
 a^ts done bv his servant in the course of his employment, 
 although the master did not, an.thnri7.ft or fcnow nf 1,hp spy- 
 vant's act, or npgW.t, or even if hp disapproved or forbade it. 
 Philadelphia & Beading Railroad v. Derby, 14 How. (U. S.) 
 468, 486. And the relation of master and servant exists 
 whenever the em piny pr retains the right to direct the man- 
 ner in whinh the hnsinpsa shall he done, as well as the result 
 to be accomplished, or. in other words. " not only what 
 shall be done, but how it shall be done." Railroad Co. v. 
 Banning, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 649, 656. 
 
 The contract between the defendant and Corbett, upon the 
 construction and effect of which this case turns, is entitled, 
 *' Canvasser's Salary and Commission Contract." The com- 
 pensation to be paid by the company to Corbett, for selling 
 its machines, consisting of " a selling commission " on the 
 price of machines sold by him, and " a collecting commis- 
 sion " on the sums collected of the purchasers, is uniformly 
 and repeatedly spoken of as made for his " services.." The 
 company may discharge him by terminating the contract at 
 any time, whereas he can terminate it only upon ten da}'s' 
 notice. The company is to furnish him with a wagon ; and 
 the horse and harness to be furnished by him are " to be 
 used exclusively in canvassing for the sale of said machines 
 and the general prosecution of said business." 
 
 But what is more significant, Corbett "agrees to give jvis 
 exclusive time and best energies to said business," and is to 
 fqrfejt all his commissions under the contract, if, while it is in 
 force, he sells any machines other than those furnished to hi m 
 by the company ; and he " farther agrees to employ himself 
 under the direction of the said Singer Manufacturing Com- 
 pjiny, and under such rules and instructions as it or its
 
 4-6.] SINGER MANUFACTURING CO. V. RAHN. 11 
 
 In short, Corbett, for the commissions to be paid him, 
 agrees to give his whole time and services to the business of 
 the company ; and the compan3 r reserves to itself the rig^ht 
 of prescribing and regulating not only what business he shall 
 do, but the manner in which he shall do it ; and might, if it 
 saw fit, instruct him what route to take, or even at what 
 speed to drive. 
 
 The provision of the contract, that Corbett shall not jise 
 the name of the company in any manner whereby the public 
 or_any individual ma}' be led to believe that it is responsible 
 for his actions, does not and cannot affect its responsibility 
 to_third persons injured b}- his negligence in the course of his 
 employment. 
 
 The circuit court therefore rightly held that Corbett was 
 the defendant's servant, for whose negligence in the course 
 of his employment, the defendant was responsible to the 
 plaintiff. Railroad Co. v. Harming , above cited ; Linne- 
 han v. Rollins, 137 Mass. 123 ; Regina v. Turner, 11 Cox 
 Grim. Cas. 551. 
 
 Affirmed.
 
 PART I. 
 
 FORMATION OF THE RELATION OF PRINCIPAL 
 AND AGENT. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 FORMATION OF THE RELATION BY AGREEMENT. 
 
 1. Agreement by contract or conduct necessary to estab- 
 lish agency. 
 
 11. CENTRAL TRUST COMPANY OF NEW 
 YORK y. BRIDGES. 
 
 16 UNITED STATES APPEALS, 115. 1893. 
 
 BILL IN EQUITY for a receiver and intervening petitions to 
 determine the priority of lien claimants and mortgagees. 
 Decree for lien claimants. 
 
 The lien claimants contracted with one Eager, who had 
 taken a contract to construct the railway against which the 
 liens were filed. The trial court found that the lien claimants 
 had no contract directly with the railwa} 1 ; that nothing was 
 due Eager from the railway ; but that Eager was the princi- 
 pal stockholder and the company merelj" another name under 
 which he did business, and that therefore the lien claimants 
 in contracting with Eager had contracted with the railway. 
 
 TAFT, CIRCUIT JUDGE (after stating the facts and the 
 provisions of the statute of Tennessee relating to liens). 
 Under this law, the contractor must deal directly with the 
 compan3* to secure a lien for his work or material, or, if a 
 sub-contractor, then he can have no lien on the railroad unless 
 at the time that or after he serves notice of his claims upon
 
 11.] CENTRAL TRUST CO. 17. BRIDGES. 13 
 
 the company, the company shall owe money to his principa\ 
 on the contract which his sub-contract has helped to per- 
 form ; and his lien is limited to the amount so due and 
 owing to his principal. In other words, the security of the 
 sub-contractor is the balance due the principal contractor 
 from the company when the company receives notice of the 
 sub-contractor's claim, and after notice is given the lien of 
 the sub-contractor is transferred from the balance due on the 
 contract to the corpus of the railroad, pro tanto. But if 
 there is no balance due at the time of service of the notice, 
 there can be no lien. 
 
 In the consideration of the liens adjudicated below, two 
 questions, therefore, arise. First, did the lien claimant deal 
 directly with the company, as principal contractor? Second, 
 if the lien claimants were sub-contractors under Eager as 
 principal contractor, was there any sum due Eager as such 
 principal contractor from the Knoxville Southern Railroad 
 Company after the company was notified by the sub-con- 
 tractors of their intention to claim liens? 
 
 First. The theory upon which the master and the learned 
 court below held that all the intervening petitioners dealt 
 directly with the Knoxville Southern Railroad Company as 
 principal contractors, was that Eager was an agent of the 
 railroad compan}' in making the contracts. One may be 
 liable for the acts of another as his agent on one of two 
 grounds : first, because by his conduct or statements he has 
 held the other out as his agent ; or, second, because he has 
 actually conferred authority on the other to act as such. The 
 master reported to the court below that in no case did Eager, 
 under or in the name of the Knoxville Southern Railroad 
 Company, make any contract with any one doing work or 
 furnishing material for the road ; that the men who con- 
 tracted with Eager knew very little of Eager, saw him only 
 occasionally, made no inquiry into the real relation of Eager 
 to the company, what interest he had in it, or how he 
 obtained money to carry on the work. 
 
 In substance, the master reported that the intervening
 
 14 AGENCY BY AGREEMENT. [OH. H. 
 
 petitioners believed that they were dealing with Eager as 
 principal contractor. The proof fully sustains this conclu- 
 sion. All the estimates introduced in evidence upon which 
 payments were made bear the name of Eager as principal 
 contractor, and every circumstance in the case rebuts the 
 idea that the intervening petitioners either believed or had 
 reason to believe that they were doing their work for, or fur- 
 nishing their material to, the company instead of to Eager. 
 The most conclusive evidence on this point is that nearly 
 every one of the intervening petitioners subsequently brought 
 suit and recovered judgment on his claim in the State court, 
 against Eager as principal contractor and against the com- 
 pany as garnishee. It is said that this does not estop the 
 lienholders from showing that Eager was actually the agent 
 of the company, because Eager and the compan}' had fraudu- 
 lently misled them into thinking that there was no such 
 relation of agency between him and the companj'. Conced- 
 ing that no estoppel arises from the judgments, they have 
 great probative force in establishing that neither Eager nor 
 the company did anything or said anything from which the 
 petitioners could infer the existence of the agency. Indeed, 
 the very argument upon which the effect of the judgments as 
 an estoppel against the present contention of the petitioners 
 that Eager was the agent of the company is sought to be 
 explained away, has for its premise that the petitioners had 
 no reason to suppose that Eager was anything but the princi- 
 pal contractor, and were led to believe, both by him and the 
 company, that no such agency existed. 
 
 It follows necessaril}* that Eager was not the agent of the 
 compan}' in contracting with the petitioners for the construc- 
 tion of the road, unless the company had in fact conferred 
 authority upon him to act as its agent in the matter. An 
 agency is created authority is actually conferred very 
 much as a contract is made, i. e. by an agreement between 
 the principal and agent that such a relation shall exist The 
 minds of the parties must meet in establishing the agency. 
 The principal must intend that the agent shall act for him,
 
 11.] CENTRAL TRUST CO. V. BRIDGES. 15 
 
 and the agent must intend to accept the authority and act on 
 it, and the intention of the parties must find expression either 
 in words or conduct between them. 
 
 Now, did the relation in fact exist? There certainly was 
 a contract between Eager as an individual and the Knoxville 
 Southern Railroad Company as a corporation, entered into 
 before May, 1890, and probably much earlier, certainly 
 before any of the construction, lien claims for which are here 
 involved, was contracted for, in which Eager agreed to 
 construct the road at a price of $20,000 in bonds and $20,000 
 in stock per mile, and other considerations. It is said that 
 this contract was a sham and a fraud, dated back nearly 
 three years to save the bondholders of the Marietta and 
 North Georgia Railway Company, and to cheat the petitioners 
 out of their claims. The fact that the contract was signed by 
 Arthur as vice-president shows that it must have been exe- 
 cuted some months after its date, because the date is August 
 20, 1887, and Arthur was not elected vice-president until 
 1888. Moreover, it was during 1888 that the president 
 reported to the stockholders that the work was progressing 
 under the North Georgia Construction Company as con- 
 tractor, instead of Eager. But the contract was spread on 
 the minutes of the company in May, 1890, so that it must 
 have been executed before that time. The evidence of one 
 or two witnesses points to its existence before March or 
 April of that year. All of the work and labor sued for below 
 was contracted for by Eager after March and substantially 
 after May, 1890. Even if the reduction of the contract to 
 writing was delayed until 1890, this by no means shows that 
 there had not been before that time a verbal contract, the 
 terms of which had been fully understood between the parties. 
 All the circumstances point to the existence of such a con- 
 tract. Eager was principal stockholder and president of the 
 North Georgia Construction Company, which was referred to 
 on the company's minutes as contractor in 1888, and Eager 
 sa3's that this company transferred its contract liabilities and 
 rights to him. This is entirely consistent with the probabili-
 
 16 AGENCY BY AGREEMENT. [CH. n. 
 
 ties, and there is nothing in conflict with it Now, whether 
 the contract of the compan}' was originally made with the 
 North Georgia Construction Company or with Eager is 
 immaterial in this discussion, if neither was the agent of the 
 company but was an independent contractor. The delay in 
 the execution of the formal contract with Eager was doubtless 
 due to the fact that, in the minds of the individuals whose 
 duty it was to attend to it, the Marietta and North Georgia 
 Railway Company and the Knoxville Southern Railroad 
 Company were the same enterprise, and Eager's contract with 
 the former was supposed to cover his work on the latter road, 
 just as the bonds and mortgage of the former were evidently 
 supposed to be in effect the bonds and mortgage of the 
 latter. There is not, however, anywhere in the proof a 
 single circumstance or statement that either the company or 
 its directors intended, or that Eager intended, his relation to 
 the company in constructing the road to be anything other 
 than what he always said it was, and what the petitioners 
 understood it to be, that of principal contractor. 
 
 The proof is undisputed that Eager received the bonds at 
 the rate of $20,000 per mile of completed road from the trust 
 company, as contractor, and that he sold them as contractor, 
 and this during the years from 1887 to 1890. He never 
 accounted to either railroad company for the proceeds of the 
 bonds. Neither company ever demanded such an account 
 from him. He took them as his property, as his compen- 
 sation under a contract for work done. Such conduct is not 
 to be reconciled with his being an agent either in the work 
 or in the negotiation of bonds. 
 
 We are clearly of the opinion, therefore, that the contract 
 of August, 1887, whenever executed, correctly represents 
 Eager's actual relation to the company in constructing its 
 road. The contract was one out of which Eager hoped to 
 make profit for himself. . . . 
 
 The reasoning by which the master, and presumably the 
 court below, reached the conclusion that Eager was the 
 agent of the company, may be seen from the following 
 passage in his report:
 
 11.] CENTRAL TRUST CO. V. BRIDGES. 17 
 
 "Above it was said that the Knoxville Southern Railroad 
 Company had only a formal existence, because of Eager's 
 ownership and control and direction of all its affairs and its 
 officers and agents. This is true ; but still in trying to 
 discover and enforce the rights of the parties who may have 
 dealt with said company and with Eager, it is impossible 
 to ignore the legal existence of said company. Eager's 
 omnipotence was exercised through formal legal methods, 
 and his power was derived from and based upon the large 
 stock he held in the company, which he received as part pay 
 for the building of the road. But this interest of Eager in 
 the road, and his control of the company and all its officers 
 and agents, made him its general agent, its plenipoten- 
 tiary ; and whatsoever he did in the building of the road, 
 whatever contracts he made, or were made by agents of his, 
 for material or work, for and upon said road, must be 
 regarded as acts and contracts of the company itself, and 
 binding upon it. He could not, by hiding his true relation 
 to the company, shield the company from liability to those 
 he dealt with ; as soon as the facts were known that liability 
 might be asserted." 
 
 We are wholly unable to concur with the foregoing. 
 Whether Eager hid his true relation to the company de- 
 pends on whether he was its contractor or its agent. He 
 said he was its contractor, and nothing stated by the master 
 shows otherwise. The corporation was a legal entity dif- 
 ferent from Eager, having its existence under the statutes of 
 Tennessee, and governed by its directors in accordance with 
 the law of its creation. Its directors made a contract with 
 Eager. The}' intended that to be a binding contract on the 
 company. Eager intended it to be. The company through 
 its legal and authorized governors and agents, therefore, 
 made a contract with Eager, 
 
 There is no law which makes it impossible for a majorit}' 
 stockholder to enter into a contract with his company. 
 Wright v. Kentucky & Great Eastern, Railway Company, 
 117 U. S. 72, 95. 
 
 As already explained, the company may appeal to a court 
 of equity to set such contract aside, if it is unfair or uncon- 
 scionable, for fraud or undue influence, but until this is done 
 
 2
 
 18 AGENCY BY AGREEMENT. [CH. H. 
 
 the contract expresses the true relation between the parties. 
 The fact that a man has controlling influence with another 
 does not make him that other's agent, unless the other 
 intends such relation to exist, or so acts as to lead third 
 persons to believe that it exists. What is true between 
 individuals is true between an individual and a corporation. 
 In the case at bar, the master fully admits that there was no 
 holding out of agency in Eager by the company. His finding 
 that an agency in fact existed rests simply on the influence 
 which Eager had over the company, and not in an}* intention 
 of either that Eager should act as its agent in the construc- 
 tion of the road, and his conclusion is reached in the face of 
 the fact, which he fully admits, that they both intended 
 Eager to be an independent contractor. The master's 
 conclusion cannot be supported. 1 
 
 (The court then decides that on the second question, 
 whether an}*thing was owing Eager from the company, the 
 case must go back for a rehearing.) 
 
 Decree reversed. 
 
 2. Consideration necessary as between principal and agent. 
 
 13.] ALLEN v. BRYSON. 
 
 67 IOWA, 591. 1885. 
 [Reported herein at p. 154.] 
 
 3. Competency of parties. 
 
 a. Infant principals. 
 
 15.] PHILPOT v. BINGHAM. 
 
 55 ALABAMA, 435. 1876. 
 
 ACTION to recover an undivided half interest in land. 
 Judgment for defendant. 
 
 1 On this point of " one-man companies," see Broderip v. Salomon, 
 1895, 2 Ch. 323.
 
 15.] PHILPOT V. BINGHAM. 19 
 
 Plaintiff, a minor, and his older brother, executed a power 
 of attorney to their father, authorizing him to sell and convey 
 the land in controversy. Under this power the land was con- 
 veyed to one Stringfellow, who convej^ed to defendant. De- 
 fendant was ignorant of plaintiff's infancy. The trial court 
 charged that the power of attorney and the deed executed 
 under it were voidable and not void. 
 
 STONE, J. Ever since the leading case of Zouch v. Par- 
 sons, 3 Burr. 1794, there has been a growing disposition to 
 treat almost all contracts made by infants as voidable rather 
 than void. The principles of that decision have received a 
 very steady and cheerful support on this side of the Atlantic. 
 The declared rule is, that contracts of an infant, caused by 
 his necessities, or manifestly for his advantage, are valid and 
 binding, while those manifestly to his hurt are void. Con- 
 tracts falling between these classes are voidable. Relaxation 
 of ancient rigor has had the effect of placing many transac- 
 tions, formerly adjudged void, in the more conservative 
 category of voidable. See 3 Washb. Real Prop. 559 et seq. / 
 2 Kent's Com. 234, in margin; 1 Amer. Leading Cases, 
 5th ed. 242 et seq., in margin ; 2 Greenl. Ev. 365 et seq. ; 
 Tyler on Infancy, 41 ; Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Pet. 58, 65 ; 
 Boody v. McKenney, (10 Shep.) 23 Maine, 517. This 
 question has been several times before this court, and we 
 have uniformly followed the modern rule above expressed. 
 Fant v. Cathcart, 8 Ala. 725 ; Elliott v. Horn, 10 Ala. 
 348 ; Thomasson v. Boyd, 13 Ala. 419 ; West v. Penny, 16 
 Ala. 186 ; Weaver v. Jones, 24 Ala. 420 ; Manning v. John- 
 son, 26 Ala. 446 ; Freeman v. Bradford, 5 Por. 270 ; 
 /Slaughter v. Cunningham, 24 Ala. 260 ; Derrick v. Ken- 
 nedy, 4 Por. 41 ; Clark v. Goddard, 39 Ala. 164. 
 
 It is declared in the adjudged cases, and in the elemen- 
 tary books, that a power of attornej 7 to sell lands, a warrant 
 of attorney, or any other creation of an attorney, by an in- 
 fant, is absolutely void. Lawrence v. McArter, 10 Ohio, 
 38, 42 ; Pyle v. Cravens, 4 Littell, 17, 21 ; Bennett v. 
 Davis, 6 Cow. 393 ; Fonda v. Van Home, 15 Wend. 631 ;
 
 20 AGENCY BY AGREEMENT. [CH. II. 
 
 Knox v. Flack, 22 Penn. 337; Tyler on Infancy, 46-47; 
 
 1 Ainer. Leading Cases, 5th ed. 247, in margin ; Saunderson 
 v. Marr, 1 H. Bla. 75 ; Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Pet. 58, 68 ; 
 
 2 Kent's Com., n. p. 235. So, in Alabama, it has been said, 
 " an infant cannot appoint an agent." Ware v. Cartledge, 
 24 Ala. 622. In Weaver v. Jones, 24 Ala. 420, C. J. 
 Chilton said, "The better opinion, as maintained by the 
 modern decisions, is, that an infant's contracts are none of 
 them (with, perhaps, one exception) absolutely void by reason 
 of non-age ; that is to say, the infant may ratify them, after 
 he arrives at the age of legal majority." C. J. Chilton re- 
 fers to Parsons on Contracts in support of this proposition. 
 Looking into that work, *244, it is clear that he means to 
 except from the operation of the general rule, laid down by 
 him, those contracts of an infant by which he attempts to 
 create an attorne}' or agency. 
 
 From such an array of authorities, sanctioned as the prin- 
 ciple has been by this court, we do not feel at liberty to 
 depart, although the argument in favor of the exception is 
 | rather specious than solid. We therefore hold, that the 
 S power of attorney, under which the plaintiffs land was sold, 
 Cmade, as it appears to have been, while he was an infant, 
 /was and is what the law denominates void. If void, then 
 no title, even inchoate, passed thereby ; and the defence to 
 the action must rest entirely on grounds other than and inde- 
 pendent of the power of attorney and deed. Thus circum- 
 scribed, the defendant (appellee here) has failed to show any 
 defence to the plaintiff's claim to an undivided half interest 
 in the land sued for. See Boody v. McKenney, 23 Maine, 
 517 ; JHovey v. Hobson, 53 Maine, 451 ; Cresinger v. Welch, 
 15 Ohio, 156. 
 
 (The court then decides that defendant is holding ad- 
 versely to plaintiff's interest) 
 
 Judgment reversed.
 
 15.] PATTEKSON V. LIPPINCOTT. 21 
 
 15.] PATTERSON v. LIPPINCOTT. 
 
 47 NEW JERSEY LAW, 457. 1885. 
 
 ACTION of debt. Judgment of non-suit against plaintiff. 
 Defendant appeals. The opinion states the facts. 
 
 SCUDDER, J. An action of debt was brought in the court 
 for the trial of small causes b}- Jacob M. Patterson against 
 Barclay Lippincott, to recover the balance, $75, claimed 
 under a contract in writing for the sale of the exclusive right 
 to use, manufacture and sell the plaintiffs patent " air- 
 heating attachment," in Atlantic Count}-, New Jersey. The 
 writing was signed " Geo. P. Lippincott, per Barclay 
 Lippincott," on the part of the purchaser. The state of 
 demand avers that by virtue of this agreement the plaintiff 
 did in due form convey said patent right to said George P. 
 Lippincott, that said George and Barclay, on request, have 
 refused to pay said balance, and that, since paj-ment be- 
 came due, the plaintiff has found out and charges that said 
 George is under the age of twent}--one years. He further 
 avers that he never had any contract or negotiations with 
 George, and that Barclay's warrant}' of authority to act for 
 his minor son is broken, whereby an action has accrued to 
 the plaintiff against the defendant. 
 
 The averment that the plaintiff never had any contract or 
 negotiations with George, is not sustained by the proof, for 
 the testimony of Joseph N. Risley, the agent who made the 
 sale, which is the onty evidence on this point that appears in 
 the case, is, that the defendant told him he was going out of 
 business and intended to transfer it to George; requested 
 him to see George ; he did so, talked with him ; he looked 
 at the patent; was satisfied with it, and talked with his 
 father about buying it. The deed for the patent-right in 
 Atlantic County was drawn to George P. Lippincott. It is 
 proved by the admission of the defendant, Barclay Lippincott, 
 that at the time of such sale and transfer his son George was
 
 22 AGENCY BY AGREEMENT. [CH. H. 
 
 a minor. This admission is competent testimony in this suit 
 against him. 
 
 A verdict of the jury was given for the plaintiff against the 
 defendant in the court for the trial of small causes ; and on 
 the trial of the appeal in the court of common pleas there 
 was a judgment of non-suit against the plaintiff. The 
 reason for the non-suit does not appear on the record, but 
 the counsel have argued the cause before us on the case pre- 
 sented by the pleadings and proofs, the contention being 
 here, as it was below, that the plaintiff could not aver and 
 show the infancy of George P. Lippincott, and bring this 
 action against Barclay Lippincott, as principal in the 
 contract, in contradiction of its express terms. 
 
 On the face of the written agreement George P. Lippincott 
 is the principal, and Barclay Lippincott the agent. The suit 
 on the contract should therefore be against the principal 
 named, and not against the agent, unless there be some 
 legal cause shown to change the responsibility. The cause 
 assigned by the plaintiff is the infancy of George at the time 
 the agreement was made in his name by his father. The 
 authority on which he bases his right of action is Hay v. 
 Cook, 2 Zab. (N. J.) 343, which follows and quotes Mott v. 
 Hicks, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 513, 13 Am. Dec. 550, to the effect 
 that if a person undertakes to contract as agent for an 
 individual or corporation, and contracts in a manner which is 
 not legally binding upon his principal, he is personally 
 responsible ; and the agent, when sued on such contract, can 
 exonerate himself from the personal responsibility only by 
 showing his authority to bind those for whom he has under- 
 taken to act -Z?y v - Cook was an action against an over- 
 seer who had eraplo}-ed a physician to attend a sick pauper, 
 without an order for relief under the provisions of the Act 
 concerning the poor. As his parol contract with the physi- 
 cian was entirely without authority' to bind the township, it 
 was said that he had only bound himself to pay for the 
 services rendered at his request. 
 
 Later cases have held that an agent is not directly liable on
 
 15.] PATTERSON V. LIPPINCOTT. 23 
 
 an instrument he executes, without authority, in another's 
 name ; that the remedy in such case is not on the contract, 
 but that he may be sued either for breach of warrant}* or for 
 deceit, according to the facts of the case. Jenkins v. Hutch- 
 inson, 13 Q. B. 744 ; Lewis v. Nicholson, 18 Q. B. 503 ; 
 Haltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467 ; White v. Madison, 26 
 N. Y. 117, and many other cases collected in the notes in 
 Wharton on Agency, 524, 532, and notes to Thomson 
 v. Davenport, 9 B. & C. 78, in 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 377 
 (Am. ed). Andrews, J., in Baltzen v. Nicolay, supra, says : 
 " The ground and form of the agent's liability in such a case 
 has been the subject of discussion, and there are conflicting 
 decisions upon the point ; but the later and better-considered 
 opinion seems to be, that his liability, when the contract is 
 made in the name of bis principal, rests upon an implied 
 warranty of his authority to make it, and that the remedy 
 is by an action for its breach." 
 
 Although the state of demand in the present case is uni- 
 formly drawn, there is in the last sentence a charge that the 
 defendant's warranty of authorit}*, in pretending to act for 
 said minor, is broken, whereby an action has accrued. This 
 alleged breach of an implied warrant}* is founded on the 
 assumption that the son could not confer any authority dur- 
 ing his minority to his father to act for him in the pur- 
 chase of this patent-right. There are two answers to this 
 position. The act of an infant in making such a contract as 
 this, which may be for his benefit in transacting business^ 
 either directly or through the agency of another, is voidable 
 only, and not absolutely void, and therefore there is no 
 breach of the implied warranty unless there be proof show- 
 ing that the act of the agent was entirely without the infant's 
 knowledge or consent. The mere fact of the infancy of the 
 principal will not constitute such breach. 
 
 It was argued in Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 457, 7 Am. 
 Dec. 229, that a promissory note signed by Dutch for his 
 partner Green, who was a minor, was void as to Green, 
 because he was not capable of communicating authority to
 
 24 AGENCY BY AGEEEMENT. [CH. H. 
 
 Dutch to contract for him, and that being void, it was not 
 the subject of a subsequent ratification. But the court held 
 that it was voidable only ? and having been ratified by the 
 minor after he came of age, it was good against him- See 
 Tyler, Inf. Ch. III. 14, 18. 
 
 Another answer is that the defence of infancy to this 
 contract with the plaintiff can only be set up by the infant 
 himself or those who legally represent him. Infancy is ^a 
 personal privilege of which no one can take advantage but 
 himself. Voorhees v. Wait, 3 Green (N. J.), 343 ; Tyler, 
 Inf. Ch. IV. 19 ; Bingham, Inf. 49. 
 
 In this case the plaintiff seeks to disaffirm the infant's 
 contract with him, in his own behalf, and sue a third party 
 on the contract, whose authority to bind him the infant has 
 not denied. The privilege of affirming or disaffirming the 
 contract belongs to the infant alone, and the plaintiff cannot 
 exercise it for him. The mere refusal to pay, charged in the 
 demand and proved, is not a denial of the defendant's 
 authority to bind the infant ; for it may be based on the 
 failure of consideration, the invalidity of the patent, fraudu- 
 lent representations, or other causes. 
 
 The judgment of non-suit entered in the Court of Common 
 Pleas will be affirmed. 
 
 b. Insane principal. 
 16.] DREW v. NUNN. 
 
 L. R. 4 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (C. A.), 661. 1879. 
 
 ACTION to recover for goods supplied defendant's wife 
 upon her order while defendant was insane. Verdict and 
 judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. The opinion 
 states the facts. 
 
 BRETT, L. J. This appeal has stood over for a long time, 
 principally on my account, in order to ascertain whether it 
 caii be determined upon some clear principle. I have found,
 
 16.] DREW V. NT7NN. 25 
 
 however, that the law upon this subject stands upon a very 
 unsatisfactory footing. 
 
 The action was tried before Mellor, J., and was brought 
 to recover the price of boots and shoes supplied by the 
 plaintiff to the defendant's wife whilst the defendant was 
 insane. It is beyond dispute that the defendant, when sane, 
 had given his wife absolute authority to act for him, and held 
 her out to the plaintiff as clothed with that authority. After- 
 wards the defendant became insane so as to be unable to act 
 upon his own behalf, and his insanity was such as to be 
 apparent to any one with whom he might attempt to enter 
 into a contract. Whilst he was in this state of mental 
 derangement, his wife ordered the goods from the plaintiff, 
 who had no notice of the defendant's insanity, and was 
 supplied with them by him. The defendant was for some 
 time confined in a lunatic asylum ; but he afterwards re- 
 covered his reason, and he has defended the action upon 
 the ground that by bis insanity the authority which be gave 
 to his wife was terminated, and that he is not liable for the 
 price of the goods supplied pursuant to her order. Mellor, 
 J., left no question to the jury as to the extent of the 
 defendant's insanitj', but in effect directed them as matter 
 of law that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. I think 
 it must be taken that the defendant's insanity existed to the 
 extent which I have indicated. 
 
 Upon this state of facts, two questions arise. Does 
 insanity put an end to the authority of the agent ? One 
 would expect to find that this question had been long 
 decided on clear principles ; but on looking into Story on 
 Agency, Scotch authorities, Pothier, and other French 
 authorities, I find that no satisfactory conclusion has been 
 arrived at. If such insanity as existed here did not put an 
 end to the agent's authority, it would be clear that the 
 plaintiff is entitled to succeed; but in mv opinion insanity 
 of^ this kind does put an end to the agent's authority. It 
 cannot be disputed that some cases of change of status in 
 the principal put an end to the authority of the agentj thus,
 
 26 AGENCY BY AGREEMENT. [CH. II. 
 
 the bankruptcy and death of the princi^aljjthe, marriage gf 
 a female principal, all put an end to the authority of the 
 agent. It ma}" be argued that this result follows from the 
 circumstance that a different principal is created. Upon 
 bankruptcy, the trustee becomes the principal ; upon death, 
 the heir or devisee as to realty, the executor or adminis- 
 trator as to personalty ; and upon the marriage of a 
 female principal her husband takes her place. And it has 
 been argued that by analogy the lunatic continues liable 
 until a fresh principal, namely, his committee, is appointed. 
 But I cannot think that this is the true ground, for execu- 
 tors are, at least in some instances, bound to carry out the 
 contracts entered into by their testators. I think that the 
 satisfactory principle to be adopted is, that where such a 
 change occurs as to the principal that he can no longer act 
 for himself, the agent whom he has appointed can no longer 
 act for him. In the present case a great change had occurred 
 in the condition of the principal ; he was so far affljftpr 1 w ^ h 
 
 insanity as to be disabled from anting for himself ; thprpfnrp 
 his wife, who waa his agent, cou]d rm Inngpr act_Jbr him. 
 Upon the ground which I have pointed out, I think that her 
 authority was terminated. It seems to me that an agent is 
 liable to be sued by a third person, if he assumes to act on 
 his principal's behalf after he has knowledge of his principal's 
 incompetency to act In a case of this kind he is acting 
 wrongful!}'. The defendant's wife must be taken to have 
 been aware of her husband's lunacy ; and if she had assumed 
 to act on his behalf with an}" one to whom he himself had not 
 held her out as his agent, she would have been acting wrong- 
 fully, and, but for the circumstance that she is married, would 
 have been liable in an action to compensate the person with 
 whom she assumed to act on her husband's behalf. In my 
 opinion, if a person who has not been held out as agent 
 assumes to act on behalf of a lunatic, the contract is void 
 against the supposed principal, and the pretended agent is 
 liable to an action for misleading an innocent person. 
 
 The second question then arises, what is the consequence
 
 16.] DREW V. NUNS'. 27 
 
 wjiere a principal,, who has held out flnpfjipr as lij 
 subseguentlY becomes insane, and a third person deals with 
 the agent without po*'^ that the principal js a lunatic? 
 Authority may be given to an agent in two wa}-s. First, it 
 may be given by some instrument, which of itself asserts 
 that the authority is thereby created, such as a power of 
 attorne}' ; it is of itself an assertion by the principal that 
 the agent may act for him. Secondly, an authority may also 
 be created from the principal holding out the agent as entitled 
 to act generally for him. The agency in the present case was 
 created in the manner last-mentioned. As between the de- 
 fendant and his wife, the agency expired upon his becoming 
 to her knowledge insane ; but it seems to me that the person 
 dealing with the agent without knowledge of the principal's 
 insanity has a right to enter into a contract with him, and 
 the principal, although a lunatic, is bound so that he canno_t 
 repudiate the contract assumed to be made upon his behalf. 
 It is difficult to assign the ground upon which this doctrine, 
 which, however, seems to me to be the true principle, exists. 
 It is said that the right to hold the insane principal liable 
 depends upon contract. I have a difficulty in assenting to 
 this. It has been said also that the right depends upon 
 estoppel. I cannot see that an estoppel is created. But it 
 has been said also that the right depends upon representa- 
 tions made by the principal and entitling third persons to act 
 upon them, until they hear that those representations are 
 withdrawn. The authorities collected in Story on Agency, 
 ch. xviii. 481, p. 610 (7th ed.), seem to base the right upon 
 the ground of public policy : it is there said in effect that 
 the existence of the right goes in aid of public business. 
 It is, however, a better way of stating the rule to say that 
 the holding out of another person as agent is a representation 
 upon which, at the time when it was made, third parties had 
 a right to act, and if no insanity had supervened would still 
 have had a right to act. In this case the wife was held out 
 as agent, and the plaintiff acted upon the defendant's repre- 
 sentation as to her authority without notice that it had been
 
 28 AGENCY BY AGREEMENT. [CH. H. 
 
 withdrawn. The defendant cannot escape from the conse- 
 quences of the representation which he has made ; he cannot 
 withdraw the agent's authority as to third persons without 
 giving them notice of the withdrawal. The principal is 
 bound, although he retracts the agent's authority, if he has 
 not given notice and the latter wrongful!}' enters into a 
 contract upon his behalf. The defendant became insane, 
 and was unable to withdraw the authority which he had con- 
 ferred upon his wife : he may be an innocent sufferer by her 
 conduct, but the plaintiff, who dealt with her bondjide, is also 
 innocent, and where one of two persons both innocent must 
 suffer by the wrongful act of a third person, that person 
 making the representation which, as between the two, was 
 the original cause of the mianhief,_must be the sufferer and 
 must bear the loss. Here it does not lie in the defendant's 
 mouth to say that the plaintiff shall be the sufferer. 
 
 A difficulty ma}* arise in the application of a general 
 principle such as this is. Suppose that a person makes a 
 representation which after his death is acted upon by an- 
 other in ignorance that his death has happened : in my view 
 the estate of the deceased will be bound to make good any 
 loss which may have occurred through acting upon that 
 representation. It is, however, unnecessary to decide this 
 point to-day. 
 
 Upon the grounds above stated I am of opinion that, 
 although the authority of the defendant's wife was put an end 
 to by his insanity, and although she had no authority to deal 
 with the plaintiff, nevertheless the latter is entitled to recover, 
 because the defendant, whilst he was sane, made representa- 
 tions to the plaintiff, upon which he was entitled to act until 
 he had notice of the defendant's insanity, and he had no 
 notice of the insanity until after he had supplied the goods 
 for the price of which he now sues. The direction of Mellor, 
 J., was right 
 
 BRAMWELL, L. J., also read for affirmance. 
 
 BRETT, L. J. I am requested by Cotton, L. J., to state 
 that he agrees with the conclusion at which we have arrived,
 
 20.] WILLCOX V. ARNOLD. 29 
 
 but that be does not wish to decide whether the authority of 
 the defendant's wife was terminated, or whether the liability 
 of a contractor lasts until a committee has been appointed. 
 He bases his decision simply upon the ground that the 
 defendant, by holding out his wife as agent, entered into a 
 contract with the plaintiff that she had authority to act upon 
 his behalf, and that, until the plaintiff had notice that this 
 authority was revoked, he was entitled to act upon the 
 defendant's representations. 
 
 I wish to add that if there had been any real question as to 
 the extent of the defendant's insanity, it ought to have been 
 left to the jury ; and that as no question was asked of the 
 jury, I must assume that the defendant was insane to the 
 extent which I have mentioned. I may remark that from the 
 mere fact of mental derangement it ought not to be assumed 
 that a person is incompetent to contract ; mere weakness of 
 mind or partial derangement is insufficient to exempt a person 
 from responsibility upon the engagements into which he has 
 entered. Appeal dismissed. 
 
 c. Married women as principals. 
 
 17.] FLESH v. LINDSAY. 
 
 115 MISSOURI, 1. 1892. 
 [Reported herein at page 1.] 
 
 d. Unincorporated societies as principals. 
 
 20.] WILLCOX ET AL. v. ARNOLD ET AL. 
 162 MASSACHUSETTS, 577. 1895. 
 
 CONTRACT for work done and materials furnished. Judgment 
 for plaintiffs against all the defendants except Gifford. De- 
 fendants allege exceptions. 
 
 The class of 1893 of Tufts College, at a class meeting duly
 
 30 AGENCY BY AGREEMENT. [CH. LT. 
 
 called, voted to publish a volume to be entitled, " The Brown 
 and Blue," and elected Arnold as business manager of the 
 publication, and certain other of the defendants as editors. 
 Defendant Arnold made a contract with plaintiffs for the print- 
 ing of the volume, upon which a balance remained unpaid. 
 All the defendants except Gifford were present at the class 
 meeting at which Arnold was elected business manager. 
 
 FIELD, C. J. The evidence was sufficient to warrant the 
 finding of the court. It was competent for the court to infer 
 from all the evidence that the defendants who were present at 
 the class meeting at which it was voted to publish a vnlnn^ft 
 to be called, " The Brown andJBlue^ either voted to publish 
 the volume or assented to the vote. This is also true of the 
 vote by which Arnold was elected " business manager of the 
 publication." The contract made by Arnold was apparently 
 within_t,hp snnpp of his employment, at least the court could 
 so find. Newell v. Harden, 128 Mass. 31 ; Ray v. Powers, 
 134 Mass. 22. Exceptions overruled. 
 
 e. Capacity of agents. 
 
 23.] LYON & CO. v. KENT, PAYNE & CO. 
 45 ALABAMA, 656. 1871. 
 
 ACTION of detinue for the recovery of a quantity of cotton. 
 Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendants appeal. 
 
 Kent, Payne & Co., citizens of Virginia, had, during the 
 civil war, a quantity of cotton in Alabama, in the custody of 
 their agent, Browder. They gave to Singleton, a citizen of 
 Illinois, an order upon Browder for the cotton. Singleton 
 took possession of it, and subsequently sold it to Guy. Guy 
 deposited it for storage in the warehouse of L}-on & Co. 
 There was a conflict of evidence as to whether Singleton was 
 given authority to sell the cotton, or any title passed to him. 
 
 PETERS, J. (after deciding that a sale to Singleton would 
 have been void as a commercial transaction between citizens
 
 23.] LYON V. KENT. 31 
 
 of hostile portions of the country.) Yet, though the order of 
 itself was not evidence of a sale to Singleton, or a power to 
 sell, it shows that the owners of the cotton had authorized 
 him to take possession of it. This he could do as the agent 
 of the owners. This was not forbidden to him or to them by 
 law, or the policy of the government. They could change the 
 agency of the custody of their cotton from one person to 
 another; and the}' could make any person, capable of acting 
 as an agent, such agent to take possession of their property 
 for them, and keep it for them. They could transfer its 
 custody from Browder to Singleton without a violation of 
 law. The objection which might be supposed to exist to 
 such an agency during the war ceased as soon as the war was 
 ended ; and its purpose being then legal, it might be legally 
 consummated. Any one, except a lunatic, imbecile, or child 
 of tender years, may be an agent for another. It is said by 
 an eminent author and jurist, that "it is by no means 
 necessary for a person to be sui juris, or capable of acting in 
 his or her own right, in order to qualify himself or herself to 
 act for others. Thus, for example, monks, infants, femes 
 covert, persons attainted, outlawed, or excommunicated, vil- 
 lains and aliens, may be agents for others." Story's Agenc}', 
 6, 7, 9. So, a slave, who is homo non civilis, a person who 
 is but little above a mere brute in legal rights, may act as 
 the agent of his owner or his hirer. Powell v. The State, 27 
 Ala. 51; Stanley v. Nelson, 28 Ala. 514. It was, then, cer- 
 tainty not unlawful, or against the public policy of the nation, 
 for Kent, Payne & Co. to keep their cotton, and keep it 
 safely, during the late rebellion. It is the undoubted law of 
 agency, that a person may do through another what he could 
 do himself in reference to his own business and his own 
 property ; because the agent is but the principal acting in 
 another name. The thing done by the agent is, in law, done 
 by the principal. This is axiomatic and fundamental. It 
 needs no authorities to support it. Qui facit per aliiim, facit 
 ger se. Broom's Max., margin ; 1 Parsons on Cont. 5th ed. 
 p. 39 et seq. ; Story's Agency, 440. And to this it may
 
 32 AGENCY BY AGREEMENT. [CH. H. 
 
 be added that an agent, in dealing with the property of his 
 principal, must confine his acts to the limit of his powers ; 
 otherwise the principal will not be bound. 1 Parsons on Cont. 
 41, 42, 5th ed. ; Powell v. Henry, 27 Ala. 612 ; Bott v. McCoy 
 et a/., 20 Ala. 578; Allen v. Ogden, 1 W. C. C. 174. And it 
 is also the duty of one dealing with an agent to know what 
 his powers are, and the extent of his authoritj'. Van Eppes 
 v. Smith, 21 Ala. 317 ; Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 607. Then, 
 the agency to receive the delivery of cotton from Browder, in 
 compliance with the order, was not illegal. If it went beyond 
 that it was void. And those who dealt with Singleton were 
 bound to know this, as they were bound to know the law. 
 9 Peters, 607, supra. 
 
 There was conflict in the testimony before the jury as to 
 the extent and character of the agency of Singleton. There 
 was a wide difference between his statement and that of 
 Kent, with whom he transacted the business about the cotton, 
 as to the purpose and scope of the agency intended to be 
 established. It is not to be presumed that the parties 
 intended to violate the law. But whether the}' did or not, 
 and what were the powers intended to be conferred upon the 
 agent, are questions for the jury. This is the effect of the 
 charge. It was pertinent to the testimony, and does not mis- 
 state the law. Such a charge is not error. 
 
 (The court then decides that there was no error in refusing 
 certain charges asked for by the defendants. ) 
 
 Judgment affirmed. 
 
 4. Form of contract. 
 
 a. Under the Statute of Frauds. 
 
 26.] JOHNSON v. DODGE. 
 
 17 ILLINOIS, 433. 1856. 
 
 SUIT for specific performance. Bill dismissed. Complain- 
 ant brings writ of error.
 
 26.] JOHNSON V. DODGE. 33 
 
 SKINNER, J. This was a bill in equit}', for the specific 
 performance of a contract for the sale of land. 
 
 The bill and proofs show that one Iglehart, a general land 
 agent, executed a contract in writing in the name of Dodge, 
 the respondent, for the sale of certain land belonging to 
 Dodge, to one Walters, and received a portion of the pur- 
 chase money : that Walters afterwards assigned the con- 
 tract to Johnson, the complainant ; a tender of performance 
 on the part of Walters, and on the part of Johnson, and a 
 refusal of Dodge to perform the contract. The answer of 
 Dodge, not under oath, denies the contract and sets up the 
 Statute of Frauds as a defence to an}- contract to be proved. 
 The evidence, to our minds, establishes a parol authority 
 from Dodge to Iglehart to sell the land, substantially accord- 
 ing to the term of the writing. It is urged against the relief 
 prayed, that Iglehart, upon a parol authority to sell, could 
 not make for Dodge a binding contract of sale under the 
 Statute of Frauds ; that the proofs do not show an authority 
 to Iglehart to sign the name of Dodge to the contract, and 
 therefore that the writing is not the contract of Dodge ; that 
 the writing not being signed by the vendee is void for want 
 of mutuality ; that no sufficient tender of performance on 
 the part of complainant is proved, and that the proof shows 
 that the authority conferred was not pursued b}* the agent. 
 Equity will not decree specific performance of a contract 
 founded in fraud ; but where the contract is .for the sale of 
 land, and the proof shows a fair transaction, and the case 
 alleged is clearly established, it will decree such performance. 
 
 In this case, the contract, if Iglehart had authority to 
 make it, is the contract of Dodge and in writing ; and it is 
 the settled construction of the Statute of Frauds, that the 
 authority to the agent need not be in writing, and by this 
 construction we feel bound. 1 Parsons on Cont. 42, and 
 cases cited; Doty v. Wilder, 15 111. 407 ; 2 Parsons on Cont. 
 292, 293, and cases cited ; Saunders' PL and Ev. 541, 
 542, and 551 ; Story on Agency, 50 ; 2 Kent's Com. 614. 
 Authority from Dodge to Iglehart to sell the land included 
 
 3
 
 34 AGENCY BY AGREEMENT. [CH. H. 
 
 the necessary and usual means to make a binding contract in 
 the name of the principal. If the authority to sell may be 
 created by parol, from this authority may be implied the 
 power to use the ordinary and usual means of effecting a 
 valid sale ; and to make such sale it was necessary to make 
 a writing evidencing the same. If a party is present at the 
 execution of a contract or deed, to bind him as a party to 
 it, when his signature is affixed by another, it is necessary 
 that the person so signing for him should have direct 
 authority to do the particular thing, and then the signing is 
 deemed his personal act. Story on Agenc}', 51. In such 
 case the party acts without the intervention of an agent, and 
 uses the third person only as an instrument to perform 
 the act of signing. This is not such a case. The agent was 
 authorized to negotiate and conclude the sale, and, for that 
 purpose, authority was implied to do for his principal what 
 would have been incumbent on the principal to do to accom- 
 plish the same thing in person. Hawkins v. Chace, 19 Pick. 
 502 ; 2 Parsons on Cont. 291 ; Story on Agency, Chap. 6 ; 
 Hunt v. Gregg, 8 Blackford, 105 ; Laicrence v. Taylor, 5 
 Hill, 107, 15 111. 411 ; Vanada v. Hopkins, 1 J. J. Marsh. 
 285 ; Yerby v. Grigsby, 9 Leigh, 387. 
 
 The mode here adopted was to sign the name of Dodge, 
 "by" Iglehart, "his agent," and it is the usual and proper 
 mode in carrying out an authority to contract conferred on 
 an agent. But if the signing the name of the principal was 
 not authorized by the authority to sell, yet the signature of 
 the agent is a sufficient signing under the statute. The 
 language of the statute is, " signed by party to be charged 
 therewith, or some other person thereto by him lawfully 
 authorized." If Iglehart had authority to sign Dodge's 
 name, then the contract is to be treated as signed by Dodge ; 
 and if Iglehart had authority to sell, in any view, his signa- 
 ture to the contract is a signing by " some other person 
 thereto by him lawfully authorized," within the statute. 
 Trueman v. Loder, 11 Ad. and El. 589 ; 2 Parsons on Cont. 
 291. It is true that authority tn ^ogvey must be in writing
 
 26.] GOEDON V. BULKELEY. 35 
 
 and by deed.; for land can only be conveyed by deed, and 
 the power must be of as high dignity as the act to be per- 
 formed under it. It was not necessar}' to the obligation of 
 the contract that it should have been signed by the vendee. 
 His acceptance and possession of the contract and payment 
 of money under it are unequivocal evidences of his concur- 
 rence, and constitute him a party as fully and irrevocably as 
 his signing the contract could. 2 Parsons on Cont. 290 ; 
 McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. 460; Shirley v. Shirley, 7 
 Blackford, 452. 
 
 We cannot question the sufficiencj* of the tender in equity 
 to entitle the complainant to specific performance. Webster 
 et al. v. French et al., \ 1 111. 254. Nor do we find any sub- 
 stantial departure in the contract from the authority proved. 
 While we hold that the authority to the agent who for his 
 principal contracts for the sale of land need not be in wri t- 
 ing. yet we should feel hound to refuse a specific performance 
 of a contract made with an agent upon parol authority, with- 
 out full and satisfactory proof of the authority, or where Jt 
 should seem at all doubtful whether the authority was not 
 assumed and the transaction fraudulent. 
 
 Decree reversed and cause remanded. 
 
 Decree reversed. 
 
 b. In the execution of sealed instruments. 
 26.] GORDON v. BULKELEY. 
 
 14 SERGEANT & RAWLE (Pa.), 331. 1826. 
 
 ACTION of debt upon a bond. Plea, non est factum. 
 Judgment for plaintiff. The bond was signed and sealed by 
 John Gordon, for himself and Groves Gordon, in the absence 
 of the latter, but under a parol authority. 
 
 ROGERS, J. The single question in this case is, whether 
 a bond can be executed in the absence of one of the obligors,
 
 36 AGENCY BY AGKEEMENT. [CH. H. 
 
 by the other signing the name of the absent obligee, and 
 affixing his seal, having but a parol authority to do so ? 
 
 Public convenience requires, that one man should have 
 power to authorize another to execute a contract for him, as 
 the business may be frequently as well performed by attor- 
 ney as in person. But it is a general rule, that such delega- 
 tion or authority must be by deed, that it may appear that 
 the attorney or substitute had a commission or power to rep- 
 resent the part}' ; and, further, that it may appear that the 
 authority was well pursued. 1 Bac. Ab. 199 ; Co. Litt. 48 b. 
 
 But this is said to be different from a letter of attorne}', 
 and, in some respects, it may be distinguished from the cases 
 cited ; but there is no difference in principle. Great abuse 
 might arise, if one man, and particularly an insolvent debtor, 
 should have it in his power to bind another in his absence by 
 so solemn an instrument as a deed, with a mere parol au- 
 thority ; in such a case, society would be too much exposed 
 to the designs of the artful and unprincipled, supported, as 
 the}' would frequently be, by the testimony of confederated 
 and perjured witnesses. The distinction has been taken 
 between a sealed and an unsealed instrument, between a 
 bond and a promissory note. No man can bind another b}' 
 deed, unless he has been authorized by deed to do it ; and if 
 a person, however authorized, if not b}- an instrument under 
 seal, make and execute a deed, expressed to be in behalf of 
 his principal, the principal is not bound by the deed, although 
 he who made it is bound. Banorgee v. Hovey et al., 5 Mass. 
 Rep. 1 1 ; Hatch v. Smith, 5 Mass. Rep. 42. 
 
 A written or parol authority is sufficient to authorize a 
 person to make a simple contract, as agent or attorney, and 
 to bind his principal to the performance of it, without a for- 
 mal letter of attorney under seal. Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 
 Mass. Rep. 27; Long v. Colburn, 11 Mass. Rep. 97; The, 
 President, <fec., of Northampton Bank v. Pepoon, 11 Mass. 
 Rep. 288. 
 
 The distinction then appears to be clearly taken between 
 a contract under seal and a simple contract, and I feel no
 
 26.] GARDNER V. GARDNER. 37 
 
 disposition to extend the law, believing that public policy 
 requires that the operation of a parol authority should be 
 rather restricted than enlarged. The case we have now 
 under consideration is an exceedingly strong one : an insol- 
 vent debtor, attempting to bind another as his surety, by 
 bond, in the absence of the surety, and with but mere parol 
 authority to do so. As then Groves Gordon was not present 
 when the bond was executed, and John Gordon had no writ- 
 ten authority to execute the bond, I am of opinion that, 
 although it is the bond of John Gordon, yet it is not the bond 
 of Groves Gordon, the surety. 9 Johns. 285. 
 Judgment reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded. 
 
 26.] GARDNER v. GARDNER. 
 
 5 GUSHING (Mass.), 483. 1850. 
 
 WRIT OF ENTRY to foreclose a mortgage. Conditional 
 judgment for demandant, subject to the opinion of the court 
 as to whether the mortgage deed was properly executed. 
 The grantor's name was signed in her presence by her 
 daughter, acting under parol authority. 
 
 SHAW, C. J. The only question is upon the sufficiency of 
 the execution of a mortgage deed, as a good and valid deed 
 of Polly Gwinn. The execution of the deed is objected to, 
 on the ground that when a deed is executed by an agent or 
 attorney, the authority to do so must be an authorit}- of as 
 high a nature, derived from an instrument under the seal 
 of the grantor. This is a good rule of law, but it does not 
 apply to the present case. The name being written by 
 another hand, in the presence of the grantor, and at her 
 request, is her act. The disposing capacity, the act of mind, 
 which are the essential and efficient ingredients of the deed, 
 are hers, and she merety uses the hand of another, through 
 incapacit}* or weakness, instead of her own, to do the physi- 
 cal act of making a written sign. Whereas, in executing a
 
 38 AGENCY BY AGREEMENT. [CH. II. 
 
 deed by attorney, the disposing power, though delegated, is 
 with the attorney, and the deed takes effect from his acj ; 
 and therefore the power is to be strictly examined and con- 
 strued, and the instrument conferring it is to be proved b}' 
 evidence of as high a nature as the deed itself. To hold 
 otherwise would be to decide that a person having a clear 
 mind and full capacity, but through physical inability inca- 
 pable of making a mark, could never make a conve3'ance or 
 execute a deed ; for the same incapacity to sign and seal the 
 principal deed would prevent him from executing the letter 
 of attorney under seal. 
 
 It appears to us that the distinction between writing one's 
 name in his presence and at his request, and executing a 
 deed by attorney, is obvious, well founded, stands on satis- 
 factory reasons, and is well sustained by authorities. Ball 
 v. Dunsterville, 4 T. R. 313 ; The King v. Languor, 1 Nev. 
 and M. 576, S. C. 4 Barn, and Adol. 647 ; 2 Greenl. Ev. 
 sec. 295. We think the deed was well executed by Polly 
 Gwinn ; and the judgment must therefore stand for the 
 demandant.
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 FORMATION OF THE RELATION BY RATIFICATION. 
 1. Act must be performed in behalf of existing person. 
 
 32.] IN RE NORTHUMBERLAND AVENUE HOTEL 
 COMPANY. 
 
 L. R. 33 CHANCERY DIVISION (C. A.), 16. 1886. 
 
 APPLICATION by Sully, as trustee of Wallis, to be admitted 
 as a creditor in the winding up of the hotel company: Ap- 
 plication denied Applicant appeals. 
 
 Wallis leased grounds to one Doyle, " as trustee for and 
 on behalf of an intended company, to be called the Northum- 
 berland Avenue Hotel Compan}*." The company was incor- 
 porated, accepted Doyle's contract, took possession of the 
 premises, and paid rent to Wallis. This proceeding is for 
 damages for breach of the contract entered into between 
 Wallis and Doyle. 
 
 COTTON, L. J. This is an appeal from a decision of Mr. 
 Justice Chitty in what, although in form it was a summons 
 from chambers in a winding-up, was in substance an action 
 for damages for breach of an agreement alleged to have been 
 entered into between Mr. Wallis, whom the claimant repre- 
 sents, and the company. The first thing, therefore, that we 
 have to see is whether in fact there was any contract be- 
 tween them. I am not referring to the question whether a 
 contract was made which, in consequence of the provisions of 
 some Act of Parliament, was incapable of being enforced, 
 but to the question whether in fact there was any agreement 
 between these two parties. 
 
 The company was incorporated on the 25th of Juty, 1882, 
 and before that date, viz., on the 24th of July, a contract in
 
 40 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. IH. 
 
 writing was entered into between a gentleman acting as agent 
 for and on behalf of Mr. Wallis, and another gentleman, who 
 described himself as a trustee for the company, the com- 
 pany, in fact, having no existence at the time. That was a 
 contract which was binding as between Mr. Wallis and the 
 other gentleman whom I have mentioned, and was a contract 
 which provided that certain things should be done by the com- 
 pany. That contract in no way bound the company, because 
 the company at that time was not formed. In fact it was 
 not in terms a contract with the compan}', although it was a 
 contract by a person who purported to act for the company 
 that certain things should be done by the company. It is 
 not contended that this contract was in any way binding on 
 the company, nor is it disputed that the company after it 
 was formed could not ratify the authority of the gentleman 
 who purported to act as their trustee before they were incor- 
 porated, and who therefore could not have any authority to 
 do so. 
 
 But it is said that we ought to hold that there was a con- 
 tract entered into between the company and Wallis on the 
 same terms (except so far as they were subsequently modi- 
 fied) as those contained in the contract of the 24th of July, 
 1882. In my opinion that will not hold. It is very true that 
 there were transactions between Wallis and the company, 
 in which the company acted on the terms of that contract 
 entered into with Wallis by the person who said he was 
 trustee for them. But why did the company do so? The 
 company seem to have considered, or rather its directors seem 
 to have considered, that the contract was a contract binding 
 
 O 
 
 on the company. But the erroneous opinion that a contract 
 entered into before the companj' came into existence was 
 binding on the company, and the acting on that erroneous 
 opinion, does not make a good contract between the com- 
 pany and Mr. Wallis ; and all the acts which occurred subse- 
 quentl}* to the existence of the company were acts proceeding 
 on the erroneous assumption that the contract of the 24th of 
 July was binding on the compan} T . In my opinion that ex-
 
 32.] NORTHUMBERLAND AVE. HOTEL CO. 41 
 
 plains the whole of these transactions. The case is entirely 
 different from those cases which have been referred to where 
 the court, finding a person in possession of land of a cor- 
 poration, and paying rent, has held that there was a contract 
 of tenancy. There was no mode of explaining why the occu- 
 pier was there, except a tenancy, unless he was to be treated 
 as a trespasser. The receipt of rent by the corporation 
 negatived his being a trespasser, and it was therefore held 
 that there was a tenancy. Here we can account, and in my 
 opinion we ought to account, for the possession by the corn- 
 pan}', and for what it has done, by reference to the agree- 
 ment of the 24th of July, which the directors erroneously 
 and wrongly assumed to be binding upon them. We are not 
 therefore authorized to infer a contract as it was inferred in 
 those cases where there was no other explanation of the 
 conduct of the parties. 
 
 In my opinion the decision of Mr. Justice Chitty was 
 right, and the appeal must therefore fail. 
 
 LIKDLEY, L. J. I am of the same opinion. The more 
 closely the case is investigated, the more plainly does it ap- 
 pear that there never was an}' contract between the company 
 and Wallis. The more closely the facts are looked into, the 
 more plain is it that everything which the company did, from 
 the taking possession down to the very last moment, was 
 referable to the agreement of the 24th of July, 1882, which 
 the directors erroneously supposed to be binding on the com- 
 pany. I therefore cannot come to any other conclusion than 
 the conclusion at which Mr. Justice Chitty arrived. 
 
 LOPES, L. J. I am entirely of the same opinion. 
 
 The question is whether there was a contract between 
 Wallis and the company. There no doubt was an agreement 
 between a man called Nunneley, who was agent for Wallis, 
 and a man named Doyle, who described himself as trustee 
 for the company. But at that time the company was not 
 incorporated, and therefore it is perfectly clear that the 
 agreement was inoperative as against the company. It is also 
 equally clear that the company, after it came into existence,
 
 42 AGENCY BY KATIFICATION. [CH. HI. 
 
 could not ratify that contract, because the company was not 
 in existence at the time the contract was made. No doubt 
 the company, after it came into existence, might have entered 
 into a new contract upon the same terms as the agree- 
 ment of the 24th of Juty, 1882 ; and we are asked to infer 
 such a contract from the conduct and transactions of the 
 company after they came into existence. It seems to me 
 impossible to infer such a contract, for it is clear to my mind 
 that the company never intended to make any new contract, 
 because they firmly believed that the contract of the 24th of 
 July was in existence, and was a binding, valid contract. 
 Everything that was done by them after their incorporation 
 appears to me to be based upon the assumption that the con- 
 tract of the 24th of July, 1882, was an existing and binding 
 contract. I think, therefore, that the appeal ought to be 
 dismissed. 
 
 32.] McARTHUR v. TIMES PRINTING CO. 
 48 MINNESOTA, 319. 1892. 
 
 ACTION for damages for breach of contract. Verdict for 
 plaintiff. Motion for new trial denied. Defendant appeals. 
 
 MITCHELL, J. The complaint alleges that about October 1 , 
 1889, the defendant contracted with plaintiff for his services 
 as advertising solicitor for one year ; that in April, 1890, it 
 discharged him, in violation of the contract. The action is 
 to recover damages for the breach of the contract. The 
 answer sets up two defences : (1) That plaintiff's employ- 
 ment was not for any stated time, but only from week to 
 week ; (2) that he was discharged for good cause. Upon the 
 trial there was evidence reasonably tending to prove that in 
 September, 1889, one C. A. Nimocks and others were engaged 
 as promoters in procuring the organization of the defendant 
 company to publish a newspaper ; that, about September 12th, 
 Nimocks, as such promoter, made a contract with plaintiff,
 
 32.] M C AKTHTJR V. TIMES FEINTING CO. 43 
 
 in behalf of the contemplated company, for his services as 
 advertising solicitor for the period of one year from and after 
 October 1st, the date at which it was expected that the 
 company would be organized ; that the corporation was not, 
 in fact, organized until October 16th, but that the publication 
 of the paper was commenced by the promoters October 1st, 
 at which date plaintiff, in pursuance of his arrangement with 
 Nimocks, entered upon the discharge of his duties as adver- 
 tising solicitor for the paper ; that after the organization of 
 the company he continued in its employment in the same 
 capacity until discharged, the following April ; that defend- 
 ant's board of directors never took any formal action with 
 reference to the contract made in its behalf by Nimocks, but 
 all of the stockholders, directors, and officers of the corpora- 
 tion knew of this contract at the time of its organization, 
 or were informed of it soon afterwards, and none of them 
 objected to or repudiated it, but, on the contrary, retained 
 plaintiff in the employment of the company without any other 
 or new contract as to his services. 
 
 There is a line of cfl afig whioh HnlH t.W. 
 
 made in behalf of, and for the benefit of. a projected corpora- ~~ / , 
 tion. the corporation after its organisation , 
 
 party to the contract, either bv adoption or ratification of ifc 
 Abbott v. Hapgood, 150 Mass. 248 (22 N. E. Rep. 907) ; 
 Beach, Corp. 198. This, however, seems to be more a 
 question of name than of substance ; that is, whether the 
 liability of the corporation, in such cases, is to be placed on 
 the grounds of its adoption of the contract of its promoters, 
 or upon some other ground, such as equitable estoppel. This 
 court^ in accordance with what we deem sound reason^ag 
 we_ll as the weight of authority, has held tbatyWhilea corpora- 
 tion is not bound by engagements made on its behalf by its 
 promoters before its organization, it may, after its organiza- 
 tion, make such engagements its own contracts. And this it 
 may do precisely as it might make similar original contracts ; 
 formal action of its board of directors being necessary only 
 where Jt would be necessary in the case of a similar original
 
 44 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. m. 
 
 contract. That it is not requisite that such adoption or ac- 
 ceptance be expressed, but it may be inferred from acts or 
 acquiescence on part of the_corporation, j>r its authorized 
 agents, as an}' similar original contract might be shown. 
 JBattelle v. Northwestern Cement & Concrete Pavement Co., 
 37 Minn. 89 (33 N. W. Rep. 327) ; see, also, Mor. Corp. 548. 
 The right of the corporate^agents to adopt an agreement 
 originally madeJbY_BrQnjoters_depends^ upon the purpQse_of 
 tbjjjjojponitjpjijimlj]^ Of course, 
 
 the agreement must be one which the corporation itself could 
 make, and one which the usual agents of the company have 
 express or implied authority to make. That the contract in 
 this case was of that kind is very clear ; and the acts and 
 acquiescence of the corporate officers, after the organization 
 of the company, fully justified the jury in finding that it had 
 adopted it as its own. 
 
 The defendant, however, claims that the contract was void 
 under the Statute of Frauds, because, " by its terms, not to 
 be performed within one year from the making thereof," 
 which counsel assumes to be September 12th, the date of 
 the agreement between plaintiff and the promoter. This 
 proceeds uponthe erroneoug_t,heorv that the act of_the cor- 
 poration,in^8ucl^case8^ is_a j:atificatipn which relates back 
 to the date of the contract with Jhe_promoter,_under the 
 familiar maxim that " a subsequent ratification has a retro- 
 active effect, and is equivalent to a prior command." But 
 theliability of the corporation, under such 
 
 does not rest upon any principleof_the law of agency, but 
 the immediate and_jyoluntary ad of^Jbh 
 
 Although the acts of a corporation with reference to the 
 contracts made by promoters in its behalf before its organi- 
 zation are frequently loosely termed " ratification," yet a 
 " ratification," properly so called, implies an existing person, 
 on whose ^BeEalTthe contract mighthave been made atTthe 
 time. There cannot, in law, be a ratification of JL contract 
 WJilch_CjQuliL not have been made bindingontbe^ratifier at_the 
 time itjwas made, because the ratifier was not then in exist-
 
 32.] WESTERN PUB. HOUSE V. DIST. TP. OF EOCK. 45 
 
 ence. In re Empress Engineering Co., 16 Ch. Div. 125 ; 
 Melhado v. Porto Alegre, N.H.&B. Ry, Co., L. R. 9 C. P. 
 503 ; Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. 174. What is called 
 " adoption," in such casea T is r in legal effect, the making of 
 a contract of the date of the adoption, and not as of some 
 former date.. The contract in this case was, therefore, not 
 within the Statute of Frauds. The trial court fairl}* sub- 
 mitted to the jur} T all the issues of fact in this case, accom- 
 panied by instructions as to the law which were exactly in 
 the line of the views we have expressed ; and the evidence 
 justified the verdict. 
 
 The point is made that plaintiff should have alleged that 
 the contract was made with Nimocks, and subsequently 
 adopted by the defendant. If we are correct in what we 
 have said as to the legal effect of the adoption by the cor- 
 poration of a contract made by a promoter in its behalf before 
 its organization, the plaintiff properly pleaded the contract 
 as having been made with the defendant. But we do not 
 find that the evidence was objected to on the ground of 
 variance between it and the complaint. The assignments 
 of error are very numerous, but what has been already said 
 covers all that are entitled to any special notice. 
 
 Order affirmed. 
 
 32.] WESTERN PUBLISHING HOUSE v. DISTRICT 
 TOWNSHIP OF ROCK. 
 
 84 IOWA, 101. 1891. 
 
 ACTION upon contract for purchase of books. Demurrer 
 sustained. Plaintiff appeals. 
 
 The petition set up that certain members of the board of 
 directors of the defendant district signed a contract to pur- 
 chase the books in question ; that later the board of directors 
 formall}' ratified the purchase ; that later still the board of 
 directors repealed the resolution ratifying the purchase.
 
 46 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. in. 
 
 BECK, C. J. (after setting out the petition). A consid- 
 eration of the agreement upon which the plaintiff bases its 
 right to recover, discloses the fact that it does not purport 
 to be the contract of the defendant, the school district, 
 and that there is not one word in it indicating the purpose 
 of the directors to bind the district, or the intention of the 
 plaintiff to require it to be bound by the agreement. The 
 obligors in the instrument describe themselves as directors 
 of the school district ; but it does not appear that the goods 
 sold were bought for the use of the defendant, or pur- 
 suant to its authority or order. It is stipulated in the con- 
 tract that the goods shall be shipped to the directors, not 
 to the defendant or its officers. On the face of the instru- 
 ment, it is plainly shown that the persons who signed the 
 instrument, and who are designated therein as "directors," 
 are alone bound by it as obligors. The plaintiff agrees in the 
 instrument to accept in payment an order or warrant issued 
 by the defendant; but this stipulation does not bind it to 
 look to the defendant for payment, or make the instrument 
 its contract. Upon the face of the instrument the defendant 
 is not bound, and the intention clearly appears to bind the 
 signers individually. The petition does not allege or show 
 that the defendant is bound by the contract, or was intended 
 by the parties to be bound. It specifically alleges that the 
 " members [of the board of directors] agree to pay for the 
 books." It alleges that the books were "ordered by said 
 members of said board of directors for the use and benefit of 
 defendant in its schools." It is not alleged that the contract 
 was made pursuant to any prior order, request, or authority 
 of the defendant; and it is averred that the books " are 
 now " in the express office, thus showing and averring, nega- 
 tively, that the goods have never come into possession of the 
 defendant, and have never been used in its schools. 
 
 The plaintiff, while inferential!}* conceding that the con- 
 tract was made without authority, insists that it was after- 
 wards ratified. But as the contract did not purport to bind 
 the defendant, it could not ratify it. There is no such thing
 
 34.] STRASSER v. CONKLIX. 47 
 
 as the ratification of a contract by an obligor made by 
 another, when it does not purport to bind him, but binds the 
 othei\_ In such a case the obligor cannot become bound by 
 a ratification. He can only become bound by a new contract 
 assuming or adopting the obligation of the prior one. If it 
 be assumed that the defendant did adopt the contract (which 
 is not alleged in the petition) it must appear what the terms 
 of the contract adopting it are, and that they have been per- 
 formed. But no such showing is made in the petition. 
 
 If the action of the board of directors of March llth be 
 regarded as the adoption of the individual contract of the 
 directors, it does not appear that the plaintiff assented to or 
 accepted it at any time. Nor is it shown that the defendant 
 acquired the right under such adoption, by the assent of the 
 plaintiff, to take the property. It is not shown that the 
 plaintiff in any way accepted such adoption of the contract 
 so as to bind the defendant. Until that was done, it could 
 withdraw its adoption of the contract, which it did do by the 
 resolution and action of its board of directors in their meet- 
 ing of March 18, 1889. 
 
 We reach the conclusion that the contract was not intended 
 to bind the defendant, and therefore was not ratified by it, 
 and that, if the act claimed to be a ratification may be re- 
 garded as a contract of adoption, it was rescinded before it 
 was accepted, and before the plaintiff acquired thereby any 
 rights by reason of such adoption. These considerations 
 lead us to the conclusion that the judgment of the district 
 court ought to be Affirmed. 
 
 2. Assent may be express or implied. 
 
 34.] STRASSER v. CONKLIN. 
 
 54 WISCONSIN, 102. 1882. 
 
 ACTION for balance of mortgage debt Judgment for de- 
 fendant. Plaintiff appeals.
 
 48 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. III. 
 
 Plaintiffs assignor sold to defendant's grantor certain hotel 
 premises, and took the latter's notes and mortgage, at the 
 same time assigning to the latter two policies of insurance on 
 the hotel furniture, but payable to him as his interest should 
 appear. Defendant, after purchasing the property, had a 
 policy renewed which contained a like clause in favor of 
 plaintiff's assignor, but without defendant's knowledge. The 
 propert}* burned, and plaintiff, as assignee of the mortgage, 
 claimed the insurance money. Plaintiff gave one Erb a power 
 of attorne} 7 to collect the insurance money. Erb agreed with 
 defendant to accept a certain portion of the insurance money 
 and a reconveyance of the premises in satisfaction of the 
 mortgage. Plaintiff accepted the money, but refused to 
 accept the conveyance, repudiating Erb's authority to make 
 such an agreement. 
 
 LYON, J. There was a controversy between the parties as 
 to whether the defendant, when he purchased the hotel 
 property, agreed with Crane}' to pay the notes given by 
 Craney to Fisher, and assigned by the latter to the plaintiff, 
 and also as to whether the insurance mone}- belonged to the 
 plaintiff or to the defendant. These controversies were settled 
 by the defendant and Mr. Erb, the latter assuming to act for 
 the plaintiff. 63' the terms of the settlement the plaintiff was 
 to receive $653.77 of the insurance money, and a conve3'ance 
 of the premises, mortgaged by Craney to Fisher to secure the 
 pa}'ment of the notes, and to release the defendant from all 
 claim on the mortgage. This was declared to be a full settle- 
 ment of all matters between the parties. The plaintiff after- 
 wards received the insurance mone}' thus stipulated to him. 
 He did so with full knowledge that Erb had assumed to act 
 as his a^ent in negotiating the settlement with the defendant, 
 and with full knowledge of the terms of the settlement. The 
 evidence of this is undisputed and conclusive. True, at the 
 same time the plaintiff refused to accept the deed of the 
 mortgaged premises, and denied that Erb had authorit}* to 
 make the settlement. But he received and retained the 
 fruits of the settlement, the insurance money.
 
 34.] STKASSEB V. CONKUK. 49 
 
 No rule of law is more firmly established than the rule that 
 if one, with full knowledge of the facts, accepts the avails of 
 an unauthorized treaty made in his behalf by another, he 
 thereby ratifies such treat} 7 , and is bound by its terms and 
 stipulations as fully as he would be had he negotiated it 
 himself. Also, a ratification of part of an unauthorized 
 transaction of an agent is a confirmation of the whole. If 
 authorities are desired to propositions so plain as these, the} 1 
 abound in the decisions of this court, many of which are cited 
 in the briefs of counsel. Under the above rules it is entirely 
 immaterial whether Erb was or was not authorized to make the 
 settlement with the defendant. If not authorized, the plain- 
 tiff, by receiving the money with full knowledge of the terms 
 of settlement, ratified and confirmed what he did, and cannot 
 now be heard to allege his agent's want of authority. 
 
 It will not do to say that the plaintiff was entitled to the 
 money he received, and might receive and retain it as his own 
 without regard to the settlement. That was the very point of 
 the controversy between the parties. Manifestly each claimed 
 the money in good faith, and we cannot determine from the 
 record before us which was entitled to it ; and it is immaterial 
 whether one or the other was so entitled, there being a real 
 controversy between them on that question. It was therefore 
 a very proper case for negotiation and compromise between 
 them, and under the circumstances they must both be held 
 bound by the settlement. The evidence of ratification is con- 
 clusive, and there was nothing for the jury to determine in 
 that behalf. Hence, the court properly directed the jury to 
 find for the defendant. 
 
 The foregoing views dispose of the case, and render it un- 
 necessary to determine the question, which was very ably 
 argued by counsel, whether a parol agreement by the defend- 
 ant to pay the mortgage debt (if he so agreed) is within the 
 Statute of Frauds, and therefore invalid. We leave the ques- 
 tion undetermined. 
 
 By THE COUKT. The judgment of the circuit court is 
 
 affirmed. 
 
 4
 
 50 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. III. 
 
 34.] WHEELER AND WILSON MFG. CO. v. 
 AUGHEY. 
 
 144 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 398. 1891. 
 
 ACTION on judgment notes. Judgment for defendant. 
 Plaintiff appeals. Defendant gave evidence to prove that 
 plaintiffs agent obtained the notes from defendant upon the 
 false representation that he was not indebted to plaintiff, 
 but wanted the notes as collateral security for machines 
 to be furnished the agent by plaintiff, while in fact the 
 machines were not furnished and the notes were used to 
 secure a prior indebtedness of the agent. Plaintiff gave evi- 
 dence to prove that defendant made the notes to secure the 
 agent's past indebtedness. 
 
 Plaintiff asked a charge that it was not affected by the 
 misrepresentation of the agent, which was denied. 
 
 Mr. JUSTICE GREEN. The learned court below distinctly 
 charged the jury that, if the notes in suit were given for a 
 past indebtedness of Landis to the plaintiff, their verdict 
 should be in favor of the plaintiff; but if they found that 
 they were given for machines to be furnished thereafter, and 
 the machines were not delivered, the verdict should be for 
 the defendant. The jury found for the defendant, and thereby 
 determined that the notes were given for machines to be 
 furnished in the future. There was abundant testimony in 
 support of the defendant's contention, and we must therefore 
 regard it as an established fact that the notes were given in 
 consideration that machines should be delivered to Landis by 
 the plaintiff subsequently to the execution and delivery of 
 the notes in question. It is beyond all question that Landis 
 obtained the signature of the defendant to the notes, and that 
 he delivered the notes so signed to the plaintiffs, who received 
 and kept them, and affirmed their title to them by bringing 
 suit upon them against the defendant. For the purpose of 
 obtaining the notes, Landis most certainly acted as the repre-
 
 34.] WHEELER & WILSON MFG. CO. V. AUGHEY. 51 
 
 sentative of the plaintiffs, and they conclusively accepted the 
 fruits of his act. That they cannot do this without being 
 subject to the conditions upon which he obtained the notes, 
 whether he had authorit}' or not to make or agree to those 
 conditions, is too well settled to admit of an}' doubt. 
 
 The whole doctrine was well expressed by Sharswood, J., 
 in the case of Mundorff v. Wickersham, 63 Pa. 87: 
 
 " If an agent obtains possession of the property of another, 
 by making a stipulation or condition which he was not author- 
 ized to make, the principal must either return the property, 
 or, if he receives it, it must be subject to the condition upon 
 which it was parted with by the former owner. This propo- 
 sition is founded upon a principle which pervades the law in 
 all its branches : Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et 
 onus. The books are full of striking illustrations of it, and 
 more especiall} 7 in cases growing out of the relation of prin- 
 cipal and agent. Thus, where a party adopts a contract 
 which was entered into without his authorit} r , he must adopt 
 it altogether. He cannot ratify that part which is beneficial 
 to himself, and reject the remainder ; he must take the benefit 
 to be derived from the transaction cum onere" 
 
 This doctrine is so reasonable and so entirely just and 
 right in every aspect in which it may be considered, and it 
 has been enforced b}* the courts with such frequency and in 
 such a great variet}' of circumstances, that its legal soundness 
 cannot for a moment be called in question. 
 
 It is of no avail to raise or discuss the question of the 
 means of proof of the agent's authorit}'. The very essence 
 of the rule is, that the agent had no authority to make the 
 representation, condition, or stipulation, by means of which 
 he obtained the property, or right of action, of which the prin- 
 cipal seeks to avail himself. It is not because he had specific 
 authority to bind his principal for the purpose in question 
 that the principal is bound, but notwithstanding the fact that 
 he had no such authority. It is the enjoyment of the fruits 
 of the agent's action which charges the principal with respon- 
 sibility for his act. It is useless, therefore, to inquire whether
 
 52 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. III. 
 
 there is the same degree of technical proof of the authority 
 of the agent, in the matter under consideration, as is required 
 in ordinary cases where an affirmative liability is set up 
 against a principal by the act of one who assumes to be his 
 agent. There the question is as to the power of the assumed 
 agent to impose a legal liability upon another person ; and, 
 in all that class of cases, it is entirely proper to hold that the 
 mere declarations of the agent are not sufficient. But in this 
 class of cases the question is entirely different. Here the 
 b. sis of liability for the act or declaration of the agent, is 
 the fact that the principal has accepted the benefits of the 
 agent's act or declaration. Where that basis is made to 
 appear by testimony, the legal consequence is established. 
 Mr. Justice Sharswood, in the case above cited, after enumer- 
 ating many instances in which the doctrine was enforced, 
 sums up the subject thus : " Many of these cases are put 
 upon an implied authority, but the more reasonable ground, 
 as it seems to me, is that the party having enjoyed a benefit 
 must take it cum onere." 
 
 We are of opinion that the learned court below was entirely 
 right in the treatment of this case. 
 
 Judgment affirmed in each of these cases. 
 
 On February 8, 1892, a motion for re-argument was 
 refused. 
 
 34.] HYATT v. CLARK. 
 
 118 NEW YORK, 563. 1890. 
 
 CROSS actions between the same parties. Clark's action 
 was for specific performance of a clause in a lease providing 
 for a renewal. Mrs. Hyatt's action was for the cancellation 
 of the lease, upon the ground that her agent exceeded his 
 authority in making it. The trial court found for Mrs. 
 Hyatt, but the general term reversed the judgment. She 
 appealed to the Court of Appeals.
 
 34.] HYATT V. CLARK. 53 
 
 In 1880, Mrs. Hyatt, while in England, appointed one 
 Lake, by written power of attorney, her agent to manage 
 her business in the United States, to sell and convey her 
 property, to receive and recover all moneys due her, and to 
 execute all instruments necessary to these ends. Lake 
 leased premises to Clark ; but both had doubts whether the 
 power of attorne}' authorized a lease, and the lease was 
 accepted subject to Mrs. Hyatt's approval. Mrs. Hyatt 
 refused to approve, and cancelled the power of attorney. 
 Clark, however, refused to cancel the lease, and went into 
 possession. Mrs. Hyatt did not know that Clark first re- 
 ceived the lease conditional!}', but was informed by Lake that 
 the lease was valid and could not be cancelled. She there- 
 fore received the rent from Clark for the term fixed in the 
 lease, but refused to renew it for another term as provided 
 for in the renewal clause. 
 
 VANX, J. We do not deem it important to decide whether 
 the power of attorney authorized Mr. Lake to execute the 
 lease in question or not, because, in either event, the same 
 result must follow, under the circumstances of this case. 
 
 If, on the one hand, he acted without adequate authority 
 in giving the lease, both the lessor and the lessee knew it, 
 for both knew the facts, and both are presumed to have 
 known the law, and the former, at least, had an absolute 
 right to disaffirm the contract. As she knew the contents of 
 the power of attorney and the lease, and that the latter was 
 executed by her agent in her name, it was not necessary that 
 she should be informed of the legal effect of those facts. 
 Kelley v. Newburyport & Amesbury Horse R. M. Co., 
 141 Mass. 496 ; Phosphate Lime Co. v. Green, L. R. 
 (7 C. P.) 43 ; Mechem on Agency, sec. 129. 
 
 Whether influenced by caprice or reason, if she had 
 promptly notified the lessee that she repudiated the lease 
 because her agent had no power to execute it, their rights 
 would have been forthwith terminated, and they would 
 have had no lease. The right to disaffirm on one ten- 
 able ground would, if acted upon, have been as effective as
 
 54 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. III. 
 
 the right to disaffirm upon all possible grounds. Under the 
 condition supposed, the law gave her the same right to dis- 
 affirm without any agreement to that effect, that she would 
 have had if her agent, being duly authorized to lease, had 
 expressly provided, in the written instrument, that she could 
 disaffirm if she chose to do so. Therefore, by accepting the 
 rent of the demised premises for more than four years, with- 
 out protest or objection T she ratified the lease as completely 
 as she could have, if she had known of two grounds upon 
 wjjich to disaffinrs instead r>f nnly nnp^ Two grounds could 
 not make the right any more effectual than one. If she had 
 the right at all, the number of grounds upon which she could 
 justify its exercise is unimportant. Her ratification was 
 none the less complete, because, being unwilling to run the 
 risk of a doubtful question of law, she did not at once act as 
 she would have acted if she had known all of the facts. As 
 said by the court, in Adams v. Mills, 60 N. Y. 533, " the law 
 holds that she was bnnnd tn knowf what authojnty_Jher_ajTgnt 
 actually had." Having executed the power of attorney, sJic 
 is conclusively prpsnrped to haypi known whfyt \\> meant, and 
 the extent of the authority that it conferred. (Best on 
 Evidence, 123 ; Wharton on Evi. 1241.) 
 
 If the lease was ultra vires, therefore, by ratifying it., she 
 inlegal effect executed and delivered it herself, and whatever 
 wflsjiaidjbetwecn Lake and Clark^became immaterial. Even 
 if they agreed that she should have the right to disapprove, it 
 is of no importance, because she had that right without any 
 such agreement. If her agent had no power to execute the 
 lease, the delivery thereof, whether absolute or conditional, 
 could not affect her rights. If she was dissatisfied with it, 
 she could have been relieved of all responsibility thereunder 
 by promptly saying to the lessee : " This contract was not 
 authorized by the agency I created, and I refuse to be 
 bound by it." After that there would have been no lease. 
 If the action of her agent was unauthorized, it did not bind 
 her, until by some act of ratification she bound herself. By 
 ratifying, she waived any right to disaffirm upon any ground,
 
 34.] 
 
 HYATT V. CLARK. 
 
 55 
 
 known or unknown, because the lease did not exist, as a 
 lease, by the act of her agent, but by her own act of 
 confirmation. 
 
 If, on the other hand, Mr. Lake was duly authorized to 
 give the lease, certain presumptions of controlling import- 
 ance spring from that fact. He is^ presumed to have dis- 
 closed to bis principal, within a reasonable time, all of the 
 material facts that came to his knowledge while acting withip 
 the scope of his authority. 
 
 It is laid down in Story on Agency (sec. 140), that 
 " notice of facts to an agent is constructive notice thereof jo 
 the principal himself, where it arises frojn or is at the time 
 connected with the subject-matter of his agency, for, upon 
 general principles of public policy, it is presumed tbatjtbe 
 agentjias communicated such facts to the principal, and if he 
 has_not, still the principal, having intrusted the agent with 
 the particular business, the other party has a right to deem 
 his acts and knowledge obligatory upon the principal." 
 
 la other words, she was chargeable with all the knowledge 
 that her agent had in the transaction of the business he had 
 in charge. Ingalls v. Morgan, 10 N. Y. 178; Adams v. 
 Mills, supra; Myers v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 99 N. Y. 1, 
 11 ; Bank of U. S. v. Davis, 2 Hill, 451 ; Higgins v. 
 Armstrong, 9 Col. 38. 
 
 It was his duty to keep_he_r informed of his acts, and to 
 give her timely notice^ of all facts and circumstances which 
 would have enabled her to take any step that she deemed 
 essential to her interests. 
 
 She does not question the good faith of Mr. Lake, and 
 there is no proof of fraudulent collusion between him and 
 Mr. Clark, who, while under no obligation to inform Mrs. 
 Hyatt of the facts, had the right to assume that her agent 
 had done so. Ingatts v. Morgan, supra; Meehan v. 
 Forrester, 52 N. Y. 277 ; Scott v. Middlelown, U. & W. G. 
 R. R. Co., 86 Id. 200. 
 
 It was hor duty to protect her interests by selecting an 
 agent of "adequate judgment, experience, and integrity, and 
 
 'Pi
 
 56 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. " [CH. HI. 
 
 if she failed to do _so.,8he. janst bear the lo8s_rejBultiDg_from 
 his inexperience, nggljggnce, or mistaken zeal. AftejLlke. 
 lapse_o_f .sufficient time, therefore, ahp- fc presumed to have 
 acted with__knpwledge_of_all__toe_ acts of her agent, injthe 
 line of his agency^- 
 
 By accepting and retaining the rent, which was the fruit of 
 her agent's act, for nearly five years without objection, she is 
 presumed to have ratified that act. Hoyt v. Thompson, 
 19 N. Y. 207 ; Alexander v. Jones, 64 Iowa, 207 ; Heyn v. 
 O'Hagen, 60 Mich. 150 ; 2 Greenl. on Ev. 66, 67. With- 
 out expressing any dissatisfaction to the lessees, she received 
 eighteen quarterly payments of rent before electing to avoid 
 the lease. She made no offer to return any part of the rent 
 so paid, although she tendered back the amount deposited 
 to her credit for the nineteenth quarter at the time that she 
 demanded possession of the premises. 
 
 Independent of what she is presumed to have known 
 through the information of her agent, she in fact knew the 
 terms of the lease, and that it was executed by Mr. Lake in 
 her name. 
 
 Upon her arrival in this country in September, 1880, she 
 visited the premises and saw the additions and improvements 
 that the tenants were making thereto, and at that time, as 
 well as subsequently, rent was paid to her in person. 
 Apparentl} r she had all the knowledge that she cared to 
 have, for she made no inquiry of her agent until about six 
 months previous to the expiration of the first term of five 
 years, and not until after the lessees had given notice of 
 their election to continue the lease for a second term. 
 Thinking that the rent was low, she then tried to find out 
 something from her agent that would enable her to avoid the 
 lease, and, as a result of her efforts in this direction, ascer- 
 tained the fact upon which she based her right to succeed in 
 this litigation. But it was then too late for her to disaffirm, 
 because her long silence, and many acts of ratification, had 
 been relied upon by the tenants, who had expended a large 
 sum of money in making permanent improvements on the
 
 35.] PHILADELPHIA, W. & B. E. CO. V. COWELL. 57 
 
 property. Having received the benefits of the contract, she 
 could not, after years of acquiescence, suddenty invoke 
 the aid of the courts to relieve her of any further obligation, 
 because she had but recently discovered a fact that she 
 should have ascertained, and which the law presumes she 
 did ascertain, long before. 1 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of 
 Law, 429. 
 
 We think that after ample opportunity for election and 
 action, she ratified the lease, and that her ratification was 
 irrevocable. 
 
 In each action the order appealed from should be affirmed, 
 and judgment directed upon the stipulation in favor of the 
 respondent, with costs of appeal to this court in one action 
 only. 
 
 3. Silence may amount to ratification. 
 
 35.] PHILADELPHIA, W. & B. RAILROAD CO. 
 v. COWELL. 
 
 28 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 329. 1857. 
 
 ACTION by Cowell to recover the sum of $1,700 dividends 
 on stock. Defence, the authorized application of the divi- 
 dends to the payment of additional stock subscription. 
 Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
 
 The subscription for additional stock was made in plain- 
 tiff's behalf by one Fisher, who promptly informed plaintiff 
 of what he had done. Plaintiff remained silent for about 
 seven years after receiving this information. Fisher had 
 previous!} 7 corresponded with plaintiff as to the condition of 
 the company, and had consulted with plaintiffs friends in 
 this country, but he had no authority to act for plaintiff. 
 The court rejected the evidence offered to prove these facts. 
 
 WOODWARD, J. The question presented by the first error 
 assigned, is not whether the evidence offered and rejected
 
 58 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. TIL 
 
 proved the plaintiffs ratification of Fisher's subscription ; 
 but whether it tended to prove it. 
 
 Suppose the court had admitted the evidence, and the 
 jury had found the plaintiffs assent and ratification, could 
 he have expected us to reverse the judgment on the ground 
 that a question of fact had been submitted and found without 
 any evidence ? 
 
 Could it have been said that the facts set down in the bill 
 of exception, full}- proved, were no evidence of ratification ; 
 that they were so entirely irrelevant as to be unworth}' of 
 consideration by rational minds in connection with such a 
 question ; that that question stood just as far from demon- 
 stration after such evidence as before? 
 
 Unless this could have been said, and must have been 
 said in the event supposed, the judgment now before us 
 must be reversed ; for the question here is, in essence and 
 substance, exactly the same as it would have been then. 
 
 If this evidence might have satisfied the jury ; that is, if 
 it were of a quality to persuade reasonable men that Cowell 
 did assent to Fisher's assumed agency^ after he had full 
 knowledge of what had been done, it should have been 
 admitted. The question in the cause was for the jur} T , and 
 not the court. But the fact to be inquired for, like all 
 mental conditions and operations, could be established only 
 inferentiall}'. We judge of the mind and will of a party 
 only from his conduct, and if he have done or omitted noth- 
 ing which may fairly be interpreted as indicative of the 
 mental purpose, there is indeed no evidence of it for either 
 court or jury ; but if his conduct, in given circumstances, 
 affords any ground for presumption in respect to the mental 
 purpose, it is for a jury to define, limit, and apply the 
 presumption. 
 
 The most material circumstance in the offer was the silence 
 of Mr. Cowell. Fully informed about the last of the j-ear 
 1848 as to what had been done in his name, and the motives 
 and reasons for doing it, he did not condescend to reply for 
 nearly seven years. It is insisted that this fact, even when
 
 35.] PHILADELPHIA, W. & B. R. CO. V. COWELL. 59 
 
 taken in connection with the other circumstances in the 
 offer, was no evidence of his intention to assent to the new 
 subscription. 
 
 The argument admits that where the relation of principal 
 and agent has once existed, or where the property of a 
 principal has with his consent come into the hands and pos- 
 session of a third party, the principal is bound to give notice 
 that he will not sanction the unauthorized acts of the agent, 
 performed in good faith and for his benefit ; but it is said, 
 and truly, that Mr. Fisher had never been an authorized 
 agent of the plaintiff for any purpose, and that the plaintiffs 
 property had never been intrusted to him. It is on this 
 distinction that the learned counsel sets aside the case of the 
 Kentucky Bank v. Combs, 7 Barr, 543, and indeed all of 
 the authorities relied on by the defendant. 
 
 I do not understand counsel to mean that there can be no 
 valid ratification unless one of the conditions specified 
 either prior agency or possession of principal's property 
 has existed, but that silence, after knowledge of the act 
 done, is evidence of ratification only in such cases. It must 
 be admitted that the act of a mere stranger or volunteer is 
 capable of ratification, for all the authorities are so; but the 
 argument is that the silence of the party to be affected, what- 
 ever the attending circumstances, cannot amount to ratifica- 
 tion of the act of a stranger. 
 
 In Wilson v. Tumman, 6 M. & G. 236, C. J. Tindall, on 
 the authority of several old cases, considered that the effect 
 of a ratification was dependent on the question whether the 
 person assuming to act had acted for another and not for 
 himself. The act, it would seem, cannot be ratified unless 
 it were done in the name of the person ratifying. Jtatum 
 quis habere non potest, quod ipsius nomine non est gestwn. 
 And the general rule is thus expressed in the Digest, 50 : 
 Si quis ratum habuerit quod gestum est, obstringitur man- 
 dati actione. 
 
 If, then, the principle of law be that I can ratify that only 
 which is done in my name, but when I have ratified what-
 
 60 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. III. 
 
 ever is done in my name, I am bound for it as by the act of 
 an authorized agent, it is apparent that my silence, in view 
 of what has been done, is to be regarded simply as evidence 
 of ratification, more or less expressive, according to the cir- 
 cumstances in which it occurs. It is not ratification of itself, 
 but only evidence of it, to go to the jury along with all the 
 circumstances that stand in immediate connection with it. 
 Among these the prior relations of the parties are very im- 
 portant. If the party to be charged had been accustomed 
 to contract through the agency of the individual assuming to 
 act for him, or had intrusted property to his keeping, or if 
 he were a child or servant, partner or factor, the relation, 
 conjunctionis favor, would make silence strong evidence 
 of assent. 
 
 On the other hand, if there had been no former agency, 
 and no peculiarity whatever, in the prior relations of the 
 parties, silence a refusal to respond to a mere impertinent 
 interference would be a very inconclusive, but not an abso- 
 lutely irrelevant circumstance. The man who will not speak 
 when he sees his interests affected by another, must be con- 
 tent to let a jury interpret his silence. 
 
 It is a clear principle of equitj r that where a man stands 
 by knowingly, and suffers another person to do acts in his 
 own name without any opposition or objection, he is pre- 
 sumed to have given authority to do those acts. Semper, 
 qui non prohibet pro se intervenire, mandare creditur : 
 Story's Agency, 89. 
 
 We do not apply the full strength of this principle when 
 we rule that the plaintiffs silence, in connection with the 
 circumstances offered, was evidence fit for the consideration 
 of a jury on the question of ratification. If mental assent 
 may be inferred from circumstances, silence may indicate it 
 as well as words or deeds. To say that silence is no evidence 
 of it, is to say that there can be no implied ratification of an 
 unauthorized act, or at the least to tie up the possibility of 
 ratification to the accident of prior relations. Neither reason 
 nor authority justifies such a conclusion. A man who sees
 
 35.] PHILADELPHIA, W. & B. K. CO. V. CO WELL. 61 
 
 what has been done in his name and for his benefit, even by 
 an intermeddler, has the same power to ratify and confirm it 
 that he would have to make a similar contract for himself; 
 and if the power to ratify be conceded to him, the fact of 
 ratification must be provable by the ordinary means. 
 
 For these reasons, the distinction on which the argument 
 for the defendant in error rests seems to us to be too narrow. 
 
 The prior relations of the parties lend great importance to 
 the fact of silence ; but it is a mistake to make the compe- 
 tency of the fact dependent on those relations. I am aware 
 that Livermore cites with approbation, p. 50, the opinion of 
 civil law writers, that where a volunteer has officiously 
 interfered in the affairs of another person, and made a 
 contract for him without any color of authority, such other 
 person is not bound to answer a letter from the intermeddler, 
 informing him of the contract made in his name, nor is his 
 silence to be construed into ratification. But it is to be 
 remembered that such writers are not laying down a rule of 
 evidence to govern trials by jury, but are declaring rather 
 the effect upon the judicial mind of the party's silence. It 
 is one thing to say that the law will not imply a ratification 
 from silence, and a very different thing to say that silence 
 is a circumstance from which, with others, a jury ma} 7 imply 
 it. Because evidence does not raise a presumption so vio- 
 lent as to force itself upon the judge as a conclusion of law, 
 is the evidence therefore incompetent to go to a jury as 
 ground for a conclusion of fact? No writer, with a common 
 law jury before his eyes, has ever maintained the affirmative 
 of this proposition. If it could be established it would 
 abolish that institution entirety, and refer every question 
 and all evidence to the judicial conscience. 
 
 But it is time now to remark that this case is far from 
 being that of a mere volunteer or intermeddler. True it is that 
 Mr. Fisher had not any proper authority to make the new 
 subscription, but Messrs. Binney and Biddle, the friends and 
 correspondents of the plaintiff, had consulted him in reference 
 to the plaintiff's interests in this railroad company, and as a
 
 62 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. HE. 
 
 director of the company he stood in some sort as a represen- 
 tative and trustee of the plaintiff, who was in a foreign coun- 
 try, and without any authorized agent here. The proposition 
 that every stockholder should subscribe new stock to the 
 extent of ten per cent, was designed, and as the event proved, 
 was well designed, to retrieve the fortunes of the company ; 
 but it was necessary to its success that every stockholder 
 should come into the arrangement. The emergency was 
 pressing, and Mr. Fisher, manifestly acting in perfect good 
 faith, made the subscription for the plaintiff, which he be- 
 lieved the plaintiff would not hesitate to make if personally 
 present. 
 
 When the plaintiff was fully informed that a sagacious 
 financier, to whom his chosen friends and correspondents had 
 referred his interests, and who stood in the fiduciary relation 
 of a director, had pledged him for a new subscription, which 
 circumstances seemed to justify and demand, I say not that 
 he was bound by it, nor even that he was bound to repudiate 
 it, but that his delay for near seven j'ears, either to approve 
 or repudiate, was a fact fit to be considered by a jury on the 
 question of ratification. The subscription was made in the 
 plaintiff's name, and accepted by the compan}' as his ; and it 
 does not appear that the}' knew Fisher was acting without 
 authorit}'. The offer was to show that it was highty bene- 
 ficial to the plaintiff. It was, then, such an act as is capable 
 in law of being ratified. The plaintiff might make it his own 
 by adoption. Did he adopt it? He did, if he ever gave it 
 mental assent. How could the company show assent by 
 anything short of a written agreement, if not by evidence of 
 the nature of that in the bill of exception? The medium of 
 proof, where a mental purpose is the object of inquiry, must 
 conform to the mode of manifestation. To sa}* that you may 
 prove assent, but maj' not give the circumstances in evi- 
 dence from which it is to be implied, is to say nothing. 
 
 Strongly persuasive as we consider the offered evidence, 
 we do not put our judgment so much upon the strength as 
 upon the nature of it. We think it was calculated to con-
 
 36.] EBERTS V. SELOVER. 63 
 
 vince a jury that the plaintiff did indeed assent to and ap- 
 prove of what Mr. Fisher had done in his behalf, and therefore 
 it should have been received and submitted. 
 
 If they should find from it the assent and ratification of the 
 plaintiff, the subscription became, as between him and the 
 company, a valid contract, and on his failure to pay the in- 
 stalments, the company had a right to apply thereto the 
 accruing dividends on his old stock. 
 
 When he pays what remains unpaid on the instalments, he 
 will be entitled to his certificates of stock. 
 
 The defence under the Statute of Limitations was not well 
 taken. It may be well doubted whether, under our Acts of 
 Assembly, any incorporated company can set up the Statute 
 of Limitations against a stockholder's dividends. It certainly 
 cannot be done until after a demand and refusal, or notice to 
 a shareholder that his right to dividends is denied. But here, 
 so far from such notice having been given, the company 
 recognize the plaintiff's right to the dividends, and claim to 
 have applied them to his use. The statute can have no place 
 in such a defence. 
 
 The judgment is reversed and a venire de novo awarded. 
 
 4. Assent must be in to to and unconditional. 
 
 36.] EBERTS v. SELOVER. 
 
 44 MICHIGAN, 519. 1880. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT to recover ten dollars as subscription price of a 
 book. Defendant tenders $4.27. Judgment for defendant. 
 Plaintiffs bring error. 
 
 COOLEY, J. This is an action brought to recover the 
 subscription price of a local history. The subscription 
 was obtained by an agent of the plaintiffs, and defendant 
 signed his name to a promise to pay ten dollars on the de- 
 livery of the book. This promise was printed in a little book,
 
 64 AGENCY BY BATIFICATION. [CH. m. 
 
 made use of for the purpose of obtaining such subscriptions, 
 and on the opposite page, in sight of one signing, was a refer- 
 ence to " rules to agents," printed on the first page of the 
 book. One of these rules was that " no promise or statement 
 made by an agent which interferes with the intent of printed 
 contract shall be valid," and patrons were warned under no 
 circumstances to permit themselves to be persuaded into 
 signing the subscription unless they expected to pay the price 
 charged. From the evidence, it appears that when Schenck, 
 the agent, solicited his subscription, the defendant was not 
 inclined to give it, but finally told the agent he would take it 
 provided his fees in the office of justice, then held by him, 
 which should accrue from that time to the time of delivery 
 of the book should be received as an equivalent. The agent 
 assented, and defendant signed the subscription, receiving at 
 the same time from the agent the following paper : 
 
 COLD WATER, April 29, 1878. 
 
 Mr. Isaac M. Selover gives his order for one copy of our 
 history, for which he agrees to pay on delivery all the pro- 
 ceeds of his office as justice from now till the delivery of said 
 history. 
 
 EBERTS & ABBOTT, per Schenck. 
 
 The plaintiffs claim that the history was duly delivered, 
 and they demand the subscription price, repudiating the 
 undertaking of the agent to receive anything else, as being in 
 excess of his authority, and void. The defendant relies on 
 that undertaking, and has brought into court $4.27 as the 
 amount of his fees as justice for the period named. This 
 statement of facts presents the questions at issue so far as 
 they concern the merits. 
 
 It may be perfectly true, as the plaintiffs insist, that this 
 undertaking of the agent was in excess of his authorit}* ; that 
 the defendant was fairly notified bj* the entries in the book 
 of that fact, and that consequently the plaintiffs were not 
 bound by it, unless they subsequent!}' ratified it. Unfortu- 
 nately for their case, the determination that the act of the
 
 36.] EBERTS V. SELOVER. 65 
 
 agent in giving this paper was void does not by any means 
 settle the fact of defendant's liability upon the subscription. 
 
 The plaintiffs' case requires that the}- shall make out a 
 contract for the purchase of their book. To do this, it is es- 
 sential that they show that the minds of the parties met on 
 some distinct and definite terms. The subscription standing 
 alone shows this, for it shows, apparently, that defendant 
 agreed to take the book and pay therefor on delivery the 
 sum of ten dollars. But the contemporaneous paper given 
 back by the agent constitutes a part of the same contract, 
 and the two must be taken and considered together. 
 JSronson v. Green, Walk. Ch. 56 ; Dudgeon v. Haggart, 17 
 Mich. 273. Taking the two together it appears that the de- 
 fendant never assented to any purchase except upon the 
 terms that the plaintiffs should accept his justice's fees for 
 the period named in full payment for the book. If this part 
 of the agreement is void, the whole falls to the ground, for 
 defendant has assented to none of which this is not a part 
 When plaintiffs discovered what their agent had done, two 
 courses were open to them : to ratify his contract, or to 
 repudiate it. If they ratified it, they must accept what he 
 agreed to take. If they repudiated it, the}' must decline to 
 deliver the book under it. But they cannot ratify so far as 
 it favors them, and repudiate so far as it does not accord with 
 their interests. They must deal with the defendant's under- 
 taking as a whole, and cannot make a new contract by a 
 selection of stipulations to which separately he has never 
 assented. 
 
 The judgment must be affirmed with costs. 1 
 
 1 See also Wheeler $ Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Aughey, ante, p. 50.
 
 66 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. III. 
 
 5. Assent must be free from mistake or fraud. 
 
 37.] TRUSTEES, &c., OF EASTHAMPTON 
 v. BOWMAN. 
 
 136 NEW YORK, 521. 1893. 
 
 ACTION to set aside a deed purporting to be given by the 
 Trustees, &c., of Easthampton, through one Dominy, to the 
 defendant. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
 
 EARL, J. (after deciding that the deed was unauthorized). 
 But the main defence relied upon by the defendant at the 
 trial, and now relied upon, grows out of the facts now to be 
 stated. The defendant paid Dominy for the land $200, 
 which he kept and appropriated to his own use. In August, 
 1884, the trustees of the town then in office commenced a 
 suit against the persons who were trustees during the year in 
 which the deed to the defendant was given, to compel them 
 to account for and pa}* over certain moneys belonging to the 
 town, and in that action, among other claims made against 
 Dominy as a defendant therein, the plaintiff claimed to re- 
 cover the $200, paid to him by the defendant. That action 
 was tried and proceeded to judgment, and the plaintiff, among 
 other things, recovered judgment against Dominy for that 
 $200, and execution upon that judgment was issued against 
 him and returned unsatisfied. Thus the town has failed to 
 collect or receive the money paid to Dominy 03- the defend- 
 ant for the land. The claim on the part of the defendant is 
 that the plaintiff in that action proceeded to judgment and 
 execution, knowing that the deed was executed without 
 authority, and that the money was received by Dominy with- 
 out authorit}', and that thus it ratified Dominy's unauthorized 
 act, and became bound thereby. It is quite true that the 
 trustees acting for the town, and clothed with authority to 
 convey these lands, could ratifj the unauthorized conveyance 
 which had already been made to the defendant, and that the 
 town could be bound by their ratification. But before a prin-
 
 37.] TRUSTEES OF EASTHAMPTON V. BOWMAN. 67 
 
 cipal can be held to have ratified the unauthorized act of an 
 assumed agent he must have full knowledge of the facts, so 
 that it can be said that he intended to ratify the act. If his 
 knowledge is partial or imperfect he will not be held to have 
 ratified the unauthorized act, and the proof of adequate 
 knowledge of the facts should be reasonably clear and cer- 
 tain, particularly in a case like this, where, so far as the 
 record discloses, no substantial harm has come to the defend- 
 ant from the delay or the acts of the principal. In this case 
 it is found, and appears from the evidence clearly, that the 
 trustees who brought the action against Dominy and others 
 for the accounting, had at and before the commencement of 
 the action no knowledge whatever of the fraud perpetrated 
 upon the town by the unauthorized execution of the deed. 
 During the progress of the trial of that action, however, 
 there was some evidence tending to show the unauthorized 
 execution of the deed by Dominy ; but the proof was given 
 by the defendants, who were resisting payment to the plain- 
 tiff in that action, and, as the trial judge found, the trustees 
 of the town did not believe that evidence thus given by the 
 parties sued in their defence to that action, and it is found 
 that the}* proceeded to judgment and execution in ignorance 
 of the fraud which had been perpetrated by Dominy upon 
 the town. We do not, therefore, think that the ratification 
 on the part of the town by its trustees was so clearly and 
 unequivocally established that we would be authorized to 
 reverse this judgment. Before a municipal corporation can 
 be held to have ratified the unauthorized act of its officers or 
 assumed agents, the rule should be strictly enforced that the 
 facts constituting the ratification should be fully and clearly 
 proved, so that it can fairly be said that there was an inten- 
 tion to confirm the unauthorized act and receive the fruits 
 thereof. Here there is no conclusive proof to that effect. 
 
 But as the plaintiff now holds a judgment against Dominy 
 in which the $200 paid to him by the defendant is included, 
 we think that as a condition of relief in this action it should 
 be required to assign so much of that judgment as relates to 
 the $200 to the defendant
 
 68 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. III. 
 
 Our conclusion, therefore, is that the judgment entered at 
 the Special Term should be so far modified as to require the 
 plaintiff to assign to the defendant so much of the judgment 
 recovered by it against Doininy as represents the $200 paid 
 by the defendant to him, and as thus modified it should be 
 affirmed, with costs. 
 
 All concur. Judgment accordingly. 1 
 
 37.] COMBS v. SCOTT ET AL. 
 
 12 ALLEN (Mass.), 493. 1866. 
 
 CONTRACT, for compensation agreed to be paid plaintiff 
 for his services in procuring two recruits as a part of the 
 quota of the town of Hawley. Verdict for plaintiff. De- 
 fendants allege exceptions. 
 
 The court charged that, as to ratification, " if there was 
 a material mistake, it makes no difference how it arose, or 
 whether defendants might have ascertained the contrary to be 
 true, unless it arose from the negligence of the defendants." 
 
 BIGELOW, C. J. (after deciding that the services were not 
 illegal). But, upon another point, we are of opinion that 
 the exceptions of the defendants are well taken. In instruct- 
 ing the jury on the question of ratification by the defendants 
 of the contract alleged to have been made by their agent in 
 excess of the authority granted to him, the judge in effect 
 told the jury that such ratification would be binding on the 
 defendants, though made under a material misapprehension 
 of facts, if such misapprehension arose from the negligence 
 or omission of the defendants to make inquiries relative to 
 the subject-matter. In the broad and general form in which 
 this instruction was given, we are of opinion that it did not 
 correctly state the rule of law, and that the jury may have 
 been misled by it in the consideration of this part of the 
 case. 
 
 1 Compare Hyatt v. Clark, 118 N. Y. 563, ante, p. 52.
 
 37.] COMBS V. SCOTT. 69 
 
 The general rule is perfectly well settled, that a ratification 
 of the unauthorized acts of an agent, in order to be effectual 
 and binding on the principal, must have been made with j. 
 full knowledge of all material facts, and that ignorance, mis- 
 take or misapprehension of any of the essential circumstances 
 relating to the particular transaction alleged to have been 
 ratified, will absolve the principal from all liability by reason 
 of any supposed adoption of or assent to the previously un- 
 authorized acts of an agent. We know of no qualification 
 of this rule such as was engrafted upon it in the instructions 
 given to the jury in the present case. Nor, after consider- 
 able research, have we been able to find that such qualification 
 has ever been recognized in any approved text-writer or ad- 
 judicated case. And, upon consideration, it seems to us to 
 be inconsistent with sound principle. 
 
 Ratification of a past and completed transaction, into 
 which an agent has entered without authority, is a purely 
 voluntary act on the part of a principal. No legal obligation 
 rests upon him to sanction or adopt it. No duty requires 
 him to make inquiries concerning it. Where there is no legal 
 obligation or dut}' to do an act, there can be no negligence in 
 an omission to perform it. The true doctrine is well stated 
 by a learned text-writer: "If I make a contract in the name 
 of a person who has not given me an authority, he will be 
 under no obligation to ratify it, nor will he be bound to the 
 performance of it." 1 Livermore on Agency, 44 ; see also 
 Paley on Agency, 171, note o. Whoever, therefore, seeks to 
 procure and rely on a ratification is bound to show that it 
 was made under such circumstances as in law to be binding 
 on the principal, especially to see to it that all material facts 
 were made known to him. The burden of making inquiries 
 and of ascertaining the truth is not cast on him who is under 
 no legal obligation to assume a responsibility, but rests on the 
 party who is endeavoring to obtain a benefit or advantage 
 for himself. This is not only just, but it is practicable. The 
 needful information or knowledge is always within the reach 
 of him who is either party or privy to a transaction which he
 
 70 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. m. 
 
 seeks to have ratified, rather than of him who did not author- 
 ize it, and to the details of which he may be a stranger. 
 
 We do not mean to say that a person can be wilfully 
 ignorant, or purposely shut his eyes to means of information 
 within his own possession and control, and thereby escape 
 the consequences of a ratification of unauthorized acts into 
 which he has deliberately entered ; but, our opinion is, that 
 ratification of an antecedent act of an agent which was unau- 
 thorized cannot be held valid ami binding, where the person 
 sought to be charged has misapprehended or mistaken mate- 
 rial facts T although he may have wholly omitted to make 
 inquiries of other persons concerning them, and his ignorance 
 and misapprehension mighthave been enlightened and Cor- 
 rected by the use of diligence on his part to ascertain them. 
 The mistake at the trial consisted in the assumption that any 
 such diligence was required of the defendants. On this 
 point, the instructions were stated in a manner which may 
 have led the jury to misunderstand the rights and obligations 
 of the parties. Exceptions sustained. 
 
 37.] KELLEY v. NEWBURYPORT HORSE 
 RAILROAD CO. 
 
 141 MASSACHUSETTS, 496. 1886. 
 
 CONTRACT, upon certain promissory notes alleged to have 
 been made by defendant corporation to K. and B., or order, 
 and indorsed to plaintiff. Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant 
 alleges exceptions. 
 
 C. ALLEN, J. (after disposing of another point). The 
 defendant then contends that the notes in suit cannot be 
 enforced, because they were given to its own directors in pay- 
 ment for the construction of the road by them, and are now 
 held by the plaintiff subject to all defences which might have 
 been made to a suit upon them by the payees. Upon this 
 point, the only question properly before us is, whether there
 
 37.] KELLEY V. NEWBUKYPOKT HORSE K. B. CO. 71 
 
 was sufficient evidence to warrant the jury in finding a ratifi- 
 cation of the notes by the corporation. The presiding judge 
 assumed that the notes were originally void, and submitted to 
 the jury the single question of ratification. Being of opinion 
 that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the verdict on 
 the question of ratification, we have no occasion to consider 
 whether it might not also have been proper to submit to the 
 jury, under proper instructions, the question of the original 
 validity of the notes. 
 
 The first request for instructions was properly refused. It 
 seems to refer to a supposed theory of the plaintiff that the 
 notes might be ratified by the directors, whereas the sole 
 question submitted to the jury was whether they had been 
 ratified by the stockholders, that is, by the corporation itself. 
 
 The third request is open to the same objection. 
 
 The second request sought to incorporate into the doctrine 
 of ratification a new element, namely, that, in order to make 
 a valid ratification, the principal must have known, not only 
 all the facts, but also the legal effect of the facts, and then, 
 with a knowledge both of the law and facts, have ratified the 
 contracts b} T some independent and substantive act. This 
 request also was properly refused. It is sufficient if a ratifica- 
 tion is made with a full knowledge of all the material facts. 
 Indeed, a rule somewhat less stringent than this ma}- properly 
 be laid down, when one purposely shuts his e}'es to means of 
 information within his own possession and control, and rati- 
 fies an act deliberately, having all the knowledge in respect to 
 it which he cares to have. Combs v. Scott, 12 Allen, 493, 
 497 ; Phosphate of Lime Co. v. Green, L. R. 7 C. P. 43, 57. 
 
 The fourth and fifth requests were both to the effect that, 
 on all the evidence, the jury would not be warranted in find- 
 ing a ratification. The circumstances of the case were such 
 as to render the inference of ratification natural and eas}', 
 especially in view of the lapse of time since the notes were 
 given. There was uncontradicted evidence tending to show 
 that the directors made a contract with one Gowan for build- 
 ing the road for a certain price in money and stock, and that
 
 72 AGENCY BY KATIFICATION. [CH. HL 
 
 he gave to the company a bond, with Kelley and Binne}' as 
 sureties, for the faithful performance of his contract. Gowan 
 failing to perform his contract, the board of directors called 
 on the sureties, who themselves were directors, to perform it, 
 with notice that they would be held liable to the company for 
 all damages that might accrue to the company by their default. 
 Thereupon the sureties proceeded to finish the road, according 
 to the contract, in which originally they had no interest. The 
 price was fair and reasonable ; the road as completed by them 
 was a well-built road ; the advancements made by them were 
 in consequence of the notice given to them by the directors, 
 and not with any fraudulent design to obtain an} 1 pecuniary 
 benefit for themselves from said contract. The settlement 
 was made with them by the directors, under authority of a 
 general vote of the stockholders authorizing them to make any 
 settlement, and the notes in suit were given. 
 
 As a general rule, a contract between a corporation and its 
 directors is not absolutely void, but voidable at the election 
 of the corporation. Such a contract does not necessarily 
 require any independent and substantive act of ratification, 
 but it may become finally established as a valid contract by 
 acquiescence. The right to avoid it may be waived. Union 
 Pacific Railroad v. Credit Mobilier, 135 Mass. 367, 376 ; 
 Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587 ; Hotel Co v. 
 Wade, 97 U. S. 13 ; Ashhursfs Appeal, 60 Penn. St. 290. 
 In the present case, such ratification or waiver might well be 
 inferred, and indeed we do not see how any other inference 
 could fairly be drawn, from the act of the company in holding 
 and operating the road for so many years without taking any 
 steps to repudiate the notes, from the payment of interest, 
 from the acceptance of the report of the treasurer on October 
 6, 1875, and October 2, 1878, in which these notes were re- 
 ferred to as outstanding obligations, and from the acceptance 
 of the Statute of 1884, c. 159, authorizing the company to issue 
 bonds to an amount not exceeding $30,000, for the purpose 
 of extinguishing its floating debt. 
 
 Exceptions overruled.
 
 38.] WALTER V. JAMES. 73 
 
 6. Right of other party to recede before ratification. 
 
 38.] WALTER v. JAMES. 
 
 L. R. 6 EXCHEQUER, 124. 1871. 
 
 ACTION on an attorney's bill to recover 63 17s. 3d. 
 Defendant paid into court 3 17s. 3c?., and to the residue 
 pleaded payment. Verdict for defendant, with leave to 
 plaintiff to move to enter the verdict for him, the court to 
 have power to draw inferences of fact. Rule obtained 
 accordingly. 
 
 Plaintiff had a claim against defendant. One Southall, 
 after his authority had been revoked, paid plaintiff 60 in 
 satisfaction of the claim. Subsequently, by agreement be- 
 tween Southall and plaintiff, the money was returned to 
 Southall. No evidence of defendant's ratification before plea 
 in this action was given. The trial court ruled that defendant 
 could take advantage of Southall's paj'ment. 
 
 KELLEY, C. B. Southall, in paying the debt, appeared to 
 act as the defendant's agent ; but it turned out afterwards 
 that, although he had originally been authorized by the 
 defendant to come to an arrangement with the plaintiff, and 
 to make this pa3"ment, that authorit}* had been revoked 
 before the payment was made. He did not, however, 
 communicate to the plaintiff that he had no authorit}* ; on 
 the contrary, he professed to act for the defendant, and the 
 plaintiff believed him to be so acting, and received the sum 
 paid in full satisfaction of his debt. But when the plaintiff 
 found that the money had been paid without the defendant's 
 authority, he returned the money to Southall. And now 
 the question is, whether the defendant can by his plea of 
 payment adopt and ratify the act of Southall, although before 
 action that act had, by arrangement between the plaintiff and 
 Southall, been undone. 
 
 Now, the law is clear, that where one makes a payment in 
 the name and on behalf of another without authoritj', it is 
 competent for the debtor to ratify the payment ; and there
 
 74 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. m. 
 
 seems to be no doubt on the authorities that he can ratify 
 after action by placing the plea of payment on the record. 
 Prirnu facie, therefore, we have here a ratification of the 
 payment by the defendant's plea ; but whether the payment 
 was then capable of ratification depends on whether previ- 
 ously it was competent to the plaintiff and Southall, apart 
 from the defendant, to cancel what had taken place between 
 them. I am of opinion that it was competent to them to 
 undo what they had done. The evidence shows that the 
 plaintiff received the money in satisfaction under the mistaken 
 idea that Southall had authority from the defendant to pay 
 him. This was a mistake in fact, on discovering which he 
 was, I think, entitled to return the monej', and apply to his 
 debtor for payment. If he had insisted on keeping it, the 
 defendant might at an}* moment have repudiated the act of 
 Southall, and Southall would then have been able to recover 
 it from the plaintiff as mone}* received for Southall's use. I 
 am, therefore, of opinion that the plaintiff, who originally 
 accepted this mone} 7 under an entire misapprehension, was 
 justified in returning it, the position of the parties not having 
 been in the meantime in any wa}* altered, and that the defend- 
 ant's plea of payment fails. The rule must accordingly be 
 made absolute. 
 
 MARTIN, B. I am of the same opinion. The rule which I 
 conceive to be the correct one may be stated as follows : 
 When a payment is not made b}* wa}* of gift for the benefit 
 of the debtor, but by an agent who intended that he should 
 be reimbursed by the debtor, but who had not the debtor's 
 authority to pay, it is competent for the creditor and the 
 person paying to rescind the transaction at any time before 
 the debtor has affirmed the payment, and repay the monej*, 
 and thereupon the payment is at an end, and the debtor 
 again responsible. This being, in my judgment, the true 
 rule, the plaintiff in this case was entitled to recover. 
 
 KELLET, C. B. My Brother Cleasby concurs in the judgment 
 of the court. Rule absolute.
 
 38.] BOLTON PARTNERS V. LAMBERT. 75 
 
 38.] BOLTON PARTNERS v. LAMBERT. 
 L. R. 41 CHANCERY DIVISION (C. A.), 295. 1889. 
 
 ACTION for specific performance of an agreement to take a 
 lease. Decree for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
 
 Defendant made to an agent of plaintiff an offer to take a 
 lease of plaintiffs premises. The agent, without authority, 
 accepted the offer in behalf of the company. Later, defendant 
 withdrew his offer, and, later still, the board of directors of 
 the plaintiff company ratified the agent's agreement. 
 
 LINDLEY, L. J. ... The question is, what is the conse- 
 quence of the withdrawal of the offer after acceptance by the 
 assumed agent, but before the authorit}- of the agent has been 
 ratified? Is the withdrawal in time? It is said on the one 
 hand that the ordinary principle of law applies, viz., that an 
 offer may be withdrawn before acceptance. That proposi- 
 tion is of course true. But the question is, acceptance by 
 whom? It is not a question whether a mere offer can be 
 withdrawn, but the question is whether, when there has been 
 in fact an acceptance which is in form an acceptance by a 
 principal through his agent, though the person assuming to 
 act as agent has not then been so authorized, there can or 
 cannot be a withdrawal of the offer before the ratification of 
 the acceptance ? I can find no authority in the books to war- 
 rant the contention that an offer made, and in fact accepted 
 by a principal through an agent or otherwise, can be with- 
 drawn. The true view, on the contrary, appears to be that 
 the doctrine as to the retrospective action of ratification is 
 applicable. 
 
 If we look at Mr. Brice's argument closely, it will be found 
 to turn on this, that the acceptance was a nullit}', and un- 
 less we are prepared to say that the acceptance of the agent 
 was absolutely a nullity, Mr. Brice's contention cannot be 
 accepted. That the acceptance by the assumed agent can- 
 not be treated as going for nothing is apparent from the case 
 of Walter v. James, Law Rep. 6 Ex. 124. I see no reason
 
 76 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. m. 
 
 to take this case out of the application of the general principle 
 as to ratification. The appeal therefore fails on all points. 
 
 COTTON, L. J. ... But then it is said that on the 13th of 
 Januar}', 1887, the defendant entirely withdrew the offer he 
 had made. Of course the withdrawal could not be effective, 
 if it were made after the contract had become complete. As 
 soon as the offer has been accepted the contract is complete. 
 But it is said that there could be a withdrawal by the de- 
 fendant on the 13th of January on this ground, that the offer 
 of the defendant had been accepted by Scratchier, a director 
 of the plaintiff company, who was not authorized to bind the 
 company by acceptance of the offer, and therefore that until 
 the company ratified Scratchley's act there was no acceptance 
 on behalf of the company binding on the company, and there- 
 fore the defendant could withdraw his offer. Is that so? 
 The rule as to ratification by a principal of acts done by an 
 assumed agent is that the ratification is thrown back to the 
 date of the act done, and that the agent is put in the same 
 position as if he had had authority to do the act at the time 
 the act was done by him. Various cases have been referred 
 to as laying down this principle, but there is no case exactly 
 like the present one. The case of Hagedorn v. Oliverson, 2 
 M. & S. 485, is a strong case of the application of the prin- 
 ciple. It was there pointed out how favorable the rule was 
 to the principal, because till ratification he was not bound, 
 and he had an option to adopt or not to adopt what had been 
 done. In that case the plaintiff had effected an insurance on 
 a ship in which another person was interested, and it was 
 held that long after the ship had been lost the other person 
 might adopt the act of the plaintiff, though done without au- 
 thority, so as to enable the plaintiff to sue upon the policy. 
 Again, in Ancona v. Marks, 7 H. & N. 686, where a bill 
 was indorsed to and sued on in the name of Ancona, who 
 had given no authority for that purpose, }'et it was held that 
 Ancona could, after the action had been brought, ratify what 
 had been done, and that the subsequent ratification was equiv- 
 alent to a prior authority so as to entitle Ancona to sue
 
 38.J BOLTOX PARTNERS V. LAMBERT. 77 
 
 upon the bill. It was said by Mr. Brice that in that case 
 there was a previously existing liabilit}' of the defendant 
 toward some person ; but the liability of the defendant to 
 Ancona was established by Ancona's authorizing and ratify- 
 ing the act of the agent, and a previously existing liability to 
 others did not affect the principle laid down. 
 
 The rule as to ratification is of course subject to some ex- 
 ceptions. An estate once vested cannot be divested, nor can 
 an act lawful at the time of its performance be rendered un- 
 lawful by the application of the doctrine of ratification. The 
 case of Walter v. James, Law Rep. 6 Ex. 124, was relied on 
 by the appellant, but in that case there was an agreement 
 between the assumed agent of the defendant and the plaintiff 
 to cancel what had been done before an}- ratification by the 
 defendant ; in the present case there was no agreement made 
 between Scratchley and the defendant that what had been 
 done by Scratchley should be considered as null and void. 
 
 The case of Bird v. Brown, 4 Ex. 786, which was also relied 
 on by the appellant, is distinguishable from this case. There 
 it was held that the ratification could not operate to divest 
 the ownership which had previously vested in the purchaser by 
 the delivery of the goods before the ratification of the alleged 
 stoppage in transitu. So also in Lydl v. Kennedy, 18 Q. B. 
 D. 796, the plaintiff, who represented the lawful heir, desired, 
 after the defendant Kennedy had acquired a title to the estate 
 by means of the Statute of Limitations, and after the title of 
 the heir was gone, to ratify the act of Kennedj- as to the re- 
 ceipt of rents, so as to make the estate vest in the heir. In 
 m} T opinion, none of these cases support the appellant's 
 contention. 
 
 I think the proper view is that the acceptance by Scratchley 
 did constitute a contract, subject to its being shown that 
 Scratchley had authority to bind the company. If that were 
 not shown, there would be no contract on the part of the 
 company, but when and as soon as authority was given to 
 Scratchley to bind the companj', the authority was thrown 
 back to the time when the act was done by Scratchley, and
 
 78 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. HI. 
 
 prevented the defendant withdrawing his offer, because it was 
 then no longer an offer, but a binding contract. 
 
 This point therefore must also be decided against the appel- 
 lant Another point was raised as to misrepresentation, but, 
 having regard to the evidence, in my opinion that has not been 
 made out. The appeal therefore fails. 
 
 LOPES, L. J., also delivered a concurring opinion. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 38.] McCLINTOCK v. SOUTH PENN OIL CO. 
 146 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 144. 1892. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT for breach of contract to purchase by assign- 
 ment a land contract existing between plaintiff and one 
 Donaldson. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
 
 Plaintiff's agent made the sale without having written 
 authority, and indorsed a memorandum of it upon the 
 Donaldson contract. Subsequently plaintiff ratified the act 
 in writing by making, signing, and acknowledging upon the 
 Donaldson contract a written transfer of her interest in it. 
 Defendant refused to accept this transfer or to pa}* the pur- 
 chase price. Plaintiff, relying on the assignment, did not 
 perform the conditions of the Donaldson contract, nor did 
 defendant, and it was forfeited. 
 
 Mr. JUSTICE MITCHELL. The receipt by plaintiff's husband 
 expressed the fact of a sale, by the acknowledgment of re- 
 ceipt of part of the purchase money, and fixed the time and 
 amount of the remaining pa3 - ment. All the other terms of the 
 contract, including the identification of the subject-matter, 
 were shown b}' the original agreement of Donaldson, on 
 which the receipt was indorsed. The two papers thus consti- 
 tuted one instrument, which, so far as appears on its face, 
 was a sufficient memorandum in writing to satisfy the Statute 
 of Frauds. Its defect in that regard was dehors the instrument 
 itself, and lay in the want of written authority in the hus-
 
 38.] MCCLDTTOCK V. OIL CO. 79 
 
 band to act as agent for his wife. Had his authority been in 
 writing at that time, even though on a separate paper, no 
 question of the validity and binding force of the contract 
 could have arisen. His action as agent was, however, for- 
 mally ratified and adopted by the wife, in writing, before any 
 rescission or change of position in any way by the defendant. 
 
 The exact question before us, therefore, is whether such 
 ratification by the wife, of its own force, perfected and 
 validated the agent's original contract, or whether it still 
 required acceptance by the grantee. 
 
 No case precisely in point has been found, and we are left 
 to determine the question on general principles. It is con- 
 ceded that a deed tendered by the vendor, but refused by the 
 vendee, will not validate a parol contract, and it is argued 
 that the present case stands upon the same footing. But I 
 apprehend that the rule in question results from the common- 
 law requirement that every writing must be accepted before 
 it becomes a contract. It is sometimes said, however, that 
 the reason a deed tendered is ineffectual under the statute, is 
 that until such tender the vendor was not bound ; the vendee 
 could not have held him, and, there being therefore a want 
 of mutuality in the agreement, equity will not specialty en- 
 force it. Whether the equitable doctrine of mutuality has 
 any proper place in cases arising under the Statute of Frauds, 
 is a vexed question on which our decisions are not in har- 
 mony, and are badly in need of review and authoritative 
 settlement. See Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Pa. 424 ; Meason v. 
 Kaine, 63 Pa. 335 ; Sands v. Arthur, 84 Pa. 479, and the 
 comment upon them by Judge Reed in his treatise on the 
 Statute of Frauds, 367. But whatever the foundation of 
 the rule, it is doubtful if the case of ratification of an agent's 
 act comes fairly within it. If the agent had been properly 
 authorized, the contract would have bound both parties in 
 the first instance ; and the settled rule is that ratification is 
 equivalent in every way to plenary prior authority. The ob- 
 jection of want of mutuality is not good in many cases of 
 dealing with an agent, for if he exceeds his authority, actual
 
 SO AGENCY BY BATIFICATION. [CH. ILL 
 
 and apparent, his principal will not be bound, yet may ratify, 
 and then the other party will be bound from the inception of 
 the agreement. The aggregatio mentium of the parties need 
 not commence simultaneously. It must co-exist ; but there 
 must be a period when the question of contract or no con- 
 tract rests on the will of one part} 7 to accept or reject a 
 proposition made, and this interval may be long or short. 
 The offer, of course, may be revoked or withdrawn at any 
 time prior to acceptance, but after acceptance it is too 
 late. The contract is complete. If, in the present case, the 
 defendants had written a letter to plaintiff, stating that 
 they had made the agreement with her husband as agent, 
 but that, his authority not being in writing, they requested 
 her to send them a written ratification, and thereupon she 
 had written and mailed an acceptance and ratification of 
 her agent's act, there could be no question of the contract. 
 Hamilton v. Insurance Co., 5 Pa. 339, and cases cited in 
 3 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 856, tit. Contract; and 13 
 Am. & Eug. Encyc. of Law, 233, tit. Mail. And, in effect, 
 that is just what the defendant did here. It made the origi- 
 nal agreement with the husband, evidenced by his indorse- 
 ment on the Donaldson contract, which was delivered into 
 its possession. On the day that payment was called for by 
 the indorsed agreement, the defendant further indorsed on 
 the contract an assignment by husband and wife, which 
 would be a written ratification of the most formal kind, of 
 the husband's previous act, and,, as the jury have found, de- 
 livered it to the husband unconditionally, for execution and 
 acknowledgment. The defendant's consent to the contract 
 sued upon was thus manifested ; and upon acceptance by 
 plaintiff, the contract became binding as a common-law con- 
 tract of both parties, and upon her signature it became a 
 contract in writing within all the requirements of the statute. 
 The objects of the act, certaint}' of subject-matter, precision 
 of terms, reliability of evidence, and clearness of intent of 
 the landowner are all secured, and we see no particular in 
 which either the letter or the policy of the statute has been 
 violated.
 
 38.] DODGE V. HOPKIXS. 81 
 
 The cases cited by appellee, though not decisions on the 
 precise point, tend to sustain the conclusion here reached. 
 Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722, was under the English stat- 
 ute, which requires only that the agent should be " lawfully 
 authorized ; " but the opinion of Lord Chief Justice Best 
 illustrates the effectiveness of ratification as equivalent to 
 antecedent authority. In our own case of McDowell v. 
 Simpson, 3 W. 129, the opinion of Kennedy, J., is clearly 
 expressed that a lease by an agent in excess of any au- 
 thority, either parol or written, may be ratified, but the 
 ratification, to create a valid term for seven years, must be in 
 writing. So far as the case goes, it is directly in line with 
 our present conclusion, and it has never been questioned, 
 but, on the contrary, is cited with approval in Dumn v. JRoth- 
 ermel, 112 Pa. 272. 
 
 This disposes of the main question in the case, and with it 
 the exceptions relating to the measure of damages fall. The 
 plaintiff recovered only the contract price to which she was 
 entitled. . . . Judgment affirmed. 
 
 38.] DODGE v. HOPKINS. 
 
 14 WISCONSIN, 630. 1861. 
 
 ACTION to recover instalments alleged to be due upon a 
 land contract. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant 
 appeals. 
 
 Plaintiff's agent sold the lands without authority. The 
 question arises as to the effect of plaintiff's ratification. 
 
 DIXON, C. J. (after deciding that the agent's acts were 
 unauthorized). We are next to ascertain the effect of this 
 want of authority upon the rights of the defendant It is very 
 clear, in the present condition of the case, that the plaintiff 
 was not bound by the contract, and that he was at liberty to 
 repudiate it at any time before it had actually received his 
 sanction. Was the defendant bound? And if he was not, 
 
 6
 
 82 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. m. 
 
 could the plaintiff, by his sole act of ratification, make the 
 contract obligatory upon him? We answer both these ques- 
 tions in the negative. The covenants were mutual, those of 
 the defendant for the payment of the money being in con- 
 sideration of that of the plaintiff for the convej'ance of the 
 lands. The intention of the parties was that they should be 
 mutually bound, that each should execute the instrument 
 so that the other could set it up as a binding contract against 
 him, at law as well as in equity, from- the moment of its 
 execution. 
 
 In such cases it is well settled, both on principle and 
 authority, that if either party neglects or refuses to bind him- 
 self, the instrument is void for want of mutuality, and the 
 party who is not bound cannot avail himself of it as obligatory 
 upon the other. Townsend v. Corning, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 435; and Townsend v. Hubbard, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 351, and 
 cases there cited. The same authorities also show that where 
 the instrument is thus void in its inception, no subsequent 
 act of the part} r who has neglected to execute it, can render it 
 obligator}' upon the party who did execute, without his 
 assent. The opinion of Judge Bronson in the first-named case 
 is a conclusive answer to all arguments to be drawn from the 
 subsequent ratification of the part}- who was not originally 
 bound. In that case, as in this, the vendors had failed to 
 bind themselves by the agreement. He says : u It would be 
 most extraordinan- if the vendors could wait and speculate 
 upon the market, and then abandon or set up the contract as 
 their own interests might dictate. But without any reference 
 to prices, and whether the delay was long or short, if this was 
 not the deed of the vendee at the time it was signed by him- 
 self and Baldwin (the agent), it is impossible that the vendors, 
 by any subsequent act of their own without his assent, could 
 make it his deed. There is, I think, no principle in the law 
 which will sanction such a doctrine." The only point in 
 which the facts in that case differ materially from those here 
 presented, is that no part of the purchase money was advanced 
 to the agent. But that circumstance cannot vary the appliea-
 
 38.] DODGE V. HOPKINS. 83 
 
 tion of the principle. The payment of the money to the 
 agent did not affect the validity of the contract, or make it 
 binding upon the plaintiff. He was at liberty to reject the 
 money, and his acceptance of it was an act of ratification 
 with which the defendant was in no way connected, and 
 which, although it might bind him, imposed no obligation 
 upon the defendant until he actually assented to it. It 
 required the assent of both parties to give the contract any 
 validity or force. 
 
 I am well aware that there are dicta and observations to be 
 found in the books, which, if taken literally, would overthrow 
 the doctrine of the cases to which I have referred. It is said 
 in Lawrence v. Taylor, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 107, that " such 
 adoptive authority relates back to the time of the transaction, 
 and is deemed in law the same to all purposes as if it had 
 been given before." And in Newton v. Jlronson, 3 Kern. 
 (N.Y.) 587 (67 Am. Dec. 87), the court say: " That a sub- 
 sequent ratification is equally effectual as an original authority, 
 is well settled." Such expressions are, no doubt, of frequent 
 occurrence ; and although they display too much carelessness 
 in the use of language, yet, if they are understood as appli- 
 cable only to the cases in which the}' occur, they may be con- 
 sidered as a correct statement of the law. The inaccuracy 
 consists in not properly distinguishing between those cases 
 where the subsequent act of ratification is put forth as the 
 foundation of a right in favor of the party who has ratified, 
 and those where it is made the basis of a demand against 
 him. There is a broad and manifest difference between a 
 case in which a party seeks to avail himself, by subsequent 
 assent, of the unauthorized act of his own agent, in order to 
 enforce a claim against a third person, and the case of a party 
 acquiring an inchoate right against a principal by an unautho- 
 rized act of his agent, to which validity is afterwards given 
 by the assent or recognition of the principal. Paley on 
 Agenc} 1 , 192, note. The principal in such a case may, by 
 his subsequent assent, bind himself ; but, if the contract be 
 executory, he cannot bind the other party. The latter ma}',
 
 84 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. IK. 
 
 if he choose, avail himself of such assent against the princi- 
 pal, which, if he does, the contract, by virtue of such mutual 
 ratification, becomes mutually obligatory. There are many 
 cases where the acts of parties, though unavailable for their 
 own benefit, may be used against them. It is upon this 
 obvious distinction, I apprehend, that the decisions which I 
 have cited are to be sustained. Lawrence \. Taylor and 
 Newton v. Bronson were both actions in which the adverse 
 party claimed rights through the agency of individuals whose 
 acts had been subsequently ratified. And the authorities 
 cited in support of the proposition laid down in the last case 
 (Weed v. Carpenter, 4 Wend. 219 ; Episcopal Society v. 
 Episcopal Church^ 1 Pick. 372 ; Corning \. Southland, 3 Hill, 
 552 ; Moss v. Rossie Lead Mining Co., 5 Id. 137 ; Clark v. 
 Van Reimsdyk, 9 Cranch, 153 ; Willinks v. Hollingsworth, 
 6 Wheat. 241), will, when examined, be found to have been 
 cases where the subsequent assent was employed against 
 the persons who had given it, and taken the benefit of the 
 contract. 
 
 (The court then considers the effect of the unauthorized 
 contract under the Statute of Frauds.) 
 
 No original authority to the agent making the contract 
 having been shown, and no evidence offered on the trial of 
 such ratification as bound the defendant, it follows that the 
 judgment must be reversed, and a new trial awarded. 
 
 Ordered accordingly. 1 
 
 7. Competency of principal. 
 
 15.] PHILPOT r. BINGHAM. 
 
 55 ALABAMA, 435. 1876. 
 [Reported herein at p. 18.] 
 
 1 The doctrine of this case is approved and applied in Atlee v. Bartholo- 
 mew, 69 Wis. 43 (1887).
 
 40.] HEATH V. NUTTER. 85 
 
 8. Form of ratification. 
 
 40.] HEATH v. NUTTER ET AL. 
 
 50 MAINE, 378. 1862. 
 
 WRIT OF ENTRY. Defendants claim under a deed from 
 one Bobbins, by Ms attorney Rich, and, in case the power of 
 attorney to Rich should be insufficient, offered to show a 
 ratification of the conveyance by Robbins, by receiving the 
 consideration and by oral statements. This testimony was 
 excluded, and the power held insufficient. Plaintiff claims 
 under a quit-claim deed from Robbins. 
 
 APPLETON, C. J. The power of attorney to Rich did not 
 empower him to convey the demanded premises to the 
 inhabitants of Tremont. The authority " to grant any and 
 all discharges by deed or otherwise, both personal and real," 
 as fully as the principal might do, cannot be fairly construed 
 as enabling the agent to convey by bill of sale, or by deed of 
 warrant}', all the personal and real estate of his principal. 
 Nor can the authority to convey by deed be found elsewhere. 
 
 Whenever any act of agency is required to be done in the 
 name of the principal under seal, the authority to do the act 
 must be conferred by an instrument under seal. A power to 
 convey lands must possess the same requisites, and observe 
 the same solemnities as are necessary in a deed directly con- 
 veying the land. Gage v. Gage, 30 N. H. 420 ; Story on 
 Agency, 49, 50 ; Montgomery v. Dorian, 6 N. H. 250. 
 So the ratification of an unauthorized conveyance by deed 
 must be by an instrument under seal. Story on Agency, 
 252. A parol ratification is not sufficient. Stetson v. 
 Patten, 2 Greenl. 359; Paine v. Tucker, 21 Me. 138; 
 Hanford v. McNair, 9 Wend. 54 ; Despatch Line Co. v. 
 Bellamy Manuf. Co., 12 N. H. 205. 
 
 The plaintiff received his conveyance with a full knowledge 
 of the equitable rights of the tenants. The remedial processes 
 of a court of equity may perhaps afford protection to the 
 defendants. At common law their defence fails. 
 
 Defendants defaulted.
 
 86 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. HI. 
 
 40.] McINTYRE v. PARK. 
 
 11 GRAY (Mass.), 102. 1858. 
 
 CONTRACT, for the non-performance of an indenture where- 
 by defendants agreed to purchase a parcel of land of plaintiff. 
 Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant alleges exceptions. 
 
 The contract was signed by a co-purchaser in Park's name 
 without Park's authority. The judge ruled that evidence 
 was competent to show Park's adoption or ratification of 
 this unauthorized execution of the instrument. 
 
 METCALF, J. We express no opinion on the question 
 whether the sum of five hundred dollars, mentioned in the 
 agreement upon which this action is brought, is a penalty 
 or liquidated damages. That point was ruled in the defend- 
 ant's favor, and the plaintiff has not excepted to the 
 ruling. 
 
 The evidence of the defendant's ratification or adoption of 
 the agreement executed in his name was rightly admitted ; 
 and he, by such ratification or adoption, became answerable 
 for a breach of that agreement. Merrifield v. Parritt, 11 
 Cush. (Mass.) 590. In that case the agreement was not 
 under seal ; and the defendant contends that a sealed in- 
 strument, executed without previous authority, can be 
 ratified only by an instrument under seal. However this 
 may be elsewhere, by the law of Massachusetts such in- 
 strument may be ratified by parol. Cady v. Shepherd, 11 
 Pick. (Mass.) 400; Swan v. Stedman, 4 Met. (Mass.) 548; 
 see also 1 Am. Leading Cases, 4th ed. 450 ; Collyer on Part. 
 3d Am. ed. sec. 467 ; Story on Agency, 5th ed. sees. 49, 51, 
 242, and notes ; McDonald v. Eggleston, 26 Vt 154. The 
 cases in which this doctrine has been adjudged were those 
 in which one partner, without the previous 'authority of his 
 co-partners, executed a deed in the name of the firm. But 
 we do not perceive any reason for confining the doctrine to 
 that class of cases. . . .
 
 40.] KOZEL V. DEAELOVE. 87 
 
 All the other rulings and instructions to which exceptions 
 have been alleged we think were correct ; and we deem it 
 unnecessary to do more than simply to affirm them. 
 
 Exceptions overruled. 
 
 40.] KOZEL v. DEARLOVE. 
 
 144 ILLINOIS, 23. 1892. 
 
 ACTION in the nature of an action for specific performance. 
 The contract was signed b}- an agent of the vendor upon 
 terms differing from those fixed by the agent's written 
 authority. The vendor orally assented to the terms as 
 changed. Petition dismissed. Petitioner brings writ ot 
 error. 
 
 BAILEY, C. J. . . . The only question presented by the 
 record which we need consider is, whether Clark was 
 authorized to sign the contract sought to be enforced, or a 
 note or memorandum thereof, by any written instrument 
 signed by Dearlove, as required b}- the second section of the 
 Statute of Frauds. That lie had competent written authority 
 to sell the lots in question at certain specified prices, and upon 
 certain prescribed terms, is not disputed. But the written 
 instrument gave him no authority to sell at lower prices or 
 upon different terms. No one, we presume, would claim 
 that, if he had undertaken to do so without consulting his 
 principal, his act would have had any legal validity, or have 
 been enforceable against the principal. The agent was just as 
 powerless to make such sale as he would have been if no 
 written authority had existed. To sell upon different terms 
 required a new and further authority, and such new authorit}', 
 to be valid under the Statute of Frauds, must itself have been 
 in writing, and signed by the principal. 
 
 It is of no avail to show that the modified terms were 
 communicated to Dearlove, and were assented to by him, 
 and that he directed the execution of the contract on those
 
 88 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. m. 
 
 terms. The authority thus given to the agent was not in 
 writing, and so was not a compliance with the requirements 
 of the statute. We think the petition was properly dismissed, 
 and the decree will therefore be affirmed. 
 
 Decree affirmed. 
 
 9. Legality of act ratified. 
 
 43.] MILFORD BOROUGH v. MILFORD WATER CO. 
 124 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 610. 1889. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT by the water company against the borough upon 
 a contract for the supply of water during the year 1884-1885. 
 Judgment for plaintiff. The borough appeals. When the 
 agreement was made in 1875, the chief burgess and two of 
 the councilmen were officers, and another of the councilmen 
 was a stockholder, in the plaintiff company. Only two 
 members of the council were not interested in the company. 
 In subsequent years the number of town officers interested 
 in the water company was less, and in some years no officer 
 was so interested. During those j*ears the borough used 
 and paid for the water. During 1884-1885 no member of the 
 borough council was interested in the water company, but 
 the borough refused to pay for the water. 
 
 Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE PAXSON (after deciding that the 
 contract of 1875 was void under the provisions of a statute 
 which made it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and for- 
 feiture of office, for a burgess or councilman to be interested 
 in a contract for supplies for the borough). It appeared, 
 however, upon the trial below, that the borough had been 
 using and paying for this water for several years ; that upon 
 some occasions when the bills were passed there was less 
 than a majority of councils who were members of the water 
 company, and some } 7 ears in which there were no members 
 of councils who were also members of said company. From
 
 43.] MTLFORD BOROUGH V. MILFORD WATER CO. 89 
 
 this it was urged that there was a ratification of the contract 
 by councils. The learned judge below adopted this view, 
 and entered judgment non obstante on the verdict in favor 
 of the water company. This will not do. 
 
 There was no ratification of the contract because there 
 was no contract to ratify. The water compan}- never con- 
 tracted with the borough. They contracted with themselves 
 to supply the latter with water ; to that agreement the 
 borough was not a party in a legal sense. It is true, the 
 borough might, after its councils had become purged of 
 the members of the water company, have passed an ordi- 
 nance similar to ordinance No. 2, and thus have entered into 
 a new contract. But no such ordinance was passed, and 
 neither councils nor the officers of the municipality can con- 
 tract in any other wa}'. It is one of the safeguards of 
 municipal corporations that they can only be bound by a 
 contract authorized by an ordinance duly passed. The Act 
 of 1860 is another and a valuable safeguard thrown around 
 municipalities. It was passed to protect the people from the 
 frauds of their own servants and agents. It may be there 
 was no fraud, actual or intended, in the present case, but we 
 will not allow it to be made an entering wedge to destroy the 
 Act of 1860. Of what possible use would that Act be if its 
 violations are condoned, and its prohibited, criminally-con- 
 demned contracts allowed to be enforced under the guise of 
 an implied ratification? It is too plain for argument that 
 the payment by councils for some years for water actually 
 furnished, created no contract to accept and pay for it in the 
 future. Nor was this suit brought upon an}* such implied 
 contract. On the contrary it was brought upon the contract 
 authorized by ordinance No. 2 ; it has nothing else to rest 
 upon, and with the destruction of its foundation the super- 
 structure crumbles. 
 
 The judgment is reversed, and judgment is now- 
 entered for the defendant below non obstante 
 veredicto.
 
 90 AGENCY BY KATIFICATION. [CH. HI. 
 
 44.] WORKMAN y. WRIGHT. 
 
 33 OHIO STATE, 405. 1878. 
 
 ACTION upon a promissory note payable to Workman, and 
 signed with the name of Wright and one Edington. Wright 
 denied the execution of the note on his part. Workman set 
 up that Wright had ratified his signature and promised to 
 pa}" the note. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error. 
 
 WRIGHT, J. Under the pleadings and findings of the court 
 below, it may be assumed that the name of Calvin Wright 
 was a forgery, as there was evidence tending to show the 
 fact ; and we cannot say that the conclusion reached, in this 
 respect, was clearly against the testimony. It is claimed, 
 however, that his admissions, and promises to pay the note, 
 ratified the unauthorized signature. 
 
 Had Workman, the owner of the note, taken it upon the 
 faith of these admissions, or had he at all changed his status 
 by reason thereof, such facts would create an estoppel, which 
 would preclude Wright now from his defence. . This appears 
 from most of the authorities cited in the case. But no foun- 
 dation for an estoppel exists. All these statements of Wright, 
 whatever they were, were made after Workman became the 
 owner of the paper. Workman did not act upon them at 
 all ; he was in no way prejudiced by them, nor did they induce 
 him to do, or omit to do, anything whatever to his disad- 
 vantage. But it is maintained that, without regard to the 
 principle of estoppel, these admissions and promises are a 
 ratification of the previously unauthorized act, upon the well- 
 known maxim, Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato 
 priori cequiparatur. 
 
 It is said that a distinction exists between the classes of 
 cases to which this principle applies. Where the original act 
 was one merely voidable in its nature, the principal may 
 ratify the act of his agent, although it was unauthorized. 
 But where the act was void, as in case of forgery, it is said
 
 44.] WORKMAN V. WRIGHT. 91 
 
 no ratification can be made, independent of the principle of 
 estoppel, to which we have alluded. Most of the authorities 
 cited by counsel for plaintiff in error are of the first class, 
 where the act was only voidable. 
 
 Bank v. Warren, 15 N. Y. 577, was where one partner, 
 without authorit} T , and for his own exclusive benefit, indorsed 
 his own note in the firm name, his co-partner was held bound 
 by subsequent promise to pay it, without any independent 
 consideration. 
 
 In Grout v. De Wolf, 1 R. I. 393, the third clause of the 
 head note is, "Where the person whose signature is forged, 
 promises the forger to pay the note, this amounts to ratifica- 
 tion of the signature, and binds him." But an examination of 
 the case shows that evidence was offered to prove that plain- 
 tiff had bought the paper in consequence of what defendant 
 said to him, and the court charged that if, before purchasing 
 the note, plaintiff asked defendant if he should buy, and he 
 was told he might, defendant could not excuse himself on the 
 ground of forgery. So that the case may be put upon the 
 ground of estoppel, without relying upon the ground stated 
 In the head note quoted. 
 
 Harper v. Devene, 10 La. An. 724, was where a clerk of 
 a house signed the name of the house by himself as agent. 
 Defendant, a member of the house, afterward took the note, 
 corrected its date, and promised to pay it ; and this was held 
 a ratification to make him liable. In this case, and many 
 like it, it may be remarked that the agent assumed to have 
 authority, and does the act under that belief ; but in case of 
 a forgery, there is no such authority and no such l><>lief. 
 
 The case of Forsyth v. Day, 46 Me. 177, involves the 
 principle of estoppel. 
 
 The cases of Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen, 447, and Howard v. 
 Duncan, 3 Lansing, 175, sustain the views of plaintiff in 
 error, holding that a forgery may be ratified, independently 
 of the principle of estoppel, and in the absence of any 
 new consideration for the ratifying promise, a conclusion, 
 however, to which we cannot agree.
 
 92 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. m. 
 
 The case in 3 Lansing is criticised in 3 Albany Law 
 Journal, 331. 
 
 Upon the other hand, there are authorities holding that a 
 forgery cannot be ratified. There is a fully considered case 
 in the English Exchequer : Brooke v. Hook, 3 Albany Law 
 Journal, 255 ; 24 Law Times, 34. This was a case where 
 defendant's name was forged, and he had given a written 
 memorandum, that he would be responsible for the bill. 
 Chief Baron Kelly places his opinion upon the grounds : 
 (1) That defendant's agreement to treat the note as his own, 
 was in consideration that plaintiff would not prosecute the 
 forger ; and, (2) that there was no ratification, as to the act 
 done, the signature to the note was illegal and void. And 
 though a voidable act ma)' be ratified, it is otherwise when 
 the act is originally, and in its inception, void. The opinion 
 fully recognizes the proposition, that where acts or admis- 
 sions alter the condition of the holder of the paper the party 
 is estopped, but it is necessary that such a case should be 
 made. It is further held, that cases of ratification are those 
 where the act was pretended to have been done for, or 
 under the authority of, the part}' sought to be charged, which 
 cannot be in case of a forgery. A distinction is also made 
 between civil acts, which ma}' be made good by subsequent 
 recognition, and a criminal offence, which is not capable of 
 ratification. Baron Martin did not concur. In Woodruff t& 
 Robinson v. Munroe, 33 Md. 147, this is held: "If, in an 
 action against an indorser of a promissory note b}' the bona 
 fide holders thereof, it be shown that the indorsement was 
 not genuine, and the defendant did not ratify or sanction it 
 prior to the maturity of the note and its transfer to plaintiff, 
 he is not liable. But if he adopted the note prior to its 
 maturity, and by such adoption assisted in its negotiations, 
 he would be estopped from setting up the forgery in a suit by 
 a bona fide holder. But any admissions, by the defendant, 
 made subsequently to the maturity of the note, would not be 
 evidence that he had authorized the indorsement of his name 
 thereon." See also Williams v. Bayley, L. R. 1 Appeals, 
 H. L. 200.
 
 44.] WELLINGTON V. JACKSON. 93 
 
 In McHugh v. County of Schuylkill, 67 Pa. St. 391, the 
 defence to a bond was forgery. The court below charged that 
 if the obligor subsequently approved and acquiesced in the 
 forgery or ratified it, the bond was binding on him. It was 
 held that, there being no new consideration, the instruction 
 was error ; also, that a contract infected with fraud was void, 
 not merely voidable, and confirmation without a new consid- 
 eration was nudum pactum. See also Negley v. Lindsay, 
 67 Pa. St. 217. Daniel recognizes this proposition. 2 Daniel, 
 Neg. Inst. 1352. 
 
 Upon principle we cannot see how a mere promise to pay 
 a forged note can lay the foundation for liability of the maker 
 so promising, when the promise was made, as it was, under 
 the circumstances set forth in the record. In addition to the 
 fact that there are no circumstances to create an estoppel, 
 there was no consideration for the promise. Wright received 
 nothing, and it is a simple nudum pactum. The con- 
 sideration for a promise may be either an advantage to the 
 promisor or a detriment to the promisee, but here neither 
 exists. Wright had signed a note, and when the one in suit 
 was shown him, said he would pa}* it, supposing it to be the 
 one he had signed. He was an ignorant man who could not 
 read writing, though he could sign his name, and when he 
 saw the paper, seeing that the signature spelled his name, and 
 being unable to read the body of the instrument, he said it 
 was all right, and he would pay it. But the promise was 
 without that consideration which would make it a binding 
 contract Judgment affirmed. 
 
 44.] WELLINGTON v. JACKSON. 
 
 121 MASSACHUSETTS, 157. 1876. 
 
 CONTRACT against the maker of a promissory note. De- 
 fence, that defendant never made the note. Judgment for 
 plaintiff, on the ground that defendant had acknowledged 
 the signature. Defendant alleges exceptions.
 
 94 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. HL 
 
 GRAY, C. J. Although the signature of Edward H. 
 Jackson was forged, yet if, knowing all the circumstances as 
 to that signature, and intending to be bound by it, he ac- 
 knowledged the signature, and thus assumed the note as his 
 own, it would bind him, just as if it had been originally 
 signed by his authority, even if it did not amount to an 
 estoppel in pais. Greenfield Sank v. Crafts, 4 Allen, 447 ; 
 Bartlett v. Tucker, 104 Mass. 336, 341. The answer of the 
 jury to the question of the court shows that they found 
 for the plaintiffs upon this ground, and renders immaterial 
 the instructions given or requested upon the subject of 
 estoppel. . . . Exceptions overruled. 
 
 10. Legal effects of ratification. 
 
 46.] DEMPSEY v. CHAMBERS. 
 
 154 MASSACHUSETTS, 330. 1891. 
 
 TORT, to recover for the breaking of a plate-glass window 
 in plaintiff's building by the negligence of one McCullock. 
 Judgment for plaintiff. 
 
 Plaintiff ordered coal of defendant. McCullock, without 
 authority, delivered the coal in behalf of defendant, and in 
 so doing carelessly broke the window. Defendant, with full 
 knowledge of McCullock's act, presented a bill for the coal 
 to plaintiff and demanded payment. 
 
 HOLMES, J. This is an action of tort to recover damages 
 for the breaking of a plate-glass window. The glass was 
 broken by the negligence of one McCullock, while delivering 
 some coal which had been ordered of the defendant b}- the 
 plaintiff. It is found as a fact that McCullock was not the 
 defendant's servant when he broke the window, but that 
 the "delivery of the coal by McCullock was ratified by the 
 defendant, and that such ratification made McCullock in law 
 the agent and servant of the defendant in the delivery of the
 
 46.] DEMPSEY V. CHAMBERS. 95 
 
 coal. " On this finding, the court ruled, ' ' that the defendant, 
 by his ratification of the delivery of the coal by McCullock, 
 became responsible for his negligence in the delivery of the 
 coal." The defendant excepted to this ruling, and to nothing 
 else. We must assume that the finding was warranted by 
 the evidence, a majority of the court being of opinion that 
 the bill of exceptions does not purport to set forth all the 
 evidence on which the finding was made. Therefore, the only 
 question before us is as to the correctness of the ruling just 
 stated. 
 
 Ifjwe were contriving a new code to-day 7 we might hesitate 
 to say that a man could make himself a party to a bare tort, 
 in any case, merely Jby_assenting to it after it had been com- 
 mitted. But we are not at liberty to refuse to carry out to 
 its consequences any principle which we believe to have been 
 part of the common law, simply because the grounds of 
 policy on which it must be justified seem to us to be hard to 
 find, and probably to have belonged to a different state of 
 society. 
 
 It is hard to explain why a master is liable to the extent 
 that he is for the negligent acts of one who at the time really 
 is his servant, acting within the general scope of his employ- 
 ment. Probably master and servant are " fained to be all 
 one person," by a fiction which is an echo of the patria 
 potestas and of the English frankpledge. Byington v. 
 Simpson, 134 Mass. 169, 170. Fitz. Abr. Corone, pi. 428. 
 Possibly the doctrine of ratification is another aspect of the 
 same tradition. The requirement that the act should be 
 done in the name of the ratifying party looks that way. 
 New England Dredging Co. v. Rockport Granite (70., 149 
 Mass. 381, 382 ; Fuller & Trimwelfs case, 2 Leon. 215, 
 216 ; Sext. Dec. 5, 12, De Reg. Jur., Keg. 9 ; D. 43, 26, 13 ; 
 D. 43, 16, 1, 14, gloss. See also cases next cited. 
 
 The earliest instances of liability by way of ratification in 
 the English law, so far as we have noticed, were where a 
 man retained property acquired through the wrongful act of 
 another. Y. B. 30 Ed. I. 128 (Rolls ed.) ; 38 Lib. Ass. 223,
 
 96 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. m. 
 
 pi. 9 ; S. C. 38 Ed. III. 18, Engettement de Garde. See 
 Plowd. 8, ad fin., 27, 31; Bract, fol. 158 b, 159 a, 171 b; 
 12 Ed. IV. 9, pi. 23. But in these cases the defendant's 
 assent was treated as relating back to the original act, and at 
 an earl}" date the doctrine of relation was carried so far as to 
 hold that, where a trespass would have been justified if it 
 had been done by the authority by which it purported to 
 have been done, a subsequent ratification might justify it 
 also. Y. B. 7 Hen. IV. 34, pi. 1. This decision is qualified 
 in Fitz. Abr. Bayllye, pi. 4, and doubted in Bro. Abr. Tres- 
 pass, pi. 86 ; but it has been followed or approved so con- 
 tinuously, and in so many later cases, that it would be hard 
 to deny that the common law was as there stated by Chief 
 Justice Gascoigne. Godbolt, 109, 110, pi. 129 ; S. C. 2 Leon. 
 196, pi. 246 ; Hull v. Pickersgill, 1 Brod. & Bing. 282 ; 
 Muskett v. Drummond, 10 B. & C. 153, 157 ; Jiuron v. 
 Denman, 2 Exch. 167, 188; Secretary of State in Council 
 of India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba, 13 Moore, P. C. 22, 
 86 ; Cheetham v. Mayor of Manchester , L. R. 10 C. P. 249 ; 
 Wiggins v. United States, 3 Ct. of Cl. 412. 
 
 If we assume that an alleged principal, by adopting an act 
 which was unlawful when done, can make it lawful, it fol- 
 lows that he adopts it at his peril, and is liable if it should 
 turn out that his previous command would not have justified 
 the act. It never has been doubted that a man's subsequent 
 agreement to a trespass done in his name and for his benefit 
 amounts to a command, so far as to make him answerable. 
 The ratihabitio mandato comparatur of the Roman lawj-ers, 
 and the earlier cases (D. 46, 3, 12, 4; D. 43, 16, 1, 14; 
 Y. B. 30 Ed. I. 128) has been changed to the dogma cequi- 
 paratur ever since the days of Lord Coke. 4 Inst. 317. 
 See Bro. Abr. Trepass, pi. 113; Co. Lit. 207 a; Wingate's 
 Maxims, 124; Com. Dig. Trespass, C, 1 ; Eastern Counties 
 Railway v. Broom, 6 Exch. 314, 326, 327; and cases here- 
 after cited. 
 
 Doubts have been expressed, which we need not consider, 
 whether this doctrine applied to the case of a bare personal
 
 46.] DEMPSEY V. CHAMBERS. 97 
 
 tort. Adams v. Freeman, 9 Johns. 117, 118; Anderson 
 and Warberton, JJ., in Bishop v. Montague, Cro. Eliz. 824. 
 If a man assaulted another in the street out of his own head, 
 it would seem rather strong to say that, if he merely called 
 himself my servant, and I afterwards assented, without 
 more, our mere words would make me a party to the assault, 
 although in such cases the canon law excommunicated the 
 principal if the assault was upon a clerk. Sext. Dec. 5, 
 11, 23. Perhaps the application of the doctrine would be 
 avoided on the ground that the facts did not show an act 
 done for the defendant's benefit. Wilson v. Barker, 1 Nev. 
 & Man. 409 ; S. C. 4 B. & Ad. 614, et seq.; Smith v. Lozo, 
 42 Mich. 6. As in other cases it has been on the ground 
 that thej' did not amount to such a ratification as was neces- 
 sary. Tucker v. Jerris, 75 Me. 184 ; Hyde v. Cooper, 26 
 Vt 552. 
 
 But the language generally used by judges and text- 
 writers, and such decisions as we have been able to find, is 
 broad enough to cover a case like the present when the ratifi- 
 cation is established. Perley v. Georgetown, 7 Gray, 464 ; 
 Bishop v. Montague, Cro. Eliz. 824 ; Saunderson v. Baker, 
 2 Bl. 832 ; S. C. 3 Wils. 309 ; Barker v. Braham, 2 Bl. 
 866, 868 ; S. C. 3 Wils. 368 ; Badkin v. Powell, Cowper, 
 476, 479 ; Wilson v. Tumman, 6 Man. & G. 236, 242 ; Lewis 
 v. Head, 13 M. & W. 834 ; Buron v. Denman, 2 Exch. 167, 
 188; Bird v. Brown, 4 Exch. 786, 799 ; Eastern Counties 
 Railway v. Broom, 6 Exch. 314, 326, 327 ; Roe v. Birken- 
 head, Lancashire, <& Cheshire Junction Railway, 7 Exch. 
 36, 41 ; Ancona v. Marks, 7 H. & N. 686, 695 ; Condit v. 
 Baldwin, 21 N. Y. 219, 225 ; Exum v. Brister, 35 Miss. 391 ; 
 Galveston, Harrisburg, & San Antonio Railway v. Don- 
 ahoe, 56 Texas, 162 ; Murray v. Lovejoy, 2 Cliff. 191, 195 ; 
 see Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall. 1, 9 ; Story on Agency, 
 455, 456. 
 
 The question remains whether the ratification is estab- 
 lished. As we understand the bill of exceptions, McCullock 
 took on himself to deliver the defendant's coal for his benefit 
 
 7
 
 98 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. HI. 
 
 and as his servant, and the defendant afterwards assented to 
 McCullock's assumption. The ratification was not directed 
 specifically to McCullock's trespass, and that act was not for 
 the defendant's benefit if taken by itself, but it was so con- 
 nected with McCullock's employment that the defendant 
 Mould have been liable as master if McCullock really had 
 been his servant when delivering the coal. We have found 
 hardly anything in the books dealing with the precise case, 
 but we are of opinion that consistency with the whole course 
 of authority requires us to hold that the defendant's ratifica- 
 tion of the employment established the relation of master 
 and servant from the beginning, with all its incidents, in- 
 cluding the anomalous liability for his negligent acts. See 
 Coomes v. Houghton, 102 Mass. 211, 213, 214; Cooley, 
 Torts, 128, 129. The ratification goes to the relation, and 
 establishes it ab initio. The relation existing, the master 
 is answerable for torts which he has not ratified specifically, 
 just as he is for those which he has not commanded, and 
 as he may be for those which he has expressly forbidden. 
 In Gibson's case, Lane, 90, it was agreed that, if strangers 
 as servants to Gibson, but without his precedent appoint- 
 ment, had seized goods by color of his office, and afterwards 
 had misused the goods, and Gibson ratified the seizure, he 
 thereb}' became a trespasser ab initio, although not privy to 
 the misusing which made him so. And this proposition is 
 stated as law in Com. Dig. Trespass, C., 1 ; Elder v. Bemis, 
 2 Met. 599, 605. In Coomes v. Houghton, 102 Mass. 211, 
 the alleged servant did not profess to act as servant to the 
 defendant, and the decision was that a subsequent pa}-ment 
 for his work by the defendant would not make him one. For 
 these reasons, in the opinion of a majority of the court, the 
 exceptions must be overruled. 
 
 Exceptions overruled
 
 48.] GELATT V. RIDGE. 99 
 
 48.] GELATT v. RIDGE. 
 
 117 MISSOURI, 553. 1893. 
 
 ACTION to recover compensation for services as a real- 
 estate agent. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
 
 Plaintiff was authorized to sell defendant's land upon pre- 
 scribed terms. He sold with some variation from those 
 terms. Defendant at first refused to cany out the sale as 
 made, but later did so upon the purchaser's making some 
 slight concessions. 
 
 MACFARLANE, J. (omitting other matters). It is next con- 
 tended that there can be no recover}', for the reason that the 
 contract made by the agent varied from the terms of his 
 authority, and that this would be the case though the terms 
 of the sale made were more advantageous to the principal 
 than was required under the letter of authority. There is 
 no doubt, as a general principle of law, that an agent must 
 act within the terms of his authority, and a substantial 
 variance therefrom would defeat his right to compensation, 
 though such variance may have been advantageous to his 
 principal. Nesbitt v. Helser, 49 Mo. 383. Yet it is equally 
 well settled that if the principal ratify the contract made 
 by the agent, the substituted terms become a part of the 
 original agreement and can be enforced as such. Woods 
 v. /Stephens, 46 Mo. 555, and cases cited. 
 
 The evidence tends to prove indeed it is very conclu- 
 sive that defendant did fully approve and ratify the terms 
 of sale as made by plaintiff, and under the instructions the 
 jury must have so found. 
 
 The suit was not upon a quantum meruit, as claimed by 
 defendant, but was upon the original contract as made and 
 supplemented by the ratification and acceptance of defend- 
 ant. If, as before stated, the departure, by the agent, from 
 the terms of the authority given him, became, upon approval
 
 100 AGENCY BY RATIFICATION. [CH. HL 
 
 and ratification by the principal, a part of the original con- 
 tract, the compensation, if fixed therein, should be measured 
 thereunder. Nesbitt v. Helser, supra. . . . 
 
 Judgment affirmed. 
 
 48.] BRAY v. GUNN. 
 
 53 GEORGIA, 144. 1874. 
 
 ACTION against defendant, as agent, for damages resulting 
 from his violation of instructions. Judgment for defendant. 
 
 Plaintiffs sent defendant a draft for collection with in- 
 structions. Defendant collected, but did not obey instruc- 
 tions as to the currency in which payment should be received. 
 Defendant informed plaintiffs of what he had done, and 
 plaintiffs did not dissent. 
 
 McCAY, J. If an agent, acting in good faith, disobey 
 the instructions of his principal, and promptly informs the 
 principal of what he has done, it is the duty of the principal, 
 at the earliest opportunity, to repudiate the act if he disap- 
 prove. Silence in such a case is a ratification. See the case 
 of McLendon v. Wilson & Ca.llaway, 52 Ga. 41, from Troup 
 County. Taking this correspondence altogether, we think 
 the jury had a right to find that the plaintiffs were satisfied 
 with the act of Gunn in taking the money in the Kimball 
 funds, and that their dissatisfaction is an afterthought in con- 
 sequence of the failure of Kimball. The evidence is con- 
 vincing that if they had promptly notified Gunn of their 
 dissatisfaction, he could have saved himself. Both the 
 parties here were commercial men, and the rule is a fair and 
 reasonable one that it is the duty of the principal promptly 
 to answer the letters of his agent, and if he do not do so he 
 is presumed to acquiesce in what the agent informs him he 
 has done or proposes to do. 
 
 Judgment affirmed.
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 FORMATION OF THE RELATION BY ESTOPPEL. 
 
 52.] BRONSON'S EXECUTOR v. CHAPPELL. 
 12 WALLACE (U. S.), 681. 1870. 
 
 BILL to foreclose a mortgage. Defence, payment to com- 
 plainant's agent. Bill dismissed. Complainant appeals. 
 
 Mr. JUSTICE S WAYNE delivered the opinion of the court. 
 
 But a single question has been argued in this court, and 
 that is one arising upon the facts as developed in the record. 
 This opinion will be confined to that subject 
 
 William C. Bostwick, acting for Frederick Bronson, nego- 
 tiated the sale of a tract of land in Wisconsin to the defend- 
 ants. According to his custom in such cases, Bronson 
 forwarded to Bostwick the draft of a contract to be executed 
 by the buyers. At the foot of the draft was a note in these 
 words : 
 
 "William C. Bostwick, Esq., of Galena, is authorized to 
 receive and receipt for the first payment on this contract. 
 All subsequent payments to be made to F. Bronson, in the 
 city of New York." 
 
 The defendants expressed to Bostwick a preference to 
 receive a deed and give a mortgage. This was communi- 
 cated to Bronson, who acceded to the proposition, and 
 forwarded to Bostwick a deed and the draft of a bond and 
 mortgage. On the 25th of March, 1865, the defendants 
 paid to Bostwick $1500 of the purchase money, and executed 
 the bond and mortgage to secure the payment of the balance. 
 According to the condition of the bond it was to be paid to 
 the obligee in the city of New York, in instalments, as fol- 
 lows : $781.20 on the 13th of November, 1865, and the
 
 102 AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL. [CH. IV. 
 
 remaining sum of $4562.40 in seven equal annual 
 from the 12th of February, 1865, with interest thereon at 
 the rate of 7 per cent, per annum. The contract was erro- 
 neously construed by Bronsou as requiring the interest on 
 all the instalments to be paid with each one as it fell due. 
 The other parties seem to have acquiesced in this construc- 
 tion. On the 4th of December, 1865, the defendants paid to 
 Bostwick, as the agent of Bronson, $825.36, in discharge of 
 the amount claimed to be due on the 30th of November, 
 1865, and took his receipt according!} 1 . On the 28th of 
 February, 1866, the}' paid Bostwick $980 to meet the second 
 instalment and interest, as claimed, with exchange, and took 
 his receipt as before. Bostwick failed in December, 1866. 
 These moneys were never paid over to Bronson. He denied 
 the authority of Bostwick to receive them, and demanded 
 payment from the defendants. The}' refused, and Bronson 
 thereupon filed this bill to foreclose the mortgage. The 
 validity of these payments is the question presented for our 
 determination. 
 
 Agents are special, general, or universal. Where written 
 evidence of their appointment is not required, it may be 
 implied from circumstances. These circumstances are the 
 acts of the agent and their recognition, or acquiescence by 
 the principal. The same considerations fix the category of 
 the agency and the limits of the authority conferred. Where 
 one, without objection, suffers another to do acts which pro- 
 ceed upon the ground of authority from him, or by his con- 
 duct adopts and sanctions such acts after they are done, 
 he will be bound, although no previous authority exist, in all 
 respects as if the requisite power had been given in the most 
 formal manner. If he has justified the belief of a third party 
 that the person assuming to be his agent was authorized to 
 do what was done, it is no answer for him to say that no 
 authority had been given, or that it did not reach so far, and 
 that the third party had acted upon a mistaken conclusion. 
 He is estopped to take refuge in such a defence. If a loss 
 is to be borne, the author of the error must bear it. If
 
 52.] BEONSON'S EXECUTOR v. CHAPPELL. 103 
 
 business has been transacted in certain cases, it is implied 
 that the like business ma}' be transacted in others. The 
 inference to be drawn is, that everything fairly within the 
 scope of the powers exercised in the past ma}' be done in 
 the future, until notice of revocation or disclaimer is brought 
 home to those whose interests ai'e concerned. Under such 
 circumstances the presence or absence of authority in point 
 of fact, is immaterial to the rights of third persons whose 
 interests are involved. The seeming and reality are followed 
 by the same consequences. In either case the legal result 
 is the same. 
 
 (After giving the correspondence between Bronson and 
 Bostwick.) This correspondence suggests several remarks : 
 
 Bostwick speaks of his employment as having been, and 
 then being, an " agency " for Bronson. He inquires whether 
 it was contemplated by Bronson to revoke it. Bronson does 
 not den}' or revoke it. He says the object of the memorandum 
 was to repel the construction that the receipt of " the first or 
 other payments by the agent" was " an implied waiver of 
 the claim for exchange," and which was the same thing in 
 effect, a waiver of the stipulation in the contract that the 
 money was to be paid to him " in the city of New York." It 
 recognizes the authority of the agent to receive the subsequent 
 payments as well as the first one, provided exchange were 
 paid upon the former by the debtor. 
 
 The language employed by Bronson will admit of no other 
 construction. It applies with full force to the bond of these 
 defendants. They paid exchange as well as the principal and 
 interest of the instalments in question. There is no evidence 
 in the record that the authority thus admitted to exist was 
 ever withdrawn. It must be presumed to have continued 
 until the relations of the parties were terminated by Bost- 
 wick's failure and insolvency. Bostwick says in his deposi- 
 tion : " I advertised myself as the agent of the Bronson lands, 
 which advertising was continued for a period of twelve or 
 fourteen years." His testimony upon this subject is uncon- 
 tradicted.
 
 104 AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL. [CH. IV. 
 
 There are found in the record thirty-four letters from 
 Bronson to Bostwick, all relating to business connected with 
 the Bronson lauds. The first letter bears date on the 12th 
 of December, 1855, the last one on the 27th of November, 
 1865. The}* are in all respects such as would naturally be 
 rddressed by a principal to an agent in whose judgment, in- 
 tegrity, and diligence he had the fullest confidence. They 
 refer to sales, to the delivery of deeds and contracts, the pay- 
 ment and collection of taxes, and a variety of other matters 
 in the same connection. Ten of the letters authorize the 
 delivery of contracts on the receipt of the first payment by 
 Bostwick. Fourteen of them authorize the collection, or 
 acknowledge the transmission, of other moneys. Bronson 
 was absent in Europe from the 9th of October, 1861, until 
 about the middle of December, 1864. During that time his 
 business was attended to by his attorney, E. S. Smith, Esq., 
 of the city of New York. There are in the record twent} 1 "- 
 one letters from him to Bostwick. They are of the same 
 character with those from Bronson. Twelve of them acknowl- 
 edge the collection and transmission of moneys for Bostwick. 
 It is not stated whether they were the first or later payments. 
 But the circumstances show clearly that the}' were in most, 
 if not in all instances, of the latter character. All collections 
 were made, and all business relating to the lands was trans- 
 acted through Bostwick. In one of these letters, Smith 
 says : 
 
 " P. S. Mr. Bronson, in a letter received, writes : ' I am 
 willing to sell lands through Mr. Bostwick upon an advance 
 of price equal to the depreciation of paper money at the time 
 of sale,' " fec. 
 
 A further analysis of the letters of these parties would 
 develop a large array of additional facts bearing in the same 
 direction and hardly less cogent than those to which we have 
 adverted. There is no intimation in any of them that Bost- 
 wick was regarded as the agent of the buj'ers, that he was 
 not regarded as the agent of Bronson, or that he had in any 
 instance exceeded his authority. It is unnecessary to pursue
 
 52.] JOHNSON V. HURLEY. 105 
 
 the subject further. Viewed in the light of the law, we think 
 the evidence abundantly establishes two propositions : 
 
 1. That Bostwick was the agent of Bronson, and as such 
 authorized to receive the payments in question. 
 
 2. If this were not so, that the conduct of Bronson 
 numerous transactions between him and Bostwick, and the 
 course of business by the latter, authorized or known to 
 and acquiesced in by the former justified the belief by the 
 defendants that Bostwick had such authority and that Bron- 
 son was bound accordingly. 
 
 Decree affirmed. 
 
 52.] JOHNSON v. HURLEY. C^. Hi 
 
 115 MISSOURI, 513. 1893. 
 
 EJECTMENT. Equitable defence, which was tried as a suit 
 for specific performance. Decree for defendant. 
 
 MACFARLANE, J. The suit is ejectment to recover posses- 
 sion of the northwest quarter, section 5, township 53, range 
 7, in Rails County. The answer set up an equitable defence 
 to the effect that defendant had purchased the land from the 
 duly authorized agent of the plaintiffs, had received from 
 said agent deeds purporting to be duly executed and acknowl- 
 edged by plaintiffs and purporting to convey to him said 
 lands ; that he had paid to said agent the entire purchase 
 price for the land, to wit, $1,650, its fair value, and had been 
 put in possession under his said purchase ; that he had in 
 good faith fenced said land and erected thereon a dwelling- 
 house and other valuable and permanent buildings and im- 
 provements, and prayed specific performance. The reply 
 denied the new matter of the answer. 
 
 The cause was tried as a suit in equity for specific per- 
 formance of a contract for the conveyance of land, and a 
 decree entered for defendant according to the prayer of the 
 answer, and plaintiffs appealed.
 
 106 AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL. [CH. IV. 
 
 The evidence showed that . . . Finlay A. Johnson, as- 
 suming to act as the agent of plaintiffs and their sister 
 Phoebe, sold to defendant the east half of said northwest 
 quarter for the sum of 800, and afterwards, on Januaiy 10, 
 1882, he sold him the west half of said quarter for the sum 
 of $850 ; that defendant paid the purchase money to the said 
 Finlay A. Johnson at the respective dates of sale, and 
 received from him deeds purporting to be signed and ac- 
 knowledged by plaintiffs and said Phoebe. Under these 
 purchases defendant went into possession of the land, which 
 was then unimproved, fenced it, built a dwelling-house and 
 other buildings thereon, and reduced it to cultivation. 
 
 The evidence further showed that the deeds and the ac- 
 knowledgments were forged by the said Finlay A., and that 
 plaintiffs never knew that contracts or deeds had been made, 
 or that money had been paid their agent, until 1884, after he 
 had absconded. 
 
 The question is whether these sales made by their agent 
 were binding on plaintiffs. 
 
 I. The evidence leaves no doubt that plaintiffs' agent 
 made the contracts with defendant for the sale of the land, 
 assuming to act for them ; that he received the purchase 
 money, delivered a deed to which their names were signed, 
 and to which an acknowledgment, certified in due form by 
 the said agent as notary public, was attached ; and that 
 under said transaction, and relying on it, defendant in good 
 faith went into the possession and made valuable and last- 
 ing improvements. Under these circumstances, if said agent 
 was authorized to make the sale, it would be the grossest 
 injustice and fraud on defendant to deny him the benefit 
 of the contract for the reason that it was not in writing as 
 required by the Statute of Frauds. To prevent such injus- 
 tice courts of equity have uniforml}" held that snch part per- 
 formance relieves the contract of the infirmity created by 
 the statute, and specific performance will not be denied. 
 Emmel v. Hayes, 102 Mo. 186 ; Bowles v. Wathan, 54 Mo. 
 261.
 
 52.] JOHNSON V. HURLEY. 107 
 
 II. The question then is, whether Fiulay A. Johnson had 
 authority from plaintiffs to make a sale of these lands. 
 
 It may be stated, in the first place, as a general rule, that 
 an agent can only act within the circumscribed authority 
 given him by his principal; and one who deals with him is 
 put upon his guard by the very fact that he is dealing with' 
 an agent, and he must ascertain for himself the nature and 
 extent of his authority. The burden is, therefore, always cast 
 upon one claiming the benefit of a contract made with an- 
 other who assumes to act as the agent of a third person, to 
 establish by satisfactory evidence that the contract relied 
 upon was within the scope of the agent's authority. Mechein 
 on Agency, sees. 276-289, and cases cited. 
 
 III. The evidence, we think, fails to establish an express 
 authority from the plaintiffs to the said Finlay A. Johnson to 
 conclude contracts for the sale of these Missouri lands, or to 
 make the particular contract in question. Both of them in 
 testifying in the case very emphatically deny such author- 
 ity, and no evidence was introduced by defendant showing 
 directlj' that an}- was given. The authority, then, if any ex- 
 isted, must be implied or presumed from the conduct of the 
 parties. 
 
 The general rule, which accords with the decisions in this 
 State, is given by Mechem in his work on Agency, as fol- 
 lows : " It _roay therefore be stated as a general rule that, 
 whenever a person has held out another as his agent author- 
 ized to act for him in a given capacity, or has knowingly and 
 without dissent permitted such other to act as his agent in 
 such capacity; or where his habits and course of dealing 
 have been such as to reasonably warrant the presumption 
 that such other was his agent authorized to act in that capa- 
 city^ whether it be in a sinala transaction or in a series of 
 transactions, hte^ujhfljEifcy to such other to act for him in 
 that capacity willJbe^conclusi^clvL.prppiirnpd, so far as it may- 
 be necessary tojprptect the rights of third persons who have 
 relied thereon in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable 
 prudence, and he will not be permitted to deny that such
 
 10& AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL. [CH. IV. 
 
 other was his agent, authorized to do the act that he assumed 
 to do, provided that such act is within the real or apparent 
 scope of the presumed authority." Rice v. Groffmann, 56 
 Mo. 434 ; Summervitte v. Railroad, 62 Mo. 391. 
 
 We are of the opinion that authorit}' to make these sales 
 is clearly implied from the conduct of the parties. One of 
 the owners of the land, a preacher, lived in the State of 
 Illinois ; the other two, unmarried ladies, lived in the State 
 of New Jersey. So far as appears, no one of them ever 
 visited the land or gave an}' personal attention to it. From 
 1868 to 1883 it was in the hands of agents for sale. For 
 most of this time the said Finlay A. Johnson, a son of one 
 of the owners and a nephew of the other two, a lawyer, a 
 notary public and judge of a court, who lived in the State of 
 New Jersey, was one of the agents. The acknowledgment 
 of deeds was made before him ; he paid taxes ; he delivered 
 deeds to purchasers; he collected purchase money; took 
 notes and deeds of trust in his own name for deferred pay- 
 ments ; he removed other local agents, and made settle- 
 ments with them ; he was, in fact, for years the medium 
 through whom all the business was transacted. 
 
 The manner in which this business was transacted through 
 this agent for ten or more years was known in the community 
 and to defendant. All inquiries in regard to the land were 
 made of this agent ; prices were given by him ; purchase 
 money paid to and deeds received from him ; lands leased 
 and rents collected by him, and all under express author- 
 ity. There was also evidence that a former agent, the one 
 removed by Finlay A., made sales and executed contracts 
 upon which plaintiffs afterwards made deeds. That agent 
 was removed for withholding money, and Finla}' A. was 
 appointed, with express authority to collect purchase money. 
 Why this agent, with all these express powers, should have 
 been restricted only in the matter of making sales, is not 
 explained by the evidence. 
 
 We think the conduct of plaintiffs in the transaction of this
 
 52.] DEEW V. NTJNN. 109 
 
 business such as would reasonably have induced defendant 
 to believe that the agent with whom he dealt had authority 
 to make the sales : and after having acted upon tfyfl frflljtfr 
 paid the purchase price, and expended large sums in improve- 
 ments. p|aintifls will not DOW be heard to dispute the 
 authority. 
 
 We are well satisfied with the conclusions reached by the 
 circuit judge, and affirm the judgment All concur, except 
 Barclay, J., who is absent 
 
 52.] BRADISH v. BELKNAP ET AL. 
 
 41 VERMONT, 172. 1868. 
 [Reported herein at p. 135.] 
 
 52.] DREW v. NUNN. 
 
 L. R. 4 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (C. A.), 661. 1879. 
 [Reported herein at p. 24.]
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 FORMATION OF THE RELATION BY NECESSITY. 
 
 55.] BENJAMIN v. DOCKHAM. 
 
 134 MASSACHUSETTS, 418. 1883. 
 
 HOLMES, J. The plaintiff's declaration was for milk de- 
 livered to the defendant by the plaintiff at the defendant's 
 request His proof was of a deliver}- to the defendant's wife, 
 who was living apart from her husband, without means of 
 support, by reason of his cruelty. The only ground of ex- 
 ception which we are asked to consider is, that there was a 
 variance between the declaration and proof. If there were 
 such a variance, as the case has been tried on its merits, and 
 it appears from the statement of the defendant's counsel him- 
 self that there can have been no surprise, an amendment 
 would be allowed. Peck v. Waters, 104 Mass. 345, 351 ; 
 Cleaves v. Lord, 3 Gray, 66. But we think no amendment is 
 necessary. The allegation of delivery to the defendant would 
 seem to be sufficient in a common court, even when the de- 
 livery was to a third person at the defendant's request. 
 Bull v. Sibbs, 8 T. R. 327, 328 ; 2 Chitty PI. (7th ed.) 47, n. 
 // (6th ed.) 56, n. w. A fortiori when it was to the defend- 
 ant's wife, who at common law is one person with her hus- 
 band. Ross v. Noel, Bull. N. P. 136 ; Jtamsdenv. Ambrose, 
 1 Stra. 127. And in those cases where the law authorizes 
 a wife to pledge her husband's credit, even against his will, 
 it creates a compulsory agency, and her request is his 
 request. 
 
 Exceptions overruled
 
 59.] TERRE HAUTE & I. R. CO. V. McMURRAY. Ill 
 
 59.] TERRE HAUTE AND INDIANAPOLIS 
 RAILROAD CO. v. McMURRAY. 
 
 98 INDIANA, 358. 1884. 
 
 ACTION for compensation for services as surgeon. Judg- 
 ment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
 
 ELLIOTT, J. The facts in this case are simple, and lie 
 within a narrow compass, but the questions of law are impor- 
 tant and difficult. 
 
 Frankfort is a way station on the line of appellant's road, 
 distant man}* miles from the principal offices of the compan} 1 
 and from the residences of its chief officers. At this station, 
 at one o'clock of the morning of July 2, 1881, Thomas 
 Coon, a brakeman in the service of the appellant, had his foot 
 crushed between the wheel of a car of the train on which he 
 was employed as a brakeman, and the rail of the track. The 
 injury was such as demanded immediate surgical attention. 
 The conductor of the train requested the appellee, who was a 
 surgeon, residing in the town of Frankfort, to render the 
 injured man professional aid, and informed the appellee that 
 the company would pay him for such services. At the time 
 the accident happened, and at the time the surgeon was 
 employed, there was no officer superior to the conductor at 
 the town of Frankfort. There was at the station a resident 
 agent who had full knowledge of the injury to Coon, and of 
 appellee's employment. This agent was in telegraphic com- 
 munication with the principal officers of the company, but did 
 not communicate with them. The trial court held the appel- 
 lant liable for the reasonable value of the services rendered 
 by the appellee, and awarded him $100. 
 
 In ordinary cases, a conductor or other subordinate agent 
 has no authority to employ surgical assistance for a ser- 
 vant of the corporation who receives an injury or becomes 
 ill. We do not doubt that the general rule is that a conductor 
 has no authority to make contracts with surgeons, and if this 
 principle governs all cases the discussion is at an end ; but
 
 112 AGENCY BY NECESSITY. [CH. V. 
 
 we do not think it does rule every case, for there may be 
 cases so strongly marked as to constitute a class in them- 
 selves and one governed by a different rule. 
 
 The authority of an agent is to be determined from the 
 facts of the particular case. Facts may exist which will 
 greatly broaden or greatly lessen an agent's authority. A 
 conductor's authority in the presence of a superior agent, 
 ma}* dwindle into insignificance ; while in the absence of a 
 superior it may become broad and comprehensive. An 
 emergency may arise which will require the corporation to 
 act instantly, and if the conductor is the only agent present, 
 and the emergency is urgent, he must act for the corporation, 
 and if he acts at all, his acts are of just as much force as those 
 of the highest officer of the corporation. In this instance the 
 conductor was the highest officer on the ground ; he was the 
 sole representative of the corporation ; he it was upon whom 
 devolved the duty of representing the corporation in matters 
 connected within the general line of his dut}* in the sudden 
 emergency which arose out of the injury to the fellow-servant 
 immediately under his control; either he, as the superior 
 agent of the company, must, in such cases, be its representa- 
 tive, or it has none. There are cases where the conductor is 
 the only representative of the corporation that in the emer- 
 gency it can possibly have. There are cases, where the 
 train is distant from the supervision of superior officers, 
 where the conductor must act, and act for the company, and 
 where, for the time, and under the exigencies of the occasion, 
 he is its sole representative, and if he be its only representa- 
 tive, he must, for the time and the exigency, be its highest 
 representative. Simple examples will prove this to be true. 
 Suppose, for illustration, that a train is brought to a halt by 
 the breaking of a bolt, and that near by is a mechanic who 
 can repair the broken bolt and enable the train to proceed on 
 its way, may not the conductor employ the mechanic? 
 Again, suppose a bridge is discovered to be unsafe, and that 
 there are timbers at a neighboring mill which will make it 
 safe, may not the conductor, in behalf of his principal, em-
 
 59.] TERRE HAUTE & I. R. CO. V. McMURRAY. 113 
 
 ploy men to haul the timber to the bridge ? Once more, sup- 
 pose the engineer of a locomotive to be disabled, and that it 
 is necessary to at once move the train to avoid danger, and 
 there is near by a competent engineer, may not the conductor 
 employ him to take the train out of danger? In these ex- 
 amples we mean to include, as a silent factor, the fact that 
 there is an emergency, allowing no time for communicating 
 with superior officers, and requiring immediate action. If it 
 be true that there are cases of pressing emergency where the 
 conductor is on the special occasion the highest representa- 
 tive of the company, then it must be true that he may do, in 
 the emergency, what the chief officer, if present, might do. 
 If the conductor is the only agent who can represent the 
 company, then it is inconceivable that he should, for the 
 purposes of the emergency, and during its existence, be 
 other than the highest officer. The position arises with 
 the emergency, and ends with it. The authorit}* incident to 
 the position is such, and such only, as the emergency im- 
 peratively creates. 
 
 Assuming, as we may justly do, that there are occasions 
 when the exigency is so great, and the necessity so pressing, 
 that the conductor stands temporarily as the representative of 
 the compan}-, with authorit}' adequate to the urgent and imme- 
 diate demands of the occasion, we inquire what is such an 
 emergenc}' as will clothe him with this authoritj' and put him in 
 the position designated. Suppose that a locomotive is over- 
 turned upon its engineer, and he is in immediate danger of 
 great bodily harm, would it not be competent for the con- 
 ductor to hire a derrick, or a lifting apparatus, if one were 
 near at hand, to lift the locomotive from the body of the 
 engineer? Surety some one owes a duty to a man, imperilled 
 as an engineer would be in the case supposed, to release him 
 from peril ; and is there any one upon whom this duty can be 
 so justly put as upon his employer? The man must, in the 
 case supposed, have assistance, and do not the plainest prin- 
 ciples of justice require that the primary duty of yielding 
 assistance should devolve upon the employer rather than on 
 
 8
 
 114 AGENCY BY NECESSITY. [CH. V. 
 
 strangers ? An employer does not stand to his servants as a 
 stranger; he owes them a duty. The cases all agree that 
 some duty is owing from the master to the servant, but no 
 case that we have been able to find defines the limits of this 
 duty. Granting the existence of this general duty, and no 
 one will deny that such a duty does exist, the inquiry is as to 
 its character and extent. Suppose the axle of a car to break 
 because of a defect, and a brakeman's leg to be mangled by 
 the derailment consequent upon the breaking of the axle, and 
 that he is in immediate danger of bleeding to death unless 
 surgical aid is summoned at once, and suppose the accident 
 to occur at a point where there is no station and when no 
 officer superior to the conductor is present, would not the 
 conductor have authority to call a surgeon? Is there not a 
 duty to the mangled man that some one must discharge? 
 and if there be such a duty, who owes it, the employer or a 
 stranger? Humanity and justice unite in affirming that some 
 one owes him this duty, since to assert the contrary is to 
 affirm that upon no one rests the duty of calling aid that may 
 save life. If we concede the existence of this general duty, 
 then the further search is for the one who in justice owes the 
 duty, arid sure!}*, where the question comes between the em- 
 ployer and a stranger, the just rule must be that it rests upon 
 the former. 
 
 (After discussing various authorities, 1 the court proceeds.) 
 If we are right in our conclusion that an emergency may 
 arise which will constitute a conductor, for the time and 
 the emergency, the chief officer of the corporation present, 
 then these cases are strongly in support of our position that 
 he ma3 T , in cases of urgent necessity, bind the corporation by 
 contracting with a surgeon. For, once it is conceded that 
 
 1 Marquette, frc. R. v. Taft, 28 Mich. 289 ; Northern Central Ry. v. State, 
 29 Md. 420 ; Walker v. Great Western Ry,, L. R. 2 Exch. 228 ; Swazey 
 Y. Union Mfg. Co., 42 Conn. 556 ; Atlantic, frc. R. T. Reisner, 18 Kans. 
 458 ; Atchison, frc. R. v. Reecher, 24 Kans. 228 ; Toledo, frc. Ry. v 
 Rodrigues, 47 111. 188 ; Toledo, frc. Ry. v. Prince, 50 111. 26 ; Indianapolis, 
 frc. R. v. Morris, 67 111. 295 ; Cairo, frc. R. v. Mahoney, 82 HI. 73.
 
 59.] TKRKE HAUTE & I. B. CO. V. McMURRAY. 115 
 
 the officer having a right to represent the company is the 
 company, it inevitably follows that his contract is that of the 
 corporation. These cases do deny, however, in general 
 terms, the authority of a station agent or conductor to era- 
 ploy a surgeon, but they affirm that if the superintendent has 
 notice of the services rendered by the surgeon, and does not 
 disavow the agent's acts, the company will be bound. It is to 
 be noted that in all of these cases the company was held liable 
 on the ground of ratification by the superintendent, and there 
 was really no decision of an}* other question than that a fail- 
 ure of the superintendent to disavow the contract of the con- 
 ductor or station agent rendered the company liable. There 
 was no discussion of the authority of a conductor in cases of 
 immediate and urgent necessity. The reasoning of the court 
 in these cases strongly indicates that the act of the superior 
 officer, whoever he may be, on the occasion and under the 
 emergency, would be deemed the act of the corporation which 
 he assumes to represent In the last of these cases it is said : 
 " While a railroad compan}- is under no legal obligation to 
 furnish an employe, who may receive injuries while in the 
 service of the company, with medical attendance, yet, where 
 a day laborer has, by an unforeseen accident, been rendered 
 helpless when laboring to advance the prosperity and the suc- 
 cess of the company, honesty and fair dealing would seem to 
 demand that it should furnish medical assistance." If it 
 be conceded that honesty and fair dealing require that medi- 
 cal assistance should be furnished, then the law requires it, 
 for the law always demands honesty and fair dealing. It 
 would be a cruel reproach to the law, and one not merited, 
 to declare that it denied to an injured man what honesty 
 and "fair dealing require." 
 
 If it should appear that a man had been denied what 
 honesty and fair dealing require of his master, and death 
 should result, it would seem clear, on every principle of 
 justice, that the master would be responsible for the servant's 
 death. Of course this dut} T should not rest upon the master 
 in ordinary cases, but should rest upon him in extraordinary
 
 116 AGENCY BY NECESSITY. [CH. V. 
 
 cases, where immediate medical assistance is imperatively 
 demanded. The case of Tucker v. St. Louis, <&.-., .R. W. 
 Co^ 54 Mo. 177, does decide that a station agent has no 
 authority to employ a surgeon, but no element of pressing 
 necessity entered into the case. There is no authority cited 
 in support of the opinion, nor is there any reasoning. All 
 that is said is : " It is only shown that they " (the station 
 agent and the conductor) " were agents of defendant in 
 conducting its railroad business, which of itself could 
 certainly give them no authority to employ physicians, 
 for the defendant, to attend to, and treat, persons acci- 
 dentally injured on the roads." It may be that this state- 
 ment is true in ordinary cases, but when we add the element 
 of immediate and pressing necessity, a new and potent factor 
 is introduced into the case. A brief opinion was rendered in 
 Brown v. Missouri, &c., R. W. Co., 67 Mo. 122, declaring 
 that the superintendent of the company could not bind the 
 company for " a small bill of drugs furnished a woman who 
 had been hurt by the locomotive or cars of the defendant." 
 It may be said of the last cited case that it presented no 
 feature of emergency requiring prompt action, and for aught 
 that appears in the meagre opinion of a very few lines, there 
 ma}* have been no necessit}' for action. But it is further to 
 be said of it, that if it is to be deemed as going to the extent 
 of denying the right of one of the principal officers to con- 
 tract for medicine in a case of urgenc}', it finds no support 
 from any adjudged case. The case of Mayberry v. Chicago, 
 cfcc., jR. JR. Co., 75 Mo. 492, is not in point, for there a 
 physician employed to render medical aid, and employed 
 for no other purpose, undertook to contract for boarding for 
 an injured man. 
 
 The learned counsel for appellant says, in his argument : 
 " In several of these cases the court takes occasion to say 
 that humanity, if not strict justice, requires a railroad com- 
 pan} r to care for an employe who is injured without fault on 
 his part in endeavoring to promote the interests of the com- 
 pany. Whilst this may be true, I think that humanity and
 
 59.] TERKE HAUTE & I. B. CO. V. McMUKRAY. 117 
 
 strict justice, too, would at least permit the company to 
 adopt the proper means for exercising the required care, and 
 of determining the cases wherein it ought to be exercised." 
 
 It seems to us that while the concession of the counsel is 
 required by principle and authority, his answer is far from 
 satisfactory. Can a man be permitted to die while waiting 
 for the company to determine when and how it shall do what 
 humanity and strict justice require? Must there not be 
 some representative of the company present, in cases of dire 
 necessity, to act for it? The position of counsel will meet 
 ordinary cases, but it falls far short of meeting cases where 
 there is no time for deliberation, and where humanitj- and 
 justice demand instant action. From whatever point of 
 view we look at the subject, we shall find that the highest 
 principles of justice demand that a subordinate agent may, 
 in the company's behalf, call surgical aid, when the emergen- 
 cies of the occasion demand it, and when he is the sole agent 
 of the conapan}' in whose power it is to summon assistance to 
 the injured and suffering servant. Humanity and justice are, 
 for the most part, inseparable, for all law is for the ultimate 
 benefit of man. The highest purpose the law can accom- 
 plish is the good of society and its members ; and it is 
 seldom, indeed, that the law refuses what humanity sug- 
 gests. Before this broad principle bare pecuniary con- 
 siderations become as things of little weight. There may 
 be cases in which a denial of the right of the conductor to 
 summon medical assistance to one of his train men would 
 result in suffering and death ; while, on the other hand, the 
 assertion of the right can, at most, never do more than entail 
 upon the corporation pecuniary loss. It may not do even 
 that, for prompt medical assistance may, in many cases, 
 lessen the loss to the company by preventing loss of life 
 or limb. 
 
 The authority of a conductor of a train in its general 
 scope is known to all intelligent men, and the court that 
 professes itself ignorant of this matter of general notoriety 
 avows a lack of knowledge that no citizen who has the
 
 118 AGENCY BY NECESSITY. [CH. V. 
 
 slightest acquaintance with railroad affairs would be willing 
 to confess. It is true that the exact limits of his authority 
 cannot be inferred from evidence that he is the conductor 
 in charge of the train, but the general duty and authority 
 may be. This general authority gives him control of the 
 train men and of the train, and devolves upon him the duty 
 of using reasonable care and diligence for the safety of his 
 subordinates. The authority of the conductor may be in- 
 ferred, as held in Columbus, <&c., R. W. Co. v. Powell, 40 
 Ind. 37, from his acting as such in the control of the train, 
 but this inference only embraces the ordinary duties of such 
 an agent. Man}' cases declare that the conductor, in the man- 
 agement of the train and matters connected with it, represents 
 the compan}'. It is true that the agency is a subordinate one, 
 confined to the subject-matter of the safetj 7 of the train and 
 its crew, and the due management of matters connected with 
 it ; but although the conductor is a subordinate agent, he yet 
 has broad authority over the special subject committed to his 
 charge. It was said in Jeffersonville Ass'n \. Fisher, 7 Ind. 
 699, that " It is not the name given to the agent, but the acta 
 which he is authorized to do, which must determine whether 
 they are valid or not, when done." In another case it was 
 said : "The authority of an agent being limited to a particu- 
 lar business does not make it special ; it may be as general 
 in regard to that, as though its range were unlimited." 
 Cnizan v. Smith, 41 Ind. 288. This subject was discussed 
 in Toledo, &c., R. W. Co. v. Owen, 43 Ind. 405, where it 
 was said: "A general agent is one authorized to transact 
 all his principal's business, or all of his principal's business 
 of some particular kind. A special agent is one who is 
 authorized to do one or more special things, and is usually 
 confined to one or more particular transactions, such as the 
 sale of a tract of land, to settle and adjust a certain account, 
 or the like. That the authority of an agent is limited to a 
 particular kind of business does not make him a special 
 agent. Few, if any, agents of a railroad company do, or can 
 attend to, every kind of business of the company, but to each
 
 59.] TERRE HAUTE & I. R. CO. V. McMURRAY. 119 
 
 one is assigned duties of a particular kind, or relating to a 
 particular branch or department of the business." Wharton 
 says: "A general agent is one who is authorized by his 
 principal to take charge of his business in a particular line." 
 Wharton on Agency, 117. It results from these familiar 
 principles, that the conductor of a train, so far as concerns 
 the direct and immediate management of the train when it is 
 out on the road, is, in the absence of some superior officer, 
 the general agent of the company ; but even general agents 
 do not have universal powers, and the authority of such 
 agents is to be deduced from the facts surrounding the 
 particular transaction. 2 Greenl. Ev. sees. 64-64a. In 
 some instances, then, the conductor is the general agent of 
 the compan}" ; and we think it clear, upon principle and 
 authority, that he is such an agent for the purpose of 
 employing surgical assistance where the brakeman of his 
 train is injured while the train is out on the road, and where 
 there is no superior officer present, and there is an immediate 
 necessity for surgical treatment. A conductor cannot be 
 regarded as having authority to emplo}* a surgeon when the 
 train is not on the road under his control, or where there is 
 one higher in authority on the ground, or where there is no 
 immediate necessity for the services of a surgeon. 
 
 Judgment affirmed. 
 
 ZOLLARS, C. J., dissents on the ground that it is not 
 sufficiently shown that the conductor had authority to bind 
 the company by his contract with appellee. 
 
 ON PETITION FOB A REHEARING. 
 
 ELLIOTT, J. Counsel for the appellant misconceive the 
 drift of the reasoning in our former opinion, as well as the 
 conclusion announced. We did not decide that a corporation 
 was responsible generalh* for medical or surgical attention 
 given to a sick or wounded servant; on the contrary, we 
 were careful to limit our decision to surgical services ren-
 
 120 AGENCY BY NECESSITY. [CH. V. 
 
 dered upon an urgent exigency, where immediate attention 
 was demanded to save life or prevent great injury. We 
 held that the liability arose with the emergency, and with it 
 expired. 
 
 We did hold that where the conductor was the highest 
 representative of the corporation on the ground, and there 
 was an emergency requiring immediate action, he was 
 authorized to emplo}' a surgeon to give such attention as the 
 exigency of the occasion made imporiousl} 7 necessary ; but 
 we did not hold that the conductor had a general authority 
 to employ a surgeon where there was no emergency, or where 
 there was a superior agent on the ground. We think our 
 decision was well sustained by the authorities there cited, 
 and that it is further supported by the reasoning in Chicago, 
 <Sbc., R. W. Co. v. Ross, 31 Albany L. J. 8, 112 U. S. 377, 
 and Pennsylvania Company v. Gallagher, 40 Ohio St. 637 ; 
 S. C. 48 Am. R. 689. 
 
 If the conductor, who is the superior agent of the company 
 on the ground, cannot represent the principal so far as to 
 employ a surgeon to render professional services to an injured 
 servant, and prevent the loss of life or great bodily harm, then 
 it must be said, as it was said by the Supreme Court of the 
 United States in Chicago, &c., R. W. Co. v. Ross, supra, 
 that " If such conductor does not represent the compan}*, 
 then the train is operated without any representative of its 
 owner." 
 
 The decision in Louisville, &c., R. R.' Co. v. McVay, 
 98 Ind. 391, is not in conflict with our conclusion in the 
 present case. There the road-master was not the superior 
 agent within reach, and there was no emergency demanding 
 immediate action. These are features which very essentially 
 distinguish the two cases. We held in this case a doctrine 
 held in the case cited, namely, that the conductor, or other 
 subordinate agent, has no general authority to employ a 
 surgeon for a sick or wounded servant of the company ; but 
 we also held that where the conductor, in control of the 
 company's train and its brakeman, is the highest agent on
 
 59.] GWILLIAM V. TWIST. 121 
 
 the ground, he does possess an authority commensurate 
 with an existing and pressing emergency. It seems clear 
 to us, upon principles of fair justice and ordinary humanity, 
 that some one must possess authority to meet an urgent 
 exigency by employing surgical aid to save from death or 
 great and permanent injury a servant under his control. 
 As the reasoning in the McVay case clearly shows, there is 
 still another material difference between the two cases, and 
 that is this: There the road-master appeared to only have 
 authority over the repairs of the road ; while here it appears 
 that the conductor had charge of the injured servant, and 
 was the highest officer of the corporation capable of acting 
 as its representative in the emergency which had so suddenly 
 arisen. 
 
 So far as concerns the general principle involved, there is 
 no conflict, but rather harmony, for the McVay case clearly 
 recognizes the doctrine that the highest agent capable of 
 acting for the company may employ surgical aid in the 
 proper case. Petition overruled. 
 
 59.] GWILLIAM v. TWIST ET AL. 
 
 1895. 1 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, 557. 
 
 64 LAW JOURNAL REPORTS, QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (C. A.), 
 474 (1895). 
 
 ACTION for damages for injuries received through the 
 careless management of defendants' omnibus. Judgment for 
 plaintiff. Defendants appeal. 
 
 Defendants' servant Harrison, to whom had been intrusted 
 the driving of the omnibus, was stopped by a police officer 
 for intoxication, and forbidden to drive the omnibus further. 
 One Veares volunteered to drive the omnibus to defendants' 
 yard, which was distant about a quarter of a mile. Harrison 
 and the conductor acquiesced, and both remained in the 
 omnibus, Harrison shouting directions to Veares to drive
 
 122 AGENCY BY NECESSITY. [CH. V. 
 
 carefully at the corners. Veares drove negligently and in- 
 jured plaintiff. The county court judge (Judge Chalmers) 
 found for the plaintiff. An appeal was taken to the Queen's 
 Bench Division. 
 
 [1895, 1 Q. B. D. 557.] 
 
 LAWRANCE, J. The question is whether Harrison and the 
 conductor, by acquiescing in Veares driving the omnibus, 
 constituted Veares the servant of the defendants, so as to 
 render the defendants liable for the accident which happened 
 while he was so driving. The judge held that, if they had 
 the power to do so, they must be taken to have authorized 
 Veares to drive on the defendants' behalf. Then, had they 
 the power to do so ? In the absence of an express authority 
 in that behalf, is an authority to employ Veares to be im- 
 plied ? I think that, having regard to the necessity which 
 the judge apparent!}' found as a fact to have arisen, such an 
 authority must be implied. The judgment must therefore be 
 affirmed. 
 
 WRIGHT, J. This case raises a very serious question of 
 law, upon which, so far as I am aware, there is little or no 
 authority. The view, however, which I take upon the matter 
 is this. I think that in cases of sudden emergency a servant 
 has an implied authority from his employer to act in good 
 faith according to the best of his judgment for that em- 
 ployer s interests^ subject "to this, that in so doing he must 
 violate no express limitation of his authority,and must not 
 act in a manner which is plainly pnreasnnftblp. And in cases 
 to which this doctrine applies I think the servant must be 
 regarded as not the less acting within the scope of his 
 employment because his judgment happens to be mistaken 
 and wrong. Of course a servant cannot have any implied 
 authority to do on behalf of his master any act which it 
 would be illegal for the master to do himself ; for instance, 
 if there had been a statute or by-law applying to those omni- 
 buses, making it illegal to employ an unlicensed person to 
 drive them, I think the defendants' servants would not, how-
 
 59.] GWILLIAM V. TWIST. 123 
 
 ever great the emergency was, have been acting within the 
 scope of their employment in authorizing such a person as 
 Veares to drive on their employers' behalf. But no such 
 illegality was shown here. Such, then, being my view of the 
 legal doctrine applicable to the facts of this case, I cannot 
 say that there was not some evidence on which the county 
 court judge might find that such an emergency existed as 
 would bring the case within the limits of that doctrine. 
 Whether upon the question of fact I should have arrived at 
 the same conclusion is another matter ; but I am of opinion 
 that we cannot upon the question of law say that the judg- 
 ment was wrong. Appeal dismissed. 
 
 The defendants then appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
 
 [64 L. J. Q. B. 474.] 
 LORD ESHER, M. R. This^ao raigpg a question of great 
 
 importance, which, however, it does not seem to me, we have 
 now to decide. That question is whether, where it may become 
 necessary for a servant who is intrusted with a particular 
 duty to delegate that duty to some one else, that ftefagHtjnn 
 makes that person to whom the duty has been so delegated 
 the servant of the master^ so as to render the master liable 
 for his wrongful acts. This proposition, however, is clear, 
 namety, that a servant employed for a particular purpose can 
 have no authority to delegate that duty to any one else, 
 unless there is a necessity that he should do so. The ser- 
 vant cannot delegate unless there is a necessity to do so. The 
 question here is whether there was an}' evidence upon which 
 the county court judge could reasonably find that there was 
 a necessity for the driver of the defendants' omnibus to 
 delegate his duty to Veares. First of all, I do not think that 
 the county court judge did find, as a fact, that there was 
 any such necessity ; but afterwards, when he delivered judg- 
 ment, he did seem to assume that, upon the facts of the case, 
 such a necessity did arise. The question, therefore, is whether 
 the servant had any right to delegate his duty without first
 
 124 AGENCY BY NECESSITY. [CH. V. 
 
 consulting bis master, for, if he had an opportunity to do so, 
 no question of necessity could arise. Here the driver became 
 incapable of driving the omnibus ; such incapacity being the 
 result of an order given by the police forbidding him to drive 
 it. It is obvious that the omnibus, which was only about 
 a quarter of a mile from the defendants' yard, might have 
 been left standing in reasonable safety where it was, and the 
 horses might have been watched, while the defendants' ser- 
 vants communicated with their masters for directions as to 
 what was to be done. The moment that was clear, the 
 county court judge would have been bound to tell the jury 
 that no case of necessit} 7 had been made out for the driver 
 delegating his duty without first communicating with his 
 masters. There was no evidence upon which he could rea- 
 sonably say that there was any necessity on the part of the 
 driver to delegate his duty to Vcares so as to make the 
 defendants liable by reason of Veares being their servant for 
 this purpose. I agree with the remarks of Mr. Baron Parke 
 in Bawtayne v. JBourne, 7 M. & W. 595, and of Chief 
 Justice Eyre in Nicholson v. Chapman, 2 H. Black. 254, 
 that the delegation of duty by reason of necessity is confined 
 to certain well-known cases as, for instance, in the cases 
 of the master of a ship, or of an acceptor of a bill of exchange 
 for the honor of the drawer, or of salvage; but those are 
 cases which are excepted, some by the law of nations, and 
 some by the law of this country. The appeal must therefore 
 be allowed. 
 
 SMITH, L. J. I am of the same opinion. ... It is, 
 however, said that such circumstances may arise that the 
 coachman is constituted an agent of his master b}- necessit}'. 
 That m^v be so, but the agent must be placed in such a 
 position that he has to act upon his own responsibility and 
 common sense when he is not able to communicate with his 
 principal. A resume of the cases which show what consti- 
 tutes an agent of necessity in the case of goods carried on 
 board ship, will be found in Carver's Carriage by Sea, where 
 it is said, in section 299, that, " If there is a fair expectation of
 
 59.] GWILLIAM V. TWIST. 125 
 
 obtaining directions, either from the owners of the goods or 
 from agents known by the master to have authority to deal 
 with the goods, within such a time as would not be imprudent, 
 the master must make every reasonable endeavor to get 
 those directions ; and his authority to sell does not arise until 
 he has failed to get them," that is to say, that until he has 
 made that endeavor and failed, he does not become an agent 
 of necessity. I adopt the words of the passage which I have 
 read. It is true that when the county court judge gave his 
 findings here on the questions of fact in the first instance, he 
 did not deal with the question whether a case of necessity 
 arose ; but when he delivered judgment, after further consider- 
 ation, he said that it was clearly necessar}* that some one 
 should drive the omnibus home. It appears to me, however, 
 that that did not make Harrison an agent of necessity within 
 the law applicable to such a question. It is impossible, upon 
 the admitted facts of the case, to say that there was evidence 
 that Harrison was, under the circumstances of the case, an 
 agent of necessity. The omnibus was within a quarter of a 
 mile of his masters' yard, and it is obvious that he had an 
 opportunity of communicating with them. Upon these grounds, 
 I think that Harrison was not acting within the scope of his 
 authority when he permitted Veares to drive the omnibus home, 
 and consequently the defendants are not liable for the injuries 
 caused by Veares' negligence. 
 
 RIGBT, L. J. I am of the same opinion. The county 
 court judge here found certain facts, and reserved the ques- 
 tion of law. I should be inclined to say that in his judgment 
 he assumes there was a necessity from the facts found. I 
 think there was no evidence here of such a necessity as is 
 required by law to justify Harrison in placing Veares in the 
 position of driver, and by so doing make the defendants 
 liable for his negligence. I do not think any of the cases 
 even point to such a liability unless there be such a necessity ; 
 and, for the reasons that have been given, I do not think 
 there is any evidence of such necessity in this case. 
 
 Appeal allowed.
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. 
 1. By accomplishment of purpose. 
 
 61.] ROWE, TRUSTEE y. RAND, RECEIVER. 
 Ill INDIANA, 206. 1887. 
 
 INTERVENING petition by Rowe, designating himself " trus- 
 tee," against Rand, as receiver of the Indiana Banking Co., 
 praying that an allowance be made in his favor for funds 
 deposited in the bank by him as "trustee." Defence: 
 (1) denial ; (2) payment ; (3) release. Judgment for de- 
 fendant. Petitioner appeals. 
 
 Rowe was intrusted with certain property belonging jointly 
 to the First N. B. (No. 55) and the Indiana Banking Co., 
 with instructions to sell it and divide the proceeds between 
 the two companies in a given proportion. Rowe sold the 
 property and, with the consent of both companies, deposited 
 the proceeds to his own credit, under the name of " William 
 Rowe, trustee," in the bank of the Indiana Banking Co. He 
 used this designation because he already had accounts there 
 in his individual name, in his name as " agent," and in his 
 name as " receiver." Later the First N. B. (No. 55) was 
 replaced by a new organization known as the First N. B. 
 (No. 255G) which succeeded to the assets and business of the 
 former bank. Later still the Indiana Banking Co. became 
 insolvent, and defendant Rand was appointed receiver. The 
 insolvent compan}- owed the two national bank organizations 
 a large sum of monej*, and there was an additional claim 
 which was contested. The representatives of the three 
 organizations met, before the appointment of the receiver, 
 adjusted their claims and signed mutual releases.
 
 61.] EOWE V. HAND. 127 
 
 Notwithstanding this settlement Howe claimed the right to 
 recover the amount deposited by him in his name as trustee. 
 
 NIBLACK, J. A trustee is one to whom an estate has been 
 conveyed in trust, and, consequently, the holding of property 
 in trust constitutes a person a trustee. An agent is one who 
 acts for, or in place of, another, denominated the principal, 
 in virtue of power or authority conferred by the latter, to 
 whom an account must be rendered. In the case of an 
 ordinary agency for the sale or disposition of property, the 
 title to the property, as well as to the proceeds, remains in the 
 principal. Such an agency may be revoked at any time, in 
 the discretion of the principal. It may, also, be in like man- 
 ner terminated by the renunciation of the agent, he being 
 liable only for the damages which may result to the principal. 
 An agency may also be, and is, revoked by operation of law 
 in certain cases, among which are the bankruptcy of the 
 principal, the extinction of the subject-matter of the agency, 
 the loss of the principal's power over such subject-matter, or 
 the complete execution of the business for which the agency 
 was created; also, where the changed condition becomes 
 such as to produce an incapacity in either party to proceed 
 with the business of the agency. Where a power or authority 
 to act as agents is conferred on two persons, the death of one 
 of them terminates the agency. So, where two persons are 
 jointly appointed agents to take charge of a particular busi- 
 ness for a specified term or purpose, and one of them becomes 
 incapacitated before the term is completed or the purpose is 
 accomplished, the other cannot proceed alone without the 
 consent of the principal, and hence the agency is thereby in 
 effect revoked. Abbott's and Bouvier's Law Dictionaries, 
 titles "Agent," and "Agency;" 1 Wait, Actions and De- 
 fences, 289 ; 1 Parsons on Cont. 39, et seq.; Story on Agency, 
 sees. 38, 42, 474, 499. 
 
 The inevitable inference from these legal propositions is, 
 that when two principals jointly appoint an agent to take 
 charge of some matter in which they are jointly interested, 
 and a severance of their joint interest afterwards occurs, the 
 severance revokes the agency.
 
 128 TERMINATION OP AGENCY. [CH. VI. 
 
 An agent may sue in his own name : First. When the 
 contract is in writing, and is expressly made with him, 
 although he may have been known to act as agent. /Sec- 
 ondly. When the agent is the only known or ostensible 
 principal, and is, therefore, in contemplation of law, the real 
 contracting party. Thirdly. When by the usage of trade, he 
 is authorized to act as owner, or as a principal contracting 
 party, notwithstanding his well known position as agent only. 
 But this right of an agent to bring an action, in certain cases, 
 in his own name is subordinate to the rights of the principal, 
 who ma} r , unless in particular cases, where the agent has a 
 lien or some other vested right, bring suit himself, and thus 
 suspend or extinguish the right of the agent. 
 
 Applying the general principles thus announced to the 
 facts herein above stated, our conclusions are, that Rowe 
 became an agent only, and hence not a trustee, for the sale 
 of the property left with him by the banks ; that he acquired 
 no lien either upon the property or its proceeds which would 
 have prevented the national banks, or either one of them, as 
 the situation might have authorized at the time, from revok- 
 ing Rowe's authority as their agent, and demanding an 
 accounting from the banking company as to the money 
 deposited with it by him, or from demanding such an account- 
 ing without revoking Rowe's agency ; that, consequently, 
 the money so deposited constituted a fund upon which the 
 national banks might have based a claim against the banking 
 company when the agreement was mutually entered into on 
 the tenth da}' of August, 1883, and that, if, in fact, all claim 
 against that fund was released by the agreement of that date, 
 the agency of Rowe in all matters concerning the fund was 
 thereby revoked, leaving him in a position to demand only an 
 accounting for his services and expenses. 
 
 (The court further holds that the mutual releases must be 
 construed to include all claims of every kind held by the 
 national banks against the banking company.) 
 
 Judgment affirmed.
 
 61.] AHERN V. BAKER. 129 
 
 61.] AHERN v. BAKER. 
 
 34 MINNESOTA, 98. 1885. 
 
 ACTION for damages for refusal to perform a contract to 
 sell land. Answer, revocation of authority of agent who 
 concluded the sale. Demurrer to answer overruled. 
 
 VANDERBURGH, J. The defendant, on the ninth day of 
 September, 1884, specially authorized one Wheeler, as his 
 agent, to sell the real property in controversy, and to execute 
 a contract for the sale of the same. He in like manner on 
 the same day empowered one Fairchild to sell the same land, 
 the authority of the agent in each instance being limited to 
 the particular transaction named. On the same day, Wheeler 
 effected a sale of the land, which was consummated b} r a 
 conveyance. Subsequently, on the tenth day of September, 
 Fairchild, as agent for defendant, and having no notice of 
 the previous sale made by Wheeler, also contracted to sell 
 the same land to this plaintiff, who, upon defendant's refusal 
 to perform on his part, brings this action for damages for 
 breach of the contract. 
 
 This is a case of special agency, and there is nothing in the 
 case going to show that the plaintiff would be estopped from 
 setting up a revocation of the agenc}' prior to the sale by 
 Fairchild. A revocation may be shown by the death of the 
 principal, the destruction of the subject-matter, or the deter- 
 mination of bis estate by a sale, as well as by express notice. 
 The plaintiff had a right to employ several agents, and the 
 act of one in making a sale would preclude the others wit 
 out any notice, unless the nature of his contract with them 
 required it In dealing with the agent the plaintiff took 
 the risk of the revocation of his agency. 1 Parsons on 
 Cont. 71. 
 
 Order affirmed, and case remanded.
 
 130 TERMINATION OF AGENCY. [CH. VI. 
 
 61.] SHORT v. MILLARD. 
 
 68 ILLINOIS, 292. 1873. 
 [Reported herein at p. 166.] 
 
 2. By revocation. 
 
 65.] BROOKS HIRE v. BROOKSHIRE. 
 8 IREDELL'S LAW (N. C.), 74. 1847. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT to recover expenses and commissions as agent. 
 Judgment for plaintiff for expenses only. Both parties 
 appeal. 
 
 Plaintiffs authority was by deed. Defendant revoked the 
 authority by parol. The expenses were incurred in part after 
 such parol revocation. The court charged that, if there was 
 a parol revocation, plaintiff could recover for expenses and 
 services up to the time of the revocation, but not after. The 
 verdict was for expenses up to the time of the revocation. 
 
 NASH, J. It is not denied by the plaintiff, that, in this 
 case, it was within the power of the defendant to put an end 
 to his agency, by revoking his authorit}*. Indeed, this is a 
 doctrine, so consonant with justice and common sense, that 
 it requires no reasoning to prove it. But he contends, that 
 it is a maxim of the common law, that every instrument must 
 be revoked by one of equal dignit}*. It is true an instru- 
 ment under seal cannot be released or discharged by an 
 instrument not under seal or by parol ; but we do not consider 
 the rule as applicable to the revocation of powers of attor- 
 ney, especially to such an one as we are now considering. 
 The authorit}' of an agent is conferred at the mere will of 
 his principal, and is to be executed for his benefit ; the prin- 
 cipal, therefore, has the right to put an end to the agency 
 whenever he pleases, and the agent has no right to insist 
 upon acting, when the confidence at first reposed in him is 
 withdrawn. In this case, it was not necessary to enable the
 
 65.] BROOKSHIRE V. BROOKSHIRE. 131 
 
 plaintiff to execute his agency, that his power should be 
 under seal ; one by parol, or by writing of any kind, would 
 have been sufficient ; it certainly cannot require more form to 
 revoke the power than to create it. Mr. Story, in his treatise 
 on Agency, page 606, lays it down that the revocation of a 
 power may be, by a direct and formal declaration publicly 
 made known, or by an informal writing, or by parol ; or it 
 may be implied from circumstances, and he nowhere inti- 
 mates, nor do any of the authorities we have looked into, 
 that when the power is created by deed, it must be revoked 
 b} r deed. And, as was before remarked, the nature of the 
 connection between the principal and the agent seems to be 
 at war with such a principle. It is stated, by Mr. Story, in 
 the same page, that an agency may be revoked by implica- 
 tion, and all the text-writers lay down the same doctrine. 
 Thus, if another agent is appointed to execute powers, pre- 
 viously intrusted to some other person, it is a revocation, in 
 general, of the power of the latter. For this proposition, 
 Mr. Story cites, Copeland v. The Mercantile Insurance Com- 
 pany, 6 Pick. 198. In that case, it was decided that a power, 
 given to one Pedrick to sell the interest of his principal in a 
 vessel, was revoked by a subsequent letter of instruction to 
 him and the master, to sell. As then, an agent ma}- be ap- 
 pointed by parol, and as the appointment of a subsequent 
 agent supersedes and revokes the powers previously granted 
 to another, it follows, that the power of the latter, though 
 created by deed, may be revoked by the principal, by parol. 
 But the case in Pickering goes further. The case does 
 pot state, in so many words, that the power granted to 
 Pedrick was under seal, but the facts set forth in the case 
 show that was the fact, and, if so, it is a direct authority in 
 this case. This is the only point raised, in the plaintiff's bill 
 of exceptions, as to the judge's charge. 
 
 (The court then decides against the defendant upon his 
 appeal on a question of costs and of practice-) 
 
 PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, on each appeal, and 
 each appellant must pay the costs of his appeal.
 
 132 TERMINATION OF AGENCY. [CH. VI. 
 
 65.] HARTLEY AND MINOR'S APPEAL. 
 53 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 212. 1866. 
 
 PETITION to Orphans' Court. Petition denied. Petition- 
 ers appeal. 
 
 An heir of the estate of one Douglas gave to petitioners a 
 power of attorney to collect all monej" and property coming 
 to her from the estate of Douglas, with power to convey her 
 interest in the real estate, the said Hartley and Minor to 
 receive as compensation for their services one-half of the 
 net proceeds so recovered. Later she gave a like power 
 to one Rowland, and in it revoked that to Hartley and Minor. 
 The latter now petition the court, as attorneys for the heir, 
 for a settlement of the administrator's accounts. Objected 
 to because of power of attorney to Rowland. 
 
 THOMPSON, J. There was no error committed by the court 
 below in holding the power of attorney of Hannah Gallion to 
 the appellants to be revocable. It was an ordinary agenc}*, 
 constituted by letter of attorney, to act for her to enforce a 
 settlement of his accounts by the administrator of her father's 
 estate, in which she was interested, and to collect any moneys 
 or property that might belong or be coming to her. For 
 these services the attorneys were to have one-half of the net 
 proceeds of what they might receive or recover for her. The 
 plaintiffs in error suppose that this clause rendered the power 
 irrevocable by their principal, under the idea that it was a 
 power coupled with an interest. This was a mistake, as all 
 the authorities show. To impart an irrevocable quality to a 
 power of attorney in the absence of any express stipulation, 
 and as the result of legal principles alone, there must co-exist 
 with the power an interest in the thing or estate to be dis- 
 posed of or managed under the power. An instance of 
 frequent occurrence in practice m&y be given of the assign- 
 ment of vessels at sea, with a power to sell for the benefit of 
 the holder of the power, or of anybody else who may have
 
 65.] BLACKSTONE V. BUTTERMORE. 133 
 
 advanced money and who it was agreed should be secured in 
 that waj'. So where securities have been transferred with a 
 power to sell, and generally, I presume, in all cases of prop- 
 erty pledged for the security of money where there is an 
 accompanying authority to sell to reimburse the lender or 
 creditor. In Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174, this doc- 
 trine is clearly and fully elucidated in the opinion of Marshall, 
 C. J. In Bancroft v. Ashhurst, 2 Grant, 513, a case tried 
 at Nisi Prius before me, at which my brethren sat as asses- 
 sors, there is a pretty full examination of the question herein 
 involved, and all the authorities referred to, and the conclu- 
 sion is fully in accordance with Hunt v. Rousmanier, and 
 sustains the above view of a power coupled with an interest. 
 In the case in hand, the power and the interest could not 
 co-exist. The interest the appellants would have would be in 
 the net proceeds collected under the power, and the exercise of 
 the power to collect the proceeds would ipso facto extinguish 
 it entirely, or so far as exercised. Hence the appellants' inter- 
 est would properly begin when the power ended. This dis- 
 tinction is noticed in Hunt v. Rousmanier ; but neither by 
 this test, nor by any other, was the power of attorney in 
 question irrevocable, and this judgment must be affirmed. 
 
 Judgment affirmed. 
 
 65.] BLACKSTONE v. BUTTERMORE. 
 53 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 266. 1866. 
 
 EJECTMENT. Verdict and judgment for defendant. Plain- 
 tiff appeals. 
 
 Buttermore gave to one Davidson a power of attorney to 
 sell the land in question, such instrument declaring that 
 " this authority is irrevocable before the first day of May 
 next." In April, Davidson sold the land to plaintiff, but 
 defendant refused to perform. There was evidence that 
 defendant had revoked the power before the sale to plaintiff,
 
 134 TERMINATION OF AGENCY. [CH. VI. 
 
 and that plaintiff had notice of the revocation. The court 
 charged that the jx>\yer was revocable, and that if it was 
 revoked and plainti^* lm ^ Anting of it., hgj^uld not.recpyer. 
 
 AGNEW, J. We have decided the substantial point in this 
 case at the present term upon the appeal of Hartley and 
 Minor from the Orphans' Court of Greene County, opinion 
 by Thompson, J., 53 Pa. St. 212. 
 
 A power of attorney constituting a mere agency is always 
 revocable. It is only wb pn ^""pl^d with an interest, jn the 
 thing itself, or the estate which Is the subject of the power. 
 it is_deemed to_hft irrevocable^ as where it is a security for 
 money advanced or is to be used as a means of effectuating 
 a_rjurrjose_necessary to protect the rights of the agent or 
 others. A mere power like a will is in its very nature 
 revocable when it concerns the interest of the principal 
 alone, and in such case even an express declaration of 
 irrevocability will not prevent revocation. An interesj; in 
 the proceeds to arise as mere compensation for tbft service 
 of executing the power will not make the power irrevocable. 
 Therefore, it has been held that a mere employment to trans- 
 act the business of the principal is not irrevocable without an 
 express covenant founded on sufficient consideration, notwith- 
 standing the compensation of the agent is to result from the 
 business to be performed and to be measured by its extent. 
 Coffin v. Landis, 10 Wright, 426. In order to make an 
 agreement for irrevocability contained in a power to transact^ 
 business for the benefit of the principal binding on him, there 
 must be a consideration for it independent of the compensa- 
 tion to be rendered for the services to be performed. In this 
 case, the object of the principal was to make sale solely for 
 his own benefit. The agreement to give his agent a certain 
 sum and a portion of the proceeds, was merely to carry out 
 his purpose to sell. But what obligation was there upon him 
 to sell, or what other interest beside his own was to be se- 
 cured by the sale? Surely his determination to sell for his 
 own ends alone was revocable. If the reasons for making a 
 sale had ceased to exist, or he should find a sale injurious to
 
 66.] BRADISH V. BELKXAP. 135 
 
 his interests, who had a right to say he should not change 
 his rnind? The interest of the agent was only in his com- 
 pensation for selling, and without a sale this is not earned. 
 A revocation could not injure him. If he had expended 
 money, time, or labor, or all, upon the business intrusted to 
 him, the power itself was a request to do so, and on a revo- 
 cation would leave the principal liable to him on his implied 
 assumpsit. But it would be the height of injustice if the 
 power should be held to be irrevocable merelj' to secure the 
 agent for his outlay or his services rendered before a sale. 
 The following authorities are referred to : Hunt v. Rous- 
 manier, 8 Wheat. 174; Story on Agency, 463, 464, 
 465, 468, 476, 477; Paley on Agency, 155; 1 Parsons on 
 Cont. 59; Irwin v. Workman, 3 Watts, 357; Smyth v. 
 Craig, 3 W. & S. 14. 
 
 The judgment is therefore affirmed. 
 
 66.] BRADISH v. BELKNAP ET AL. 
 
 41 VERMONT, 172. 1868. 
 
 ACTION on book account. Judgment for plaintiff on the 
 special report of the auditor. Exceptions b\- defendants. 
 
 PIERPONT, C. J. The report in this case shows that, for a 
 long period prior and up to 1863, one Brockway was the 
 agent of the defendants in taking stoves about the country, 
 and selling them as he could find purchasers. This fact was 
 generally known, and was well known to the plaintiff. In 1863 
 Brockway and the defendants changed their arrangement, 
 and Brockway ceased to be their agent in fact ; but he con- 
 tinued the business of selling stoves, which he took of the 
 defendants as before. It does not appear that this new 
 arrangement was known to an}' one except Brockway and 
 the defendants. No public notice was given of the fact. 
 Brockwa}* continued to hold himself out to the world as the 
 agent of the defendants in the business, and was in the
 
 136 TERMINATION OF AGENCY. [CH. VI. 
 
 habit of taking notes for stoves sold, paj'able to the de- 
 fendants ; and this was known to the defendants. 
 
 While the business was being so conducted, the plaintiff, 
 believing Brockway to be the agent of the defendants, pro- 
 posed to Brockway to buy a stove of him and pay in pine 
 lumber. Brockway said he was selling the stoves for the 
 defendants, and, if they wanted the lumber, he would take 
 it and let him have the stove. Afterward Edson, one of the 
 defendants, went to the plaintiffs, looked at the lumber, 
 ascertained the price, and said it would answer their pur- 
 pose. Afterward Edson went to the plaintiff's, and measured 
 out a part of the lumber, and laid it by itself, and the 
 plaintiff and Brockway subsequently measured out the re- 
 mainder of the lumber charged, and the defendants and 
 Brockway drew it away, and the defendants converted it to 
 their own use. The plaintiff charged the lumber to the 
 defendants, and took the stove, giving the defendants credit 
 for it against the lumber. 
 
 Brockway during all this time was perfectly poor and 
 irresponsible, and this fact was known by both parties. 
 Brockway represented himself as the agent of the defen- 
 dants, and the conduct of the defendants was such as to 
 justify the plaintiff in regarding them as the principals ; and 
 we can hardly conceive it possible under the circumstances, 
 that the defendants did not understand that the plaintiff 
 so regarded them. And to allow them now to den} 7 the 
 agency and thus defeat the plaintiff's right to recover for the 
 balance of the lumber, would be permitting them to per- 
 petrate a palpable fraud on the plaintiff. 
 
 Judgment of the county court is affirmed.
 
 70.] TURNER V. GOLDSMITH. 137 
 
 3. By change affecting subject-matter. 
 
 70.] TURNER v. GOLDSMITH. 
 
 1891. 1 QUEEN'S BENCH (C. A.), 544. 
 
 ACTION for damages for breach of contract of employment. 
 Defence, destruction of defendant's manufactory by fire. 
 Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. 
 
 LINDLET, L. J. This is an action for breach of contract in 
 not employing the plaintiff for the period of five j'ears. The 
 contract turns upon the construction of the agreement 
 entered into by the parties, and the application of it in the 
 events which have happened. The plaintiff wished to act as 
 traveller to the defendant, and the defendant wished to 
 engage him in that capacity. An agreement, dated January 
 31, 1887, was entered into between them, which contained 
 this recital : 
 
 " Whereas, in consideration of the agreement of the said 
 A. S. Turner, the said company" (i.e., Mr. Goldsmith, 
 and an} T partner he might have) " agree to employ the said 
 A. S. Turner as their agent, canvasser, and traveller, upon 
 the terms and subject to the stipulations and conditions 
 hereinafter contained ; and in consideration of the premises 
 the said A. S. Turner hereby agrees with the said company 
 that he, the said A. S. Turner, shall and will diligently, 
 faithfull}', and honestly serve the said company as their 
 agent, canvasser, and traveller, upon the terms and subject 
 to the stipulations and conditions hereinafter contained." 
 
 Stopping there, we have a clear agreement b} T the company 
 to employ the plaintiff, and by the plaintiff to serve the com- 
 pany and on what terms? (1) That the agency shall 
 commence as from January 31, 1887, and shall be deter- 
 minable either by the company or Turner at the end of five 
 years from the date of the agreement upon giving such notice 
 as therein mentioned. (2) " The said A. S. Turner shall 
 do his utmost to obtain orders for and sell the various goods 
 manufactured or sold by the said company as shall be from
 
 138 TERMINATION OF AGENCY. [CH. VI. 
 
 time to time forwarded or submitted by sample or pattern 
 to him, at list price, to good and substantial customers." 
 Clause 5 is only material because it repeats the words 
 " manufactured or sold by the said company." The 8th 
 clause provides for the plaintiffs remuneration by a com- 
 mission on the goods sold by him. The other clauses are 
 not material as regards the question before us. 
 
 It was contended by the defendant that the agreement did 
 not contain any stipulation that the company should furnish 
 the plaintiff with an}' samples, and that there was, therefore, 
 no agreement to do what was necessary to enable him to earn 
 commission. The answer to that is, that the company would 
 not be employing the plaintiff within the meaning of the 
 agreement unless they supplied him with samples to a reason- 
 able extent. Then it was said that there is no undertaking 
 by the company to go on manufacturing. It is true that 
 there is no express, nor, so far as I see, any implied under- 
 taking b} r the company to manufacture even a single shirt ; 
 they might buy the articles in the market. The defendant's 
 place of business was burned down ; the defendant has given 
 up business, and has made no effort to resume it. The 
 plaintiff then says, " I am entitled to damages for your 
 breach of the agreement to employ me for five j'ears." The 
 defendant pleads that the agreement was conditional on the 
 continued existence of his business. On the face of the 
 agreement there is no reference to the place of business, and 
 no condition as to the defendant's continuing to manufacture 
 or sell. How, then, can such a condition as the defendant 
 contends for be implied ? 
 
 It was contended that the point was settled by authority. 
 I will refer to three cases on the subject. In Rhodes v. 
 Forwood, 1 A pp. Cas. 256, it was held that an action very 
 similar to the present was not maintainable. But that case 
 went on the ground that, there not being any express con- 
 tract to employ the agent, such a contract could not be 
 implied. In the present case we find an express contract to 
 employ him.
 
 70.] TURNER V. GOLDSMITH. 139 
 
 In Cowasjee Nanabhoy v. Lallbhoy Vullubhoy, Law Rep. 
 3 Ind. App. 200, there was a contract in a partnership deed 
 to employ one of the partners during his life as sole agent to 
 effect purchases and sales on behalf of the partnership at a 
 commission upon his sales. The partnership was dissolved 
 by decree of the High Court of Bombay on the ground that 
 the business could not be carried on at a profit. It was held 
 that the employment was to sell on behalf of the partnership ; 
 that, the partnership having come to an end, the employ- 
 ment ceased, and that the partner could not claim any 
 compensation, for that a contract to carry on the partner- 
 ship during the claimant's life under all circumstances coulu 
 not be implied. 
 
 Taylor v. Caldwett, 3 B. & S. 826, 833, contains some ob- 
 servations which are very much in point. Blackburn, J., 
 there says: "There seems no doubt that where there is a 
 positive contract to do a thing not in itself unlawful, the 
 contractor must perform it or pay damages for not doing it, 
 although in consequence of unforeseen accidents the perform- 
 ance of his contract has become unexpectedly burdensome cr 
 even impossible. . . . But this rule is only applicable when 
 the contract is positive and absolute, and not subject to any 
 condition, either express or implied, and there are authorities 
 which we think establish the principle that where from the 
 nature of the contract it appears that the parties must from 
 the beginning have known that it could not be fulfilled, 
 unless when the time for the fulfilment of the contract 
 arrived some particular specified thing continued to exist, so 
 that when entering into the contract they must have contem- 
 plated such continuing existence as the foundation of what 
 was to be done, then, in the absence of any express or im- 
 plied warranty that the thing shall exist, the contract is not 
 to be construed as a positive contract, but as subject to an 
 implied condition that the parties shall be excused in case 
 before breach performance becomes impossible from the per- 
 ishing of the thing without default of the contractor." The 
 sjibstance of that is that the contract will be treated as SUD-
 
 140 TEKMINATION OF AGENCY. [CH. VI. 
 
 ject to an implied condition that it is to be in force only so 
 long as a certain state of things continues, in those cases 
 only where the parties must have contemplated the continu- 
 ing of that state of things as the foundation of what was to 
 be done. Here the parties cannot be taken to have con- 
 templated the continuance of the defendant's manufactory 
 as the foundation of what was to be done ; for, as I have 
 already observed, the plaintiffs employment was not con- 
 fined to articles manufactured by the defendant. The action 
 therefore, in my opinion, is maintainable. 
 
 The plaintiff then is entitled to damages, and in my opin- 
 ion not merely to nominal damages ; for, if I am right in my 
 construction of the agreement, he has suffered substantial 
 loss. We think, however, that 125 is too much, and the 
 plaintiff's counsel having agreed to take our assessment of 
 damages rather than be sent to a new trial, we assess them 
 at 50, and direct judgment to be entered for the plaintiff 
 for that amount. 
 
 KAY, L. J. The Lord Justice Lopes desires me to say 
 that he concurs in our decision. If it had been shown that 
 not only the manufactory but the business of the defendant 
 had been destroyed by vis major, without any default of the 
 defendant, I think that the plaintiff could not recover. But 
 there is no proof that it is impossible for the defendant to 
 carry on business in articles of the nature mentioned in the 
 agreement. The contract is peculiar; it is to employ the 
 plaintiff for five years certain, with power to either party to 
 determine the employment at the end of that time by notice. 
 The defendant has ceased to employ the plaintiff within the 
 five years, and contends that a condition is to be implied 
 that the manufactory must continue to exist. The plaintiff 
 is not seeking to import anything into the contract ; the 
 defendant seeks to import the implied condition which I have 
 mentioned. I cannot import any such condition. If it had 
 been proved that the defendant's power to carry on business 
 had been taken away b}' something for which he was not 
 responsible, I should say that there was no breach of the
 
 71.] LONG V. THAYER, 141 
 
 agreement ; but here it was not taken away, and our decision 
 is quite consistent with the class of cases where the parties 
 have been excused from the performance of a contract, be- 
 cause it was considered to be subject to an implied condition. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 1 
 
 4. By death. 
 
 71.] LONG v. THAYER. 
 
 150 UNITED STATES, 520. 1893. 
 
 BILL in equity filed by Thayer to enjoin enforcement of a 
 judgment of ejectment obtained by Long against one Smith, 
 a tenant under Thayer. Judgment for Tha}*er, upon condi- 
 tion that he pay into court $126.25, with interest, and decree 
 that Long deposit quit-claim deed, etc. Long appeals. 
 
 Thayer bought the lot in question of Skiles and Western 
 under a contract made with their agent Kinney, by which 
 upon non-payment of future instalments (amounting to 
 $252.50), Thayer was to forfeit the contract. Western died 
 soon after. The instalments were paid by Thayer to Kinney 
 after Western's death, one being paid before he knew of 
 Western's death and one after he knew of it. Long is the 
 grantee from Western's heirs, who had by partition proceed- 
 ings succeeded to Skiles' interest also. 
 
 Mr. JUSTICE BROWN (after stating the case) delivered the 
 opinion of the court. 
 
 This case turns largely upon the legal effect to be given to 
 the death of Western, which took place a few days after the 
 contract for the sale of the land was made, and before the 
 first note became due. Had Western not died, there can be 
 no question that the payments to Kinney would have been 
 good, and that Thayer would have been entitled to a deed. 
 
 Western's death undoubtedly operated as a revocation of 
 Kinney's authority to act for him or his estate. The pay- 
 
 1 Compare Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500, where it was held that 
 defendant was excused from his contract to manufacture and sell cheese 
 from milk furnished by plaintiff, by the destruction of defendant's factory.
 
 142 TERMINATION OF AGENCY. [CH. VL 
 
 ments made to Kinney as bis agent would not be sufficient to 
 discharge Thayer' s obligation to his estate, even if such pay- 
 ments were made by him in actual ignorance of Western's 
 death. Michigan Insurance Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Ver- 
 mont, 11; Davis v. Windsor Savings Bank, 46 Vermont, 
 728 ; Jenkins v. Atkins, 1 Humphrey (Tenn.), 294 ; Clayton 
 v. Merrett, 52 Mississippi, 353 ; Lewis v. Kerr, 17 Iowa, 73. 
 Indeed it was said by this court in Gait v. Galloway, 4 Pet. 
 332, 344, that "no principle is better settled, than that the 
 powers of an agent cease on the death of his principal. If an 
 act of agency be done, subsequent to the decease of the prin- 
 cipal, though his death be unknown to the agent, the act is 
 void." 
 
 Whether Western's death also operated as a revocation of 
 the verbal authority given by Skiles may admit of some doubt, 
 although the weight of authority is that the death of one part- 
 ner or joint owner operates, in the case of a partnership, to 
 dissolve the partnership, and in the case of a joint tenancy 
 to sever the joint interest ; and the authority of an agent 
 appointed by a firm or joint owners thereupon ceases, where 
 such authority is not coupled with an interest. McNaughton 
 v. Moore, 1 Hay wood (N. C.), 189 ; Howe v. Rand, 111 
 Indiana, 206. 
 
 But even if it did operate as a technical revocation of Kin- 
 nej r 's authority to act for Skiles, the presumption is, from 
 Skiles' long silence, in the absence of proof to the contrar} r , 
 that Kinney accounted to him for his proportion of the money 
 collected. The court below evidently proceeded upon this 
 theory, and required Thayer, as a condition for calling upon 
 Long for a deed, to repay one-half of the amount of the two 
 notes with the stipulated interest at 10 per cent. These were 
 certainly as favorable terms as Long could expect. Thayer 
 had paid the money to Kinney, with whom the contract was 
 made, the first payment in actual ignorance of Western's 
 death, and the second doubtless under the supposition, which 
 a person unlearned in the law might reasonably entertain, 
 that payment to the person with whom the contract was made
 
 71.] LONG V. THAYER. 143 
 
 was sufficient, and that Kinnej* would account to the proper 
 representatives of Western, and procure him a deed. All the 
 equities of the case were in Thayer's favor, and justice de- 
 manded that Long should be required to convey, upon being 
 paid Western's share of the consideration with interest. 
 
 There is another view of the case which does not seem to 
 have been presented to the court below, and which indicates 
 that Long received even more than he was really entitled to. 
 The second note of $150, which is produced, appears upon its 
 face to have been payable to " J. F. Kinney or bearer," and 
 while the first note is not produced, Kinney swears that this 
 was also payable in the same manner. The probabilities are 
 that it was, both from the fact that the second note was 
 payable to bearer and from the further fact that Kinney 
 claimed that Western was largely indebted to him. If such 
 were the case (and Kinne}''s authority to take these notes is 
 not disputed), it is difficult to see why the payments to Kin- 
 ne}-, who himself held the notes, were not valid paj'ments, 
 which entitled Thayer to a deed to the land. So long as 
 these notes were outstanding, he could not safely pay to any- 
 one else, and if he paid the holder, he did just what the 
 contract required him to do. 
 
 Long clearly was not an innocent purchaser of the land in 
 question. Not onl}' had Thaj-er been in the open, notorious, 
 and unequivocal possession of the land and its improvement, 
 renting the premises and paying the taxes, but Long's mar 
 riage into the Western family, his taking a deed from the 
 heirs through Mr. Meriwether, the husband of one of the 
 heirs, who acted as attorney both for Long and for the heirs, 
 and the giving of a promissory note unsecured by mortgage 
 upon the land, a note which the heirs apparently never saw, 
 indicate very clearly that he could not have been ignorant 
 of the true situation. 
 
 The decree of the court below was clearly right, and must 
 be Affirmed.
 
 144 TERMINATION OF AGENCY. [CH. VI. 
 
 FARMERS' LOAN & TRUST Co. v. WILSON, 139 N. Y. 284 
 (1893) : An agent after the death of his principal collected 
 rents. The plaintiff, as trustee, recovered judgment from 
 the defendant for the rents so paid. Neither the agent nor 
 the defendant knew of the death of the principal when the 
 rent was paid. Held (by O'Brien, J.) : That the agency was 
 revoked by the death of the principal and that the payments 
 to the agent after the death of the principal did not bind the 
 estate. The court says : " The rule seems to have originated 
 in the presumption that those who deal with an agent know- 
 ingly assume the risk that his authority may be terminated by 
 death without notice to them. The case of an agency coupled 
 with an interest is an exception to the rule. . . . The com- 
 mon-law rule has become too firmly established in this State 
 to be disturbed "by judicial action, though a change by the 
 law-making power would be in harmony with more enlightened 
 views and would promote the interests of justice." 
 
 5- By insanity. 
 
 n.] DREW v. NUNN. 
 
 L. R. 4 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (C. A.), 661. 1879. 
 [Reported herein at p. 24.] 
 
 6. Irrevocable agencies. 
 
 72.] ROLAND, ADMINISTRATOR, v. COLEMAN AND 
 COMPANY. 
 
 76 GEORGIA, 652. 1886. 
 
 BILL for an injunction to enjoin a sale about to be made 
 under a power of sale contained in a written instrument 
 made by the intestate to the defendants. Injunction refused. 
 Complainant appeals.
 
 72.] BOLASTD V. COLEMAX. 145 
 
 JACKSON, C. J. This is a bill brought by Roland, admin- 
 istrator, &c., v. S. T. Coleman & Company to enjoin that 
 firm from selling certain lands conveyed to them to secure a 
 debt. The chancellor refused the writ, and the complainant 
 excepted. 
 
 Is the paper a mortgage, or is it a deed which passes the 
 title absolutely to Colemau & Compan}' to secure certain in- 
 debtedness, with power to sell in order to pay the debt? 
 
 (The court then decides that the instrument is a deed.) 
 
 This conveyance also has a power to sell, coupled with a 
 big interest in the property, even the title to it to secure the 
 debt, and therefore the power is irrevocable, and does not 
 die with the grantor. Woodson v. Veal, 60 Ga. 562 ; 
 Cattoway v. The People's Bank of Bettefontaine et al., 54 
 Ga. 441. 
 
 Lathrop & Co. v. Brown, ex'r, et al., 65 Ga. 312, was a 
 mere mortgage with power to sell, which was revocable, and 
 died with the mortgagor, the mortgagees having no interest 
 in the thing, but only in the proceeds. And such is the fact 
 also in Miller, trustee, v. McDonald et al., 72 Ga. 20 ; 
 Wofford v. Wyly et al., Id. 863, is also clearly distinguish- 
 able, as no time was fixed for the payment of the money, 
 and there was a written obligation to reconvey and no 
 power to sell, but nothing ruled there conflicts with aught 
 said here. There were mortgages with power to sell without 
 regular foreclosure, but with no pretence that the title passed. 
 In the case at bar, the title did pass, and this great interest 
 in the land itself made the power here irrevocable after the 
 grantor's death. 
 
 . 
 
 Judgment affirmed.
 
 146 TERMINATION OF AGENCY. [CH. VL 
 
 72.] HUNT v. ROUSMANIER'S ADMINIS- 
 TRATORS. 
 8 WHEATON (U. S.), 174. 1823. 
 
 BILL IN EQUITY to compel defendants, as administrators, to 
 join in the sale of the intestate's interest in two vessels. 
 Demurrer to the bill sustained and the bill dismissed. 
 Plaintiff appeals. 
 
 Rousmanier executed to Hunt a power of attorney authoriz- 
 ing Hunt to sell and convey Rousmauier's interest in the 
 two vessels, and after paying two notes owing from Rous- 
 manier to Hunt, to return the residue to Rousmanier. 
 Rousmanier died before the payment in full of the two notes. 
 Hunt took possession of the vessels and was proceeding to 
 sell them when defendants forbade the sale. 
 
 Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the 
 court. 
 
 The counsel for the appellant objects to the decree of the 
 circuit court on two grounds. He contends, 
 
 1. That this power of attorney does, by its own operation, 
 entitle the plaintiff, for the satisfaction of his debt, to the 
 interest of Rousmanier in the Nereus and the Industoy. 
 
 2. Or, if this be not so, that a court of chancery will, the 
 conveyance being defective, lend its aid to carry the contract 
 into execution, according to the intention of the parties. 
 
 We will consider, 1 . The effect of the power of attorney. 
 
 This instrument contains no words of conveyance or of 
 assignment, but is a simple power to sell and convey. As the 
 power of one man to act for another depends on the will 
 and license of that other, the power ceases when the will, or 
 this permission, is withdrawn. The general rule, therefore., 
 is, that a letter of attorney m ay , at any time, be revoked by 
 the party who makes it, and is I evoked by his death. But 
 this general rule, which results from the nature of the act, 
 has sustained gome modification. Where a letter of attorney 
 forms AJ?art of jt jcontract, and is a security for money^ or
 
 72.] HUNT V. ROTJSMAXDEK. 147 
 
 for the performance of any act which is deemed valuable, it^ 
 is generally made irrevocable in terms, or if not BO, is 
 deemed irrevocable in law. 2 Esp. N. P. Rep. 565. Al- 
 though. P lotto* of attorney depends^ from its nature, on the 
 will of the person making it f and may, in general, be recalled 
 at his will, yet if he binds himself for a consideration, in 
 terms, or by the nature of his contract, not to change Jiis 
 will, the law will not permit him to change it. Rousmanier, 
 therefore, could not, during bia Jife, by any act of his own. 
 have revoked this letter of attorney. But does it retain its 
 efficacy after his death ? We thinkjt does not. We think 
 it wplljip-tt.lpdj tMt,JLjgower of attorney, though irrevocable 
 duringjhje4ife-othe party, becomesextinct by his death. 
 
 Tliis principle is asserted in Littleton (sec. 66), by Lord 
 Coke, in his commentary on that section (52 b), and in 
 Willes' Reports (105, note, and 565). The legal reason of 
 the rule is a plain one. It seems founded on the presump- 
 tion, that the substitute acts by virtue of the authority of his 
 principal, existing at the time the act is performed ; and on 
 the manner in which he must execute his authorit}-, as stated 
 in Coombes' case, 9 Co. 766. In that case it was resolved, 
 that " when any has authority as attorney to do any act, he 
 ought to do it in his name who gave the authority." The 
 reason of this resolution is obvious. The title can, regularly, 
 pass out of the person in whom it is vested, onl}' by a con- 
 veyance in his own name ; and this cannot be executed by 
 another for him, when it could not, in law, be executed by 
 himself. A conveyance in the name of a person who was 
 dead at the time would be a manifest absurdity. 
 
 This general doctrine, that a power must be executed in 
 the name of a person who gives it, a doctrine founded on 
 the nature of the transaction, is most usually engrafted in the 
 power itself. Its usual language is, that the substitute shall 
 do that which he is empowered to do in the name of his 
 principal. He is put in the place and stead of his principal, 
 and is to act in his name. This accustomed form is observed 
 in the instrument under consideration. Hunt is constituted
 
 148 TEKMINATION OF AGENCY. [CH. VI. 
 
 the attorney, and is authorized to make and execute a regular 
 bill of sale in the name of Rousmanier. Now, as an authority 
 must be pursued in order to make the act of the substitute 
 the act of the principal, it is necessary that this bill of sale 
 should be in the name of Rousmanier ; and it would be a 
 gross absurdity that a deed should purport to be executed by 
 him, even by attorney, after his death ; for the attorne} r is 
 in the place of the principal, capable of doing that alone 
 which the principal might do. 
 
 This general rule, that a power ceases with the life of the 
 person giving it. admits of one exception. If a power _j^c 
 coupled with an "interest." it survives the person givjngjt- 
 and may be executed after his death. 
 
 As this proposition is laid down too positively in the books 
 to be controverted, it becomes necessaiy to inquire what is 
 meant by the expression, " a power coupled with an interest? " 
 Is it an interest in the subject on which the power is to be 
 exercised, or is it an interest in that which is produced by the 
 exercise of the power? We hold it to be clear that the interest 
 which can protect a power after the death of a person who cre- 
 ates it, must be an interest in the thing itself. In other words, 
 the power must be engrafted on an estate in the thing. 
 
 The words themselves would seem to import this meaning. 
 "A power coupled with an interest," is a power which 
 accompanies, or is connected with, an interest. The power 
 and the interest are united in the same person. But if we 
 are to understand the word "interest," an interest in that 
 which is to be produced by the exercise of the power, then 
 the}- are never united. The power, to produce the interest, 
 must be exercised, and by its exercise is extinguished. The 
 power ceases when the interest commences, and therefore can- 
 not, in accurate law language, be said to be " coupled " with it. 
 
 But the substantial basis of the opinion of the court on 
 this point is found in the legal reason of the principle. The 
 Interest or title in the thing being vested in the person who 
 gives the power, remains in him, unless it be conveyed with 
 the power, and can pass out of him only by a regular actin
 
 72.] HUNT V. ROUSMANIEK. 149 
 
 his own name. The act of the substitute, therefore, which in 
 such a case is the act of the principal, to be legally effectual 
 must be in his name, must be such an act as the principal 
 himself would be capable of performing, and which would be 
 valid if performed by him. Such a power necessarily ceases 
 with the life of the person making it. Bj^t if the interest or 
 estate passes with the power, and vests in the person Jbv 
 whom the power ia o fre exercised, such a person acts in his 
 ojrn name. The estate, being in him, passes from him by a 
 conveyance in his own name. He is no longer a substitute, 
 acting in the place and name of another, but is a principal 
 acting in his own name, in pursuance of powers which limit his 
 estate. The legal reason which limits a power to the life of 
 the person giving it exists no longer, and the rule ceases with 
 the reason on which it is founded. The intention of the in- 
 strument ma}' be effected without violating any legal principle. 
 This idea ma}' be in some degree illustrated by the examples 
 of cases in which the law is clear, and which are incompatible 
 with any other exposition of the term, " power coupled with 
 an interest." If the word " interest'' thus used indicated a 
 title to the proceeds of the sale T and not a title to the thing to 
 be sold, then a power to A. to sell for his own benefit, would 
 be a power coupled with an intejrestj but a power to A. to 
 sell for the benefit of B. would be a naked power, which could 
 be executed only in the life of the person who gave it. Yet, 
 for this distinction, no legal reason can be assigned. Nor is 
 there any reason for it in justice ; for a power to A. to sell 
 for the benefit of B. may be as much a part of the contract on 
 which B. advances his money as if the power had been made 
 to himself. If this were the true exposition of the term, then 
 a power to A. to sell for the use of B., inserted in a convey- 
 ance to A., of the thing to be sold, would not be a power 
 coupled with an interest, and consequently could not be exer- 
 cised after the death of the person making it ; while a power 
 to A. to sell and pay a debt to himself, though not accompanied 
 with any conveyance which might vest the title in him, would 
 enable him to make the conveyance, and to pass a title not in
 
 150 TERMINATION OF AGENCY. [CH. VI. 
 
 him, even after the vivifying principle of the power had 
 become extinct But eveiy day's experience teaches us that 
 the law is not as the first case put would suppose. We know 
 that a power to A. to sell for the benefit of B. t engrafted on 
 an estate conveyed to A.^ may be exercised at any time, and 
 is not affected by the denih of tlipi person who created, it. It 
 igjjhen, a power coupled with an interest, although the person 
 to whom it is given has no interest in its evernigfi, His power 
 is coupled with an interest in the thing which enables him to 
 execute it in his own name, and is. therefore, not dependent 
 on the life of the person who nreated |t.. 
 
 The general rule, that a power of attorney, though irrevo- 
 cable by the party during his life, is extinguished by his death, 
 is not affected by the circumstance that testamentary powers 
 are executed after the death of the testator. The law, in 
 allowing a testamentary disposition of property, not only per- 
 mits a will to be considered as a conveyance, but gives it an 
 operation which is not allowed to deeds which have their effect 
 during the life of the person who executes them. An estate 
 given by will may take effect at a future time or on a future 
 contingency, and in the meantime descends to the heir. The 
 power is necessarily to be executed after the death of the per- 
 son who makes it, and cannot exist during his life. It is the 
 intention that it shall be executed after his death. The convey- 
 ance made by the person to whom it is given takes effect by 
 virtue of the will, and the purchaser holds his title under it. 
 Every case of a power given in a will is considered in a court of 
 chancery as a trust for the benefit of the person for whose use 
 the power is made, and as a devise or bequest to that person. 
 
 It is, then, deemed perfectly clear that the power given in 
 this case is a naked power, not coupled with an interest, 
 which, though irrevocable by Rousmanier himself, expired 
 on his death. 
 
 (The court then decides that upon the facts alleged in the 
 bill a court of equity may give relief as for mistake and sub- 
 ject the vessels to an equitable lien in favor of the appellant. 
 Upon this ground the decree was) Reversed.
 
 PART II. 
 
 LEGAL EFFECT OF THE RELATION AS BETWEEN 
 PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 OBLIGATIONS OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. 
 1. Compensation for authorized act. 
 
 75.] McCRARY, SURVIVING PARTNER, ETC. v. 
 RUDDICK ET AL. 
 
 33 IOWA, 521. 1871. 
 
 ACTION to recover for professional services rendered to 
 defendants by Rankin & McCrary, attorneys at law. Judg- 
 ment for plaintiff. 
 
 The plaintiff firm was retained by one Galland, who had a 
 special contract with defendants to conduct the suit in which 
 the services were rendered. Plaintiff firm had no knowledge 
 of this special contract. The court charged that if defendants 
 knew that the plaintiff firm was managing the suit, there 
 would arise an implied promise to pay what the services 
 we're reasonably worth, even though Galland had agreed with 
 defendants to pay for such services himself, unless the plain- 
 tiff firm knew of this special contract between defendants 
 and Galland. The court refused to charge that if defendants 
 never employed the plaintiff firm, and had reason to believe 
 that the firm was acting for Galland, they would not be 
 liable. 
 
 MILLER, J. . . . We are of opinion that there was no 
 error in the ruling of the court.
 
 152 OBLIGATIONS OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [CH. VII. 
 
 Il will not be questioned that, if the defendants had re- 
 quested Rankin & McCrary to perform the services, with- 
 out more being said, the}* would have been liable to pay 
 what their services were reasonably worth. Nor will it be 
 doubted that, if there had been no special contract between 
 Galland and the other defendants, and the services had been 
 rendered with the knowledge of defendants, they would be 
 liable to pay for them. The firm of Rankin & McCrary 
 performed the services for the defendants with their knowl- 
 edge. They knew that these attorneys were appearing and 
 defending the action in their behalf and for their benefit, 
 and, although they had not requested Rankin & McCrary 
 to render the services, yet, by their silence, they assented 
 that they should do so, and thereby rendered a previous 
 request unnecessary. 
 
 If the defendants did not intend that Rankin & McCrary 
 should look to them for payment for the services they were 
 rendering, they should have objected, or informed them of 
 the special contract ; but by the silence of the defendants, 
 with full knowledge of what was being done by Rankin & 
 McCrary, and by receiving and enjoying the benefit of the 
 sen-ices rendered, a promise to pay will be implied. 2 Par- 
 sons on Cont. (5th ed.) 58; 3 Bl. Com. 161. See also 2 
 Parsons on Cont. 46 ; Phillips v. Jones, 1 Adol. & Ell. 333 ; 
 Peacock v. Peacock, 2 Camp. 45 ; Scully v. ScuUy, 28 Iowa, 
 548 ; Waterman v. Gilson, 5 La. An. 672 ; Lucas v. God- 
 win, 3 Bing. (N. C.) 737; James v. Bixby, 11 Mass. 34; 
 Farmington Academy v. Allen, 14 Id. 172. 
 
 It would have been otherwise had Rankin & McCrary 
 been informed of the special agreement, or had the circum- 
 stances been such as to raise a presumption that the}' had 
 such information. But they entered upon the services at the 
 request of one who was himself a defendant, and they per- 
 formed the services with the knowledge and implied assent 
 and for the benefit of all the defendants, without notice of 
 an}* special agreement in regard to the defence of the case. 
 Rankin & McCrary had a right to rely on the promise which,
 
 77.] WILSON V. DAME. 153 
 
 under the circumstances, the law implied, unless they were 
 
 informed of the special agreement. This information they 
 
 did not possess, but the defendants did, and it was their 
 fault that it was not communicated. 
 
 The judgment of the district court is Affirmed. 
 
 2. Compensation for unauthorized act. 
 77.] WILSON v. DAME. 
 
 58 NEW HAMPSHIRE, 392. 1878. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT, on the common counts, to recover a reward for 
 the apprehension of a criminal. The referee found for the 
 plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
 
 BINGHAM, J. The facts reported by the referee establish, 
 (1) that the defendant, city marshal of Portsmouth, desired 
 to arrest Walters ; (2) that the plaintiff rendered necessary 
 and valuable services in accomplishing it, as the defendant's 
 servant or agent, expecting to be paid for them ; (3) that the 
 defendant, knowing these facts, accepted the services, in- 
 tending to pay for them, and afterwards, on receiving the 
 reward, promised the warder that he would do so. 
 
 If a person acts as an agent, without authority, and the 
 principal, after full knowledge of the transaction, ratifies it, 
 it will be his act, the same as if he had originally given the 
 authority ; and the agent will be entitled to the same rights 
 and remedies, and to the same compensations, as if he had 
 acted within the scope of an acknowledged original authority. 
 Story on Agency, 244. 
 
 If the case does not show an original employment of the 
 plaintiff, or a request to assist in the arrest and return of the 
 convict, it clearly shows that the defendant accepted and 
 ratified whatever the plaintiff did, and that the defendant is 
 liable to pay a reasonable compensation for the same. Hatch 
 v. Taylor, 10 N. H. 538 ; Low v. Railroad, 45 N. H. 370 ; 
 S. C. 46 N. H. 284. Judgment on the report. 1 
 
 i See also Gelatt v. Ridge, ante, p. 99.
 
 154 OBLIGATIONS OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [CH. VH. 
 
 3. Compensation for gratuitous service. 
 
 77.] ALLEN v. BRYSON. 
 
 67 IOWA, 591. 1885. 
 
 ACTION to recover compensation for professional services. 
 Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
 
 SEEVERS, J. . . . The defendant pleaded that he and the 
 plaintiff were brothers-in-law, and, in substance, that each of 
 them was engaged in the practice of the law, and had been 
 in the habit of assisting each other as a matter of mutual 
 accommodation, and that " all and each of the professional 
 services for which plaintiff seeks to recover in this action 
 were rendered by him as matter of mutual accommodation 
 and interchange of courtesies, and without charge or expecta- 
 tion of payment or reward, by one as against the other." 
 The court instructed the jury: "If, however, such services 
 were rendered by the plaintiff without expectation of reward, 
 or intention on his part to charge therefor, or by any agree- 
 ment or understanding that the services were to be gratui- 
 tous, the plaintiff cannot recover unless, after such services 
 were rendered, and in consideration thereof, defendant agreed 
 with or promised plaintiff to pay for the same. In the 
 latter case the valuable character of the sendee, and the 
 moral obligation to pay for the same, would be a sufficient 
 consideration to support the promise, and enable the plaintiff 
 to recover the reasonable value of such service." We under- 
 stand this instruction to mean that where one person renders 
 sendees for another gratuitous!}', and with no expectation of 
 being paid therefor, a moral obligation is incurred by the 
 latter which will support a subsequent promise to pay. In 
 our opinion, this is not the law. If the services are gratui- 
 tous, no obligation, either moral or legal, is incurred by the 
 recipient. No one is bound to pay for that which is a gratu- 
 ity. No moral obligation is assumed by a person who re- 
 ceives a gift Suppose the plaintiff had given the defendant
 
 79.] CUTTER V. GILLETTE. 155 
 
 a horse, was he morally bound to pay what the horse was 
 reasonably worth? We think not. In such case there never 
 was any liability to pa} r , and therefore a subsequent promise 
 would be without any consideration to support it. That 
 there are cases which hold that where a liability to pay at 
 one time existed, which, because of the lapse of time, or for 
 other reasons, cannot be enforced, the moral obligation is 
 sufficient to support a subsequent promise, will be conceded. 
 These cases are distinguishable, because the instructions 
 contemplate a case where an obligation to pay never existed 
 until the promise was made. We do not believe a case can 
 be found where a moral obligation alone has been held to be 
 a sufficient consideration for a subsequent promise. To our 
 minds, however, it is difficult to find a moral obligation to 
 pay anything, in the case contemplated in the instructions, 
 prior to the promise. The following cases support the view 
 above expressed. Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57 ; Williams 
 v. Hathaway, 19 Pick. 387 ; Dawson v. Dawson, 12 Iowa, 
 
 512 ; McCarty v. Hampton Building Ass'n, 61 Id. 287. 
 . 
 
 Reversed. 
 
 4. Compensation after revocation of agency. 
 
 79.] CUTTER v. GILLETTE. 
 
 163 MASSACHUSETTS, . 1895. 
 39 NORTHEASTERN REPORTER, 1010. 
 
 ACTION to recover damages for breach of a contract of 
 employment Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant alleges 
 exceptions. 
 
 The contract was for five years, but defendant discharged 
 plaintiff after three months' service. The court allowed dam- 
 ages to be assessed to the time of the trial, and from the 
 trial to the expiration of the five years. Plaintiff had tried
 
 156 OBLIGATIONS OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [CH. VH. 
 
 to carry on carriage manufacturing on his own account after 
 the breach, but had failed. Defendant sought to show that 
 plaintiff's reputation was such that he could not get credit, 
 but this evidence was excluded. 
 
 BARKER, J. The evidence offered and excluded from the 
 cross-examination of the plaintiff was, in effect, that his per- 
 sonal reputation as to credit among dealers was so poor that 
 he could not get credit to carry on the business in which he 
 attempted to work after his wrongful discharge from the 
 defendant's service. Assuming that the defendant was enti- 
 tled to show that the plaintiff might have earned more money 
 than he did between the time of his discharge and the time 
 of trial, evidence of the plaintiff's poor reputation for credit 
 among dealers did not tend to show that he could have suc- 
 ceeded in the business, and it was rightly excluded, as it 
 might have had a tendency to prejudice the jurj- against the 
 plaintiff. If it did not have that effect, its only tendency 
 would seem to be to enhance the plaintiff's damages. We do 
 not see how the defendant was harmed by the exclusion of 
 the evidence. 
 
 The exception to the refusal to instruct the jury to the 
 effect that if the plaintiff, after his discharge, began to do 
 business on his own account, he could not recover damages 
 relating to the period of time after he so entered into business, 
 was waived at the argument. 
 
 The remaining question is whether or not the jury should 
 have been allowed to assess damages for the period of time 
 subsequent to the trial. The plaintiff was hired for five years 
 from April 25, 1892, and was discharged about the middle 
 of Jul}', 1892. He brought suit on November 10, 1892, and 
 the verdict was rendered on March 14, 1894. The verdict 
 assessed at the sum of $3,180.95, the plaintiff's whole damages 
 for breach of the contract for hiring, and stated that of the 
 amount 01,392.95 was the damage to the time of trial. The 
 defendant concedes that the plaintiff is entitled to recover 
 damages for an entire breach, so far as such damages can 
 be ascertained, but contends that, as the trial occurred before
 
 79.] CUTTER V. GILLETTE. 157 
 
 the expiration of the contract period, it was impossible for 
 the jury to ascertain or assess the damage for the unexpired 
 portion of the contract period subsequent to the time of trial. 
 In support of this contention the defendant cites the cases of 
 Colburn v. Woodworth, 31 Barb. 381 ; Fowler v. Armour, 
 24 Ala. 194 ; Litchenstein v. Brooks, 75 Tex. 196, 12 S. W. 
 975 ; and Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355, in which cases 
 it seems to have been held that, if the suit is begun before 
 the expiration of the contract period, damages can only be 
 allowed to the time of the trial. He asserts that in the case 
 of Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, in which full damages 
 were given, the writ was brought after the expiration of the 
 contract period. On the other hand, it has been held in 
 Vermont that, if there has been such a breach as to authorize 
 the plaintiff to treat it as entirely putting an end to the con- 
 tract, he may recover damages for an entire non-fulfilment, 
 and is not limited to what he has actually sustained at the 
 time of his bringing suit or the time of trial. Remelee v. 
 Hall, 31 Vt. 582. And in Maine, in an action for breach of 
 a contract for hiring, brought before the expiration of the 
 contract period, it was held that the just recompense for the 
 actual injury sustained by the illegal discharge was the stipu- 
 lated wages, less whatever sum the plaintiff actually earned, 
 or might have earned by the use of reasonable diligence. 
 Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64. Such would seem to be 
 the rule in Pennsylvania. See King v. Steiren, 44 Pa. St. 
 99 ; Chamberlin v. Morgan, 68 Pa. St. 168. And the de- 
 fendant concedes that such is the rule in England. We do 
 not go into an exhaustive consideration of the decisions upon 
 the question, as we consider it to have been settled in favor 
 of the ruling given at the trial, by our decisions. Paige v. 
 Barrett, 151 Mass. 67, 23 N. E. 725 ; Blair v. Laflin, 127 
 Mass. 518 ; Dennis v. Maxfield, 10 Allen, 138 ; Jewett v. 
 Brooks, 134 Mass. 505. See also Parker v. Russell, 133 
 Mass. 74 ; Amos v. Oakley, 131 Mass. 413 ; Warner v. Ba- 
 con, 8 Gra} T , 397, 408 ; Drummond v. Crane, 159 Mass. 577, 
 581, 35 N. E. 90. The plaintiffs cause of action accrued
 
 158 OBLIGATIONS OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [CH. VII. 
 
 when he was wrongfully discharged. His suit is not for 
 wages, but for damages for the breach of his contract by the 
 defendant. For this breach he can have but one action. In 
 estimating his damages the jury have the right to consider 
 the wages which he would have earned under the con tract T 
 the probability whether his life and that of the defendant 
 would continue to the end of the contract period, whether the 
 plaintiff's working ability would continue, and any other un- 
 certainties growing out of the terms of contract, as well as 
 the likelihood that_the plaintiff would be able to earn money 
 in other work during the time. But it is not the law that 
 damages, which may be larger or smaller because of such 
 uncertainties, are not recoverable. The same kind of diffi- 
 culty is encountered in the assessment of damages for per- 
 sonal injuries. All the elements which bear upon the matters 
 involved in the prognostication_jire_-tQ he considered by the 
 jury, and from the evidence in each case they are to form an 
 opinion upon which all can agree, and to which, unless it is 
 set aside by the court, the parties must submit. The liability 
 to have the damages which he inflicts by breaking his con- 
 tract so assessed is one which the defendant must be taken 
 to have understood when he wrongfully discharged the plain- 
 tiff, and, if he did not wish to be subjected to it, he should 
 have kept his agreement. Exceptions overruled. 
 
 79.] SUTHERLAND v. WYER. 
 
 67 MAINE, 64. 1877. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT to recover damages for breach of contract of 
 employment for thirty-six weeks at $35 a week, from Sep- 
 tember 6, 1875. Plaintiff was discharged January 8, 1876, 
 and paid in full to that date. The action was begun January 
 11, 1876. Plaintiff afterward found like employment, but left 
 it voluntarily before the expiration of the thirty-six weeks
 
 79.] SUTHJSIiLAND V. WYEE. 159 
 
 from September 6th. Verdict for plaintiff for full amount of 
 salary after January 8th, less what he had actually earned in 
 other employment. Defendants appeal. 
 
 VIRGIN, J. (after deciding that the action was not 
 prematurely brought). There are several classes of cases 
 founded both in tort and in contract, wherein the plaintiff is 
 entitled to recover, not only the damages actually sustained 
 when the action was commenced, or at the time of the trial, 
 but also whatever the evidence proves he will be likely to 
 suffer thereafter from the same cause. Among the torts 
 coming within this rule, are personal injuries caused by the 
 wrongful acts or negligence of others. The injury continu 
 ing beyond the time of trial, the future as well as the past 
 is to be considered, since no other action can be maintained. 
 So in cases of contract, the performance of which is to extend 
 through a period of time which has not elapsed when the 
 breach is made and the action brought therefor and the trial 
 had. JKemelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582. Among these are 
 actions on bonds or unsealed contracts stipulating for the 
 support of persons during their natural life. Sibley v. 
 Eider, 54 Me. 463 ; Philbrook v. Burgess, 52 Me. 271. 
 
 The contract in controversy falls within the same rule. 
 Although, as practically construed by the parties, the salary 
 was payable weekly, still, when the plaintiff was peremptorily 
 discharged from all further service during the remainder of 
 the season, such discharge conferred upon him the right to 
 treat the contract as entirely at an end, and to bring his 
 action to recover damages for the breach. In such action 
 he is entitled to a just recompense for the actual injury 
 sustained by the illegal discharge. Prima facie, such 
 recompense would be the stipulated wages for the remain- 
 ing eighteen weeks. This, however, would not necessarily 
 be the sum which he would be entitled to ; for in cases of 
 contract as well as of tort, it is generally incumbent upon an 
 injured party to do whatever he reasonably can, and to 
 improve all reasonable and proper opportunities to lessen 
 the injury. Miller v. Mariners' Church, 7 Me. 51, 56 ;
 
 160 OBLIGATIONS OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [CH. VII. 
 
 Jones v. Jones, 4 Md. 609, 2 Greenl. Ev. 261, and notes ; 
 Chamberlin v. Morgan, 68 Pa. St. 168 ; Sedg. on Dam. 
 (6th ed.) 416, 417, cases supra. The plaintiff could not be 
 justified in lying idle after the breach ; but he was bound to 
 use ordinary diligence in securing employment elsewhere, 
 during the remainder of the term ; and whatever sum he 
 actuall} 7 earned or might have earned by the use of reason- 
 able diligence, should be deducted from the amount of the 
 unpaid stipulated wages. And this balance, with interest 
 thereon, should be the amount of the verdict. Applying the 
 rule mentioned, the verdict will be found too large. 
 
 By the plaintiff's own testimony, he received only $60 
 from all sources after his discharge, $25 in February, and 
 $35 from the 10th to the 20th of April, at Booth's. His last 
 engagement was for eight weeks, commencing April 10th, 
 which he abandoned on the 20th, thus voluntarily omitting 
 an opportunity to earn $57, prior to the expiration of his 
 engagement with the defendants, when the law required him 
 to improve such an opportunity, if reasonable and proper. 
 We think he should have continued the last engagement 
 until May 6th, instead of abandoning it and urging a trial in 
 April, especially inasmuch as he could have obtained a trial 
 in May, just as well. The instructions taken together were 
 as favorable to the defendants as they were entitled to. 
 
 If, therefore, the plaintiff will remit $57, he may have 
 judgment for the balance of the verdict ; otherwise the entry 
 must be Verdict set aside and new trial granted. 
 
 5. Compensation after renunciation of agency. 
 
 81.] TIMBERLAKE v. THAYER. 
 
 71 MISSISSIPPI, 279. 1893. 
 
 ACTION against indorser of a promissory note. Defence, 
 payment by maker, and release by act of plaintiff in agreeing
 
 81.] TIMBERLAKE V. THAYER. 161 
 
 with the maker that the latter should perform services for 
 the former in payment of the note. The court charged that 
 if the maker agreed to serve plaintiff for a year, but aban- 
 doned the contract before the end of the year, he could 
 recover nothing for the services performed. The court 
 refused to charge that such a contract would release defend- 
 ant. Judgment for plaintiff. 
 
 COOPER, J. If we were authorized to make the law, 
 instead of announcing it as it is already made, we would 
 unhesitatingly hold that one contracting to render personal 
 service to another for a specified time, could, upon breach 
 of the contract by himself, recover from that other for the 
 value of the service rendered by him and received by that 
 other, subject to a diminution of his demand to the extent of 
 the damage flowing from his breach of contract. In Britton 
 v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481, Judge Parker demonstrates, in an 
 admirable and powerful opinion, the equity of such a rule ; 
 and it was held in that case that such was the rule of the 
 common law. The courts of some of the States have 
 followed or been influenced by that opinion, and have 
 overturned or mitigated the rigorous rule of the common 
 law. Pixler v. Nichols, 8 Iowa, 106 (74 Am. Dec. 298) ; 
 Coe v. Smithy Ind. 79 (58 Am. Dec. 618) ; Riggs v. Horde, 
 25 Tex. Supp. 456 (78 Am. Dec. 584) ; ChamUee v. Baker, 
 95 N. C. 98 ; Parcell v. McComber, 11 Neb. 209. But the 
 decided weight of authority is to the contrary. Lawson on 
 Contracts, 470, n. 4, and authorities there cited. And it 
 was decided at an earty day in this State that an entire 
 contract of this character could not be apportioned, and 
 that under the circumstances named no recover}' could be 
 had by the party guilty of the breach of contract ; that 
 he could not recover on the special contract because he 
 himself had not performed, nor upon quantum meruit be- 
 cause of the existence of the special contract. Wooten v. 
 Mead, 2 Smed. & M. 585. In Hariston v. Sale, 6 Smed. & 
 M. 634, and Robinson v. Sanders, 24 Miss. 391, it was 
 held that an overseer's contract with his employer, though 
 
 11
 
 162 OBLIGATIONS OF PKINCIPAL TO AGENT. [CH. VII. 
 
 made for a definite time, was not an entire contract, and 
 recoveries were allowed on the common counts. 
 
 The cases relied on to support the rule announced in these 
 decisions were Byrd v. Boyd, 2 McCord (So. Car.), 246 ; 
 Eaken v. Harrison, Id. 249; McClure v. Pyatt, Id. 26. 
 Of these, the leading case is Byrd v. Boyd ; the others 
 simply follow it. In Byrd v. Boyd, the court evidently 
 legislates the exception into the law, and so, in effect, 
 declared, for, after referring to the rule of the common law, 
 the court proceeds to say: "There is, however, a third 
 class of cases for which it is necessary to provide," and 
 then declares that these cases for which it is necessary for 
 the court "to provide" are "those where the employer 
 reaps the full benefit of the services which have been 
 rendered, but some circumstance occurs which renders his 
 discharging the overseer necessary and justifiable, and that, 
 perhaps, not immediatel} 7 connected with the contract, as in 
 the present case." 
 
 The South Carolina court put its decision expressly upon 
 the ground of expediency, and confined its effect, by neces- 
 sary implication, to the particular sort of contract under 
 consideration. Since the abolition of slavery we have no 
 such contracts, stricte, as those which formerly existed be- 
 tween employer and overseer, and the decisions in Wooten 
 v. Head, and Hariston v. Sale have no field of operation. 
 The instructions for the plaintiff were properly given. 
 
 (The court then decides that the trial judge erred in 
 refusing the instruction as to the effect of such a contract in 
 working a release of the surety, and on this ground reversed 
 the judgment)
 
 81.] DAVIS V. MAXWELL. 163 
 
 81.] DAVIS v. MAXWELL. 
 
 12 METCALF (Mass.) 286. 1847. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT to recover for three months and one day's 
 service at twelve dollars a month. Defence, an entire con- 
 tract for seven months and breach by plaintiff. Judgment 
 for defendant. 
 
 HUBBAED, J. ... In regard to the contract itself, which 
 was an agreement to work for the defendant seven mouths, 
 at twelve dollars per month, we are of opinion that it was 
 an entire one, and that the plaintiff, having left the defend- 
 ant's service before the time expired, cannot recover for the 
 partial service performed ; and that it differs not in principle 
 from the adjudged cases of Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267 ; 
 Olmstead v. Beale, 19 Pick. 528; and Thayer v. Wads- 
 worth, 19 Pick. 349 ; which we are unwilling to disturb, 
 upon mere verbal differences between the contracts in those 
 cases and in this, which do not affect its spirit. 
 
 The plaintiff has argued that it was a contract for seven 
 months, at twelve dollars per month, to be paid at the end of 
 each month. But however reasonable such a contract might 
 be, it is not, we think, the contract which is proved. There 
 is no time fixed for the payment, and the law therefore fixes 
 the time ; and that is, in a case like this, the period when the 
 service is performed. It is one bargain ; performance on one 
 part and payment on the other ; and not part performance 
 and full payment for the part performed. The rate per month 
 is stated, as is common in such contracts, as fixing the rate 
 of pa}-ment, in case the contract should be given up by con- 
 sent, or death or other casualty should determine it before its 
 expiration, without affecting the right of the party. Such 
 contracts for hire, for definite periods of time, are reasonable 
 and convenient, are founded in practical wisdom, and have 
 long received the sanction of the law. It is our duty to sus- 
 tain them, when clearly proved. 
 
 The rulings and directions of the learned judge, we think, 
 were correct, and the exceptions are overruled.
 
 164 OBLIGATIONS OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [CH. VH. 
 
 6. Compensation where agent acts for both parties. 
 
 82.] CANNELL v. SMITH. 
 
 142 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 25. 1891. 
 
 ACTION to recover back $5,000 paid by plaintiff to defendant 
 as a commission for effecting a sale of real estate. Judgment 
 for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
 
 Defendant was employed by one Massey, who represented 
 a prospective purchaser of plaintiff's propert}', to interview 
 plaintiff as to the terms on which she would sell, Massey 
 agreeing to pay defendant a commission. Defendant repre- 
 sented to plaintiff that he would act for her upon her agree- 
 ment to pay him one-half of all the property sold for over and 
 above $80,000. Defendant negotiated a sale to Massey's prin- 
 cipal for $92,000, and accepted $5,000 as his commission. 
 Massey's principal demanded that defendant should account 
 to her for the commission received from plaintiff, on the 
 ground that defendant was her agent. Defendant thereupon 
 compromised by paying $2,600 of his commission to Massey's 
 principal. 
 
 The court excluded the testimonj' of one Shallcross offered 
 to prove that plaintiff's property sold for from $10,000 to 
 $15,000 more than it was worth, and charged the jury that it 
 was immaterial whether plaintiff lost anything by the fact 
 that defendant represented both parties, and that if defend- 
 ant represented both sides without the knowledge of plaintiff, 
 she could recover back the money paid to him. 
 
 PER CURIAM. The defendant was a real-estate broker and 
 attenip_tejLto_8erve two masters. There is high authority for 
 saying that this cannot be done. Mattjri. 24. The plaintiff 
 paid him a commission of $5,000 for effecting a sale of cer- 
 tain real estate, in ignorance of the fact that he was also 
 the broker or agent of the purchaser. When she discov- 
 ered that he was acting in this dual character, she brought 
 this suit in the court below to recover back the money so
 
 82.] CANNELL V. SMITH. 165 
 
 paid, and succeeded. We have no doubt of the right to 
 recover money paid under such circumstances. It is against 
 public policy and sound morality for a man to act as broker 
 for both parties, unless that fact is fully communicated to 
 them. The right to recover being established, this judgment 
 must stand unless some error was committed on the trial 
 below by which the defendant was prejudiced. 
 
 A careful examination of the record fails to disclose any 
 such error. The court was not asked to direct a verdict in 
 favor of the defendant, and could not properly have done so 
 in view of the evidence. This disposes of the first assign- 
 ment. The second is without merit. The paj'ment of the 
 $2, 600 to the Drexels was a fact in the case. The defendant's 
 belief as to his moral or legal liability to pay this money was 
 not important ; nor was it material that he had never made 
 an}' admissions ' ' to the Masseys, or any one else," upon this 
 subject. The testimony of the witness Shallcross was properly 
 
 rejected. Tljg plain tiff's right tr> wnnvpr did nr>t ^pp^nr) npftn 
 
 the character of the sale, whether advantageous or otherwise ; 
 it rested upon the higher ground of pqblic policy : Everhart v. 
 Searle, 71 Pa. 256. The instructions complained of in the 
 fourth and fifth assignments are free from error. The learned 
 judge fairly submitted to the jury the question of plaintiff's 
 knowledge of the defendant's dual character. There was 
 abundant evidence of her ignorance upon this point to go to 
 the jury. She testified distinctly that the defendant told her 
 that he was acting for her, and for her alone. The defendant 
 did not den} 7 that he had been employed by the purchasers. 
 His contention was that he had ceased to act for them before 
 he entered the service of the plaintiff. This was a question 
 of fact for the jury, and unfortunately for the defendant they 
 did not take his view of it. 
 
 Judgment affirmed.
 
 166 OBLIGATIONS OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [CH. VH. 
 
 82.] SHORT v. MILLARD. 
 
 68 ILLINOIS, 292. 1873. 
 
 THIS was an action brought by Mortimer Millard against 
 John Short, to recover for services as agent, in the city 
 court of East St. Louis. The plaintiff recovered judgment, 
 and the defendant appealed to the circuit court, where the 
 plaintiff again recovered judgment for $500 and costs. From 
 this judgment the defendant appealed to this court. 
 
 Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the court. 
 
 Appellee sued appellant to recover for services as agent in 
 selling a tract of land. It appears that appellant agreed that 
 if appellee would find him a purchaser for a piece of land, he 
 would pay him $500. The evidence shows that he procured 
 a purchaser at the price fixed by appellant, and the sale was 
 consummated. But it is urged that appellee was acting as 
 the agent of both appellant and Lovingston, the purchaser, 
 without having notified appellant. An examination of the 
 evidence shows that tha defence is not established. The 
 only evidence we find in support of the defence is what was 
 said by Lovingston when the sale was closed. He at that time 
 proposed that appellee should prepare the deed, as he was 
 acting for both parties ; but the proposition was declined, 
 appellant at the time saying another attorney did his busi- 
 ness ; and it appears that appellee was present when the 
 papers were executed. He was there at the instance of 
 Lovingston. 
 
 There is no doubt that appellee was the agent of appellant 
 in procuring a purchaser, and the evidence shows that he 
 obtained one at the full price fixed by appellant ; and when 
 he had fully performed the agency, and it was at an end, he 
 thci^ received a retainer from the purchaser to see that the 
 papers were properly prepared and executed. In this we 
 perceive nothing wrong or inconsistent., It is true, his 
 retainer by Lovingston grew out of his former agency, but 
 not till after that relation had terminated. When he found
 
 82.] MONTROSS V. EDDY. 167 
 
 the purchaser he was no longer the agent of appellant, and 
 was free to take the retainer from Lovingston. There was, 
 then, nothing improper or inconsistent in his thus acting. 
 The evidence sustains the finding of the jury. 
 
 No question has been raised as to the jurisdiction of the 
 city court to try the case, and the judgment of the court 
 below is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. 
 
 82.] MONTROSS v. EDDY ET AL. 
 
 94 MICHIGAN, 100. 1892. 
 
 ACTION to recover for services rendered defendants in 
 negotiating a sale of their lands. Judgment for plaintiff. 
 Defendants appeal. 
 
 Defendants promised plaintiff that if fop, found a purchaser 
 for the lands at $90,000 they would pay him for his services. 
 Plaintiff at that time was representing a prospective pur- 
 chaser, to whom subsequently he introduced defendants, and 
 who purchased the lands of defendants at S90 7 000. The 
 purchaser paid plaintiff $500 as compensation. Defendants 
 paid plaintiff $250, and he brought this action for additional 
 compensation, and recovered a verdict for $250. 
 
 DURAND, J. . . . As to whether the payment by Pitts & 
 Cranage to the plaintiff of $500 was a present, or was paid 
 under an agreement made by them for his services, we deem 
 it immaterial. If the defendants are liable at all, it is upon 
 their agreement to paj' the plaintiff for his services if he made 
 a sale of this land at $90,000. Nothing was left to his dis- 
 cretion. He. had nothing to do with the price. He had 
 simply to find a. pnrnhn.spr willing f.n give the price asked ; 
 and it can be of no importance whatever to the defendants 
 whether or not those purchasers also paid the plaintiff for 
 any services he may have rendered them. As was said in 
 Ranney v. Donovan, 78 Mich. 318 : 
 
 " A_hrnkpr who simply brings the parties together, and has 
 no hand in the negotiations between them, they making their
 
 OBLIGATIONS OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [CH. VH. 
 
 own bargain without bis aid jDr_interfe rence, can legally 
 from both of them, although each was 
 
 ignorant_of bis employment by the other." 
 
 All that the plaintiff was to do was to find a purchaser at a 
 certain sum fixed and agreed upon. Neither his efforts nor 
 judgment were to be employed to get a greater price. When 
 he did this, and the sale brought about by him as middle- 
 man was consummated, he was entitled to a reasonable com- 
 pensation for his services, if the JUIT believed his version of 
 what the contract was, as they evidently did do. If the 
 plaintiff made any misstatements to Pitts & Cranage in ref- 
 erence to the amount of pine on the land, or to its qualit}-, 
 and thereby induced them to pa}- the sum asked for it b}* the 
 defendants, certainly the defendants cannot complain ; nor 
 can they be heard to sa} - that, because Pitts & Cranage paid 
 or gave plaintiff $500 for services performed by him in bring- 
 ing about the purchase, therefore the}* are relieved from paj*- 
 ing him, if they agreed to do so. He was simply acting as a 
 go-between to bring the buyers and sellers together, f,n makft 
 their own bargain. This is all he did do ; and either or both 
 parties in such a case would be legally bound to pay such 
 sum as was agreed upon for the services rendered. 
 
 We do not find any prejudicial error in the case. 
 
 The judgment will be affirmed, with costs of this court to 
 the plaintiff. 
 
 The other justices concurred. 
 
 82.] TERRY v. BIRMINGHAM NATIONAL 
 
 BANK. 1 
 
 99 ALABAMA, 566. 1892. 
 
 ACTION of assumpsit by the bank to recover against Terry 
 upon a promissory note. Plea of set-off. Judgment for 
 plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
 
 i For former appeal see 93 Ala. 599.
 
 82.] TERRY V. BIRMINGHAM NATIONAL BANK. 169 
 
 The note in question was secured by certain stocks de- 
 posited with the bank as collateral security. Defendant 
 gave the president of the bank a power of attorney to sell the 
 stock on the Stock Exchange. The president employed one 
 Lightfoot to sell it. Lightfoot was also employed by one 
 Rucker to buy similar stock. Lightfoot procured one Brad- 
 field, also a member of the exchange, to bid for Rucker. 
 Lightfoot offered the stock on the exchange, and it was bid 
 in by Bradfield for Lightfoot's principal, Rucker. The 
 amount was credited on the note, and this action is for the 
 balance due over and above this credit and other credits. 
 The defendant seeks to set off the value of the stock above 
 what it brought on this sale. 
 
 COLEMAN, J. . . . The principle of law that the same 
 person cannot be both buyer and seller has no application 
 to the facts of the case. R. D. Johnston employed Lightfoot, 
 a member of the Stock Exchange, to sell this stock. One 
 E. W. Rucker, the purchaser, employed Lightfoot to pur- 
 chase on the exchange, at a limited price, stock of the char- 
 acter offered by Johnston. Johnston knew nothing of 
 Rucker's engagement or intentions. In accordance with the 
 rules of the exchange, Lightfoot secured the services of 
 Bradfield, another member of the exchange, to bid the price 
 fixed by Rucker. Lightfoot knew the instructions of both 
 Johnston and Rucker, but neither Johnston nor Rucker had 
 any knowledge of each other's intentions, or their instruc- 
 tions to Lightfoot. And, as we have stated, there is no 
 evidence to show that the rules of the Stock Exchange, 
 which were known to Terry, were not observed, or that the 
 stock did not bring its fair market value, which was credited 
 upon the note of the defendant. 
 
 Under any view we take of the case, the plaintiff was 
 entitled to the general charge upon all the evidence, and it 
 is unnecessary to consider special exceptions to the rulings 
 of the court. 
 
 Affirmed.
 
 170 OBLIGATIONS OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [CH. VH, 
 
 7. Reimbursement and indemnity. 
 
 84, 85.] MOORE v. APPLETON. 
 
 26 ALABAMA, G33. 1855. 
 
 TRESPASS on the case to recover indemnity for damages 
 paid by plaintiff as a result of a suit against him by one 
 Quinb}* for acts done by plaintiff as defendant's agent. 
 Demurrer to complaint overruled. Verdict and judgment 
 for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
 
 Plaintiff by direction of defendant took goods out of the 
 possession of Quinby, which defendant claimed were his. 
 Quinby brought an action of trespass against plaintiff and 
 had judgment, which was paid. 
 
 RICE, J. Every man who employs another to do an act 
 which the employer appears to have a right to authorize him 
 to do, undertakes to indemnify him for all such acts as the 
 agent does not know to be unlawful, and as would bejawful 
 if the employer bad the authority he pretends to have. 
 Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66 ; Story on Agency, 339. 
 
 Where two persons are claiming title to personal property 
 adversely to each other, and one of these claimants calls 
 upon another person to take it, and the latter has reasonable 
 ground to believe that his emplo}*er is the owner of the 
 property, and therefore takes it, without knowing at the time 
 that such taking is a trespass or tort, a promise of indemnity 
 will be implied to such person, although it subsequently 
 turns out that the title of the emplo}'er was not good, and 
 the act of taking a trespass. Avery v. Halsey, 14 Pick. 
 174. 
 
 In all snch cases, a promise of indemnity is impHpd T ^pnji 
 the plain dictates of reason and natural Justice. Gower v. 
 Emery, 1 8 Maine R. 79 ; Parsons on Cont. 36, n. x. 
 
 The promise thus implied extends only to such losses and 
 damages as are .direct and immediate, and naturally flow 
 from the execution of the agency^ In other words, the
 
 84, 85.] MOORE V. APPLETON. 171 
 
 agency must be the cause, and^not merely the occasion of 
 tfae losses or damages, to found a just right to reimburse- 
 ment. Story on Agency, 341 ; Story on Contracts, 
 176. 
 
 Assumpsit lies upon such implied promises. An action on 
 the case is equally maintainable, and it is said to be the more 
 appropriate remed}'. Myers v. Gilbert^ 18 Ala. 467 ; Adam- 
 son v. Jarvis, and other cases cited supra. But whether the 
 action be assumpsit or case, the declaration is bad, on de- 
 murrer, if no breach is stated in it. 1 Chitty's PI. 337. 
 
 When the declaration is in case, as it is here, and shows 
 that the losses for which the agent is seeking indemnity from 
 the principal, are certain damages recovered against the 
 agent for taking property by the direction of the principal, 
 in an action of trespass brought against the agent by the 
 true owner of the property, the declaration is defective, if 
 it omits to state that the taking by the agent was without 
 knowledge on his part, at the time of the taking, that it was 
 a trespass. The agent must, in his declaration, negative 
 the existence of such knowledge on his part, although the 
 onus of proving the existence of such knowledge may be on 
 the principal ; for the rule, that the allegala and probata 
 must correspond, is not of universal application. Car- 
 penter v. Devon, 6 Ala. 718. 
 
 Each count of this declaration is bad, for the omission of 
 a breach, and also for failing to aver that the agent, jit_the 
 time of the taking, (lid not know^that it was a jrespass or 
 tort~ 
 
 An averment that the principal had notice of the losses 
 and damages sustained by the agent set forth in the declara- 
 tion, and failed to pay the same, would be a good breach in 
 such a case as this. 
 
 We admit the rule, that the law will not enforce contribu- 
 tion nor indemnity between wrong-doers. But that rule does 
 not apply to any case where the act of the agent was not 
 manifestly illegal in itself, and was done bona fide in the 
 execution of his agency, and without knowledge (either actual,
 
 172 OBLIGATIONS OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [CH. VH. 
 
 or implied by law) that it was illegal. Parsons on Cont. 
 p. 36, note x. 
 
 That rule is applicable, whenever it appears that the act of 
 the agent was manifestly illegal in itself. For example, if A. 
 employs B. to assault C., and B. thereupon does assault C., 
 and is subjected to damages therefor, B. cannot recover such 
 damages from A. : the act of B. being clearty illegal in itself, 
 the law implies that he knew it to be so, and therefore will 
 not enforce his claim to indemnit}'. 
 
 The rule also applies, whenever it appears that, although 
 the act of the agent was not manifestly illegal in itself, yet, 
 in fact, he knew it to be unlawful at the time he did it. For 
 example, if Appleton, at the time he took the propert}' claimed 
 by Moore, knew that Moore had no just nor lawful right to 
 it, and that Moore's claim was groundless and iniquitous, and 
 that it really belonged to some other person, such knowledge 
 on the part of Appleton at the time of the taking would 
 defeat any recovery by him for any loss resulting from such 
 taking, although he took it as the agent of Moore, and by 
 Moore's direction. Chappell v. Wysham, 4 Harris & 
 Johns. 560. 
 
 For the error of the court below in overruling: the de- 
 
 o 
 
 murrers to the several counts of the declaration, its judgment 
 is reversed, and the cause remanded. 
 
 84, 85.] D'ARCY ?). LYLE. 
 
 5 BINNEY (Pa.), 441. 1813. 
 
 ACTION of indebitatus assumpsit for money paid out and ex- 
 pended, and services rendered. Verdict for plaintiff. Motion 
 for new trial. 
 
 D'Arcy in 1804 received from Lyle a power of attorney to 
 settle the latter's accounts with Suckle}- & Co. in Hayti. On 
 his way to Hayti he was chased by a French privateer and
 
 84, 85.] D'ARCY v. LYLE. 173 
 
 threw overboard, among other papers, this power of attorney. 
 Suckle}* & Co. consented to deliver Lyle's goods to D'Arcy 
 if the latter would pay a balance due them from Lyle. This 
 was agreed to, but before the goods were completely deliv- 
 ered the}' were attached by one Richardson for debts due his 
 principals from Suckley & Co. The courts awarded the goods 
 to D'Arcy for Lyle conditioned upon his giving a bond to 
 procure an authentic power of attorney, or pay to Richardson 
 the invoice value of the goods. The power of attorney was 
 afterward received and duly noted, and the bond satisfied. 
 D'Arcy sold the goods and rendered an account to Lyle. 
 
 Three years later, upon a change in the government of 
 Hayti, Richardson brought suit against D'Arcy to recover 
 the value of these goods. The courts decided for D'Arcy on 
 the ground that his bond had been satisfied ; but the presi- 
 dent, Christophe, issued an arbitrary order that D'Arcy and 
 Richardson should fight each other, and that the victor should 
 have judgment in the suit. D'Arcy protested, but finally 
 consented to the wager of battle. The result was uncertain, 
 and Christophe issued an order that they should fight again. 
 D'Arcy sought to flee the country, but was intercepted. 
 After an interview with the president, he consented to pay 
 Richardson the $3,000 claimed, and the judgment of the 
 court was entered to that effect. D'Arcy paid the $3,000, 
 and brings this action to recover it from Lyle. 
 
 TILGHMAN, C. J. This is one of those extraordinary cases 
 arising out of the extraordinary situation into which the 
 world has been thrown by the French revolution. 
 
 If the confession of judgment by the plaintiff had been 
 voluntary, it would have lain on him to show that the 
 $3,000 were justly due from the defendant to Richardson, 
 or the persons for whom he acted, or that they had a lien 
 on the goods of the defendant to that amount. But the 
 confession of judgment was beyond all doubt extorted from 
 the plaintiff by duress, and he did not yield to fears of which 
 a man of reasonable firmness need be ashamed. The ma- 
 terial fact on which this case turns is, whether the trans-
 
 174 OBLIGATIONS OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. ['CH. VII. 
 
 actions between the plaintiff and Richardson were on any 
 private account of the plaintiff, or solely on account of 
 the defendant That was submitted to the jury, and we 
 must now take for granted that the proceedings at the Cape 
 against the plaintiff were in consequence of his having re- 
 ceived possession of the defendant's goods from Suckley & 
 Co. I take the law to be as laid down by Heineccius, Turn- 
 bull's Heiuec. c. 13, pp. 269, 270, and by Erskine in his 
 Institutes, 2 Ersk. lust. 534, that damages incurred by the 
 agent in the course of the management of the principal's 
 affairs, or in consequence of such management, are to be 
 borne by the principal. It is objected that at the time when 
 judgment was rendered against the plaintiff, he was no longer 
 an agent, having long before made np his accounts, and 
 transmitted the balance to the defendant. But this objection 
 has no weight if the judgment was but the consummation of 
 the proceedings which were commenced during the agency. 
 As such I view them, and I make no doubt but they were so 
 considered by the jury. It is objected again, that no man is 
 safe if he is to be responsible to an unknown amount, for any 
 sums which his agent may consent to pay, in consequence of 
 threats of unprincipled tyrants in foreign countries. Ex- 
 treme cases may be supposed, which it will be time enough 
 to decide when they occur. I beg it to be understood, that 
 I give no opinion on a case where an agent should consent 
 to pay a sura far exceeding the amount of the property in his 
 hands. That is not the present case, for the property of the 
 defendant, in the hands of the plaintiff in 1804, was esti- 
 mated at S3, 000. The cases cited by the defendant show, 
 that if the agent, on a journey on business of his prin- 
 cipal, is robbed of his own money, the principal is not an- 
 swerable. I agree to it, because the carrying of his own 
 money was not necessarily connected with the business of 
 his principal. So if he receives a wound, the principal is 
 not bound to pay the expenses of his cure, because it is a 
 personal risk which the agent takes upon himself. One of 
 the defendant's cases was, that where the agent's horse was
 
 84, 85.] D'ARCY v. LYLE. 175 
 
 taken lame, the principal was not answerable. That I think 
 would depend upon the agreement of the parties. If A. 
 undertakes for a certain sum to carry a letter for B. to a 
 certain place, A. must find his own horse, and B. is not 
 answerable for any injury which may befall the horse in the 
 course of the journey. But if B. is to find the horse, he is 
 responsible for the damage. In the case before us, the 
 plaintiff has suffered damage without his own fault, ^n ac- 
 count of bis agency, and the jury have indemnified him to 
 an amount very little, if at all, exceeding the property in his 
 hands, with interest and costs. I am of opinion that the 
 verdict should not be set aside. 
 
 YEATES, J. . . . I see no reason whatever for retracting 
 the opinion I had formed on the trial, that where a factor 
 has acted faithfully and prudently within the scope of his 
 authority, jie is entitled to protection from his constituent, 
 and compensation for compulsory payments exacted against 
 himjmder the form of law, for the transactions of hjsjigency. 
 The flagitious conduct of Christophe, President of Ha} - ti, 
 compelled the litigant parties under his savage power into a 
 trial by battle, in order to decide their civil rights. He 
 influenced the civil tribunal of the first district of the prov- 
 ince of the North, sitting at the Cape, " to set aside a former 
 judgment rendered by the tribunal of commerce, and of 
 their own court, and to condemn D'Arcy," according to the 
 language of the sentence, " to pay to Thomas Richardson 
 $3,000, for so much he had engaged to him to pay for 
 Suckley & Co. for merchandise, which the latter had de- 
 livered to him as belonging to James Lyle, whom the said 
 D'Arcy represented, for which the tribunal do reserve to 
 D'Arcy his rights, that be may prosecute the same, if he 
 thinks proper, against the said Lyle or Suckley," etc. 
 
 The defendant appointed the plaintiff his attorney, to settle 
 and collect a debt in a barbarous foreign countr}'. The 
 plaintiff has transacted that business with fidelity and care, 
 and remitted the proceeds to his principal. He risked his 
 life in defence of the interests of his constituent, under the
 
 176 OBLIGATIONS OF PKINCIPAL TO AGENT. [CH. VH. 
 
 imperious mandate of a capricious tyrant, holding the reins 
 of government He has since been compelled, by a mockery 
 of justice, to pay his own moneys for acts lawfully done in 
 the faithful discharge of his duties as an agent ; and I have 
 no difficulty in saying, that of two innocent persons, the 
 principal, and not the agent, should sustain the loss. 
 
 In Leate v. Turkey Company Merchants, Toth. 105, it 
 was decreed, that if a consul bej'ond sea hath power, and 
 do levy goods upon a private merchant, the company must 
 bear the loss, if the factor could not prevent the act of the 
 consul. The decree is founded in the highest justice, and 
 its reason peculiarly applies to the present case. D'Arcy 
 was doomed by the cruel order of an inexorable tyrant, either 
 to pay the $3,000, or in his hated presence to fight his antag- 
 onist until one of them should fall. 
 
 Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the motion for the 
 new trial be denied. 
 
 BRACKENRIDGE, J., delivered a dissenting opinion. 
 
 New trial refused.
 
 CHAPTER Vin. 
 
 OBLIGATIONS OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. 
 
 1. Obedience. 
 
 88.] WHITNEY ET AL. v. MERCHANTS' UNION 
 
 EXPRESS CO. 
 104 MASSACHUSETTS, 152. 1870. 
 
 CONTRACT, with alternative count in tort, for negligence of 
 defendants in the matter of the collection of a draft drawn by 
 plaintiffs, at Boston, upon Plummer & Co., at Providence. 
 Plaintiffs instructed defendants to return the draft at once if it 
 was not paid. Plummer & Co. objected to the draft as being 
 $1.20 in excess of their debt, and offered to write to plaintiffs 
 for an explanation. Defendants held the draft ; Plummer & 
 Co. wrote to plaintiffs and received a satisfactory explanation ; 
 defendants did not again present the draft, and two days 
 after Plummer & Co. were read)* to pay it the firm failed, 
 and paid but 50 per cent of its liabilities. This action is to 
 recover the balance, by way of damages, from defendants. It 
 was agreed that if, upon the facts, the jury would be warranted 
 in finding a verdict for the plaintiffs, a judgment should be 
 entered for the plaintiffs for 61,233.21 and interest. 
 
 COLT, J. Under the instructions given to the defendants 
 at the time they received this draft for collection, it was their 
 duty to collect it, or to return it at once to the plaintiffs if not 
 paid. It was duly presented by the defendants' messenger 
 for payment on the 14th of October, and payment refused. 
 Instead of returning the draft at once, they retained posses- 
 sion of it, in order to enable the drawees to obtain, by corres- 
 pondence, some explanation from the plaintiffs as to the 
 
 12
 
 178 OBLIGATIONS OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. [CH. VIII. 
 
 amount for which it was drawn. Satisfactory explanations 
 were received in due course of mail, and Pluinuier & Co., the 
 drawees, were ready on the morning of the 16th of the same 
 month to pay the full amount. But the draft was not again 
 presented, and on the 19th they failed and have since been 
 unable to pay. 
 
 It is the first duty of an agent, whose authority is limited, to 
 adhere faithfully to his instructions in all cases to which they 
 can be properly applied. If he exceeds, or violates, or neglects 
 them, he is responsible for all losses which are the natural 
 consequence of his act. And we are of opinion that there is 
 evidence of neglect in this case, upon which the jury would 
 have been warranted in finding a verdict for the plaintiffs. 
 
 The defendants would clearly have avoided all liability by 
 returning the draft at once, upon the refusal to pa}-. It is 
 urged that the defendants had done all they were bound to do, 
 when the}' had presented the draft and caused the plaintiffs to 
 be notified of its non-payment; that the notice which was 
 immediate!}' communicated by the letter of Plummer & Co., 
 asking explanation, was equivalent to a return of the draft ; 
 that this notice was given by the procurement or assent of the 
 defendants, as early as they would be required to give it if 
 they had themselves done it instead of intrusting it to Plummer 
 & Co. ; and that, after the receipt of it, it was the duty of the 
 plaintiffs to give new instructions if they desired the draft 
 presented for payment a second time. 
 
 There would be force in these considerations if the letter of 
 Plummer & Co. was only a simple notice of non-payment, 
 with no suggestion of further action in regard to it. It 
 expresses and implies much more. The reason for the 
 refusal to pay is stated, and the plaintiffs are told that the 
 defendants will hold the draft until they, Plummer & Co., hear 
 from them. Plainly, if the defendants avail themselves of the 
 letter as a performance of their obligation to give notice, they 
 must abide by the whole of its contents. They make Plummer 
 & Co. their agents in writing it, and authorize the plaintiffs 
 to rely on the assurance which substantially it contains, that
 
 89.] HEINEMANN V. HEARD. 179 
 
 upon the receipt by Plumrner & Co. of their explanation the 
 draft would be paid or returned, or notice of its non-payment 
 given. There is no suggestion in it that the defendants were 
 awaiting further instructions from the plaintiffs, or needed or 
 expected them. It clearly implies that the defendants had 
 only suspended, at the suggestion of Plummer & Co., and for 
 their accommodation, the further performance of the duty they 
 had undertaken, until an answer and explanation could be 
 returned to Plummer & Co. The plaintiffs had no new 
 instructions to give, nor had the defendants any right to 
 expect them. They trusted to others, instead of correspond- 
 ing themselves with the plaintiffs, who in this matter are in 
 no respect chargeable with neglect. The loss is wholly due to 
 the neglect of the defendants, and must be borne by them. 
 According to the agreement of the parties, the entry must 
 be Judgment for the plaintiffs. 
 
 88.] BRAY v. GUNN. 
 
 53 GEORGIA, 144. 1874. 
 [Reported herein at p. 100.] 
 
 2. Prudence. 
 
 89.] HEINEMANN v. HEARD. 
 
 50 NEW YORK, 27. 1872. 
 
 ACTION for damages for breach of duty. Non-suit, and 
 judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. 
 
 Defendants were plaintiffs' agents, residing in China. 
 Plaintiffs sent to defendants 15,000 for the purchase of teas 
 and silks, with instructions as to amounts and prices. De- 
 fendants neglected to purchase as instructed. It appeared 
 that the defendants could not have procured the tea at the 
 price fixed, but they could have procured the silk. They waited,
 
 180 OBLIGATIONS OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. [CH. VIII. 
 
 however, in the expectation that they could procure it at a 
 lower price, but it suddenly advanced beyond the price fixed 
 bj' plaintiffs. 
 
 RAPALLO, J. (after deciding that no recovery could be had 
 for the failure to purchase the tea, and after discussing the 
 evidence as to the possibility of purchasing the silk). The 
 question in the case was one of due diligence, and we think 
 that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on that 
 point. The position cannot be maintained that fraud on the 
 part of the agent is necessary to subject him to an action for 
 neglecting to perform a duty which he has undertaken. An 
 agent is bound not onty to good faith but to reasonable 
 diligence, and to such skill as is ordinarily possessed by per- 
 sons of common capacity engaged in the same_b_asiness. 
 Story on Agency, 183, 186. Whether or not he has 
 exercised such skill and diligence is usually a question of 
 fact ; but its omission is equally a breach of his obligation 
 and injurious to his principal, whether it be the result of 
 inattention or incapacity, or of an intent to defraud. In the 
 case of Entwisle v. Dent (1 Exch. 812) there was an ele- 
 ment of fraud as well as breach of duty ; but the judgment 
 of the court was not founded upon the fraud, nor could it be, 
 as the action was for breach of the implied contract of the 
 defendant to act according to instructions. 
 
 As an independent ground for sustaining the non-suit, it is 
 claimed, on the part of the defendants, that the order to 
 purchase silk was discretionary, and that for that reason 
 they are not responsible in damages for their failure to 
 execute it. 
 
 By reference to the letter of December 23, 1864, it will be 
 seen that no discretion was given whether or not to pur- 
 chase. The order to invest 5,000 in silk of one or other of 
 the particular descriptions mentioned, and at the prices 
 named, was absolute. The only matter left to the discretion 
 of the defendants was the selection of the silks as well as the 
 teas. They were instructed to purchase either Cumchuck at 
 18., or No. 1 Loo Kong, or Kow Kong, at 16s., and were
 
 89.] HEINEMANN V. HEARD. 181 
 
 requested to obtain all white if possible ; otherwise, to 
 separate the white from the yellow. No other matters were 
 left to their discretion. It was their duty to select some of 
 these descriptions, if they were to be obtained, and to use 
 reasonable diligence in obtaining the required quantity in 
 time to ship under the letter of credit. It is argued that as 
 they had discretion in the selection of the silks, and had to 
 determine whether it was possible to obtain all white, no 
 period can be fixed as the time when they were bound to 
 decide these matters and make the purchase. This argu- 
 ment is not satisfactory. The necessity of making a selec- 
 tion may have justified them in not accepting the first offer 
 which they may have met with, and in looking further for the 
 purpose of complying with the wishes of their correspondents ; 
 but it would not justify them in allowing all opportunities 
 to pass, and the time to elapse within which they could pur- 
 chase under the letter of credit. They were bound to make 
 a selection within a reasonable time, and, at all events; 
 before the time for shipping, under the credit, expired. The 
 prices appear to have continued below their limit from the 
 early part of June until the first term of the letter of credit 
 had run out ; yet they allowed all that time to elapse without 
 making any selection. Such_delay was^certainly evidence ot 
 want of due skill and diligence, if attributable merely to j\ 
 failure to come to a decision . 
 
 But the defendants do not, in their correspondence, take 
 any such ground, or claim that they regarded themselves as 
 having any discretion as to purchasing the silks and tea. 
 On the contrary, in their letter of February 27, 1866, they 
 say: "We were bound to follow your instructions for the 
 investment of 15,000 credit first sent, and have already ex- 
 plained to you our reasons for not having purchased silk ; " 
 referring to their letter of December 14, 1865.. They rest 
 their justification wholly upon the ground that while the silks 
 were below the plaintiffs' limits they held off in the attempt to 
 obtain them at still lower prices. They were scarcely justi- 
 fied, however, in persisting in this attempt until it became too
 
 182 OBLIGATIONS OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. [CH. VIU. 
 
 late to ship under the letter of credit as originally drawn or 
 as extended. 
 
 (The court then discusses the question of damages and 
 concludes) : It is enough, at the present stage of the case, 
 to say that the evidence on the subject of damages was re- 
 ceived without objection, and that the non-suit was not 
 moved for, or granted on the ground of any defect of proof 
 in this respect, but on the sole ground that the plaintiffs had 
 not given any evidence of their alleged cause of action 
 sufficient to go to the jury. We think they have shown 
 enough in respect to the silk to put the defendants to their 
 defence, and that the judgment should therefore be reversed 
 and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. 
 
 All concur. Judgment reversed. 
 
 3. Good faith. 
 
 90.] GEISINGER v. BEYL.* 
 
 80 WISCONSIN, 443. 1891. 
 
 ACTION of ejectment. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant 
 appeals. 
 
 Defendant relied for title upon certain tax deeds issued to 
 himself and to one Steinke in his behalf and upon a quit- 
 claim deed from Steinke. The jury found specially that the 
 defendant was the agent of plaintiff for the sale or care of 
 the land when the tax deeds were executed, and that (except 
 as to these tax deeds) plaintiff was the owner of the lands. 
 
 LTON, J. The learned counsel for defendant earnestly con- 
 tended in his argument that there is no testimony to support 
 the finding of the jury that when the tax deeds were executed 
 defendant was the agent of the plaintiff for " selling or car- 
 ing for the plaintiffs interest in the land in question.'* We 
 do not agree with counsel in this view of the testimony. 
 
 Plaintiff resided at Rochester, in Minnesota, and the de- 
 fendant resided in Barren County, in this State, near the
 
 90.] CONKEY V. BOND. 183 
 
 land. The parties had considerable correspondence in 1869, 
 1870, and 1871, concerning the land. Some of the letters 
 which passed between them are in evidence, and the contents 
 of others, which had been lost or destroyed, were testified to 
 on the trial. This testimony will not be repeated here. It 
 is sufficient to say of it that, if true, it proves that the de- 
 fendant was, at the times mentioned, the agent of the plain- 
 tiff, not only to look after and care for the land, but to sell 
 it. In either case it was a violation of his duty to ta.kjj, a 
 tax deed of the land to himself or another, for it was his 
 
 duty to protect_and_ preserve plaintiff's interest therein. 
 Hence the tax deeds were a fraud upon the plaintiff, and 
 vested in defendant no title to the land. At most, the pur- 
 chase of the tax certificates by the defendant was a redemp- 
 tion of the land from the tax sales thereof. . . . 
 
 We conclude, therefore, that the finding on the subject of 
 defendant's agency is supported by the testimony, and dem- 
 onstrates that the defendant took no title to the land under 
 any of the tax deeds. . . . Judgment affirmed. 
 
 90.] CONKEY v. BOND. 
 
 36 NEW YOKE, 427. 1867. 
 
 ACTION to rescind a sale of stock made by defendant to 
 plaintiff, and to recover the amount paid therefor, and cer- 
 tain payments made by plaintiff as stockholder. Judgment 
 for defendant. Reversed at General Term. Defendant ap- 
 peals from the order of the General Term. 
 
 Defendant, as agent, undertook to purchase stock forl 
 plaintiff, and, without plaintiff's knowledge, transferred ten/ 
 shares of his own stock to plaintiff. 
 
 PORTER, J. Tho fapf, that the defendant volunteered his 
 agency did not absolve him. frnm t hp *\Pty nf fidelity in the 
 relation of trust and confidence which he sought and as t - 
 sumed. The plaintiff was induced to purchase at an extrava-
 
 184 OBLIGATIONS OF AGENT TO PKINCIPAL. [CH. VHL 
 
 gant premium, stock of the value of which he was ignorant, 
 on the mistaken representations of the defendant, who pro- 
 fessed to have none which he was willing to sell. This 
 assurance very naturally disarmed the vigilance of the 
 respondent, and he availed himself of the defendant's offer 
 by authorizing him to buy at the price he named. 
 
 The defendant did not buy, but sent him a certificate for 
 the amount required, concealing the fact that he had not 
 acted under the authority, and that the stock transferred was 
 his own. 
 
 There is no viewjrf the facts in which the transaction can 
 bejupheld. He stood in a relation to his principal which dis- 
 abled him from concluding a contract with himself, without 
 the knowledge or assent of the party he assumed to repre- 
 sent. He undertook to act at once as seller and as pur- 
 chaser.. He bought Jjg_ggent, and sold as owner. The 
 ex parte bargain, thus concluded, proved advantageous to 
 him and very unfortunate for his principal. It was the 
 right of thejatter to rescind it, on discovery of the breach 
 of conifidence. It is not material to inquire whether the 
 defendant had any actual fraudulent purpose. The mak- 
 ing of a purchase from himself, without authority from 
 the plaintiff, was a constructive fraud, in view of the fidu- 
 ciary relation which existed between the parties. In such 
 a case, the law delivers the agent from temptation by a 
 presumptio juris et de jure, which good intentions are un- 
 availing to repel. It is unnecessary to state our views more 
 fully on this question, as it is fully and ably discussed in the 
 opinion delivered by Judge Bacon in the court below, and his 
 conclusions are abundantly fortified by authority. 34 Barb. 
 276 ; Gillett v. Peppercorne, 3 Beavan, 78 ; Story on Agency, 
 214 ; Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. U. S. 503 ; Davone v. 
 Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252, 270 ; Moore v. Moore, 1 Seld. 
 256 ; N. Y. Central Ins. Co. v. Protection Ins. Co., 14 
 N. Y. 85 ; Gardner v. Ogden, 22 Id. 325. 
 
 The objection, that this theory is inconsistent with that 
 stated in the complaint, is not sustained by the record. The
 
 90.] BUNKER V. MILES. 185 
 
 essential facts are alleged, and the appropriate relief is de- 
 manded. The fact that the complaint alleged other matters 
 which the plaintiff failed to establish, impairs neither his 
 right nor his remedy. Utile per inutile non vitiatur. 
 
 The order of the Supreme Court should be affirmed, with 
 judgment absolute for the respondent. 
 
 All the judges concurring. Judgment accordingly. 
 
 90.] BUNKER v. MILES. 
 
 30 MAINE, 431. 1849. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT for money had and received. Judgment for 
 plaintiff. 
 
 Defendant bought a horse of one Seaver for $65, and agreed 
 that if the horse sold for more than $65, he would divide the 
 profit with Seaver. Defendant then had $80 of plaintiff's 
 money with which to buy that horse, and was to buy it as 
 cheaply as possible and receive one dollar for his services. 
 Defendant told Seaver he had sold the horse for $80, and 
 gave Seaver $7.50, keeping $7.50 for himself. Judgment for 
 $6.50 and interest. 
 
 TENNEY, J. The case was put to the jury upon evidence 
 introduced by the plaintiff alone. It appeared that he placed 
 in the hands of the defendant the sum of $80, and requested 
 him to obtain a certain horse. The defendant was restricted, 
 in the price to be paid, to that sum, and was to procure the 
 horse at a less price, if he should be able to do so, it being 
 agreed that the defendant should receive the sum of $1 for 
 his services in purchasing the horse. He obtained the horse 
 and delivered him to the plaintiff, who received him and dis- 
 posed of him the same day. The defendant represented to 
 the plaintiff, that he had saved nothing for himself. It ap- 
 pears by other testimony that the price paid for the horse by 
 the defendant did not exceed the sum of $72.50. 
 
 If the defendant made a valid contract with the plaintiff, to
 
 186 OBLIGATIONS OP AGENT TO PKINCIPAL. [CH. VHI. 
 
 do the service requested as an agent, and did do it as was 
 agreed, he was not at liberty to make a profit to himself in 
 the transaction, in which he was acting as the agent ; and 
 whatever sum remained in his hands, after paying the price of 
 the horse, deducting the compensation to be made to him, 
 was the money of the plaintiff, for which the equitable action 
 of money had and received could be maintained. The in- 
 structions to the jury were consistent with these principles, 
 and a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff. 
 
 Exceptions overruled. 
 
 90.] HEGENMYER . MARKS. 
 
 37 MINNESOTA, 6. 1887. 
 [Reported herein at p. 339.] 
 
 4. Accounting. 
 
 91.] BALDWIN BROS. v. POTTER. 
 
 46 VERMONT, 402. 1874. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals. 
 
 Defendant, as plaintiffs' agent, sold prize packages of 
 candies and collected the price. Defendant refused to account 
 for the monej's or for samples of the prizes intrusted to him, 
 and defended upon the ground of the illegality of the trans- 
 action. 
 
 PIERPOINT, C. J. We do not find it necessary in this case 
 to consider the question as to whether the contract for the 
 sale of the property referred to, by the plaintiffs, to the several 
 persons who purchased it, were contracts made in violation 
 of law, and therefore void, or not. This action is not between 
 the parties to those contracts ; neither is it founded upon, or 
 brought to enforce them. If those contracts were illegal, the 
 law will not aid either party in respect to them ; it will not
 
 91.] BALDWIN BROS. V. POTTEE. 187 
 
 allow the seller to sue for and recover the price of the prop- 
 erty sold, if it has not been paid ; if it has been paid, the 
 purchaser cannot sue for and recover it back. The facts in 
 this case show that the purchasers paid the money to the 
 plaintiffs, not to the plaintiffs personally, but to the defendant 
 as the agent of the plaintiffs, authorized to receive it. When 
 the money was so paid it became the plaintiffs' money, and 
 when it was received by the defendant as such agent, the 
 law, in consideration thereof, implies a promise, on the part of 
 the defendant, to pay it over to his principals, the plaintiffs ; 
 it is this obligation that the present action is brought to 
 enforce : no illegality attaches to this contract. But the de- 
 fendant insists that, inasmuch as the plaintiffs could not have 
 enforced the contracts of sale as between themselves and the 
 purchaser, therefore, as the purchaser has performed the con- 
 tracts by paying the money to the plaintiffs through me, as 
 their agent, I can now set up the illegality of the contract of 
 sale to defeat an action brought to enforce a contract on my 
 part to pa}' the money, that I as agent receive, over to my 
 principal. In other words, because my principal did not 
 receive the money on a legal contract, I am at liberty to steal 
 the money, appropriate it to my own use, and set my principal 
 at defiance. We think the law is well settled otherwise, and 
 the fact that the defendant acted as the agent of the plaintiffs 
 in obtaining orders for the goods does not vary the case. 
 Tenant v. Elliot, 1 B. & P. 3 ; Armstrongs. Toler, 11 Wheat. 
 258 ; Evans v. City of Trenton, 4 Zab. (N. J.) 764. 
 
 We think the certificate granted by the county court was 
 properly granted. It has been urged in behalf of the de- 
 fendant, that the zeal with which he has defended this case 
 shows that he intended no wrong ; but we think the man who 
 receives money in a fiduciary capacit}', and refuses to pay it 
 over, does not improve his condition by the tenacity with 
 which he holds on to it. 
 
 Judgment of the county court affirmed.
 
 188 OBLIGATIONS OF AGENT TO PKESTCIPAL. [CH. VIII. 
 
 91.] BAKER v. NEW YORK NATIONAL 
 EXCHANGE BANK. 
 
 100 NEW YORK, 31. 1885. 
 [Reported herein at p. 341.] 
 
 91.] RIEHL v. EVANSVILLE FOUNDRY 
 ASSOCIATION. 
 
 104 INDIANA, 70. 1885. 
 [Reported herein at p. 344.] 
 
 5. Appoinment of sub-agents. 
 
 93.J COMMERCIAL BANK OF LAKE ERIE 
 v. NORTON ET AL. 
 
 1 HILL (N. Y.), 501. 1841. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT by plaintiffs as indorsees against defendants 
 as acceptors of two bills of exchange. Verdict for plaintiffs. 
 Defendants move for a new trial. 
 
 E. Norton & Co., the defendants, authorized H. Norton, 
 their general agent, to accept bills. H. Norton directed 
 Cochrane, a book-keeper, to accept these bills, which he did 
 by writing across the bills, " E. Norton & Co. per A. G. 
 Cochrane." Cochrane had no authority from E. Norton & 
 Co. to accept bills. 
 
 By the Court, COWEN, J. (after deciding that there was 
 evidence to go to the jury that H. Norton had authority to 
 accept the bills). But it is said he could not delegate the 
 power to accept This is not denied, nor did he do so. The 
 bills came for acceptance ; and having as agent made up his 
 mind that they should be accepted, he directed Cochrane,
 
 93.] COMMERCIAL BANK V. NORTON. 189 
 
 the book-keeper, to do the mechanical part, write the ac- 
 ceptance across the bills. He was the mere amanuensis. 
 Had anj-thing like the trust which is in its nature personal to 
 an agent, a discretion for instance to accept what bills he 
 pleased, been confided to Cochrane, his act would have 
 been void. But to question it here would be to deny that the 
 general agent of a mercantile firm could retain a carpenter to 
 make a box, or a cooper to make a cask. The books go on 
 the question whether the delegation be of a discretion. Such 
 is the very latest case cited by the defendants' counsel 
 (JEmerson v. The Prov. Hat Manuf. Co., 12 Mass. Rep. 
 237, 241, 2) ; and the latest book (2 Kent's Com. 633, 
 4th ed.). Jilore v. Sutton (3 Meriv. 237) is among the 
 strictest cases I have seen. There the clerk of the agent put 
 his own initials to the memorandum, by direction of the agent ; 
 and held, insufficient. Henderson v. Harnewall (1 Young & 
 Jerv. 387) followed it. Both were cases arising under the 
 Statute of Frauds, which requires that the memorandum 
 should be signed by the principal or his agent ; and, I admit, 
 it is very difficult to distinguish the manner of the signatures 
 there from that now in question, by Cochrane. Everything 
 there seems to have been mechanical merety, as here ; and 
 there may be some doubt, I should think, whether such cases 
 can be sustained. At any rate, in our attempt to applj* 
 them, we are met with a case as widely the other way ; Ex 
 parte Sutton, 2 Cox, 84. The rule as there laid down is, 
 that " an authority given to A. to draw bills in the name of 
 B. may be exercised by the clerks of A." Such is the mar- 
 ginal note, and it is entirety borne out by the case itself. 
 Peter Marshall wrote to Lewis & Potter authorizing them " to 
 make use of his name by procuration or otherwise to draw 
 bills on G. & J." The clerk of Lewis & Potter drew the 
 bill, signing thus: "By procuration of Peter Marshall, 
 Robert Edgecumbe." The Lord Chancellor put it on the 
 ground that the signature of the clerk would have bound 
 Lewis & Potter, had he signed their name under the general 
 authority which he had.
 
 190 OBLIGATIONS OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. [CH. VHI. 
 
 We thus make very little progress one way or the other on 
 direct English authority. Left to go on the principle of any 
 other English case I have seen, and there are man}', all we 
 have to say is, I think, that the agent shall not delegate 
 his discretion ; but may at least do any mechanical act by 
 deputy. I do not know that the language of Lord Ellen- 
 borough in Mason v. Joseph (1 Smith's Rep. 406) has been 
 anywhere directly carried into an adjudication. But it sounds 
 so much like all the cases professing to go on principle, that 
 I can scarcely doubt its being law. His lordship said, " It 
 is true an attorney appointed by deed cannot delegate his 
 authority to a third person. He must exercise his own judg- 
 ment on the principal subject for the purpose of which he 
 is appointed ; but as to an}' mere ministerial act, it is not 
 necessary that he should do it in person, if he direct it to 
 be done, or upon a full knowledge of it adopt it. Suppose 
 for instance he had got the gout in his hands, and could not 
 actually sign himself, he might have authorized another to 
 sign for him." 
 
 
 
 New trial denied. 
 
 93.] WRIGHT v. BOYNTON. 
 
 37 NEW HAMPSHIRE, 9. 1858. 
 
 ACTION against defendant, as a partner in the firm of 
 William Hayward & Co., upon promissory notes signed in 
 the firm name by the hand of Willard Russell. Verdict for 
 defendant. 
 
 BELL, J. . . . The defendant, Boynton, executed to 
 Russell a power of attorney, by which he appointed him his 
 agent, and authorized him to purchase and sell certain kinds 
 of goods, in his name, and to transact business of that kind 
 with capital furnished by him, and to use his name generally 
 in the business. Russell, in the name of Boynton, entered
 
 93.] WRIGHT V. BOYNTON. 191 
 
 into partnership with Hay ward, the other part}* named in the 
 writ, in a business of that kind. The court held that the 
 power of attorney did not give to Russell the power to make 
 Boynton a partner with Hay ward, and we think rightly. 
 
 One who has a bare power or authority from another to do 
 any act, must execute it himself, and cannot delegate it to a 
 stranger ; for, this being a trust or confidence reposed in him 
 personally, it cannot be assigned to one whose integrity or 
 ability may not be known to the principal, and who, if he 
 were known, might not be selected by him for such a purpose. 
 The authority is exclusively personal, unless, from the express 
 language used, or from the fair presumptions growing out of 
 the particular transaction, a broader power was intended 
 to be conferred. Story on Agency, sees. 13, 14 ; 2 Kent's 
 Com. 633; Paley on Agency, 175i Broom's Maxims. 665 ; 
 Bank v. Norton^ 1 Hill, 501 ; Cockran v. Irlam, 2 M. & S. 
 301. 
 
 Now each partner possesses an equal and general power 
 and authority, independently of articles, or express stipula- 
 tions regulating their powers, in behalf of the firm, to transfer, 
 pledge, exchange, or appl}-, or otherwise dispose of the part- 
 nership property and effects, for any and all purposes, within 
 the scope and objects of the partnership, and in the course of 
 its trade or business. Story on Part. 144. He may pledge 
 the credit of his partners to any amount, and in all simple 
 contract dealings, relating to the partnership business, he is, 
 in his own person, the representative of the firm, and the act 
 of one partner is the act of all. Car}' on Part 29, 30 ; 
 3 Kent's Com. 41, 43. Powers thus broad cannot be con- 
 ferred by a mere agent on a stranger, without express 
 authority. 
 
 ... 
 
 Judgment on the verdict.
 
 192 OBLIGATIONS OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. [CH. VHI. 
 
 95.] POWER ET AL. v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK. 
 6 MONTANA, 251. 1887. 
 
 ACTION to recover the amount of a draft deposited by 
 plaintiffs with defendant for collection. Defendant sent the 
 draft to its correspondent at the place of payment. The 
 correspondent collected the draft, but failed to remit, and 
 subsequently became insolvent. Judgment for defendant. 
 Plaintiffs appeal. 
 
 MCLEARY, J. . . . The question of how far a bank is 
 liable for the default of a correspondent or collecting agent 
 in regard_to_a collection is one which has been solved in at 
 least tbjjee^different wav.S-bv the many courts of last resort in 
 the tlnited States which have at different times had the 
 matter under consideration. One cjass of cases maintains the 
 absolute liability of a bank for any default of its correspon- 
 dent or collecting agent, in the same manner as it would be 
 for the default of its own employes^ on the principle that the 
 bank, by undertaking the collection, obligated itself to see 
 that every proper measure was taken, and regarding the 
 collector as the agent of the bank, and not as the agent of 
 the owner of the commercial paper. A second class of cases 
 boldsthat the bank is liable only for the exercise of due care 
 and diligence Jn selecting a trustworthy agent or correspon- 
 dent, and that there is in the deposit for collection the im- 
 plied authority to employ a sub-agent, and thatjmchjmb-agent 
 becomes, when chosen, the agent of the holder, and not of 
 the bank which selected him. The third class of cases draws 
 a distinction between the cases in which the payer resides 
 where the bank is situated, and the cases where he resides at 
 a distance ; in the first place making the bank liable abso- 
 Injglyjfor any dpftuilt nr wrongful act, and in f.h 
 
 only making the bank liable for the proper selection of a com- 
 petent andjrejiablejigejit^ with proper instruction. 1 Daniel, 
 Neg7Instr 341.
 
 95.] POWER v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK. 193 
 
 The cases of the first class are found principally in the 
 decisions of the courts of the United States and the States of 
 New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana. 
 The cases of the second class are found chiefly in the reports 
 of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, Mississippi, Mis- 
 souri, and Iowa. The third class of cases is made up of 
 those decided by the courts of Illinois, Tennessee, Wisconsin, 
 and Louisiana. 
 
 Inasmuch as there is such a variety of opinions to be found 
 among the highest courts on this important question, it is 
 proposed to examine at some length such of them as are 
 accessible to us, and thence deduce what we consider to be 
 the true rule governing such cases. 
 
 There has never been an} r adjudication on a question simi- 
 lar to this in this court ; and so far as concerns this territory, 
 this is a case of first impression. 
 
 (The court then makes an exhaustive review of the author- 
 ities, which is too extended to reprint here.) 
 
 The foundation for all the differences of opinion among the 
 learned judges who have had the matter under consideration 
 appears clearly to rest in the interpretation of the implied 
 contract between the depositor and the bank at the time the 
 negotiable paper is deposited for collection. Where there is 
 an express contract, it must, of course, be followed, and 
 there is no room for a difference of opinion ; and all of the 
 decisions herein styled cases of the second and third classes 
 are founded on the idea that the course of business or the 
 customs of bankers, or the necessities of the case, or the 
 peculiar circumstances, raise some other presumption than 
 the one that the bank receiving the deposit for collection 
 undertakes to collect it, and assumes all the risks from the 
 negligence or default of the agents which it employs. We 
 do not believe that any other contract can be inferred from 
 the mere tender and acceptance of negotiable paper for col- 
 lection. No matter where the debtor may reside, nor what 
 agencies it is necessary to employ in the collection, the de- 
 positor is not supposed to be acquainted with the methods 
 
 13
 
 194 OBLIGATIONS OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. [CH. VHI. 
 
 to be employed by the bank in collecting its paper, or the 
 carefulness, skill, solvency, or honesty of the agents whom 
 it m&y be necessary to employ in such collections. Besides, 
 it is the universal custom of banks t on receiving collections, 
 to passthem to the credit of the owner, and to indorse and 
 transmit them to their correspondents, where they are in like 
 manner passed to the credit of the indorser, and so on until 
 collection ; and, if the collection fails on account of the in- 
 solvency of the debtor, and through no fault of any inter- 
 mediate bank or agent, the paper is returned, and charged 
 back, until it reaches the original depositor and indorser, 
 who is called upon to make it good. Such was the course 
 pursued in the case at bar, and the defendant is clearly liable 
 for the amount collected. 
 
 On mature consideration of the authorities, supporting all 
 shades of opinion on this subject, we fully agree with the 
 views expressed in 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. 342, and hold that, 
 in the absence of a special contract, a bank is absolutely 
 liable for any laches, negligence, or default of its corre- 
 spondent whereby the holder of negotiable paper suffers loss. 
 By such a rule alone can the depositor who intrusts his busj- 
 ness to a bank be secure against carelessness or dishonesty 
 on the part of collecting agencies employed by banks to carry 
 out their contracts Banks can easily avoid the effects of 
 this stringent rule by making special contracts in special 
 cases, or declining to undertake collections at points where 
 they have any fears as to the reliability or solvency of the 
 agents whom they will be obliged to employ ; but when they 
 undertake collections, either at their own location, or at 
 distant points, without a special contract limiting their lia- 
 bility, they must be held to do so for a sufficient consid- 
 eration, and to be responsible absolutely to the owner of 
 negotiable paper for the payment of all money collected 
 thereon, and for all losses occurring through the negligence 
 of the agent, resulting in a failure to make such collection. 
 
 In accordance with these views, the judgment is hereby 
 reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial. 
 
 Judgment reversed.
 
 95.] GUELICH V. NATIONAL STATE BANK. 195 
 
 95.] GUELICH v. NATIONAL STATE BANK. 
 56 IOWA, 434. 1881. 
 
 ACTION to recover the amount of a bill of exchange depos- 
 ited with defendant for collection by plaintiff's testator, which 
 defendant failed to present for payment to the drawee or to 
 protest for non-payment, whereby the other parlies to the 
 paper were discharged. There was a trial by the court with- 
 out a jury and judgment for plaintiff; defendant appeals. 
 The facts of the case appear in the opinion. 
 
 BECK, J. I. The paper in question in this suit was a 
 foreign bill drawn in Munich, Westphalia, upon New York, 
 and was deposited with defendant for collection. In the 
 usual course of business of the bank, it was sent by defend- 
 ant to its correspondent, the Metropolitan Bank of New 
 York. It may be conceded, in the view we take of the case, 
 that, for the reason the paper was not presented for payment 
 and protested for non-pa3 - ment by the New York bank within 
 the time required by law, the drawers and indorsers of the 
 bill were discharged. Counsel for defendant insist that for 
 the reason the paper was over due when received by defend- 
 ant no liability attaches for failure to protest it for non-pay- 
 ment. They also argue that defendant as a national bank is 
 not liable for the default charged in the petition. These and 
 other questions discussed by counsel we need not consider, as 
 the decision of the case turns upon another point arising 
 upon facts we have just stated. 
 
 II. The question which, in our opinion, is decisive of the 
 case, is this : Is defendant liable for t] ' fi deficit, of jts ^prr^. 
 pondent. the New York Bank T in failing to present and pro- 
 test the bill in due time,? 
 
 The paper was deposited with defendant for collection ; it 
 was paj'able in New York. The course of business of 
 defendant, and all other banks, is, in such cases, to make 
 collections through correspondents. They do not undertake
 
 196 OBLIGATIONS OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. PjCH. 
 
 themselves to collect the bills, but to intrust them to other 
 banks at the place payment is to be made. The holder of 
 the paper, having full notice of the course of business, must 
 be held to assent thereto. He, therefore, authorizes the bank 
 with whom he deals to do the work of collection through 
 another bank. 
 
 We will now inquire as to the relations existing between 
 the bank charged with the collection of the paper, and the 
 holder depositing it with the first bank. 
 
 The bank receiving the paper becomes an agent of the 
 depositor with authority to employ another bank to collect it. 
 The second bank becomes the sub-agent of the customer of 
 the first, fnr the rpiaann tha * thft customer authorizes the 
 employment of such an agent to make the collection. 
 
 The~paper remains the property of the customer, and is 
 collected for him; the party employed, with his assent, to 
 make the collection, must therefore be regarded as his agent. 
 
 A sub-agent is accountable ordinarily only to his superior 
 agent when emplo} T ed without the assent or direction of the 
 principal. But if he be emplo}'ed with the express or implied 
 assent of the princijjakJhe^superior agent will not be respon- 
 siblelbr_hi3_aclaL There is, in such a case, a privity between 
 the sub-agent and the principal, who must, therefore, seek a 
 remedy directly against the sub-agent for his negligence or 
 misconduct. Story on Agency, sees. 217 and 313. These 
 familiar rules of the law, applied to the case, relieve it of all 
 doubt when considered in the light of legal principles. 
 
 III. But there is conflict in the adjudged cases upon the 
 question of the direct liability of the bank employed as a sub- 
 agent to the holder of the paper, for negligence or default in 
 its collection. The preponderance of the authorities strongly 
 supports the conclusion we have just reached in this case. 
 The following cases are to this effect : Dorchester & Milton 
 Bank v. New England Bank, 1 Gush. 177 ; Fabens v. Mer- 
 cantile Bank, 23 Pick. 330 ; Lawrence v. Stonington Bank, 
 6 Conn. 521 ; East Haddam Bankv. Scovil, 12 Conn. 303; 
 Hyde et al. v. Planters? Bank, 17 La. Ann. 560 ; Baldwin v.
 
 95.J GUELJCH V. NATIONAL STATE BANK. 197 
 
 Bank of Louisiana, 1 La. Ann. 13 ; JEtna Insurance Co. v. 
 Alton City Bank, 25 111. 221 ; Stacy v. Dane County Bank, 
 12 Wis. 629 ; Tiernan v. Commercial Bank, 1 How. (Miss.) 
 648 ; Agricultural Bank v. Commercial Bank, 7 Sm. & M. 
 592 ; Bowling v. Arthur, 34 Miss. 41 ; Jackson v. Union 
 Bank, 6 Har. & J. 146 ; Citizens' Bank v. Howell, 8 Md. 
 530 ; Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Pet. 25 ; Mechan- 
 ics' Bank v. Earp, 4 Kawle, 384 ; Bellemire v. The U. S. 
 Bank, 1 Miles, 173 ; S. C. 4 Wheat. 105 ; Dalyv. Butchers' 
 & Drovers' Bank, 56 Mo. 94 ; Smedes v. The Bank of 
 Utica, 20 Johns. 372. 
 
 IV. The following cases hold that the bank to whom a bill 
 or note is sent for collection by another bank is not the 
 agent of the owner of the paper : Allen v. Merchants' Bank, 
 22 Wend. 215 ; Downer v. Madison Co. Bank, 6 Hill, 648 ; 
 Montgomery Co. Bank v. Albany City Bank, 3 Seld. 459 ; 
 Commercial Bank v. Union Bank, 1 Kern. 203 ; S. C. 19 
 Barb. 391 ; Ayrault v. Pacific Bank, 47 N. Y. 570 ; Indig 
 v. Brooklyn City Bank, 16 Hun, 200 ; Reeves v. St. Bank 
 of Ohio, 8 Ohio St. 465. 
 
 V. Bradstreet v. Everson, 72 Pa. St. 124; Lewis <& 
 Wallace v. Peck <fe Clark, 10 Ala. 142, and Pollard v. 
 
 Rowland, 2 Blackford, 22, are sometimes quoted as accord' 
 ing with the cases last cited. We think the}' are distin- 
 guished from all the conflicting cases above referred to, by 
 the fact that the parties receiving the paper, being collecting 
 agents only, became bound, either by express or implied 
 contracts, to make the collections themselves. In the other 
 cases there was no such contract shown, but on the contrary 
 it appears that banks in their usual course of business 
 make collections of notes and bills at distant places through 
 their correspondents, with the implied assent of the parties 
 depositing such paper with them. The collecting bank thus 
 becomes the sub-agent of, and is responsible to, the owners 
 of the paper. See Story on Agency, sec. 217 a, and cases 
 cited. 
 
 The decision in Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Pet
 
 198 OBLIGATIONS OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. [CH. VTH. 
 
 25, and Mechanics' Bank v. Earp, 4 Rawle, 384, are based 
 upon the ground that the paper in each case was deposited 
 for transmission, and not for collection, that is, the receiving 
 bank undertook to transmit the paper to its correspondent 
 and not to collect it. This very element, in our opinion, is 
 in all the cases cited to support our position, and in the case 
 before us. Under the usage of banks, paper received for 
 collection at the places other than the town or nit.y whpra tho 
 receiving bank is located, is received under the implied con- 
 tract that it is accepted for transmission to correspondents 
 at Jjiej)lace where it is payable. These cases, we think, are 
 in accord with the other decisions we have cited in support 
 of our views. 
 
 Mackersy v. Ramsay s, 9 Clark & F. 818, is not in conflict 
 with the doctrine we adopt. In that case the receiving bank 
 expressly undertook to forward the paper, and, upon its pay- 
 ment, to place the amount thereof to the credit of the deposi- 
 tor, and for the performance of its undertaking it was to 
 receive a commission. The paper was collected by its cor- 
 respondent, who failed soon after, and the bank receiving 
 the paper from its customer, never received the funds. 
 Surely under this contract to credit its customers with the 
 amount of the paper upon payment, the bank would be bound 
 to give him credit when it was paid to its correspondent, 
 and thus become directly liable for the money to the 
 customer. 
 
 Allen v. The Merchants' Sank, 22 Wend. 215, which 
 established the doctrine afterwards followed in New York, 
 was announced by a divided court, fourteen senators con- 
 curring in the decision, and ten, with Chancellor "VVal worth, 
 dissenting. The case, however, has been uniformly followed 
 in New York. 
 
 (The court then distinguishes the case of Hoover v. Wise, 
 91 U. S. 308, which is superseded as an authority on this 
 point by Exchange Nat. Bank v. Third Nat. Bank, 112 
 U. S. 276, decided in 1884.) 
 
 In many of the cases above cited banks were held not to
 
 97.] DELANO V. CASE. 199 
 
 be liable for the negligence of notaries to whom paper was 
 delivered for protest. Undoubtedly the doctrines which 
 would relieve a bank from liability for the negligence of a 
 notary would protect it when charged with liability for the 
 negligent act of a correspondent. 
 
 It may be remarked that while a bank is not responsible 
 for the defaults of proper and competent sub-agents, it 
 becomes liable if negligent in selecting incompetent and 
 improper agents to whom it intrusts paper for collection. 
 
 We are of the opinion that the district court erred in ren- 
 dering a judgment against defendant upon the facts before it. 
 
 Reversed. 
 
 6. Obligations of gratuitous agents. 
 
 97.] DELANO v. CASE. 
 
 121 ILLINOIS, 247. 1887. 
 
 Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the 
 court. 
 
 This was case, in the circuit court of Macoupin County, 
 b}' a general depositor in a bank, against directors of the 
 bank, for negligence in permitting it to be held out to the 
 public as solvent, when in fact it was, at the time, insolvent. 
 Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in that court, and 
 that judgment was affirmed, on appeal to the Appellate 
 Court for the Third District, and this appeal is from that 
 judgment. 
 
 The Appellate Court, in its opinion filed on rendering that 
 judgment, holds, first, that the directors of a bank are 
 trustees for depositors as well as for stockholders ; second, 
 that they are bound to the observance of ordinar}^ care and 
 diligence, and are hence liable for injuries resulting from 
 their non-observance ; and third, that the present appellants 
 did not observe that degree of care and diligence, and, in 
 consequence thereof, appellee sustained the damages for
 
 200 OBLIGATIONS OF AGENT TO PKINCIPAL. [CH. VIIL 
 
 which the judgment was rendered. Delano et al. v. 
 17 Bradw. 531. 
 
 The last proposition we are relieved from inquiring into, 
 since there was evidence tending (though, it may be, but 
 slightly) to sustain it 
 
 The propositions of law, as above stated, are, in our 
 opinions, free of objection and sustained by authority. 
 Percy et al. v. Millandon, 3 La. 568 ; United Society of 
 Shakers v. Underwood, 9 Bush, 609 ; Morse on Banks and 
 Banking (2d ed.), 133 ; Thompson on Liability of Officers 
 and Agents, 395; Shea v. Mabry, 1 Lea (Tenn.), 319; 
 Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R. I. 312 ; Wharton 
 on Negligence, sec. 510. 
 
 The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 Judgment affirmed. 
 
 97.] IS HAM, TRUSTEE, v. POST, ADMINISTRATRIX. 
 141 NEW YORK, 100. 1894. 
 
 ACTION to recover $25,000 placed in defendant's hands by 
 plaintiff to be loaned. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant 
 appeals. 
 
 FINCH, J. The relation between the parties to this con- 
 troversy must be regarded as that of principal and agent. 
 Post was a banker, not a member of the Stock Exchange, 
 and so bound bj- its rules, but familiar with its customs and 
 usages, and controlled by them to some extent whenever 
 dealing with stocks in the Wall Street market. He held him- 
 self out to the business world in that character. By his 
 circulars he advertised himself as dealing in " choice stocks," 
 and promised his customers " careful attention" in all their 
 financial transactions. Those who dealt with him contracted 
 for, and had a right to expect, a degree of care commensurate 
 with the importance and risks of the business to be done, and 
 a skill and capacity adequate to its performance. That care
 
 97.] ISHAM V. POST. 201 
 
 and skill is such as should characterize a banker operating for 
 others in a financial center, and different in kind from the 
 ordinary diligence and capacity of the ordinary citizen. The 
 banker is employed exactly for that reason. Without it there 
 might cease to be motives for employing him at all. 
 
 Isham was the trustee of an express trust, but in this dis- 
 pute must be regarded simply as an individual, and without 
 reference to his trust character ; for the trial court has found 
 as a fact that, in employing the banker to loan for him 
 $25,000, he gave no notice of the trust character attaching to 
 the money, contracted apparently for himself, and left Post 
 to believe, and be justified in believing, that the money was 
 his own. The evidence on the subject admits of some differ- 
 ence of opinion, but on this appeal the finding must control. 
 
 In the same way the question whether Post's services in 
 making the loan were or were not to be gratuitous must be 
 deemed settled. The finding is that those services were to 
 be without compensation ; and on that ground the appellant 
 claims that Post was a gratuitous mandatary, and liable only 
 for gross negligence. But, while no compensation as such 
 was to be paid, it does not follow that the banker was freed 
 from the obligation of such diligence as he had promised to 
 those who dealt with him, or was at liberty to withhold from 
 his agency the exercise of the skill and knowledge which he 
 held himself out to possess. Nothing in general is more un- 
 satisfactory than attempts to define and formulate the different 
 degrees of negligence ; but even where the neglect which 
 charges the mandatary is described as^" gross, "it is still true 
 that if his situation or employment implies ordinary skill or 
 knowledge adequate to the undertaking, he will be responsible 
 for an}" losses or injuries resulting from the want of the exer- 
 cise of such skill or knowledge. Story on Bailments, 182a ; 
 Shiells v. Blackburne, 1 H. Black. 158 ; Foster v. Essex 
 Bank, 17 Mass. 479; First Nat. Bank v. Ocean Nat. 
 Bank, 60N.Y. 278. In the latter case it was said that 
 ordinary care as well as gross negligence, the one being in 
 contrast with the other, must be graded by the nature and
 
 202 OBLIGATIONS OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. [CH. VHI. 
 
 value of the property, and the risks to which it is exposed. 
 Post, therefore, was required to exercise the skill and knowl- 
 edge of a banker engaged in loaning money for himself and 
 for his customers, because of the peculiar character and scope 
 of his agency, because of his promise of careful attention, and 
 because the contract was made in reliance upon his business 
 character and skill. 
 
 We should next consider upon whom rested the burden of 
 proof. The plaintiff alleged and proved that he put into 
 Post's hands, as his banker and agent, to be loaned upon 
 demand at the high rates of interest prevailing, and in the 
 mode approved by custom and usage, the sum of $25,000, 
 which sum Post had not returned, but refused to return upon 
 proper demand, and so had converted the same to his own 
 use. That made out plaintiff's case. Judgment for him 
 must necessarily follow, unless Post, in answer, has estab- 
 lished an affirmative defence. That which he pleaded and 
 sought to prove was that the money was lost without his fault 
 and through an event for which he was altogether blameless. 
 In other words, he was bound to show that he did his duty 
 fully and faithfully, and without negligence or misconduct, so 
 that the resultant loss was not his, but must justly fall upon 
 the plaintiff. Marvin v. Brooks, 94 N. Y. 71 ; Ouderkirk v. 
 C. N. Bank, 119 Id. 263. With that burden resting upon 
 him, we must examine his defence and the evidence given in 
 its support, and determine whether or not it is our duty to 
 sustain the adverse conclusion, to reverse which he brings 
 this appeal. 
 
 (The court then decides that the trial court erred in exclud- 
 ing certain evidence offered by the defendant, and on this 
 ground reverses the judgment.) 
 
 Judgment reversed.
 
 PART III. 
 
 LEGAL EFFECT OF THE RELATION AS BETWEEN 
 THE PRINCIPAL AND THIRD PARTIES. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 CONTRACT OF AGENT IN BEHALF OF A DISCLOSED 
 PRINCIPAL. 
 
 1. Contracts apparently authorized. 
 
 103.] HUNTLEY v. MATHIAS ET AL. 
 90 NORTH CAROLINA, 101. 1884. 
 
 ACTION for damages to a horse. Judgment for plaintiff. 
 Defendant corporation appeals. 
 
 Mathias was the agent of defendant corporation. As such 
 agent he was engaged in travelling about the country selling 
 steam-engines. While so engaged he hired a horse of plain- 
 tiff, and overdrove and injured it. Defendant corporation 
 contends that there was no proof that Mathias had authority 
 from it to hire the horse. 
 
 MERRIMON, J. In the absence of any written instrument, 
 agencies in man} 7 cases arise from verbal authorizations, from 
 implications, from the nature of the business to be done, or 
 from the general usage of trade and commerce. 
 
 It is a general principle, applicable in all snch cases, 
 whether the agency be general or special, unless the inference 
 is express!}' negatived by some fact or circumstance, that it 
 includes the authority to employ all the usual modes and 
 means of accomplishing the purposes and ends of the agency, 
 and a slight deviation by the agent from the course of his
 
 204 CONTEACT FOE DISCLOSED PEDTCIPAL. [CH. IX. 
 
 duty will not vitiate his act, if this be immaterial or circum- 
 stantial only, and does not, in substance, exceed his power 
 and duty. Such an agency carries with and includes in it, as 
 an incident, all the powers which are necessary, proper, usual, 
 and reasonable, as means to effectuate the purposes for which 
 it was created, and it makes no difference, whether the author- 
 ity is general or special, expressed or implied, it embraces all 
 the appropriate means to accomplish the end to be attained. 
 
 The nature and extent of the incidental authority, in 
 such cases, turn oftentimes upon very nice considerations 
 of actual usage, or implications of law, and it is sometimes 
 difficult to apply the true rule. Incidental powers are gen- 
 eralty derived from the nature and purposes of the particular 
 agency, or from the particular business or employment, or 
 from the character of the agent himself. Sometimes the 
 powers are determined by mere inference of law ; in other 
 cases by matters of fact ; in others by inference of fact ; 
 and in others still, to determine them becomes a question 
 of mixed law and fact. Story on Agency, 85, 97, 100; 
 Gilbraith v. Lineberger, 69 N. C. 145 ; Katzenstein v. Rail- 
 road, 84 N. C. 688 ; Bank v. Bank, 75 N. C. 534 ; Williams 
 v. Windley, 86 N. C. 107 ; 1 Wait, Act. & Def. 221, 230. 
 
 In the case before us the allegations of the complaint are 
 very general and the evidence is meagre, but applying the 
 rules of law above stated to the whole case, we think the 
 court pro perl}' held that there was evidence to go to the jury 
 in respect to the authority of the agent to hire the horse. 
 
 It is alleged in the complaint that Mathias was the agent 
 of the defendant corporation, and this is admitted in the 
 answer, and the evidence went to show that the object of the 
 agency was, that the agent should travel about the country 
 from place to place, and sell steam-engines for his principal. 
 Now, common experience and observation show that, gen- 
 erally, a man, whether as principal or agent, going about the 
 country from place to place, and in various directions, to sell 
 steam-engines, or merchandise of any kind that people gener- 
 ally purchase, does not go on foot, but on railroads when he
 
 103.] HUNTLEY V. MATHIAS. 205 
 
 can, on horseback, or in light, convenient vehicles. This is 
 done almost uniformly, with a view to expedition as well as 
 the reasonable comfort of the person travelling. In the general 
 order of things this is done, and it is reasonable and proper 
 that it should be. And ordinarily, where an agent is sent out 
 on such service, his principal furnishes the means of trans- 
 portation. This is not perhaps uniformly, but it is generally 
 so, and if there is not a legal presumption of authority in the 
 agent to hire a horse or vehicle for the purpose of getting 
 from place to place, the fact certainly raises the ground for an 
 inference of the fact to that etfect, to be drawn by the jury. 
 The nature of the agency in this case rendered it necessary that 
 the agent should, from time to time, have a horse to enable 
 him to get from one place to another, and this gives rise to the 
 inference that his employer gave him authority to hire one. 
 
 The corporation defendant sent its agent out to travel from 
 place to place to sell its goods, and it gave him credit as a 
 trustworthy man in and about the business of the agency. 
 In view of the habits of men, the customary course of busi- 
 ness, especially the custom in such agencies as that under 
 consideration, there arose the ground for an inference that 
 the jury might property draw, not conclusive in itself, but to 
 be made and weighed by the jury, to the effect that the agent 
 Mathias had authority to hire the horse for the purpose of 
 his agency. Katzenstein v. Railroad, supra ; Bank v. Ban7c t 
 supra ; Bentleyv. Doggett, 51 Wis. 224 ; 37 Am. Rep. 827. 
 
 That the principal is liable to third persons for torts, de- 
 ceits, frauds, malfeasance and nonfeasance, and omissions 
 of dut}' of his agent in the course of his emplo3'ment, cannot 
 be questioned, even though the principal did not authorize, 
 justify, or participate in, or know of such misconduct Story 
 on Agency, 452 et seq. ; Jones v. Glass, 13 Ired. 305 ; Cox 
 v. Hoffman, 4 Dev. & Bat. 180. 
 
 The evidence in this case tended to show, and the jury 
 found, that the agent hired the horse in the course of the 
 business of his agencj T , and for the benefit of his principal, 
 and while he had possession of, and used the horse, in the
 
 206 CONTRACT FOB- DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. IX. 
 
 course of his business, be negligently and carelessly drove 
 him too rapidly, or otherwise maltreated him, whereby he 
 was seriously injured, to the damage of the plaintiff. The 
 court fairly left the question of authority in the agent to hire 
 the horse, and the character and extent of the injury to him, 
 to the jury, and we cannot see that the defendant has 
 just ground of complaint. 
 
 There is no error, and the judgment must be affirmed. 
 
 Affirmed. 
 
 103.] BRONSON'S EXECUTOR v. CHAPPELL. 
 12 WALLACE (U. S.), 681. 1870. 
 [Reported herein at p. 101.] 
 
 103.] JOHNSON v. HURLEY. 
 
 115 MISSOURI, 513. 1893. 
 [Reported herein at p. 105.] 
 
 104.] HO WELL ET AL. v. GRAFF ET AL. 
 25 NEBRASKA, 130. 1888. 
 
 MAXWELL, J. On the thirtieth day of September, 1886, 
 the plaintiffs filed a petition in the district court of Douglas 
 County against the defendants, to recover the sum of 
 $1,419.30, with interest, for breach of contract, for that on 
 the fourth day of August, 1886, the defendants entered into 
 a written contract of sale with plaintiffs, and on that day 
 sold to the plaintiffs a certain lot of dimension timber for 
 immediate shipment, delivered at Atchison, Kansas, all white 
 pine, at $16.50 per M., terms 90 days. The contract of sale 
 was in writing.
 
 104.] HOWELL V. GRAFF. 207 
 
 The defendants failed to deliver any part of the lumber, 
 and this suit was brought to recover the difference between 
 the contract price, to wit, $16.50 per M., and the market 
 price, the difference being $1,419.30. 
 
 The defendants, in their answer, set up that their agent 
 F}'fe, who made this contract, was, on the fourth day of August, 
 1886, employed by the defendants to solicit orders for cer- 
 tain kinds of lumber, certain specified kinds and grades only, 
 and that he had special and specific orders and instructions 
 not to solicit orders for lumber of any kind or grade from 
 plaintiffs, or to have an}' dealings with them whatsoever, and 
 that he had no authority to receive or accept orders from 
 plaintiffs, or to enter into any contract with them, and set- 
 ting out that the prices in said contract were below the 
 market prices and values of lumber at the time, and also 
 below the prices at which F}*fe was instructed to take and 
 solicit orders ; and further alleging that the contract was made 
 b}* mistake, and that after it was made said agent notified the 
 plaintiffs, and that the same was cancelled and annulled. 
 
 On the trial of the cause in the court below a jury was 
 waived, and the cause submitted to the court, which found for 
 the defendants, and dismissed the action. 
 
 The principal question in the case is the apparent authority 
 of the agent, Mr. Fyfe, to make the contract sued on. The 
 testimony fails to show such apparent authority, while it does 
 tend to show that orders were taken subject to approval by 
 his principal. It appears that on the fifth day of August, 
 1886, the order was taken, Fyfe estimating the weight per 
 1,000 feet of green pine lumber at 2,800 Ibs. In the evening, 
 however, in revising his figures, he discovered that he had 
 made a mistake of 1,000 Ibs., the estimate should have been 
 3,800 Ibs. He then telegraphed his principal to know if they 
 would fill an order of the kind specified at $16.50 per M., to 
 which they answered, in substance, no, but at $19.50 per M. 
 Fyfe claims to have notified the plaintiffs on the next day 
 of this refusal. This the plaintiffs den}'. There is consider- 
 able dispute in the testimony as to what took place between
 
 208 CONTRACT FOR DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. IX. 
 
 the parties afterwards, but that matter does not seem to be 
 material in the case. The whole question turns upon the 
 apparent authority of Fyfe to make an absolute contract and 
 gives credit for 90 days, and the testimony fails to clearly 
 establish such apparent authority. The rule is, that if a 
 special agent exercise the power exhibited to the public, the 
 principal will be bound, even if the agent has received private 
 instructions which limit his special authority. Wilson v. 
 Beardsley, 20 Neb. 449. The proof, however, fails to show 
 that Fyfe had apparent authority from his principal to make 
 an absolute sale upon the terms proposed. 
 
 Some objection is made to proof of usage, but both parties 
 resorted to this proof to sustain the issues on their respective 
 parts, and cannot now complain. 
 
 There is no error apparent in the record, and the judgment 
 is affirmed. 
 
 Judgment affirmed. 
 
 106,111.] DAYLIGHT BURNER CO. v. ODLIN. 
 51 NEW HAMPSHIRE, 56. 1871. 
 
 AssuMPsrr against Odlin as a common carrier for delivering 
 goods marked " C. O. D." without receiving the price. Ver- 
 dict for defendant, and plaintiff moved to set it aside. 
 
 The goods were addressed to one Berry, to whom they had 
 been sold by Moore, an agent of plaintiff. Berry refused to 
 pay for the goods on the ground that he had purchased them 
 of Moore on credit. Defendant refused to deliver them, but 
 subsequently Berry presented an order from Moore to defend- 
 ant directing defendant to deliver them " without C. O. D.," 
 and thereupon defendant delivered them without receiving 
 
 Moore travelled to sell his own goods, but incidentally 
 sold goods for plaintiff. He had no actual authority to sell 
 on credit.
 
 106, 111.] DAYLIGHT BURNER CO. V. ODLIN. 209 
 
 BELLOWS, C. J. From the uncontradicted testimony of the 
 plaintiff and the finding of the jury, it may be assumed that 
 Moore was clothed by the plaintiff with an apparent author- 
 ity, like that of a factor, to sell all the goods of the plaintiff 
 he could sell within his business circuit, on a commission of 
 ten per cent. 
 
 As incident to that general authority, he had power to fix 
 the terms of sale, including the time, place, and mode of 
 delivery, and the price of the goods, and the time and mode 
 of payment, and to receive payment of the price, subject 
 of course to be controlled by proof of the mercantile usage 
 in such trade or business. 
 
 There is some conflict in the adjudged cases upon the ques- 
 tion of the authority of a factor to sell on credit, but we think 
 the weight of modern authority is in favor of the position 
 that he may sell on credit, unless a contrary usage is shown. 
 Goodenow v. Tyler, 1 Mass. 36 ; Hapgood v. Batcheller. 4 
 Met. 573 ; Greely v. Bartlett, 1 Greenl. 172 ; Van Alen v. 
 Vanderpool, 6 Johns. 70 ; Robertson v. Livingston, 5 Cow. 
 473 ; Leland v. Douglass, 1 Wend. 490 ; and see 1 Am. 
 Leading Cases, 4th ed., 662, note, where it is said that it is 
 universally established as the law-merchant that a factor may 
 sell on credit. So in Laussatt v. Lippincott, 6 S. & R. 386, 
 and May v. Mitchell, 5 Humph. 365, and Story on Agency, 
 sec. 209. 
 
 The same views are recognized in Scott v. Surman, Willes, 
 406 ; Russell v. JTankey, 6 T. R. 12 ; Haughton \. Mathews, 
 3 B. & P. 489, per Chambre, J. ; 3 Selw. N. P. 719. 
 
 In the case before us, Moore stands much on the same 
 footing as a factor. The most marked distinction is that 
 he is a travelling merchant, and did not apparently have his 
 principal's goods with him ; but this, we think, cannot affect 
 the rule. 
 
 The reason of that rule in the case of factors is that it is 
 found, by experience and repeated proofs in courts of justice, 
 that it is ordinarily the usage of factors to sell on credit ; and 
 the same reason will apply in this case. 
 
 14
 
 210 CONTRACT FOB DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. IX. 
 
 We have a case, then, where the agent was apparently 
 clothed with the authority to sell the plaintiff's goods, with- 
 out limitation as to the quantity, and on commission, for 
 cash or on credit as he might think proper ; and this being 
 so, Moore must be regarded, in respect to third persons, as 
 the plaintiff's general agent, whose authority would not' be 
 limited by instructions not brought to the notice of such 
 third persons. Backman v. Charlestown, 42 N. H. 125 
 and cases cited. 
 
 As Moore, then, in respect to third persons, had the power 
 to sell on credit, the authority to control the delivery of the 
 goods so sold and sent to his order, for the purpose of mak- 
 ing it conform to the contract of sale, would necessarily come 
 within the scope of his agency ; and we think his order to the 
 defendant would justify a delivery of the goods without pay- 
 ment, unless he had notice of the agent's want of authority. 
 As to him the agent's apparent authority was reul authority. 
 The marking of the package by another agent of the plain- 
 tiff, to the effect that cash was required on delivery, was not 
 in law notice of such want of authority, although it might be 
 sufficient to put the defendant upon inquiry. That, however, 
 was properly left to the jiuy, and they have found it not to 
 be sufficient for that purpose. The marking of the package 
 in that way does not necessarily imply that the agent had no 
 authority to sell on credit, but it might indicate merely that 
 the person so marking it supposed the sale to be for cash. 
 And it might well be considered to come within the scope of 
 Moore's agency to make the delivery conform to the contract 
 of sale. 
 
 As the defendant, therefore, is found to have had no notice 
 of any want of authority in Moore, and was not put upon in- 
 quiry, there must be Judgment on the verdict.
 
 106.] BYRNE V. MASSASOIT PACKING CO. 211 
 
 106.] BYRNE v. MASSASOIT PACKING CO. 
 
 137 MASSACHUSETTS, 313. 1884. 
 
 CONTRACT, for breach of written agreement. Verdict for 
 plaintiff. Defendant alleged exceptions. 
 
 Defendant's agent sold plaintiff 3,000 barrels of mackerel. 
 Defendant refused to deliver on the ground that the agent 
 agreed to sell at not less than market price and to respon- 
 sible parties alone, whereas this sale was at less than market 
 price and to an irresponsible party. Defendant offered to 
 prove that plaintiff was an irresponsible party, and also offered 
 to prove a custom among Boston fish-dealers to accept or 
 reject contracts of agents. Both offers were rejected and 
 the evidence excluded. 
 
 W. ALLEN, J. The authority of Brookinan as selling agent 
 of the defendant was not limited by the provisions in the con- 
 tract between them, by which he guaranteed that his sales 
 should not be less than $200,000, and that all sales should 
 be to good and responsible parties, and at not less than mar- 
 ket prices. This was an arrangement between the principal 
 and agent which could not affect, and plainly was not in- 
 tended to affect, third parties. The evidence offered to prove 
 that the agent had violated his agreements to sell to good 
 and responsible parties, in making the sale to the plaintiff, 
 was therefore immaterial, and was property excluded, even 
 if it was competent evidence to prove the fact for which it 
 was offered. 
 
 The evidence to prove a custom among the fish-dealers in 
 Boston to accept or reject contracts of selling agents, not 
 known to the plaintiff, nor in New Orleans, where the con- 
 tract was made, was properly excluded. 
 
 Exceptions overruled.
 
 212 CONTRACT FOR DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. IX. 
 
 106.] BENTLEY w. DOGGETT ET AL. 
 51 WISCONSIN, 224. 1881. 
 
 ACTION to recover for livery furnished by plaintiff to one 
 Otis, an agent of defendants. Judgment for plaintiff. De- 
 fendants appeal. 
 
 Defendants offered to prove that they had furnished Otis 
 with money to cover all expenses, that he had no authority 
 to pledge their credit, that they had subsequently settled with 
 Otis and allowed him the amount of plaintiff's bill, and that 
 there was a general custom in Chicago (where defendants 
 did business) to furnish travelling salesmen with money for 
 all expenses, and to give such salesmen no authority to 
 pledge the credit of their principals. This evidence was 
 excluded. 
 
 TAYLOR, J. It is clearly shown by the evidence that it 
 was not only convenient but necessary for the agent, Otis, to 
 have the use of horses and carnages in order to transact the 
 business he was employed to transact ; and the only question 
 is, whether he could bind his principals by hiring them upon 
 their credit. Otis was the agent of the defendants for the 
 purpose of travelling about the country with samples of their 
 merchandise, contained in trunks, which rendered it neces- 
 sary to have a team and carnage to transport him and his 
 samples from place to place, with full authorit}' to sell their 
 merchandise by sample to customers, and direct the same to 
 be delivered according to his orders. The defendants not 
 having furnished their agent the necessarj- teams and car- 
 riages for transportation, he clearly had the right to hire the 
 same and pa} T their hire out of the funds in his hands be- 
 longing to them. This is admitted by all parties. The real 
 question is, can the agent, having the mone}' of his principals 
 in his possession for the purpose of paying such hire, by 
 neglecting to pay for it, charge them with the payment to the 
 party furnishing the same, such party being ignorant at the
 
 106.] BENTLEY V. DOGGETT. 213 
 
 time of furnishing the same that the agent was furnished by 
 his principals with monej* and forbidden to pledge their credit 
 for the same? 
 
 There can be no question that, from the nature of the busi- 
 ness required to be done by their agent, the defendants held 
 out to those who might have occasion to deal with him, that 
 he had the right to contract for the use of teams and car- 
 riages necessary and convenient for doing such business, in 
 the name of his principals, if he saw fit, in the way such 
 service is usually contracted for ; and we ma}-, perhaps, take 
 judicial notice that such service is usually contracted for, 
 pa}-ment to be made after the service is performed. It would 
 seem to follow that, as the agent had the power to bind his 
 principals by a contract for such service, to be paid for in the 
 usual way, if he neglects or refuses to pa}* for the same after 
 the service is performed, the principals must pay. The fault 
 of the agent in not paying out of the money of bis principals 
 in his hands cannot deprive the party furnishing the service 
 of the right to enforce the contract against them, he being 
 ignorant of the restricted authority of the agent. If the 
 part}* furnishing the service knew that the agent had been 
 furnished by his principal with the mone}* to pay for the 
 service, and had been forbidden to pledge the credit of his 
 principals for such service, he would be in a different position. 
 Under such circumstances, if he furnished the service to the 
 agent, he would be held to have furnished it upon the sole 
 credit of the agent, and he would be compelled to look to the 
 agent alone for his pay. We think the rule above stated as gov- 
 erning the case is f ull}* sustained by the fundamental principles 
 of law which govern and limit the powers of agents to bind their 
 principals when dealing with third persons. Judge Story, in 
 his work on Agenc}*, 127, says : " The principal is bound by 
 all acts of his agent within the scope of the authority which 
 he holds him out to the world to possess, although he may 
 have given him more limited private instructions unknown to 
 the persons dealing with him." In section 133, he says : " So 
 far as an agent, whether he is a general or special agent, is in
 
 214 CONTRACT FOR DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. IX. 
 
 an}* case held out to the public at large, or to third persons 
 dealing with him, as competent to contract for and bind the 
 principal, the latter will be bound by the acts of the agent, 
 notwithstanding he may have deviated from his secret in- 
 structions." And again, in section 73, in speaking of the 
 power of an agent acting under a written authority, he says : 
 " In each case the agent is apparently clothed with full 
 authorit}* to use all such usual and appropriate means, unless 
 upon the face of the instrument a more restrictive authority 
 is given, or must be inferred to exist. In each case, there- 
 fore, as to third persons innocently dealing with his agent, 
 the principal ought equally to be bound by acts of the agent 
 executing such authority b} r any of those means, although he 
 may have given to the agent separate private and secret in- 
 structions of a more limited nature, or the agent may be 
 secretly acting in violation of his duty." In the case of 
 Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38-43, Lord Ellenborough, 
 speaking of the power of an agent to bind his principal, saj's : 
 "It is clear that he may bind his principal within the limits 
 of the authority with which he has been apparently clothed by 
 the principal in respect to the subject-matter ; and there 
 would be no safety in mercantile transactions if he could not." 
 These general principles have been illustrated and applied by 
 this and other courts in the following cases : Young v. Wright, 
 4 Wis. 144 ; Whitney v. State Bank, 7 Wis. 620 ; Long v. 
 Fuller, 21 Wis. 121 ; Houghton v. Bank, 26 Wis. 663 ; Kas- 
 son v. Noltner, 43 Wis. 646 ; Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y. 
 79 ; Andrews v. Kneeland, 6 Cow. 354. 
 
 In this view of the case it was immaterial what the orders 
 of the principal were to the agent, or that he furnished him 
 mone}' to pay these charges, so long as the person furnishing 
 the service was in ignorance of such facts. In order to re- 
 lieve himself from liability, the principal was bound to show 
 that the plaintiff had knowledge of the restrictions placed 
 upon his agent, or that the custom to limit the powers of 
 agents of this kind was so universal that the plaintiff must 
 be presumed to have knowledge of such custom. Under the
 
 106, 107, 112.] HIGGESS V. MOORE. 215 
 
 decisions of this court, the custom offered to be proved was not 
 sufficiently universal to charge the plaintiff with notice 
 thereof. See Scott v. Whitney, 41 Wis. 504, and the cases 
 cited in the decision, and Hinton v. Coleman, 45 Wis. 1G5. 
 And there being no proof of actual notice to the plaintiff, the 
 onlj r issue left in the case, which was not clearly disposed of 
 in favor of the plaintiff b} T the evidence, was submitted to 
 the jur} r , viz., whether the credit was, in fact, given by the 
 plaintiff to the agent or to the firm. The jury found against 
 the defendants upon this issue. From reading the evidence 
 in the record, I should have been better pleased with a dif- 
 ferent verdict upon this issue ; but as there is some evidence 
 to support the verdict, and as this court has held substan- 
 tially in Champion v. Doty, 31 Wis. 190, that charging the 
 service in the plaintiff's books to the agent is not conclusive 
 that the credit was given to him, but might be explained, it 
 was the province of the jury to say whether the explana- 
 tion given by the plaintiff was reasonable and satisfactory. 
 We cannot, therefore, set aside the verdict as against the 
 evidence. 
 BY THE COURT. The judgment of the court is affirmed. 
 
 106, 107, 112.] HIGGINS v. MOORE. 
 34 NEW YORK, 417. 1866. 
 
 ACTION for the price of a cargo of rye sold and delivered by 
 plaintiffs to defendant. Defence, payment to plaintiffs' 
 agent through whom defendant purchased. Judgment for 
 defendant. Plaintiffs appeal. 
 
 The sale was negotiated by a broker in New York, plain- 
 tiffs residing in Alban3 T . Defendant, before the delivery of 
 the grain, knew that plaintiffs were the principals. The 
 broker never had possession of the grain. The defendant 
 relied upon a usage of trade in New York which allowed such 
 payments to a broker when the seller resided out of the city 
 of New York.
 
 216 CONTRACT FOB DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. LX. 
 
 PECKHAM, J. The judgment was sustained in the superior 
 court mainly on the ground that a grain broker, who had 
 never had possession of the rye sold, but was only authorized 
 to contract for its sale, had thereby an implied authority to 
 receive the purchase price. The court was not satisfied with 
 the finding of the fact by the referee as to the usage of 
 trade which allowed a payment to a broker, but did not set 
 it aside. I agree that the evidence is entirely unsatisfactor}' 
 to establish any such usage. To my mind, it is utterly 
 insufficient. This court, however, has no authority to inter- 
 fere with this judgment on that ground. The fact, as found, 
 is conclusive here. 
 
 The first question arising here is, had the broker, merely 
 as such, authority to receive paj'inent? I think he had not. 
 In Baring v. Corrie (2 B. & Aid. 137), Holroyd, J., said, 
 4i A factor who has the possession of goods differs materially 
 from a broker. The former is one to whom goods are sent or 
 consigned. He not only has the possession, but generally a 
 special property in them ; but the broker has not the posses- 
 sion, and so the vendee cannot be deceived by that ; besides 
 employing a broker to sell goods does not authorize him to 
 sell in his own name." 
 
 In that case it was held that the purchaser from a broker 
 had no authority to set off a debt against the broker, on the 
 ground that the broker had no authority to sell in his own 
 name. Brokers are defined to be " those who make con- 
 tracts between merchants and tradesmen, in matters of 
 money and merchandise, for which the}' have a fee." 1 Liv. 
 on Agency, 73, ed. of 1818. 
 
 It has been questioned among civilians, says Livermore, 
 whether an authorit3 T to sell or let includes an authority to 
 receive the price or not, and that Pothier says this power is 
 not generally included. Id. p. 74 ; Pothier's Traite des 
 Obligations, 477. But, that in some cases it will be pre- 
 sumed, as if goods are put into the hands of public brokers 
 to be sold, and the}' are in the habit of receiving the price. 
 Putting the goods in their hands implies an authority to
 
 106, 107, 112.] HIGGINS V. MOORE. 217 
 
 receive payment (2 Liv. 284, 285), as it does to receive pay- 
 ment on securities. 3 Chit Com. Law, 207, 208. 
 
 The general doctrine is, that a broker employed to sell has 
 no authority as such to receive payment. Russell on Factors 
 and Brokers, 48 Law Lib. 68-110 ; Mynn v. Joliffe, 1 Wood 
 & Rob. 326 ; Baring v. Corrie, 2 B. & Aid. 137. Excep- 
 tion is made to this general rule in some cases where the 
 principal is not disclosed. Smith's Mer. L. 129, by Hoi. & 
 Gholson ; see also, as throwing light upon this question, 
 though not directly in point, Whitbeck v. Waltham, 1 Sol. 
 157 ; Morris v. Cleasby, 1 M. & S. 576. Story s&ys, an 
 agent to conclude a contract is not, of course, authorized 
 to receive payment thereunder. Story on Agency, 98, and 
 cases there cited. 
 
 Where the person contracting for the sale has the property 
 in his possession, and delivers it, he is clothed with the 
 indicia of authority to receive payment, especially when 
 the owner is not known. Such are the cases referred to by 
 the court below. He is then clothed with apparent authority, 
 and that, as to third persons, is the real authority. Capel v. 
 Thornton, 3 Car. & P. 352 ; Pickering v. .Busk, 15 East, 
 38. In the latter case the property had been put into the 
 possession of the broker and the title in his name. " The 
 sale was made by a person who had all the indicia of prop- 
 erty." Ireland v. Thomson, 4 Com. Bench R. 149. 
 
 Cross v. Hasking, 13 Vt 536. In this case, in the facts 
 as stated, it does not distinctly appear ; but it was so stated 
 in the syllabus of the case by the reporter. Hackney v. Jones, 
 3 Humph. 612. 
 
 In the case at bar, however, the broker never bad posses: 
 sion of the rye, and never delivered it; but the plaintiffs 
 retained possession till they delivered to the defendant, and 
 they were well known to the defendant ; one of them had 
 taken part in the negotiation for the sale, as owner, Snaths 
 city of New York. The broker was simply authorized to 
 make a contract for the sale. This was the whole of his 
 authority in reality, and he had no other or further apparent 
 authority.
 
 218 CONTRACT FOR DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. IX. 
 
 Irrespective of the usage found by the referee, therefore, 
 the defendant was not discharged by a payment to the 
 broker. 
 
 Does that usage discharge him ? In other words, did the 
 usage give the broker an authority to receive payment which 
 otherwise did not belong to him ? There is no authority in 
 this State on this point, and none in principle, I think, that 
 sustains the affirmative of such a position. 
 
 Mr. Justice Story, after referring to various cases of 
 authority in agents to receive payment on bonds, etc., and 
 whether before due or not, and to other cases, adds: " But 
 if there be a known usage of trade, or course of business 
 in a particular employment, or habit of dealing between the 
 parties, extending the ordinary reach of the authority, that 
 may well be held to give full validit}' to the act. Story on 
 Agency, 98. In another section he says : " Payments made 
 to agents are good in all cases where the agent is authorized 
 to receive them, either by express authority or by that 
 resulting from the usage of trade, or from the particular 
 dealings between the parties." Id. 249. The authorities 
 referred to are, 2 B. & Aid. 137; 1 East, 36; and 1 M. & 
 Sel. 576, 579, besides writers on agency. 
 
 Baring v. Corrie (2 B. & Aid. 137) simply holds, that 
 where the broker sells without disclosing his principal, he 
 acts beyond his authorit}*, and the buyer cannot set off a 
 debt against the broker in answer to an action for the goods. 
 
 In Foveusv. Bennet (11 Cow. 86), it is true that Lord 
 Ellenborough referred the case to a jury to find whether a 
 payment made to a broker had been made according to the 
 usage of trade. They found it had been. It was also re- 
 ferred to the jury to find what the words (in the bought and 
 sold note given to each party) meant of " payment in a 
 month, money." They found those words meant " payment 
 at an}' time within a month." 
 
 In that case the brokers were entitled to receive payment, 
 as they themselves made the delivery of the property, and 
 were, therefore, intrusted with its possession. That con-
 
 106, 107, 112.] HIGGINS V. MOORE. 219 
 
 fessedly gave them the right to receive payment. They were 
 then factors. The question litigated there was, whether the 
 broker had the right to receive the payment before the expi- 
 ration of the month, not whether they had the right to 
 receive it at all. The interpretation of the words in the 
 notes settled that, a very proper office of usage. Morris v. 
 Cleasby (1 M. & S. 576) simply decides that, after the prin- 
 cipal is disclosed, a purchaser has no right to pay a factor for 
 the goods. 
 
 We are referred, by the counsel for the respondent, to 
 Campbell v. Hassell (1 Stark. 233), where no question of 
 usage of trade arose, except when the defendant offered to 
 show " that, by usage of the trade, a bill at two months, 
 with a discount, might be submitted for the original terms of 
 a bill at four months." But Lord Ellenborough refused to 
 hear any evidence to this effect, observing that it would be 
 productive of intolerable mischief to permit brokers to devi- 
 ate from the original terms of the contracts ; and the pay- 
 ment there made to the broker was held unauthorized, and 
 no defence to the purchaser. 
 
 In Stewart v. Aberdeen (4 Mees. & Wels. 211), the insur- 
 ance company had paid the agent, and it was held valid, on 
 the ground that the prior dealings between the parties had 
 authorized it. 
 
 In Greaves v. Legg (11 Exch. 642), a broker at Liverpool 
 had purchased a quantity of wool for merchants in London, 
 and the vendors gave to the broker notice of the vessels in 
 which they would ship it to the purchasers. It was proved 
 to have been the universal usage at Liverpool to give such 
 notice to the broker, and that it was his duty to communicate 
 it to the purchaser ; held, a valid performance by the sellers ; 
 that the notice thus given according to the usage of trade 
 was sufficient. 
 
 Authority to receive such a notice is of a very different 
 character and responsibility from an authority in a broker 
 to receive payment for goods. 
 
 Russell on Factors and Agents, 48 Law Lib. 68, while he
 
 220 CONTRACT FOR DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. IX. 
 
 denies the authority of a broker as such to receive payment, 
 adds that he may, "if the custom of trade or the usual 
 course of dealing between himself and his principal warrant 
 it ; " and he cites Baring v. Carrie, 2 B. & Aid. 137, before 
 referred to, when the only point decided, as we have seen, 
 was that a broker had no right to sell in his own name, and, 
 of course, no right to receive payment. The duties and 
 rights of the broker to contract for the sale of the grain were 
 as clear and well defined in this case, as the duties and rights 
 of a pledgee of stock, or of choses in action. The law 
 defined them. It was no part of his duty to receive pay- 
 ment when the principal was known, and he never had 
 possession of the rye. That was no part or branch of his 
 assumed duty, which was simply to contract for a sale. 
 There was nothing uncertain or obscure in the broker's legal 
 duty that required or justified proof of usage to make certain 
 or plain. It gave an addition, a clear addition to, not an 
 explanation of, his authority. 
 
 No usage is admissible to control the rules of law. In 
 Wheeler and Newbold, 16 N. Y. 392, this court held that 
 proof of usage of brokers in New York city to sell choses 
 in action pledged to them in a mode unauthorized by law, 
 was inadmissible. And so it has been held of stock 
 pledged to brokers. Allen v. Dykers, 1 Hill, 497 ; and see 
 Bowen v. Newell, 4 Seld. 190; Merchants' Bank v. Wood- 
 ruff, 6 Hill, 174. So usage is not admissible to contradict 
 the contract. Clark v. Baker, 11 Met. 186; Blackett v. 
 Assurance Co., 2 Tyrw. 266. In this case the law defined 
 the rights and duties of this broker as clearly as it did those 
 of the pledgee of stock in Allen v. Dykers, or of choses in 
 action in Bowen v. Newell, and they could no more be con- 
 trolled by usage. 
 
 Usages of merchants have been sparingly adopted by 
 courts in this State, and in my opinion properly, too. Mr. 
 Justice Story says they are often founded in mere mistake, 
 and more often in want of enlarged views of the full bearing 
 of principles. Donnell v. Col. Ins. Co., 2 Sum. 377. The
 
 107.] . TALMAGE V. BIERHAUSE. 221 
 
 usage, as found, seems to me entirely unreasonable, and to 
 uphold it would be fraught with mischief. Brokers are 
 thereby allowed to receive payment for principals living out 
 of the city, and by implication, not for those residing in the 
 city. Sound reason would seem to call for an opposite rule, 
 as city dealers might well be supposed to be well acquainted 
 with the brokers, and to know who were worthy of trust ; 
 while country dealers would be very likely to share the fate 
 of these plaintiffs, a grain broker, as the evidence shows, 
 being quite likely to be without pecuniary responsibility. 
 The purchaser need never incur risk, as he may learn the 
 name of the principal and always pay him with safety. 
 
 In this case it would seem from the defendant's testimony, 
 that this money was obtained from him, not under any usage, 
 but the false pretence of the broker that the plaintiffs had 
 drawn upon him for the proceeds of the rye, and thereby 
 impliedly authorized him to collect. 
 
 The judgment, 1 think,, should be reversed, and a new trial 
 ordered, costs to abide the event. 
 
 WRIGHT, J., also read for the reversal. 
 
 Judgment reversed. 
 
 107.] TALMAGE v. BIERHAUSE. 
 
 103 INDIANA, 270. 1885. 
 
 ACTION for the price of goods. Defence, off-set for breach 
 of warranty of quality of goods under a prior contract. 
 Judgment for defendants. The sale was made by a 
 travelling salesman, who gave the warranty. 
 
 MITCHELL, C. J. . . . It is next contended that the evi- 
 dence fails to show that the salesman had authority to make 
 the guaranty which the defendants claimed was made. 
 
 The inference to be drawn from the argument of counsel 
 is, that it was incumbent on the defendants to prove affirma- 
 tively, either that express authority to that end had been 
 conferred, or that such sales are usually attended with
 
 222 CONTRACT FOR DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. IX. 
 
 warranties. It ma}' be said that the position contended for 
 has the support of authority, but the authorities supporting it 
 are, in the main, cases which involved an agency to do a 
 single act, as the sale of some article by an agent in whose 
 hands the particular article was placed for sale. Andrews 
 v. Kneeland, 6 Cow. 354 ; Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y. 79 ; 
 Cooley v. Perrine, 41 N. J. L. 322 ; Brady v. Todd, 9 C. B. 
 (N. S.) 592. 
 
 We think the rule generally prevailing is, that an agent 
 upon whom general authority to sell is conferred will be 
 presumed to have authority to warrant, unless the contrary 
 appears. Authority to sell general!}*, without an}- restric- 
 tions, carries with it prima facie authority to do any act or 
 make any declaration in regard to the subject-matter of the 
 sale necessary to consummate the contract, and usually inci- 
 dent thereto, and until the contrary is made to appear, it 
 will be presumed that a warranty is not nn unusual incident 
 to a sale by an agent for a dealer in a commodity or article, 
 where the thing sold is not present and subject to the in- 
 spection of the purchaser. Ahern v. Goodypeed, 72 N. Y. 
 108 ; Sturgis v. N. J. Steamboat Co., 62 N. Y. 625 ; Nelson 
 v. Cowing, 6 Hill, 336 ; Schuchardt v. Aliens, 1 Wall. 359 ; 
 Boothby Y. Scales, 21 Wis. 626 ; Howard v. Sheward, L. R. 
 2 C. P. 148 ; Deming v. Chase, 48 Vt. 382. 
 
 In all sich cases, even though the authority of the agent is 
 restricted by instructions from his principal, he will be bound 
 by a warrant} 7 attending a sale made by the agent, unless the 
 purchaser knew of the restriction. Murray v. Brooks, 41 
 Iowa, 45. ... 
 
 Judgment affirmed.
 
 111.] PICKERING V. BUSK. 223 
 
 2. Factors. 
 
 111.] PICKERING v. BUSK. 
 
 15 EAST (K. B.), 38. 1812. 
 
 TROVER for hemp. Verdict for defendants. Rule to set 
 aside verdict. 
 
 One Swallow, a factor or broker, purchased for plaintiff a 
 quantity of hemp which, by desire of plaintiff, was trans- 
 ferred in the wharfinger's book to the name of Swallow. 
 Later Swallow purchased more hemp for plaintiff, which was 
 transferred to the name of Pickering or Swallow. Swallow, 
 as factor or broker, sold hemp to defendants' assignors, and 
 transferred to them plaintiff's hemp. 
 
 LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C. J. Tt^annnt fairly bp. qnpQfmnP/1 
 in this case but that Swallow had an implied authority to 
 jjgll. Strangers can only look to the acts of the parties, and 
 to the external indicia of property, and not to the private 
 communications which may pass between aprino.ip^l and hia 
 broker i. and if a person authorize another to assume the 
 apparent right of disposing of property in the ordinary course 
 of trade, it must be presumed that the apparent authority is 
 the real authority. I cannot snhanrihft to the dnntrine, that 
 a broker's engagements are necessarily and in all case.3 
 limited to his actual authority, the reality of which is after- 
 wards to bp tried by t.hp fa.f t. It is clear that he may bind 
 his principal within the limits of the authority with which he 
 has been apparently clothed by the principal in respect of the 
 subject-matter ; and there would be no safety in mercantile 
 transactions if he could not. Ih 
 
 moditj 7 to a place, where it is the ordimtry business ojLthe 
 person to wb.om_iLl8.ftonfided to sell, it must be jnt ended that 
 the commodity was sent thither for the jpurpose of sale. If 
 the owner of a horse send it to a repository of sale, can it 
 be implied that he sent it thither for any other purpose than 
 that of sale ? Or if one send goods to an auction-room, can it
 
 224 CONTRACT FOR DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. IX. 
 
 be supposed that he sent them thither merely for safe custody ? 
 Where the commodity is sent in such a way and to such a 
 place as to exhibit an apparent purpose of sale, the principal 
 will be bound, and the purchaser safe. The case of a factor 
 not being able to pledge the goods of his principal confided to 
 him for sale, though clothed with an apparent ownership, has 
 been pressed upon us in the argument, and considerably dis- 
 tressed our decision. The court, however, will decide that 
 question when it arises, consistently with the principle on 
 which the present decision is founded. It was a hard 
 doctrine when the pawnee was told that the pledger of 
 the goods had no authority to pledge them, being a mere 
 factor for sale; and yet since the case of Paterson v. 
 Task, that doctrine has never been overturned. I re- 
 member Mr. Wallace arguing, in Campbell v. Wright, 4 
 Burr. 2046, that the bills of lading ought to designate the 
 consignee as factor, otherwise it was but just that the 
 consignors should abide by the consequence of having mis- 
 led the pawnees. The present case, however, is not the case 
 of a pawn, but that of a sale by a broker having the posses- 
 sion for the purpose of sale. The sale was made by a_ 
 
 person whn had all t.hft indi.r.in. of prnpprt.y ; J.hp hrnnp 
 only have been transferred into his namp. for rhp 
 sale.; and the party who has so transferred it cannot now 
 rescind the contract. If the plaintiff had Intended to retain 
 the dominion over the hemp, he should have placed it in the 
 wharfinger's books in his own name. 
 
 GROSE, J. The question, whether the plaintiff is bound by 
 the act of Swallow, depends upon the authority which 
 Swallow had. This being a mercantile transaction, the jury 
 was most competent to decide it ; and if I had entertained 
 any doubt, I should rather have referred the question to them 
 for their determination : but I am perfectly satisfied ; I think 
 Swallow had a power to sell. 
 
 LE BLANC, J. The law is clearly laid down, that the mere 
 possession of personal property does not convey a title to 
 dispose of it ; and, which is equally clear, that the possession
 
 111.] PICKERING V. BUSK. 225 
 
 of a factor or broker does not authorize him to pledge. But 
 this is a case of sale. The question then is whether Swallow 
 had an authority to sell. To decide this let us look at the 
 situation of the parties. Swallow was a general seller of 
 hemp : the hemp in question was left in the custody of the 
 wharfingers, part in the name of Swallow, and part in the 
 name of plaintiff or Swallow, which is the same thing. 
 Now for what purpose could the plaintiff leave it in the 
 name of Swallow, but that Swallow might dispose of it in 
 his ordinary business as broker ; if so, the broker having 
 sold the hemp, the principal is bound. This is distinguish- 
 able from all the cases where goods are left in the custody 
 of persons, whose proper business it is not to sell. 
 
 BAYLEY, J. It ma}' be admitted that the plaintiff did not 
 give Swallow any express authorit}- to sell ; but an implied 
 authority may be given : and if a person put goods into 
 the custody of another whose common business it is to sell, 
 without limiting his authority, he thereb}* confers an implied 
 authorit}' upon him to sell them. Swallow was in the habit of 
 bgying and selling hemp for others, concealing their names. 
 And now the plaintiff claims a liberty to rescind the contract, 
 because no express authorit}' was given to Swallow to sell. 
 But is it competent to him so to do ? If the servant of a 
 horse-dealer, with express directions not to warrant, do 
 warrant, the master is bound ; because the servant, having a 
 general authority to sell, is in a condition to warrant, and 
 the master has not notified to the world that the general 
 authority is circumscribed. This case does not proceed on 
 
 the ground of a sale in market overt, but it proceeds on the 
 
 principle, that the plaintiffjiaving givenjSwallow anj,uthority 
 
 to sell, he is not at liberty afterwards, when there has been a 
 sale,J/o jleny the authority. 
 
 Rule discharged. 1 
 
 l See also Daylight Burner Co. v. Odlin, 51 N. H 56, ante, p. 208. 
 
 15
 
 226 CONTRACT FOB DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. IX. 
 
 3. Brokers. 
 
 112.] HIGGINS v. MOORE. 
 
 34 NEW YORK, 417. 1866. 
 [Reported herein at p. 215.] 
 
 4. Auctioneers. 
 
 113.] BROUGHTON v. SILLOWAY. 
 
 114 MASSACHUSETTS, 71. 1873. 
 
 CONTRACT for refusal of defendant to convey to plaintiff 
 certain lands offered for sale by defendant at public auction, 
 at which plaintiff was the highest bidder. Verdict for plain- 
 tiff. Defendant alleges exceptions. 
 
 The contract of sale provided that $500 should be paid at 
 the time of the sale. Plaintiff gave his check for $500 to the 
 auctioneer, but had no funds to meet the check. Two daj'S 
 later defendant learned that the auctioneer had received the 
 check, and that the drawer had no funds to meet it, and im- 
 mediately revoked the agency and refused to be bound by the 
 sale. Later in the same day the check was paid to the auc- 
 tioneer. No notice was given plaintiff of the defendant's 
 repudiation of the transaction until after the check was 
 paid. 
 
 f The defendant asked the court to charge that the auctioneer 
 lad no authority to receive a check drawn on a bank in which 
 plaintiff had no funds. The court declined so to charge, 
 and instructed the jury in effect that the defendant had a 
 right to repudiate the contract, but if the check was paid 
 Before notice of revocation to the plaintiff, then the contract 
 jras binding. 
 
 GRAY, C. J. The^ terms of the contract of sale requiring 
 $500 to be paid down, the auctioneer had no righj;. by virtue
 
 114.] MOULTOX V. BOWKER. 227 
 
 of his employment as such, and without express authority, 
 to bind the defendant by accepting as cash a check drawn 
 against a bank in which the drawer had at the time no funds. 
 Sykes v. Giles, 5 M. & W. 645 ; Williams v. Evans, L. R. 
 1 Q. B. 352 ; Taylor \. Wilson, 11 Met. 44 ; Story on Agency, 
 209. 
 
 There was no evidence in the case that the drawer had 
 funds in the bank when the check was drawn, or that the de- 
 fendant knew that the auctioneer had taken a check until the 
 second day afterwards, or even assented to or ratified the 
 taking of the check. The act of the auctioneer in taking 
 the check being unauthorized, it was not necessary for the 
 defendant, to re.pnriia.te iiy 
 
 It follows that the defendant was entitled to the first instruc- 
 tion requested, and that the instructions given did not meet 
 the requirements of the case. 
 
 Exceptions sustained. 
 
 113.] WOOLFE v. HORNE. 
 
 L. R. 2 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, 355. 1877. 
 [Reported herein at p. 383.] 
 
 5. Attorn eys-at-law. 
 
 114.] MOULTON v. BOWKER. 
 
 115 MASSACHUSETTS, 36. 1874. 
 
 WRIT of entry to recover the undivided half of certain 
 premises. Verdict directed for tenant. 
 
 Demandants claimed under a sheriffs deed executed upon 
 a sale of the premises after attachment on mesne process 
 followed by judgment on execution. The tenant claimed 
 under deed from the owner against whom the attachment was
 
 228 CONTRACT FOE DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. IX. 
 
 issued, and offered in evidence a certified copy of a discharge 
 of the attachment signed by one Searle, who was demandauts' 
 attorney of record in the attachment proceedings. Demand- 
 ants objected to the admission of the paper, and offered to 
 prove that Searle acted without authority and in fraud of their 
 rights. The court ruled that the discharge by Searle enabled 
 the owner to give a valid title to the tenant who, it was ad- 
 mitted, was cognizant of no fraud. 
 
 GRAY, C. J. An attornev-at-law has authority, by virtue 
 of his employment as such, to do in behalf of his client jail 
 acts, in or out of tiourt T necessary or incidental to the prose- 
 cution and management of the suit, and which affect the 
 remedy only, and not the cause of action ^ and we can have 
 nodoubt that this includes the power to release an attach- 
 ment, at least before judgment, which is all that this case 
 requires us to consider^ Lewis v. Sumner, 13 Met 269 ; 
 Shores v. Caswell, Id. 413 ; Wieland v. White, 109 Mass. 
 392 ; Jenney v. Delesdernier, 20 Me. 183 ; Ricev. Wilkins, 21 
 Me. 558 ; Pierce v. Strickland, 2 Story, 292 ; Levi v. Abbott, 
 4 Exch. 588. 
 
 The act of the demandants' attorney was therefore within 
 his professional authority, and bound his clients ; and if jt 
 T^ajVandiil "*, fhoi 'r roT nftdA' must be sought against him, it 
 being agreed that the other party was not cognizant of any 
 fraud. Judgment on the verdict for the tenant 
 
 6. Bank cashiers. 
 
 115.] MERCHANTS' BANK v. STATE BANK. 
 10 WALLACE (U. S.), 604. 1870. 
 
 ACTION on three checks drawn by M. W. & Co. upon de- 
 fendant bank, and certified as " good " by its cashier. Judg- 
 ment directed for defendant Plaintiff brings error.
 
 115.] MERCHANTS' BANK v. STATE BANK. 229 
 
 M. W. & Co. negotiated with plaintiff for the purchase of 
 gold. A representative of M. "W. & Co., and the cashier of 
 defendant bank, went to plaintiff bank, counted the gold 
 certificates, and gave plaintiff a check, which defendant's 
 cashier then certified as "good." It did not appear whether 
 defendant was interested in the gold purchase, and the action 
 may here be treated as upon the certification of the checks. 
 Evidence was introduced that tended to show that over 
 twenty bank cashiers in Boston had never certified checks 
 except by express authorit}'. Defendant denies that its 
 cashier had authorit} 7 to certify checks. 
 
 Mr. JUSTICE SWATNE. . . . But it is strenuously denied 
 that the cashier had authority to certify the checks in 
 question. . . . 
 
 The power of the bank to certify checks has been suffi- 
 ciently examined. The question we are now considering is 
 the authority of the cashier. iLJs his duty to receive all the 
 funds which come into the bank, and to enter them upon its 
 books. The authority to receive implies and carries with it 
 authority to give certificates of deposit and other proper 
 vouchers.. Where the money is in the bank, he has the same 
 authority to certify a check to be good, charge the amount to 
 the drawer, appropriate it to the payment of the check, and 
 m ake the proper entr} r on the hooks of the bank . This he 
 is authorized to do virtute ofliciL The power is inherent in 
 tLejDffjcel Wild v. '1'he Bank of Passamaquoddy, 3 Mason, 
 506 ; JBurnham v. Webster, 19 Me. 232 ; Elliot v. Abbot, 12 
 N. H. 549 ; Bank of Vergennes v. Warren, 7 Hill, 91 ; Lloyd 
 v. The West Branch Bank, 15 Pa. St. 172 ; Badger v. The 
 Bank of Cumberland, 26 Me. 428 ; Bank of Kentucky v. 
 The SchuylkillBank, 1 Parsons's Select Cases, 182 ; Fleckner 
 v. Bank of the United States, 8 Wheat. 338. 
 
 The cashier is the executive officer, through whom the 
 whole financial operations of the bank are conducted. He 
 receives and pays out its monej's, collects and pays its debts, 
 and receives and transfers its commercial securities. Tellers 
 and other subordinate officers may be appointed, but they
 
 230 CONTRACT FOR DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. IX. 
 
 are under his direction, and are, as it were, the arms by 
 which designated portions of his various functions are dis- 
 charged. A teller may be clothed with the power to certify 
 checks, but this in itself would not affect the right of the 
 cashier to do the same thing. The directors may limit his 
 authority as they deem proper, but this would not affect 
 those to whom the limitation was unknown. Commercial 
 Bank of Lake Erie v. Norton et al., 1 Hill, 501 ; Bank of 
 Vergennes v. Warren, 1 1d. 91 ; Beers v. The Phoenix Glass 
 Co., 14 Barb. 358 ; Farmers' & Mechanics ' Bank v. Butch- 
 ers' & Drovers 1 Bank, 14 N. Y. 624 ; North River Bank v. 
 Ay mar, 3 Hill, 262, 268 ; Barnes v. Ontario Bank, 19 N. Y. 
 152, 166. 
 
 The foundation upon which this liability rests was con- 
 sidered in an earlier part of this opinion. Those deal- 
 ing with a bank in good faith have a right to presume 
 integrity on the part of its officers, when acting within the 
 apparent sphere of their duties, and the bank is bound 
 accordingly. 
 
 In~Barnes v. The Ontario Bank, 19 N. Y. 152, the 
 cashier had issued a false certificate of deposit. In the 
 Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. The Butchers' & Drovers' 
 Bank, 14 N. Y. 624; S. C. 16 N. Y. 133, and in Meads v. 
 The Merchants' Bank of Albany, 25 N. Y. 143, the teller 
 had fraudulentl}' certified a check to be good. In each case 
 the bank was held liable to an innocent holder. 
 
 It is objected that the checks were not certified by the 
 cashier at his banking-house. The provision of the Act of 
 Congress as to the place of business of the banks created 
 under it must be construed reasonably. The business of 
 ever}* bank away from its office frequentlj* large and im- 
 portant is unavoidably done at the proper place by the 
 cashier in person, or by correspondents, or other agents. In 
 the case before us, the gold must necessarily have been 
 bought, if at all, at the buying or the selling bank, or at 
 some third locality. The power to pay was vital to the 
 power to buy, and inseparable from it. There is no force
 
 115.] MEKCHANTS' BANK V. STATE BANK. 231 
 
 in this objection. Sank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet 
 519; Pendleton v. Bank of Kentucky, 1 T. B. Munroe, 
 171. . . . 
 
 Judgment reversed, and a venire de novo awarded. 
 
 Mr. JUSTICE CLIFFOKD (with whom concurred Mr. JUSTICE 
 DAVIS) read a dissenting opinion.
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 CONTRACT OF AGENT IN BEHALF OF UNDISCLOSED 
 PRINCIPAL. 
 
 1. Liability of undisclosed principal : general rule. 
 
 124.] KAYTON v. BARNETT. 
 
 116 NEW YORK, 625. 1889. 
 
 ACTION to recover a balance of purchase price due for 
 property sold and delivered to one Bishop, ostensibly for 
 himself, but secretly purchased by him for defendants. 
 Plaintiffs non-suited, and judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs 
 appeal. 
 
 FOLLETT, C. J. When goods are sold on credit to a person 
 whom tbp Yf nriA r ^liev^y to be the purchaser, and he after- 
 wards discovers that the person credited bought as agent for 
 another, th^ vpnrW hna n ransft of action against the principal 
 for the purchase price. The defendants concede the existence 
 of this general rule, but assert that it is not applicable to this 
 case, because, while Bishop and the plaintiffs were negotiating, 
 they stated they would not sell the property to the defendants, 
 and Bishop assured them he was buying for himself, and not 
 for them. It appears, by evidence which is wholly uncontra- 
 dicted, that the defendants directed every step taken by 
 Bishop in his negotiations with plaintiffs ; that the property 
 was purchased for and delivered to the defendants, who have 
 ever since retained it ; that they paid the $3,000 towards the 
 purchase price, and agreed with Bishop, after the notes had 
 been delivered, to hold Mm harmless from them. Notwith- 
 standing the assertion of the plaintiffs that the}' would not sell 
 to the defendants, they, through the circumvention of Bishop 
 and the defendants, did sell the property to the defendants, who
 
 124.] HUBBAED V. TENBROOK. 233 
 
 have had the benefit of & and havp novpr pnul th 
 
 o^the purchase price pursuant to their agrepjnegk Bishop 
 was the defendants' agent. Bishop's inind was, in this tran- 
 saction, the defendants' mind, and so the minds of the partjej 
 met, and the defendants having, through their own and their 
 agent's deception, acquired the plaintiffs' prnp^rjky by pur- 
 chase, cannot successfully assert that they are not liable for 
 the remainder of the purchase price because they, through 
 their agent, succeeded in inducing^ the defendants to do that 
 which they did not intend to do, and, perhaps t would npj. have 
 done had the defendants not dealt disingenuously. 
 
 The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, 
 with costs to abide the event. 
 
 All concur, except Haight, J., not sitting. 
 
 Judgment reversed. 
 
 124.] HUBBARD v. TENBROOK. 
 
 124 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 291. 1889. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT for goods sold and delivered to one Sides , doing 
 business in his own name, but secretly for defendants. 
 Judgment for plaintiff upon the pleadings. Defendants bring 
 error. _-_ 
 
 Mr. JUSTICE MITCHELL. This case affords one among many 
 examples of the failure of the so-called reformed procedure 
 tojiccomplish anything towards the brevity, the clearness, the 
 accuracy., or the convenience of legal forms. So long as the 
 fundamental principle of our remedial jurisprudence shall be, 
 that upon conflicting evidence the jur} T shall ascertain the 
 facts, and upon ascertained facts the judges shall pronounce 
 the law, so long will it be a cardinal rule of pleading, b}" what- 
 ever name pleading shall be called, that the line of distinction 
 between facts and the evidence to prove them shall be kept 
 clear and well-defined. The notion of the reforming enthusiast 
 that the average litigant or his average lawyer can make a
 
 234 CONTRACT FOB UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 shorter, clearer, or less redundant statement of his case if 
 left to his own head, than if directed and restrained by the 
 settled forms, sifted, tested, and condensed as they have been 
 by generations of the acutest intellects ever devoted to a 
 logical profession, is as vain as that of any other componnder 
 of panaceas. 
 
 The plaintiff's statement is at least three times as long as 
 a declaration in the established forms need have been, and 
 about half of it is occupied, not with the averment of facts, 
 but with a recital of evidence. Indeed, the strongest argu- 
 ment for the defendants is that the statement fails to aver 
 two essential facts, to wit, the delivery of the goods to Sides, 
 and the agency of Sides for the defendants as his undisclosed 
 principals. 
 
 Fortunately for the plaintiff, his statement is helped out as 
 to the first fact by the bill of particulars, which, being sworn 
 to be a copy of his book of original entry, imports delivery as 
 well as sale. Thejagency, though stated in the objectionable 
 form of an inference from the previous!}* recited evidence, is 
 clearly intended to be averred, and may fairly be so treated. 
 
 Taking the statement, therefore, in its plain intent, it sets 
 out that plaintiff sold and delivered a quantity of bams to one 
 Sides, who was conducting a grocery business in his own 
 name, but with the property and as the agent of defendants. 
 The defendants filed an affidavit of dejffljgg. and a supolemen- 
 tary one, the substance of which is that " Sides was not the 
 agent of defendants to purchase from plaintiff or any one 
 else," and that he ' was employed as salesman only, by sajd 
 defendants, without any authorit3 r whatever to act for or bind 
 defendants for the purchase of any goods or merchandise 
 upon credit of the said defendants." We have thus the ques- 
 tion presented whether an agent may be put forward to con- 
 duct a separate business in his own name, and the principal 
 escape liabilit}' by a secret limitation on the agent's authority 
 to purchase. 
 
 The answer is not at all doubtful. A man conducting an 
 apparently prosperous and profitable business obtains credit
 
 124.] WATTEATJ V. FENWICK. 235 
 
 thereby, and his creditors have a right to suppose that his 
 
 profits go into his assets for their protection in case of a pi^g)i 
 
 or an unfavorable turn in the business. To allow an undis- 
 
 closed principal to absorb the profits, and then 
 
 pinch comes to escape responsibility on foe ground of 
 
 to his a^ent not to buy on credit, would be a plain fraud on 
 
 No exact precedent has been cited ; none is needed. 
 The rule so vigorously contended for by the plaintiff in error, 
 that those dealing with an agent are bound to look to his 
 authority, is freely conceded ; but this case falls within the 
 equally established rule tha^ those clothing an agent witft 
 apparent authority are, as to parlies dealing on the faith of 
 such authority, conclusively estopped from denying it. 
 
 The affidavits set up no available defence, and the judg- 
 ment is 
 
 Affirmed. 
 
 124.] WATTEAU v. FENWICK. 
 
 1893, 1 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, 346. 
 
 ACTION for goods sold and delivered to one Humble, doing 
 business in his own name, but secretly for defendants. Judg- 
 ment for plaintiff. Defendants appeal 
 
 LORD COLERIDGE, C. J. The judgment which I am about 
 to read has been written by my Brother Wills, and I entirely 
 concur in it. 
 
 WILLS, J. The plaintiff sues the defendants for price of 
 cigars supplied to the Victoria Hotel, Stockton-upon-Tees. 
 The house was kept, not by the defendants, but by a person 
 named Humble, whose name was over the door. The pluin- 
 tiff gave credit to Humble, and to him alone, and had never 
 heard of the defendants. The business, however, was really 
 the defendants', and they had put Humble into it to manage 
 it for them, and had forbidden him to buy cigars on credit.
 
 236 CONTRACT FOB UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 The cigars, however, were such as would usually be supplied 
 to and dealt in at such an establishment. The learned county 
 court judge held that the defendants were liable. I am of 
 opinion that he was right. 
 
 There seems to be less of direct authority on the sub- 
 ject than one would expect. But I think that the Lord 
 Chief Justice during the argument laid down the correct 
 principle, viz., once it is established that the defendant 
 was the real principal, the ordinary doctrine as to principal 
 and agent applies, that the principal is liable for all the 
 acts of the agent which are within the authority, usually 
 confided to an agent of that character, notwithstanding limi- 
 tations, as between the principal and the agent, put upon 
 that authority. It is said that it is only so where there has 
 been a holding out of authority, which cannot be said of a 
 case where the person supplying the goods knew nothing of 
 the existence of a principal. But I do not think so. Other- 
 wise, in every case of undisclosed principal, or at least in 
 every case where the fact of there being a principal was 
 undisclosed, the secret limitation of authorit} 7 would prevail 
 and defeat the action of the person dealing with the agent 
 and then discovering that he was an agent and had a 
 principal. 
 
 But in the case of a dormant partner, it is clear law that 
 no limitation of authority as between the dormant and active 
 partner will avail the dormant partner as to things within the 
 ordinary authority of a partner. The law of partnership is, 
 on such a question, nothing but a branch of the general law 
 of principal and agent, and it appears to me to be undisputed 
 and conclusive on the point now under discussion. 
 
 The principle laid down by the Lord Chief Justice, and 
 acted upon by the learned county court judge, appears to be 
 identical with that enunciated in the judgments of Cockburn, 
 C. J., and Mellor, J., in Edmunds v. JBushell, Law Rep. 1 
 Q. B. 97, the circumstances of which case, though not iden- 
 tical with those of the present, come very near to them. 
 There was no holding out, as the plaintiff knew nothing of
 
 125.] IRVINE V. WATSON. 237 
 
 the defendant. I appreciate the distinction drawn by Mr. 
 Finlay in his argument, but the principle laid down in the 
 judgments referred to, if correct, abundantly covers the pres- 
 ent case. I cannot find that any doubt has ever been ex- 
 pressed that it is correct, and I think it is right, and that 
 very mischievous consequences would often result if that 
 principle were not upheld. 
 
 In my opinion this appeal ought to be dismissed with 
 costs. Appeal dismissed. 
 
 2. Same : exception as to state of accounts. 
 
 125.] IRVINE v. WATSON. 
 
 LAW REPORTS, 5 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, 414. 1880. 
 
 ACTION to recover the price of certain casks of oil. Judg- 
 ment for plaintiffs. Defendants appeal. 
 
 BRAMWELL, L. J. I am of opinion that the judgment must 
 be affirmed. The facts of the case are shortly these : The 
 plaintiffs sold certain casks of oil, and on the face of the con- 
 tract of sale Conning appeared as the purchaser. But the 
 plaintiffs knew that he was only an agent buying for prin- 
 cipals, for he told them so at the time of the sale, therefore 
 they knew that they had a right against somebod}' besides 
 Conning. On the other hand, the defendants knew that 
 somebody or other had a remedy against them, for they had 
 authorized Conning, who was an ordinarj* broker, to pledge 
 their credit, and the invoice specified the goods to have been 
 bought " per John Conning." Then, that being so, the de- 
 fendants paid the broker ; and the question is whether such 
 payment discharged them from their liability to the plaintiffs. 
 I think it is impossible to say that it discharged them, unless 
 they were misled by some conduct of the plaintiffs into the be- 
 lief that, the broker had already settled with the plaintiffs, and 
 made such payment in consequence of such belief. But it is
 
 238 CONTRACT FOR UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 contended that the plaintiffs here did mislead the defendants 
 into such belief, by parting with the possession of the oil to 
 Conning without getting the money. The terms of the con- 
 tract were " cash on or before deliver}*," and it is said that 
 the defendants had a right to suppose that the sellers would not 
 deliver unless the}' received payment of the price at the time of 
 delivery. I do not think, however, that that is a correct view 
 of the case. The plaintiffs had a perfect right to part with the 
 oil to the broker without insisting strictly upon their right to 
 prepa}Tnent, and there is, in m} T opinion, nothing in the facts of 
 the case to justify the defendants in believing that they would 
 so insist No doubt, if there was an invariable custom in the 
 trade to insist on prepayment where the terms of the contract 
 entitled the seller to it, that might alter the matter ; and in 
 such case non-insistence on prepayment might discharge the 
 buyer if he paid the broker on the faith of the seller already 
 having been paid. But that is not the case here ; the evi- 
 dence before Bowen, J., shows that there is no invariable 
 custom to that effect. 
 
 Apart from all authorities, then, I am of opinion that the 
 defendants' contention is wrong, and upon looking at the au- 
 thorities, I do not think that any of them are in direct conflict 
 with that opinion. It is true that in Thomson v. Davenport, 
 9 B. & C. 78, both Lord Tenterden and Baj'ley, J., suggest 
 in the widest terms that a seller is not entitled to sue the 
 undisclosed principal on discovering him, if in the meantime 
 the state of account between the principal and the agent has 
 been altered to the prejudice of the principal. But it is im- 
 possible to construe the dicta of those learned judges in that 
 case literally ; it would operate most unjustly to the vendor 
 if we did. I think the judges who uttered them did not intend 
 a strictly literal interpretation to be put on their words. But 
 whether they did or no, the opinion of Park, B., in Heald v. 
 Renworthy, 10 Exch. 739 ; 24 L. J. (Exch.) 76, seems to me 
 preferable ; it is this, that " If the conduct of the seller would 
 make it unjust for him to call upon the buyer for the money, 
 as for example, where the principal is induced by the conduct
 
 125.] IRVINE V. WATSON. 239 
 
 of the seller to pay his agent the money on the faith that the 
 agent and seller have come to a settlement on the matter, or 
 if any representation to that effect is made by the seller, 
 either by words or conduct, the seller cannot afterwards 
 throw off the mask and sue the principal." That is in my 
 judgment a much more accurate statement of the law. But 
 then the defendants rely on the case of Armstrong v. Stokes, 
 Law Rep. 7 Q. B. 598. Now that is a very remarkable case ; 
 it seems to have turned in some measure upon the peculiar 
 character filled by Messrs. Ryder as commission merchants. 
 The court seems to have thought it would be unreasonable 
 to hold that Messrs. R} - der had not authority to receive the 
 money. I think upon the facts of that case that the agents 
 would have been entitled to maintain an action for the money 
 against the defendant, for as commission merchants they were 
 not mere agents of the buyer. Moreover the present is a 
 case which Blackburn, J., there expressly declines to decide. 
 He expressly draws a distinction between a case in which, as 
 in Armstrong v. Stokes, the seller at the time of the sale 
 supposes the agent to be himself a principal, and gives credit 
 to him alone, and one in which, as here, he knows that the 
 person with whom he is dealing has a principal behind, 
 though he does not know who that principal is. 
 
 It is to my mind certainly difficult to understand that dis- 
 tinction, or to see how the mere fact of the vendor knowing 
 or not knowing that the agent has a principal behind can 
 affect the liability of that principal. I should certainly have 
 thought that his liability would depend upon what he him- 
 self knew, that is to sa} r , whether he knew that the vendor 
 had a claim against him and would look to him for payment 
 in the agent's default But it is sufficient here that the 
 defendants did know that the sellers had a claim against 
 them, unless the broker had already paid for the goods. 
 
 In this view of the case it is unnecessary to consider the 
 further question raised by Mr. Kennedy, as to whether a 
 payment on a general running account, as distinguished 
 from a payment specifically appropriated to the particular
 
 240 CONTRACT FOR UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 purchase, would be sufficient to bring the case within Lord 
 Tenterden's qualification of the general rule. 
 
 (BAGGALLAY and BRETT, L. JJ., also delivered opinions to 
 the same effect.) Appeal dismissed. 
 
 125.] FRADLEY v. HYLAND. 
 
 37 FEDERAL REPORTER, 49. 1888. 
 [Circuit Court, S. D., Neiv York.'} 
 
 LIBEL in admiralty for supplies furnished one Gibson, 
 ostensibty for himself, but for the benefit of defendant whose 
 boat Gibson was managing. Defendant had supplied Gibson 
 with funds and instructed him not to purchase on credit. 
 Defendant had settled with Gibson, and allowed him for 
 these supplies. Decree for libellant. Respondent appeals. 
 
 WALLACE, J. ... As to the first cause of action no ques- 
 tion is made by the appellant that it is not of admiralty 
 cognizance, but he insists that he is not liable as a principal 
 for the supplies sold to his agent by the libellant, under the 
 circumstances of the case. The general rule is familiar that, 
 when goods are bought by an agent who does not at the 
 time disclose that he is acting as agent, the seller, although 
 he has relied solely upon the agent's credit, may, upon dis- 
 covering the principal, resort to the latter for pa} r ment. But 
 the rule which allows the seller to have recourse against an 
 undisclosed principal is subject to the qualification stated by 
 Lord Mansfield in Railton v. Hodgson^ 4 Taunt. 576, and by 
 Tenterden, C. J., and Bayley, J., in Thomson v. Davenport, 
 9 B. & C. 78. As stated by Mr. Justice Bayley, it is 
 "that the principal shall not be prejudiced by being made 
 personally liable if the justice of the case is that he should 
 not be personally liable. If the principal has paid the agent, 
 or if the state of accounts between the agent here and the 
 principal would make it unjust that the seller should call on
 
 125.] FRADLEY V. HYLAJSTD. 241 
 
 the principal, the fact of payment or such a state of accounts 
 would be an answer to the action brought by the seller, 
 where he has looked to the responsibility of the agent." 
 The principal must respond to, and may avail himself of, a 
 contract made with another by an undisclosed agent. When 
 he seeks to enforce a bargain or purchase made by his agent, 
 the rule of law is that, if the agent contracted as for himself, 
 the principal can only claim subject to all equities of the 
 seller against the agent. In the language of Parke, B. : 
 " He must take the contract subject to all equities, in the 
 same way as if the agent were the sole principal" (Beck- 
 ham v. Drake, 9 M. & W. 79), and accordingly subject to 
 any right of set-off on the part of the seller (Borries v. Bank, 
 29 L. T. N. S. 689). Thus the rights of the principal to 
 enforce, and his liability upon, a contract of sale or purchase 
 made by his agent, without disclosing the fact of the agency, 
 are precisely co-extensive, as regards the other contracting 
 party, if the limitation of his liability is accurately stated in 
 the earlier cases. The qualification of the principal's lia- 
 bility to respond to his agent's contract, as stated in the 
 earlier authorities mentioned, was narrowed by the interpre- 
 tation adopted in Heald v. Kenworthy, 10 Exch. 739, to the 
 effect that the principal is not discharged from full responsi- 
 bility unless he has been led by the conduct of the seller to 
 make payment to or settle with the agent; and the doctrine 
 of this case has been reiterated in many subsequent cases, 
 both in England and in this country, where the agent did not 
 contract as for himself, but as a broker, or otherwise as 
 representing an undisclosed principal. One of the more 
 recent English cases of this class is Davison v. Donaldson, 
 9 Q. B. D. 623. But as is shown in Armstrong v. Stokes, 
 L. R. 7 Q. B. 598, the version of Heald v. Kenworthy, while a 
 correct interpretation of the rule of the principal's liability, 
 when applied to cases in which the seller deals with the 
 agent relying upon the existence of an undisclosed principal, 
 is not to be applied in those in which the seller has given 
 credit solely to the agent, supposing him to be the principal. 
 
 16
 
 242 CONTRACT FOR UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 This case decides that the principal is not liable when the 
 seller has dealt with the agent supposing him to be the 
 principal, if he has in good faith paid the agent at a time 
 when the seller still gave credit to the agent, and knew of 
 no one else. See also Irvine v. Watson, 5 Q. B. D. 102. 1 
 Under such circumstances it is immaterial that the principal 
 has not been misled by the seller's conduct or laches into 
 paying or settling with his agent. It is enough to absolve 
 him from liability that he has in good faith paid or settled 
 with his agent. In that case the court was dealing with a 
 contract made by an agent which was within the scope of the 
 authority conferred on him, but which was nevertheless 
 made by the agent as though he were acting for himself as 
 principal. 
 
 In the present case Gibson had no authority at all to make 
 a purchase upon the credit of the appellant. But as it ap- 
 pears that appellant, in the monthly settlements of account 
 with Gibson, allowed him out of the earnings charges for 
 supplies for which the latter had not actually paid, he must 
 be deemed to have authorized Gibson to purchase supplies 
 for him upon Gibson's own credit. Under the circumstances, 
 if Gibson had purchased supplies, purporting to act as an 
 agent of appellant in doing so, appellant, by consenting to 
 their being used for his benefit, and by allowing the price in 
 his settlements with Gibson, would have been liable to those 
 who sold to him upon the theory of ratification. But, as 
 Gibson did not assume to act as agent in making the 
 purchases, there is no basis for applying the doctrine of 
 ratification. 
 
 Very different considerations govern the case in which an 
 agent who assumes to represent an undisclosed principal 
 buys of a seller upon credit, and one in which the agent 
 assumes to be acting for himself, and the seller deals with 
 him, and gives him exclusive credit, supposing him to be the 
 only principal. In the first, if the agent has authorit}', ex- 
 
 1 The court overlooks the appeal in this case, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 414, 
 ante, p. 237.
 
 125.] FRADLEY V. HYLAND. 243 
 
 press or implied, to buy upon credit for the principal, or 
 ostensible authority to do so, upon which the seller relies, 
 then, by the familiar rules of law, the contract is the con- 
 tract of the principal, and is none the less so because the 
 name of the principal does not happen to have been dis- 
 closed. The principal is bound by the acts of his agent 
 within the scope of his real or apparent authority ; and the 
 seller understands that, even though he may hold the agent 
 personally responsible, he may also resort to the undisclosed 
 principal. But in the other, as the seller does not rely upon 
 any ostensible authorit}* of the one with whom he contracts 
 to represent a third person, he can only resort to the third 
 person as principal, and charge him as such, when the pur- 
 chase is made by one having lawful authority to bind the 
 third person. It is immaterial, in such a case, whether the 
 contract is made b}' an agent who is employed, in a con- 
 tinuous employment or in a single transaction, by a principal, 
 or whether he is one who may be deemed a general, instead 
 of a special agent. " When the agency is not held out by 
 the principal b}* any acts or declarations or implications to 
 be general in regard to the particular act or business, it must 
 from necessity be construed according to its real nature and 
 extent ; and the other party must act at his own peril, and is 
 bound to inquire into the nature and extent of the authority 
 actual!}' conferred. In such a case there is no ground to 
 contend that the principal ought to be bound b}- the acts of 
 the agent be} - ond what he has apparent!}- authorized, because 
 he has not misled the confidence of the other party who has 
 dealt with the agent." Story on Agency, 133. 
 
 It is therefore difficult to understand how, as an original 
 proposition, it could be reasonably maintained that there is 
 any liabilit}' on the part of one who has emploj'ed another to 
 manage his interests in a business, or series of transactions, 
 in which, as an incident, purchases of goods are to be made, 
 has given him instructions not to purchase on credit, and 
 has supplied him with funds to purchase for cash, to a seller 
 who has sold to the person employed upon credit, and dealt
 
 244 CONTRACT FOR UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 with him as the only principal. Toft v. Baker, 100 Mass. 
 68. Of course he would be liable, and the instructions not 
 to buy on credit would go for nothing, if he did not supply 
 the agent with funds to pay for the necessary goods, because 
 in that case the agent would have implied authority to buy 
 them on credit. So also in a case which may be supposed, 
 where a principal knows, or ought to know, that the agent 
 is buying on credit in his own name, yet the principal takes 
 all the income of the business without making any provision 
 for payment to those who have trusted the agent, the prin- 
 cipal would be liable, because in such a case his conduct 
 would be inconsistent with good faith, and he ought not to 
 be permitted to avail himself of the benefits without incurring 
 full responsibility for the agent's acts. 
 
 But it is probably too late to consider the questions thus 
 suggested upon principle ; and it maj^ be accepted as law 
 that the seller, under the circumstances of a case like the 
 present, upon discovery of the principal, can resort to and 
 recover of him, if he [the principal] has not bond fide paid 
 the agent in the meantime, or has not made such a change 
 in the state of the account between the agent and himself 
 that he would suffer loss if he should be compelled to pay 
 the seller. Story on Agency, 291 ; 1 Parsons on Cont. 63 ; 
 Fish v. Wood, 4 E. D. Smith, 327 ; Thomas v. Atkinson, 38 
 Ind. 248; Clealand v. Walker, 11 Ala. 1058; McCullough 
 v. Thompson, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 449 ; Lalng v. Butler, 
 37 Hun, 144. In the case last cited the court used this 
 language : 
 
 " Where the purchase has been made by the agent upon 
 credit authorized by the principal, but without disclosing his 
 name, and payment is subsequently made by the principal 
 to the agent in good faith before the agenc}' is disclosed to 
 the seller, then the principal would not be liable." 
 
 According to these authorities, if it should be conceded 
 that the facts in the present case warrant the inference that 
 the appellant gave Gibson authority to buy either upon his 
 own credit or upon the credit of the appellant, the libellant
 
 125.] LAING V. BUTLER. 245 
 
 cannot recover. It certainly is not material that the ap- 
 pellant did not pay Gibson, or make any settlement with 
 him, on account of the libellant's demands specifically. It 
 is enough that he did settle with Gibson for, and allowed 
 him to retain in his hands sufficient moneys to pay, all out- 
 standing liabilities contracted by him for the appellant's 
 benefit, including the demands of the libellant. At the time 
 of the last settlement the appellant had paid the libellant's 
 demands and all outstanding liabilities contracted by Gibson 
 as between Gibson and himself, and this was before the 
 libellant knew any principal in the purchases other than 
 Gibson himself. 
 
 (The court then decides that the second cause of action is 
 not enforceable in admiralty.) 
 
 Libel dismissed. 
 
 125.] LAING v. BUTLER. 
 
 37 HUN (N. Y. S. C.), 144. 1885. 
 
 ACTION to recover the price of certain hides sold to one 
 Smith, ostensibly for himself, but really for the defendants 
 as undisclosed principals. Defendants had supplied Smith 
 with funds for the purchase of the hides. Judgment for 
 plaintiff. Defendants appeal. 
 
 HAIGHT, J. (after discussing various authorities 1 ). It 
 appears to us that where an agent buys in his own name, 
 but for the benefit of his principal, without disclosing the 
 name of the principal, the rule is that the principal as well 
 as the agent will be bound, provided the goods are received 
 
 1 Dnnlap's Paley on Agency, pp. 245-250; Story on Agency, 291 ; 
 1 Parsons on Cont. p. 63 ; Armstrong v. Stokes, L. K. 7 Q. B. 598 ; Irvine 
 v. Watson, L. R. 5 Q. B. I). 102,414; Davison v. Donaldson, L. R. 9 
 Q. B. D. 623; Clealand v. Walker, 11 Ala. 1058; Komorowski v. Krun- 
 dick, 56 Wis. 23 ; Tqft v. Baker, 100 Mass. 68 ; Fish v. Wood, 4 E. D. 
 Smith, 327; Jaque$ v. Todd,3 Wend. 83-94; AfcCullough y. Thompson, 
 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 449 ; Knapp v. Simon, 96 N. Y. 284-288.
 
 246 CONTRACT FOJR UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 by the principal, if the agent in making the purchase acted 
 within his power as agent ; but that this rule is subject to 
 the following limitations and exceptions : First. The pur- 
 chase of the agent must be within the power conferred upon 
 him by his principal, or it must be shown that the principal 
 has subsequently ratified his acts ; Second. If the principal 
 furnished the agent with the money with which to make the 
 purchase before the purchase, and the agent should, without 
 his knowledge, purchase the property upon credit, without 
 disclosing his principal, that the principal will not be bound ; 
 and, Third. Where the purchase has been made by the agent 
 upon credit, authorized by the principal, but without dis- 
 closing his name, and pa}*ment is subsequently made by the 
 principal to the agent in good faith before the agency is dis- 
 closed to the seller, then the principal would not be liable. 
 In the case under consideration it appears that the defend- 
 ants authorized Smith to purchase the hides for them ; that 
 they advanced the money to him with which to make the 
 purchases they had authorized. The plaintiff, in selling the 
 hides to Smith, sold to him upon his individual credit and 
 promise to pay. The case therefore appears to us to be 
 within the exceptions to the rule mentioned, and it conse- 
 quently follows that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. 
 
 Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered. 
 
 3. Same : exception based on election. 
 
 126.] BEYMER v. BONSALL. 
 
 79 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 298. 1875. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT for breach of contract to deliver a quantity of 
 petroleum. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. 
 
 Plaintiff made the contract with brokers who were acting 
 for defendant as undisclosed principal. Plaintiff brought an 
 action against the brokers, and had judgment against them.
 
 126.] KINGSLEY V. DAVIS. 247 
 
 Defendant pleaded this judgment, and plaintiff demurred 
 to the plea. The court reserved the point, and entered 
 judgment upon the verdict of the jurj'. 
 
 PER CURIAM. Undoubtedly an agent who makes a con- 
 tract in his own name without disclosing his agency is liable 
 to the other party. The latter acts upon his credit, and is 
 not bound to yield up his right to hold the former personally, 
 merely because he discloses a principal who is also liable. 
 The principal is liable because the contract was for his 
 benefit, and the agent is benefited by his being presumedly 
 the creditor, for there can be but one satisfaction. But it 
 does not follow that the agent can afterwards discharge 
 himself by putting the creditor to his election. Being already 
 liable by his contract, he can be discharged only by satisfac- 
 tion of it, by himself or another. So the principal has no 
 right to compel the creditor to elect his action, or to dis- 
 charge either himself or his agent, but can defend his agent 
 only by making satisfaction for him. We think no error was 
 committed by the court below, except in the form of the 
 reservation. Judgment should have been given directly on 
 the demurrer itself, and not by way of a reserved point upon 
 it. This, hovever, is not a substantial error, and judgment 
 may be treated as entered upon the demurrer. 
 
 Judgment affirmed. 
 
 126.] KINGSLEY v. DAVIS. 
 
 104 MASSACHUSETTS, 178. 1870. 
 
 CONTRACT, by brokers for commissions. Submitted to the 
 court upon agreed facts. 
 
 Plaintiffs supposed they were acting for John J. Davis, 
 whereas in fact the propert}' sold by them belonged to his 
 wife, the defendant. After learning this fact plaintiffs had 
 taken judgment against John J. Davis, and had issued an 
 execution upon it ; but the judgment remained unsatisfied.
 
 248 CONTRACT FOR UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 MORTON, J. . . . But the true inference to be drawn from 
 the facts stated undoubtedly is, that the plaintiffs contracted 
 with, and gave credit to, John J. Davis ; and they now claim 
 that he was acting as the agent of the defendant, and that they 
 gave him credit in ignorance of this fact. If we assume that 
 he was acting as her agent in contracting with the plaintiffs, 
 3*et there is an insuperable obstacle to their right to maintain 
 this action. The general principle is undisputed, that, when 
 a person contracts with another who is in fact an agent of an 
 undisclosed principal, he may, upon discover}' of the princi- 
 pal, resort to him, or to the agent with whom he dealt, at his 
 election. But if, after having come to a knowledge of all the 
 facts, he elects to hold the agent, he cannot afterwards resort 
 to the principal. In the case at bar, it is admitted that the 
 plaintiffs, after all the facts became known to them, obtained 
 a judgment against John J. Davis upon the same cause of 
 action for which this suit is brought. We are of opinion 
 that this was conclusive evidence of an election to resort to 
 the agent, to whom the credit was originally given, and is a 
 bar to this action against the principal. Raymond v. Crown 
 & Eagle Mills, 2 Met. 319. 
 
 Judgment for the defendant. 
 
 4. Same : exception as to sealed instruments. 
 
 127.] BRIGGS v. PARTRIDGE. 
 
 64 NEW YORK, 357. 1876. 
 
 ACTION to recover the purchase price unpaid under a con- 
 tract for the purchase and sale of lands. Complaint dis- 
 missed. Plaintiff appeals. 
 
 The complaint and the opening remarks of plaintiffs coun- 
 sel at the trial alleged that the contract was under seal ; 
 that it was signed by one Hurlburd ; that defendant Part- 
 ridge's name did not appear in the instrument; but that 
 plaintiff would prove that Hurlburd was acting solely for
 
 127.] BRIGGS V. PARTRIDGE. 249 
 
 Partridge under a parol authority; and that Partridge had 
 paid or caused to be paid the sum of $100 on the delivery of 
 the instrument. Defendant's counsel moved to dismiss the 
 complaint on the ground that the facts stated did not consti- 
 tute a cause of action, and that it was not competent to vary 
 the terms of the instrument by parol proof that the party 
 signing it as principal was not a principal, but an agent. 
 The court granted the motion. 
 
 ANDREWS, J. . . . The real question is, can the vendor, in a 
 sealed executory agreement, inter partes, for the sale of land, 
 enforce it as the simple contract of a person not mentioned in 
 or a party to the instrument, on proof that the vendee named 
 therein, and who signed and sealed it as his contract, had 
 oral authority from such third person to enter into the con- 
 tract of purchase, and acted as his agent in the transaction ; 
 and can the vendor on this proof, there having been no 
 default on his part, and he being ready and willing to convey, 
 recover of such third person the unpaid purchase money? 
 This question here arises in a case where the vendor, so far 
 as it appears, has remained in possession of the land, and 
 where no act of ratification of the contract by the undisclosed 
 principal has been shown. It is not disputed, and indeed it 
 cannot be, that Hurlburd is bound to the plaintiff as cove- 
 nantor, upon the covenants in the agreement. He covenants 
 for himself and not for another, to pay the purchase money, 
 and by his own seal fixes the character of the obligation as a 
 specialty. He is liable to perform the contract irrespective of 
 the fact whether it can be enforced against his nominal prin- 
 cipal. On the other hand it is equally clear that Hurlburd's 
 covenant cannot be treated as, or made the covenant of the 
 defendant. Those persons only can be sued on an indenture 
 who are named as parties to it, and an action will not lie 
 against one person on a covenant which purports to have 
 been made by another. JSeckham v. Drake, 9 M. & W. 
 79 ; Spencer v. Field, 10 Wend. 88 ; Townsend v. Hubbard, 
 4 Hill, 351. 
 
 In the case last cited, it was held that where an agent duly
 
 250 CONTEACT FOR UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 authorized to enter into a sealed contract for the sale of the 
 land of his principals, had entered into a contract under his 
 own name and seal, intending to execute the authority con- 
 ferred upon him, the principals could not treat the covenants 
 made by the agent as theirs, although it clearly appeared in 
 the body of the contract that the stipulations were intended 
 to be between the principals and purchasers and not between 
 the vendees and the agent. The plaintiffs in that case were 
 the owners of the land embraced in the contract, and brought 
 their action in covenant to enforce the covenant of the ven- 
 dees to pay the purchase money, and the court decided that 
 there was no reciprocal covenant on the part of the vendors 
 to sell, and that for want of mutuality in the agreement the 
 action could not be maintained. It is clear, that unless the 
 plaintiff can pass by the persons with whom he contracted, 
 and treat the contract as the simple contract of the defendant, 
 for whom it now appears that Hurlburd was acting, this 
 action must fail. The plaintiff invokes in his behalf the doc- 
 trine that must now be deemed to be the settled law of this 
 court, and which is supported by high authority elsewhere, 
 that a principal may be charged upon a written parol execu- 
 tory contract entered into by an agent in his own name, within 
 his authority, although the name of the principal does not 
 appear in the instrument, and was not disclosed, and the 
 party dealing with the agent supposed he was acting for him- 
 self, and this doctrine obtains as well in respect to contracts 
 which are required to be in writing, as to those where a writ- 
 ing is not essential to their validity. Higgins v. Senior, 8 
 M. & W. 834; Trueman v. Loder, 11 Ad. & El. 589; 
 Dykers v. Townsend, 24 N. Y. 57 ; Coleman v. First Nat. 
 Bank ofMmira, 53 N. Y. 388 ; Ford v. Williams, 21 How. 
 289 ; Huntington v. Knox, 7 Gush. 371 ; The Eastern It. 
 JR. Co. v. Benedict, 5 Gray, 561 ; Hubbert v. Borden, 6 
 Wharton, 79 ; Browning v. Provincial Ins. Co., 5 L. R. 
 (P. C.) 263 ; Colder v. Dobell, 6 L. B. (C. P.) 486 ; Story 
 on Agency, 148, 160. 
 
 It is, doubtless, somewhat difficult to reconcile the doctrine
 
 127.] BRIGGS V. PARTRIDGE. 251 
 
 here stated with the rule that parol evidence is inadmissible 
 to change, enlarge, or vary a written contract, and the argu- 
 ment upon which it is supported savors of subtlety and 
 refinement. In some of the earlier cases the doctrine that a 
 written contract of the agent could be enforced against the 
 principal, was stated with the qualification, that it applied 
 when it could be collected from the whole instrument, that 
 the intention was to bind the principal. But it will appear 
 from an examination of the cases cited, that this qualification 
 is no longer regarded as an essential part of the doctrine. 
 Whatever ground there may have been originally to question 
 the legal soundness of the doctrine referred to, it is now too 
 firmty established to be overthrown, and I am of opinion, that 
 the practical effect of the rule as now declared is to promote 
 justice and fair dealing. There is a well-recognized excep- 
 tion to the rule in the case of notes and bills of exchange, 
 resting upon the law merchant. Persons dealing with nego- 
 tiable instruments are presumed to take them on the credit of 
 the parties whose names appear upon them ; and a person not 
 a party cannot be charged upon proof that the ostensible 
 party signed or indorsed as his agent. JSarker v. Mechanics' 
 Ins. Co., 3 Wend. 94; Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Id. 271 ; De 
 Witt v. Walton, 9 N. Y. 571 ; Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 
 Mass. 27 ; Eastern R. R. Co. v. Be.nedict, 5 Gray, 561 ; 
 Beckham v. Drake, 9 M. & W. 79. That Hurlburd had 
 oral authorit}' from the defendant to enter into a contract for 
 the purchase of the land, and that he was acting for the 
 defendant in making it is admitted ; and if the contract had 
 been a simple contract and not a specialty the defendant 
 would, I think, have been bound by it within the authorities 
 cited. No question would arise under the Statute of Frauds, 
 for the statute prescribing what shall be necessary to make a 
 valid contract for the sale of lands requires only that the con- 
 tract, or some note or memorandum thereof expressing the 
 consideration, should be in writing and subscribed by the 
 party by whom the sale is to be made, or his agent lawfully 
 authorized. 2 R. S. 135, 8, 9. In this case the contract
 
 252 CONTRACT FOR UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 was signed by the vendors ; and even if it had been executed 
 on their part by an agent pursuant to an oral authority, it 
 would have been a valid execution within the statute. Law- 
 rence v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 107 ; Worrall v. Munn, 1 Seld. 229. 
 But the vendee's contract need not be in writing. Me Crea v. 
 Purmort, 16 Wend. 460. 
 
 We return, then, to the question originally stated. Can 
 a contract under seal, made by an agent in his own name for 
 the purchase of land, be enforced as the simple contract 
 of the real principal when he shall be discovered? No 
 authorit}' for this broad proposition has been cited. There 
 are cases which hold that when a sealed contract has been 
 executed in such form, that it is, in law, the contract of the 
 agent and not of the principal, but the principal's interest in 
 the contract appears upon its face, and he has received the 
 benefit of performance by the other part\ r , and has ratified 
 and confirmed it by acts in pais, and the contract is one 
 which would have been valid without a seal, the principal 
 may be liable in assumpsit upon the promise contained in the 
 instrument, which may be resorted to to ascertain the terms 
 of the agreement. Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 John. 60 ; 
 Du Bois v. The Del. & Hudson Canal Co., 4. Wend. 285 ; 
 Lawrence v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 107 ; see also Evans v. Wells, 
 22 Wend. 324 ; Worrall v. Munn, supra ; Story on Agency, 
 277 ; 1 Am. Leading Cases, 735, note. 
 
 The plaintiffs agreement in the case was with Hurlburd, 
 and not with the defendant. The plaintiff has recourse 
 against Hurlburd on his covenant, which was the only 
 remedy which he contemplated when the agreement was 
 made. No ratification of the contract by the defendant is 
 shown. To change it from a specialty to a simple contract, 
 in order to charge the defendant, is to make a different con- 
 tract from the one the parties intended. A seal has lost 
 most of its former significance, but the distinction between 
 specialties and simple contracts is not obliterated. A seal 
 is still evidence, though not conclusive of a consideration. 
 The rule of limitation in respect to the two classes of
 
 129.] HUNTINGTON V. KNOX. 253 
 
 obligations is not the same. We find no authority for the 
 proposition that a contract under seal may be turned into 
 the simple contract of a person not in any way appearing 
 on its face to be a party to, or interested in it, on proof 
 dehors the instrument, that the nominal party was acting as 
 the agent of another, and especially in the absence of any 
 proof that the alleged principal has received any benefit 
 from it, or has in any way ratified it, and we do not feel at 
 liberty to extend the doctrine applied to simple contracts 
 executed by an agent for an unnamed principal so as to 
 embrace this case. The general rule is declared b} T Shaw, 
 C. J., in Huntington v. Knox, 1 Gush. 371 : " Where a 
 contract is made by deed, under seal on technical grounds, 
 no one but a party to the deed is liable to be sued upon it, 
 and, therefore, if made by an attorney or agent, it must be 
 made in the name of the principal, in order that he may be a 
 party, because otherwise he is not bound by it." 
 
 The judgment of the General Term should be affirmed. 
 
 All concur. Judgment affirmed. 
 
 5 Same : exception as to negotiable instruments. 
 
 128.] RENDELL v. HARRIMAN. 
 
 75 MAINE, 497. 1883. 
 [Reported herein at p. 360.] 
 
 6. Rights of undisclosed principal: general rule. 
 
 129.] .HUNTINGTON v. KNOX. 
 
 7 GUSHING (Mass.), 371. 1851. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT for goods sold and delivered. Award by 
 arbitrator in favor of plaintiff, subject to the opinion of 
 the court on questions of law.
 
 254 CONTRACT FOR UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 George H. Huntington entered into the contract in writing 
 with the defendant. Plaintiff offered to prove that the bark 
 was her property, and that George H. Huntington entered 
 into the contract in his name as her agent. The arbitrator 
 ruled that such parol evidence was competent, and that the 
 evidence established the facts as alleged. 
 
 SHAW, C. J. This action is brought to recover the value 
 of a quantity of hemlock bark, alleged to have been sold by 
 the plaintiff to the defendant, at certain prices charged. The 
 declaration was for goods sold and delivered, with the usual 
 money counts. The case was submitted to a referee by a 
 common rule of the court, who made an award in favor of 
 the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court on questions 
 reserved, stating the facts in his report, on which the decision 
 of those questions depends. 
 
 The facts tended to show that the bark was the property 
 of the plaintiff ; that the contract for the sale of it was made 
 by her agent, George H. Huntington, by her authority ; that 
 it was made in writing by the agent, in his own name, not 
 stating his agency, or naming or referring to the plaintiff, or 
 otherwise intimating, in the written contract, that any other 
 person than the agent was interested in the bark. 
 
 Objection was made, before the referee, to the admission 
 of parol evidence, and to the right of the plaintiff to maintain 
 the action in her own ncme. The referee decided both points 
 in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the action could be main- 
 tained bj- the principal and owner of the property, subject to 
 an}- set-off, or other equitable defence which the buyer might 
 have if the action were brought by the agent. 
 
 The court are of opinion that this decision was correct upon 
 both points. Indeed, they resolve themselves substantially 
 into one ; for primd facie, and looking only at the paper 
 itself, the property is sold by the agent, on credit ; and in 
 the absence of all other proof, a promise of payment to the 
 seller would be implied by law ; and if that presumption of 
 fact can be controverted, so as to raise a promise to the 
 principal by implication, it must be b}* evidence aliunde, 
 proving the agency and property in the principal.
 
 129.] HTJNTINGTON V. KNOX. 255 
 
 It is now well settled^ by authorities that when the property 
 of one is sold by anotber T as agent, if the principal give 
 notice to the purchaser, before payment, to pay to himself, 
 and not to the agpnt, tha purchaser is bound to pay the 
 principal^ subject to any equities of the purchaser against 
 tbe^ agent. 
 
 When a contract is made by deed under seal, on technical 
 grounds, no one but a party to the deed is liable to be sued 
 upon it; and, therefore, if made by an agent or attorney, it 
 must be made in the name of the principal, in order that he 
 may be a party T bpoanaA r^ f rw i a a I 1f > fa no f, hnnnd fry ]f.. 
 
 But a different rule, and a far more liberal doctrine, pre- 
 vails in regard to a written contract not under seal. In the 
 case of Higgins v. Senior , 8 M. & W. 834, it is laid 
 down as a general proposition, that it is competent to show 
 that one or both of the contracting parties were agents for 
 other persons, and acted as such agents in making the con- 
 tract of sale, so as to give the benefit of the contract, on the 
 one hand to, and charge with liability on the other, the un- 
 named principals ; and this whether the agreement be or be 
 not required to be in writing, by the Statute of Frauds. But 
 the court mark the distinction broadly between such a case 
 and a case where an agent, who has contracted in his own 
 name, for the benefit, and by the authority, of a principal, 
 seeks to discharge himself from liabilit}*, on the ground that 
 be contracted in the capacity of an agent. The doctrine 
 proceeds on the ground that the principal and Rgpnt. may 
 each be bounjj: the agent, because by his contract and 
 promise he has expressly bound himselfj and the principal, 
 because it was a contract, made by his authprjty for hys 
 account. Paterson v. Gandasequi, 15 East, 62; Magee\. 
 Atkit^jn, 2 M. & W. 440; Trueman v. Loder, 11 Ad. & 
 El. 589; Taintor v. Prendergast, 3 Hill, 72; Edwards v. 
 Golding, 20 Vt. 30. It is analogous to the ordinarj r case 
 of a dormant partner. He is not named or alluded to in the 
 contract ; yet as the contract is shown in fact to be made for 
 his benefit, and by his authority, he is liable.
 
 256 CONTRACT FOB UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 So, on the other hand, where the contract is made for the 
 benefit of one not named, though in writing, the latter may 
 sue on the contract, jointly with others, or alone, according 
 to the interest. Garrett v. Handley, 4 B. & C. 664 ; Sad- 
 ler v. Leigh, 4 Carnpb. 195 ; Coppin v. Walker, 7 Taunt. 237 ; 
 Story on Agency, 410. The rights and liabilities of a prin- 
 cipal, upon a written instrument executed by his agent, do 
 not depend upon the fact of the agency appearing on the in- 
 strument itself, but upon the facts : (1) that the act is done in 
 the exercise, and (2) within the limits, of the powers dele- 
 gated ; and these are necessarily inquirable into by evidence. 
 Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat. 326. 
 
 And we think this doctrine is not controverted by the 
 authority of any of the cases cited in the defendant's argu- 
 ment. Hastings v. Lovering, 2 Pick. 214, was a case where 
 the suit was brought against an agent, on a contract of war- 
 rant}' upon a sale made in his own name. The case of the 
 United States v. Parmele, Paine, 252, was decided on the 
 ground that, in an action on a written executory promise, 
 none but the promisee can sue. The court admit that, on a 
 sale of goods made by a factor, the principal may sue. 
 
 This action is not brought on any written promise made 
 by the defendant ; the receipt is a written acknowledgment, 
 given by the plaintiff to the defendant, of part payment for 
 the bark, and it expresses the terms upon which the sale had 
 been made. The defendant, by accepting it, admits the sale 
 and its terms ; but the law raises the promise of paj-ment. 
 And this is by implication, primd facie, a promise to the 
 agent ; j-et it is onlj* primd facie, and may be controlled b}* 
 parol evidence that the contract of sale was for the sale of 
 property belonging to the plaintiff, and sold by her authority 
 to the defendant, by the agency of the person with whom the 
 defendant contracted. 
 
 We are all of opinion that the provisions of Rev. Sts. 
 c. 28, 201, do not apply to the sale of bark, as made 
 in this case. 
 
 Judgment on the award for the plaintiff.
 
 130.] MONTAGUE V. FORWOOD. 257 
 
 7. Same : exception as to state of accounts. 
 
 130.] MONTAGUE v. FORWOOD. 
 
 1893, 2 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (C. A.), 351. 
 
 ACTION to recover a sum of mone} r alleged to have been 
 received by the defendants to the use of the plaintiffs. Judg- 
 ment for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. 
 
 Plaintiffs had been engaged by the owners of a cargo to 
 collect a general average loss from underwriters at Lloyd's. 
 They employed a merchant firm, Beyts & Craig, who, not 
 being members of Lloyd's, employed defendants as brokers. 
 Defendants collected the loss and claimed the right to set off 
 the amount collected against a sum due them from Bej'ts & 
 Craig. Defendants had no notice that Beyts & Craig were act- 
 ing as agents, and believed them to be principals. Beyts & 
 Craig were adjudged bankrupt after the money was collected. 
 
 LORD ESHER, M. R. I feel no doubt about this case. The 
 plaintiffs were directed by a foreign bank, who were acting 
 for the owners of the cargo, to collect a general average con- 
 tribution from the underwriters in England who had insured 
 against a general average loss. The plaintiffs emplo3*ed 
 Beyts & Craig to collect the money from the insurers. Beyts 
 & Craig, who are not brokers, in their turn employed the de- 
 fendants as their agents to collect the money, the defendants 
 being brokers at Lloyd's. Beyts & Craig did not tell the de- 
 fendants that they were acting as agents for any one. Beyts 
 & Craig were not brokers, nor had they in any way the char- 
 acter of persons whose business it was to act as agents for 
 others. It was found by the learned judge as a fact that the 
 defendants did not know that Beyts & Craig were acting in 
 the matter as agents for any one. The defendants accordingly, 
 acting as agents for Eeyis & Craig, collected the money, and 
 at the ver} T time when they did so Beyts & Craig were indebted 
 to them in a larger amount. At that very time the defendants 
 had a right of set-off as against Beyts & Craig, though the 
 
 17
 
 258 CONTRACT FOR UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 right would not come into play until an action was brought. 
 After the defendants had collected the money, and the right 
 of set-off had accrued, the defendants, not knowing, and 
 having no reason to suspect, and not in fact suspecting, that 
 Beyts & Craig were acting for any principals, can the plain- 
 tiffs now intervene and say that the money belongs to them, 
 and that the defendants were not their agents, and that the 
 defendants cannot set off as against the plaintiffs a debt due 
 to them from Beyts & Craig? The law of bankruptcy has 
 nothing to do with the case. What is the law which governs 
 it? I think it was settled by Rabone v. Williams, 7 T. R. 
 360, n. ; George v. Clagett, 7 T. R. 359, and Fish v. Kemp- 
 ton, 7 C. B. 687. 
 
 In Fish v. Kempton, 7 C. B. at p. 691, Wilde, C. J., 
 said: "Where goods are placed in the hands of a factor 
 for sale and are sold by him under circumstances that are 
 calculated to induce, and do induce, a purchaser to believe 
 that he is dealing with his own goods, the principal is not 
 permitted afterwards to turn round and tell the vendee that 
 the character he himself has allowed the factor to assume did 
 not really belong to him. The purchaser may have bought 
 for the express purpose of setting off the price of the goods 
 against a debt due to him from the seller. But the case is 
 different where the purchaser has notice at the time that the 
 seller is acting merely as the agent of another." And Cress- 
 well, J., said (at p. 693) : " This is an attempt to extend 
 the rule laid down in Rabone v. Williams, 7 T. R. 360, n., 
 and George v. Clagett, 7 T. R. 359, which has now been uni- 
 formly acted upon for many years. IfLa factor sells goods 
 as owner, and the buyer bond fide purchases them in ibe 
 belief that he is dealing with the owner, he may set off a_ debt 
 due to him from the factor against a demand preferred by 
 the principal. Lord Mansfield so lays down the rule dis- 
 tinctly in Rabone v. Williams, 7 T. R. 360, n. ' Where/ he 
 says, ' a factor, dealing for a principal, but concealing that 
 principal, delivers goods in his own name, the person con- 
 tracting with him has a right to consider him to all intents and
 
 130.] MONTAGUE V. FORWOOD. 259 
 
 purposes as the principal ; and, ^"ffh thfi Vpfl1 principal 
 aj>pear and Jbring^anjiction upon that contract against the 
 purchaser of the goods, yet that purchaser may set off any 
 claim he may have against the factor in answer to the demand 
 of the principal. This has been long settled.' The distinc- 
 tion between a factor and a broker has been noticed by 
 Abbott, C. J., and Bay ley, J., in Baring v. Come, 2 B. 
 & A. 137." 
 
 In Fish v. Kempton, 7 C. B. 687, the plaintiffs' goods had 
 been sold to the defendant by a factor, that is, a person 
 whose business it is to sell in his own name goods placed in 
 his hands for that purpose by his principal ; but the same 
 principle applies to any one who is authorized to sell goods, 
 or to receive money for his principal, when there is nothing 
 to lead the person who deals with him to suppose, and he does 
 not in fact know, that he is acting as an agent. When a 
 person who sells goods is known by the purchaser to be a 
 broker, that is, an agent, the case is entirely different ; the 
 purchaser cannot then set off a debt due to him from the 
 broker against the demand of the principal. Beyts & Craig 
 were not brokers, and the defendants had no reason for sup- 
 posing that they were acting for a principal. They acted as if 
 the moneys to be collected would, when collected, belong to 
 themselves. It is found as a fact by the learned judge that 
 the defendants did not know that Beyts & Craig were acting 
 for a principal. That being so, they had a right at the moment 
 when they received the money to set off against it a debt due 
 to them b} T Beyts & Craig, and if the plaintiffs could now 
 intervene, they would be taking away from the defendants a 
 valid and existing right. 
 
 BOWEN, L. J. I am of the same opinion. The Master of 
 the Rolls has so clearly expressed the law on the subject that 
 I have really nothing to add, beyond saying that I concur in 
 his view. The case is, in my judgment, governed by principles 
 of the decision in George v. Clayett, 1 T. R. 359, by the rules 
 of common sense and justice, and I think also b}' the law of 
 estoppel. The principle is not confined to the sale of goods.
 
 260 CONTRACT FOR UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 If A. crapes B. as his agent to make any contract for him, 
 or to receive money for him, and B. makes a contract with C., 
 or employs C. as his agent, if B. is a person who would rea- 
 sonably be supposed to be acting as a principal, and is not 
 known or suspected by C. to be acting as an agent for any 
 one, A. cannot make a demand against C. without the latter 
 being entitled to stand in the same position as if B. had in 
 fact been a principal. If A. has allowed his agent B. to ap- 
 pear in the character of a principal he must take the conse- 
 quences. Here Beyts & Craig were allowed b} - the plaintiffs 
 to deal with the defendants as if they had been dealing on 
 their own account, and the defendants who dealt with Bej'ts 
 & Craig are entitled to stand in the position in which they 
 would have stood if Beyts & Craig had really been dealing as 
 principals. 
 
 (KAY, L. J., also delivered a concurring opinion.) 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 8. Same : exception where exclusive credit is given to 
 
 agent. 
 
 132.] WINCHESTER v. HOWARD. 
 
 97 MASSACHUSETTS, 303. 1867. 
 
 CONTRACT for the price of a pair of oxen alleged to have 
 been purchased by the defendant of the plaintiffs. Judgment 
 for plaintiffs. Defendant alleged exceptions. 
 
 Defendant offered to prove that one Smith claimed to be 
 the owner of the oxen, and represented that plaintiffs had no 
 interest in them ; that relying upon this representation de- 
 fendant purchased the oxen of Smith, and that as soon as he 
 learned that the representation was false he returned the oxen 
 to Smith, who refused to receive them, and offered defendant 
 a bill of sale in plaintiffs' name, which offer defendant de- 
 clined ; that defendant would not willingly have any dealings 
 with plaintiffs, and had for some years refused to deal with
 
 132.] WINCHESTER V. HOWARD. 261 
 
 them. This proof the court ruled would not constitute a de- 
 fence, and directed a verdict for plaintiffs. 
 
 CHAPMAN, J. The court are of the opinion that it should 
 have been left to the jury in this case to determine whether 
 the minds of the parties really met upon any contract, and if 
 so, what the contract was. 
 
 It is true that an agent may sell the property of his princi- 
 pal without disclosing the fact that he acts as an agent, or 
 that the property is not his own ; and the principal may main- 
 tain an action in his own name to recover the price. If the 
 purchaser says nothing on the subject, he is liable to the un- 
 known principal. Huntington v. Knox, 1 Cush. 371. But 
 on the other hand, every man has a right to elect what parties 
 he will deal with. As was remarked by Lord Den man in 
 Humble v. Hunter, 12 Q. B. 310, " You have a right to the 
 benefit you contemplate from the character, credit, and sub- 
 stance of_the person with whom you contract." There may 
 be good reasons why one should be unwilling to buy a pair of 
 oxen that has been owned or used, or were claimed by a par- 
 ticular person, or why he should be unwilling to have any 
 dealings with that person ; and as a man's right to refuse to 
 enter into a contract is absolute, he is not obliged to submit 
 the validity of his reasons to a court or jury. 
 
 In this case it appears that Smith, the plaintiffs' agent, told 
 the defendant that he had a pair of oxen for sale (referring to 
 the oxen in question), and that another pair belonging to one 
 Blanchard were in his possession, which pair he was autho- 
 rized to sell. A jury might properly find that this amounted 
 to a representation that the oxen in question were his own. 
 The defendant then made inquiries, in answer to which Smith 
 affirmed that the oxen had never been hurt ; that the plain- 
 tiffs had no mortgage upon them, and that there was no claim 
 upon them except the claim which Smith had. A jury might 
 properly find that this was, in substance, a representation 
 that the title to the oxen was exclusively in Smith, and that, 
 as the defendant was unwilling to deal with the plaintiffs, he 
 made proper inquiries on the subject, and was led by Smith
 
 262 CONTRACT FOR UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 to believe he was not dealing with the plaintiffs. The 
 defendant took the cattle home with an agreement that Iff 
 might return them " if he did not find things as Smith had 
 told him." In the course of the evening he was informed that 
 the cattle belonged to the plaintiffs, and befog unwillingjojbuy 
 oxen of them, he rfitoirnflrl ther" ^ SmU.fr fih p np. f ^t morning 
 before any bill of sate had bftpty a/jp. The jury would be 
 authorized to find that he returned them within the terms of 
 the condition upon which he took them, because he did not 
 find things as Smith had told him. It is thus apparent that 
 upon the whole evidence they would be justified in finding a 
 verdict for the defendant. 
 
 Exceptions sustained. 
 
 133.] HUMBLE v. HUNTER. 
 
 12 QUEEN'S BENCH REPORTS, 310. 1848. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT on a charter-party. Judgment for plaintiff. 
 The court granted a rule nisi, upon a motion for a new 
 trial. 
 
 The charter-party was not signed by plaintiff, but by her 
 son, C. J. Humble, and contained this clause : " It is . . . 
 mutually agreed between C. J. Humble, Esq., owner of the 
 good ship or vessel called ' The Ann,' . . . and Jameson 
 Hunter," etc. C. J. Humble__wa8 offered ft witness Jo 
 prove that plaintiff was the true owner of the vessel, and 
 that he had signed as her agent. This was objected to on 
 the ground that one who has expressly signed as principal 
 cannot testify, in contradiction to the written .instrument, 
 that he signed as agent. The evidence was received, and 
 this was alleged as error. 
 
 LORD DENMAN, C. J. We were rather inclined to think 
 at first that this case came within the doctrine that a prin- 
 cipal may come in and takejfche benefit of-fl^nntrnnt. mfldfi 
 by his agent. But that doctrine cannot be applied where the
 
 133.] HUMBLE V. HUNTER. 263 
 
 agent contracts as principal ; and he has done so here by 
 describing himself as "owner" of the ship. The language 
 of Lord Ellenborough in Lucas v. De la Cour, 1 M. & S. 
 249, " If one partner makes a contract in his individual 
 capacity, and the other partners are willing to take the ben- 
 efit of it, the}' must be content to do so according to the 
 mode in which the contract was made," is very apposite to 
 the present case. 
 
 PATTESON, J. The question in this case turns on the 
 form of the contract. If the contract had been made in the 
 son's name merely, without more, it might have been shown 
 that he was the agent only, and that the plaintiff was the 
 principal. But, as the document itself represents that the son 
 contracted as "owner," Lucas v. De la Cour applies. There 
 the partner who made the contract represented that the prop- 
 erty which was the subject of it belonged to him alone. The 
 plaintiff here must be taken to have allowed her son to 
 contract in this form, and must be bound by his act. In 
 Robson v. Drummond, 2 B. & Ad. 303, where Sharpe, a 
 coach-maker, with whom Robson was a dormant partner, 
 had agreed to furnish the defendant with a carriage for five 
 years at a certain yearly sum, and had retired from the busi- 
 ness, and assigned all his interest in it to C. before the end 
 of the first three years, it was held that an action could not 
 be maintained by the two partners against the defendant, 
 who returned the carriage, and refused to make the last 
 two yearly payments. In this case I was at first in the 
 plaintiff's favor, on account of the general principle referred 
 to by my Lord ; but the form of the contract takes the case 
 out of that principle. 
 
 WIGHTMAN, J. I thought at the trial that this case was 
 governed by Skinner v. Stocks, 4 B. & Aid. 437. But 
 neither in that nor in an}- case of the kind did the contracting 
 part}' give himself any special description, or make any 
 assertion of title to the subject-matter of the contract. 
 Here the plaintiff describes himself expressly as " owner " of 
 the subject-matter. This brings the case within the prin-
 
 264 CONTKACT FOB UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. [CH. X. 
 
 ciple of Lucas v. De la Cour, and the American authorities 
 cited. 
 
 LORD DENMAN, C. J. Jftobson v. Drummond, 2 B. & Ad. 
 303, which my Brother Patteson has cited, seems the same, 
 iu principle, with the present case. You have a right to the 
 benefit you contemplate from the character, credit, and sub- 
 stance of the party with whom you contract. 
 
 COLERIDGE, J., having heard the argument for the de- 
 fendant only, gave no judgment. 
 
 Kule absolute.
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 ADMISSIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF AGENT. 
 
 139.] WHITE v. MILLER. 
 
 71 NEW YORK, 118. 1877. 
 
 ACTION against defendants as "trustees of the mutual 
 society called Shakers" to recover damages for a breach of 
 a contract of warranty of cabbage seed. Judgment for 
 plaintiffs. 
 
 Plaintiffs bought the seed as "large Bristol cabbage 
 seed." In fact the seed were impure and mixed, and did 
 not answer the description. 
 
 ANDREWS, J. (after deciding that there was a warranty 
 arising from the sale by description). The remaining ques- 
 tions arise upon exceptions taken by the defendants to the 
 admission or rejection of evidence, and without passing upon 
 the validity of the other exceptions of this character, we are 
 of opinion that the referee erred in allowing the conversation 
 between Chauncey Miller and the plaintiff White, at the 
 interview between them in the fall of 1868, to be given in 
 evidence. This conversation occurred nearly eight months 
 after the sale of the seed, and the making of the warranty 
 upon which the action is brought. If the declarations of 
 Miller on this occasion were admissible to bind the society, 
 they furnished very material evidence to sustain the plain- 
 tiffs' case. The plaintiffs sought to establish, among other 
 things, that the defect in the seed was owing to improper 
 and negligent cultivation, thereby raising an implied war- 
 rant}', in addition to the warranty arising out of the descrip- 
 tion in the bill of parcels ; and it was also an essential part 
 of their case to establish that the seed sold were not Bristol 
 cabbage seed ; and this they sought to show by proving by
 
 266 ADMISSIONS OF AGENT. [CH. XI. 
 
 gardeners and other persons who had purchased seed of the 
 defendants of the same kind as that sold to the plaintiffs, 
 that their crops had also failed, and that the seed did not 
 produce Bristol cabbage. The admissions of Miller, in the 
 conversation proved, tended to establish both of the facts re- 
 ferred to, viz. : that the seed was inferior and mixed, owing 
 to improper cultivation, and that it would not produce Bristol 
 cabbage. He stated, in the conversation, that the impurity 
 of the seed was owing to planting the Bristol cabbage stocks 
 in the vicinity of stocks of the red cabbage, and that the 
 society had, in consequence of the defective character of the 
 seed, lost their own crops of cabbage in that year. The proof 
 of this conversation was objected to on several grounds ; and 
 among others, that the declarations of Miller, when not en- 
 gaged in the business of the societ}*, were not admissible. 
 
 Thft frpnerq.] rulp. is r that what one person says, qut of court. 
 is not admissible to charge or bind another. The exception 
 ; and in cases of agency, the declara- 
 
 tions of the agent, are ngt_gpmpp.tp.nt. t.n r>hnrgP. t,h ft 
 upon proofjnerely that the relation of principal and agent 
 existed when the declarations were made. It must further 
 appear Jhat the agent,, at the time the declaration was made , 
 ras^engaged in executing the authority conferred upon him, 
 and that thejieclarations related to, and were connected with, 
 businessjjienjdepending, so t.h^t they constituted a part 
 ?f tfae_ra* gestsB* In Fairlie v. Hastings (10 Ves. Jr. 123), Sir 
 William Grant expressed, with great clearness and accuracy, 
 the doctrine upon this subject. He said: " What an agent 
 has .said may be what constitutes t.hp ggrpp r m<>nt nf thp P" n - 
 cipalj or the representations or statements made may be the 
 foundation of or the inducement to thp. agreement. There- 
 fore, if a writing is not necessary by law, the evidence must 
 be admitted, to prove the agent did make that statement or 
 representation. So, with regard to ants done^ jhe_worda 
 which thege^ acts are accompanied frequently tend tr> 
 mine their quality. The party, therefore, to be bound by the 
 act must be affected by the words. But, except in one ox
 
 139.] WHITE V. MILLER. 267 
 
 the other of these ways, I do not know how what is said fay 
 an agent can be_eyidence against the principal. The mere 
 assertion of_ajact cannot amount to proof of it, though it 
 may_have some relation to the business in which the person 
 making that assertion was employed as agent." See also 
 Story on Agency, 134, 137; Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoof, 
 4 Wend. 394 ; Hubbard v. Elmer, 7 Id. 446 ; Luby v. H. M. 
 E. E. Co., 17 N. Y. 131. The rule that the declarations of 
 the agent are inadmissible to bind the principal, unless they 
 constitute the agreement which he is authorized to make, or 
 relate to and accompany an act done in the course of the 
 agency, is applicable in all cases, whether the agent is a 
 general or special one, or the principal is a corporation or 
 private person. Angell & Ames on Cor. 309 ; 1 Gr. Ev., 
 114 a. 
 
 The conversation with Miller was inadmissible within the 
 rule stated. It was not a part of any contract between the 
 society and__the plaintiffs, nor was it connected with any 
 business which Miller was at the time transacting for the 
 defendants. The plaintiffs had not then, so far as it ap- 
 pears, made any claim that the defendants were liable on the 
 warranty, or that the failure of the crop was owing to a 
 defect in the seed. The plaintiff White states that up to the 
 time of the conversation, he had not been able to account for 
 the failure. He had written to Miller before the conversa- 
 tion, and requested him to look at the crop, and to explain, 
 if he could, the cause of the failure ; and, not receiving an 
 answer, he went to see Miller, when the conversation referred 
 to occurred. Miller at this time made no contract or arrange- 
 ment with White for a settlement or adjustment of any liabil- 
 ity incurred by the society, and he had no authority to bind 
 the society, if he had attempted to do so, to pay the large 
 damages subsequently claimed by the plaintiffs. The cove- 
 nant express!}' declares that no important contract made by 
 the trustees shall be considered valid without the previous 
 approbation of the ministry and elders. An agreement to 
 pay several thousand dollars damages on a sale of thirty-six
 
 268 ADMISSIONS OF AGENT. [CH. XI. 
 
 dollars' worth of seed, would be an important contract, 
 beyond the power of the trustees alone to make. 
 
 For these reasons, we are of opinion that the referee erred 
 
 111 th g^'nJQcirm r>f tho nrmvorcgtirm in q^Pglinn. 
 
 The evidence was important, and we cannot say that it did 
 not influence the result^ For the error in admitting it, the 
 judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted. 
 
 Judgment reversed. 
 
 139.] WILLIAMSON v. CAMBRIDGE RAILROAD 
 COMPANY. 
 
 144 MASSACHUSETTS, 148. 1887. 
 
 TORT for personal injuries. Judgment for defendant. 
 Plaintiff alleges exceptions. 
 
 Plaintiff was thrown from defendant's horse-car while 
 attempting to alight. She was unconscious for a moment 
 on striking the pavement; the conductor hastened to her 
 assistance, and said, " I am very sorry, madam, that was my 
 fault." The trial judge excluded evidence of this remark. 
 
 W. ALLEN, J. This case cannot be distinguished from 
 Lane \. Bryant, 9 Gray, 245. That was an action for injury 
 to the plaintiff's carriage by collision with the defendant's 
 wagon driven by his servant. A witness was asked " what 
 the servant said to the plaintiff at the time of the accident, 
 and while the plaintiff was being extricated from his carriage, 
 and while the crowd was about." The reply, that the servant 
 said the plaintiff was not to blame, was admitted, and an 
 exception to its admission was sustained. Mr. Justice Bige- 
 low, in delivering the opinion of the court, said, in language 
 which well applies to the case at bar: " The declaration of 
 the defendant's servant was incompetent, and should have 
 been rejected. It was made after the accident occurred, and 
 the injury to the plaintiff's carnage had been done. _It_did 
 not accompany the principal act. . . . or *pnd in ar\y Wfl y tn 
 elucidate it. It was only the expression of an opinion about
 
 139.] ELLEDGE V. EAILWAY CO. 269 
 
 a past occurrence, and not part of the res aestce. It is no more 
 cojnjjetent because madejmmediately after the accident than 
 if made a week or a month afterwards." 
 
 In the case under consideration, the plaintiff relied upon 
 the act of the conductor in ringing the bell and starting the 
 car while the plaintiff was leaving it, to prove negligence in 
 the defendant. The words of the conductor did not form 
 part of that transaction, or in any manner qualify his act^pr 
 any act of the plaintiff, They were in form and substance 
 narrative, and expressed an opinion upon a past transaction. 
 The words, if competent as an admission, might have been 
 evidence to showjvhat the jjharacter of the transaction was, 
 botjhey did not enter into it and give it character, anyjnore 
 than would the declaration of the conductor that he had not 
 been in fault, or that the plaintiff had been.^ In the opinion of 
 a majority of the court, the evidence was properly excluded. 
 
 Exceptions overruled. 
 
 139.] ELLEDGE v. RAILWAY COMPANY. 
 100 CALIFORNIA, 282. 1893. 
 
 ACTION for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for 
 plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
 
 Plaintiff was a workman engaged in loading rock from a 
 bank or cliff from ten to sixteen feet high, under the direction 
 of defendant's roadmaster. There was a seam or crack behind 
 the bank, known to the roadmaster but unknown to plaintiff, 
 which rendered the place unsafe for work. A portion of the 
 rocks and earth slid down and injured plaintiff. When the 
 roadmaster saw what, had happened., hq exclaimed : " My_God T 
 I expected that ! " 
 
 TEMPLE, C. (after disposing of other matters). Appellant 
 also alleges some errors of law at the trial. 
 
 He contends that it was error to permit the witness to state, 
 against his objection, the exclamation of O'Connell (the road-
 
 270 ADMISSIONS OF AGENT. [CH. XI. 
 
 master), when the cliff came down. TJris is jjlainlj' part of 
 the res gestce. It was unpremeditated and could hardly have 
 been made if Q'Connell had not feared that it might pome 
 It does not depend for its probative force upon O'Ckffi- 
 and therein is entirely unlike a deliberate 
 
 ^ 
 admission made after the event 
 
 Judgment affirmed. 
 
 YORDY v. MARSHALL COUNTY, 86 Iowa, 340 (1892): In an 
 action for damages for the breaking down of a county bridge, the 
 court admitted evidence that a member of the board of super- 
 visors, after the accident, declared that the bridge had been con- 
 demned by the board as unsafe, and notices to that effect ordered 
 posted. Held : " It appears that the alleged declarations of Bene- 
 dict were made after the accident, and it does not appear that 
 when he made the declarations he was engaged in any official work 
 or employment for the county. Under these circumstances, the 
 testimony as to his declarations was not competent evidence. He 
 was an agent of the county, and his declaration was in no way 
 connected with, nor a part of, the res gestce." 
 
 VICKSBURG, &c. R. v. O'BRIEN, 119 U. S. 99 (1886) : An en- 
 gineer ten to thirty minutes after an accident declared that at the 
 time of the accident the train was running at the rate of eighteen 
 miles an hour. Held : Incompetent. " The occurrence had ended 
 when the declaration in question was made, and the engineer was 
 not in the act of doing anything that could possibly affect it. If 
 his declaration had been made the next day after the accident, it 
 would scarcely be claimed that it was admissible evidence against 
 the company. And yet the circumstance that it was made be- 
 tween ten and thirty minutes an appreciable period of time 
 after the accident, cannot, upon principle, make this case an ex- 
 ception to the general rule. If the contrary view shall be main- 
 tained, it would follow that the declarations of the engineer, if 
 favorable to the company, would be admissible in its behalf as part 
 of the res gestce, without calling him as a witness a proposition 
 that will find no support in the law of evidence. The cases have 
 gone far enough in the admission of the subsequent declarations 
 of agents as evidence against their principals."
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 NOTICE TO THE AGENT. 
 
 144.] THE DISTILLED SPIRITS. 
 
 11 WALLACE (U. S.), 356. 1870. 
 
 INFORMATION filed by the United States upon the seizure of 
 278 barrels of distilled spirits for violation of the revenue 
 laws. Appearance and claim of ownership by one Harring- 
 ton and one Boyden. Decree against 50 barrels claimed by 
 Harrington and all those claimed by Boyden. Appeal by 
 claimants. 
 
 The spirits were withdrawn from bond by false and fraudu- 
 lent representations, and upon false and fraudulent bonds. 
 Defendants claimed to have purchased in open market with- 
 out notice of this fraud, Harrington having purchased through 
 Boyden as his agent. The court charged that if Boyden 
 was cognizant of the fraud, Harrington would be bound by 
 Boyden's knowledge. 
 
 Mr. JUSTICE BRADLEY. . . . The substance of the third 
 instruction prayed for was, that if the spirits were removed 
 from the warehouse according to the forms of law, and the 
 claimants bought them without knowledge of the fraud, they 
 were not liable to forfeiture. The court charged in accord- 
 ance with this prayer with this qualification, that if Boyden 
 bought the spirits as agent for Harrington, and was cognizant 
 of the fraud, Harrington would be bound by his knowledge. 
 The claimants insist that this is not law. 
 
 The question how far a purchaser is affected with notice of 
 prior liens, trusts, or frauds, by the knowledge of his agent 
 who effects the purchase, is one that has been much mooted 
 in England and this country. That he is bound and affected
 
 272 NOTICE TO AGENT. [CH. XII. 
 
 by such knowledge or notice as his agent obtains in nego- 
 tiating the particular transaction, is everywhere conceded. 
 But Lord Hardwicke thought that the rule could not be 
 extended so far as to affect the principal by knowledge of 
 the agent acquired previously in a different transaction. 
 Warrick v. Warrick, 3 Atkyns, 291. Supposing it to be 
 clear, that the agent still retained the knowledge so formerly 
 acquired, it was certainly making a very nice and thin dis- 
 tinction. Lord Eldon did not approve of it. In Mountford 
 v. Scott, 1 Turner & Russel, 274, he says : " It may fall to 
 be considered whether one transaction might not follow so 
 close upon the other as to render it impossible to give a man 
 credit for having forgotten it. I should be unwilling to go 
 so far as to say, that if an attorney has notice of a transac- 
 tion in the morning, he shall be held in a court of equity to 
 have forgotten it in the evening ; it must in all cases depend 
 upon the circumstances." The distinction taken by Lord 
 Hardwicke has since been entirely overruled by the Court 
 of Exchequer Chamber in the case of Dresser v. Norwood, 
 1 7 Common Bench, N. S. 466. So that Jn England the doctrine 
 now seeins to be established, that if the agent at theJime of 
 effecting a purchase, has knowledge of any. prior lien^ trust, 
 or fraud, affecting the property^ no matter when Jie Acquired 
 such knowledge, his principal is affected thereby. If he ac- 
 quire the knowledge when he effects the purchase, no question 
 can arise as to his having it at that time ; if he acquired it 
 previous to the purchase, the presumption that he still retains 
 it, and has it present to his mind, will depend on the lapse of 
 time and other circumstances. Knowledge communicated to 
 the principal himself he is bound to recollect, but he is not 
 bound by knowledge communicated to his agent, unless it is 
 ^the agent's mmd at f.hp tfmp. of effqntjng the pur- 
 
 chase. Clear and satisfactory proof that it was so present 
 seems to be the only restriction required by the English rule 
 as now understood. With the qualification that the agent is 
 at liberty to communicate his knowledge to his principal, it 
 appears to us to be a sound view of the subject. The general
 
 144.] THE DISTILLED SPIRITS. 273 
 
 rule that a principal is bound by the knowledge of his agent 
 is based on the principle of law, that it is the agent's duty 
 to communicate to his principal the knowledge which he has 
 respecting the subject-matter of negotiation, and the presump- 
 tion that he will perform that duty. When it is not the 
 agent's duty to communicate such knowledge, when it would 
 be unlawful for him to do so, as, for example, when it has 
 been acquired confidentially as attorney for a former client 
 in a prior transaction, the reason of the rule ceases, and in 
 such a case an agent would not be expected to do that which 
 would involve the betrayal of professional confidence, and 
 his principal ought not to be bound by his agent's secret and 
 confidential information. This often happened in the case 
 of large estates in England, where men of great professional 
 eminence were frequently consulted. They thus became pos- 
 sessed, in a confidential manner, of secret trusts, or other 
 defects of title, which they could not honorably, if they could 
 legally, communicate to subsequent clients. This difficulty 
 presented itself to Lord Hardwicke's mind, and undoubtedly 
 lay at the bottom of the distinction which he established. 
 Had he confined it to such cases, it would have been entirely 
 unexceptionable. 
 
 The general tendency of decisions in this country has been 
 to adopt the distinction of Lord Hardwicke, but it has several 
 times been held, in consonance with Lord Eldon's suggestion, 
 that if the agent acquired his information so recently as to 
 make it incredible that he should have forgotten it, his prin- 
 cipal will be bound. This is really an abandonment of the 
 principle on which the distinction is founded, Story on 
 Agency, 140 ; Hovey v. Blanchard, 13 N. H. 145 ; Patten 
 v. Insurance Co., 40 Id. 375 ; Hart v. Farmers' & Mechanics' 
 Bank, 33 Vt. 252. The case of Hart v. Farmers' & Mechanics' 
 Bank, 33 Vt. 252, adopts the rule established by the case of 
 Dresser v. Norwood. Other cases, as that of Bank of United 
 States v. Davis, 2 Hill, 452 ; New York Central Insurance 
 Co. v. National Protection Co., 20 Barb. 468, adhere to the 
 more rigid views. See cases collected in note to American 
 
 18
 
 274 NOTICE TO AGENT. [CH. XIL 
 
 edition of 17 Common Bench, N. S. 482, and Mr. Justice 
 Clifford's opinion in the Circuit Court in the present case. 
 
 On the whole, however, we think _ that the rule as finally 
 settled by the English courts, with the qualification above 
 mentioned, is the true one, and is deduced from the best 
 consideration of the reasons on which it is founded. Apply- 
 ing it to the case in hand, we think that the charge was sub- 
 stantially correct. The fair construction of the charge is, 
 that if the jury believed that Boyden, the agent, was cogni- 
 zant of the fraud at the time of the purchase, Harrington, the 
 principal, was bound by this knowledge. The precise words 
 were, "that if Boyden bought the spirits as agent for Har- 
 rington, and Boyden was cognizant of the fraud, Harrington 
 would be bound by his knowledge." The plain and natural 
 sense of these words, and that in which the jury would under- 
 stand them, we think, is that they refer to Boyden's knowl- 
 edge at the time of making the purchase. Thus construed, 
 the charge is strictly in accordance with the law as above 
 explained. There was no pretence that Boyden acquired his 
 knowledge in a fiduciary character. 
 
 . . 
 
 Judgment affirmed. 
 
 144.] CONSTANT v. UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER. 
 Ill NEW YORK, 604. 1889. 
 
 ACIION to foreclose a mortgage dated February 17, 1883, 
 given by A. & B. to plaintiff's testator. Defendant sets up 
 title under foreclosure proceedings upon a mortgage dated 
 January 10, 1884, given by A. & B. to defendant. At the 
 time defendant purchased under the foreclosure sale plain- 
 tiffs mortgage had not been recorded, and defendant denies 
 any notice or knowledge of it. One Deane acted as attorney 
 and agent of plaintiff in taking the first mortgage, and of 
 defendant in taking the second. Judgment for plaintiff. 
 Defendant appeals.
 
 144.] CONSTANT V. UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER. 275 
 
 PECKHAM, J. (after discussing the evidence and the 
 authorities upon the subject of notice). But the burden is 
 upon the plaintiff to prove, clearly and beyond question, that 
 he [the agent] did, and it is not upon the defendant to show 
 that he did not have such recollection. And we think that 
 there is a total lack of evidence in the case which would 
 sustain the finding that Deane has the least recollection on 
 the subject at the time of the execution of the university 
 mortgage. Under such circumstances we think it impossible 
 to impute notice to the university, or knowledge in regard to 
 a fact which is not proved to have been possessed by its 
 agent. If such knowledge did not exist in Deane at the time 
 of his taking the mortgage to the university, then the latter 
 is a bonafide mortgagee for value, and its mortgage should 
 be regarded as a prior lien to that of the unrecorded mort- 
 gage of Constant, which is prior in point of date. The plain, 
 tiff is bound to show, by clear and satisfactory evidence, that 
 when this mortgage to the university was taken by Deane, 
 he then had knowledge, and the fact was then present in his 
 mind, not only that he had taken a mortgage to Constant 
 eleven mouths prior thereto on the same premises, which had 
 not been recorded, but that such mortgage was an existing 
 and valid lien upon the premises, which had not been in any 
 manner satisfied. If he recollected that there had been such 
 a mortgage, but honestly believed that it was or had been 
 satisfied, then, although mistaken upon that point, the 
 university could not be charged with knowledge of the 
 existence of such mortgage. . . . 
 
 One other question has been argued before us which has 
 been the subject of a good deal of thought. It is this: 
 Assuming that Deane had knowledge of the existence of 
 the Constant mortgage at the time of the execution of the 
 mortgage to the university, is his knowledge to be imputed 
 to the university, considering the position Deane occupied to 
 both mortgagees? 
 
 While acting as the agent of Constant in taking the 
 mortgage in question as security for the funds which he
 
 276 NOTICE TO AGENT. [CH. XII. 
 
 was investing for him, it was the duty of Deane to see that 
 the moneys were safely and securely invested. The value 
 of the property was between eleven and twelve thousand 
 dollars ; and it was obviously the duty of Deane to see that 
 the mortgage which he took upon such property as a security 
 for a loan of $6,000 for Constant should be a first lien thereon. 
 Whitney v. Martine, 88 N. Y. 535. In order to become such 
 first lien it was the duty of Deane to see that the Constant 
 mortgage was first recorded. In January, 1884, when acting 
 as agent for the university to invest its moneys, he owed the 
 same duty to the university that he did to Constant, and it 
 was his business to see that the security which he took was 
 a safe and secure one. Neither mortgage was safe or secure 
 if it were a subsequent lien to the other upon this property. 
 This duty he continued to owe to Constant at the time he 
 took the mortgage to the university. 
 
 At the time of the execution of the latter mortgage, there- 
 fore, he owed conflicting duties to Constant and to the uni- 
 versit}', the duty in each case being to make the mortgage 
 to each principal a first lien on the property. Owing these 
 conflicting duties to two different principals, in two separate 
 transactions, can it be properly said that any knowledge 
 coming to him in the course of either transaction should be 
 imputed to his principal? Can any agent occupj-ing such a 
 position bind either principal by constructive notice? It has 
 been stated that in such a case where an agent thus owes 
 conflicting duties, the security which is taken or the act 
 which is performed by the agent may be repudiated by his 
 principal when he becomes aware of the position occupied 
 by such agent. Story on Agency, 210. 
 
 The reason for this rule is, that the principal has the right 
 to the best efforts of his agent in the transaction of the 
 business connected with his agency, and where the agent 
 owes conflicting duties he cannot give that which the prin- 
 cipal has the right to demand, and which he has impliedly 
 contracted to give. Ought the university to be charged with 
 notice of the existence of this prior mortgage when it was
 
 144.] CONSTANT V. UNTVEKSITY OF KOCHESTEK. 277 
 
 the duty of its agent to procure for it a first lien, while, at 
 the same time, in his capacit} 7 as agent for Constant, it was 
 equally his duty to give to him the prior lien ? Which prin- 
 cipal should he serve ? There have been cases where, in the 
 sale and purchase of the same real estate, both parties have 
 employed the same agent, and it has been held under such 
 circumstances that the knowledge of the agent was to be im- 
 puted to both of his principals. If, with a full knowledge of 
 the facts that his own agent was the agent of the other, each 
 principal retained him in his employment, we can see that 
 there would be propriety in so holding ; for each then notes 
 the position which the agent has with regard to the other, 
 and each takes the risk of having imputed to him whatever 
 knowledge the agent may have on the subject. See Le Neve 
 v. Le Neve, 1 Ambler's Reports, 436, Hardwicke, Chancellor, 
 decided in 1747 ; Toulmin v. Steer e, 3 Merivale, 209, decided 
 in 1817, by Sir Walter Grant, Master of the Rolls. The 
 case of Nixon v. Hamilton, already referred to, decided by 
 Lord Plunkett, Lord Chancellor in the Irish Court of Chan- 
 cery, in 1838 (2 Drury & Walsh, 364), is a case in many 
 respects somewhat like the one at bar, so far as this prin- 
 ciple is concerned, if it be assumed that Deane realty had 
 the knowledge of the prior mortgage as an existing lien. 
 It will be observed, however, upon examination of it, that 
 the question, whether the knowledge of the common agent in 
 two different transactions with two different principals was 
 notice to the second principal, was not raised with reference 
 to this particular ground. The whole discussion was upon 
 the subject of imputing the knowledge of the agent to the 
 second mortgagee, of the existence of the prior mortgage, 
 which knowledge was not obtained in the last transaction. 
 Whether such knowledge should or should not be imputed to 
 the second mortgagee, because of the conflicting duties owed 
 by the common agent, was not raised. The only defence set 
 up was, that the information did not come to the agent of 
 the second mortgagee in the course of transacting the busi- 
 ness of the second mortgagee, and the question was simply
 
 278 NOTICE TO AGENT. [CH. XH. 
 
 whether such knowledge could be imputed to the second 
 mortgagee, because of the knowledge acquired by his agent 
 at another time, in another transaction, with another prin- 
 cipal. The court held, that where it appeared, as in this 
 case it did appear, fully and plainly, that the matter was 
 fresh in the recollection, and fully within the knowledge of 
 the agent, and under such circumstances, that it was a gross 
 fraud on the part of the agent, in the first place in keeping a 
 prior mortgage off the record, and in the second place, in not 
 communicating the knowledge which he had to his principal, 
 the second mortgagee, that in such case the second mort- 
 gagee was charged with the knowledge of his agent. 
 
 Whether the same result would have been reached if the other 
 ground had been argued we cannot of course assume to decide. 
 I have found no case precisely in point where the subject has 
 been discussed and decided either way. I have very grave 
 doubts as to the propriety of holding in the case of an agent, 
 situated as I have stated, that his principal in the second 
 mortgage should be charged with knowledge which such 
 agent acquired in another transaction, at a different time, 
 while in the employment of a different principal, and where 
 his duties to such principal still existed and conflicted with 
 his duty to his second principal. "We do not deem it, how- 
 ever, necessary to decide the question in this case. 
 
 For the reasons already given the judgment should be 
 reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the 
 event. 
 
 GRAY and ANDREWS, JJ., dissent. 
 
 Judgment reversed,
 
 144.] MCCORMICK V. JOSEPH. 279 
 
 144.] McCORMICK v. JOSEPH. 
 
 83 ALABAMA, 401. 1887. 
 
 ACTION to recover possession of goods. Intervention by 
 claimants. Judgment for plaintiffs. Claimants appeal. 
 
 Plaintiffs sold the goods to one Manasses. Manasses turned 
 over a part of the goods to claimants in payment of a debt. 
 Plaintiffs claim the right to rescind the contract of sale on the 
 ground that Manasses fraudulently obtained the goods while 
 insolvent and having no expectation of paying for them, and 
 that claimants had notice of Manasses' insolvency. The 
 evidence to sustain the contention that claimants had notice 
 was this : One White, who was claimants' attorney in securing 
 the goods in payment of the debt, had a few days earlier 
 drawn a mortgage upon Manasses' stock of merchandise in 
 favor of E., and had aided in a transfer of the rest of the stock 
 to Manasses' wife ; White testified that while performing these 
 services he ascertained that Manasses was insolvent. The 
 court charged in substance that claimants were chargeable in 
 law with notice of the facts ascertained by White in the course 
 of the previous transactions between Manasses and E. and 
 Manasses and wife. 
 
 STONE, C. J. It was early settled in this State, and has 
 been since followed, that notice, or knowledge by an attorney, 
 to carry home constructive notice to the client, must be shown 
 to have been given or acquired after the relation of attorney 
 and client was formed. It is not enough that the notice is first, 
 and the retainer afterwards. Lucas v. Bank of Darien, 2 
 Stew. 280; Terrell v. Br. Bank, 12 Ala. 502; Freukelv. 
 Hudson, 82 Ala. 158 ; Story on Agency, 140. The case 
 of City Nat. Bank v. Jeffries, 73 Ala. 183, is not opposed to 
 this view. In that case, the information was obtained while 
 the relation of attorney and client existed. 
 
 This must work a reversal of this case.
 
 280 NOTICE TO AGENT. [CH. XH. 
 
 145.] HEGENMYER v. MARKS. 
 
 37 MINNESOTA, 6. 1887. 
 [Reported herein at p. 339.] 
 
 147.] CARPENTER v. GERMAN AMERICAN 
 INSURANCE CO. 
 
 135 NEW YORK, 298. 1892. 
 
 ACTION upon a policy of fire insurance. Judgment for 
 plaintiff. 
 
 One Mandeville was agent of defendant. He employed a 
 sub-agent, Andrews, to solicit insurance. Andrews inspected 
 the premises and knew before the policy was issued that the 
 plaintiff was not the absolute owner. Defendant contends 
 that it is not chargeable with such notice and that the policy 
 is avoided by breach of the term by which plaintiff undertakes 
 that he is the " sole, absolute, and unconditional owner." 
 
 ANDREWS, J. It must be assumed in disposing of this 
 appeal that Andrews, the sub-agent of Mandeville, before the 
 original policy was issued of which the policy upon which this 
 action is brought is a renewal, was sent by Mandeville to 
 inspect the premises and arrange the insurance, and that he 
 was then informed by the plaintiff that the property upon 
 which the insured building was erected was held under a con- 
 tract of purchase from the State Bank of Elizabeth, New 
 Jersej\ If this constituted notice to the defendant, then, 
 within our decisions, the policy was not avoided by the 
 printed condition that if the insured is not the " sole, abso- 
 lute, and unconditional owner of the property insured, or if 
 said property be a building, and the insured be not the owner 
 of the land on which said building stands, by title in fee- 
 simple, and this fact is not expressed in the written portion
 
 147.] CARPENTER V. INS. CO. 281 
 
 of the policy, this policy shall be void." Van Schoick v. 
 Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 68 N. Y. 434. It appears that 
 Mandeville was a general agent of the defendant, clothed 
 with power to make contracts of insurance and to issue poli- 
 cies, and was furnished with printed forms which he filled up 
 as occasion required. He was agent for several other com- 
 panies also, which presumably upon the evidence was known 
 to the defendant. Andrews had been employed by him for 
 several years before the policy in question was issued, to 
 solicit insurance, acting as Mandeville's clerk and employe*. 
 It has been the common custom and practice of agents of 
 insurance companies, having the power of general agents, 
 to employ subordinates to render services similar to those 
 rendered by Andrews, and we have held that notice to such 
 a sub-agent while engaged in soliciting insurance of any fact 
 material to the risk, and which affects the contract of insur- 
 ance, is notice to the company, and binds the compan}* to the 
 same extent as though it had been given directly to the agent 
 himself. Arff v. Starr Ins. Co., 125 N. Y. 57 ; Bodine v. 
 Exchange Ins. Co., 51 Id. 117. The point, therefore, based 
 on the condition as to the ownership of the insured property 
 must be overruled. 
 
 . 
 
 Judgment affirmed.
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOB TORTS OF AGENT. 
 
 1. Liability for torts generally. 
 
 149.] SINGER MANUFACTURING CO. v. RAHN. 
 132 UNITED STATES, 518. 1889. 
 [Reported herein at p. 9.] 
 
 149.] HUNTLEY v. MATHIAS. 
 
 90 NORTH CAROLINA, 101. 1884. 
 [Reported herein at p. 203.] 
 
 149.] DEMPSEY v. CHAMBERS. 
 
 154 MASSACHUSETTS, 330. 1891. 
 [Reported herein at p. 94.] 
 
 2. Fraud for benefit of principal. 
 
 153.] BARWICK v. ENGLISH JOINT STOCK BANK. 
 LAW REPORTS, 2 EXCHEQUER (CHAMBER), 259. 1867. 
 
 ACTION in tort for damages for fraud. At the close of 
 plaintiff's case the trial court directed a non-suit on the 
 ground that there was no evidence proper to go to the jury. 
 Bill of exceptions.
 
 153.] BABWICK V. ENGLISH JOINT STOCK BANK. 283 
 
 WILLES, J. (for the court 1 ). This case, in which the 
 court took time to consider their judgment, arose on a bill 
 of exceptions to the ruling of my Brother Martin at the 
 trial that there was no evidence to go to the jury. 
 
 It was an action brought for an alleged fraud, which was 
 described in the pleadings as being the fraud of the bank, 
 but which the plaintiff alleged to have been committed by 
 the manager of the bank in the course of conducting their 
 business. At the trial, two witnesses were called, first, 
 Barwick, the plaintiff, who proved that he had been in 
 the habit of supplying oats to a customer of the bank of 
 the name of Davis; and that he had done so upon a 
 guarantee given to him by the bank, through their manager, 
 the effect of which probably was, that the drafts of the 
 plaintiff upon Davis were to be paid, subject to the debt 
 of the bank. What were the precise terms of the guarantee 
 did not appear, but it seems that the plaintiff became dis- 
 satisfied with it, and refused to supply more oats without 
 getting a more satisfactory one ; that he applied to the 
 manager of the bank, and that after some conversation 
 between them, a guarantee was given, which was in this 
 form : 
 
 DEAR SIR, Referring to our conversation of this morn- 
 ing, I beg to repeat that if you sell to, or purchase for, J. 
 Davis and Son not exceeding 1,000 quarters of oats for the 
 use of their contract, I will honor the check of Messrs. J. 
 Davis and Son in your favor in payment of the same, on re- 
 ceipt of the money from the commissariat in payment of 
 forage supplied for the present month, in priority to any 
 other payment except to this bank ; and provided, as I ex- 
 plained to you, that they, J. Davis and Son, are able to 
 continue their contract, and are not made bankrupts. 
 
 (Signed.) DON. M. DEWAR, Manager. 
 
 The plaintiff stated that in the course of the conversation 
 as to the guarantee, the manager told him that whatever 
 
 1 WILLES, BLACKBURN, KEATING, MELLOR, MONTAGUE SMITH, and 
 LUSH, JJ.
 
 284 TORTS BY AGENT. [CH. XIH. 
 
 time he received the government check, the plaintiff should 
 receive the money. 
 
 Now, that being the state of things upon the evidence of 
 the plaintiff, it is obvious that there was a case on which 
 the jury might conclude, if they thought proper, that the 
 guarantee given by the manager was represented by him 
 to be a guarantee which would probably, or might probably, 
 be paid, and that the plaintiff took the guarantee, supposing 
 that it was of some value, and that the check would prob- 
 ably, or might probably, be paid. But if the manager at 
 the time, from his knowledge of the accounts, knew that it 
 was improbable in a very high degree that it would be paid, 
 and knew and intended that it should not be paid, and kept 
 back from the plaintiff the fact which made the payment of 
 it improbable to the extent of being as a matter of busiuess 
 impossible, the jury might well have thought (and it was a 
 matter within their province to decide upon) that he had 
 been guilty of a fraud upon the plaintiff. 
 
 Now, was there evidence that such knowledge was in the 
 mind of the manager ? The plaintiff had no knowledge of the 
 state of the accounts, and the manager made uo communica- 
 tion to him with respect to it. But the evidence of Davis 
 was given for the purpose of supplying that part of the 
 case ; and he stated that, immediately before the guarantee 
 had been given, he went to the manager, and told him it 
 was impossible for him to go on unless he got further sup- 
 plies, and that the government were buying in against him ; 
 to which the manager replied, that Davis must go and try 
 his friends, on which Davis informed the manager that the 
 plaintiff would go no further unless he had a further 
 guarantee. Upon that the manager acted; and Davis 
 added, "I owed the bank above 12,000." The result was 
 that oats were supplied by the plaintiff to Davis to the 
 amount of 1,227 ; that Davis carried out his contract with 
 the government, and that the commissariat paid him the 
 sum of 2,676, which was paid by him into the bank. He 
 thereupon handed a check to the plaintiff, who presented it
 
 153.] BARWICK V. ENGLISH JOINT STOCK BANK. 285 
 
 to the bank, and without further explanation the check was 
 refused. 
 
 This is the plain state, of the facts ; and it was contended 
 on behalf of the bank that, inasmuch as the guarantee con- 
 tains a stipulation that the plaintiff's debt should be paid 
 subsequent to the debt of the bank, which was to have 
 priority, there was no fraud. We are unable to adopt that 
 conclusion. I speak sparingly, because we desire not to 
 anticipate the judgment which the constitutional tribunal, 
 the jury, may pass. But they might, upon these facts, 
 justly come to the conclusion that the manager knew and 
 intended that the guarantee should be unavailing ; that he 
 procured for his employers, the bank, the government 
 check, by keeping back from the plaintiff the state of 
 Davis's account, and that he intended to do so. If the 
 jury took that view of the facts, they would conclude that 
 there was such a fraud in the manager as the plaintiff 
 complained of. 
 
 If there be fraud in the manager, then arises the question, 
 whether it was such a fraud as the bank, his employers, 
 would be answerable for. With respect to that, we conceive 
 we are in no respect overruling the opinions of my Brothers 
 Martin and Bramwell in Udell v. Atherton, 7 H. & N. 172 ; 
 30 L. J. (Exch.) 337, the case most relied upon for the pur- 
 pose of establishing the proposition that the principal is not 
 answerable for the fraud of his agent. Upon looking at 
 that case, it seems pretty clear that the division of opinion 
 which took place in the Court of Exchequer arose, not so 
 much upon the question whether the principal is answerable 
 for the act of an agent in the course of his business, a 
 question which was settled as early as Lord Holt's time 
 (Hern v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289), but in applying that 
 principle to the peculiar facts of the case ; the act which 
 was relied upon there as constituting a liability in the sellers 
 having been an act adopted by them under peculiar circum- 
 stances, and the author of that act not being their general 
 agent in business, as the manager of a bank is. But with
 
 286 TORTS BY AGENT. [CH. XITL 
 
 respect to the question, whether a principal is answerable 
 for the act of his agent in the course of his master's busi- 
 ness, and for his master's benefit, no sensible distinction can 
 be drawn between the case of fraud and the case of any 
 other wrong. The general rule is, that the master is 
 answerable for every such wrong of the servant or agent 
 as is committed in the course of the service and for the 
 master's benefit, though no express command or privity of 
 the master be proved. See Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & 
 C. 547, at p. 554. That principle is acted upon every 
 day in running down cases. It has been applied also to 
 direct trespass to goods, as in the case of holding the 
 owners of ships liable for the act of masters abroad, im- 
 properly selling the cargo. EwbanJc v. Nutting, 7 C. B. 
 797. It has been held applicable to actions of false im- 
 prisonment, in cases where officers of railway companies, 
 intrusted with the execution of by-laws relating to im- 
 prisonment, and intending to act in the course of their 
 duty, improperly imprison persons who are supposed to 
 come within the terms of the by-laws. Ooff v. Great 
 Northern Railway Company, 3 E. & E. 672 ; 30 L. J. 
 (Q. B.) 148, explaining (at 3 E. & E. p. 683) Roe v. 
 irkenhead Railway Company, 7 Exch. 36 ; and see Barry 
 v. Midland Railway Company, Ir. L. Rep. 1 C. L. 130. 
 It has been acted upon where persons employed by the 
 owners of boats to navigate them and to take fares, have 
 committed an infringement of a ferry, or such like wrong. 
 Huzzey v. Field, 2 C. M. & R. 432, at p. 440. In all these 
 cases it may be said, as it was said here, that the master 
 has not authorized the act. It is true, he has not authorized 
 the particular act, but he has put the agent in his place to 
 do that class of acts, and he must be answerable for the 
 manner in which the agent has conducted himself in doing 
 the business which it was the act of his master to place 
 him in. 
 
 The only other point which was made, and it had at first 
 a somewhat plausible aspect, was this : It is said, if it be
 
 153.] HASKELL V. STAEBIRD. 287 
 
 established that the bank are answerable for this fraud, it 
 is the fraud of the manager, and ought not to have been 
 described, as here, as the fraud of the bank. I need not 
 go into the question whether it be necessary to resort to 
 the count in case of fraud, or whether, under the circum- 
 stances, money having been actually procured for, and 
 paid into, the bank, which ought to have got into the 
 plaintiff's hands, the count for money had and received 
 is not applicable to the case. I do not discuss that ques- 
 tion, because in common-law pleading no such difficulty as 
 is here suggested is recognized. If a man is answerable 
 for the wrong of another, whether it be fraud or other 
 wrong, it may be described in pleading as the wrong of 
 the person who is sought to be made answerable in the 
 action. That was the decision in the case of Raphael v. 
 Goodman, 8 A. & E. 565. The sheriff sued upon a bond ; 
 plea, that the bond was obtained by the sheriff and others 
 by fraud ; proof, that it was obtained by the fraud of the 
 officer ; held, the plea was sufficiently proved. 
 
 Under these circumstances, without expressing any opinion 
 as to what verdict ought to be arrived at by the jury, espe- 
 cially considering that the whole case may not have been 
 before them, we think this is a matter proper for their 
 determination, and there ought, therefore, to be a venire de 
 novo. Venire de novo. 
 
 153.] HASKELL v. STARBIRD. 
 
 152 MASSACHUSETTS, 117. 1890. 
 
 TORT for false and fraudulent representations in the sale 
 of land. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant alleges excep- 
 tions. 
 
 The sale was made by defendant through an agent. The 
 court was asked to charge that: " If the jury shall find that 
 Rockwell was the agent of the defendant in selling the laud
 
 288 TORTS BY AGENT. [CH. XTTT. 
 
 in question, the plaintiff cannot recover, unless it is proved 
 that the defendant was privy to or adopted the misrepre- 
 sentation relied on." This request was refused, and the 
 court charged, in substance, that if the agent was author- 
 ized to sell the land the defendant would be liable for the 
 methods employed, and therefore liable for the agent's 
 fraudulent representations. 
 
 DEVENS, J. . . . The instructions of the court upon the 
 second request for a ruling which was in substance, that, 
 even if Rockwell was the agent of the defendant to sell, the 
 plaintiff could not recover unless it was proved that the 
 defendant was privy to or adopted the misrepresentations 
 reliedon made the defendant responsible for the false and 
 fraudulent representations as to the land made by Rockwell, 
 if Rockwell was employed by the defendant to sell the land 
 as his agent, notwithstanding Rockwell was not authorized 
 to make them, and notwithstanding the defendant did not 
 know that he had made them until after the conveyance. 
 They held that the defendant, by employing Rockwell as his 
 agent to make the sale, became responsible for the methods 
 which he adopted in so doing. The defendant contends that 
 Rockwell was a special agent only, and that, as his authority 
 extended only to the sale of this single tract of land, the 
 defendant is not responsible for any representations Rock- 
 well might have made which he did not authorize. 
 
 The cases in which a distinction has been made in the 
 responsibility of a principal for the acts of general and of 
 special agents are those where the special agent did not have, 
 and was not held out as having, full authority to do that 
 which he undertook to do, and where one dealing with him 
 was informed, or should have informed himself, of the lim- 
 itations of his authority. There is no distinction in the mat- 
 ter of responsibility for the fraud of an agent authorized to 
 do business generally, and of an agent employed to conduct a 
 single transaction, if, in either case, he is acting in the busi- 
 ness for which he was employed by the principal, and had full 
 authority to complete the transaction. While the principal
 
 153.] WHEELER & WILSON MFG. CO. V. AUGHEY. 289 
 
 may not have authorized the particular act, he has put the 
 agent in his place to make the sale, and must be responsible 
 for the manner in which he has conducted himself in doing 
 the business which the principal intrusted to him. Benjamin 
 on Sale (3d Am. ed.), 465. The rule that a principal is 
 liable civilly for the neglect, fraud, deceit, or other wrongful 
 act of his agent, although the principal did not in fact 
 authorize the practice of such acts, is quoted with approba- 
 tion by Chief Justice Shaw in Lock v. Stearns, I Met. 560. 
 That a principal is liable for the false representations of his 
 agent, although personally innocent of the fraud, is said by 
 Mr. Justice Hoar, in White v. Sawyer, 16 Gra}-, 586, 589, 
 to be settled by the clear weight of authority. 
 
 In the case at bar, if the false representations were made 
 by Rockwell, they were made by him while acting within 
 the scope of his authority, in making a sale of land which 
 the defendant employed him to sell, and the instruction 
 properly held the defendant answerable for the damage 
 occasioned thereby. Lothrop v. Adams, 133 Mass. 471. 
 The defendant urges that, even if in an action of contract 
 the false representations of Rockwell as his agent might 
 render the defendant responsible as the principal, he cannot 
 thus be made responsible in an action of tort for deceit, and 
 that in such action the misrepresentation must be proved to 
 have been that of the principal. It is sufficient to say, that 
 no such point was presented at the trial, nor do we consider 
 that any such distinction exists. . . . 
 
 Exceptions overruled. 
 
 153.] WHEELER AND WILSON MFG. CO. v. 
 AUGHEY. 
 
 144 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 398. 1891. 
 
 [Reported herein at p. 50.] 
 19
 
 290 TORTS BY AGENT. [CH. XIIL 
 
 3. Fraud for benefit of agent : fictitious stock. 
 
 154,155.] BRITISH MUTUAL BANKING CO. v. 
 CHARNWOOD FOREST RAILWAY CO. 
 
 LAW REPORTS, 18 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (C. A.), 714. 
 
 1887. 
 
 APPEAL from an order of the Queen's Bench Division 
 (Manisty and Mathew, JJ.) directing judgment to be 
 entered for the plaintiffs. 
 
 The action was brought to recover damages for fraudulent 
 misrepresentations alleged to have been made by the defend- 
 ants through their secretary. At the trial before Lord 
 Coleridge, C. J., it appeared that certain customers of the 
 plaintiffs had applied to them for an advance on the security 
 of transfers of debenture stock of the defendant company. 
 The plaintiffs' manager called upon Tremayne, the defend- 
 ants' secretary, and was informed in effect that the transfers 
 were valid, and that the stock which they purported to 
 transfer existed. The plaintiffs thereupon made the ad- 
 vances. It subsequently appeared that Tremayne, in conjunc- 
 tion with one Maddison, had fraudulently issued certificates 
 for debenture stock in excess of the amount which the 
 company were authorized to issue, and the transfers as to 
 which the plaintiffs inquired related to this over-issue. The 
 plaintiffs accordingly lost their security. The defendants did 
 not benefit in any way by the false statements of Tremayne, 
 which were made entirely in the interest of himself and 
 Maddison. There was some question whether Tremayne 
 was still secretary at the time the statements were made ; 
 but the jury found that the inquiries were made of him as 
 secretary, and that the defendants held him out as such to 
 answer such inquiries. The jury assessed the damages, and 
 the chief justice left either of the parties to move for 
 judgment. A motion was accordingly made on behalf of
 
 154, 155.] BRITISH BKG. CO. V. KAIL WAY CO. 291 
 
 the plaintiffs before Manisty and Mathew, JJ., who directed 
 judgment to be entered for them. 
 
 The defendants appealed. 
 
 LORD ESHER, M. B. In this case an action has been 
 brought by the plaintiffs to recover damages for fraudulent 
 misrepresentation by the defendants, through their secretary, 
 as to the validity of certain debenture stock of the defendant 
 company. The defendants are a corporation, and the alleged 
 misrepresentations were, in fact, made by a person employed 
 in the capacity of their secretary ; and it cannot be doubted 
 that when he made the statements he had a fraudulent mind, 
 and made them knowing them to be false. 
 
 I differ from the judgment of the divisional court, but I do 
 not think the ground on which my decision is based was 
 present to the minds of the learned judges. The point 
 principally argued in the divisional court seems to have been 
 that the defendants could not be liable on account of their 
 being a corporation. It seems to me, however, that there is 
 a defect in the plaintiffs' case, irrespective of the question 
 whether the defendants were a corporation or not. The 
 secretary was held out by the defendants as a person to 
 answer such questions as those put to him in the interest of 
 the plaintiffs, and if he had answered them falsely on behalf 
 of the defendants, he being then authorized by them to give 
 answers for them, it may well be that they would be liable. 
 But although what the secretary stated related to matters 
 about which he was authorized to give answers, he did not 
 make the statements for the defendants, but for himself. 
 He had a friend whom he desired to assist and could assist 
 by making the false statements, and as he made them in his 
 own interest or to assist his friend, he was not acting for the 
 defendants. The rule has often been expressed in the terms, 
 that to bind the principal the agent must be acting " for the 
 benefit " of the principal. This, in my opinion, is equivalent 
 to saying that he must be acting " for" the principal, since 
 if there is authority to do the act it does not matter if the 
 principal is benefited by it I know of no case where the
 
 292 TORTS BY AGENT. [CH. XIII. 
 
 employer has been held liable when his servant has made 
 statements not for his employer, but in his own interest. 
 The attention of the learned judges seems to have been drawn 
 off from this view of the case by the argument founded on 
 the defendants being a corporation, and I think their judg- 
 ment must be overruled. 
 
 The following judgment was read by 
 
 BOWEN, L. J. There is, so far as I am aware, no pre- 
 cedent in English law, unless it be Swift v. Winterbotham, 
 Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 244, a case that was overruled upon appeal 
 (Swift v. Jewsbury, Law Rep. 9 Q. B. 301), for holding that a 
 principal is liable in an action of deceit for the unauthorized 
 and fraudulent act of a servant or agent committed, not for 
 the general or special benefit of the principal, but for the 
 servant's own private ends. The true rule was, as it seems 
 to me, enunciated by the Exchequer Chamber in a judgment 
 of Willes, J., delivered in the case of Barwick v. English 
 Joint Stock Bank, Law Rep. 2 Exch. 259. " The general 
 rule," says Willes, J., "is that the master is answerable for 
 every such wrong of his servant or agent as is committed in 
 the course of his service and for the master's benefit, though 
 no express command or privity of the master be proved." 
 This definition of liability has been constantly referred to in 
 subsequent cases as adequate and satisfactory, and was cited 
 with approval by Lord Selborne in the House of Lords in 
 Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Sank, 5 App. Cas. 317. 
 Mackey v. Commercial Bank of New Brunswick, Law Rep. 
 5 P. C. 394, is consistent with this principle. It is a definition 
 strictly in accordance with the ruling of Martin, B., in Limpns 
 v. London General Omnibus Co., 1 H. & C. 526, which was 
 upheld in the Exchequer Chamber (see per Blackburn, J.). 
 
 It was argued on behalf of the plaintiffs in the present 
 appeal that the defendant company, although they might not 
 have authorized the fraudulent answer given by the secretary, 
 had nevertheless authorized the secretary to do "that class 
 of acts " of which the fraudulent answer, it was said, was 
 one. This is a misapplication to a wholly different case of
 
 154, 155.] BRITISH BKG. CO. V. RAILWAY CO. 293 
 
 an expression which in Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, 
 Law Rep. 2 Exch. 259, was perfectly appropriate with regard 
 to the circumstances there. In that case the act done, though 
 not expressly authorized, was done for the master's benefit. 
 With respect to acts of that description, it was doubtless 
 correct to say that the agent was placed there to do acts of 
 "that class." Transferred to a case like the present, the 
 expression that the secretary was placed in his office to do 
 acts of " that class " begs the very question at issue ; for the 
 defendants' proposition is, on the contrary, that an act done 
 not for the employer's benefit, but for the servant's own 
 private ends, is not an act of the class which the secretary 
 either was or could possibly be authorized to do. It is said 
 that the secretary was clothed ostensibly with a real or 
 apparent authority to make representations as to the genuine- 
 ness of the debentures in question ; but no action of contract 
 lies for a false representation unless the maker of it or his 
 principal has either contracted that the representation is true, 
 or is estopped from denying that he has done so. In the 
 present case the defendant company could not in law have so 
 contracted, for any such contract would have been beyond 
 their corporate powers. And if they cannot contract, how 
 can they be estopped from denying that they have done so? 
 The action against them, therefore, to be maintainable at all, 
 must be an action of tort founded on deceit and fraud. But 
 how can a company be made liable for a fraudulent answer 
 given by their officer for his own private ends, by which they 
 could not have been bound if they had actually authorized 
 him to make it, and promised to be bound by it? The ques- 
 tion resolves itself accordingly into a dilemma. The fraudu- 
 lent answer must have either been within the scope of the 
 agent's employment or outside it. It could not be within it, 
 for the company had no power to bind themselves to the 
 consequences of any such answer. If it is not within it, on 
 what ground can the company be made responsible for an 
 agent's act done beyond the scope of his employment, and 
 from which they derived no benefit? This shows that the
 
 294 TORTS BY AGENT. [CHL XHL 
 
 proposition that the secretary in the present case was em- 
 ployed to do that "class of acts" is fallacious, and cannot 
 be maintained. The judgment of the court below is based 
 upon the view that the act done was in fact within the scope 
 of the secretary's employment ; and if this proposition cannot 
 be maintained, the judgment must fall with it. How far a 
 statutory corporate body could in any case be made liable in 
 an action for deceit beyond the extent of the benefits they 
 have reaped by the fraud is a matter upon which I desire to 
 express no opinion, for none is necessary to the decision 
 here ; but even if the principals in the present case were not 
 a statutory body, with limited powers of contracting and of 
 action, I think there would be danger in departing from the 
 definition of liability laid down by Willes, J., in Barwick v. 
 English Joint Stock Bank, Law Rep. 2 Exch. 259, and in 
 extending the responsibility of a principal for the frauds 
 committed by a servant or agent beyond the boundaries 
 hitherto recognized by English law. I think, therefore, that 
 this appeal must be allowed, with costs. 
 
 FRY, L. J. I agree in the view that the appeal must be 
 allowed. It appears to me that the case is one of an action 
 for fraudulent misrepresentation made by a servant, who in 
 making it was acting not in the interest of his employers, but 
 in his own interest. It is plain that the action cannot suc- 
 ceed on any ground of estoppel, for otherwise the defendants 
 would be estopped from denying that the stock was good. 
 No corporate body can be bound by estoppel to do some- 
 thing beyond their powers. The action cannot be supported, 
 therefore, on that ground. Nor can it be supported on the 
 ground of direct authority to make the statements. Neither 
 can it be supported on the ground that the company either 
 benefited by, or accepted or adopted any contract induced or 
 produced by the fraudulent misrepresentation. I can see no 
 ground for maintaining the action, and the appeal must be 
 allowed. 
 
 Appeal allowed.
 
 154, 155.] FIFTH AVE. BANK V. FEKRY CO. 295 
 
 154, 155.] FIFTH AVENUE BANK v. FORTY- 
 SECOND STREET AND GRAND STREET 
 FERRY CO. 
 
 137 NEW YORK, 231. 1893. 
 
 ACTION to recover damages for loss sustained by plaintiff 
 in consequence of the issue by defendant's agent of false 
 and fraudulent certificates of stock. Judgment for plaintiff. 
 
 Plaintiff took from H. a certificate of stock purporting to 
 be issued by defendant. In fact the certificate was spurious, 
 the signature of the president being forged by one Allen, 
 who was the defendant's agent for countersigning certificates, 
 and who had countersigned this, and delivered it to H. for 
 the purpose of borrowing money upon it. Before taking the 
 certificate plaintiff inquired at defendant's office as to its 
 genuineness, and was informed by Allen that it was genu- 
 ine, and that H. was the registered holder of it. Later, 
 plaintiff took another like certificate, but without making 
 inquiries as to its genuineness. Defendant refused to 
 recognize these certificates. 
 
 Plaintiff recovered upon the first certificate, but not on the 
 second. Defendant alone appeals. 
 
 MAYNARD, J. ... It is very clear that under the regula- 
 tions adopted by the defendant, and pursuing the mode of 
 procedure which it has prescribed, the final act in the issue 
 of a certificate of stock was performed by its secretary and 
 transfer agent, and that when he countersigned it and affixed 
 the corporate seal, and delivered it with the intent that it 
 might be negotiated, it must be regarded, so long as it re- 
 mained outstanding, as a continuing affirmation by the de- 
 fendant that it had been lawfully issued, and that all the 
 conditions precedent upon which the right to issue it depended 
 had been, duly observed. Such is the effect necessarily im- 
 plied in the act of countersigning. This word has a well- 
 defined meaning, both in the law and in the lexicon. To
 
 296 TOUTS BY AGENT. [CH. XHI. 
 
 countersign an instrument is to sign what has already been 
 signed by a superior, to authenticate by an additional 
 signature, and usually has reference to the signature of a 
 subordinate in addition to that of his superior by way of 
 authentication of the execution of the writing to which it is 
 affixed, and it denotes the complete execution of the paper. 
 (Worcester's Die.) When, therefore, the defendant's secre- 
 tary and transfer agent countersigned and sealed this certifi- 
 cate and put it in circulation, he declared, in the most formal 
 manner, that it had been properly executed by the defendant, 
 and that every essential requirement of law and of the by- 
 laws had been performed to make it the binding act of the 
 company. The defendant's by-laws elsewhere illustrate the 
 application of the term when used with reference to the sig- 
 natures of its officers. In section 10 it is provided that all 
 moneys received by the treasurer should be deposited in 
 bank to the joint credit of the president and treasurer, to be 
 drawn out only by the check of the treasurer, countersigned 
 by the president. If the president should forge the name 
 of the treasurer to a check, and countersign it and put it in 
 circulation, and use the proceeds for his individual benefit, 
 we apprehend it would not be doubted that this would be 
 regarded as a certificate of the due execution of the check, 
 so far as to render the company responsible to any person 
 who innocently and in good faith became the holder of it. 
 
 This result follows from the application of the funda- 
 mental rules which determine the obligations of a principal 
 for the acts of his agent. They are embraced in the compre- 
 hensive statement of Story in his work on Agency (9th ed. 
 452), that the principal is to be " held liable to third per- 
 sons in a civil suit for the frauds, deceits, concealments, 
 misrepresentations, torts, negligences, and other malfea- 
 sances, or misfeasances and omissions of duty of his agent in 
 the course of his employment, although the principal did not 
 authorize, or justify, or participate in, or, indeed, know of 
 such misconduct, or even if he forbade the acts or disap- 
 proved of them. In all such cases the rule applies respondeat
 
 154, 155.] FIFTH AVE. BANK V. FERRY CO. 297 
 
 superior, and is founded upon public policy and convenience, 
 for in no other way could there be any safety to third persons 
 in their dealings, either directly with the principal, or in- 
 directly with him through the instrumentality of agents. In 
 every such case the principal holds out his agent as compe- 
 tent and fit to be trusted, and thereby, in effect, he warrants 
 his fidelity and good conduct in all matters within the scope 
 of the agency." It is true that the secretary and transfer 
 agent had no authority to issue a certificate of stock, except 
 upon the surrender and cancellation of a previously existing 
 valid certificate, and the signature of the president and treas- 
 urer first obtained to the certificate to be issued ; but these 
 were facts necessarily and peculiarly within the knowledge 
 of the secretary, and the issue of the certificate in due form 
 was a representation by the secretary and transfer agent that 
 these conditions had been complied with, and that the facts 
 existed upon which his right to act depended. It was a cer- 
 tificate apparently made in the course of his employment as 
 the agent of the company and within the scope of the general 
 authority conferred upon him ; and the defendant is under an 
 implied obligation to make indemnity to the plaintiff for the 
 loss sustained by the negligent or wrongful exercise by its 
 officers of the general powers conferred upon them. Griswold 
 v. Haven, 25 N. Y. 595 ; N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co. v. Schuy- 
 ler, 34 Id. 30 ; Titus v. G. W. Turnpike Co., 61 Id. 237 ; Bank 
 ofBatavia v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 106 Id. 195. The 
 learned counsel for the defendant seeks to distinguish this 
 case from the authorities cited because the signature of the 
 president to the certificate was not genuine ; but we cannot 
 see how the forgery of the name of the president can relieve 
 the defendant from liability for the fraudulent acts of its 
 secretary, treasurer, and transfer agent. They were officers 
 to whom it had intrusted the authority to make the final 
 declaration as to the validity of the shares of stock it might 
 issue, and where their acts, in the apparent exercise of this 
 power, are accompanied with all the indicia of genuineness, 
 it is essential to the public welfare that the principal
 
 298 TORTS BY AGENT. [CH. XTTT. 
 
 should be responsible to all persons who receive the certifi- 
 cates in good faith and for a valuable consideration and 
 in the ordinary course of business, whether the indicia 
 are true or not. Beach on Pr. Cor. vol. 2, p. 790 ; North 
 River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill, 262 ; Jarvis v. Manhattan 
 Beach Co., 53 Hun, 362 ; Tome v. Parkersburg Branch, 39 
 Md. 36 ; Baltimore, &c. R. Co. v. Wilkens, 44 Id. 11 ; West- 
 ern M. R. Co. v. Franklin Bank, 60 Id. 36 ; Com. v. Bank, 
 137 Mass. 431 ; Holden v. Phelps, 141 Id. 456 ; Manhattan 
 Beach Co. v. Harned, 27 Fed. Rep. 484 ; Shaw v. Port Phillip 
 & Co., 13 Q. B. D. 103. 
 
 The rule is, we think, correctly stated in Beach on 
 Private Corporations (Vol. 2, 488, p. 791): "When cer- 
 tificates of stock contain apparently all the essentials of 
 genuineness, a bond fide holder thereof has a claim to 
 recognition as a stockholder, if such stock can legally be 
 issued, or to indemnity if this cannot be done. The fact 
 of forgery does not extinguish his right when it has been 
 perpetrated by or at the instance of an officer placed in 
 authority by the corporation, and intrusted with the custody 
 of its stock-books, and held out by the company as the 
 source of information upon the subject." 
 
 Having reached the conclusion that the defendant is liable 
 for the representations of its officers, appearing upon the 
 face of its certificate over their official signature and under 
 the seal of the corporation, we do not deem it necessary to 
 consider the effect of the oral representations made at the 
 office of the company to the plaintiff's clerk, except so far 
 as they bear upon the question of the good faith of the 
 plaintiff in the acquisition of the certificate. 
 
 The judgment and order must be affirmed with costs. 
 
 All concur. Judgment affirmed.
 
 156.] FRTKDLANDEB V. TEXAS & PACIFIC KY. 299 
 
 4. Fraud for benefit of agent : fictitious bills of lading. 
 
 156.] FRIEDLANDER v. TEXAS & PACIFIC 
 RAILWAY CO. 
 
 130 UNITED STATES, 416. 1889. 
 
 ACTION for damages for non-delivery of cotton named in 
 a bill of lading. Judgment for dftfftfldjfrnt.. 
 
 Defendant's shipping agent issued to one Lahnstein a bill 
 of lading for cotton in the usual form. In fact no cotton 
 was shipped, and the agent and Lahnstein were in collusion 
 to obtain money upon the bill of lading. Lahnstein indorsed 
 the bill of lading and attached it to a draft drawn on plain- 
 tiffs, which draft plaintiffs accepted and paid in good faith. 
 
 Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the 
 court. 
 
 The agreed statement of facts sets forth "that, in point 
 of fact, said bill of lading of November 6, 1883, was exe- 
 cuted by said E. D. Easton, fraudulently and by collusion 
 with said Lahnstein, and without receiving any cotton for 
 transportation, such as is represented in said bill of lading, 
 and without the expectation on the part of the said Easton 
 of receiving any such cotton ; " and it is further said that 
 Easton and Lahnstein had fraudulently combined in another 
 case, whereby Easton signed and delivered to Lahnstein a 
 similar bill of lading for cotton " which had not been 
 received, and which the said Easton had no expectation of 
 receiving ; " and also " that, except that the cotton was not 
 received nor expected to be received by said agent when 
 said bill of lading was by him executed as aforesaid, the 
 transaction was, from first to last, customary." In view of 
 this language, the words u for transportation, such as is 
 represented in said bill of lading," cannot be held to operate 
 as a limitation. The inference to be drawn from the state- 
 ment is that no cotton whatever was delivered for transport 
 tation to the agent at Sherman station.
 
 300 TORTS BY AGENT. [CH. XTTT. 
 
 The question arises, then, whether the agent of a railroad 
 company at one of its stations can bind the company by the 
 execution of a bill of lading for goods not actually placed 
 in his possession, and its delivery to a person fraudulently 
 pretending in collusion with such agent that he had shipped 
 such goods, in favor of a party without notice, with whom, 
 in furtherance of the fraud, the pretended shipper negotiates 
 a draft, with the false bill of lading attached. Bills of 
 exchange and promissory notes are representatives of money, 
 circulating in the commercial world as such, and it is essen- 
 tial, to enable them to perform their peculiar functions, that 
 he who purchases them should not be bound to look beyond 
 the instrument, and that his right to enforce them should 
 not be defeated by anything short of bad faith on his part. 
 But bills of lading answer a different purpose and perform 
 different ^functions. They are regarded^ as so much cotton , 
 grain, iron, or other articles of merchandise, in that they 
 are_syjnbol8 of ownership of the goods they cover. And as 
 Do_sale of goods lost or stolen, though to a bond fide pur- 
 chaser for value, can divest the_ownership of the person 
 who lost tem or from whom they were stolen,, so the sale of 
 the symbol; or mere_^epresentative of the goods, can have 
 DO such effect, althoughjt_8onie,times happens that the true 
 owner, by negligence, has so pjit it into the power of another 
 to occupy his position ostensibly as to estop him from assert- 
 in^his right as against a purchaser who has been misled to 
 his hurt by^ reason of such negligence. Shaw v. Railroad 
 Co., 101 U. S. 557, 563 ; Pollard v. Vinton, 105 U. S. 7, 8 ; 
 Gurney v. Behrend, 3 El. & Bl. 622, 633, 634. It is true 
 that while not negotiable as commercial paper is, bills of 
 lading are commonly used as security for loans and ad- 
 vances ; but it is only as evidence of ownership, special or 
 general, of the property mentionedjn them, and of the right 
 to receive such property at the place of delivery. 
 
 Such being the character of a bill of lading, can a recov- 
 ery be had against a common carrier for goods never actually 
 in its possession for transportation, because one of its agents,
 
 156.] FKIEDLANDER V. TEXAS & PACIFIC RY. 301 
 
 having authority to sign bills of lading, by collusion with 
 another person issues the document in the absence of any 
 goods at all ? 
 
 It has been frequently held by this court that the master 
 of a vessel has no authority to sign a bill of lading for 
 goods not actually put on board the vessel, and, if he does 
 so, his act does not bind the owner of the ship even in favor 
 of an innocent purchaser. The Freeman v. Buckingham, 
 18 How. 182, 191 ; The Lady Franklin, 8 Wall. 325; Pol- 
 lard v. Vinton, 105 U. S. 7. And this agrees with the rule 
 laid down by the English courts. Lickbarrow v. Mason, 
 2 T. R. 77 ; Grant v. Norway, 10 C. B. 665 ; Cox v. Bruce, 
 18 Q. B. D. 147. " The receipt of the goods," said Mr. 
 Justice Miller, in Pollard v. Vinton, supra, " lies at the 
 foundation of the contract to carry and deliver. If no 
 goods are actually received, there can be no valid contract 
 to carry or to deliver." "And the doctrine is applicable to 
 transportation contracts made in that form by railway com- 
 panies and other carriers by land, as well as carriers by sea," 
 as was said by Mr. Justice Matthews in Iron Mountain Rail- 
 way v. Knight, 122 U. S. 79, 87, he adding also : " If Potter 
 (the agent) had never delivered to the plaintiff in error any 
 cotton at all to make good the five hundred and twenty-five 
 bales called for by the bills of lading, it is clear that the 
 plaintiff in error would not be liable for the deficiency. This 
 is well established by the cases of The Schooner Freeman v. 
 Buckingham, 18 How. 182, and Pollard v. Vinton, 105 U. S. 7." 
 
 It is a familiar principle of law that where one of two 
 innocent parties must suffer by the fraud of another, the 
 loss should fall upon him who enabled such third person to 
 fnmrnit the frai^d ; but nothing that the railroad company 
 djd or omitted to do can be properly said to have enabled 
 Lahnstein to impose upon Friedlander & Co. The company 
 not only did not authorize Easton to sign fictitious bills of 
 lading, but it did not assume authority itself to issue such 
 documents, except upon the delivery of the merchandise. 
 Easton was not the company's agent in the transaction, for
 
 302 TORTS BY AGENT. [CH. XTQ. 
 
 there was nothing upon which the agency could act. Railroad 
 companies are not dealers in billj^of^ exchange, nor in bills 
 of lading ; thejjarejsarriers [only, and held to rigid respon- 
 sibility as such. Eastern, disregarding the object for which 
 he was employed, and not intending by his act to execute 
 it, but wholly for a purpose of his own and of Lahnstein, 
 became pdrticeps criminis with the latter in the commission 
 of the fraud upon Friedlander & Co., and it would be going 
 too far to hold the company, under such circumstances, 
 estopped from denying that it had clothed this agent with 
 apparent authority to do an act so utterly outside the scope 
 of his employment and of its own business. The defendant 
 cannot be held on contract as a common carrier, in the 
 absence of goods^huonient, and shipjierj nor is the action 
 maintainable on . the_grouDd_Qf_tort. "The general rule," 
 said Willes, J., in Barwick v. English Joint Stock Banky 
 L. R. 2 Exch. 259, 265, "is_that..the master is answerabla 
 forjiyery such wrong of the servant or agent as is committed 
 in_the^ course of the service and for the master's benefit, 
 though no express command or privity of the master bj 
 proved." See also Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co., 
 1 H. & C. 526. The fraud was in respect to a matter within 
 the scope of Easton's employment or outside of it. It was 
 not within it, for bills of lading could only be issued for mer- 
 chandise delivered ; and being without it, the company, which 
 derived and could derive no benefit from the unauthorized 
 and fraudulent act, cannot be made responsible. British 
 Mutual Banking Co. v. Charnwood Forest Railway Co., 18 
 Q. B. D. 714. 
 
 The law can punish roguery, but cannot always protect a 
 purchaser from loss ; and so fraud perpetrated through the 
 device of a false bill of lading may work injury to an 
 innocent party, which cannot be redressed by a change of 
 victim. 
 
 Under the Texas statutes the trip or voyage commences 
 from the time of the signing of the bill of lading issued 
 upon the delivery of the goods, and thereunder the carrier
 
 156.] BANK V. NEW YORK, ETC. R. CO. 303 
 
 cannot avoid his liability as such, even though the goods are 
 not actually on their passage at the time of a loss, but these 
 provisions do not affect the result here. 
 
 We cannot distinguish the case in hand from those here- 
 tofore decided by this court, and in consonance with the 
 conclusions therein announced this judgment must be 
 
 Affirmed. 
 
 156.] BANK OF BATAVIA v. NEW YORK, ^ 
 L. E., & W. R. COMPANY. 
 
 106 NEW YOKK, 195. 1887. 
 
 ACTION for damages for wrongful issue by defendant, 
 through its shipping agent, of two bills of lading. Judg 
 ment for plaintiff. 
 
 FINCH, J. It is a settled doctrine of the law of agency in 
 this State, that where the principal has clothed his agent 
 with power to do an act upon the existence of some ex- 
 trinsic fact necessarily and peculiarly within the knowledge 
 of the agent, and of the existence of which the act of exe- 
 cuting the power is itself a representation, a third person 
 dealing with such agent in entire good faith, pursuant to 
 the apparent power, may rely upon the representation, and 
 the principal is estopped from denying its truth to his 
 prejudice. North River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill, 262 ; 
 Griswold v. Haven, 25 N. Y. 595, 601 ; N. Y. & N. H. R. 
 R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 Id. 30 ; Armour v. M. C. R. R. Co., 
 65 Id. 111. A discussion of that doctrine is no longer 
 needed or permissible in this court, since it has survived an 
 inquiry of the most exhaustive character, and an assault 
 remarkable for its persistence and vigor. If there be any 
 exception to the rule within our jurisdiction, it arises in the 
 case of municipal corporations, whose structure and func- 
 tions are sometimes claimed to justify a more restricted 
 liability. The application of this rule to the case at bar has
 
 304 TORTS BY AGENT. [CH. XIIL 
 
 determined it in favor of the plaintiff, and we approve of 
 that conclusion. 
 
 One Weiss was the local freight agent of the defendant cor- 
 poration at Batavia, whose duty and authority it was to receive 
 and forward freight over the defendant's road, giving a bill 
 of lading therefor specifying the terms of the shipment, but 
 having no right to issue such bills except upon the actual re- 
 ceipt of the property for transportation. He issued bills of 
 lading for sixty-five barrels of beans to one Williams, describ- 
 ing them as received to be forwarded to one Comstock, as con- 
 signee, but adding with reference to the packages that their 
 contents were unknown. Williams drew a draft on the con- 
 signee, and procured the money upon it of the plaintiff by 
 transferring the bills of lading to secure its ultimate payment. 
 It turned out that no barrels of beans were shipped by Wil- 
 liams, or delivered to the defendant, and the bills of lading 
 were the product of a conspiracy between him and Weiss to 
 defraud the plaintiff or such others as could be induced to 
 advance their money upon the faith of the false bills. 
 
 It is proper to consider only that part of the learned and 
 very able argument of the appellant's counsel which ques- 
 tions the application of the doctrine above stated to the 
 facts presented. So much of it as rests upon the ground 
 that no privity existed between the defendant and the bank 
 may be dismissed with the observation that no privity is 
 needed to make the estoppel available other than that which 
 flows from the wrongful act and the consequent injury. 
 N. Y. & N. H. R. E. Co. v. Schuyler, supra. 
 
 While bills of lading are not negotiable in the sense appli- 
 cable to commercial paper, they are very commonly trans- 
 ferred as security for loans and discounts, and carry with 
 them the ownership, either general or special, of the prop- 
 erty which they describe. It is the natural and necessary 
 expectation of the carrier issuing them that they will pass 
 freely from one to another, and advances be made upon 
 their faith, and the carrier has no right to believe, and never 
 does believe, that their office and effect is limited to the
 
 156.] BANK V. NEW YORK, ETC. R. CO. 305 
 
 person to whom they are first and directly issued. On the 
 contrary, he is bound by law to recognize the validity of 
 transfers, and to deliver the property only upon the pro- 
 duction and cancellation of the bill of lading. 
 
 If he desires to limit his responsibility to a delivery to the 
 named consignee alone, he must stamp his bills as " non- 
 negotiable ; " and where he does not do that, he must be 
 uriclerstood to intend^ possiblelransfer of the bills and jo 
 affectTthe action of such transferees. In such a case, the 
 facts go far beyond the instance cited, in which an estoppel 
 has been denied because the representations were not made 
 to the party injured. Mayeriborg v. Haynes, 50 N. Y. 675 ; 
 Maguire v. Selden, 103 N. Y. 642. Those were cases in 
 which the representations made were not intended, and could 
 not be expected to influence the persons who relied upon 
 them, and their knowledge of them was described as purely 
 accidental and not anticipated,, Here they were of a totally 
 different character. The bills were made for the precise 
 purpose, so far as the agent and Williams were concerned, 
 of deceiving the bank by their representations, and every 
 bill issued not stamped was issued with the expectation o_f 
 the principal that it would be transferred and used in the 
 ordinary channels of business, and be relied upon as evidence 
 of ownership or security for advances. Those thus trusting 
 to it and affected by it are not accidentally injured, but have 
 done what they who issued the bill had every reason to ex- 
 pect. Considerations of this character provide the basis of 
 an equitable estoppel, without reference to negotiability or 
 directness of representation. 
 
 It is obvious, also, upon the case as presented, that the 
 fact or condition essential to the authority of the, agent to 
 issue the bills of lading was one unknowjL to_the bank and 
 peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent and Jiis prin- 
 cipal.. Tf tl^e rqlf ^mppHpri tho fronoforoo fo inriir the peril 
 of the existence or absence of the essential fact, it would 
 pnicticalty end the large volume _of busi ness founded upon 
 of hillq of ladjng. Of whom shall the lender in- 
 20
 
 306 TORTS BY AGENT. [CH. XIII. 
 
 quire, and how ascertain the fact? Naturally be would go 
 to the freight agent, who had already falsely declared in 
 writing that the property had been received. Is he &ny more 
 authorized to make the verbal representation than the written 
 one? Must the lender get permission to go through the 
 freight-house or examine the books? If the property is 
 grain, it may not be easy to identify, and the books, if dis- 
 closed, are the work of the same freight agent. It seems 
 very clear that the vital fact of the shipment is one peculiarly 
 within the knowledge of the carrier and his agent, and quite 
 certain to be unknown to the transferee of the bill of lading, eg- 
 cept as he relies upon the representation of the freight agent. 
 
 The recital in the bills that the contents of the packages 
 were unknown would have left the defendant free from re- 
 sponsibility for a variance in the actual contents from those 
 described in the bill, but is no defence where nothing is 
 shipped and the bill is wholly false. The earner cannot 
 defend one wrong by presuming that if it had not occurred 
 another might have taken its place. The presumption is 
 the other way ; that if an actual shipment had been made, the 
 property really delivered would have corresponded with the 
 description in the bills. 
 
 The facts of the case bring it, therefore r within the rule of 
 estoppel as it is established in this court, and justify the 
 decision made. 
 
 The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur. 
 
 Judgment affirmed. 
 
 5. Fraud for benefit of agent : forged telegram. 
 
 157.] M'CORD v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH 
 COMPANY. 
 
 39 MINNESOTA, 181. 1888. 
 
 APPEAL from an order overruling a demurrer to the 
 complaint. The opinion states the facts.
 
 157.] M'CORD v. WESTERN UNION TEL. co. 307 
 
 VANDERBURGH, J. Dudley & Co., who resided at Grove 
 City, Minn., were the agents of plaintiff for the purchase of 
 wheat for him. He resided at Minneapolis, and was in the 
 habit of forwarding money to them, to be used in making 
 such purchases, in response to telegrams sent over the 
 defendant's line, and delivered to him by it. On the first 
 day of February, 1887, the defendant transmitted and 
 delivered to plaintiff the following message, viz. : 
 
 GROVE CITY, MINN., February 1, 1887. 
 
 To T. M. M'Cord & Co. : Send one thousand or fifteen 
 hundred to-morrow. 
 
 DUDLEY & Co. 
 
 The plaintiff in good faith acted upon this request, 
 believing it to be genuine, and, in accordance with his 
 custom, forwarded through the American Express Company 
 the sum of $1,500 in currency, properly addressed to Dudley 
 & Co., at Grove City. It turned out, however, that this 
 despatch was not sent by Dudley & Co., or with their 
 knowledge or authority ; but it was, in fact, false and 
 fraudulent, and was written and sent by the agent of the 
 defendant at Grove City, whose business it was to receive 
 and transmit messages at that place. He was also at the 
 same time the agent of the American Express Company for 
 the transaction of its business, and for a long time previous 
 to the date mentioned had so acted as agent for both com- 
 panies at Grove City, and was well informed of plaintiff's 
 method of doing business with Dudley & Co. On the 
 arrival of the package by express at Grove City, contain- 
 ing the sum named, it was intercepted and abstracted by 
 the agent, who converted the same to his own use. The 
 despatch was delivered to the plaintiff, and the money 
 forwarded in the usual course of business. These facts, as 
 disclosed by the record, are sufficient, we think, to establish 
 the defendant's liability in this action. 
 
 1. Considering the business relations existing between 
 plaintiff and Dudley & Co., the despatch was reasonably
 
 308 TORTS BY AGENT. [CH. 
 
 interpreted to mean a requisition for one thousand or fifteen 
 hundred dollars. 
 
 2. As respects the receiver of the message, it is entirely 
 immaterial upon what terms or consideration the telegraph 
 company undertook to send the message. It is enough that 
 the message was sent over the line, and received in due 
 course by the plaintiff, and acted on by him in good faith. 
 The action is one sounding in tort, and based upon the 
 claim that the defendant is liable for the fraud and mis- 
 feasance of its agent in transmitting a false message pre- 
 pared by himself. New York, &c. Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 
 Pa. St. 298, 78 Am. Dec. 338 ; Gray, Tel. 75. 
 
 3. The principal contention of defendant is, however, that 
 the corporation is not liable for the fraudulent and tortious 
 act of the agent in sending the message, and that the maxim 
 respondeat superior does not apply in such a case, because 
 the agent in sending the despatch was not acting for his 
 master, but for himself and about his own business, and 
 was, in fact, the sender, and to be treated as having tran- 
 scended his authority, and as acting outside of, and not in, 
 the course of his employment, nor in furtherance of his 
 master's business. But the rule which fastens a liability 
 upon the master to third persons for the wrongful and 
 unauthorized acts of his servant is not confined solely to 
 that class of cases where the acts complained of are done in 
 the course of the employment in furtherance of the master's 
 business or interest, though there are many cases which fall 
 within that rule. Mott v. Consumer's Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 
 543 ; FisKkill Savings Inst. v. National Banlc, 80 N. Y. 162, 
 168; Potulni v. Saunders, 37 Minn. 517, 35 N. W. Rep. 
 379. Where the business with which the agent is intrusted 
 involves a duty owed by the master to the public or third 
 persons, if the agent, while so employed, by his own wrong- 
 ful act, occasions a violation of that duty, or an injury to 
 the person interested in its faithful performance by or on 
 behalf of the master, the master is liable for the breach of 
 it, whether it be founded in contract or be a common-law
 
 157.] M'COED v. WESTERN UNION TEL. co. 309 
 
 duty growing out of the relations of the parties. 1 Shear. 
 & R. Neg. (4th ed.) 149, 150, 154; Tayl. Corp. (2d ed.) 
 145. And it is immaterial in such case that the wrongful 
 act of the servant is in itself wilful, malicious, or fraudulent. 
 Thus a carrier of passengers is bound to exercise due regard 
 for their safety and welfare, and to protect them from insult. 
 If the servants employed by such carrier in the course of 
 such employment disregard these obligations, and maliciously 
 and wilfully, and even in disregard of the express instructions 
 of their employers, insult and maltreat passengers under their 
 care, the master is liable. Stewart v. Brooklyn & Crosstown 
 R. E. Co., 90 N. Y. 588, 593. In Booth v. Farmers', &c. 
 Bank, 50 N. Y. 396, an officer of a bank wrongfully dis- 
 charged a judgment which had been recovered by the bank, 
 after it had been assigned to the plaintiff. It was there 
 claimed that the authority of the officer and the bank itself 
 to satisfy the judgment had ceased, and that hence the bank 
 was not bound by what its president did after such assign- 
 ment. But the court held otherwise, evidently upon the 
 same general principle, as respects the duty of the bank to 
 the assignee, and laid down the general proposition, equally 
 applicable to the agent of the defendant in the case at bar, 
 that the particular act of the agent or officer was wrongful 
 and in violation of his duty, yet it was within the general 
 scope of his powers, and as to innocent third parties dealing 
 with the bank, who had sustained damages occasioned by 
 such act, the corporation was responsible. 
 
 And the liability of the corporation in such cases is not 
 affected by the, font that the particular act which the agent 
 has assumed to do is one which the corporation itself could not 
 rightfully or lawfully do. In Farmers', &c. Bank v. Butchers' 
 and Drovers' Bank, 16 N. Y. 125, 133 (69 Am. Dec. 678), 
 a case frequently cited with approval, the teller of a bank 
 was, with its consent, in the habit of certifying checks for 
 customers, but he had no authority to certify in the absence 
 of funds, which would be a false representation ; yet it was 
 held, where he had duly certified a check though the drawer
 
 310 TORTS BY AGESTT. [CH. XIII. 
 
 had no funds, that the bank was liable, on the ground that, 
 as between the bank which had employed the teller, and 
 held him out as authorized to certify checks (which involved 
 a representation by one whose duty it was to ascertain and 
 know the facts), and an innocent purchaser of the check so 
 certified, the bank ought to be the loser. Gould v. Town of 
 Sterling, 23 N. Y. 439, 463 ; Bank of New York v. Bank 
 of Ohio, 29 N. Y. 619, 632. See also Titus v. President, 
 &c., Turnpike Road, 61 N. Y. 237 ; New York and N. H. 
 R. R. Co. v. Sclmyler, 34 N. Y. 30, 64 ; Lane v. Cotton, 12 
 Mod. 472, 490. The defendant sftWtnd its agent, placed him 
 in charge of its business at the station in question, and author- 
 ized him to send messages over its line. Persons receiving 
 despatches in the usual course of business, when there is 
 nothing to excite suspicion, are entitled to rely upon the 
 presumption that the agents intrusted with the performance 
 of the business of the company have faithfully and honestly 
 discharged the duty owed by it to its patrons, and that they 
 would not knowingly send a false or forged message ; and 
 it would ordinarily be an unreasonable and impracticable 
 rule to require the receiver of a despatch to investigate the 
 question of the integrity and fidelity of the defendant's 
 agents acting in the performance of their duties, before 
 acting. "Whether the agent is unfaithful to his trust, or 
 violates his duty to, or disobeys the instructions of, the 
 company, its patrons may have no means of knowing. K 
 t.hg pnrporntinn faj1s in the performance of its duty through 
 the neglect or fraud of the agent whom it has delegated 
 to perform it ? the master is responsible. It was the busi- 
 ness of the agent to send despatches of a similar character, 
 and such acts were within the scope of his employment, 
 and the plaintiff could not know the circumstances that 
 made the particular act wrongful and unauthorized. As 
 to him, therefore, it must be deemed the act of the cor- 
 poration. Bank of Cal. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 52 Cal. 
 280 ; Booth v. Farmers', &c., Bank, supra. 
 4. The defendant also insists that it is not liable for the
 
 159.] COMMONWEALTH V. KELLEY. 311 
 
 money forwarded in response to the despatch, because it was 
 embezzled by Swanson as agent of the express company. It 
 is unnecessary to consider whether an action for the amount 
 might not have been maintained against that company as well 
 as against the defendant or the agent himself. The position 
 of trust in which the defendant had placed him enabled him, 
 through the use of the company's wires in the ordinary 
 course of his agency, to induce the plaintiff to place the 
 money within his reach. It is immaterial what avenue was 
 chosen. Had it been forwarded, and intercepted by a con- 
 federate, the result would have been the same. The proxi 
 mate cause of plaintiff's loss was the sending of the forged 
 despatch. The actual conversion of the money was only the 
 culmination of a successful fraud. The acts of Swanson 
 as agent of the defendant and of the express company 
 were the execution of the different parts of one entire plan 
 or scheme. That his subsequent acts aided and concurred 
 in producing the result aimed at, did not make the forged 
 despatch any the less operative as the procuring or proxi- 
 mate cause of plaintiff's loss. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. 
 Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 475 ; Martin v. North Star 
 Iron Works, 31 Minn. 407, 410 (18 N. W. Rep. 109). 
 Order affirmed, and case remanded for further proceedings. 
 
 6. Liability for crimes of agent. 
 
 159.] COMMONWEALTH v. KELLEY. 
 140 MASSACHUSETTS, 441. 1886. 
 
 INDICTMENT and conviction for violation of the statute 
 which prohibited licensed liquor-sellers from maintaining a 
 screen or curtain to cut off a public view of the premises. 
 Defendant had instructed his clerk not to draw the curtains, 
 but the clerk did so in violation of his instructions. The 
 court ruled this was no defence.
 
 312 TORTS BY AGENT. [CH. XIH. 
 
 W. ALLEN, J. We think that the ruling and instructions 
 were correct. The provision of the statute relates to the use 
 and management of licensed premises, and its expi*ess intent is 
 to secure an unobstructed view of their interior at all times 
 by persons outside. It is addressed to the licensee onty ; no 
 other person can violate it. It forbids him to do, or to per- 
 mit to be done, the prohibited act, and, by fair intendment, 
 includes acts done in the use of the premises in carrying on 
 the business licensed, whether the} - are done by the licensee 
 in person, or b} r his agent left by him in charge and man- 
 agement of the business. Commonwealth v. Emmons, 98 
 Mass. 6; Commomcealth \. Uhrig, 138 Mass. 492; Rex v. 
 Medley, 6 Car. & P. 292 ; Rex v. Dixon, 3 M. & S. 11. 
 
 Exceptions overruled. 
 
 COMMONWEALTH v. WACHENDORF, 141 Mass. 270 (1886) : 
 Indictment and conviction for selling liquor during prohibited 
 hours. The court ruled that it was no defence that defendant 
 had instructed his bar-keeper not to sell during those hours, 
 and that the bar-keeper had disobeyed instructions. MORTON, 
 C. J. (after distinguishing Commonwealth v. Kelley, supra). 
 " Section 1, upon which the complaint in the case at bar is 
 based, subjects to punishment any person who sells liquor un- 
 lawfully. It is to be presumed that the Legislature intended 
 to use the language in its natural sense, and with the meaning 
 given to equivalent language by the court in Commonwealth 
 v. Nichols, 10 Met. 259. It is not a necessary or reasonable 
 construction to hold that it subjects to punishment a person 
 who does not sell, because a servant in his employment, in 
 opposition to his will and against his orders, makes an unlaw- 
 ful sale. We are therefore of opinion that the instruction re- 
 quested by the defendant should have been given. Of course, 
 it would be for the jury, under the instruction, to determine 
 whether the defendant did, in good faith, give instructions, 
 intended to be obeyed and enforced, that no sale should be 
 made after eleven o'clock. If he did, and a sale was made 
 in violation of them, without his knowledge, he cannot be 
 held guilty of the offence charged in the complaint."
 
 159.] COMMONWEALTH V. KELLEY. 313 
 
 STATE v. McCANCE, 110 Missouri, 398 (1892), holds that 
 proof of sale by agent makes a,primdfacie case against the 
 principal, but that the latter may rebut the presumption by 
 proof that the sale was forbidden by. him. "As a general 
 rule of law, the principal cannot be held criminally liable for the 
 acts of his agent committed without his knowledge or con- 
 sent. But there are statutes, which are in the nature of police 
 regulations, which impose criminal penalties, irrespective of 
 any intent to violate them. A number of these are collated 
 by Chief Justice Cooley in People v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577." 
 
 NOECKER v. PEOPLE, 91 Illinois, 494 (1879) : Indictment 
 and conviction for selling liquor without a license. Mr. 
 JUSTICE SHELDON. . . . "Some of the sales testified to were 
 made by clerks of the defendant. The court rejected testi- 
 mony offered by the defendant, as to what instructions he 
 gave his clerks in relation to the sale of intoxicating liquors. 
 This is assigned for error. We think the testimony was 
 properly excluded. The language of the statute is, who- 
 ever, by himself, clerk, or servant, shall sell, etc., shall be 
 liable. The testimony was uncontradicted that the defendant 
 kept intoxicating liquors for sale, and the defendant would 
 be responsible for the acts of selling by his clerks, no matter 
 what might have been his instructions to them. . . ." 
 
 MORSE v. STATE, 6 Conn. 9 (1825) : Information and con- 
 viction for violation of a statute prohibiting the giving of 
 credit to college students. HOSMER, C. J. . . . " It is fairly 
 to be inferred that no credit was given to Van Zandt by 
 the defendant, but by Northam, his bar-keeper, onl}*, with- 
 out the knowledge or consent of Morse, and against his 
 express directions. In the performance of this act Northam 
 was not the defendant's agent. He was not authorized 
 to give the credit, either expressly or in the usual course 
 of his business, but was prohibited from doing it. Not- 
 withstanding this, which the court below impliedly admitted, 
 the jury were charged that if the defendant subsequently
 
 314 TOUTS BY AGENT. [CH. XIIL 
 
 assented to the acts of Northam, he ratified them, and made 
 them his own. This was an unquestionable error. In 
 the law of contracts a posterior recognition, in many cases, 
 is equivalent to a precedent command ; but it is not so in 
 respect of crimes. The defendant is responsible for his own 
 acts, and for the acts of others done by his express or implied 
 command ; but to crimes the maxim omnis ratihabitio retro- 
 trahitur ex mandato equiparatur, is inapplicable." 
 
 7. Liability for torts of sub-agents. 
 
 160.] HALUPTZOK v. GREAT NORTHERN 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY. 
 55 MINNESOTA, 446. 1893. 
 
 ACTION for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for 
 plaintiff. Defendant appeals from an order denying its 
 motion for a new trial. 
 
 MITCHELL, J. The plaintiff brought this action to recover 
 for personal injuries to his infant child, caused by the negli- 
 gence of the alleged servant of the defendant. 1878 G. S. 
 ch. 66, 34. 
 
 The injuries were inflicted by one O'Connell, and the only 
 question presented by this appeal is whether O'Connell was 
 defendant's servant. The evidence, in which there is no 
 material conflict, is substantially as follows : The defendant 
 maintained a public depot and freight and passenger station 
 at the village of Waverly. The premises were owned and 
 controlled by the defendant, but the Great Northern Express 
 Company and the Western Union Telegraph Company had 
 their offices in the same building, one Westinghouse being 
 the common agent for all three companies. Westinghouse 
 had exclusive charge of all the defendant's business at the 
 station. He testified that he had no authority to employ any 
 assistants, such authority being exclusively vested in the
 
 160.] HALUPTZOK V. GREAT NORTHERN RY. 315 
 
 general officers of the company ; and, as respects express 
 authorit}*, this testimony is not contradicted. For a year or 
 more before the injury complained of, Westinghouse had 
 permitted a j'oung man named Foutch to use and practise on 
 the instruments in the office, for the purpose of learning teleg- 
 raphy ; and during that time Foutch had been in the habit, 
 as occasion required, of assisting Westinghouse in the per- 
 formance of his railway duties, such as selling tickets, han- 
 dling freight, putting out switch lights, etc. He had no 
 contract with the railway company, and received no wages ; 
 the work he did evidently being in return for the privilege of 
 the office, and the use of the instruments, in learning teleg- 
 raph}*. There is no evidence that the general officers of the 
 defendant knew of or assented to Foutch's performing this 
 work, except the length of time it had continued, and the 
 absence of any testimon}* that they ever objected. About 
 ten days before the accident, Westinghouse, with the per- 
 mission of the Western Union Telegraph Company, gave 
 O'Connell the privilege of the office, and the use of the 
 instruments, for the purpose of learning telegraph}*, evidently 
 under substantially the same arrangement by which he had 
 previously given Foutch similar privileges. O'Connell had 
 no contract with the defendant, and received no wages. The 
 time between his coming into the office and the date of the 
 accident was so brief that the evidence is very meagre as to 
 his doing railroad work about the station during that time, 
 but there was evidence tending to show that he had on 
 several occasions, with the knowledge and consent of West- 
 inghouse, handled freight. On the day in question, he went 
 to work, with a truck, to move some goods from the station 
 platform into a freight room. Foutch assisted him by piling 
 up the goods in the room while O'Connell carried them in. 
 While thus handling the truck, O'Connell ran it against 
 plaintiff's child, who was walking around the depot, and 
 inflicted the injury complained of. There is no evidence that 
 at or prior to the accident the general officers of the defend- 
 ant knew that O'Connell was employed about the station.
 
 316 TORTS BY AGENT. [CH. XIII. 
 
 But both Foutch and O'Connell, after the accident, continued 
 at the depot, practising telegraphy, and assisting Westing- 
 house, as before, in selling tickets, handling freight, etc., and 
 were still doing so at the date of the trial, which was five 
 months after the accident, and over four months after the 
 commencement of this action ; and, while there is no direct 
 evidence that this was with the knowledge of the general 
 officers of the defendant, there is no evidence that they did 
 not know of it, and none that they ever objected to it. Such 
 we believe to be a fair and full statement of the effect of the 
 evidence. 
 
 Under the doctrine of respondent superior, a master, how- 
 ever careful in the selection of his servants, is responsible to 
 strangers for their negligence committed in the course of 
 their employment. The doctrine is at best somewhat severe, 
 and, if a man is to be held liable for the acts of his servants, 
 he certainly should have the exclusive right to determine who 
 they shall be. Hence, we think, in every well-considered 
 case where a person has been held liable, under the doctrine 
 referred to, for the negligence of another, that other was 
 engaged in his service either by the defendant personally, or 
 by others by his authority, express or implied. There is a 
 class of cases, of which JBush v. Steinman, 1 Bos. & P. 404 
 (often doubted and criticised), is an example, which seems to 
 hold that a person may be liable for the negligence of an- 
 other, not his servant. But these were generall}' cases where 
 the injury was done by a contractor, sub-contractor, or their 
 servant!?, upon the real estate of the defendant, of which he 
 was in possession and control ; and they seem to proceed 
 upon the theory that, where a man is in possession of fixed 
 property, he must take care that it is so used and managed 
 by those whom he brings upon the premises as not to be 
 dangerous to others. In that view, he is held liable, not for 
 the negligence of another, but for his own personal negligence 
 in not preventing or abating a nuisance on his own premises. 
 See Laugher v. Pointer, 5 Barn. & C. 547. There will also 
 be found in some text-books statements to the effect that
 
 160.] HALUPTZOK V. GREAT NORTHERN RY. 317 
 
 where a servant is employed to do a particular piece of work, 
 and he employs another person to assist him, the master is 
 liable for the acts of the person so employed, as much as for 
 the acts of the servant himself. Thus generally stated, with- 
 out qualification, the proposition is misleading, as well as 
 inaccurate. 
 
 The cases most generally cited in support of it are Booth 
 v. Mister, 7 Car. & P. 66, and Altlwrfv. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 
 355. In Booth v. Mister the defendant's servant, whose duty 
 it was to drive his master's cart, was riding in the cart, but 
 had given the reins to another person, who was riding with 
 him, but was not in the master's employment, and through 
 the negligent management of this other person the plaintiff 
 was injured. The defendant was held liable, not for the 
 mere negligence of such other person, but for the negligence 
 of the servant himself, who was riding in the cart, and either 
 actively or passively controlling and directing the driving, as 
 much as if he had held the reins in his own hands. 
 
 In Althorf v. Wolfe, a servant, having been directed to 
 remove snow from the roof of his master's house, secured the 
 services of a friend to assist him ; and while the two were 
 engaged together in throwing the snow from the roof into the 
 street, a passer-by was struck and killed. It was held that it 
 was immaterial which of the two threw the ice or snow which 
 caused the injury ; that in either case the master was liable. 
 The case is a very unsatisfactory one, and it is very difficult 
 to ascertain the precise ground upon which it was decided. 
 Wright, J. , seems to put it on one or all of three grounds : 
 (1) That the servant had implied authority to procure assist- 
 ance ; (2) that defendant's family, who were left in charge of 
 the house, ratified the act of the servant ; and (3) upon the 
 same ground upon which Booth v. Mister was decided. On 
 the other hand, Deuio, J., seems to place his opinion upon 
 the ground upon which we have suggested that Bush v. 
 Steinman proceeds. It is also to be observed that two of the 
 justices dissented. But neither of these cases, if rightly under- 
 stood, is in conflict with the proposition with which we started
 
 318 TORTS BY AGENT. [CH. XIII. 
 
 out, that a master, as such, can be held liable for the negli- 
 gence only of those who are employed in his work by his 
 authority ; and hence, if a servant who is employed to per- 
 form a certain work procures another person to assist him, 
 the master is liable for the sole negligence of the latter, only 
 when the servant had authority to employ such assistant. 
 Such authority ma}', however, be implied as well as express, 
 and subsequent ratification is equivalent to original authority ; 
 and, where the servant has authority to employ assistants, 
 such assistants, of course, become the immediate servants of 
 the master, the same as if employed by him personally. Such 
 authority may be implied from the nature of the work to be 
 performed, and also from the general course of conducting the 
 business of the master by the servant for so long a time that 
 knowledge and consent on part of the master ma\- be inferred. 
 It is not necessary that a formal or express employment on 
 behalf of the master should exist, or that compensation should 
 be paid by or expected from him. It is enough to render the 
 master liable if the person causing the injurj* was in fact 
 rendering service for him by his consent, express or implied. 
 
 Under this view of the law, the evidence made a case for 
 the jury to determine whether Westinghouse had implied 
 authority from the defendant to employ O'Conncll as an 
 assistant, or, to state the question differently, whether O'Con- 
 nell was rendering these services for the defendant by its 
 consent. 
 
 If the evidence were limited to the employment of O'Connell 
 alone, and to what occurred during the ten days preceding 
 the accident, it would probably be insufficient to support a 
 verdict in favor of the plaintiff. But it is an undisputed fact 
 that Westinghouse had for over a jear before this been 
 emplo3*ing Foutch as an assistant under a similar arrange- 
 ment, without, so far as appears, any objection on part of the 
 defendant, although the length of time was such that its 
 knowledge of the fact may be fairly inferred. It is true that 
 implied authority to employ Foutch as assistant would not 
 necessarily include authority to emplo}" O'Connell ; but the
 
 161.] KEENAN V. SOUTHWORTH. 319 
 
 fact of Foutch's long continued employment has an important 
 bearing upon the question of Westinghouse's implied authority, 
 as indicated by the manner of conducting the business ; and, 
 as bearing upon this same question of implied authority, the 
 fact is significant that after the accident both Foutch and 
 O'Connell continued, without objection, to perform these ser- 
 vices for defendant, as assistants to Westinghouse, up to the 
 date of the trial. Additional force is added to all this, when 
 considered in connection witli the nature of the duties of a 
 station agent at a place like this, which are of such multifarious 
 character as to render the employment of an occasional assist- 
 ant not only convenient, but almost necessary. The facts 
 that the consideration for the services of these assistants 
 moved from Westinghouse rather than defendant, and that 
 their aid was for the accommodation or convenience of West- 
 inghouse, are not controlling. 
 
 There is nothing in the point that defendant is not liable 
 because the freight which O'Connell was moving had been 
 delivered to the consignee, who had promised to take care of 
 it where it lay, on the station platform. 
 
 O'Connell's act was in the line of his employment, and was 
 being done in furtherance of defendant's business. The 
 liability of the defendant to third parties cannot be made to 
 depend upon the question whether, as between it and the 
 owner of the goods, it owed the latter the continued duty of 
 taking care of them. Order affirmed. 
 
 8. Liability of public principals and charities for torts of 
 
 agents. 
 
 161.] KEEN AN v. SOUTHWORTH. 
 
 110 MASSACHUSETTS, 474. 1872. 
 
 TORT against the postmaster of East Randolph, to recover 
 damages for the loss, by the defendant's negligence, of a 
 letter addressed to the plaintiff. At the trial in the superior
 
 320 TOETS BY AGENT. [CH. XHI. 
 
 court, before Pitman, J., the plaintiff introduced evidence, 
 not now necessar}- to report, that the letter was received at 
 the post-office at East Randolph, and was lost by the negli- 
 gence or wrongful conduct of one Bird, who was the post- 
 master's clerk. The plaintiff having disclaimed " any actual 
 participancy or knowledge of the acts of Bird on the part 
 of the defendant," the judge ruled that the defendant was 
 not liable for any careless, negligent, or wrongful acts of 
 Bird } and, by consent of the plaintiff, he directed a verdict 
 for the defendant, and reported the case for the considera- 
 tion of his court. If the ruling was wrong, the verdict to 
 be set aside, and the case to stand for trial ; otherwise, judg- 
 ment for the defendant on the verdict. 
 
 GRAY, J. The law is well settled in England and America, 
 that the postmaster-general, the deputy postmasters, and 
 their assistants and clerks, appointed and sworn as required 
 by law, are public officers, each of whom is responsible for 
 his own negligence only, and not for that of any of the 
 others, although selected by him, and subject to his orders. 
 Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 646; S. C. 12 Mod. 472; 
 Whitfield v. Le Despencer, Cowp. 754 ; Durilop v. Munroe, 
 7 Cranch, 242 ; Schroyer v. Lynch, 8 Watts, 453 ; Bishop 
 v. Williamson, 2 Fairf. 495 ; Hutchins v. Brackett, 2 Fos- 
 ter, 252. 
 
 The ruling at the trial was therefore right ; and the plain- 
 tiff, having consented to a verdict for the defendant, reserv- 
 ing only the question of the correctness of that ruling, 
 cannot now raise the question whether there was sufficient 
 evidence of the defendant's own negligence to be submitted 
 to the jury. Judgment on the verdict.
 
 101.J FLEE INSURANCE PATROL V. BOxt>. 82'i 
 
 161.] FIRE INSURANCE PATROL v. BOYD. 
 120 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 624. 1888. 
 
 ACTION for wrongfully causing the death of plaintiffs' in- 
 testate. Judgment for plaintiffs. 
 
 Defendant's servants negligent!}- pitched heavy bundles 
 out of a fourth-story window. Plaintiffs' intestate was struck 
 by one of these bundles and so seriously injured that he sul>- 
 sequently died of his injuries. Defendant corporation has no 
 capital stock, declares no dividends, and is equipped and 
 maintained by voluntary contributions or subscriptions made 
 mainly by insurance companies. Its services are given how- 
 ever to the saving of life and property threatened by fire, 
 whether the property endangered is insured or not. 
 
 Mr. JUSTICE PAXSON (after discussing the question whether 
 defendant corporation is a public charity). Our conclusion 
 is that the Fire Insurance Patrol of Philadelphia is a public 
 institution ; that in the performance of its duties 
 
 it is acting in aid and in ease of the municipal government 
 in the preservation of life and property at fires. It re- 
 mains to inquire whether the doctrine of respondeat superior 
 applies to it Upon this point we are free from doubt. 
 It has been held in this State that the duty of extinguish- 
 ing fires and saving property therefrom is a public duty, 
 and the agent to whom such authority is delegated is a 
 public agent and not liable for the negligence of its em- 
 ployes. This doctrine was affirmed by this court in Knight 
 v. City of Philadelphia, 15 W. N. C. 307, where it was 
 said : " We think the court did not commit any error 
 in entering judgment for the defendant upon the demurrer. 
 The members of the fire department are not such servants 
 of the municipal corporation as to make it liable for their 
 acts or negligence. Their duties are of a public character, 
 and for a high order of public benefit. The fact that this 
 not of assembly did not make it obligatory on the city to 
 organize a fire department, does not change the legal lia- 
 
 21
 
 322 TOUTS BY AGENT. [CH. XIII. 
 
 bility of the municipality for the conduct of the members of 
 the organization. The same reason which exempts the city 
 from liability for the acts of its policemen, applies with 
 equal force to the acts of the firemen." And it would 
 seem from this and other cases to make no difference as 
 respects the legal liabilit}*, whether the organization perform- 
 ing such public service is a volunteer or not. Jewett v. New 
 Haven, 38 Conn. 368 ; Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 
 667 ; Feoffees of Heriofs Hospital v. Ross, 12 C. & F. 
 506; Riddle v. Proprietors, 7 Mass. 169; McDonald v. 
 Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 ; Boyd v. Insurance Patrol, 113 
 Pa. 269. But I will not pursue this subject further, as there 
 is another and higher ground upon which our decision may 
 be placed. 
 
 The Insurance Patrol is a public charity : it has no property 
 or funds which havq t. he a n fK>ntri u nfprf for the purposes of 
 charity, and it would be against all law and all equity to take 
 those ^gj funds, so contributed for a specif 
 
 pose, to compensate injuries inflicted or occasionedjtmthe 
 negligence of the agents or sprvants of the patrol. It would 
 be can-vino; the doctrine of respondeat superior to an un- 
 rnflpnnnhlfi nnfl dangerous length^ That doctrine is at 
 best as I once before observed a hard rule. I trust 
 and believe it will never be extended to the sweeping away 
 of public charities ; to the misapplication of funds, especial!}' 
 contributed for a public charitable purpose, to objects not 
 contemplated by the donors. I think it may be safely 
 assumed that private trustees, having the control of money 
 contributed for a specific charity, could not, in case of a tort 
 committed by any one of their members, apply the funds in 
 their hands to the payment of a judgment recovered therefor. 
 A public charity, whether incorporated or not, is but a trustee, 
 and is bound to apply its funds in furtherance of the charity, 
 and not otherwise. This doctrine is hoary with antiquity, 
 and prevails alike in this countr}' and in England, where it 
 originated as early as the reign of Edward V., and it was 
 announced in the Year Book of that period. In the Feoffees
 
 161.] FIRE INSURANCE PATROL V. BOYD. 323 
 
 of Iferiot's Hospital v. J?oss, 12 C. & F. 506, a person 
 eligible for admission to the hospital brought an action for 
 damages against the trustees for the wrongful refusal on their 
 part to admit him. The case was appealed to the House of 
 Lords, when it was unanimously held that it could not be 
 maintained. Lord Cottenham said: "It is obvious that it 
 would be a direct violation, in all cases, of the purpose of a 
 trust if this could be done ; for there is not any person who 
 ever created a trust that provided for payment out of it of 
 damages to be recovered from those who had the manage- 
 ment of the fund. No such provision has been made here. 
 There is a trust, and there are persons intended to manage it 
 for the benefit of those who are to be the objects of the charity. 
 To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it 
 to those objects which the author of the fund had in view, but 
 would be to divert it to a completely different purpose." Lord 
 Brougham said : " The charge is that the governors of the 
 hospital have illegal!}* and improperly done the act in ques- 
 tion, and, therefore, because the trustees have violated the 
 statute, therefore what? Not that they shall themselves 
 pay the damages, but that the trust fund which they adminis- 
 ter shall be made answerable for their misconduct. The find- 
 ing on this point is wrong, and the decree of the court below 
 must be reversed." Lord Campbell : " It seems to have been 
 thought that if charity trustees have been guilty of a breach 
 of trust, the persons damnified thereby have a right to be 
 indemnified out of the trust funds. That is contrary to all 
 reason, justice, and common sense. Such a perversion of 
 the intention of the donor would lead to most inconvenient 
 consequences. The trustees would in that case be indemni- 
 fied against the consequences of their own misconduct, and 
 the real object of the charity would be defeated. Damages 
 are to be paid from the pocket of the wrong-doer, not from a 
 trust fund. A doctrine so strange, as the court below has 
 laid down in the present case, ought to have been supported 
 by the highest authorit}*. There is not any authority, not a 
 single shred, to support it. No foreign or constitutional
 
 324 TORTS BY AGENT. [CH. XHI. 
 
 writer can be referred to for such a purpose." I have quoted 
 at some length from the opinions of these great jurists because 
 they express in vigorous and clear language the law upon 
 this subject. I have not space to discuss the long line of 
 cases in England and this country in which the above prin- 
 ciple is sustained. It is sufficient to refer to a few of them 
 by name. Riddle v. Proprietors of the .Locks. 1 Mass. 187 ; 
 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 
 432; Sherbourne v. Tuba Co., 21 Cal. 113; Brown v. 
 Inhabitants of Vinalhaven, 65 Me. 402 ; Mitchell v. City 
 of Rockland, 52 Me. 118 ; City of Richmond v. Long, 17 
 Grattan, 375 ; Ogg v. City of Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495 ; Mur- 
 taugh v. City of St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479 ; Patterson v. 
 Penn. Reform School, 92 Pa. 229 ; Maxmillian v. Mayor, 
 62 N. Y. 160. 
 
 I am glad to be able to say that no State in this country, 
 or in the world, has upheld the sacredness of trusts with a 
 firmer hand than the State of Pennsylvania. Not onlj* is a 
 trustee for a public or private use not permitted to misapply 
 the trust funds committed to his care, but if he convert them 
 to his own use the law punishes him as a thief. How much 
 better than a thief would be the law itself, were it to apply 
 the trust's funds contributed for a charitable object, to pay 
 for injuries resulting from the torts or negligence of the 
 trustee ? The latter is legally responsible for his own wrong- 
 ful acts. I understand a judgment has been recovered against 
 the individual whose negligence occasioned the injury in this 
 case. If we apply the money of the Insurance Patrol to the 
 payment of this judgment, or of the same cause of action, 
 what is it but a misapplication of the trust fund, as much so as 
 if the trustees had used it in payment of their personal liabili- 
 ties? It would be an anomaly to send a trustee to the 
 penitentiary for squandering trust funds in private specula- 
 tions, and j'et permit him to do practically the same thing by 
 making it liable for his torts. If the principle contended for 
 here were to receive any countenance at the hands of this 
 court, it would be the most damaging blow at the integrity of
 
 161.] FIRE INSURANCE PATROL V. BOYD. 325 
 
 trusts which has been delivered in Pennsylvania. We are 
 not prepared to take this step. 
 
 We are not unmindful of the fact that it was contended for 
 the defendant in error that the case of Feoffees of Iferiot's 
 Hospital v. Ross is in conflict with Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 
 L. R. 1 E. & I. App. Cas. 93, and Parnaby v. Lancaster 
 Canal Co., 11 Ad. & E. 223. I am unable to see an}' such 
 conflict. The two corporations last named were evidently 
 trading corporations, and in no sense public charities. In 
 regard to the docks, it was said by Blackburn, J., at page 
 465: "There are several cases relating to charities which 
 were mentioned at your lordship's bar, but were not much 
 pressed, nor, as it seems to us, need they be considered now ; 
 for whatever may be the law as to the exemption of property 
 occupied for charitable purposes, it is clear that the docks in 
 question can come within no such exemption." 
 
 I will not consume time by discussing the case of Glamn 
 y. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, which, to some 
 extent, sustains the opposite view of this question. There, 
 a hospital patient, paying eight dollars per week for his board 
 and medical attendance, was allowed to recover a verdict 
 against the hospital for unskilful treatment, and it was held 
 that the general trust funds of a charitable corporation are 
 liable to satisfy a judgment in tort recovered against it for 
 the negligence of its officers or agents. It is at least doubt- 
 ful whether under its facts the case applies, and if it does, 
 we would not be disposed to follow it in the face of the over- 
 whelming weight of authority the other way, and of the sound 
 reasoning by which it is supported. 
 
 The foregoing is little more than a re-assertion of the views 
 of this court as heretofore expressed in this case by our 
 Brother Clark. See 113 Pa. 269. Many of the authorities 
 I have referred to are there cited by him. We are now more 
 fully informed as to the facts of the case, and can apply to 
 them the law as indicated in the former opinion. 
 
 We are all of opinion that the Insurance Patrol is not liable 
 in this action, and the judgment against it is, therefore, 
 
 Reversed.
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 LIABILITY OF THIRD PERSON TO PRINCIPAL. 
 
 1. Liability upon contracts. 
 
 165.] HUNTINGTON v. KNOX. 
 
 7 CUSHING (Mass.), 371. 1851. 
 [Reported herein at p. 253.] 
 
 2. Liability in quasi-contract for money paid under mis- 
 take, duress, or fraud. 
 
 167.] STEVENSON v. MORTIMER. 
 
 COWPER'S REPORTS (K. B.), 805. 1778. 
 
 ACTION for money had and received. Non-suit ordered. 
 Rule to show cause why non-suit should not be set aside. 
 
 Plaintiffs were owners of a boat. Defendant was a cus- 
 tom-house officer. Plaintiffs' agent, the master of the boat, 
 had paid to defendant certain fees which were alleged by 
 plaintiffs to be unauthorized and exorbitant. The trial court 
 ruled that the duty to pay the fees (if any) was imposed by 
 statute upon the master, and that the action could not be 
 maintained in the name of the plaintiffs. 
 
 LORD MANSFIELD. The ground of the non-suit at the 
 trial was, that this action could not be well maintained by 
 the plaintiffs, who are the owners of the vessel in question ; 
 but it ought to have been brought by the master, who actu- 
 ally paid the money. That ground, therefore, makes now the 
 only question before us ; as to which, there is not a particle 
 of doubt. Qui facit per alium, facit per se. Where a man
 
 167. J STEVENSON V. MORTIMER. 327 
 
 pa}'s money by his agent, which ought not to have been paid, 
 either the agent, or the principal, may bring an action to 
 recover it back. The agent ma)', from the authority of the 
 principal, and the principal may, as proving it to have been 
 paid by his agent If money is paid to a known agent, and 
 an action brought against him for it, it is an answer to such 
 action, that he has paid it over to the principal. Sadler v. 
 Evans, 4 Bur. 1984. Here the statute la}*s the burden on 
 the master from necessity, and makes him personally liable 
 to penalties if he neglects to perform the requisitions of it. 
 But still he is entitled to charge the necessary fees, etc., 
 upon his doing so, to the account of his owners. And in 
 this case there can be no doubt of the relation in which the 
 master stood to the plaintiffs ; for he is the witness, and he 
 swears that the money was paid by the order of the plain- 
 tiffs. Therefore, they are very well warranted to maintain 
 the action. If the parties had gone to trial upon an appre- 
 hension that the onty question to be tried was, whether this 
 was a case within the Act of Parliament, consequently, 
 whether any fee was due, the plaintiffs could not have been 
 permitted to surprise the defendant at the trial, by starting 
 another ground, upon which to recover a Norfolk groat. An 
 action for money had and received is governed by the most 
 liberal equity. Neither party is allowed to entrap the other 
 in form. But here, the plaintiff gave notice, that he meant 
 to insist that too much was taken ; and therefore, both came 
 to the trial with equal knowledge of the matter in dispute. 
 Therefore, the rule for a new trial must be absolute. 
 
 Lord Mansfield added, that he thought the plaintiffs ought 
 to let the defendant know the amount of the excess which 
 they claimed ; that the defendant might have an opportunity 
 of paying money into court; and the rule was drawn up 
 accordingly.
 
 328 LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTY. [CH. XIV. 
 
 3. Liability in tort for property diverted by agent. 
 a. General rule 
 
 168.] THOMPSON v. BARNUM. 
 
 49 IOWA, 392. 1878. 
 
 REPLEVIN for six ploughs. Judgment for plaintiffs. De- 
 fendants appeal. 
 
 Plaintiffs made J. & S. sales agents for ploughs, and agreed 
 to take approved notes of purchasers. The ploughs were 
 shipped and a shipping bill in the name of J. & S. was for- 
 warded. J. & S. turned over the ploughs in payment of a 
 debt due from them to defendants. 
 
 DAY, J. The court did not err in holding that, under the 
 terms of the order pursuant to which the property in ques- 
 tion was shipped, the title did not pass from the plaintiffs to 
 Johnston & Searles, and that they had no authority to dis- 
 pose of it in payment of a pre-existing debt which they owed 
 the defendants. Under the terms of shipment Johnston & 
 Searles were merely the agents of plaintiffs, with authority to 
 dispose of the implements in the manner indicated in the 
 order. To hold that they became either absolute or con- 
 ditional purchasers of the ploughs, it would be necessary to 
 ignore utterly many of the provisions of the order pursuant 
 to which the shipment was made. The plaintiffs are not 
 estopped from insisting upon their rights in the property 
 because of the execution of the bill for the ploughs, set out in 
 the court's finding of facts. The defendants were not induced 
 to make their purchase because of the existence of this bill. 
 From the finding of facts it appears that they had agreed to 
 take this property in payment of the debt due them, before 
 they had any knowledge of the existence of this bill. The bill 
 was referred to simph- for the purpose of ascertaining the 
 price of the ploughs. For cases analogous in their principles 
 to this, see Conable v. Lynch, 45 Iowa, 84 ; Bayliss v. Davis, 
 47 Iowa, 340. Affirmed.
 
 170.] MCCAULBY v. BKOWN. 329 
 
 b. Exception : indicia of oumership. 
 
 170.] McCAULEY v. BROWN. 
 
 2 DALY (N. Y. C. P.), 426. 1869. 
 
 ACTION to recover the value of a truck and set of harness 
 alleged to have been converted by defendants. Judgment 
 for plaintiff. 
 
 The property was bought by defendants of J. M., a brother 
 of plaintiff. J. M., with plaintiff's knowledge, had taken out 
 a license in his own name for the truck, and had held himself 
 out as owner. Defendants, before buying, went to the 
 mayor's office, and ascertained that the license was in the 
 name of J. M. 
 
 BARRETT, J. By the provisions of the Revised Ordin- 
 ances of 1859, p. 356, 2, it is made unlawful ." for any 
 person to receive or hold a license to keep public carts, 
 or to be a public cartman, unless he be the actual owner 
 of the cart or carts so licensed." The taking out of the 
 license for the truck in question was, therefore, a decla- 
 ration of ownership made by the plaintiff's brother, John 
 McCaule}', with the plaintiff's full knowledge and consent, 
 upon which the defendants had a right to and did rely 
 in making the purchase. These facts, coupled with John 
 McCauley's actual possession, and seeming ownership, bring 
 the case within the prinniplps that whei) thp. nwnpr nf gQQjja 
 stands by and permits another to treat them as his o\vn, 
 whereby a third person.iaJed to purchase them in good faith, 
 the former cannot recover the goods, or their value, from tke 
 buyej*. Thompson v. Blanchard, 4 N. Y. 303 ; Hibbard v. 
 Stewart, 1 Hilt. 207; Brewster v. Baker, 16 Barb. 613; 
 Cheeney v. Arnold, 18 Barb. 434 ; Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill, 
 215 ; Pickard v. Sears, 6 Ad. & El. 469 ; Gregg v. Wells, 
 10 Ad. & El. 90. The doctrine applies although the plain- 
 tiff was not present when the bargain was made. It is 
 sufficient that, by his previous conduct, he enabled his
 
 330 LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTY. [CH. XIV. 
 
 brother to assume the credit of ownership, and to deceive 
 the defendants. Thompson v. Blanckard, supra. 
 
 The judgment with respect to the truck was, therefore, 
 erroneous ; and as there was no evidence of the separate 
 value of the harness, except the wholly insufficient statement 
 of what the plaintiff had paid for it some seven months 
 prior to the sale, we have no basis for a modification of the 
 judgment. Besides, the conduct of these brothers savors 
 very strongly of collusion. John McCaulej' had previously 
 offered the truck for sale, with the plaintiffs knowledge, and 
 seemingly with his consent certainly without an}* expres- 
 sion of his disapprobation. From these and other unfavor- 
 able circumstances, such as the plaintiffs failure to assert 
 his title upon the discovery of the property in the defendants' 
 possession, we are not inclined to strain a point with respect 
 to the evidence of value, for the purpose of upholding this 
 judgment, even in part. It is fairer to leave the parties in 
 such a position, that the plaintiff may, if he thinks fit, bring 
 a fresh action for the value of the harness, when the defend- 
 ants can have these facts and circumstances submitted to a 
 jury, upon the question of collusion and authority. 
 
 The judgment should be reversed. 
 
 170.] PICKERING v. BUSK. 
 
 15 EAST (K. B.), 38. 1812. 
 [Reported herein at p. 223.] 
 
 c. Exception : Factors Act. 
 
 170,171.] BIGGS v. EVANS. 
 
 1894, 1 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, 88. 
 
 ACTION to recover possession of personal propert}', in- 
 trusted to one Geddes, and b}* Geddes sold to defendant. 
 Action tried by WILLS, J., without a jury.
 
 170, 171.] BIGGS V. EVANS. 331 
 
 WILLS, J., delivered judgment as follows : 
 The plaintiff was the owner of a valuable table-top made of 
 what is called opal matrix, an exceptional article, but of a 
 class in which jewellers and dealers in gems might be ex- 
 pected to deal. 
 
 In the year 1886 he sent it to the business premises of a 
 person named Geddes, who was a dealer in jewels and gems, 
 and who also, as a part of his business, and as a known part 
 of his business, sold such things for other people in his own 
 name, and having them in his possession. The following 
 letter gives the terms of the deposit : 
 
 "APKIL30, 1886. 
 
 " I will intrust you with the sale of my opal table upon 
 the following conditions. That the table shall not be sold to 
 any person nor at any price without my authorization is first 
 obtained that such sale shall be effected. That the check 
 handed to you in payment for the table shall be paid over to 
 me intact for me to pay into my bankers, and that I shall pay 
 for commission on the sale of the table one-third of the bal- 
 ance which remains after deducting cost of stone mounting 
 and all expenses incurred by me in connection with the 
 same." 
 
 Geddes, in the year 1888, sold the table out and out to the 
 defendant for 200, which was satisfied as follows : Geddes 
 asked the defendant to pay 170 for him to Streeter, a West 
 End jeweller, in satisfaction of a judgment which Streeter 
 had obtained against him, and to pay him (Geddes) 30 in 
 cash. The defendant did not pay Streeter 170, but gave 
 him a diamond valued between him and Streeter at 120, 
 and paid him 50 in cash. 
 
 Geddes shortly afterwards became bankrupt and disap- 
 peared. The table-top at the time of action brought was in 
 the possession of Streeter, who was holding it for the de- 
 fendant. The plaintiff claims to recover the table-top from 
 the defendant. The defendant resists the claim on two 
 grounds : First, be says that at common-law the plaintiff is 
 estopped from denying his title. Secondly, that he is pro- 
 tected by the Factors Acts, from which, of course, the Act
 
 332 LIABILITY OF THIRD PAETY. [CH. XIV. 
 
 of 1889 must be excluded, as the transaction took place be- 
 fore it was passed. 1 
 
 The claim of the defendant at common-law is put thus : It 
 is said that the plaintiff enabled Geddes to sell the table-top 
 as his own, and that his doing so was within the scope of his 
 authority, as it would be understood by persons who dealt 
 with him, and that, as he had put it in the power of Geddes 
 to commit the fraud, his must be the loss. 
 
 I think, however, that a fallacy underlies the expression 
 that he enabled Geddes to commit the fraud. In one sense, 
 and one only, did he do so. He gave him the corporal pos- 
 session of the table-top, and it was that possession which 
 enabled Geddes to sell it as his own, or by way of a transac- 
 tion within the scope of his apparent authority, as a person 
 carrying on a business in which such sales are habitually 
 effected. But it is quite clear that it requires more to found 
 the argument in question. In one sense every person who 
 intrusts an article to any person who deals in second-hand 
 articles of that description enables him, if so disposed, to 
 commit a fraud by selling it as his own. A man who lends 
 a book to a second-hand bookseller puts it into his power, in 
 the same sense, to sell it as his own. A man who intrusts 
 goods for safe custody to a wharfinger, who also deals in his 
 own goods, or in other people's goods intrusted to him for 
 sale, in such a sense enables him to commit a fraud by selling 
 them to a customer. But such a transaction clearly could not 
 give a title to a purchaser as against the owner. The true 
 test is, I take it, whether the authority given in fact is of 
 such a nature as to cover a right to deal with the article at 
 all. If it does, and the dealing effected is of the same nature 
 as the dealing contemplated by the authority, and the agent 
 carries on a business in which he ordinarily effects for other 
 
 1 52 & 53 Viet, c 45, which by section 14, and the schedule repeals the 
 earlier Factors Acts, preserving any right acquired or liability incurred 
 before the commencement of the Act. The provisions corresponding to 
 6 Geo. 4, c. 94, s. 4, are contained in section 1, sub-section 1, and section 2, 
 sub-section 1, of the Act now in force.
 
 170, 171.] BIGGS V. EVANS. 333 
 
 people such dispositions as he does effect, what he has done 
 is within the general authority conferred, and any limitations 
 imposed as to the terms on which, or manner in which, he is 
 to sell are matters which may give a right of action by the 
 principal, but cannot affect the person who contracts with 
 the agent. It is within the scope of the authority that the 
 agent should sell the goods on some terms, and it is not usual 
 in the trade to inquire into the limits or conditions of an au- 
 thority of that kind ; and therefore the principal is supposed, 
 as respects other people, to have clothed the agent with the 
 usual authorit}'. The foundation, however, of the whole thing 
 is that the agent should be authorized to enter into some such 
 transaction. If the principal has intrusted the goods to the 
 agent for some other purposes, the agent is acting outside his 
 authority in selling at all, and then the principal, whose goods 
 have been disposed of without any authority at all so to do, 
 is entitled to recover them in spite of the disposition. 
 
 Now in the present case, the letter, taken as a whole, shows 
 that the table-top never was intrusted to Geddes to sell. 
 He was forbidden in express terms to sell without further 
 authority. He was not to sell the table-top, but to keep it 
 safely for the plaintiff until a further authority was given ; 
 and I think he sold, not violating instructions as to the terms 
 on which he should effect a sale, but in spite of a prohibition 
 to sell at all till some further authority should be given. At 
 common-law, therefore, I think the plaintiff is entitled to 
 succeed. 
 
 Do the Factors Acts protect the defendant? I think not. 
 I think it is an essential condition of the validity of a sale 
 protected by them that the goods should have been intrusted 
 to the agent for sale. I think the Factors Acts would apply, 
 so far as relates to the business which Geddes was carrying 
 on, the nature of the article dealt in, and what was usual in 
 such a trade. But the defect that the article never was 
 intrusted to him for sale is fatal. 
 
 I think there is another difficulty. In order to validate pay- 
 ment to the agent under 6 Geo. 4, c. 94, s. 4, it must be
 
 334 LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTY. [CH. XIV. 
 
 made in the ordinary course of business, that is, by cash or 
 check or bill, as the case may be. I do not think that buy- 
 ing up a judgment from some one else, partly b}* delivery of 
 a diamond of the defendant's own, can be considered as pay- 
 ment in the ordinary course within the section. And there is 
 good reason for it. If the agent gets cash, he may be able 
 to hand it to his principal ; but if he does not get cash, and 
 there is only a transaction of this kind, he cannot if impecu- 
 nious pay the principal ; it is out of his power to do so. 
 
 I am of opinion, therefore, that judgment must be entered 
 for the plaintiff, with costs. 
 
 Judgment for the plaintiff. 
 
 4. Liability for collusive fraud. 
 
 175.] MAYOR, &c. OF SALFORD v. LEVER. 
 1891, 1 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (C. A.), 168. 
 
 ACTION for damages for fraud, or, in the alternative, for 
 money had and received^, Judgm^ntjorplaintiffs. &fi^~ 
 
 Defendant bribed plaintiffs' purchasing agent to accept 
 defendant's offer to supply coal to plaintiffs. Upon dis- 
 covering the fraud plaintiffs stayed action against the agent 
 upon his agreement to furnish evidence against defendant 
 and others, to pay the costs of the action against them, and 
 to guarantee an aggregate recovery of 10,000, for which he 
 gave security. 
 
 LORD ESHER, M. R. The corporation of Salford have 
 brought this action against the defendant, who is a coal 
 merchant, and it is an action founded on fraud. What is 
 the fraud \\ hich the defendant had committed ? He had coals 
 to sell, and he was obliged to make a bargain with the cor- 
 poration through their agent, a man who, no doubt, would be 
 known in Salford as having the power to make contracts for 
 the corporation, and who, consequently, would be looked to
 
 175.] MAYOR V. LEVER. 335 
 
 by traders. The defendant knew that this man was the 
 agent of the corporation, and that it was his duty to buy 
 coals for them at the price at which the defendant or some 
 other trader was willing to sell them. The defendant was at 
 liberty to sell the coals at any price he could get for them, 
 not necessarily at market price, but at the best price which 
 he could obtain. He was bound, however, to act honestly. 
 He offered this man Hunter to sell him coal at a price which 
 would give him such a profit as he desired. But then Hunter 
 tempted him by saying, " You want to sell your coals at a 
 price which will give you a profit. I have the power of buying 
 coals from you or from anybody else, and I will not buy them 
 from you at the price at which you are willing to sell them, 
 unless you will help me to cheat the corporation out of 
 another shilling a ton. You are to have your price ; but you 
 are to add to it in the bills which you send to the corporation 
 another shilling per ton, making the real price apparently a 
 shilling per ton more ; but that shilling is to be mine, you 
 are to give it to me." They call this a commission, a term 
 very well known, at all events in the North of England ; and 
 commissions sometimes cover a multitude of sins. In the 
 present case it was meant to cover a fraud. The fraud was 
 this, that the defendant allowed and assisted the agent of 
 the corporation to put down a false figure as the price of the 
 coals in order to cheat the corporation out of a shilling a ton, 
 which was to be paid to their own agent ; and the way in 
 which it was done was this : the defendant sent in a bill to 
 the corporation for the whole price thus increased. He got 
 the advanced price into bis bands, and as he got it by fraud 
 he is bound to pay it back, unless something^hag^happened 
 to_oiist the right of t.hft mrporatioiy The damage to the cor- 
 porationjs clearly the one shilling per tom out of which they 
 have been cheated, neither more nor Jess^ The form of the 
 action, on which some stress has been laid in the argument, 
 is immaterial. Unless something has happened to oust the 
 right of the corporation, they are entitled to sue the defendant 
 for the one shilling a ton in one form of action or another,
 
 336 LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTY. [CH. XIV. 
 
 although he has parted with the monej', and has handed it 
 over to his confederate Hunter, because it was once in his 
 hands^and^e_is_liable for _the_fraud_to_ which he wasLthusji 
 party. 
 
 But the defendant says that something has happened which 
 prevents the corporation from enforcing this right, and the 
 first ground which was taken was this : that this money which 
 came into his hands passed into the hands of Hunter, the 
 agent of the corporation, and they have recovered it, or part 
 of it, from Hunter, and therefore cannot recover it from the 
 defendant This defence was advanced independently of, 
 and without reference to, the agreement between the corpora- 
 tion and Hunter. On what ground have the corporation re- 
 covered the money from Hunter? Hunter, their agent, had 
 received money from the defendant, for the performance of a 
 duty which he was bound to perform without any such pay- 
 ment. Nothing could in law be more fraudulent, dangerous, 
 or disgraceful, and therefore thejaj? has struck at such con- 
 duct in this way. It jsays tfrat t if an agent takes n. hrjba 
 from_a third person, whether he calls it a commission or by 
 for thfi performance "f ft duty whirh ha IB 
 
 ^ 
 
 bound to perform for hia principal, hp must, give up to his prin- 
 cipal whatever he has by reason, nf flip frapd 
 
 his due. It is a separate and distinct fraud of the agent. He 
 might have received the money without any fraud of the per- 
 son who was dealing with him. Suppose that person thought 
 that the agent was entitled to a commission, he would not 
 be fraudulent; but the agent would be, and it is because 
 of his separate and distinct fraud that the law says he must 
 give up the money to his principal. It signifies not what it 
 may be called, whether damages or money had and received,, 
 the foundation of the claim of the principal is, that there ij^a 
 separate jmd distinct fraud by his agent upon him, and there-^ 
 fore be is entitled to recover from the agent the sum which he 
 has received. But does this prevent the principal from suing 
 the third person also, if he had been fraudulent, because of 
 his fraud ? It has been settled that, if the principal brings
 
 175.] MAYOR V. LEVEK. 337 
 
 against tlio thir^ pprsorj first, he cannot set up the 
 defence that the action cannot be maintained against. hjm 
 hftnaiise t.hp. f.hipcr was Hnrm through the agent, fl,nd the py|n- 
 clpal was entitled to sue the agent. What difference can it 
 make that the principal sues the third party secondly instead 
 of first? The agent has been guilty of two distinct and inde- 
 pendent frauds, the one in his character of agent, the other 
 by reason of his conspiracy with the third person with whom 
 he has been dealing. Whether the action by the principal 
 against the third person was the first or the second must be 
 wholly immaterial. The third person was bound to pa}* back 
 the extra price which he had received, and he could not 
 absolve himself or diminish the damages by reason of the 
 principal having recovered from the agent the bribe which he 
 had received. 
 
 But then the defendant says and this is his second 
 ground that, even if this be so, the corporation have 
 entered into an agreement with their agent, Hunter, which 
 prevents them from suing the defendant in respect of the 
 combined fraud of Hunter and himself. There is a well 
 settled rule that, if there are two joint tort-feasors t and tlm 
 third person to whom the wrong has been done releases one 
 of the two, he cannot afterwards sue the other. That is a 
 well-known rule. Whether the rule goes further, and ex- 
 tends to an accord and satisfaction with one tort-feasor. it is 
 immaterial now to consider. Let us see what has been done. 
 It is said that the corporation have entered into an agree- 
 ment with Hunter. Though the corporation will not take 
 the objection that the agreement is not under seal, I am not 
 sure that the court ought not to take it, seeing that the de- 
 fendant has been guilty of a fraud. There is in fact no 
 agreement at all which is binding on the corporation, because 
 the alleged agreement does not bear their seal. First, then. 
 there is no agreement ; and, secondly, even supposing there 
 is an agreement such as the defendant alleges, namely, that 
 the corporation undertook to bring actions in the first in- 
 stance against the third parties, at his request and at his 
 
 22
 
 338 LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTY. [CH. XIV. 
 
 expense, to recover the extra price which they had received, 
 that would not, so far as I can see, be a compromise of a 
 doubtful claim. It was an absolute agreement entered into 
 by the officers of the corporation, and, if it were binding on 
 the corporation, they bound themselves to bring the actions 
 at the request of Hunter, and thus lost their independence as 
 to whether those actions should proceed or not. If the 
 actions failed, the corporation would be primarily liable for 
 the costs to the persons against whom they were brought. It 
 was true they were to get the costs from Hunter ; but they 
 would be primarily liable. They had given up their inde- 
 pendence, and had bound themselves to bring the actions, 
 whether they were likely to be successful or not. The}' had 
 bound the rate-payers to pay the costs, in the first instance, 
 if the actions failed, and to take the chance of Hunter pay- 
 ing them, and, supposing Hunter's securities proved insuffi- 
 cient, the rate-payers would lose these costs. Under these 
 circumstances, speaking for myself alone, I am of opinion 
 that the agreement was wholly ultra vires the corporation. 
 They had no mandate from the rate-payers to agree to it. 
 
 But, suppose the difficulty to to be got over, what was the 
 effect of the agreement? Was it a release of Hunter in 
 respect of the combined fraud? Certainly it was not a 
 release. It did not purport to be that. ^ Moreover, it was 
 not under seal, and it cannot therefore be dealt with as 
 a release. And, when the terms of the agreement are looked 
 at, it was clearly not a release of Hunter. It is perfectly 
 true, as Mr. Henn Collins has pointed out, that the agree- 
 ment nifrply siiRp^nded the action of the corporation against 
 Hunter, and left it open to them to sue him afterwards , 
 should circumstances arise in which they might think it right 
 to do so. It was, in fact, nothing more than a postpone- 
 ment of their right of action, and that of itself cannot pre- 
 vent them from suing Lever. Therefore, upon almost every 
 ground upon which the case can be looked at, there is no 
 defence to this action, and the defendant is liable. I know 
 the result of it all may be this, that the corporation will
 
 175.] HEGENMYER V. MARKS. 339 
 
 recover their money from the defendant, and from other 
 traders in a similar position against whom they may proceed, 
 and that Hunter will have the benefit of it. Certainly the 
 corporation cannot legally return to Hunter the money which 
 they may thus recover. It belongs to the rate-paj-ers, and 
 the corporation have no possible right to pay it over to 
 Hunter. But the result will be the same. These coal- 
 dealers, who were tempted by Hunter and persuaded by him 
 to pay him the bribes, will be the sufferers. They may be 
 ruined ; and Hunter, when he comes out of prison, may find 
 the securities, which are the result of his plunder and his 
 gross frauds, untouched, and he may retain the whole of the 
 money which he has received in this way. I am sorry for it ; 
 but such, in my opinion, is the law. It follows, therefore, 
 that the defendant has no defence, and the judgment _of 
 the divisional court must remain, and the appeal must be 
 dismissed. 
 
 LINDLEY and LOPES, LL.J., also delivered concurring 
 opinions. Appeal dismissed. 
 
 175.] HEGENMYER v. MARKS. 
 
 37 MINNESOTA, 6. 1887. 
 
 ACTION to rescind a sale and conveyance of land. Judg- 
 ment for plaintiff. 
 
 GILFILLAN, C. J. The plaintiff owned a lot of land in 
 Minneapolis. One Creigh was a real-estate broker, and at 
 his request she employed and authorized him to sell the lot 
 to an}* one who would purchase it at such sum as would net 
 her $1,050 ; Creigh to receive as his compensation whatever 
 he could get for the lot in excess of $1,050. At the time of 
 such employing, he (believing it to be true) represented to 
 her, and she believed, that $1,050 was the fair market value 
 of the lot. Both of them supposed the lot to be entirely 
 vacant ; but a third person, owning the adjoining lot, had by
 
 340 LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTY. [CH. XTV. 
 
 mistake constructed on her lot, thinking it was his, a valuable 
 house and barn in such manner that they were part of the 
 realty. Neither plaintiff nor Creigh knew an} - thing of this 
 at the time of the employing. With the buildings the lot was 
 worth over $3,000. Creigh learned of it before making a 
 sale, but did not disclose it to plaintiff. He sold the lot to 
 defendant for $1,150 ; the latter knowing of the buildings on 
 the lot, and knowing that Creigh knew, and that plaintiff was 
 ignorant of the fact. Of the $1,150, $450 was paid in cash, 
 plaintiff receiving $350 and Creigh $100, and $700 was secured 
 by the defendant's note to plaintiff and his mortgage on the 
 lot. Upon learning of the facts, plaintiff tendered to de- 
 fendant the $350, with interest, and the note and mortgage, 
 and demanded a reconveyance of the lot, which defendant 
 refused. The action is to jescind the sale and convej'ance. 
 The court below decided in favor of plaintiff. 
 
 The decision of the court below proceeds on the proposi- 
 tions : First, that it was the duty of Creigh, upon learning of 
 the buildings being upon the lot, to communicate that fact to 
 plaintiff, and that by selling the lot without disclosing that 
 fact, at a price which he knew she had put upon it_in igno- 
 rance of that fact, he committed a fraud upon her ; and, 
 second, that defendant, by purchasing with notice of Creigh's 
 fraud, became a party tojt. If the first proposition be cor- 
 rect, the second follows as a necessary consequence. 
 
 The case turns upon whether it was the duty of Creigh, 
 before making a sale, to disclose what he had learned to his 
 principal. Upon this contract of agency, my brethren are of 
 opinion (though it is not mine), that when Creigh learned a 
 fact affecting the value of the property, and of which fact he 
 knew she was ignorant when she fixed the price, and if he 
 had reason to believe that, had she known the fact, she would 
 have fixed a higher price (as in this case she undoubtedly 
 would), then good faith towards his principal required of him, 
 and it was his legal duty, to disclose the fact to herbefore_he 
 pj-oceederl to seH^o that she might, if so disposed, fix the 
 selling price in accordance with the actual condition of things.
 
 178.] BAKER V. NEW YORK, ETC. BANK. 341 
 
 This being so, his selling upon the basis of the price first 
 fixed, without disclosing to her the fact he had learned, was 
 of course a fraud on her. 
 
 The tender was sufficient. Defendant and Creigh were 
 parties to the fraud on plaintiff, by which Creigh, one of the 
 parties, received (in effect) from defendant, the other party 
 to it, $100. No consideration of equity or morality would 
 require of plaintiff to make that good either to Creigh or de- 
 fendant. All that can be required of her as a condition of 
 her repudiating the transaction imposed on her by the fraud 
 of Creigh and defendant is to restore what (in ignorance of 
 the facts) she received in the transaction. 
 
 Judgment affirmed. 
 
 5. Liability in equity for trust funds diverted by agent. 
 
 178.] BAKER v. NEW YORK NATIONAL 
 EXCHANGE BANK. 
 
 100 NEW YORK, 31. 1885. 
 
 ACTION to recover the amount of a check drawn upon de- 
 fendant by " C. A. Wilson & Bro., agents." The drawers 
 were commission merchants who were insolvent, and who, 
 in order to protect their principals, opened with defendant, 
 under the above title, a deposit account to the credit of which 
 they deposited the proceeds of the sales of their principals' 
 goods. The check in question was given in settlement of the 
 account of the agents with plaintiff, as principal. Defendant 
 alleged that there was no balance of the account with which 
 to pay the check, and offered to prove that by authority of 
 the agents they had charged against the account an individual 
 indebtedness of the firm. This evidence was excluded. 
 
 ANDREWS, J. The relation between a commission agent 
 for the sale of goods and his principal is fiduciary. The 
 title to the goods until sold remains in the principal, and
 
 342 LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTY. [CH. XIV. 
 
 when sold, the proceeds, whether in the form of money, or 
 notes, or other securities, belong to him, subject to the lien 
 of the commission agent for advances and other charges. 
 The agent holds the goods and the proceeds upon an implied 
 trust to dispose of the goods according to the directions of 
 the principal, and to account for, and pay over to him the 
 proceeds from sales. The relation between the parties in 
 respect to the proceeds of sales is not that of debtor and 
 creditor simply. The money and securities are specifically 
 the property of the principal, and he may follow and reclaim 
 them, so long as their identity is not lost, subject to the 
 rights of a bond fide purchaser for value. In case of the 
 bankruptcy of the agent, neither the goods nor their pro 
 ceeds would pass to his assignees in bankruptcy for general 
 administration, but would be subject to the paramount claim 
 of the principal. Chesterfield Manufacturing Co. v. Dehon, 
 5 Pick. 7 ; Merrill v. Bank of Norfolk, 19 Id. 32 ; Thomp- 
 son v. Perkins, 3 Mason, 232 ; Knatchbutt v. Hallett, L. R. 
 13 Ch. Div. 696 ; Duguid\. Edwards, 50 Barb. 288 ; Story on 
 Agency, 229. - The relation between a principal and a con- 
 signee for sale is, however, subject to modification by express 
 agreement, or by agreement implied from the course of busi- 
 ness or dealing between them. The parties may so deal that 
 the consignee becomes a mere debtor to the consignor for the 
 proceeds of sales, having the right to appropriate the specific 
 proceeds for his own use. 
 
 In the present case the bank account against which the 
 check was drawn, represented trust moneys belonging to the 
 principals for whom Wilson & Bro. were agents. The 
 deposits to the credit of this account were made in the name 
 of the firm, with the word " agents" added. The} 7 were the 
 proceeds of commission sales. Wilson & Bro. became insol- 
 vent in October, 1878, and they opened the account in this 
 form for the purpose of protecting their principals, which 
 purpose was known to the bank at the time. The check in 
 question was drawn on this account in settlement for a bal- 
 ance due to plaintiffs upon cash sales made by the drawers
 
 178.] BAKER V. NEW YORK, ETC. BANK. 343 
 
 as their agents. It is clear upon the facts that the fund 
 represented by the deposit account was a trust fund, and that 
 the bank had no right to charge against it the individual 
 debt of Wilson & Bro. The bank, having notice of the char- 
 acter of the fund, could not appropriate it to the debt of 
 Wilson & Bro., even with their consent to the prejudice of 
 the cestui que trusts. The supposed difficult}* in maintaining 
 the action arising out of the fact that the money deposited was 
 not the specific proceeds of the plaintiffs' goods, is answered 
 by the case of Van Alen v. American Nat. Bank, 52 N. Y. 
 1. Conceding that Wilson & Bro. used the specific proceeds 
 for their own purposes, and their identity was lost, yet when 
 they made up the amounts so used, and deposited them in 
 the trust account, the amounts so deposited were impressed 
 with the trust in favor of the principals, and became substi- 
 tuted for the original proceeds and .subject to the same 
 equities. The objection that the deposit account represented 
 not only the proceeds of the plaintiffs' goods, but also the pro- 
 ceeds of the goods of other persons, and that the other par- 
 ties interested are not before the court, and must be brought 
 in in order to have a complete determination of the contro- 
 versy, is not well taken. The objection for defect of parties 
 was not taken in the answer, and moreover it does not appear 
 that there are any unsettled accounts of Wilson & Bro. with 
 any other person or persons for whom they were agents. 
 The check operated as a setting apart of so much of the 
 deposit account to satisfy the plaintiffs' claim. It does not 
 appear that the plaintiffs are not equitably entitled to this 
 amount out of the fund, or that there is any conflict of inter- 
 est between them and any other person or persons for whom 
 Wilson & Bro. acted as consignees. The presumption, in 
 the absence of any contrary indication, is, that the fund was 
 adequate to protect all interests, and that Wilson & Bro. 
 appropriated to the plaintiffs onty their just share. 
 
 We are of opinion that the judgment was properly directed, 
 and it should therefore be affirmed. 
 
 All concur. Judgment affirmed.
 
 344 LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTY. [CH. XTV, 
 
 178.] RIEHL v. EVANSVILLE FOUNDRY 
 ASSOCIATION. 
 
 104 INDIANA, 70. 1885. 
 
 ACTION to have defendant declared a trustee of certain 
 real estate for benefit of plaintiff. Judgment for plaintiff. 
 
 ELLIOTT, J. The substantial averments of the appellee's 
 complaint are these : Frederick A. Riehl was the appellee's 
 book-keeper and salesman, and, in that capacity, received 
 of its money $6,000 which he embezzled ; with the money 
 embezzled he bought real estate, caused the title to be made 
 to his wife, and built a house on the real estate so purchased 
 and convejed to her; that she had no money of her own 
 with which to purchase the property, but, with knowledge 
 of her husband's fraudulent appropriation of his employ- 
 er's money, took the title to the property for the purpose of 
 defrauding his employer. 
 
 A book-keeper or salesman, who receives the money of 
 his employer by virtue of his employment, does receive it in 
 a fiduciary capacity, and if he fraudulently appropriates it to 
 his own use, he is guilty of a breach of trust. The funds 
 which come into the hands of an agent for his principal are 
 trust funds, and the latter, as the beneficiary, becomes in 
 equity the owner of the propert}' purchased by the agent 
 with these funds. Where one occupies the position of a trustee, 
 either b}' express appointment or b}- implication of law, and 
 wrongfully uses the money received by him as trustee in the 
 purchase of property, the beneficiary may follow it into the 
 property. Pomeroy Eq. Juris, sec. 1051 ; Story Eq. Juris, 
 sec. 1260 ; Bank of America v. Pollock, 4 Edw. Ch. 215 ; 
 Taylor v. Plumer, 3 M. & S. 562 ; Pugh v. Pugh, 9 Ind. 
 132 ; Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y. 133 (25 Am. R. 152). 
 
 "The trust," says Mr. Bigelow, "will follow the estate 
 into the hands of all purchasers with notice, and of volun- 
 teers or persons taking by gift or descent from the trustees." 
 Bigelow, Eq. 63.
 
 178.] RIEHL V. EVANSVTLLE FOUNDRY ASS'N. 345 
 
 In this instance, Mrs. Riehl was a volunteer, and had 
 notice of the trust. Clearly enough, she cannot successfully 
 resist the effort of the beneficiary to follow the money into 
 the property conveyed to her. 
 
 The complaint is not one by a creditor to set aside a fraud- 
 ulent conveyance of property, but is one to enforce a trust 
 arising by implication of law. Where an agent, in violation 
 of his trust, uses the money of his principal, the law implies 
 a trust in favor of the principal, and to enforce the trust thus 
 implied equity will subject the property purchased to the 
 claims of the principal, as against either a volunteer or a 
 fraudulent grantee. It is this equitable principle which the 
 complaint invokes. 
 
 Cases are cited holding that where an agent embezzles 
 money from his employer and invests it in property, the prin- 
 cipal cannot follow the trust into the property, because the 
 remedy against the agent is by a criminal prosecution. 
 Campbell v. Drake, 4 Ire. Eq. 94 ; Pascoag Bank v. Hunt, 
 3 Edw. Ch. 583. 
 
 We have no doubt that these cases were not well decided. 
 They are in conflict with the verj* great weight of authority, 
 and are unsound in principle. The fact that the agent may 
 be criminally prosecuted does not affect the right of the prin- 
 cipal to get back his money. With quite as much reason 
 might it be urged that the principal could not take from the 
 embezzler the money, if found on his person, because he can 
 be punished by a criminal prosecution, as to urge that the 
 principal cannot follow the trust because the embezzler is 
 liable to be punished by a prosecution at the instance of the 
 State. There is no conceivable reason why the wronged em- 
 ploj-er ma}' not secure his money, and the embezzler be also 
 punished. The punishment is not to vindicate or reward the 
 principal, but to protect the community from the criminal 
 acts of embezzlers. 
 
 We agree with counsel that the beneficiary cannot follow 
 the trust into the property purchased by the agent, and also 
 compel payment of the money from the agent. Barker v.
 
 346 LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTY. [CH. XTV. 
 
 Barker, 14 Wis. 142 ; Murray v. Lylbum, 2 Johns. Ch. 
 441. But that question does not arise in this case. Here 
 the beneficiary seeks to subject the property bought with 
 the trust funds to its claims, and does not seek to coerce the 
 agent to also refund the money embezzled. The rule of 
 which we are speaking does not forbid the beneficiary from 
 obtaining a judgment against the agent for the sum remain- 
 ing due after deducting the value of the property, and, under 
 our system, the plaintiff in such a case as this may, in one 
 action, obtain both equitable and legal relief. This is what 
 the complaint seeks, and it is not vulnerable to a demurrer, 
 even though it may demand too much, for a complaint suf- 
 ficient to entitle the plaintiff to some relief will repel a 
 demurrer. 
 
 (The court then decides that the evidence is sufficient to 
 sustain the finding and judgment of the trial court). 
 
 Judgment affirmed.
 
 PART IV. 
 
 LEGAL EFFECT OF THE RELATION AS BETWEEN 
 THE AGENT AND THIRD PARTIES. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 CONTRACT RELATIONS BETWEEN AGENT AND THIRD 
 PARTY. 
 
 1. Liability of agent upon an unauthorized contract. 
 
 183.] KROEGER v. PITCAIRN. 
 
 101 PENNSYLVANIA STATE, 311. 1882. 
 
 CASE, to recover damages against an agent for loss sus- 
 tained by plaintiff in consequence of the agent's representa- 
 tions. Judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto. 
 
 Defendant was acting as agent for a, fire insurance com- 
 pany, and represented to plaintiff that the company, notwith- 
 standing the terms of the policy t would allow plaintiff to keep 
 petroleurn. Defendant had no authority to make this repre- 
 sentation, and the policy was snnrassfully defended by the 
 company. 
 
 STERRETT, J. The subject of complaint, in both specifi- 
 cations of error, is the entry of judgment for defendant non 
 obstante veredicto. It is contended that, upon the facts es- 
 tablished by the verdict, judgment should have been entered 
 thereon in favor of plaintiff. The jury were instructed to 
 return a verdict for the amount claimed by him, if they were 
 satisfied the allegations of fact contained in the point pre- 
 sented by him were true. In view of this, the finding in his 
 favor necessarily implies a verification of the several matters
 
 348 AGENT AND TH1KD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 specified in plaintiffs point, and hence it must now be re- 
 garded as containing a truthful recital of the circumstances 
 connected with the delivery of the policy and paj'ment of the 
 premium. 
 
 The transaction, as therein detailed, clearly amounted to a 
 mutual understanding or agreement between the parties that 
 the stock of merchandise mentioned in the policy should 
 include one barrel of carbon oil ; in other words, that the 
 plaintiff should have the privilege of keeping that quantit}' of 
 oil in connection with and as a part of the stock insured, 
 without thereby invalidating his policy. It is impossible to 
 regard the transaction in any other light. The jur}' found 
 that plaintiff " took the policy upon the faith " of the 
 representations made by defendant. These representations 
 were not merely expressions of opinion as to the meaning of 
 the policy. On the contrary, the defendant, acting as its 
 agent and assuming authority to speak for the insurance 
 company, asserted without any qualification that when car- 
 bon oil was kept as plaintiff was in the habit of keeping it 
 a single barrel at a time it was unnecessarj* to mention 
 the fact in the policy, or otherwise obtain the consent of the 
 company ; that no notice is ever taken of it unless " it is kept 
 in large quantit}' say several hundred barrels. In that 
 case, when it is wholesale, it should be mentioned ; but as 
 long as it is kept, not more than a barrel in the store at a 
 time, it is considered as general merchandise, and is not 
 taken notice of in any other way." Such was the language 
 employed by defendant, evidently for the purpose of dis- 
 pelling any doubt that existed in the mind of the plaintiff, 
 and inducing him to accept the policy and pay the pre- 
 mium ; and to that end at least it was successful. What was 
 said and done by defendant, in the course of the transaction, 
 amounted to more than a positive assurance that the accepted 
 meaning of the policy was as represented by him. In effect, 
 if not in substance, his declarations were tantamount to a 
 proposition, on behalf of the company he assumed to rep- 
 resent, that if the insurance was effected it should be with
 
 183.] KROEGEK V. PITCAIRN. 349 
 
 the understanding that a barrel of carbon oil was included in 
 and formed part of the insured stock of merchandise, without 
 being specially mentioned in the policy. 
 
 The plaintiff doubtless so regarded his declarations, and 
 relying thereon, as the jury has found, accepted the policy 
 on the terms proposed, and thus concluded, as he believed, 
 a valid contract of insurance, authorizing him to keep in 
 stock, as he had theretofore done, a small quantity of carbon 
 oil. It was not until after the property was destroyed that 
 he was undeceived. He then discovered, that in consequence 
 of defendant having exceeded his authority, he was without 
 remedy against the company. 
 
 Has he any remedy against the defendant, by whose un- 
 authorized act he was placed in this false position? We 
 think he has. If the president, or &ny one duly authorized 
 to represent the company, had acted as defendant did, there 
 could be no doubt as to its liability. Wh}* should not the 
 defendant be personally responsible, in like manner, for the 
 consequences, if he, assuming to act for the compan}', over- 
 stepped the boundary of his authority, and thereby misled the 
 plaintiff to his injury, whether intentional!}* or not? 
 
 The only difference is, that in the latter the authority is 
 self-assumed, while in the former it is actual ; but that can- 
 not be urged as a sufficient reason wh}* plaintiff, who is 
 blameless in both cases, should bear the loss in one and not in 
 the other. As a general rule, " whenever a part}- undertakes 
 tq^ do any act as the agent of another, if he does not possess 
 anv authority from the principal therefor, or if he exceeds the 
 authority delegated to him, he will be personally liable to 
 the person with whom he is dealing, for or on account of his 
 principal." Story on Agency, 264. The same principle 
 is recognized in Evans on Agenc}*, 301 ; Whart. on Agency, 
 524 ; 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 380, note ; 1 Parsons on Cont. 
 67, and in numerous adjudicated cases, among which are 
 Hampton v. SpecJcenagel, 9 S. & R. 212, 222 ; 11 Am. Dec. 
 704; Layng v. Stewart, 1 W. & S. 222, 226; Me Conn v. 
 Lady, 10 W. N. C. 493 ; Jefts v. York, 10 Cush. 392 ; 
 Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467.
 
 350 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 In the latter case, it is said, the reason why an agent is 
 liable in damages to the person with whom he contracts when 
 he exceeds his authority, is that the party dealing with him 
 is deprived of any remedj* upon the contract against the prin- 
 cipal. The contract, though in form that of the principal, is 
 not his in fact, and it is but just that the loss occasioned by 
 there being no valid contract with him should be borne by the 
 agent who contracted for him without authority. In Layng 
 v. Stewart, supra, Mr. Justice Huston says : " It is not worth 
 while to be learned on very plain matters. The cases cited 
 show that if an agent goes beyond his authority and employs 
 a person, his principal is not bound, and in such case the 
 agent is bound." 
 
 The plaintiff in error, in Me Conn v. Lady, supra, made a 
 contract, believing he had authority to do so, and not intend- 
 ing to bind himself personally. The jury found he had no 
 authority to make the contract as agent, and this court, in 
 affirming the judgment, . said : "It was a question of fact 
 submitted to the jury whether the plaintiff in error had au- 
 thority from the school board to make the contract as their 
 agent. They found he had not. He was personally liable 
 whether he made the contract in his own name or in the 
 name of his alleged principal. It is a mistake to suppose 
 that the only remedy was an action against him for the wrong. 
 The party can elect to treat the agent as a principal in the 
 contract." 
 
 The cases in which agents have been adjudged liable 
 personally have sometimes been classified as follows ; viz. : 
 (1) Where the agent makes a false representation of his 
 authority with intent to deceive. (2) Where, with the knowl- 
 edge of his want of authority, but without intending any 
 fraud, he assumes to act as though he were fully authorized. 
 (3) Where he undertakes to act bond fide, believing he has 
 authority, but in fact has none, as in the case of an agent 
 acting under a forged power of attorney. As to cases fairly 
 brought within either of the first two classes, there cannot be 
 any doubt as to the personal liability of the self-constituted
 
 183.] KROEGER V. PITCAIEN. 351 
 
 agent ; and his liability may be enforced either by an action 
 on the case for deceit, or by electing to treat him as principal. 
 While the liability of agents, in cases belonging to the third 
 class, has sometimes been doubted, the weight of authority 
 appears to be that they are also liable. 
 
 In Story on Agency, the learned author, recognizing the 
 undoubted liability of those belonging to the first two classes, 
 says : " Another case may be put which may seem to admit 
 of some doubt, and that is where the party undertakes to act 
 as an agent for the principal, bonafide, believing he had due 
 authority, and therefore acts under an innocent mistake. In 
 this last case, however, the agent is held by law to be equally 
 as responsible, as he is in the two former cases, although 
 he is guilty of no intentional fraud or moral turpitude. This 
 whole doctrine proceeds upon a plain principle of justice ; for 
 every person so acting for another, by a natural if not by a 
 necessary implication, holds himself out as having competent 
 authority to do the act, and he thereby draws the other party 
 into a reciprocal engagement. If he has no such authority 
 
 fifa, still hp flops n wrrmg fo the nt.hpr pa.rt.yj 
 
 ftiTd_rf__tbat wrong produces injury to the latter, owing to his 
 confidence in the truth of an express or implied assertion of 
 anthgrity by the agent, it is perfectly lust that he who makqs 
 such assertion should be personally responsible for the con- 
 sequences, jgther^ than that the injury should be borne by 
 the other party who has been misled by it." Story on 
 Agency, 264. This principle is sustained by the authori- 
 ties there cited, among which is Smout v. Hbery, 10 M. & 
 W. 1, 9. 
 
 Without pursuing the subject further, we are of the opinion 
 that upon the facts established by the verdict, judgment 
 should have been entered for the plaintiff, on the question 
 of law. 
 
 Judgment reversed, and judgment is now entered in 
 favor of the plaintiff for $3,027.20, the amount found by the 
 jury, with interest from January 20, 1882, the date of the 
 verdict. Judgment reversed.
 
 352 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 183.] BALTZEN y. NICOLAY. 
 
 53 NEW YORK, 467. 1873. 
 
 ACTION for damages against an auctioneer. Judgment for 
 plaintiffs. 
 
 Defendant, without disclosing his principal, sold stock to 
 plaintiffs. The principal i*e fused to perform because the 
 stock was sold at a price lower than that authorized. De- 
 fendant sets up that the contract of sale was void because 
 not in writing. 
 
 ANDREWS, J. There are but two theories upon which the 
 plaintiffs can claim to recover in this action. The one is that 
 the defendant, acting as agent for Belmont & Co. in selling 
 the stock, exceeded his authority by selling it below the 
 price limited by them for the sale. The other is that the 
 defendant did not at the time of the sale disclose his princi- 
 pals, and thereby became bound as principal upon the con- 
 tract made. When an agent makes a contract beyond^hjs 
 authority, by which the principal is not bound, by reason of 
 the fact that it was unauthorized, the agent is liable in dam- 
 ages to the person dealing with him upon the faith that Jie 
 possessed the authority which he assumed. The ground and 
 form of his liability in such a case has been the subject 
 of discussion, and there are conflicting decisions upon the 
 point ; but the later and better considered opinion seems 
 to be that his liability, when the contract is made in the 
 name of his principal, resjb8_upon an implied warranty of 
 his authority to make it, and the remedy is by an action 
 forjte breach. Gotten v. Wright, 8 E. & B. 647 ; White 
 v. Madison, 26 N. Y. 117 ; Dung v. Parker, 52 Id. 494. 
 
 The reason why the agent is liable in damages jo the per- 
 8on_with wjiom he contracts, when he excecdshis authority, 
 is that the party dealing with him_ig_deprived of anjemedy 
 upon the contract against the principal. The contract, 
 though in form the contract of the principal, is not his in 
 fact, and it is but just that the loss occasioned by there being
 
 5 183.} BALTZEN V. NICOLAY. 353 
 
 no valid contract with him should be borne by the agent who 
 contracted for him without authority. In order to make the 
 agent liable in such a case, however, the unauthorized con- 
 tract must be one which the law would enforce against the 
 principal if it had been_ authorized by him. Dung v. 
 Parker, supra. Otherwise the anomaly would exist of giving 
 a right of action against the assumed agent for an unau- 
 thorized representation of his power to make a contract, 
 when the breach of the contract itself, if he had been au- 
 thorized to make it, would have furnished no ground of 
 action. That the agent who makes a contract for an undis- 
 closed principal is personally bound by it. although the party 
 dealing with him ma} 7 know the general fact that he is antjnjg 
 asjigent, is well settled ; nor does the fact that the agentJs 
 an auctioneer, and that the mntraot arises upon a sale by 
 hirn^ as such, withdraw it from the operation of the rule . 
 Thomson v. Davenport, 9 B. & C. 78 ; Mitts v. Hunt, 20 
 Wend. 431. 
 
 Applying these principles to the case, the recovery cannot 
 be upheld. There was no payment on account of the pur- 
 chase of the stock, and no delivery ; and no memorandum in 
 writing, of the sale, was shown to have been made by the 
 auctioneer. The plaintiffs upon the case made must recover, 
 if at all, upon the basis of the existence of a contract, valid 
 in form, for the purchase of the stock. If the}' rely upon the 
 false warranty of authority by the defendant, then, if the 
 contract was invalid within the Statute of Frauds, they can 
 recover nothing, for in a legal sense they have sustained no 
 injury. If they say that the contract was the personal con- 
 tract of the defendant, he has a right to interpose the stat- 
 ute as his defence. The validity of the contract, under the 
 Statute of Frauds, was put in issue by the pleadings. It 
 appeared upon the trial that there was no delivery of the 
 stock, and that the purchase money, although tendered, was 
 not accepted by the defendant. The defendant, at the con- 
 clusion of the plaintiffs' case, moved to dismiss the complaint 
 on the ground that no liability had been shown, and no valid 
 
 23
 
 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 contract of purchase or sale, within the statute, had been 
 proved. The referee denied the motion and the defendant 
 excepted. The exception was well taken. 
 
 It was part of the plaintiffs' case to show a valid contract for 
 the sale of the stock ; and, upon objection being interposed 
 on the ground of the statute, it appearing that the contract 
 proved was within it, they were bound to establish affirma- 
 tively the existence of an agreement valid by its provisions. 
 
 The fact that the law imposes upon auctioneers the duty 
 to make memoranda of sales made b} T them did not relieve 
 the plaintiffs from the necessity, in this action, of proving 
 a valid contract ; and the presumption which in many cases 
 is indulged, in favor of the performance of official duty, can- 
 not stand for proof that there was a written contract of sale 
 as against the defendant, who denies the fact, and against 
 whom the contract is directly or indirectly sought to be 
 enforced. 
 
 The waiver, by the defendant, of the deposit of a part of 
 the purchase money required by the conditions of sale, pre- 
 cluded him from alleging the omission to make it as a breach 
 of the contract by the plaintiffs ; but it did not estop him 
 from showing that there was no actual payment on the con- 
 tract, without which the statute is not satisfied, where the 
 fact of payment is relied upon to take a contract out of it. 
 
 The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, 
 with costs to abide the event. 
 
 RAPALLO, ALLEN, and FOLGER, JJ., concur. 
 
 CHURCH, C. J., GROVER and PECKHAM, JJ., dissent. 
 
 Judgment reversed. 
 
 2. Liability of agent who acts for incompetent principal 
 
 184.] PATTERSON v. LIPPINCOTT. 
 
 47 NEW JERSEY LAW, 457. 1885. 
 [Reported herein at p. 21.]
 
 185.] COMFORT V. GRAHAM. 355 
 
 3. Liability of agent who acts for fictitious principal. 
 
 185.] COMFORT v. GRAHAM. 
 
 87 IOWA, 295. 1893. 
 
 ACTION for services rendered as attorney. Judgment for 
 defendant. 
 
 Defendant, in behalf of an unincorporated society, engaged 
 plaintiff to perform services as an attorney. The facts 
 appear in the opinion. 
 
 KINNE, J. ... It is insisted that, in making the contract 
 with the plaintiff, the defendant was acting in a representa- 
 tive capacity only, and hence is not personally liable. It 
 appears that the plaintiff was a member of the order, and 
 knew that the defendant was acting in behalf of the branch 
 of the order in Iowa, of which he was then the head, and it is 
 true that the defendant, in writing the plaintiff about the 
 work he was to do, expressed the hope that he (plaintiff) 
 " would consider it a labor of love." But the plaintiff in his 
 reply saj's: " My labors of love are somewhat extensive 
 here, but will do the best I can in part, and you can send me 
 the balance if you recover." The plaintiff did not charge 
 full value for his services. Except the defendant's naked 
 statement in his testimony that he was acting in the matter 
 in a representative capacity, we find no evidence whatever to 
 justify the contention that such was the arrangement or under- 
 standing between the plaintiff and the defendant. It appears 
 to us, also, that if the defendant sought, as he did, to shield 
 himself from personal liability because the contract for ser- 
 vices was made in a representative capacity, it was incum- 
 bent on him to establish that fact. He has not done so. On 
 the contrary, we think it clearly appears that the order which 
 the defendant claimed to represent was an unincorporated, 
 voluntary association, and hence he represented no principal 
 which the law recognized ; hence, if it be conceded that the
 
 856 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 defendant undertook to act for such an association, he is 
 personally liable. Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa, 220 ; Reding 
 v. Anderson, 72 Iowa, 498. 
 
 It is true that the judgment in this case stands as the 
 verdict of a jury, and cannot be disturbed if it finds support 
 in the evidence. We are unable, however, to see that the 
 defendant has established any of his claims, and the judg- 
 ment must be Reversed. 1 
 
 4. Rights and liabilities of agent where credit is extended 
 to him exclusively. 
 
 186.] KELLY v. THUEY. 
 
 102 MISSOURI, 522. 1890. 
 
 ACTION for specific performance of a contract brought by 
 James T. Kelly against defendant. Judgment for plaintiff. 
 
 The contract was made and executed by defendant and D. 
 T. Kell} 7 for the sale and purchase of land. Plaintiff claimed 
 to be the real party in interest, and as such offered to per- 
 form the contract, and demanded a deed. Defendant had no 
 knowledge of the interest of plaintiff in the contract. 
 
 BLACK, J. . . . We must take this verified answer as an 
 admission that Thuey knew D. T. Kelly was bu}'ing the 
 property for an unnamed person. The other evidence shows 
 that he was acting for plaintiff, but this Thue}* did not know. 
 The contract was taken in the name of the agent by the 
 directions of the plaintiff, for he had it prepared. Under these 
 circumstances can the plaintiff compel specific performance? 
 
 Where, as here, the contract, is not under seal, if it 
 can be gathered from the whole instrument that one party 
 acted as agent, the principal will be bound, or he may sue 
 
 1 See also In re Northumberland Aye. Hotel, L. R. 33 Ch. D. 16, ante, 
 p. 39 ; McArthar v. Times Printing Co., 48 Minn. 319, ante, p. 42 ; Western 
 Pob. House v. District Tp. of Rock, 84 Iowa, 101, ante, p. 45.
 
 186.] KELLY V. THUEY. 357 
 
 thereon in his own nanje. Indeed, if the instrument is so 
 uncertain in its terms as to leave it in doubt whether the 
 principal or agent is to be bound, such uncertainty may be 
 obviated by the production of parol evidence. Hartzell v. 
 Crumb, 90 Mo. 630 : Elostermann v. Loos, 58 Mo. 290. 
 But these principles cannot aid the plaintiff in this case, for 
 there is nothing whatever on the face of thisjxmtract to show 
 
 as gent. for fln.yj>n<>. 
 
 The plaintiff insists that a much more comprehensive 
 doctrine should be applied, and he refers to the often cited 
 case of Higgins v. Senior, 8 M. & W. 834, which was a 
 contract for the sale of goods. The question presented there 
 was, whether the defendant could discharge himself by prov- 
 ing that the agreement, though made in his own name, was 
 really made by him as the agent of a third person, and that 
 this was known to the plaintiff when the contract was signed. 
 "There is no doubt," says the court, " that, where such an 
 agreement is made, it is competent to show that one or both 
 of the contracting parties were agents for other persons, and 
 acted as such agents in making the contract so as to give the 
 benefit of the contract on the one hand to, and charge with 
 liability on the other, the unnamed principal; and this, 
 whether the agreement be or be not required to be in writing 
 by the Statute of Frauds." 
 
 Such proof, it is said, does not violate the rule of law 
 which says, parol evidence will not be received to vary the 
 terms of a written contract, because it only shows that the 
 agreement binds another person by reason of the act of 
 the agent in signing the agreement pursuant to his authority. 
 The doctrine of that case has been quoted with approval by 
 this court on two occasions. Briggs v. Munchon, 56 Mo. 
 467 ; Hi g gins v. Dellinger, 22 Mo. 397. The following, and 
 many other authorities, are to the same effect: Story on 
 Agency (9th ed.), sec. 160 a; Whart. on Agents, sec. 403; 
 Fry on Spec. Perf. sec. 148 ; Huntington v. Jhox, 7 Cush. 
 371 ; Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357. 
 
 This broad doctrine, that, when an agent makes a contract
 
 358 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV, 
 
 in his own name only, the known or unknown principal may 
 sue or be sued thereon, may be applied ip many oasps vyij.li 
 safety and especially in cases of informal commercial con- 
 tyacts. But it is certain that 
 
 exclusive credit is given to the agent^nd it is intended by 
 both parties that no resort shall be~had by or against the 
 principal (Story on Agency, sec. 160 a), nor does it auulyjx) 
 those cases where skill, solvency ? or any personal quality oj' 
 one of the parties to the contract is a material ingredient in 
 it. _ Fry on Spec. Perf. sec. 149. 
 
 Now, in this case, the written contract is full, complete. 
 and formal. It expresses just what the parties thereto 
 intprujpH it fthoiiH oYprpgq The plaintiff had it prepared, 
 and must be taken to have directed it to be made in the name 
 of D. T. Kelly and not in his own name. In short, the contract 
 is one between Thuey and D. T. Kelly, and was so intended 
 by all the parties. It contains agreements to be performed 
 by both partjeA. Tbuey agreed to sell the land to D. T. 
 Kelly, and agreed to take the latter's notes and deed of tryst 
 for the deferred payment^ He did not agree to take the 
 notes and deed of trust of the plaintiff for the deferred 
 payments. To admit parol evidence to show that D. T. 
 Kelly acted as an agent of the plaintiff, and then substitute, 
 or add, the plaintiff as a party, is simply to make ,a jnew^on- 
 tract for the parties. To say that the admission of such 
 evidence does not alter the written contract, in a case like 
 the one in hand, is a doctrine too subtle and refined to be 
 comprehended. D. T. Kelly contracted for the warranty 
 deed of Thuey, and he is entitled to Thuey's covenant of 
 warrant}', and could not be required to take the covenants 
 of some person to whom Thuey should sell the property. 
 Steiner v. Zwickey, 43 N. W. Rep. 376. 
 
 So, on the other hand, Thuey contracted for, and is entitled 
 to have, the notes and deed of trust of D. T. Kelly, and he 
 cannot be compelled to take the notes of another person. 
 Whatever the rights may be as between the Kellys, the 
 plaintiff is not a party to the contract with Thuey, and he
 
 187.] KAULBACK V. CHURCHILL. 359 
 
 cannot enforce specific performance of it, and thereby compel 
 Thuey to accept his obligations for the deferred payments. 
 
 The right to enforce specific performance of this contract 
 exists in D. T. Kelly, and not the plaintiff. D. T. Kelly 
 must make the note and deed of trust, and to that end the 
 title must be vested in him, and he is, therefore, a necessary 
 and indispensable part}" to this suit. 
 
 The judgment is, therefore, reversed and the cause re- 
 manded. All concur. 
 
 5. Liability of agent who acts for a foreign principal. 
 187.] KAULBACK v. CHURCHILL. 
 
 59 NEW HAMPSHIRE, 296. 1879. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT, for apples sold and delivered. The defendant, 
 residing in this State, was the agent of A. & O. W. Mead 
 & Co., a firm doing business in Boston, and all its members 
 resident in Massachusetts. At the time of the sale of the 
 apples, the plaintiff was informed and knew that the defend- 
 ant was acting as agent of the firm. A referee found for 
 the defendant. 
 
 CLARK, J. " If a duly authorized agent uses such terms 
 as legally import an undertaking by the principal only, the 
 contract is that of the principal, and he alone is the party by 
 whom it is to be performed." Met. on Cont. 106. Whether 
 the defendant assumed a personal liability in making the con- 
 tract is a question of fact, which has been determined by the 
 finding of the referee. Noyes v. Patrick, 58 N. H. 618. 
 The fact that the firm of A. & O. W. Mead were residents of 
 Massachusetts, doing business there, is not of itself a ground 
 for holding the defendant personally liable. " The present 
 doctrine is, that when the terms of a contract made by an 
 agent are clear, they are to have the same construction and 
 legal effect, whether made for a domestic or for a foreign 
 principal." Met. on Cont. 111. The statement cited by
 
 360 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 the plaintiff from Story, Agencj*, sec. 268, is not now recog- 
 nized as the law, excepting, perhaps, in Maine and Louisiana. 
 Met. on Cont. Ill ; Bray v. Kettell, 1 Allen, 80; Kirkpat- 
 rick v. Stani&r, 22 Wend. 244 ; Oelricks v. Ford, 23 How. 
 49. Judgment for the defendant. 
 
 6. Liability of agent who contracts in his own name in an 
 instrument under seal. 
 
 188.] BRIGGS v. PARTRIDGE. 
 
 64 NEW YORK, 357. 1876. 
 [Reported herein at p. 248.] 
 
 7. Liability of an agent who contracts in his own name in 
 a negotiable instrument. 
 
 a. Construction from signature alone. 
 
 190.] RENDELL v. 'HARRIMAN ET AL. 
 75 MAINE, 497. 1883. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT upon the following promissory note. 
 
 The plea was the general issue with brief statement that 
 the instrument declared on was the note of the Prospect and 
 Stockton Cheese Company. 
 
 [NOTE.] 
 
 $246.50 STOCKTON, October 19, 1878. 
 
 For value received, we promise to pay S. A. Rendell, or 
 order, two hundred forty-six and fifty one-hundreths dollars, 
 in one year from date, with interest. 
 
 OTIS HARRIMAN, ^ President. 
 
 R. M. TREVETT, 1 . Directors of 
 
 L. MDDGETT, Prospect and Stockton 
 
 W. H. GINN, J Cheese Company.
 
 190.] EENDELL V. HABRIMAN. 361 
 
 Defendants offered to show that they signed the above 
 instrument as duly authorized agents of the Prospect and 
 Stockton Cheese Compan}* ; that plaintiff knew that fact 
 when he accepted the note ; that a payment had been made 
 thereon by the company and receipted for by plaintiff; and 
 that the note was for a balance due plaintiff for machinery 
 purchased by the company from plaintiff and paid for by the 
 company save for this balance. If this evidence is admissible 
 the action is to stand for trial ; otherwise defendants are to 
 be defaulted. 
 
 DANFORTH, J. All the questions which have been or can 
 be raised in this case growing out of the common law, as 
 well the purpose and effect of R. S. c. 73, 15, were raised 
 and fully discussed and settled in Sturdivant v. Hull, 59 
 Me. 172. A case so well considered and so fully sustained 
 by the authorities as that would seem to be decisive of all 
 the questions involved and would undoubtedly have been so 
 considered, but for a hope raised by what is claimed " as a 
 modification of the rule established by it, in Simpson v. 
 Garland, 72 Me. 40, following a more liberal construction 
 of the statute in NoUeboro 1 v. Clarlc, 68 Me. 87." But 
 upon a review of Sturdivant v. Hull, we see no occasion to 
 depart from its teachings, nor do we perceive any modifica- 
 tion of its doctrine in any case which follows. On the 
 other hand, Mellen v. Moore, 68 Me. 390, " is exclusively 
 based " upon it ; it is referred to as authority in Nobleboro' v. 
 Clark, and is followed in the still later case of JKoss v. 
 Brown, 74 Me. 352 ; nor do we find anything inconsistent 
 with it in Simpson v. Garland. In the latter case the note 
 contained language purporting to show that the promise was 
 that of the principal and which the court held did show it ; 
 while in Sturdivant v. Hull, no such language is used. 
 True, in the case of Ross v. Brown, it is suggested that it 
 does not appear that the maker of the note had any authority 
 to bind the town ; but from the opinion it clearly appears 
 that the liability is fixed upon the agent by force of the terms 
 of the contract and not by any extraneous evidence, or the 
 want of it. In Nobleboro 1 v. Clark, the contract was set up
 
 862 AGENT AND THIRD PAETY : CONTKACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 as binding upon the principal, and was so held because by its 
 terms it appeared that such was the intention of the agent, 
 and such being the intention, it was necessary with or with- 
 out the statute to show the authority of the agent before the 
 contract could be regarded as that of the principal. The 
 action at bar is against the alleged agents, and as suggested 
 in Sturdivant v. Hull, whatever may be the effect of the 
 statute in " extending a liability to the real party in interest 
 and affording a remedy against him, it cannot be so con- 
 strued as to discharge one who, for a sufficient consideration, 
 has expressly assumed a liabilit}' by means of a written con- 
 tract, or to allow proof aliunde for that purpose." Nor do 
 we find any case at common law to go so far. All the 
 authorities, including those cited by the defendant in this 
 case, concur in holding that the liability of the one party or 
 the other must be ascertained from the terms of the written 
 instrument, and parol proof cannot be received to vary or 
 control such terms. 
 
 That an agent may make himself responsible for his prin- 
 cipal's debt is bej^ond doubt. That the defendants in this 
 case have done so by the terms of the note in suit, uncon- 
 trolled by extraneous evidence, is settled by the uniform 
 decisions in this State, supported, as shown in Sturdivant v. 
 Hull) by the weight of reason, as well as of authority 
 elsewhere. 
 
 The evidence, then, offered, if admitted, would not avail 
 the defendants unless it had the effect to discharge them from 
 a contract into which they have entered. 
 
 It is true, that in the cases cited, such evidence was 
 admitted and was perhaps admissible, under the well estab- 
 lished rule of law, that when there is an ambiguity in the 
 contract, when the language used is equally susceptible of 
 two different constructions, evidence of the circumstances by 
 which the parties were surrounded and under which the 
 contract was made may be given, not for the purpose of 
 proving the intention of the parties independent of the writ- 
 ing, but that the intention may be more intelligently ascer- 
 tained from its terms. But to make this evidence admissible
 
 191.] BRADLEE V. BOSTON GLASS FACTORY. 363 
 
 some ambiguity must first appear ; there must be language 
 used such as may, without doing violence to its meaning, be 
 explained consistently with the liability of either party, some 
 language which, as in Simpson v. Garland, tends, in the 
 words of the statute, to show that the contract was made by 
 the agent " in the name of the principal, or in his own name 
 for his principal." 
 
 In this case no such ambiguity exists, no such language is 
 used. The promise is that of the defendants alone without 
 anything to indicate that it was for or in behalf of another. 
 True, the defendants affixed to their names their official title, 
 with the name of the corporation in which they held office, 
 but nothing whatever to qualify their promise or in the slight- 
 est degree to show it other than their own. The statute as 
 well as the decisions, with few exceptions, as we have seen, 
 requires more than this to make the testimony admissible. 
 Bray v. Kettell, 1 Allen, 80. 
 
 Defendants defaulted for the amount of the note and 
 interest. 
 
 b. Construction from signature aided by recitals in the 
 instrument. 
 
 191.] BRADLEE v. BOSTON GLASS MANU- 
 FACTORY. 
 
 16 PICKERING (Mass.), 347. 1835. 
 ASSUMPSIT on the following promissory note : 
 
 BOSTON, 13th January, 1823. 
 
 For value received, we, the subscribers, .jointty and severally, 
 promise to pay Messrs. J. and T. Bradlee or order, for the 
 Boston Glass 'Manufactory, thirty-five hundred dollars, on 
 demand, with interest 
 
 JONATHAN HUNNEWELL, 
 SAMUEL GORE, 
 CHARLES F. KUPFER. 
 
 Thirty days' notice shall be given before payment of this 
 note, by either side.
 
 864 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 Plaintiffs loaned the company $3,500, for which they re- 
 ceived the note of the company, signed by Kupfer as treasurer, 
 and-by Hunnewell and Gore as sureties. That note was can- 
 celled and this note given in its stead. The company continued 
 to pay the interest on this note. Plaintiffs have already re- 
 covered a judgment against Hunnewell, Gore, and Kupfer on 
 this note, and issued a body execution thereon against 
 Hunnewell, and covenanted with Gore, upon his paj'ment of 
 one third of the judgment, not to proceed further against 
 him. 
 
 SHAW, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. 
 
 The first question which arises here is, whether this was the 
 promissory note of the Boston Glass Manufactory, or of the 
 individuals who signed it. It is not now contended that a 
 corporation may not give a promissory note by its agents, 
 and is not to be treated, in this respect, like a natural person. 
 The main question in the present case arises from the form of 
 the contract ; and the question is, whether in this form it binds 
 the persons who signed it, or the company for whose use the 
 money was borrowed. As the forms of words in which con- 
 tracts may be made and executed are almost infinite!} 7 various, 
 the test question is, whether the person signing professes and 
 intends to bind himself, and adds the name of another to 
 indicate the capacity or trust in which he acts, or the person 
 for whose account his promise is made ; or whether the words 
 Deferring to a principal are intended to indicate that he does 
 a mere ministerial act in giving effect and authenticity to 
 the act, promise, and contract of another. Does the person 
 signing apply the executing hand as the instrument of another, 
 or the promising and engaging mind of a contracting party ? 
 It is held in man}' cases, that although the contract of one is 
 given for the debt of another, and although it is understood 
 between the person promising and the party for whom the 
 contract is entered into, that the latter is to pay it, or to 
 reimburse and indemnify the contracting party, if he should 
 be required to pay it, it is still, as between the parties to it, 
 the contract of the party making it. A leading and decisive 
 case on this point is StacJcpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. R. 27.
 
 191.] BEADLEE t?, BOSTON GLASS FACTORY. 365 
 
 With these views as to what the question is, and the 
 grounds on which it is to be considered, we are of opinion 
 that this was the promissory note and obligation of the three 
 makers, and not of the company. 
 
 The words, " for the Boston Glass Manufactory," if they 
 stood alone, would perhaps leave it doubtful and ambiguous, 
 whether they meant to bind themselves as promisors to pay 
 the debt of the company, or whether they meant to sign a 
 contract for the company, by which they should be bound to 
 pay their own debt ; though the place in which the words are 
 introduced would rather seem to warrant the former con- 
 struction. 
 
 But other considerations arise from other views of the 
 whole tenor of the note. The fact is of importance that it is 
 signed by three instead of one, and with no designation or 
 name of office, indicating any agency or connection with the 
 company. No indication appears on the note itself that either 
 of them was president, treasurer, or director, or that they 
 were a committee to act for the company. But the words 
 "jointly and severally" are quite decisive. The persons are 
 " we, the subscribers," and it is signed Jonathan Hunnewell, 
 Samuel Gore, and Charles F. Kupfer. This word," severally " 
 must have its effect ; and its legal effect was to bind each of 
 the signers. This fixes the undertaking as a personal one. 
 It would be a forced and wholly untenable construction to 
 hold, that the company and signers were all bound ; this 
 would be equally inconsistent with the terms and the obvious 
 meaning of the contract. 
 
 If we go out of the contract itself, and look at the relation 
 in which the parties stood to each other, with the view of 
 giving effect to the language of their contract for one purpose, 
 we must for another. It is a circumstance relied on for the 
 plaintiffs with some confidence, that the money was originally 
 borrowed for the company, that the note was entered on the 
 books as the debt of the company, and that the interest was 
 paid by them. But it further appears that from 1814 to 1823 
 these promisees held the note of the company, guaranteed by
 
 366 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 two of these promisors, Gore and Hunnewell, the other, 
 Kupfer, having signed it as treasurer, which did not render him 
 personally liable, and that at that time all the parties were in 
 good credit. Now upon the plaintiffs' hypothesis, they must 
 have voluntarily relinquished the Iiabilit3" of two responsible 
 guarantors, retaining the liability of the company only, and 
 that for a large debt, which, from the clause providing for a 
 mutual notice of thirty daj's, seems intended to have been a 
 kind of permanent loan. But upon the other hypothesis they 
 retained the names of two responsible persons, and that in 
 the more direct and unquestionable form of joint and several 
 promisors, together with the name of another responsible 
 person as promisor, in lieu of that of the company. 
 
 Plaintiffs non-suit. 
 
 191.] FRANKLAND v. JOHNSON. 
 
 147 ILLINOIS, 520. 1893. 
 AssuMPsrr upon the following instrument : 
 
 $5,592.00. CHICAGO, June 1, 1885. 
 
 On or before the first day of June, 1888, the Western Sea- 
 man's Friend Society agrees to pay to L. M.Johnson, or order, 
 the sum of five thousand five hundred and ninety-two dollars, 
 with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum. 
 
 B. FRANKLAND, Gen. Sup't. 
 
 Judgment was given for the plaintiff, and the defendant 
 (Franklin) appeals. 
 
 Mr. JUSTICE WILKINS. . . . The writing on its face is not 
 distinctly the note of Frankland. A personal note by him, 
 in proper form, would have used the personal pronoun "I," 
 instead of the name of the corporation, and would have been 
 signed without the designation " Gen. Sup't." Neither is it, 
 by its terms, the note of a corporation. As such, it should 
 have been been signed with the name of the corporation, by 
 its president, secretary, or other officers authorized to execute
 
 191.] FKANKLAND V. JOHNSON. 367 
 
 it, or, as in Scanlan v. Keith, 102 111. 634, by the proper 
 officers designating themselves officers of the corporation for 
 which they assumed to act, or, as in New Market Savings Bank 
 v. Gillet, 100 111. 254, using the corporate name both in the 
 bodj' of the note and in the signatures to it. 
 
 But if it be conceded that, prima facie, a general superin- 
 tendent of a corporation has authority to make promissory 
 notes in its name, and this instrument be held to appear, on 
 its face, to be the obligation of the society, rather than of 
 Frankland, certainly it could not even then be contended 
 that it was conclusively so. It is well understood that if the 
 agent, either of a corporation or an individual, makes a con- 
 tract which he has no authority to make, he binds himself 
 personally, according to the terms of the contract. Angell & 
 Ames on Corp. sec. 303. It was said by Sutherland, J., in 
 Matt v. Hicks, 1 Cow. 573 (13 A. D. 556) : " It is perfectly 
 well settled that if a person undertake to contract, as agent, 
 for an individual or corporation, and contracts in a manner 
 which is not legally binding upon his principal, he is person- 
 ally responsible (citing authorities). And the agent, when 
 sued upon such a contract, can exonerate himself from per- 
 sonal liability only by showing his authority to bind those for 
 whom he has undertaken to act. It is not for the plaintiff to 
 show that he had not authority. The defendant must show, 
 affirmatively, that he had." 1 This rule is quoted with ap- 
 proval in Wheeler v. Reed et al., 36 111. 81. 
 
 This action is against Frankland, individually. The note 
 is declared upon as his personal promise to pa}*. The Question, 
 then, as to whether it is his contract or that of the Western 
 Seaman's Friend Society, is one of fact, and so it was treated 
 on the trial. Both parties went full}* into the facts and cir- 
 cumstances leading to and attending the making of the note. 
 So far from showing affirmatively that appellant had author- 
 ity to make the note so as to bind the corporation, the evidence 
 strongly tends to show the contrary, and that it was the inten- 
 
 1 But see Baltzen v. Nicolay, ante, p. 352. The decision may be ap- 
 proved without assenting to this line of argument.
 
 368 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 tion of the parties that he should be individually responsible. 
 No record proceedings whatever, on the part of the corpora- 
 tion, pertaining to appellant's transactions with appellee or 
 her husband, were shown. It is clear that if suit had been 
 against the societ}' there could have been no recovery on the 
 evidence in this record. At all events, the facts have been 
 settled adversely to appellant, and are not open to review in 
 this court. 
 
 The propositions submitted to the trial court by appellant, 
 to be held as law applicable to the case, are mainly requests 
 to hold certain facts to have been proved, and, under the 
 evidence, the} T were all properly refused. In fact, nc argu- 
 ment is made in support of them. There is but one theory 
 on which the judgment below could be reversed by this court, 
 and that is, that the note sued on must be held to be the con- 
 tract of the corporation, absolutely and conclusively, and all 
 parol proof tending to establish appellant's liabilit}', was in- 
 competent, and that theory is clearly untenable. 
 
 As to the judgment on the attachment, it is only necessary 
 to say that the evidence at least tended to support the allega- 
 tions of the original affidavit, and the judgment of affirmance 
 in the Appellate Court is conclusive. 
 
 The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed. 
 
 Judgment affirmed.
 
 192.] MECHANICS' BANK v. COLUMBIA BANK. 369 
 
 c. Construction from signature aided by marginal headings 
 or memoranda. 
 
 192.] MECHANICS' BANK OF ALEXANDRIA 
 v. THE BANK OF COLUMBIA. 
 
 5 WHEATON (U. S.), 326. 1820. 
 ASSTJMPSIT on the following check : 
 
 No. 18. 
 
 MECHANICS' BANK OF ALEXANDRIA. 
 
 June 25, 1817. 
 Cashier of the Bank of Columbia, 
 
 Pay to the order of P. H. Minor, Esq., Ten 
 Thousand Dollars. 
 
 K WM. PATON, JR. 
 
 * $10,000. 
 
 Paton was cashier and Minor teller of the Mechanics' 
 Bank. Minor turned over the check to the Bank of the 
 United States in payment of a balance due that bank by the 
 Mechanics' Bank. The Bank of the United States presented 
 the check to the Bank of Columbia, which paid it and 
 charged it to the account of the Mechanics' Bank, treating it 
 as the check of the latter bank. The Mechanics' Bank con- 
 tended that the check was Paton's private obligation ; that 
 it bought it for value ; that he had funds in the Bank of 
 Columbia to meet it ; and that it should be charged to his ac- 
 count. The court heard parol evidence to establish the 
 official character of the check, and gave judgment for the 
 plaintiff. Defendant objected to this evidence and requested 
 a charge that the check was on its face a private check of 
 Paton's, which charge was refused. 
 
 24
 
 370 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 Mr. JUSTICE JOHNSON. . . . The only ground on which 
 it can be contended that this check was a private check, is, 
 that it had not below the name the letters Cas. or Ca. But 
 the fallacy of the proposition will at once appear from the 
 consideration, that the consequence would be, that all Paton's 
 checks must have been adjudged private. For no definite 
 meaning could be attached to the addition of those letters 
 without the aid of parol testimony. 
 
 But the fact that this appeared on its face to be a private 
 check is by no means to be conceded. On the contrary, the 
 appearance of the corporate name of the institution on the 
 face of the paper, at once leads to the belief that it is a cor- 
 porate, and not an individual transaction : to which must be 
 added the circumstances, that the cashier is the drawer, and 
 the teller the payee ; and the form of ordinary checks de- 
 viated from by the substitution of to order, for to bearer. 
 The evidence, therefore, on the face of the bill predominates 
 in favor of its being a bank transaction. Applying, then, 
 the plaintiff's own principle to the case, and the restriction 
 as to the production of parol or extrinsic evidence could have 
 been only applicable to himself. But it is enough for the 
 purposes of the defendant to establish, that there existed, on 
 the face of the paper, circumstances from which it might 
 reasonably be inferred, that it was either one or the other. 
 In that case, it became indispensable to resort to extrinsic 
 evidence to remove the doubt. The evidence resorted to for 
 this purpose was the most obvious and reasonable possible, 
 viz., that this was the appropriate form of an official check ; 
 that it was, in fact, cut out of the official check-book of the 
 bank, and noted on the margin ; that the money was drawn 
 in behalf of, and applied to the use of the Mechanics' Bank ; 
 and by all the banks, and all the officers of the banks through 
 which it passed, recognized as an official transaction. It is 
 true, it was in evidence that this check was credited to 
 Paton's own account on the books of his bank. But it was 
 done by his own order, and with the evidence before their 
 eyes that it was officially drawn. This would never have
 
 192.] HITCHCOCK V. BUCHANAN. 371 
 
 been sanctioned by the directors, unless for reasons which 
 they best understood, and on account of debits which they 
 only could explain. 
 
 It is by no means true, as was contended in argument, 
 that the acts of agents derive their validity from profess- 
 ing, on the face of them, to have been done in the exercise of 
 their agency. In the more solemn exercise of derivative 
 powers, as applied to the execution of instruments known to 
 the common-law, rules of form have been prescribed. But 
 in the diversified exercise of the duties of a general agent, the 
 liability of the principal depends upon the facts : (1) That 
 the act was done in the exercise, and, (2) Within the limits 
 of the powers delegated. These facts are necessarily inquir- 
 able into by a court and jury ; and this inquiry is not con- 
 fined to written instruments, (to which alone the principle 
 contended for could apply), but to any act with or with- 
 out writing, within the scope of the power or confidence 
 reposed in the agent ; as, for instance, in the case of money 
 credited in the books of a teller, or proved to have been de- 
 posited with him, though he omits to credit it. 
 
 Judgment affirmed. 
 
 192.] HITCHCOCK v. BUCHANAN. 
 
 105 UNITED STATES, 416. 1881. 
 
 THIS was an action of assurapsit by Hitchcock as indorsee, 
 against Buchanan and Waugh as drawers, of the following 
 bill of exchange : 
 
 OFFICE OF BELLEVILLE NAIL MILL Co., 
 $5,477.13. BELLEVILLE, ILL., Dec. 15, 1875. 
 
 Four months after date, pay to the order of John Stevens, 
 Jr., cashier, fifty-four hundred and seventy-seven ^\ dollars, 
 value received, and charge same to account of Belleville Nail 
 Mill Co. 
 
 WM. C. BUCHANAN, Pres't. 
 
 JAMES C. WAUGH, Sec'y. 
 
 To J. H. PIEPER, Treas.y Belleville, Illinois.
 
 372 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 Demurrer to a declaration against the defendants as 
 drawers of the bill was sustained, and judgment given for 
 the defendants, on the ground that the instrument was the 
 bill of the Belleville Nail Mill Company, and not the bill of 
 the defendants. 
 
 Mr. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case, delivered the 
 opinion of the court. 
 
 The bill of exchange declared on is manifest^ the draft of 
 the Belleville Nail Mill Company, and not of the individuals 
 by whose hands it is subscribed. It purports to be made 
 at the office of the company, and directs the drawee to charge 
 the amount thereof to the account of the company, of which 
 the signers describe themselves as president and secretan'. 
 An instrument bearing on its face all these signs of being 
 the contract of the principal cannot be held to bind the 
 agents personally. Sayre v. Nichols, 7 Cal. 535 ; Carpenter 
 v. Farnsworth, 106 Mass. 561, and cases there cited. 
 
 The allegation in the declaration, that the defendants made 
 "their" bill of exchange, is inconsistent with the terms of 
 the writing sued on and made part of the record, and is not 
 admitted by the demurrer. Dillon v. J3arnard, 21 Wall. 
 430 ; Binz v. Tyler, 79 111. 248. 
 
 The provision of the statute of Illinois (ed. 1877, title 
 Practice, sees. 34, 36) prohibiting defendants sued on 
 written instruments from denying their signatures, except 
 under plea verified by affidavit, has no application where the 
 fact of signature is admitted by demurrer, and the only issue 
 is one of law. 
 
 Judgment affirmed.
 
 192.] 
 
 CHIPMA^ V. FOSTER. 
 
 373 
 
 192.] CHIPMAN v. FOSTER ET AL. 
 119 MASSACHUSETTS, 189. 1875. 
 
 CONTRACT against the defendants as drawers of three drafts 
 indorsed in blank by the payees, of which the following is 
 a copy : 
 
 No. 176. $5,000. 
 
 NEW ENGLAND AGENCY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA 
 FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, PHILADELPHIA. 
 
 FOSTER & COLE, 
 General Agents 
 
 for the 
 New England 
 
 States, 
 
 15 Devonshire 
 Street, 
 Boston. 
 
 BOSTON, August 18, 1873. 
 Pay to the order of Haley, Morse, & Com- 
 pany, five thousand dollars, being in full of all 
 claims and demands against said company 
 for loss and damage by fire on the 30th day of 
 May, 1873, to property insured under policy 
 No. 824, of Boston, Mass., agency. 
 
 FOSTER & COLE. 
 
 To the Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Com- 
 pany, Philadelphia. 
 
 Defendants were general agents of the Pennsylvania Fire 
 Insurance Company of Philadelphia, and drew the drafts in 
 question in payment of three policies issued by that company. 
 The company refused to honor the drafts, and they were duly 
 protested. 
 
 GRAY, C. J. Each of these drafts, upon its face, purports 
 to be issued by the New England agency of the Pennsylvania 
 Fire Insurance Company, and shows that Foster & Cole are 
 the general agents of that corporation for the New England 
 States, as well as that the draft is drawn in paj'inent of a 
 claim against the corporation. It thus appears that Foster 
 & Cole, in drawing it, acted only as agents of the corpora- 
 tion, as clearly as if they had repeated words expressing 
 their agency after their signature ; and they cannot be held 
 personally liable as drawers thereof. Carpenter v. Fams* 
 worth, 106 Mass. 561, and cases cited. 
 
 Judgment for the defendants.
 
 874 AGENT AND THIRD PABTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 192.] CASCO NATIONAL BANK v. CLARK 
 
 ET AL. 
 
 139 NEW YORK, 307. 1893. 
 
 ACTION against defendants as makers of a promissory note. 
 Judgment for plaintiff. The opinion states the facts. 
 
 GRAY, J. The action is upon a promissory note, in the 
 following form, viz : 
 
 BROOKLYN, N. Y., August 2, 1890. 
 
 $7,500. Three months after date, we promise to pay to 
 the order of Clark & Chaplin Ice Company, seventy-five 
 hundred dollars at Mechanics' Bank : value received. 
 
 JOHN CLARK, Prest. 
 
 E. H. CLOSE, Treas. 
 
 It was delivered in payment for ice sold by the payee 
 company to the Ridgewood Ice Company, under a contract 
 between those companies, and was discounted by the plaintiff 
 for the payee, before its maturity. The appellants, Clark 
 and Close, appearing as makers upon the note, the one 
 describing himself as " Prest." and the other as "Treas.," 
 were made individually defendants. They defended on the 
 ground that they had made the note as officers of the Ridge- 
 wood Ice Company, and did not become personally liable 
 thereby for the debt represented. 
 
 Where a negotiable promissory note has been given for the 
 payment of a debt contracted by a corporation, and the lan- 
 guage of the promise does not disclose the corporate obliga- 
 tion, and the signatures to the paper are in the names of 
 individuals, a holder, taking bond fide, and without notice of 
 the circumstances of its making, is entitled to hold the note 
 as the personal undertaking of its signers, notwithstanding 
 they affix to their names the title of an office. Such an affix 
 will be regarded as descriptive of the persons and not of the 
 character of the liability. Unless the promise purports to
 
 192.] CASCO NATIONAL BANK V. CLAKK. 375 
 
 be by the corporation, it is that of the persons who subscribe 
 to it ; and the fact of adding to their names an abbreviation 
 of some official title has no legal signification as qualifying 
 their obligation, and imposes no obligation upon the corpora- 
 tion whose officers they may be. This must be regarded as 
 the long and well settled rule. Byles on Bills, 36, 37, 
 71 ; Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Wend. 271 ; Toft v. Brewster, 9 
 Johns. 334 ; Hills v. Bannister, 8 Cow. 31 ; Moss v. Liv- 
 ingston, 4 N. Y. 208 : De Witt v. Walton, 9 Id. 571 ; Bot- 
 tomley v. Fisher, 1 Hurlst. & Colt. 211. It is founded in 
 the general principle that in a contract every material thing 
 must be definitely expressed, and not left to conjecture. 
 Unless the language creates, or fairly implies, the under- 
 taking of the corporation, if the purpose is equivocal, the 
 obligation is that of its apparent makers. 
 
 It was said in Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357, 363, 
 that persons taking negotiable instruments are presumed to 
 take them on the credit of the parties whose names appear 
 upon them, and a person not a party cannot be charged, 
 upon proof that the ostensible party signed, or indorsed, as 
 his agent. It may be perfectly true, if there is proof that 
 the holder of negotiable paper was aware, when he received 
 it, of the facts and circumstances connected with its making, 
 and knew that it was intended and delivered as a corporate 
 obligation only, that the persons signing it in this manner 
 could not be held individually liable. Such knowledge might 
 be imputable from the language of the paper, in connection 
 with other circumstances, as in the case of Mott v. Hicks, 1 
 Cow. 513, where the note read, " the president and direc- 
 tors promise to pay," and was subscribed by the defendant 
 as " president." The court held that that was sufficient to 
 distinguish the case from Taft v. Brewster, supra, and 
 made it evident that no personal engagement was entered 
 into or intended. Much stress was placed in that case upon 
 the proof that the plaintiff was intimately acquainted with 
 the transaction out of which arose the giving of the corporate 
 obligation.
 
 376 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 In the case of Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank, 19 
 N. Y. 312, referred to by the appellants' counsel, the action 
 was against the defendant to hold it as the indorser of a 
 bill of exchange, drawn to the order of " S. B. Stokes, 
 Cas.," and indorsed in the same words. The plaintiff bank 
 was advised, at the time of discounting the bill, by the 
 president of the Patchin Bank, that Stokes was its cashier, 
 and that he had been directed to send it in for discount ; and 
 Stokes forwarded it in an official way to the plaintiff. It was 
 held that the Patchin Bank was liable, because the agency 
 of the cashier in the matter was communicated to the 
 knowledge of the plaintiff as well as apparent. 
 
 Incidentally, it was said that the same strictness is not 
 required in the execution of commercial paper as between 
 banks, that is, in other respects, between individuals. 
 
 In the absence of competent evidence showing or charging 
 knowledge in the holder of negotiable paper as to the charac- 
 ter of the obligation, the established and safe rule must be 
 regarded to be that it is the agreement of its ostensible 
 maker and not of some other party, neither disclosed by the 
 language, nor in the manner of execution. In this case the 
 language is, "we promise to pay," and the signature by 
 the defendants, Clark and Close, are perfectly consistent 
 with an assumption by them of the company's debt 
 
 The appearance upon the margin of the paper of the 
 printed name " Ridgewood Ice Company" was not a fact 
 canring any presumption that the note was, or was intended 
 to be, one by that compan} T . 
 
 It was competent for its officers to obligate themselves 
 personally, for any reason satisfactory to themselves ; and, 
 apparently to the world, they did so by the language of the 
 note, which the mere use of a blank form of note, having 
 upon its margin the name of their company, was insufficient 
 to negative. 
 
 (The court then decides that the fact that one Winslow 
 was a director in the paj-ee company, and also in the plaintiff 
 bank, did not charge the latter with notice as to the origin of 
 the paper.) Judgment affirmed.
 
 194.] SOUHEGAN NAT'L BANK v. BOAKDMAN. 377 
 
 d. Indorsers of bills and notes. 
 
 194.] SOUHEGAN NATIONAL BANK v. 
 BOARDMAN. 
 
 46 MINNESOTA, 293. 1891. 
 
 ACTION against defendant as indorser upon the following 
 promissory iiote : 
 
 $1,000. MINNEAPOLIS, May 12, 1884. 
 
 Six months after date we promise to pay to the order of 
 A. J. Boardman, treasurer, one thousand dollars, value re- 
 ceived, with interest at eight per cent, after maturity. 
 
 MINNEAPOLIS ENGINE & MACHINE WORKS. 
 By A. L. CROCKER, Sec'y. 
 
 [Indorsed :] A. J. BOARDMAN, Treasurer. 
 
 Defendant was treasurer of the Minneapolis Engine & 
 Machine Works, and claims to have made the indorsement in 
 that capacity. Judgment for plaintiff. 
 
 MITCHELL, J. (after stating the facts, and deciding that 
 the trial court erred in not submitting to the jurj* a question 
 as to the extension of the time of pa3*ment without the 
 consent of the defendant). With a view to another trial it 
 is necessary to consider the questions involved in the first 
 defence. These are (1) whether, on the face of the paper, 
 this is the indorsement of the corporation or of defendant 
 individually ; and (2) whether its character is conclusively 
 determined by the terms of the instrument itself, or whether 
 extrinsic evidence is admissible to show in what charac- 
 ter officially or individually the defendant made the 
 indorsement. 
 
 Where both the names of a corporation and of an officer or 
 agent of it appear upon a bill or note, it is often a perplexing 
 question to determine whether it is in legal effect the contract 
 of the corporation, or is the individual contract of the officer
 
 378 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 or agent. It is very desirable that the rules of interpretation 
 of commercial paper should be definite and certain ; and if 
 the courts of the highest authority on the subject had laid 
 down any exact and definite rules of construction for such 
 cases, we would, for the sake of uniformity, be glad to adopt 
 them. But, unfortunately, not only do different courts differ 
 with each other, but we are not aware of any court whose 
 decisions furnish an} 7 definite rule or system of rules appli- 
 cable to such cases. Each case seems to have been decided 
 with reference to its own facts. If what the courts some- 
 times call "corporate marks" greatly predominate on the 
 face of the paper, they hold it to be the contract of the corpo- 
 ration, and that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show 
 that it was the individual contract of the officer or agent. If 
 these marks are less strong, the}- hold it prima facie the 
 individual contract of the officer or agent, but that extrinsic 
 evidence is admissible to show that he executed it in his 
 official capacity in behalf of the corporation ; while in still 
 other cases the}- hold that it is the personal contract of the 
 party who signed it, that the terms "agent," " secretary," 
 and the like, are merely descriptive of the person, and that 
 extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show the contrarj'. 
 See Daniel, Neg. Inst. 398 et seq. When others have thus 
 failed we can hardly hope to succeed. Perhaps the difficulty 
 is inherent in the nature of the subject 
 
 This court has in a line of decisions held that where a party 
 signs a contract, affixing to his signature the term " agent," 
 " trustee," or the like, it is prima facie his individual con- 
 tract, the term affixed being presumptively merely descriptive 
 of his person, but that extrinsic evidence is admissible to 
 show that the words were understood as determining the 
 character in which he contracted. See Pratt v. Beaupre, 13 
 Minn. 177 (187) ; Bingham v. Stewart, 13 Minn. 96 (106), 
 and 14 Minn. 153 (214); Peering v. Thorn, 29 Minn. 120 
 (12 N. W. Rep. 350) ; Rowett v. Oleson, 32 Minn. 288 (20 
 N. W. Rep. 227) ; Peterson v. Hornan, 44 Minn. 166 (46 
 N. W. Rep. 303) ; Brunswick- Balke Co. v. Boutell, 45 Minn.
 
 194.] SOUHEGAN NAT'L BANK v. BOARDMAN. 379 
 
 21 (47 N. W. Rep. 261). Only one of these, however (Bing- 
 ham v. Stewart), was a case of commercial paper where the 
 name of a corporation appeared on its face, and in that case 
 possibly the court did not give due weight to all the " corpo- 
 rate marks " upon it. Where there is nothing on the face of 
 the instrument to indicate in what capacity a party executed 
 it except his signature with the word " agent," " treasurer," 
 or the like suffixed, there can be no doubt of the correctness 
 of the proposition that it is at least primd facie his individual 
 contract, and the suffix merety a description of his person. 
 But bills, notes, acceptances, and indorsements are to some 
 extent peculiar, at least, the different relations of the parties, 
 respectively, to the paper are circumstances which in them- 
 selves throw light upon, and in some cases control, its inter- 
 pretation, regardless of the particular form of the signature. 
 For example, if a draft were drawn on a corporation by name, 
 and accepted by its duty authorized agent or officer in his 
 individual name, adding his official designation, the acceptance 
 would be deemed that of the corporation, for only the drawee 
 can accept a bill ; while, on the other hand, if drawn on the 
 drawee as an individual, he could not by words of official 
 description in his acceptance make it the acceptance of some 
 one else. So if a note was made payable to a corporation by 
 its corporate name, and is indorsed by its authorized official, 
 it would be deemed the indorsement of the corporation ; for 
 it is only the payee who can be first indorser, and transfer the 
 title to the paper. But this is not such a case. It does not 
 appear on the face of this note what the defendant was 
 treasurer of. Extrinsic evidence has to be resorted to at the 
 very threshold of the case to prove that fact. 
 
 Counsel for the defendant relies very largeh- upon the case 
 of Falk v. Moebs, 127 U. S. 597 (8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1319), which 
 comes nearer sustaining his contention than any other case to 
 which we have been referred. But that case differs from this 
 in the very important particular that it appeared upon the 
 face of the paper itself that the payee and indorser was the 
 secretary and treasurer of the corporation, and that as such
 
 380 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 he himself executed the note in its behalf. The case was also 
 decided largely upon the authority of Hitchcock v. Buchanan, 
 105 U. S. 416, which is also clearly distinguishable from the 
 present case, for there the bill sued on purported on its face 
 to be drawn at the office of the company, and directed the 
 drawee to charge the amount to the account of the company, 
 of which the signers described themselves as president and 
 secretary. 
 
 Our conclusion is that there is nothing upon the face of the 
 note sued on to take it out from under the rule laid down in 
 the decisions of this court already referred to, that upon its 
 face this is prima facie the indorsement of defendant indi- 
 vidually, but that extrinsic evidence is admissible to show that 
 he made the indorsement only in his official capacity as the 
 indorsement of the corporation. Order reversed. 
 
 8. Liability of agent who contracts in his own name in a 
 simple contract. 
 
 197.] HIGGINS v. SENIOR. 
 
 8 MEESON & WELSBY (Exch.), 834. 1841. 
 
 SPECIAL assumpsit to recover compensation for the non- 
 delivery of iron. Judgment for plaintiffs. Rule for a non- 
 suit or a new trial. The contract of sale was signed by 
 defendant, but he was known to be acting for the Varteg Iron 
 Co. 
 
 PARKE, B. The question in this case, which was argued 
 before us in the course of last term, may be stated to be, 
 whether in an action on an agreement in writing, purporting 
 on the face of it to be made by the defendant, and subscribed 
 b}* him, for the sale and delivery by him of goods above the 
 value of 10, it is competent for the defendant to discharge 
 himself, on an issue on the plea of non assumpsit by proving 
 that the agreement was really made by him by the authority
 
 197.] HIGGINS V. SENIOR. 381 
 
 of and as agent for a third person, and that the plaintiff knew 
 those facts at the time when the agreement was made and 
 signed. Upon consideration, we think that it was not, and 
 that the rule for a new trial must be discharged. 
 
 There is no doubt that, where such an agreement is made, 
 it is competent to show that one or both of the contracting 
 parties were agents for other persons, and acted as such 
 agents in making the contract, so as to give the benefit of 
 the contract on the one hand to ( Garrett v. Handley, 4 B. 
 & C. 664 ; Bateman v. Phillips, 15 East, 272), and charge 
 with liability on the other (Paterson v. Gandasequi, 1 5 East, 
 62) , the unnamed principals ; and this, whether the agree- 
 ment be or be not required to be in writing by the Statute of 
 Frauds : and this evidence in no way contradicts the written 
 agreement. It does not deny that it is binding on those 
 whom, on the face of it, it purports to bind ; but shows that 
 it also binds another, by reason that the act of the agent, in 
 signing the agreement, in pursuance of his authority, is in 
 law the act of the principal. 
 
 But, on the other hand, to allow evidence to be given that 
 the party who appears on the face of the instrument to be 
 personally a contracting party, is not such, would be to allow 
 parol evidence to contradict the written agreement, which 
 cannot be done. And this view of the law accords with the 
 decisions, not merely as to bills of exchange (Sowerby v. 
 Butcher, 2 C. & M. 368 ; Le Feme v. Lloyd, 5 Taunt. 749) 
 signed by a person, without stating his agency on the face of 
 the bill, but as to other written contracts, namely, the cases 
 of Jones v. Zittledale, 6 Ad. & Ell. 486, 1 Nev. & P. 677, 
 and Magee v. Atkinson, 2 M. & W. 440. It is true that the 
 case of Jones v. Littledale might be supported on the ground 
 that the agent really intended to contract as principal, but 
 Lord Denman, in delivering the judgment of the court, lays 
 down this as a general proposition, " that if the agent con- 
 tracts in such a form as to make himself jjgjgonally respon- 
 sible, he cannot^afterwardgj whether his principal were or 
 were not known at^the time of the contract, relieve himself
 
 882 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 from that responsibility." And this is also laid down in 
 Story on Agency, 269. Magee v. Atkinson is a direct 
 authority, and cannot be distinguished from this case. 
 
 The case of Wilson v. Hart, 1 Taunt. 295, 1 Moore, 45, 
 which was cited on the other side, is clearly distinguishable. 
 The contract in writing was, on the face of it, with another 
 person named Read, appearing to be the principal buyer ; but 
 there being evidence that the defendant fraudulently put for- 
 ward Read as the buyer, whom he knew to be insolvent, 
 in order to pay a debt from Read to himself with the goods 
 purchased, and having subsequently got possession of them, 
 it was held, on the principle of Hill v. Perrott, 3 Taunt. 274, 
 and other cases, that the defendant was liable ; and as is 
 observed by Mr. Smith in the very able work to which we 
 were referred (Leading Cases, Vol. II. p. 125), that decision 
 turned altogether upon the fraud, and if it had not, it would 
 have been an authorit}" for the admission of parol evidence 
 to charge the defendant not to discharge Read. 
 
 Rule discharged. 
 
 197.] BRIGGS v. PARTRIDGE. 
 
 64 NEW YORK, 357. 1876. 
 [Reported herein at p. 248.] 
 
 9. Liability of agent arising from interest in subject-mattei. 
 
 199.] WOOLFE v. HORNE. 
 
 L. R. 2 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, 355. 1877. 
 
 ACTION to recover damages for non-delivery of goods sold 
 by defendants, as auctioneers, to plaintiff. Plaintiff was non-
 
 199.] WOOLFE V. HORNE. 383 
 
 suited. Order to show cause why non-suit should not be set 
 aside and verdict entered for plaintiff. Defendants relied 
 upon the fact that they sold as agents for a disclosed 
 principal. 
 
 MELLOR, J. I am of opinion that the verdict must be 
 entered for the plaintiff. The general doctrine with regard 
 to the authorit}' of auctioneers is laid down in the case of 
 Williams v. Mittington, 1 H. Bl. 81, at pp. 84, 85, by Lord 
 Loughborough, who says : " An auctioneer has a possession 
 coupled with an interest in goods which he is employed to 
 sell, not a bare custody, like a servant or shopman. There 
 is no difference whether the sale be on the premises of the 
 owner, or in a public auction-room ; forjpu the premises of 
 the owner an actual possession is given to the auctioneer and 
 bis servants by the owner, not merely an authority to sell. 
 I have said a possession coupled with an interest ; but an 
 auctioneer has also a special property in )nim r with a Ijen f9r 
 the charges of the sale T the commission^ and the auction duty, 
 which he is bound to pay." Now, it was conceded by the 
 counsel for the defendants that an auctionee r js} entitled to S^IP. 
 for the price of goods which he has put up to auction ; but it 
 was contended that an auctioneer is no more a contracting 
 party, and no more liable to be sued, than a broker or any 
 other kind of agent. But, having regard to the general doc- 
 trine which I have stated, and to the conditions of sale by 
 which the auctioneer undertakes to deliver the goods, and par- 
 ticularty to the condition by which, in case the auctioneers 
 are unable to deliver any lot, the purchaser is to accept com- 
 pensation, I think that in the present case the auctioneer is 
 responsible for his neglect to deliver. 
 
 Then it was contended that the plaintiff had not complied 
 with the conditions of sale as to the removal of his lot within 
 three days, and that he had, therefore, no right of action. 
 My answer to this objection is that these stipulations cannot 
 be looked upon as conditions precedent. I cannot think that 
 the mere fact that the purchaser did not present himself till 
 Monday morning deprived him of the right to claim his goods.
 
 384 AGENT AND THIED PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 I think, therefore, the action was properly brought against the 
 
 auctioneers, and that the conditions afford them no defence. 
 
 FIELD, J., concurred. Order absolute. 
 
 10. Where neither principal nor agent is bound. 
 
 200.] LONG v. THAYER. 
 
 150 UNITED STATES, 520. 1893. 
 [Reported herein at p. 141.] 
 
 201.] WILSON v. SHALES. 
 
 1892, 1 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, 456. 
 
 ACTION for damages against agents. The agents, having 
 doubt as to the correctness of a telegraphic authority, signed 
 the contract " by telegraphic authority of Sam Reischer, 
 Smales, Eeles, & Co., as agents." There was a mistake, 
 and Reischer refused to be bound. Plaintiffs sue the agents 
 as upon a warranty of authority. Defendants contend that 
 the signature negatives a warranty. 
 
 DENMAN, J. ... It appeared from the evidence of trust- 
 worthy witnesses for the defendants, that whenever charters 
 are entered into by brokers in accordance with telegraphic 
 instructions, it is usual to sign in this form with the very 
 object of avoiding the implication of an absolute warrant}*. 
 I see no reason to doubt that this was the real object of the 
 defendants in signing as they did ; and this being my opin- 
 ion, I think that there can be no ground for fixing them with 
 a warranty, such as they never intended to give, and which 
 would be wholly inconsistent with the general understanding 
 of persons engaged in the business in which they were em- 
 ployed. I therefore give judgment for defendants with costs. 
 
 Judgment for defendants.
 
 204.] LA FAKGE V. KNEELAND. 385 
 
 202.] BALTZEN v. NICOLAY. 
 
 53 NEW YORK, 467. 1873. 
 [Reported herein at p. 352.] 
 
 11. Liability of agent for money received through mistake 
 or fraud. 
 
 204.] LA FARGE v. KNEELAND. 
 
 7 COWEN (N. Y.), 456. 1827. 
 
 ASSUMPSIT to recover a balance of an advance made by 
 plaintiffs on certain cotton consigned to them by defendant 
 acting for B. & A. Judgment for plaintiffs. 
 
 When defendant received the advance from plaintiffs it 
 was carried to the credit of B. & A., who already had a bal- 
 ance in their favor. Later this balance was, by order of B. & 
 A., credited on defendant's account against B., individually, 
 who, after such credit, still owed defendant. 
 
 CURIA, per SAVAGE, C. J. (after deciding that the court 
 erred in receiving certain testimony). The main question in 
 the case is, whether the defendant can be made liable, he 
 having disclosed his principal at the time ? And if that 
 alone is not a sufficient defence, then whether he has so paid 
 over or disposed of the monej*, as to alter his relation to his 
 principals in respect to it. 
 
 The general rule, no doubt, is well settled, that an agent 
 who discloses his principal, and so contracts as to give a 
 remedy against the principal, is not liable personalty, unless 
 it was clearly his intention to assume personal responsibility. 
 But where money has been paid to an agent for his principal, 
 under such circumstances that it may be recovered back from 
 the latter, then it may be recovered from the agent, provided 
 he has not paid it to his principal, nor altered his situation 
 in relation to him ; for instance, by giving fresh credit. That 
 
 25
 
 386 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY ; CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 point was so decided in Butter v. Harrison, Cowp. 565. 
 There was in that case, no doubt of a right once to recover 
 from the principal ; but the agent of the defendant had given 
 credit to his principal, and rendered him his account contain- 
 ing the credit. His situation, however, was not altered in 
 any other respect. Lord Mansfield said the jury were em- 
 barrassed with the question, whether this was a payment 
 over. He said, for some purposes, it would be a payment 
 over; and the law was clear that an agent who received 
 money by mistake, and paid it over, was not liable, but the 
 principal. As there was no alteration, however, in the situa- 
 tion of the agent in relation to his principal, it was held 
 wrong that he should be in any better situation than if the 
 mistake had not happened. It was, therefore, the opinion 
 of the court, that the agent should pay back the money. In 
 Cox v. Prentice (3 M. & S. 344), Lord Ellenborough says, 
 " I take it to be clear that an agent who receives money for 
 his principal is liable as a principal, so long as he stands in 
 his original situation, and until there has been a change of 
 circumstances, b} T his having paid over the money to his 
 principal, or done something equivalent to it." 
 
 In this case, the defendant has not paid over the money to 
 Braham & Atwood, in an}* other manner than b}' passing it 
 to their credit. There was then a large balance in their 
 favor. But Bogart & Kneeland had also an account with 
 Braham alone, who did business upon his own account as 
 well as in connection with Atwood. Atwood, one of the 
 partners, was in New York. The monej* was received and 
 credited on the 12th of November, 1818. An account sales 
 was rendered on the 28th of the same month, when the 
 credit due to Braham & Atwood was, by their order, trans- 
 ferred to the credit on Braham's separate account. Had this 
 transfer been made to the account of any person distinct 
 from the firm of Braham & Atwood, it would be considered 
 equivalent to a pa}*ment. It closed the concerns of Bogart 
 & Kneeland with Braham & Atwood. Braham, in his indi- 
 vidual capacity, had nothing to do with Braham & Atwood.
 
 204.] T.A FABGE V. KNEELAND. 387 
 
 I think, therefore, the judge was correct in charging the jury 
 that this was such an appropriation of the mone} r as excused 
 the defendant from liability. 
 
 The ground upon which agents have been held liable, in 
 such cases, is, that there has been no change in the relative 
 situation of the parties. Where there is a mere passing of 
 credit on the books, for instance, the agent still has it in his 
 power to redress himself. It is not, however, in the power 
 of Kneeland, the defendant, to alter the credit to Braham. 
 He cannot retain the money, as he might have done had no 
 transfer been made. Kneeland virtually paid the money to 
 Atwood, and received the same amount on account against 
 Braham. 
 
 I think, therefore, the plaintiffs ought not to recover, and 
 that a new trial should be granted. 
 
 As the judge erred in receiving testimony, and as the 
 question of appropriation, upon which the jur}' erred, is a 
 question of law (Cowper, 566), I think the costs should 
 abide the event. It is not strictlj 7 a verdict against evidence 
 only. 
 
 Rule accordingly. 
 
 12. Liability of third person to agent. 
 
 207.] KELLY v. THUEY. 
 
 102 MISSOURI, 522. 1890. 
 [Reported herein at p. 356.] 
 
 207.] BRIGGS v. PARTRIDGE. 
 
 64 NEW YORK, 357. 1876. 
 
 [Reported herein at p. 248.]
 
 388 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : CONTRACTS. [CH. XV. 
 
 208.] ROWE v. RAND. 
 
 Ill INDIANA, 206. 1887. 
 [Reported herein at p. 126.] 
 
 210.] STEVENSON v. MORTIMER. 
 
 COWPER'S REPORTS (K. B.), 805. 1778. 
 [Reported herein at p. 326.]
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 TORTS BETWEEN AGENT AND THIRD PARTY. 
 1. Liability of agent for non-feasance. 
 
 212.] DELANEY . ROCHEREAU. 
 
 34 LOUISIANA ANNUAL, 1123. 1882. 
 
 ACTION to hold agents liable to third parties for injuries 
 sustained by the giving way of the gallery of a house in 
 possession and under control of defendants as agents. Judg- 
 ment for defendants. 
 
 BERMUDEZ, C. J. ... The contention is, that as the in- 
 juries received caused intense suffering, and as they were 
 occasioned by the falling of the gallery, which was in very 
 bad condition, to the knowledge of the defendants, who, as 
 the agents of the owner, were bound to keep it in good 
 order, and who, without justification, neglected to do so, their 
 firm and each member thereof are responsible in solido for 
 the damages claimed. 
 
 The theory on which the suit rests is, that agents are 
 liable to third parties injured for their non-feasance. 
 
 In support of that doctrine, both the common and the civil 
 law are invoked. 
 
 At common law, an agent is personally responsible to third 
 parties for doing something which he ought not to have done, 
 but not for not doing something which he ought to have done, 
 the agent, in the latter case, being liable to his principal only. 
 For non-feasance, or mere neglect in the performance of 
 duty, the responsibilit}' therefor must arise from some express 
 or implied obligation between particular parties standing in 
 privity of law or contract with each other. No man is bound
 
 890 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY: TORTS. [CH. XVI. 
 
 to answer for such violation of duty or obligation except to 
 those to whom he has become directly bound or amenable for 
 his conduct 
 
 Every one, whether he is principal or agent, is responsible 
 directly to persons injured by his own negligence, in fulfilling 
 obligations resting upon him in his individual character, and 
 which the law imposes upon him, independent of contract. 
 No man increases or diminishes his obligations to strangers 
 by becoming an agent. If, in the course of his agency, he 
 comes in contact with the person or property of a stranger, 
 he is liable for any injury he may do to either, by his negli- 
 gence, in respect to duties imposed by law upon him in com- 
 mon with all other men. 
 
 An agent is not responsible to third persons for any negli- 
 gence in the performance of duties devolving upon him purely 
 from his agency, since he cannot, as agent, be subject to an}' 
 obligations towards third persons other than those of his prin- 
 cipal. Those duties are not imposed upon him by law. He 
 has agreed with no one, except his principal, to perform 
 them. In failing to do so, he wrongs no one but his princi- 
 pal, who alone can hold him responsible. 
 
 The whole doctrine on that subject culminates in the pro- 
 position, that wherever the agent's negligence, consisting in 
 his own wrong-doing, therefore in an act, directly injures a 
 stranger, then such stranger can recover from the agent 
 damages for the injury. Story on Agency, 308, 309 ; Id. on 
 Bailments, 165; Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, 111, 
 112, ed. 1874 ; Evans on Agency, notes by Ewell, 437, 438 ; 
 Wharton on Negligence, 535, 78, 83, 780. 
 
 It is an error to suppose that the principle of the civil law, 
 on the liability of agents to third persons, is different from 
 those of the common law. It is certainty not broader. 
 
 While treating of " negligence in discharge of duties not 
 based on contract," which had not previously been consid- 
 ered, Wharton, beginning the third book of his remarkable 
 work on Negligence, says : 
 
 " The Roman law in this respect rests on the principle that
 
 212.] DELANEY V. KOCHEKEAU. 39; 
 
 vi?e necessity of society* requires that all citizens should be 
 educated to exercise care and consideration in dealing with 
 the persons and property of others. Whoever directly injures 
 another's person or property by the neglect of such care, is 
 iu culpa, and is bound to make good the injury caused by hi 
 neglect. The general responsibility is recognized by the 
 Aquilian law, enacted about three centuries before Christ, 
 which is the basis of Roman jurisprudence in this relation. 
 Culpa of this class consists mainly in commission infaciendo. 
 Thus, an omission by a stranger to perform an act of charity 
 is not culpa; it is culpa however to inadvertentl}" place 
 obstacles on a road, over which another falls and is hurt ; to 
 kindle a fire by which another's property may be burned ; to 
 dig a trench which causes another's wall to fall." He subse- 
 quently states that the following are cases in which no 
 responsibility can possibly attach: 
 
 " When a man does everj'thing in his power to avoid doing 
 the mischief, or when it is of a character utterly out of the 
 range of expectation, the liability ceases and the event is to 
 be regarded as a casualty. 
 
 " If the injury is due to the fault of the party injured, the 
 liability of the party injuring is extinguished. 
 
 " Quod quieex sua culpa damnum sentit, non intelligitur 
 sentire" Pomponius. Wharton, 780, 300. 
 
 The allusion made by certain writers to the Roman law, 
 which gives a remedy in all cases of special damages, must 
 necessarily be understood as referring to instances in which 
 the wrong or damage is done or inflicted by an actual wrong- 
 doing or commission of the injuring party. 
 
 The article of the French code, 1992, from which article 
 3003 of our R. C. C. derives, which is to the effect that the 
 agent is responsible not only for unfaithfulness in his manage- 
 ment, but also for his fault and mistake, contemplates an 
 accountability to the principal onl}', and this by reason of the 
 assumption of responsibility by the acceptance of the man- 
 date. How, indeed, can an agent be responsible to a third 
 person for the management of the affairs of his principal, or
 
 392 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : TORTS. [CH. XVI. 
 
 for a mistake committed in the administration of bis property ? 
 The responsibility for /aull is likewise in favor of the " man- 
 dant" alone. 
 
 The Napoleon Code, article 11G5, contains the formal pro- 
 vision that agreements have effect only on the contracting 
 parties ; the}* do not prejudice third parties, nor can they avail 
 them, except in the case mentioned in article 1121. This 
 last article refers to stipulations in favor of autrui, which be- 
 come obligatory when accepted. 
 
 The Code of 1808 contained a corresponding article, but 
 that of 1825 did not ; neither does the Revised Code of 1870. 
 It must not be concluded, however, that the omission to in- 
 corporate the provision in the subsequent legislation must be 
 considered as a repudiation of the doctrine. 
 
 The distinguished compilers and framers of the Code of 
 1825 account for the omission to reproduce, because the 
 provisions were already embodied in other Articles, and might 
 be deemed to be exceptions to the undoubted rule that con- 
 tracts can only avail, or prejudice, the parties thereto. Projet 
 du Code de 1825, p. 264. 
 
 Quod inter olios actum est, aliis neque nocet, neque 
 prodest, L. 20, De instit. Act ; see also Pothier on Oblig. 
 Nos. 85, 87 ; Domat, L. 1, t. 16, sec. 3, No. 8 ; L. 2, t. 8 ; 
 Troplong Hand. No. 510 ; Duranton, 10, No. 541 ; Toullier, 
 6, 341 ; Toullier, 7, 252, 306 ; Demolombe, 25, No. 38 ; Lau- 
 rent, 10, No. 377; Larombiere, 1, 640. 
 
 That such is the case was formally recognized by the Court 
 of Cassation of France, in the case of Thomassin, decided in 
 July, 1869, and reported in Part 1 of Dalloz, J. G., for that 
 year. The syllabus in the case is in the words following : 
 
 " Le mandataire n'est responsable des fautes qu'il commet 
 dans 1'execution du mandat, qu'envers le mandant." 
 
 See also, J. G., Vo. Obi., Nos. 878, et seq., and Vo. Man- 
 dat, No. 213. 
 
 The case of Beaugillot v. Callemer, 33 Sirey , 322, far from 
 expounding a doctrine antagonistical to that prevailing, as 
 was seen at common-law, and which we consider as well
 
 212.] BAIRD V. SHIPMAN. 393 
 
 settled likewise under the civil law, is fully confirmatory of 
 the same. 
 
 It was the case of an agent condemned to pay damages for 
 obstructing, by means of beams, a water-course partly closed 
 up by masonr}', and thus causing an over-flow, in conse- 
 quence of which a hay crop was damaged. The plea of 
 respondeat superior did not avail. The court well held that 
 the commission of the act constituted a quasi offence, in 
 justification of which the mandate could not be set up. 
 
 This anterior view of the case relieves the court from the 
 necessity of passing upon the other questions presented rela- 
 tive to fault, trespass, contributory negligence, suffering, 
 and damages. 
 
 Judgment affirmed with costs. 
 
 212.] BAIRD y. SHIPMAN. 
 
 132 ILLINOIS, 16. 1890. 
 
 ACTION for damages for injuries resulting in the death of 
 plaintiffs intestate, caused by the defective condition of 
 premises controlled by defendants, as agents. Judgment for 
 plaintiff. 
 
 When defendants rented the premises to one W., the barn- 
 door was in a very insecure condition, and defendants prom- 
 ised W. to repair it. This was not done, and the door fell 
 and killed plaintiff's intestate, an expressman, who was deliv- 
 ering goods at the barn. 
 
 The Appellate Court (33 Appellate Court Reports, 503) 
 delivered the following opinion : 
 
 GARNETT, P. J. ... Appellants make two points. First, 
 that the verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence ; 
 second, that they were the agents of the owner, Goodman, 
 and liable to him onlj'foran}' negligence attributable to them. 
 
 There is nothing more than the ordinary conflict of evi- 
 dence found in such cases, presenting a question of fact for
 
 394 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : TORTS. [CH. XVI. 
 
 the jur}', and the finding must be respected by this court in 
 deference to the well settled rule. 
 
 The other point is not so easily disposed of. An agent 
 is liable to his principal only for mere breach of his contract 
 with his principal. He must have due regard to the rights 
 and safety of third persons. He cannot, in all cases, find 
 shelter behind his principal. If, in the course of his agency, 
 he is intrusted with the operation of a dangerous machine, 
 to guard himself from personal liability he must use proper 
 care in its management and supervision, so that others in the 
 use of ordinary care will not suffer in life, limb, or property. 
 Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 358 ; Phelps v. Wait, 30 N. Y. 
 78. It is not his contract with the principal which exposes 
 him to or protects him from liability to third persons, but 
 his common-law obligation to so use that which he controls 
 as not to injure another. That obligation is neither increased 
 nor diminished by his entrance upon the duties of agency, 
 nor can its breach be excused by the plea that his principal 
 is chargeable. Delaney v. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123. 
 
 If the agent once actually undertakes and enters upon 
 the execution of a particular work, it is his duty to use rea- 
 sonable care in the manner of executing it, so as not to cause 
 any injury to third persons which may be the natural con- 
 sequence of his acts, and he cannot, by abandoning its 
 execution midway, and leaving things in a dangerous con- 
 dition, exempt himself from liability to a third person who 
 suffers injury by reason of his having so left them without 
 proper safeguard. Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102. 
 
 A number of authorities charge the agent, in such cases, 
 on the ground of misfeasance, as distinguished from non- 
 feasance. Mechem, in his work on Agency (sec. 572), says : 
 " Some confusion has crept into certain cases from failure to 
 observe clearly the distinction between non-feasance and 
 misfeasance. As has been seen, the agent is not liable to 
 strangers for injuries sustained by them because he did not 
 undertake the performance of some duty which he owed to 
 his principal, and imposed upon him by his relation, which
 
 212.] BAIED V. SHTPMAN. 395 
 
 is non-feasance. Misfeasance may involve, also, to some 
 extent, the idea of not doing ; as, where the agent, while 
 engaged in the performance of his undertaking, does not do 
 something which it was his duty to do under the circum- 
 stances, does not take that precaution, does not exercise 
 that care, which a due regard for the rights of others re- 
 quires. All this is not doing ; but it is not the not doing 
 of that which is imposed upon the agent merely by virtue 
 of his relation, but of that which is imposed upon him by 
 law as a responsible individual, in common with all other 
 members of society. It is the same not doing which consti- 
 tutes actionable negligence in any relation." To the same 
 effect are Lottman v. Barnett, 62 Mo. 159 ; Martin v. 
 Benoist, 20 Mo. App. 262; Harriman v. Stowe, 57 Mo. 
 93 ; and BeU v. Josselyn, 3 Gray, 309. 
 
 A case parallel to that now in hand is Campbell v. Port- 
 land Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552, where agents of the Portland 
 Sugar Company had the charge and management of a wharf 
 belonging to the company, and rented the same to tenants, 
 agreeing to keep it in repair. They allowed the covering to 
 become old, worn, and insecure, by means of which the plain- 
 tiff was injured. The court held the agents were equally re- 
 sponsible to the injured person with their principals. 
 
 Wharton, in his work on Negligence (sec. 535), insists 
 that the distinction, in this class of cases, between non-feas- 
 ance and misfeasance, can no longer be sustained ; that the 
 true doctrine is, that when an agent is employed to work on 
 a particular thing, and has surrendered the thing in question 
 into the principal's hands, then the agent ceases to be liable 
 to third persons for hurt received by them from such thing, 
 though the hurt is remotely due to the agent's negligence, 
 the reason being, that the causal relation between the agent 
 and the person hurt is broken by the interposition of the 
 principal as a distinct center of legal responsibilities and 
 duties, but that wherever there is no such interruption of 
 causal connection, and the agent's negligence directly in- 
 jures a stranger, the agent having liberty of action in respect
 
 396 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY: TORTS. [CH. XVI. 
 
 to the injury, then such stranger can recover from the agent 
 damages for the injury. The rule, whether as stated by 
 Mechem or Wharton, is sufficient to charge appellants with 
 damages, under the circumstances disclosed in this record. 
 They had the same control of the premises in question as the 
 owner would have had if he had resided in Chicago, and at- 
 tended to his own leasing and repairing. In that respect, 
 appellants remained in control of the premises until the door 
 fell upon the deceased. There was no interruption of the 
 causal relation between them and the injured man. They 
 were, in fact, for the time being, substituted in the place of 
 the owner, so far as the control and management of the prop- 
 ertj r was concerned. The principle that makes an inde- 
 pendent contractor, to whose control premises upon which he 
 is working are surrendered, liable for damages to strangers, 
 caused by his negligence, although he is at the time doing 
 the work under contract with the owner (Wharton on Negli- 
 gence, sec. 440), would seem to be sufficient to hold appel- 
 lants. The owner of cattle who places them in the hands of 
 an agister is not liable for damages committed by them while 
 the}' are under the control of the agister. It is the posses- 
 sion and control of the cattle which fix the liability, and the 
 law imposes upon the agister the duty to protect strangers 
 from injury by them. Ward v. Brown, 64 111. 307 ; Ozburn 
 v. Adams, 70 Id. 291. 
 
 "When appellants rented the premises to Mrs. Wheeler, in 
 the dangerous condition shown by the evidence, they volun- 
 tarily set in motion an agency which, in the ordinary and 
 natural course of events, would expose persons entering the 
 barn to personal injury. Use of the barn for the purpose for 
 which it was used when the deceased came to his death, was 
 one of its ordinary and appropriate uses, and might, by 
 ordinary foresight, have been anticipated. If the insecure 
 condition of the door-fastenings had arisen after the letting to 
 Mrs. Wheeler, a different question would be presented ; but 
 as it existed before and at the time of the letting, the owner 
 or persons in control are chargeable with the consequences.
 
 213.] WEBER V. WEBER. 397 
 
 Gridley v. Bloomington, 68 111. 47 ; Tomle v. Hampton, 
 129 Id. 379. 
 
 Neither error is well assigned, and the judgment is 
 affirmed. 
 
 PER CURIAM. We fully concur in the legal proposition 
 asserted in the foregoing opinion, and deem it unnecessary 
 to add to what is therein said in support of that proposition. 
 
 The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 2. Liability of agent for misfeasance. 
 213.] WEBER v. WEBER. 
 
 47 MICHIGAN, 569. 1882. 
 
 CAMPBELL, J. Plaintiff sued defendant in case for making 
 false representations to him concerning the freedom from 
 incumbrance of certain land which she sold to him as agent 
 for her husband, Henry Weber. The declaration contains 
 full averments showing the purchase and pa3'ment to have 
 been made in reliance on these representations, their wil- 
 ful falsehood, and the loss of the entire premises by sale 
 under the mortgage which existed, and which defendant had 
 said did not exist, by declaring that there was no incum- 
 brance whatever. 
 
 Defendant demurred to the declaration on the grounds, 
 first* that defendant was Henry Weber's wife, and that he 
 should have been made co-defendant ; second, that defendant 
 is not averred to have been interested in the property ; third, 
 that it does not appear the representations were made at 
 Henry Weber's request and by his authority ; and fourth, 
 that the mortgage being recorded was notice. The court 
 below sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment for 
 defendant. 
 
 It is not now claimed that the fact that the mortgage was 
 recorded was of any importance. Where positive represen-
 
 398 AGENT AND THIKD PARTY : TORTS. [CH. XVI. 
 
 tations arejgade concerning a title for frpndnlpnt purposes, 
 and are relied on, it can hardly be insisted that what would 
 be merely constructive notice in the absence of such declara- 
 tions will prevent a person from having the right to rely on 
 statements which, if true T would render p. search unneces- 
 sary. And it is not necessarily true that a recorded 
 mortgage is unpaid, merely because not discharged. 
 
 Neither is it true that an agent is exempt from liability for 
 fraud knowingly committed on behalf of his principal. A 
 person cannot avoid responsibility merely because he gets no 
 personal advantage from his fraud. All persons who are 
 active in defrauding others are liable for what they do, 
 whether they act in one capacit}' or another. No one can 
 lawfully pursue a knowingly fraudulent employment ; and, 
 while it may be true that the principal is often liable 
 for the fraud of his agent, though himself honest, his own 
 fraud will not exonerate his fraudulent agent. Starkweather 
 v. Benjamin, 32 Mich. 305 ; Josselyn v. McAllister, 22 
 Mich. 300. 
 
 If liable at all, the agent may as well be sued separately 
 as any other joint wrong-doer. It is not usually necessary 
 fo sue jointly in t.nrt.. And we do not think that under our 
 present statutes the case of husband and wife makes any 
 different rule applicable. At common law the husband was 
 liable_p_ersonallv for his wife's torts, and she could not be 
 sued without Him, ]Rnt under our statutes now, that liability 
 has been abolished, and she is solely responsible for them. 
 Comp. L. 6129, 7382. This being the case, we can 
 see no ground for joining them in a suit, unless both are sued 
 as wrong-doers. The evident purpose of the law was to put 
 him, as to her personal wrongs, on the same footing with any 
 third person. 
 
 The demurrer should have been overruled. The judgment 
 below must be reversed, with costs of both courts, and the 
 defendant required to answer over within twenty days.
 
 213.] SWIM v. WILSON. 399 
 
 213.] SWIM v. WILSON. 
 
 90 CALIFORNIA, 126. 1891. 
 
 DE HAVEN, J. The plaintiff was the owner of one hundred 
 shares of stock of a mining corporation, issued to one H. B. 
 Parsons, trustee, and properly indorsed by him. This stock 
 was stolen from plaintiff by an employe in his office, and 
 delivered for sale to the defendant, who was engaged in the 
 business of buying and selling stocks on commission. At the 
 time of placing the stock in defendant's possession, the thief 
 represented himself as its owner, and the defendant, relying 
 upon this representation, in good faith, and without any 
 notice that the stock was stolen, sold the same in the usual 
 course of business, and subsequently, still without any notice 
 that the person for whom he had acted in making the sale 
 was not the true owner, paid over to him the net proceeds of 
 such sale. Thereafter, the plaintiff brought this action to 
 recover the value of said stock, alleging that the defendant 
 had converted the same to his own use, and the facts as 
 above stated appearing, the court in which the action was 
 tried gave judgment against defendant for such value, and 
 from this judgment, and an order refusing him a new trial, 
 the defendant appeals. 
 
 It is clear that the defendant's principal did not, by steal- 
 ing plaintiff's property, acquire an}' legal right to sell it ; and 
 it is equally clear that the defendant, acting for him, and as 
 his agent, did not have an}' greater right, and his act was 
 therefore wholly unauthorized, and in law was a conversion 
 of plaintiff's property. 
 
 " It is no defence to an action of trover that the defendant 
 acted as the agent of another. If the principal is a wrong- 
 doer, the agent is a wrong-doer also. A person is guilty of 
 a conversion who sells the property of another without 
 authority from the owner, notwithstanding he acts under the 
 authority of one claiming to be the owner, and is ignorant of
 
 400 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY: TORTS. [CH. XVI. 
 
 such person's want of title." Eimbdtt v. Billings, 55 Me. 
 147 ; 92 Am. Dec. 581 ; Coles v. Clark, 3 Cush. 399 ; Koch 
 v. Branch, 44 Mo. 542 ; 100 Am. Dec. 324. 
 
 In Stephens v. Elwall, 4 Maule & S. 259, this principle 
 was applied where an innocent clerk received goods from an 
 agent of his employer, and forwarded them to such employer 
 abroad, and in rendering his decision on the case presented, 
 Lord Ellenborough uses this language: "The only ques- 
 tion is, whether this is a conversion in the clerk, which un- 
 doubtedly was so in the master. The clerk acted under an 
 unavoidable ignorance, and for his master's benefit, when he 
 sent the goods to his master ; but, nevertheless, his acts may 
 amount to a conversion ; for a person is guilty of conversion 
 who intermeddles with my property, and disposes of it, and 
 it is no answer that he acted under the authority of another 
 who had himself no authority to dispose of it." 
 
 To hold the defendant liable, under the circumstances dis- 
 closed here, may seem upon first impression to be a hardship 
 upon him. But it is a matter of every -da} 1 experience that 
 one cannot always be perfectly secure from loss in his deal- 
 ings with others, and the defendant here is only in the posi- 
 tion of a person who has trusted to the honesty of another, 
 and has been deceived. He undertook to act as agent for one 
 who, it now appears, was a thief, and, relying on his represen- 
 tations, aided his principal to convert the plantiffs property 
 into money, and it is no greater hardship to require him to 
 pay to the plaintiff its value than it would be to take the 
 same away from the innocent vendee, who purchased and 
 paid for it. And 3 - et it is universally held that the purchaser 
 of stolen chattels, no matter how innocent or free from negli- 
 gence in the matter, acquires no title to such property as 
 against the owner ; and this rule has been applied in this 
 court to the case of an innocent purchaser of shares of stock. 
 Barstow v. Savage Mining Co., 64 Cal. 388 ; 49 Am. Rep. 
 705 ; Sherwood v. Meadow Valley Mining Co., 50 Cal. 412. 
 
 The precise question involved here arose in the case of 
 Bercich v. Marye, 9 Nev. 312. In that case, as here, the
 
 213.] SWIM V. WILSON. 401 
 
 defendant was a stock-broker who had made a sale of stolen 
 certificates of stock for a stranger, and paid him the pro- 
 ceeds. He was held liable, the court, in the course of its 
 opinion, saying: "It is next objected that as the defendant 
 was the innocent agent of the person for whom he received 
 the shares of stock, without knowledge of the felon}', no 
 judgment should have been rendered against him. It is well 
 settled that agency is no defence to an action of trover, to 
 which the present action is analogous." 
 
 The same conclusion was reached in Kimlall v. Billings, 
 55 Me. 147, 92 Am. Dec. 581, the property sold in that case 
 by the agent being stolen government bonds, payable to 
 bearer. The court there said : " Nor is it any defence that 
 the property sold was government bonds payable to bearer. 
 The bond fide purchaser of a stolen bond payable to bearer 
 might perhaps defend his title against even the true owner. 
 But there is no rule of law that secures immunity to the 
 agent of the thief in such cases, nor to the agent of one not 
 a bond fide holder. . . . The rule of law protecting bond 
 fide purchasers of lost or stolen notes and bonds payable to 
 bearer has never been extended to persons not bond fide pur- 
 chasers, nor to their agents." 
 
 Indeed, we discover no difference in principle between the 
 case at bar and that of Rogers v. Huie, 1 Cal. 429, 54 Am. 
 Dec. 300, in which case, Bennett, J., speaking for the court, 
 said : " An auctioneer who receives and sells stolen property 
 is liable for the conversion to the same extent as any other 
 merchant or individual. This is so both upon principle and 
 authority. Upon principle, there is no reason why he should 
 be exempted from liability. The person to whom he sells, 
 and who has paid the amount of the purchase money, would 
 be compelled to deliver the property to the true owner or pa}' 
 him its full value ; and there is no more hardship in requir- 
 ing the auctioneer to account for the value of the goods, than 
 there would be in compelling the right owner to lose them, or 
 the purchaser from the auctioneer to pa}* for them." 
 
 It is true that this same case afterwards came before the 
 
 26
 
 402 AGENT AND THIRD PARTY : TORTS. [CH. XVI. 
 
 court, and it was held, in an opinion reported in 2 Cal. 571, 
 56 Am. Dec. 363, that an auctioneer who in the regular 
 course of his business receives and sells stolen goods, and 
 pays over the proceeds to the felon, without notice that the 
 goods were stolen, is not liable to the true owner as for a 
 conversion. This latter decision, however, cannot be sus- 
 tained on principle, is opposed to the great weight of author- 
 ity, and has been practically overruled in the later case of 
 Cerkel v. Waterman, 63 Cal. 34. In that case the defend- 
 ants, who were commission merchants, sold a quantity of 
 wheat, supposing it to be the property of one Williams, and 
 paid over to him the proceeds of the sale, before they knew 
 of the claim of the plaintiff in that action. There was no 
 fraud or bad faith, but the court held the defendants there 
 liable for the conversion of the wheat 
 
 It was the duty of the defendant in this case to know for 
 whom he acted, and, unless he was willing to take the chances 
 of loss, he ought to have satisfied himself that his principal 
 was able to save him harmless if in the matter of his agency 
 he incurred a personal liability by the conversion of property 
 not belonging to such principal. 
 
 Judgment and order affirmed. 
 
 GAROUTTE, MCFARLAND, and SHARPSTEIN, JJ V concurred. 
 
 BEATTY, C. J. , and PATTERSON, J., dissented. 
 
 Rehearing denied.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Accounting : PAOB 
 
 as duty of agent 186-188 
 
 following trust funds 341-346 
 
 Accounts : 
 
 state of, between agent and undisclosed principal . 237-246, 
 
 257-260 
 Acquiescence : 
 
 ratification by 56, 57-63 
 
 Action : 
 
 against agent of infant principal . 21-24 
 
 against undisclosed principal 232-253 
 
 by undisclosed principal 253-264 
 
 to recover money paid by mistake or fraud 326-327, 385-387 
 
 in equity to recover trust funds 341-346 
 
 against agent by third party 347-384, 389-402 
 
 against third party by agent 356-359 
 
 Admissions of agent: 
 
 when admissions of principal 265-270 
 
 Agency : 
 
 formation of, 
 
 by agreement 12-38 
 
 by ratification 39-100 
 
 by estoppel 101-109 
 
 by necessity 110-125 
 
 termination of, 
 
 by accomplishment of purpose 126-130 
 
 by revocation 130-136, 144-150 
 
 by change affecting subject-matter ..... 137-141 
 
 by death 141-144 
 
 by insanity 24-29, 144 
 
 irrevocable agencies 144-150
 
 404 INDEX. 
 
 Agent: 
 
 distinguished from servant ..... ...... 1-8 
 
 may also be servant ............ 9-11 
 
 distinguished from independent contractor ..... 12-18 
 
 competency of .............. 30-32 
 
 liability to third person ........... 21-24 
 
 renunciation of agency .......... 160-163 
 
 compensation of ............ 151-169 
 
 reimbursement and indemnity ........ 170-176 
 
 obligations to principal .......... 177-202 
 
 rights against principal .......... 151-176 
 
 liability to third person . . ... . . 347-387,389-402 
 
 rights against third person ....... 356-359, 388 
 
 Agreement : 
 
 formation of agency by ........... 14-16 
 
 consideration for ............ 154-155 
 
 Apparent authority of agent : 
 
 principal bound within scope of ....... 203-222 
 
 from what to be inferred ........ . . 204 
 
 operates by way of estoppel ........ 101-109 
 
 apparent authority of travelling salesman . 203-206, 208-210, 
 
 211, 212-215 
 apparent authority of broker ........ 215-221 
 
 apparent authority to warrant ........ 221-222 
 
 apparent authority to sell on credit ....... 209 
 
 how affected by custom ......... 211, 212-221 
 
 in case of undisclosed principal ....... 233-237 
 
 in case of fraud ............ 282-311 
 
 to appoint sub-agent .......... . 314-319 
 
 warranty of, by agent . ......... 347-354 
 
 Attorney s-at-law : 
 
 scope of authority of ........... 227-228 
 
 Auctioneers : 
 
 scope of authority of ........... 226-227 
 
 liability of, to third persons ........ 383-384 
 
 Authority of agent: 
 
 how conferred ............. 12-125 
 
 how terminated ............ 126-150 
 
 how ascertained ............ 203-231 
 
 when acting for undisclosed principal ..... 232-237 
 
 warranty of .............. 347-354 
 
 See APPARENT AUTHORITY OF AGENT.
 
 INDEX. 405 
 
 Bank: PJUM 
 
 liability for collection of paper 192-199 
 
 liability of gratuitous directors 199-200 
 
 powers of cashier of 228-231 
 
 liability upon paper signed by cashier 369-371 
 
 Bill of lading : 
 
 issue of fictitious 299-306 
 
 Brokers : 
 
 scope of authority of 215-221 
 
 Cashier of Bank : 
 
 scope of authority of ........... 228-231 
 
 signing negotiable instrument 369-371 
 
 Charities : 
 
 liability for torts of agents 321-325 
 
 Clerk : 
 
 construction of statutory term 3-8 
 
 Clubs. See VOLUNTARY SOCIETIES. 
 
 Compensation of agent: 
 
 for authorized acts 151-152 
 
 for unauthorized acts 153 
 
 for gratuitous service 154-155 
 
 after revocation of agency 155-160 
 
 after renunciation of agency 160-163 
 
 when acting for both parties 164-169 
 
 Conductor : 
 
 agency of necessity of railway 111-121 
 
 Contract : 
 
 agency by 12-18,177-199 
 
 by agent for infant principal 18-24 
 
 by agent for insane principal 24-29 
 
 by agent for unincorporated club 29-30, 355-356 
 
 by agent for foreign principal 359-360 
 
 formal appointment of agent to make 32-38 
 
 by promoters for prospective corporation 39-45 
 
 by agent without authority. See RATIFICATION, ESTOPPEL, 
 
 NECESSITY, WARRANTY OF AUTHORITY. 
 by agent in behalf of disclosed principal .... 203-231 
 by agent in behalf of undisclosed principal . . . 232-264 
 
 by agent under seal 248-253 
 
 by agent in negotiable instrument 360-380 
 
 by agent in simple contract 380-382, 356-359 
 
 by agent having interest in subject-matter .... 383-384 
 
 Contractor, Independent. See INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
 
 406 ' INDEX. 
 
 Conversion : 
 
 liability of third person to principal for .... 328-334 
 liability of agent to third person for 399-402 
 
 Corporation : 
 
 stockholder's statutory liability to employes .... 3-9 
 
 ratification of contracts of promoters 39-45 
 
 liability for torts of agents 286, 298, 304, 308 
 
 liability for torts of sub-agents 314-319 
 
 charitable, liability for torts of agents 321-325 
 
 Crimes of agent: 
 
 liability of principal for 311-314 
 
 Custom: 
 
 proof of, to establish authority . 211, 214, 218-221, 229-231 
 
 Death: 
 
 effect upon agent's authority 141-143 
 
 Deceit : 
 
 liability of principal for agents . 282-311 
 
 liability of agent for 347-354 
 
 liability of third person for 334-341 
 
 Declarations of agent: 
 
 when declarations of principal 265-270 
 
 Deed. See SEALED INSTRUMENTS. 
 
 Delegation of duties by agent. See SUB-AGENTS. 
 
 Dissolution of agency. See TERMINATION OF AGENCY. 
 
 Election: 
 
 to hold agent or principal 246-248 
 
 of third person to recede from unauthorized contract . 73-84 
 
 Estoppel: 
 
 agency by 13-14, 24-29, 101-109, 203-231 
 
 of principal to deny that agent is principal . . . 260-264 
 in case of torts by agent 303 
 
 Evidence : 
 
 to show that agent is acting for undisclosed principal 248-256, 
 
 260-264 
 
 to vary terms of written instrument 262-264 
 
 admissions of agent as 265-270 
 
 Execution of instruments: 
 
 simple contracts 380-382, 356-359 
 
 sealed instruments 248-253, 85-87 
 
 negotiable instruments 360-380 
 
 under Statute of Frauds 32-35, 87-88
 
 INDEX. 407 
 
 Factors : p A o 
 
 scope of authority of 208-210, 223-225 
 
 Factors Acts: 
 
 construction of 330-334 
 
 False representations. See FRAUD; DECEIT. 
 
 Foreign principal : 
 
 liability of agent of 359-360 
 
 Forgery : 
 
 ratification of 90-94 
 
 Form: 
 
 of appointment of agent 32-38 
 
 of ratification 85-88 
 
 Fraud: 
 
 liability of principal for agent's 282-311 
 
 liability of third person to principal for .... 334-341 
 
 Frauds, Statute of. See STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
 
 General agent: 
 
 scope of authority 233-237 
 
 See SPECIAL AGENT. 
 Good faith: 
 
 as duty of agent 182-186 
 
 Gratuitous agent: 
 
 liability of, to principal 199-202 
 
 subsequent promise to compensate ...... 154-155 
 
 Holding out. See ESTOPPEL. 
 Husband and wife: 
 
 agency of wife by necessity *.. 110 
 
 Identity, fiction of: 
 
 in relation of principal and agent . . . 233, 236, 271-281 
 Illegality : 
 
 of contract, in ratification 88-94 
 
 Impossibility : 
 
 as discharging agency 137-141 
 
 Inc ompetency : 
 
 of parties, in agency 18-32 
 
 Indemnity : 
 
 to agent by principal 170-176 
 
 Independent contractor : 
 
 distinguished from agent 9-11, 12-18
 
 408 INDEX. 
 
 Indicia of ownership : P AOB 
 
 principal conferring on agent 329-334 
 
 Infant: 
 
 competency as principal 18-24 
 
 Insane principal : 
 
 liability of 24-29 
 
 Irrevocable agencies : 
 
 doctrine of 144-150 
 
 Joint-parties : 
 
 as principals 126-128 
 
 Joint-tort-feasors : 
 
 principal and agent as 398 
 
 Judgment : 
 
 as evidence of election 246-248 
 
 Knowledge. See NOTICE. 
 
 Legality of contract. See ILLEGALITY. 
 
 Liability : 
 
 of principal to agent . . .... . . . . . 151-176 
 
 of agent to principal 177-202 
 
 of principal to third person 203-325 
 
 of third person to principal 326-346 
 
 of agent to third person 347-387, 389-402 
 
 of third person to agent 388 
 
 Married women : 
 
 as principal 1-3 
 
 as agent 110 
 
 Master : 
 
 liable for torts of servant 9-11 
 
 liable for torts of sub-servant 314-319 
 
 ratification of torts of servant 94-98 
 
 Misrepresentation : 
 
 of agent as to authority 347-354 
 
 Mistake : 
 
 effect upon ratification 66-72 
 
 Necessity : 
 
 formation of agency by 110-125
 
 INDEX. 409 
 
 Negligence of agent : PAGB 
 
 liability to principal for 179-182, 199-202 
 
 liability to third persons for 389-397 
 
 Negotiable instruments : 
 
 liability of agent who signs 360-380 
 
 liability of agent -who wrongfully sells 399-402 
 
 Non-feasance : 
 
 liability of agent to third party for 389-397 
 
 Notice to agent: 
 
 when notice to principal 55, 271-281 
 
 of termination of agency 135-136 
 
 Obedience : 
 
 as duty of agent 177-179, 179-182 
 
 Obligations. See LIABILITY. 
 Officers. See PUBLIC AGENTS. 
 Ownership. See INDICIA OF OWNERSHIP. 
 
 Farol evidence : 
 
 to introduce undisclosed principal into a contract . 248-253, 
 
 255, 262-264, 356-359, 360-382 
 to remove ambiguity 362, 367, 369-371, 377-380 
 
 Parties to contract of agency : 
 
 competency of 18-32 
 
 joint-parties 126-128 
 
 shown by parol. See PAROL EVIDENCE. 
 
 Payment : 
 
 authority of agent to receive 101-109, 215-221 
 
 Power coupled with an interest : 
 
 renders agency irrevocable 144-150 
 
 Principal : 
 
 competency of 18-32 
 
 by agreement 12-38 
 
 by ratification 39-100 
 
 by estoppel 101-109 
 
 by necessity 110-125 
 
 revocation by 130-136, 144-150 
 
 obligations to agent 151-176 
 
 rights against agent 177-202 
 
 liabilities to third persons 203-325 
 
 rights against third persons 326-346 
 
 Privity of contract : 
 
 between principal and sub-agents 192-199 
 
 between undisclosed principal and third persons . . 232-264
 
 410 INDEX. 
 
 Promoters : P AOB 
 
 ratification of contract of 39-45 
 
 Prudence : 
 
 as duty of agent 179-182 
 
 Public principal : 
 
 liability for torts of agent 319-320 
 
 Q uasi-contract : 
 
 liability of third person in 326-327 
 
 liability of agent in 385-387 
 
 Ratification : 
 
 by corporation of contract of promoters 39-45 
 
 by one in whose behalf contract not made 45-47 
 
 by receiving fruits of contract . . 47-57 
 
 by silence 57-63 
 
 must be in toto 51, 63-65 
 
 must be free from mistake and fraud ...... 66-72 
 
 may third party withdraw before 73-84 
 
 is new assent of third person necessary 81-84 
 
 principal must be competent 20 
 
 form of ratification 85-88 
 
 of illegal or void act 88-94 
 
 of forgery 90-94 
 
 of tort 94-98 
 
 effect as between principal and agent .... 57, 99-100 
 
 Reimbursement : 
 
 of agent by principal 170-176 
 
 Renunciation : 
 
 of agency by agent 160-163 
 
 Res gestae : 
 
 meaning and application 265-270 
 
 Revocation : 
 
 of agency by principal .... 130-136, 144-150, 155-160 
 
 Bale: 
 
 authority of agent to make, 105-109, 206-208, 211, 223-225, 
 
 328-334, 352-354, 399-402 
 
 Scope of authority. See AUTHORITY ; APPARENT AUTHORITY. 
 
 Sealed instruments : 
 
 authority of agents to execute 35-38 
 
 parties cannot be introduced into by parol .... 248-253 
 liability of agent who signs 360
 
 INDEX. 411 
 
 Servant : p AQg 
 
 distinguished from agent 1-8 
 
 may also be agent * 9-11 
 
 master liable for torts of 9-11 
 
 agency of necessity 121-125 
 
 Signature of agent : 
 
 to simple contract 253-256, 262-264, 380-382 
 
 to sealed instrument 248-253 
 
 to negotiable instrument 360-380 
 
 Silence : 
 
 whether evidence of ratification 57-63 
 
 Special agent : 
 
 whether to be distinguished from general agent, 203, 208, 233- 
 
 237, 288 
 
 Statute of Frauds : 
 
 contract by agent under 32-35, 87-88 
 
 as affecting liability of agent 352-354 
 
 Stockholder : 
 
 statutory liability to agents and servants 3-9 
 
 as agent of corporation 16-18 
 
 Sub-agents : 
 
 power of agent to appoint 188-199, 314-319 
 
 liability of principal for torts of 314-319 
 
 notice to 280-281 
 
 Termination of agency : 
 
 forms of 126-150 
 
 See AGENCY. 
 
 Third person : 
 
 liability to principal 326-346 
 
 Title to property : 
 
 when sold without authority . 328-334 
 
 Torts of agent : 
 
 liability of principal for 282-325 
 
 ratification by principal, of 94-98 
 
 liability of agent for 389-402 
 
 Torts of third person: 
 
 liability to principal for 328-341 
 
 Travelling salesman: 
 
 embraced within statutory term " clerk ".... 3-8 
 
 not within statutory term " laborer " 8-9 
 
 scope of authority of 203-206, 208-215 
 
 Trust funds : 
 
 may be followed into hands of third persons . . . 341-346
 
 412 INDEX. 
 
 Unauthorized acts: 
 
 ratification of. See RATIFICATION. 
 
 compensation for. See COMPENSATION. 
 
 liability of agent for 347-354 
 
 Undisclosed principal: 
 
 liability of 232-253 
 
 rights of 253-264,356-359 
 
 liability of agent of 380-382 
 
 Voluntary societies: 
 
 competency of, as principals 29-30 
 
 liability of agent of 355-356 
 
 'War: 
 
 effect of, on agency 30-32 
 
 Warranty : 
 
 authority of agent to give 221-222 
 
 Warranty of authority : 
 
 liability of agent for 347-354,384-385
 
 UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 
 
 A 000 774 290 1