i^f^f^mmW^^W^c?^
THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES
SCHOOL OF LAW
A TREATISE
ON THE
Law of Naturalization
OF THE
United States
BY
FREDERICK VAN DYNE, LL. M.,
American Consul; formerly Assistant Solicitor of the Department of
State of the United States; Author of ''Citizenship
of the United States," etc.
Washington:
FREDERICK VAN DYNE,
1907.
r
\imi n
19^7
Copyright, 1907, by Frederick Van Dyne.
The Law Reporter Printing Company,
Washington, D. C.
a.
To My Devoted Wife, Clara M.,
This Book is Affectionately Inscribed.
740095
PREFACE.
One of the most creditable achievements of the ad-
ministration of President Roosevelt was the reformation
of our naturalization laws.
These laws, substantially the statutes enacted more
than a hundred years ago when our population was less
than four millions, and when it was the policy of our
government to invite immigration, were ill adapted to
our modern conditions, with a population of eighty mil-
lions and an influx of foreigners of more than a million
annually. Under these laws lax and unsatisfactory
methods of naturalization had grown up, opening the
way to gross frauds against our citizenship, including
perjury, false impersonation, and traffic in false and
counterfeit certificates of citizenship. Such certificates
were sometimes sold to alien criminals to secure their ad-
mission to the United States, and frequently to procure
protection against their home governments. Cases have
actually occurred where aliens have landed on our shores
for the first time, having in their possession certificates
entitling them to the full rights of American citizenship.
Our Presidents had on numerous occasions brought the
subject to the attention of Congress and urged legislation,
but without effect. At length, in March, 1905, President
Roosevelt— at the suggestion, it is understood, of the
Honorable Oscar Straus, now Secretary of Commerce and
Labor — appointed, by Executive order, a special commis-
sion, composed of Milton D. Purdy of the Department of
Justice, Gaillard Hunt of the Department of State, and
Richard K. Campbell of the Department of Commerce
(V)
VI PREFACE
and Labor, to investigate the subject of naturalization,
and recommend legislation. The Commission made a
thorough investigation and report and submitted drafts
of bills which the President transmitted to Congress.
While the bills drafted by the Commission were not
enacted into law, their recommendations formed the basis
for the bill prepared and reported by the House Com-
mittee on Immigration and Naturalization, which, with
some modifications, became a law on June 29, 1906.
This law effects a revolution in our system of natural-
ization, giving the Federal Government effective control
of the matter through a central bureau in the Depart-
ment of Commerce and Labor, and throws such safeguards
around naturalization as will effectually prevent frauds
if the law is enforced, — and no one who knows President
Roosevelt and Secretary Straus can doubt that it will
be faithfully and rigidly enforced.
Besides the numerous changes in our statutes made
by this law, as shown in the text, still more recent legis-
lation, making further modifications of importance and
far-reaching consequences in our naturalization laws, has
been enacted. In pursuance of a report of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs (H. Rep. No. 4,784, 59th
Cong., 1st session), Secretary Root designated James
B. Scott, Solicitor for the Department of State, David J.
Hill, Minister to the Netherlands, and Gaillard Hunt,
chief of the Passport Bureau (now the Bureau of Citizen-
ship), to make an inquiry into the subjects of citizen-
ship, expatriation and protection abroad, and to report
with recommendations. The report of this board, which
was embodied in House Document No. 326, 59th Cong.,
2d session, together with recommendations of the board,
was transmitted to Congress, and nearly all of the recom-
mendations were incorporated in the law of March 2, 1907.
These numerous modifications of our laws, and the
PREFACE Vll
lack of any comprehensive work on the subject of natu-
ralization, have influenced the writer to prepare, as a
companion volume to his work "Citizenship of the
United States," an independent treatise on Naturaliza-
tion. While the recent legislation completely changes
the method of naturalizing aliens, parts of the old laws
remain in force. This work clearly indicates the changes
made, and undertakes to show by an exhaustive analysis
of the new legislation and by reference to and discussion
of the judicial decisions and the opinions and rulings of
the Executive and international claims commissions,
what the law of naturalization now is.
The work is specially designed to meet the needs of
judges and clerks of courts having jurisdiction in natu-
ralization matters, of United States Attorneys who appear
for the government in naturalization proceedings and in
proceedings to set aside or cancel naturalization certifi-
cates, of diplomatic and consular officers and other
officers in the various branches of the government serv-
ice dealing with questions relating to citizenship and
naturalization. It is believed that the work will also fill
a real need in furnishing, in comprehensive and conven-
ient form, to lawyers who desire to advise their clients
seeking naturalization or to establish rights of citizen-
ship, and to general readers and students wishing to be
well informed, the complete law on this important sub-
ject. Executive and Departmental orders and regula-
tions are included in their appropriate places and the
book will be found to constitute an exhaustive manual.
In the preparation of the work considerable assistance
was derived from the comprehensive report of the citi-
zenship board referred to, as well as from the chapter on
nationality in John Bassett Moore's monumental work,
the International Law Digest, and the author desires to
make due acknowledgment therefor.
Vlll PREFACE
By an order of the Secretary of State dated May 31,
1907, the designation of the Passport Bureau of the
Department of State, to which numerous references are
made in this worli, was changed to the Bureau of Citizen-
ship. Since the Secretary's order was made too late for
insertion in the text of this book, which had then gone
to press, the change is noted in the Preface.
F. V.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
NATURALIZATION IN PURSUANCE OF THE STATUTES OF THE
UNITED STATES BY TAKING OUT FORMAL PAPERS.
Page.
Definition 5
Power to regulate 6
Naturalization a judicial function 9
Courts authorized to naturalize 11
— Courts of record . 13
— Common law jurisdiction 14
—Act of June 29, 1906 17
— State courts 17
— Judges 19
—Clerks 22
—Duties 22
As to declaration of intention 22
As to petition 24
As to notice of petition 25
As to witnesses 26
As to docketing petitions 26
As to duplicates of petitions 26
As to final hearing 26
As to aliens denied naturalization 26
As to certificates of citizenship 26
Blank certificates 26
Defaced or injured certificates 28
Accountability for certificates 28
Duplicates 29
Stub 29
Canceled certificates 29
Certified copies 30
(ix)
X TABLE OF CONTENTS
Courts authorized to naturalize — Continued: Page.
Records 31
Fees 31
United States District Attorneys 34
— Appearance in opposition to naturalization. ... 34
— Proceedings to set aside or cancel certificates. . 34
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization 36
— Functions of Secretary of Commerce and Labor 36
— Functions of Bureau 38
— Commissioners of Immigration 39
— Disbursing clerk, Department of Commerce and
Labor 40
Who are capable of naturalization 40
— Chinese 42
— Japanese 43
— Burmese 44
— Hawaiians 45
— Indians 45
— Mexicans 46
— Porto Ricans and Filipinos 48
— Alien enemies 49
— Women 51
— Anarchists and Polygamists 53
Usual Legal Conditions 54
Declaration of Intention 54
Time of making 55
Before whom made 55
Form 57
Difference between Act of 1906 and Rev. Stat.
2165 59
Porto Ricans and Filipinos 60
Exceptions to usual requirement 61
Army 61
Navy and Marine Corps 62
Widow and Children of Deceased Declarant. . 62
Minor Residents 62
TABLE OF CONTENTS XI
Declaration of Intention — Continued: Page.
In Hawaii 63
In Philippine Islands and Porto Rico 63
Rights conferred by Declaration of Intention. . 64
Under Federal laws 64
Under State laws 64
Citizenship not conferred by 64
Burnato's case 67
Koszta's case 68
Declaration of Intention and Residence 73
Declaration of Intention and Three Years Resi-
dence 74
Declaration of Intention and Service as Mer-
chant Seaman 74
Status conferred on Minors by Declaration of
Intention of Parent 76
Petition for Naturalization 84
— Time of filing 85
— To whom made 85
—Form 85
Description of applicant 88
Allegations of petition 88
Signature of petitioner 90
Verification of petition 90
Witnesses 90
Notice of petition 92
Certificate of Department of Commerce and Labor 93
Residence 94
— Meaning of '' residence " 95
— " Continued residence " 95
— Constructive residence 105
Merchant seamen 105
In countries in which United States has ex-
traterritorial rights 105
— Residence within State 106
— In the Philippines and Porto Rico 107
Xll TABLE OF CONTENTS
Residence — Continued: Page.
— In Hawaii 107
— Proof of residence 108
— Exceptions 109
Army 109
Navy and Marine Corps 110
Merchant seamen 110
Qualifications as to Age, Education and Moral
Character Ill
Final Hearing 119
—Time of 119
—Place 120
— Procedure 120
Appearance and examination of applicant and
witnesses 120
Appearance of United States 120
Proof of residence and behavior as of good
moral character 121
Renunciation of foreign allegiance 121
Renunciation of title or order of nobility. . . 122
Oath of allegiance to United States 123
Change of name 124
Certificate 124
—Under Act of March 3, 1903 125
—Under Act of June 29, 1906 126
—Form 126
—Duplicate 128
—Stub 128
— Blank certificates 129
— Proof of naturalization 129
The record 129
Where record has been destroyed or lost. . . . 132
Certificate of naturalization 133
— Naturalization not retroactive 134
Impeachment of Naturalization 134
— Before municipal courts 134
TABLE OF CONTENTS Xlll
Impeachment of Naturalization — Continued : Page.
Under Act of 1906 135
Under prior laws 138
— International practice 141
Executive Department of Government 141
Power to treat certificate as invalid 141
Right of foreign governments to impeach
American certificate of naturalization
denied 142
International claims commissions 142
Spanish Claims Commission of 1871 142
Costa Rican Claims Commission of 1860. . 143
Venezuelan Claims Commission of 1903. . . 143
Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, 1905. . 144
Crimes and offenses against naturalization laws. , 189
Limitation of actions 195
CHAPTER II.
NATURALIZATION BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT.
Section 2172 of the Revised Statutes 197
Meaning of phrase "dwelling in the United States" 198
— Where children are dwelling in United States at
time of parent's naturalization 198
— Where children are dwelling abroad at time of
parent's naturalization 200
Act of March 2, 1907 218
Mode of parent's naturalization immaterial 220
— By naturalization of father by treaty 220
— By naturalization of mother by marriage 220
Illegitimate children 223
Adoption 223
Effect of declaration of intention of parent during
minority of child 224
Naturalization not effective internationally as to
absent children 224
Xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER III.
Naturalization by Marriage. Page.
In general 227
Women who may be naturalized by marriage 229
Time of marriage 231
Necessity of residence in United States 233
— Residence in United States held not to be nec-
essary 234
— Residence in United States held to be necessary 234
Nature of citizenship acquired 238
Effect of death of husband on citizenship of alien
woman married to an American 240
— Instructions of Department of State 241
Citizenship of American woman married to an alien 243
—Under law prior to 1907 243
—Under Act of March 2, 1907 256
Instructions of Department of State 257
Case of Nellie Grant Sartoris 258
Effect of divorce 260
Declaration of intention of husband 262
CHAPTER IV.
Collective Naturalization.
Naturalization by Conquest 266
Allegiance of inhabitants of conquered state. . . . 266
Citizenship of inhabitants of conquered state. . . . 267
American ante-nati 272
Naturalization by Treaty 273
In general 273
Power of United States to acquire territory by
treaty and to prescribe terms on which it
will receive inhabitants 273
Treaties of Cession to which United States has
been a party 275
— In general 275
TABLE OF CONTENTS XV
Naturalization hy Treaty — Continued: Page.
—Treaty of 1794 with Great Britain 276
—Treaty of 1803 with France 276
Case of Egle Aubry 276
Case of Foucher 279
Case of De Baca 281
—Treaty of 1819 with Spain 283
—Treaty of 1848 with Mexico 284
—Treaty with Mexico of 1853 (Gadsden Treaty) 291
—Treaty with Russia of 1867 291
—Treaty with Spain of 1898 293
Insular cases 296
Status of Porto Ricans and Filipinos 309
Treaties with Indians 316
Naturalization by Special Act of Congress 317
In general 317
On the acquisition of the Territory of Oregon. . 317
On the annexation of Hawaii 318
Readmission of Nellie Grant Sartoris to citizen-
ship 318
Naturalization of Indians 319
Naturalization by Admission of Territory to
Statehood 321
In general 321
Louisiana 321
States carved out of Northwest Territory 324
Florida 327
Texas 329
Nebraska 331
Power of Congress over Territories 330
CHAPTER V.
Expatriation.
Definition 333
Right of expatriation 333
How effected 336
XVI TABLE OF CONTENTS
Expatriation — Continued: Page.
Modes of expatriation 336
—Act of 1907 336
By Naturalization in a foreign State 337
By taking oath of allegiance to a foreign State 338
By residence in a foreign country 340
Exceptions : Expatriation not accomplished. . 355
— When residence abroad is due to ill health
or financial condition 355
— Agents of American enterprises 355
— Missionaries 356
— By desertion 357
— Military and naval service in foreign country. . . 358
— Accepting public office under foreign govern-
ment 360
Engaging in diplomatic service 360
Engaging in consular service 360
Entrance into civil service of foreign
country 361
CHAPTER VI.
Passports.
In general 363
Statutes 363
Rules and regulations 365
—In the United States 365
— In Insular Possessions 373
—Executive order of April 6, 1907 380
Forms 384
CHAPTER VII.
Attitude of Foreign Governments Toward Their
Citizens Who Have Become Naturalized in the
United States.
Information relative to rules and regulations of
foreign countries compiled by Department of State 389
— Austria-Hungary 389
TABLE OF CONTENTS XVI 1
Attitude of Foreign Governments, etc. — Continued : Page.
—Belgium . 390
—Denmark 391
—France 392
— Germany = 394
— Greece 395
—Italy 396
—Netherlands 397
—Norway 398
—Persia 399
—Portugal 399
— Roumania 401
— Russia 401
— Servia 402
—Sweden 403
— Switzerland 404
—Turkey 405
APPENDIX.
Laws of United States relating to Naturalization
AND Expatriation 409
— Sections of the Revised Statutes 409
— Later acts of Congress 416
Act of June 29, 1906, establishing a bureau of
naturalization 417
Act of March 2, 1907, in reference to expatria-
tion and protection 438
Naturalization Conventions to which the United
States is a party 441
— With Austria Hungary 441
—With Baden 444
— With Bavaria 447
—With Belgium 451
, —With Denmark 453
—With Great Britain 456
— With Haiti 461
XVm TABLE OF CONTENTS
Naturalization Conventions, etc. — Continued: Page.
—With Hesse 463
— With North German Confederation 466
— With Sweden and Norway 468
—With Wiirttemberg 472
Executive orders 475
Naturalization regulations 485
List of courts having jurisdiction to naturalize
ALIENS 493
List of foreign countries and rulers 507
NATURALIZATION.
CHAPTER I.
NATURALIZATION IN PURSUANCE OF THE STATUTES OF THE
UNITED STATES BY TAKING OUT FORMAL PAPERS.
A. Definition.
B. Power to regulate.
C. Naturalization a judicial function.
D. What courts are authorized to naturalize.
1. Courts of record.
2. Common law jurisdiction.
3. Act of June 29, 1906.
4. State courts.
5. Judges.
Functions of
6. Clerks of courts.
Duties:
a. As to declaration of intention.
b. As to petition for naturalization.
c. As to notice of petition.
d. As to witnesses.
e. As to docketing.
f. As to duplicates.
g. As to final hearing.
h. As to aliens denied naturalization,
i. As to certificates of citizenship.
(A) Blank certificates.
(B) Defaced or injured certificates.
(C) Accountability for certificates.
(D) Duplicates.
(E) Stub.
(F) Cancelled certificates,
j. Certified copies.
k. Record,
1. Fees.
E. United States District Attorneys.
Duties:
1. Appearance in opposition to naturalization.
2. Proceedings to set aside or cancel certificates.
5233—1
I NATURALIZATION
F. Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.
1. In general.
2. Functions of Secretary of Commerce and Labor.
a. Direction and control of Bureau.
b. Rules and regulations.
c. Blank certificates of citizenship.
d. Certificate of registry of alien.
e. Allowance of additional compensation to clerks of courts.
3. Functions of Bureau.
a. Supervision of naturalization.
b. Registry of aliens arriving in United States.
c. Blank certificates of citizenship.
d. As to naturalization fees.
4. Commissioners of Immigration,
5. Disbursing clerk, Department of Commerce and Labor.
a. Duties as to naturalization fees.
b. Bond.
G. Who are capable of naturalization.
1. In general.
2. Chinese.
3. Japanese.
4. Burmese.
5. Hawiians.
6. Indians.
7. Mexicans.
8. Porto Ricans and Filipinos.
9. Alien enemies,
to. Women:
a. In general.
b. Married women.
11. Anarchists and polygamists.
H. Usual legal conditions.
1. Declaration of intention.
a. Time of making.
b. Before whom made.
c. Form of declaration.
d. Difference between Act of 1905 and prior law.
e. Porto Ricans and Filipinos.
f . Exceptions to usual requirement of declaration.
(A) Army.
(B) Navy and Marine Corps.
(C) Widow and children of deceased declarant.
(D) Minor residents.
Repeal of Minor's Clause.
(E) In Hawaii.
(F) In the Philippine Islands and Porto Rico.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 6
H. Usual legal conditions. — Continued.
g. Rights conferred by declaration of intention.
(A) Under State laws.
(B) Under Federal laws.
(C) Citizenship not conferred by.
(i) Burnato's case.
(ii) Koszta's case,
h. Declaration of intention and residence.
(A) In general.
(B) Declaration and three years' residence.
i. Declaration of intention and service as merchant seaman,
j. Status conferred on minors by declaration of intention of
parents.
2. Petition for naturalization.
a. In general.
b. Time of filing.
c. To whom made.
d. Form of petition.
(A) Description of applicant.
(B) Allegations of petition.
(a) Disbelief in anarchy and polygamy.
(b) Of intention to become a citizen, to reside perman-
ently in United States, and to renounce allegiance
to foreign sovereign.
(c) Of previous denial of naturalization.
(d) As to residence.
(e) As to ability to speak English.
(C) Signature of petitioner.
(D) Verification of petition.
(E) Witnesses.
(i) Citizenship of.
(ii) Personal acquaintance with applicant.
(iii) Form of affidavit.
(iv) Fees.
e. Notice.
(A) In general.
(B) Form.
f. Certificate from Department of Commerce and Labor, and
declaration of intention.
3- Residence.
a. In general.
b. Meaning of "residence."
c. "Continued residence."
d. Constructive residence.
(A) Merchant Seamen.
(B) In countries in which the United States has extraterri-
torial rights.
4 NATURALIZATION
H. Usual legal conditions. — Continued.
e. Residence within State.
f. In the Philippines and Porto Rico.
g. In Hawaii.
h. Proof of residence.
(A) Under Act of 1906.
(B) Under prior laws.
i. Exceptions:
(A) Army.
(B) Navy and Marine Corps.
(C) Merchant Seamen.
4. Qualifications as to age, education, and moral character.
a. Age.
b. Education.
(A) Under Act of June 29, 1906.
(B) Exceptions.
(i) Physical inability.
(ii) Declaration under prior law.
(iii) Where declarant makes homestead entry.
(C) Under prior law.
c. Moral character.
(A) In general.
(B) What acts are immoral.
(C) Anarchists and polygamists.
(D) Proof of moral character,
(i.) Oath of applicant,
(ii.) Witnesses.
5. Final Hearing.
a. Time of
b. Place.
c. Procedure.
(A) Appearance and examination of applicant and wit-
nesses before the court.
(B) Appearance of United States.
(C) Proof of residence and behavior as man of good
moral character.
(D) Renunciation of foreign allegiance,
(i.) In general.
(ii. ) Filipinos and Porto Ricans.
(E) Renunciation of title or order of nobility.
(F) Oath of allegiance to United States.
(G) Change of name.
6. Certificate.
a. In general.
b. Under Act of March 3, 1903.
c. Under Act of June 29, 19O6.
d. Form.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. O
H. Usual legal conditions . —Continued .
e. Duplicates.
f. Stub.
g. Blank certificates.
h. Proof of naturalization:
(i.) The record.
(ii.) Where records have been lost or destroyed.
(iii.) Certificate of naturalization.
i. Naturalization not retroactive.
I. Impeachment of naturalization.
1. Before municipal courts.
a. Under Act of 1906.
b. Under prior laws.
2. International practice.
a. Executive Departments of Government.
(A) Power to treat certificate as invalid.
(B) Right of foreign governments to impeach denied.
b. International claims commissions.
(A) In general.
(B) Spanish Claims Commission of 1871.
(C) Costa Rican Claims Commission of i860.
(D) Venezuelan Claims Commission of 1903.
(E) Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, 1905-
J. Crimes and offenses against naturalization laws.
1. In general.
2. By clerks.
3. Limitation of actions.
1. NATURALIZATION IN PURSUANCE OF THE STATUTES OF
THE UNITED STATES BY TAKING OUT FORMAL PAPERS.
A. Definition.
Naturalization is the act of adopting a foreigner and
clothing him with the privileges of a citizen. 9 Ops. Atty.
Gen. 359; Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135.
A naturalized citizen becomes a member of the society,
possessing all the rights of a native citizen and standing,
in the view of the Constitution, on the footing of a native.
Chief Justice Marshall, in Spratt v. Spratt, 1 Pet. 343.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside.
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, Sec. 1.
b NATURALIZATION
B. Power to Regulate Naturalization Vested Exclusively in
Congress.
In the United States the naturalization of foreigners
is within the exclusive control of the Federal Govern-
ment. It is one of the powers expressly granted to the
National Government.
Prior to the establishment of the government under
the Constitution, the different colonies and states had
enacted laws regulating the naturalization of aliens. They
had manifested very diverse views in their legislation on
the subject. One state, desiring to foster immigration,
conferred on foreigners all the rights of citizenship on
their landing on its shores, while another required a pro-
bation of many years before conferring those privileges
upon the immigrant. It was feared that if the states
were to be left to themselves, the same diversity would
continue under the Constitution. As early as 1782, Mr.
Madison strenuously urged the adoption of a uniform
rule of naturalization hy the states.
The Constitution (Art. 1, Sec. 8) provides that "the
Congress shall have power to establish a uniform rule of
naturalization." The Constitution went into operation
on the 4th of March, 1789. The first Congress that as-
sembled under it, at its second session, exercised the
power vested in it by the Constitution, and passed an
act to establish a uniform system of naturalization. Act
of March 26, 1790, 1 Stat, at L. 103.
The question arose whether, after this act went into
effect, any authority existed for the naturalization of
foreigners under state laws. The United States Supreme
Court, in Collet v. Collet (1792), 2 Dallas, 294, expressed
the opinion that the states still individuallyenjoyed a con-
current authority upon the subject, but that this au-
thority could not be exercised so as to contravene the
rule established by the authority of the Union.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 7
But in United States t^.Villato (1797), 2 Dallas, 370, it was
decided that a Spaniard by origin who had complied with
the requirements prescribed by the laws of the State of
Pennsylvania in relation to naturalization was not a
citizen of the United States. While the decision in this
case was based on the ground that the naturalization
laws of the state had been repealed by the new constitu-
tion of that state, doubt was expressed by one of the
judges of the court as to the correctness of the view
expressed in Collet v. Collet, and he indicated his belief
that the power of naturalization operated exclusively as
soon as it was exercised by Congress.
And in Chirac v. Chirac (1817), 2 Wheaton, 259, Chief
Justice Marshall said: "That the power of naturalization
is exclusively in Congress does not seem to be and cer-
tainly ought not to be controverted."
Matthews' Lessee v. Rae (1829), 3 Cranch C. C. 699, in-
volved the question of the status of the naturalization
law of Maryland of 1779 and that of Pennsylvania of
1789. The court held that one who, after the Act of
Congress of 1790, had gone through the forms of nat-
uralization prescribed by the laws of the states, had not
been naturalized, "the state naturalization laws being
superseded and annulled by the Act of Congress whose
jurisdiction upon that subject is, under the Constitution
of the United States, exclusive."
Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19
Howard, 393, said: "Previous to the adoption of the
Constitution of the United States every state had the
undoubted right to confer on whomsoever it pleased the
character of citizen, and to endow him with all its rights.
But this character, of course, was confined to the bound-
aries of the state and gave him no rights or privileges in
other states beyond those secured to him by the laws of
nations and the comity of states, . . . Each state may
still confer " these rights and privileges " upon an alien, or
8 NATURALIZATION
any one it thinks proper, or upon any class or descrip-
tion of persons; yet he would not be a citizen in the sense
in which that word is used in the Constitution of the
United States. . . . The rights which he would ac-
quire would be restricted to the state which gave them.
The Constitution has conferred on Congress the right to
establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and this
right is evidently exclusive and has always been held by
this court to be so. Consequently no state, since the
adoption of the Constitution, can by naturalizing an alien
invest him with the rights and privileges secured to a
citizen of a state under the Federal Government, al-
though, so far as the state alone was concerned, he would
undoubtedly be entitled to the rights of a citizen and
clothed with all the rights and immunities which the
constitution and laws of the state attached to that char-
acter. It is very clear, therefore, that no state can, by
any act or law of its own, passed since the adoption of
the Constitution, introduce a new member into the po-
litical community created by the Constitution of the
United States. It can not make him a member of this
community by making him a member of its own; and for
the same reason it can not introduce any person, or de-
scription of persons, who were not intended to be em-
braced in this new political family, which the Constitu-
tion brought into existence, but were intended to be
excluded from it."
Mr. Justice Gray, in United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U. S. 649, said: "The power granted to
Congress by the Constitution, 'to establish an uniform
rule of naturalization,' was long ago adjudged by this
court to be vested exclusively in Congress."
In Minneapolis v. Reum, 56 Fed. 576, the court said, re-
ferring to the power vested in Congress by the Constitu-
tion in relation to naturalization : "Congress has exercised
this power, established the rule, and expressly declared
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 9
that foreign-born residents may be naturalized by a com-
pliance with it, and not otherwise. This power, like the
power to regulate commerce among the states, was carved
out of the general sovereign power held by the states
when this nation was formed and granted by the Consti-
tution to the Congress of the United States. It thus
vested exclusively in Congress, and no power remained
in the states to change or vary the rule of naturalization
Congress established, or to authorize any foreign subject
to denationalize himself and become a citizen of the
United States without a compliance with the conditions
Congress had prescribed." See, also, Lanz v. Randall, 4
Dill. 425.
The history of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention, and the speeches of Charles Pinckney who
drafted this clause of the Constitution, clearly show that it
was the intention of the framers to confer on the Federal
Government the exclusive power to declare on what
terms naturalization should be extended to foreigners.
The State courts have adopted the view taken of the
subject by the Federal courts. Lynch v. Clark, 1 Sandf.
Ch. 641; Davis v. Hall, 1 Nott & McCord, 292; In re
Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443; In re Stephens, 4 Gray, 559; In re
Ramsden, 13 How. Pr. 429.
By the Act of April 14, 1802 (2 Stat, at L. 153), Con-
gress declared that the children of persons who, previous
to the passage of any law on the subject of naturalization
by the Government of the United States, had been
naturalized under the laws of one of the States, should,
if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens
of the United States.
C. Naturalization a Judicial Function.
In the United States naturalization is a judicial func-
tion, having been committed by Congress to the courts.
A naturalization proceeding is a judgment. Chief
10 NATURALIZATION
Justice Marshall, in Spratt v. Spratt (4 Peters, 393), said:
" The various acts upon the subject submit the decision on
the right of aliens to admission as citizens to courts of rec-
ord. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with
the law, and to judge on both law and fact. This judg-
ment is entered on record as the judgment of the court."
See, also, Campbell v. Gordon, 6 Cranch, 175; Mut. Bene-
fit Ins. Co. V. Tisdale, 91 U. S. 238; Ritchie v. Putnam, 13
Wend. 524; State v. McDonald, 24 Minn. 48.
An interesting discussion of the question whether the
final order of a court admitting an alien to citizenship is
a judgment, is found in the opinion of the Spanish Treaty
Claims Commission in the case of Ruiz v. United States,
from which full quotation is made under " Impeachment
of Naturalization," page 141, post. The Commission said:
" In the refinements of legal phraseology we may find
some other word that suits us better than judgment by
which to call the final determining act of a court in pass-
ing upon such proceedings — order, adjudication, decree,
decision, conclusion — but the effect is just the same.
The thing done and not the technical name one chooses
to give it is of importance only. The validity and legality
of an act done, whether by an officer or a tribunal,
depends upon the jurisdiction over the subject-matter,
and the exercise of its delegated power by a judicial
body in reaching a conclusion is, to all intents and
purposes, a judgment, whether technically so called or
not; and it is a matter of legal insignificance what other
term or name is employed to express it. The authorities
make no distinction between the orders of officers and
the judgments of tribunals, where the exercise of
jurisdiction is confided to their discretion, and they
employ the same within the authority and power con-
ferred. Neither do we find authorities to sustain the
proposition that a judgment in uncontested proceedings,
by default or confession, is excluded from the terms of
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 11
Article IV, Section l,of the Constitution, which provides
that 'full faith and credit shall be given in each state
to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
every other state ' and of the Act of Congress, Revised
Statutes, Section 905, which declares that such records
and .judicial proceedings, when properly authenticated,
'shall have such faith and credit given to them in every
court within the United States as they have by law or
usage in the courts of the state from which they are
taken.' The authorities appear to make no distinction
whatever between different kinds of judgments. They
are all entitled to the same faith and credit, whether
entered by default, confession, or in a contested litiga-
tion, and may be impeached on the same grounds as other
judgments are impeachable upon. Freeman on Judg-
ments, Section 588; Bunn v. Ahl, 29 Pa. St. 387; 72 Am.
Dec. 639; Sipes v. Whitney, 30 Ohio, 69; Kingman v.
Paulson, 126 Ind. 507. It is interesting to note in this
connection that neither the Constitution nor the statute
refers specifically to a judgment, and it is equally true
that the Acts of Congress relating to naturalization and
conferring jurisdiction upon certain courts never speak
of a judgment, and yet the courts of the country, from
the earliest decisions to the present time, in innumerable
cases, have uniformly treated them as judgments. Un-
doubtedly the decision of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion to grant a naturalization certificate based upon
facts made to appear to its satisfaction, is comprehended
in the expression 'public acts, records, and judicial pro-
ceedings, and must be a judgment.' "
D. What Courts Are Authorized to Naturalize.
The first law enacted by Congress concerning naturali-
zation (Act of 1790), authorized " any common law
court of record in any one of the states " to admit
aliens to citizenship.
12 NATURALIZATION
The Act of 1795, which repealed the Act of 1790, con-
ferred jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings upon
" the supreme, superior, district, or circuit court of some
one of the states, or of the territories northwest or south
of the river Ohio, or a circuit or district court of the
United States."
The Act of April 14, 1802 (2 Stat, at L. 153), which,
in turn, repealed the Act of 1795, authorized "the su-
preme, superior, district or circuit court of some one of the
states or of the territorial districts of the United States, or
a circuit or district court of the United States," to
act in naturalization proceedings, and aeclared that
"every court of record in any individual state having
common law jurisdiction and a seal and clerk or prothon-
otary, shall be considered as a district court within the
meaning of this act." As carried into the Revised Stat-
utes of the United States (1878) , Section 2165, which re-
mained the law on the subject until the passage of the
Act of June 27, 1906, 34 Stat, at L. 596, the provision
read : "A circuit or district court of the United States, or
a district or supreme court of the territories, or a court
of record of any of the states having common law juris-
diction and a seal and clerk."
The Act of June 27, 1906 — the existing law — provides
that "exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize aliens as citizens
of the United States is hereby conferred upon the follow-
ing specified courts: United States circuit and district
courts now existing, or which may hereafter be established
by Congress in any state, United States district courts
for the Territories of Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Hawaii, and Alaska, the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia, and the United States courts for the Indian
Territory; also all courts of record in any state or ter-
ritory now existing, or which may hereafter be created,
having a seal, a clerk, and jurisdiction in actions at law
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 13
or equity, or law and equity, in which the amount in
controversy is unlimited."
1. Courts of Record.
The language of the Statute is " courts of record
having a seal, a clerk, and jurisdiction in actions at law
or equity, or law and equity, in which the amount in
controversy is unlimited."
There have been no judicial decisions under the Act of
1906, but the courts have frequently passed upon the
question of jurisdiction of courts under prior laws. As
cases may arise concerning naturalization conferred under
prior laws, and as the language of the existing law is, in
part, similar to that of previous acts, references to earlier
decisions of the courts are given.
In ex parte Cregg, 2 Curtis, C. C. 98, the Court said:
"When the Act speaks of courts of record it speaks of
courts whose proceedings are duly recorded by author-
ized persons; and when it says 'having a clerk or pro-
thonotary,' it superadds the requirement that those
proceedings shall be recorded by one of those officers."
In Mills V. McCabe, 44 111. 194, the question involved
was whether the Marine Court of the City of New York,
which was created by Act of the State Legislature and
had a clerk and seal and a limited common law jurisdic-
tion, was a court of record within the meaning of the
Act of Congress. The New York courts had decided that
the marine court was a court of record only to the extent
to which it was declared so by statute, and not in the
strict legal sense of the term. The Illinois court said:
"A fair and reasonable construction of the Act of Con-
gress requires us to hold that only a court of record for
general, and not special, purposes was intended to be
embraced. The Act has not declared that a court of
record for some purposes only shall be invested with
14 NATURALIZATION
such jurisdiction. Nor do we think such can be held to be
the legislative intention."
A court with no clerk or recording officer other than
the judge, has been held to have no jurisdiction of
applications for naturalization. Mills v. McCabe, 44 111.,
194; State ex rel. Fossler v. Webster, 7 Neb. 469; Re
Dean, 83 Me. 489.
In ex parte Gladhill, 8 Met. 168, the question being
whether the police court of Lowell, Mass., was a court
of record, the court said:
"It possesses all the characteristics of a court of rec-
ord. It is to be holden by a learned, able, and discreet
person to be appointed and commissioned by the gov-
ernor pursuant to the constitution. In general, all
judicial officers by the constitution hold their offices
during good behavior, except justices of the peace, whose
office is limited to the term of seven years. There is also a
provision. Section 8, for the appointment of special jus-
tices to hold the court whenever the standing justice
shall be interested in any suit or prosecution, or shall
be unable, from any cause, to hear and determine any
matter pending in said court. This indicates the estab-
lishment of a court, or judicial organized tribunal, hav-
ing attributes and exercising functions, independently of
the person of the magistrate designated generally to
hold it, and distinguishes it from the case of a justice of
the peace on whom, personally, certain judicial powers
are conferred by the law.
"We have no doubt it is a court of record. Section 6
directs the keeping of a fair record and a subsequent
act, cited hereafter, authorizes the appointment of a
clerk for the same purpose."
2. Common Law Jurisdiction.
The courts have frequently construed the phrase:
^'common law jurisdiction," in the naturalization statutes.
The constructions have not been uniform.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 15
Mr. Justice Story, in Parsons vs. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433,
said: "The phrase 'common law' found in this clause, is
used in contradistinction to equity and admiralty and
maritime jurisprudence."
In the case of In re Conner, 39 Cal. 98, the court said
that the term "common law jurisdiction" is capable of
no other meaning than jurisdiction to try and decide
causes which were cognizable by the courts of law under
what is known as the common law of England; that, as
our judicial system was modeled chiefly after that of
England, when we speak through our statutes and courts
of common law actions, proceedings at common law, and
common law jurisdiction, we mean such actions, proceed-
ings, and jurisdiction as appertain to the common law of
England as administered through her courts. The court
held, however, that the statute did not require that the
courts have all the common law jurisdiction which per-
tains to all classes of actions, but that it was enough
that it had "common law jurisdiction."
In United States vs. Power, 14 Blatch. 223, it was de-
cided that the City Court of Yonkers, which by statute
had civil jurisdiction in all actions for the recovery of
money when the amount recovered did not exceed one
thousand dollars, had jurisdiction in naturalization pro-
ceedings. The court said that it was manifest that by
the statutory provisions the court was "authorized to
exercise some common law jurisdiction — that is, it has
jurisdiction to hear and determine causes which were
cognizable by the courts of law under what is known as
the common law of England, although it has not juris-
diction of all such causes." The court added, that the
statute of the United States did not require of courts
authorized to entertain applications for naturalization
that they should have all the jurisdiction possessed by
any court of law; that if the court might exercise any
part of that jurisdiction it was within the language of
16 NATURALIZATION
the statute and within its meaning as well. See, also, 8
Met. 168; 2 Curt. 98; 50 N. H. 245; 39 Cal. 98.
In accordance with this view, a county court which
had exclusive jurisdiction in common law actions of
trespass commenced in a justice's court, was held to
come within the terms of the statute. People v. Sweet-
man, 3 Park. Crim. Rep. 358.
And, in People v. Pease, 30 Barb. 588, it was decided
that a county court, shown to have jurisdiction of suits
commenced in a justice's court, where it appeared by the
answer of the defendant that the title to lands had come
in question, also in matters of partition and admeasure-
ment of dower, "with other powers not enumerated,"
satisfied the statutory requirements.
The court, in In re Conner, supra, held that the fact
that the jurisdiction of the court was restricted as to
the amount involved did not deprive it of authority to
act in naturalization proceedings.
In United States v. Lehman, 39 Fed. 49, it was held
that a court of criminal correction whose jurisdiction
was statutory, "having power to punish offenses that
existed at common law, and to enforce private rights
and to redress private wrongs recognized by the common
law," and whose action in the exercise of that power "is
governed by the principles, rules, and usages of the
common law in so far as they have not been modified or
abolished by statute," had power to naturalize aliens.
The court said: "Congress intended to confer the power
of naturalization on all courts of record of the several
states that have power to administer justice under and
in accordance with that system of jurisprudence known
as the common law." See, also. Levin v. United States,
128 Fed. 826.
On the other hand, there are decisions holding that
courts empowered by statute to exercise common law
jurisdiction for certain purposes, but, not having com-
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 17
mon law jurisdiction in all cases, did not come within
the terms of the act of Congress. Ex parte McKenzie, 51
S. C. 244; Ex parte Tweedy, 22 Fed. 84.
3. Act of June 29, 1906.
The Act of Congress of June 29, 1906, substitutes for
the phrase "common law jurisdiction" the words "juris-
diction in actions at law or equity, or law and equity, in
which the amount in controversy is unlimited." The dif-
ficulty indicated in the diverse decisions we have just
been considering is not obviated by the change in phrase-
ology of the law. It expressly provides that a court may
naturalize which has jurisdiction of actions both at law and
in equity, or of actions either at law or in equity. This
language confers jurisdiction on courts of equity.
The law contains the qualification, however, that the
amount in controversy shall be unlimited.
4. State Courts.
It is apparent that the majority of naturalizations are
by state courts.
Before a state court acts in a naturalization proceeding,
under the act of 1906, the clerk of the court is required
by a regulation of the Department of Commerce and
Labor, to furnish the Bureau of Naturalization with
authoritative evidence (preferably the certificate of the
Attorney-General of the state) that the court has " a
seal, a clerk, and jurisdiction in actions at law or equity,
or law and equity, in which the amount in controversy is
unlimited." Nat. Reg. of Oct. 2, 1906.
There is a line of decisions holding that state courts
in admitting aliens to citizenship, act as United States
courts. An opposite view is held by another line of
cases.
In People v. Sweetman, 3 Park. Crim. 358, the court
said: "The Act of Congress (relating to naturalization)
5233—2
18 NATURALIZATION
adopts every state court as its agent to do this service
that is a court of record, and has common law jurisdic-
tion and a seal and clerk. , . . Without attempting
to examine the question in regard to the power of the
Federal Government to confer such jurisdiction upon
state courts and magistrates, it seems . . . quite
clear that, in entertaining such proceedings they are ex-
clusively under the laws of the United States, and should
be deemed quoad hoc courts of the United States." See,
also. Re Christern, 11 Jones and S. 523; and In re Rams-
den, 13 How. Pr. 429.
The leading case holding an opposite view is United
States V. Severino, 125 Fed. 949, in which the authorities
on both sides are collected and reviewed and the conclu-
sion reached that: "State courts while entertaining ju-
risdiction in naturalization proceedings remain state
courts." See, also. Rump v. Commonwealth, 30 Pa. St. 475.
It was also held in United States v. Severino that per-
jury committed by a witness in a naturalization proceed-
ing in a state court is punishable by the sovereignty
whose justice it offends, and that the Federal court can
not entertain jurisdiction in the absence of a Federal
statute conferring it.
In In re Naturalization, 5 Pa. Dist. R. 597, it was held
that state courts are not obliged to exercise the power
conferred by Rev. Stat. Sec. 2165.
In Stephens, Petitioner, 4 Gray, 559, it was declared
that the power to naturalize given to state courts is a
naked power which imposes no legal obligation on courts
to assume and exercise it, and that such exercise is not
within their official duty or their oath to support the
Constitution of the United States. The court added:
"But whatever may be the authority of Congress to re-
quire the performance of duties by state courts, magis-
trates and officers not affecting the organization of the
national government or not expressly provided for by
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 19
the Constitution . . . it is well established that such
courts and magistrates may, if they choose, exercise the
powers thus conferred by Congress unless prohibited by
state legislation." See, also, Rushworth v. Judges, 58 N. J.
Law, 97; Morgan v. Dudley, 18 B. Mon.. 693; State v.
Penney, 10 Ark. 621.
In State v. Whittemore, 50 N. H. 245, the view was ex-
pressed that the state legislature may prohibit a state
court which comes within the class of tribunals described
in the United States Act, from exercising jurisdiction in
naturalization cases. But " the state can not confer that
jurisdiction on any tribunal which does not come within
the terms of the United States Statute." Id. See, also.
In re Ramsden, supra.
The state may indicate which of its courts coming
within the class of tribunals described in the United
States Act, shall exercise the jurisdiction, and it may fix
the time within which such jurisdiction may be exer-
cised. Rushworth v. Judges, supra. See, also. In re Gil-
roy, 88 Me. 199; Ryan v. Egan, 156 111. 224.
5. Judges.
Functions.
Naturalization is a function of the court, not of the
clerk.
While the preliminary declaration of intention may be
made before the clerk, the petition for naturalization
must be addressed to the court (Sec. 27); the facts as
to the requisite residence of the applicant, his behavior
as a man of good moral character and attachment to the
principles of the Constitution, must "be made to appear
to the satisfaction of the court.'' These facts shall be
proved by the oath of the applicant and the testimony
of at least two witnesses, citizens of the United States.
Sec. 4, par. 4.
20 NATURALIZATION
And the law expressly provides that "every final hear-
ing upon such petition shall be had in open court before
a judge or judges thereof, and every final order which
may be made upon such petition shall he under the hand
of the court* and entered in full upon a record kept for
that purpose, and upon such final hearing of such peti-
tion the applicant and witnesses shall be examined under
oath before the court and in the presence of the court.''
Sec. 9.
The applicant is required, before he is admitted to
citizenship to declare on oath, in open court, that he will
support the Constitution and defend it and the laws of
the United States against all enemies and bear truth faith
and allegiance to the same.
He shall also declare on oath, in open court, that he
absolutely and entirely renounces and abjures all alle-
giance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state,
or sovereignty of which he was before a citizen or sub-
ject. Sec. 4, par. 3.
In case the applicant has borne any hereditary title or
has been of any of the orders of nobility, he shall make
an express renunciation thereof in the court to which his
application is made. Sec 4, par. 5.
The days upon which final action shall be had on pe-
titions of naturalization shall he fixed by 7'ule of court.
Sec. 6.
The court may, in its discretion, upon petition of the
applicant and as a part of his naturalization, make a
decree changing the name of said alien. Sec. 6.
Any court having jurisdiction to naturalize aliens has
jurisdiction of a suit instituted by the United States
District Attorney for the purpose of setting aside and
* No certificate of naturalization shall be issued to a petitioner until
after the judge of the court granting naturalization has signed the order
to that effect. Nat. Reg. of Oct. 2, 1906.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 21
canceling a certificate of citizenship on the ground of
fraud or that it was illegally procured. Sec. 15.
Whenever any certificate of citizenship shall be set
aside or canceled, as herein provided, the court in which
such judgment or decree is rendered shall make an order
canceling such certificate of citizenship and shall send a
certified copy of such order to the Bureau of Immigra-
tion and Naturalization; and in case such certificate was
not originally issued hy the court making such order it
shall direct the clerk of the court to transmit a copy of
such order and judgment to the court out of which
such certificate of citizenship shall have been originally
issued. And it shall thereupon be the duty of the clerk
of the court receiving such certified copy of the order
and judgment of the court to enter the same of record
and to cancel such original certificate of citizenship upon
the records and to notify the Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization of such cancellation.
The provisions of this section shall apply not only to
certificates of citizenship issued under the provisions of
this act,buttoall certificates of citizenship whichmay have
been issued heretofore by any court exercising jurisdic-
tion in naturalization proceedings under prior laws.
Courts having jurisdiction of the offense of procuring
naturalization in violation of the Act of 1906 are au-
thorized to adjudge and declare void the final order ad-
mitting to citizenship a person convicted of such offense.
Sec. 23.
Renunciation of Citizenship by Foreign-born Widow of
American Citizen.
A new function of courts of naturalization is conferred
by the Act of March 2, 1907, which authorizes such courts
to receive the renunciation made by the foreign-born
22 NATURALIZATION
Widow of a citizen of the United States of he citizenship
acquired by her marriage. The law reads:
" Sec. 4. That any foreign woman who acquires Ameri-
can citizenship by marriage to an American shall be as-
sumed to retain the same after the termination of the
marital relation if she continue to reside in the United
States, unless she makes formal re7iunciatio7i thereof
before a court having jurisdiction to 7iaturalize aliens,
or if she resides abroad she may retain her citizenship
by registering as such before a United States consul
within one year after the termination of such mar tal
relation."
6. Clerks of Courts.
Duties:
a. As to Declaration of Intention.
It shall be the duty of the clerk of any court author-
ized to naturalize aliens to receive declarations of inten-
tions of aliens.* Sec. 4, par. 1, and to keep and file a
duplicate of each declaration made before him. Sec. 12.
By the express terms of the Act of June 29, 1906, an
alien's declaration of intention may be made before the
" authorized deputy " of the clerk. Sec. 4, par. 1. And
prior to the passage of that act it was held that the
*The declarations of intention shall be bound in chronological order in
separate volumes, indexed, consecutively numbered, and made a part of
the reconis of the court. Sec. 14, Act of June 29, 1906. Declarations
of intention will be furnished in bound volumes, as a court record, vary-
ing in size according to the amount of such business transacted by the
court. In addition to the bound records, the duplicate and triplicate
declarations of intention will be furnished as loose sheets attached
together and perforated, so that they can be readily torn apart, the
triplicate to be given to the petitioner and the duplicate to be forwarded
to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (Division of Naturali-
zation). Each bound record will consist of the original declarations of
intention, paged in consecutive order and indexed. These volumes are
to be numbered and will form a permanent record of the court. Nat.
Reg. of Oct. 2, 1906.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 23
actual work of the clerk might be performed by a deputy
acting for the clerk. State v. Hoeflinger, 35 Wis. 393.
See, also, Sec. 21, Act of 1906, which specifically refers
to the "authorized deputy or assistant" of the clerk.
In In re Dean, 83 Me. 489, the court decided that the
recorder of a municipal court was a clerk within the mean-
ing of the naturalization statute (R. S. 2165). The court
said:
"The court must have a clerk distinct from the judge,
not necessarily an officer denominated clerk, but a perma-
nent 'recording officer charged with the duty of keeping
a true record of its doings and afterwards of authenti-
cating them.' . . . The court contemplated by the
Act of Congress has an organized existence; it is imper-
sonal; the judge is one of the constituent parts of the or-
ganization; the clerk is another and a separate and an
independent element. The essential function of the clerk
is to make and keep the records and give them legal veri-
fication by his attestation and the use of the seal.
"By those sections of the Act establishing the municipal
court of Biddeford above quoted the responsible duty
of making and keeping the records of the court is im-
posed upon the judge and not upon the recorder. There
is no duty of making and keeping the records imposed
upon the recorder by law. He is to keep the records of
the court only when requested so to do by the judge.
Furthermore, the recorder of this court can not authen-
ticate by his attestation any copies of records 'made
and kept' by the judge, or kept by himself at the request
of the judge. Only such copies of the records as are
'duly certified by the judge shall be legal evidence in all
courts.' The authority to appoint a recorder was con-
ferred upon the judge, not for the purpose of creating a
fixed and permanent clerical office distinct and separate
from that of the judge, but primarily to provide for the
judge a substitute who should be empowered to act in
24 NATURALIZATION
his stead in the contingencies named in the act. 'His
signature as recorder is sufficient evidence of his right to
act instead of the judge.' When thus acting in a judi-
cial capacity, exercising the powers and performing the
duties of the judge, the recorder is the court, and must
personally make, keep, and authenticate the records of
the court. The recorder's court has no clerk other than
the recorder himself."
The declaration of intention must be made in the
clerk's office, or in open court.
b. As to Petition for Naturalization.
The petition of an applicant for naturalization must
be subscribed and sworn to before the clerk of the court
to which it is addressed. Sec. 27, Act of 1906.
The petitions for naturalization shall be bound in chron-
ological order in separate volumes, indexed, consecu-
tively numbered, and made part of the records of the
court. Each certificate of naturalization issued shall bear
upon its face, in a place prepared therefor, the volume
number and page number of the petition whereon such
certificate was issued, and the volume number and page
number of the stub of such certificate.* Sec. 14, Act of
June 29, 1906.
The clerk of any court exercising jurisdiction in natu-
ralization proceedings, or any person acting under
*The original of the petitions for naturalization will be furnished in
bound volumes of varying size, paged in consecutive order and indexed.
The duplicate petitions will be furnished as loose sheets and must be
forwarded to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (Division ot
Naturalization) within thirty days after execution. The original petitions
for naturalization must be filled out and signed in the bound volumes,
and remain as a part of the permanent records of the office in which
filed.
If an alien is physically unable to speak, that fact should be stated in
his petition for naturalization in lieu of the statement, "I am able to
speak the English language."
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 25
authority of this act, who shall knowingly certify that
a petitioner, affiant, or witness named in an affidavit,
petition, or certificate of citizenship, or other paper or
writing required to be executed under the provisions of
this act, personally appeared before him and was sworn
thereto, or acknowledged the execution thereof or signed
the same, when in fact such petitioner, affiant, or witness
did not personally appear before him, or was not sworn
thereto, or did not execute the same, or did not acknowl-
edge the execution thereof, shall be punished by a fine
not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment
not to exceed five years. Sec. 22, Act of June 29, 1906.
The clerk shall receive and file at the time the petition
for naturalization is filed a certificate from the Depart-
ment of Commerce and Labor (if the petitioner arrives
in the United States after the passage of the Act of June
29, 1906), stating the date, place and manner of his
arrival in this country, and the declaration of intention,
which certificate and declaration shall be attached to and
made a part of the petition.
c. As to Notice of Petition.
Immediately after filing the petition the clerk of the
court shall give notice thereof by posting in a public
and conspicuous place in his office, or in the building in
which his office is situated, under an appropriate head-
ing, the name, nativity and residence of the alien, the
date and place of his arrival in the United States, and
the date as nearly as may be, for the final hearing of his
petition, and the names of the witnesses whom the ap-
plicant expects to summon in his behalf. Sec. 5, Act of
1906.*
See Notice p. 92, post.
*Witliin thirty days after posting the notice required by Sec. 5, the clerk
shall inform the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization of the date,
as near as may be, for the final hearing of each and every petition for
naturalization. Nat. Reg. of Oct. 2, 1906.
26 NATURALIZATION
d. Witnesses.
The clerk shall, if the applicant requests it, issue a
subpoena for the witnesses named by the applicant to
appear upon the day set for the final hearing. Sec. 5.
e. As to Docketing Petitions.
Petitions for naturalization may be made and filed
during term time or vacation of the court, and shall be
docketed the same day as filed. Sec. 6.
f . As to Duplicates of Petitions.
It shall be the duty of the clerk of the court to fur-
nish to the Bureau of Naturalization duplicates of all
petitions within thirty days after the filing of the same.
Sec. 12.
g. As to Final Hearing.
The clerk shall enter in full upon a record kept for
that purpose every final order which may be made upon
a petition for naturalization. Sec. 9.
h. As to Aliens Denied Naturalization.
It shall be the duty of the clerk to report to the
Bureau of Naturalization within thirty days after the
final hearing and decision of the court the name of each
and every alien who shall be denied naturalization. Sec.
12, Act of 1906.*
i. As to Certificates of Citizenship.
(A) Blank Certificates. Upon the requisition of clerks
of courts authorized to naturalize aliens, the courts shall
be furnished from time to time by the Bureau of
*Within thirty days after the sitting of a court in naturalization cases,
the clerk of such court shall forward to the Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization, a list containing the name of each and every alien who,
during such sitting of court, has been denied naturalization, and the
reason or reasons for such denial. Nat. Reg. of Oct. 2, 1906.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 27
Naturalization with such blank forms as may be required
in the naturalization of aliens, and all certificates of
naturalization shall be consecutively numbered and
printed on safety paper furnished by said bureau. Sec.
3, par. 4.
The first supply of blank forms will be furnished upon
the written application of the clerks of courts having
jurisdiction to naturalize aliens, accompanied, in the case
of clerks of state courts, by authoritative evidence
(preferably the certificate of the attorney-general of the
state) that the courts of which such clerks are officers
have "a seal, a clerk, and iurisdiction inactions at law
or equity, or law and equity, in which the amount in
controversy is unlimited." Subsequent supplies of such
blank forms will be furnished the clerks of courts having
jurisdiction to naturalize aliens upon the receipt by the
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (Division of
Naturalization) of requisitions. Nat. Reg. of Oct. 2,
1906.
Clerks of courts will be furnished with requisition
blanks on which are listed, by number and title, all blank
forms, including record and order books, to be used in
the naturalization of aliens, and these forms must be
obtained exclusively from the Department of Commerce
and Labor (Division of Naturalization), none other being
official. Manila envelopes or jackets will be furnished
to clerks in which to place the triplicate declaration of
intention or the original certificate of naturalization be-
fore delivering them to the person making the declaration
or to the person naturalized. Nat. Reg. Oct. 2, 1906.
All applications for supplies of certificates of naturali-
zation should be accompanied by a statement of the
number, if any, of certificates of naturalization issued
by the clerks of courts making such applications since
June 1, 1903, if such certificates failed to comply with
28 NATURALIZATION
the requirements of the immigration act of March 3,
1903. Id.
Certificates of naturalization will be supplied in bound
volumes consisting of original and duplicate certificates
and stubs. Each original and duplicate certificate and
the stub will be given the same serial number, the stub
to the original certificate bearing a page number in addi-
tion to its serial number. Each book will bear a volume
number, and the volume number and page of the stub
must be given on the face of the certificate. The original
certificate will be given to the petitioner in accordance
with the final order of the court, and the duplicate shall
be forwarded to the Bureau of Immigration and Natural-
ization (Division of Naturalization) by registered mail
within thirty days after the issuance of the original, the
stub to the original constituting a part of the permanent
records of the court. Nat. Reg. Oct. 2, 1906.
Clerks of courts having and exercising jurisdiction in
naturalization matters shall be responsible for all blank
certificates of citizenship received by them from time
to time from the Bureau of Naturalization, and shall
account for the same to the said Bureau whenever re-
quired so to do by the Bureau. Sec. 12, par. 3.
(B) Defaced or Injured Certificates. No certificate of
citizenship received by any clerk which may be defaced
or injured in such manner as to prevent its use as pro-
vided in the Act of June 29, 1906, shall in any case be
destroyed, but such certificate shall be returned to the
said bureau.
(C) Accountability for Certificates. In case any clerk shall
fail to return or properly account for any certificate fur-
nished by the said bureau as provided by law, he shall
be liable to the United States in the sum of fifty dollars
to be recovered in an action of debt for each and every
certificate not properly accounted for or returned. Sec.
12, par. 3.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 29
(D) Duplicates. It is made the duty of the clerk of
every court exercising jurisdiction in naturalization mat-
ters under the Act of June 29, 1906, to send to the
Bureau of Naturalization at Washington, within thirty
days after the issuance of a certificate of citizenship, a
duplicate of such certificate. Sec 12, par. 1.
Beginning with October 1, 1906, and on the first work-
ing day of each and every month thereafter, clerks of
courts shall forward to the Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization (Division of Naturalization) duplicate
declarations of intention and petitions for naturalization
filed, and all duplicates of certificates of naturalization
issued, during the preceding month. Duplicate petitions
for naturalization and duplicate certificates of naturali-
zation shall be forwarded by registered mail; and dupli-
cate declarations of intention shall be sent therewith,
provided the combined weight of the documents does
not exceed 4 pounds, otherwise they shall be forwarded
in a separate package by unregistered mail. The clerks
making such shipments are required to notify the Chief
of the Division of Naturalization of the date thereof, by
unregistered mail. In transmitting petitions clerks of
courts are directed to state that the names of the peti-
tioners and their witnesses have been conspicuously
posted, as required by law. Nat. Reg. Oct. 2, 1906.
(E) Stub. Each clerk shall keep on file in his office a
stub for each certificate so issued by him, whereon shall
be entered a memorandum of all the essential facts set
forth in such certificate. Sec. 12.
(F) Canceled Certificates. Whenever any certificate of
citizenship shall be set aside or canceled, as herein pro-
vided, the court in which such judgment or decree is ren-
dered shall make an order canceling such certificate of
citizenship and shall send a certified copy of such order
to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization; and in
case such certificate was not originally issued by the
30 NATURALIZATION
court making such order it shall direct the clerk of the
court to transmit a copy of such order and judgment to
the court out of which such certificate of citizenship
shall have been originally issued. And it shall thereupon
be the duty of the clerk of the court receiving such
certified copy of the order and judgment of the court to
enter the same of record and to cancel such original
certificate of citizenship upon the records and to notify
the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization of such
cancellation.
The provisions of this section shall apply not only to
certificates of citizenship issued under the provisions of
this act, but to all certificates of citizenship, which may
have been issued heretofore by any court exercising jur-
isdiction in naturalization proceedings under prior laws.
Sec. 15, Act of 1906.
j. Certified Copies.
It shall be the duty of the clerks of courts to furnish
to the Bureau of Naturalization certified copies of such
proceedings and orders instituted in or issued out of the
courts affecting or relating to the naturalization of aliens
as may be required by said Bureau. Sec. 12.
In case any clerk or officer acting under his direction
shall refuse or neglect to comply with any of the forego-
ing provisions he shall forfeit and pay to the United
States the sum of twenty-five dollars in each and every
case in which such violation or omission occurs, and the
amount of such forfeiture may be recovered by the
United States in an action of debt against such clerk.
Sec. 12, Act of 1906.
Certified copies of all papers, documents, certificates,
and records required to be used, filed, recorded or kept
under any and all of the provisions of the Act of June
29, 1906, shall be admitted in evidence equally with the
originals in any and all proceedings under this act, and in
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 31
all cases in which the original thereof might be admissible
as evidence. Sec. 28.
k. Records.
A duplicate of each declaration of intention shall be
kept and filed by the clerk before whom the declaration
is made. Sec. 12.
Declarations of intention and the petitions for natur-
alization shall be bound in chronological order in sepa-
rate volumes, indexed, consecutively numbered and made
part of the records of the court. Sec. 14.
Petitions for naturalization shall be docketed the day
they are filed. Sec. 6.
Every final order which may be made upon a petition
for naturalization shall be under the hand of the court
and entered in full upon a record kept for that purpose.
Sec. 9.
Each certificate of naturalization issued shall bear
upon its face, in a place prepared therefor, the volume
number and page number of the petition whereon such
certificate was issued, and the volume number and page
number of the stub of such certificate. Sec. 14.
The name, place of residence, and occupation of each
witness whose testimony is required by law as to the
facts of residence, moral character, and attachment of
the applicant to the principles of the Constitution, shall
be set forth in the record.
The renunciation by the applicant of hereditary title
or order of nobility, if any, shall be recorded in the court.
For "cancellation of certificate," see "United States
District Attorneys," page 34, post.
1. Fees.
Act of June 29, 1906.
"Sec. 13. The clerk of each and every court exercising
jurisdiction in naturalization cases shall charge, collect.
32 XATURALIZATIOX
and account for the following fees in each proceeding:
"For receiving and filing a declaration of intention and
issuing a duplicate thereof, one dollar.
"For making, filing, and docketing the petition of an
alien for admission as a citizen of the United States and
for the final hearing thereon, two dollars; and for entering
the final order and the issuance of the certificate of citi-
zenship thereunder, if granted, two dollars.
"The clerk of any court collecting such fees is hereby
authorized to retain one-half of the fees collected by
him in such naturalization proceeding; the remaining
one-half of the naturalization fees in each case collected
by uch clerks, respectively, shall be accounted for in
their quarterly accounts, w^hich they are hereby required
to render the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,
and paid over to such Bureau within thirty days from
the close of each quarter in each and every fiscal year,
and the moneys so received shall be paid over to the dis-
bursing clerk of the Department of Commerce and Labor,
who shall thereupon deposit them in the Treasury of the
United States, rendering an account therefor quarterly
to the Auditor for the State and other Departments, and
the said disbursing clerk shall be held responsible under
his bond for said fees so received.
"In addition to the fees herein required, the petitioner
shall, upon the filing of his petition to become a citizen
of the United States, deposit with and pay to the clerk
of the court a sum of money sufficient to cover the ex-
penses of subpoenaing and paying the legal fees of any
witnesses for whom he may request a subpoena, and upon
the final discharge of such witnesses they shall receive, if
they demand the same from the clerk, the customary and
usual witness fees from the moneys which the petitioner
shall have paid to such clerk for such purpose, and the
residue, if any, shall be returned by the clerk to the
petitioner: Provided, That the clerks of courts exercis-
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 33
ing jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings shall be
permitted to retain one-half of the fees in any fiscal year
up to the sum of three thousand dollars, and that all
fees received by such clerks in naturalization proceed-
ings in excess of such amount shall be accounted for and
paid over to said Bureau as in case of other fees to which
the United States may be entitled under the provisions
of this Act- The clerks of the various courts exercising
jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings shall pay all
additional clerical force that may be required in perform-
ing the duties imposed by this Act upon the clerks of
courts from fees received by such clerks in naturaliza-
tion proceedings. And in case the clerk of any court
collects fees in excess of the sum of six thousand dollars
in any one year, the Secretary of Commerce and Labor
may allow to such clerk from the money which the United
States shall receive additional compensation for the em-
ployment of additional clerical assistance, but for no
other purpose, if in the opinion of the said Secretary the
business of such clerk warrants such allowance."*
"Sec. 20. That any clerk or other officer of a court
having power under this Act to naturalize aliens, who
wilfully neglects to render true accounts of moneys re-
ceived by him for naturalization proceedings or who wil-
fully neglects to pay over any balance of such moneys
due to the United States within thirty days after said
payment shall become due and demand therefor has been
made and refused, shall be deemed guilty of embezzle-
ment of the public moneys, and shall be punishable by
*A11 fees provided for in Section 13 of the Act of June 29, 1906, col-
lected by clerks of courts during any quarter of a fiscal year, shall be
accounted for within thirty days after the close of such quarter, on
Form 2212. provided for that purpose; and one-half of all moneys so
collected shall be remitted to the Chief of the Division of Naturaliza-
tion, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, with said quarterly ac-
counts. In cases where no naturalization business is transacted during
any quarter, said blank form shall be forwarded as aforesaid, with the
words "No transactions" noted thereon, Nat. Reg., Oct. 2, 1906.
5233-3
34 NATURALIZATION
imprisonment for not more than five years, or by a fine
of not more than five thousand dollars, or both.
"Sec. 21. That it shall be unlawful for any clerk of
any court or his authorized deputy or assistant exercis-
ing jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings, or* to de-
mand, charge, collect, or receive any other or additional
fees or moneys in naturalization proceedings save the
fees and moneys herein specified; and a violation of any
of the provisions of this section or any part thereof is
hereby declared to be a misdemeanor and shall be pun-
ished by imprisonment for not more than two years, or
by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by
both such fine and imprisonment."
E. United States District Attorneys.
Duties.
1. Appearance in Opposition to Naturalization.
The United States shall have the right to appear be-
fore any court or courts exercising jurisdiction in natu-
ralization proceedings for the purpose of cross-examining
the petitioner and the witnesses produced in support of
his petition concerning any matter touching or in any
way affecting his right to citizenship, and shall have the
right to call witnesses, produce evidence, and be heard in
opposition to the granting of any petition in naturaliza-
tion proceedings.
2. Proceedings to Set Aside or Cancel Certificates of Citi-
zenship.
It shall be the duty of the United States district
attorneys for the respective districts, upon affidavit
showing good cause therefor, to institute proceedings in
any court having jurisdiction to naturalize aliens in the
judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may
* Error in original net. The word " or " should be omitted. — AUTHOR.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 35
reside at the time of bringing the suit, for the purpose
of setting aside and canceling the certificate of citizen-
ship on the ground of fraud or on the ground that such
certificate of citizenship was illegally procured. In any
such proceedings the party holding the certificate of
citizenship alleged to have been fraudulently or illegally
procured shall have sixty days' personal notice in which
to make answer to the petition of the United States;
and if the holder of such certificate be absent from the
United States or from the district in which he last had
his residence, such notice shall be given by publication
in the manner provided for the service of summons by
publication or upon absentees by the laws of the state
or the place where such suit is brought.
The provisions of this section shall apply not only to
certificates of citizenship issued under the provisions of
this act, but to all certificates of citizenship which
may have been issued heretofore by any court exercising
jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings under prior
laws. Sec. 15, Act June 29, 1906.
Section 15, paragraph 2, of the Act provides that if any
alien who shall have secured a certificate under the provis-
ions of the law shall, within five years after the issuance of
such certificate, return to the country of his nativity, or
go to any other foreign country, and take permanent
residence therein, it shall be considered prima facie evi-
dence of a lack of intention on the part of such alien to
become a permanent citizen of the United States at the
time of filing his application for citizenship, and, in the
absence of countervailing evidence, it shall be sufficient
in the proper proceeding to authorize the cancellation
of his certificate of citizenship as fraudulent, and the
diplomatic and consular officers of the United States in
foreign countries shall from time to time, through the
Department of State, furnish the Department of Justice
36 NATURALIZATION
with the names of those within their respective jurisdic-
tions who have such certificates of citizenship and who
have taken permanent residence in the country of their
nativity, or in any other foreign country, and such state-
ments, duly certified, shall be admissible in evidence in
all courts in proceedings to cancel certificates of citizen-
ship.
F. Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.
1. In General.
While the constitutional provision expressly conferring
on Congress " Power to establish a uniform rule of natu-
ralization," clearly authorized Congress to provide for
the effective supervision and control of naturalization
by the Federal Government, there was no legislation
effecting that object until the enactment of the law of
June 29, 1906, 34 Stat, at L. 596.
This law changes the designation of the Bureau of
Immigration in the Department of Commerce and Labor
to the "Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,"
and provides that said Bureau, under the direction and
control of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, ''shall
have charge of all matters concerning the naturalization
of aliens."
2. Functions of Secretary of Commerce and Labor.
a. Direction and Control of Bureau.
The Secretary of Commerce and Labor is charged by
this law with "the direction and control" of the Bureau
of Immigration and Naturalization. Sec. 1.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 37
The statute (Sec. 2) authorizes the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor "to provide the Bureau of Immi-
gration and Naturalization with such additional furnished
offices within the city of Washington, such books of
record and facilities, and such additional assistants,
clerks, stenographers, typewriters, and other employees
as may be necessary for the proper discharge of the
duties imposed by this Act upon such Bureau."
b. Rules and Regulations.
Section 28 of the Act authorizes the Secretary of Com-
merce and Labor "to make such rules and regulations as
may be necessary for properly carrying into execution
the various provisions of the Act."
c. Blank Certificates of Citizenship.
It is the duty of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor
to cause to be engraved, on distinctive paper, blank
certificates of citizenship (Sec. 17), which shall be fur-
nished clerks of courts having jurisdiction in naturaliza-
tion matters. Sec. 12, par. 3.
d. Certificate of Registry of Alien.
The law (Sec. 1) makes it the duty of commissioners
of immigration to cause to be granted to every alien
arriving in the United States after the passage of the
Act of June 29, 1906, a certificate of registry giving par-
ticulars as to name, age, occupation, personal description,
place of birth and residence of such alien, and the name
of the vessel in which he comes.
Section 4, paragraph 2, of the Act provides that the
applicant for naturalization shall at the time of filing his
38 NATURALIZATION
petition file with the clerk a " certificate from the Depart-
ment of Commerce and Labor," stating the date and man-
ner of his arrival in this country.
e. Allowance of Additional Compensation to
Clerks.
The Secretary of Commerce and Labor is authorized in
cases where the clerk of any court collects fees in excess
of the sum of six thousand dollars in any one year to al-
low to such clerk from the money which the United States
shall receive additional compensation for the employ-
ment of additional clerical assistance, if, in the opinion
of the Secretary, the business of such clerk warrants
such allowance. Sec. 13, par. 5.
3. Functions of Bureau.
a. Supervision of Naturalization.
The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, under
the direction and control of the Secretary of Commerce
and Labor, has "charge of all matters concerning the
naturalization of aliens." Sec. 1.
h. Registry of Aliens Arriving in United States.
The law makes it the duty of the Bureau to provide,
for use at the various immigration stations throughout
the United States, books of record, wherein the commis-
sioners of immigration shall cause a registry to be made
in the case of each alien arriving in the United States
from and after the passage of this act of the name, age,
occupation, personal description (including height, com-
plexion, color of hair, and eyes), the place of birth, the
last residence, the intended place of residence in the
United States, and the date of arrival of said alien, and,
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 39
if entered through a port, the name' of the vessel in
which he comes.
c. Blank Certificates of Citizenship.
The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization is to
furnish clerks of courts having and exercising jurisdiction
in naturalization matters, blank certificates of citizen-
ship, and to require said clerks to account for all such
blank certificates. Sec. 12, par. 3.
d. Naturalization Fees.
The law (Sec. 13, par. 4) makes it the duty of
the Bureau to pay over to the disbursing clerk of the
Department of Commerce and Labor, naturalization
fees, which, under the law, clerks of courts are required
to account for, and pay over to said Bureau.
4. Commissioners of Immigration.
The Act (Sec. 1) makes it the duty of commissioners of
immigration to cause a registry to be made in the case of
each alien arriving in the United States from and after the
passage of the act, of the name, age, occupation, personal
description (including height, complexion, color of hair
and eyes), the place of birth, the last residence, the in-
tended place of residence in the United States, and the
date of arrival of said alien, and, if entered through a
port, the name of the vessel in which he comes.
The law also makes it the duty of commissioners of
immigration to cause to be granted to such alien a cer-
tificate of such registry, with the particulars thereof.
The certificate of registry here described is to be signed
by the head of the Department of Commerce and Labor
for the time being; and is the certificate referred to in Sec-
tion 4, paragraph 2 of the Act as "a certificate from the
40 NATURALIZATION
Department of Commerce and Labor," which the appli-
cant for naturalization is required to file with the clerk
of the court at the time of filing his petition.
5. Disbursing Clerk, Department of Commerce and Labor.
a. Duty as to Nattiralization Fees.
It is the duty of the disbursing clerk of the Department
of Commerce and Labor to receive from the Bureau of
Naturalization and deposit in the Treasury of the United
States, rendering an account therefor quarterly to the
auditor for the state and other departments, naturaliza-
tion fees which, under the law, clerks of courts are re-
quired to account for and pay over to said Bureau.
h. Bond.
The said disbursing clerk shall be held responsible
under his bond for the fees so received. Sec. 13.
(G) Who are capable of naturalization.
1. In General.
All aliens are not eligible to citizenship under our
naturalization laws. What persons are capable of natu-
ralization?
In all the acts of Congress on the subject, from that
of 1790 down to the Revised Statutes (Sec. 2169), the
language is "that any alien, being a free white person,
may be admitted to become a citizen." After the adop-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
prohibiting slavery, and the Fourteenth Amendment, de-
claring who shall be citizens, Congress, by the Act of
July 14, 1870 (16 Stat, at L. 254), amending the naturali-
zation laws, extended the privilege of naturalization to
the negro. The language of the Act of 1870, was: "The
naturalization laws are hereby extended to aliens of
African nativity, and to persons of African descent."
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 41
This was subsequently revised and placed in the Re-
vised Statutes,Section 2169(U.S.Comp.Stat. 1901,1333)
so as to read: "The provisions of this title shall apply-
to aliens [being free white persons, and to aliens] of
African nativity, and to persons of African descent."
This is the law now in force.
Who are excluded from the privilege of naturalization
by the language of the statute? The words of a statute
are to be taken in their ordinary sense, unless it can be
shown that they are used in a technical sense. Taken in
their ordinary meaning, the words of the law exclude all
but persons of the Caucasian and African races. From a
common, popular standpoint, the races of mankind have
been distinguished by difference of color, and they have
been classified as the white, black, yellow, and brown.
As ordinarily used everywhere in the United States, the
words "white person" mean a person of the Caucasian
race.
Ethnologists also consider the color of skin the most
important criterion for the distinction of race. Blumen-
bach divided mankind into five principal types — the
Caucasian, or white, Mongolian or yellow, Ethiopian or
black, American or red, and Malay or brown. Cuvier sim-
plified this classification into Caucasian, Mongol, and
Negro, or white, yellow, and black races.
When the words "white persons" were incorporated
in the naturalization laws, in 1802, the country was in-
habited by three races — the Caucasian or white race,
the Negro or black race, and the American or red race.
It is reasonable to infer, therefore, that Congress in desig-
nating the classes of persons who could be naturalized,
intended to exclude from the privilege of citizenship all
alien races except the Caucasian.
Again, in the first revision of the statutes, in 1873,
the words "being a free white person" were omitted,
42 NATURALIZATION
probably through inadvertence, so that the section read:
"An alien may be admitted to become a citizen," etc.
Under the act of February 18, 1875 (18 Stat, at L. 318,
chap. 80, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1333), to correct errors
and supply omissions in the first revision, this section
was amended by restoring these words. In moving the
adoption of this amendment in the House of Represen-
tatives it was stated that this omission operated to
extend naturalization to all classes of aliens, and that it
was only proposed, by restoring these words, to place the
law where it stood at the time of the revision. 3 Cong.
Record, pt. 2, 1081.
Whether viewed in the light of the popular or of the
scientific meaning, or of Congressional intent, therefore,
the words "white persons" seem to include only indi-
viduals of the Caucasian race. Under the statute, there-
fore, only members of this race and of the Ethiopian
race can be naturalized.
The courts have at different times held that neither
Chinese, Japanese, Hawaiians, Burmese, nor Indians can
be naturalized.
2. Chinese.
The question of the right of a court to naturalize a
Chinaman came before the circuit court of the United
States in 1878, in Re Ah Yup, 5 Sawy. 155, Fed. Cas.No.
104, and the court denied the application, on the ground
that a Mongolian is not a "white person" within the
meaning of the term as used in the naturalization laws
of the United States.
In an instruction, October 29, 1878, to Mr. Holcombe^
United States minister to China, Mr. Evarts, adverting to
this case, said: "Although not accepting as a final de-
cision (not having yet been affirmed by the Supreme
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 43
Court of the United States), the Department is con-
strained, on examination of the laws, to believe that the
decision is based on a sound appreciation of the law."
MSS. Inst, to China.
Some courts having admitted Chinese to citizenship,
the Act of May 6, 1882 (22 Stat, at L. 61, Chap. 126, Sec-
tion 14, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1333), in order to prevent
such naturalization, and to remove all doubt, provided
"that hereafter no state court or court of the United
States, shall admit Chinese to 'citizenship; and all laws
in conflict with this Act are hereby repealed."
In the case of Re Hong Yen Chang, 84 Cal. 163, 24
Pac. 156, it was held that a certificate of naturalization
showing the naturalization of a person of Mongolian
nativity by the judgment of a court is void. To the same
effect is Re Gee Hop, 71 Fed. 274. In the first case, a
naturalization certificate had been granted by a New
York court, and in the latter a New Jersey court had
issued the certificate.
In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 716, 37 L.
ed. 914, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016, the United States Supreme
Court said: "Chinese persons not born in this country
have never been recognized as citizens of the United
States, nor authorized to become such under the natur-
alization laws."
And in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649,
42 L. ed. 890, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456, Chief Justice Fuller
said: "They (the Chinese) have never been allowed, by
our laws, to acquire our nationality."
3. Japanese.
In the case of Re Saito, 62 Fed. 126, the United States
Circuit Court held that a native of Japan (of the Mon-
golian race) is not included within the term "white per-
sons," in Rev. Stat. Sec. 2169 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,
1333), and hence is not entitled to naturalization.
44 NATURALIZATION
In In re Yamashita (Wash.), 59 L. R. A. 671, 70 Pac.
482, a native of Japan applied for admission, as an
attorney, in the courts of the State of Washington,
whose laws preclude the admission of any person who is
not a citizen of the United States. Yamashita had ob-
tained from the superior court of Pierce County, Wash-
ington, an order admitting him to citizenship. It was
held that the judgment upon its face showed that Yama-
shita was of the Japanese race; that Japanese are not
entitled to become citizens of the United States; that,
as the court was without authority to pronounce the
judgment, its determination was void, and must be dis-
regarded. It was decided that he could not be admitted.
It was claimed in the recent controversy caused by
the exclusion of Japanese from San Francisco schools
that Japanese are not Mongolians. But as it does not
appear to be claimed that they belong to either the
Caucasian or African race it is not seen that they are
placed in any better position under our statute.
4. Burmese.
The city court of Albany, New York, decided against
the naturalization of a dark yellow native of Burmah,
although he was an educated physician. Re San C. Po,
7 Misc. 471, 28 N. Y. Supp. 383. In the opinion the
court said:
"Burmese are Malays and under modern ethnological
subdivisions are Mongolians, . . . and are not, therefore,
within the strict letter of the Act of 1882, which pro-
hibited the admission of Chinese to citizenship, for one
can be a Mongolian and yet not be a Chinaman; but the
petitioner falls squarely within the provision of Section
2169 of the United States Revised Statutes which limits
naturalization to free white persons and to persons of
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 45
African nativity and of African descent, for he is cer-
tainly neither."
5. Hawaiians.
In Re Kanaka Nian, 6 Utah, 259, the Supreme Court
of Utah denied the application of a native Hawaiian for
admission to citizenship, holding that the applicant was
neither a ivhite person nor a person of the African race.
The court said: "We are of opinion that the law author-
izes the naturalization of aliens of the Caucasian"or white
race and of the African race only, and all other races,
among which are the Hawaiians, are excluded."
This was prior to the annexation of Hawaii to the
United States. Congress, by the Act of April ;^30, 1900,
providing a government for the territory of Hawaii, de-
clared that "all persons who were citizens of the Repub-
lic of Hawaii, on August 12, 1898, are citizens of the
United States."
6. Indians.
The general statutes of naturalization do not apply to
American Indians. 7 Ops. Atty. Gen. 746.
The Civil Rights Act, in defining citizens, expressly
excluded "Indians not taxed." And while the citizen-
ship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment omits this
phrase, an examination of the debates in Congress when
the Amendment was under consideration shows that the
words were omitted as unnecessary, such persons not
being deemed to be "subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States."
In In re Burton, 1 Alaska, 111, it was decided that an
Indian, a native of British Columbia, was not a "free
white person or an alien of ^African nativity or of African
descent," and hence was not capable of naturalization
under the statute.
It has also been decided that a person of half white
46 NATURALIZATION
and half Indian blood is not entitled to admission to
citizenship under our general naturalization statutes,
such person not being a "white person" within the pur-
view of the law. In re Camille, 6 Sawyer, 541.
Indians are capable of naturalization by treaty and by
special law, however, and citizenship has been frequently
bestowed upon them in these ways. Elk v. Wilkins, 112
U. S. 94; Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135.
7. Mexicans.
In the case of Re Rodriguez, 81 Fed. 337, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas
held that a native citizen of Mexico, whatever might be
his status viewed solely from the standpoint of the
ethnologist, is embraced within the spirit and intent of
our naturalization laws. In this case it was contended
that Rodriguez was excluded from the privilege of natu-
ralization under Rev. Stat. 2169 because of his color, the
authorities relied upon being: Re Ah Yup, 5 Sawy. 155,
Fed. Cas. No. 104; Re Camille, 6 Sawy. 541, 6 Fed. 256;
Re Kanaka Nian, 6 Utah, 259, 4 L. R. A. 726, 21 Pac. 993,
and Re Saito, 62 Fed. 126.
The court analyzed the decision in Ah Yup's case,
which is termed the leading one. It says that the opinion
of Judge Sawyer is by no means decisive of the present
question, as his language may well convey the meaning
that the amendment of the naturalization statutes re-
ferred to by him (the amendment striking the word
"white" therefrom) was intended solely as a prohibition
against the naturalization of members of the Mongolian
race. The court refers to the Act of May 6, 1882 (22
Stat, at L. 61, Chap. 126, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1333),
expressly forbidding the naturalization of Chinese, and
asks why, if the Chinese were denied the right to become
naturalized citizens, under laws existing when Re Ah Yup
was decided, did Congress enact this prohibitory statute?
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 47
Says the court: "Indeed, it is a debatable question
whether the term 'free white person,' as used in the
original Act of 1790, was not employed for the sole pur-
pose of withholding the right of citizenship from the
black or African race and the Indians then inhabiting this
country." Continuing, the court says: " Nor is it deemed
material to inquire into what race ethnological writers
would assign the present applicant. If the strict scien-
tific classification of the anthropologist should be
adopted, he would probably not be classed as white.
It is certain he is not an African nor a person of African
descent. According to his own statement he is a 'pure-
blooded Mexican,' bearing no relation to the Aztecs or
original races of Mexico. Being, then, a citizen of Mexico,
may he be naturalized pursuant to the laws of Congress ?
If debarred by the strict letter of the law from re-
ceiving letters of citizenship, is he embraced within
the intent and meaning of the statute ? If he falls
within the intent and meaning of the law, his appli-
cation should be granted notwithstanding the letter
of the statute may be against him." The court then
quoted from the Constitution of the Republic of Texas
and the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States, which, it is said, disclose that both that Repub-
lic and the United States have freely, during the past
sixty years, conferred upon Mexicans the rights and
privileges of American citizenship — not individually, but
by various collective acts of naturalization. He also
quotes Rev. Stat., Section 1999 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,
1269), recognizing the right of expatriation, and reciting
that this government has freely received emigrants from
all nations, and invested them with the rights of citizen-
ship. He concludes: "When all the foregoing laws,
treaties, and constitutional provisions are considered,
which either affirmatively confer the rights of citizen-
ship upon Mexicans, or tacitly recognize in them the right
48 NATURALIZATION.
of individual naturalization, the conclusion forces itself
upon the mind that citizens of Mexico are eligible to
American citizenship, and may be individually natural-
ized by complying with the provisions of our [naturali-
zation] laws." The applicant was admitted to naturali-
zation.
The fact that the United States has by collective acts
conferred upon Mexicans the rights and privileges of
American citizenship affords no basis for the argument
that Mexicans are eligible to naturalization under our
general naturalization statutes. See Re Yamashita
(Wash.), 59 L. R. A. 671, 70 Pac. 482. In this case the
applicant was ignorant, and was unable to read or write,
and did not understand the principles of the Constitu-
tion, yet the court held, in the face of several decisions
to the contrary, that he was entitled to be naturalized,
inasmuch as it appeared that he was peaceable, industri-
ous, of a good moral character, and law-abiding. The
existing law, the Act of June 29, 1906, expressly requires
that the applicant shall be able to write his name and
speak the English language.
8. Porto Ricans and Filipinos.
In In re Gonzales, 118 Fed. 941, the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Southern District of New York,
in 1902, held that a native Porto Rican woman was an
alien, within the meaning of our laws regulating the ad-
mission of aliens who come to the United States. But,
on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed this decision and
decided that the woman, who was a citizen of Porto
Rico, was not an alien, within the sense of the immigra-
tion laws. Gonzales vs. Williams, 192 U. S., 1.
Under this decision, citizens of Porto Rico and citi-
zens of the Philippine Islands, while not citizens of the
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 49
United States, were not aliens, and were not capable of
becoming naturalized, for two reasons: 1. The naturali-
zation laws of the United States apply only to aliens.
2. The naturalization laws of the United States require a
renunciation of former allegiance. As citizens of Porto
Rico and citizens of the Philippine Islands owed alle-
giance only to the United States, there was no former
allegiance for them to renounce.
Under these circumstances Congress by the Act of June
29, 1906 (34 Stat, at L. 596, Sec. 30) , provided for the ad-
mission of such citizens as citizens of the United States,
upon compliance with our naturalization laws. The law
reads as follows:
"All the applicable provisions of the naturalization
laws of the United States shall apply to and be held to
authorize the admission to citizenship of all persons not
citizens who owe permanent allegiance to the United
States, and who may become residents of any state or
organized territory of the United States, with the follow-
ing modifications: The applicant shall not be required to
renounce allegiance to any foreign sovereignty; he shall
make his declaration of intention to become a citizen of
the United States at least two years prior to his admis-
sion; and residence within the jurisdiction of the United
States, owing such permanent allegiance, shall be re-
garded as residence within the United States within the
meaning of the five years' residence clause of the existing
law."
9. Alien Enemies.
Alien enemies of the United States are incapable of
naturalization. Section 2171 of the Revised Statutes
declares that "No alien who is a native citizen or sub-
ject, or a denizen of any country, state, or sovereignty
5233-4
50 NATURALIZATION
with which the United States are at war, at the time of
his application, shall be then admitted to become a
citizen of the United States."
This provision, which is based on the language of the
Act of April 14, 1802, was before the courts in the case
of Ex parte Overington (1812), 5 Binney, 371. Over-
ington applied for admission to citizenship under the
Act of March 26, 1804, which provided that upon the
death of an alien who had declared his intention to
become a citizen of the United States, but had not com-
pleted his naturalization, his widow and children should
be considered as citizens, upon taking the oaths pre-
scribed by law. Overington's father, a subject of Great
Britain, had been residing in the United States, with his
son, from October, 1807, until his death in 1809. It was
held, that as the father if living, would have come
within the description of the Act of 1802, "an alien
enemy," and would have been incapable of naturalization,
the son could not be given rights of citizenship.
The Act of July 30, 1813, provided that persons
resident within the United States on June 18, 1812, who
had previously made a declaration of intention to
become citizens of the United States, or were then
entitled to become citizens, might be admitted to become
citizens, notwithstanding they should be alien enemies,
at the times and manner prescribed by the laws
previously passed on that subject.
The case of Ex parte Newman, 1813, 2 Gallison, 11,
raised the question whether a British subject could file
a preliminary declaration of intention under the Act of
July 30, 1813. The court said that the "act enables per-
sons who before the war had made the preparatory
declaration to become citizens in the same manner as if
war had not intervened. But it confers no privileges on
other persons. The petitioner, therefore, can not ex-
empt himself from the general disability."
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 51
10. Women — The Naturalization Laws Include Females as
Well as Males.
a. In General.
In the case of Brown v. Shilling, 9 Md. 74, where a woman
had been naturalized after the death of her husband, the
court declared that there was nothing in the naturaliza-
tion acts that should be construed as excluding women
from the right of citizenship by naturalization.
Mr. Evarts,when Secretary of State, declared that "an
alien woman may be naturalized under the laws of the
United States in the same manner and under the same
conditions that pertain to the naturalization of an alien
man. Citizenship does not involve the electoral quali-
fication. The question is so well settled and the instances
of women having been naturalized are so numerous that
it is deemed unnecessary to cite you any particular cases."
3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 331.
In Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, the court said
that "it is apparent that from the commencement of
legislation upon this subject alien women and alien min-
ors could be made citizens by naturalization."
b. Married Women.
It has also been decided that an alien wife might be
naturalized, and there are numerous recorded instances
of such naturalizations. Ex parte Pic, 1 Cranch. C. C.
372, where the naturalization was in the United States
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, and Priest vs.
Cummings, 16 Wend. 617.
In Priest t;s. Cummings, which was decided in 1839, the
wife, a British subject, married to a native citizen of the
United States, took out naturalization papers as a citi-
zen of the United States during the life of her husband
and while living with him. In the course of the opinion,
the court said: "It will not be denied that Congress pos-
sesses the power to naturalize femes covert,even against
62 NATURALIZATION
the consent of their husbands; and the language used
by that body could not well be made more comprehen-
sive — ^any alien, being a free white person, may be ad-
mitted to become a citizen of the United States.'
. . . The practice, I believe, has been universal to
admit femes covert to citizenship upon application."
This decision, on appeal, was affirmed as to the question
of citizenship, though reversed on other grounds. 20
Wend. 338.
The statement of the court, in this case, that a mar-
ried woman can be naturalized, even against the consent
of her husband, is dictum, and its correctness, from a
legal standpoint, is doubted.* Indeed, it seems question-
able whether, in view of the almost universal doctrine
that the citizenship of a woman during marriage is
merged in that of her husband, a married woman can,
while the marriage status lasts, independently secure
naturalization. No case in which this question has
squarely been presented appears to have come before
the courts. In passing upon the question whether a
declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United
States could be made before the clerk of the court at the
private residence of the applicant, who was the actress,
Mrs. Langtry, Mr. Justice Field, in circuit, made this
statement:
"Note by the court. — It is stated in the public journals
that Mrs. Langtry is not a feme sole, and that her hus-
* It does not appear in this case that the husband was unwilling for
his wife to become naturalized. When the decisions in Priest v. Cum-
tnings were rendered (1839 and 1840), the common law rule that the
marriage of an alien woman to a citizen did not affect her citizenship
still generally prevailed. The wife in this case simply availed herself of
our naturalization laws to adopt her husband's American citizenship.
Such a proceeding became unnecessary after the passage of the statute
of 1855, which enacted that an alien woman married to a citizen herself
becomes a citizen if she was herself capable of naturalization. Kelly v.
Owen, 7 Wall. 496.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 53
band is living in England, and a subject of the Queen.
If this be so, the question will arise on her application
for final naturalization papers, whether she can be nat-
uralized in this country. No person can be a citizen of
two countries; and the wife is by law a citizen of her
husband's country." In re Langtry, 1887, 31 Fed. 879, 880.
And to the inquiry of a person "whether the British
Government would recognize the naturalization papers
of a former British subject, an English woman, who was
naturalized in the United States without the consent of
her husband," the Department of State, on October 3,
1896, replied that the writer should consult private coun-
sel learned in the law of Great Britain. 3 Moore's Int.
Law Digest, 454.
It was said in the case of Comitis v. Parkerson, 56
Fed. 556, however, that the relation of husband and wife
is not inconsistent with one being a citizen and the other
being an alien.
11. Anarchists and Polygamists.
Section 7 of the Act of June 29, 1906, which, with the
substitution of the words "or who is a polygamist," for
the phrase "or who has violated any of the provisions of
this act," substantially re-enacts the first sentence of
Section 39 of the Act of March 3, 1903 (32 Statutes at
Large, 1222), provides that "no person who disbelieves
in or who is opposed to organized government, or who is
a member of, or affiliated with any organization enter-
taining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to
organized government, or who advocates or teaches the
duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting
or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific
individuals or of officers generally, of the Government of
the United States, or of any other organized govern-
ment, because of his or their official character, or who is
54 NATURALIZATION
a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of
the United States."
(H.) Usual Legal Conditions.
The usual conditions of naturalization in the United
States are:
1. A declaration of intention to become a citizen.
2. A petition for naturalization.
3. Residence.
4. Qualifications as to age, education, and moral char-
acter.
5. Renunciation of order of nobility or hereditary
title, if any.
6. Oath of allegiance, and renunciation of prior alle-
giance.
1. Declaration of Intention.
The first step in the process of naturalization is the
declaration of intention to become a citizen.
The Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat, at L. 596, Sec. 4,
par. 1, provides that the alien "shall declare on oath be-
fore the clerk of any court authorized by this Act to
naturalize aliens, or his authorized deputy, in the district
in which such alien resides, two years at least prior to
his admission, and after he has reached the age of eigh-
teen years, that it is bona fide his intention to become a
citizen of the United States, and to renounce forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
state, or sovereignty, and particularly, by name, to the
prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of which the alien
may be at the time a citizen or subject. And such declara-
tion shall set forth the name, age, occupation, personal
description, place of birth, last foreign residence and alle-
giance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel, if any,
in which he came to the United States, and the present
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 55
place of residence in the United States of said alien:
Provided, however, That no alien who, in conformity
with the law in force at the date of his declaration, has
declared his intention to become a citizen of the United
States shall be required to renew such declaration."
a. Time of Making.
As to the time of making the declaration, it may be
made immediately after the arrival of the alien in this
country. It must be made at least two years before his
admission to citizenship. Sec. 4, par. 1.
The declarant must be at least eighteen years of age.
Id. Until the enactment of the Act of June 29, 1906,
application to be admitted to citizenship could be made
at any time after the lapse of two years from the date of
the declaration of intention; but that act limits the life
of a declaration of intention to seven years. The theory
of the law is that one who does not, within seven years,
carry out his formally expressed intention, must be
deemed to have abandoned such intention, and should
be required to begin his probation again. The provision
was designed to prevent the abuse of our citizenship by
large numbers of aliens who under the old law were en-
abled to enjoy most of the rights of citizens, including
political rights, and who designedly refrained from com-
pleting their naturalization that they might avoid mili-
tary duty and service as jurors.
b. Before Whom Made.
The declaration of intention must be made before the
clerk of a court authorized by the Act of June 29, 1906,
to naturalize aliens, or his authorized deputy.
*
*On and after September 27, 1906, declarations of intention to become
citizens of the United States shall be filed with the clerks of such State
courts only as have "a seal, a clerk, and jurisdiction in actions at
law or equity, or law and equity in which the amount in controversy is
unlimited." Nat. Reg., Oct. 2, 1906.
56 NATURALIZATION
As to what courts are authorized to naturalize, see
Sec. 3, par. 2 of Act, and page 11 ante, where that subject is
fully treated; and also Appendix, post, wherein is con-
tained a complete list of the courts having jurisdiction
to naturalize in the United States.
The declaration must be made in the district in which
the alien resides. Sec. 4, par. 1 of Act. This means the
judicial district of the court.
The words "before the clerk," mean before the clerk
either in the clerk's office or in open court. In re Lang-
try, 31 Fed. 879; Sto. Scola's Case, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 344.
As to the meaning of the phrase ''before the clerk," in
Andres v. Arnold, 77 Mich., 85, a case arising under the
provision of Section 2165 of the Revised Statutes, it was
held that it was sufficient if the declaration was made
before the clerk out of his office, and became a part of
his records when filed.
But in the case of Re Langtry, 31 Fed. 879, where the
clerk of the United States Circuit Court had taken the
necessary records and seal of the court to the private
residence of Mrs. Langtry and received her declaration of
intention there, the court (Mr. Justice Field), held that
the declaration must be made either in the clerk's office
or in open court. The court said that persons seeking
the great privilege of American citizenship ought to con-
sider it of sufficient value to attend where the records of
the court are held in proper legal custody. The justice
called attention to the fact that in some states a man is
allowed to vote as soon as he makes his declaration of
intention to become a citizen, and said that, if a clerk of
the court, or his deputy, could go around the country
taking declarations of intention and administering oaths,
dangerous consequences might follow. He said that
Congress, in authorizing the declaration to be made be-
fore the clerk, could not have contemplated the granting
of authority to clerks to remove records from the proper
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 57
place of their custody for the accommodation of parties.
The same view was reached in Sto. Scola's Case, 8 Pa.
Co. Ct. 344.
The declaration can not be made before a court
having no clerk; Ex parte Cregg, 2 Curtis, 98.
c. Form of Declaration of Intention.
The statute (Act of June 29, 1906), Section 4,
paragraph 1, provides that the declaration shall be "on
oath." For judicial decisions relative to the taking of
oaths upon making declaration of intention under the
old statutes, see McDaniel v. Richards, 1 McCord, 187;
and U. S. v. Walsh, 22 Fed., 644.
The declaration shall set forth the name, age, occupa-
tion, personal description, place of birth, last foreign
residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of
the vessel, if any, in which he came to the United
States, and the present place of residence in the United
States of said alien. Id. Sec. 4, par. 1.
The applicant shall declare that it is bona fide his
intention to become a citizen of the United States, and
to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and
particularly, by name, to the prince, potentate, state, or
sovereignty of which the alien may be at the time a
citizen or subject. Id.
None of the prior laws prescribed a form, but the Act
of 1906, Section 27, prescribes the form of the declaration
of intention, which must, substantially, be used. This
form is as follows:
DECLARATION OF INTENTION.*
(Invalid for all purposes seven years after the date
hereof.)
, ss :
I, , aged years, occupation ,
do declare on oath (affirm) that my personal description
*See note, next page.
58 NATURALIZATION
is: Color , complexion , height , weight
, color of hair , color of eyes , other
visible distinctive marks ; I was born in on
the day of , anno Domini ; I now reside
at. ; I emigrated to the United States of America
from on the vessel ; my last foreign resi-
dence was It is my bona fide intention to renounce
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly to
, of which I am now a citizen (subject); I arrived
at the (port) of... , in the State (Territory or Dis-
trict) of on or about the day of anno
Domini ; I am not an anarchist; I am not a polyg-
amist nor a believer in the practice of polygamy; and it
is my intention in good faith to become a citizen of the
United States of America and to permanently reside
therein. So help me God.
(Original signature of declarant)*
Subscribed and sworn to (affirmed) before me this
day of , anno Domini
[L. S.]
(Official character of attestor.)
The statute (Sec. 4, par. 1) contains a proviso relative
to those who have, in conformity with the law in force
when they made their declarations, declared their inten-
tion to become citizens, in this language: "Provided,
however. That no alien who, in conformity with the law
in force at the date of his declaration, has declared his
intention to become a citizen of the United States, shall
be required to renew such declaration."
In view of this proviso, the Secretary of Commerce
and Labor, in pursuance of the power vested in him by
*The names of aliens making declarations of intention, or filing peti-
tions for naturalization, must be entered in full in the appropriate places
on the various blank forms, without abbreviation, and the signatures of
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 59
Sec. 28 of the Act of 1906, made the following naturali-
zation regulations, under date of October 2, 1906:
"Declarations of intention made prior to September
27, 1906, before clerks of courts having jurisdiction to
naturalize aliens under the provisions of the law existing
at the time such declarations were made may be used in
lieu of the declarations required by the Act of June 29,
1906, at any time after the expiration of two years from
the date when made.
"Aliens who have made declarations of intention prior
to September 27, 1906, under the provisions of law in
force at the time of making such declarations, can not be
required, as a preliminary to filing their petitions for
naturalization, to file new declarations of intention
under the Act of June 29, 1906; nor are such aliens re-
quired, as a condition precedent to naturalization, to
speak the English language."
d. Difference Between Provisions of Act of 1906 and Sec.
2165 of the Revised Statutes Relative to Declaration of
Intention.
The first difference to be noted between the provisions
of Sec. 2165, Rev. Stat., and the existing law, is in the
courts which may receive the declaration. Under Section
2165 the declaration could be made before any court
having jurisdiction to naturalize aliens, without reference
to the place of residence of the declarant. Under the
Act of June 29, 1906, it can be made only before a court
authorized to naturalize aliens, "in the district in which
such alien resides.''
As to the courts authorized to naturalize, under the
Act of 1906, see p. 11 (supra), " What courts are author-
ized to naturalize."
The second difference is in relation to the age of the
declarant. Under Section 2165 the declaration could not
such aliens must also be written out without abbreviation. Great care
should be taken to get in every case the correct spelling of names. Nat.
Reg. of Oct. 2, 1906.
60 NATURALIZATION
be made until the applicant had reached the age of
twenty-one years. Under the Act of June 29, 1906, it
may be made at any time after the alien reaches the age
of eighteen.
The third difference is in relation to the life of the
declaration of intention. Under Section 2165 application
for final naturalization could be made at any time after
the two year period from the date of the declaration had
elapsed. Under the existing law the petition for admis-
sion to citizenship must be made "not more than seven
years after he (the alien) has made such declaration of
intention." Act of June 29, 1906, Sec. 4, par. 2.
It may be observed that, of course, only aliens who are
capable of naturalization under our laws can make formal
declaration of intention to become citizens.
Clerks of courts shall not receive declarations of in-
tention to become citizens from other aliens than white
persons and persons of African nativity or of African
descent. Nat. Reg. of Oct. 2, 1906.
e. Porto Ricans and Filipinos.
By section 30 of the Act of 1906, however, citizens of
Porto Rico and citizens of the Philippine Islands, though
owing permanent allegiance to the United States, and
hence not aliens, are authorized to become naturalized
and to make their declaration of intention two years prior
to admission. The provision is as follows:
"All the applicable provisions of the naturalization
laws of the United States shall apply to and be held to
authorize the admission to citizenship of all persons not
citizens who owe permanent allegiance to the United
States, and who may become residents of any state or
organized territory of the United States, with the fol-
lowing modifications: The applicant shall not be required
to renounce allegiance to any foreign sovereignty ; he
shall make his declaration of intention to become a citi-
zen of the United States at least two years prior to his
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 61
admission; and residence within tiie jurisdiction of the
United States, owing such permanent allegiance, shall
be regarded as residence within the United States within
the meaning of the five years' residence clause of the
existing law."
f . Exceptions to the Usual Requirement of Declaration of
Intention.
There are several exceptions, by special provision of
law, to the requirement of declaration of intention.
(A.) Army.
Section 2166 of the Revised Statutes reads as follows:
"Any alien, of the age of twenty-one years and up-
ward, who has enlisted, or may enlist, in the armies of
the United States, either the regular or the volunteer
forces, and has been, or may be hereafter, honorably dis-
charged, shall be admitted to become a citizen of the
United States, upon his petition, without any previous
declaration of his intention to become such; and he shall
not be required to prove more than one year's residence
within the United States previous to his application to
become such citizen; and the court admitting such alien
shall, in addition to such proof of residence and good
moral character, as now provided by law, be satisfied by
competent proof of such person's having been honorably
discharged from the service of the United States."*
*Under section 2166 of the Revised Statutes, an honorably discharged
soldier, who is of the age of 21 years and upward, may be admitted to
become a citizen of the United States without making the declaration of
intention required of other aliens. Also, under the provisions of the Act
of July 26, 1894, chapter l65, any alien, of the age of 21 years and up-
ward, who has enlisted, or may enlist, in the United States Navy or
Marine Corps, having been honorably discharged therefrom, after a resi-
dence of five years may be admitted to become a citizen of the United
States without making the declaration of intention required of other
aliens. Clerks of courts are therefore instructed to appropriately note
upon the petition of such discharged alien soldier or member of the Navy
or Marine Corps, and upon the stub of the certificate of naturalization
62 NATURALIZATION
(B.) ITavy and Marine Corps.
The Act of July 26, 1894, 28 Stat, at L. 124, provides
that any alien of the age of twenty-one years and up-
ward who has enlisted or may enlist in the United States
Navy or Marine Corps, and has served or may hereafter
serve five consecutive years in the United States Navy
or one enlistment in the United States Marine Corps, and
has been or may hereafter be honorably discharged, shall
be admitted to become a citizen of the United States
upon his petition, without any previous declaration of
his intention to become such; and the court admitting
such alien shall, in addition to proof of good moral char-
acter, be satisfied by competent proof of such person's
service in and honorable discharge from the United
States Navy or Marine Corps.*
(C.) Widow and Children of Deceased Declarant.
Sec. 4, par. 6, of the Act of June 29, 1906, provides:
When any alien who has declared his intention to be-
come a citizen of the United States dies before he is
actually naturalized the widow and minor children of
such alien may, by complying with the other provisions
of this Act, be naturalized without making any declara-
tion of intention.
(D.) Minor Residents.
Prior to the passage of the Act of 1906, minor aliens
coming to this country at the age of eighteen years or
under, were allowed, under the provisions of Section 2167
of the Revised Statutes, to be admitted to naturaliza-
tion after reaching majority and after five years' residence
issued to him, in lieu of the information required thereon as to the filing
of the declaration of intention, that the petitioner was an honorably dis-
charged alien soldier, or member of the Navy or Marine Corps, and ap-
plied for citizenship under the said Section 2166, or the Act of July 26,
1894. Nat. Reg. of Oct. 2, 1906.
*See note, page 61.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 63
here, without having made the declaration required by-
Rev. Stat. 2165, the applicant being required at the time
of his admission to make the declaration, and to further
declare on oath and prove to the satisfaction of the court
that for two years next preceding, it had been his bona
fide intention to become a citizen of the United States.
Repeal of '' Minor's Claused — But, as a majority of
the naturalization frauds perpetrated were committed
under the provisions of this section of the statutes,
which was known as the "Minor's Clause," the section
was repealed by the Act of June 29, 1906, and the exist-
ing law provides for the making of declaration of inten-
tion by minors after they have reached the age of
eighteen years.
(E.) In Hawaii.
By the Act of April 30, 1900, the previous declaration
of intention was dispensed with in the case of persons
applying to be naturalized in Hawaii, who had resided
there at least five years prior to the taking effect of
the Act.
(F.) In the Philippine Islands and Porto Rico.
By the Act of June 29, 1906 (Sec. 30), residence
within the Philippines or Porto Rico is to be regarded
as residence within the United States within the mean-
ing of the five years' residence clause of the naturaliza-
tion law, with respect to citizens of those islands. The
language of the law is:
"That all the applicable provisions of the naturalization
laws of the United States shall apply to and be held to
authorize the admission to citizenship of all persons not
citizens who owe permanent allegiance to the United
States, and who may become residents of any state or
organized territory of the United States, with the follow-
ing modifications: The applicant shall not be required
64 NATURALIZATION
to renounce allegiance to any foreign sovereignty; he
shall make his declaration of intention to become a citi-
zen of the United States at least two years prior to his
admission; and residence within the jurisdiction of the
United States, owing such permanent allegiance, shall be
regarded as residence within the United States within
the meaning of the five years' residence clause of the
existing law,"
g. Rights Conferred by Declaration of Intention.
(A.) Under Federal laws.
One who has declared his intention to become a citizen
may, under the preemption and homestead laws of the
United States, preempt and acquire public lands. Rev.
Stat. 2259, 2289.
(B.) Under state laws.
He may, under state laws, vote at all elections, state
or national, in Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Ne-
braska, South Dakota, Texas, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
Under the laws of Delaware, Kentucky, New York, and
Washington he enjoys rights in the acquisition of real
property that other aliens do not enjoy. In some states
he may be employed upon public works and other aliens
may not.
(C.) Citizenship not conferred by.
Mere declaration of intention does not confer citizen-
ship upon the declarant. The declaration is merely an
expression of purpose, and has not the effect, either of
naturalization or expatriation. By it, the alien simply
records his intention to renounce his present allegiance
on becoming a citizen of the United States. He remains
an alien until naturalization is complete according to our
laws. Lanz v. Randall, 4 Dill. 425; Maloy v. Duden, 25
Fed. 673; Re Moses, 83 Fed. 995.
J
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 65
The law, justly regarding a change in his allegiance by
a foreigner as an act of grave importance, wisely pro-
vides that there shall be two steps in the process. By
the first, the purpose of change is announced. Between
this and actual naturalization the lapse of a considerable
interval is required in order that the final step may be
taken with due deliberation. For. Rel. 1871, 253, Sec'y
Fish to Mr. Wing, Inst, to Ecuador.
From the standpoint of the government, also, it is
undesirable that persons inexperienced in our institu-
tions should take part in matters which they do not
understand. The period of probation is designed to
afford them an opportunity to become familiar with our
mode of government, and to fit themselves for the per-
formance of the duties of citizenship. Upon final
hearing, the court, for good reasons, may refuse to com-
plete the naturalization.
Does the declaration of intention confer the rights of
citizenship upon an alien ? While the laws of several of
the states of the Union extend the right of suffrage to
aliens who have declared their intention to become
citizens of the United States, a state can not make the
subject of a foreign government a citizen of the United
States, or confer on him the rights and privileges apper-
taining to such citizenship.
As is said by the Circuit Court of the United States in
the case of Minneapolis v. Reum, 6 C. C. A. 31, 12 U. S.
App. 446, 56 Fed. 580: "A state may confer on foreign
citizens or subjects all the rights and privileges it has
the power to bestow, but when it has done all this, it
has not naturalized them. They are foreign citizens or
subjects still, within the meaning of the Constitution
and laws of the United States." See, also, Boyd v.
Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135, 36 L. ed. 103, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep.
375; In re Moses, 83 Fed. 995; White v. White, 2 Met.
(Ky.) 185; Dorsey v. Brigham, 177 III. 250.
5233—5
66 NATURALIZATION
A mere " declaration of intention " by a foreigner to
become a citizen does not deprive a court of tlie United
States of jurisdiction over a suit to whicli lie is a party —
as a suit against a foreign citizen or subject. The final
renunciation of his foreign allegiance is necessary,
Baird v. Byrne, 3 Wall. Jr. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 757.
Is a person who has declared his intention to become
a citizen clothed with the rights of citizenship while
without the United States? Upon principle, it seems
clear that this question should be answered in the nega-
tive. As he is not a citizen, and is not invested with the
rights of Federal citizenship while in the United States,
it is not perceived upon what ground he can claim the
privileges of American citizenship while in a foreign
country.* As we have seen, the declarant does not re-
nounce his original allegiance, but remains an alien until
his naturalization is completed. If he goes back to his
native country, he returns as a subject or citizen thereof.
By treaties with Austria, Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, North
Germany, Sweden and Norway, and Wiirttemberg, it is
expressly provided that a declaration of intention to be-
come a citizen shall not have the effect of naturalization.
It has been repeatedly held by the Department of
State that the declaration of intention to become a citi-
zen does not so clothe the individual with the nationality
of this country as to enable him to return to his native
land without being subject to all the laws thereof. 2
Wharton's. Int. Law Digest, 359.
Where declarant, a native Turk, contemplating a visit
to Turkey, inquired whether he could count upon the
intervention of this government in his behalf, Mr. Bayard
held that, " so far as political rights are concerned, a mere
declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United
States would give . . . [declarant] no title to claim
*The Act of March 2, 1907, appears to contemplate a limited protection
for these persons in certain exceptional circumstances. See p. 74, post.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 67
the intervention of the United States should he return to
his native land." 2 Wharton, International Law Dig. 360.
And in a similar case it was held: "Until the declarant
has perfected his naturalization by due course of law,
and obtained his final papers, he can not claim the pro-
tection of this government in case of his voluntary re-
turn to Turkey." Mr. Bayard to Mr. Grain, January 28,
1886, MSS. Dom. Let. See also, Mr. Hay to Mr. Bell, April
7, 1899, MSS. Dom. Let.
(i.) Burnato's Case.
With the exception of the case of Burnato, no instance
is found where this government has intervened, in the
country of his origin, in behalf of an alien who has merely
declared his intention to become a citizen. This case is
sometimes cited as a precedent for extending protection
to such persons, but an examination of the correspond-
ence shows that it is subject to considerable qualifica-
tion. Burnato, a native of Mexico, came to Texas in
1866, and in 1872 declared his intention to become a
citizen of the United States. In 1879 he was arrested by
the Mexican authorities at Piedras Negras for smuggling
liquor across the border, was tried and sentenced to five
years' service as a soldier in the Mexican Army, In Oc-
tober, 1880, the impressment of Burnato and several
others, citizens of the United States, having come to the
notice of our government, the Department of State di-
rected the United States Minister to demand of the Mexi-
can government their instant release. "If the fact of
Burnato's not being a citizen of the United States should
be brought up by the Mexican government" (wrote As-
sistant Secretary Hunter) "you will suggest that for
fourteen years he has been a permanent resident of this
country, of which he had declared his intention to be-
come a citizen, and has thus been under the protection
of this government, its laws and treaties, and it would
68 NATURALIZATION
seem very ungracious for the Mexican government to in-
sist, under these circumstances, on making any unfavor-
able distinction in his case." Acting Sec'y Hunter to
Mr. Morgan, For. Rel. 1880, 777.
Mr. Morgan in his note to the Mexican government re-
fers to the men as "citizens of the United States," and
it does not appear that the question of Burnato's citizen-
ship was raised at all. It transpired that he had been
dismissed from the army some months previous. Sub-
sequently Mr. Morgan wrote the Department asking in-
structions in regard to demanding an indemnity, and ex-
pressing doubts as to Burnato's title to protection. The
Department, under date of September 14, 1881, replied
as follows: "Adverting to your inquiries respecting Felipe
Burnato, one of the persons impressed, I have to state
that he will not be entitled to the protection of this gov-
ernment without having acquired full citizenship." Act-
ing Sec'y Hitt to Mr. Morgan, MSS. Dip. Inst, to Mexico.
Although a mere declaration of intent does not confer
citizenship, yet, under peculiar circumstances in a Mo-
hammedan or semi-barbarous land, it may sustain an ap-
peal to the good offices of a diplomatic officer of the
United States in such land. Sec'y Cass to Mr. De Leon,
U. S. Consul General at Alexandria, Egypt, August 18,
1858.
(ii.) Koszta's Case.
In a few instances the Department of State has held
that the declarant acquires, by his declaration of inten-
tion, a quasi right to the protection of this government
while in a third country. Of these cases, the best known
is that of Martin Koszta, in which an extreme position
was taken by this Government. This case has been
criticised, and has been explained and qualified by the
Department of State. Koszta was an Austrian subject,
who engaged in the Hungarian rebellion of 1848-9. At
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 69
the end of the rebellion he escaped to Turkey, whence
he came to the United States. He remained in this
country about two years, during which time he made the
statutory declaration of intention to become an American
citizen. He then returned to Turkey on business. He
obtained from the United States consul at Smyrna a
traveling pass, stating that he was entitled to American
protection. While at Smyrna he was arrested by Aus-
trian authorities and put on board an Austrian war vessel
for conveyance to Trieste. He managed to communicate
with the captain of an American war vessel which was
lying in the same port. This officer demanded the release
of Koszta. The Austrian commander refused. There-
upon the American officer trained his guns upon the
Austrian vessel, and declared that if an attempt was
made to leave the port with Koszta on board he would
blow the vessel to pieces. As a conflict between the two
ships would have been attended with great danger to the
shipping in the port and to the town, the matter was
temporarily settled by the delivery of the prisoner to the
French consul, to be kept until the governments con-
cerned should have an opportunity of arriving at a de-
cision. The Austrian charge d'affaires at Washington,
Chevalier Hulsemann, presented a formal remonstrance
to the United States Government, protesting against the
claim of the United States of the right to afford protec-
tion to Koszta, and calling on them to disavow the con-
duct of their agents, and to grant reparation for the
insult offered to the Austrian flag. Secretary Marcy
replied, contending that, although Koszta had not yet
been naturalized, he was at the time he was seized and
imprisoned at Smyrnaclothed with American nationality,
and that in virtue thereof the Government of the United
States was authorized to extend to him its protection at
home and abroad. Mr. Marcy maintained that national
character, according to the law of nations, depended
70 NATURALIZATION
upon domicil, and that, as Koszta had a domicil in
the United States, he was vested with American nation-
ality. The matter was finally compromised by an ar-
rangement between the American and Austrian lega-
tions at Constantinople, that Koszta should be shipped
off to the United States, the Austrian government re-
serving the right to proceed against him should he be
again found in Ottoman territory.
The position taken by Mr. Marcy, that mere domicil in
the United States confers citizenship and the right to
protection in another country, is held by such eminent
writers on international law as Hall and Cockburn, to be
untenable. The former (Hall, International Law, 5th ed.,
243, 244) says: "Domicil no doubt imparts national
character for certain purposes; but those purposes, so far
as they have to do with public international law, are con-
nected with the rules of war alone, and Mr. Marcy's con-
tention was wholly destitute of legal foundation." And in
a note on the same page the author further says that Mr.
Marcy's doctrine was strangely inconsistent with the law
of the United States at the period when he wrote, as at
that time persons of foreign nationality, who had de-
clared their intention of becoming citizens, were in-
capable of receiving United States passports, and
consequently could not have been regarded as subjects.
He refers to the passport given Koszta by the United
States consul at Smyrna in contravention of the laws
of the United States as obviously a mere piece of waste
paper. Cockburn says: "The reasoning of Mr. Marcy,
which is remarkable for its boldness in carrying the doc-
trine of acquired nationality further than it ever has
been carried, and in which the effect of domicil in re-
spect of civil consequences is confounded with its effect
as to political consequences, is altogether inadmissible.
Domicil, and even residence, in a particular country, en-
titles the party to the protection of that country only
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 71
SO long as he is within it; and the effect of such a rule
as that contended for by Mr. Marcy would be to intro-
duce the most lamentable confusion into this branch of
the public law. Naturalization is generally, and should
be always, accompanied by some authentic act, which
can be referred to, and which speaks authoritatively. But
if mere domicil were to give the rights of citizenship,
every case would necessitate a judicial inquiry upon a
matter which every lawyer knows to be, depending, as it
does, on intention, a question often most difficult of
solution." Nationality, 122. Mr. Cockburn's opinion of
the Koszta case is given in a brief note at the bottom of
the page just given, as follows: "Both parties were
equally in the wrong. The Austrians had no pretense of
right for seizing Koszta on Turkish territory. . .
On the other hand, the American authorities had no
right to claim Koszta as an American subject, as he had
not become naturalized. The party really entitled to
complain was the Ottoman government, which refused
the application of the Austrians for leave to arrest
Koszta, and protested against the outrage offered to
their authority, but whose protest does not appear to
have been heeded."
Just prior to, and during the Cuban insurrection of
1869, many Cubans declared their intention to become
citizens of the United States, and after doing so returned
to Cuba. The United States consul at Trinidad inter-
fered in behalf of several of these persons, claiming that
they were American citizens, and asked the Department
to approve his action. This the Department declined to
do, in the following instruction, dated May 12, 1869, in
the course of which Mr. Marcy's note in the Koszta case
was explained and qualified: "The late distinguished
Secretary of State, Mr. Marcy, was very careful in his
elaborate letter concerning the case of Martin Koszta
not to commit this government to the obligation, or to
72 NATURALIZATION
the propriety, of using the force of the nation for the
protection of foreign-born persons who, after declaring
their intention to become at some future time citizens
of the United States, leave its shores to return to their
native country. . . . He took special care to insist
that the case was to be judged, not by the municipal
laws of the United States, not by the local laws of
Turkey, not by the conventions between Turkey and
Austria, but by the great principles of international law.
It is true that in the concluding part of that masterly
despatch he did say that a nation might, at its pleasure,
clothe with the rights of its nationality persons not
citizens, who were permanently domiciled in its borders.
But it will be observed by the careful reader of that
letter that this portion is supplemental, merely, to the
main line of the great argument. ... To extend
this principle beyond the careful limitation put upon it
by Secretary Marcy would be dangerous to the peace of
the country. It has been repeatedly decided by this
Department that the declaration of intention to become
a citizen does not, in the absence of treaty stipulations,
so clothe the individual with the nationality of this
country as to enable him to return to his native land
without being necessarily subject to all the laws thereof-
In the present unhappy state of things in Cuba the
Secretary of State can see no reason for departing from
so well-established and so wise a rule. . . . He
earnestly exhorts you, and all other consuls of the
United States, to spare no effort to protect the lives, the
property, and the rights of American citizens in this
emergency, and he will see with satisfaction any unofficial
efforts you may make to shield the persons of those who
have declared their intention to become citizens from
the barbarities of the Spanish Volunteers, but he desires
me to direct you hereafter in your official action to
observe the rule laid down for your guidance in this
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 73
instruction." Mr. Davis, Asst. Sec'y to Mr. Fox, U. S.
Consul Trinidad, S. Ex. Doc. 108, 41st Cong., 2d Session,
202, 203.
Secretary Olney in an instruction to the United States
minister in China, January 13, 1897, said: "The some-
what extreme position taken by Mr. Marcy in the Koszta
case, that the declarant is followed, during sojourn in a
third country, by the protection of this government, has
since been necessarily regarded as applying particularly
to the peculiar circumstances in which it originated, and
to relate only to the protection of such a declarant in a
third country against arbitrary seizure by the govern-
ment of the country of his origin. . . . It is estab-
lished by the practical interpretation and application of
domestic statutes, and by various treaties of naturaliza-
tion concluded with foreign states, that a mere declara-
tion of intention to become a citizen can not clothe the
declarant with any of the international rights of
citizenship." Mr. Olney to Mr. Denby, MSS. Dip. Inst,
to China, For. Rel. 1896, 92. See, also. Secretary Hay to
Mr. McKinney, March 20, 1899; and 3 Moore's Int. Law
Digest, 336 et seq.
h. Declaration of Intention and Residence.
(A.) In General.
Declaration of intention and residence, however long
continued, do not operate to confer citizenship upon an
alien.
In Lanz v. Randall, 4 Dill. 425, where the declarant had
resided in the United States fifteen years after making
his declaration, it was decided that naturalization had
not been effected.
And in Johnson v. United States, 29 Court of Claims,
1, where the applicant came to the United States at the
age of thirteen years and made the declaration of inten-
tion after arriving at majority, it was held, when he had
74 NATURALIZATION
resided in this country eighteen years, that he could ac-
quire citizenship only by taking out his final papers.
(B.) Declaration of Intention and Three Years' Residence.
But the Act of Congress of March 2, 1907, authorizes the
Secretary of State, "in his discretion," to issue passports
to persons not citizens of the United States as follows:
"Where any person has made a declaration of inten-
tion to become such a citizen as provided by law, and
has resided in the United States for three years, a pass-
port may be issued to him entitling him to the protection
of the government in any foreign country: Provided,
that such passport shall not be valid for more than six
months and shall not be renewed, and that such passport
shall not entitle the holder to the protection of this
Government in the country of which he was a citizen
prior to making such declaration of intention."*
It is to be observed, first, that the issuance of a pass-
port to such person is in the discretion of the Secretary
of State; second, that, if issued, it is only good for six
months and is not renewable; and, third, that it does not
entitle the holder to protection in the country of origin
or previous citizenship. See post, rules governing the
issuance of passports to those who have declared their
intention to become citizens.
It is believed that the occasions for the issuance of
passports under this law should be very rare.
i. Merchant Seamen.
An exception is also made in our laws in the case of a
seaman who declares his intention to become a citizen
and serves on a merchant vessel of the United States. Sec-
* Section 4076, Revised Statutes, declared that " No passport shall be
granted or issued to, or verified for, any other persons than citizens of
the United States." This section was amended by Act of June 14, 1902
(32 Stat, at I,., 386), so as to permit the issuance of passports to the loyal
residents of the insular possessions of the United States.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 75
tion 2174, Rev. Stat., provides that: "Every seaman, being
a foreigner, who declares his intention of becoming a
citizen of the United States in any competent court, and
shall have served three years on board of a merchant
vessel of the United States subsequent to the date of
such declaration, may, on his application to any compe-
tent court, and the production of his certificate of dis-
charge and good conduct during that time, together with
the certificate of his declaration of intention to become
a citizen, be admitted a citizen of the United States; and
every seaman, being a foreigner, shall, after his declara-
tion of intention to become a citizen of the United States,
and after he shall have served such three years, be
deemed a citizen of the United States for the purpose of
manning and serving on board any merchant vessel of
the United States, anything to the contrary in any Act of
Congress notwithstanding; but such seaman shall, for all
purposes of protection as an American citizen, be deemed
such after the filing of his declaration of intention to be-
come such citizen."
This section of the Revised Statutes is Section 29 of the
Act of June 7, 1872 (17 Stat, at L. 268, Chap. 322, U. S.
Comp. Stat. 1901, 1334), which was entitled "An Act to
authorize the appointment of shipping commissioners
. . . to superintend the shipping and discharge of
seamen engaged in merchant ships belonging to the
United States, and for the further protection of sea-
men."
In the case of Gustav Richelieu, a native of France,
who, in 1872, declared his intention to become a citizen
of the United States, and subsequently served as seaman
and steward on American merchant vessels for more
than twenty years, it was held that he was entitled,
under the provisions of Section 2174 (U. S. Comp. Stat.
1901, 1334), to the protection of the United States, and
76 NATURALIZATION
a claim in his behalf for arbitrary arrest and imprison-
ment by the Spanish authorities in Cuba was presented
to the government of Spain by the Department of State.
Acting Secretary Rockhill to Mr. Taylor, August 31,
1896, MSS. Dip. Inst, to Spain. The Spanish Treaty
Claims Commission, before which this claim subsequently
came, made an award of $5,000 in favor of Richelieu.
This does not extend to the naval service. Ex parte
Gormly, 14 Phila. 211.
The Act of June 9, 1874 (18 Stat, at L. 64, Chap. 260,
U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 3064), provides that none of the
provisions of the Act of 1872 (Sec. 2174 U. S. Comp. Stat.
1901, 1334) "shall apply to sail or steam vessels engaged
in the coastwise trade, except the coastwise trade be-
tween the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, or in the lake-
going trade touching at foreign ports or otherwise, or in
the trade between the United States and the British
North American possessions, or in any case where the
seamen are by custom or agreement entitled to partici-
pate in the profits or result of a cruise or voyage."
j. Status Conferred upon Minors by Declaration of Inten-
tion of Parents.
What is the status of minor children of aliens who
declare their intention to become citizens, but do not
perfect their naturalization? Suppose an alien emigrates
to the United States, bringing minor children with him,
and in due time declares his intention to become a citi-
zen, but fails to take out his final papers, what is the
status of the children when they reach majority?
President Arthur, in his annual message in 1884, re-
ferred to this question, and recommended that Congress
should "clearly define the status of minor children of
fathers who have declared their intention to become
citizens, but have failed to perfect their naturalization."
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 77
The question was presented to the United States Su-
preme Court in the ease of Boyd vs. Nebraska, 143 U. S.
135, 36 L. ed. 103, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375. Boyd was born
in Ireland in 1834, of Irish parents, and brought to this
country in 1844 by his father, who settled in Ohio, and,
in 1849, declared his intention to become a citizen of the
United States. There is no record or other written evi-
dence that he ever completed his naturalization by taking
out his naturalization certificate after the expiration of
five years. For many years after the expiration of that
period, however, he exercised rights and claimed privi-
leges in Ohio, which could only be claimed and exercised
by citizens of the United States and of the state. In
1855 the son voted in Ohio as a citizen, under the belief
that his father had taken out his final naturalization
papers. In 1856 he removed to Nebraska. In 1857 he
was elected and served as county clerk of Douglass
county; in 1864 he was sworn into the military service,
and served as a soldier of the Federal Government to de-
fend the frontier from an attack of Indians; in 1866 he
was elected a member of the Nebraska legislature and
served one session; in 1871 he was elected a member of
the convention to frame a state constitution, and served
as such; in 1875 he was again elected and served as a
member of the convention which framed the present
state constitution; in 1880 he was elected and acted as
president of the city council of Omaha; and in 1881 and
1885, respectively, was elected mayor of that city, serv-
ing in all four years. From 1856 until Nebraska was
admitted as a state, he voted at all elections, territorial,
state, municipal, and national. He took the oath required
by law in entering upon the duties of the oflices he filled,
and swore that he would support the constitution of the
United States. In 1888, after thirty years of unques-
tioned exercise of the rights, privileges, and immunities
of a citizen of the United States and of the territory and
78 NATURALIZATION
state, he was elected governor of the state. He took the
oath of office and entered upon the discharge of its duties.
His predecessor, Thayer, as relator, filed an information in
the Supreme Court of Nebraska, setting forth the facts
as to the declaration of intention by Bo5^d's father, aver-
ring that the father did not become a citizen during the
son's minority, and claiming that Boyd, the son, never
having himself been naturalized, was not, at the time of
his election, a citizen of the United States, and was not,
under the constitution and laws of Nebraska, eligible to
the office of governor of the state. The relator prayed
judgment that Boyd be ousted from that office, and that
the relator be declared entitled to it until a successor
could be elected. The state court having decided in
favor of Thayer, a writ of error was sued out to the
Supreme Court of the United States. The court, in dis-
cussing the question of the status of minor children of
persons who have declared their intention to become
citizens, said: "Clearly, minors acquire an inchoate status
by the declaration of intention on the part of their
parents. If they attain their majority before the parent
completes his naturalization, then they have an election
to repudiate the status which they find impressed upon
them, and determine that they will accept allegiance to
some foreign potentate or power rather than hold fast to
the citizenship which the act of the parent has initiated
for them. Ordinarily this election is determined by ap-
plication on their own behalf, but it does not follow that
an actual equivalent may not be accepted in lieu of a
technical compliance."
Under the law of the territory of Nebraska, citizens of
the United States, and those who had filed their declara-
tion of intention to become such, were citizens of the
territory. The court said that Congress so regarded
them, and in Section 3 of the enabling act (13 Stat, at L.
47), referred to them as citizens. The court declared that
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 79
all those who were citizens of the original states became,
upon the formation of the Union, citizens of the United
States, and that upon the admission of Nebraska into
the Union "upon an equal footing with the original states,
in all respects whatsoever," the citizens of what had been
the territory became citizens of the United States and of
the state. The court concluded: "We are of opinion
that James E. Boyd is entitled to claim that, if his father
did not complete his naturalization before his son had
attained majority, the son can not be held to have lost
the inchoate status he had acquired by the declaration
of intention, and to have elected to become the subject
of a foreign power, but, on the contrary, that the oaths
he took and his action as a citizen entitled him to insist
upon the benefit of his father's act, and placed him in
the same category as his father would have occupied if
he had emigrated to the territory of Nebraska; that, in
short, he was within the intent and meaning, effect and
operation of the acts of Congress in relation to citizens
of the territory, and was made a citizen of the United
States and of the State of Nebraska under the organic
and enabling acts and the act of admission." Id.
In the somewhat similar case of Trabing v. United
States, 32 Ct. CI. 440, the court said that the status
which a minor acquires by the declaration of intention
of his parents is only an inchoate status. "If he attains
his majority," said the court, "before his father completes
his naturalization, he has an election to repudiate the
status and determine whether he will render allegiance to
the United States or to the foreign potentate or power
of the country where he was born." In that case there
was nothing to evidence the election of American citi-
zenship by the claimant upon attaining his majority. He
did not vote, but remained in his status until the year
1892 (when he was fifty years of age), when he applied
for naturalization and obtained a decree. "If he had
80 NATURALIZATION
voted and held office [said the court] , and )3erformed all
the duties of citizenship in the active and unequivocal
manner of the respondent in Boyd v. Nebraska, there
would be good reason to say, as his counsel says, that
obtaining naturalization in 1892 was for the purpose of
obtaining some precise evidence of naturalization so that
his status as a citizen could not be questioned. But,
taken with the negative facts of this case — the facts that
he was not born a citizen of the United States, that his
father was not a citizen of the United States, that his
father is not shown to have become a citizen of the
United States, that the claimant owed no natural alle-
giance to the United States, and that he apparently
chose to remain a subject of a foreign power after attain-
ing his majority — it must be held that this application
for naturalization was the first manifestation of an intent
to become a citizen, and that it negatives the presump-
tion of an earlier election."
In the case of In re Di Simone, 108 Fed. 942, an Italian
subject came to the United States, leaving a child in
Italy with relatives. After taking out his first citizen-
ship papers, the father sent for his child to join him.
Upon arrival in the United States and examination by
the immigration authorities it was found that she had
trachoma, and an order for her deportation was issued.
Application was made on her behalf to the circuit court
for the district of Louisiana for a writ of habeas corpus, on
the^ ground that she was illegally detained. In view of the
fact that her father had made his declaration of inten-
tion, it was contended that the child, under the policy of
our naturalization laws, was not an alien immigrant. The
view was expressed that if the petitioner on coming here
had found her father a naturalized citizen, she could not,
under the policy of the law, have been treated as an alien
immigrant so as to prohibit her from entering this country,
however loathsome, dangerous or contagious a disease
4
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 81
her sore eyes might prove to be. The opinion was ad-
vanced that, under the policy of the^naturalization laws,
"alien residential citizens," though not naturalized, may
possess an " inchoate status" of citizenship, J'.which may
vest such rights of citizenship in this petitioner on her
arrival in the United States, as should forbid her depor-
tation as an alien immigrant, evenjjthough she may be
afflicted with a dangerous, contagious disease. The court
said that the petitioner, although an alien, may not be
"an alien immigrant" under the statute. The court
stated that the facts involved "grave questions of both
domestic and international law, which have not since the
organization of the national courts been free therein from
plaguing difficulties — that is, as to whether the peti-
tioner, notwithstanding the 'inchoate status' of the
father's citizenship, on her coming to'this port, is an alien
immigrant."
There was no evidence introduced by the immigration
authorities in this case in support of their view that the
petitioner was an alien immigrant or that she had a
"loathsome or dangerous contagious disease." There
were certain unverified papers pinned to the answer of
the immigration authorities, called "annexes," but it was
held that these were not competent as evidence in a court
authorizing the deportation of the petitioner, and the
court expressed the view that she should be set at
liberty to join and live with her parents, who were "resi-
dential citizens" of New Orleans.
In United States ex rel. Abdoo v. Williams, 132 Fed.
894, the facts were that John Abdoo, a native Syrian,
came to the United States and prior to July, 1904, took
out his first papers. On July 31, 1904, his two children,
aged 8 and 14, arrived at the port of New York. Upon
examination it was found that they both had trachoma,
and they were excluded from admission. On August 10,
1904, Abdoo took out his final papers and applied to
5235—6
82 NATURALIZATION
the immigration authorities for a rehearing, which was
granted. The result of the hearing was to confirm the
view reached as to the older child, but on the ground
that it did not satisfactorily appear from the evidence
that she was Abdoo's daughter. As to the younger
daughter, although the board who passed upon the
matter was satisfied that she had a contagious disease, a
majority apparently supposed that her father's naturali-
zation had changed her status, and voted to admit her.
The third member of the board appealed to the Depart-
ment of Commerce and Labor, and that Department
held that both children were aliens and should be
excluded.
The court held that the naturalization of the father
did not change the status of the children. Said the
court : " They were born out of the limits and jurisdiction
of the United States, their father at the time of their
respective births not being a citizen thereof; therefore,
under R. S. 1993 they were born aliens. They were
aliens when they arrived here on July 31, 1904. The
effect of their father's naturalization has been carefully
restricted by Congress. The relevant parts of R. S. 2172
are, 'the children of persons who have been duly nat-
uralized under any law of the United States, . . . being
under the age of twenty-one years at the time of
naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the
United States, be considered as citizens thereof.' It has
been repeatedly held that the mere being at Ellis Island
in the custody of the immigration authorities is not a
landing within the meaning of any provision of the
Revised Statutes, and that no landing has been effected
until the immigrnnt has been passed by the authorities
at Ellis Island. In re Palagano, 38 Fed. 580; Nishimura
Ekiu V. United States, 142 U.S. 651; In re Gayde (C. C),
113 Fed. 588. Therefore these children were not
dwelling in the United States' when their father was
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 83
naturalized, and his act did not require the authorities
to consider them as citizens. Being aliens, and indis-
putably immigrants, the provisions of the exclusion
acts apply, and it being properly determined that they
are within one of the excluded classes, the respondent
has jurisdiction to hold them for deportation. The re-
lator relies on In re Di Simone, 108 Fed. 942. In that
case the court held that a minor child 'coming to join
her father and finding him a naturalized citizen, could
not, under the policy of the law, have been treated
as an alien immigrant, so as to prevent her from en-
tering, however loathsome, contagious and dangerous a
disease her sore eyes might have proven to be.' And
it applied the same rule when the parent had only taken
out first papers. Although the opinion cited is a
careful and elaborate one, it is unpersuasive to the
conclusion that plain, positive, and unambiguous provis-
ions of statute should be disregarded, as they necessarily
must be, to reach the result contended for. The subjects
of naturalization and its results and of immigration and
its restrictions rest wholly with Congress, and the policy
of the law is what that branch of the government chooses
to make it. If the law which it enacts works hardship,
application should be made to amend it. Judicial legis-
lation under the guise of a construction of unambiguous
words is an imperfect remedy, and one which courts —
certainly courts of first instance — should be slow to
adopt. But in cases like the one at bar, there is no in-
justice in the legislation. Upon this subject Congress
has expressly provided for just such a case as this. As
to aliens generally, it is provided (Sec. 19, Act Mar. 3,
1903, 32 Stat, at L. 1218), that 'no alien suffering from a
loathsome or with a dangerous contagious disease other
than one of a quarantinable nature shall be permitted to
land for medical treatment in the hospitals of the United
States.' But in the 37th Section of the same act (32
84 NATURALIZATION
Stat. 1221), is found this provision: 'Whenever an alien
shall have taken up his permanent residence in this
country and shall have filed his preliminary declaration
to become a citizen and thereafter shall send for his wife
or minor children to join him, if said wife or either of
said children shall be found to be affected with any con-
tagious disorder, and if it be proved that said disorder
was contracted on board the ship in which they came,
and is so certified by the examining surgeon at the port
of arrival, such wife or children shall be held, under such
regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury shall pre-
scribe, until it shall be determined whether the disorder
will be easily curable, or whether they can be permitted
to land without danger to other persons; and they shall
not be deported until such facts have been ascertained.'
Congress has thus set the limits within which the rules
excluding aliens shall be modified, in cases where the
father avails of his opportunity to become a citizen; and
since the children of the relator do not come within the
proviso and are in fact aliens suffering from a contagious
disease, they should be deported."
2. Petition for Naturalization,
a. In General.
The next step in the process of naturalization is the
petition for naturalization.
The Act of June 29, 1906, provides that:
"Not less than two years nor more than seven years
after he has made such declaration of intention he shall
make and file, in duplicate, a petition in writing, signed
by the applicant in his own handwriting and duly veri-
fied, in which petition such applicant shall state his full
name, his place of residence (by street and number, if
possible), his occupation, and, if possible, the date and
place of his birth; the place from which he emigrated,
and the date and place of his arrival in the United
States, and, if he entered through a port, the name of
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 85
the vessel on which he arrived; the time when and the
place and name of the court where he declared his in-
tention to become a citizen of the United States; if he
is married he shall state the name of his wife and, if pos-
sible, the country of her nativity and her place of resi-
dence at the time of filing his petition; and if he has
children, the name, date, and place of birth and place of
residence of each child living at the time of the filing of
his petition: Provided, That if he has filed his declara-
tion before the passage of this Act he shall not be re-
quired to sign the petition in his own handwriting."
Sec. 4, par. 2.
b. Time of Filing.
If the applicant has resided in the United States for
the statutory period, he may, when two years have elapsed
after making formal declaration of intention to become a
citizen, make and file his petition for naturalization.
The petition must be filed not more than seven years
after the applicant has made the declaration of inten-
tion. Sec. 4, par. 2.
Petitions for naturalization may be made and filed
either during term time or vacation of the court, and
shall be docketed the same day as filed.
c. To Whom Made.
The petition must be addressed to a court authorized
to naturalize aliens, and in the judicial district in which
the alien resides. Sec. 4, par. 1. See, also, In re Clark,
18 Barb. 444.
For the courts authorized to naturalize, see p. 11, supra,
and Appendix, post, giving list of courts.
d. Form of Petition.
Prior to the passage of the Act of 1906, no form of
petition was prescribed by law, but it was held by the
courts that the petition must "allege the existence of all
86 NATURALIZATION
facts and the fulfilment of all conditions upon the exist-
ence and fulfilment of which the statutes which confer
the right asserted have made it dependent." In re Bodek,
63 Fed. Rep. 813; In re An Alien, 7 Hill. 137.
The Act of 1906, provides that the petition shall set
forth "every fact material to his (the petitioner's)
naturalization and required to be proved upon the final
hearing of his application." Sec. 4, par. 2.
The Act of 1906, prescribes the following form of
petition:
PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION.
Court of
In the matter of the petition of to be ad-
mitted as a citizen of the United States of America.
To the Court:
The petition of respectfully shows:
First. My full name is
Second. My place of residence is number
street, city of , State (Territory or District) of
Third. My occupation is
Fourth. I was born on the day of at
Fifth. I emigrated to the United States from ,
on or about the day of , anno Domini ,
and arrived at the port of , in the United States,
on the vessel
Sixth. I declared my intention to become a citizen of
the United States on the day of at ,
in the court of
Seventh. I am married. My wife's name is
She was born in and now resides at „.
I have children, and the name, date, and place of
birth and place of residence of each of said children is as
follows: ; ;
Eighth. I am not a disbeliever in or opposed to or-
ganized government or a member of or affiliated with any
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 87
organization or body of persons teaching disbelief in or-
ganized government. I am not a polygamist nor a be-
liever in the practice of polygamy. I am attached to the
principles of the Constitution of the United States, and
it is my intention to become a citizen of the United
States and to renounce absolutely and forever all alleg-
iance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state,
or sovereignty, and particularly to , of which at
this time I am a citizen (or subject), and it is my inten-
tion to reside permanently in the United States.
Ninth. I am able to speak the English language.
Tenth. I have resided continuously in the United
States of America for a term of five years at least im-
mediately preceding the date of this petition, to wit,
since , anno Domini , and in the State (Terri-
tory or District) of for one year at least next pre-
ceding the date of this petition, to wit, since day
of , anno Domini
Eleventh. I have not heretofore made petition for
citizenship to any court. (I made petition for citizenship
to the court of at , and the said peti-
tion was denied by the said court for the following rea-
sons and causes, to wit, , and the cause of
such denial has since been cured or removed.)
Attached hereto and made a part of this petition are
my declaration of intention to become a citizen of the
United States and the certificate from the Department of
Commerce and Labor required by law. Wherefore your
petitioner prays that he may be admitted a citizen of
the United States of America.
Dated
(Signature of petitioner)
, ss:
, being duly sworn, deposes and says
that he is the petitioner in the above-entitled proceed-
ing; that he has read the foregoing petition and knows
the contents thereof; that the same is true of his own
88 NATURALIZATION
knowledge, except as to matters therein stated to be
alleged upon information and, belief, and that as to those
matters he believes it to be true.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day
of , anno Domini
[l- s.] ,
(Sec. 27.) Clerk of the Court.
The petition must be made in duplicate. This is to
enable the clerk to furnish one to the Bureau of Natura-
lization at Washington, the other to remain on file in the
court.
(A) Description of Applicant.
The petition must contain a description of the appli-
cant. It shall state "his full name, place of residence,
occupation, date and place of birth, place from which he
emigrated, date and place of arrival in the United States,
and if entered through a port, the name of vessel in which
he arrived; the time when, andjplace and name of court
where he declared his intention to become a citizen; if
married, name of wife, and country of her nativity and
place of residence at time of filing petition; and if he has
children, name, date, and place of birth and residence of
each child living at time of filing petition."
(B) Allegations of Petition.
{a) Disbelief in Anarchy and Polygamy.
The petition shall state that the petitioner is not a dis-
believer in or opposed to organized government or a
member of or affiliated with any organization or body of
persons teaching disbelief in organized government.
It shall also set forth that the petitioner is not a
polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy.
(6) Of Intention to Become a Citizen, to Renounce
Allegiance, and to Reside Permanently in the
United States.
The petition must state that it is the intention of the
applicant to become a citizen of the United States, and
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 89
to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sover-
eignty, and particularly byname to the prince, potentate,
state, or sovereignty of which at the time of filing the
petition he may be a citizen or subject.
To prevent mistake in the name or title of the partic-
ular sovereign or state whose allegiance is to be re-
nounced, a list of foreign countries and their rulers is
furnished clerks of courts by the Bureau of Naturalization.
See Appendix, post.
Revised lists are sent out from the Bureau from time
to time.
The petition must also state that it is the intention
of the petitioner to reside permanently in the United
States.
(c) Of Previous Denial of Naturalization.
The petitioner shall also state whether he has been
denied admission as a citizen of the United States, and,
if denied, the ground or grounds of such denial, the
court or courts in which such decision was rendered, and
that the cause for such denial has since been cured or
removed.
(d) As to Residence.
The petition must state that the applicant has resided
continuously in the United States of America for a term
of five years at least immediately preceding the date of
his petition, and in the state, territory, or district for
one year at least next preceding the date of the petition.
(e) As to Ability to Speak English.
The petition should state that the applicant is able to
speak the English language. An exception is made, how-
ever, in the case of persons who have made their declara-
tion of intention to become citizens required by law
prior to September 27, 1906. Sec. 8.
Naturalization regulation of October 2, 1906:
"Aliens who make the declaration of intention required
90 NATURALIZATION
by law prior to September 27, 1906, unless they can be
naturalized before that date under the laws then in force,
must comply with the requirements of the Act of June
29, 1906, in regard to the filing of petitions for naturaliza-
tion and furnishing proof, except that they will not be
required to speak the English language or to sign peti-
tions in their own handwriting."
(C.) Signature of Petitioner.
The petition must be signed by the applicant. Sec. 4,
par. 2.* And unless he filed his declaration of intention
before the passage of the Act of 1906, it must be "in his
own handwriting." The proviso to Section 4, paragraph
2, declares "that if he has filed his declaration before
the passage of this Act he shall not be required to sign
the petition in his own handwriting."
(D.) Verification of Petition.
The petition must be "duly verified." Sec. 4, par. 2.
It should be subscribed and sworn to before the clerk
of the court to which it is addressed. Sec. 27.
The petition shall also be verified by the affidavits of
at least two credible witnesses. Sec. 4, par. 2.
(E.) Witnesses.
(^.) Citizenship of.
The witnesses must be "citizens of the United States."
Sec. 4, par. 2.
{ii.) Personal Acquaintance with Applicant.
The witnesses shall state in their affidavits that they
have personally known the applicant to be a resident of
*The signature must be written out without abbreviation. Nat. Reg. ,
Oct. 2, 1906.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 91
the United States for a period of at least five years con-
tinuously, and of the state, territory, or district in which
the application is made for a period of at least one year
immediately preceding the date of the filing of his peti-
tion, and that they have personal knowledge that the
petitioner is a person of good moral character, and that
he is in every way qualified, in their opinion, to be ad-
mitted as a citizen of the United States. Sec. 4, par. 2.
(in.) Form of Affidavit.
The following form of affidavit of witnesses is pre-
scribed by the law: Sec 27.
AFFIDAVIT OF WITNESSES.
-Court of
In the matter of the petition of to be admitted
a citizen of the United States of America.
, ss :
, occupation , residing at ,
and , occupation , residing at
each being severally, duly andrespectively sworn, deposes
and says that he is a citizen of the United States of
America; that he has personally known , the
petitioner above mentioned, to be a resident of the
United States for a period of at least five years con-
tinuously immediately preceding the date of filing his
petition, and of the state (territory or district) in which
the above-entitled application is made for a period of
years immediately preceding the date of filing
his petition, and that he has personal knowledge that
the said petitioner is a person of good moral character,
attached to the principles of the Constitution of the
92 NATURALIZATION
United States, and that he is in every way qualified, in
his opinion, to be admitted as a citizen of the United
States.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of
, nineteen hundred and
[l. s.] ,
(Official character of attestor).
(iv.) Fees of.
Upon the filing of his petition to become a citizen of
the United States, the petitioner shall deposit with and
pay to the clerk of the court a sum of money sufficient
to cover the expenses of subpoenaing and paying the
legal fees of any witnesses for whom he may request a
subpoena, and upon the final discharge of such witnesses
they shall receive, if they demand the same from the
clerk, the customary and usual witness fees from the
moneys which the petitioner shall have paid to such
clerk for such purpose, and the residue, if any, shall be
returned by the clerk to the petitioner. Sec. 13, par. 5.
e. Notice.
(A.) In General.
Immediately after filing the petition, the clerk shall
give notice thereof by posting in a public and conspicu-
ous place in his oflSce, or in the building in which his
office is situated, under an appropriate heading, the
name, nativity and residence of the alien, the date and
place of his arrival in the United States, and the date,
as nearly as may be, for the final hearing of his petition,
and the names of the witnesses whom the applicant ex-
pects to summon in his behalf; and the clerk shall, if
the applicant requests it, issue a subpoena for the wit-
nesses so named by the said applicant to appear upon
BY FORMAL PAPERS.
93
the day set for the final hearing, but in case such wit-
nesses can not be produced upon the final hearing, other
witnesses may be summoned. Sec. 5, Act of June 29,
1906.
(B.) Form.
The form of notice prescribed by the Bureau of Natu-
ralization is as follows:
NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO CITIZENSHIP.
Petitions for Naturalization at the Term of
Court, to be held at
Name.
Place of
Birth.
Resi-
dence.
Date of
Arrival
in U. S.
Place of
Arrival.
Approxi-
mate Date
of Final
Hearing.
Witnesses.
Name.
Res.
Clerk of the Court,
f. Certificate from Department of Commerce and^Labor —
Declaration of Intention.
At the time of filing his petition there shall be filed
with the clerk of the court a certificate from the Depart-
ment of Commerce and Labor, if the petitioner arrives in
the United States after the passage of this Act. This cer-
tificate shall state the date, place, and manner of his
arrival in the United States. Sec. 4, par. 2.
At the same time, the declaration of intention of the
petitioner shall be filed with the clerk. Sec. 4, par. 2.
94 NATURALIZATION
The certificate from the Department of Commerce and
Labor and the declaration of intention shall be attached
to and made a part of the petition. Sec. 4, par. 2.
3. Residence.
a. In General.
Before an alien can become naturalized under the
general laws of the United States, he must have resided
here at least five years.
Section 2170 of the Revised Statutes provides that
"no alien shall be admitted to become a citizen who has
not for the continued term of five years next preceding
his admission resided within the United States."
The language of the Act of June 29, 1906, is similar:
"It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the
court admitting any alien to citizenship that immediately
preceding the date of his application he has resided
continuously within the United States five years at least,
and within the state or territory where such court is at
the time held one year at least."
The reason for the requirement of such preliminary
residence is obvious. It enables the applicant to become
acquainted with the character of our institutions. It
tests the sincerity of his desire for citizenship.
The law, justly regarding a change in his allegiance by
a foreigner as an act of grave importance, wisely provides
that there shall be two steps in the process. By the first,
the purpose of change is announced. Between this and
actual naturalization the lapse of a considerable interval
is required, in order that the final step may be taken
with due deliberation. Persons who may have declared
their intention to become citizens often change their
minds, and fail to carry that intention into effect. They
have seen occasion to avail themselves of the locus
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 95
penitenticB which the law allows. Sec'y Fish, For. Rel.
1871, 254.
b. Meaning of ** Residence."
In its more restricted meaning the word residence de-
notes a person's habitual physical presence in a country
or place. In its broad sense it means a place of abode,
selected with the intention of remaining permanently or
for an indefinite period. Van Dyne, Citizenship of the
United States, 83.
In its legal acceptation residence is the place of a
party's home or domicile. Every change of abode is not
regarded as constituting a new residence, in the legal
sense of the word, unless it is accompanied with the in-
tention to abandon the former with the purpose of tak-
ing up another. Residence, in its legal acceptation, is
the party's home or domicile, and not merely the spot
occupied by him for the time being. In re An Alien, Fed.
Cas. 201a.
In the case of In re Hawley, 1 Daly, 531, the court
said: "There are few questions that come up for the con-
sideration of judicial tribunals which it is more difficult
to define than what will constitute a residence. The
best definition that I have ever been able to find, or
which my own experience could suggest — and I have
had a great deal — is that to be deduced from the Roman
law — that a man's residence is the place where his family
dwells, or which he makes the chief seat of his affairs
and interests."
0. "Continued Residence."*
The residence must be continuous. The language of
Section 2170 is "continued term of five years." In the
Act of 1906 it is "resided continuously . . . five
years at least."
*See article by author on " Continued Residence of Applicant for Na-
turalization," 29 American Law Review, 52.
96 NATURALIZATION
What is meant by continued residence? Can a foreigner
after making the formal declaration of intention to be-
come a citizen, leave the United States for any purpose,
or for any period, without interrupting the continuity
of his residence and forfeiting the benefits acquired
thereby? Little light is thrown upon this inquiry by the
decisions of our courts, and text writers seem to give the
matter little attention.
Taken in the legal sense,* temporary absence from the
United States, upon business or pleasure, would not be
incompatible with continued residence here. The sole
criterion would be the intention of the party. To deter-
mine this it would be proper to take into consideration
the length of the absence, its purpose, and the circum-
stances surrounding the case. In a case arising under the
treaty of 1868 (15 Stat, at L. 615) between the United
States and the North German Confederation, the opinion
was expressed by the Attorney General that the residence
of an applicant for naturalization would not be inter-
rupted by "a transient absence for business, pleasure, or
other occasion, with the intention of returning." Stern's
Case, 13 Ops. Atty. Gen. 376. On the other hand, one
who, immediately after declaring his intention to become
a citizen of the United States, removed to Mexico and
there engaged in business, was deemed to have abandoned
his declared intention to become an American citizen.
2 Wharton's Int. Law Digest, 360.
And in the case of a native Russian who declared his
intention to become a citizen in 1893, and then returned
to Russia where he still remained in 1896, Secretary
Olney said his sojourn in Russia would doubtless beheld
by a naturalizing court to interrupt the continuous resi-
dence required by law as a condition precedent to his
*"The phrase ' continued term of five years' means residence in the
general legal sense." Mr. Fish to Mr. Bancroft, Sept. 20, 1870, 3 Moore's
Int. Law Digest, 354.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 97
naturalization. Mr. Olney to Mr. Breckinridge, January
27, 1896, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 356.
The logical and rational construction of the language
of the law would admit a brief temporary absence from
the United States during the period of probation with-
out interruption of the continued residence required by
the statute. A study of the history of our naturaliza-
tion legislation, however, does not clearly show this to
have been the intention of Congress. The earliest Fed-
eral law relative to the naturalization of aliens, the Act
of March 26, 1790 (1 Stat, at L. 103, Chap. 3), provided
that "any alien . . . who shall have resided within
the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States
for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a
citizen thereof." By Act of January 29, 1795 (1 Stat, at
L. 414, Chap. 20), a preliminary declaration of intention
was provided for, and the applicant was required to de-
clare " that he has resided within the United States five
years at least." The act of June 18, 1798 (1 Stat, at L.
566, Chap. 54), required the applicant to prove "that he
has resided within the United States fourteen years at
least." This law was repealed by the Act of April 14,
1802 (2 Stat, at L. 153, Chap 28, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,
1329), which made it the duty of the court admitting
the applicant to satisfy itself " that he has resided within
the United States five years at least." This Act also pro-
vided that the oath of the applicant should, in no case,
be allowed to prove his residence.
In November, 1804, while the law of 1802 was in force,
one Walton applied to the United States Circuit Court
at Alexandria, Virginia, for naturalization. Affidavits
were submitted showing that Walton had resided in the
United States more than six years; that during that
period he was absent a short time on business, but left
his family in this country. The application was rejected
by the court because the residence did not appear to be
5233-7
98 NATURALIZATION
a continued residence, and the term of absence was in-
definite. Ex parte Walton, 1 Crancli, C. C. 186, Fed. Cas.
No. 17,127.
In December, 1804, in the case of James Saunderson,
who applied to the same court, an affidavit was presented
showing that Saunderson came to the United States in
October, 1797, and continued to reside here until 1800,
when he went to England, returning in April, 1801. In
the fall of 1801 he again went to England, and in 1802
returned to this country, where he continued to live to
the date of his application. Although he had actually
resided in the United States more than five years, the
court refused to admit him because he had not continued
to reside, according to the requirement of the law.
Ex parte Saunderson, 1 Cranch C. C. 219, Fed. Cas. No.
12,378.
In the case of Hawley (In re Hawley, 1 Daly, 531),
naturalization was refused because the applicant after
residing in the United States ten years and declaring
his intention to become a citizen went to his native coun-
try (Ireland) on account of his father's illness and re-
mained there seven years. After returning to the United
States and dwelling here more than a year longer, he
made application for admission to citizenship, and the
evidence showed that before leaving for Ireland he had
expressed to his friends his intention to return and reside
in the United States. The court in rejecting his appli-
cation based its action largely upon the fact that while
he was in Ireland he worked at his trade of mechanic.
This, coupled with his long absence, in the opinion of
the court, effected a change of residence.
Up to this time the law had not expressly required a
continuous residence. It appears to have been the opin-
ion of the court, however, in the cases just cited, that
the law contemplated continuous physical presence in
the country. This seems to be an extreme construction.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 99
March 3, 1813, Congress passed "An Act for the regula-
tion of seamen on board the public and private vessels of
the United States " (2 Stat, at L. 809, chap. 42, U. S.
Comp. Stat. 1901, 1333), the 12th section of which
provided that " no person who shall arrive in the United
States from and after the time when this act shall take
effect shall be admitted to become a citizen of the United
States, who shall not, for the continued term of five
years next preceding his admission, as aforesaid, have
resided within the United States, without being at any
time during the said five years out of the territory of
the United States."
In Ex parte Paul, 7 Hill, 56, the facts were that Paul,
a native of Ireland, came to the United States in 1836.
In 1843 he left the city of Rochester, N. Y., to go to
Ogdensburg by way of Lake Ontario. The steamboat in
which he traveled stopped about ten minutes at Kings-
ton, Canada, to take in passengers, during which time
Paul stepped upon the dock where he remained two or
three minutes and then returned to the boat and pro-
ceeded to Ogdensburg. In 1844 he applied for naturali-
zation, having resided in the United States since 1836.
The court denied his application. Referring to the lan-
guage of the statute, the court said:
"The leading object of the provision was undoubtedly
to make the alien's right depend upon the simple en-
quiry whether he has in fact remained within the United
States during the whole five years next preceding his ap-
plication, and thus exclude all enquiry as to the inten-
tion and purpose of his departure. In the present case
the applicant has not complied with the condition upon
which his right to become a citizen depends, and his ap-
plication must, therefore, be rejected."
While it is not unreasonable to suppose that this law
was intended to apply to seamen alone, its terms em-
braced all aliens, and precluded even momentary absence
100 NATURALIZATION
from the territory of the United States, for any purpose
whatever, without the forfeiture of the benefits acquired
by previous residence. This remained the law until the
year 1848. In 1846 an effort was made to repeal the last
clause of the 12th section, and a bill was introduced in
the Senate to accomplish that purpose. It was referred
to the judiciary committee, and a favorable report was
submitted thereon by Senator Breese. The bill did not
become a law at that time, but the following extract
from the report referred to is of interest as showing the
sentiment of the committee: "The hardship complained
of by this law as it now reads is that persons other than
seamen, for whose regulation and naturalization, alone,
the law may well be supposed to have been enacted,
have, by the courts of the country, adhering to the
letter of the law, been deprived of certificates of citizen-
ship, who had made their declaration of intention to be-
come citizens of the United States in conformity with
the general naturalization law, whose residence, business
pursuits, and property are wholly within the United
States; it being shown on final examination that after
five years had commenced to run, and during their pro-
gress, they had been temporarily out of the territory and
beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, sometimes
with their own consent, in pursuit of their business, at
other times accidentally, in the course of voyages upon
the northern lakes, where a divided jurisdiction obtains,
the line and limit of which is imaginary only. Cases are
stated of persons engaged in large commercial operations,
who, with their families, permanently reside in some of
our large cities, after making their declarations of their
bona fide intention to become citizens, are compelled to
visit foreign countries for purposes connected with their
business, but immediately returning to their homes in
the United States, who are unable, by reason of this
temporary absence, to show upon the final examination
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 101
that they have been continually during the five years
within our territory, and are thus refused their certifi-
cates of naturalization. . . . All such persons could
conscientiously depose that they have, at no time
within the five years, been out of the territory of the
United States with the intention of remaining out; that
the animus revertendi always continued. The committee
think that the rigor of the law, if originally intended to
apply to such persons, and not to seamen only, might
with propriety be relaxed, leaving it to the courts to de-
termine upon each application for a certificate of natu-
ralization, if the residence set up has been bona fide
with the intention of remaining, only interrupted by
such and kindred circumstances to which the committee
have referred. To accomplish this, enough of the section
will remain after the clause in question is repealed; for
a momentary absence, to be judged of by all the circum-
stances attending it, may not be found inconsistent with
a correct legal idea of a continued residence as required."
Two years later the matter again came up in Congress,
and June 26, 1848, an act (9 Stat, at L. 240, chap. 72) was
passed striking from the law the clause in question, viz.,
"without being at any time during the said five years out
of the territory of the United States." The natural infer-
ence from this action of Congress would seem to be that
it intended to relieve the applicant for naturalization
from the forfeiture caused by necessary temporary ab-
sence, unaccompanied by change of intention.* But a
perusal of the record of the debate in Congress at the
time of the repeal of the clause does not fully confirm
this view. Mr. Dickinson, having the bill in charge in
the Senate, stated its object to be "to enable those indi-
viduals who had not been able to perfect their letters of
naturalization, in consequence of being compelled to be
absent from the United States since the notification of
*See In re Clark, 18 Barb. 444.
102 NATURALIZATION
their intention, to obtain relief." Cong. Globe, 1st Ses-
sion, 30th Congress, 854.
"Mr. Underwood asked whether the bill proposed that
the time an individual might be absent from the United
States was to be made up by subsequent residence, prior
to the granting of the certificate. Mr. Dickinson replied
in the affirmative. Mr. Breese said that if the applicant
for naturalization should be called out of the United
States, and remain abroad four years and eleven months,
that time would not be counted. Mr. Berrien explained
the law as it would stand after the passage of the bill,
which required that the five years' residence should be
completed. If the applicant for a certificate were absent
any part of that time, it would remain for the court to
decide whether that absence was sufl&cient to prevent
the issuing of the certificate. As the law now stands if
any person after notifying his intention to become a
citizen, sets his foot out of the United States, he must
go through the full term of five years' residence again.
Under this bill he may be called away for a short period
by business, but having filed his desire to become natu-
ralized, the court may decide that there is no sufficient
reason for his going again over the whole term of proba-
tion. The bill was then considered and read a third time
and passed." Id.
In the House, Mr. Birdsall, in explaining the object of
the bill, stated that persons who had left the United
States as volunteers for Mexico, after declaring their in-
tention to become naturalized, had been thus prevented
from obtaining the residence required by law. "Mr. Mc-
Clernand said that those who had enlisted in the service
of their country, and had been sent beyond its limits in
the prosecution of the war, fell within the wording of
the present law, and were forced to lose all the time they
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 103
were thus absent, though they had previously notified
their intention of being naturalized. The bill was then
passed." Id. 864.
So far as it can be gathered from the foregoing, the
intention of Congress in repealing the clause in question
seems to have been to conserve to the applicant for natu-
ralization, who, in good faith, temporarily absents him-
self from the United States after declaring his intention,
only the benefit of the time which he has actually spent
in this country.
But it is not believed that this apparent intention
would justify the courts in disregarding what seems to
be the plain and reasonable meaning of the language of
the law. The great injustice of such a construction is
well shown by the statement of Mr. McClernand, quoted
above, that persons who had volunteered in the service
of the United States, and been sent beyond its limits in
prosecution of war against a foreign nation, would be
"forced to lose all the time they were thus absent, though
they had previously notified their intention of being
naturalized."
Moreover, if the residence is interrupted by temporary
absence, without change of intention on the part of the
applicant, the logical consequence would be that he
should be required, not merely to make up the time thus
lost, but to begin cle 7iovo. For a residence which is
once broken can not be said to be a continued residence,
such as the law requires.
The just rule, it is apprehended, is that suggested by
Senator Berrien, supra: "If the applicant is absent any
part of the time, it remains for the court to decide
whether that absence is sufficient to prevent the issuing
of the certificate." In other words, if the facts and cir-
cumstances of the absence, as shown in the particular
case, indicate no change of intention on the part of the
104 NATURALIZATION
applicant, it is the duty of the court to issue the certifi-
cate, without requiring such time to be made up. If
there is evidence showing abandonment of intention, the
application should be refused, and the party should be
required to begin de novo. This is believed to be the
only construction consistent with the spirit of the law
and with the plain import of the language employed.
It is interesting, in this connection, to note the con-
struction given very similar language used in naturaliza-
tion treaties. Our treaties of naturalization with Bava-
ria (15 Stat, at L. 661), and Wiirttemberg (16 Stat, at L.
735), concluded in 1868, require that citizens of the one
country shall have "resided uninterruptedly" within the
territory of the other for five years. This language is
certainly as strong as "continued residence" in our nat-
uralization law. Rev. Stat., Sec. 2170 (U. S. Comp. Stat.
1901, 1333). Yet in the protocol of each of these treaties,
more exactly defining and explaining the contents of the
treaties, it is declared: "The words 'resided uninter-
ruptedly' are obviously to be understood, not of a con-
tinued bodily presence, but in the legal sense, and there-
fore a transient absence, a journey, or the like, by no
means interrupts the period of five years contemplated
by the 1st article." 15 Stat, at L. 664. See, also. For.
Rel. 1901, 520.
Section 15 of the Act of June 29, 1906, declares that
" if any alien who shall have secured a certificate of citi-
zenship under the provisions of this Act shall within five
years after the issuance of such certificate return to the
country of his nativity or go to any other foreign coun-
try, and take permanent residence therein, it shall be
considered prima facie evidence of a lack of intention
on the part of such alien to become a permanent citizen
of the United States at the time of filing his application
for citizenship, and in the absence of countervailing evi-
dence it shall be sufficient in the proper proceeding to
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 105
authorize the cancellation of his certificate of citizenship
as fraudulent."
d. Constructive Residence.
(A.) Merchant Seamen.
Alien seamen, while serving on board a merchant vessel
of the United States, are deemed to be constructively
within the United States.
In the case of In re Scott, 1 Daly, 534, the applicant
came to the United States at the age of three years, and
lived in New York until he reached the age of seventeen,
when he shipped as a seaman on board an American vessel
and was continuously employed as a sailor on American
merchant vessels for seven years and until he applied for
naturalization. The court expressed the opinion that
the residence of a seaman, if married, is the place where
his family dwells; if unmarried, it is the place where his
domicile was fixed when he first went to sea as a mariner,
and that his service as a mariner exclusively in American
vessels did not operate as an abandonment of his domi-
cile. The conclusion of the court was, that the applicant
had resided within the United States during the five years
preceding his application, and admitted him to citizen-
ship. See In re Shaw, 2 Pa. Dist. Ct. 250.
(B.) In Countries in Which the United States has Extra-
Territorial Rights.
In the case of Gargiulo, a dragoman of the American
Legation at Constantinople, who had made his declaration
of intention in the United States and afterwards returned
to his official duties in Turkey, Secretary Gresham held
that the five years' residence required by the statutes
means actual residence, and that a person can not be
considered "as having been constructively in this coun-
try during the past five years merely because he has
106 NATURALIZATION
been in the employment of this government " as inter-
preter or dragoman of the American Legation in Turkey
during that time. The fiction of extraterritoriality can
not be carried to that extent. Mr. Gresham to Mr. Ter-
rell, Nov. 2, 1893, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 353.
A constructive residence is held not to answer the
requirement of the statute. Proposed residence in Japan
can not, therefore, be made available for naturalization
purposes. Mr. Evarts to Mr. de la Camp, July 25, 1877,
3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 353.
The process of naturalization must be performed in
the United States. Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Kasson,
Jan. 15, 1885, For. Rel. 1885, 394.
e. Residence within State.
In addition to residence within the United States for
the continued term of five years, the applicant must
have resided within the state or territory where the
court is at the time held, one year at least. Sec. 4, par. 4.
In Chandler v. Wartman, 6 N. J. L. J. 301, it was held
that R. S. 2165, providing that the court naturalizing
an alien must be satisfied that he has resided in the
United States for five years and within the state where
the court is held for one year, did not require the last
year of residence to be in the state where the applica-
tion is made, but that it was sufficient that applicant
had lived for any one year in that state.
And, in Cummings' Petition, 41 N. H. 270, arising
under the same statute, the court declared that: "In an
application for naturalization under the Act of April 14,
1802, it is not necessary for the applicant to allege or
prove his residence for the year immediately preceding
his application in the state or territory where the court
is holden; but it is sufficient for him to allege and prove
such residence for any one of the five years of his resi-
dence in the United States."
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 107
The existing law, the Act of June 29, 1906 (Sec. 10),
provides: "That in case the petitioner has not resided
in the state, territory, or district for a period of five
years continuously and immediately preceding the filing
of his petition he may establish by two witnesses, both
in his petition and at the hearing, the time of his resi-
dence within the state, provided that it has been for
more than one year, and the remaining portion of his five
years' residence within the United States required by
law to be established may be proved by the depositions
of two or more witnesses who are citizens of the United
States, upon notice to the Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization and the United States attorney for the
iistrict in which said witnesses may reside."
f. In the Philippines and Porto Rico.
Residence in the Philippine Islands or Porto Rico, is
deemed "residence within the United States" within the
meaning of the naturalization law. The Act of June 29,
1906, provides that "residence within the jurisdiction of
the United States, owing such permanent allegiance, shall
be regarded as residence within the United States within
the meaning of the five years' residence clause of the
existing law." (Sec. 30.)
g. In Hawaii.
The Act of April 30, 1900, 31. Stat. 161, dispensed with
the previous declaration of intention in the case of per-
sons applying to be naturalized in Hawaii, who had re-
sided there at least five years prior to June 14, 1900.
The language of the Act (Sec. 100) is: "For the purposes
of naturalization under the laws of the^ United States,
residence in the Hawaiian Islands prior to the taking
effect of this Act shall be deemed equivalent to residence
in the United States and in the Territory of Hawaii;
108 NATURALIZATION
and the requirement of a previous declaration of inten-
tion to become a citizen of the United States and to re-
nounce former allegiance shall not apply to persons who
have resided in said islands at least five years prior to
the taking effect of this Act, but all other provisions of
the laws of the United States relating to naturalization
shall, so far as applicable, apply to persons in the said
islands."
h. Proof of Residence.
(A.) Under Act of 1906.
The statute (Act of June 29, 1906, Sec. 4, par. 4) pro-
vides that "it shall be made to appear to the satisfac-
tion of the court" that the alien has resided, etc.
(B) Under Prior Laws.
Before the passage of the Act of 1906, Rev. Stat. 2165,
provided that "the oath of the applicant shall in no case
be allowed to prove his residence." And it was held that
this not merely rendered the oath of the applicant in-
sufficient, but that it amounted to a prohibition against
taking his oath as proof of his residence, and that such
oath if taken was extra-judicial.
The statute did not prescribe how the residence was to
be proved, but the usual method was for the courts to
require testimony under oath of at least two citizens of
good standing who were able to testify of their own
knowledge that the applicant had been a resident of the
United States for five years at least, and within the state
or territory wherein the court was held for one year.*
*Ia re An Alien, 7 Hill, 137, it was held that in proceedings for
naturalization an alien's residence could not be established by affidavit,
but must be proved in court by the testimony of witnesses.
In Com. V. Paper, 1 Brewster (Pa.), 263, it was held that an alien could
not vouch for a person petitioning for naturalization.
The law requires that some of the essential facts shall be made to
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 109
The Act of 1906, which repeals Section 2165 R. S. ex-
pressly provides:
"In addition to the oath of the applicant, the testi-
mony of at least two witnesses, citizens of the United
States, as to the facts of residence . . . shall be re-
quired, and the name, place of residence and occupation
of each witness shall be set forth in the record." Sec.
4, par, 4,
i. Exceptions.
There are several exceptions by special provision of
law to the requirement as to residence.
(A.) Army.
Soldiers in the Army of the United States who have
enlisted and are honorably discharged, may be admitted
as citizens of the United States after one year's residence
within the United States previous to the application.
The law reads:
Rev. St., Sec. 2166 (U. S. Comp. Stat., 1901. 1331):
"Any alien of the age of 21 years and upward, who
has enlisted, or may enlist, in the armies of the United
States, either the regular or the volunteer forces, and
has been, or may be hereafter, honorably discharged,
shall be admitted to become a citizen of the United
States, upon his petition, without any previous declara-
tion of his intention to become such; and he shall not he
required to prove more than one yeai^'s residence within
appear to the satisfaction of the court by evidence other than the testi-
mony of the applicant himself, and, to meet this requirement, a witness
is usually produced, commonly called a "voucher. " In the case of Re
Lipshitz, 97 Fed. 584, where it appeared that the "voucher" presenting
himself had been in the habit of appearing in the same capacity in such
cases, and of making a charge for appearing and giving his testimony,
the court held that an applicant for naturalization should produce a
voucher other than one who habitually, and for compensation, appears
as such. See, also, People v. Sweetman, 3Park. C, R. 358.
110 NATURALIZATION
the United States previous to his application to become
such citizen; and the court admitting such alien shall, in
addition to such proof of residence and good moral char-
acter, as now provided bylaw, be satisfied by competent
proof of such person's having been honorably discharged
from the service of the United States."
"Armies " does not cover enlistments in the Navy. In
re Bailey, 2 Sawyer C. C. 200; In re Chamavas, 21 N. Y. S.
104.
(B. ) Navy and Marine Corps.
Aliens enlisting in the Navy or Marine Corps of the
United States, and serving five consecutive years in the
Navy, or one enlistment in the Marine Corps, after honor-
able discharge, may be admitted as citizens without other
proof of residence. The law. Act of July 26, 1894, 28 Stat,
at L. 124, Chap. 165, reads: "Any alien of the age of
21 years and upward, who has enlisted or may enlist
in the United States Navy or Marine Corps, and has
served, or may hereafter serve, five consecutive years in
the United States Navy, or one enlistment in the United
States Marine Corps, and has been or may hereafter be
honorably discharged, shall be admitted to become a citi-
zen of the United States upon his petition without any
previous declaration of his intention to become such."
Mere service as a soldier, or residence in the country
in that capacity, does not make one a citizen, however.
People ex rel. Orman v. Riley, 15 Cal. 48.
The soldier, sailor or marine must personally petition
the court and be formally admitted to citizenship. Van
Dyne, Citizenship of the United States, 96.
(C.) Merchant Seamen.
While serving on board a merchant vessel of the United
States, a seaman is deemed to be constructively within
the United States.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. Ill
As has been stated heretofore (supra), under Sec.
2174, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1334), a sea-
man being a foreigner, after declaring his intention of
becoming a citizen, and serving three years on board of a
merchant vessel of the United States, may be admitted
to citizenship. He is required to make application to a
competent court, and to produce a certificate of his
declaration of intention, and his certificate of discharge
and good conduct during his service on such vessel.
For the purpose of manning and serving on board any
merchant vessel of the United States, he is to be deemed
a citizen of the United States after making his declara-
tion of intention, and after he shall have served such
three years; and for all purposes of protection as an
American citizen, he shall be deemed such after filing his
declaration of intention.
4. Qualifications as to Age, Education, and Moral Character,
(a.) Age.
While there is no express declaration of the law to
that effect, no person can become naturalized under the
general statutes of the United States who has not
attained the age of twenty-one years.
Until the Act of June 29, 1906, went into effect, an
alien minor was not competent to declare his intention
to become a citizen of the United States, but Section 4,
paragraph 1, of that Act provides that an alien shall
make his declaration of intention "after he has reached
the age of eighteen years."
Section 2166 of the Revised Statutes, providing for
the naturalization of soldiers of the Army of the United
States, expressly limits the benefits of the law to aliens
"of the age of twenty-one years and upward."
112 NATURALIZATION
And the Act of July 26, 1894, relating to the naturali-
zation of men of the Navy or Marine Corps of the United
States, contains a like limitation.
(b.) Education.
(A.) Act of June 29, 1906.
Under the existing law, Act June 29, 1906, ability to
speak English and to write is one of the qualifications of
an applicant for naturalization. The language of the law
is " that no alien shall hereafter be naturalized or ad-
mitted as a citizen of the United States who can not
speak the English language." Sec. 8.
And the law, in providing for the making and filing of
a petition for naturalization requires the applicant to
make such petition in writing "signed by the applicant
in his own handwriting." Sec. 4, par, 2.
This section contains a proviso, however, dispensing
with the requirement that the petitioner shall sign the
petition in his own handwriting in cases where the ap-
plicant has filed his declaration of intention before the
passage of the Act of June 29, 1906, the provision read-
ing: "Provided that if he has filed his declaration
before the passage of this Act, he shall not be required
to sign the petition in his own handwriting." Sec. 4, par. 2.
(B.) Exceptions.
There are also three exceptions to the provision of
the law declaring that no alien who can not speak Eng-
lish shall be naturalized:
(i) Where the alien is physically unable to comply
with the requirement.*
*If an alien is physically unable to speak, that fact should be stated
in his petition for naturalization in lieu of the statement, " I am able to
speak the English language." Nat. Reg., Oct. 2, 1906.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 113
(ii) Where the alien has before the passage of the Act
of June 29, 1906, declared his intention to become a citi-
zen of the United States in conformity with the law in
force at the date of making such declaration.*
(iii) In the case of aliens who shall hereafter declare
their intention to become citizens and who shall make
homestead entries upon the public lands of the United
States and comply in all respects with the laws provid-
ing for homestead entries on such lands. Sec. 8.
The text of the proviso is: "Provided, That this
requirement shall not apply to aliens who are physically
unable to comply therewith, if they are otherwise quali-
fied to become citizens of the United States: And pro-
vided further, That the requirements of this section
shall not apply to any alien who has prior to the passage
of this act declared his intention to become a citizen of
the United States in conformity with the law in force at
the date of making such declaration: Provided further,
That the requirements of section eight shall not apply
to aliens who shall hereafter declare their intention to
become citizens and who shall make homestead entries
upon the public lands of the United States and comply
in all respects with the laws providing for homestead
entries on such lands." Sec. 8, Act June 29, 1906.
(C.) Under Prior Law.
Under the provisions of Section 2165 of the Revised
Statutes repealed by the Act of June 29, 1906, there was
no requirement that the applicant should be able to
read or write. The law provided, however, that it should
appear to the satisfaction of the naturalizing court
that the applicant was " attached to the principles of
*Aliens who have made declarations of intention prior to September
27, 1906, under the provisions of law in force at the time of making such
declarations, can not be required, as a preliminary to filing their
petitions for naturalization, to file new declarations of intention under
the Act of June 29, 1906; nor are such aliens required, as a condition
precedent to naturalization, to speak the English language. Id.
5233—8
114 NATURALIZATION
the Constitution of the United States; " and required
him to declare on oath that he would support the
Constitution.
In the case of Re Kanaka Nian, 6 Utah, 259, which
arose under the provisions of Section 2165 of the Revised
Statutes, it was held that one who could not read or
write English but had read the Constitution in a foreign
language, and knew that the United States had a President
but could not mention his name, did not understand the
principles of the Government of the United States
or its institutions sufficiently to become a citizen. See,
also, In re Bodek, 63 Fed. 813; Rushworth v. Judges, 58
N. J. L. 97; In re Conway, 9 Misc. 652; In re Lab's
Petition, 3 Pa. Dist. R. 728; 5 Id. 597; 18 Pa. Co. Ct. 270.
But in the case of Re Rodriguez, 81 Fed. 337, it was
held that an alien who was ignorant and unable to read
and write and who could not explain the principles of
the Constitution was entitled to be naturalized, it ap-
pearing that he was peaceable, industrious, of a good
moral character, and law abiding. See, also, Ex parte
Johnson, 79 Miss. 637.
c. Moral Character.
(A.) In General.
The law (Act of June 29, 1906) provides that " it shall
be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court ad-
mitting any alien to citizenship that he has resided con-
tinuously within the United States five years at least
. . . and that, during that time, he has behaved as
a man of good moral character, attached to the princi-
ples of the Constitution of the United States, and well
disposed to the good order and happinesss of the same."
Sec. 4, par, 4.
Our law contemplates the naturalization of aliens of
good moral character only. As was well stated in the case
of In re Clark, 18 Barb. 444:
"It was never intended by those who enacted the act for
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 115
the naturalization of aliens that persons who had been
transported for crime — that those who came over here
merely because Europe was too full for them — but who
retained their loyalty of feeling for the monarchies they
had left, should, because they remained here for the
period of five years, be entitled to admission to citizen-
ship. The intention was to permit those who came here
from abroad seeking a permanent home, who, by five
years of continuous residence, manifested that intention,
and by good behavior during all that time and an attach-
ment to republican principles — a good behavior and an
attachment to republican principles, which could be
proved to the satisfaction of a court — had shown them-
selves worthy recipients of the benefits to be derived
from citizenship, and safe depositories of the powers it
confers, to be admitted to these rights and the exercise
of these powers, by an order entered in open court after
an examination into the facts of each case — and a judi-
cial decision upon the application — an examination which
should be conducted with the same care, and a decision
which should be made with the same deliberation and
solemnity as that which should accompany every other
judicial act."
(B.) What Acts are Immoral.
As to what acts are immoral within the meaning of the
law, it was held in the case of Re Spenser, 5 Sawyer, 195,
which arose when Section 2165 of the Revised Statutes
was in force containing identically the same language on
the subject as the existing law, that an alien who has
been guilty of murder, robbery, theft, bribery, or perjury
is barred from admission to citizenship.
An alien who lives in a state of polygamy or believes
that polygamy may be rightfully practiced in defiance
to the laws of the country to the contrary is not entitled
to citizenship. Ex parte Douglass, and Ex parte Sand-
burg, 5 West. Jur. 171.
116 NATURALIZATION
It has also been held that habitual gaming or selling
of liquors, when forbidden by statute, would be a bar to
admission. Re Spenser, supra. The court said that:
"Upon general principles it would seem that whatever
is forbidden by the law of the land ought to be consid-
ered for the time being immoral within the purview of
this statute. And it may be said with good reason that
a person who violates the law thereby manifests, in a
greater or less degree, that he is not 'well disposed to the
good order and happiness' of the country. Good be-
havior — that behavior for which a person reasonably
suspected of an intention to misbehave may be required
to give surety — is defined to be conduct authorized by
law, and bad behavior such as the law punishes."
In this case the applicant had been convicted of per-
jury before making his application, but had been par-
doned. It was contended that the pardon wiped out the
offense and that he was eligible to naturalization just as
if the offense had never been committed. But the court
declared that, while the pardon operated to purge the
offender of his guilt and that thenceforth he was an inno-
cent man, it did not obliterate the past, nor the fact
that he had committed the crime wiped out. The effect
of the decision was that an alien convicted of perjury
while residing here though pardoned is not "of good
moral character," entitled to admission to citizenship;
and that an alien who has behaved as a man of good
moral character during the five years immediately pre-
ceding his application, but who had not so behaved dur-
ing his residence in the United States prior thereto is
not entitled to admission.
(C.) Anarchists; Polygamists.
Section 7 of the Act of June 29, 1906, provides:
"That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed
to organized government, or who is a member of or
affiliated with any organization entertaining and teach-
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 117
ing such disbelief in or opposition to organized govern-
ment, or who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity,
or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any
officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of
officers generally, of the Government of the United States,
or of any other organized government, because of his or
their official character, or who is a polygamist, shall be
naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States."
While the law in force prior to the date of the passage
of the Act of 1906, contains no express provision in rela-
tion to anarchists, in Ex parte Sauer, 81 Fed. 355, where
the applicant declared himself to be a socialist and a be-
liever in the doctrines of socialism, the court decided
that he was not entitled to become a citizen of the United
States. In the course of the opinion the court said:
"Thereupon I stated that, in the judgment of the court,
the principles of socialism are directly at war with and
antagonistical to the principles of the Constitution of the
United States of America and absolutely inconsistent
with his being 'well disposed to the good order and hap-
piness' of the people and government of this country.
I then asked him to state some of its leading principles.
He replied that they contemplated the ownership and
operation of all railroads and transportation lines of the
country by the Government, and that, as land was as free
as air and water, socialists demanded the forced sale of
all lands owned by the citizens in excess of that which
was actually necessary to make a living upon (estimated
by him at 200 acres) to the government for the purpose
of giving it to those who owned none. I sought to point
out to him how such ideas were un-American, impracti-
cable, and dangerous in the extreme to society as or-
ganized throughout the civilized world, and particularly
in this free country. I furthermore explained to him
that private property could not, under the Constitution,
be taken by the government for private use, and that
118 NATURALIZATION
this was a fundamental principle of the government, and
one of the most sacred and jealously guarded rights of
the citizen. He repelled these suggestions with deris-
ion and scorn, maintaining his right to his views. I in-
formed him that while it was true that he or any nat-
uralized citii^en had an indisputable right to such senti-
ments and to their free utterance, as well as to any other
views they might entertain upon government, yet when
a foreigner openly confesses to have such opinions, and,
declaring his intentions to promulgate and carry them
out, seeks to be admitted to American citizenship, it
would be contrary to his oath of naturalization and vio-
lative of the spirit and principles on which this govern-
ment is founded and depends for its welfare to admit him
to citizenship.
"For these reasons, and because I am of opinion that
the time is upon us when the safety and perpetuity of
our free institutions and of constitutional government in
the land, as well as the good order and happiness of the
people, demand that those who apply for the privilege,
honor, and distinction of becoming American citizens
should be free from doctrines which are not only sub-
versive of constitutional government and our free insti-
tutions, but of organized society itself, have I deemed it
wise and meet to deny the application of Richard V.
Sauer, while he harbors such views, to become a citizen
of the United States of America."
(D.) Proof of Moral Character.
The good moral character of the applicant is to be
proved (1) by the oath of the applicant; (2) by the tes-
timony of at least two witnesses, citizens of the United
States.
Section 4, paragraph 2, of the Act of June 29, 1906,
providing for the verification of the applicant's petition
for naturalization by the affidavits of at least two cred-
ible witnesses, citizens of the United States, who shall
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 119
state in their affidavits that they have personally known
the applicant to be a resident of the United States for a
period of at least five years, and of the state, territory,
or district for a period of at least one year, provides also
that they shall state in their affidavits "that they each
have personal knowledge that the petitioner is a person
of good moral character, and that he is in every way
qualified in their opinion to be admitted as a citizen of
the United States."
And paragraph 4 of the same section, providing that
"it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the
court " that the applicant for naturalization has behaved
as a man of good moral character during his residence in
the United States and the state, territory, or district for
the period prescribed by the statute, also provides that
"in addition to the oath of the applicant the testimony
of at least two witnesses, citizens of the United States,
as to the facts of . . . moral character and attach-
ment to the principles of the Constitution, shall be re-
quired; " and the name, place of residence, and occupa-
tion of each witness shall be set forth in the record.
To recapitulate: The applicant is required to verify
his petition for naturalization by the affidavits of at least
two witnesses, stating that they each have personal
knowledge that he is a person of good moral character;
and at the final hearing the petitioner is examined under
oath, and, in addition, the testimony of at least two wit-
nesses is required as to his moral character.
The law (Sec. 9) provides that upon the final hearing
"the applicant and his witnesses shall be examined under
oath before the court and in the presence of the court."
5. Final Hearing,
a. Time of.
Final action on petitions for naturalization shall be
had only on stated days, to be fixed by rule of the court.
In no case shall final action be had upon a petition until
120 NATURALIZATION
at least ninety days have elapsed after filing and posting
of notice of such petition. Sec. 6, Act of June 29, 1906.
The Act further provides that "no person shall be
naturalized, nor shall any certificate of naturalization be
issued by any court within thirty days preceding the
holding of any general election within its territorial jur-
isdiction. Id.
b. Place.
Every final hearing upon petition for naturalization
shall be had in open court before a judge or judges thereof.
Sec. 9.
c. Procedure.
(A.) Appearance and Examination of Applicant and Wit-
nesses.
Upon the day fixed for final hearing the applicant and
his witnesses shall appear before the court and be ex-
amined under oath in the presence of the court. Sec. 9.
The language of the law is " upon such final hearing of
such petition the applicant and witnesses shall be ex-
amined under oath before the court and in the presence
of the court."
In case the witnesses which the applicant when filing
his petition for naturalization has named to be summoned
in his behalf at the final hearing can not be produced
upon the final hearing, other witnesses may be sum-
moned. Sec. 5.
(B.) Appearance of United States.
The United States shall have the right to appear be-
fore any court exercising jurisdiction in naturalization
proceedings for the purpose of cross-examining the
petitioner and the witnesses produced in support of his
petition concerning any matter touching or affecting his
right to admission to citizenship, and shall have the
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 121
right to call witnesses, produce evidence, and be heard
in opposition to the granting of any petition in
naturalization proceedings. Sec. 11.
(C.) Proof of Residence and Behavior as Man of Good
Moral Character.
The law provides that certain facts "shall be made to
appear to the satisfaction of the court," viz: (1) That,
immediately preceding the date of his application, the
alien has resided continuously within the United States
five years at least, and within the state or territory
where the court is held one year. (2) That he has be-
haved as a man of good moral character, attached to the
principles of the Constitution of the United States, well
disposed to the good order and happiness of the same.
These matters are to be proved (1) by the oath of the
applicant, (2) by the testimony of at least two witnesses,
citizens of the United States. Sec. 4, par. 4.
(D.) Renunciation of Foreign Allegiance,
(i.) In General.
The applicant is also required, before he is admitted
to citizenship, to "declare on oath in open court that he
. . . absolutely and entirely renounces and abjures
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, poten-
tate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly by name to the
prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of which he was
before a citizen or subject." Sec. 4, par. 3.
To preclude errors in the name or title of the sovereign
or state whose allegiance is renounced, the Bureau of
Naturalization furnishes clerks of courts with a list of
foreign countries and their rulers. See Appendix.
In Ex parte Smith, 8 Blackf. 395, where, in the oath of
122 NATURALIZATION
renunciation, the sovereign was not specified by name,
the omission was held not to be fatal.
(ii.) Filipinos and Porto Ricans.
Under the judicial interpretation of the law in force
prior to the Act of June 29, 1906 (Gonzales v. Williams,
192 U. S. 1), citizens of the Philippine Islands and Porto
Rico were debarred from citizenship of the United States,
as they were not aliens, and the naturalization laws of
the United States only applied to aliens. To remedy
this situation the Act of June 29, 1906 (Sec. 30), pro-
vides:
"That all the applicable provisions of the naturalization
laws of the United States shall apply to and be held to
authorize the admission to citizenship of all persons not
citizens who owe permanent allegiance to the United
States, and who may become residents of any state or
organized territory of the United States, with the fol-
lowing modifications: The applicant shall not be re-
quired to renounce allegiance to any foreign sovereignty;
he shall make his declaration of intention to become a
citizen of the United States at least two years prior to
his admission; and residence within the jurisdiction of
the United States, owing such permanent allegiance,
shall be regarded as residence within the United States
within the meaning of the five years' residence clause of
the existing law."
As citizens of the Philippines and Porto Rico owe al-
legiance to the United States, they are not required to
renounce former allegiance.
(E.) Renunciation of Title or Order of Nobility.
In case the alien has borne any hereditary title, or has
been of any of the orders of nobility in the kingdom or
state from which he came, he is required to make an ex-
press renunciation of his title or order of nobility in the
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 123
court to which his application is made, and his renunci-
ation shall be recorded in the court. Sec. 4, par. 5.
(F.) Oath of Allegiance to the United States.
Before the applicant is admitted to citizenship "he
shall declare on oath in open court that he will support
the Constitution of the United States, . . . and that
he will support and defend the Constitution and laws
of the United States against all enemies, foreign, and
domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same."
Sec. 4, par. 3.
The applicant for admission to citizenship must be
acquainted with the provisions of the Federal Constitu-
tion and in sympathy with its principles, otherwise he
can not intelligently and truthfully declare that he will
support it. Evans' American Citizenship, 27.
Where it appears, upon examination, that an applicant
for naturalization is without such knowledge of the Con-
stitution as is essential to the rational assumption of an
undertaking avouched by oath to support it, his oath to
support the Constitution should not be accepted, nor
should the court admit an alien to citizenship without
being satisfied that he has at least some general com-
prehension of what the Constitution is, and of the prin-
ciples which it affirms. Re Bodek, 63 Fed. 813.
One who can not read or write English, but has read
the Constitution in a foreign language, and knows that
the United States has a President, but can not mention
his name, does not understand the principles of the
Government of the United States or its institutions suf-
ficiently to become a citizen. Re Kanaka Nian, 6 Utah,
259, 4 L. R. A. 726, 21 Pac. 993.
But in the case of Re Rodriguez, 81 Fed. 337, the
United States Circuit Court held that an alien who was
ignorant and unable to read and write, and who could
124 NATURALIZATION
not explain the principles of the Constitution, was enti-
tled to be naturalized, where it was shown that he was
peaceable, industrious, of a good moral character, and
law-abiding.
(G.) Change of Name.
At the time and as a part of the naturalization of any
alien it shall be lawful for the court in its discretion
upon the petition of such alien to make a decree chang-
ing his name, and his certificate of naturalization shall
be issued to him in accordance therewith. Sec. 6.*
Prior to the passage of the law of 1906, it was held
in In re Nigri, 32 Misc. 392, 66 N. Y. S. 182, that a person
who obtains a legal change of name was not entitled to
have his certificate or record of naturalization changed
accordingly.
Where the name is misstated in the certificate the true
name may be proved by parol. Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz,
135 111. 591.
Every final order which may be made upon the peti-
tion for naturalization shall be under the hand of the
court and entered in full upon a record kept for that
purpose.
6. Certificate.
(a.) In General.
Prior to the enactment of the Law of June 29, 1906, no
form of naturalization certificate was prescribed by law
and there was great variety in the certificates issued.
Some were long with a full recital. Others were short,
with a bare statement that the holder was admitted to
* In every case in which the name of a naturalized alien is changed by
order of court, as provided in Section 6, the clerks of courts are required
to report to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, when trans-
mitting to it the duplicate of the certificate of naturalization of the alien
whose name is changed, both the original and the new name of the said
person. Nat. Reg. of Oct. 2, 1906.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 125
citizenship on a certain day. The certificates contained
no description of the person naturalized, and were, in
consequence, readily transferable. They were printed
from type on ordinary paper, and it was easy to manu-
facture spurious certificates.
(b.) Certificates Under the Act of March 3, 1903.
The Act of March 3, 1903, 32 Stat, at L. 1222, in its
39th section, known as the "anarchist clause," provided
that in order to render a naturalization certificate valid
the naturalizing court should cause to be entered of
record the affidavit of the applicant and his witnesses, so
far as applicable, reciting and affirming a compliance with
the terms of that act and previous acts relating to
naturalization, and that each final order and certificate
thereafter made should show on the face thereof that
the aflBdavits required of the applicant and his witnesses
were duly made and recorded.
Many courts, through ignorance of the provisions of
the Act, or for other reason, issued invalid certificates of
naturalization. Thousands of such invalid certificates
were issued — and many were issued to persons entitled
to receive valid certificates. To remedy this injustice,
on the same day the Act of June 29, 1906, establish-
ing a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, and pro-
viding for a uniform rule for the naturalization of aliens,
was passed, which repealed Section 39 of the Act of
March 3, 1903, the following law was passed:
"Naturalization certificates issued after the Act ap-
proved March third, nineteen hundred and three, entitled
'An Act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the
United States,' went into effect, which fail to show that
the courts issuing said certificates complied with the re-
quirements of section thirty-nine of said Act, but which
were otherwise lawfully issued, are hereby declared to be
126 NATURALIZATION
as valid as though said certificates complied with said sec-
tion: Provided, That in all such cases applications shall
be made for new naturalization certificates, and when the
same are granted, upon compliance with the provisions of
said Act of nineteen hundred and three, they shall relate
back to the defective certificates, and citizenship shall
be deemed to have been perfected at the date of the de-
fective certificate.
"Section 2. That all the records relating to naturaliza-
tion, all declarations of intention to become citizens of the
United States, and all certificates of naturalization filed,
recorded, or issued prior to the time when this Act takes
effect in or from the criminal court of Cook County,
Illinois, shall for all purposes be deemed to be and to have
been made, filed, recorded, or issued by a court with
jurisdiction to naturalize aliens, but shall not be by this
Act further validated or legalized." Act of June 29, 1906.
(c.) Under the Act of June 29, 1906.
The Act of 1906, makes it the duty of the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor to cause to be engraved on dis-
tinctive paper blank certificates of citizenship (Sec. 17),
to be furnished clerks of courts having jurisdiction in
naturalization matters. Sec. 12, par. 3. All blank cer-
tificates are consecutively numbered, and clerks are re-
quired to account for them to the Bureau of Naturali-
zation.
(d.) Form.
The Act prescribes the form of certificates as follows:
CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION.
Number
Petition, volume , page
Stub, volume , page
(Signature of holder)
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 127
Description of holder: Age ; height ; color
; complexion ; color of eyes ; color of
hair ; visible distinguishing marks Name,
age, and place of residence of wife , ,
Names, ages, and places of residence of minor children
, ss :
Be it remembered, that at a term of the
court of , held at on the day of ,
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and ,
, who previous to his (her) naturalization was
a citizen or subject of , at present residing at
number street city (town) state
(territory or district), having applied to be admitted a
citizen of the United States of America pursuant to law,
and the court having found that the petitioner had re-
sided continuously within the United States 'for at least
five years and in this State for one year immediately pre-
ceding the date of the hearing of his (her) petition, and
that said petitioner intends to reside permanently in the
United States, had in all respects complied with the law
in relation thereto, and that ...he was entitled to be so
admitted, it was thereupon ordered by the said court
that ...he be admitted as a citizen of the United States of
America.
In testimony whereof the seal of said court is here-
unto affixed on the... day of , in the year of our
Lord nineteen hundred and , and of our independ-
ence the
[L. S.] ,
(Official character of attestor.)
It will be noticed that the certificate includes a per-
sonal description of the holder, and he is required to
sign his name on the face of the certificate. This pre-
cludes false personation.
128 NATURALIZATION
The prescribed form is brief and simple, as well as com-
prehensive. It attests that the person therein named
and described, having made application pursuant to law,
and the court having found that he had complied in all
respects with the law in relation to naturalization and
was entitled to be naturalized, it was ordered by the
court that he be admitted as a citizen.
The seal of the court is affixed to the certificate.
Each certificate of naturalization shall bear upon its
face in a place prepared therefor the volume number and
page number of the petition whereon such certificate was
issued, and the volume number and the stub number
of such certificate. Sec. 14.
(e.) Duplicate of Certificate.
It is made the duty of the clerk of every court exer-
cising jurisdiction in naturalization matters under the
Act of 1906 to send to the Bureau of Naturalization at
Washington within thirty days after the issuance of a
certificate of citizenship a duplicate of such certificate.
Sec. 12.
(f.) Stub.
The Act also requires the clerk to make and keep on
file in his office a stub for each certificate issued by him
whereon shall be entered a memorandum of all the essen-
tial facts set forth in such certificate. Sec. 12.
The prescribed form of the stub of certificate is as
follows:
STUB OF CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION.
No. of certificate,
Name, ; age,
Declaration of intention, volume , page
Petition, volume , page
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 129
Name, age, and place of residence of wife, ^
, Names, ages, and places of residence of
minor children, , , ; , ^
Date of order, volume , page,
(Signature of holder) ....
(g.) Blank Certificates.
Section 12 of the Act provides that:
"Clerks of courts having and exercising jurisdiction in
naturalization matters shall be responsible for all blank
certificates of citizenship received by them from time to
time from the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
and shall account for the same to the said Bureau when-
ever required so to do by such Bureau. No certificate of
citizenship received by any such clerk which may be de-
faced or injured in such manner as to prevent its use as
herein provided shall in any case be destroyed, but such
certificate shall be returned to the said Bureau; and in
case any such clerk shall fail to return or properly ac-
count for any certificate furnished by the said Bureau,
as herein provided, he shall be liable to the United
States in the sum of fifty dollars, to be recovered in an
action of debt, for each and every certificate not prop-
erly accounted for or returned."
(h.) Proof of Naturalization.
(i.) The Record.
The judicial record, or a certified copy thereof, is the
usual evidence of naturalization. Naturalization can be
proved by parol only when the record has been lost or
destroyed. Green v. Salas, 31 Fed. 106. In this case the
court said that it found nowhere a departure from the
5233—9
130 NATURALIZATION
rule that "the record must be produced or accounted
for."
This rule applies to a woman who alleges citizenship
through the naturalization of her husband. Belcher v.
JFarren, 26 Pac. 791.
The mere certificate of the clerk of the court, stating
that the applicant had been naturalized, is not compe-
tent proof. Green v. Salas, supra.
A passport issued by the Department of State is not
competent judicial proof of citizenship. In re Gee Hop,
71 Fed. 274.
Where the name of a person is misstated in a certifi-
cate of naturalization, the true name may be proved by
parol. Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz, 135 111. 591.
It was held in In re McCoppin, 5 Sawyer, 630, that an
inaccurate statement of facts in the recital of a judgment
of naturalization did not impair the judgment where it
appeared that the conditions of law had been fulfilled.
See, also, In re Coleman, 15 Blatch. 406.
In Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135, the United States
Supreme Court held that "where no record of naturaliza-
tion can be produced, evidence that a person having the
requisite qualifications to become a citizen did in fact
and for a long time vote and hold office and exercise
rights belonging to citizens, is sufficient to warrant a
jury in inferring that he had been duly naturalized as a
citizen."
In the absence of a record, a jury may be allowed to
infer that a person having the requisite qualifications to
become a citizen had been fully naturalized. Contzen
V. United States, 179 U. S. 191.
Evidence that a man had lived in the United States
for forty years, that he had voted for twenty-five years,
and that a person of his name had been naturalized, is
sufficient to show that he was a naturalized citizen.
Ryan vs. Egan, 156 111., 224.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 131
Where it appeared that an alien was residing in South
Carolina on July 4, 1776; that he fought as a Whig officer
during the Revolution; that he acquired and sold real
estate; that he was always reputed as a citizen, and that
his children born in France while he and his wife were
there had always claimed to be American citizens, it was
held that he and his children were citizens of the United
States. Sasportas v. De La Motta, 10 Rich. Eq. 38;
People V. McNally, 59 How. Pr. 500.
Where an alien came to the United States in 1865 and
lived here until his death in 1899, having participated in
state and national elections, and held at his death a
liquor tax certificate which could be issued lawfully only
to a citizen, it was held that this was sufficient to show
that he had been in fact naturalized and was a citizen at
his death. Fay v. Taylor, 63 N. Y. S. 572, 31 Misc. Rep.
32.
Where it is alleged that a record of naturalization has
been lost or destroyed, the Department of State leaves
it to the courts to hear the evidence of such loss and
remedy it. Secretary Bayard, Feb. 2, 1887, 3 Moore's
Int. Law Digest, 498.
The proper course for a person seeking to establish
his naturalization by other than ordinary proofs is to
resort to the judicial branch of the government, which is
charged with the duty of naturalizing aliens, and which
is invested with appropriate powers for investigating
and determining matters of fact which are essential to
the decision of the question of acquired citizenship.
Secretary Blaine, May 9, 1889, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest,
498.
Record evidence of naturalization of the fathers (of the
applicants for protection) is, of course, the best evidence
but it is not the only evidence. If it can be proved " by
the testimony of witnesses who know the fact that their
fathers were naturalized, such evidence will be received
132 NATURALIZATION
and considered." Secretary Olney, April 14, 1896; 3 Moore's
Int. Law Digest, 499.
The record may be amended nunc pro tunc. In re
Christern, 11 Jones & S. 523.
It has been held that the record of the declaration of
intention may be amended to include omissions even
after a proceeding to impeach the record has been
begun. State v. McDonald, 24 Minn. 48.
The record can not be amended, however, where it
does not show that the necessary proceedings were taken
under the naturalization law. Matter of Desty, 8 Abb.
(N. Y.), N. Cas. 250; Green v. Salas, 31 Fed. 106.
In Gagnon v. United States, 193 U. S. 451, where a
judgment of naturalization was entered by way of
amendment of the record 7iunc pro tunc thirty-three
years after judgment was alleged to have been rendered,
there being no entry or memorandum of any kind of the
alleged original decree, it was held that the order was
invalid, the power to amend not involving the power to
create.
(ii.) Where Records Have Been Lost or Destroyed.
Where a record has been lost or destroyed, or where it
can not be produced owing to lapse of time or death of
the person naturalized, secondary evidence is admissible
to prove naturalization. Strickley v. Hill, 22 Utah, 257;
People V. McNally, 59 How. Pr. 500; Hogan v. Kurtz, 94
U. S. 773; Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 111. 141.
Applications for the issuance of declarations of inten-
tion, or certificates of naturalization, in lieu of declarations
of intention or certificates of naturalization claimed to
have been lost or destroyed, shall be made under oath to
the clerk of the court by which any such declarations of
intention or certificates of naturalization were originally
issued, and shall contain full information in regard to
the lost or destroyed papers, and as to the time, place,
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 133
and circumstances of such alleged loss or destruction.
The clerk shall forward to the Bureau of Immigration
and Naturalization the above-mentioned applications,
together with such information as he may have bearing
upon the merits thereof, for investigation, and no such
paper so applied for shall be issued until the Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization (Division of Naturaliza-
tion) reports the results of its investigation as to the
merits of the application. Nat. Reg. of Oct. 2, 1906.
In every case in which the clerk of a court issues, in
accordance with the preceding rule, a declaration of in-
tention (Form 2203) or a certificate of naturalization
(Form 2207), upon proof of the loss or destruction of
the original, he shall make an entry on the original
declaration, or on the stub of the original certificate of
naturalization, as the case may require, showing the issu-
ance of a new paper and the number thereof, and shall
immediately thereafter forward to the Bureau of Immi-
gration and Naturalization (Division of Naturalization)
the duplicate of any such paper so issued. Nat. Reg. of
Oct. 2, 1906.
(iii.) Certificate of Naturalization.
Some courts have held that a certificate of naturaliza-
tion is legal evidence of the naturalization of a person.
Vaux V. Nesbit, 1 McCord Ch. 352; People v. Pease, 30
Barb. 588; Brown v. Shilling, 9 Md. 74.
Other courts have held that the certificate in particu-
lar cases was insufficient evidence of naturalization. See
Miller v. Reinhart, 18 Ga. 239, and cases cited.
In Green v. Salas, 31 Fed. 106, it was held that a mere
certificate of the clerk of the court, stating that the ap-
plicant had been naturalized, is not competent proof,
and can not be aided by parol evidence.
Certified copies of all papers, documents, certificates,
and records required to be used, filed, recorded, or kept
134 NATURALIZATION
under any of the provisions of the Act of June 29, 1906,
shall be admitted in evidence equally with the originals
in any proceedings under the Act and in all cases in
which the originals thereof might be admissible as evi-
dence. Sec. 28.
The statements of diplomatic and consular officers of
the United States, duly certified, required by Section 15,
paragraph 2, of the Act, to be furnished from time to time
to the Department of Justice, through the Department of
State, in relation to aliens who shall have secured cer-
tificates of citizenship under the provisions of that Act,
and who shall within five years after the issuance of such
certificates, return to the country of their nativity, and
take permanent residence therein, shall be admissible in
evidence in all courts in proceedings to cancel certifi-
cates of citizenship.
i. Naturalization Not Retroactive.
The decree of naturalization does not operate retro-
actively. Ex parte Kyle, 67 Fed. 306; Dryden v. Swin-
burne, 20 W. Va. 89; State v. Boyd, 48 N. W. 739. See
3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 423 et seq.
I. Impeachment of Naturalization.
1. Before Municipal Courts.
A decree of naturalization can not be impeached col-
laterally. Spratt V. Spratt, 4 Pet. 392; Campbell v.
Gordon, 6 Cranch, 175.
A judgment of naturalization rendered by a compe-
tent court is conclusive as between the person natural-
ized and private individuals.*
*A private individual has no standing in court to institute a proceed-
ing to set aside an order admitting an alien to citizenship. Re McCarran,
8 Misc. 482, 23 L. R. A. 835; United States v. Norsch, 42 Fed. 417;
United States v. Gleason, 73 Fed. 396; Pintsch Compressing Company v.
Bergin, 84 Fed. 140. In the latter case the court said: "The record thus
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 135
a. Under Act of 1906.
It is not conclusive upon the United States, however.
The existing law (Act of June 29, 1906) specifically pro-
vides for the appearance of the United States in opposi-
tion to the admission of an applicant to naturalization
(Sec. 11) and for the institution of proceedings by the
United States district attorney for setting aside or can-
celing the certificate of citizenship on the ground of fraud
or that it was illegally procured. Sec. 15.
Reports of Fraudulent Naturalization.
The second paragraph of Section 15 of the Act pro-
vides for the cooperation of American diplomatic and
ordered on the application of the respondent evidenced a solemn judicial
judgment that she was entitled to receive and did thereby receive from
the United States the franchise of citizenship. Is anyone entitled to pro-
ceed for its rescission unless the United States themselves, or by their
authorization ? No precedent, no text writer, and no rule of law is cited
which justifies us in answering this question aflSrmatively. The funda-
mental principle that, in the absence of a statute of authorization, only
the United States can proceed judicially to recall or rescind franchises
granted by them, has peculiar force with reference to citizenship, as to
which so great a variety of interests, political and individual of high im-
portance is concerned, that the jurisdiction of inquiry should be espe-
cially fixed and limited."
In Scott V. Strobach, 49 Ala. 477, it was held that a certificate of natu-
ralization valid on its face could not be impeached collaterally on the
ground of fraud and false recitals; and it has been held that naturaliza-
tion proceedings can not be impeached for a false oath which is extra-
judicial. United States v. Grottkau, 30 Fed. 672.
Naturalization has been impeached where defects in the naturalization
proceedings were shown on the face of the record (Banks v. Walker), 3
Barb. Ch. 438); and for improper vouching (Commonwealth v. Paper, 1
Brewster, 263).
In re Yamashita (Wash.), 59 L. R. A. 671, however, where a Japanese
was denied admission as an attorney at law (although he had a certificate
of naturalization) on the ground that he was not a citizen of the United
States, the court held that the judgment admitting him to citizenship
could be collaterally attacked because it showed on its face that Yama-
shita was of the Japanese race and not entitled to citizenship.
Certificates of naturalization granted to Chinese against the prohibi-
tion of the Act of 1882 have been treated as void. In re Gee Hop, 71
Fed. 274; In re Hong Yen Chang, 84 Cal. 163; 21 Ops. Atty. Gen. 581.
136 NATURALIZATION
consular officers in the detection and prosecution of
naturalization frauds. The provisions of this paragraph
have been called to their attention by a circular instruc-
tion from the Department of State, dated April 19, 1907,
which reads as follows:
''To the Diplomatic and Consular Officers of the United
States.
"Gentlemen: Under the provisions of the executive
order of April 6, 1907, the following paragraph is added
to the diplomatic instructions and consular regulations
after paragraph 170:
"'Reports of Fraudulent Naturalization. — When any
alien who has secured naturalization of the United
States shall proceed abroad within five years after his
naturalization and shall take up his permanent residence
in any foreign country within five years after the date
of his naturalization, it shall be deemed prima facie evi-
dence that he did not intend in good faith to become a
citizen of the United States when he applied for natural-
ization, and in the absence of countervailing evidence
it shall be sufficient in the proper proceedings to author-
ize the cancellation of his certificate of citizenship as
fraudulent. Diplomatic and consular officers shall fur-
nish the Department of State, to be transmitted to the
Department of Justice, the names of those within their
jurisdictions, respectivel3% who are subject to the pro-
visions of this requirement, and such statements from
diplomatic and consular officers shall be certified to by
such officers under their official seals, and are under the
law admissible in evidence in all courts to cancel certifi-
cates of naturalization.' Act of June 29, 1906, Sec. 15.
"The text of the law upon which this paragraph is based
is appended to this instruction.*
"You are instructed, accordingly, that whenever a
* For the text of the Act of June 29, 1906, see Appendix, Laws of the
United States, relating to Naturalization and Expatriation.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 137
naturalized citizen goes abroad and takes up a perma-
nent residence in a foreign country within five years
after his naturalization, it may be assumed that his
naturalization was not obtained in good faith, and upon
certification by a diplomatic or consular officer of the
fact of the foreign residence proceedings may be taken
through the Department of Justice to set aside the
naturalization on the ground that it was obtained in con-
travention of the naturalization laws.
"Diplomatic and consular officers making such certifi-
cation, must, therefore, state:
" First, that the person is a permanent resident in a
foreign country; and
"Second, that the permanent residence was taken up
within five years after naturalization was conferred, and
must certify not only to the facts but to their means of
knowledge.
" No specified form of certification is prescribed, as the
circumstances surrounding each case vary materially. It
is not necessary that the residence shall have been
acquired during the incumbency of the certifying officer,
but he may, if he is in possession of sufficient evidence,
certify to a residence which was acquired prior to his
having had opportunity to have personal knowledge on
the subject.
"Certifications under this instruction should be sent
forthwith to this Department, together with the certifi-
cate of naturalization of the person in interest; and,
pending instructions from the Department, such person's
citizenship shall be considered as awaiting adjudication,
and he may be refused a passport or registration as a
citizen of the United States. In the event of actual in-
terposition being required in his behalf with the authori-
ties of a foreign country, the facts should, if possible,
be telegraphed to the Department and its instructions
awaited, and the foreign authorities should be requested
138 NATURALIZATION
to suspend any proceedings against the person in interest
until instructions from this Government shall have been
received.
"When a certification under this instruction is made by
a consul he should, at the same time that he sends the
certification to this Department, notify the embassy or
legation in the country in which his consulate is situated.
"I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,
Elihu Root."
Affidavit.
Before any United States attorney is authorized to in-
stitute proceedings for the cancellation of a naturaliza-
tion certificate, he must be furnished with a proper
affidavit on which the proceedings may be based. The
Attorney General to the Secretary of Commerce and La-
bor, March 26, 1907. This has been held to be necessary
in view of the text of paragraph one, Section 15 of the
law, which provides for the institution of such proceed-
ings "upon affidavit showing good cause therefor." It is
held to apply with equal force in cases where the infor-
mation is furnished by diplomatic or consular officers.
In such cases the officer of the Department of State whose
duty it is to examine and make proper disposition of
the reports concerning fraudulent naturalizations re-
ceived from the diplomatic and consular officers has been
designated as the proper person to make the affidavit.
This officer is the chief of the Passport Bureau. The
affidavit states that "the papers hereto appended are the
genuine documents received by" the Department of
State, "and they are forwarded to the Department of
Commerce and Labor to be used in proceedings to set
aside as unlawfully obtained the naturalization of" X. Y.
b. Under Prior Laws.
But before the passage of the law of 1906, it was held
that the United States could sue for the cancellation of
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 139
a decree of naturalization where it had been fraudulently
obtained. United States v. Norsch, 42 Fed. 417.
In Pintsch Compressing Co. v. Bergin, 84 Fed. 140,
where a woman had been admitted to citizenship, and
there was no irregularity or defect apparent on the face
of the record, while the court refused the petition of a
private party to cancel the decree at a subsequent term
on the ground that for the greater part of the two years
immediately preceding her admission she had been under
the disability of marriage, and held that this proposi-
tion involved mixed questions of law and fact, which
were presumably passed on by the court before it
admitted her to citizenship, the view was expressed that
only the United States, or some person acting by their
authorization, can institute proceedings to set aside a
judgment of naturalization.
In United States v. Kornmehl, 89 Fed. 10, where it
was made to appear to the court that the court issuing a
naturalization certificate had been deceived by material
false statements of the applicant as to his age and
length of residence in this country, the court directed
that the letters of naturalization be revoked as having
been improvidently issued. The proceedings in this case
were instituted by the immigration commissioners, in
behalf of the United States.
See, also, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 500.
But, in United States v. Gleason, 78 Fed. 396, the court
declined to cancel the certificate upon the ground that
it had been obtained by false representations. In refer-
ring to the case of U. S. v. Norsch, the court said:
"Thayer, J., in U.S. V. Norsch, 42 Fed. 417, . . . seems to
treat the liability of a judgment of naturalization to be
set aside for fraud, like a patent, as conceded, and to
have considered only the power of the courts of the
United States to set aside such judgments of state courts
and to intimate that the relief would be accomplished
140 NATURALIZATION
by setting aside the certificate or by injunction against
exercising the right. Such would seem to be the only
modes of relief, if any could be granted, for, technically,
no court not authorized by law to review a judgment
could directly set it aside. Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S.
80, 25 L. ed. 407. And a court of equity can affect a
judgment only by decree to prevent carrying it out or
enforcing it. 2 Story Eq. Sec. 885. The surrender of
the certificate, which is only evidence of the judgment,
would not affect the citizenship established by the judg-
ment; and an injunction which could only run against
further exercise of the rights of citizenship would not
affect past acts."
The court said that an attempt to carry out such a
decree against the defendant would produce great con-
fusion and mischief. "The defendant became," said the
court, "a citizen of the State of New York, as well as of
the United States. Other citizens became entitled to
vote for him for such offices as citizens could hold, as
well as he became entitled to vote, hold office, hold lands,
or do what else citizens can do. Neither the state, nor
any citizen of New York or of the United States, is a
party to this suit; nor do they hold their right to vote
for him or to have him hold office, under him, and no
decree against him here could affect their right."
Upon the question whether a judgment of naturaliza-
tion is conclusive upon a state, there has not been entire
unanimity of opinion. The Act of 1906 contains no pro-
vision relating to the matter. In Commonwealth v.
Paper, 1 Brewster, 263, while the court ordered the set-
ting aside of certain certificates of naturalization, it was
stated that this was done on the condition that the At-
torney-General of the state should appear in the case.
The court said: "One citizen can not impugn the action
of a court in naturalization cases so far as to require the
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 141
cancellation of naturalization papers. Some public au-
thority must do this; and I understood when this peti-
tion was handed up that the Attorney-General was to be
the official party to the proceeding."
In re Shaw, 2 Pa. Dist. C. 250, is to the same effect.
See, also. Re McCarran, 8 Misc. 482, and 16 App. Div. 311.
On the other hand, it was held in Peterson v. State, 89
S. W. 81, that a state can not impeach naturalization
proceedings.
2. International Practice.
a. Executive Department of Government.
(A.) Power to Treat Certificate as Invalid.
The Department of State possesses no power to vacate
decrees of naturalization; but it exercises, under the di-
rection of the President, plenary jurisdiction over the
conduct of foreign relations. In the exercise of this ju-
risdiction, the Department, as has often been held, will,
so far as any action of its own is concerned, treat as in-
valid a certificate of naturalization that has been im-
properly obtained. John Bassett Moore, 3 Moore's Int.
Law Digest, 501.
Secretary Hay in an instruction to the American
Minister to Ecuador, June 21, 1902, said: "As you are
aware, the Department's regulations require every
naturalized citizen when he applies for a passport to
make a sworn statement concerning his own or his
parents' immigration, residence, and naturalization; and
whenever the naturalization appears to have been im-
properly or improvidently granted it is not recognized
under the Department's rules. For. Rel. 1902, 389. See
also, Moore's Int. Law Digest, 501 et seq.
Recitations in the record of matters of fact are bind-
ing only upon parties to the proceedings and their
privies. The Government of the United States was no
party and stands in privity with no party to these pro-
142 NATURALIZATION
ceedings of naturalization. And it is not in the power
of Mr. Stern by erroneous recitations in ex parte pro-
ceedings to conclude the government as to matters of
fact. Case of Moses Stern, 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 376-
(B.) Right of Foreign Governments to Impeach American
Certificate of Naturalization Denied.
While the Department of State declines to recognize
the validity of a certificate of naturalization when it
appears that it was obtained by fraud or granted by
mistake, this government denies the right of a foreign
government to impeach a certificate of naturalization
issued by an American court. American Passport, 156.
It has been uniformly held by the Department of
State that while, on the application of a foreign govern-
ment, it will cause inquiries to be made as to whether a
judgment of naturalization was improvidently granted,
and while it will never permit itself to grant protection
based upon a naturalization decree which is shown to it to
be fraudulent, it will not recognize a foreign government's
right to impeach such decrees. When set up by it as a
basis of its action towards a foreign state, it can not
recognize the right of any foreign executive or court to
determine as to their validity. That determination must
be made, so far as concerns foreign governments, exclu-
sively by itself. Mr. Bayard to Mr. McLane, February 15,
1888, For. Rel. 1888, pt. 1, 511. See 3 Moore's Int. Law
Digest, 513, et seq.
b. International Claims Commissions.
(A.) In General.
It has been repeatedly held by international claims
commissions that certificates of naturalization may be
impeached in proceedings before such tribunals.
(B.) Spanish Claims Commission of 1871.
In a communication relating to the United States and
Spanish Claims Commission of 1871, Secretary Evarts
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 143
said that that Commission was "an independent judicial
tribunal possessed of all the powers and endowed with
all the properties which should distinguish a court of high
international jurisdiction, alike competent in the juris-
diction conferred upon it to bring under judgment the
decisions of the local courts of both nations and beyond
the competence of either government to interfere with,
direct, or obstruct its deliberations." 3 Moore's Interna-
tional Arbitrations, 2599.
(C.) Costa Rican Claims Commission of 1860.
The umpire, Bertinatti, in Medina's case, before the
United States and Costa Rican Commission of 1860, said:
"An act of naturalization, be it made by a judge ex
parte in the exercise of his voluntaria jurisdictio, or be it
the result of a decree of a king bearing an administrative
character; in either case its value, on the point of evi-
dence before an international commission, can only be
that of an element of proof, subject to be examined
according to the principle locus regit actum, both intrin-
sically and extrinsically, in order to be admitted or re-
jected according to the general principles in such a
matter. . . .
" The certificates exhibited by them (the claimants)
being made in due form, have for themselves the pre-
sumption of truth; but when it becomes evident that
the statements therein contained are incorrect, the pre-
sumption of truth must yield to truth itself." 3 Moore's
Arbitrations, 2587.
(D.) Venezuelan Claims Commission of 1903.
In the Flutie cases, which came before the United
States and Venezuelan Claims Commission of 1903, Mr.
Bainbridge, commissioner for the United States, in de-
livering the opinion of the Commission — an opinion re-
markable for its clearness and comprehensiveness, giving
144 NATURALIZATION
as it does an exhaustive rgsum^ of judicial decisions,
rulings of the executive, and adjudications of inter-
national tribunals — said:
" Whatever may be the conclusive force of judgments of
naturalization under the municipal laws of the country
in which they are granted, international tribunals, such
as this Commission, have claimed and exercised the right
to determine for themselves the citizenship of claimants
from all the facts presented."
In this case the Commission were convinced that the
claimant ''had not resided " in the United States for the
continued term of five years nor for any considerable
portion thereof prior to the date on which a naturaliza-
tion certificate was granted to him; that the facts neces-
sary to give the court jurisdiction did not exist, and
therefore that the certificate of naturalization was im-
properly granted. The claim was dismissed. Ralston's
Report, 38. See, also, numerous cases in which inter-
national claims commissions have declined to recognize
judgments of naturalization as conclusive, in 3 Moore's
International Arbitrations, 2583 to 2655.
(E.) Spanish Treaty Claims Commission (1905).
In the case of Rita L. Ruiz et al. v. The United
States, which came before the Spanish Treaty Claims
Commission, established pursuant to the treaty of 1898
between the United States and Spain, under the Act of
March 3, 1901,* the defendant, in its answer to the peti-
*The 7th Article of the Treaty reads as follows:
"The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for
indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Govern-
ment, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other Government, that
may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba
and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, includ-
ing all claims for indemnity for the cost of the v^'ar. The United States
-will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relin-
quished in this article."
It is provided in the first section of the organic Act that it shall be
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 145
tion of the plaintiffs, who claimed as the widow and
children of Ricardo Ruiz, asserted that the naturaliza-
tion of said Ricardo Ruiz, if obtained at all, was pro-
cured by false and fraudulent representations as to resi-
dence in the United States immediately preceding his
application, and by the procuring of an affidavit to the
same effect from a witness called by him, and that the
claimants ought not to maintain their action.
The claimants demurred to the answer on the ground
that the certificate of naturalization which defendant
sought to impeach was a judgment of a court having
competent jurisdiction and not subject to impeachment
or review by the Commission.
Upon the demurrer oral arguments were made and
briefs were filed, not only by counsel on both sides but
by numerous attorneys for other claimants before the
Commission.
As preliminary to the question of the conclusiveness
of the certificate of naturalization, counsel discussed at
great length the question as to whether the Commission
was a municipal court or an international tribunal, and
it was urged that the Commission was a court of the
United States and not an international tribunal, and
therefore that it must give full faith and credit to the
judgments of all other courts, state or Federal, and must
impute absolute verity and conclusiveness to a certifi-
cate of naturalization.
In passing on the preliminary question, the Commision
said: "In a strictly technical sense the Commission is a
national court, but in a broader sense is also international.
In a very unique sense it is intimately related to both.
the duty of the Commission and that " it shall have jurisdiction to re-
ceive, examine and adjudicate all claims of citizens of the United States
against Spain which the United States agreed to adjudicate and settle
by the 7th Article of the Treaty," . . . and that the Commission
"shall adjudicate said claims according to the merits of the several
cases, the principles of equity, and of international law."
5233—10
146 NATURALIZATION
If not distinctly incorporated into the Federal judiciary
system, it will not be denied that the organic Act (March
3, 1901) and the amendatory Act (June 30, 1902) confer
upon the Commission all the powers of a Federal court
necessary to the investigation and adjudication of the
claims arising under the treaty of December 10, 1898.
Being the creature of an Act of Congress, it is neces-
sarily domestic in origin, and, being constituted exclu-
sively of individuals of one nationality, it is certainly not
international in composition, and its decisions affect
only the government of its creation and composition.
Back of the Act of Congress which gave it life, however,
we find its conception in a treaty between two nations,
and thus it came into being as a domestic creature
stamped with the features of internationality.
"After a close study of the act and giving to its words
the broad interpretation which the generous motive be-
hind them authorizes, we find it impossible to separate
the domestic character of the Commission as derived
through its origin and composition from the international
character imposed upon it by the treaty, and the precise
words of the Act of Congress requiring the adjudication
of claims "according to the principles of international
law." Other domestic tribunals, such as prize courts, for
illustration, administer international law in the absence
of statutory mandate, because the nature of their busi-
ness requires them to apply the law of nations; but this
Commission is differentiated from all other municipal
courts in that it is a domestic judicial tribunal definitely
required, by the statute of its creation, to administer in-
ternational law wherever that law may be fairly applied.
The language of the statute, 'it shall adjudicate said
claims according to the merits of the several cases, the
principles of equity, and of international law,' is a
mandate to the Commission to apply the principles of
international law in a spirit of equity to the merits of
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 147
the cases whenever there are any such principles appli-
cable. The exact status of the Comnoiission, therefore,
in jurisprudence, whether domestic or international, is
by no means so important a question as the one of its
powers. What can it do, rather than what we may call
it, is the question of vital interest and consequence.
"If, by the act of its creation, admittedly domestic, it
is required to do the very things for which international
tribunals are established, it must be assumed that the
Commission, as an equity tribunal, will endeavor to ap-
ply the principles of international law to the several
cases as they arise. Relief can not be expected, therefore,
in a case that is without merits — the first essential stipu-
lation of the statute — and a case can not be meritorious
that is dishonest or founded upon fraud. A case may,
however, develop merits and yet this tribunal can not
rightly adjudicate the same, in the light of the treaty
and the Act of Congress, if it falls within the principles
of international law, without applying them just as a
mixed tribunal should do.
"Congress in its wisdom apprehended and unquestion-
ably appreciated the difficulties in the way of adjudicat-
ing the various classes of claims by a tribunal restricted
in its operation to the settled rules of law, and conse-
quently decided to clothe it with greater power and more
discretion than are properly exercised by the ordinary
courts of law. It was not alone because the Government
had solemnly assumed, but because it desired to pay all
the valid claims of its citizens against Spain, that Con-
gress created a tribunal with equitable powers so elastic
that no complexity of facts or circumstances could or
should prevent it from rendering such an award as the
merits of the claim, the principles of justice and of inter-
national law require. The purpose of Congress in enact-
ing this beneficial statute could not be better expressed
148 NATURALIZATION
than in the impressive words of Chief Justice Waite in
Freylinghuysen v. Key (110 U. S. 63):
" 'No technical rules of pleading, as applied in municipal
courts, ought ever to be allowed to stand in the way of
the national power to do what is right under all circum-
stances.'
"Finally, on the question as to the character of this
Commission, the argument that it is only a domestic tri-
bunal limited in some unexplained way in its powers as
compared with an international tribunal, because, under
certain conditions, the Supreme Court can review a case
pending before it, is not a conclusive proposition. It
will hardly be denied that the district courts of the
United States are domestic tribunals, and yet Mr. Jus-
tice Story, in the case of the Adeline (9 Cranch, 244),
speaking of district courts sitting as courts of prize,
said:
" ' In the prize courts, in an especial manner, the allega-
tions, the briefs, and the proceedings are in general
modeled upon the civil law, with such additions and
alterations as the practice of nations and the rights of
belligerents and neutrals inevitably impose. A court of
prize is emphatically a court of nations, and it takes
neither its character nor its rules from the mere munici-
pal regulations of any country.'
"It is no answer to say that this was spoken with ref-
erence to a prize court, because a district court of the
United States, when sitting in prize cases, is no less
domestic in its creation and composition than when sit-
ting in bankruptcy, and appeals lie to the Supreme Court
from a court of prize, which Justice Story says is 'em-
phatically a court of nations,' under precisely the same
conditions as from a court of bankruptcy. Here we see
the Supreme Court calling a purely municipal court a
'court of natio7is.'
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 149
" While we have never gone so far as to call this Com-
mission a 'court of nations,' it is quite clear that we
might do so, with the sanction of the Supreme Court,
without in any wise affecting its municipal character.
We have rather been inclined to adopt the view of the
Court of Claims, as so well expressed by Judge Weldon
in the case of The Ship Rose v. The United States (36 Ct.
CI. R. 290, 302). That was a case arising under the
Act of Congress of January 20, 1885, giving the Court of
Claims jurisdiction to ascertain the claims of American
citizens for spoliations committed by the French prior
to the 31st of July, 1801, wherein it was provided that
' they (the Court of Claims) shall decide upon the validity
of said claims according to the rules of law, municipal
and international, and the treaties of the United States
applicable to the same.' The able jurist in that case
said: 'This court in making the investigation contem-
plated by the act of our jurisdiction is sitting in the
chcwacter of an international trihunal.'
"Now, the act of this Commission's jurisdiction provides
that ' it shall adjudicate said claims (those provided for
by the treaty) according to the merits of the several
cases, the principles of equity and of international law,'
and the claims all arise out of alleged injury to the
persons and property of people claiming American citi-
zenship, by Spanish authorities and subjects, contrary
to their rights under international law. This Commission,
therefore, while in every essential a municipal judicial
body, in making the investigations and adjudications
'contemplated by the act of our jurisdiction is sitting
in the character of an international tribunal.' . . .
"It is the opinion of the Commission that the court
which issued the naturalization certificate to Ruiz is one
of competent jurisdiction; that its decision upon facts
' made to appear to the satisfaction of the court ' is con-
clusive that it exercised the jurisdiction conferred upon
150 NATURALIZATION
it by the statute, and its conclusion entered upon the
record, whether we call it an order, decision, or judg-
ment, is entitled to the same degree of faith and credit
generally accorded to the judgments of courts exercising
undisputed jurisdiction. But it remains to be consid-
ered whether such an order or judgment is conclusive
upon and precludes inquiry into the facts which were
made to appear to the satisfaction of the court render-
ing it, by another forum of competent jurisdiction to
hear and determine a cause in a proceeding wherein that
judgment is pleaded as a basis for equitable relief, and
the defense interposed is that the court was deceived by
false and fraudulent representations knowingly and in-
tentionally made by claimant to grant the certificate of
naturalization.
"In considering their conclusiveness upon this court we
will treat certificates of naturalization as judgments
entitled to have such faith and credit given to them as
by law or usage they have in the courts of the state
where rendered, subject to the principles of international
law, as applied by courts charged (as this one) with the
administration of the law of nations.
"Counsel for claimants contend broadly that a judg-
ment of naturalization is a judgment in rem, and for that
reason is conclusive upon all the world as to the facts
and things adjudged. Therefore, they argue, it is im-
material whether or not the judgment of naturalization
is, as to Spain (in whose shoes the United States now
stands), a foreign judgment, and that whether domestic or
foreign it is equally conclusive in this tribunal, irre-
spective of the question as to whether it is administer-
ing municipal or international law. Admitting, however,
that even a judgment in rem is not under all circum-
stances conclusive and may be collaterally attacked, not
only for want of jurisdiction in the court that rendered
it, but for some kinds of fraud, it is urged by claimants
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 151
that the fraud alleged in the case at bar is not of the
kind that would render the judgment subject to a col-
lateral attack, because the fraud charged is not extrinsic.
"Counsel for defendant deny that a certificate of natu-
ralization is a judgment in rem, contending that at best
it is only quasi in rem, but insist that in either aspect
the proceedings which 'made it appear to the satisfac-
tion of the court ' may be inquired into in a subsequent
action based upon that judgment when it is alleged that
it was procured by fraud.
"Why counsel should distinguish a judgment of natu-
ralization from a judgment in rem, and call it a judg-
ment quasi in rem, does not clearly appear, for it is not
pointed out in what respects the legal consequences of
the one differ from the other. Being like a judgment in
rem, similar attributes and consequences necessarily fol-
low.
"Where fraud, in its procurement, is the defense against
the conclusiveness of a judgment, we fail to discover any
difference between a judgment in personam and a judg-
ment in rem. The same is true if want of jurisdiction is the
defense. These, however, are the only defenses that can be
made to judgments in rem, since they are conclusive in
all other respects upon all the world. But judgments in
personam, being conclusive only as to parties and their
privies, may be attacked by strangers upon any ground
that would have been a valid defense in the original
action.
"The only difference, therefore, between the two classes
of judgments when pleaded in a subsequent action is
that the sources of impeachment are materially less re-
stricted in the case of an in personam judgment than
when the judgment is w rem. The one, however, enjoys
no greater immunity than the other when founded in
fraud. Law can not be 'the perfection of human wis-
dom' if one mav so debase its instrumentalities as to
152 NATURALIZATION
make it the servant of his fraudulent designs and thereby
secure for himself rights and privileges which would
otherwise be denied him. The law that would make false-
hood incontestable and fraud impregnable is not the law
that makes and protects American citizenship.
"In the administration of the laws of Congress the
courts are called upon to perform few more important
functions than the conversion of an alien into American
citizenship, and it is not easy to conceive how they
could be more ignobly employed than in conferring this
boon upon men who intentionally and criminally induce
their favorable action through false and fraudulent
representations. Shall an alien who thus abuses the juris-
diction of one of our courts in ex parte proceedings be
permitted, unchallenged, to make the judgment of
naturalization, obtained through fraud and perjury, the
basis of a suit for damages against the country of his
nativity, and for that purpose to invoke the assistance
of another judicial tribunal of the country upon which
he committed the fraud ? It is difficult to see how there
can be but one answer to the question.
"Admitting all that counsel have said and all the books
say on the subject of estoppel by a former judgment,
and even that ' the doctrine of estoppels in judgments,
instead of being odious, is one of the most conservative
and salutary doctrines of the law ' (Freeman on Judg-
ments, sec. 247; Gray v. Pingry, 17 Vt., 419, 44 Am.
Dec. 345), we can not be unmindful of the principle,
underlying and safeguarding all judicial proceedings,
that whatever is settled thereby must be the result of
an investigation conducted under the most favorable
rules that mankind have been able to devise for the ex-
posure of falsehood and the ascertainment of truth.
Estoppel has become a revered doctrine in our jurispru-
dence, not because it protects fraud, but prohibits a
party from disputing the truth.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 153
"In ex partepToceedings the court necessarily acts upon
a state of facts, and not infrequently upon constructions
of law, presented alone by the petitioner, and the judg-
ment rendered upon a one-sided presentation of the case
is predicated largely upon the principle of truthfulness,
honesty, and absence of fraud in the party invoking its
jurisdiction. This is true in mandamus and injunction
cases, but there the adverse party is given a subsequent
day in court, when full opportunity is afforded to expose
the falsehood, dishonesty, and fraud in the first proceed-
ings. Not so in naturalization proceedings. If it be ad-
mitted that there is an adverse party in naturalization
proceedings the adversary in reality never has a day in
court.
"In the case of fraudulent naturalization there are ordi-
narily but two remedies: (1) A direct attack by bill in
the proper court to set aside the judgment; (2) injunc-
tion restraining the party from exercising rights under
the judgment, such as prosecuting a suit when valid citi-
zenship is the essential prerequisite. United States v.
Norsch, 42 Fed. Rep. 419; United States v. Gleason, 78
Fed. Rep. 396. But it is not necessary to discuss either
of these remedies in determining the questions presented
in the case under consideration, for it is conceded that
this tribunal is without power to annul a judgment of
naturalization even though it should be shown that it
was fraudulently obtained; and the remedy by injunc-
tion would at least be of doubtful availability in the
present case, because of the adequate facilities offered
defendant for equitable defense in this jurisdiction, the
only one having cognizance of claimants' case. The or-
ganic act provides that claims before this tribunal shall
be adjudicated 'according to the principles of equity,'
and it is a familiar principle of equity that 'he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands.' This
maxim — or, as it is otherwise expressed, 'He that hath
154 NATURALIZATION
committed iniquity shall not have equity' — is the equi-
table application of a fundamental principle pervading
the entire body of the law, 'that no one shall be per-
mitted to profit by his own fraud or take advantage of
his own wrong, or to found any claim on his own iniquity,
or to acquire property by his own crime.' Riggs v. Pal-
mer, 115 N. Y. 506; Fetter on Equity, 39.
"This is an undisputed principle and needs no elabora-
tion, in the present case especially, since the defendant
admits that the Commission can not go behind a decree
of naturalization in the sense of attempting to nullify it,
'even upon a showing of the most palpable and bare-
faced fraud.'
"It is a general rule, too familiar to require any cita-
tion of authorities in its support, that 'a judgment,
either of a legal or of an equitable tribunal, may be, in
effect, vacated by a court of equity, if it was obtained
by fraud.' 2 Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 489.
" 'It is the just and proper pride of our matured system
of equity jurisprudence that fraud vitiates every trans-
action; and however men may surround it with forms,
solemn instruments, proceedings conforming to all the de-
tails required in the laws, or even by the formal judg-
ment of court, a court of equity will disregard them all
if necessary, that justice and equity may prevail.'
Warner v Blakeman, 4 Keys, 507.
"Having invoked the jurisdiction of a tribunal specifi-
cally charged with applying the principles of equity in
the adjudication of cases before it and virtually praying
the enforcement of a judgment, which the defendant
alleges was obtained by fraud, claimants can not com-
plain if their demurrer admitting the truth of defend-
ant's allegation and pleading the conclusiveness of the
judgment is not allowed to arrest the court in the exer-
cise of its unquestionable powers of equitable prevention.
The defendant not only has the right to invoke the
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 155
remedy of equitable prevention, to tlie end that fraud
shall not taint this litigation, but the peculiar character
of the claim, being in reality a suit for damages against
a foreign government whose liability, and none other, the
United States has assumed, . . . imposes an obliga-
tion upon the defendant here to do so, to the end that
ultimate justice may be done through the application
of the principles of equity and of international law to
the merits of the case.
"The judicial status of this tribunal, its jurisdiction
and powers being thus defined and understood, it be-
comes unnecessary to discuss extensively the question
whether the United States can, in a domestic tribunal,
administering exclusively municipal law, controvert the
judgment of another of its domestic tribunals conferring
citizenship upon an alien, for we shall hold that in the
investigation and adjudication of the questions that arise
in this case the Commission is sitting in the capacity of
an international tribunal. When domestic tribunals are
thus sitting, it is the established principle that municipal
law, in the absence of a treaty stipulating otherwise,
must be subordinate to international law when they an-
tagonize each other, as that is the law common to both
parties. It is only where the question is not within the
domain of international that the municipal law may be
invoked to determine the proper solution of the question.
"Judgments of naturalization rendered by courts of
competent jurisdiction, like other judgments not defect-
ive on their face, may be conclusive as between the
naturalized alien and other parties raising the question
before a domestic court administering only municipal
law, and a careful exploration of the authorities relied
upon by claimants show that they bear with substantial
exclusiveness upon that class of cases. The case of
Spratt V. Spratt (4 Pet. 392), is a leading case cited by
counsel for claimants in support of the general propo-
156 NATURALIZATION
sition that a judgment of naturalization is conclusive
upon the Commission, ' whether or not the judgment of
naturalization is as to Spain a foreign judgment.' That
was a case involving the title to real estate in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and by no sort of interpretation
or construction involved the administration of inter-
national law. It was a dispute between parties in their
individual capacities, one purely of local domestic law
and administration, and therefore without any relevancy
to the principles of international law administered by
an international tribunal or a municipal court sitting in
the capacity of an international tribunal.
"The case of Campbell v. Gordon (6 Cranch,176) involved
the question of title to land in Virginia. The question
was, what effect should be given by a domestic tribunal
to a judgment rendered in another domestic tribunal, the
settlement of which required the application of municipal
or domestic law pure and simple? No international ques-
tion and no principle of international law arose in the
case. The same may be said in reference to the case of
Stark V. Insurance Co. (7 Cranch, 420). In that case the
question of American citizenship arose on the objection
of defendant to the record of naturalization of the
plaintiff, and the objection went simply to the regularity
of the proceedings and to the introduction of parol
evidence in aid of the record. The Supreme Court held
that it need not appear by the record of naturalization
that all the requisites prescribed bylaw for the admission
of aliens to the rights of citizenship have been complied
with. It involved the ownership of American property
by an American citizen, and the determination of that
question was submitted to a municipal court of the
United States administering purely domestic law. The
fact that the judgment in these cases was a judgment of
naturalization presents no international question, because
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 157
the statutes of the United States relating to naturaliza-
tion are no more international in their character than the
statutes which settle the rights of our citizens to the enjoy-
ment of any other domestic privilege, and a judgment of
naturalization pleaded in a cause involving the title to
property in the United States before a domestic tribunal
administering only municipal law raises no more of an
international question than a judgment on contract or on
promissory notes. The degree of conclusiveness of the
judgment would be just the same in either case. It will
be seen, therefore, that the question in all of these cases
was simply the force and effect which should be given by
a domestic tribunal to a judgment of another domestic
tribunal administering purely municipal law. It is ma-
terial, however, to notice that in none of these cases was
the question of jurisdiction or fraud in the procurement
of the judgment raised, and, therefore, that it does not
appear what the decision in each of these cases might
have been if the objection to the naturalization proceed-
ings had been, as alleged in the case now under con-
sideration, obtained through fraud practiced upon the
court,
"Bearing in mind that the Commission in the trial of
this case is 'sitting in the capacity of an international
tribunal;' that in a former case it has been decided by
the Commission 'these claims remain in their nature in-
ternational and are to be tried by the principles by which
the liability of independent nations, one to another, is
governed,' and 'that the sole question before this Com-
mission is that of the primary liability of Spain, which
is not in any way enlarged by the Government of the
United States, to adjudicate and pay such claims,' would
it be impertinent or incompetent for Spain to challenge
the applicability of the principles announced in the de-
cisions referred to, and all others of similar import, upon
the ground that they are the decisions of purely domestic
158 NATURALIZATION
tribunals, administering the municipal law of the United
States regarding a subject-matter with which it is in no
wise concerned, namely, the settlement of titles to prop-
erty which is always and everywhere determinable by the
lex loci? Manifestly not. But suppose the response
to be that nevertheless the judgment of naturalization
of Ruiz, so far as the right of his heirs to maintain this
action is concerned, is valid and binding in every juris-
diction until it is conclusively shown it was obtained by
fraud, and that Spain should then offer in evidence the
official record of proceedings before a Spanish tribunal
of competent jurisdiction, wherein Ruiz, after his alleged
naturalization in the United States, being at the time a
resident of Cuba, in a case involving his allegiance to the
Sovereign of Spain, had been adjudged to be a Spanish
subject, and furthermore, that his attempt to acquire
American citizenship was a fraud on his native land,
would it be argued that this Commission must give full
faith and credit to the American judgment of naturaliza-
tion and must disregard the Spanish adjudication entirely?
The mere asking of this question echoes its answer, and
is an illustration of the unsoundness of the position that
an international tribunal is to be bound by the judgment
of the domestic tribunals of either one of the parties to
the controversy.
"It is nowuniversally admitted that every independent
state has, as one of the incidents of its sovereignty, the
power not only to regulate the local obligations of aliens
resident in its territory, but to confer upon them national
privileges and immunities, even the full rights of citizen-
ship, by the proceeding called naturalization. The law
for this proceeding, by which the nationality of a foreign-
born citizen or subject is changed from that of birth to
one of adoption, is the creature of modern states and
necessarily local, and is a distinct invasion of the rights
of the country of nativity over its subject or citizen, in
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 159
whatever part of the world, as maintained until within
comparatively recent years. Such laws are made and
administered without reference to the consent of the
country of nativity to the release or the transfer of the
allegiance of such subjects or citizens. The municipal
laws of the States whose subjects or citizens are so natu-
ralized being thus disregarded and in fact set at defiance,
it must follow that the naturalization proceedings can
not have conclusive exterritorial application.
''The exterritorial force of a judgment, like the law
authorizing naturalization, is a thing of modern recogni-
tion, and therefore we must look to the more recent
writers for the best opinions on this and allied subjects,
and we find them in practical accord with the doctrine
just stated. Calvo (Derecho Internacional, vol. 1, 295
et seq.), while laying down the same doctrine, says:
International law recognizes the power (or faculty) in
a state to naturalize the subjects or citizens of another;
but naturalization does not take place by virtue of said
international law, but as a consequence of local legisla-
tion; so that the new citizen or subject is the pure and
exclusive creation of the civil and political laws of the
country of adoption, and he will enjoy solely the rights,
privileges, and immunities which they confer. And what
has been said of naturalization applies to expatriation,
or the breaking of the natural bonds of citizenship, which
have their origin and are preserved forever in the shadow
of local legislation. The right of expatriation, then, like
that of naturalization, is subordinated under the point
of view of international law to the general principle that
each independent state is sovereign in its own territory
and that its laws are binding upon all persons who are
within its jurisdiction, but that they have no force be-
yond its territory.'
"The distinction drawn and the reasoning invoked by
this eminent author make it perfectly clear that the pro-
160 NATURALIZATION
ceedings or judgment of naturalization can be conclusive
only within the jurisdiction of the country through whose
laws the nationality of a subject or citizen is changed
from the country of nativity to the country of the court
granting the judgment.
"Conceding that it might be held by a domestic tri-
bunal, sitting exclusively in its capacity of a municipal
court and therefore administering only domestic law, that
a judgment of naturalization rendered in a domestic tri-
bunal of competent jurisdiction was ipso facto conclu-
sive, it does not follow that it would hold the same way
when sitting in the capacity of an international tribunal.
"The Commission, in a former case, has decided —
" ' That the sole question before this Commission is that
of the primary liability of Spain, which is not in any way
enlarged by the agreement of the United States to adju-
dicate and pay such claims,' (Op. Commissioner Wood,
27), which is the equivalent of holding that Spain is the
real defendant, and therefore entitled to make any defense
which she could make before an international or mixed
commission.
"The fundamental question, therefore, for present con-
sideration is the effect given by international tribunals
to judgments of a domestic tribunal of one of the parties
to the controversy.
"Article VII of the treaty of 1794, between the United
States and Great Britain, provided for indemnification
by Great Britain to American creditors by reference to a
mixed commission, and directed that 'the Commission
shall decide the claims in question according to the
merits of the several cases and justice, equity, and
the law of nations,' language strikingly similar to that
in the treaty under which this Commission is sitting.
"One of the first and most important questions that
arose before the board of commissioners organized to
carry the treaty of 1794 into effect was whether 'the
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 161
sentence of the Supreme Court of the nation,' which it
was admitted was 'binding on individual persons and
things within the jurisdiction of the court,' was 'con-
clusive as to the law, not only on the subjects of this
government but on foreign nations.'
"The tribunal decided that it was not conclusive, and
Commissioners Gore and Pinckney, both eminent inter-
national authorities, rendered elaborate opinions discuss-
ing the question most thoroughly. Mr. Commissioner
Gore said (quoting very briefly from his lengthy opinion):
'"That the decision of any court, however respectable
its members, is conclusive on foreign governments as to
the law of nations, and that the principles on which it is
founded may not be rightfully contested, as contrary to
that law, is not, in my belief, warranted by just ideas of
the equal independence of nations or by their practice.
'"To suppose the decisions of the courts of any coun-
try conclusive evidence of the law of nations would be to
suppose that nation always right who captures and con-
demns the effects of another, and that always wrong who
complains of and on failure of other means seeks redress
for such captures and condemnations by letters of marque
and reprisal; and yet after a condemnation of effects
taken in virtue of such letters, according to Mr. Gost-
ling's position, such condemnation would be conclusive
evidence of the law of nations.
" 'It does not coexist with the equality of independent
nations to regard the decision of one, merely because it
was the decision of that nation, as conclusive evidence
of the law of nations; and other nations or other judicial
courts pronouncing that law would adopt the decisions
of no court only so far as such appeared to them to cor-
respond with its principles and rules.
'"The decision of a judicial court, judging on the law
of nations, can not be considered more conclusive or
binding on others than the judgment of that nation
5233-n
162 NATURALIZATION
expressed by a different organ of its government. In
the practice of nations there are many instances of dif-
ference of opinion as to what acts are, or are not, cor-
respondent with the law of nations, and each asserting
and maintaining its right to decide for itself against the
express opinion of the other.' 3 Moore's Int. Arb.
3162-3163.
"The opinion of Mr. Pinckney is even more elaborate (3
Moore's International Arbitrations, 3180, 3206). It will
be remembered that the sentence (judgment) of condem-
nation in an admiralty court had, upon appeal of the
claimants, been affirmed by the lords commissioners of
appeal, the supreme judicature in the Kingdom in mat-
ters of prize. The leading question was whether the
international tribunal was bound and concluded by that
affirmance so as to be prevented from examining into the
case. The principal objection urged by the agent of the
British government was that the judgment was conclus-
ive because it had 'been given in a solemn decision of
the supreme court of the law of nations in the kingdom
which other authorities, proceeding by the same law, are
bound to respect and confirm.' A brief quotation from
the opinion of the distinguished commissioner will suffice
to show that at this early date in the history of inter-
national arbitration the conclusiveness of a foreign judg-
ment was disputed in a discussion of the subject so
elaborate and learned that the views then expressed were
adopted by a majority of his colleagues and accepted as
correct expositions of the doctrine by both governments,
and substantially without exception have been followed
by every international tribunal down to the present
time. Says Mr. Pinckney:
"'Upon the fullest consideration of this objection I
have stated it to be my opinion "that the affirmance of
the condemnation by the lords does in no respect bind us
as commissioners under the seventh article of the treaty,
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 163
and that it is no further material to our inquiries in the
execution of the trust confided to us than as it goes to
prove that compensation was unattainable by the claim-
ants in the ordinary course of justice."
"'It has been explicitly understood that the opinion I
have thus delivered is in precise conformity with that of
His Majesty's government; but as the objection to which
it is opposed has been repeated by the agent on every
occasion that has since occurred, notwithstanding the
avowed disapprobation of its principles by those from
whom his authority is derived, and as one of the board
has not only sustained the objection by his ultimate
opinion, but recorded the reasons which have induced
him to do so in the nature of a protest against the de-
cision of the majority, I feel it to be my duty to reduce
to writing and to file the reflections which have led me
to the foregoing conclusion.'
"Denying with indignation the suggestion of the British
agent that the King was a party, and therefore the judg-
ment was more especially conclusive, he said:
" ' But even if the allegation were true, there is certainly
more novelty than correctness in the argument that a
judgment of His Majesty's own court, composed of the
members of his own council, is the more especially
entitled to a conclusive quality . . . because His
Majesty was himself a party to the suit. I am very far
from being disposed to insist that the judgment of the
lords of appeal is less to be respected on that account;
but it is neither indecorous toward that high court nor
unreasonable in itself to say that the extensive binding
force, now for the first time attributed to their sen-
tences, could not be rested on a foundation so little cal-
culated to support it.
"'In order to ascertain whether the sentence of the
lords in this case (however unjust it may be) is conclusive
upon this board under the treaty, it is previously to be
164 NATURALIZATION
inquired whether the government of the United States,
independent of the treaty, would upon the application
of the claimants for redress against the capture and con-
demnation confirmed by it, by way of reprisals or other-
wise, be bound by the law of nations to esteem it just,
although upon the face of it it was manifestly the reverse.'
"The United States has never been more ably repre-
sented on an international commission than in this initial
instance with Great Britain. Mr. Gore, popularly known
as the legal preceptor of Daniel Webster, was one of the
profoundest lawyers of his day, filled many of the high
places aspired to by the profession, including the gov-
ernorship of Massachusetts and Senator in Congress.
But his most distinguished service was as a commissioner
under the treaty of 1794.
"Among the brilliant men who have adorned the public
service of this country William Pinckney deservedly
stands in the front rank. John Bassett Moore says of
him: 'Never a seeker after preferment, he was continu-
ally chosen, either by the suffrages of his fellow-citizens
or by executive favor, to positions of public trust and
responsibility, which he filled with distinction to himself
and advantage to his country.' At home and abroad, in
the Senate of the United States, in the Cabinet, as min-
ister to Russia and the court of Naples he was equal to
every demand. But his distinguishing preeminence was
as a lawyer. No lawyer ever received a stronger tribute
than was paid to him by Chief Justice Marshall in a
formal opinion of the Supreme Court. The Nereide, 9
Cranch, 388,430.
"It is not strange, therefore, that the opinions deliv-
ered by Mr. Gore, and more especially by Mr. Pinckney,
as members of the board of commissioners under Article
VII of the treaty of 1794, should have been accepted by
the two English great constitutional nations of the
world a century ago as the correct interpretation of the
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 165
international problems discussed by them. Nor is it to
be marveled at that down through our developing juris-
prudence the principles enunciated by them have come
to us as established doctrines. Referring to Mr. Pinck-
ney's opinions, and especially the one in the case of the
Betsey, Mr. Wheaton said: 'They are finished models of
judicial eloquence, uniting powerful and comprehensive
argument, with a copious, pure, and energetic diction.'
"Another eminent writer on international law, a publi-
cist of world-wide fame and authority, discussing this
question, says:
" 'It was maintained before the British and American
Mixed Commission, sitting in London under the treaty of
1794, that a decision of a British prize court estopped
the party against whom it was made from proceedings,
when a foreigner, through his own government. This was
contested by Mr. Pinckney, and his position was con-
firmed by the arbitration, acting under the advice of
Lord Chancellor Loughborough, and is now accepted
law.' 2 Wharton, 2d ed.. Sec. 242.
"And in 3 Wharton (2d ed., 198) it is said:
'"The prevalent opinion now is that in international
controversies a sovereign can no more protect himself by
a decision in his favor by courts established by him,
even though they be prize courts, than he can by the
action of any other department of his government.'
"The doctrine is so generally approved by writers on
international law that we deem it unnecessary to refer
any further to that vast field of authority.
"Perhaps no government ever appeared to greater ad-
vantage than the United States did before the Geneva
arbitration, when Hon. Caleb Cushing, Hon. William M.
Evarts, and Chief Justice Waite maintained the doctrine
of the inconclusiveness of a judgment rendered in a
British court before that august tribunal, in the case of
166 NATURALIZATION
The Florida. In that case the vice-admiralty court of
the Bahamas, by its decree, which is given at page 521
of the fifth volume of the appendix to the American case,
acquitted the Florida of every charge, but the great
lawyers above named contended for the principle that:
"'As between the claimants of the vessel and Her
Majesty's government seeking to enforce a forfeiture
under the provisions of the foreign enlistment act, this
decree may have been conclusive; but as between the
United States and Her Majesty's government it has not
that effect.'
"And this is exactly the distinction we are endeavoring
here to point out. Regardless of whether judgments of
naturalization are under all circumstances conclusive as
between the naturalized alien and any other person rais-
ing the question in the United States, Spain was no party
to those proceedings, and before a tribunal, whether in
all its features international, or a municipal court sitting
in the capacity of an international tribunal, has the right
to inquire into the facts upon which those proceedings
were based and the judgment rendered. The conclusive
character which it is argued attaches to domestic judg-
ments, where sued upon in another state of the United
States, is, in virtue of the constitutional provision re-
quiring that 'full faith and credit shall be given in each
state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceed-
ings of every other state,' and of the act of Congress
passed in effectuation of this provision of the Constitu-
tion. The Supreme Court, in the case of Christmas v.
Russell, 5 Wallace, 290, has adjudicated this very ques-
tion. The court says:
" 'Common law rules placed foreign judgments upon a
different footing, and those rules remain, as a general re-
mark, unchanged to the present time. Under these rules
a foreign judgment was prima facie evidence of the debt,
but it was open to examination, not only to show that
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 167
the court in which it was rendered had no jurisdiction of
the subject-matter, but also to show that the judgment
was fraudulently obtained.'
"It is not denied that some of the authorities relied
upon in support of the conclusiveness of a foreign judg-
ment seem to sustain this contention and therefore may
serve to raise the presumption that judgments m rem,
under some extraordinary conditions, may not be inquired
into, even by an international tribunal, yet a close scrutiny
of the facts, as well as the law in the cases referred to,
leave it to be indisputably true that a foreign judgment
is universally impeachable for fraud. Black states the
principle thus :
"'In the present state of the English authorities it
seems to be well settled that fraud may always be set up
as a ground of impeachment against a foreign judgment,
and that if it be shown that fraud was successfully prac-
ticed in the concoction or procuring of the judgment the
court will treat it as of no effect and will refuse to recog-
nize or enforce it. (2 Black on Judgments, Sec. 844, citing
numerous English adjudications.)'
" Freeman on Judgments (4th ed.. Vol. 2, Sec. 595) is to
the same effect, saying that a foreign judgment to be con-
clusive must be 'free from the taint of fraud in the pro-
curement.'
"Story on Conflict of Laws (Sec. 608), says:
"'The general doctrine maintained in the American
courts in relation to foreign judgments is that they are
prima facie evidence, but that they are impeachable;
but how far and to what extent this doctrine is to be
carried does not seem to be definitely settled. It has
been declared that the jurisdiction of the court and its
power over the parties and the things in controversy may
be inquired into, and that the judgment may be im-
peached for fraud. Beyond this no definite lines have as
yet been drawn.'
168 NATURALIZATIOX
"The inference clearly is that this eminent jurist, writ-
ing half a century ago, held the opinion that foreign judg-
ments were only prima facie evidence, and that they
were subject to impeachment generally. Black on Judg-
ments, the latest work, says:
"'So far as the question has been considered by our
own courts this (the doctrine of the English authorities,
supra) may be said to be also the prevailing doctrine in
this country, citing Rankin r. Goddard,54 Me. 28; Fisher
V. Fielding, 67 Conn. 92; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113,
and many others.'
"It has very recently been held in an English case,
where the action was upon a judgment recovered by the
plaintiff against the defendant in a Russian court, and
the defendant pleaded that the judgment was procured
by fraud and deceit of the plaintiff and by false repre-
sentations and false evidence given to the court, that the
defense was good and sufficient, and this notwithstand-
ing the question of the alleged fraud had been investi-
gated and negatived in the foreign court. Abouloff u.
Oppenheimer, 10 Q. B. Div., 295.
"Singularly enough, Black, who refers to this decision
with approbation, follows this (see Sec. 844) with the
remark that —
" 'In a late American case where the same question arose
this ruling was disapproved, and it was stated that the
doctrine of the English decision was not borne out by
the cases cited in its support, and the opinion was
expressed that false testimony and the suppression of
the truth do not constitute the kind of fraud by which a
judgment is vitiated and may be nullified.'
"He was referring to the case of Hilton r. Guyot (C.C,
42 Fed. 252), apparently overlooking the fact that this
case had been reversed by the Supreme Court (159 U. S.
113). In that case, on appeal, the Supreme Court
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 169
undoubtedly sustain the English doctrine, as stated by
Black:
"'But it is now established in England, by well con-
sidered and strongly reasoned decisions of the Court of
Appeals, that foreign judgments may be impeached, if
procured by false and fraudulent representations and
testimony of the plaintiff, even if the same question of
fraud was presented to and decided by the foreign court.'
"Mr. Justice Gray, who delivered the opinion in the
Hilton V. Guyot case, and from which the paragraph just
above quoted is taken, discusses extensively the decisions
of foreign courts generally upon that question and con-
cludes his opinion as follows:
" 'In holding such a judgment, for want of reciprocity,
not to be conclusive evidence of the merits of the claim,
we do not proceed upon any theory of retaliation upon
one person by reason of injustice done to another; but
upon the broad ground that international law is founded
upon mutuality and reciprocity, and that by the princi-
ples of international law recognized in most civilized
nations, and by the comity of our own country, which it
is our judicial duty to know and to declare, the judgment
is not entitled to be considered conclusive.
" 'By our law, at the time of the adoption of the Con-
stitution, a foreign judgment was considered as prima
facie evidence, and not conclusive. There is no statute
of the United States, and no treaty of the United States
with France, or with any other nation, which has changed
that law, or has made any provision upon the subject.
It is not to be supposed that, if any statute or treaty
had been or should be made, it would recognize as con-
clusive the judgments of any country which did not give
like effect to our own judgments. In the absence of
statute or treaty it appears to us equally unwarrantable
to assume that the comity of the United States requires
anything more.
170 NATURALIZATION
" 'If we should hold this judgment to be conclusive, we
should allow it an effect to which, supposing the defend-
ants' offers to be sustained by actual proof, it would, in
the absence of a special treaty, be entitled in hardly any
other country in Christendom, except the country in
which it was rendered. If the judgment had been ren-
dered in this country, or in any other outside of the
jurisdiction of France, the French courts would not have
executed or enforced it, except after examining into its
merits. The very judgment now sued on would be held
inconclusive in almost any other country than France.
In England, and in the colonies subject to the law of
England, the fraud alleged in its procurement would be
a sufficient ground for disregarding it. In the courts of
nearly every other nation it would be subject to reexam-
ination, either merely because it was a foreign judgment,
or because judgments of that nation would be reexamin-
able in the courts of France.,
"The principle thus impressively announced by the
highest tribunal in the United States has been announced
in many state decisions, but nowhere with more precision
and force than in the case of Bryant v. Ela, Smith (N. H.),
396, 404:
" 'The respect which is due to judgments, sentences,
and decrees of courts in a foreign state, by the law of
nations, seems to be the same which is due to those of
our own courts. Hence the decree of an admiralty court
abroad is equally conclusive with decrees of our admir-
alty courts. Indeed, both courts proceed by the same
rule, are governed by the same law — the maritime law of
nations (Coll. Jurid. 100), which is the universal law of
nations except where treaties alter it.
" 'The same comity is not extended to judgments or de-
crees which may be founded on the municipal laws of the
state in which they are pronounced. Independent states
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 171
do not choose to adopt such decisions without examina-
tion. These laws and regulations may be unjust, partial
to citizens, and against foreigners; they may operate in-
justice to our citizens, whom we are bound to protect;
they may be, and the decisions of courts founded on
them, just cause of complaint against the supreme power
of the state where rendered. To adopt them is not merely
saying that the courts have decided correctly on the
law, but it is approbating the law itself. Wherever, then,
the court may have proceeded on municipal law the rule
is that the judgments are not conclusive evidence of
debt, but prima facie evidence only. The proceedings
have not the conclusive quality which is annexed to the
records or proceedings of our own courts, where we ap-
prove both of the rule and of the judges who interpret
and apply it. A foreign judgment may be impeached;
defendant may show that it is unjust, or that it was
irregularly or unduly obtained. Doug. 5, note.'
"Referring to all the treaties and the decisions of inter-
national tribunals since the treaty of 1794 with Great
Britain down to the arbitrations just concluded with
Venezuela, we have been unable to find a single case in
which the principle laid down in the case of the Betsey,
and which is in this case adhered to, where the contrary
doctrine — the one contended for by claimants in this
case — has been maintained. The only instance in which
there is a semblance of a departure from this doctrine
was in the case of the United States and Spanish Com-
mission of 1871. Mr. Blaine, then Secretary of State,
instructed the agents of the United States, in regard to
the powers of that Commission that *a certificate of
naturalization as a citizen of the United States can not
be impeached for fraud before an international commis-
sion.' It is clearly shown by his letter, that, as the
Commission had been established by the executive act
172 NATURALIZATION
of the United States and Spain, and as tlie executive
departments of the two governments had no power to
annul or impeach a judgment of the other country, it was
his opinion that the Commission, the creature of the two
countries, could not. Mr. Evarts, however, Mr. Blaine's
predecessor as Secretary of State, and Mr. Frelinghuysen,
his successor in office, both great lawyers, held opinions
contrary to Mr. Blaine's. Mr. Evarts said, in his letter
to the Spanish minister, March 4, 1880, in regard to the
powers of the Spanish-American Commission of 1871,
that —
"'The Government of the United States from the first
considered, and it is still maintained, that the Commis-
sion established under the convention of 1871 was an
independent judicial tribunal, possessed of all the powers
and endowed with all the properties which should dis-
tinguish a court of high international jurisdiction, alike
competent in the jurisdiction conferred upon it to bring
under judgment the decisions of the local courts of both
nations, and beyond the competence of either govern-
ment to interfere with, direct, or obstruct its delibera-
tions.'
"And Mr. Frelinghuysen wrote to Mr. Suydam, counsel
for the United States before the Commission, September
25, 1882, as follows:
"'This government, while holding, as before stated,
that the judgment of naturalization, unimpeached by
fraud, is complete evidence of its own validity, can not
deny that, under the terms of the agreement, the certifi-
cate of naturalization may be proven to have been ob-
tained fraudulently. . . . The true rule to govern
the Commission is that when an allegation of naturaliza-
tion is traversed and the allegation is established prima
facie by the production of a certificate of naturalization,
or by other competent and sufficient proof, it can only
be impeached by showing that the court which granted
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 173
it was without jurisdiction, or by showing, in conformity
with the adjudications of the courts of the United States
on that topic, that fraud, consisting of intentional and
dishonest misrepresentation or suppression of material
facts by the party obtaining the judgment, was practiced
upon it, or that the naturalization was granted in viola-
tion of a treaty stipulation or of a rule of international
law.'
"The case of Ortega, No. 91, before the United States
and Spanish Commission of 1871, was decided before
Secretary Blaine asserted the proposition that a judg-
ment of naturalization was conclusive of every question
before the Commission. In that case the judgment was
not attacked for fraud nor for any want of jurisdiction
in the court which granted it, but merely on the grounds
that the proceedings were irregular, and that the facts
before the court granting the naturalization were untrue.
The only question before the Commission was its right to
go behind the judgment and ascertain the truth; and
upon their interpretation of international law, they held
that the judgment of naturalization granted by a court
of the United States of competent jurisdiction was not
conclusive. It was, perhaps, because of the possible
effect of this decision upon future cases that Secretary
Blaine took the emphatic position he did, which tempor-
arily arrested the progress of the Commission and re-
sulted in a modification of the agreement between the
two governments under which the Commission was sit-
ting. This also explains Secretary Frelinghuysen's
diplomatic reference to the 'terms of the agreement' in
his letter of September 25, 1882, in which he says: 'This
government, while holding, as before stated, that the
judgment of naturalization, unimpeached by fraud, is
complete evidence of its own validity, can not deny that,
under the terms of the agreement, the certificate of
naturalization may be proven to have been obtained
174 NATURALIZATION
fraudulently.' A close study of Mr. Blaine's letter, and
the argument of the advocate of the United States in the
Buzzi case, No. 22, which arose subsequent to Mr. Blaine's
declaration, leads us to think that their contention was
based on the theory that the agreement itself expressly
limited the right of Spain to require the production of
the naturalization papers, and when they were shown,
the right to question the naturalization was at an end.
At any rate all the cases before that Commission involv-
ing this question, whether before or after Mr. Blaine's
declaration and the modification of the terms of the
agreement, were decided against the conclusiveness of a
foreign judgment. (See in addition to cases before re-
ferred to, Angarica, No. 17, and Criado, No. 29.)
"The United States and Mexican Commission of 1873, in
the case of Rowlands v. Mexico, which was a customs
case, where the Supreme Court of Mexico ordered the
restoration of the property, the Commission held that it
had jurisdiction, and disregarded the judgment of the
Mexican court, which had refused damages and costs and
awarded claimant $18,000. This and other cases fol-
lowing show that the decisions on this subject are not
peculiar to prize judgments.
"Before the United States and Costa Rica Commission
of 1860, in the Medina case, it was held that the Com-
mission was not bound by a judgment of naturalization
in the United States. The case is reported at length in 3
Moore's International Arbitrations, page 2583, et seq.
The following brief extract, however, will clearly show
the opinion of that Commission:
" 'To give to naturalization certificates in a foreign land
or before an international tribunal an absolute value,
which they have not in the United States, where they
may eventually be set aside, while Costa Rica, not recog-
nizing the jurisdiction of any tribunal in the United
States, would be left with no remedy. Moreover, this
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 175
Commission would be placed in an inferior position and
denied a faculty which is said to belong to a tribunal in
the United States.'*
"The United States and MexicanCommission of 1868, in
the case of Mather and Glover, No. 178, referring to a
judgment of the Supreme Court of Mexico, and speaking
by Commissioner Wadsworth, says:
" ' Such a decision by the Supreme Court may be binding
upon all inferior tribunals in Mexico, and while it is
entitled to much respect here it is not conclusive upon
this Commission.'
"The British and American Mixed Commission of 1871
held that it had power to review judgments in prize cases
in the courts of the United States. Hale's report of that
Commission, on page 88, says:
" 'The question was early raised, on the part of the
United States, as to the jurisdiction of these prize cases
by the Commission, both in respect to cases where the de-
cision of the ultimate appellate tribunal of the United
States had been had, and to those in which no appeal had
been prosecuted on the part of the claimants to such ulti-
mate tribunal. As to the former class of cases, the under-
signed may properly state that he personally entertained
no doubt of the jurisdiction of the Commission as an
international tribunal to review the decisions of the prize
courts of the United States where the parties alleging
themselves aggrieved had prosecuted their claims by ap-
peal to the court of last resort. As this jurisdiction,
however, had been sometimes questioned, he deemed it
*NoTE — There appears to be a slight omission in this citation. The
umpire's words at this point of his decision, as reported in 3 Moore's
International Arbitrations, 2587-8, are as follows:
" It has been alleged in behalf of the claimants that even admitting
that these acts of naturalization are intrinsically void, it is not in the
power of this commission to reject them as proof, if they are not first
set aside as fraudulent by the same tribunal from which they were
obtained.
" To admit this would give those certificates in a foreign land or
before an international tribunal an absolute value, which they have not
in the United States," etc.
176 NATURALIZATION
desirable that a formal adjudication by the Commission
should be had upon this question. The Commission
unanimously sustained their jurisdiction in this class of
of cases, and, as will be seen, all the members of the
Commission at some time joined in awards against the
United States in such cases.'
"The United States and French Commission of 1880, in
the Kuhnagel case, as reported in 3 Moore's International
Arbitrations, page 2649, held that the Commission 'had
the right to examine the original proceedings for natu-
ralization, and, finding that the certificate of naturaliza-
tion was obtained by misrepresentation of material facts,
we hold it to be null and void.'
"Before the Geneva Tribunal it was urged by Great
Britain that the [judgment of the] Vice-Admiralty Court
in the Bahamas acquitting the Florida should be ac-
cepted as conclusive. This great tribunal, however, held
otherwise, and several opinions were delivered on the
subject. The opinion of Count Sclopis, speaking for the
Commission, says:
" 'The decision of the vice-admiralty court may then be
considered as conclusive, even if not perfectly correct, as
between those who claimed the vessel and the British
Government, which claimed its confiscation under the
clauses of the foreign-enlistment act; but I do not think
it is sufficient to bar the claim of the United States
against Great Britain. The United States were not par-
ties to the suit; everything relating to it is for them res
inter alios acta.'
"Mr. Staempfli in a separate opinion in the same matter
says:
" 'The objection that the judicial decision at Nassau
relieves Great Britain of all responsibility can not be
maintained. As regards the internal (or municipal) law,
the judgment is valid; but as far as international law is
concerned, it does not alter the position of Great Britain.'
Papers Relating to the Treaty of Washington, Vol. 4, 92.
BY FORMAL PAPERS, 177
" Before the very recent Commission between the United
States and Venezuela of 1903 the identical question that
we have here under consideration arose, namely, the con-
clusiveness of a judgment of naturalization in the United
States, and the unanimous decision of the Commission
was that such a judgment is not 'conclusive upon the
United States or upon this tribunal.' The opinion was
rendered for the Commission by Mr. Bainbridge, Com-
missioner for the United States. It gives an exhaustive
resume of the adjudications by international tribunals,
the decisions of the courts of England and the United
States, also of the diplomatic expressions of the State
Department, and expresses its own conclusions as fol-
lows:
" 'The present Commission is charged with the duty of
examining and deciding all claims by citizens of the
United States against the Republic of Venezuela. It is
absolutely essential to its jurisdiction over any claim
presented to it to determine at the outset the American
citizenship of the claimant. And the fact of such citi-
zenship, like any other fact, must be proved to the
satisfaction of the Commission, or jurisdiction must be
held wanting.
" 'Whatever may be the conclusive force of judgments
of naturalization under the municipal laws of the country
in which they are granted, international tribunals, such
as this Commission, have claimed and exercised the right
to determine for themselves the citizenship of claimants
from all the facts presented.' See Ralston's report,
Venezuelan Arbitrations, 1903, 42, and authorities there
cited.
"No case has come under our observation where the
question arose before a purely domestic tribunal exer-
cising international powers and jurisdiction, but it is not
perceived that the rule could or should be different in
such a case.
"The judgment of naturalization is pnma/ac^e evidence
5233—12
178 NATURALIZATION
of its regularity and will be given 'full faith and credit '
until the defendant overcomes its conclusiveness by
proof. The degree of proof which will constitute a suf-
ficient demonstration by the defense in cases of fraudu-
lent naturalization must necessarily rest in the discretion
of the Commission, there being no adjudicated cases, so
far as we have been able to discover, which furnish de-
finitive guides in this regard.
"The burden upon the defendant in this case is to prove
the legal fraud perpetrated by claimant in the procure-
ment of his naturalization certificate and can not be
shifted by evidence showing errors or irregularities in
the proceedings or by raising a doubt merely in the mind
of the Commission, The proof can not stop at showing
that the facts made to appear to the satisfaction of the
court which granted naturalization were false. It must
at least go to the extent of satisfying the Commission
that the claimant knew the statements and representa-
tions made by him at the time he filed his original declara-
tion and at the time of procuring the judgment were false,
or facts must be proven from which such fraud would be
implied, and it must appear that his false representations
and the representations procured by him to be made by
the other witnesses were intentionally used by him for
the purpose of deceiving the court and thereby securing
his certificate of naturalization.
"The demurrer to defendant's amendment to the answer
is overruled without arresting the further progress of the
case, which will proceed now to a hearing upon evidence
to be submitted regarding fraud."
Commissioner Maury, in an able dissenting opinion,
after setting forth the facts, the contentions of the par-
ties, and the status of the case before the Commission,
said:
"The Commission, without any claim whatever of juris-
diction to cancel or compel the surrender of the certifi-
cate of naturalization issued to Ruiz, has, nevertheless,
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 179
by overruling the demurrer, concluded to go behind the
certificate and investigate the charge of fraud in its pro-
curement, and, in case the charge is established, refuse
to give the certificate effect in this case, leaving it, how-
ever, to be treated as a valid and operative certificate
for all other purposes in the hands of the widow and
children of Ruiz. In other words, as I understand the
position of the Commission, it amounts to this, in the
last analysis, that the certificate of naturalization held
by Ruiz for seventeen years, and up to his death, is
worthless in this case on what I conceive to be ethical
grounds, but that it may be, at the same time, valid and
operative elsewhere on juridical groimds.
"The position of the Commission is contradictory to
one of the best settled and most useful principles of
private international law; which is remarkable, consider-
ing that the Commission in deciding this case has pro-
ceeded on the idea that it is invested with the powers
of an international tribunal established by treaty be-
tween nations, 'among which, it is said, is the power of
administering justice by the rules of the law of nations,
unhampered by those of municipal law. And here it
should be understood that by a fiction Spain, without
interest, substantial or sentimental, is made to perform
a ghostly part in the purely domestic controversies be-
tween American citizens and their government before
this Commission, which, by this forced process, is sup-
posed to be invested with an international character.
"It is conceded that by the municipal law, as laid down
in the federal and state courts of the United States, the
Commission could not have overruled petitioners' de-
murrer, and I hope to be able to show that the action of
the Commission on the demurrer is equally unwarranted
by the law of nations.
"I will begin by quoting a remark of Lord Hardwicke's
which is characterized by great good sense and fre-
quently referred to. His Lordship, speaking with regard
180 NATURALIZATION
to the alleged validity of a certain foreign marriage,
said: 'It has been argued to be valid from being estab-
lished by the sentence of a court in France having proper
jurisdiction. And it is true, that if so, it is conclusive,
whether in a foreign court or not, from the law of na-
tions in such cases; otherwise the rights of inankind
would be very precarious aiid uncertain.^ Roach v.
Garvan, 1 Ves. Sr. 159.
"Upon the same principle of general international con-
venience the Supreme Court, in the great Kosciusko
case, allowed in evidence, to prove kinship, two decrees
of Russian Courts of Nobility, treating them as purely
in rem and good ' against all the world,' having been
rendered by courts of competent jurisdiction. Ennis v.
Smith, 14 How. 400, 430.
'"It is for the convenience of mankind that judgments
in rem should be binding on all the world, . . .' said
Mr. Justice Fry, interrupting counsel, in the case of De
Mora V. Concha (29 Ch. Div. 292), where the effect of
judgments in rem was extremely well discussed at the
bar.
"There is commanding authority for the proposition
that judgments in rem defining permanent personal
status are not open to attack or question collaterally for
any purpose. The convenience of the nations requires
that such status should stand effective everywhere until
annulled by the authority that defined it. And the same
may be said of cases of permanent status not originating
in a judicial act.
"By permanent status I mean a personality conferred
by law without limitation as to time or place, such as
naturalization, legitimacy, adoption, and marriage. See
Minor on Conflict of Laws, Sec. 71, note 5, p. 143, and
Sec. 97, p. 212, ed. 1901; Miller v. Miller, 91 N. Y. 315, 319;
Ross V. Ross, 129 Mass. 243; Adams v. Adams, 154 Mass.
290, 293.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 181
"The principle as stated above belongs to private in-
ternational law and not to municipal law, although, of
course, recognized by it, as is obvious from the follow-
ing authorities:
"Story says that this rule, so widely favored by the
continental jurists, owes its beginning to 'the extreme
inconvenience which would otherwise result to all nations
from a perpetual fluctuation of capacity, state, and con-
dition upon every accidental change of place of the
person or of his movable property.' Conflict of Laws,
Sec. 67.
"The rule as to personal status is the result of the tacit
agreement of nations, attested by the almost unanimous
agreement of authors. Foelix, Droit International, par
Demangeat, Tome 1, p. 64, Paris, 1866.
"Boullenois says that the rule is for the greatest good
of commerce and of intercourse among men. Traite,
etc., Tome 1, 152. He also refers to the fact that Bur-
gundus, who denied any effect to a judgment outside
the country where rendered, made a single exception in
favor of judgments that determine the status and condi-
tions of persons. Id., 603.
"Pardessus says: 'The general consent of civilized
nations has decreed that whatever concerns the capacity
of an individual should be regulated by the laws of the
country to which he belongs.' See Foelix, Tome 1, 62.
"To these authorities Foelix and Demangeat add a long
list of others, to the same effect. Id., 62.
"From this universality of the permanent personal
status, we have the necessary, the inevitable deduction of
its unity and indivisibility. It is no exaggeration to say
that it clings to the individual as the leprosy does to the
skin, to borrow the forcible, if not elegant, illustration
of some of the older authorities. Boullenois says the
personal status pervades the whole being to whom it be-
longs. Others illustrate the idea thus: Qualitas per-
sonam sicut umhra sequitur.
182 NATURALIZATION
"To violate this principle of unity and indivisibility, as
the Commission appears to have done unconsciously
in this case, is to commit a legal solecism; for how can
we speak of a person as, at the same time, legitimate and
illegitimate; as of age and not of age; as capable and
incapable of managing his affairs, and as being a citizen
and not a citizen of the United States? Such is the
character of the illustrations used by the Continental
jurists. Fcelix, Tome 1, 61; Proudhon, Traite des Per-
sonnes. Tome 1, 82.
"Indeed, it would be as incongruous to speak of a per-
son as a leper in part and at the same time as whole,
or as illegitimate in some respects although judicially
found to be legitimate in all respects, or as having two
mothers, as for an international tribunal to declare a
man an alien for the purposes of a particular case, who
is at the same time admitted to be a citizen in all re-
spects by a judgment of naturalization rendered by a
competent court.
"In the face of these great names I am unable to see
how this Commission, assuming, as it does in this case,
to have the power that belongs to an international tri-
bunal established by treaty between nations, can con-
sistently refuse to respect the principle of unity and
indivisibility which is ascribed to personal status by the
private law of nations. This is the more remarkable
when we consider that a judgment fixing the status of a
mere thing is unassailable collaterally anywhere, although
the validity of the reasons for such judgment may he
inquired into, a distinction which does not appear to
have excited the attention of the majority. De Mora v.
Concha, supra. In other words, a judgment fixing the
status of a ship stands on a higher plane than one estab-
lishing the citizenship or legitimacy of an individual,
which is hardly agreeable to reason.
"In a recent great case in England it was seriously
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 183
doubted whether any degree of fraud in a foreign sen-
tence in rem would affect the title of a bona fide pur-
chaser under that sentence. Castrique v. Imbie, L. R. 4
H. L. 414, 433. With such a case compare that of the
innocent widow and children of Ruiz standing in the
presence of this charge of fraud against the husband
and the father, made for the first time eight years after
his death and twenty-five years after the judgment of
naturalization was rendered. Are not these innocents
entitled to as much protection under their judgment in
rem as the innocent purchaser in the case supposed
possibly could be ? Dismiss them from the Commission
with the impress of American nationality still on them
uneffaced, and we give Spain unanswerable ground to
repudiate them as Spanish claimants, while by our own
act we make them outcasts with nowhere to turn for
redress.
"Why the United States did not institute a direct
proceeding in the proper court to cancel the certificate
of naturalization issued to Ruiz has not been explained;
and my voice is against allowing her to do per indirectum
what it would, perhaps, better become her dignity to
do per directum. Indeed, if the matter pleaded by the
defense were not hopelessly bad, the Commission might
now by analogy to the practice in chancery, order the
counsel for the government to institute a direct pro-
ceeding in the proper court to cancel the Ruiz certifi-
ficate, holding this case, meanwhile in abeyance.
"But whether Ruiz was forsworn or not in obtaining
naturalization, I do not think the government should be
permitted to raise a contest on the point with his widow
and children by a direct proceeding even.
"Ruiz having held unquestioned the s^a^i^s of citizen of
the United States up to the time of his death, some
seventeen years, I deem it too late to spring the
issue when he, the only witness who, presumably could
184 NATURALIZATION
meet it, is in his grave. His lips being sealed the govern-
ment should not be allowed to speak either.
"Such a proceeding is against fair play everywhere, and
humanity revolts at it. I take pride in saying that the
common law abhorred it. By that system, where a man,
born out of wedlock of parents who afterwards inter-
married, was treated by them as legitimate all his life
and on his father's death allowed to enter as heir and
die ' seized in peace ' leaving a son, for instance, that
son took by descent to the exclusion of the lawful heir,
whose entry and action were taken away absolutely ,*
because to allow either would have been to bastardize
after death him who had been treated as legitimate
all his life, which the law would not tolerate. Justum
non est aliquem post mortem facere bastardum qui toto
tempore vitce suce pro legitimo habebatur. Co. Litt.
244a; Sir Richard Lechford's case, 8 Co. Rep. 101a.
"Can Ruiz, who lived and died a lawful citizen, now be
made a bastard citizen in his grave, as it were, for the
purpose of defeating the claim of his innocent widow and
children?
"In the recent case of Clyde Mattox v. The United
States (156 U. S. 237), you will find this principle of fair
play strongly upheld. There it is laid down that a wit-
ness on a former trial who had died could not be discred-
* "Note — This is remarkable, because in other instances descent cast
only puts the real owner fo his action, but here descent cast destroys the
right, leaving the lawful heir, though an infant at the time of descent cast,
neither entry nor right. Says Lord Coke:
'" Hereby it appeareth that this discent diflfereth from other discents,
for this discent barreth the right of the mulier [the lawful heir],
whereas other discents do take away the entrie only of him that right
hath, and leaveth him to his action, but here by the dying seised of the
bastard, his issue is become lawfull heire. It is holden that if the mulier
[the lawful heir] bee within age at the time of the dying seised, that
nevertheless hee shall bee barred, because the issue of the bastard is in
judgment of law become lawfull heire, and the law doth prefer legitima-
tion before the privilege of infancie.' Co. Litt. ubi supra.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 185
ited on the second trial by evidence of contradictory
statements, because death had cut him off from an op-
portunity to protect his character and explain away the
supposed contradiction; and this, though justice itself
should thereby fail.
"Could there be a stronger plea for the application of
the principle of fair play than the case before us pre-
sents?
"But assuming it to be of moment, which in in my judg-
ment it is not, to determine whether this Commission is
entitled to take rank with international tribunals or is
only a domestic municipal court, I am of opinion that a
tribunal to be international and, therefore, as held by
the majority, unhampered by municipal law, must in the
nature of things be created by treaty between independ-
ent nations, and that it seems repugnant to reason to
hold that Congress had power to invest this Commission
with authority to exercise a jurisdiction above and be-
yond the Constitution and laws of the United States and
the jurisprudence administered by the Federal courts.
"It is true Congress has power to establish prize courts
whose jurisdiction is to administer international law in
time of war in connection with maritime captures, but
the authority to do so is necessarily implied from the
power conferred by the Constitution on Congress to de-
clare war. So with the jurisdiction conferred by Con-
gress on consular courts established in oriental coun-
tries. Such legislation is for the purpose of carrying out
the provisions of treaties entered into between the United
States and such countries and is not necessarily in har-
mony with the Constitution of the United States. (Re-
vised Statutes of the United States, Sec. 4083, and the
following sections to the end of Title XLVII.)
"Plainly, there is nothing in the treaty of peace that
calls for the establishment of an international tribunal
186 NATURALIZATION
or, indeed, one of any kind. The most that can be said is
that by Article VII of the treaty the United States
agreed to 'adjudicate and settle' the claims released by
the article, but it was left entirely to the United States
to determine how the stipulation should be carried out.
Indeed, the failure of the treaty to designate the way in
which the adjudication should be performed is, of itself,
conclusive evidence that the matter was left entirely to
the United States^ Spain having no longer any interest in
the released claims, which she had fully satisfied by ces-
sions of territory, although, indeed, her spectre is being
continually raised here to serve some special purpose.
"Of course this Commission, like any other domestic
court, must apply the rules of international law when
applicable; but, at the same time, where that code con-
flicts with municipal law the latter must govern as the
law of the land. When, therefore, Congress legislates in
contravention of a treaty, the courts hold that such
legislation supersedes the treaty as a rule of civil con-
duct; notwithstanding the treaty, by the law of nations,
stands unrepealed, so far as the other contracting power
is concerned.
"The case of The Ship Rose v. The United States (36
Ct. Cls. 290) seems to be much relied on as an authority
to show that this Commission, in doing what it calls in-
ternational justice, is not to be controlled by municipal
law. But I think the case is misconceived and not at all
in point. *
"It was a French spoliation case over which the Court
of Claims had no jurisdiction as a court with power to
render a judgment. Indeed, there was nothing conten-
tious in the case, inasmuch as Congress had never con-
sented that the United States should be sued at all and
there was consequently no real plaintiff or real defend-
ant, but merely the form of an adversary proceeding. In
truth, the Court of Claims was simply performing the
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 187
function of a committee of Congress to ascertain and re-
port to Congress the law and the facts of the case with
its views thereon, that Congress might the better judge
whether the rules of international law in force at the
time the ship Rose was captured by the French author-
ized her capture and condemnation.
"It is very plain, therefore, that when the claimants of
the ship undertook to excuse their delinquency under
the law of nations by an act of Congress the court had
a ready answer; that in the controversy in the foreign
prize court between the ship and her French captor the
act of Congress had no relevancy whatever, as it could
not possibly change the law of nations or afford any
justification or excuse for the conduct of the ship which
took place on the high seas, where the act of Congress
could not operate.
"This proceeding, or case, if you please, took place under
the act of Congress of January 20, 1885 (23 Stats. 283),
which expressly says (Sec. 6): 'Such finding and report
of the court shall be taken to be merely advisory as to
the law and facts found, and shall not conclude either
the claimant or Congress.'
"In Gordon v. The United States (117 U.S., Appendix,
699) the Chief Justice comments on this advisory
function of the Court of Claims and likens it to that of
an auditor or comptroller, saying: 'The circumstance
that one is called a court and its decisions called judg-
ments can not alter its character nor enlarge its power.'
"But if Congress has power to establish tribunals that
are at liberty to disregard the decisions of the courts
that are the repositories of the judicial power of the Con-
stitution, there is an end of the supposed coordination
between the legislative and judicial departments of the
government.
"Of course, a judgment may be attacked on jurisdic-
tional grounds under all circumstances. Letters of
188 NATURALIZATION
administration and of guardianship and judgments of
naturalization, for example, may be denied exterritorial
effect, but they can never be collaterally assailed, as in
this case, on a ground that admits jurisdiction in the
authority from which they emanated. This follows from
the unity and indivisibility of status, which, in the
nature of things, can not be exposed to attack or
aspersion save in the jurisdiction authorized to vacate
the act by which the particular status was conferred.
The law of nations has settled down on this principle
with reference to judgments establishing status, what-
ever latitude that code may allow the courts of one
country when called upon to enforce judgments of other
kinds rendered in foreign countries — a subject much
considered in the opinion of the majority, but which I
shall not go into, as, in my view, the case does not re-
quire it.
"It is on the ground of the unity and indivisibility of
status that the authority of a personal representative
appointed by a competent court can not be questioned
in any other court. But, if I understand the reasoning
of the majority, the attack made on the judgment of
naturalization would have been equally permissible if
the petition here had been filed by the administrator of
Ruiz, and the government had made defense on the
ground that the letters of administration were obtained
by petitioner's false swearing. Indeed, a question based
on this hypothesis was put to one of the learned coun-
sel for the government during the argument, but it failed
to elicit discussion.
"It is perfectly clear, therefore, that whether a judg-
ment conferring status be limited in operation to a par-
ticular country, as letters of administration, or be without
such restriction, as where permanent and universal, it
must, from the principle of unity and indivisibility that
inheres in it, be exempt from collateral attack or ques-
tion of any kind.
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 189
"As to the decisions of international commissions, re-
lied on in the majority opinion as upholding the position
taken in this case with regard to the demurrer, I must de-
cline to give them precedence over the opinions of jurists
of world-wide authority, and especially so when I fail to
discover in the decisions of those commissions evidence
that the question now in hand was philosophically con-
sidered."
J. Crimes and Offenses against Naturalization Laws.
False Swearing.
Rev. Stat. Sec. 5395 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 3654] :
"In all cases where any oath or affidavit is made or taken
under or by virtue of any law relating to the naturaliza-
tion of aliens, or in any proceedings under such laws,
any person taking or making such oath or affidavit, who
knowingly swears falsely, shall be punished by imprison-
ment not more than five years, nor less than one year,
and by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars."
Sec. 23, Act of June 29, 1906: "Any person who . . .
in any naturalization proceeding knowingly procures or
gives false testimony as to any material fact, or who
knowingly makes an affidavit false as to any material
fact required to be proved in such proceeding, shall be
fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both."
False Personation, Forgery, Uttering, and Counter-
feiting.
Rev. Stat. Sec. 5424 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 3668]:
"Every person applying to be admitted a citizen, or ap-
pearing as a witness for any such person, who knowingly
personates any other person than himself, or falsely ap-
pears in the name of a deceased person, or in an assumed
or fictitious name, or falsely makes, forges, or counter-
feits any oath, notice, affidavit, certificate, order, record,
signature, or other instrument, paper, or proceeding
190 NATURALIZATION
required or authorized by any law relating to or providing
for the naturalization of aliens; or who utters, sells, dis-
poses of, or uses as true or genuine, or for any unlawful
purpose, any false, forged, antedated, or counterfeit oath,
notice, certificate, order, record, signature, instrument,
paper, or proceeding above specified; or sells or disposes
of to any person other than the person for whom it was
originally issued any certificate of citizenship, or certifi-
cate showing any person to be admitted a citizen — shall
be punished by imprisonment at hard labor not less than
one year, nor more than five years, or by a fine of not
less than three hundred nor more than one thousand
dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
Sec. 16, Act of June 29, 1906: "Every person who
falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, or causes or procures
to be falsely made, forged, or counterfeited, or knowingly
aids or assists in falsely making, forging, or counterfeiting
any certificate of citizenship, with intent to use the same,
or with the intent that the same may be used by some
other person or persons, shall be guilty of a felony, and a
person convicted of such offense shall be punished by
imprisonment for not more than ten years, or by a fine of
not more than ten thousand dollars, or by both such fine
and imprisonment."
Use of forged or counterfeit certificate, etc.
Rev. Stat. 5425 (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 3669): "Every
person who uses, or attempts to use, or aids, or assists,
or participates in the use of, any certificate of citizen-
ship, knowing the same to be forged, or counterfeit, or
antedated, or knowing the same to have been procured
by fraud or otherwise unlawfully obtained; or who, with-
out lawful excuse, knowingly is possessed of any false,
forged, antedated, or counterfeit certificate of citizen-
ship, purporting to have been issued under the provisions
of any law of the United States relating to naturalization,
BY FORMAL PAPERS, 191
knowing such certificate to be false, forged, ante-
dated, or counterfeit, with intent unlawfully to use the
same; or obtains, accepts, or receives any certificate of
citizenship known to such person to have been procured
by fraud or by the use of any false name, or by means of
any false statement made with intent to procure, or to
aid in procuring, the issue of such certificate, or known
to such person to be fraudulently altered or antedated;
and every person who has been or may be admitted to
be a citizen who, on oath or by affidavit, knowingly
denies that he has been so admitted, with intent to
evade or avoid any duty or liability imposed or required
by law, shall be imprisoned at hard labor not less than
one year, nor more than five years, or be fined not less
than three hundred dollars, nor more than one thousand
dollars, or both such punishments may be imposed."
It has been held that this section does not render
punishable the uttering of a forged certificate by a person
other than the one applying for such certificate or ap-
pearing as a witness for the person so applying. United
States V. York, 131 Fed. 323.
Rev. Stat. 5426 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 3669):
" Every person who in any manner uses, for the purpose
of registering as a voter, or as evidence of a right to vote,
or otherwise, unlawfully, any order, certificate of citizen-
ship, or certificate, judgment, or exemplification, show-
ing any person to be admitted to be a citizen, whether
heretofore or hereafter issued or made, knowing that
such order or certificate, judgment, or exemplification
has been unlawfully issued or made; and every person
who unlawfully uses, or attempts to use, any such order
or certificate, issued to or in the name of any other per-
son, or in a fictitious name, or the name of a deceased
person, shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor
not less than one year nor more than five years, or by a
fine of not less than three hundred nor more than one
192 NATURALIZATION
thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprison-
ment."
Sec. 17, Act of June 29, 1906: "Every person who
engraves or causes or procures to be engraved, or assists
in engraving, any plate in the likeness of any plate de-
signed for the printing of a certificate of citizenship, or
who sells any such plate, or who brings into the United
States from any foreign place any such plate, except
under the direction of the Secretary of Commerce and
Labor, or other proper officer, and any person who has
in his control, custody, or possession any metallic plate
engraved after the similitude of any plate from which
any such certificate has been printed, with intent to use
such plate or suffer the same to be used in forging or
counterfeiting any such certificate or any part thereof;
and every person who prints, photographs, or in any
other manner causes to be printed, photographed, made,
or executed, any print or impression in the likeness of
any such certificate, or any part thereof, or who sells any
such certificate, or brings the same into the United States
from any foreign place, except by direction of some
proper officer of the United States, or who has in his
possession a distinctive paper which has been adopted
by the proper officer of the United States for the print-
ing of such certificate, with intent to unlawfully use the
same, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
ten thousand dollars, or by imprisonment at hard labor
for not more than ten years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment."
Rev. Stat. 5427 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 3670): "Every
person who knowingly and intentionally aids or abets
any person in the commission of any felony denounced
in sections 5424, 5425, and 5426, or attempts to do any
act therein made felony, or counsels, advises, or
procures, or attempts to procure, the commission thereof,
shall be punished in the same manner and to the same
extent as the principal party."
BY FORMAL PAPERS. ' 193
Rev. Stat. 5428 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 3670):
"Every person who knowingly uses any certificate of
naturalization heretofore granted by any court, or here-
afterSgranted, which has been or may be procured through
fraud or by false evidence, or has been or may be issued by
the clerk, or any other officer of the court without any
appearance and hearing of the applicant in court and
without lawful authority; and every person who falsely
represents himself to be a citizen of the United States,
without having been duly admitted to citizenship, for
any fraudulent purpose whatever, shall be punishable by
a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or be
imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
Rev. Stat. 5429 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1001, 3670) : "The
provisions of the five preceding sections [i. e. R. S.
5424-5428] shall apply to all proceedings had or taken,
or attempted to be had or taken, before any court in
which any proceeding for naturalization may be com-
menced or attempted to be commenced."
Unlawful possessioti of blank certificate of citi-
zenship.
Sec. 19, Act of June 29, 1906: "Every person who
without lawful excuse is possessed of any blank certifi-
cate of citizenship provided by the Bureau of Immigra-
tion and Naturalization, with intent unlawfully to use the
same, shall be imprisoned at hard labor not more than
five years or be fined not more than one thousand dol-
lars."
Unlawfully procuring naturalization.
Sec. 23, Act of June 29, 11906: "Any person who
knowingly procures naturalization in violation of the
provisions of this Act shall be fined not more than five
thousand dollars, or shall be imprisoned not more than
five years, or both, and upon conviction the court in
which such conviction is had shall thereupon adjudge
6233—13
194 NATURALIZATION
and declare the final order admitting such person to
citizenship void. Jurisdiction is hereby conferred on
the courts having jurisdiction of the trial of such offense
to make such adjudication. Any person who knowingly
aids, advises, or encourages any person not entitled
thereto to apply for or to secure naturalization, or to file
the preliminary papers declaring an intent to become a
citizen of the United States, or who in any naturaliza-
tion proceeding knowingly procures or gives false testi-
mony as to any material fact, or who knowingly makes
an affidavit false as to any material fact required to be
proved in such proceeding, shall be fined not more than
five thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both."
2. By Clerks.
Act of June 29, 1906.
"Sec. 18. It is hereby made a felony for any clerk or
other person to issue or be a party to the issuance of a
certificate of citizenship contrary to the provisions of
this Act, except upon a final order under the hand of a
court having jurisdiction to make such order, and upon
conviction thereof such clerk or other person shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than five years
and by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, in
the discretion of the court."
"Sec. 20. Any clerk or other officer of a court having
power under this Act to naturalize aliens, who wilfully
neglects to render true accounts of moneys received by
him for naturalization proceedings or who wilfully neg-
lects to pay over any balance of such moneys due to the
United States within thirty days after said payment
shall become due and demand therefor has been made
and refused, shall be deemed guilty of embezzlement of
the public moneys, and shall be punishable by imprison-
ment for not more than five years, or by a fine of not
more than five thousand dollars, or both."
BY FORMAL PAPERS. 195
"Sec. 21. It shall be unlawful for any clerk of any court
or his authorized deputy or assistant exercising jurisdic-
tion in naturalization proceedings to demand, charge,
collect, or receive any other or additional fees or moneys
in naturalization proceedings save the fees and moneys
herein specified; and a violation of any of the provisions
of this section or any part thereof is hereby declared to
be a misdemeanor and shall be punished by imprison-
ment for not more than two years, or by a fine of not
more than one thousand dollars, or by both such fine
and imprisonment."
"Sec. 22. The clerk of any court exercising jurisdiction
in naturalization proceedings, or any person acting un-
der authority of this Act, who shall knowingly certify
that a petitioner, affiant, or witness named in an affidavit,
petition, or certificate of citizenship, or other paper or
writing required to be executed under the provisions of
this Act, personally appeared before him and was sworn
thereto, or acknowledged the execution thereof or signed
the same, when in fact such petitioner, affiant, or witness
did not personally appear before him, or was not sworn
thereto, or did not execute the same, or did not acknowl-
edge the execution thereof, shall be punished by a fine
not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment
not to exceed five years."
3. Limitation of Actions.
"Sec. 24. No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or
punished for any crime arising under the provisions of
this Act [June 29, 1906], unless the indictment is found
or the information is filed within five years next after
the commission of such crime."
Crimes Committed Prior to the Date When the
Act of June 29, 1906, Went Into Effect.
Act of June 29, 1906: "Sec. 25. For the purpose of
the prosecution of all crimes and offenses against the
196 NATURALIZATION
naturalization laws of the United States which may have
been committed prior to the date when this Act shall go
into effect, the existing naturalization laws shall remain
in full force and effect."
"Sec. 31. This act shall take effect and be in force
from and after ninety days from the date of its passage:
Provided that sections one, two, twenty-eight, and
twenty-nine shall go into effect from and after the passage
of this Act."
BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 197
CHAPTER II.
NATURALIZATION BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT.
A. In general.
B. Meaning of phrase "dwelling in the United States."
1. Where the children are dwelling in United States at naturaliza-
tion of parent.
2. Where the children are dwelling abroad at naturalization of
parent.
3. Act of March 2, 1907.
C. Mode of parent's naturalization immaterial.
a. By naturalization of father by treaty.
b. By naturalization of mother by marriage.
D. Illegitimate children.
E. Adoption.
F. Effect of declaration of intention of parent during minority of child.
G. Naturalization not effective internationally as to absent family.
NATURALIZATION BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT.
A. In General.
The naturalization of an alien also confers citizenship
upon his minor children dwelling in the United States.
Section 2172, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,
1334), provides that " the children of persons who have
been duly naturalized under any law of the United States,
. . . being under the age of twenty-one years at the
time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if
dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens
thereof; and the children of persons who now are, or
have been citizens of the United States, shall, though
born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United
States, be considered as citizens thereof."
This is substantially the language of the Act of April
14, 1802(2 Stat, at L. 153), which repealed the Act of
January 29, 1795 (1 Stat, at L. 414), the wording of which
was: "The children of persons duly naturalized, dwelling
within the United States, and being under the age of
twenty-one years, at the time of such naturalization, and
198 NATURALIZATION
the children of citizens of the United States, born out of
the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, shall be
considered as citizens of the United States."
B. Meaning of Phrase " Dwelling in the United States."
The use of the qualifying phrase, " Dwelling in the
United States," makes the meaning of the law somewhat
uncertain. The difficulty is in determining at what period
of time the child is required to be "dwelling in the
United States" in order to acquire citizenship. The ques-
tion can be most logically considered under the follow-
ing division: (1) Where the children are dwelling
in the United States at the time of the parent's natura-
lization; (2) where the children are dwelling abroad at
the time of the parent's naturalization.
1. Where the Children Are Dwelling in the United States
at the Time of the Parent's Naturalization.
The naturalization of an alien naturalizes his minor
children born abroad but residing in the United States
at the time of his naturalization. Children born abroad
of aliens who subsequently emigrated to this country
with their families, and were naturalized during the
minority of their children, are citizens of the United
States. 10 Ops. Atty. General, 329; Gumm v. Hubbard,
97 Mo. 311; 10 Am. St. Rep. 312; State, ex rel. Carey v.
Andriano, 92 Mo. 70, 4 S. W. 263.
In the case of West v. West, 8 Paige Ch. 432, which
arose in 1840, the facts were that a British subject who
was twice married, each time to a native English woman,
had three children born to him by the first wife and four
children by the second. The first two children of his
second marriage were born in England. In 1823, after the
birth of the second child, he removed to New York with
his wife and five children, where two more were born to
him. In 1830, he was naturalized while his children were
BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 199
all minors, residing with him. Upon his death, claim
was asserted on behalf of the children born in this
country to his entire estate on the ground that the chil-
dren born in England were aliens and could not inherit.
It was decided by the court that it was the intention of
the law of 1802 "to embrace the children of those who
should thereafter be, as well as those who had already
been, duly naturalized under any of the laws of the
United States;" that "all the children . . . were citizens
of the United States at the time of his death, and his real
estate descended to them in equal proportion as tenants
in common."
In State v. Penney, 10 Ark. 621, it appeared that an
alien came to the United States when his son was eleven
years of age, and that the father was naturalized during
the son's minority. The son was subsequently elected to
the oiBce of sheriff in Arkansas. Quo icarranto proceed-
ings were brought against him, upon the ground that at
the time of his election he was not a citizen of the
United States. The court held that he was naturalized
by the naturalization of his father, and said that under
the Act of 1802, the infant children of aliens, though
born out of the United States, if dwelling within the
United States at the time of the naturalization of their
parents, became citizens by such naturalization.
In State v. Andriano, 92 Mo. 70, the court held that:
"The infant children of aliens, though born out of the
United States, if dwelling within the United States at
the time of the naturalization of their parents, became
citizens by such naturalization, and the provisions of
that act on this subject are prospective, and intended to
embrace the children of those who should thereafter be,
as well as those who had already been, duly naturalized
under any of the laws of the United States,"
The same conclusion was reached by the court in
200 NATURALIZATION
O'Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, which involved the citizen-
ship of a native of Bavaria, who came to the United
States while a minor, with his father who took out
naturalization papers during the son's minority. See,
also, North Noonday Mining Co. v. Orient Mining Co., "6
Sawyer, 299.
2. Where the Children are Dwelling Abroad at the Time of
the Parent's Naturalization.
The statute applies also to children who come to the
United States after the father's naturalization, but be-
fore they reach majority.
In Campbell v. Gordon, 6 Cranch, 175, the facts were
that a subject of Great Britain emigrated to the United
States, leaving in Scotland a daughter who had been
born there. In 1795 the father was naturalized in the
United States, and in 1797, his daughter joined him in
this country. The question of her citizenship being pre-
sented to the Supreme Court of the United States in
1809, the court said:
''The next question to be decided is whether the natu-
ralization of William Currie conferred upon his daughter
the rights of a citizen, after her coming to and residing
within the United States, she having been a resident in
a foreign country at the time when her father was natu-
ralized?
" Whatever difficulty might exist as to the construction
of the third section of the Act of the 29th of January,
1795, in relation to this point, it is conceived that the
rights of citizenship were clearly conferred upon the
female appellee by the fourth section of the Act of the
14th of April, 1802. This Act declares that the children
of persons duly naturalized under any of the laws of the
United States, being under the age of 21 years at the
time of their parent's being so naturalized, shall, if dwell-
ing in the United States, be considered as citizens of the
BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 20 1
United States. This is precisely the case of Mrs. Gordon.
Her father was duly naturalized, at which time she was
an infant; but she came to the United States before the
year 1802, and was at the time when this law passed
dwelling within the United States.
"It is therefore the unanimous opinion of the court
that at the time of the death of James Currie, Mrs. Gor-
don was entitled to all the right and privilege of a
citizen."
While this decision has been cited as authority for the
view that under the statute, children born abroad but
who come to the United States and dwell here after the
naturalization of the father and during their minority are
citizens of the United States, what the court really de-
cided was that the minor daughter of a person natural-
ized as a citizen of the United States became a citizen
though not within the United States at the time of his
naturalization, as she was dwelling here ai the time when
the Act of 1802 was passed.
The Supreme Court, in Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135,
declared that the Act of 1802 was intended to operate
prospectively as well as retrospectively, and should not
be limited to the children of those who had been natural-
ized at the time of its passage. See U. S. v. Kellar, 13
Fed. 82.
In Young v. Peck, 21 Wend. 389, and 26 Wend. 613,
the facts were that a native of Scotland emigrated to the
United States in 1774 and acquired citizenship here, not
by formal naturalization, but by residence and election of
American allegiance. He had a daughter who had been
born in Scotland about 1770 and who remained there
and married in that country. Her husband died and she
came to the United States in 1830, when she was about
sixty years old. Notwithstanding she was not "dwelling
in the United States " either at the time of her father's
naturalization, or at any time during her minority, and
hence did not come within the description of "children"
202 NATURALIZATION
in the statute, the Supreme Court of New York decided
that she was a citizen of the United States, under the
provisions of the Act of 1802. The court appears to have
taken the view that the intent of the law was that such
persons were to be considered as citizens whenever
dwelling in the United States. It does not appear that
there is legal basis for the opinion. Although the deci-
sion was affirmed on appeal, the decision of the superior
court is no more satisfactory than that of the court be-
low. It seems that the higher court based its decision
that the daughter was a citizen upon the ground of the
transfer of the allegiance by her father while she was a
minor.
In Ludlam v. Ludlam, 31 Barb. 486, the court said that
"Young V. Peck was decided in the Supreme Court upon
the statute of 1802, and in the court of errors either upon
the same ground or upon the effect of the Declaration of
Independence and the treaty of peace upon persons
domiciled and remaining here after the revolutionary
war."
The phrase "dwelling in the United States" was con-
strued by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
interesting case of Zartarian v. Billings, decided January
7, 1907 (204 U. S. 170). Charles Zartarian, a Turkish
subject, came to this country about the year 1880, leav-
ing his wife and two children in Turkey. In 1896, he be-
came naturalized in Chicago, and in 1904 sent passage-
money for his wife and children to join him in this
country. At the request of the American minister at
Constantinople, the Turkish Government granted them
permission to emigrate to the United States, it being
stipulated in the passport that they could never return
to Turkey. Upon their arrival at Boston, Zartarian's
wife and son were admitted, but it being found that the
daughter Mariam had trachoma, she was debarred from
BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 203
landing, under the Immigration Act of March 3, 1903,
32 Stat, at L. 1213, which provides that aliens afflicted
with a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease, shall
be excluded from admission to the United States. She
was detained in the immigration detention hospital at
Boston, and the father, by writ of habeas corpus peti-
tioned the United States Circuit Court for the District of
Massachusetts, alleging that her restraint was in viola-
tion of her constitutional rights, without due process of
law, and contrary to the provisions of Section 2172 of
the Revised Statutes, which, it was claimed, made her a
citizen of the United States, by virtue of the citizenship
of her father. The circuit court having denied the peti-
tion, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the
United States. Mr. Justice Day, delivering the opinion
of the court, after reciting the facts, said:
" The contention is that she does not come within the
terms of this statute, not being an alien, but entitled to
be considered a citizen of the United States, under the
provisions of Section 2172 of the Revised Statutes,
which provides: 'The children of persons who have been
duly naturalized under any law of the United States
. . . being under the age of twenty-one years at the
time of naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling
in the United States, be considered as citizens thereof.'
"As Mariam was born abroad, a native of Turkey, she
has not become a citizen of the United States except
upon compliance with the terms of the Act of Congress,
for, wanting native birth, she can not otherwise become
a citizen of the United States. Her right to citizenship,
if any she has, is the creation of Congress, exercising the
power over this subject conferred by the Constitution.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 702.
"The relevant section, 2172, which it is maintained
confers the right of citizenship, is the culmination of a
204 NATURALIZATION
number of Acts on the subject passed by Congress from
the earliest period of the government. Their history will
be found in vol. 3, Moore's Int. Law Digest, 467.
"Section 2172 is practically the same as the Act of
April 14, 1802, 2 Stat. 153, which provided:
"'The children of persons duly naturalized under any
of the laws of the United States . . . being under
the age of 21 years at the time of their parents being so
naturalized . . . shall, if dwelling in the United
States, be considered as citizens of the United States,
and the children of persons who are now or have been
citizens of the United States shall, though born out of
the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be con-
sidered citizens of the United States.'
"In Campbell i?. Gordon, 6Cranch, 176, it was held that
this Act conferred citizenship upon the daughter of an
alien naturalized under the Act of January 29, 1795, she
being in this country at the time of the passage of the
Act of April 14, 1802, and then 'dwelling in the United
States.'
"The Act has also been held to be prospective in its
operation and to include children of aliens naturalized
after its passage, when 'dwelling in the United States.'
Boyd V. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135, 177.
"The construction of this law and the meaning of the
phrase 'dwelling in the United States' has been the
subject of much consideration in the executive depart-
ment of the government having to do with the admis-
sion of foreigners and the rights of alleged naturalized
citizens of the United States. The rulings of the State
Department are collected in Prof. Moore's Digest of Inter-
national Law, vol. 3, 467 et seq.
"The Department seems to have followed a rule estab-
lished at an early period, and formulated with fullness
in Foreign Relations for 1890, 301, in an instruction
from Mr. Blaine to Minister Phelps, at Berlin, in which it
BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 205
was laid down that the naturalization of the father
operates to confer the municipal right of citizenship
upon the minor child if, at the time of the father's nat-
uralization, dwelling within the jurisdiction of the
United States, or if he come within that jurisdiction
subsequent to the father's naturalization and during his
own minority.
"Whether, in the latter case, a child not within the
jurisdiction of the United States at the time of the
parents' naturalization, but coming therein during minor-
ity, acquires citizenship is not a question now before us.
"The limitation to children 'dwelling in the United
States' was doubtless inserted in recognition of the
principle that citizenship can not be conferred by the
United States on the citizens of another country when
under such foreign jurisdiction; and is also in deference
to the right of independent sovereignties to fix the alle-
giance of those born within their dominions, having re-
gard to the principle of the common law which permits
a sovereignty to claim, with certain exceptions, the citi-
zenship of those born within its territory.
"It is pointed out by Mr. Justice Gray, delivering the
opinion in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S.
649, 686, that the naturalization acts of the United
States have been careful to limit admission to citizen-
ship to those 'within the limits and under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States.'
"The right of aliens to acquire citizenship is purely
statutory; and the petitioner's child having been born and
remained abroad, clearly does not come within the terms
of the statute. She was debarred from entering the
United States by the action of the authorized officials,
and, never having legally landed, of course could not
have dwelt within the United IStates. Nishimura Ekiu
V. United States, 142 U. S. 651.
"It is urged that this seems a harsh application of the
206 NATURALIZATION
law, but if the terms of the statute are to be extended
to include children of a naturalized citizen who have
never dwelt in the United States, such action must come
from legislation of Congress and not judicial de-
cision. Congress has made provision concerning an alien's
wife or minor child suffering from contagious disease,
when such alien has made a declaration of his intention
to become a citizen, and when such disease was con-
tracted on board the ship in which they came, holding
them under regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury
until it shall be determined whether the disorder will be
easily curable, or whether such wife or child can be per-
mitted to land without danger to other persons, requiring
that they shall not be deported until such facts are ascer-
tained, 37 Stat. 1221, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, Supp. of
1903, 185. But Congress has not said that an alien child
who has never dwelt in the United States, coming to
join a naturalized parent, may land when afflicted with a
dangerous contagious disease.
"As this subject is entirely within Congressional con-
trol, the matter must rest there; it is only for the courts
to apply the law as they find it.
"It is suggested that the agreed finding of facts con-
tains no stipulation as to the dangerous or contagious
quality of trachoma, but the petition shows that the
petitioner's daughter was debarred from landing because
it was found that she had a dangerous contagious disease,
to wit, trachoma. Furthermore, the statute makes the
finding of the board of inquiry final, so far as review by
the courts is concerned, the only appeal being to certain
officers of the department. 32 Stat. 1213; Nishimura
Ekiu V. United States, 142 U. S. 651."
The order of the Circuit Court was affirmed, and orders
for the deportation of the young woman were issued. As
she was precluded from returning to her native land, she
BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 207
was "a woman without a country," and it seemed im-
probable that she would be allowed to enter any civil-
ized country. Fortunately, just at this juncture, the
doctors at the hospital pronounced her cured, the De-
partment of Commerce and Labor issued an order for
her release, and she was allowed to join her parents.
The instruction of Mr. Blaine, to which the court re-
ferred was prepared by John Bassett Moore, than whom
there is no higher authority on such questions in the
United States, and it related to the case of Carl Heis-
inger. Because of the importance of the instruction, it
is quoted in full:
" Mrs. Heisinger was born in Altona, Prussia. Her hus-
band was also an alien by birth and came to the United
States in May, 1866. He was naturalized August 18,
1871, and died probably not later than 1879. The son
Carl was born in Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsyl-
vania, Jan. 21, 1871, more than six months before the
naturalization of his father. In 1879 Mrs. Heisinger re-
turned to Germany, taking her son with her, and has
ever since resided in that country. . . . It is a
reasonable interpretation that the words, ' if dwelling in
the United States ' were intended, among other things,
to meet the cases of conflicting claims of allegiance. In
this relation it is pertinent to disclose the origin of those
words. On March 26, 1790, an act was approved, enti-
tled 'An Act to establish an uniform rule of naturaliza-
tion.' 1 Stats, at Large, 103. This was the first law
enacted by Congress on that subject. The first clauses
prescribe the conditions and methods of naturalization.
Then followed these words: 'And the children of such
persons so naturalized, dwelling within the United States,
being under the age of 21 years at the time of such natu-
ralization, shall also be considered as citizens of the
United States.' In 1795 the law of 1790 was repealed
208 NATURALIZATION
by an Act of the 29th of January of the former year
entitled 'An Act to establish an uniform rule of natural-
ization, and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that
subject.' 1 Stats, at Large, 414. By the third section
of the Act of January 29, 1795, it was provided that:
"'The children of persons duly naturalized, dwelling
within the United States and being under the age of 21
years at the time of such naturalization, and the children
of citizens of the United States born out of the limits
and jurisdiction of the United States shall, if dwelling
in the United States, be considered citizens thereof.'
"It will be observed that in this provision, which is
incorporated in section 2172 of the Revised Statutes, the
words *if dwelling in the United States' are transposed.
The effect of this transposition was considered by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Camp-
bell V. Gordon (6 Cranch, 176), in 1810. The case involved
a title to land, which depended upon the citizenship
of one Yanetta Gordon, nee Currie, who was by birth a
British subject. Her father, also a natural-born British
subject, emigrated to the United States, and in 1795 was
naturalized. His daughter Yanetta was then residing in
Scotland, where she remained until 1797, in which year
she came to the United States. It was contended
by counsel that she was not a citizen of the United
States, inasmuch as she was not dwelling in the United
States at the time of her father's naturalization. The
Supreme Court took a different view of the matter. Mr.
Justice Washington, delivering the opinion of the court,
said: 'The next question to be decided is whether the
naturalization of William Currie conferred upon his
daughter the rights of a citizen after her coming to and
residing within the United States, she having been a
resident in a foreign country at the time when her father
was naturalized. Whatever difficulty might exist as to
BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 209
the construction of the third section of the Act of
January 29, 1795, in relation to this point, it is con-
ceived that the rights of citizenship were clearly con-
ferred upon the female appellee by the fourth section of
the Act of April 14, 1802. This Act declares that the
children of persons duly naturalized under any of the
laws of the United States, being under the age of 21
years at the time of their parents being so naturalized,
shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as
citizens of the United States. This is precisely the case
of Mrs. Gordon.'
"The effect of the law, as thus expounded, is to make
actual residence in the United States, and not residence
at the time of naturalization, the test of the claim to
citizenship; and here as explanatory of this rule, it is
important to observe the associated provision, found in
all the acts above quoted, and incorporated in the same
relation in Section 2172 of the Revised Statutes, that chil-
dren born of citizens of the United States shall, though
born out of the limts and jurisdiction of theUnited States,
be considered as citizens thereof. Under this provision,
such children are treated as citizens thereof, whether
dwelling in the United States or not, being regarded as
citizens of the United States by birth. The preceding
provision relates to children born of parents who were
not at the time citizens of the United States and upon
whom the country of the parents, under the same rule
of law as that announced by this Government, might have
claims of allegiance. In respect to such persons, the
words ' if dwelling in the United States ' recognize another
principle, and that is that it is not within the power of
a parent to eradicate the original nationality of his child,
though he may, during the minority of such child, invest
him with rights or subject him to duties which may or
may not be claimed or performed. For this reason, also,
5233—14
210 NATURALIZATION
it is provided that children not born citizens of the
United States are, by virtue of naturalization of the
parents, to be considered as citizens of the United States
'if dwelling' therein.
"The Department does not desire to be understood to
a,ssert that natural-born subjects of a foreign power whose
parents have been naturalized in the United States must
at every moment be dwelling in the United States in
order to claim its citizenship. That question does not
arise in the present case. The words 'if dwelling in the
United States,' whether meaning residence at a particular
moment or contemplating a settled abode, apply to Carl
Heisinger, who, being now 19 years of age, has for about
11 years been dwelling in Germany. It is not known that
the government of that country has made any claims
upon him. But, if the German government should, under
a provision of law similar to that in force in the United
States in relation to the foreign-born children of citizens,
seek to exact from him the performance of obligations as
a natural-born subject, the Department would be bound
to consider the provisions of Section 2172 of the Revised
Statutes." Mr. Blaine to Mr. Phelps, Feb. 1, 1890, For.
Rel. 1890, 301.
A boy of 18 years, who has never been out of Germany,
but whose father is a naturalized citizen of and resident
in the United States, is not entitled to obtain the inter-
vention of this government to secure him from military
service in Germany, or to relieve him from being detained
in Germany for that purpose. Mr. Evarts to Mr. Cald-
well, Mch. 6, 1880; 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 464.
"The laws of the United States on the subject of natu-
ralization provide, in relation to persons situated as your
sons are, 'that the children of persons duly naturalized
under any of the laws of the United States, . . .
being under the age of 21 years at the time of their
parents being so naturalized or admitted to the rights of
BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 211
citizenship, shall, if dwelling in the United States, be
considered as citizens of the United States.' Assuming
that your three sons were born in France, accompanied
you to this country, and have continued to reside here,
they, together with your son born here, are, under the
provision just cited, to be considered when dwelling in
the United States, citizens of the United States, with all
the rights and privileges attaching to that character, and
entitled to the protection which this government ex-
tends to all its citizens in the exercise and enjoyment of
these rights." Mr. Fish to Mr. Jouffret, Feb. 11, 1874;
3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 465.
Robert Emden was born in Switzerland in 1862. His
father, a native of Switzerland, was naturalized in the
United States in 1854, but soon afterwards returned to
Switzerland, where he ever afterwards continued to reside.
In 1885 the son, who had never been in theUnited States,
applied to the American legation at Berne for a passport.
Secretary Bayard held: "The passport application of Mr.
Robert Emden, although he is the son of a naturalized
American, can not be granted, because he is not, and
never has been, 'dwelling in the United States,' according
to Section 2172 of the Revised Statutes. 3 Moore's Int.
Law Digest, 466.
A native of Germany was taken in infancy to the United
States. Her father, who was a German, died soon after
his emigration, and his widow married his brother, who
was a naturalized citizen of the United States. Subse-
quently, when she was 24 years of age, having lived
nearly all her life in the United States, she went to Ger-
many, temporarily, to study music. She applied soon
afterwards to the embassy for a passport, which was
granted. The action of the embassy was approved by
the Department of State. Mr. Adee, Acting Secretary, to
Mr. Runyon, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 466.
J. W. claimed American citizenship through the
212 NATURALIZATION
naturalization of his father. The latter was born in the
Crimea in 1836, came to the United States in 1875, and
was naturalized in 1881. Three months later he returned
to Russia, where he continued to reside, following the
occupation of a farmer. J. W. was born in Russia and
returned to that country with his father in 1881, being
then 19 years of age, and afterwards resided there, also
following the occupation of a farmer. In 1891, being
then 28 years of age, he applied to the American legation
at St. Petersburg for a passport. He expressed no inten-
tion as to returning to the United States. Mr. Blaine
declared that it would not have availed him if he had.
Under Section 2172, Revised Statutes, said the Depart-
ment, the children of persons who have been duly nat-
uralized, being under the age of 21 years at the time of
their parents' naturalization, are, "if dwelling in the
United States," to be considered as citizens thereof.
J. W., said the Department, "never has dwelt here
since attaining his majority, and is not dwelling here
now. He is therefore precluded by the statute from
claiming the benefits of citizenship of the United States."
3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 469.
In the case of Henry Huber and family and Frederick
Huber and family, who, in 1881, applied to our legation
in Vienna for passports, the facts were as follows: Henry
Huber was born in Switzerland in 1823, married there in
1846, and had five children born in that country. He
came to the United States with his family in 1854, was
naturalized in 1859, and returned with his family to
Europe in 1860. His eldest son, Heinrich Huber, returned
to this country in 1864, and continued to reside here
His son Frederick married an Austrian subject in Austria
in 1876. The latter stated that he intended "in course of
time" "to return to America." Minister Kasson granted
a passport to Henry Huber, accompanied by his wife and
infant child. In reporting the matter to the Department^
BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 213
he said: "My difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory de-
cision in these cases arises from the language of our stat-
ute. . . . Sec. 2172 (U.S.Comp. Stat. 1901, 1334) intends
minors living with their parents at the time of natural-
ization, but employs as to these the dubious expression
'shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as
citizens thereof.' Does that mean that our laws make
them citizens by virtue of the father's naturalization
while they are minors living with him? Or does it mean
that the law considers them to be citizens only during
their residence in the United States, and withholds pro-
tection from them outside of the domestic jurisdiction?
Or that they are not to be considered our citizens at all,
anywhere beyond their minority? Are they thrown back,
on arriving in Europe, upon their born allegiance?" Sec-
retary Blaine approved Mr. Kasson's action, and said in
reply: "This Department has always held the provisions
of Sec. 2172, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1334),
as applicable to such children as were actually residing
in the United States at the time of their fathers' natural-
ization, and to minor children who came to the United
States during their minority and while the parents were
residing here in the character of citizens. This view ap-
pears to be in consonance with the traditional policy of
the government on the subject of citizenship." Mr. Blaine
to Mr. Kasson, March 31, 1881, For. Rel. 1881, 53.
In a despatch dated October 13, 1884, Mr. Kasson in-
quired: "Does the phrase, 'if dwelling in the United
States'— Rev. Stat. Sec. 2172 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,
1334) — refer to the date of naturalization, or to the
duration of residence within the United States, and
excluding a foreign residence? In other words, which of
these readings is correct: 'Sec. 2172 (U. S. Comp. Stat.
1901, 1334). The children of persons who have been
duly naturalized under any law of the United States,
. . . being under the age of twenty-one years at the
214 NATURALIZATION
time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if [at
the time] dwelling in the United States [or while dwell-
ing in the United States] be considered as citizens there-
of.' The former construction would allow a young man
to join his father in the United States a week before his
naturalization, and return to his native land a week after,
a full-fledged American citizen, while still in his minority,
and without renunciation of old allegiance or swearing
to the new." For. Rel. 1884, 202.
In reply. Secretary Frelinghuysen stated that Mr.
Kasson's query was hypothetical, and that no such case
had, so far as he knew, been presented for the decision
of the Executive or the courts of the United States. He
said, however, that in the light of Rev. Stat., Sec. 1999 (U.
S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1269), declaring any decision of any
officer of the government tending to restrict the right of
expatriation to be inconsistent with the fundamental
principles of the Republic, and of Sec. 2000 (U. S. Comp.
Stat. 1901, 1270), declaring that all naturalized citizens
of the United States while in foreign countries are en-
titled to receive from this government the same protec-
tion which is accorded to native-born citizens, it was
difficult to see how any branch of the government could
well maintain that the children of persons duly natural-
ized in the United States, and therefore also citizens by
law, should lose that status by the mere act of passing
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
especially if they passed within the limits of a third
state not of the original allegiance, which could under
no circumstances lay claim to their subjection. ^'It can
be seen," said he, "how such an interpretation might re-
gard a citizen of the United States as a citizen of no
country whatever, through the sole fact of setting foot
outside of our territory, and how, by again setting foot
within our borders, his right of citizenship might be
deemed to revive unimpaired."
BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 215
Referring to Mr. Kasson's remark that the construction
of the phrase as meaning that the minor children who
become citizens through the naturalization of the father
must be, at the time of the father's naturalization,
dwelling in the United States, would allow a young man
to join his father in the United States a week before his
naturalization, and return to his native land a week
after, a full-fledged American citizen. Secretary Freling-
huysen said: ''That such a thing is possible is a defect
in our existing naturalization laws." For. Rel. 1885,395,,
396; Van Dyne, Citizenship of the United States, 111.,
112.
Jacob Lenzen, Jr., was born in Germany in 1881, and in
1882 was taken by his father to the United States, where
he lived until August, 1898, when he went to Germany
with the intention of remaining two or three years. His
father was naturalized September 13, 1898 — after young
Lenzen had left the United States. Lenzen applied for a
passport, to the United States embassy at Berlin. Upon
the request of the embassy for instructions, Secretary
Hay said: "The words 'dwelling in the United States,'
in Rev. Stat., Sec. 2172 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1334),
have been held by the Department to mean either at the
time of the father's naturalization or afterwards during
the child's minority."
After quoting Mr. Blaine's instruction to Mr. Kasson,
supra, he added: "Taking this view, young Lenzen, who
was not dwelling in the United States at the time of his
father's naturalization, and has not dwelt here since, is
not a citizen of the United States. Should he come to
the United States and dwell here during his minority he
would, however, be entitled to claim citizenship under
the statute." Mr. Hay to Mr. White, October 15, 1898,
MSS. Inst, to Germany; Id. August 18, 1898.
It is sufficient, therefore, it seems, if the children are
"dwelling in the United States" at the time of the
216 NATURALIZATION
naturalization of tiieir parents, or at any subsequent
period during their minority.
The naturalization of an alien, after his son, born out
of the United States, has become of age, does not make
the latter a citizen. Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135, 36
L. ed. 103, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375.
Naturalization of the parent in the United States does
not confer citizenship on his minor children born abroad
before that event, and continuing to reside and attain
their majority abroad. Mr. Foster to Mr. Lincoln, August
10, 1892, MSS. Inst, to Gt. Brit., For. Rel. 1892, 233. See,
also, Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Brulatour, July 30, 1883,
For. Rel. 1883, 274.
If the children remain abroad until they reach major-
ity, they can not acquire citizenship through their
parents' naturalization. In the case of Frank Fred
Nicklas, the father emigrated to the United States from
Germany in 1869, and was naturalized here in 1884. In
1885 he sent for his son, aged seventeen, to join him in
this country. The son was arrested just before he started,
was confined in jail for a couple of weeks, and was then
brought before a court of justice and discharged. The
father requested the intervention of this government in
the son's behalf. Secretary Bayard said: "If, as is under-
stood from your statement, the son, Frank Fred Nicklas,
did not emigrate with his father to America, was not re-
siding in America when his father was naturalized here
in 1884, and has not at any time since been a resident of
the United States, he can not be considered a United
States citizen. Our laws require that the children of
persons who have been naturalized here must be 'dwelling
in the United States' to be considered citizens thereof."
Mr. Bayard to Mr. Cole, November 9, 1885, MSS. Dom.
Let.
And upon the application of Mr. Charles Drevet for a
passport, it appeared that he was born, in 1864, in Paris,
where he had always resided. His father, a Frenchman,
BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 217
came to the United States in 1852; in 1858 he declared
his intention to become an American citizen; in 1859 he
married an American lady; in 1860 he went back to
France; in 1869 he returned to America; in the same
year he took out his second papers, and shortly after re-
sumed his residence in France, where he continued to
live. The son had always lived in France; the father
had been domiciled there for many years; neither the
son nor the father had expressed any intention of residing
in the United States at any time in the future. The
department held that, under Rev. Stat. Sec. 2172 (U. S.
Comp. Stat. 1901, 1334), as Charles Drevet was not, at
the time of the naturalization of his father, dwelling in
the United States; as he had never resided in this coun-
try, and never intended to do so, he could not be con-
sidered an American citizen. Mr. Bayard to Mr. McLane,
July 2, 1885, MSS. Inst, to France, For. Rel. 1885, 373;
2 Wharton's Int. Law Digest, 410.
Section 2172, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,
1334), only confers citizenship upon minors dwelling in
the United States; and the Department holds that the
prescribed minority residence in this country must have
coincided with, or been subsequent to, the parent's ad-
mission to citizenship. Mr. Hay to Mr. Harris, April 1,
1899, MSS. Inst, to Austria.
Anton Macek was born in Vienna of Austrian parents
August 13, 1875. In May, 1884, his father emigrated to
the United States with his entire family and had resided
in Chicago ever since. Before his naturalization and
while the son Anton was yet a minor, August 16, 1894,
his father sent him to Austria to be educated. The
father was naturalized in Chicago October 22, 1894 —
that is, subsequent to the return of the son Anton to
Austria, where he had since remained. Upon application
for a passport it was held that Anton Macek was not
entitled to claim citizenship in the United States for the
reason that "he was not dwelling in the United States at
218 NATURALIZATION
the time of his father's naturalization, he has not at any
time since dwelt in the United States, and of course is
not now dwelling here."
In this case the view was advanced that the words of
the statute, "dwelling in the United States," refer to the
legal residence of a minor; that although at the time of
the naturalization of the father Anton Macek was not
actually within the jurisdiction of the United States,
his legal residence was with the parent, and that he might
be held to have been vicariously present in the person
of his father, through whom he became a citizen of the
United States, the same as though he had been person-
ally present at the father's home in Chicago. The De-
partment said that "the principle may be broadly stated
that no country can naturalize an inhabitant of another
country while that person is dwelling within the jurisdic-
tion of the other country." Mr. Hay to Mr. Harris, Jan-
uary 22, 1900, For. Rel. 1900, 13.
And in answering the same contention advanced in the
case of Miss Meta Schwartz in 1902, Secretary Hay said:
"The law (Rev. Stat. Sec. 2172 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,
1334]) is anomalous enough in permitting the minor son
of an alien to come to the United States immediately
before his father's naturalization here, and to leave this
country a full-fledged citizen the day after such naturali-
zation. To construe the statute as conferring citizen-
ship upon a minor who is not in the United States at the
time of the father's naturalization, nor subsequently,
would be to needlessly open the door to further abuses
of our citizenship." Mr. Hay to Mr. Hardy, July 15,
1902, MSS. Inst, to Switzerland. See, also, the case of
Antonio Basile, For. Rel. 1902, 685.
3. Act of March 2, 1907.
In order that there might be no further doubt as to
the meaning of the phrase "dwelling in the United
States," Congress, in pursuance of the recommendation
BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 219
of the Citizenship Commission of 1906, designated by the
Secretary of State pursuant to the request of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs (Report No. 4784, 59th
Congress, 1st Session), enacted the law of March 2, 1907,
Section 5 of which provides "that a child born without
the United States of alien parents shall be deemed a
citizen of the United States by virtue of the naturaliza-
tion of or resumption of American citizenship by the
parent: Provided, That such naturalization or resump-
tion takes place during the minority of such child: And
provided, further. That the citizenship of such minor
child shall begin at the time such minor child begins to
reside permanently in the United States."
By the terms of this law, naturalization of the parent
confers citizenship on the foreign-born minor child if
the latter is permanently residing in this country at the
time of the parent's naturalization, or subsequently to
such naturalization, during the minority of the child.
This would preclude the naturalization of the son of a
naturalized citizen, coming to the United States tem-
porarily just before reaching majority and going at once
back to his native country, with the design of escaping
military or other obligations there. See pp. 213-15, ante.
By this statute, resumption of American citizenship
has the same effect as naturalization upon the status of
the minor child. It is understood that this provision
was designed to meet the case of the foreign-bornminor
child of an American woman who, after the termination
of her marriage with a foreigner, resumes American
citizenship, in accordance with the provisions of Section
3 of the same Act.
Under this statute, such decisions as Campbell v. Gor-
don and Young v. Peck, would be impossible.
To give further effect to this provision, the President,
by Executive Order of April 6, 1907,* amended para-
*For the full text of this order see Appendix.
220 NATURALIZATION
graph 142 of the Instructions to Diplomatic Officers and
of the Consular Regulations so as to read as follows:
"Paragraph 142. Children of Naturalized Citizens. —
The naturalization or resumption of American citizen-
ship of the parents confers American citizenship upon
the minor children and such citizenship shall begin at
the time such minor children begin to reside permanently
in the United States."
C. Mode of Parent's Naturalization Immaterial.
The language of the statute is: "The children of per-
sons who have been duly naturalized under any law of
the United States," etc. It does not matter in what law-
ful mode the naturalization of the parent is effected.
a. By Naturalization of Father by Treaty.
A treaty is just as much a law of the United States as
an Act of Congress. Hence, it was decided, in the case
of Crane v. Reeder, 25 Mich. 303, that the minor child of
one who became a citizen under Article 2 of Jay's Treaty,
if residing in the United States at the time, thereby be-
came a citizen of the United States.
b. By Naturalization of Mother by Marriage.
In United States v. Kellar, 11 Biss. 314, where a resi-
dent alien woman married a naturalized citizen of the
United States, it was held that her 9-year-old son, dwell-
ing with her, became a citizen, by virtue of the provisions
of Sec. 2172 Rev. Stat. The mother became "duly
naturalized" by her marriage to an American citizen,
under Sec. 1994, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,
1268), which will form the subject of the next chapter.
The court said: "The marriage of the defendant's mother
with a naturalized citizen was made, by the statute, an
equivalent, in respect of citizenship, to formal naturaliza-
tion under the Acts of Congress. Thenceforward she was
to be regarded as having been duly naturalized under
BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 221
the laws of this country, and her infant son, then dwell-
ing in this country, was therefore to be considered, not
an alien, but as a citizen." See, also. People v. Newell,
38 Hun 78; Gumm v. Hubbard, 97 Mo. 311, 10 Am. St.
Rep. 312, 11 S. W. 61, and Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125
HI. 141, 8 Am. St. Rep. 349, 17 N. E. 232, For. Rel.
1900, 527.
In the last case, two children born in Canada of Brit-
ish parents were brought to the United States upon the
death of their father; and the mother married an Ameri-
can citizen. Upon an application for a passport. Secre-
tary Hay said: "Under our law the two persons referred
to are citizens of the United States. By her second mar-
riage the mother acquired American citizenship by vir-
tue of the provisions of Sec. 1994 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1268),
which reads as follows: 'Any woman who is now, or may
hereafter be, married to a citizen of the United States,
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be
deemed a citizen.' Rev. Stat. Sec. 2172 (U. S. Comp.
Stat. 1901, 1334), declares that 'the children of persons
who have been duly naturalized under any law of the
United States, . . . being under the age of twenty-one
years at the time of the naturalization of their parents,
shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as
citizens thereof.' Any possible question whether, by the
marriage of the mother, she became duly naturalized is set
at rest by the decision of the United States Circuit Court
in the case of the United States v. Kellar, 11 Biss. 314,
13 Fed. 82, in which the court held that the mother, an
alien, by her marriage to a naturalized citizen of the
United States, became 'duly naturalized.' . . . In the
opinion of the Department the persons referred to . . .
are entitled to passports as citizens of the United States."
For. Rel. 1900, 527.
222 NATURALIZATION
The minor son of an alien, who has been naturalized
under Rev. Stat. Sec. 2172 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1334),
by the naturalization of his father in the United States,
has "become a naturalized citizen of the United States,"
within the meaning of the naturalization treaty between
the United States and Wiirttemberg (6 Stat, at L. 735).
Actg. Secy. Adee to Mr. White, July 15, 1902, MSS. Inst.
Germany.
The language of the statute is: "The children of
'persons' duly naturalized . . . shall be considered
as citizens of the United States." Under this section,
the naturalization of an alien womaii, a widow, confers
citizenship on her minor son. Brown v. Shilling, 9 Md.
74.
In Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 111. 141, where a widow,
an alien woman, had married a citizen of the United
States, the court said: "The children of such a woman,
under the age of 21 years, become citizens by virtue of
her citizenship."
The same court, in Dale v. Irwin, 78 111. 170, which in-
volved the question of the citizenship of an illegitimate
child, whose mother married his reputed father, and the
latter was afterwards naturalized, said: "His (the son's)
case is a peculiar one, and though he may be illegitimate,
he came to this country as a member of John Ruckle's
family, whose wife was his mother and who was natur-
alized whilst the son was an infant. John Ruckle is his
reputed father, and the husband of his mother. We are
inclined to hold, as he was a member of his reputed
father's family when his father was naturalized, and he
an infant, that, by virtue of the Act of Congress, he be-
came naturalized."
In United States v. Rodgers, 144 Fed. 711, it was held
that a minor residing in the United States with his
BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 223
mother and stepfather became a citizen when the latter
was naturalized.
D. Illegitimate Children.
Where the reputed father of an illegitimate child mar-
ried the mother and was subsequently naturalized, it
was decided that the child became a citizen of the
United States. Dale v. Irwin, 78 111. 170; Van Dyne, Citi-
zenship of the United States, 118.
Opinions of Secretaries of State. — A bastard who is
legitimated by the intermarriage of his natural father
and mother, the mother being an alien and the father a
citizen, becomes a citizen of the United States by virtue
of the provisions of Sec. 2172 of the Revised Statutes.
Mr. Hay to Mr. White, Mch. 3, 1899, Van Dyne, Citizen-
ship of the United States, 118.
E. Adoption.
Citizenship can not be conferred upon an alien child
by adoption. The naturalization laws of the United
States contain no provision as to the effect of adoption
by an American citizen on the status of an alien minor.
Opinions of Secretaries of State. — A citizen of the
United States can not, by adopting a child of foreign
nationality, confer on such child the privileges of citizen-
ship in the United States. Mr. Fish to Mr. Rand, Jan. 6,
1872, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 484.
The only mode of adoption by which a private person
can confer citizenship upon an alien is that of marrying
a female of foreign birth. Mr. Fish to Mr. Morris, Feb.
26, 1870, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 484.
Secretary Frelinghuysen in 1884 expressed the view
that a child born abroad of foreign parents is not, by an
act of adoption under a state law, brought within any of
224 NATURALIZATION
the provisions of the laws of the United States prescrib-
ing United States citizenship. Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr.
Willis, Feb. 21, 1884, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 485.
Secretary Bayard in 1886 declined to grant a passport
to a Chinese woman who had been adopted in China by
an American citizen and who desired to go to Japan as a
medical missionary in the service of an American mission-
ary society. Mr. Bayard to Mr. McCartee, Oct. 15, 1886,
3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 485.
F. Effect of Declaration of Intention of Parent during
Minority of Child.
Under this statute, citizenship is not conferred on a
minor child by the declaration of intention of the parent
to become a citizen of the United States. To effect
naturalization of the child, the father must take out
final naturalization papers during the minority of the
child. Berry v. Hull, 6 N. Mex. 643: In re Conway, 17
Wis. 526; In re Moses, 83 Fed. 995; Dorsey v. Brigham,
177 111. 250.
Opinion of Secretary of State. — It does not suffice that
the child was a minor when the parent's declaration of
intention was made; he must have been a minor when
the naturalization was completed. Mr. Cass to Mr. Medill,
June 14, 1859, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 464.
G. Naturalization Not Effective Internationally as to Absent
Children.
A native of the canton of Vaud, who had been natur-
alized in the United States, invoked the intervention of
the United States in order to secure the removal of his
children to the United States. It appeared that by the
proceedings in his native country, which took place prior
to his change of allegiance, he was divorced from his wife,
and the custody of the children was assigned to her. He
had demanded their custody from the authorities of the
BY NATURALIZATION OF PARENT. 225
canton of Vaud, but without effect. The Department of
State said: "The fact of your having become a citizen
of the United States has the effect of entitling you to
the same protection from this Government that a native
citizen would receive; but it can not operate to destroy
or to weaken in any way the authority of the canton of
Vaud over its native-born citizens who have never been
out of its jurisdiction, nor the exclusive rights of the
tribunals, to whom the administration of its law is com-
mitted, to decide all questions which may arise between
such citizens."
Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Rosset, Nov. 25, 1845, 3 Moore's
Int. Law Digest, 487.
"As the question as to the right of your daughter, who
is a minor, to leave her native country for the purpose
of joining you in the United States, appears to be one
over which the authorities of the former have exclusive
jurisdiction, and as these have decided against that right
it is conceived that there is no occasion for the inter-
ference of this Department in the matter."
Mr. Trescot, Assist. Sec. of State, to Mr. Capelle, June
18, 1860, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 487.
" I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the
21st ultimo in relation to the impediment interposed to
the embarkation from Italy of the wife and children of
Mr. Dominick Valon, a native of that kingdom, now a
naturalized citizen of the United States. It may be
open to question whether the Act of Congress of Feb. 10,
1855, declaring to be a citizen any woman who might
be lawfully naturalized and who has married a citizen
of the United States, can be deemed to have operated
upon a woman who has never been within the jurisdic-
tion of this government. This doubt renders it inex-
pedient to issue a passport to the lady in question, as
the law requires that passports be issued only to citizens
of the United States. The facts of the case will, however,
5233-15
226 NATURALIZATION
be communicated to our consul at Naples with instruc-
tions to use his good offices to procure the withdrawal
by the state authorities of all obstacles to the emigration
of Mrs. Valon and her children."
Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, to Mr. Tinelli, April
1, 1868, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 485.
" While the general rule is that the wife and minor
children share the fortunes of the husband and father,
it is necessary that they should in fact partake of his
change of domicil and allegiance and it has been held
that the naturalization of an alien in the United States
does not require this government to regard as American
citizens those members of his household who have never
been within the jurisdiction of the United States, but
have remained in the land of their original allegiance."
Mr. Rives, Assistant Secretary of State, to Mr. Smith,
December 13, 1888, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 486.
BY MARRIAGE. 227
CHAPTER III.
NATURALIZATION BY MARRIAGE.
A. In general.
B. Women who may be naturalized by marriage.
C. Time of marriage.
D. Necessity of residence in United States.
a. Residence in United States held not to be necessary.
b. Residence in United States held to be necessary.
E. Nature of citizenship acquired.
F. Effect of death of husband on citizenship of alien woman married to
an American.
Instructions of the Department of State.
G. Citizenship of American woman married to alien.
a. Under law prior to 1907.
b. Act of March 2, 1907.
Instructions of the Department of State.
H. Case of Nellie Grant Sartoris.
I. Effect of divorce.
J. Declaration of intention of husband.
NATURALIZATION BY MARRIAGE.
A. In General.
Before the passage of the Act of February 10, 1855
(10 Stat, at L. 604, Rev. Stat. Sec. 1994, U.S. Comp.Stat.
1901, 1268), marriage had no effect upon the citizenship
of a woman; under our laws an alien woman marrying a
citizen remained an alien still. This was in virtue of the
common-law doctrine that no person can by any act of
his own, without the consent of the government, put off
his allegiance and become an alien. The leading case on
this point is Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Peters, 242, 7 L. ed. 666.
In this case, a woman who had been born in this coun-
try before the Revolution, lived here until after reaching
majority, and while the war was still in progress was
married to an officer of the British army. Later, the
couple removed to England, where she resided until her
death. The Supreme Court decided that her marriage did
not effect a change of allegiance, as "marriage with an
228 NATURALIZATION
alien . . . produces no dissolution of the native allegi-
ance of the wife. It may change her civil rights, but it does
not affect her political rights or privileges. The general
doctrine is that no person can, by any act of their own,
without the consent of the government, put off their
allegiance and become aliens. If it were otherwise, then
a feme alien would, by her marriage, become ipso facto,
a citizen, and would be dowable of the estate of her
husband, which is clearly contrary to law. . . . Our
conclusion, therefore, is that neither of these acts warrant
the court in saying that Ann Shanks had ceased to be a
citizen of South Carolina at the death of her father."
In the case of Beck v. McGillis, 9 Barb. 35, the facts
were that a native American citizen, married, in Canada,
a British subject, where they remained and had children
born to them. In passing upon the rights of the wife
and children to take under a will, the court said: "Mrs.
McGillis was born a citizen of the United States. While
a minor she intermarried with a subject of Great Britain,
but neither her marriage nor her residence in a foreign
country constitutes her an alien. Whether, indeed, a
citizen can, by any mere act of his own, dissolve his
native allegiance and become an alien is not definitively
settled in this country. The question has been regarded
as one of much difficulty as well as delicacy, and though
frequently discussed before the Supreme Court of the
United States, it has never, I believe, been regarded as
the leading point in the case presented, so as to call for
the judgment of the court. But it has been decided by
that court that the marriage of a feme sole with an alien
husband does not produce a dissolution of her native
allegiance."
The British Act of Parliament of 1844 (7 & 8 Vict.
154, Chap. 66) declared that "any woman married, or
who shall be married, to a natural-born subject or person
naturalized, shall be deemed and taken to be herself
BY MARRIAGE. 229
naturalized, and have all the rights and privileges of a
natural-born subject."
The American law is based on the British act.
Section 2 of the Act of February 10, 1855, reads as
follows: "Any woman who might lawfully be naturalized
under the existing laws, married, or who shall be married
to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and
taken to be a citizen" of the United States.
The language of the law as incorporated in the Revised
Statutes of the United States, Section 1994 (U. S. Comp.
Stat. 1901, 1268), is as follows: "Any woman who is nov/,
or may hereafter be, married to a citizen of the United
States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized,
shall be deemed a citizen."
The power of Congress to enact a uniform rule of
naturalization throughout the United States authorizes
the provision of Rev. Stat., Section 1994 (U. S. Comp. Stat.
1901, 1268), that the marriage of an alien woman with a
citizen makes her a citizen. Dorsey v. Brigham, 177 111.
250, 42 L. R. A. 809, 69 Am. St. Rep. 228, 52 N. E. 303.
Any woman capable of naturalization under our laws,
who is married to a citizen of the United States, is to be
deemed a citizen.
B. Women Who May be Naturalized by Marriage.
What women may be naturalized? What is the mean-
ing of the clause, "who might herself be lawfully natu-
ralized?"
In Burton v. Burton, 26 How. Pr. 474, it was held the
Act was designed for the benefit of "alien white women."
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Kelly v.
Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19 L. ed. 283, expressed the opinion
that the terms of the Act limit the application of the
law to "free white women."
In Kane v. McCarthy, 63 N. C. 299, it was decided that
230 NATURALIZATION
"a white woman not an alien enemy" answered the de-
scription required by the section under consideration.
To the same effect is 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 403. See, also,
Secy. Hay to Mr. Cruger, February 6, 1903.
In Leonard v. Grant, 6 Sawy. 603, 5 Fed. 11, which
was decided after the extension by the Act of July 14,
1870 (16 Stat, at L. 256, Ch. 254, Sec. 7, U. S. Comp.
Stat. 1901, 1333), of the naturalization laws to the
African, it was declared that the law applied to free
white persons, or persons of African nativity or descent.
It was decided in this case that a native Swiss woman
became a citizen of the United States by virtue of her
marriage to a citizen.
In Broadis v. Broadis, 86 Fed. 951, it was held that an
alien woman of African descent, married to a citizen of
the United States is a citizen of the United States, since
the extension of the naturalization laws to persons of
African birth or descent.
In the case of Pequignot v. Detroit, 16 Fed. 215, the
court said: "All doubt upon the construction to be
placed upon the words, 'who might herself be natural-
ized,' was put at rest by the case of Kelly v. Owen, 7
Wall. 496, 19 L. ed. 283, in which it was held that these
terms only limited the application of the law to 'free white
women,' inasmuch as the naturalization act existing at
the time only required that a person applying for its
benefits should be a 'free white person,' and not an alien
enemy."
The Act of August 9, 1888 (25 Stat, at L. 392, Chap.
818, Sec. 2), provides that every Indian woman, mem-
ber of any Indian tribe in the United States, or any of
its territories except the Five Civilized Tribes in the
Indian Territory, who may hereafter be married to any
citizen of the United States, is declared to become by
such marriage a citizen of the United States, with all the
BY MARRIAGE. 231
rights, privileges, and immunities of any such citizen,
being a married woman.
As the law now stands, therefore, any white woman,
or woman of African nativity or descent, or Indian
woman, a member of any Indian tribe (except a member
of the Five Civilized Tribes in Indian Territory), married
to a citizen of the United States, is a citizen thereof.
C. Time of Marriage.
What is the significance of the term "married " in the
section under consideration? In order to confer citizen-
ship upon the wife, must the husband be a citizen at the
time of marriage, or does his subsequent naturalization
have the same effect?
Kelly V. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19 L. ed. 283, was a case
in which it appeared that one Miles Kelly, a native of
Ireland, emigrated to the United States in 1848. In 1853
he married Ellen Duffy; in 1855 he was naturalized; and
in 1862 he died in the city of Washington, intestate,
seized of certain real property. He left surviving him in
the United States, his widow, the said Ellen, and two
sisters, Ellen Owen and Margaret Kahoe. The sister
Ellen arrived in 1856, and was married in 1861 to Ed-
ward Owen, who had been naturalized in 1835. The sister
Margaret arrived in the United States in 1850, and was
married in 1862 to James Kahoe, who was naturalized in
1854. Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the
court, said that the case turned upon the construction
given to the second section of the Act of Congress of
February 10, 1855 (10 Stat, at L. 604, Ch. 71, U. S. Comp.
Stat. 1901, 1268). He said: "As we construe this Act, it
confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married
to citizens of the United States, if they are of the class
of persons for whose naturalization the previous Acts of
Congress provide. The terms 'married,' or 'who shall be
232 NATURALIZATION
married,' do not refer, in our judgment, to the time when
the ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to a state of
marriage. They mean that whenever a woman, who un-
der previous Acts might be naturalized, is in a state of
marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship existed at
the passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after
the marriage, she becomes, by that fact, a citizen also.
His citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under the
Act, citizenship upon her. The construction which would
restrict the Act to women whose husbands, at the time
of marriage, are citizens, would exclude far the greater
number, for whose benefit, as we think, the Act was in-
tended. ... It follows, from these views, that the
widow and the two sisters were citizens of the United
States upon the decease of the intestate husband. The
widow and Margaret Kahoe became such on the natural-
ization of their respective husbands, and Ellen Owen
became such on her marriage."
And in Kane v. McCarthy, 63 N. C. 299, where the facts
showed that the naturalization of the husband took
place after the marriage, the court said: "The circum-
stance that the husband was not a citizen at the time of
marriage is wholly immaterial, for he became a citizen
afterward ipso facto.'' Referring to the wife, the court
said: "Being a free white woman married to a citizen,
[she] comes within the description and the very words
of the Act of Congress [10 Stat, at L. 604, Chap. 71, Sec.
2, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1268], 'and is deemed and
taken to be a citizen;' for it is the status of being mar-
ried to — being the wife of — a citizen that makes her one.
It can in no possible view make any difference whether
the marriage ceremony is performed first and then the
husband becomes a citizen, or whether he becomes a
citizen first and the marriage afterwards takes place.
Whenever the two events concur and come together 'she
BY MARRIAGE. 233
is a woman married to a citizen.'" See, also, 14 Ops.
Atty. Gen. 402. The fact that the wife is under twenty-
one years of age does not exclude her from citizenship.
She acquires citizenship when her husband becomes a
citizen. Renner v. Muller, 57 How. Pr. 229.
The wife of an alien becomes a citizen upon the
naturalization of her husband. People v. Newell, 38
Hun, 78.
D. Kecessity of Residence in the United States.
Whether, under this law, residence in the United
States, is essential, in order to confer citizenship upon a
woman of foreign nationality married to a citizen of the
United States, is not entirely well settled, although the
better view appears to be that such residence is neces-
sary.
It has been contended that an alien woman, in order
to be naturalized by marriage to an American citizen,
must have resided in the United States for the statutory
period of five years. In Burton v. Burton, 1 Keyes,
359, the judges of the Court of Appeals of New York were
divided in opinion upon this point. Mr. Justice Mullin
said: "If a residence of five years was not a condition
precedent to citizenship, residence for some length of
time was most obviously contemplated. Without resi-
dence she could not be naturalized, and it is the most
essential of all the requirements for naturalization, and
can not be dispensed with, unless the intention to dis-
pense with it is most clearly manifested by the legisla-
ture." But Mr. Justice Wright thought that the act did
not require that the woman claiming its benefits should
have resided within the United States; and, if it did, he
thought the residence of the wife was, by construction of
law, the same as that of her husband.
234 NATURALIZATION
a. Residence in the United States Held not to be Necessary.
In Kane v. McCarthy, 63 N. C. 299, it was decided
that a woman who, in 1857, married in Ireland a natural-
ized citizen of the United States, was a citizen of the
United States although she always resided in Ireland.
The Circuit Court of the United States, in the case of
Ware v. Wisner, 50 Fed. 310, held that a nonresident
alien woman who marries a citizen of the United States
is capable of inheriting, in Iowa, since she thereby be-
comes a citizen of the United States under Rev. Stat.
Sec. 1994 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,1268).
In Headman v. Rose, 63 Ga. 458, it was held than an
alien woman whose husband becomes a naturalized citi-
zen of the United States, is under Section 2 of the Act
of 1855 (10 Stat, at L. 604, Ch. 71, R. S. 1994, U. S. Comp.
Stat. 1901, 1268), thereby made a citizen, though she may
live at a distance from her husband for years, and never
come to the United States until after his death.
In the opinion of Attorney General Williams (14 Ops.
Atty. Gen. 402), an alien woman residing abroad, who
has intermarried with a citizen of the United States re-
siding abroad, the marriage having been solemnized
abroad, and the parties after marriage continuing to re-
side abroad, is to be regarded as a citizen of the United
States within the meaning of said Act, though she may
never have resided within the United States.
b. Residence in the United States Held to be Necessary.
In Burton v. Burton, 26 How. Pr. 474, where aliens were
married abroad, the husband came to the United States,
was naturalized and died, the wife not coming to this
country until after his death, the court in passing upon
her citizenship, said:
"The Act of 1855, therefore, as we glean from this pre-
vious legislation, though unfinished, the history of the
legislative object to be attained by it, and as well the
BY MARRIAGE. 235
general considerations which influence nations in framing
naturalization laws, was designed, certainly, for the bene-
fit of an alien white woman, whether resident or not,
married to a person who was at the time of the marriage
a citizen of the United States, thus, securing, by the
same law, the rights of citizenship to the children of
American citizens born abroad, and to such alien wife
all legal rights of citizenship which otherwise, and by
reason of her alienism, she might not possess . . .
Construed with liberality, however, it might be held also
to extend to an alien woman resident in this country,
though married abroad to an alien, and who came to this
country with him or followed him here, and in that way,
or in one of these ways, identified herself with the coun-
try of his adoption. ... In this case the plaintiff
has neither sought to derive the benefit of her husband's
naturalization by coming with or following him here nor
entitled herself to the benefit of a liberal construction
in her favor of the act, as suggested by a residence in
this country of any duration prior to her husband's
death. Her rights, therefore, as a citizen depend entirely
upon the construction of the section of the statute under
consideration, and I am of the opinion that she has no
claim upon her husband's estate thereunder. He was
not, when he married her, a citizen of the United States,
and she was never a resident thereof during his life. On
the contrary, she was, and continued to be, both alien
and stranger.
"The plaintiff being an alien, and having married an
alien, and not having resided in this country prior to
her husband's death, has no dower right in the lands of
which her husband died seized under the provisions of
the act of the legislature passed in 1845."
Secretary Seward, in 1868, in the case of the wife and
children of one Valon, a native Italian who left his family
in Italy, came to the United States, was subsequently
236 NATURALIZATION
naturalized here, and then sought the assistance of the
Department of State in overcoming an impediment inter-
posed to their embarkation from that country, said: "It
may be open to question whether the Act of Congress of
February 10, 1855, declaring to be a citizen any woman
who might be lawfully naturalized and who has married
a citizen of the United States, can be deemed to have
operated upon a woman who has never been within the
jurisdiction of this Government. This doubt renders it
inexpedient to issue a passport to the lady in question,
as the law requires that passports be issued only to citi-
zens of the United States. The facts of the case will,
however, be communicated to our consul at Naples with
instructions to use his good offices to procure the with-
drawal by the state authorities of all obstacles to the
emigration of Mrs. Valon and her children." Mr. Seward
to Mr. Tinelli, April 1, 1868; 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest,
486.
In 1888, Asst. Secy. Rives, said, referring to the same
question: "While the general rule is that the wife and
minor children share the fortunes of the husband and
father, it is necessary that they should in fact partake
of his change of domicil and allegiance, and it has been
held that the naturalization of an alien in the United
States does not require this Government to regard as
American citizens those members of his household who
have never been within the jurisdiction of the United
States, but have remained in the land of their original
allegiance." Mr. Rives to Mr. Smith, Dec. 13, 1888; 3
Moore's Int. Law Digest, 486.
Secretary Foster, in an instruction to the American
Minister to Turkey, in 1893, said:
"Although Attorney General Williams, in his opinion
of June 4, 1874, 14 Op. 402, referring to Kelly v. Owen,
7 Wall. 496, and to certain other cases, stated that the
authorities 'go to the extent of holding that, irrespective
BY MARRIAGE. 237
of the time or place of marriage or the residence of the
parties, any free white woman, not an alien enemy, mar-
ried to a citizen of this country, is to be taken and
deemed a citizen of the United States,' yet in view of the
obstacles to claiming for the laws, judicial decisions, and
executive opinions of the UnitedjStates effective validity
beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, this Depart-
ment prudently refrains from asserting its application to
the case of an alien wife continuing within her original
allegiance at the time of her husband's naturalization in
the United States, inasmuch as the citizenship of the
wife might not be effectively asserted as against any
converse claim of the sovereignty within which she has
remained. The result would naturally be a conflict of
private international law, wherein the state within whose
actual jurisdiction the wife remains might be found to
have the practical advantage of the argument." Mr. Fos-
ter, Secretary of State, to Mr. Thompson, Minister to
Turkey, February 9, 1893, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 486.
Mr. Gresham expressed the opinion that naturalization
in the United States has no international effect on the
allegiance of the wife and children of the naturalized
person while they continue to reside in the country of
origin. Secretary Gresham to Mr. Watrous, January 23,
1905, 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 487.
And Secretary Olney, in 1896, in a report in response
to a resolution of the Senate, expressed the view that
the naturalization of a Turkish subject in the United
States does not operate to naturalize his wife, who has
never been in the United States, and who is at the time
dwelling in a foreign country. He said: "The naturali-
zation laws of the United States being obviously framed
to permit the bestowal of the franchise of citizenship
upon certain persons of alien birth who are within its
jurisdiction, and the application, of these statutes being
intrusted to the judicial branch, it is clear that they can
238 NATURALIZATION
not operate to naturalize by indirection or by executive
interpretation a person who is an alien by birth and
origin, who has never been within the jurisdiction of the
United States, and who at the time may be dwelling
within a foreign jurisdiction." S. Doc. No. 83, 1st Ses-
sion, 54th Congress.
Secretary Olney added, however, that the Turkish gov-
ernment had, on several occasions permitted the emigra-
tion of the wives and children of Turkish subjects who
had come to the United States and here acquired citizen-
ship, leaving their families behind them; had even per-
mitted the emigration of other kinsmen of a degree not
within the purview of the naturalization laws of the
United States; and had also, asserting a discretionary
power in the premises, refused to permit the emigration
of the families of naturalized Armenians, even within
the marital or filial degree. He continued: "The good
offices of the United States Minister are uniformly ex-
erted on all proper occasions to assist the emigration of
such persons, upon permission properly secured from the
Turkish authorities, and when funds have been assured
to pay the journey, he has assisted their departure. He
has likewise assisted the coming to the United States of
the wives of citizens of Armenian origin, who, being in
this country at or subsequent to the naturalization of
their husbands, have returned to Turkey; and of the
children of such citizens born abroad subsequent to the
naturalization of the father, or who may have acquired
American citizenship by actual presence in the United
States subsequent to the father's naturalization, and in
such instances permission for the families to emigrate has
been demanded as of right.'" For. Rel. 1895, Part II, 1472.
E. Nature of Citizenship Acquired.
What is meant by the phrase, "shall be deemed a citi-
zen," in the section of the Revised Statutes under con-
sideration?
BY MARRIAGE. 239
''The phrase, 'shall be deemed a citizen,' in Section 1994,
Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1268) or as it was in
the Act of 1855 (10 Stat, at L. 604, Chap. 71, Sec. 2),
'shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen,' while it may
imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually
become a citizen by the ordinary means or in the usual
way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a
proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that
such person is on that account practically any the less a
citizen. The word 'deemed' is the equivalent of 'con-
sidered ' or 'judged,' and therefore, whatever an Act of
Congress requires to be 'deemed' or 'taken' as true of
any person or thing must, in law, be considered as having
been duly adjudged or established concerning such per-
son or thing, and have force and effect accordingly.
When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman
shall, under certain circumstances, be 'deemed' an Ameri-
can citizen, the effect when the contingency occurs, is
equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an Act of
Congress or in the usual mode thereby prescribed."
Leonard v. Grant, 6 Sawyer, 603, 5 Fed. 11.
The Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496,
19 L. ed. 283, said that the object of the Act was to
allow the citizenship of the wife " to follow that of her
husband, without the necessity of any application for
naturalization on her part."
In U. S. V. Kellar, 11 Biss. 314, 13 Fed. 82, Mr. Justice
Harlan said that the woman, "upon her marriage, there-
fore, with a naturalized citizen of the United States,
. . . became, under the plain words of Sec. 1994
[U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1268], ipso facto, a citizen of the
United States, as fully as if she had complied with all
the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of
naturalization."
And in Haberacker's case, Mr. Wharton, Acting Secre-
tary of State, in an instruction to Mr. Phelps, said: "It
240 NATURALIZATION
is uniformly held under Sec. 1994 [U. S. Comp. Stat.
1901, 1268], that an alien woman who might herself be
lawfully naturalized, by marriage to a citizen becomes
herself a citizen without any previous declaration or
act on her part, or without reference to the previous
length of her residence in this country, as fully to all in-
tents and purposes as if she had become a citizen upon
her own application and by the judgment of a compet-
ent court." Mr. Wharton to Mr. Phelps, March 26, 1891,
MSS. Inst, to Germany, For. Rel. 1891, 508.
F. Effect of Death of Husband on Citizenship of Alien
Woman Married to an American.
The Act of March 2, 1907 (Sec. 4), provides that "any
foreign woman who acquires American citizenship by
marriage to an American shall be assumed to retain the
same after the termination of the marital relation if
she continue to reside in the United States, unless she
makes formal renunciation thereof before a court having
jurisdiction to naturalize aliens, or if she resides abroad
she may retain her citizenship by registering as such be-
fore a United States consul within one year after the
termination of such marital relation."
It was the practice of the Department of State, prior
to the passage of the Act of March 2, 1907, in passing
upon applications for passports and for protection abroad,
to regard the American citizenship of a foreign-born
widow of a citizen of the United States as subsisting at
least while she continued to reside in this country.
There was no provision by statute for the renunciation
of citizenship, however. This law serves the useful pur-
pose of enabling a widow of an American citizen, who
desires to resume her former nationality, to formally an-
nounce her purpose by renouncing, in a naturalization
court, the citizenship which she acquired by marriage.
If the widow resides abroad, and desires to retain the
BY MARRIAGE. 241
citizenship acquired by her marriage, she is required,
under this law, to register before a consul of the United
States, within one year after the termination of the
marital relation.
The same rules apply in case the marriage is terminated
by divorce as in the event of the death of the husband.
Instructions of the Department of State.
The Executive Order of President Roosevelt of April
6, 1907,* amending the diplomatic and consular regula-
tions so as to embody in them the provisions of the Act
of March 2, 1907, makes the following prescription con-
cerning foreign women who have acquired American
citizenship by naarriage to citizens from whom they have
afterward been separated by death or absolute divorce:
"Registration to Resume or Retain Citizenship.
"Whenever any foreign woman has acquired American
citizenship through her marriage, upon the death of her
husband or upon their absolute divorce she must, if she is
abroad and desires to retain her American citizenship,
register as an American citizen before a United States
Consul within one year after the termination of the mari-
tal relation. . . ."
The Department of State, on April 19, 1907, issued a
circular instruction, addressed to the American diplo-
matic and consular officers to carry this regulation into
effect, the pertinent portion whereof reads as follows:
"A foreign woman who has acquired American citizen-
ship by marriage to an American citizen and who, upon
the termination of the marital relation by the death of
her husband or by their absolute divorce, desires to re-
tain the American citizenship which she acquired through
her marriage, must, within one year after the termina-
tion of the marital relation, register with an American
consular officer her intention to retain her American
citizenship.
* For the full text of this order see Appendix.
5233—16
242 NATURALIZATION
"The form of such registration shall be as follows:
"I, [name of affiant] do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I was born on [date of birth] in [place
of birth] and was, up to the time of my marriage on
[date of marriage] to [name of late husband] a
citizen (or subject) of [name of country]; that
the said [name of late husband] was born in
[place of birth] and was, at the time of his death (or
our divorce), a citizen of the United States by
[birth or naturalization]; that the said [name of
husband] died (or we were divorced) on [date of
death or divorce] at [place of death or divorce];
that I am now temporarily residing in [place of
residence] and desire to retain my American citizenship;
that it is my intention to go to the United States within
[length of intended foreign residence] with the
intention of residing and performing the duties of an
American citizen.
"Sworn and subscribed to before me this day
of
>
American Consul.
"The consul's certificate to this affidavit should be
the same as in the case of an American woman married
to a foreigner who desires to resume her American citi-
zenship, and documentary evidence of the allegations
relative to the termination of the marital relation should
be required as in the case of an American woman mar-
ried to a foreigner who desires to resume her American
citizenship. Also documentary proof of the husband's
citizenship should be required. The affidavit and the
consul's certificate should be made in duplicate and re-
ported as in the case of an American woman who desires
to resume her citizenship.
I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,
Elihu Root."
G. Citizenship of American Woman Married to an Alien.
a. Under laio prior to 1907.
Under Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes, which we
have been considering, an alien woman who marries a
BY MARRIAGE. 243
citizen of the United States is deemed a citizen. Is the
converse of this rule true? Does an American woman
become an alien by marriage to a foreigner? The status
of such persons prior to the enactment of the law of
March 2, 1907, and the reasons inducing Congress to act
in the matter, appear from the following review of the
decisions of the courts and opinions of the Executive
Department of the government, and of international
claims commissions to which the United States has been
a party.
In the case of Mrs. Preto (10 Ops. Atty. Gen. 321), a
woman born in the United States, of American parents,
who married a Spanish subject residing here, and subse-
quently removed with her husband to Spain, where she
lived until his death, Attorney General Bates, in 1862,
held that the marriage did not deprive her of her native
citizenship.
And in 1877, in Mrs. D'Ambrogia's case (15 Ops. Atty.
Gen. 599) Solicitor General Phillips decided that the
marriage of an alien-born woman to a naturalized citi-
zen of the United States conferred on her "a permanent
status of citizenship, defeasible only as in the case of
other persons;" and, on the authority of Shanks v.
Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, 7 L. ed. 666, it was further held that
her subsequent marriage with an alien did not affect this
status.
But in 1866, in the case of Mrs. Berthemy (12 Ops.
Atty. Gen. 7), who was born in France, of American
parents, there married a Frenchman, and continued to
reside in France after the death of her husband, Attorney
General Stanbery held that she was not a citizen of the
United States.
And, in 1869, Attorney General Hoar expressed the
opinion that the same woman, who was still domiciled in
France, was not a citizen of the United States for the
purposes of the internal revenue law. The Attorney
General, however, expressly disclaimed any opinion upon
244 NATURALIZATION
the question whether a native woman marrying an alien
"is not, after such marriage, a citizen of the United
States in a qualified sense." 13 Ops. Atty. Gen. 128.
In the claim of the heirs of Felix Mahan v. Mexico,
American and Mexican claims commission, convention of
1868 (15 Stat, at L. 679), the umpire held that the
daughter of the original claimant, who was married to a
Spaniard, was not a citizen of the United States. 3 Moore's
Int. Arbitrations, 2485.
In the cases of Bowie v. United States, and Calder-
wood V. United States, and Tooraen v. United States,
before the American and British claims commission,
treaty of 1871 (17 Stat, at L. 863), it was held that the
national character of a married woman is governed by
that of her husband in all cases, irrespective of domicil;
and that on the death of the husband the national
character of the widow, acquired by marriage, remains
unchanged. From this conclusion Mr. Commissioner
Frazer (the American commissioner) dissented in the case
of a widow of American origin who had always remained
domiciled in the United States, holding that in such case,
upon the death of her British huband, her original
national character reverted. In the case of Mrs. Bowie,
the claimant was by birth a British subject, but was at
the time of the alleged injuries the widow of a citizen of
the United States, and domiciled in the insurrectionary
State of Virginia, and before the filing of her memorial
had again intermarried with a citizen of the United
States, who was still living and there domiciled. Her
claim was disallowed, all the commissioners agreeing. In
the case of Mrs. Tooraen, claimant was by birth a British
subject, her husband at the time of marriage being a
subject of Sweden, but naturalized as a citizen of the
United States subsequent to the marriage. Claimant
and her husband were both domiciled from the time of
marriage within the United States. Her claim was
BY MARRIAGE. 245
unanimously dismissed. Hale's Report, 17; 3 Moore,
International Arbitrations, 2486.
In the case of Jane L. Brand v. United States, Ameri-
can and British Claims Commission, treaty of 1871 (17
Stat, at L. 863), claimant, a native of Ireland, married in
New Orleans a citizen of the United States, who died,
and she continued domiciled in New Orleans. The com-
mission held that the national character of a married
woman was in all cases determined by that of her hus-
band; and that such national character, once acquired
by marriage, continues on the death of the husband ; that
this doctrine had always prevailed in Great Britain, as well
as elsewhere, where the domicil of the wife and widow had
continued to be that of the husband's nntionality; and
that by no treaty stipulation or law, municipal or inter-
national, was the widoweven allowed to reclaim her original
nationality while still domiciled within the nationality
of her husband, until the conventions of 1870 and 1871;
and that by those conventions she could only reclaim her
original nationality in the form provided by the conven-
tion of 1871, which in the case of Mrs. Brand had never
been done; that she was therefore, both at the time of
the commission of the alleged wrongs and at the time of
the presentation of her memorial, a citizen of the United
States. The claim was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
3 Moore, International Arbitrations, 2487, 2488.
In the cases of Mrs. De Brissot and Mrs. Hammer, before
the United States and Venezuelan Commission, sitting in
Washington, the claimants were born in Venezuela and
married citizens of the United States. They were domi-
ciled in Venezuela, and continued to reside there after
the death of their husbands. Their claim against the
Venezuelan government was for the killing of their hus-
bands. It was held that, inasmuch as they were Vene-
zuelan citizens according to Venezuelan law, and that
law and the law of the United States being thus in
246 NATURALIZATION
conflict, the matter must be decided by tlie public law. On
that basis the claim of the Venezuelan government was
considered the better, the claimants were treated as Vene-
zuelan citizens, and their claims ruled out for want of
jurisdiction. Opinion of Commissioners, 3 Moore's Inter-
national Arbitrations, 2457-60.
In several cases before the British and American Mixed
Commission, under the treaty of Washington (17 Stat, at
L. 803), it was held that a married woman's nationality
is governed by that of her husband in all cases, irrespec-
tive of domicil, and remains unchanged after his death.
Hence, that an American woman married to a British
subject, and who continued to live in this country after
his death, was still a British subject. The American
commissioner dissented from this decision (U. S. Agent's
Report, pp. 17, 18, vol. 6, Washington Arbitration). These
claims arose before the passage of the British Act of 1870,
33 and 34 Vict. 104, Chap. 14.
In Pequignot v. Detroit, 16 Fed. 211, it was decided
(in 1883) by the United States Circuit Court, that an
alien woman who has once become an American citizen
by marriage, which is subsequently dissolved, may re-
sume her alienage by marriage to a native of her own
country. In this case the facts were that a native French
woman came to the United States with her parents when
she was a child. Her parents never applied for naturali-
zation. In 1863 she married one Partridge, a native citi-
zen of the United States. Upon his death several years
later she married one Pequignot, a native of France, who
never sought naturalization in this country. While living
with him the suit was brought. Judge Brown (afterward
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court)
expressed doubt as to the binding force of Shanks v.
Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, 7 L. ed. 666, in its literalisms, be-
cause the two reasons given for that decision have
ceased to exist, viz: (1) that the general doctrine is
BY MARRIAGE. 247
"that no person can, by any act of their own, without
the consent of the government, put off their allegiance
and become aliens;" (2) that, "if it were otherwise, then
a feme alien would by marriage become, ipso facto, a
citizen, and would be dowable of the estate of her hus-
band, which are clearly contrary to law."
In view of the Act of July 27, 1868 (Rev. Stat. Sec.
1999, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1269), expressly recogniz-
ing the right of expatriation, and the Act of February 10,
1855 (Rev. Stat. Sec. 1994, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1268),
declaring that any woman married to an American citi-
zen shall be deemed a citizen, Judge Brown said that it
seemed to him "that we ought to apply the maxim
cessante ratione, cessat lex, to this case, and are not
bound to treat it as controlling authority." He added:
"We should regard the sections above quoted as announc-
ing the views of Congress upon this branch of interna-
tional law, and ought to apply the same rule of decision
to a case where a female American citizen marries an
alien husband, that we should to a case where an alien
woman marries an American citizen."
In Comitis v. Parkerson (decided in 1893), 22 L. R. A.
148,56 Fed. 556, the plaintiff, a native citizen of Louis-
iana, married a native-born subject of Italy who had
come to Louisiana and engaged in business, without in-
tending ever to return to Italy. He never became
naturalized. After the marriage, the woman and her
husband, until his death, lived together in Louisiana
without any intention on the part of either to depart
from the United States. After the husband's death the
widow continued to reside in Louisiana. The court
(Billings, J.) held that expatriation must be effected by
removal from the country, and that, in the absence of
any act of Congress authorizing it, there can be no im-
plied renunciation of citizenship by an American woman
marrying an alien.
248 NATURALIZATION
In Jenns v. Landes, 85 Fed. 801, it appeared that the
complainant was born in the State of Washington, and
lived with her father until the year 1896, when she per-
manently removed from the State of Washington, and
was married to a British subject; that she and her hus-
band resided in Canada, and had their domicil in the
city of Victoria, The Canadian statute of 1886, Vol. 2,
Chap. 113, Sec. 22, declared that "a married woman shall,
within Canada, be deemed to be a subject of the state of
which her husband is for the time being a subject." The
court held that the complainant became an alien, as re-
spects the United States, so as to enable her to sue in a
Federal court.
In Ruckgaber v. Moore, 104 Fed. 947, the United
States Circuit Court for the eastern district of New York
held that the political status of a native-born American
woman, who married a citizen of France and removed
with him to that country, followed that of her husband.
The woman having died in France, the court declared
that she must be regarded as having been a nonresident
alien at the time of her death. The court said: " By the
several statutes of America, France, and Great Britain the
marriage of a citizen of such country with an alien wife
confers upon the latter the citizenship of the husband;
and this policy of three great powers, in connection with
Sec. 1999 of the Revised Statutes [U. S. Comp. Stat.
1901, 1269], which proclaims that expatriation is an in-
herent right, establishes that the political status of the
wife follows that of her husband, with the modification
that there must be withdrawal from her native country,
or equivalent act expressive of her election to renounce
her former citizenship as a consequence of her marriage.
Some serious objection to this, or even the opposite
conclusion, exist, but it has been reached after due con-
sideration of the subject, and pertinent authorities.
BY MARRIAGE, 249
including Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 243, 7 L. ed. 666;
Pequignot v. Detroit, 16 Fed. 211; and CoEQitis v. Parker-
son, 22 L. R. A. 148, 56 Fed. 556."
For the same reason the court declared that the
daughter of the deceased, who had intermarried with a
citizen of Germany and for eight years previous to her
mother's death had resided there, should be regarded as
a citizen of that country.
The question was presented to the Department of
State in 1871. In this case an American woman had mar-
ried an alien, and after his death applied to our legation
in Paris for a passport. Secretary Fish, in an instruction
to Mr. Washburne, said: "By the law of England and
the United States, an alien woman on lier marriage with
a subject or citizen merges her nationality in that of her
husband. But the converse has never been established
as the law of the United States, and only by the Act of
Parliament of May 12, 1870, [33 and 34 Vict. 104, Ch. 14]
did it become British law that an English woman lost
her quality of a British subject by marrying an alien.
The Continental codes, on the other hand, enable a
woman whose nationality has been changed by marriage
to resume it when she becomes a widow, on the condi-
tion, however, of her returning to the country of her
origin. The widow to whom you refer may, as a matter
of strict right, remain a citizen, but, as a citizen has no
absolute right to a passport, and as the law of the
United States has, outside of their jurisdiction, only such
force as foreign nations may choose to accord it in their
own territory, I think it judicious to withhold passports
in such cases unless the widow gives evidence of her in-
tention to resume her residence in the United States."
Sec'y Fish to Mr. Washburne, February 24, 1871, MSS.
Inst, to France.
Secretary Fish in a letter to the President, dated
250 NATURALIZATION
August 25, 1873, said: "Chief Justice Marshall (Murray v.
The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch, 119, 2 L. ed. 226) says
that when a citizen by his own act has made himself the
subject of a foreign power, his situation is completely
changed, and the act certainly places him out of the pro-
tection of the United States while within the territory
of the sovereign to whom he has sworn allegiance. . . .
Hence, it would seem that the marriage of a female
citizen of the United States with a foreigner, subject of
a country by whose laws marriage confers citizenship
upon the wife of its subject, and her removal to and res-
idence in the country of her husband's citizenship,
would devest her of her native character of an American
citizen." For. Rel. 1873, pt. 2, 1187.
In 1874 the case was presented of an American lady,
native born, who, after arriving at womanhood, went to
Europe and married an Englishman; after living many
years with her husband and having children by him, she
obtained a divorce in England. She applied to the United
States legation in Paris for a passport, to be issued in
her maiden name and as an American citizen. Mr. Wash-
burne, the United States minister, declined giving such
a passport for the reasons: "(1) That there is nothing in
the decree of divorce authorizing her to take her maiden
name; and that I am not advised that the laws of Eng-
land, independent of the order in the decree, authorize a
divorced woman, at her option, to take her maiden name.
(2) Touching the question of citizenship, I consider her
case analogous to that decided by you in your despatch
dated February 24, 1871, supra, where you decided that
it would be judicious to withhold a passport in a case
where an American woman had married a foreigner, and
her husband had afterwards died, unless she gave evidence
of her intention to resume her residence in the United
States. In the present case, the party desiring the pass-
BY MARRIAGE. 251
port not only does not 'give evidence of her intention
to resume her residence in the United States,' but avows
that her purpose in obtaining a passport in her maiden
name is to enable her to marry a Frenchman."
Mr. Washburne said that it was strongly contended by
the parties interested that the decree of divorce dissolved
the nationality of the woman as well as the bonds of mat-
rimony. He added that he did not take this view of the
subject, but he had been pressed with so much insistence
to give the passport that he had to promise to submit
the question to the Department for its decision. The
course pursued by the minister was approved by Secre-
tary Fish. For. Rel. 1874, 408, 413.
In the case of Mrs. Lawrence, a native of Great Brit-
ain, who married a citizen of the United States, from
whom she obtained a divorce, Acting Secretary Uhl held
that "Mrs. Lawrence, by her marriage, became an Ameri-
can citizen, both by British and American law; she is
undoubtedly still an American citizen, viewed either
from the American or the English standpoint. She has not
lost her American nationality by any method recognized
by our law; and, according to British law, an English
woman, who, by marriage acquires foreign citizenship,
must, in order to reacquire her original nationality upon
her husband's death, obtain a certificate therefor from
the British authorities. It is not believed that any dif-
ferent rule would be applied where the parties are di-
vorced. As Mrs. Lawrence claims American citizenship,
it is assumed that she has not taken any steps to reac-
quire British nationality. It is not understood, either,
that there is any conflicting claim to her allegiance."
Mr. Uhl to Mr. Denby,January30,1894,For. Rel. 1894,139.
The question was again presented to Secretary Fish in
Degallado's case. He said: "It would seem that the
marriage of a female citizen of the United States with a
252 NATURALIZATION
foreigner, the subject of a country by whose laws mar-
riage confers citizenship upon the wife of a subject, and
her removal out of the jurisdiction of the United States
and residence in the country of her husband's citizen-
ship would devest her of her native citizenship." He
added: "But, although the marriage of a female citi-
zen of the United States with a foreigner should make
her a citizen of the country to which her husband be-
longs, it does not necessarily follow that she becomes
subject to all the disabilities of alienage, such, for in-
stance, as inability to inherit or transfer real property,"
Mr. Fish to Mr. Williamson, September 22, 1875, MSS.
Inst, to Costa Rica.
In 1886 Mr. Bayard, in the case of Mrs. Zografo, held
that a native-born American woman, who marries a Turk-
ish subject and takes up her residence in Turkey, be-
comes a Turkish subject. Upon the death of her hus-
band, in order to revive her American nationality, she
must leave Turkey and take up an American residence.
Mr. Bayard to Mr. Zografo, February 6, 1886, MSS. Dom.
Let.
In 1887 Mrs. Arana, who had been born in the United
States in 1846 of American parents, and had married in
1869 a Spanish subject, claimed that, by the death of
her husband in 1883, her United States citizenship had
reverted. She applied to the United States minister to
Salvador for a passport. Secretary Bayard, in instructing
the minister, quoted from Secretary Fish's instruction of
February 24, 1871, to Mr. Washburne, supra, and said
that he was not disposed to depart from this precedent.
He held that Mrs. Arana, so long as she remained with-
out the jurisdiction of this government was not entitled
to the privileges of a citizen of the United States, so far,
at least, as would entitle her to diplomatic interposition
against the government of Salvador on a claim accruing
since her marriage and departure from the United States.
BY MARRIAGE. 253
Secretary Bayard to Mr. Hall, January 6, 1887, For. Rel.
1887, 92.
In 1890, in the case of Carl Heisinger, Mr. Blaine said
that the Department had several times taken the view
that the marriage of an American woman to a foreigner
does not completely devest her of her original national-
ity; that her American citizenship was held for most
purposes to be in abeyance during coverture, but to be
susceptible of revival by her return to the jurisdiction and
allegiance of the United States. Mr. Blaine to Mr. Phelps,
Feb. 1, 1890, For. Rel. 1890, 302.
And in an instruction to the American consul at Sagua
la Grande, June 7, 1895, Acting Secretary Uhlsaid: "The
view has been taken by this Department in several cases
that the marriage of an American woman to a foreigner
does not completely devest her of her American citizen-
ship, but that the same is only suspended during cover-
ture, and reverts upon the death of her husband, if she
is residing in the United States, or upon her returning
to this country if she is residing abroad." Van Dyne on
Citizenship of the United States, 137.
It is believed that this view that marriage to an alien
does not completely devest an American woman of her
original nationality, but that it is only suspended while
the marriage exists, and reverts upon the husband's
death if the wife is residing in the United States, or upon
her return here, if residing abroad, was based on the case
of Moore v. Tisdale, 5 B. Mon. 352, which was decided in
Kentucky in 1845. The facts in that case were that a
native American woman went with her husband, who was
a citizen of the United States, from their home in Ken-
tucky, to the "province of Texas," prior to 1845, resided
there for some years, returning to Kentucky upon the
death of her husband. The court decided that as she
had returned to the United States soon after the
death of her husband, "it should be assumed that she
254 NATURALIZATION
had merely submitted herself temporarily, and as a wife,
to the dominion of Texas, without having renounced her
native allegiance; that she, therefore, never has been
an alien, and that her rights of property remain as if,
instead of having been a temporary resident of Texas,
she had, during her absence from Kentucky, been a resi-
dent of one of the other states of the Union. She can
not, therefore, be debarred of her dower on the ground
of having been an alien at the death of her husband."
In October, 1895, Mrs. Beatens, a native-born Amer-
ican woman, who had in 1889 married a Hollander resid-
ing in the United States, applied for a passport as an
American citizen. She was temporarily sojourning in Ger-
many for the purpose of completing her musical education.
In a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture, who had
transmitted Mrs. Beatens' application. Secretary Olney,
after citing the decisions of the courts, and of the At-
torneys General on the subject of citizenship of married
women, said: "It has been the uniform practice of this
Department to decline to grant passports to American
women who are married to aliens. In my opinion the
Department would not be warranted in departing from
this practice in the present case." Mr. Olney to Mr.
Morton, MSS. Dom. Let. October 26, 1895. Van Dyne,
Citizenship of United States, 138.
Secretary Sherman, in an instruction to the United
States minister at St. Petersburg, March 15, 1897, said:
"By our statute an alien wife of an American citizen
shares his citizenship. By the usual rules of Continental
private international law a woman marrying an alien
shares his status, certainly during his life; but there-
after, on widowhood, reverts to her original status unless
she abandons the country of her origin and returns to
that of her late husband." For. Rel. 1901, 443.
These authorities were not entirely uniform. But the
BY MARRIAGE. 255
decided weight of authority was to the effect that the
marriage of an American woman to an alien conferred
upon her the nationality of her husbamd.
Cockburn, in his work on Nationality (published in
1869), says: "In every country, except where the English
law prevnils, the nationality of a woman on marriage
merges in that of her husband, she loses her own nation-
ality and acquires his" (p. 24). Since this was written,
the British Act of 1870 has been passed, which expressly
declares that a married woman shall be deemed to be a
subject of the state of which her husband is for the time
being a subject.
The practice of the Department, alluded to above, of
declining to grant passports to American-born women
married to foreigners, showed the recognition of this
principle by the Executive Department of ourgovernment.
Provision is made, in all Continental European codes,
for enabling a woman whose nationality of origin has
been changed by marriage into that of her husband, to
resume, if so minded, her original nationality on becom-
ing a widow; on the condition, however, if not resident
in the country of origin, of returning to it. Cockburn,
Nationality, 25.
And it had been repeatedly held by the Department
of State that the nationality of origin of an American-
born woman reverted upon the death of her alien hus-
band if she were residing in the United States, or upon
her returning to this country if residing abroad.
b. Act of March 2, 1907.
To resolve any doubt that might exist because of
variant decisions of the courts and opinions of Secre-
taries of State as to the effect of the marriage of an Amer-
ican woman to an alien, the Citizenship Commission
256 NATURALIZATION
of 1906 recommended and Congress enacted the fol-
lowing law:
"Any American woman who marries a foreigner shall
take the nationality of her husband. At the termination
of the marital relation she may resume her American
citizenship, if abroad, by registering as an American
citizen within one year with a consul of the United States,
or by returning to reside in the United States, or, if re-
siding in the United States at the termination of the
marital relation, by continuing to reside therein." Sec.
3, Act of March 2, 1907.
This law not only served to settle definitely, and in
the same manner that the matter has been fixed by
statute in most other civilized countries, the citizenship
of married women, but it removed from the sphere of
''executive legislation " the constantly recurring question
of the reversion of nationality of married women upon
the death of their alien husbands. The proposition that
upon the termination of the marriage relation, the
American nationality of an American woman married to
a foreigner reverted, did not square with the proposition
laid down by Chief Justice Marshall that when a citizen
becomes an alien — by whatever process — he can recover
his rights as a citizen only by going through the forms
which our laws prescribe for the naturalization of aliens.
Instructions of the Department of State.
The Executive Order of President Roosevelt of April,
6, 1907,* amending the diplomatic and consular regula-
tions so as to embody in them the provisions of the Act
of March 2, 1907, makes the following prescription con-
cerning American worn, n who have married foreigners
and been separated from their husbands by death or
absolute divorce:
"Registration to Resume or Retain Citizenship. —
When an American woman has married a foreigner and
*For the full text of this order see Appendix.
BY MARRIAGE. 257
he dies or they are absolutely divorced, in order to re-
sume her rights as an American citizen, she must register
with an American consulate within one year after the
termination of the marital relation."
The Department of State, on April 19, 1907, issued a
circular instruction addressed to the American diplo-
matic and consular officers to carry this regulation into
effect, the pertinent portion whereof reads as follows:
"A woman who was an American before her marriage
to a foreigner, and who, upon the termination of the
marital relation by the death of her husband or by their
absolute divorce, desires to resume the American citizen-
ship which she enjoyed before her marriage, must, within
one year after the termination of the marital relation,
register with an American consular officer her intention
to resume her American citizenship. The form of such
registration shall be as follows:
"I, [name of affiant] do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I was born on [date of birth] in [place
of birth] and was, up to the time of my marriage on
[date of marriage] to [name of late hus-
band] a citizen of the United States; that the said
[name of husband] was born in [place of
his birth] and was, at the time of his death (or our di-
vorce), a citizen (or subject) of [name of country];
that the said [name of late husband] died (or we
were divorced) on [date of death or divorce] at
[place of death or divorce]; that I am now tem-
porarily resident in [place of residence] and de-
sire to resume my American citizenship; that it is my
intention to return to the United States within
[limit of intended foreign residence] with the intention
of residing and performing the duties of an American
citizen.
"Sworn and subscribed to before me this dav
of
[L. S.] American Consul.
5233-17
258 NATURALIZATION
"I, [name of consul] American consul at
[place of consulate] certify that [name of affiant]
who signed the above affidavit, is the person she repre-
sents herself to be and that the proof presented of her
marriage to [name of late husband] and of the
termination of her marital relation with [name of
late husband] is as follows: [state here
nature of proof presented].
"In testimony whereof, I have hereunto signed my name
and affixed my seal of office.
>
AmeiHcan Consul.
"Documentary evidence in support of the allegations
relative to the termination of the marital relation should
be required in each case and the nature of such docu-
mentary proof should be set forth in the consul's certifi-
cate. In the case of a woman having been a native citizen
of the United States before her marriage, documentary
proof of such citizenship need not be required unless the
consul entertains doubts as to the statements made to
him, in which case he should require a certificate of birth
or the affidavit of a credible witness personally known
to him.
" In the case of a woman having been a naturalized citi-
zen of the United States previous to her marriage, proof
of the naturalization, such as would be required if she
applied for a passport, should be required. The affidavit
and the consul's certificate should be made in duplicate,
and one copy should be sent to this Department immed-
iately afterwards and the embassy or legation in the
country, in which the consulate is situated should be at
the same time advised of the making of the affidavit and
of the report to the Department."
H. Case of Nellie Grant Sartoris.
By Article 1 of the convention relative to naturaliza-
tion, concluded between the United States and Great
Britain May 13, 1870 (16 Stat, at L. 775), it was provided
BT MARRIAGE. 259
that "citizens of the United States of America, who have
become, or shall become, and are, naturalized according
to law within the British dominions as British subjects,
shall ... be held by the United States to be in all
respects and for all purposes British subjects, and shall
be treated as such by the United States."
Article 3 provides that "if any such citizen of the
United States as aforesaid, naturalized within the do-
minions of Her Britannic Majesty, should renew his resi-
dence in the United States, the United States government
may, on his own application and on such conditions as
that government may think fit to impose, readmit him
to the character and privileges of a citizen of the United
States, and Great Britain shall not, in that case, claim
him as a British subject on account of his former natura-
lization."
In 1874 Nellie Grant, daughter of President Grant,
married Algernon Sartoris, a British subject, and went
to England, where she resided until his death in 1896.
In May, 1898, the following joint, resolution of Congress
was adopted readmitting Mrs. Sartoris to American citi-
zenship, in pursuance of the above treaty. Resolution of
May 18, 1898(30 Stat, at L. 1496):
"Whereas, Nellie Grant Sartoris, widow, daughter of
the late General Ulysses S. Grant, being a natural-born
citizen of the United States, married in eighteen hundred
and seventy-four Algernon Charles Frederick Sartoris, a
subject of the Queen of Great Britain, and emigrated to
Great Britain, becoming thereby, under the laws of Great
Britain, a naturalized British subject, to be recognized
as such by the United States, according to the provisions
of the convention relative to naturalization between the
United States and Great Britain of the thirteenth of
May, eighteen hundred and seventy; and
"Whereas, the said Nellie Grant Sartoris has since re-
turned to the United States and renewed her residence
260 NATURALIZATION
therein, and petitioned Congress to be readmitted to the
character and privileges of a citizen of the United States
under and by virtue of the provisions of article third of
the convention aforesaid; therefore,
" Resolved by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That Nellie Grant Sartoris, daughter of Gen-
eral Ulysses S. Grant, be, and she is hereby, on her own
application, unconditionally readmitted to the character
and privileges of a citizen of the United States, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of article third of the con-
vention relative to naturalization between the United
States and Great Britain concluded May thirteenth,
eighteen hundred and seventy."
I. Effect of Divorce.
The decree of a competent court granting an absolute
divorce would have the same effect as the death of the
husband upon the citizenship of the woman.
Secretary Hay, in a, case arising before the enactment
of the law of 1907, in replying to the request of the
United States minister at Berne for instructions as to
the issuance of a passport to Mrs. Daisie Annie Newman
Van Buren, the daughter of a native citizen of the United
States, who had been married to Baron Van Buren, a
Dutch subject, from whom she was subsequently di-
vorced, said: "In accordance with the view which the
Department has taken in several cases, when an American
woman marries an alien her condition from the stand-
point of nationality is lost in that of her husband, as
long as the marital union lasts. Upon its termination
she may resume the nationality of her birth by returning
to the United States to reside, if residing abroad, or
acquire a new one. In this case Mrs. Van Buren's status
under the laws of the Netherlands calls for no considera-
tion. She does not live in that country, nor does she.
BY MARRIAGE, 261
apparently, intend to do so. Her divorce having been
lawfully obtained, her marital relations with Baron Van
Buren having ceased, her domicil bona fide being in this
country, you may properly issue a passport in her favor
upon satisfactory proof of the facts as set forth in your
despatch, and in the letter from the consul at Geneva."
Mr. Hay to Mr. Leishman, March 16, 1899, MSS. Inst, to
Switzerland.
In a case coming before the Department of State in
1906, it appeared that a native-born Swiss woman had
married in the United States an American citizen, and
that thereafter the marital relationship had been dis-
solved by a decree of absolute divorce in Kansas. The
woman then returned to her native country and estab-
lished a residence there with her parents, until her symp-
toms of mental infirmity became so pronounced that she
was removed to an insane asylum. The Swiss Minister
at Washington informed the Department of the intention
to send the woman to the United States, and requested
that she be permitted to land and that provision be made
for her by locating her in some institution.
The Department of State replied stating that, under its
practice, "a widow, or a woman who has obtained an abso-
lute divorce, being an American citizen and who has
married an alien, must return to the United States or
must have her residence here in order to have her Amer-
ican citizenship revert on becoming feme sole. Con-
versely, an alien woman who marries an American citizen
and secures a divorce from him in the United States and
returns to her native country must be held to have aban-
doned her citizenship acquired by marriage and to have
intended to adopt her native allegiance.
"The views above expressed seem also to be in keep-
ing with the provisions of the Continental codes, which
enable a woman whose nationality has been changed by
262 NATURALIZATION
marriage to resume it when she becomes a widow on the
condition of her returning to the country of origin.
"Under the circumstances of the present case, the De-
partment is of the opinion that Mrs. has lost her na-
tionality as an American citizen; and as the statutes of
the United States prohibit the landing of insane aliens, it
would seem to be impossible to allow her to land in this
country." Mr. Root to Mr. Vogel, June 2, 1906, MSS.
Notes to Switzerland.
J. Declaration of Intention of Husband.
As an alien does not become a citizen of the United
States by making a declaration of intention, it is clear
that his wife does not acquire American citizenship; nor
does an alien woman become naturalized by marriage to a
foreigner who has merely declared his intention to be-
come a citizen.
Section 2168 of the Revised Statutes provided that:
"When any alien, who has complied with the first condi-
tion specified in Sec. 2165, [viz., formally declared his in-
tention to become a citizen] dies before he is actually
naturalized, the widow and children of such alien shall
be considered as citizens of the United States, and shall
be entitled to all rights and privileges as such, upon
taking the oaths prescribed by law."
The Act of June 29, 1906, repealed Section 2168, and
provided that: "When any alien who has declared his in-
tention to become a citizen of the United States dies be-
fore he is actually naturalized, the widow and minor chil-
dren of such alien may, by complying with the other pro-
visions of this act be naturalized without making any
declaration of intention."
Under the provision of Section 2168, when it was in
force, there was some doubt as to the exact meaning of
the latter part of the section, viz., " taking the oaths pre-
scribed by law." It had been held that what was meant
BY MARRIAGE. 263
was " the oaths prescribed by law to be taken by an alien
upon his admission to citizenship." Van Dyne, Citizen-
ship of United States 98.
It is understood that the object of the amendment of
the law was to resolve this doubt, and also to remove
any doubt which might have existed as to the meaning of
the words "first condition specified in Section 2165," had
they been allowed to stand as in the Revised Statutes.
It is to be observed that the declaration of intention
and death of the husband and father do not of themselves
confer citizenship upon the widow and minor children.
There is a further requisite: They must comply with
the other provisions of the law, go before a competent
court and be admitted to citizenship. And while, under
the terms of Section 2168, the intent of the law was ap-
parent to admit them to citizenship merely upon applica-
tion to a court of naturalization and the taking of the
necessary oaths, it is not clear under the language of
the existing law that it was intended to dispense with
any other requirement in their case than the declaration
of intention.
CHAPTER IV.
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION.
I. Naturalization by conquest.
A. Allegiance of inhabitants of conquered state.
B. Citizenship of inhabitants of conquered state.
C. American ante-nati.
11. Naturalization by treaty.
A. In general.
B. Power of United States to acquire territory by treaty and to
prescribe terms upon which it will receive inhabitants.
C. Treaties of cession to which the United States has been a party.
a. In general.
b. Treaty of 1794 with Great Britain.
c. Treaty of I803 with France.
1. Case of Egle Aubry.
2. Case of Foucher.
3. Case of De Baca.
d. Treaty of 1819 with Spain.
e. Treaty of 1848 with Mexico.
f. Treaty of 1853 with Mexico.
g. Treaty of 1867 with Russia,
h. Treaty of I898 with Spain.
1. Insular cases: Decision of Supreme Court.
2. Status of Porto Ricans and Filipinos.
i. Treaties with Indians.
III. Naturalization by special act of Congress.
A. In general.
B. On the acquisition of Oregon.
C. On the annexation of Hawaii.
D. Readmission of Nellie Grant Sartoris to citizenship.
E. Naturalization of Indians.
IV. Naturalization by admission of territory to statehood.
A. In general.
B. Louisiana.
C. Northwest territory.
1. In general.
2. Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.
3. Michigan.
D. Florida.
E. Texas.
F. Power of Congress over territories.
G. Nebraska.
266 NATURALIZATION
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION.
Besides naturalization of the individual alien by com-
pliance with the formalities prescribed by the general
naturalization law, citizenship may be conferred upon
certain people in mass, or upon particular classes of per-
sons. This method of naturalization is called collective
naturalization. It may be effected by conquest, by
treaty, by special Act of Congress, or by admission of
new states.
I. Naturalization by Conquest.
A. Allegiance of Inhabitants of Conquered State.
According to the general principles of the law of na-
tions, every sovereign nation has, as an inherent attri-
bute, the power to acquire territory by conquest. In
the absence of stipulations on the subject, whenever a
government acquires territory by conquest the relation
of the conquered territory to the new government is to
be determined by the conquering state.
The Constitution [of the United States] confers abso-
lutely on the government of the Union the powers of
making war, and of making treaties; consequently that
government possesses the power of acquiring territory,
either by conquest or by treaty. Insular cases, 182 U. S.
300. The usage of the world is, if a nation be not
entirely subdued, to consider the holding of conquered
territory as a mere military occupation, until its fate
shall be determined at the treaty of peace. If it be
ceded by the treaty, the acquisition is confirmed, and
the ceded territory becomes a part of the nation to which
it is annexed; either on the terms stipulated in the treaty
of cession, or on such as its new master shall impose.
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L. ed. 242;
Johnson v. Mcintosh, 8 Wheat. 543.
In Church of Jesus Christ of L. D. S. v. United States,
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 267
136 U. S. 1, 34 L. ed. 478, the Supreme Court declared:
"The power to acquire territory ... is derived
from the treaty-making power and the power to declare
and carry on war. The incidents of these powers are
those of national sovereignty, and belong to all inde-
pendent governments. The power to make acquisitions
of territory by conquest, by treaty, and by cession is an
incident of national sovereignty."
Upon the conquest of a country the allegiance due by
birth from its citizens or subjects to its sovereign passes,
by operation of law, to the conqueror, who, as sovereign
de facto, has a right to the allegiance of all who are sub-
ject to his power and submit to the protection of his
arms. Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbour, 3 Pet. 99, 7 L.
ed. 617; Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 How. 176.
The nationality of the inhabitants of territory acquired
by conquest or cession becomes that of the government
under whose dominion they pass, subject to the right of
election on their part to retain their former nationality
by removal or otherwise, as may be provided. Boyd v.
Thayer, 143 U. S. 135.
In the absence of express treaty stipulations or legis-
lation by the conqueror, the relations between the con-
quered and the conqueror are determined by the law of
nations, which establishes the general rule that the alle-
giance of the conquered is transferred to the new sov-
ereign. 2 Halleck, International Law, 485.
B. Citizenship of Inhabitants of Conquered State.
The acquisition of territory by conquest by the United
States does not operate to incorporate the inhabitants of
the conquered territory as citizens of the conquering
State. Insular Cases, 182 U. S. 300. The grounds upon
which the court based its opinion are shown by the fol-
lowing quotation from the concurring opinion of Justices
White, Shiras, and McKenna:
268 NATURALIZATION
"It is insisted, . . . conceding the right of the
government of the United States to acquire territory,
as all such territory when acquired becomes absolutely
incorporated into the United States, every provision of
the Constitution which would apply under that situa-
tion is controlling in such acquired territory. This,
however, is but to admit the power to acquire, and
immediately to deny its beneficial existence.
"The general principle of the law of nations, . . .
is that acquired territory, in the absence of agreement
to the contrary, will bear such relation to the acquiring
government as may be by it determined. To concede to
the government of the United States the right to acquire,
and to strip it of all power to protect the birthright of
its own citizens and to provide for the well-being of the
acquired territory by such enactments as may, in view
of its condition, be essential, is, in effect, to say that the
United States is helpless in the family of nations, and
does not possess that authority which has at all times
been treated as an incident of the right to acquire. Let
me illustrate the accuracy of this statement. Take a case
of discovery. Citizens of the United States discover an
unknown island, peopled with an uncivilized race, yet
rich in soil, and valuable to the United States for com-
mercial and strategic reasons. Clearly, by the law of na-
tions, the right to ratify such acquisition and thus to
acquire the territory would pertain to the government of
the United States. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543,
595, 5 L. ed. 681, 694; Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367,
409, 10 L. ed. 997, 1012; Jones v. United States, 137
U. S. 202, 212, 34 L. ed. 691, 695, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80;
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 50, 38 L. ed. 331, 349, 14
Sup. Ct. Rep. 548. Can it be denied that such right could
not be practically exercised if the result would be to en-
dow the inhabitants with citizenship of the United States
and to subject them, not only to local, but also to an
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 269
equal proportion of national taxes, even although the
consequence would be to entail ruin on the discovered
territory, and to inflict grave detriment on the United
States, to arise both from the dislocation of its fiscal
system and the immediate bestowal of citizenship on
those absolutely unfit to receive it?
"The practice of the government has been otherwise.
As early as 1856 Congress enacted the Guano Islands
Act, . . . which by Sec. 1 provided that when any
citizen of the United States shall 'discover a deposit
of guano on any island, rock, or key not within the
lawful jurisdiction of any other government, and not
occupied by the citizens of any other government, and
shall take peaceable possession thereof, and occupy
the same, said island, rock, or key may, at the dis-
cretion of the President of the United States, be con-
sidered as appertaining to the United States.' 11 Stat»
at L. 119, Chap. 164; Rev. Stat., Sec. 5570 [U. S. Comp.
Stat. 1901, 3739]. Under the Act referred to, it was
stated, in argument, that the government now holds
and protects American citizens in the occupation of
some seventy islands. The statute came under consid-
eration in Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202 [34
L. ed. 691, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80], where the question
was whether or not the Act was valid, and it was
decided that the Act was a lawful exercise of power,
and that islands thus acquired were 'appurtenant' to
the United States. The court, in the course of the opin-
ion, speaking through Mr. Justice Gray, said, page 212
[L. ed. 695, Sup. Ct. Rep. 83] : 'By the law of nations, rec-
ognized by all civilized states, dominion of new territory
may be acquired by discovery and occupation, as well as
by cession or conquest; and when citizens or subjects of
one nation, in its name and by its authority or with its
assent, take and hold actual, continuous, and useful pos-
session (although only for the purpose of carrying on a
270 NATURALIZATION
particular business, such as catching and curing fish or
working mines) of territory unoccupied by any other
government or its citizens, the nation to which they be-
long may exercise such jurisdiction and for such period
as it sees fit over territory so acquired. This principle
affords ample warrant for the legislation of Congress
concerning guano islands. . . .'
''And these considerations concerning discovery are
equally applicable to ownership resulting from conquest.
A just war is declared, and in its prosecution the terri-
tory of the enemy is invaded and occupied. Would not
the war, even if waged successfully, be fraught with
danger if the effect of occupation was to necessarily in-
corporate an alien and hostile people into the United
States? Take another illustration. Suppose at the
termination of a war the hostile government had been
overthrown, and the entire territory or a portion thereof
was occupied by the United States, and there was no
government to treat with or none willing to cede by
treaty, and thus it became necessary for the United
States to hold the conquered country for an indefinite
period, or at least until such time as Congress deemed
that it should be either released or retained because it
was apt for incorporation into the United States. If
holding was to have the effect which is now claimed for
it, would not the exercise of judgment respecting the
retention be so fraught with danger to the American
people that it could not be safely exercised?
"Yet again. Suppose the United States, in conse-
quence of outrages perpetrated upon its citizens, was
obliged to move its armies or send its fleets to obtain
redress, and it came to pass that an expensive war re-
sulted and culminated in the occupation of a portion of
the territory of the enemy, and that the retention of
such territory — an event illustrated by examples in his-
tory — could alone enable the United States to recover
the pecuniary loss it had suffered. And suppose, further,
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 271
that to do so would require occupation for an indefinite
period, dependent upon whether or not payment was
made of the required indemnity. It being true that in-
corporation must necessarily follow the retention of the
territory, it would result that the United States must
abandon all hope of recouping itself for the loss suffered
by the unjust war, and hence the whole burden would
be entailed upon the people of the United States. This
would be a necessary consequence, because if the United
States did not hold the territory as security for the
needed indemnity it could not collect such indemnity,
and, on the other hand, if incorporation must follow
from holding the territory the uniformity provision of
the Constitution would prevent the assessment of the
cost of the war solely upon the newly acquired country.
In this, as in the case of discovery, the traditions and
practices of the government demonstrate the unsound-
ness of the contention."
" In Brown's case, 5 Court of Claims, 571, the facts were
that claimant, a former subject of the Kingdom of Han-
over, brought suit before the Court of Claims as a
Prussian subject to recover the proceeds of the sale of
his cotton seized by the authorities of this government
during our civil war. Subsequently to the time when the
claim arose and before the bringing of the suit, Hanover
had been incorporated by conquest in the Kingdom of
Prussia. The law gives the Court of Claims jurisdiction
of claims against the United States of aliens, 'citizens,
or subjects of any government which accords to citizens
of the United States the right to prosecute claims
against such governments in their courts.' Under the
law of Prussia aliens could prosecute claims against that
government in its courts. In the opinion of the Court of
Claims, which held that Brown was a Prussian subject,
and hence capable of prosecuting his claim before the
court, the court said:
" 'Hanover, hy conquest, in 1866 became incorporated
272 NATURALIZATION
in the Kingdom of Prussia. . . . When the territory
and government of a kingdom pass to and become merged
in the territory and government of another nation, all of
its subjects pass also. The tie which binds and carries
them is not bodily presence, but allegiance.'"
C. American Ante-nati.
All white persons, or persons of European descent,
who were born in any of the colonies, or resided or had
been adopted there, before 1776, and had adhered to the
cause of independence up to July 4, 1776, were, by the
Declaration, invested with the privileges of citizenship.
Inglis V. Sailor's Snug Harbour, 3 Pet. 164, 7 L. ed. 640.
It is universally admitted, both in English courts and
in those of our own country, that all persons born within
the colonies of North America while subject to the
Crown of Great Britain were natural-born British sub-
jects, and it must necessarily follow that that charcter
was changed by the separation of the colonies from the
parent state, and the acknowledgment of their inde-
pendence.
The rule as to the point of time at which the Ameri-
can ante-nati ceased to be British subjects differs in this
country and in England, as established by the courts of
justice in the respective countries. The English rule is
to take the date of the Treaty of Peace, in 1783. Our
rule is to take the date of the Declaration of Independ-
ence. The settled doctrine of this country is that a
person born here, who left the country before the Decla-
ration of Independence and never returned here, became
thereby an alien. Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbour, 3 Pet.
99, 7 L. ed. 617.
By withdrawing from this country and adhering to the
British government, the ante-nati lost, or, perhaps, more
properly speaking, never acquired the character of Amer-
ican citizens. Id.
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 273
n. Naturalization by Treaty.
A. In General.
Collective naturalization is also effected by treat5^
Treaties of cession of territory, whether made as the
result of military conquest or peaceful transfer, ordi-
narily contain stipulations determining the relations
which the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall bear
to the acquiring state.
B. Power of United States to Acquire Territory by Treaty
and to Prescribe Terms Upon Which It Will Receive
Inhabitants.
Justices White, Shiras, and McKenna, in their concur-
ring opinion in the Insular cases (182 U. S., 300), said:
" It maynot be doubted that, by the general principles
of the law of nations, every government which is sovereign
within its sphere of action possesses as an inherent attri-
bute the power to acquire territory by discovery, by
agreement or treaty, and by conquest. It can not also
be gainsaid that, as a general rule, wherever a govern-
ment acquires territory as a result of any of the modes
above stated, the relation of the territory to the new
government is to be determined by the acquiring power
in the absence of stipulations upon the subject. These
general principles of the law of nations are thus stated
by Halleck in his treatise on International Law, page
126: 'A state may acquire property or domain in various
ways ; its title may be acquired originally by mere occu-
pancy, and confirmed by the presumption arising from
the lapse of time ; or by discovery and lawful possession ;
or by conquest, confirmed by treaty or tacit consent; or
by grant, cession, purchase or exchange; in fine, by any
of the recognized modes by which private property is
acquired by individuals. It is not our object to enter
into any general discussion of these several modes of
5233—18
274 NATURALIZATION
acquisition, any further than may be necessary to dis-
tinguish the character of certain rights of property which
are the peculiar objects of international jurisprudence.
......
"In American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 [7 L. ed.
242], the general doctrine was thus summarized in
the opinion delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall,
page 542 [L. ed, 255] : 'If it (conquered territory)
be ceded by the treaty, the acquisition is confirmed,
and the ceded territory becomes a part of the nation
to which it is annexed, either on the terms stipulated
in the treaty of cession or on such as its new master
shall impose.'
"When our forefathers threw off their allegiance to
Great Britain and established a republican government,
assuredly they deemed that the nation which they called
into being w^as endowed with those general powers to
acquire territory which all independent governments in
virtue of their sovereignty enjoyed. This is demonstrated
hy the concluding paragraph of the Declaration of In-
dependence, which reads as follows: 'As free and inde-
pendent states, they [the United States of America]
have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract
alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts
and things which independent states may of right do.'
"That under the Confederation it w^as considered that
the government of the United States had authority to
acquire territory like any other sovereignty is clearly
established by the 11th of the Articles of Confederation.
"The decisions of this court leave no room for ques-
tion that, under the Constitution, the government of the
United States, in virtue of its sovereignty, supreme
within the sphere of its delegated power, has the full
right to acquire territory enjoyed by every other
sovereign nation.
"In American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 [7 L. ed.
242] , the court, by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, said
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 2/5
page 542 [L. ed. 255] : 'The Constitution confers abso-
lutely on the government of the Union the powers of
caaking war and of making treaties; consequently, that
government possesses the power of acquiring territory,
either by conquest or hy treaty.''
"In United States v. Huckabee (1872), 16 Wall. 414
[21 L. ed. 457], the court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Clifford, said, page 434 [L. ed. 464] : 'Power to acquire
territory either by conquest or treaty is vested by the
Constitution in the United States. Conquered territory,
however, is usually held as a mere military occupation
until the fate of the nation from which it is conquered
is determined; but if the nation is entirely subdued, or
in case it be destroyed and ceases to exist, the right of
occupation becomes permanent, and the title vests
absolutely in the conqueror. . . . Complete con-
quest, by whatever mode it may be perfected, carries
with it all the rights of the former government; or,
in other words, the conqueror, by the completion of his
conquest, becomes the absolute owner of the property
conquered from the enemy nation or state. His rights
are no longer limited to mere occupation of what he
has taken into his actual possession, but they extend
to all the property and rights of the conquered state,
including even debts as well as personal and real prop-
erty. Halleck, International Law, 839; Elphinstone v.
Bedreechund, 1 Knapp P. C. C. 329; Vattel, 365; 3 Phil-
limore. International Law, 505.' "
For a further quotation from the opinion of the court
in this case see pp. 295 et seq, post.
C. Treaties of Cession to which United States has been a
Party.
a. In General.
Every treaty of cession to which the United States has
been a party, with the exception of the treaty of peace
of 1898 (30 Stat, at L. 1754), with Spain, ceding Porto
276 NATURALIZATION
Rico and the Philippine Islands to the United States^
contains a stipulation providing that the inhabitants of
the territory ceded may, in whole or in part, become citi-
zens of the United States, either immediately or under
certain conditions.
The treaty with Russia for the cession of Alaska (15
Stat, at L. 542) excepted "uncivilized native tribes"
from the privilege of admission to citizenship.
The pertinent provisions of these several treaties are
set out below, together with concrete cases in which
they have been construed by the courts or international
claims commissions.
b. Treaty of 1794 with Great Britain.
Under the 2d article of the treaty of 1794 (8 Stat, at
L. 116), between the United States and Great Britain,
British subjects who resided at Detroit before and at
the time of the evacuation of the territory of Michigan,
and who continued to reside there afterwards without
at any time prior to the expiration of orje year from such
evacuation declaring their intention of remaining British
subjects, became, ipso facto, to all intents and purposes
American citizens. Crane v. Reeder, 25 Mich. 303.
c. Treaty of 1803 with France .
By Article 3 of the Treaty of Paris of 1803 (8 Stat, at
L. 200), ceding Louisiana to the United States, it was
provided that " the inhabitants of the ceded territory
shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States,
and admitted as soon as possible according to the prin-
ciples of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of
all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of
the United States."
1. Case of Egle Aubry.
Egle Aubry, a person of color, presented to the com-
mission under the convention between the United States
and France of January 15, 1880 (21 Stat, at L. 673), a
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 277
memorial in which, in the character of a citizen of
France, she claimed damages from the United States for
the occupation of buildings by General Grover in the
parish of St. Tammany, Louisiana, in February, 1864. In
this memorial it was set forth, as the ground of the
claimant's French citizenship, that she was born in the
territory of Orleans, January 3, 1803, while that territory
was a French colony.
Counsel for the United States demurred on the ground
that, as the claimant was an inhabitant of the territory
in question when it was ceded by France to the United
States by the treaty of April 30, 1803 (8 Stat, at L. 200),
she thereby became a citizen of the United States, inas-
much as the treaty of cession transferred to the United
States full and complete jurisdiction over the inhabitants
resident upon the territory without any reservation
whatever on the part of the French government. In
support of this position, counsel cited Wheaton's Inter-
national Law, 6th ed., 627, where, in treating of "col-
lective naturalization," the author mentions the con-
vention of April 30, 1803.
Counsel for the memorialist relied upon the third ar-
ticle of the treaty, which is in these words: "The inhabi-
tants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the
Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as
possible, according to the principles of the Federal Con-
stitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages,
and immunities of citizens of the United States, and in
the meantime they shall be maintained and protected in
the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the
religion which they profess."
As memorialist was a person of color, whose citizen-
ship was not recognized by the United States till the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, her counsel
contended that she had not, at the time her claim arose,
enjoyed the advantages and immunities of a citizen of
278 NATURALIZATION
the United States, but that she remained a citizen of
France, and as such was entitled to be "maintained and
protected" in the "free enjoyment" of her "liberty,
property, and religion." In support of this position he
cited the case of one Decuir, whose father, a free negro,
was an inhabitant of the territory of Louisiana when it
was ceded to the United States. The son, having been
impressed into the Confederate service, was discharged
by the superior court of Alexandria on a writ of habeas
corpus upon the ground that he was not a citizen of
Louisiana, and, consequently, that he was protected as a
French subject under the third article of the treaty of
1803.
Upon the issues thus presented, the demurrer was
sustained by the following decision of the Commission:
"The claimant, Egle Aubry, a colored woman, was born
on the 3d day of January, 1803, in the territory of
Louisiana, then a French colony, and therefore was by
birth a citizen of France. On the 30th day of April, 1803,
the territory of Louisiana was, by treaty, ceded by
France to the United States. The treaty ' cedes to the
United States forever and in full sovereignty the territory,
with all its rights and appurtenances, as fully and in the
same manner as they have been acquired by the French
Republic in virtue of the treaty with Spain.' Spain had
ceded the territory to France in October, 1801, and the
cession did not affect slavery, which then existed there.
The treaty of cession contains no provision by which the
inhabitants could remain, or by their option choose to
remain, French citizens. On the contrary, the third
article of the treaty obviously contemplates that they
were to be American citizens. Article 3 of the treaty is
as follows: [Here follows the article as above quoted.]
There is nothing in the treaty, therefore, to indicate
that it was the intention, either of France, or of the
United States, that the inhabitants, or any of them, were
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 279
to remain citizens of France. On the contrary, it was in-
tended that they should be citizens of the United States.
The demurrer is sustained, and the claim is disallowed."
3 Moore's International Arbitrations, 2511 et seq.
2. Case of Foucher.
A claim against the United States, for the seizure and
destruction of property by military authorities, was
made before the same Commission in behalf of the heirs
of Louis Frederick Foucher Marquis de Circe, who died
in France in 1869. It appeared that Foucher was born in
1798 in New Orleans, province of Louisiana, then a pos-
session of Spain, and that he was residing there with his
father in 1803, when the territory of Louisiana was ceded
by France to the United States. ^-^' remained at New
Orleans till 1836, when he removed to France, where he
continued to reside till his decease. In France he exer-
cised the rights and enjoyed the privileges of a citizen,
owned a chateau, and assumed his inherited title; but
there was no evidence of record that he was ever rein-
stated or naturalized in conformity with the French
Code.
It was claimed by counsel for the United States, on
the authority of the decision of the commission in the
case of Egle Aubry (supra), that Foucher became a citi-
zen of the United States by the treaty of cession in 1803;
that his residence in France, even with the attending
circumstances, did not entitle him to be considered a
citizen of that country; and that consequently the com-
mission could not take jurisdiction of the case; but it
was admitted that the Supreme Court of the state of
Louisiana, in a case entitled De Circe's Succession, 41 La.
Ann. 506, 6 So. 812, had held that he was, at the time of
his death, a French citizen within the meaning of both
the French law and the law of Louisiana.
Counsel for the French Republic maintained that.
280 NATURALIZATION
inasmuch as the father of Louis Fredericlc Foucher was
born in Louisiana when that province was within the
jurisdiction of France, his descendant, Louis Fredericli
Foucher, was a citizen of France, and not affected by the
cession of the territory of Louisiana by France to Spain,
then by Spain to France, then by France to the United
States. It was also claimed by counsel for the French
Republic that the opinions of certain French lawyers,
whose words were quoted in the brief, should be accepted
as the evidence of experts in regard to the law of France.
M. Harrisse, speaking of the French law, said: "Citizen-
ship is conferred in the forms given in my first cross-
interrogatory. It is evidenced by public notoriety and
enjoyment and practice of certain political rights which
are conferred on French citizens only, such as the registry
of voting at elections or inscription on the electoral
lists. But, as the law does not prescribe the rules of
evidence for such cases, it springs from circumstances."
The certificate of the minister of the interior was also
relied upon. He said, in substance, that Louis Frederick
Foucher, Marquis de Circe, born at New Orleans, had
been, in view of the evidence produced, considered to be
French and inscribed on the electoral list of the seventh
arrondissement of Paris for the years 1864 to 1869, and
that his inscription on that list established, until the
contrary was proved, that he was French. M. Jason, a
French lawyer, who was examined as an expert, said: "I
consider the French nationality of Louis Frederick
Foucher, Marquis de Circe, as proved, first, by the judg-
ment of the tribunal of the Seine of April 11, A. D. 1851,
ordering the rectification of the birth certificate of his
son, and the addition of the name of Circe, which had been
omitted — an addition which the tribunal could order
only after the Marquis de Circe had established his qual-
ity of French citizen; second, by the inscription of L. F.
Foucher de Circe on the electoral lists of the seventh
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 281
arrondissemeyit on presentation to the competent muni-
cipal officers of documents establishing his quality of
French citizen."
The commission unanimously awarded $9,200. Coun-
sel for the United States in his final report, referring to
this award, said: "This act was a recognition of the
citizenship of Foucher in France; but whether the con-
clusion was reached upon the ground that the father of
Foucher was a citizen of France and that the son,
although born in the territory of Louisiana, then a
province of Spain, followed the condition of his father,
or whether the commission were of opinion that the re-
moval of Foucher to France in 1836, and his continuous
residence there for a third of a century and during his
life, coupled with the fact that he was recognized as a
citizen of France, although formal proceedings, as re-
quired by articles 9 and 10 of the French Code, had not
been complied with, justified the conclusion, legally,
that he was a citizen of France, does not appear."
Arthur Denis, Testamentary Executor of L. F. Foucher,
Marquis de Circe v. United States, 3 Moore, International
Arbitrations, 2512 et seq.
3. Case of De Baca.
Neither the treaty of 1800 between Spain and France,
nor that of 1803 (8 Stat, at L. 200), between France and
the United States, ceding "the colony or province of
Louisiana," definitely fixed the boundaries of that colony
or province. A dispute arose between the United States
and Spain on this subject. The United States contended
that the Rio Grande River was the western boundary of
the territory ceded, but Spain controverted this. After
a lengthy correspondence, the differences between the
two governments were settled by the treaty of February
22, 1819 (8 Stat at L. 252), by which the United States
acquired East and West Florida, and renounced all its
282 NATURALIZATION
rights, claims, and pretensions to the territories lying west
and north of a line beginning at the mouth of the Sabine
River and running north and west in the manner described
in the treaty.
In the case of De Baca v. United States, 37 Ct. CI. 482,
it appears that Sandoval, claimant's decedent, was born
of Spanish parents in 1809 in Sante Fe, in the territory
of New Mexico (within the territory described above to
which the United States renounced all its rights, claims,
and pretensions), and continued to reside there until his
death in 1862. It was contended by the claimant that
decedent acquired citizenship in the United States under
article 3 of the treaty of 1803, between the United States
and France, which entitled inhabitants of the ceded ter-
ritory to "be incorporated in the Union of the United
States, and admitted, as soon as possible, according to
the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoy-
ment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of
citizens of the United States." The court held that the
disputed territory was not acquired by cession from
France, citing in support of that view the provision of
article 6 of the treaty of 1819, between the United States
and Spain, which provides that the inhabitants of the
territories which His Catholic Majesty cedes to the
United States by this treaty shall be "incorporated in
the Union of the United States as soon as may be con-
sistent with the principles of the Federal Constitution*
and admitted to the enjoyment of all the privileges,
rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United
States." "There is no provision in the treaty," says the
court, "with reference to the citizenship of the inhabi-
tants in the disputed territory, thus indicating to our
minds that such territory had not, up to that time,
ceased to be Spanish territory, and for that reason no
provision was necessary concerning their citizenship
under the Spanish government."
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 283
The court's conclusion was that it could not regard
these treaties as affecting or changing the citizenship of
any person dwelling within the limits of the disputed
territory; that Spaniards continued to be Spaniards, and
Americans continued to be Americans, and their children
were of the citizenship of their parents. The court called
attention to the fact that the inhabitants of Santa Fe
were universally regarded as Spaniards or Mexicans,
until the United States acquired that territory by treaty;
and that the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo recognized
all of these inhabitants as Mexican citizens, and made
provision for their remaining such or becoming citizens
of the United States at their own election.
The decision of the court was that claimant's decedent
was born a subject of Spain, and did not become a citizen
of the United States until the expiration of the year pre-
scribed by the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo — that is, one
year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the
treaty, which took place May 30, 1848 (9 Stat, at L. 922.)
d. Treaty of 1819, with Spain.
The treaty of 1819 (8 Stat, at L. 252), art. 6, with Spain,
ceding Florida to the United States, provided that the
inhabitants of the ceded territory "shall be incorporated
in the Union of the United States as soon as maybe con-
sistent with the principles of the Federal Constitution,
and admitted to the enjoyment of all the privileges,
rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United
States."
In the case of American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet.
511, 7 L. ed. 242, Chief Justice Marshall said: "This
treaty is the law of the land, and admits the inhabi-
tants of Florida to the enjoyment of the privileges,
rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United
States. It is unnecessary to inquire whether this is not
their condition, independent of stipulation. They do
284 NATURALIZATION
not, however, participate in political power; they do not
share in the government till Florida shall become a
state."
In Tannis v. Doe ex dem. St. Cyre, 21 Ala. 449, it was
held by the Supreme Court of Alabama, in 1852, that a
free negro, who was an inhabitant of Florida at the date
of the treaty by which Spain ceded that territory to the
United States, lost the character of an alien by the
operation of that treaty. See, also, Boyd v. Thayer, 143
U. S. 135.
e. Treaty of February 2, 1848, with Mexico.
The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, signed February 2,
1848 (9 Stat, at L. 922), effected a collective naturaliza-
tion of all (Mexicans) inhabitants of California and other
territory ceded by that treaty who remained in and ad-
hered to the United States. Article 8 of the treaty pro-
vided that "Mexicans now established in territories
previously belonging to Mexico;" and which were to "re-
main for the future within the limits of the United
States, as defined hy the present treaty," should, if re-
maining in such territories, elect within a year from the
date of the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty
whether they would "retain the title and rights of Mexi-
can citizens, or acquire those of citizens of the United
States," but that those who remained "in the said terri-
tories after the expiration of that year, without having
declared their intention to retain the character of Mexi-
cans," should " be considered to have elected to become
citizens of the United States."
Under the provision of this treaty that Mexicans re-
siding in the ceded territory should acquire United
States citizenship, it was decided, in United States v.
Lucero, 1 N. Mex. 422, that Pueblo Indians, who were
" Mexicans," under Mexican law, became citizens of the
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 285
United States. See, also, U. S. v. Santistevan, 1 New
Mex. 583.
The 8th section of the treaty is inapplicable to per-
sons who, before the revolution in Texas, had been citi-
zens of Mexico, and who, by that revolution, had been
separated from it. McKinney v. Saviego, 18 How. 235,
15 L. ed.365.
Two claimants, natives of Mexico, who had remained
in New Mexico after the ratification of the treaty with-
out having indicated an election to "retain the title and
rights of Mexican citizens," complained of acts commit-
ted by the authorities of the United States prior to the
date of the conclusion of the treaty. It was held by the
commissioners, without reference of the question to the
umpire, that the claimants in question had no standing
as Mexicans before the commission. Melquiades and
Josefa Chavez v. United States, United States and Mexi-
can Claims Commission, Convention of July 4, 1868, 15
Stat, at L. 679, Moore, International Arbitrations, 2510.
A., a native of Mexico, where he was born in 1833, was
taken by his father, in 1851, to California, whither the
latter had gone in March, 1848. It was held by the Commis-
sioners that the phrase, "Mexicans now established," as
employed in article 8 of the treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo, applied only to those who were established in
the ceded territories at the date of the conclusion of the
treaty, and not to those who came subsequently; and
that neither the father, nor consequently the son through
him, acquired, under the treaty, the citizenship of the
United States. Jesus M. Ainsa t?. Mexico, United States
and Mexican Claims Commission, Convention of July 4,
1868, 15 Stat, at L. 679, 3 Moore, International Arbitra-
tions, 2510.
The constitution of California of October 1, 1849, Art.
2, Sec. 1, provided: "Every white male citizen of the
286 NATURALIZATION
United States, and every white male citizen of Mexico,
who shall have elected to become a citizen of the United
States, under the treaty of peace exchanged and ratified
at Queretaro on the 30th day of May, 1848 [9 Stat, at L.
922], of the age of 21 years, who shall have been a resi-
dent of the state six months next preceding the day of
the election, and of the county or district in which he
claims his vote thirty days, shall be entitled to vote at
all elections which are now or hereafter may be author-
ized by law." The Commissioners held that neither this
article, nor anything in the Act of Congress admitting
California into the Union, helped claimant's case.
"The umpire considers that the claimant must be con-
sidered to be a Mexican citizen, the contrary not having
been proved by the defense. The witnesses testify that
he was born in Mexico, and it is not shown that he had
divested himself of that nationality. The umpire does
not think that article 8 of the treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo applied to the claimant, though he might have
been a resident of Texas at the time of the conclusion of
that treaty and for a year afterward. Texas was not, in
the meaning of that article, one of the territories pre-
viously belonging to Mexico, and which remained for the
future within the limits of the United States. Texas
had been independent since 1836, and a state of the
Union since 1845. It was claimed by the United States
that the strip of territory between the rivers Nueces and
Bravo was a part of Texas, and had always been so. It
must therefore be supposed, nothing to the contrary
having been proved, that the claimant was a Mexican
citizen residing in Texas." Thornton, Umpire, July 7,
1876, Convention of July 4, 1868, 15 Stat, at L. 679;
Agapito Longoria v. United States, United States and
Mexican Claims Commission, 3 Moore, International
Arbitrations, 2510, 2511.
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 287
The right of election secured to Mexican citizens of
the territory of New Mexico by the treaty with Mexico,
to retain their citizenship or to become American citi-
zens, was not required to be exercised in any particular
mode, but could be exercised and proved in any manner
appropriate to the nature of the case. A declaration of
intention by a Mexican citizen to retain Mexican citizen-
ship, by signing his name to a list authorized to be kept
by the clerks of the prefects' courts by a proclamation
of the military governor of New Mexico, is a sufficient
exercise of such right of election, and is not affected by
a subsequently declared intention to withdraw such
signature, which is not shown to have been acted on.
Quintana v. Tomkins, 1 N. M. 29.
A declaration of intention to retain Mexican citizen-
ship, made before a probate court, in accordance with
the proclamation above referred to, was a binding and
valid exercise of the right of election reserved to Mexi-
can residents of the territory of New Mexico by Article
8 of the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (9 Stat, at L. 922).
Carter v. Territory, 1 N. M. 317.
In the case of Tobin v. Walkinshaw, McAll. 186, Fed.
Cas. No. 14,070, the United States Circuit Court held
that the principle that the allegiance of the inhabitants
of territory ceded is transferred with the territory, un-
less the treaty of cession provides otherwise, applies
only to natural-born citizens of the country making the
cession. In this case one Forbes, a native of Great
Britain, was, at the date of the treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo, a naturalized citizen of Mexico. He continued
to reside in California after the execution of the treaty,
and never made any declaration of intention to retain
the rights of a Mexican citizen. It was contended that
these facts, with the subsequent admission of California
into the Union, fixed at once and by mere operation of
288 NATURALIZATION
law the status of American citizenship upon him. The
treaty stipulated, as to those Mexicans who should pre-
fer to remain in the ceded territory, that they might
either retain the title and rights of Mexican citizens, or
acquire those of American citizens; but declared that
they should be under the obligation to make their elec-
tion within one year from the date of the exchange of the
ratifications of the treaty, and those who should remain
after the expiration of that year, without having declared
their intention to retain the character of Mexican citi-
zens, should be considered to have elected to become
citizens of the United States. The court said that birth
binds man by the tie of natural allegiance to his native
soil, and such allegiance gives to the country in which
he was born the right to transfer this natural allegiance,
subject, however, to the right of election in the party
whether he will retain his allegiance to his old sover-
eign, or pay allegiance to the new. Said the court:
"The object of the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo was to
regulate the exercise of this right of election by
such parties as by the principles of international
law were subject to their jurisdiction as contract-
ing parties. The Mexican government stipulated
for a right for Mexicans residing in the territory
to elect at any time within a year after the date
of the treaty to retain their title and rights as Mexicans;
the government of the United States guarded against the
abuse of the right, by limiting the time within which it
was to be executed, and stipulating that, if the election
was not made within the time limited, they should be
considered as having elected to become citizens of the
United States. The right of the two governments thus
to stipulate in relation to native-born Mexicans, under
the law of nations, is unquestionable. It was evidently
proper that the status of all such should be fixed. If
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 289
they were neither to continue Mexican citizens, nor be-
come citizens of the United States, a whole people would
become disfranchised. They would have no status as
citizens, owe no allegiance, and be left in the anomalous
position of a people without a country. Not so with
the defendant Forbes. So soon as he had been released
from the voluntary allegiance to Mexico, he was remitted
to his original status. No power existed in one govern-
ment to transfer, or in the other to receive, the volun-
tary or statutory allegiance of a naturalized citizen.
Neither had the right to say to such, ' You shall continue
your allegiance to Mexico, although she has conveyed it
away; or you shall become a citizen of the United States.'
The allegiance of the naturalized citizen is the offspring
of municipal law. Unlike natural allegiance, its support
does not rest upon the law of nature and the code of
nations. The only relations that Mexico or the United
States could change were those arising from those
sources. Nor does the language of the treaty authorize
the conclusion that the contracting parties intended
to include within the word 'Mexicans' naturalized
citizens of foreign countries. ... In the 8th
article of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexicans
are only mentioned as entitled to the rights of election.
The whole of this article refers to Mexicans ; and the
9th article speaks of ' Mexicans ' only, and provides that
those who do not preserve the character of Mexican citi-
zens shall be subsequently incorporated into and become
entitled to all the rights of citizens of the United States.
Naturalized citizens are nowhere included, eo nomine,
within the provisions of the treaty, and, in the opinion
of the court, it was not intended to include them. This
construction of the treaty is sought to be defeated by the
assumption that the change in the political relations of
the inhabitants of the ceded territory was contemplated
5233—19
290 NATURALIZATION
to be made by the treaty with their consent by giving
to them the right of election; hence, that it is to be
reasonably concluded that naturalized citizens were in-
tended to be included in the term 'Mexicans.' The
answer is, first, it is a violence to the language of the
treaty so to construe it; secondly, the allegiance of the
naturalized citizen was not a subject of transfer between
the contracting parties; and thirdly, the argument sur-
renders the whole question, because if the defendant was
included in the treaty, his consent was essential to en-
title him to exercise the right of election. . . . But,
in the opinion of the court, the election was given only
to Mexicans who remained in the ceded territory longer
than one year after the date of the treaty, who were
during that interval to elect to retain Mexican rights or
be considered citizens of the United States. Both gov-
ernments had the right so to negotiate in regard to
Mexicans; but in relation to the defendant, Forbes, a
naturalized citizen, his voluntary allegiance might be
released by Mexico — not transferred. On his release he
was remitted to his original status of a British subject,
derived from his birth, and the courts know no principle
of law which would authorize the Government of the
United States to compel the transfer of the defendant's
voluntary allegiance from Mexico to themselves. The
contracting parties did not intend to do so. The court
considering the defendant without the provisions of the
treaty, his claim to be a citizen of the United States
under them can not be sustained; and he stood at the
execution of the treaty, and now stands, where his acts
and declarations and original status have placed him —
an alien, and subject of Great Britain."
A subject of a foreign state, residing in the State of
Texas at the time of its admission to the Union, did not
thereby become a citizen of the United States. Coutzen
V. United States, 33 Ct. CI. 475.
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 291
A person born in Texas, and removing therefrom be-
fore tlie separation from Mexico, remains a citizen of
Mexico, though a minor when the separation took place.
Jones V. McMasters, 20 How. 8, 15 L. ed. 805.
In the case of Masson v. Mexico (American and Mexi-
can Claims Commission, Convention of 1868, 15 Stat, at
L. 679), claimant stated that he emigrated from France
to the Republic of Texas in 1844, and continued to re-
side there until the annexation of that republic to the
United States and its incorporation into the Union. He
asserted that he thereby became a citizen of the United
States. The umpire held that, to have become a citizen
of the United States by virtue of the annexation of
Texas, the claimant must have first been a citizen of the
Republic of Texas, and, as it was not found that he went
through the forms required to acquire that citizenship,
his claim to American citizenship was not established.
3 Moore, International Arbitrations, 2542,2543.
f . Treaty of December 30, 1853, with Mexico (Gadsden
Treaty).
Article 5 of the Gadsden treaty, signed December 30,
1853 (10 Stat, at L. 1031), declared that the provisions
of article 8 of the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (9 Stat.
at L. 922) relative to the inhabitants of the ceded ter-
ritory should apply to the territory ceded by the Gadsden
treaty. The Mexican inhabitants of the territory re-
ferred to (Arizona) who adhered to and remained in the
United States thereby became citizens of the United
States.
g. Treaty of 1867 with Russia.
The treaty of 1867 with Russia, ceding Alaska to the
United States, gave the inhabitants of the ceded terri-
tory the privilege of reserving their Russian allegiance
and returning to Russia within three years. It was pro-
vided that those remaining there (with the exception of
292 NATURALIZATION
uncivilized native tribes) should be admitted to the
enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities
of citizens of the United States.
The treaty provision (art. 3) reads as follows: "The
inhabitants of the ceded territory, according to their
choice, reserving their natural allegiance, may return to
Russia within three years; but, if they should prefer to
remain in the ceded territory, they, with the exception
of uncivilized native tribes, shall be admitted to the
enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities
of citizens of the United States, and shall be maintained
and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property, and religion. The uncivilized tribes will be
subject to such laws and regulations as the United
States may from time to time adopt in regard to abor-
iginal tribes of that country." 15 Stat, at L. 542. See
Rasmussen v. U. S., 197 U. S. 516.*
*The following report from Moore's International Arbitrations of
an interesting case which came before a claims commission to which the
United States was a party, is given:
Henriette Levy, widow of Jacob Levy, and a native of Alsace, filed,
in her own right, and as tutrix of her six minor children, a memorial
before the commission under the treaty between the United States and
France of January 15, 1880 (21 Stat at L. 673), for damages for the
seizure of cotton by the United States forces in Louisiana in 1863. The
cotton in question belonged to the firm of Isaac Levy & Co., then doing
business in Louisiana. This firm was composed of Jacob Levy and
Isaac Levy, citizens of France, and Marx Levy and Benjamin Weil, citi-
zens of the United States. In 1866 Jacob Levy purchased the interests
of Marx Levy and Benjamin Weil in the property and assets of the firm,
and subsequently removed to Strasburg, in Alsace, then in the jurisdic-
tion of France, where he died March 1, 1871. The memorial filed by
Henriette Levy embraced both the original and the acquired interest of
Jacob Levy in the property and assets of the firm.
On this state of facts counsel for the United States demurred to the
memorial, on the following grounds : " 1, As to the whole case : That
it appears that the claimant and her children, about the year 1871,
became citizens or subjects of Germany, and have ever since remained
and are now such citizens or subjects, and have not since that year been
citizens of the Republic of France, and that this claim is, therefore, not
presented by or on behalf of the citizens of that Republic. 2. As to the
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 293
h. Treaty of 1898, with Spain.
The treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898 (30 Stat, at
L. 1754), which terminated the late war between the
United States and Spain and by which Spain ceded Porto
Rico and the Philippine Islands to the United States, pro-
vided (art. 9) that Spanish subjects, natives of the Pen-
insula, residing in the territory ceded, might preserve
interest alleged to have been assigned by Benjamin Weil : That as it
appears that said Weil was at the time of the acts complained of a citizen
of the United States, the claim is not one arising out of acts committed
against the persons or propertj' of citizens of France."
In support of so much of the demurrer as related to the claim derived
from Benjamin Weil, counsel for the United States referred to the case
of Archbishop Perch^.
In support of the demurrer to the whole case counsel for the United
States invoked the treaty of Frankfort of May 10, 1871, by which Alsace
was ceded to Germany, By article 2 of this treaty it was provided that
French subjects, born in the ceded territory and actually domiciled
therein, who desired to preserve their French nationality, should be
allowed till October 1, 1872, to declare their intention to do so, before
competent authority, and to remove their domicil to France.
As there was no allegation in the memorial that Henriette Levy had
availed herself of this privilege, counsel for the United States main-
tained that it was a reasonable presumption that she had omitted to do
so, and had in consequence become a German subject. Counsel cited
in this relation the case of Archbishop Perchd, and moved that the
memorialist be required to amend her memorial and state whether she
had availed herself of the privilege secured by article 2 of the treaty of
Frankfort. He further moved that in default of such a statement the
case be dismissed.
Special counsel for the memorialist contended (l)that the case was not
analogous to that of Archbishop Perch6, since in that case the claimant
had voluntarily renounced his allegiance to France and become a citizen
of the United States ; while Jacob Levy, the husband of Henriette Levy,
was born in France, lived in France, and died a citizen of France ; and
(2) that as Jacob Levy was a citizen of France when the loss was sus-
tained and continued to be a citizen of France during his life, the claim
was by a citizen of France, and that the commission should take and
maintain jurisdiction. In support of this position the 1st, 2d, and 4th
articles of the treaty were quoted. The attention of the commission was
also called to the 7th article of the treaty of February 23, 1853 (10 Stat,
at L. 996), between France and the United States, in which it is provided
that : " Frenchmen shall enjoy the right of possessing personal and real
property by the same title and in the same manner as the citizens of the
United States. They shall be free to dispose of it as they may please,
294 NATURALIZATION
their allegiance to Spain by making, before a court of
record, within a year from the date of the exchange of
ratifications of the said treaty, a declaration of their
decision to preserve such allegiance. The treaty declared
that in default of such declaration they should be held
to have renounced such allegiance and to have adopted
the nationality of the territory in which they resided.
either gratuitously or for value received, by donation, testament, or other-
wise, just as those citizens themselves ; and in no case shall they be sub-
ject to taxes on transfer, inheritance, or any others different from those
paid by the latter."
It was also contended that any change in the nationality of the country
of their nativity could not affect the rights acquired by the heirs of Jacob
Levy while the country was an integral part of France and they were
citizens thereof ; that the repeal of a law, or change of a treaty, or a
cession of territorial domain subsequent to the date when the right of
inheritance attached could not affect any right acquired under the
treaty or such law or cession of territory. Several authorities were
cited in the brief in support of these positions, and especially the decis-
ion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Dawson v.
Godfrey, 4 Cranch, 321, 2 L. ed. 634. It was also claimed by counsel for
the memorialist that the nationality of the father was transmitted to his
minor children ; that neither the mother nor guardian could change it
during their minority ; that when the minors attained their majority
they had the right to elect whether they would adhere to the country to
which their father owed allegiance at the date of his death, and that until
that period arrived they continued citizens of France. The cession of
Alsace, it was alleged, did not affect in any particular the private rights
of the -citizens to property or claims for injuries committed prior to the
cession.
Counsel for the United States, in reply to the contention of private
counsel that there was no analogy between the case of Perch^ and the
case at bar, maintained that the question for the commission to consider
was one solely of the fact of citizenship ; that the motive or reason or
the attending circumstances in the case of a change of nationality ought
not to be considered, and could properly have no weight; that, assuming
the position of counsel for the claimant to be a tenable one, it was true
that she had the option tendered to her by the treaty of 187 1 ; but that she
was then called upon to make her choice, either to remain in Germany
and become a subject of the German Empire or to accept the privileges
of the treaty and retain her citizenship in France. She chose to remain
in the German Empire, and thas voluntarily fixed her character as a
German subject.
The Commission sustained the demurrer in these words : " The com-
mission, in this case, judges well-founded, and admits the demurrer
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 295
The trent}^ (art. 9) further provided that "the civil
rights and political status of the native inhabitants of
the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall
be determined by the Congress."
It will be observed that this treaty, unlike previous
treaties of cession to which the United States has been a
party, makes no provision for the incorporation of the
interposed by the agent of the United States to the claim or memorial.
In its opinion, it is beyond doubt that the claimant and her children,
being natives of Alsace and having always resided there, and not having
made choice of the French nationalit}' during the interim granted by
the treaty of May 10th, 1871 (which applied to persons of full age as well
as to minors), are included in the collective naturalization, real as well
as personal, which resulted to that country in consequence of its annexa-
tion to the German Empire, sanctioned by that treaty. And as German
subjects, which they have become, they can not in any manner have
recourse to a commission created solely for the settlement of certain
claims of French or American citizens. The French nationality of Jacob
Levy, whose rights the claimant and her children have inherited, can
not be included in this inheritance. Possessed by him alone, it does not
satisfy the requirements of the convention, which demands French
nationality in those who actualh' present themselves before the com-
mission. Benjamin Weil and Marx Levy never having been French, the
rights which they transferred to Jacob Levy can not, a fortiori, be taken
into consideration, nor can they render any better the legal condition
of the claimant and her children. For these reasons the commission
sustains the demurrer of the United States counsel, and declares the
claim outside of its jurisdiction."
The judgment of the commission sustaining the demurrer was dated
the 25th of June, l8Sl. The 20th of September, iSSl, the claimant, by
her attorney, filed an amendment to the memorial, in which she declared
that she and her minor children were then residents and citizens of
France, and that her post-office address at that time was in Paris, France.
Documentary evidence was also produced, showing that Henriette Levy,
the claimant, was, upon a proper application to the authorities of France,
reinstated as a French subject on the 3d of June, 1882.
Counsel for the United States maintained that the amendment was, in
effect, an admission that Henriette Levy and her minor children were
subjects of Germany at the time the treaty was ratified, and that citizen-
ship in France, acquired after the date of the treaty, could not give
jurisdiction to the commission over parties so acquiring citizenship.
The case was dismissed finally for want of jurisdiction.
Boutwell's Report, 65, French and American Claims Commission, Con-
vention of January l5, 1880, 21 Stat, at L. 673; 3 Moore's Int. Arbitrations,
2514 et seq.
296 NATURALIZATION
inhabitants of the ceded territory as citizens of the
United States. It expressly declares that the civil rights
and political status of the native inhabitants shall be
determined by the Congress.
The contention was advanced by those who were op-
posed to the acquisition of Porto Rico and the Philippine
Islands that the United States has no power, in acquiring
and governing territory, to provide against the incorpo-
ration of the inhabitants of the acquired territory as
citizens of the United States. They contended that the
inhabitants of the territory ceded to the United States
by Spain became, immediately upon annexation, citizens
of the United States. •
1. Insular Cases : Decisions of Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the Insular
Cases, 182 U. S. 1-391, 45 L. ed. 1041-1146, 21 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 742-827, declared, however, that this government,
in acquiring territory, has power to prescribe the terms
upon which it will receive the inhabitants ; and, in the
concurring opinion of Justices White, Shiras, and Mc-
Kenna, it was held that where a treaty of cession con-
tains provisions against the incorporation of the inhabit-
ants as citizens, incorporation does not take place until,
in the wisdom of Congress, it is deemed that the acquired
territory has reached a condition where it is proper that
it should enter into and form a part of the American
family.
In their concurring opinion (182 U. S. 300), Justices
White, Shiras, and McKenna said:
". . . Let me . . . eliminate the case of war, and
consider the treaty-making power as subserving the pur-
poses of the peaceful evolution of national life. Suppose
the necessity of acquiring a naval station or a coaling
station on an island inhabited with people utterly unfit
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 297
for American citizenship and totally incapable of bear-
ing their proportionate burden of the national expense.
Could such island, under the rule which is now insisted
upon, be taken? Suppose, again, the acquisition of terri-
tory for an interoceanic canal, where an inhabited strip
of land on either side is essential to the United States
for the preservation of the work. Can it be denied that,
if the requirements of the Constitution as to taxation
are to immediately control, it might be impossible by
treaty to accomplish the desired result?
"Whilst no particular provision of the Constitution is
referred to, to sustain the argument that it is impossible
to acquire territory by treaty without immediate and
absolute incorporation, it is said that the spirit of the Con-
stitution excludes the conception of property or depend-
encies possessed by the United States and which are not
so completely incorporated as to be in all respects a
part of the United States; that the theory upon which
the Constitution proceeds is that of confederated and
independent states, and that no territory, therefore, can
be acquired which does not contemplate statehood, and
excludes the acquisition of any territory which is not in
a position to be treated as an integral part of the United
States. But this reasoning is based on political, and not
judicial, considerations. Conceding that the conception
upon which the Constitution proceeds is that no terri-
tory, as a general rule, should be acquired unless the
territory may reasonably he expected to be worthy of
statehood, the determination of when such blessing is to
be bestowed is wholly a political question, and the aid
of the judiciary can not be invoked to usurp political
discretion in order to save the Constitution from imagi-
nary, or even real, dangers. The Constitution may not
be saved by destroying its fundamental limitations.
"Let me come, however, to a consideration of the
298 NATURALIZATION
express powers which are conferred by the Constitution,
to show how unwarranted is the principle of immediate
incorporation, which is here so strenuously insisted on.
In doing so it is conceded at once that the true rule of
construction is not to consider one provision of the Con-
stitution alone, but to contemplate all, and therefore to
limit one conceded attribute by those qualifications
which naturally result from the other powers granted by
that instrument, so that the whole may be interpreted
by the spirit which vivifies, and not by the letter which
killeth. Undoubtedly, the power to carry on war and to
make treaties implies also the exercise of those incidents
which ordinarily inhere in them. Indeed, in view of the
rule of construction which I have just conceded — that
all powers conferred by the Constitution must be inter-
preted with reference to the nature of the government,
and be construed in harmony with related provisions of
the Constitution — it seems to me impossible to conceive
that the treaty-making power by a mere cession can in-
corporate an alien people into the United Saates without
the express or implied approval of Congress. And from
this it must follow that Chere can be no foundation for
the assertion that, where the treaty-making power has
inserted conditions which preclude incorporation until
Congress has acted in respect thereto, such conditions
are void and incorporation results in spite thereof. If
the treaty-making power can absolutely, without the
consent of Congress, incorporate territory, and if that
power may not insert conditions against incorporation, it
must follow that the treaty-making power is endowed by
the Constitution with the most unlimited right, suscep-
tible of destroying every other provision of the Consti-
tution; that is, it may wreck our institutions. If the
proposition be true, then millions of inhabitants of alien
territory, if acquired by treat}^, can, without the desire
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 299
or consent of the people of the United States speaking
through Congress, be immediately and irrevocably incor-
porated into the United States, and the whole structure
of the government be overthrown. While thus aggran-
dizing the treaty-making power on the one hand, the
construction at the same time minimizes it on the other,
in that it strips that authority of any right to acquire
territory upon any condition which would guard the
people of the United States from the evil of immediate
incorporation. The treaty-making power, then, under
this contention, instead of having the symmetrical func-
tions which belong to it from its very nature, becomes
distorted — vested with the right to destroy upon the
one hand, and deprived of all power to protect the gov-
ernment on the other.
"And, looked at from another point of view, the effect
of the principle asserted is equally antagonistic, not
only to the express provisions, but to the spirit of t e
Constitution in other respects. Thus, if it be true that
the treaty-making power has the authority which is
asserted, what becomes of that branch of Congress
which is peculiarly the representative of the people of
the United States, and what is left of the functions of
that body under the Constitution? For, although the
House of Representatives might be unwilling to agree
to the incorporation of alien races, it would be impotent
to prevent its accomplishment, and the express provi-
sions conferring upon Congress the power to regulate
commerce, the right to raise revenue — bills for which,
by the Constitution, must originate in the House of
Representatives — and the authority to prescribe uniform
naturalization laws, would be in effect set at naught by
the treaty-making power. And the consequent result —
incorporation — would be beyond all future control of or
remedy by the American people, since, at once and with-
out hope of redress or power of change, incorporation
300 NATURALIZATION
by the treaty would have been brought about. The in-
consistency of the position is at once manifest. The
basis of the argument is that the treaty must be con-
sidered to have been incorporated, because acquisition
presupposes the exercise of judgment as to fitness for
immediate incorporation. But the deduction drawn is,
although the judgment exercised is against immediate
incorporation and this result is plainly expressed, the
conditions are void because no judgment against in-
corporation can be called into play.
"All the confusion and dangers above indicated, how-
ever, it is argued, are more imaginary than real, since,
although it be conceded that the treaty-making power
has the right by cession to incorporate without the con-
sent of Congress, that body may correct the evil by
availing itself of the provision of the Constitution giving
to Congress the right to dispose of the territory and
other property of the United States. This assumes that
there has been absolute incorporation by the treaty-
making power on the one hand, and yet asserts that
Congress may deal with the territory as if it had not
been incorporated into the United States. In other
words, the argument adopts conflicting theories of the
Constitution, and applies them both at the same time.
I am not unmindful that there has been some contrariety
of decision on the subject of the meaning of the clause
empowering Congress to dispose of the territories and
other property of the United States, some adjudged
cases treating that article as referring to property as such,
and others deriving from it the general grant of power
to govern territories. In view, however, of the relations
of the territories to the government of the United States
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and the
solemn pledge then existing that they should forever
'remain a part of the Confederacy of the United States
of America,' I can not resist the belief that the theory
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 301
that the disposing clause relates as well to a relin-
quishment or cession of sovereignty as to a mere transfer
of rights of property is altogether erroneous.
"Observe, again, the inconsistency of this argument.
It considers, on the one hand, that so vital is theq,ues-
tion of incorporation that no alien territory may be ac-
quired by a cession without absolutely endowing the
territory with incorporation and the inhabitants with
resulting citizenship, because, under our system of gov-
ernment, the assumption that a territory and its inhabi-
tants may be held by any other title than one incor-
porating is impossible to be thought of. And yet, to
avoid the evil consequences which must follow from
accepting this proposition, the argument is that all citi-
zenship of the United States is precarious and fleeting,
subject to be sold at any moment like any other prop-
erty. That is to say, to protect a newly acquired people
in their presumed rights, it is essential to degrade the
whole body of American citizenship.
"The reasoning which has sometimes been indulged
in by those who asserted that the Constitution was not
at all operative in the territories, is that, as they were
acquired by purchase, the right to buy included the right
to sell. This has been met by the proposition that if the
country purchased and its inhabitants become incorpo-
rated into the United States, it came under the shelter
of the Constitution, and no power existed to sell Ameri-
can citizens. In conformity to the principles which I
have admitted, it is impossible for me to say at one and
the same time that territory is an integral part of the
United States, protected by the Constitution, and yet
the safeguards, privileges, rights, and immunities which
arise from this situation are so ephemeral in their
character that by a mere act of sale they may be de-
stroyed. And applying this reasoning to the provisions
302 NATURALIZATION
of the treaty under consideration, to me it seems indu-
bitable that if the treaty with Spain incorporated all
the territory ceded into the United States, it resulted
that the millions of people to whom that treaty related
were, without the consent of the American people as ex-
pressed by Congress, and without any hope of relief,
indissolubly made a part of our common country.
"Undoubtedly, the thought that under the Constitu-
tion power existed to dispose of people and territory,
and thus to annihilate the rights of American citizens,
was contrary to the conceptions of the Constitution
entertained by Washington and Jefferson.
"True, from the exigency of a calamitous war or the
necessity of a settlement of boundaries, it may be that
citizens of the United States may be expatriated by the
action of the treaty-making power, impliedly or expressly
ratified by Congress.
"But the arising of these particular conditions can not
justify the general proposition that territory which is an
integral part of the United States may, as a mere act of
sale, be disposed of. If, however, the right to dispose
of an incorporated American territory and citizens by
the mere exertion of the power to sell be conceded,
arguendo, it would not relieve the dilemma. It is ever
true that, where a malign principle is adopted, as long
as the error is adhered to it must continue to produce
its baleful results. Certainly, if there be no power to
acquire subject to a condition, it must follow that there
is no authority to dispose of subject to conditions, since
it can not be that the mere change of form of the trans-
action could bestow a power which the Constitution has
not conferred. It would follow, then, that any condi-
tions annexed to a disposition which looked to the pro-
tection of the people of the United States, or to enable
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 303
them to safeguard the disposal of territory, would be
void; and thus it would be that either the United States
must hold on absolutely, or must dispose of uncondi-
tionally.
"A practical illustration will at once make the con-
sequences clear. Suppose Congress should determine
that the millions of inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
should not continue appurtenant to the United States,
but that they should be allowed to establish an autono-
mous government, outside of the Constitution of the
United States, coupled, however, with such conditions
providing for control as far only as essential to the
guaranty of life and property and to protect against
foreign encroachment. If the proposition of incorpora-
tion be well founded, at once the question would arise
whether the ability to impose these conditions existed,
since no power was conferred by the Constitution to
annex conditions which would limit the disposition. And
if it be that the question of whether territory is immedi-
ately fit for incorporation when it is acquired is a judi-
cial and not a legislative one, it would follow that the
validity of the conditions would also come within the
scope of judicial authority, and thus the entire political
policy of the government be alone controlled by the
judiciary.
"The theory as to the treaty-making power upon which
the argument which has just been commented upon rests,
it is now proposed to be shown, is refuted by the history
of the government from the beginning. There has not
been a single cession made from the time of the Confed-
eration up to the present day, excluding the recent
treaty with Spain, which has not contained stipulations
to the effect that the United States through Congress
would either not disincorporate or would incorporate the
ceded territory into the United States. ... To adopt
304 NATURALIZATION
the limitations on the treaty-making power now insisted
upon would presuppose that every one of these condi-
tions thus sedulously provided for was superfluous,
since the guaranties which they afforded would have ob-
tained, although they were not expressly provided for.
"When the various treaties by which foreign territory
has been acquired are considered in the light of the cir-
cumstances which surrounded them, it becomes to my
mind clearly established that the treaty-making power
was always deemed to be devoid of authority to incor-
porate territory into the United States without the
assent, express or implied, of Congress, and that no ques-
tion to the contrary has ever been even mooted."
The opinion reviews the history of the various acqui-
sitions of territory by the United States, quotes from the
decisions of the court, and concludes:
" It is, then, as I think, indubitably settled by the prin-
ciples of the law of nations, by the nature of the govern-
ment created under the Constitution, by the express and
implied powers conferred upon that government by the
Constitution, by the mode in which those powers have
been executed, from the beginning, and by an unbroken
line of decisions of this court, first announced by Mar-
shall and followed and lucidly expounded by Taney, that
the treaty-making power can not incorporate territory
into the United States without the express or implied
assent of Congress, that it may insert in a treaty condi-
tions against immediate incorporation, and that, on the
other hand, when it has expressed in the treaty the con-
ditions favorable to incorporation, they will, if the treaty
be not repudiated by Congress, have the force of the law
of the land, and therefore by the fulfilment of such con-
ditions cause incorporation to result. It must follow,
therefore, that where a treaty contains no conditions for
incorporation, and, above all, where it not only has no
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 305
such conditions, but expressly provides to the contrary,
incorporation does not arise until, in the wisdom of Con-
gress, it is deemed that the acquired territory has reached
that state where it is proper that it should enter into
and form a part of the American family.
" Does, then, the treaty in question contain a provision
for incorporation, or does it, on the contrary, stipulate
that incorporation shall not take place from the mere
effect of the treaty and until Congress has so deter-
mined ? — is then the only question remaining for consid-
eration.
"The provisions of the treaty with respect to the
status of Porto Rico and its inhabitants are as follows:
" 'Article II. Spain cedes to the United States the
island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Span-
ish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of
Guam, in the Marianas or Ladrones.' [30 Stat, at L.
1755.]
" 'Article IX. Spanish subjects, natives of the Penin-
sula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the
present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may
remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, re-
taining in either event all their rights of property, in-
cluding the right to sell or dispose of such property or
of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to
carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, be-
ing subject in respect thereof to such laws as are appli-
cable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain by making, before a court of record, within
a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications
of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to pre-
serve such allegiance; in default of which declaration
they shall be held to have renounced it and to have
adopted the nationality of the territory in which they
may reside.
5233-20
306 NATURALIZATION
'"The civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United
States shall be determined by the Congress.' [30 Stat, at
L. 1759.]
"'Article X. The inhabitants of the territories over
which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall
be secured in the free exercise of their religion.' [30 Stat,
at L. 1759, 1760.]
"It is to me obvious that the above-quoted provisions
of the treaty do not stipulate for incorporation, but, on
the contrary, expressly provide that the 'civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the terri-
tories hereby ceded ' shall be determined by Congress.
When the rights to which this careful provision refers
are put in juxtaposition with those which have been
deemed essential from the foundation of the government
to bring about incorporation, all of which have been pre-
viously referred to, I can not doubt that the express
purpose of the treaty was, not only to leave the status
of the territory to be determined by Congress, but to
prevent the treaty from operating to the contrary. Of
course, it is evident that the express or implied acqui-
escence by Congress in a treaty so framed can not import
that a result was brought about which the treaty itself —
giving effect to its provisions — could not produce. And,
in addition, the provisions of the Act by which the duty
here in question was imposed, taken as a whole, seem to
me plainly to manifest the intention of Congress that,
for the present, at least, Porto Rico is not to be incor-
porated into the United States.
"The fact that the Act directs the officers to swear to
support the Constitution does not militate against this
view, for, as I have conceded, whether the island be in-
corporated or not, the applicable provisions of the Con-
stitution are there in force. A further analysis of the
provisions of the Act seems to me not to be required in
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 307
view of the fact that, as the Act was reported from the
committee, it contained a provision conferring citizen-
ship upon the inhabitants of Porto Rico, and this was
stricken out in the Senate. The argument, therefore, can
only be that rights were conferred, which, after con-
sideration, it was determined should not be granted.
Moreover I fail to see how it is possible, on the one hand,
to declare that Congress in passing the Act had exceeded
its powers by treating Porto Rico as not incorporated
into the United States, and, at the same time, it be said
that the provisions of the Act itself amount to an incor-
poration of Porto Rico into the United States, although
the treaty had not previously done so. It in reason can
not be that the Act is void because it seeks to keep the
island disincorporated, and, at the same time, that ma-
terial provisions are not to be enforced because the Act
does incorporate. Two irreconcilable views of that Act can
not be taken at the same time, the consequence being to
cause it to be unconstitutional.
"In what has preceded I have in effect considered
every substantial proposition, and have either conceded
or reviewed every authority referred to as establishing
that immediate incorporation resulted from the treaty
of cession which is under consideration. Indeed, the
whole argument in favor of the view that immediate in-
corporation followed upon the ratification of the treaty
in its last analysis necessarily comes to this: Since it has
been decided that incorporation flows from a treaty which
provides for that result, when its provisions have been
expressly or impliedly approved by Congress, it must
follow that the same effect flows from a treaty which ex-
pressly stipulates to the contrary, even although the
condition to that end has been approved by Congress.
That is to say, the argument is this: Because a provi-
sion for incorporation when ratified incorporates, there-
fore a provision against incorporation must also produce
308 NATURALIZATION
the very consequence which itexpressly provides against.
"The result of what has been said is that whilst, in an
international sense, Porto Rico was not a foreign country,
since it was subject to the sovereignty of and was owned
by the United States, it was foreign to the United States
in a domestic sense, because the island had not been in-
corporated into the United States, but was merely
appurtenant thereto as a possession. As a necessary
consequence, the impost in question assessed on mer-
chandise coming from Porto Rico into the United States
after the cession was within the power of Congress, and
that body was not, morever, as to such imposts, con-
trolled by the clause requiring that imposts should be
uniform throughout the United States; in other words,
the provision of the Constitution just referred to was
not applicable to Congress in legislating for Porto Rico.
"Incidentally I have heretofore pointed out that the
arguments of expediency pressed with so much earnest-
ness and ability concern the legislative, and not the judi-
cial, department of the government. But it may be
observed that, even if the disastrous consequences which
are foreshadowed as arising from conceding that the gov-
ernment of the United States may hold property with-
out incorporation were to tempt me to depart from what
seems to me to be the plain line of judicial duty, reason
admonishes me that so doing would not serve to pre-
vent the grave evils which it is insisted must come, but,
on the contrary, would only render them more danger-
ous. This must be the result, since, as already said, it
seems to me it is not open to serious dispute that the
military arm of the government of the United States may
hold and occupy conquered territory without incorpora-
tion for such length of time as may seem appropriate to
Congress in the exercise of its discretion. The denial of
the right of the civil power to do so would not, there-
fore, prevent the holding of territory by the United
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 309
States if it was deemed best by the political department
of the government, but would simply necessitate that it
should be exercised by the military instead of by the
civil power."
2. Status of Porto Ricans and Filipinos.
In conformity with the provision of the treaty which
declares that the civil rights and political status of the
native inhabitants of the ceded territories shall be deter-
mined by the Congress, Congress, by the Act of April 12,
1900 (31 Stat, at L. 77, Ch. 191), establishing a civil gov-
ernment for Porto Rico, provided that "all inhabitants
continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects
on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in Porto
Rico, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of Porto Rico, and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, ex-
cept such as shall have elected to preserve their alleg-
iance to the Crown of Spain on or before the 11th day
of April, 1900, in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain en-
tered into on the 11th day of April, 1899 (30 Stat, at L.
1754); and they, together with such citizens of the
United States as may reside in Porto Rico, shall consti-
tute a body politic under the name of The People of
Porto Rico, with governmental powers as hereinafter
conferred, and with power to sue and be sued as such."
(Sec. 7.)
And by the Act of July 1st, 1902 (32 Stat, at L. 691,
Chap. 1369), providing for the administration of the
affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, Con-
gress declared that "all inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided
in said islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deem9d and held to be citizens of the
310 NATURALIZATION
Philippine Islands, and as such entitled to the pro-
tection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain, signed at
Paris December 10th, 1898" (Sec. 4).* [30 Stat, at L.
1754].
From a despatch of the United States consul at Amoy
in August, 1903, it appeared that Buenaventura Chun-
tianlay, a Chinese merchant, born at Amoy, emigrated to
the Philippines thirty years ago, and had been domiciled
there since that time. In 1899 he married a native of the
Philippines, and, as the result of the marriage, a son was
born in the Philippine Islands December 5, 1902. Chun-
tianlay, who was then with his family on a temporary
visit in Amoy, wished to be registered in the consulate,
or, failing that, desired to have either his wife or child
registered. The consul stated that Chuntianlay had con-
siderable property interests in Amoy, and that his object
* The whole law relating to the citizenship of residents of the Philip-
pine Islands is as follows :
ARTICLE IX OF THE TREATY OF PARIS.
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over
which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty
may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in
either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dis-
pose of such property or of its proceeds, and they shall also have the
right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being sub-
ject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners.
In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year
(extended by the protocol of agreement proclaimed on April 28, 1900, to
eighteen months, 31 Stat, at L., l88l) from the date of the exchange of
ratifications of this treaty (April 11, 1899), a declaration of their decision
to preserve such allegiance ; in default of which declaration they shall
be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the
territory in which they may reside.
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress.
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 311
in trying to register a member of the family in tiie con-
sulate was to enable him to transfer the property to the
member so registered, thus putting it under American
ownership, to avoid the assessments of the Chinese offi-
cials, which are said to be quite heavy on property
owned by nonresidents. The consul inquired whether
any one of his family was entitled to registration, and, if
so, whether it would be proper for him to record a trans-
fer of property from Mr. Chuntianlay to such member of
his family.
In reply, the Acting Secretary of State said: "Upon
the facts stated, neither of the Chuntianlays appears to
be entitled to registration in the consulate.
"Section 4 of the Act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat, at L.
692, Ch. 1369), provides that 'all inhabitants of the Phil-
ippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and
then resided in said islands, and their children born sub-
SECTION 4 OF ACT OF CONGRESS OF JULY 1, 1902.
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens
of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their alle-
giance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. [And the protocol
proclaimed April 28, 1900.]
PROVISIONS OF THE SPANISH CIVIL CODE.
Art. 17. The following are Spaniards: (1) Persons born in Spanish
territory ; (2) children of a Spanish father or mother, even though they
were born out of Spain; (3) foreigners who may have obtained naturali-
zation papers ; (4) those who, without said papers, may have acquired
a residence in any town in the monarchy.
Art. 18. Children, while they remain under the parental authority,
have the nationality of their parents.
In order that those born of foreign parents in Spanish territory may
enjoy the benefits granted them by No. 1 of article 17, it shall bean
312 NATURALIZATION
sequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens
of the Philippine Islands, and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at
Paris December 10, 1898.' 30 Stat, at L. 1754.
"While Mr. Chuntianlay comes within the language of
the statute, 'inhabitants of the Philippine Islands,' he is
not included within the description, 'who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899.' According to
the statement in your despatch, he is 'a Chinese merchant
who emigrated to the Philippine Islands thirty years ago
and has been domiciled there since that time.' If he had
acquired Spanish citizenship it is inferred that that fact
would have been stated.
indispensable requisite that the parents declare, in the manner and be-
fore the officials specified in article 19, that they choose in the name of
their children the Spanish nationality, renouncing all others.
Art. 19. The children of a foreigner born in Spanish possessions must
state, within the year following their majority of emancipation, whether
they desire to enjoy the citizenship of Spaniards granted them by
article 17.
Those who are in the kindom shall make this declaration before the
official in charge of the civil registry of the town in which they reside;
those who reside abroad before one of the consular or diplomatic agents
of the Spanish government, and those who are in a country in which
the government has no agent addressing the secretary of state of Spain.
The effect of these provisions, as interpreted by the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands in the Bosque case (1 Philippine Reports, 88)
is that:
1. Natives of Spain became citizens of the Philippine Islands if they
complied with two requirements: (a) Residence in the islands from 11
April, 1899, toll October, 1900, and {b) failure to preserve allegiance
to Spain by a legal declaration made within that period.
2. Inhabitants of the Philippine Islands (other than those embraced
in the last paragraph), and their children born after 11 April, 1899, are
citizens of the Philippine Islands, if {a) they were Spanish subjects on
that date, and (b) resided in the Philippine Islands on that date and
continue to reside therein. Memorandum regarding Naturalization of
Residents of the Philippine Islands, S. Doc. 336, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 313
"Assuming, then, that Mr. Chuntianlay is, as stated in
your despatch, a Chinese subject domiciled in the Philip-
pine Islands, upon his marriage to a native of the Philip-
pines, under the general rule that the nationality of the
wife follows that of the husband, she became a Chinese
subject.
"The son, born in the Philippines December 5, 1902,
is not a citizen of the Philippine Islands within the
meaning of the statute, as that only applies to the chil-
dren of inhabitants of the islands who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899." Asst. Sec'y Adee to United
States Consul at Amoy, September 5, 1903.
The treaty provision and the Act of Congress of April
12, 1900, were construed by the Circuit Court of the
United States for the southern district of New York, in
October, 1902, in the case of Re Gonzalez, 118 Fed. 941,
upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The facts
are stated in the opinion of the court, Lacombe, Judge:
"Petitioner, an unmarried woman, is a native of Porto
Rico, twenty years of age, who arrived here from that
island on August 24, 1902. She was detained at Ellis
Island immigrant station, was duly examined by a board
of special inquiry, and was excluded from admission into
the United States upon the ground that she was liable
to become a public charge. The only question open for
discussion on this application is whether or not peti-
tioner is an alien. Upon all other questions the decision
of the appropriate immigration officers, when adverse to
the admission of the alien, is made final, unless reversed
on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury. Act August
18, 1894 (28 Stat, at L. 390, Chap. 301 [U. S. Comp. Stat.
1901,1303]). . . . The 14th Amendment to the Con-
stitution provides that all persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States. It is not dis-
puted that petitioner was by birth an alien. Unless in
314 NATURALIZATION
some appropriate way she has since been naturalized,
she is still an alien. There is no suggestion that
she was ever naturalized under the general laws pre-
scribed by Congress regulating the admission of
aliens to citizenship. The treaty of Paris, unlike earlier
treaties which dealt with the Louisiana and Florida
purchases, with California, and with Alaska, did not
undertake to make the native-born inhabitants of Porto
Rico citizens of the United States. It expressly pro-
vided that 'the civil rights and political status of the
native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the
United States shall be determined by the Congress.' In
conformity with this provision of the treaty it was pro-
vided in Act April 12, 1900, Chap. 191, Sec. 7 [31 Stat.
at L. 77], 'that all inhabitants continuing to reside there-
in who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April,
1899, and then resided in Porto Rico, and their children
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of Porto Rico, and as such entitled to the pro-
tection of the United States (excepting such as had pre-
served their allegiance to Spain), and they, together with
such citizens of the United States as may reside in Porto
Rico, shall constitute a body politic under the name of
"The People of Porto Rico," with governmental powers
as hereinafter conferred and with power to sue and be
sued as such.' This legislation has certainly not operated
to effect a naturalization of the petitioner as a citizen of
the United States. Being foreign born and not natural-
ized, she remains an alien, and subject to the provisions
of law regulating the admission of aliens who come to the
United States."
Upon appeal, however, the Supreme Court reversed
this decision, and held that a native of Porto Rico who
was an inhabitant of that island at the time it was ceded
to the United States, is not an alien immigrant within
the meaning of the immigration law of 1891. The court
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 315
said that it was not necessary to go into the question
whether the cession accomplished the naturalization of
the people of Porto Rico, or whether a citizen of Porto
Rico, under the law of Congress creating a civil govern-
ment for that country, is a citizen of the United States;
that the question presented to the court was one of
alienage rather than one of citizenship; that it seemed
clear that the immigration act related to persons owing
allegiance to a foreign government and citizens or sub-
jects thereof; and that citizens of Porto Rico, whose
permanent allegiance is due to the United States, living
within the peace and domain of the United States, the
organic law of whose domicil was enacted by the United
States and is enforced through officials sworn to support
the Constitution of the United States, are not aliens,
and upon their arrival at our ports are not alien immi-
grants. Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1.
In the case of Mercado, a native of Porto Rico, who,
in 1901, sought the intervention of this government to
present for him a claim against the government of Vene-
zuela, where he had been residing for fourteen years, it
was held that as he was not an " inhabitant " of Porto
Rico at the time of its cession to the United States, and
was not a citizen of Porto Rico within the definition of
the Act of Congress of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat, at L. 77),
he was not entitled to the protection of the United
States. Mr. Adee to Mr. Loomis, August 10, 1901, MSS.
Inst, to Venezuela. See, also, Paradis' case. For. Rel.
1905, 542 et seq.
In the case of Marrero, a native of Porto Rico, who
had resided in Chile since 1884, but who proposed, in
1901, to return to Porto Rico to perform the duties of
citizenship there, it was held by Acting Secretary Hill
that the language of Sec. 7 of the Act of April 12, 1900
(31 Stat, at L. 77, Ch. 191), was to be construed in its
general legal sense, in which continued personal presence
316 NATURALIZATION
is not necessary to constitute continuous residence; and
that a native of Porto Rico who makes it his permanent
domicil does not, therefore, lose the benefits of this
law because he was temporarily abiding elsewhere when
it went into efl'ect. Acting Secretary Hill to Mr. Lend-
erink, April 29, 1901, For. Rel. 1901, 32. And Attorney-
General Knox (24 Ops. Atty. Gen. 40) held that a native
Porto Rican temporarily living in France, who was not
in Porto Rico on April 11, 1899, is, under Sec. 7 of the
Act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat, at L. 79), a citizen of
Porto Rico.
At the date of the passage of the Act of April 12
1900, the law of the United States (Rev. Stat., Sec. 4076,
U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 2765) prohibited the granting
or verification of passports to or for any persons other
than citizens of the United States. The Act of June 14,
1902 (32 Stat, at L. 386, Ch. 1088), however, amended
this section so as to make it read: "No passport shall
be granted or issued to, or verified for, any other per-
sons than those owing allegiance, whether citizens or not,
to the United States." Under this law as amended pass-
ports are now issued to citizens of Porto Rico and the
Philippine Islands.
i. Treaties with Indians.
Certain Indian tribes, or such members thereof as
chose to remain behind on the removal of their tribes
westward, have been declared to be citizens, and indi-
viduals of the particular tribes have been authorized to
become citizens on application to a court of the United
States for naturalization, and satisfactory proof of fitness
for civilized life. See treaties in 1817 and 1835 with the
Cherokees (7 Stat, at L. 159, 483) ; and in 1820 and 1830,
with the Choctaws (7 Stat, at L. 211, 335); in 1855 with
the Wyandottes (10 Stat, at L. 1159); in 1861 and 1866
with the Pottawatomies (12 Stat, at L. 1192 and 14 Stat.
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 317
at L. 763); in 1862 with the Ottawasl(12 Stat, at L.
1237). and the Kickapoos (13 Stat, at L. 624). See, also,
treaties with the Stockbridge Indians in 1848 and 1856
(9 Stat, at L. 955, and 11 Stat, at L. 663).
The Act of Congress of March 3, 1871 (16 Stat, at L.
566, Chap. 120, Rev. Stat. Sec. 2079), required that the
Indian tribes should be dealt with for the future through
the legislative, and not through the treaty-making power.
The provision is as follows: "Hereafter no Indian nation
or tribe within the territory of the United States shall
be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation,
tribe, or power with whom the United .States may con-
tract by treaty."
m. Naturalization by Special Act of Congress.
A. In General.
There are numerous instances of naturalization by
special statute.
The Act of April 14, 1802 (see Par. 5, Rev. Stat., Sec.
2165, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1330), provided for the
admission of aliens who were residing in the United
States before January 29, 1795, upon proof of two years'
residence in this country.
The Act of March 22, 1816 (see Par. 6, Rev. Stat., Sec.
2165, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1330), provided for the
admission, without previous declaration of intention, of
aliens who had resided in the United States between
June 18, 1798, and June 18, 1812.
B. On the Acquisition of the Territory of Oregon.
The acquisition of the Territory of Oregon led to the
enactment of another special law extending citizenship
to persons born therein. The Act of Congress of May
18, 1872 (Rev. Stat., Sec. 1905, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,
1268), provided that "all persons born in the district
of country formerly known as the Territory of Oregon,
and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on
318 NATURALIZATION
the 18th May, 1872, are citizens in the same manner
as if born elsewhere in the United States."
C. On the Annexation of Hawaii.
The annexation of Hawaii was followed by the enact-
ment of the law of April 30, 1900 (31 Stat, at L. 141,
Chap. 339), "providing a government for the Territory
of Hawaii," Section 4 of which declares that all persons
who were citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on August
12, 1898, are citizens of the United States and citizens of
the Territory of Hawaii.
Ng Faun, a subject of China, was admitted to citizen-
ship in the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1892 and was a citizen
of Hawaii on August 12, 1898. In 1901 he made appli-
cation to the Department of State for a passport as a
citizen of the United States. The Attorney General, to
whom the Secretary of State referred the question
whether Ng Faun was a citizen of the United States,
quoted the language of Section 4 of the Act of April 30,
1900 (31 Stat, at L. 141, Chap. 339), "that all persons
who were citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on August
12, 1898, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States and citizens of the Territory of Hawaii," and held
that this comprehensive language included Chinese citi-
zens of Hawaii. A passport was accordingly issued to
Ng Faun. 23 Ops. Atty. Gen. 509. See, also, 23 Ops. Atty.
Gen. 345 and 352, in which it was held that any Chinese
person who was a citizen of the Republic of Hawaii on
August 12, 1898, and who has not since abandoned, or
been legally deprived of, his citizenship, is a citizen of
the United States. See, also, Chung Dai Yau's case. For.
Rel. 1905, 735.
D. Readmission of Nellie Grant Sartoris to Citizenship.
And in 1898, Congress, by joint resolution, readmitted
to citizenship Nellie Grant Sartoris, the daughter of
General U. S. Grant, who had married a British subject.
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 319
and who, upon the death of her husband, returned to the
United States to reside. See page 258, supra.
E. Naturalization of Indians.
In the same way many classes of Indians have been
made citizens of the United States. By the Act of March
3, 1843, it was provided that, on the completion of certain
arrangements for the partition of the lands of the tribe
among its members, the Stockbridge tribe of Indians, and
each and every of them, shall be deemed to be citizens
of the United States, to all intents and purposes, and
entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of
such citizens. 5 Stat, at L. 645, Chap. 101.
The Act of July 15, 1870, (16 Stat, at L. 361, Chap. 296),
provided that if at any time thereafter any of the Win-
nebago Indians in the State of Minnesota should desire
to become citizens of the United States they should
make application to the District Court of the United
States for the district of Minnesota, and in open court
make the same proof and take the same oath of alle-
giance as is provided by law for the naturalization of
aliens; and should also make proof, to the satisfaction
of the court, that they were sufficiently intelligent and
prudent to control their affairs and interests; that they
had adopted the habits of civilized life, and had, for at
least five years before, been able to support themselves
and their families; and thereupon they should be de-
clared by the court to be citizens of the United States,
the declaration should be entered of record, and a cer-
tificate thereof given to the applicant.
By the Act of March 3, 1873 (17 Stat, at L. 632, Chap.
332), a similar provision was made for the naturalization
of any adult member of the Miami tribe in Kansas, and
of his minor children.
Some of the Sioux tribes, and the Brothertown Indians,
320 NATURALIZATION
have also been granted citizenship by special Acts of
Congress.
The Act of February 8, 1887 (24 Stat, at L. 390, Ch.
119, Sec. 6), providing for the allotment of lands in sev-
eralty to Indians on the various reservations, and ex-
tending the protection of the laws of the United States
and the territories over the Indians, etc., is very sweep-
ing in its terms, making every Indian situated as therein
referred to a citizen of the United States. It reads as
follows: "Every Indian born within the territorial limits
of the United States, to whom allotments shall have been
made under the provisions of this Act, or under any law
or treaty, and every Indian born within the territorial
limits of the United States who has voluntarily taken
up, within said limits, his residence separate and apart
from any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the
habits of civilized life, is hereby declared to be a
citizen of the United States, and is entitled to all the
rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizens,
whether said Indian has been or not, by birth or other-
wise, a member of any tribe of Indians within the terri-
torial limits of the United States."
An Indian to whom land has been allotted in sever-
alty becomes a citizen of the United States, with all the
rights, privileges, and immunities of such, including the
right to sue in the proper forum. Re Celestine, 114 Fed.
551; Bird v. Terry, 129 Fed. 472, 592; Baldwin v. Let-
son, 6 Kans. App. 11; Carter v. Wann, 6 Ida. 556. See^
also, 6 Ida. 85.
The Act of May 2, 1890, provided that ''any member
of any Indian tribe or nation residing in the Indian Ter-
ritory may apply to the United States court therein to
become a citizen of the United States, and such court
shall have jurisdiction thereof, and shall hear and deter-
mine such application, as provided in the statutes of
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 321
the United States." 26 Stat at L. 99, Ch. 182, Sec. 43.
And every Indian in Indian Territory was made a citi-
zen of the United States by the following innocent pro-
vision in the Act of March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1447, viz:
"Section six of chapter one hundred and nineteen of the
United States Statutes at Large, numbered twenty-four,
page three hundred and ninety, is hereby amended as
follows, to wit: after the words 'civilized life,' in line 13,
said section six, insert the words 'and every Indian in
Indian Territory.' "
rV. Naturalization by Admission of Territory to Statehood.
A. In General.
Section 3 of article 4 of the Constitution provides that
"new states may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union;" and the second paragraph of the same section
declares that " the Congress shall have power to dispose
of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property belonging to the United
States."
So far as the original states were concerned, all those
who were citizens of such states became, upon the forma-
tion of the Union, citizens of the United States. As re-
marked by Mr. Chief Justice Waite in Minor v. Happer-
sett, 21 Wall. 162, 167, 22 L. ed. 627, 628: "Whoever,
then, was one of the people of either of these states
when the Constitution of the United States was adopted,
became ipso facto, a citizen — a member of the nation
created by its adoption. He was one of the persons as-
sociating together to form the nation, and was, conse-
quently, one of its original citi/ens. As to this there
has never been a doubt."
B. Louisiana.
By article 3 of the treaty of Paris of 1803 (8 Stat, at
L. 202) it was provided that "the inhabitants of the
5233—21
322 NATURALIZATION
ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the
United States, and admitted as soon as possible, accord-
ing to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the
enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities
of citizens of the United States; and in the meantime
they shall be maintained and protected in the free en-
joyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which
they profess."
It was said by Mr. Justice Catron, in his separate opin-
ion in Scott V. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 525, 15 L. ed. 691,
750: "The settled doctrine in the state courts of Louis-
iana is, that a French subject coming to the Orleans ter-
ritory, after the treaty of 1803 was made, and before
Louisiana was admitted into the Union, and being an in-
habitant at the time of the admisson, became a citizen
of the United States by that Act; that he was one of the
inhabitants contemplated by the 3d article of the treaty,
which referred to all inhabitants embraced within the
new state on its admission. That this is the true con-
struction I have no doubt."
In Desbois's case, 2 Mart. (La.) 185 (decided in 1812),
one Desbois, of French birth, applied for a license to
practise as a counsellor and attorney at law in the super-
ior courts of Louisiana, and by one of the rules of the
court the applicant could not be admitted unless he was
a citizen of the United States. Desbois conceded that he
had no claim to citizenship by birth, nor by naturaliza-
tion under the Acts of Congress to establish an uniform
rule on that subject, but he contended that there was a
third mode of acquiring citizenship of the United States,
namely, the admission into the Union of a state of which
he was a citizen. He contended that, as he had, in the
year 1806, removed to, and settled with his family in
the city of New Orleans in the territory of Orleans, in
contemplation of the enjoyment of the advantages which
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 323
the laws of the territory and of the United States held
out to foreigners removing into that territory, and had
ever since considered it as his adopted country, he had
become a citizen under the Act of Congress of March 2,
1805 (2 Stat, at L. 322, Ch. 23), further providing for the
territorial government of Orleans, the enabling Act of
February 20, 1811 (2 Stat, at L. 641, Ch.21),and that of
April 8, 1812 (2 Stat, at L. 701, Ch. 50), admitting the
state.
Judge Martin, who delivered the opinion of the court,
referred, among other things, to the fact that the Act of
Congress authorizing the formation of the state govern-
ment of Louisiana was almost literally copied from that
which authorized that of Ohio, and, pointing out that
by the 1st section of the latter statute the inhabitants
of the designated territory were authorized to form for
themselves a state constitution, while, by the 4th sec-
tion the persons entitled to vote for members of the
convention were described as, first, all male citizens of
the United States, and next, all persons having in all
other respects the legal qualifications to vote for mem-
bers of the general assembly of the territory, which were
a freehold of fifty acres of land in the district, and citi-
zenship of one of the states, and residence in the district,
or the like freehold and two years' residence in the dis-
trict, said: "The word 'inhabitants,' in the 1st section
of this Act, must be taken lato sensu; it can not be re-
strained so as to include citizens of the United States
only; for other persons are afterwards called upon to vote.
There is not any treaty, or other instrument, which may
be said to control it. Every attempt to restrict it must
proceed on principles absolutely arbitrary. If the word
is to be taken lato sensu in the act passed in favor of
the people of one territory, is there any reason to say
that we are to restrain it in another act, passed for
324 NATURALIZATION
similar purposes, in favor of the people of another terri-
tory?" Id. 192, 193.
His conclusion was that the applicant must be
considered a citizen of the State of Louisiana and enti-
tled to all the rights and privileges of a citizen of the
United States.
In 1813, in United States v. Laverty, 3 Mart. (La.) 733,
Judge Hall of the district court of the United States
hekl that the inhabitants of the territory of Orleans be-
came citizens of Louisiana and of the U^nited States by
the admission of Louisiana into the Union; denied that
the only constitutional mode of becoming a citizen of
the United States is naturalization by compliance with
the uniform rule established by Congress; and fully
agreed with the decision in Desbois's case, which he cited.
In an Alabama case, it was held, however, that an alien
moving into the territory of Louisiana after it was ceded
to the United States, and residing there until after its
admission into the Union, as a state, does not thereby
become a citizen of the United States. State v. Prim-
rose, 3 Ala. 546.
C. States Carved Out of Northwest Territory.
1. In General.
By the ordinance for the government of the Northwest
Territory, of July 13, 1787 (1 Stat, at L.51, note), it was
provided that, as soon as there should be 5,000 free male
inhabitants of full age in the district thereby constituted,
they were to receive authority to elect representatives
to a general assembly, and the qualifications of a repre-
sentative in such cases were previous citizenship
of one of the United States for three years and resi-
dence in the district, or a residence of three years in
the district and a fee simple estate of 200 acres of land
therein. The qualifications of electors were a freehold
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION 325
in 50 acres of land in the district, previous citizenship
of one of the United States, and residence, or the like
freehold, and two years' residence in the district. And
it was also provided that there should be formed in the
territory not less than three, nor more than five, states,
with certain boundaries, and that, whenever any such
state should contain 60,000 free inhabitants, such state
should be admitted by its delegates in Congress on an
equal footing with the original states in all respects
whatever, and should be at liberty to form a permanent
constitution and state government, provided it should
be republican and in conformity with the articles of com-
pact. 1 Stat, at L. 51, note; Rev. Stat. 2d ed. Organic
Laws, 13, 14.
2. Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.
Reference to the various Acts of Congress creating the
Indiana and Illinois territories (2 Stat, at L. 58, Chap. 41;
2 Stat, at L. 514, Chap. 13); the enabling acts under which
the state governments of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois were
formed (2 Stat, at L. 173, Chap. 40 ; 3 Stat, at L. 289, Chap.
57; 3 Stat, at L. 428, Chap. 67); and the act recognizing
and resolutions admitting those states (2 Stat, at L. 201,
Chap. 7; 3 Stat, at L. 399; 3 Stat, at L. 536); and to their
original constitutions, establishes that the inhabitants
or people who were empowered to take part in the crea-
tion of these new political organisms and who continued
to participate in the discharge of political functions,
included others than those who were originally citizens
of the United States. And that the action of Congress
was advisedly taken is put beyond doubt by the language
used in the legislation in question.
3. Michigan.
In case of the admission of Michigan this was strik-
ingly shown. By the Act of Congress of January 11,1805
326 NATURALIZATION
(2 Stat, at L. 309, Chap. 5), a part of the Indiana Territory
was constituted the Territory of Michigan, and a gov-
ernment in all respects similar to that provided by the
ordinance of 1787 (1 Stat, at L. 51a), was established.
The Act of February 16, 1819 (3 Stat, at L. 482, Chap.
22), authorized that territory to send a delegate to
Congress, and conferred the right of suffrage on the
free white male citizens of the territory who had resided
therein one year next preceding the election, and had
paid county or territorial taxes. The Act of March 3, 1823
(3 Stat, at L. 769, Chap. 36), provided that all citizens of
the United States having the qualifications prescribed
by the Act of February 16, 1819, should be entitled to
vote and be eligible to office. By an Act of the territo-
rial legislature of January 26, 1835, the free white male
inhabitants of the territory, of full age, who had resided
therein three months preceding "the 4th day of April
next in the year 1835," were authorized to choose dele-
gates to form a constitution and state government.
Mich. Laws, 1835, 72, 75. Delegates were elected accord-
ingly, and a constitution completed January 29, 1835,
and ratified by a vote of the people November 2, 1835,
which provided that every white male citizen above the
age of 21 years, who had resided in the state six months
next preceding any election, should be entitled to vote
at any election, ''and every white male inhabitant of the
age aforesaid, who may be a resident of the state at the
time of the signing of this constitution, shall have the
right of voting as aforesaid.'' 1 Charters and Constitu-
tions, 983, 984. This constitution was laid before Con-
gress by President Jackson in a special message Decem-
ber 9, 1835, and a bill was introduced for the admission
of Michigan into the Union. While this was under con-
sideration an amendment to the provision that on the
assent being given by a convention of the people of
Michigan to certain boundaries defined in the bill, the
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 327
state should be admitted, to strike out the words,
"people of the said state," and insert, "by the free male
white citizens of the United States over the age of 21
years, residing within the limits of the proposed state,"
was voted down; as was also another amendment pro-
posing to insert after that part of the bill which declared
the constitution of the new state ratified and confirmed
by Congress the words, "except that provision of said
Constitution by which aliens are permitted to enjoy the
right of suffrage." The Act was passed June 15, 1836
(5 Stat, at L. 49, Chap. 99), and the conditions imposed
having been first rejected and then finally accepted, the
state was admitted into the Union by the Act of January
26, 1837 (5 Stat, at L. 144, Chap. 6).
In all these instances citizenship of the United States
in virtue of the recognition by Congress of the qualified
electors of the state as citizens thereof was apparently
conceded, and it was the effect in that regard that fur-
nished a chief argument to those who oppose the admis-
sion of Michigan. As to that state, the state Constitution
of 1850, as amended in 1870, preserved the rights as an
elector of "every male inhabitant, residing in the state
on the 24th day of June, 1835." And in Atty. Gen. ex
rel. Conely v. Detroit, 78 Mich. 545, 7 L. R. A. 99,
18 Am. St. Rep. 458, 44 N. W. 388, the Supreme Court of
Michigan assigned, as one of the reasons for holding the
registry law under consideration invalid, that no pro-
vision was therein made for this class of voters, nor for
the inhabitants who had resided in Michigan in 1850, and
declared their intention to become citizens of the United
States, who had the right to vote under the Constitution
of 1850.
D. Florida.
The 6th article of the treaty of 1819 with Spain (8
Stat, at L. 256) contained a provision to the same
328 NATURALIZATION
effect as that in the Treaty of Paris (8 Stat, at L. 200),
and Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said (American Ins. Co. v.
Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 542, 7 L. ed. 242, 255): "This
treaty is the law of the land, and admits the inhabi-
tants of Florida to the enjoyment of the privileges,
rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United
States. It is unnecessary to inquire whether this is not
their condition, independent of stipulation. They do not,
however, participate in political power; they do not
share in the government, till Florida shall become a state.
In the meantime, Florida continues to be a territory of
the United States; governed by virtue of that clause in
the Constitution which empowers Congress 'to make all
needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory,
or other property belonging to the United States.'"
At the second session of the 27th Congress, in the case
of David Levy, who had been elected a delegate from the
Territory of Florida, where it was alleged that he was not
a citizen of the United States, it was held by the House
Committee of Elections that "it matters nothing whether
the naturalization be effected by Act of Congress, by
treaty, or by the admission of new states; the provision
is alike applicable."
The question turned on whether Mr. Levy's father was
an inhabitant of Florida at the time of its transfer to
the United States, as the son admitted that he was not
a native-born citizen of the United States, but claimed
citizenship through that of his father effected by the
treaty while he was a minor. The argument of the re-
port in support of the position that "no principle has
been more repeatedly announced by the judicial tribunals
of the country, and more constantly acted upon, than
that the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should
always be in favor of the claimant of it," and that
liberality of interpretation should be applied to such a
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 329
treaty, is well worthy of perusal. Contested elections
1834, 1835, 2d Session, 38th Congress, 41.
E. Texas.
By the annexation of Texas, under a joint resolution
of Congress of March 1, 1845, and its admission into the
Union on an equal footing with the original states,
December 29, 1845, all the citizens of the former re-
public* became, without any express declaration, citi-
zens af the United States. 5 Stat, at L. 798; 9 Stat, at L.
108; McKinney v. Saviego, 18 How. 235, 15 L. ed. 365, Cryer
V. Andrews, 11 Tex. 170; Barrett v. Kelly, 31 Tex. 476;
Carter tJ. Territory, 1 N. M. 317; 13 Ops. Atty. Gen. 397.
*"The citizens of Texas thus adopted into the citizenship of the
United States were of three classes.
"1. Persons who came within the following description in Section 10
of the general provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Texas
[viz.y. 'All persons (Africans, the descendants of Africans, and Indians
excepted) who were residing in Texas on the day of the Declaration of
Independence [March 2, 1836] shall be considered citizens of the Re-
public, and entitled to all the privileges as such;' and who did not forfeit
their citizenship by the acts defined in the 8th section of said provisions,
which is in the words following: 'All persons who shall leave the country
for the purpose of evading a participation in the present struggle [the
war between Texas and Mexico for Texas independence], or who shall
refuse to participate in it, or shall give aid or assistance to the present
enemy, shall forfeit all rights of citizenship and such lands as they may
hold in the Republic. . . .'
" 2. Persons born in that Republic during its independence, — that is,
between the dates of March 2, 1836, and December 29, 1845.
"3. Persons naturalized in the Republic of Texas.
" The provision for naturalization in that Republic was Section 6 of
the general provisions of the Constitution [of Texas], and in the words
following: 'All free white persons who shall emigrate to this Republic,
and who shall, after a residence of six months, make oath before some
competent authority that they intend to reside permanently in the same,
and shall swear to support this Constitution, and that they will bear true
allegiance to the Republic of Texas, shall be entitled to all the privileges
of citizenship.' " 13 Ops. Atty Gen. 397.
330 NATURALIZATION
F. Powers of Congress over Territories.
Chief Justice Fuller, in delivering the opinion in Boyd
V. Nebraska, 143 U. S., at p. 169, 36 L. ed. 112, 12 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 375, freely quoted above, said : "It is too late at this
day to question the plenary power of Congress over the
territories. As observed by Mr. Justice Matthews, deliv-
ering the opinion of the court in Murphy v. Ramsey, 114
U. S. 15, 44, 29 L. ed. 47, 57, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747: ' It
rests with Congress to say whether, in a given case, any
of the people, resident in the territory, shall participate
in the election of its officers, or the making of its laws;
and it may, therefore, take from them any right of
suffrage it may previously have conferred, or at any
time modify or abridge it as it may deem expe-
dient. The right of local self-government, as known
to our system as a constitutional franchise, be-
longs, under the Constitution, to the states and to
the people thereof, by whom that Constitution was or-
dained, and to whom by its terms all power not con-
ferred by it upon the government of the United States
was expressly reserved. The personal and civil rights of
the inhabitants of the territories are secured to them,
as to other citizens, by the principles of constitutional
liberty which restrain all the agencies of government,
state and national; their political rights are franchises
which they hold as privileges in the legislative discretion
of the Congress of the United States. . . . If we concede
that this discretion in Congress is limited by the obvious
purposes for which it was conferred, and that those pur-
poses are satisfied by measures which prepare the people
of the territories to become states in the Union, still the
conclusion can not be avoided, that the Act of Congress
here in question is clearly within that justification.'
"Congress having the power to deal with the people
of the territories in view of the future states to be
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION. 331
formed from them, there can be no doubt that, in the
admission of a state, a collective naturalization may be
effected in accordance with the intention of Congress
and the people applying for admission.
"Admission on an equal footing with the original
states, in all respects whatever, involves equality of
constitutional right and power, which can not thereafter-
wards be controlled; and it also involves the adoption,
as citizens of the United States, of those whom Congress
makes members of the political community, and who
are recognized as such in the formation of the new state
with the consent of Congress."
When a state is admitted into the Union upon an
equal footing with the original states, all residents
thereof who are endowed by Congress with political
rights and privileges, or who, with the consent of Con-
gress, are permitted to participate in the formation of
the new state, become citizens of the United States by
adoption, even though, being foreigners, they have never
complied with the requirements of the naturalization
laws. Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135, 36 L. ed. 103, 12
Sup. Ct. Rep. 375.
Nebraska.
The Nebraska enabling Act (13 Stat, at L. 47, Chap. 59)
declared that all persons qualified to vote for represen-
tatives of the territorial legislature should be eligible to
election as members of the convention, and should be
entitled to vote upon the acceptance or rejection of the
constitution. By the existing laws of the territory, for-
eigners who had declared an intention to become citi-
zens of the United States were entitled to vote at
elections, and this provision was carried into the consti-
tution of the new state, as ratified by Congress. The
Supreme Court of the United States held in Boyd v.
332 NATURALIZATION
Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135, 36 L. ed. 103, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep.
375, that upon the admission of the state into the Union,
all persons of this class became citizens of the United
States.
A citizen of France, a resident and inhabitant of the
Territory of Nebraska, who had declared his intention to
become a citizen of the United States, became a citizen
of the United States upon the admission of Nebraska
into the Union as a state. Bahuaud v. Bize, 105 Fed. 485.
EXPATRIATION. 333
CHAPTER V.
EXPATRIATION.
A. Definition.
B. Right of expatriation.
C. How effected.
a. In general.
b. Modes of expatriation.
1. Act of 1907.
(a) By naturalization in a foreign state.
(b) By taking the oath of allegiance to a foreign state.
(c) By residence in a foreign country.
Instructions of the Department of State.
Exceptions.
(A) When residence abroad is due to ill health or finan-
cial condition.
(B) Agents of American enterprises.
(C) Missionaries.
(d) By marriage.
2. By desertion.
3. Military or Naval service in foreign country.
4. Accepting public office under foreign government.
A. Definition.
Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation or abandon-
ment of nationality and allegiance.
B. Right of Expatriation.
While the naturalization laws of the United States have
from the beginning been based on the principle that the
right to change one's allegiance is a natural and inherent
right, there was considerable difference of opinion in this
country, prior to 1868, on the question whether the
English doctrine of perpetual allegiance obtained here.
The right of a citizen to devest himself of his allegiance
to the United States without the consent of the govern-
ment was denied by able American jurists, but the poli-
tical branch of this government uniformly held that the
doctrine of indelible allegiance was not in force in the
United States.
The question was definitely settled in this country by
334 NATURALIZATION
the Act of Congress of July 27, 1868 (15 Stat, at L. 223,
Ch. 249), which declares that "the right of expatriation
is a natural and inherent right of all people."
This Act, which has been embodied in the Revised
Statutes, reads as follows:
"Sec. 1999 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1269]. Whereas
the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right
of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the
rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and
whereas, in the recognition of this principle, this govern-
ment has freely received emigrants from all nations, and
invested them with the rights of citizenship; and whereas
it is claimed that such American citizens, with their de-
scendants, are subjects of foreign states, owing alleg-
iance to the governments thereof; and whereas it is
necessary to the maintenance of public peace that this
claim of foreign allegiance should be promptly and fin-
ally disavowed: Therefore, any declaration, instruction,
opinion, order, or decision of any officer of the United
States which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the
right of expatriation, is declared inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of the republic.
"Sec. 2000 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1270]. All natur-
alized citizens of the United States, while in foreign
countries, are entitled to and shall receive from this gov-
ernment the same protection of persons and property
which is accorded to native-born citizens.
"Sec. 2001 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1270]. Whenever
it is made known to the President that any citizen of the
United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty
by or under the authority of any foreign government, it
shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand
of that government the reasons of such imprisonment;
and if it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the
rights of American citizenship, the President shall forth-
with demand the release of such citizen, and if the re-
EXPATRIATION. 335
lease so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused,
the President shall use such means, not amounting to
acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to ob-
tain or effectuate the release; and all the facts and pro-
ceedings relative thereto shall as soon as practicable be
communicated by the President to Congress."
But the promulgation of this municipal law did not
operate to override the laws or practice of foreign gov-
ernments inconsistent with it, and it was necessary to
secure acceptance of the principle enunciated thereby,
by means of treaties.
Treaties recognizing the right of expatriation, with
various modifications in detail, were concluded between
the United States and the North German Union (15
Stat, at L. 615), Bavaria (15 Stat, at L. 661), Baden (16
Stat, at L. 731), Wiirttemberg (16 Stat, at L. 735), and
Belgium (16 Stat, at L. 747), in 1868; with Hesse (16
Stat, at L. 743), and Sweden and Norway (17 Stat, at L.
809), in 1869; with Austria (17 Stat, at L. 833), and
England (16 Stat, at L. 775), in 1870; with Denmark
(17 Stat, at L. 941), in 1872, and with Haiti in 1902.
One of the chief causes of the War of 1812 between
the United States and Great Britain was the rigor with
which the latter government applied the doctrine of in-
alienable allegiance. British cruisers took from Ameri-
can vessels on the high seas naturalized American
citizens of British origin, and impressed them for service
in the royal navy, on the grounds that they were British
subjects by birth, and that no forms gone through in
America could devest them of their British nationality.
This was vigorously resisted by the United States.
While the war did not settle this question, opinion in
England gradually changed, and by the naturalization
act of 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. 105, Chap. 14), which shortly
preceded the treaty with the United States, the old
doctrine of the common law was abandoned, and it was
336 NATURALIZATION
declared that "any British subject who has at any time
before, or may at any time after, the passing of this act,
when in any foreign state, and not under any disability,
voluntarily become naturalized in such state, shall, from
and after the time of his so having become naturalized
in such foreign state, be deemed to have ceased to be a
British subject, and be regarded as an alien." See Law-
rence, Principles of International Law, 196, 197.
C. How Effected,
(a.) In GeneraL
The Act of Congress of 1868 (15 Stat, at L. 223, Chap.
249, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1269), does not define what
steps must be taken by a citizen before it can be held
that he has become denationalized. In fact, until the
enactment of the law of March 2, 1907, " in reference to
the expatriation of citizens and their protection abroad,"
there was no mode of renunciation of citizenship pre-
scribed by our laws, with the exception of Section 1998,
of the Revised Statutes, by virtue of which desertion from
the Army or Navy works forfeiture of the rights of citi-
zenship.* Whether expatriation had taken place in any
case was to be determined by the facts and circumstances
of the particular case. No general rule that would apply
to all cases could be laid down.
b. Modes of Expatriation.
1. Act of 1907.
The law of March 2, 1907, expressly prescribes several
modes by which citizenship of the United States may be
renounced.
The Act (Sections 2 and 3) reads as follows:
"Sec. 2. That any American citizen shall be deemed to
have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized
in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or when
*See, also, Section 15, Act of June 29, 1906.
EXPATRIATION. 337
he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state.
"When any naturalized citizen shall have resided for
two years in the foreign state from which he came, or
for five years in any other foreign state, it shall be pre-
sumed that he has ceased to be an American citizen, and
the place of his general abode shall be deemed his place
of residence during said years: Provided, however, That
such presumption may be overcome on the presentation
of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular
officer of the United States, under such rules and regu-
lations as the Department of State may prescribe: A^id
provided, a^so, That no American citizen shall be allowed
to expatriate himself when this country is at war.
"Sec. 3. That any American woman who marries a for-
eigner shall take the nationality of her husband. At
the termination of the marital relation she may resume
her American citizenship, if abroad, by registering as an
American citizen within one year with a consul of the
United States, or by returning to reside in the United
States, or, if residing in the United States at the termi-
nation of the marital relation, by continuing to reside
therein."
It will be observed that the Act declares that expatri-
ation may be effected in four different ways, viz: By
naturalization in a foreign state, by taking the oath of
allegiance to a foreign state, by marriage of an American
woman to a foreigner, and by residence of a naturalized
citizen of the United States in a foreign country.
(A.) By Naturalization in a Foreign State.
This is the most obvious form of expatriation, and,
even in the absence of any statutory declaration to that
effect, was always regarded as a method of expatriation.
While the purpose of the Act of 1868 was, primarily,
to define the rights of aliens seeking to acquire citizen-
ship in this country rather than the rights of American
5233—22
338 NATURALIZATION
citizens, its declaration that the right of expatriation is
"a natural and inherent right of all people," applies to
citizens of the United States who seek to exercise it as
well as to those of other countries. 14 Ops. Atty. Gen.
295.
(B.) By Taking the Oath of Allegiance to a Foreign State.
Before the passage of the Act of March 2, 1907, the
rulings of the Executive Departments of the government
show a difference of opinion on the question whether or
not expatriation was effected by the taking of an oath of
allegiance to a foreign power.
In the case of Sidney Mason, who, while residing in
Porto Rico, had taken the oath of allegiance to the King
of Spain and renounced his citizenship in the United
States , Secretary Forsyth, in 1839, declined to sanction
the issuance of a passport, on the ground that Mason
had become a Spanish subject. 3 Moore's Int. Law
Digest, 718.
On the other hand, it was held by the Supreme Court,
in Blight's Lessee v. Rochester, 7 Wheat. 535, that a
change of allegiance can not be effected without an
actual change of domicil. Relying upon this decision,
Mr. B. R. Curtis, formerly an associate justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, rendered an opinion
to the effect that one did not cease to be a citizen of the
United States who, for the purpose of obtaining protec-
tion for his vessels, placed them under the Hamburg
flag, and, in order to do so, took the citizen's oath to be
true and faithful to the Free and Hanseatic Town of
Hamburg. The oath contained no renunciation of native
allegiance. 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 721.
Assistant Secretary Porter, on August 18, 1887, held that
citizens of the United States, who take the oath of fealty
promulgated as a part of the new constitution of Hawaii,
remain citizens of the United States, and are entitled to
EXPATRIATION. 339
be regarded and protected as such. For. Rel. 1895, pt
2, 849.
The oath mentioned was "to support the constitution,
laws, and government of the Republic of Hawaii."
But in the case of J. F. Bowler, a citizen of the United
States, who, in 1895, took an oath to support the con-
stitution and laws of the Hawaiian Islands, and bear true
allegiance to the King, without expressly renouncing or
reserving his allegiance to the United States, Secretary
Gresham said that Bowler had "manifested his intention
of abandoning his American citizenship by taking the
oath to support the constitution and laws of Hawaii, and
bear true allegiance to the King, and, so far as is known,
he manifested no contrary intention before his arrest. The
oath is inconsistent with his allegiance to the United
States. By taking it he obligated himself to support
the government of his adoption, even to the extent of
fighting its battles in the event of war between it and
the country of his origin. He could not bear true allegi-
ance to both governments at the same time. The Presi-
dent directs that you inform Mr. Bowler he is not
entitled to the protection of the United States." For.
Rel. 1895, pt. 2, 853.
And in the case of Frank Godfrey, an American citizen
who had taken the oath of denization in the Hawaiian
Islands, Secretary Olney, on November 13, 1895, said:
"Under the decisions of my predecessor, his taking the
oath and voluntarily subjecting himself to accounta-
bility to the laws of the Hawaiian Republic, and to per-
formance of all the duties and obligations of a citizen
thereof, constitute naturalization for all Hawaiian pur-
poses, while within Hawaiian jurisdiction, and the phrase
that ' these letters are without prejudice to his native alle-
giance,' can have no significance, either as to his status
within Hawaiian jurisdiction, or as to his status within
the jurisdiction of the United States, should he return
340 NATURALIZATION
hither, for, in the latter case, it would be determinable
by the laws of this country, and not by any administra-
tive act of Hawaii." Mr. Olney to the United States
Minister in Hawaii, For. Rel. 1895, pt. 2, 867.
And Secretary Hay, in the case of certain American
citizens (colored), who had gone to Liberia, and by
taking out an allotment of land, became for all national
purposes Liberian citizens (no oath of allegiance being
required), declared that the principle involved in this
case was substantially the same as in the Bowler and
Godfrey cases. He said: "The Republic of Liberia is an
independent sovereignty, in no wise bound to or depend-
ent upon the United States, and theoretically at least, it
is within the range of possibilities that differences might
arise between the two governments leading even to
rupture of relations. It is inconsistent for an individual
to bear true allegiance at the same time to two different
sovereigns, and the exercise of the rights of citizenship
under any alien sovereignty must be regarded as a vol-
untary assumption of the obligations of allegiance to
such sovereignty." 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest, 730.
C. By Residence in a Foreign Country.
The Act of March 2, 1907, provides that when a natu-
ralized citizen of the United States shall have resided
for two years in the foreign state from which he came,
or five years in any other foreign state, it shall be pre-
sumed that he has ceased to be an American citizen
(Sec. 2). In consequence of this provision, the executive
order of President Roosevelt of April 6, 1907 (printed in
full in the Appendix, post), directed certain changes to
be made in the diplomatic and consular regulations, in
order to bring them into conformity with the new law,
and the following circular instructions to the United
States diplomatic and consular officers relative to expa-
triation were thereafter issued by the Department of
EXPATRIATION. 341
State under date of April 19, 1907, bringing the provi-
sions of the new law to their attention and mailing the
rules and regulations authorized by the second section
of the second paragraph of the Act.
To the Diplomatic and Consular Officers
of the United States.
Gentlemen: Paragraph 144 of the Diplomatic Instruc-
tions and Consular Regulations, as amended by Execu-
tive order of April 6, 1907, reads as follows:
" 144. Expatriation. — An American citizen shall be
deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been
naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its
laws, or when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any
foreign state. When any naturalized citizen shall have
resided for two years in the foreign state from which he
came, or for five years in any other foreign state, it shall
be presumed that he has ceased to be an American citi-
zen, and his place of general abode shall be deemed his
place of residence during the said years; Provided,
That such presumption may be overcome on the pre-
sentation of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or
consular officer of the United States, under such rules
and regulations as the Department of State may prescribe.
"An American citizen shall not be allowed to expa-
triate himself when this country is at war. — Act of March
2, 1907, Sec. 2."
The text of the law is appended for your information.*
Whenever it comes to the knowledge of a diplomatic
or consular officer that an American citizen has secured
naturalization in a foreign state in conformity with its
laws, or has taken an oath of allegiance to a foreign
state, such diplomatic or consular officer should certify
to the facts under his seal and should transmit the certi-
fication to this Department. If the citizen who has
thus acquired foreign naturalization was a naturalized
citizen of the United States, the fact should be stated
in the certification and the certificate of American natu-
ralization should, if possible, be taken up and forwarded
* For the text of the law see Appendix, post.
342 NATURALIZATION
to the Department with the certification. The form of
the certification shall be as follows:
I, A. B., [name and rank of certifying officer], hereby
certify that C. B., a citizen of the United States by birth
(or naturalization), has secured naturalization as a citizen
of , the proof of such naturalization being as fol-
lows :
(If he was a citizen of the United States by naturali-
zation, a statement of the date and place of his natu-
ralization in the United States should follow.)
In testimony whereof I have hereunto signed my name
and affixed my seal of office.
[L. s.] ...
When a naturalized citizen of the United States has
resided for two years in the country of his origin, or for
five years in any other country, this fact creates a pre-
sumption that he has ceased to be an American citizen;
but the presumption may be overcome by his presenting
to a diplomatic or consular officer proof establishing the
following facts :
(a.) That his residence abroad is solely as a represen-
tative of American trade and commerce, and that he
intends eventually to return to the United States per-
manently to reside; or,
(b.) That his residence abroad is in good faith, for
reasons of health or for education, and that he intends
eventually to return to the United States to reside; or,
(c.) That some unforeseen or controlling exigency be-
yond his power to foresee has prevented his carrying out
a bona fide intention to return to the United States
within the time limited by law, and that it is his inten-
tion to return and reside in the United States immedi-
ately upon the removal of the preventing cause.
The evidence required to overcome the presumption
must be of the specific facts and circumstances which
bring the alleged citizen under one of the foregoing
heads, and mere assertions, even under oath, that any of
the enumerated reasons exist will not be accepted as
sufficient.
Whenever evidence shall be produced to overcome the
presumption of expatriation from residence abroad, as
indicated in this instruction, the affidavit or affidavits
must be made in duplicate, one copy thereof being sent
EXPATRIATION. 343
forthwith to this Department, and if the affidavits or
other evidence have been presented to a consular officer
he shall notify the embassy or legation in the country in
which he is resident of the name of the person and of
the facts concerning his residence abroad.
So much of this instruction as relates to residence
abroad is not applicable to natural-born citizens of the
United States. Their status, so far as their right to the
protection of this Government is concerned, is governed
by existing instructions of this Department and espec-
ially by so much of the circular instruction of March 27,
1899, as applies to them, which is appended to this in-
struction for your information.*
I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,
Elihu Root.
*The circular of March 27, 1899, reads as follows:
Passports for Persons Residing or Sojourning Abroad.
Department of State,
Washington, March 27^ 1899.
To the Diplomatic and Constilar Officers
of the United States.
Gentlemen :
A condition precedent to the granting of a passport is, under the law
and the rules prescribed by authority of the law, that the citizenship of
the applicant and his domicil in the United States and intention to re-
turn to it with the purpose of residing and performing the duties of
citizenship shall be satisfactorily established. One who has expatriated
himself can not, therefore, receive a passport.
Expatriation has been defined by Mr. Hamilton Fish as " the quit-
ting of one's country, with an abandonment of allegiance and with the
view of becoming permanently a resident and citizen of some other
country, resulting in the loss of the party's preexisting character of
citizenship," Thus, a person "maj' reside abroad for purposes of health,
of education, of amusement, of business, for an indefinite period; he
may acquire a commercial or civil domicil there, but if he do so sin-
cerely and bona fide ammo revertendi, and do nothing inconsistent with
his preexisting allegiance, he will not thereby have taken any step
towards self-expatriation. But if, instead of this, he permanently with-
draws himself and his property and places both where neither can be
made to contribute to the national necessities, acquires a political domi-
cil, and avows his purpose not to return, he has placed himself in the
position where his country has the right to presume that he has made
his election of expatriation," . . ,
344 NATURALIZATION
Before the passage of the Act of 1907, some authori-
ties held that in order to effect expatriation there must
be a change of residence. "No person can make himself
subject to another power while domiciled and resident
within a country to which he owes allegiance," said Sec-
retary Fish to the President, August 25, 1873. For Rel.
1873, pt. 2, 1187; The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283.
In Comitis v. Parkerson, 22 L. R. A. 148, 56 Fed. 556,
where a woman, a native of Louisiana, married a subject
of Italy and lived with her husband in Louisiana until
But even where expatriation may not be established, a person who is
permanently resident and domiciled outside of the United States can
not receive a passport. " When a person zvko has attained his majority
removes to another country and settles himself there, he is stamped with
the national character of his new domicil; and this is so, notwithstand"
ing he may entertain a floating intention of returning to his original
residence or citizenship at some future period, and the presumption of
law with respect to residence in a foreign country, especially if it be
protracted, is that the party is there aniino inanendi, and it lies upon
him to explain it." Mr. Fish to the President, For. Rels. 1873, 1186,
et seq. If, in making application for a passport, he swears that he in-
tends to return to the United States within a given period, and after-
wards, in applying for a renewal of his passport, it appears that he did
not fulfil his intention, this circumstance awakens a doubt as to his real
purpose, which he must dispel. For. Rels. 1890, 11.
The treatment of the individual cases as they arise must depend
largely upon attendant circumstances. When an applicant has completely
severed his relations with the United States; has neither kindred nor
property here; has married and established a home in a foreign land;
has engaged in business or professional pursuits wholl5' in foreign coun-
tries; has so shaped his plans as to make it impossible or improbable
that they will ever include a domicil in this country — these and similar
circumstances should exercise an adverse influence in determining the
question whether or not a passport should issue. On the other hand, a
favorable conclusion may be influenced by the fact that family and
property connections with the United States have been kept up; that
reasons of health render travel and return impossible or inexpedient;
and that pecuniary exigencies interfere with the desire to return. But
the circumstance which is perhaps the most favorable of all is that the
applicant is residing abroad in representation and extension of legiti-
mate American enterprises. . .
I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,
John Hay.
EXPATRIATION. 345
his death, the latter never becoming naturalized, it was
held that the widow, who continued to reside in the
United States, was a citizen of the United States; that
expatriation must be effected by removal from the
country; and that, in the absence of an Act of Congress
authorizing it, there can be no implied renunciation of
citizenship by an American woman marrying an alien.
For the opposite view, see Pequignot v. Detroit, 16
Fed. 211.
While residence of a naturalized citizen of the United
States in a foreign country is not sufficient evidence of
expatriation, long continued residence abroad raises a
presumption of abandonment of citizenship.
The presumption of law, with respect to residence in
a foreign country, especially if it be protracted, is that
the party is there " animo manendi," and it lies upon him
to explain it.
A person "may reside abroad for purposes of health,
of education, of amusement, of business, for an indefi-
nite period; he may acquire a commercial or a civil
domicil there; but, if he does so sincerely and bo7ia fide
animo revertendi, and do nothing inconsistent with
his pre-existing allegiance, he will not thereby have
taken any step towards self-expatriation. But if, in-
stead of this, he permanently withdraws himself and his
property, and places both where neither can be made to
contribute to the national necessities, acquires a politi-
cal domicil in a foreign country, and avows his purpose
not to return, he has placed himself in the position
where his country has the right to presume that he
has made his election of expatriation." Secretary Fish
to the President, For Rel. 1873, pt. 2, 1188, 1189.
"It not infrequently happens that naturalization is
almost immediately followed by the return of the natur-
alized person to his native country, and his continued
residence there, without having acquired property or
346 NATURALIZATION
established any permanent relations of family or of busi-
ness in the United States. Again, cases are of frequent
occurrence of naturalized persons who have resided for
years in the country of nativity, manifesting no purpose
of returning to the United States and exhibiting no in-
terest in the government, but who assert American citi-
zenship only when called upon to discharge some duty
in the country of their residence; thus making the claim
to American citizenship the pretext for avoiding duties
to one country, while absence secures them from duties
to the other. These are among the class of cases where
the continued residence in the country of nativity, and
the absence of apparent purpose of returning, may be
taken at least as prima facie evidence of expatriation."
Id. For. Rel. 1873, pt. 2, 1191.*
Voluntary expatriation by a naturalized citizen, which
forfeits a right to diplomatic intervention, may be in-
ferred from a long residence abroad in the place of his
birth, by nonpayment of taxes and nonpossession of
property in this country, and by failure to express an in-
tention to return. 2 Wharton's Int. Law Digest, 368.
Persons voluntarily emigrating from the United States
to take up a permanent abode in a foreign land "cease
to be citizens of the United States, and can have, after
such a change of allegiance, no claims to protection as
such citizens from our government." 2 Wharton's Int.
Law Digest, 447.
The theory and practice of this government proceed
upon the principle that citizenship involves duties and
obligations as well as rights, and an evasion of the duties
and obligations by continued residence abroad works a
forfeiture of the right to protection from the authorities
*The views of Mr. Fish upon the subject of expatriation were em-
bodied by Secretary Hay in a circular dated March 27, 1899, entitled:
"Passports for Persons Residing or Sojourning Abroad," printed in the
note on pages 343-4, supra.
EXPATRIATION. 347
of the United States. Mr. Fish to Mr. Niles, MSS. Dom.
Let., October 30, 1871; Mr. Evarts to Mr. Logan, March
9, 1881, MSS. Inst, to Cent. America.
In determining whether expatriation has taken place
in any given case, the intent of the party or absence of
intent to return to the United States is a very material
element.
The provision of the law of 1907 that a residence of
two years in the country from which a naturalized citizen
came shall create a presumption that he has ceased to be
an American citizen, is analogous to the provision in
several of the naturalization treaties of the United States
with other countries whereby the residence of a natural-
ized citizen in the land of his nativity, without intent to
return to the United States, is declared to work of itself
a renunciation of the citizenship acquired by such natu-
ralization, and that such intent may be held to exist
when the residence continues for more than two years.
The adoption of this period of two years as that when
the intent not to return to the United States may be
held to exist on the part of the naturalized citizen who
has returned to his native country indicates that, while
the principle on which rests the right of protection while
in foreign countries of the naturalized citizen is the same
with that of the native-born citizen, there is an apprecia-
tion of the strong proclivity to resume his original citi-
zenship, on the part of him who, having wandered from
home, returns to find the attractions of early associations
and of family ties enticing him at a period, perhaps, when
the restlessness and spirit of adventure of the fresher
years of life have passed, to rest and to end his days
amid the scenes of his childhood or youth, and among
those who claim the strong ties of common blood. Hence,
the evidence would be more readily obtained to deter-
mine that a naturalized citizen who had returned to the
348 NATURALIZATION
country of his nativity should be deemed to have ex-
patriated himself, or, perhaps, it would be more proper
to say, to have rehabilitated himself with his original
citizenship, than to show that a native-born citizen had
expatriated himself by the same period of foreign resi-
dence. Secretary Fish to the President, August 25,
1873, For Rels. 1873, pt. 2, 1190, 1191.
Under the provision in the naturalization treaty with
the North German Confederation, that the "intent not
to return may be held to exist when the person natural-
ized in the one country resides more than two years in
the other country," it is held that the two years' resi-
dence is merely prima facie evidence of abandonment of
nationality, and may be rebutted. 2 Wharton's Int. Law
Digest, 379.
While the intent to remain in the country of birth may
be held to exist after two years' continuous residence, it
is in reality not so held without special circumstances
showing, either an intent to remain permanently, or the
absence of all intent to return to the United States. Id.
By the express terms of the Act of 1907, the presump-
tion of expatriation " may be overcome on the presenta-
tion of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular
officer of the United States, under such rules and regula-
tions as the Department of State may prescribe." Sec. 2.*
A naturalized citizen may forfeit his citizenship before
the expiration of the period mentioned.
When a citizen of the United States goes abroad with-
out any intention to return, he forfeits, with the aban-
donment of his country, all right to the protection of its
government. 2 Wharton's Int. Law Digest, 450.
A citizen of the United States, who, being of a lawful
age, leaves the United States and establishes himself
in a foreign country, without any definite intention to
*For the rules and regulations adopted by the Department of State
in pursuance of this authority, see pages 341-343, supra.
EXPATRIATION. 349
return to the United States, is to be considered as having
expatriated himself. Decision of Arbitrators in American
and Spanish Claims Commission, Convention of 1871 (17
Stat, at L. 839), 3 Moore's International Arbitrations,
2565.
The position of the Department of State, where an
American citizen goes to a foreign country and settles
there animo manendi, is that he thereby forfeits the
right to the protection of this government, and is to be
considered as having expatriated himself. Acting Secre-
tary Hill to Mr. Pioda, June 14, 1901, For. Rel. 1901, 511.
Instructions of the Department of State Relative to Election
of American Citizenship by Minors Abroad.
Naturalized citizens are not the only citizens of this
country who are within the scope of the Act of March 2,
1907. Its prescriptions affect a certain class of natural-
born citizens also.
Under Section 6 of the Act of 1907, it is provided that
children born abroad to an American father must register
in an American consulate when eighteen years of age and
take the oath of allegiance at twenty-one, in order to
receive the protection of the United States. That pro-
vision reads as follows :
"Sec. 6. That all children born outside the limits of
the United States who are citizens thereof in accordance
with the provisions of section nineteen hundred and
ninety-three of the Revised Statutes of the United States
and who continue to reside outside the United States
shall, in order to receive the protection of this Govern-
ment, be required upon reaching the age of eighteen
years to record at an American consulate their intention
to become residents and remain citizens of the United
States and shall be further required to take the oath of
350 NATURALIZATION
allegiance to the United States upon attaining their
majority."
An appropriate change was accordingly made by the
Executive Order of April 6, 1907,* in the diplomatic and
consular regulations, and in furtherance of the new pro-
vision of law the following circular instruction, dated
April 19, 1907, was addressed by the Department of State
to the American diplomatic and consular officers :
Children of Citizens Born Abroad.
Department of State,
Washington, April 19, 1907.
To the Diplomatic and Consular Officers
of the United States.
Gentlemen: Paragraph 138 of the Instructions to Dip-
lomatic Officers and of the Consular Regulations, as
amended by the Executive order of April 6, 1907, reads
as follows:
"138. Children of Citizens Born Abroad. — All children
born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United
States whose fathers were at the time of their birth citi-
zens thereof are citizens of the United States; but the
rights of citizenship do not descend to children whose
fathers never resided in the United States. All children
who are, in accordance with this paragraph, born citizens
of the United States, and who continue to reside outside
of the United States, are required in order to receive the
protection of this government, upon reaching the age
of eighteen years to record at an American Consulate
their intention to become residents and remain citizens,
and upon reaching their majority are further required to
take the oath of allegiance to the United States. R. S.
Sec. 1993; Act of March 2, 1907, Sec. 6."
Appended is the text of Section 1993 of the Revised
Statutes and of Section 6 of the Act of March 2, 1907.
You are instructed that children born abroad whose
parents were American citizens at the time of their birth
*Fortlie text of the order see Appendix, post.
EXPATRIATION. 351
should report to a convenient American consul upon
reaching the age of 18 years and before they have reached
the age of 19 years and make a solemn declaration in
the following form:
I, A. B., born in , on , of parents who were
at the time of my birth American citizens, do solemnly
declare that it is my intention and desire to remain a
citizen of the United States and to become a resident
thereof. My father acquired citizenship through birth
(or naturalization) (if by birth state where
the father was born; if by naturalization state when
and where he was naturalized, as shown by record evi-
dence of such naturalization.)
This statement should be made in triplicate, one copy
being sent forthwith to the embassy or legation in the
country in which the consulate is situated, one to the
Department, and one to be retained and filed in the con-
sulate.
Upon reaching the age of 21 years and before they
have reached the age of 22 years, such children are re-
quired to take before a convenient consul the following
oath (or affirmation):
I, A. B., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will sup-
port and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I
take this obligation freely, without any mental reserva-
tion or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
This oath or affirmation should be made in triplicate,
one copy being sent forthwith to the embassy or legation
in the country in which the consulate is situated, one to
the Department, and one to be retained and filed in the
consulate.
Diplomatic and consular officers are instructed to
make every effort necessary to bring the requirements of
the law to which this instruction relates to the attention
of those whom it will affect.
I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,
Elihu Root.
352 NATURALIZATION
Instructions of the Department of State Relative to Regis-
tration of American Citizens Abroad.
In order to accomplish more effectually the purposes
of the provisions of the Act of 1907, the President on
April 8, 1907, by Executive order supplementing his order
of the 6th of the same month, amended paragraph 172 of
the consular regulations and provided for the keeping
of a detailed registry of American citizens within the
consular jurisdiction. This order was brought to the
attention of the American diplomatic and consular
officers in a circular instruction of the Department of
State, dated April 19, 1907, which reads:
Department of State,
Washington, April 19, 1907.
To the Diplomatic and Consular Officers
of the United States.
Gentlemen: Paragraph 172 of the Consular Regula-
tions, as amended by the Executive order of April 8,
1907, reads as follows:
" 172. Registration of American Citizens. — Principal
consular officers should keep at their offices a register of
all American citizens residing in their several districts,
and will therefore make it known that such a register is
kept and invite all resident Americans to cause their
names to be entered therein. The same general princi-
ples govern applications for registry which govern appli-
cations for passports. Paragraph 151.
"The register should show the date of registration,
the full name of the person registered, the date and
place of his birth, the place of his last domicil in the
United States, the date of his arrival in the foreign
country where he is residing and his place of residence
therein, the reasons for his foreign residence, whether or
not he is married, and if married the name of his wife,
her place of birth and residence, and if he has children
the name, date, and place of birth and residence of each.
EXPATRIATION, 353
The nature of the proof accepted to establish his citi-
zenship should also appear, and his signature should be
inscribed in the register.
"Consuls may issue certificates of the registration pre-
scribed above for use with the authorities of the place
where the person registered is residing. Each certificate
shall set forth the facts contained in the register and
shall be good for use for one year only and shall be
in a form prescribed by the Secretary of State (Form
No. ). When a certificate expires a new one may be
issued, the old one being destroyed, if it is clearly shown
that the residence abroad has not assumed a permanent
character. Persons who hold passports which have not
expired shall not be furnished with certificates of regis-
tration, and it is strictly forbidden to furnish them to
be used for traveling in the place of passports. Returns
of all registrations made and of all certificates of regis-
tration issued shall be made to the embassy or legation
in the country in which the consulate is situated and to
the Secretary of State at intervals and under regulations
to be prescribed by him. No fee will be charged for
registration nor for any service connected therewith,
nor for certificates of registration,
"This paragraph shall go into effect July 1, 1907."
Books for registration are being prepared and will be
furnished to consuls as soon as possible. In the mean-
time, after July 1, consuls will register American citizens,
following carefully the requirements of the paragraph
quoted above, and will carefully preserve the registra-
tions and enter them in the register of American citizens
as soon as the books for that purpose shall have been
received.
The certificate of registration shall be in the following
form:
I, [name of consul]. Consul of the United States
of America at [name of place], hereby certify
that [name of person registered] is registered as an
American citizen in this consulate. He was born
[date of birth] at [place of birth] and is a citizen
of the United States by (birth or naturalization). He
arrived in [place of foreign residence] on
5233—23
354 NATURALIZATION
[date], where he is now residing for the purpose of
[reason why residing in foreign place]. He is married to
[name of wife], who was born in [place of
birth of wife], and resides at [place of wife's resi-
dence].
He has the following children:
[name of child] born in [place of birth]
on [date of birth] and residing at [place of
residence]; and [name of child] born in
[place of birth] on [date of birth] and residing at
[place of residence]; and [name of child]
born in [place of birth] on [date of birth]
and residing at [place of residence]; his citizen-
ship of the United States is established by [nature
of proof of citizenship produced].
This certificate is not a passport and its validity ex-
pires on [date of expiration].
The following is the signature of [person regis-
tered].
In testimony whereof I have hereunto signed my name
and affixed the seal of this consulate.
[l. s.] ,
Atnerican Consul.
Immediately upon the registration of an American
citizen the fact of such registration should be certified
to the embassy or legation in the country in which the
consulate is situated, and a duplicate of the registration
should be forthwith sent to this Department, together
with a statement whether a certificate of registration has
been issued.
When a certificate of registration shall have expired
and a new one has been issued, notice of this fact should
be sent immediately to the embassy or legation in the
country in which the consulate is situated and to this
Department.
American citizens resident abroad are required to
register each year, and any additional facts concerning
residence, marriage, and children should be noted in the
register, but the full registration having been made once
need not be repeated on each subsequent registration.
The Department expects consuls to observe this re-
quirement with great care, and if they are uncertain
EXPATRIATION. 355
concerning any of their duties in relation thereto they
should ask for instructions from the Department.
I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,
Elihu Root.
Exceptions; Expatriation not Accomplished:
(A) When Residence Abroad is Due to 111 Health or Finan-
cial Condition.
In an instruction to the diplomatic and consular offi-
cers of the United States, March 27, 1899,'^ Secretary
Hay stated that a favorable conclusion in determining
whether a passport shall be granted to one residing
abroad may be influenced by the fact that reasons of
health render travel and return to the United States im-
possible or inexpedient; and that pecuniary exigencies
interfere with the desire to return.
In the case of Strahlheim, which arose in Switzerland
in 1902, where it was shown that the applicant was pre-
vented from returning to the United States, where he
was born, by precarious health and impecunious circum-
stances, it was held that he was entitled to a passport.
Mr. Hay to Mr. Hardy, May 20, 1902, For. Rel. 1902, 975.
(B) Agents of American Enterprises.
An American, whether by birth or by naturalization,
residing abroad, in representation of an American busi-
ness, and keeping up an interested association with this
country, is not deemed to have forfeited his nationality
by residence abroad. See Hunt's American Passport, 206.
"Were we to hold that citizens of the United States
can not, without forfeiting their nationality, reside from
time to time in South American states as agents of their
countrymen, the business of both continents would re-
ceive a heavy blow. In affairs so vast, so intricate, and
so continuous as those of Alsop & Co., for instance,
there can be neither consistency nor responsibility of
*Printed in note on pages 343-4, supra.
356 NATURALIZATION
action except through trusted agents, who, while taking
up continuous abode in their places of business action in
South America, would from early personal relations be in
the confidence of their chiefs, making their central busi-
ness in this country the place to which their domiciliary
duties would relate, and continuing to subject them-
selves to the laws of the country in which the firm is
domiciled. As a matter of public policy, therefore, as
well as of international law, lean not but conclude that
Mr. Wheelwright's domicil and nationality are in the
United States." Mr. Bayard to Mr. Roberts, March 20,
1886, 2 Wharton's Int. Law Digest, 369, 370.
An exception has been made in the case of agents of
American business houses who are engaged in foreign
lands in promoting trade with the United States. Mr.
Gresham to Mr. Runyon, November 1, 1894, American
Passport, 209.
In enumerating the circumstances which should ex-
ercise an influence in determining whether or not a pass-
port should issue to a person residing abroad, Secretary
Hay states that "the circumstance which is, perhaps, the
most favorable of all is that the applicant is residing
abroad in representation and extension of legitimate
American enterprises." Circular Instructions to Diplo-
matic and Consular Officers, March 27, 1899, pages 343-4,
supra, note.
(c.) Missionaries.
Our legations have been authorized to issue passports
to missionaries in foreign lands whose residence there
was continuous and practically permanent, and who could
not allege any definite intention of returning to and re-
siding in the United States. Mr. Gresham to Mr. Runyon,
November 1, 1894, American Passport, 209.
The presumption of abandonment of nationality by
EXPATRIATION. 357
long residence abroad is rebutted by proof that such
residence was that of a missionary, who never intended
to relinquish his nationality or his purpose finally to
return home. Mr. Everett to Mr. Marsh, February 5, 1853,
2 Wharton's Int. Law Digest, 360.
(d.) By Marriage.
See "Naturalization by Marriage," for a full considera-
tion of the subject of "expatriation by marriage," pp.
227-263, supra.
2. Desertion.
A fifth way in which expatriation may be effected is
by desertion from the Army or Navy.
By Section 1996 of the Revised Statutes, deserters from
the military or naval service of the United States who
did not return or report themselves to a provost-mar-
shal within sixty days after March 11, 1865, were deemed
to have voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their
rights of citizenship, as well as the right to become citi-
zens; and such deserters were declared to be forever
incapable of holding office or exercising any rights of
citizenship.
Section 1997 provided that no soldier or sailor who
faithfully served until April 19, 1865, and who, without
proper authority or leave first obtained, quit his com-
mand or refused to serve after that date, shall be held to
be a deserter from the Army or Navy; but that section
shall be construed solely as a removal of any disability
such soldier or sailor may have incurred, under Section
1996, by the loss of citizenship and of the right to hold
office, in consequence of his desertion.
Section 1998 provides that "every person who here-
after deserts the military or naval service of the United
358 NATURALIZATION
States, or who, being duly enrolled, departs the jurisdic-
tion of the district in which he is enrolled, or goes
beyond the limits of the United States, with intent to
avoid any draft into the military or naval service, law-
fully ordered, shall be liable to all the penalties and for-
feitures of Section nineteen hundred and ninety-six."
This law relative to desertion is applicable only where
the person has been convicted of the offense by court-
martial. Goetscheus v. Matthewson, 61 N. Y. 420; Holt
V. Holt, 59 Me. 464.
The law means that the forfeiture which it prescribes,
like all other penalties for desertion, must be adjudged
to the convicted person, after trial by a court-martial,
and sentence approved. Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. St. 112.
The conviction must be proved by a duly authenti-
cated record. Goetscheus v. Matthewson, supra.
3. Military or Naval Service in Foreign Country.
Merely entering into the military or naval service of a
foreign sovereign does not, of itself, work expatriation.
Chacon y. 89 Bales of Cochineal, 1 Brock. 478; The San-
tissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283; State v. Adams, 45
Iowa, 99.
In Calais v. Marshfield, 30 Me. 511, it was held that the
voluntary performance by a citizen of the United States
of service in the local militia, was insufRcient to effect
expatriation.
Assistant Secretary Rives on January 5, 1888, in re-
sponse to an inquiry of the United States Consul General
at Honolulu, whether citizens of the United States by
enlisting in the army in Hawaii, relinquished their Amer-
ican nationality, said: " Citizens of the United States do
not lose their nationality by enlisting in foreign armies."
For. Rel. 1895, 850.
EXPATRIATION. 359
Acting Secretary Hunter in an instruction to the con-
sul at Cordoba, September 10, 1880, said: "Enlistment in
the military or naval service of a foreign power is not of
itself a renunciation of American citizenship." 3 Moore's
Int. Law Digest, 732.
And Secretary Bayard in an instruction to the Ameri-
can legation in Mexico, November 14, 1888, affirming the
same principle, said that besides the generallyrecognized
principles of international usage, there were historical
precedents which emphasized the position of this gov-
ernment in respect of its citizens temporarily abroad.
"As evidence of this," said he, "it may be stated that
entering the military service of a foreign state is by itself
in no sense an abjuration of prior nationality. In our
Revolutionary war over six thousand Frenchmen were
enlisted in our armies, either in our marine forces or as
auxiliaries, but the cases in which those thus serving ac-
cepted an American nationality were very few. This
government never maintained, nor did France ever con-
cede, that this enlisting into our service had any effect
on their nationality. ... La Fayette was a major-
general in our service, but during the diplomatic contro-
versies that arose as to him subsequently, when he was
a prisoner in Austria this government never claimed that
he was a citizen of the United States, or that he ever
ceased to be a Frenchman." 3 Moore's Int. Law Digest,
734.
On the other hand, however, a citizen of Illinois, un-
der the declaration adopted by the convention of Texas,
in 1835, promising citizenship and donations of land to
all volunteers in her war for independence, who after-
wards entered her army as a volunteer, and who died in
her service, was held to have become a citizen of Texas;
and it was also decided that his wife's citizenship
360 NATURALIZATION
followed his, though she never came to Texas. Kircher
V. Murray, 54 Fed. 617.
It was held by Acting Secretary Seward, in 1879, that
James W. Smith, an American citizen, by the act of vol-
untarily taking military service under the government
of Mexico, while a law was in existence by which such
an act on his part conferred and involved the assump-
tion of Mexican citizenship, must be deemed to have
understandingly conformed to that Mexican law, and of
his own accord embraced Mexican citizenship. Mr. Sew-
ard to Mr. Foster, August 13, 1879, For. Rel. 1879, 824.
4. Accepting Public Ofi&ce under a Foreign Government.
(A) Engaging in the Diplomatic Service of a Foreign Govern-
ment.
In Corvaia's case, which came before the Italian-Ven-
ezuelan Commission in 1903, Mr. Ralston, umpire, held
that one who accepts, without permission of his govern-
ment and against her laws, employment in the diplo-
matic service of another government, loses his citizen-
ship. Ralston's Report, 808, 809.
(B) Engaging in the Consular Service of a Foreign Gov-
ernment.
In Fish V. Stoughton, 2 Johns. Cas. 407, the court
held that a citizen of the United States did not expatri-
ate himself by accepting an appointment as consul of a
foreign state and the performance of duties in that
capacity.
A naturalized citizen of the United States, of Swiss
origin, was advised by the Department of State, in 1869,
EXPATRIATION. 361
that he could not divest himself of his American citizen-
ship by accepting the office of Swiss vice-consul at New
York, but must, in order to accomplish that result, re-
turn to Switzerland with the intention to reside there, or
else be naturalized in some third country. 3 Moore's Int.
Law Digest, 716.
(C) Entrance into Civil Service of Foreign Country.
Entrance into the civil service of the country of his
nativity, by a naturalized citizen of the United States,
who has returned to that country, and continues his
residence there beyond the length of time at which, by
convention between the two states, the intent not to
return to the country of adoption may be held to exist,
must be taken to be very strong evidence of the absence
of intent to return, and must raise a presumption, which
might, and probably would, make it very difficult for
the country of adoption to assert the continued citizen-
ship of the party thus taking service and continuing to
reside in the country of his nativity. Mr. Fish to Mr
Miiller, January 28, 1874, 2 Wharton's Int. Law Digest,
367.
Assistant Secretary Rives, in an instruction to the
consul-general at Apia, January 6, 1888, said that tenure
of office under theSamoan government, unless it required
the assumption of Samoan citizenship, could not of itself
be treated as an act of expatriation, as there is nothing
in the Constitution or laws of the United States that
precludes a private citizen of the United States from
rendering official services to foreign governments. 3
Moore's Int. Law Digest, 718.
Such acts, in addition to the selection and enjoyment
of a foreign domicil, as amount to a renunciation of
United States citizenship and a willingness to submit
362 NATURALIZATION
to, or adopt, the obligations of a citizenship of the
country of domicil, such as accepting public employ-
ment, etc., may be treated as effecting expatriation. 14
Ops. Atty. Gen. 295.
Under the existing law, providing that an American
citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when
he has taken an oath of allegiance to a foreign state, if
the acceptance of office under the foreign government
involves the taking of an oath of allegiance to that gov-
ernment, this, of course, operates to expatriate him.
PASSPORTS. 363
CHAPTER VI.
PASSPORTS.
A. In general.
B. Statutes.
C. Rules and regulations.
1. In the United States.
2. In the insular possessions of the United States.
3. Executive order of President Roosevelt, April 6, 1907.
D. Forms.
A. In General.
The American passport is a document issued by the
Secretary of State, or under his authority by a diplomatic
or consular officer of the United States abroad (or by an
executive officer of the insular possessions of the United
States), to a citizen of the United States (or to a person
owing allegiance to the United States), stating his citi-
zenship (or status), and requesting for him free passage
and all lawful aid and protection during his travels in
foreign lands. See American Passport, 4.
B. Statutes.
Until the passage of the Act of Congress of June 14,
1902 (32 Stat, at L. 386, Chap. 1088), amending the
statutes of the United States so as to permit the granting
of passports to residents of the insular possessions of
the United States, passports were only issued to citizens
of theUnitedStates. The sections of theRevisedStatutes,
as amended, which govern the subject, are as follows:
"Sec. 4075 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 2764]. The Secre-
tary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause
passports to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign
countries by such diplomatic or consular officers of the
United States, and by such chief or other executive
officer of the insular possessions of the United States,
and under such rules as the President shall designate and
prescribe for and on behalf of the United States; and
364 NATURALIZATION
no other person shall grant, issue, or verify any such
passport. Where a legation of the United States is es-
tablished in any country no person other than the diplo-
matic representative of the United States at such place
shall be permitted to grant or issue any passport, except
in the absence therefrom of such representative.
"Sec. 4076 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 2765]. No passport
shall be granted or issued to, or verified for, any other
persons than those owing allegiance, whether citizens or
not, to the United States."
Sec. 1, Act of March 2, 1907: "The Secretary of State
shall be authorized, in his discretion, to issue passports
to persons not citizens of the United States as follows:
Where any person has made a declaration of intention to
become such a citizen as provided by law and has resided
in the United States for three years a passport may be
issued to him entitling him to the protection of the
government in any foreign county. Provided^ That such
passport shall not be valid for more than six months and
shall not be renewed, and that such passport shall not
entitle the holder to the protection of this government
in the country of which he was a citizen prior to making
such declaration of intention.
"Sec. 4077 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 2765]. All persons
who shall be authorized to grant, issue, or verify pass-
ports shall make return of the same to the Secretary of
State, in such manner and as often as he shall require;
and such returns shall specify the names and all other
particulars of the persons to whom the same shall be
granted, issued, or verified, as embraced in such pass-
ports.
"Sec. 4078 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 2766]. If any per-
son acting, or claiming to act, in any office or capacity,
under the United States, its possessions, or any of the
states of the United States, who shall not be lawfully
authorized so to do, shall grant, issue, or verify any pass-
PASSPORTS. 365
ports or other instrument in the nature of a passport, to
or for any person whomsoever, or if any consular officer
who shall be authorized to grant, issue, or verify pass-
ports shall knowingly and wilfully grant, issue, or verify
any such passport to or for any person not owing alle-
giance, whether a citizen or not, to the United States,
he shall be imprisoned for not more than one year, or
fined not more than five hundred dollars, or both; and
may be charged, proceeded against, tried, convicted, and
dealt with therefor in the district where he may be
arrested or in custody."
An excellent historical sketch of the American pass-
port, together with a digest of the laws, rulings, and
regulations governing its issuance by the Department of
State, was prepared by Mr. Gaillard Hunt, chief of the
passport bureau of that Department, and published by
the government printing office in 1898, under the title of
"The American Passport."
C. Rules and Regulations Governing the Granting and Issu-
ance of Passports, Prescribed by the President.
The following are the existing rules and regulations
governing the granting of passports, prescribed by the
President:
1. Rules Governing the Granting and Issuing of Passports
in the United States.
1. By Whom Issued. — No one but the Secretary of
State may grant and issue passports in the United
States. Rev. Stat. Sees. 4075, 4078 [U. S. Comp. Stat.
1901, 2764, 2766].
A person who is entitled to receive a passport if tem-
porarily abroad should apply to the diplomatic repre-
sentative of the United States in the country where he
happens to be; or, in the absence of a diplomatic repre-
sentative, to the consul general of the United States;
366 NATURALIZATION
or, in the absence of both, to the consul of the United
States. The necessary statements may be made before
the nearest consular officer of the United States.
Application for a passport by a person in one of the
insular possessions of the United States should be made
to the chief executive of such possession.
(The evidence required of a person making application
abroad or in an insular possession of the United States
is the same as that required of an applicant in the
United States.)
2. To Whom Issued. — The law forbids the granting of
a passport to any person who does not owe allegiance to
the United States.*
3. Applications. — A person who is entitled to receive
a passport, if within the United States, must make a
written application, in the form of an affidavit, to the
Secretary of State.
The affidavit must be attested by an officer authorized
to administer oaths, and if he has an official seal it must
be affixed. If he has no seal, his official character must
be authenticated by certificate of the proper legal
officer.
If the applicant signs by mark, two attesting wit-
nessses to his signature are required.
The applicant is required to state the date and place
of his birth, his occupation, and the place of his perma-
nent residence, and to declare that he goes abroad for
temporary sojourn, and intends to return to the United
States with the purpose of residing and performing the
duties of citizenship therein.
The applicant must take the oath of allegiance to the
Government of the United States.
The application must be accompanied by a description
*For the exception, contained in the first section of the Act of March
2, 1907, in favor of persons who have declared their intention to become
citizens and have resided in the United States for three years. See pages
371-373, post.
PASSPORTS. 367
of the person applying, and should state the following
particulars, viz. : Age, ; stature, feet
inches (English measure); forehead, ; eyes, ;
nose, ; mouth, ; chin, ; hair, ;
complexion, ; face,
The application must be accompanied by a certificate
from at least one credible witness that the applicant is
the person he represents himself to be, and that the facts
stated in the affidavit are true to the best of the wit-
ness' knowledge and belief.
4. Native Citizens. — An application containing the in-
formation indicated by rule 3 will be sufficient evidence
in the case of native citizens; but a person of the Chinese
race, alleging birth in the United States, must accompany
his application with supporting affidavits from at least
two credible witnesses, preferably not of the Chinese
race, having personal knowledge of the applicant's birth
in the United States.
5. A Person Born Abroad, Whose Father was a Native
Citizen of the United States. — In addition to the state-
ments required by rule 3, his application must show that
his father was born in the United States, resided therein,
and was a citizen at the time of the applicant's birth.
The Department may require that this affidavit be sup-
ported by that of one other citizen acquainted with the
facts.
6. Naturalized Citizens, — In addition to the statements
required by rule 3, a naturalized citizen must transmit
his certificate of naturalization, or a duly certified copy
of the court record thereof, with his application. It will
be returned to him after inspection. He must state in
his affidavit when and from what port he emigrated to
this country, what ship he sailed in, where he has lived
since his arrival in the United States, when and before
what court he was naturalized, and that he is the iden-
tical person described in the certificate of naturalization.
368 NATURALIZATION
The signature to the application should conform in
orthography to the applicant's name as written in his
certificate of naturalization.
7. Woman's Application. — If she is unmarried, in ad-
dition to the statements required by rule 3, she should
state that she has never been married. If she is the wife
of a native citizen of the United States the fact should
be made to appear in her application. If she is the wife
or widow of a naturalized citizen, in addition to the
statements required by rule 3, she must transmit for in-
spection her husband's certificate of naturalization, must
state that she is the wife (or widow) of the person de-
scribed therein, and must set forth the facts of his emi-
gration, naturalization, and residence, as required in the
rule governing the application of a naturalized citizen.
(A married woman's citizenship follows that of her
husband so far as her international status is concerned.
It is essential, therefore, that a woman's marital relations
be indicated in her application for a passport, and that
in the case of a married woman her husband's citizenship
be established.)
8. The nhild of a Naturalized Citizen Claiming Citizen-
ship Through the Naturalization of the Parent. — In addi-
tion to the statements required by rule 3, the applicant
must state that he or she is the son or daughter, as the
case may be, of the person described in the certificate of
naturalization, which must be submitted for inspection,
and must set forth the facts of emigration, naturaliza-
tion, and residence, as required in the rule governing the
application of a naturalized citizen.
9. A Resident of an Insular Possession of the United
States, Who Owes Allegiance to the United States. — In
addition to the statements required by rule 3, he must
state that he owes allegiance to the United States, and
that he does not acknowledge allegiance to any other
government; and must submit an affidavit from at least
PASSPORTS. 369
two credible witnesses liavins good means of knowledge
in substantiation of his statements of birth, residence,
and loyalty.
10. Expiration of Passport. — A passport expires two
years from the date of its issuance. A new one will be
issued upon a new application, and, if the applicant be
a naturalized citizen, the old passport will be accepted
in lieu of a certificate of naturalization, if the application
upon which it was issued is found to contain sufficient
information as to the naturalization of the applicant.
11. Wife, Minor Children, and Servants. — When the ap-
plicant is accompanied by his wife, minor children, or
servant who would be entitled to receive a passport, it
will be sufficient to state the fact, giving the respective
ages of the children and the allegiance of the servant,
when one passport will suffice for all. For any other
person in the party a separate passport will be required.
A woman's passport may include her minor children and
servant under the above-named conditions.
(The term "servant" does not include a governess,
tutor, pupil, companion, or person holding like relations
to the applicant for a passport.)
12. Professional Titles. — They will not be inserted in
passports.
13. Fee. — By Act of Congress approved March 23, 1888
[24 Stat, at L. 45, Chap. 34], a fee of $1 is required to be
collected for every citizen's passport. That amount in
currency or postal money-order should accompany each
application made by a citizen of the United States.
Orders should be made payable to the disbursing clerk
of the Department of State. Drafts or checks will not
be accepted.
14. Blank Forms of Application. — They will be fur-
nished by the Department to persons who desire to apply
for passports, but are not furnished, except as samples,
to those who make a business of procuring passports.
6233—24
370 NATURALIZATION
15. Address. — Communications should be addressed to
the Department of State, Passport Bureau, and each com-
munication should give the post-office address of the
person to whom the answer is to be directed.
16. Rejection of Application. — The Secretary of State
has the right, in his discretion, to refuse to issue a pass-
port, and will exercise this right towards anyone who
he has reason to believe desires it for an unlawful or
improper purpose.
Section 4075 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 2764], as amended by
the Act of Congress, approved June 14, 1902 [32 Stat, at
L. 386, Chap. 1088], providing that " the Secretary of
State may grant and issue passports, and cause passports
to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign countries
by such diplomatic or consular officers of the United
States, and by such chief or other executive officer of
the insular possessions of the United States, and under
such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe
for and on behalf of the United States," the foregoing
rules are hereby prescribed for the granting and issuing
of passports in the United States.
The Secretary of State is authorized to make regula-
tions on the subject of issuing and granting passports
additional to these rules and not inconsistent with them.
Theodore Roosevelt.
Oyster Bay, New York, September 12, 1903.
The provisions of Rev. Stat. 4076, which prescribe that
no passport shall be granted to any person who does not
owe allegiance to the United States, and which are em-
bodied in paragraph numbered 2 of the Rules as above
printed have been modified by the first section of the
Act of March 2, 1907, in favor of persons who have de-
clared their intention to become citizens of the United
States as provided by law, and have resided in the
PASSPORTS. 371
United States for three years. By this law the Secre-
tary of State is authorized, in his discretion, to issue
passports to such persons, good for a period of six
months. In the exercise of the discretion conferred
upon him by the law, the Secretary of State has promul-
gated the following
Rules Governing the Granting and Issuing of Passports to
Those Who Have Declared their Intention to Become
Citizens of the United States.
1. The first section of the Act approved March 2,
1907, "in reference to the expatriation of citizens and
their protection abroad," provides "That the Secretary
of State shall be authorized, in his discretion, to issue
passports to persons not citizens of the United States as
follows: Where any person has made a declaration of
intention to become such a citizen as provided by law
and has resided in the United States for three years, a
passport may be issued to him entitling him to the
protection of the government in any foreign country:
Provided, That such passport shall not be valid for
more than six months and shall not be renewed, and
that such passport shall not entitle the holder to the
protection of this government in the country of which
he was a citizen prior to making such declaration of in-
tention."
2. This section is not intended to confer upon persons
who have only declared their intention to become citi-
zens a general right to receive passports upon applica-
tion. Such passports will be issued only when it is
affirmatively shown to the Secretary of State that some
special exigency requires the temporary absence of the
applicant from the United States, and that without such
absence the applicant would be subjected to special
hardship or injury.
3. Such passports will not be issued to those who have
made the declaration of intention and who have failed,
372 NATrRALIZATIOX
through their own neglect, to complete their intention
and secure naturalization as citizens of the United
States; nor to those who may make the declaration of
intention in order to secure passports and leave the
United States, ?2or shall more than one such passport
be issued to any applicant.
4. It is therefore ordered that before a passport shall
be issued to an3"one who has made the declaration of
intention to become a citizen of the United States the
folloii'ing facts shall he established to the satisfaction
of the Secretary of State:
(a) That the applicant has resided in the United
States for at least three years, as provided by ]a.w.
(b) That he is not yet eligible under the law for mak-
ing application for final naturalization.
(c) That at least six months have elapsed since the
applicant' s declaration of intention.
(d) That the applicant has not previously applied for
and obtained a similar passport from this Department.
(e) That a special and imperative exigency exists re-
quiring the absence of the applicant from the United
States. The burden of proof will, in each case, be upon
the applicant, to show to the satisfaction of the Secre-
tary of State that there is a necessity for his absence.
if) That the applicant has not applied for or obtained
a passport from any other government since he declared
his intention to become a citizen of the United States.
5. Applications must be made in the form of an affida-
vit to the Secretary of State.
6. The affidavit must be attested by an officer author-
ized to administer oaths, and if he has an official seal it
must be affixed. If he has no seal his official character
must be authenticated by certificate of the proper legal
officer.
7. If the applicant signs by mark two attesting wit-
nesses to his signature are required.
PASSPORTS. 373
8. The applicant is required to state the date and
place of his birth, his occupation, and the place of his
permanent residence, where he intends to travel, how
long he expects to remain in each foreign country, for
what purpose he is proceeding abroad, the circumstances
which make his absence necessar}', that he intends to re-
turn to the United States, and the probable duration of
his absence therefrom.
9. If any previous application for a similar passport
has been denied by the Department, this fact must be
stated by the applicant.
The application must be accompanied by a description
of the person applying and should state the following
particulars, namely: Age, : stature, feet
inches (English measure) : forehead : eyes,
: nose, ; mouth : chin, : hair,
; complexion. ; face,
The application must be accompanied by two sup-
porting affidavits from citizens of the United States, who
shall state that the applicant is the person he represents
himself to be, how long they have known him, and that
the facts stated in his affidavit are true to the best of
their knowledge and belief.
Elihu Root.
Department of State.
Washington, March 23. 1907.
2. Rules Governing the Granting and Issuing of Passports
in the Insular Possessions of the United States.
Section 4075 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901. 2764], as amended by
the Act of Congress, approved June 14, 1902 [32 Stat, at
L. 386, Chap. 1088], providing that "the Secretary of
State may grant and issue passports, and cause pass-
ports to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign
countries by such diplomatic or consular officers of the
374 NATURALIZATION
United States, and by such chief or other executive
officer of the insular possessions of the United States, and
under such rules as the President shall designate and
prescribe for and on behalf of the United States," the
following rules are hereby prescribed for the granting
and issuing of passports in the insular possessions of the
United States:
1. By Whom Issued. — Application for a passport by a
person in one of the insular possessions of the United
States should be made to the chief executive of such
possession.
A person who is entitled to receive a passport if tem-
porarily abroad should apply to the diplomatic repre-
sentative of the United States in the country where he
happens to be; or, in the absence of a diplomatic repre-
sentative, to the consul general of the United States; or,
in the absence of both, to the consul of the United
States. The necessary statements may be made before
the nearest consular officer of the United States.
2. To Whom Issued. — The law forbids the granting of
a passport to any person who does not owe allegiance to
the United States.*
3. Applications. — A person who is entitled to receive
a passport must make a written application in the form
of an affidavit. The affidavit must be attested by an
officer authorized to administer oaths, and if he has an
official seal it must be affixed. If he has no seal, his
official character must be authenticated by certificate of
the proper legal officer.
If the applicant signs by mark, two attesting witnesses
to his signature are required.
The applicant is required to state the date and place
*For the exception, contained in the first section of the Act of March
2, 1907, in favor of persons who have declared their intention to become
citizens and have resided in the United States for three years, see
pages 378-380, post.
PASSPORTS. 375
of his birth, his occupation, and the place of his perma-
nent residence, and to declare that he goes abroad for
temporary sojourn, and intends to return to the United
States or one of the insular possessions of the United
States with the purpose of residing and performing the
duties of citizenship therein.
The applicant must take the oath of allegiance to the
Government of the United States.
The application must be accompanied by a description
of the person applying, and should state the following
particulars, viz.: Age, ; stature, feet
inches (English measure); forehead, ; eyes, ;
nose, ; mouth, ; chin, ; hair, ;
complexion, ; face,
The application must be accompanied by a certificate
from at least one credible witness that the applicant is
the person he represents himself to be, and that the facts
stated in the affidavit are true to the best of the wit-
ness' knowledge and belief.
4. Native Citizens of the United States. — An applica-
tion containing the information indicated by rule 3 will
be sufficient evidence in the case of native citizens of the
United States.
5. A Person Born Abroad, Whose Father was a Native
Citizen of the United States. — In addition to the state-
ments required by rule 3, his application must show that
his father was born in the United States, resided therein,
and was a citizen at the time of the applicant's birth.
The Department may require that this affidavit be sup-
ported by that of one other citizen acquainted with the
facts.
6. Naturalized Citizens. — In addition to the statements
required by rule 3, a naturalized citizen must transmit
his certificate of naturalization or a duly certified copy
of the court record thereof with his application. It
will be returned to him after inspection. He must
376 NATURALIZATION
state in his affidavit when and from what port he emi-
grated to this country, what ship he sailed in, where he
has lived since his arrival in the United States, when and
before what court he was naturalized, and that he is the
identical person described in the certificate of naturaliza-
tion. The signature to the application should conform
in orthography to the applicant's name as written in his
certificate of naturalization.
7. Woman's Application. — If she is unmarried, in ad-
dition to the statements required by rule 3, she should
state that she has never been married. If she is the wife
of a native citizen of the United States the fact should
be made to appear in her application. If she is the wife
or widow of a naturalized citizen, in addition to the
statements required by rule 3, she must transmit for in-
spection her husband's certificate of naturalization, must
state that she is the wife (or widow) of the person de-
scribed therein, and must set forth the facts of his emi-
gration, naturalization, and residence, as required in the
rule governing the application of a naturalized citizen.
8. The Child of a Naturalized Citizen Claiming Citizen-
ship through the Naturalization of the Parent. — In addi-
tion to the statements required by rule 3, the applicant
must state that he or she is the son or daughter, as the
case may be, of the person described in the certificate of
naturalization, which must be submitted for inspection,
and must set forth the facts of emigration, naturaliza-
tion, and residence, as required in the rule governing the
application of a naturalized citizen.
9. A Resident of an Insular Possession of the United
States, who Owes Allegiance to the United States. — In
addition to the statements required by rule 3, he must
state that he owes allegiance to the United States, and
that he does not acknowledge allegiance to any other
government; and must submit an affidavit from at least
two credible witnesses having good means of knowledge
PASSPORTS. 377
in substantiation of his statements of birth, residence,
and loyalty.
10. Expiration of Passport. — A passport expires two
years from the date of its issuance. A new one will be
issued upon a new application, and, if the applicant be
a naturalized citizen, the old passport will be accepted
in lieu of a certificate of naturalization, if the applica-
tion upon which it was issued is found to contain suf-
ficient information as to the naturalization of the appli-
cant.
11. Wife, Minor Children, and Servants. — When the
applicant is accompanied by his wife, minor children, or
servant who would be entitled to receive a passport, it
will be suflScient to state the fact, giving the respective
ages of the children and the allegiance of the servant,
when one passport will suffice for all. For any other per-
son in the party a separate passport will be required. A
woman's passport may include her minor children and
servant under the above-named conditions.
12. Professional Titles. — They will not be inserted in
passports.
13. Rejection of Application. — The chief executive
officers of the insular possessions of the United States
are authorized to refuse to issue a passport to anyone
who, there is reason to believe, desires it for an unlawful
or improper purpose, or who is unable or unwilling to
comply with the rules.
Theodore Roosevelt.
Oyster Bay, New York, July 19, 1902.
The provisions of Rev. Stat. 4076, which prescribe
that no passport shall be granted to any person who
does not owe allegiance to the United States, and which
are embodied in paragraph numbered 2 of the Rules as
above printed, have been modified by the first section of
the Act of March 2, 1907, in favor of persons who have
378 NATURALIZATION
declared their intention to become citizens of the United
States, as provided by law, and have resided in the
United States for three years. By this law the Secretary
of State is authorized, in his discretion, to issue pass-
ports to such persons, good for a period of six months.
In the exercise of the discretion conferred upon him by
the law, there have been issued the following
Rules Governing the Granting and Issuing of Passports to
Those Who Have Declared Their Intention to Become
Citizens of the United States.
1. The first section of the Act approved March 2, 1907,
"in reference to the expatriation of citizens and their
protection abroad," provides "That the Secretary of
State shall be authorized, in his discretion, to issue pass-
ports to persons not citizens of the United States, as
follows: Where any person has made a declaration of
intention to become such a citizen as provided by law
and has resided in the United States for three years, a
passport may be issued to him entitling him to the pro-
tection of the government in any foreign country: Pro-
vided, That such passport shall not be valid for more
than six months and shall not be renewed, and that such
passport shall not entitle the holder to the protection of
this government in the country of which he was a citizen
prior to making such declaration of intention."
2. This section is not intended to confer upon persons
who have only declared their intention to become citi-
zens a general right to receive passports upon applica-
tion. Such passports will be issued only when it is affir-
matively shown to the Secretary of State that some
special exigency requires the temporary absence of the
applicant from the United States, and that without such
absence the applicant would be subjected to special
hardship or injury.
PASSPORTS. 379
3. Such passports will not be issued to those who have
made the declaration of intention and who have failed,
through their own neglect, to complete their intention
and secure naturalization as citizens of the United States;
nor to those who may make the declaration of intention
in order to secure passports and leave the United States,
nor shall more than one such passport he issued to any
applicant.
4. It is therefore ordered that before a passport shall
be issued to any one who has made the declaration of
intention to become a citizen of the United States the
following facts shall be established to the satisfaction of
the Secretary of State:
{a) That the applicant has resided in the United
States for at least three years, as provided by law.
{b) That he is not yet eligible under the law for mak-
ing application for final naturalization.
(c) That at least six months have elapsed since the
applicant' s declaratioii of inte7itio7i.
(d) That the applicant has not previously applied for
and obtained a similar passport from this Depaii,ment.
{e) That a special and imperative exigency exists re-
quiring the absence of the applicant from the United
States. The burden of proof will, in each case, be upon
the applicant to show to the satisfaction of the Secretary
of State that there is a necessity for his absence.
(/) That the applicant has not applied for or obtained
a passport from any other government since he declared
his intention to become a citizen of the United States.
5. Applications must be made in the form of an affidavit
to the Secretary of State.
6. The affidavit must be attested by an officer au-
thorized to administer oaths, and if he -has an official
seal it must be affixed. If he has no seal his official char-
acter must be authenticated by certificate of the proper
legal officer.
380 NATURALIZATION
7. If the applicant signs by mark two attesting wit-
nesses to his signature are required.
8. The applicant is required to state the date and
place of his birth, his occupation and the place of his
permanent residence, where he intends to travel, how
long he expects to remain in each foreign country, for
what purpose he is proceeding abroad, the circumstances
which make his absence necessary, that he intends to
return to the United States, and the probable duration
of his absence therefrom.
9. // any previous application for a similar passport
has been denied by the Department, this fact must be
stated by the applicant.
The application must be accompanied by a description
of the person applying and should state the following
particulars, namely: Age, ; stature, feet
inches (English measure); forehead, ; eyes,
; nose, ; mouth, ; chin, ; hair,
; complexion, ; face,
The application must be accompanied by two support-
ing affidavits from citizens of the United States, who
shall state that the applicant is the person he represents
himself to be, how long they have known him, and that
the facts stated in his affidavit are true to the best of
their knowledge and belief.
Elihu Root.
Department of State,
Washington, March 23, 1907.
3. Issuance of Passports as Affected by the Executive
Order of April 6, 1907 — Emergency Passp6rts.
The following circular instruction relative to the issu-
ance of passports, dated April 19, 1907, has been sent by
the Department of State to all American diplomatic and
consular officers:
PASSPORTS. 381
To the Diplomatic and Consular Officers
of the United States.
Gentlemen: Paragraphs 150, 151, 152, and 163 of the
Diplomatic Instructions and Consular Regulations as
amended by the Executive order* of April 6, 1907, read
as follows:
"150. When Passports May Be Issued. — Passports can
not be issued by diplomatic or consular officers if the
applicant has time to apply to the Department of State
and await its reply. Where inconvenience or hardship
would result to a person entitled to receive a passport
unless he received it at once, a diplomatic officer, or a
consular officer who shall have received authority to do
so from the Secretary of State, may issue to such person
an emergency passport, good for a period not to exceed
six months from the date of issuance, and to be used
for a purpose which shall be stated in the passport.
"This paragraph shall become effective July 1, 1907."
"151. Applications. — Persons entitled to receive pass-
ports who desire to secure them when they are abroad
may make applications therefor to the Department of
State through a diplomatic or consular officer. Native
citizens thus applying must make an affidavit with re-
spect to birth, take the oath of allegiance, and furnish
identification by a creditable person, all in duplicate and
according to Form No. — . Naturalized citizens must
comply with the same requirements, using Form No. — ;
and, if claiming citizenship through naturalization of
husband or parent, using Form No. — . A naturalized
citizen must also exhibit his certificate of naturalization
or that of the husband or parent through whom citizen-
ship is claimed, or a duly certified copy of the court
record thereof. Further evidence of the applicant's
citizenship may be required, if deemed necessary. A
loyal resident of an insular possession of the United
States in addition to the information now required in
the case of a citizen of the United States must state that
he owes allegiance to the United States and does not
acknowledge allegiance to any other government, and
* For the text of this order, see Appendix.
382 NATURALIZATION
must submit an affidavit from at least two credible wit-
nesses having good means of knowledge in substantiation
of his statements of birth, residence and loyalty. The
identity of an applicant for a passport should always be
established when the application is taken.
"This paragraph shall become effective July 1, 1907."
" 152. Expiration of Passports. — A passport issued by
the Department is good for a period of two years, when
it expires; but it may be renewed for a further period of
two years by a diplomatic officer or by a consular officer
who has received authority for the purpose from the Sec-
retary of State. It is permissible to renew passports
only once.
"This paragraph shall become effective July 1, 1907."
" 163. Return of Passports. — As soon as an emergency
passport is issued by a diplomatic or consular officer he
shall transmit to the Department of State a duplicate of
the application and a statement of the proof accepted by
him for the issuance of the passport and of the reason
why the issuance of the passport was necessary. When-
ever an application for a passport is made to the Depart-
ment of State through a diplomatic or consular officer
he shall transmit a duplicate of the application and of
the accompanying proof of the right to receive a pass-
port to the Department of State, but he need not, unless
otherwise instructed, transmit a certificate of naturaliza-
tion.
"This paragraph shall become effective July 1, 1907."
Consuls at the following places shall have the right to
issue emergency passports:
Adis Ababa, Abyssinia.
Barbados.
Calcutta.
Colombo, Ceylon.
Curacao, W. I.
Nassau, N. P.
St. Michael's, Azores.
Seoul, Korea.
Sierra Leone.
Singapore.
Tahiti.
Tamatave.
PASSPORTS. 383
A consul in a country where there is diplomatic repre-
sentation of the United States may issue emergency
passports during the temporary absence of the diplomatic
representative.
Emergency passports may be issued only when it is
clearly shown that the person applying for the passport
is about to proceed to a country to obtain admission
into which a passport is obligatory. They may be issued
for use with the local authorities only in case such
authorities will not accept as evidence of a right to
recognition as an American citizen the certificate of
registration provided for in paragraph 172 of the consu-
lar regulations as prescribed in the executive order of
April 8, 1907. Emergency passports shall be in the form
now used for regular passports, except that there shall
be inserted therein the following statement:
Emergency Passport. — This passport is issued to ,
in order that he may proceed to (If the passport
is issued for other purposes than travel, the fact should
be stated).
Diplomatic officers and all consular officers may take
applications for the issuance of passports to American
citizens by this Department, following the rules now in
force on the subject of the issuance of passports, and
shall forward each application to the Department with
the evidence of the right to secure the passport. In the
case of an application by a naturalized citizen who pre-
sents his certificate of naturalization, this document need
not be forwarded to this Department, being the property
of the applicant; but the application should set forth
the name of the court in which the applicant was natu-
ralized and the date and place of such naturalization.
Diplomatic and principal consular officers are author-
ized to extend for a period of two years passports issued
by this Department which are about to expire and pre-
sented to them for extension. Such extension should
be made by marking conspicuously across the passport
the following words:
"Extended under the authority of the Secretary of
State for two years and not valid after (date of
expiration)," this being signed and dated by the diplo-
matic or consular officer and his seal affixed. A passport
which has been thus extended is not valid after the
384 NATURALIZATION
date to which it was extended. A passport which has
expired can not be extended, and no passport can be
extended more than once. Emergency passports can not
be extended.
Immediately upon thus extending a passport the diplo-
matic or consular officer should notify the Department of
the name of the holder of the passport, its number and
date, and the reason why the extension was asked.
I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,
Elihu Root.
D. Forms.
The blank forms of applications for passports by na-
tive and naturalized citizens of the United States are
subjoined:
[form for native citizen.]
No . Issued
united states of AMERICA.
State of |
County of f
I, , a native and loyal citizen of the United
States, hereby apply to the Department of State, at
Washington, for a passport for myself, accompanied by
as follows: , born at , on the
day of , 18 , and
I solemnly swear that I was born at , in the
State of , on or about the day of ,
18 ; that my father is a citizen of the
United States; that I am domiciled in the United States,
my permanent residence being at , in the State of
, where I follow the occupation of ; that I
am about to go abroad temporarily, and that I intend to
return to the United States , with the purpose of
residing and performing the duties of citizenship therein.
oath of ALLEGIANCE.
Further, I do solemnly swear that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith
PASSPORTS. 385
and allegiance to the same, and that I take this obliga-
tion freely, without any mental reservation or purpose
of evasion: So help me God.
Sworn to before me this day of , 19
Notary Public.
DESCRIPTION OF APPLICANT.
Age, years. Mouth,
Stature, feet, Chin,
inches, Eng. Hair,
Forehead, „ Complexion,
Eyes, Face,
Nose ,
IDENTIFICATION.
,19
I hereby certify that I know the above-named
personally, and know him to be a native-born citizen of
the United States, and that the facts stated in his affi-
davit are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
[Address of witness.]
Applicant desires passport sent to following address:
[form for NATURALIZED CITIZEN.]
No Issued.
united states of america.
State of /
County of |
I, , a naturalized and loyal citizen of the United
States, hereby apply to the Department of State, at Wash-
ington, for a passport for myself, accompanied by „
as follows: , born at , on the day of
, 18 ; and
I solemnly swear that I was born at , on or about
the day of , 18 ; that I emigrated to
5233—25
386 NATURALIZATION
the United States, sailing on board the , from
, on or about the day of , 18 ;
that I resided years, uninterruptedly, in the United
States, from „ to , at ; that I was natu-
ralized as a citizen of the United States before the
court of , at , on the day of ,
19 ~, as shown by the accompanying certificate of
naturalization; that I am the identical person described
in said certificate; thatlamdomiciled in theUnitedStates,
my permanent residence being at , in the State of
, where I follow the occupation of ; that I
am about to go abroad temporarily and that I intend to
return to the United States , with the purpose
of residing and performing the duties of citizenship
therein.
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE.
Further, I do solemnly swear that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic ; that I will bear true faith
and allegiance to the same ; and that I take this obliga-
tion freely, without any mental reservation or purpose
of evasion: So help me God.
Sworn to before me this day of , 19
Notary Public.
DESCRIPTION OF APPLICANT.
Age, years. Mouth,
Stature, feet, Chin,
inches, Eng. Hair,
Forehead, Complexion,
Eyes, Face, :
Nose,
IDENTIFICATION.
I hereby certify that I know the above-named
personally, and know h to be the identical person
referred to in the within-described certificate of natural-
ization, and that the facts stated in h affidavit are
true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
[Address of witness.]
PASSPORTS. 387
Applicant desires passport sent to following address :
Passports issued by the Secretary of State are in the
following form :
[seal.]
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Department of State.
To all to whom these presents shall come, greeting:
I, the undersigned, Secretary of State of the United
States of America, hereby request all whom it may con-
cern to permit , a citizen of the United States,
safely and freely to pass, and in case of need to
give all lawful aid and protection.
description.
Age, years ; stature feet inches,
Eng.; forehead ; eyes ; nose ; mouth
; chin ; hair ; complexion ; face
[Signature of the bearer,]
Given under my hand and seal of the Department of
State, at the city of Washington, the day of ,
in the year 190..., and of the independence of the United
States the one hundred and twenty-eighth.
No
ATTITUDE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. 389
CHAPTER VII.
ATTITUDE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTvS TOWARD THEIR
CITIZENS WHO HAVE iBECOME NATURALIZED IN UNITED
STATES.
Information relative to rules and regulations of foreign countries,
compiled by Department of State.
Austria-Hungary.
Belgium.
Denmark.
France.
Germany.
Greece.
Italy.
The Netherlands.
Norway.
Persia.
Portugal.
Roumania.
Russia.
Servia.
Sweden.
Switzerland.
Turkey.
Information Relative to Rules and Regulations of Foreign
Countries, Compiled by Department of State.*
The following information relative to the laws and
regulations of various foreign countries has been care-
fully compiled by the Department of State, and is fur-
nished to American citizens, formerly subjects of those
countries, who contemplate returning to the country of
their origin:
Austria-Hungary .
All male subjects of Austria-Hungary are liable to the
performance of military service between the ages of
nineteen and forty-two years.
Under the terms of the treaty between the United
* The information given is believed to be correct, yet it is not to be
considered as official, as it relates to the laws and regulations of
foreign countries. Note by Department of State.
390 NATURALIZATION
States and Austria-Hungary a former subject of that
country, now a naturalized citizen of the United States,
is treated, upon his return, as a citizen of the United
States. If he violated any of the criminal laws of Austria-
Hungary before the date of emigration he remains liable
to trial and punishment, unless the right to punish has
been lost by lapse of time as provided by law. A natural-
ized American citizen, formerly a subject of Austria-Hun-
gary, may be arrested and punished under the military
laws only in the following cases: (1) If he was accepted
and enrolled as a recruit in the army before the date of
emigration, although he had not been put in service; (2)
if he was a soldier when he emigrated, either in active
service or on leave of absence; (3) if he was summoned
by notice, or by proclamation, before his emigration, to
serve in the reserve or militia, and failed to obey the call;
(4) if he emigrated after war had broken out.
A naturalized American citizen of Austro-Hungarian
origin on arriving in that country should at once show
his passport to the proper authorities; and if, on in-
quiry, it is found that his name is on the military rolls,
he should request that it be struck off, calling attention
to the treaty of September 20, 1870 (17 Stat, at L. 833),
between this country and Austria-Hungary.
The laws of Austria-Hungary require every stranger to
produce a passport on entering. This provision is not
usually enforced, but may be at any time. Travelers
are usually called upon to establish their identity, and
are advised to provide themselves with passports. They
do not ordinarily require to be visaed.
Belgium.
Every male Belgian must register during the calendar
year in which he reaches the age of nineteen years to
take part in the drawing of lots for the raising of the
necessary military contingent.
ATTITUDE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. 391
Anyone who has drawn a number which designates
him for military service, or, in case of his absence, has
had a number drawn for him by the proper authority, is
punishable if he does not answer the call for service.
Under the terms of the convention between the United
States and Belgium, a Belgian, naturalized as a citizen
of the United States, is considered by Belgium as a citi-
zen of the United States, but upon return to Belgium he
may be prosecuted for crime or misdemeanor committed
before naturalization, saving such limitations as are es-
tablished by the laws of Belgium.
A naturalized American, formerly a Belgian, who has
resided five years in this country, can not be held to
military service in Belgium, or to incidental obligation
resulting therefrom, in the event of his return, except in
cases of desertion from organized or embodied military
or naval service.
Passports are not usually required in Belgium, but
people who contemplate sojourning in that country are
recommended to carry them in order to establish their
identity. They do not require to be visaed or indorsed.
Denmark.
Military service becomes compulsory to a subject of
Denmark during the calendar year in which he reaches
the age of twenty-two years.
In November or December of the year in which he be-
comes seventeen years old, he is expected to report for
enrollment on the conscription lists. If he neglects to
do so, he may be fined from 2 to 40 kroner; but if his
neglect arises from a design to evade service he may be
imprisoned.
In case he fails to appear when the law requires that
he be assigned to military duty, he is liable to imprison-
ment.
When one whose name has been, or should have been.
392 NATURALIZATION
entered on the conscription lists emigrates without re-
porting his intended departure to the local authorities
he is liable to a fine of from 25 to 100 kroner.
A person above the age of twenty-two years, entered
for military service, must obtain a permit from the min-
ister of justice to emigrate. Noncompliance with this
regulation is punishable by a fine of from 20 to 200
kroner.
The treaty of naturalization between the United
States and Denmark provides that a former subject of
Denmark, naturalized in the United States, shall, upon
his return to Denmark, be treated as a citizen of the
United States; but he is not thereby exempted from
penalties for offenses committed against Danish law be-
fore his emigration. If he renews his residence in Den-
mark with intent to remain, he is held to have renounced
his American citizenship.
A naturalized American, formerly a Danish subject, is
not liable to perform military service on his return to
Denmark, unless at the time of emigration he was in the
army and deserted, or, being twenty-two years old at
least, had been enrolled for duty and notified to report,
and failed to do so. He is not liable for service which
he was not actually called upon to perform.
Passports are not required to secure admission to
Denmark, but they are useful or necessary as means of
identification, or in proof of citizenship. They should
be exhibited whenever evidence of citizenship is required.
France.
All Frenchmen who are not declared unfit or excused
may be called upon for military duty between the ages
of 20 and 45 years. They are obliged to serve three
years in the active army, ten in the reserve of the active
army, six in the territorial army, and six in the reserve
of the territorial army.
ATTITUDE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. 393
If released from all military obligations in France, or
if the authorization of the French government was ob-
tained beforehand, naturalization of a former French
citizen in the United States is accepted by the French
government; but a Frenchman naturalized abroad with-
out the consent of his government, and who at the time
of his naturalization was still subject to military service
in the active army, or in the reserve of the active army,
is held to be amenable to the French military laws. Not
having responded to the notice calling him to accom-
plish his military service, he is placed on the list of those
charged with noncompliance with the military laws, and,
if he returns to France, he is liable to arrest, trial, and,
upon conviction, is turned over to the army, active,
reserve, or territorial, according to his age. Long absence
from France and old age do not prevent this action.
A Frenchman naturalized abroad, after having passed
the age of service in the active army and the reserve,
nevertheless continues on the military list until he has
had his name struck from the rolls, which may usually
be done by his sending his naturalization certificate
through the United States embassy to the proper French
authorities.
The French government rarely gives consent to a
Frenchman of military age to throw off his allegiance.
Application on the subject may, however, be addressed
to the minister of justice at Paris, accompanied by a full
statement of the particulars and a fee of 675 francs. If
the request is granted the name of the person concerned
is erased from the military list, and he may return to
France safely.
There is no treaty between the United States and
France defining the status of former French citizens who
have become naturalized American citizens.
Passports are not necessary to enter France, but are
394 NATURALIZATION
usually required from sojourners or travelers afterwards.
They are recognized without being visaed or indorsed.
Germany.
A German subject is liable to military service from the
time he has completed the seventeenth year of his age
until his forty-fifth year, active service lasting from the
beginning of his twentieth year to the end of his thirty-
sixth year.
A German who emigrates before he is seventeen years
old, or before he has been actually called upon to appear
before the military authorities, may after a residence in
the United States of five years and after due naturaliza-
tion, return to Germany on a visit, but his right to
remain in his former home is denied by Germany, and he
may be expelled after a brief sojourn on the ground that
he left Germany merely to evade military service. It is
not safe for a person who has been once expelled to
return to Germany without having obtained permission
to do so in advance. A person who has completed his
military service and has reached his thirty-first year
and become an American citizen may safely return to
Germany.
The treaties between the United States and the Ger-
man states provide that German subjects who have
become citizens of the United States shall be recognized
as such upon their return to Germany if they resided in
the United States five years.
But a naturalized American of German birth is liable
to trial and punishment upon return to Germany for an
offense against German law committed before emigration,
saving always the limitations of the laws of Germany. If
he emigrated after he was enrolled as a recruit in the
standing army; if he emigrated while in service or while
on leave of absence for a limited time; if, having an
unlimited leave or being in the reserve, he emigrated
ATTITUDE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. 395
after receiving a call into service or after a public proc-
lamation requiring his appearance, or after war broke
out — he is liable to trial and punishment on return.
Alsace-Lorraine having become a part of Germany
since our naturalization treaties with the other German
states were negotiated, American citizens, natives of
that province, under existing circumstances, may be
subjected to inconvenience, and possible detention, by
the German authorities if they return without having
sought and obtained permission to do so from the im-
perial governor at Strasburg.
The authorities of Wiirttemberg require that the evi-
dence of the American citizenship of a former subject of
Wiirttemberg, which is furnished by a passport, shall be
supplemented by a duly authenticated certificate show-
ing five years' residence in the United States, in order
that fulfilment of the treaty condition of five years' resi-
dence may appear separately as a fact of record.
A former German subject against whom there is an
outstanding sentence, or who fears molestation upon re-
turn for an offense against German law, may petition the
sovereign of his native state for relief, but this government
can not act as intermediary in presenting the petition.
Travelers are not required to show passports on enter-
ing or leaving Germany, but they are likely to be called
upon to establish their identity and citizenship at any
time, and especially so if living in boarding houses or
renting apartments. They are consequently recom-
mended to provide themselves with passports. They do
not usually require to be visaed or indorsed, but the local
authorities sometimes demand a German translation.
Greece.
The Greek government does not, as a general state-
ment, recognize a change of nationality on the part of a
former Greek without the consent of the King, and a
396 NATURALIZATION
former Greek who has not completed his military service,
and who is not exempt therefrom under the military
code, may be arrested on his return to Greece. The
practice of the Greek government is not, however, uni-
form, but American citizens of Greek origin are advised
to find out before returning what status they may expect
to enjoy. Information should be sought directly from
the Greek government, and this Department always re-
fuses to act as intermediary in seeking the information.
There is no treaty on the subject of naturalized citi-
zens between the United States and Greece.
Passports are not required in Greece, but may be use-
ful in establishing American citizenship.
Italy.
Italian subjects, between the ages of twenty and
thirty-nine years are liable for the performance of mili-
tary duty under Italian law, except in the case of an
only son ; or where two brothers are so nearly of the
same age that both would be serving at the same time,
in which event only one is drafted; or where there are
two sons of a widow, when only one is taken.
Naturalization of an Italian subject in a foreign coun-
try without consent of the Italian government is no bar
to liability to military service.
A former Italian subject may visit Italy without fear
of molestation when he is under the age of twenty years;
but between the ages of twenty and thirty-nine he is
liable to arrest and forced military service, if he has not
previously reported for such service. After the age of
thirty-nine he may be arrested and imprisoned (but will
not be compelled to do military duty) unless he has
been pardoned. He may petition the Italian govern-
ment for pardon, but this Department will not act as the
intermediary in presenting his petition.
There is no treaty between the United States and Italy
ATTITUDE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. 397
defining the status of former Italian subjects who have
become American citizens.
The Italian law does not require the production of
passports by foreign travelers, but they are frequently
called upon to establish their identity, and are accord-
ingly recommended to provide themselves with pass-
ports. They are often useful in preventing an interfer-
ence with departure from Italy. They do not require to
be visaed or indorsed.
The Netherlands.
A subject of the Netherlands is liable to military
service from his nineteenth to his fortieth year. He
must register to take part in the drawing of lots for
military service between January 1 and August 31 of the
calendar year in which he reaches the age of nineteen.
He is exempt, however, from service if he is an only son
or is physically disabled; and in the case of a family half
of the brothers are exempt, or the majority if the num-
ber is uneven.
No military service is required of one who became a
citizen of the United States before the calendar year in
which he became nineteen years of age, and a Nether-
lands subject who becomes a citizen of the United States
when he is nineteen and between January 1 and August
31 may have his name removed from the register by ap-
plying to the Queen's commissioner of the province in
which he was registered. If he does not have his name
removed from the register, or if he becomes a citizen of
the United States after the register is closed (August 31),
and his name is drawn for enlistment, his naturalization
does not affect his military obligations to the Nether-
lands, and if he returns he is liable (1) to be treated as a
deserter, if he did not respond to the summons for
service, or (2) to be enlisted if he is under forty.
398 NATURALIZATION
Former Netherlands subjects are advised to ascertain
by inquiry from the Netherlands authorities what status
they may expect to enjoy if they return to the Nether-
lands. This Department, however, uniformly declines
to act as the intermediary in the inquiry.
Passports are not required for admission to the
Netherlands, but American citizens are advised to carry
them for purposes of identification and in attestation of
citizenship.
Norway.
Subjects of Norway are liable to performance of mili-
tary duty in and after the calendar year in which they
reach their twenty-second year.
Under the treaty between the United States and
Sweden and Norway, a naturalized citizen of the United
States, formerly a subject of Norway, is recognized as
an American citizen upon his return to the country of
his origin. He is liable, however, to punishment for an
offense against the laws of Norway committed before his
emigration, saving, always, the limitations and remissions
established by those laws. Emigration itself is not an
offense, but nonfulfilment of military duty and desertion
from a military force or ship are offenses.
A naturalized American who performed his military
service or emigrated when he was not liable to it, and
who infracted no laws before emigrating, may safely re-
turn to Norway.
He must, however, report to the conscription officers,
and, on receiving a summons, present himself at the
meetings of the conscripts in order to prove his American
citizenship.
If he has remained as long as two years in Norway, he
is obliged, without being summoned, to present himself
for enrollment at the first session, since he is then deemed
ATTITUDE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. 399
by Norway to have renounced his American citizenship.
If he renews his residence in the kingdom without in-
tent to return to America, he is held to have renounced
his American citizenship.
Passports are not required from persons entering or
traveling in the kingdom, but they may be called upon
to establish their citizenship, and are consequently
advised to procure passports.
Persia.
Permission to be naturalized in a foreign country is
not granted by the Persian government to a Persian sub-
ject if he is undercharge for a crime committed in Persia,
or is a fugitive from justice, or a deserter from the Per-
sian army, or is in debt in Persia, or fled to avoid pecuniary
obligations.
If a Persian subject becomes a citizen of another coun-
try with the permission of the Persian government he is
forbidden to re-enter Persian territory, and if he had any
property in Persia he is ordered to sell or dispose of it.
There is no treaty between the United States and
Persia defining the status of former Persian subjects who
have become naturalized American citizens.
Passports are usually required of foreigners desiring
to enter Persia, and they should, if possible, bear the
visa or indorsement of a Persian consular officer.
Portugal.
Military service is obligatory upon Portuguese male
subjects, but by becoming naturalized in a foreign coun-
try a Portuguese loses his qualifications as such.
On returning to the kingdom with the intention of re-
siding in it he may reacquire Portuguese subjection by
requesting it from the municipal authorities of the place
400 NATURALIZATION
he selects for his residence. Not making this declara-
tion, he remains an alien, and is not subject to military
duty.
If a Portuguese leaves Portugal without having per-
formed the military duty to which he was liable, and
becomes naturalized in a foreign country, his property is
subject to seizure, and that of the person who may have
become security for him when he left the kingdom is
equally liable. There is no treaty between the United
States and Portugal defining the status of former Portu-
guese subjects who have become naturalized American
citizens.
Passports are not required to enter Portuguese domin-
ions. Travelers are, however, required to establish their
nationality when they depart, and for this purpose a
passport is the most effective document.
[Note by the author: The rules as above stated for
Portugal need some amplification. If a Portuguese subject
leaves Portugal after becoming liable to military duty and
becomes naturalized in this country, he is liable to arrest
upon his return to Portugal. The Department of State has
recognized this principle in its treaties and diplomatic
correspondence with many foreign governments. But
Portugal has taken a more extreme attitude. In a case
recently occurring in Madeira, the Portuguese authori-
ties arrested and imprisoned a naturalized American citi-
zen of Portuguese origin, although it appeared that the
man had left Portugal and had been domiciled in the
United States for five years at the time he was summoned
to report for military duty, but had not yet become a
naturalized citizen. The Portuguese government held
that inasmuch as he was drafted prior to his naturaliza-
tion, he was a deserter under their law and subject to
punishment. His absence from the territorial jurisdiction
of Portugal at the time of his summons appeared to be
immaterial. This attitude has been made the subject of
ATTITUDE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. 401
protest by the Department of State. Mr. Bacon, Acting
Secretary, to Mr. Bryan, minister to Portugal, March 30,
1907. MS. Inst, to Portugal.]
Roumania.
All male inhabitants of Roumania, except those under
foreign protection, are liable to military duty between
the ages of twenty -one and thirty years.
American citizens formerly Roumanian subjects are
not molested upon their return to Roumania, unless they
infringed Roumanian law before emigrating. One who
did not complete his military service in Roumania, and
can not prove that he performed military service in the
United States, is subject to arrest, or fine, or both, for
evasion of military duty.
There is no treaty between the United States and
Roumania defining the status of naturalized Americans
of Roumanian birth returning to Roumania.
Passports are absolutely necessary in Roumania, and
must be visaed by a Roumanian consul. If they are not
so visaed the holder may be sent back from the frontier
to the nearest place where there is a Roumanian consul.
An American who intends to remain in Roumania for
a longer period than eight days must have his passport
visaed by the United States consul at Bucharest, and
obtain a permit of residence, valid for one year, from the
prefecture of police.
Russia.
A Russian is enrolled for military service at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first year of his age, and remains on
the rolls to the end of his forty-third year; but at the
age of fifteen he is considered to be among those who
are liable to perform military service, and he can not,
after reaching that age, ask for permission to become a
citizen of a foreign country, unless he has performed his
5233—26
402 NATURALIZATION
military service. A Russian who becomes a citizen of
another country without imperial consent is liable, under
Russian law, to the loss of all his civil rights, and to
perpetual banishment from the Empire. If he returns
he is liable to deportation to Siberia. When a Russian
emigrates before he is fifteen years old, and subsequently
becomes a citizen of another country, he is equally liable
to punishment, unless when he attained the age of
twenty-one years he took steps necessary to obtain the
consent of the Emperor to his expatriation.
Naturalized Americans of Russian birth, of the Jewish
race, are not allowed to enter Russia except by special
permission. For this, they may apply to the Minister
of the Interior, but the Department can not act as inter-
mediary in making the application.
There is no treaty between the United States and
Russia defining the status of American citizens of Rus-
sian birth upon their return to Russia.
No one is admitted to Russia without a passport. It
must be visaed by a Russian diplomatic or consular rep-
resentative. Upon entering Russia it should be shown
at the first government house, and the holder will be
given another passport or permit of sojourn. At least
twenty-four hours before departure from Russia this
permit should be presented and a passport of departure
will be granted and the original passport returned. A
fresh permit to remain in Russia must be obtained every
six months.
Servia.
Ordinarily, all subjects of Servia are expected to per-
form at least two years military service after they attain
manhood.
If a subject of Servia emigrates before he has fulfilled
his military obligations, the Servian government does
not recognize a change of nationality made without the
ATTITUDE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. 403
consent of the King, and upon his return he may be sub-
ject to molestation.
If, however, he performed his military service before
emigration, his acquisition of naturalization in the United
States is recognized by the Servian government.
There is no treaty between the United States and
Servia defining the status of naturalized Americans of
Servian birth returning to Servia.
Passports are rigorously required of all persons who
desire to enter Servia.
Sweden.
Subjects of Sweden are liable to performance of military
duty in and after the calendar year in which they reach
their twenty-first year.
Under the treaty between the United States and
Sweden and Norway [17 Stat, at L. 809], a naturalized
citizen of the United States, formerly a subject of
Sweden, is recognized as an American citizen upon his
return to the country of his origin. He is liable, how-
ever, to punishment for an offense against the laws of
Sweden committed before his emigration, saving, always,
the limitations and remissions established by those laws.
Emigration itself is not an offense, but nonfulfilment of
military duty, and desertion from a military force or
ship, are offenses.
A naturalized American who performed his military
service or emigrated when he was not liable to it, and
who infracted no laws before emigrating, may safely re-
turn to Sweden.
If he renews his residence in the kingdom without in-
tent to return to America, he is held to have renounced
his American citizenship, and he will be liable to perform
military duty.
Passports are not required from persons entering or
traveling in the kingdom, but they may be called upon
404 NATURALIZATION
to establish their citizenship, and are consequently ad-
vised to procure passports.
Switzerland.
Every Swiss citizen is liable, under Swiss law, to mili-
tary service from the beginning of the year in which he
becomes twenty years of age until the end of the year
when he becomes forty-four. Every Swiss of military
age who does not perform military service is subject
to an annual tax, whether he resides in the Confederation
or not, or to punishment for nonpayment of the tax if
he returns to Switzerland.
If a Swiss citizen renounces Swiss allegiance in the
manner prescribed by the Swiss law of July 3, 1876, and
his renunciation is accepted, his naturalization in another
country is recognized, but without such acceptance it is
not recognized, and is held to descend from generation
to generation.
Before he returns to Switzerland an American citizen
of Swiss origin should file with the cantonal authorities
his written declaration of renunciation of his rights to
communal, cantonal, and in general Swiss citizenship,
with documents showing that he has obtained foreign
citizenship for himself, wife, and minor children, and
received the sealed document of release from Swiss citizen-
ship through the direction of justice of the canton of his
origin. If he neglects this, and is within the ages when
military service may be required, he is liable to military
tax, or to arrest and punishment in case of nonpayment
of the tax.
There is no treaty between the United States and
Switzerland defining the status of former Swiss citizens
who have become naturalized as American citizens.
Passports are not required for admission to Switzer-
land, but are usually demanded from persons sojourning
ATTITUDE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. 405
in that country. They do not require to be visaed or
indorsed to be valid.
Turkey.
The Turkish government denies the right of a subject
of Turkey to become a citizen of any other country
without the authority of the Turkish government. His
naturalization is, therefore, regarded by Turkey as void
with reference to himself and his children, and he is for-
bidden to return to Turkey.
The consent of the Turkish government to the natu-
ralization in another country of a former subject of
Turkey is given only upon condition that the applicant
shall stipulate, either never to return, or, returning, to
regard himself as a Turkish subject. Therefore, if a
naturalized American citizen, formerly a subject of
Turkey, returns to Turkey, he may expect arrest and
imprisonment, or expulsion.
Jews are prohibited from colonizing in Turkish domin-
ions.
There is no treaty between the United States and
Turkey defining the status of naturalized Americans,
formerly Turkish subjects, who return to Turkey.
Passports are required from all persons entering Turk-
ish dominions (Egypt excepted), and persons who enter
without passports are liable to fine or imprisonment.
The passports should, if possible, be visaed by a Turkish
consular officer in the United States.
APPENDIX.
Laws of the United States relating to Naturalization and
Expatriation.
Naturalization Treaties to which the United States is a
Party.
Executive Orders of April 6 and April 8, 1 907, Amend-
ing the Instructions to Diplomatic Officers and the
Consular Regulations, Relative to Expatriation,
Citizenship, Naturalization, and Passports.
Naturalization Regulations Promulgated by the Depart-
ment of Commerce and Labor.
List of Courts Authorized to Naturalize Aliens.
List of Foreign Countries and their Rulers.
APPENDIX. 409
APPENDIX.
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO
NATURALIZATION AND EXPATRIATION.
Sections of Revised Statutes :
Sec. 1994. Citizenship of alien woman married to a citizen of the
United States.
Sec. 1995- Citizenship of persons born in Territory of Oregon.
Sec. 1996. Deserters.
Sec. 1997. Deserters.
Sec. 1998. Deserters.
Sec. 1999. Right of expatriation.
Sec. 2000. Protection of naturalized citizens of the United States.
Sec. 2001. Assistance to citizens of the United States unjustly deprived
of liberty in foreign country.
Sec. 2166. Naturalization of soldiers.
Sec. 2169. Who may be naturalized.
Sec. 2171. Alien enemies.
Sec. 2172. Naturalization by naturalization of parent.
Sec. 2174. Naturalization of merchant seamen.
Sec. 5395. False swearing in naturalization.
Sec. 5424. False personation, etc.
Sec. 5425. Using false certificate of citizenship.
Sec. 5426. Using false certificate, etc., as evidence of right to vote.
Sec. 5427. Aiding or abetting violation of preceding sections.
Sec. 5428. Falsely claiming citizenship.
Sec. 5429. Provisions applicable to all courts of naturalization.
Other Acts of Congress :
Act of May 6, 1882 (22 Stat, at L/.), forbidding naturalization of
Chinese.
Act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat, at D.), establishing a Bureau of Natu-
ralization, and providing for a uniform rule for the naturaliza-
tion of aliens.
Act of March 2, 1907, in reference to the expatriation of citizens and
their protection abroad.
SECTIONS OF THE REVISED STATUTES.
Sec. 1994. Any woman who is now or may hereafter
be married to a citizen of the United States, and who
410 NATURALIZATION
might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen.
Sec. 1995. All persons born in the district of country
formerly known as the Territory of Oregon, and subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States on the 18th May,
1872, are citizens in the same manner as if born else-
where in the United States.
Sec. 1996. All persons who deserted the military or
naval service of the United States and did not return
thereto or report themselves to a provost-marshal within
sixty days after the issuance of the proclamation by the
President, dated the 11th day of March, 1865, are
deemed to have voluntarily relinquished and forfeited
their rights of citizenship, as well as their right to be-
come citizens; and such deserters shall be forever in-
capable of holding any office of trust or profit under the
United States, or of exercising any rights of citizens
thereof.
Sec. 1997. No soldier or sailor, however, who faithfully
served according to his enlistment until the 19th day of
April, 1865, and who, without proper authority or leave
first obtained, quit his command or refused to serve
after that date, shall be held to be a deserter from the
Army or Navy; but this section shall be construed solely
as a removal of any disability such soldier or sailor may
have incurred, under the preceding section, by the loss
of citizenship and of the right to hold office, in conse-
quence of his desertion.
Sec. 1998. Every person who hereafter deserts the
military or naval service of the United States, or who,
being duly enrolled, departs the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict in which he is enrolled, or goes beyond the limits
of the United States, with intent to avoid any draft into
the military or naval service, lawfully ordered, shall be
liable to all the penalties and forfeitures of section nine-
teen hundred and ninety-six.
APPENDIX. 411
Sec. 1999. Whereas the right of expatriation is a
natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to
the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness; and whereas in the recognition of this
principle this government has freely received emigrants
from all nations, and invested them with the rights of
citizenship; and whereas it is claimed that such Ameri-
can citizens, with their descendants, are subjects of
foreign states, owing allegiance to the governments
thereof; and whereas it is necessary to the maintenance
of public peace that this claim of foreign allegiance
should be promptly and finally disavowed: Therefore
any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision
of any officer of the United States which denies, restricts,
impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is de-
clared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of
the Republic.
Sec. 2000. All naturalized citizens of the United States,
while in foreign countries, are entitled to and shall re-
ceive from this government the same protection of persons
and property which is accorded to native-born citizens.
Sec. 2001. Whenever it is made known to the President
that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly
deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any
foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President
forthwith to demand of that government the reasons of
such imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and
in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the
President shall forthwith demand the release of such
citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasonably
delayed or refused, the President shall use such means,
not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary
and proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and all
the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon
as practicable be communicated by the President to
Congress.
412 NATURALIZATION
Sec. 2166. Any alien, of the age of twenty-one years
and upward, who has enlisted, or may enlist, in the
armies of the United States, either the regular or the
volunteer forces, and has been, or maybe hereafter, hon-
orably discharged, shall be admitted to become a citizen
of the United States, upon his petition, without any pre-
vious declaration of his intention to become such; and
he shall not be required to prove more than one year's
residence within the United States previous to his ap-
plication to become such citizen; and the court admit-
ting such alien shall, in addition to such proof of resi-
dence and good moral character, as now provided by law,
be satisfied by competent proof of such person's having
been honorably discharged from the service of the United
States.
Sec. 2169. The provisions of this title shall apply to
aliens [being free white persons, and to aliens] of African
nativity and to persons of African descent.
Sec. 2170. No alien shall be admitted to become a citi-
zen who has not for the continued term of five years next
preceding his admission resided within the United States.
Sec. 2171. No alien who is a native citizen or subject,
or a denizen of any country, state, or sovereignty with
which the United States are at war, at the time of his
application, shall be then admitted to become a citizen
of the United States; but persons resident within the
United States, or the Territories thereof, on the eighteenth
day of June, in the year one thousand eight hundred and
twelve, who had before that day made a declaration, ac-
cording to law, of their intention to become citizens of
the United States, or who were on that day entitled to
become citizens without making such declaration, may
be admitted to become citizens thereof, notwithstanding
they were alien enemies at the time and in the manner
prescribed by the laws heretofore passed on that sub-
ject; nor shall anything herein contained be taken or
APPENDIX, 413
construed to interfere with or prevent the apprehension
and removal, agreeably to law, of any alien enemy at any
time previous to the actual naturalization of^such alien.
Sec. 2172, The children of persons who have been duly
naturalized under any law of the United States, or who,
previous to the passing of any law on that subject, by the
Government of the United States, may have become citi-
zens of any one of the States, under the laws thereof,
being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of
the naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in
the United States, be considered as citizens thereof; and
the children of persons who now are, or have been, citi-
zens of the United States, shall, though born out of the
limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered
as citizens thereof; but no person heretofore proscribed
by any State, or who has been legally convicted of having
joined the army of Great Britain during the Revolution-
ary War, shall be admitted to become a citizen without
the consent of the legislature of the State in which such
person was proscribed.
Sec, 2174 [U, S. Comp, Stat, 1901, 1334], Every sea-
man, being a foreigner, who declares his intention of be-
coming a citizen of the United States in any competent
court, and shall have served three years on board of a
merchant vessel of the United States subsequent to the
date of such declaration, may, on his application to any
competent court, and the production of his certificate of
discharge and good conduct during that time, together
with the certificate of his declaration of intention to be-
come a citizen, be admitted a citizen of the United
States; and every seaman, being a foreigner, shall, after
his declaration of intention to become a citizen of the
United States, and after he shall have served such three
years, be deemed a citizen of the United States for the
purpose of manning and serving on board any merchant-
vessel of the United States, anything to the contrary in
414 NATURALIZATION
any Act of Congress notwithstanding; but such seaman
shall, for all purposes of protection as an American citi-
zen, be deemed such, after the filing of his declaration of
intention to become such citizen.
Sec. 5395. In all cases where any oath or affidavit is
made or taken under or by virtue of any law relating to
the naturalization of aliens, or in any proceedings under
such laws, any person taking or making such oath or affi-
davit who knowingly swears falsely, shall be punished
by imprisonment not more than five years, nor less than
one year, and by a fine of not more than one thousand
dollars.
Sec. 5424. Every person applying to be admitted a
citizen, or appearing as a witness for any such person,
who knowingly personates any other person than him-
self, or falsely appears in the name of a deceased person,
or in an assumed or fictitious name, or falsely makes,
forges, or counterfeits any oath, notice, affidavit, certifi-
cate, order, record, signature, or other instrument, paper,
or proceeding required or authorized by any law relating
to or providing for the naturalization of aliens; or who
utters, sells, disposes of, or uses as true or genuine, or
for any unlawful purpose, any false, forged, ante-dated,
or counterfeit oath, notice, certificate, order, record, sig-
nature, instrument, paper, or proceeding above specified;
or sells or disposes of to any person other than the per-
son for whom it was originally issued any certificate of
citizenship, or certificate showing any person to be ad-
mitted a citizen, shall be punished by imprisonment at
hard labor not less than one year, nor more than five
years, or by a fine of not less than three hundred nor
more than one thousand dollars, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
Sec. 5425. Every person who uses, or attempts to use,
or aids, or assists, or participates in the use of any cer-
tificate of citizenship, knowing the same to be forged, or
APPENDIX. 415
counterfeit, or ante-dated, or knowing the same to have
been procured by fraud or otherwise unlawfully obtained;
or who, without lawful excuse, knowingly is possessed of
any false, forged, ante-dated, or counterfeit certificate of
citizenship, purporting to have been issued under the
provisions of any law of the United States relating to
naturalization, knowing such certificate to be false,
forged, ante-dated, or counterfeit, with intent unlawfully
to use the same; or obtains, accepts, or receives any cer-
tificate of citizenship known to such person to have been
procured by fraud or by the use of any false name, or
by means of any false statement made with intent to
procure, or to aid in procuring, the issue of such certifi-
cate, or known to such person to be fraudulently altered
or ante-dated; and every person who has been or may be
admitted to be a citizen who, on oath or by affidavit,
knowingly denies that he has been so admitted, with in-
tent to evade or avoid any duty or liability imposed or
required by law, shall be imprisoned at hard labor not
less than one year nor more than five years, or be fined
not less than three hundred dollars nor more than one
thousand dollars, or both such punishments may be
imposed.
Sec. 5426. Every person who in any manner uses for
the purpose of registering as a voter, or as evidence of a
right to vote, or otherwise, unlawfully, any order, certifi-
cate of citizenship, or certificate, judgment, or exempli-
fication, showing any person to be admitted to be a
citizen, whether heretofore or hereafter issued or made,
knowing that such order or certificate, judgment, or ex-
emplification has been unlawfully issued or made; and
every person who unlawfully uses, or attempts to use,
any such order or certificate, issued to or in the name of
any other person, or in a fictitious name, or the name of
a deceased person, shall be punished by imprisonment at
hard labor not less than one year nor more than five
416 NATURALIZATION
years, or by a fine of not less than three hundred nor
more than one thousand dollars, or by both such fine
and imprisonment.
Sec. 5427. Every person who knowingly and intention-
ally aids or abets any person in the commission of any
felony denounced in the three preceding sections, or
attempts to do any act therein made felony, or counsels,
advises, or procures, or attempts to procure, the com-
mission thereof, shall be punished in the same manner
and to the same extent as the principal party.
Sec. 5428. Every person who knowingly uses any cer-
tificate of naturalization heretofore granted by any court
or hereafter granted, which has been or may be procured
through fraud or by false evidence, or has been or may be
issued by the clerk, or any other officer of the court
without any appearance and hearing of the applicant in
court and without lawful authority; and every perspn
who falsely represents himself to be a citizen of the
United States, without having been duly admitted to
citizenship, for any fraudulent purpose whatever, shall
be punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand
dollars, or be imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.
Sec. 5429. The provisions of the five preceding sections
shall apply to all proceedings had or taken, or attempted
to be had or taken, before any court in which any
proceeding for naturalization may be commenced or
attempted to be commenced.
Later Acts of Congress.
Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat, at L. 61. Hereafter no
state court or court of the United States shall admit
Chinese to citizenship; and all laws in conflict with this
act are hereby repealed.
APPENDIX. 417
Act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat, at L. 596), Establishing a
Bureau of Naturalization.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That the designation of the Bureau of Immi-
gration in the Department of Commerce and Labor is
hereby changed to the "Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization," which said Bureau, under the direction
and control of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, in
addition to the duties now provided by law, shall have
charge of all matters concerning the naturalization of
aliens. That it shall be the duty of the said Bureau to
provide, for use at the various immigration stations
throughout the United States, books of record, wherein
the commissioners of immigration shall cause a registry
to be made in the case of each alien arriving in the United
States from and after the passage of this act of the name,
age, occupation, personal description (including height,
complexion, color of hair and eyes), the place of birth, the
last residence, the intended place of residence in the
United States, and the date of arrival of said alien, and,
if entered through a port, the name of the vessel in which
he comes. And it shall be the duty of said commissioners
of immigration to cause to be granted to such alien
a certificate of such registry, with the particulars
thereof.
Sec. 2. That the Secretary of Commerce and Labor
shall provide the said Bureau with such additional fur-
nished offices within the city of Washington, such books
of record and facilities, and such additional assistants,
clerks, stenographers, typewriters, and other employees
as may be necessary for the proper discharge of the du-
ties imposed by this Act upon such Bureau, fixing the
compensation of such additional employees until July
first, nineteen hundred and seven, within the appropria-
tions made for that purpose.
5233—27
418 NATURALIZATION
Sec. 3. That exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize aliens
as citizens of the United States is hereby conferred upon
the following specified courts:
United States circuit and district courts now existing,
or which may hereafter be established by Congress in any
State, United States district courts for the Territories
of Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Hawaii, and Alaska,
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and the
United States courts for the Indian Territory; also all
courts of record in any State or Territory now existing,
or which may hereafter be created, having a seal, a clerk,
and jurisdiction in actions at law or equity, or law and
equity, in which the amount in controversy is un-
limited.
That the naturalization jurisdiction of all courts
herein specified, State, Territorial, and Federal, shall ex-
tend only to aliens resident within the respective judicial
districts of such courts.
The courts herein specified shall, upon the requisition
of the clerks of such courts, be furnished from time to
time by the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
with such blank forms as may be required in the natu-
ralization of aliens, and all certificates of naturalization
shall be consecutively numbered and printed on safety
paper furnished by said Bureau.
Sec. 4. That an alien may be admitted to become a
citizen of the United States in the following manner and
not otherwise:
First. He shall declare on oath before the clerk of any
court authorized by this Act to naturalize aliens, or his
authorized deputy, in the district in which such alien
resides, two years at least prior to his admission, and
after he has reached the age of eighteen years, that it is
bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the United
States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity
to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty.
APPENDIX. 419
and particularly, by name, to the prince, potentate, state,
or sovereignty of which the alien may be at the time a
citizen or subject. And such declaration shall set forth
the name, age, occupation, personal description, place of
birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of
arrival, the name of the vessel, if any, in which he came
to the United States, and the present place of residence
in the United States of said alien: Provided, however,
That no alien who, in conformity with the law in force
at the date of his declaration, has declared his intention
to become a citizen of the United States shall be required
to renew such declaration.
Second. Not less than two years nor more than seven
years after he has made such declaration of intention he
shall make and file, in duplicate, a petition in writing,
signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and duly
verified, in which petition such applicant shall state his
full name, his place of residence (by street and number,
if possible), his occupation, and, if possible, the date
and place of his birth; the place from which he emigrated,
and the date and place of his arrival in the United States,
and, if he entered through a port, the name of the ves-
sel on which he arrived; the time when and the place
and name of the court where he declared his intention
to become a citizen of the United States; if he is mar-
ried he shall state the name of his wife and, if possible,
the country of her nativity and her place of residence at
the time of filing his petition; and if he has children,
the name, date, and place of birth and place of residence
of each child living at the time of the filing of his peti-
tion: Provided, That if he has filed his declaration be-
fore the passage of this Act he shall not be required to
sign the petition in his own handwriting.
The petition shall set forth that he is not a disbeliever
in or opposed to organized government, or a member of
or affiliated with any organization or body of persons
420 NATURALIZATION
teaching disbelief in or opposed to organized govern-
ment, a polygamist or believer in the practice of poly-
gamy, and that it is his intention to become a citizen of
the United States and to renounce absolutely and for-
ever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly by
name to the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of
which he at the time of filing of his petition may be a
citizen or subject, and that it is his intention to reside
permanently within the United States, and whether or
not he has been denied admission as a citizen of the
United States, and, if denied, the ground or grounds of
such denial, the court or courts in which such decision
was rendered, and that the cause for such denial has
since been cured or removed, and every fact material to
his naturalization and required to be proved upon the
final hearing of his application.
The petition shall also be verified by the affidavits of
at least two credible witnesses, who are citizens of the
United States, and who shall state in their affidavits
that they have personally known the applicant to be a
resident of the United States for a period of at least five
years continuously, and of the State, Territory, or dis-
trict in which the application is made for a period of at
least one year immediately preceding the date of the
filing of his petition, and that they each have personal
knowledge that the petitioner is a person of good moral
character, and that he is in every way qualified, in their
opinion, to be admitted as a citizen of the United
States.
At the time of filing his petition there shall be filed
with the clerk of the court a certificate from the Depart-
ment of Commerce and Labor, if the petitioner arrives
in the United States after the passage of this Act, stating
the date, place, and manner of his arrival in the United
APPENDIX. 421
States, and the declaration of intention of such peti-
tioner, which certificate and declaration shall be attached
to and made a part of said petition.
Third. He shall, before he is admitted to citizenship,
declare on oath in open court that he will support the
Constitution of the United States, and that he abso-
lutely and entirely renounces and abjures all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or
sovereignty, and particularly by name to the prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty of which he was before
a citizen or subject; that he will support and defend the
Constitution and laws of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and
allegiance to the same.
Fourth. It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction
of the court admitting any alien to citizenship that im-
mediately preceding the date of his application he has
resided continuously within the United States five years
at least, and within the State or Territory where such
court is at the time held one year at least, and that dur-
ing that time he has behaved as a man of good moral
character, attached to the principles of the Constitution
of the United States, and well disposed to the good
order and happiness of the same. In addition to the
oath of the applicant, the testimony of at least two wit-
nesses, citizens of the United States, as to the facts of
residence, moral character, and attachment to the prin-
ciples of the Constitution shall be required, and the
name, place of residence, and occupation of each witness
shall be set forth in the record.
Fifth. In case the alien applying to be admitted to
citizenship has borne any hereditary title, or has been
of any of the orders of nobility in the kingdom or state
from which he came, he shall, in addition to the above
requisites, make an express renunciation of his title or
422 NATURALIZATION
order of nobility in the court to which his application
is made, and his renunciation shall be recorded in the
court.
Sixth. When any alien who has declared his intention
to become a citizen of the United States dies before he
is actually naturalized the widow and minor children of
such alien may, by complying with the other provisions
of this Act, be naturalized without making any declara-
tion of intention.
Sec. 5. That the clerk of the court shall, immediately
after filing the petition, give notice thereof by posting
in a public and conspicuous place in his office, or in the
building in which his office is situated, under an appro-
priate heading, the name, nativity, and residence of the
alien, the date and place of his arrival in the United
States, and the date, as nearly as may be, for the final
hearing of his petition, and the names of the witnesses
whom the applicant expects to summon in his behalf;
and the clerk shall, if the applicant requests it, issue a
subpoena for the witnesses so named by the said appli-
cant to appear upon the day set for the final hearing, but
in case such witnesses can not be produced upon the
final hearing other witnesses may be summoned.
Sec. 6. That petitions for naturalization may be made
and filed during term time or vacation of the court and
shall be docketed the same day as filed, but final action
thereon shall be had only on stated days, to be fixed by
rule of the court, and in no case shall final action be had
upon a petition until at least ninety days have elapsed
after filing and posting the notice of such petition : Pro-
vided, That no person shall be naturalized nor shall any
certificate of naturalization be issued by any court within
thirty days preceding the holding of any general election
within its territorial jurisdiction. It shall be lawful, at
the time and as a part of the naturalization of any alien,
for the court, in its discretion, upon the petition of such
APPENDIX. 423
alien, to make a decree changing tlie name of said alien,
and his certificate of naturalization shall be issued to
him in accordance therewith.
Sec. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is
opposed to organized government, or who is a member
of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and
teaching such disbelief in or opposition to organized gov-
ernment, or who advocates or teaches the duty, neces-
sity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing
of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or
of officers generally, of the Government of the United
States, or of any other organized government, because of
his or their official character, or who is a polygamist,
shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United
States.
Sec. 8. That no alien shall hereafter be naturalized or
admitted as a citizen of the United States who can not
speak the English language: P7'ovided, That this require-
ment shall not apply to aliens who are physically unable
to comply therewith, if they are otherwise qualified to
become citizens of the United States : Atid provided fur-
ther, That the requirements of this section shall not
apply to any alien who has prior to the passage of this
Act declared his intention to become a citizen of the
United States in conformity with the law in force at the
date of making such declaration : Provided further, That
the requirements of section eight shall not apply to
aliens who shall hereafter declare their intention to be-
come citizens and who shall make homestead entries
upon the public lands of the United States and comply
in all respects with the laws providing for homestead
entries on such lands.
Sec. 9. That every final hearing upon such petition
shall be had in open court before a judge or judges
thereof, and every final order which may be made upon
such petition shall be under the hand of the court and
424 NATURALIZATION
entered in full upon a record kept for that purpose, and
upon such final hearing of such petition the applicant
and witnesses shall be examined under oath before the
court and in the presence of the court.
Sec. 10. That in case the petitioner has not resided in
the State, Territory, or district for a period of five years
continuously and immediately preceding the filing of his
petition he may establish by two witnesses, both in his
petition and at the hearing, the time of his residence
within the state, provided that it has been for more than
one year, and -the remaining portion of his five years'
residence within the United States required by law to be
established may be proved by the depositions of two or
more witnesses who are citizens of the United States,
upon notice to the Bureau of Immigration and Natural-
ization and the United States attorney for the district
in which said witnesses may reside.
Sec. 11. That the United States shall have the right
to appear before any court or courts exercising jurisdic-
tion in naturalization proceedings for the purpose of
cross-examining the petitioner and the witnesses pro-
duced in support of his petition concerning any matter
touching or in any way affecting his right to admission
to citizenship, and shall have the right to call witnesses,
produce evidence, and be heard in opposition to the
granting of any petition in naturalization proceedings.
Sec. 12. That it is hereby made the duty of the clerk
of each and every court exercising jurisdiction in natural-
ization matters under the provisions of this Act to keep
and file a duplicate of each declaration of intention made
before him and to send to the Bureau of Immigration
and Naturalization at Washington, within thirty days
after the issuance of a certificate of citizenship, a dupli-
cate of such certificate, and to make and keep on file in
his office a stub for each certificate so issued by him,
whereon shall be entered a memorandum of all the essen-
APPENDIX. 425
tial facts set forth in such certificate. It shall also be
the duty of the clerk of each of said courts to report to
the said Bureau, within thirty days after the final hear-
ing and decision of the court, the name of each and every
alien who shall be denied naturalization, and to furnish
to said Bureau duplicates of all petitions within thirty
days after the filing of the same, and certified copies of
such other proceedings and orders instituted in or issued
out of said court affecting or relating to the naturaliza-
tion of aliens as may be required from time to time by
the said Bureau.
In case any such clerk or officer acting under his direc-
tion shall refuse or neglect to comply with any of the
foregoing provisions he shall forfeit and pay to the
United States the sum of twenty-five dollars in each and
every case in which such violation or omission occurs,
and the amount of such forfeiture may be recovered by
the United States in an action of debt against such clerk.
Clerks of courts having and exercising jurisdiction in
naturalization matters shall be responsible for all blank
certificates of citizenship received by them from time to
time from the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,
and shall account for the same to the said Bureau when-
ever required so to do by such Bureau. No certificate of
citizenship received by any such clerk which may be
defaced or injured in such manner as to prevent its use
as herein provided shall in any case be destroyed, but
such certificate shall be returned to the said Bureau; and
in case any such clerk shall fail to return or properly
account for any certificate furnished by the said Bureau,
as herein provided, he shall be liable to the United
States in the sum of fifty dollars, to be recovered in
an action of debt, for each and every certificate not
properly accounted for or returned.
Sec. 13. That the clerk of each and every court exer-
cising jurisdiction in naturalization cases shall charge,
426 NATURALIZATION
collect, and account for the following fees in each pro-
ceeding:
For receiving and filing a declaration of intention and
issuing a duplicate thereof, one dollar.
For making, filing, and docketing the petition of an
alien for admission as a citizen of the United States and
for the final hearing thereon, two dollars; and for enter-
ing the final order and the issuance of the certificate of
citizenship thereunder, if granted, two dollars.
The clerk of any court collecting such fees is hereby
authorized to retain one-half of the fees collected by him
in such naturalization proceeding ; the remaining one-
half of the naturalization fees in each case collected by
such clerks, respectively, shall be accounted for in their
quarterly accounts, which they are hereby required to
render the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,
and paid over to such Bureau within thirty days from
the close of each quarter in each and every fiscal year,
and the moneys so received shall be paid over to the dis-
bursing clerk of the Department of Commerce and Labor,
who shall thereupon deposit them in the Treasury of the
United States, rendering an account therefor quarterly
to the Auditor for the State and other Departments, and
the said disbursing clerk shall be held responsible under
his bond for said fees so received.
In addition to the fees herein required, the petitioner
shall, upon the filing of his petition to become a citizen
of the United States, deposit with and pay to the clerk
of the court a sum of money sufficient to cover the ex-
penses of subpoenaing and paying the legal fees of any
witnesses for whom he may request a subpoena, and upon
the final discharge of such witnesses they shall receive,
if they demand the same from the clerk, the customary
and usual witness fees from the moneys which the peti-
tioner shall have paid to such clerk for such purpose, and
the residue, if any, shall be returned by the clerk to the
APPENDIX. 427
petitioner: Provided, That the clerks of courts exercising
jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings shall be per-
mitted to retain one-half of the fees in any fiscal j'ear
up to the sum of three thousand dollars, and that all
fees received by such clerks in naturalization proceed-
ings in excess of such amount shall be accounted for
and paid over to such Bureau as in case of other fees to
which the United States may be entitled under the pro-
visions of this Act. The clerks of the various courts
exercising jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings
shall pay all additional clerical force that may be re-
quired in performing the duties imposed by this Act
upon the clerks of courts from fees received by such
clerks in naturalization proceedings. And in case the
clerk of any court collects fees in excess of the sum of
six thousand dollars in any one year, the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor may allow to such clerk from the
money which the United States shall receive additional
compensation for the employment of additional clerical
assistance, but for no other purpose, if in the opinion of
the said Secretary the business of such clerk warrants
such allowance.
Sec. 14. That the declarations of intention and the
petitions for naturalization shall be bound in chronolo-
gical order in separate volumes, indexed, consecutively
numbered, and made part of the records of the court.
Each certificate of naturalization issued shall bear upon
its face, in a place prepared therefor, the volume number
and page number of the petition whereon such certificate
was issued, and the volume number and page number of
the stub of such certificate.
Sec. 15. That it shall be the duty of the United States
district attorneys for the respective districts, upon affi-
davit showing good cause therefor, to institute proceed-
ings in any court having jurisdiction to naturalize aliens
in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen
428 NATURALIZATION
may reside at the time of bringing the suit, for the pur-
pose of setting aside and canceling the certificate of
citizenship on the ground of fraud or on the ground that
such certificate of citizenship was illegally procured. In
any such proceedings the party holding the certificate
of citizenship alleged to have been fraudulently or ille-
gally procured shall have sixty days personal notice in
which to make answer to the petition of the United
States; and if the holder of such certificate be absent
from the United States or from the district in which he
last had his residence, such notice shall be given by pub-
lication in the manner provided for the service of sum-
mons by publication or upon absentees by the laws of
the State or the place where such suit is brought.
If any alien who shall have secured a certificate of
citizenship under the provisions of this Act shall, within
five years after the issuance of such certificate, return
to the country of his nativity, or go to any other for-
eign country, and take permanent residence therein, it
shall be considered prima facie evidence of a lack of in-
tention on the part of such alien to become a permanent
citizen of the United States at the time of filing his ap-
plication for citizenship, and, in the absence of counter-
vailing evidence, it shall be sufficient in the proper pro-
ceeding to authorize the cancellation of his certificate
of citizenship as fraudulent, and the diplomatic and con-
sular officers of the United States in foreign countries
shall from time to time, through the Department of
State, furnish tne Department of Justice with the names
of those within their respective jurisdictions who have
such certificates of citizenship and who have taken per-
manent residence in the country of their nativity, or in
any other foreign country, and such statements, duly
certified, shall be admissible in evidence in all courts in
proceedings to cancel certificates of citizenship.
Whenever any certificate of citizenship shall be set
APPENDIX. 429
aside or canceled, as herein provided, the court in which
such judgment or decree is rendered shall make an order
canceling such certificate of citizenship and shall send
a certified copy of such order to the Bureau of Immigra-
tion and Naturalization; and in case such certificate was
not originally issued by the court making such order it
shall direct the clerk of the court to transmit a copy of
such order and judgment to the court out of which such
certificate of citizenship shall have been originally is-
sued. And it shall thereupon be the duty of the clerk
of the court receiving such certified copy of the order
and judgment of the court to enter the same of record
and to cancel such original certificate of citizenship upon
the records and to notify the Bureau of Immigration
and Naturalization of such cancellation.
The provisions of this section shall apply not only to
certificates of citizenship issued under the provisions of
this Act, but to all certificates of citizenship which may
have been issued heretofore by any court exercising ju-
risdiction in naturalization proceedings under prior
laws.
Sec. 16. That every person who falsely makes, forges,
counterfeits, or causes or procures to be falsely made,
forged, or counterfeited, or knowingly aids or assists in
falsely making, forging, or counterfeiting any certificate
of citizenship, with intent to use the same, or with the
intent that the same may be used by some other person
or persons, shall be guilty of a felony, and a person con-
victed of such offense shall be punished by imprison-
ment for not more than ten years, or by a fine of not more
than ten thousand dollars, or by both such fine and im-
prisonment.
Sec. 17. That every person who engraves or causes or
procures to be engraved, or assists in engraving, any
plate in the likeness of any plate designed for the print-
ing of a certificate of citizenship, or who sells any such
430 NATURALIZATION
plate, or who brings into the United States from any
foreign place any such plate, except under the direction
of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, or other proper
officer, and any person who has in his control, custody,
or possession any metallic plate engraved after the simi-
litude of any plate from which any such certificate has
been printed, with intent to use such plate or suffer the
same to be used in forging or counterfeiting any such
certificate or any part thereof; and every person who
prints, photographs, or in any other manner causes to be
printed, photographed, made, or executed, any print or
impression in the likeness of any such certificate, or any
part thereof, or who sells any such certificate, or brings
the same into the United States from any foreign place,
except by direction of some proper officer of the United
States, or who has in his possession a distinctive paper
which has been adopted by the proper officer of the
United States for the printing of such certificate, with
intent to unlawfully use the same, shall be punished by
a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or by im-
prisonment at hard labor for not more than ten years,
or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Sec. 18. That it is hereby made a felony for any clerk
or other person to issue or be a party to the issuance of
a certificate of citizenship contrary to the provisions of
this Act, except upon a final order under the hand of a
court having jurisdiction to make such order, and upon
conviction thereof such clerk or other person shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than five years
and by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, in
the discretion of the court.
Sec. 19. That every person who without lawful excuse
is possessed of any blank certificate of citizenship pro-
vided by the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,
with intent unlawfully to use the same, shall be im-
APPENDIX. 431
prisoned at hard labor not more than five years or be
fined not more than one thousand dollars.
Sec. 20. That any clerk or other officer of a court hav-
ing power under this Act to naturalize aliens, who wil-
fully neglects to render true accounts of moneys received
by him for naturalization proceedings or who wilfully
neglects to pay over any balance of such moneys due to
the United States within thirty days after said payment
shall become due and demand therefor has been made
and refused, shall be deemed guilty of embezzlement of
the public moneys, and shall be punishable by imprison-
ment for not more than five years, or by a fine of not
more than five thousand dollars, or both.
Sec. 21. That it shall be unlawful for any clerk of any
court or his authorized deputy or assistant exercising
jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings, or"^ to demand,
charge, collect, or receive any other or additional fees or
moneys in naturalization proceedings save the fees and
moneys herein specified; and a violation of any of the
provisions of this section or any part thereof is hereby
declared to be a misdemeanor and shall be punished by
imprisonment for not more than two years, or by a fine
of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both such
fine and imprisonment.
Sec. 22. That the clerk of any court exercising juris-
diction in naturalization proceedings, or any person act-
ing under authority of this Act, who shall knowingly
certify that a petitioner, affiant, or witness named in an
affidavit, petition, or certificate of citizenship, or other
paper or writing required to be executed under the pro-
visions of this Act, personally appeared before him and
was sworn thereto, or acknowledged the execution thereof
or signed the same, when in fact such petitioner, affiant,
or witness did not personally appear before him, or was
*Error in original Act. Theword " or " should be omitted. — AUTHOR.
432 NATURALIZATION
not sworn thereto, or did not execute the same, or did
not acknowledge the execution thereof, shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by im-
prisonment not to exceed five years.
Sec. 23. That any person who knowingly procures
naturalization in violation of the provisions of this Act
shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or
shall be imprisoned not more than five years, or both,
and upon conviction the court in which such conviction
is had shall thereupon adjudge and declare the final order
admitting such person to citizenship void. Jurisdiction
is hereby conferred on the courts having jurisdiction of
the trial of such offense to make such adjudication. Any
person who knowingly aids, advises, or encourages any
person not entitled thereto to apply for or to secure
naturalization, or to file the preliminary papers declaring
an intent to become a citizen of the United States, or
who in any naturalization proceeding knowingly procures
or gives false testimony as to any material fact, or who
knowingly makes an aflEidavit false as to any material
fact required to be proved in such proceeding, shall be
fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
Sec. 24. That no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or
punished for any crime arising under the provisions of
this Act unless the indictment is found or the informa-
tion is filed within five years next after the commission
of such crime.
Sec. 25. That for the purpose of the prosecution of all
crimes and offenses against the naturalization laws of the
United States which may have been committed prior to
the date when this Act shall go into effect, the existing
naturalization laws shall remain in full force and effect.
Sec. 26. That sections twenty-one hundred and sixty-
five, twenty-one hundred and sixty-seven, twenty-one
hundred and sixty-eight, twenty-one hundred and
APPENDIX. 433
seventy-three, of the Revised Statutes of the United
States of America, and section thirty-nine of chapter
one thousand and twelve of the Statutes at Large of the
United States of America for the year nineteen hundred
and three, and all Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent
with or repugnant to the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed.
Sec. 27. That substantially the following forms shall
be used in the proceedings to which they relate:
DECLARATION OF INTENTION.
(Invalid for all purposes seven years after the date
hereof.)
, ss :
I, , aged years, occupation ,
do declare on oath (affirm) that my personal descrip-
tion is: Color , complexion , height ,
weight , color of hair , color of eyes ,
other visible distinctive marks ; I was born in
on the day of , anno Domini ;
I now reside at ; I emigrated to the United
States of America from on the vessel ; my
last foreign residence was It is my bona fide in-
tention to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and
particularly to , of which I am now a citizen (sub-
ject); I arrived at the (port) of , in the State (Ter-
ritory or District) of on or about the day
of anno Domini ; lam not an anarchist;
I am not a polygamist nor a believer in the practice of
polygamy; and it is my intention in good faith to be-
come a citizen of the United States of America and to
permanently reside therein. So help me God.
(Original signature of declarant)
Subscribed and sworn to (affirmed) before me this
day of , anno Domini
[L. S.]
(Official character of attestor.)
5233—28
434 NATURALIZATION
PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION.
Court of
In the matter of the petition of to be ad-
mitted as a citizen of the United States of
America.
To the Court:
The petition of respectfully shows:
First. M}^ full name is
Second. My place of residence is number
street, city of , State (Territory or District) of
Third. My occupation is
Fourth. I was born on the day of at
Fifth. I emigrated to the United States from ,
on or about the day of , anno Domini
, and arrived at the port of , in the United
States, on the vessel
Sixth. I declared my intention to become a citizen of
the United States on the day of at ,
in the court of
Seventh. I am married. My wife's name is
She was born in and now resides
at I have children, and the name, date,
and place of birth and place of residence of each of
said children is as follows : ; ;
Eighth. I am not a disbeliever in or opposed to
organized government or a member of or affiliated with
any organization or body of persons teaching disbelief in
organized government. I am not a polygamist nor a be-
liever in the practice of polygamy. I am attached to
the principles of the Constitution of the United States,
and it is my intention to become a citizen of the United
States and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegi-
ance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state,
or sovereignty, and particularly to , of which at
this time I am a citizen (or subject), and it is my inten-
tion to reside permanently in the United States.
Ninth. I am able to speak the English language.
Tenth. I have resided continuously in the United
States of America for a term of five years at least imme-
APPENDIX. 435
diately preceding the date of this petition, to wit, since
;.., anno Domini , and in the State (Territory
or District) of for one year at least next preced-
ing the date of this petition, to wit, since day of
, anno Domini
Eleventh. I have not heretofore made petition for citi-
zenship to any court. (I made petition for citizenship
to the court of at , and the said
petition was denied by the said court for the following
reasons and causes, to wit, , and the cause
of such denial has since been cured or removed.)
Attached hereto and made a part of this petition are
my declaration of intention to become a citizen of the
United States and the certificate from the Department of
Commerce and Labor required by law. Wherefore your
petitioner prays that he ma}' be admitted a citizen of the
United States of America.
Dated
(Signature of petitioner)
, ss:
, being duly sworn, deposes and says that
he is the petitioner in the above-entitled proceeding;
that he has read the foregoing petition and knows the con-
tents thereof; that the same is true of his own knowledge,
except as to matters therein stated to be alleged upon
information and belief, and that as to those matters he
believes it to be true.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of
, anno Domini
[l. s.] ,
Clerk of the Court.
AFFIDAVIT OF WITNESSES.
Court of
In the matter of the petition of to be
admitted a citizen of the United States of America.
, ss :
, occupation , residing at , and
, occupation , residing at ,each
being severally, duly, and respectively sworn, deposes and
436 NATURALIZATION.
says that he is a citizen of the United States of America;
that he has personally known, the peti-
tioner above mentioned, to be a resident of the United
States for a period of at least five years continuously
immediately preceding the date of filing his petition, and
of the State (Territory or District) in which the above-
entitled application is made for a period of years
immediately preceding the date of filing his petition; and
that he has personal knowledge that the said petitioner
is a person of good moral character, attached to the prin-
ciples of the Constitution of the United States, and that
he is in every way qualified, in his opinion, to be admitted
as a citizen of the United States.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of
, nineteen hundred and
[l. s.] _ ,
(Official character of attestor).
CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION.
Number
Petition, volume , page
Stub, volume , page
(Signature of holder) _ •
Description of holder: Age, ; height, ;
color, ; complexion, ; color of eyes, ;
color of hair, ; visible distinguishing marks,
Name, age, and place of residence of wife, ,
, Names, ages, and places of residence of
minor children, , , ; , ,
ss:
Be it remembered, that at a term of the
court of , held at on the day of
, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
, , who previous to his (her) naturalization
was a citizen or subject of , at present residing at
number street, city (town)
APPENDIX. 437
State (Territory or District), having applied to be ad-
mitted a citizen of the United States of America pursuant
to law, and the court having found that the petitioner
had resided continuously within the United States for at
least five years and in this State for one year immediately
preceding the date of the hearing of his (her) petition,
and that said petitioner intends to reside permanently
in the United States, had in all respects complied with
the law in relation thereto, and that he was entitled
to be so admitted, it was thereupon ordered by the said
court that he be admitted as a citizen of the United
States of America.
In testimony whereof, the seal of said court is here-
unto affixed on the day of , in the year of
our Lord nineteen hundred and , and of our inde-
pendence the
[l. s.] _ ,
(Official character of attestor.)
STUB OF CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION.
No. of certificate,
Name, ; age,
Declaration of intention, volume , page
Petition, volume , page
Name, age, and place of residence of wife,
, Names, ages, and places of residence o>
minor children, , , ; , ,
Date of order, volume , page .
(Signature of holder)
Sec. 28. That the Secretary of Commerce and Labor
shall have power to make such rules and regulations as
may be necessary for properly carrying into execution
the various provisions of this Act. Certified copies of all
papers, documents, certificates, and records required to
be used, filed, recorded, or kept under any and all of the
provisions of this Act shall be admitted in evidence
equally with the originals in any and all proceedings
under this Act and in all cases in which the originals
thereof might be admissible as evidence.
438 NATURALIZATION.
Sec. 29. That for the purpose of carrying into effect
the provisions of this Act there is hereby appropriated
the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, out of any
moneys in the Treasury of the United States not other-
wise appropriated, which appropriation shall be in full
for the objects hereby expressed until June thirtieth,
nineteen hundred and seven; and the provisions of sec-
tion thirty-six hundred and seventy-nine of the Revised
Statutes of the United States shall not be applicable in
any way to this appropriation.
Sec. 30. That all the applicable provisions of the na-
turalization laws of the United States shall apply to and be
held to authorize the admission to citizenship of all per-
sons not citizens who owe permanent allegiance to the
United States, and who may become residents of any
State or organized Territory of the United States, with
the following modifications: The applicant shall not be
required to renounce allegiance to any foreign sover-
eignty; he shall make his declaration of intention to be-
come a citizen of the United States at least two years
prior to his admission; and residence within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States, owing such permanent allegi-
ance shall be regarded as residence within the United
States within the meaning of the five years' residence
clause of the existing law.
Sec. 31. That this Act shall take effect and be in force
from and after ninety days from the date of its passage:
Provided, That sections one, two, twenty-eight, and
twenty-nine shall go into effect from and after the
passage of this Act.
Act of March 2, 1907 {S4 Stat, at L. 1228), in Reference
to the Expatriation of Citizens and their Protection
Abroad.
Be it eriacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress as-
sembled, That the Secretary of State shall be authorized,
APPENDIX. 439
in his discretion, to issue passports to persons not citi-
zens of the United States as follows: Where any person
has made a declaration of intention to become such a
citizen as provided by law, and has resided in the United
States for three years, a passport may be issued to him
entitling him to the protection of the Government in any
foreign country: Provided, That such passport shall not
be valid for more than six months and shall not be re-
newed, and that such passport shall not entitle the holder
to the protection of this Government in the country of
which he was a citizen prior to making such declaration
of intention.
Sec. 2. That any American citizen shall be deemed to
have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized
in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or when
he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state.
When any naturalized citizen shall have resided for
two years in the foreign state from which he came, or
for five years in any other foreign state it shall be pre-
sumed that he has ceased to be an American citizen, and
the place of his general abode shall be deemed his place
of residence during said years: Provided, however,
That such presumption may be overcome on the presenta-
tion of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular
officer of the United States, under such rules and regu-
lations as the Department of State may prescribe: And
provided also, That no American citizen shall be allowed
to expatriate himself when this country is at war.
Sec, 3. That any American woman who marries a
foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband. At
the termination of the marital relation she may resume
her American citizenship, if abroad, by registering as an
American citizen within one year with a consul of the
United States, or by returning to reside in the United
States, or, if residing in the United States at the
440 NATURALIZATION.
termination of the marital relation, by continuing to
reside therein.
Sec. 4. That any foreign woman who acquires American
citizenship by marriage to an American shall be assumed
to retain the same after the termination of the marital
relation if she continue to reside in the United States,
unless she makes formal renunciation thereof before a
court having jurisdiction to naturalize aliens, or if she
resides abroad she may retain her citizenship by regis-
tering as such before a United States consul within one
year after the termination of such marital relation.
Sec. 5. That a child born without the United States
of alien parents shall be deemed a citizen of the United
States by virtue of the naturalization of or resumption
of American citizenship by the parent: Provided, That
such naturalization or resumption takes place during the
minority of such child: And provided further, That the
citizenship of such minor child shall begin at the time
such minor child begins to reside permanently in the
United States.
Sec. 6. That all children born outside the limits of the
United States who are citizens thereof in accordance
with the provisions of section nineteen hundred and
ninety-three of the Revised Statutes of the United States
and who continue to reside outside the United States
shall, in order to receive the protection of this Govern-
ment, be required upon reaching the age of eighteen
years to record at an American consulate their intention
to become residents and remain citizens of the United
States and shall be further required to take the oath of
allegiance to the United States upon attaining their
majority.
Sec. 7. That duplicates of any evidence, registration,
or other acts required by this Act shall be filed with the
Department of State for record.
APPENDIX. 441
NATURALIZATION CONVENTIONS TO WHICH THE
UNITED STATES IS A PARTY.
CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY [17 Stat, at L.
833].
Signed September 20, 1870; Ratified March 24, 1871;
Ratifications Exchanged July 14, 187 1; Proclaimed
August 1, 1871.
Article I.
Citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy who have
resided in the United States of America uninterruptedly
at least five years, and during such residence have be-
come naturalized citizens of the United States, shall be
held by the government of Austria and Hungary to be
American citizens, and shall be treated as such.
Reciprocally, citizens of the United States of America
who have resided in the territories of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy uninterruptedly at least five years,
and during such residence have become naturalized citi-
zens of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, shall be held
by the United States to be citizens of the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy, and shall be treated as such.
The declaration of an intention to become a citizen of
the one or the other country has not for either party the
effect of naturalization.
Article II.
A naturalized citizen of the one party, on return to
the territory of the other party, remains liable to trial
and punishment for an action punishable by the laws of
his original country committed before his emigration,
saving always the limitation established by the laws of
his original country and any other remission of liability
to punishment.
In particular, a former citizen of the Austro-Hungar-
ian Monarchy, who, under the first article, is to be held
442 NATURALIZATION.
as an American citizen, is liable to trial and punishment,
according to the laws of Austro-Hungary, for non-fulfil-
ment of military duty:
1st. If he has emigrated, after having been drafted at
the time of conscription, and thus having become en-
rolled as a recruit for service in the standing army.
2d. If he has emigrated whilst he stood in service un-
der the flag, or had a leave of absence only for a limited
time.
3d. If, having a leave of absence for an unlimited
time, or belonging to the reserve or to the militia, he
has emigrated after having received a call into serv-
ice, or after a public proclamation requiring his appear-
ance, or after war has broken out.
On the other hand, a former citizen of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy naturalized in the United States,
who by or after his emigration has transgressed the legal
provisions on military duty by any acts or omissions
other than those above enumerated in the clauses num-
bered one, two, and three, can, on his return to his
original country, neither be held subsequently to military
service nor remain liable to trial and punishment for the
non-fulfilment of his military duty.
Article III.
The convention for the mutual delivery of criminals,
fugitives from justice, concluded on the 3d July, 1856,
[11 Stat, at L. 691], between the government of the
United States of America, on the one part, and the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, on the other part, as well
as the additional convention, signed on the 8th May,
1848 [9 Stat, at L. 944], to the treaty of commerce and
navigation concluded between the said governments on
the 27th of August, 1829 [8 Stat, at L. 398], and espe-
cially the stipulations of Article IV of the said additional
convention concerning the delivery of the deserters from
APPENDIX. 443
the ships of war and merchant vessels, remain in force
without change.
Article IV .
The emigrant from the one state, who, according to
Article I, is to be held as a citizen of the other state,
shall not, on his return to his original country, be con-
strained to resume his former citizenship; yet if he shall
of his own accord re-acquire it, and renounce the citizen-
ship obtained by naturalization, such a renunciation is
allowable, and no fixed period of residence shall be re-
quired for the recognition of his recovery of citizenship
in his original country.
Article V.
The present convention shall go into effect immedi-
ately on the exchange of ratifications, and shall continue
in force ten years. If neither party shall have given to
the other six months' previous notice of its intention
then to terminate the same, it shall further remain in
force until the end of twelve months after either of the
contracting parties shall have given notice to the other
of such intention.
Article VI.
The present convention shall be ratified by the Presi-
dent of the United States, by and with the consent of
the Senate of the United States, and by his Majesty the
Emperor of Austria, &c.. King of Hungary, with the con-
stitutional consent of the two legislatures of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy, and the ratifications shall be ex-
changed at Vienna within twelve months from the date
hereof.
In faith whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed this
convention as well in German as in English, and have
thereto affixed their seals.
Done at Vienna the twentieth day of September, in
444 NATURALIZATION.
the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
seventy, in the ninety-fifth year of the Independence of
the United States of America, and in the twenty-second
year of the reign of his imperial and royal Apostolic
Majesty.
[seal.] John Jay.
[seal.] Beust.
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE GRAND
DUCHY OF BADEN [16 Stat, at L. 731].
Concluded July 19, 1868; Exchanged December 7,
1869; Proclaimed January 10, 1870.
Article I.
Citizens of the Grand Duchy of Baden, who have re-
sided uninterruptedly within the United States of Amer-
ica five years, and before, during, or after that time have
become or shall become naturalized citizens of the
United States, shall be held by Baden to be American
citizens, and shall be treated as such. Reciprocally, citi-
zens of the United States of America, who have resided
uninterruptedly within the Grand Duchy of Baden five
years, and before, during, or after that time have become
or shall become naturalized citizens of the Grand Duchy
of Baden, shall be held by the United States to be citi-
zens of Baden, and shall be treated as such. The declar-
ation of an intention to become a citizen of the one or
the other country has not for either party the effect of
naturalization.
Article II.
A naturalized citizen of the one party, on return to
the territory of the other party, remains liable to trial
and punishment for an action punishable by the laws of
his original country, and committed before his emigra-
tion, saving always the limitation established by the
laws of his original country, or any other remission of
APPENDIX. 445
liability to punishment. In particular, a former Badener
who, under the first article, is to be held as an American
citizen, is liable to trial and punishment according to
the laws of Baden for non-fulfilment of military duty:
1. If he has emigrated after he, on occasion of the
draft from those owing military duty, has been enrolled
as a recruit for service in the standing army.
2. If he has emigrated whilst he stood in service under
the flag, or had a leave of absence only for a limited
time.
3. If, having a leave of absence for an unlimited time,
or belonging to the reserve or to the militia, he has emi-
grated after having received a call into service, or after
a public proclamation requiring his appearance, or after
war has broken out.
On the other hand, a former Badener, naturalized in
the United States, who, by or after his emigration, has
transgressed or shall transgress the legal provisions on
military duty by any acts or omissions other than those
above enumerated in the clauses numbered one to three,
can, on his return to his original country, neither be held
subsequently to military service, nor remain liable to trial
and punishment for the non-fulfilment of his military
duty. Moreover, the attachment on the property of an
emigrant for non-fulfilment of his military duty, except in
the cases designated in the clauses numbered one to three,
shall be removed so soon as he shall prove his naturali-
zation in the United States according to the first article.
Article III.
The convention for the mutual delivery of criminals,
fugitives from justice, concluded between the Grand
Duchy of Baden on the one part and the United States
of America on the other part, the thirtieth day of Jan-
uary, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-seven, remains
in force without change.
446 NATURALIZATION.
Article IV.
The emigrant from the one state who, according to the
first article, is to be held as a citizen of the other state
shall not on his return to his original country be con-
strained to resume his former citizenship; yet if he shall
of his own accord reacquire it and renounce the citizen-
ship obtained by naturalization, such a renunciation is
allowed, and no fixed period of residence shall be required
for the recognition of his recovery of citizenship in his
original country.
Article V.
The present convention shall go into effect immediately
on the exchange of ratifications, and shall continue in
force ten years. If neither party shall have given to the
other six months' previous notice of its intention then
to terminate the same, it shall remain in force until the
end of twelve months after either of the contracting
parties shall have given notice of such intention.
Article VI.
The present convention shall be ratified by His Royal
Highness the Grand Duke of Baden and by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the
United States, and the ratifications shall be exchanged
at Carlsruhe as soon as possible.
In faith whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed and
sealed this convention.
Carlsruhe, the 19th July, 1868.
[seal.] George Bancroft.
[seal.] v. Freydorf.
APPENDIX. 447
TREATY BETWEBN THE UNITED STATES AND THE KINGDOM
OF BAVARIA [15 Stat, at L. 66l].
Concluded May 26 , 1868; Ratified September 18, 1868;
Proclaimed October 8, 1868.
Article I.
Citizens of Bavaria, who have become, or shall become,
naturalized citizens of the United States of America and
shall have resided uninterruptedly within the United
States five years, shall be held by Bavaria to be American
citizens, and shall be treated as such.
Reciprocally: Citizens of the United States of America
who have become, or shall become, naturalized citizens
of Bavaria, and shall have resided uninterruptedly within
Bavaria five years, shall be held by the United States to
be Bavarian citizens, and shall be treated as such.
The declaration of an intention to become a citizen of
the one or the other country has not for either party the
effect of naturalization.
Article II.
A naturalized citizen of the one party on return to the
territory of the other party remains liable to trial and
punishment for an action punishable by the laws of his
original country, and committed before his emigration,
saving always the limitation established by the laws of
his original country, or any other remission of liability
to punishment.
Article III.
The convention for the mutual delivery of criminals,
fugitives from justice, in certain cases, concluded be-
tween the United States, on the one part, and Bavaria,
on the other part, the twelfth day of September, one
thousand eight hundred and fifty-three, remains in force
without change.
448 NATURALIZATION
Article IV.
If a Bavarian, naturalized in America, renews his resi-
dence in Bavaria, without the intent to return to
America, he shall be held to have renounced his nat-
uralization in the United States.
Reciprocally, if an American, naturalized in Bavaria,
renews his residence in the United States, without the
intent to return to Bavaria, he shall be held to have
renounced his naturalization in Bavaria.
The intent not to return may be held to exist when
the person naturalized in the one country resides more
than two years in the other country.
Article V.
The present convention shall go into effect imme-
diately on the exchange of ratifications, and shall con-
tinue in force for ten years. If neither party shall have
given to the other six months' previous notice of its in-
tention then to terminate the same, it shall further re-
main in force until the end of twelve months after either
of the contracting parties shall have given notice to the
other of such intention.
Article VI.
The present convention shall be ratified by His Majesty
the King of Bavaria, and by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate of the United
States, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Munich
within twelve months from the date hereof.
In faith whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed and
sealed this convention.
Munich, the 26th May, 1868.
[seal.] George Bancroft.
[seal.] Dr. Otto Fhr. von Volderndorff.
APPENDIX. 449
PROTOCOL.
Done at Munich, the 26th May, 1868,
The undersigned met to-day to sign the treaty agreed
upon in conformity with their respective full powers,
relating to the citizenship of those persons who emigrate
from Bavaria to the United States of America, and from
the United States of America to Bavaria; on which oc-
casion the following observations, more exactly defining
and explaining the contents of this treaty, were entered
in the following protocol:
I. RELATING TO THE FIRST ARTICLE OF THE TREATY.
1. Inasmuch as the copulative "and" is made use
of, it follows, of course, that not the naturalization
alone, but an additional five years' uninterrupted resi-
dence is required before a person can be regarded as
coming within the treaty; but it is by no means requisite
that the five years' residence should take place after the
naturalization. It is hereby further understood that
if a Bavarian has been discharged from his Bavarian
indigenate, or on the other side, if an American has been
discharged from his American citizenship in the manner
legally prescribed by the government of his original
country, and then acquires naturalization in the other
country in a rightful and perfectly valid manner, then
an additional five years' residence shall no longer be
required, but a person so naturalized shall from the
moment of his naturalization be held and treated as a
Bavarian, and reciprocally as an American citizen.
2. The words "resided uninterruptedly" are obviously
to be understood, not of a continued bodily presence,
but in the legal sense, and therefore a transient absence,
a journey, or the like, by no means interrupts the period
of five years contemplated by the first article.
5233—29
450 NATURALIZATION
II. RELATING TO THE SECOND ARTICLE OF THE TREATY.
1. It is expressly agreed, that a person who, under the
first article, is to be held as an adopted citizen of the
other state, on his return to his original country can not
be made punishable for the act of emigration itself,
not even though at a later day he should have lost his
adopted citizenship.
III. RELATING TO ARTICLE FOUR OF THE TREATY.
1. It is agreed on both sides, that the regulative pow-
ers granted to the two governments respectively, by
their laws for protection against resident aliens, whose
residence endangers peace and order in the land, are not
affected by the treaty. In particular the regulation con-
tained in the second clause of the tenth Article of the
Bavarian military law of the 30th of January, 1868, accord-
ing to which Bavarians emigrating from Bavaria before
the fulfilment of their military duty can not be admitted
to a permanent residence in the land till they shall have
become thirty-two years old, is not affected by the treaty.
But yet it is established and agreed, that by the expres-
sion ''permanent residence," used in the said article, the
above described emigrants are not forbidden to under-
take a journey to Bavaria for a less period of time and
for definite purposes, and the royal Bavarian govern-
ment moreover cheerfully declares itself ready, in all
cases in which the emigration has plainly taken place in
good faith, to allow a mild rule in practice to be adopted.
2. It is hereby agreed that when a Bavarian natural-
ized in America and reciprocally an American naturalized
in Bavaria takes up his abode once more in his original
country without the intention of return to the country
of his adoption, he does by no means thereby recover
his former citizenship; on the contrary, in so far as it
relates to Bavaria, it depends on his Majesty, the King,
APPENDIX. 451
whether he will, or will not in that event grant the
Bavarian citizenship anew.
The article fourth shall accordingly have only this
meaning, that the adopted country of the emigrant can
not prevent him from acquiring once more his former
citizenship; but not that the state to which the emigrant
originally belonged is bound to restore him at once to
his original relation.
On the contrary, the citizen naturalized abroad must
first apply to be received back into his original country
in the manner prescribed by its laws and regulations,
and must acquire citizenship anew, exactly like any
other alien.
But yet it is left to his own free choice, whether he
will adopt that course or will preserve the citizenship of
the country of his adoption.
The two plenipotentiaries give each other mutually
the assurance that their respective governments in rati-
fying this treaty will also regard as approved and will
maintain the agreements and explanations contained in
the present protocol, without any further formal ratifi-
cation of the same.
[seal.] George Bancroft.
[seal.] Dr. Otto Fhr. von Volderndorff.
CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BELGIUM.
[16 Stat, at L. 747].
Concluded November 16 , 1868; Ratifications Exchanged
July 10, 1869; Proclaimed July 30, 1869.
Article I.
Citizens of the United States who may or shall have
been naturalized in Belgium will be considered by the
United States as citizens of Belgium. Reciprocally, Bel-
gians who may or who shall have been naturalized in the
452 NATURALIZATION
United States will be considered by Belgium as citizens
of the United States.
Article II.
Citizens of either contracting party, in case of their
return to their original country, can be prosecuted there
for crimes or misdemeanors committed before natu-
ralization, saving to them such limitations as are estab-
lished by the laws of their original country.
Article III.
Naturalized citizens of either contracting party who
shall have resided five years in the country which has
naturalized them, can not bejheld to the obligation of
military service in their original country, or to incidental
obligation resulting therefrom, in the event of their re-
turn to it, except in cases of desertion from organized
and embodied military or naval service, or those that
may be assimilated thereto by the laws of that country.
Article IV.
Citizens of the United States naturalized in Belgium
shall be considered by Belgium as citizens of the United
States when they shall have recovered their character as
citizens of the United States according to the laws of
the United States. Reciprocally, Belgians naturalized
in the United States shall be considered as Belgians by
the United States when they shall have recovered their
character as Belgians according to the laws of Belgium.
Article V.
The present convention shall enter into execution im-
mediately after the exchange of ratifications, and shall re-
main in force for ten years. If, at the expiration of that
APPENDIX. 453
period, neither of the contracting parties shall have
given notice six months in advance of its intention to
terminate the same, it shall continue in force until the
end of twelve months after one of the contracting par-
ties shall have given notice to the other of such in-
tention.
Article VI.
The present convention shall be ratified by the Presi-
dent of the United States, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and by his Majesty the King of
the Belgians, with the consent of Parliament, and the
ratifications shall be exchanged at Brussels within twelve
months from the date hereof, or sooner if possible.
In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries
have signed the same, and affixed thereto their seals.
Made in duplicate at Brussels, the sixteenth of No-
vember, one thousand eight hundred aud sixty-eight.
[seal.] H. S. Sanford.
[seal.] Jules Vander Stichelen.
CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND DENMARK [17 Stat, at L. 941].
Concluded July 20, 1872; Ratified January 22, 1873;
Ratifications Exchanged March 14-, 1873; Pro-
claimed April 15, 1873.
Article I.
Citizens of the United States of America who have
become, or shall become, and are, naturalized, according
to law, within the Kingdom of Denmark as Danish sub-
jects, shall be held by the United States of America to
be in all respects and for all purposes Danish subjects,
454 NATURALIZATION
and shall be treated as such by the United States of
America.
In like manner, Danish subjects who have become, or
shall become, and are, naturalized, according to law,
within the United States of America as citizens thereof,
shall be held by the Kingdom of Denmark to be in all
respects and for all purposes as citizens of the United
States of America, and shall be treated as such by the
Kingdom of Denmark.
Article II.
If any such citizen of the United States, as aforesaid,
naturalized within the Kingdom of Denmark as a Danish
subject, should renew his residence in the United States,
the United States government may, on his application,
and on such conditions as that government may see fit
to impose, readmit him to the character and privileges
of a citizen of the United States, aud the Danish govern-
ment shall not, in that case, claim him as a Danish sub-
ject on account of his former naturalization.
In like manner, if any such Danish subject, as afore-
said, naturalized within the United States as a citizen
thereof, should renew his residence within the Kingdom
of Denmark, His Majesty's government may, on his ap-
plication, and on such conditions as that government
may think fit to impose, readmit him to the character
and privileges of a Danish subject, and the United States
government shall not, in that case, claim him as a citi-
zen of the United States on account of his former
naturalization.
Article III.
If, however, a citizen of the United States, naturalized
in Denmark, shall renew his residence in the former
country without the intent to return to that in which
APPENDIX.
455
he was naturalized, he shall be held to have renounced
his naturalization.
In like manner, if a Dane, naturalized in the United
States, shall renew his residence in Denmark without the
intent to return to the former country, he shall be held
to have renounced his naturalization in the United
States.
The intent not to return may be held to exist when a
person naturalized in the one country shall reside more
than two years in the other country.
Article IV.
The present convention shall go into effect immedi-
ately on or after the exchange of the ratifications, and
shall continue in force for ten years. If neither party
shall have given to the other six months' previous notice
of its intention then to terminate the same, it shall fur-
ther remain in force until the end of twelve months after
either of the contracting parties shall have given notice
to the other of such intention.
Article V.
The present convention shall be ratified by the Presi-
dent of the United States of America, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by His
Majesty the King of Denmark, and the ratifications shall
be exchanged at Copenhagen as soon as may be, within
eight months from the date hereof.
In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries
have signed the same, and have affixed thereto their re-
spective seals.
Done at Copenhagen, the twentieth day of July, in
the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
seventy-two.
[seal.] Michael J. Cramer.
[seal.] 0. D. Rosenorn-Lehn.
456 NATURALIZATION
CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
GREAT BRITAIN [16 Stat, at L. 775].
Concluded May 13, 1870; Ratifications Exchanged
August 10, 1870; Proclaimed September 16 , 1870.
Article I;
Citizens of the United States of America who have
become, or shall become, and are naturalized according
to law within the British dominions as British subjects,
shall, subject to the provisions of Article II, be held by
the United States to be in all respects and for all pur-
poses British subjects, and shall be treated as such by
the United States.
Reciprocally, British subjects who have become, or
shall become, and are naturalized according to law within
the United States of America as citizens thereof, shall,
subject to the provisions of Article II, be held by Great
Britain to be in all respects and for all purposes citizens
of the United States, and shall be treated as such by
Great Britain.
Article II.
Such citizens of the United States as aforesaid who
have become and are naturalized within the dominions
of Her Britannic Majesty as British subjects, shall be at
liberty to renounce their naturalization and to resume
their nationality as citizens of the United States, pro-
vided that such renunciation be publicly declared within
two years after the exchange of the ratifications of the
present convention.
Such British subjects as aforesaid who have become
and are naturalized as citizens within the United States,
shall be at liberty to renounce their naturalization and
to resume their British nationality, provided that such
APPENDIX. 457
renunciation be publicly declared within two years after
the twelfth day of May, 1870.
The manner in which this renunciation may be made
and publicly declared shall be agreed upon by the gov-
ernments of the respective countries.
Article III.
If any such citizen of the United States as aforesaid,
naturalized within the dominions of her Britannic
Majesty, should renew his residence in the United States,
the United States government may, on his own applica-
tion and on such conditions as that government may
think fit to impose, readmit him to the character and
privileges of a citizen of the United States, and Great
Britain shall not, in that case, claim him as a British
subject on account of his former naturalization.
In the same manner, if any such British subject as afore-
said naturalized in the United States should renew his
residence within the dominions of her Britannic Majesty,
her Majesty's government may, on his own application
and on such conditions as that government may think
fit to impose, readmit him to the character and privi-
leges of a British subject, and the United States shall
not, in that case, claim him as a citizen of the United
States on account of his former naturalization.
Article IV.
The present convention shall be ratified by the Presi-
dent of the United States, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate thereof, and by her Britannic
Majesty, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Lon-
don as soon as may be within twelve months from the
date hereof.
In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries
458 NATURALIZATION
have signed the same, and have affixed thereto their re-
spective seals.
Done at London, the thirteenth day of May, in the
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
seventy.
[seal.] John Lothrop Motley.
[seal.] Clarendon.
SUPPLEMENTAIv CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN CONCERNING THE RENUN-
CIATION OF NATURALIZATION IN CERTAIN CASES [17
Stat, at Iv. 841].
Signed February 23, 1871; Ratified March 24, 1871;
Ratifications Exchanged May 4, 1871; Proclaimed
May 5, 1871.
Article I.
Any person, being originally a citizen of the United
States, who had previously to May 13th, 1870, been natu-
ralized as a British subject, may, at any time before Au-
gust 10th, 1872, and any British subject who, at the date
first aforesaid, had been naturalized as a citizen within
the United States, may, at any time before May 12th, 1872,
publicly declare his renunciation of such naturalization
by subscribing an instrument in writing substantially in
the form hereunto appended, and designated as Annex A.
Such renunciation, by an original citizen of the United
States, of British nationality, shall, within the terri-
tories and jurisdiction of the United States, be made in
duplicate, in the presence of any court authorized by
law for the time being to admit aliens to naturalization,
or before the clerk or prothonotary of any such court: If
the declarant be beyond the territories of the United
States, it shall be made in duplicate, before any diplo-
matic or consular officer of the United States. One of
such duplicates shall remain of record in the custody of
the court or officer in whose presence it was made; the
APPENDIX. 459
other shall be, without delay, transmitted to the Depart-
ment of State.
Such renunciation, if declared by an original British
subject, of his acquired nationality as a citizen of the
United States, shall, if the declarant be in the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, be made in dup-
licate, in the presence of a justice of the peace; if else-
where in Her Britannic Majesty's dominions, in tripli-
cate, in the presence of any judge of civil or criminal
jurisdiction, of any justice of the peace, or of any other
officer for the time being authorized by law, in the place
in which the declarant is, to administer an oath for any
judicial or other legal purpose: if out of Her Majesty's
dominions, in triplicate, in the presence of any officer in
the diplomatic or consular service of Her Majesty.
Article II.
The contracting parties hereby engage to communicate
each to the other, from time to time, lists of the persons
who, within their respective dominions and territories,
or before their diplomatic and consular officers, have de-
clared their renunciation of naturalization, with the dates
and places of making such declarations, and such infor-
mation as to the abode of the declarants, and the times
and places of their naturalization, as they may have
furnished.
Article III.
The present convention shall be ratified by the Presi-
dent of the United States, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Britannic
Majesty, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at
Washington as soon as may be convenient.
In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries
have signed the same, and have affixed thereto their
respective seals.
460 NATURALIZATION
Done at Washington the twenty-third day of Febru-
ary, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred
and seventy-one.
[seal.] Hamilton Fish.
[seal.] Edw'd Thornton.
Annex A.
I, A. B., of [insert abode], being originally a citizen of
the United States of America, [or a British subject,] and
having become naturalized within the dominions of Her
Britannic Majesty as a British subject, [or as a citizen
within the United States of America,] do hereby renounce
my naturalization as a British subject, [or citizen of the
United States,] and declare that it is my desire to resume
my nationality as a citizen of the United States, [or
British subject.]
(Signed) A. B.
Made and subscribed to before me, , in [insert
country or othersubdivision, and State, province, colony,
legation, or consulate,] this day of ,
187
(Signed) E. F.,
Justice of the Peace, [or other title.]
[seal.] Hamilton Fish.
[seal.] Edw'd Thornton.
APPENDIX. 461
NATURALIZATION TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI [33 Stat, at L. 2101].
Signed at Washington March 22, 1902; Ratification
advised by the Senate February 1, 1904; Ratified
, by the President March 17, 1904; Ratified by
Haiti, April 24, 1903; Ratifications Exchanged at
Washington March 19, 1904; Proclaimed March
24, 1904.
Article I.
Citizens of the United States of America who shall
have been duly naturalized as citizens of Haiti, and who
shall have resided uninterruptedly in Haiti during a
period of five years, shall be recognized by the United
States as citizens of Haiti.
Reciprocally, citizens of Haiti who shall have been
duly naturalized as citizens of the United States of
America, and who shall have resided uninterruptedly in
the United States during a period of five years, shall be
recognized by Haiti as citizens of the United States.
This article shall apply as well to those already natu-
ralized in either country as those hereafter naturalized.
Article II.
The person who, after having become a naturalized
citizen of one of the contracting States, shall return to
live in the country of his origin, without intention to
return to the country where he has been naturalized,
shall be considered as having renounced the nationality
obtained through naturalization.
Article III.
The intent not to return may be held to exist when
the person naturalized in the one country resides more
than two years in the other country.
462 NATURALIZATION
Article IV.
The naturalized citizens of either State who return to
their country of origin, will be there liable to prosecu-
tion and punishment in conformity to the laws for the
crimes or misdemeanors committed before their emigra-
tion and that are not covered by the statute of limita-
tions.
Article V.
The declaration of intention to become a citizen of
the one or the other country has not for either party
the effect of naturalization.
Article VI .
The present treaty shall remain in force for ten years
from the date of the exchange of ratifications; and un-
less one of the contracting parties shall notify the other
of its intention to terminate it one year before the ex-
piration of that period, the said treaty shall continue
in force from year to year until the expiration of one
year after official notice shall have been given by either
of the contracting governments of a purpose to termin-
ate it.
Article VII.
The present treaty shall be submitted to the approval
and ratification of the respective appropriate authorities
of each of the contracting parties, and the ratifications
shall be exchanged at Washington as soon as possible
within twelve months from the date hereof.
In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries
have signed the foregoing articles, and have affixed their
seals.
Done in duplicate at the City of Washington, in the
English and French languages this twenty-second day of
March, 1902.
[seal.] John Hay.
[seal.] J. N. LtGER.
APPENDIX. 463
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND HAITI EX-
TENDING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH MAY BE EFFECTED
THE EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE TREATY OF
NATURALIZATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES,
SIGNED MARCH 22, 1902 [33 Stat, at L. 2157].
Signed at Washingtori February 28, 1903; Ratification
advised by the Senate February 1, 1904; Ratified
by the President March 17, 1904; Ratified by
Haiti April 24, 1903; Ratifications Exchanged at
Washingto7i March 19, 1904; Proclaimed March
24, 1904.
Sole Article.
The respective ratifications of the said treaty shall be
exchanged as soon as possible, and within twelve months
from March 22, 1903.
Done in duplicate at Washington, in the English and
French languages, this 28th day of February, A. D, 1903.
[seal.] John Hay.
[seal.] J. N. Leiger.
CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND HESSE
[16 Stat, at L. 743].
Concluded August 1, 1868; Ratifications Exchanged
July 23, 1869; Proclaimed August 31, 1869.
Article I.
Citizens of the parts of the Grand Duchy of Hesse not
included in the North German Confederation, who have
become or shall become naturalized citizens of the United
States of America, and shall have resided uninterruptedly
within the United States five years, shall be held by the
464 NATURALIZATION
Grand Ducal Hessian government to be American citizens,
and shall be treated as such.
Reciprocally: Citizens of the United States of America,
who have become or shall become naturalized citizens of
the above-described parts of the Grand Duchy of Hesse,
and shall have resided uninterruptedly therein five years,
shall be held by the United States to be citizens of the
Grand Duchy of Hesse, and shall be treated as such.
The declaration of an intention to become a citizen of
the one or the other country has not for either party the
effect of naturalization.
Article II.
A naturalized citizen of the one party, on return to the
territory of the other party, remains liable to trial and
punishment for an action punishable by the laws of his
original country and committed before his emigration,
saving always the limitation established by the laws of
his original country.
Article III.
The convention for the mutual delivery of criminals,
fugitives from justice, in certain cases, concluded between
the United States of America and the Grand Duchy of
Hesse, on the 16th of June, 1852 [10 Stat, at L. 964],
remains in force, without change.
Article IV.
If a Hessian, naturalized in America, but originally a
citizen of the parts of the Grand Duchy not included in
the North German Confederation, renews his residence in
those parts without the intent to return to America, he
shall be held to have renounced his naturalization in the
United States.
APPENDIX. 465
Reciprocally: If an American, naturalized in the Grand
Duchy of Hesse, (within the above-described parts,)
renews his residence in the United States without the
intent to return to Hesse, he shall be held to have
renounced his naturalization in the Grand Duchy.
The intent not to return may be held to exist, when
the person naturalized in the one country resides more
than two years in the other country.
Article V.
The present convention shall go into effect immedi-
ately, on the exchange of ratifications, and shall continue
in force for ten years. If neither party shall have given
to the other six months' previous notice of its intention
then to terminate the same, it shall further remain in
force until the end of twelve months after either of the
contracting parties shall have given notice to the other
of such intention.
Article VI.
The present convention shall be ratified by the Presi-
dent of the United States of America, and by his Royal
Highness the Grand Duke of Hesse and by Rhine, &c.
The ratification of the first is to take effect by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate of the United
States; on the Grand Ducal Hessian side, the assent of
the States of the Grand Duchy is reserved, in so far as it
is required by the constitution.
The ratifications shall be exchanged at Berlin within
one year of the present date.
In faith whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed and
sealed this convention.
Darmstadt, the 1st of August, 1868.
[seal.] Geo. Bancroft.
[seal.] Friedrich Freiherr von Lindelof.
5233-30
466 NATURALIZATION
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION [IS Stat, at L. 6l5].
Co7icluded February 22, 1868; Ratification Advised by
Senate, with Amendme7it, March 26, 1868; Ratified
by President March 30, 1868; Ratified by King of
Prussia, April 11, 1868; Ratifications Exchanged
at Berlin May 9, 1868; Proclaimed by President
May 27, 1868.
Article I.
Citizens of the North German Confederation, who be-
come naturalized citizens of the United States of America
and shall have resided uninterruptedly within the United
States five years, shall be held by the North German
Confederation to be American citizens, and shall be
treated as such.
Reciprocally: Citizens of the United States of America
who become naturalized citizens of the North German
Confederation, and shall have resided uninterruptedly
within North Germany five years, shall be held by the
United States to be North German citizens, and shall be
treated as such.
The declaration of an intention to become a citizen of
the one or the other country has not for either party
the effect of naturalization.
This article shall apply as well to those already
naturalized in either country as those hereafter natu-
ralized.
Article IL
A naturalized citizen of the one party on return to the
territory of the other party remains liable to trial and
punishment for an action punishable by the laws of his
original country and committed before his emigration;
saving, always, the limitation established by the laws of
his original country.
APPENDIX. 467
Article III.
The convention for the mutual delivery of criminals,
fugitives from justice, in certain cases, concluded be-
tween the United States on the one part, and Prussia and
other States of Germany on the other part, the sixteenth
day of June, 1852, is hereby extended to all the States of
the North German Confederation.
Article IV.
If a German naturalized in America renews his resi-
dence in North Germany, without the intent to return
to America, he shall be held to have renounced his natu-
ralization in the United States.
Reciprocally: If an American naturalized in North
Germany renews his residence in the United States, with-
out the intent to return to North Germany, he shall be
held to have renounced his naturalization in North
Germany.
The intent not to return may be held to exist when
the person naturalized in the one country resides more
than two years in the other country.
Article V.
The present convention shall go into effect immediately
on the exchange of ratifications, and shall continue in
force for ten years. If neither party shall have given
to the other six months' previous notice of its intention
then to terminate the same, it shall further remain in
force until the end of twelve months after either of the
contracting parties shall have given notice to the other
of such intention.
Article VI.
The present convention shall be ratified by the Presi-
dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
of the United States, and by his Majesty the King of
468 NATURALIZATION
Prussia in the name of the North German Confedera-
tion; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Berlin
within six months from the date hereof.
In faith whereof, the plenipotentiaries have signed and
sealed this convention.
Berlin, the 22d of February, 1868.
[Seal.] George Bancroft.
[Seal.] Bernhard Konig.
CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND SWEDEN AND NORWAY [17
Stat, at L. 809] .
Signed May 26, 1869; Ratified December 17, 1870;
Ratifications Exchanged June 14, 1871; Pro-
claimed January 12, 1872.
Art. I.
Citizens of the United States of America who have
resided in Sweden or Norway for a continuous period of
at least five years, and during such residence have be-
come and are lawfully recognized as citizens of Sweden
or Norway, shall be held by the government of the
United States to be Swedish or Norwegian citizens, and
shall be treated as such.
Reciprocally, citizens of Sweden or Norway who have
resided in the United States of America for a continuous
period of at least five years, and during such residence
have become naturalized citizens of the United States,
shall be held by the government of Sweden and Norway
to be American citizens, and shall be treated as such.
The declaration of an intention to become a citizen of
the one or the other country has not for either party
the effect of citizenship legally acquired.
APPENDIX. 469
Art. II.
A recognized citizen of the one party, on returning to
the territory of the other, remains liable to trial and
punishment for an action punishable by the laws of his
original country and committed before his emigration,
but not for the emigration itself, saving always the limi-
tation established by the laws of his original country
and any other remission of liability to punishment.
Art. III.
If a citizen of the one party, who has become a recog-
nized citizen of the other party, takes up his abode once
more in his original country and applies to be restored
to his former citizenship, the government of the last-
named country is authorized to receive him again as a
citizen, on such conditions as the said government may
think proper.
Art. IV.
The convention for the mutual delivery of criminals,
fugitives from justice, in certain cases, concluded be-
tween the United States on the one part, and Sweden
and Norway on the other part, the 21st March, 1860 [12
Stat, at L. 1125], remains in force without change.
Art. V.
The present convention shall go into effect immediately
on the exchange of ratifications, and shall continue in
force for ten years. If neither party shall have given
the other six months' previous notice of its intention
then to terminate the same, it shall further remain in
force until the end of twelve months after either of the
contracting parties shall have given notice to the other
of such intention.
470 NATURALIZATION
Art. VI.
The present convention shall be ratified by the Presi-
dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
of the United States, and by His Majesty the King of
Sweden and Norway; and the ratifications shall be ex-
changed at Stockholm within twenty-four months from
the date hereof.
In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed and
sealed this convention.
Stockholm, May 26, 1869.
[seal.] Joseph J. Bartlett.
[seal.] C. Wachtmeister.
protocol.
Done at Stockholm, May 26, 1869.
The undersigned met to-day to sign the convention
agreed upon in conformity with their respective full
powers, relating to the citizenship of those persons who
emigrate from the United States of America to Sweden
and Norway, and from Sweden and Norway to the United
States of America; on which occasion the following ob-
servations, more exactly defining and explaining the con-
tents of this convention, were entered in the following
protocol: —
I. Relating to the 1st article of the convention.
It is understood that if a citizen of the United States
of America has been discharged from his American citi-
zenship, or, on the other side, if a Swede or a Norwegian
has been discharged from his Swedish or Norwegian citi-
zenship, in the manner legally prescribed by the govern-
ment of his original country, and then in the other
country in a rightful and perfectly valid manner ac-
quires citizenship, then an additional five years' resi-
dence shall no longer be required; but a person who has
in that manner been recognized as a citizen of the other
APPENDIX. 471
country shall, from the moment thereof, be held and
treated as a Swedish or Norwegian citizen, and, recipro-
cally, as a citizen of the United States.
II. Relating to the second article of the convention.
If a former Swede or Norwegian, who under the first
article is to be held as an adopted citizen of the United
States of America, has emigrated after he has attained
the age when he becomes liable to military service, and
returns again to his original country, it is agreed that he
remains liable to trial and punishment for an action
punishable by the laws of his original country and com-
mitted before his emigration, but not for the act of emi-
gration itself, unless thereby have been committed
any punishable action against Sweden or Norway, or
against a Swedish or Norwegian citizen, such as non-fulfil-
ment of military service, or desertion from the military
force or from a ship, saving always the limitation estab-
lished by the laws of the original country, and any other
remission of liability to punishment; and that he can be
held to fulfil, according to the laws, his military service,
or the remaining part thereof.
III. Relating to the third article of the convention.
It is further agreed that if a Swede or Norwegian, who
has become a naturalized citizen of the United States,
renews his residence in Sweden or Norway without the
intent to return to America, he shall be held by the
government of the United States to have renounced his
American citizenship.
The intent not to return to America may be held to
exist when the person so naturalized resides more than
two years in Sweden or Norway.
[seal.] Joseph J. Bartlett.
[seal.] C. Wachtmeister.
472 NATURALIZATION
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE KINGDOM
OF WUERTTEMBERG [16 Stat, at L. 735].
Concluded July 27, 1868; Proclaimed March 7, 1870.
Article I.
Citizens of Wiirttemberg, who have become or shall
become naturalized citizens of the United States of
America, and shall have resided uninterruptedly within
the United States five years, shall be held by Wiirttem-
berg to be American citizens and shall be treated as
such. Reciprocally, citizens of the United States of
America who have become or shall become naturalized
citizens of Wiirttemberg, and shall have resided unin-
terruptedly within Wiirttemberg five years, shall be held
by the United States to be citizens of Wiirttemberg, and
shall be treated as such. The declaration of an intention
to become a citizen of the one or the other country has
not for either party the effect of naturalization.
Article II.
A naturalized citizen of the one party on return to
the territory of the other party remains liable to trial
and punishment for an action punishable by the laws of
his original country, and committed before his emigra-
tion; saving always the limitation established by the
laws of his original country, or any other remission of
liability to punishment.
Article III.
The convention for the mutual delivery of criminals,
fugitives from justice, in certain cases, concluded between
Wiirttemberg and the United States the 16 June, 1852
—13 October, 1853 [10 Stat, at L. 971], remains in force
without change.
APPENDIX. 473
Article IV.
If a Wiirttemberger, naturalized in America, renews
his residence in Wiirttemberg without the intent to re-
turn to America, he shall be held to have renounced his
naturalization in the United States. Reciprocally, if an
American naturalized in Wiirttemberg, renews his resi-
dence in the United States without the intent to return
to Wiirttemberg, he shall be held to have renounced his
naturalization in Wiirttemberg. The intent not to return
may be held to exist when the person naturalized in the
one country resides more than two years in the other
country.
Article V.
The present convention shall go into effect immedi-
ately on the exchange of ratifications, and shall continue
in force for ten years. If neither party shall have given
to the other six months' previous notice of its intention
then to terminate the same, it shall further remain in
force until the end of twelve months after either of the
high contracting parties shall have given notice to the
other of such intention.
Article VI.
The present convention shall be ratified by his
Majesty the King of Wiirttemberg, with the consent of
the Chambers of the kingdom, and by the President by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the
United States, and the ratifications shall be changed at
Stuttgart as soon as possible, within twelve months from
the date hereof.
In faith whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed and
sealed this convention.
Stuttgart, the twenty-seventh of July, one thousand
eight hundred and sixty-eight.
[seal.] Geo. Bancroft.
[seal.] Freiherr Von Varnbuler.
APPENDIX. 475
EXECUTIVE ORDERS OF APRIL 6 AND APRIL
8, 1907.
AMENDING THE INSTRUCTIONS TO DIPLOMATIC OFFICERS
AND THE CONSULAR REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO
EXPATRIATION, CITIZENSHIP, NATURALIZATION AND
PASSPORTS.*
Executive Order of April 6, 1907.
It is hereby ordered that the instructions to the
diplomatic officers of the United States and the regula-
tions prescribed for the use of the consular service of
the United States be amended in the following parti-
culars, the numbers of the paragraphs amended being
the same in both the instructions and the regulations.
Paragraph 138 shall read as follows:
Children of Citizens Born Abroad. — All children born
out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States
whose fathers were at the time of their birth citizens
thereof are citizens of the United States; but the rights
of citizenship do not descend to children whose fathers
never resided in the United States. All children who
are, in accordance with this paragraph, born citizens of
the United States, and who continue to reside outside
of the United States, are required in order to receive
the protection of this government, upon reaching the
age of eighteen years to record at an American Consulate
their intention to become residents and remain citizens,
*Togive effect to the principal provisions of these Orders, the Depart-
ment of State, on April 19, 1907. issued a set of circular instructions, six
in number, addressed to the American diplomatic and consular officers.
The subjects of these circulars, and the reference to the pages of this
volume where they may be found, are as follows:
"Children of Citizens Born Abroad," pp. 350, 351.
" Expatriation," pp. 341-343.
" Issuance of Passports," pp. 380-384.
" Registration of American Citizens," pp. 352-354.
" Registration of Women Who Desire to Resume or Retain American
Citizenship," pp. 241-243 and 257, 258.
" Reports of Fraudulent Naturalizadon," pp. 136-138.
476 NATURALIZATION
and upon reaching their majority are further required to
take the oath of allegiance to the United States. — R. S.
Sec. 1993; Act of March 2, 1907, Sec. 6.
Paragraph 141 shall read as follows:
Wife of Citizen. — Any white woman or woman of
African nativity or descent or Indian woman married to
a citizen of the United States is a citizen thereof; and
it is immaterial whether the husband became a citizen
before or after marriage. Any woman who acquires
American citizenship by marriage shall be assumed to
have retained it after the termination of the marital re-
lation by death or absolute divorce if she continues to
reside in the United States, unless she makes formal re-
nunciation thereof before a court having jurisdiction to
naturalize aliens; or, if she resides abroad, she may re-
tain American citizenship by registering as an American
citizen before a United States Consul within one year
after the termination of the marital relation. — R. S. Sec.
1994; 25 Stat. L. 392; Act of March 2, 1907, Sec. 4.
After paragraph 141, a new paragraph shall be added
as follows:
An American Woman Who Marries a Foreigner. — An
American woman who marries a foreigner takes the
nationality of her husband. At the termination of the
marital relation, by death or absolute divorce, she may
resume her American citizenship, if abroad, by register-
ing as an American citizen within one year with a consul
of the United States, or by returning to reside in the
United States, or, if residing in the United States at the
termination of the marital relation, by continuing to
reside therein. — Act of March 2, 1907, Sec. 4.
Paragraph 142 shall read as follows:
Children of Naturalized Citizens. — The naturalization
or resumption of American citizenship of the parents
confers American citizenship upon the minor children
and such citizenship shall begin at the time such minor
APPENDIX. 477
children begin to reside permanently in the United
States.— Act of March 2, 1907, Sec. 5.
Paragraph 143 shall read as follows:
Declaration of Intention. — The declaration of inten-
tion to become a citizen of the United States does not
make one a citizen, and the certificate of a court that
such declaration has been made is not evidence of citi-
zenship; but when any alien who has declared his inten-
tion to become a citizen of the United States dies be-
fore he is actually naturalized his widow and minor
children may, by complying with the other provisions of
the naturalization laws, be admitted to citizenship with-
out making the declaration of intention. — Act of June
29, 1906, Sec. 4, Par. 6.
Paragraph 144 shall read as follows:
Expatriation. — An American citizen shall be deemed
to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized
in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or when
he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state.
When any naturalized citizen shall have resided for two
years in the foreign state from which he came, or for five
years in any other foreign state, it shall be presumed
that he has ceased to be an American citizen, and his
place of general abode shall be deemed his place of resi-
dence during the said years: Provided, That such pre-
sumption may be overcome on the presentation of satis-
factory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of
the United States, under such rules and regulations as
the Department of State may prescribe.
An American citizen shall not be allowed to expatriate
himself when this country is at war. — Act of March 2, 1907,
Sec. 2.
After paragraph 144, add the following three para-
graphs:
Registration to Resume or Retain Citizenship. — When
an American woman has married a foreigner and he dies
478 NATURALIZATION
or they are absolutely divorced, in order to resume her
rights as an American citizen, she must register with an
American consulate within one year after the termination
of the marital relation. Whenever any foreign woman
has acquired American citizenship through her marriage,
upon the death of her husband or upon their absolute
divorce she must, if she is abroad and desires to retain her
American citizenship, register as an American citizen be-
fore a United States consul within one year after the
termination of the marital relation. All minor children,
born of American parents outside of the United States,
must, in order to receive the protection of this govern-
ment, at the age of eighteen years, record at an American
consulate their intention to become residents and remain
citizens of the United States. — Act of March 2, 1907, Sec-
tions 3, 4, and 6.
Oath of Allegiance. — Every child born without the
United States of American parents and resident abroad
is required, in order to conserve his American citizenship,
to take the oath of allegiance to the United States before
an American consul, upon attaining his majority. — Act of
March 2, 1907, Sec. 6.
Duplicates of Evidence of Citizenship. — Diplomatic
and consular officers are required to file with the Depart-
ment of State duplicates of any evidence, registration, or
other acts, taken before them in conservation or resump-
tion of citizenship and the right to protection. — Act of
March 2, 1907, Sec. 7.
Paragraph 149 shall read as follows:
To Whom Issued. — No passport shall be granted or
issued to or verified for any persons other than citizens
of the United States or loyal residents of the insular pos-
sessions of the United States by diplomatic or consular
officers. In his discretion the Secretary of State may
issue passports to those who have made the declaration of
intention to become citizens of the United States, but such
APPENDIX. 479
passports are not permitted to be issued by diplomatic
and consular officers. — Section 4076, R. S.; Act of June
14, 1902; Act of March 2, 1907, Sec. 1.
Paragraph 150 shall read as follows:
When Passports May be Issued. — Passports can not be
issued by diplomatic or consular officers, if the applicant
has time to apply to the Department of State and await
its reply. Where inconvenience or hardship would re-
sult to a person entitled to receive a passport unless he
received it at once, a diplomatic officer, or a consular
officer who shall have received authority to do so from
the Secretary of State, may issue to such person an
emergency passport, good for a period not to exceed six
months from the date of issuance, and to be used for a
purpose which shall be stated in the passport.
This paragraph shall become effective July 1, 1907.
Paragraph 151 shall read as follows:
Applications. — Persons entitled to receive passports
who desire to secure them when they are abroad may
make applications therefor to the Department of State
through a diplomatic or consular officer. Native citizens
thus applying must make an affidavit with respect to
birth, take the oath of allegiance, and furnish identifica-
tion by a creditable person, all in duplicate and according
to Form No. . Naturalized citizens must comply
with the same requirements, using Form No. ; and,
if claiming citizenship through naturalization of husband
or parent, using Form No. . A naturalized citizen
must also exhibit his certificate of naturalization or that
of the husband or parent through whom citizenship is
claimed, or a duly certified copy of the court record
thereof. Further evidence of the applicant's citizenship
may be required, if deemed necessary. A loyal resident
of an insular possession of the United States in addition
to the information now required in the case of a citizen
of the United States must state that he owes allegiance
480 NATURALIZATION
to the United States and does not acknowledge allegiance
to any other government, and must submit an affidavit
from at least two credible witnesses having good means
of knowledge in substantiation of his statements of birth,
residence and loyalty. The identity of an applicant for
a passport should always be established when the appli-
cation is taken.
This paragraph shall become effective July 1, 1907.
Paragraph 152 shall read as follows:
Expiration of Passports. — A passport issued by the
Department is good for a period of two years, when it
expires; but it may be renewed for a further period of
two years by a diplomatic officer or by a consular officer
who has received authority for the purpose from the
Secretary of State. It is permissible to renew passports
only once.
This paragraph shall become effective July 1, 1907.
Paragraph 153 shall read as follows:
Old Passport in Lieu of Naturalization Certificate. — An
American citizen who is abroad and who holds a pass-
port which has expired after renewal may apply through
a diplomatic officer or a consular officer for a new pass-
port, and the old passport will be accepted as prima facie
evidence that the citizenship of the applicant was prop-
erly proved when the old passport was granted, and a
naturalized citizen need not, therefore, be required to
produce again the certificate of naturalization through
which he acquired his citizenship. The old passport
should be retained and sent to the Department of State
with the application. If there is any doubt surrounding
the case, however, the applicant should be required to
produce the same evidence that would be required of
him if he were making his first application for a pass-
port.
Paragraph 154 shall be struck out.
APPENDIX. 481
Paragraph 159 shall read as follows:
Fees. — An official fee equivalent to one dollar in the
gold coin of the United States must be collected for
each passport issued.
Paragraph 160 shall read as follows:
Visa. — A diplomatic officer or a consular officer, includ-
ing a consular agent, may visa or verify regularly issued
passports by endorsing thereon the word "Good" in the
language of the country and affixing to the endorsement
his official signature and seal. A diplomatic officer
should visa a passport only when there is no American
consulate established in the city where the mission is
situated, or when the consular officer is absent, or the
government of the country refuses to acknowledge the
validity of the consular visa. Whenever a passport
without signature is presented to be visaed the holder
should be required to sign it before it is visaed by a
diplomatic or consular officer. An official fee equivalent
to one dollar in the gold coin of the United States should
be collected for each passport visaed. No visa shall be
attached to a passport after its validity has expired.
Paragraph 163 shall read as follows:
Return of Passports. — As soon as an emergency pass-
port is issued by a diplomatic or consular officer he shall
transmit to the Department of State a duplicate of the
application and a statement of the proof accepted by
him for the issuance of the passport and of the reason
why the issuance of the passport was necessary. When-
ever an application for a passport is made to the Depart-
ment of State through a diplomatic or consular officer
he shall transmit a duplicate of the application and of
the accompanying proof of the right to receive a pass-
port to the Department of State, but he need not, unless
otherwise instructed, transmit a certificate of naturaliza-
tion.
This paragraph shall become effective July 1, 1907.
5233-31
482 NATURALIZATION
Add, as a separate paragraph, after paragraph 169:
When Protection Should be Denied. — Any one who has
expatriated himself is not entitled to intervention on
the part of any diplomatic or consular officer of the
United States. (See Paragraph 144.)
After paragraph 170 add:
Reports of Fraudulent Naturalization. — When any alien
who has secured naturalization of the United States
shall proceed abroad within five years after his naturali-
zation and shall take up his permanent residence in any
foreign country within five years after the date of his
naturalization, it shall be deemed prima facie evidence
that he did not intend in good faith to become a citizen
of the United States when he applied for naturalization,
and in the absence of countervailing evidence it shall be
sufficient in the proper proceedings to authorize the can-
cellation of his certificate of citizenship as fraudulent.
Diplomatic and consular officers shall furnish the Depart-
ment of State, to be transmitted to the Department of
Justice, the names of those within their jurisdictions,
respectively, who are subject to the provisions of this
requirement, and such statements from diplomatic and
consular officers shall be certified to by such officers
under their official seal, and are under the law admissi-
ble in evidence in all courts to cancel certificates of
naturalization. — Act of June 29, 1906, Sec. 15.
Theodore Roosevelt.
The White House, April 6, 1907.
Executive Order of April 8, 1907.
It is hereby ordered that paragraph 172 of the regu-
lations prescribed for the use of the consular service of
the United States be so amended as to read as follows:
APPENDIX. 483
Registration of American Citizens. — Principal consular
officers should keep at their offices a register of all Ameri-
can citizens residing in their several districts, and will
therefore make it known that such a register is kept and
invite all resident Americans to cause their names to be
entered therein. The same general principles govern
applications for registry which govern applications for
passports. (Paragraph 151.)
The register should show the date of registration, the
full name of the person registered, the date and place of
his birth, the place of his last domicile in the United
States, the date of his arrival in the foreign country
where he is residing and his place of residence therein,
the reasons for his foreign residence, whether or not he
is married and if married the name of his wife, her place
of birth and residence, and if he has children the name,
date, and place of birth and residence of each. The
nature of the proof accepted to establish his citizenship
should also appear, and his signature should be inscribed
in the register.
Consuls may issue certificates of the registration pre-
scribed above for use with the authorities of the place
where the person registered is residing. Each certificate
shall set forth the facts contained in the register and
shall be good for use for one year only and shall be in a
a form prescribed by the Secretary of State (Form
No. .). When a certificate expires a new one may
be issued, the old one being destroyed, if it is clearly
shown that the residence abroad has not assumed a per-
manent character. Persons who hold passports which
have not expired shall not be furnished with certificates
of registration, and it is strictly forbidden to furnish
them to be used for traveling in the place of passports.
Returns of all registrations made and of all certificates
of registration issued shall be made to the embassy or
484 NATURALIZATION.
legation in the country in which the consulate is situ-
ated and to the Secretary of State at intervals and under
regulations to be prescribed by him. No fee will be
charged for registration nor for any service connected
therewith, nor for certificates of registration.
This paragraph shall go into effect July 1, 1907.
Theodore Roosevelt.
The White House, April 8, 1907.
APPENDIX. 485
NATURALIZATION REGULATIONS.
Department of Commerce and Labor,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, October 2, 1906.
1. On and after September 27, 1906, declarations of
intention to become citizens of the United States shall
be filed with the clerks of such state courts only as have
"a seal, a clerk, and jurisdiction in actions at law or
equity, or law and equity, in which the amount in con-
troversy is unlimited."
2. Declarations of intention made prior to September
27, 1906, before clerks of courts having jurisdiction to
naturalize aliens under the provisions of the law exist-
ing at the time such declarations were made, may be
used in lieu of the declarations required by the act of
June 29, 1906, at any time after the expiration of two
years from the date when made.
3. Aliens who have made declarations of intention
prior to September 27, 1906, under the provisions of law
in force at the time of making such declarations, cannot
be required, as a preliminary to filing their petitions for
naturalization, to file new declarations of intention under
the act of June 29, 1906; nor are such aliens required,
as a condition precedent to naturalization, to speak the
English language.
4. Aliens who make the declaration of intention
required by law prior to September 27, 1906, unless they
can be naturalized before that date under the laws then
in force, must comply with the requirements of the act
of June 29, 1906, in regard to the filing of petitions for
naturalization and furnishing proof, except that they
will not be required to speak the English language or to
sign petitions in their own handwriting.
5. Declarations of intention will be furnished in bound
486 NATURALIZATION
volumes (Form 2202,2202A, or 2202B),as a court record,
varying in size according to the amount of sucli business
transacted by the court. In addition to the bound
records, the duplicate and triplicate declarations of in-
tention (Form 2203) will be furnished as loose sheets
attached together and perforated, so that they can be
readily torn apart, the triplicate to be given to the peti-
tioner and the duplicate to be forwarded to the Bureau
of Immigration and Naturalization (Division of Natu-
ralization). Each bound record will consist of the
original declarations of intention, paged in consecutive
order and indexed. These volumes are to be numbered
and will form a permanent record of the court.
6. The original of the petitions for naturalization will
also be furnished in bound volumes (Form 2204, 2204A
or 2204B) of varying size, paged in consecutive order and
indexed. The duplicate petitions (Form 2205) will be
furnished as loose sheets and must be forwarded to the
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (Division of
Naturalization) within thirty days after execution. The
original petitions for naturalization must be filled out
and signed in the bound volumes, and remain as a part
of the permanent records of the office in which filed.
7. Certificates of naturalization (Form 2207) will be
supplied in bound volumes consisting of original and
duplicate certificates* and stubs. Each original and
duplicate certificate and the stub will be given the same
serial number, the stub to the original certificate bear-
ing a page number in addition to its serial number. Each
book will bear a volume number, and the volume number
and page of the stub must be given on the face of the
certificate. The original certificate will be given to the
petitioner in accordance with the final order of the court,
and the duplicate shall be forwarded to the Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization (Division of Naturaliza-
tion) by registered mail within thirty days after the issu-
APPENDIX. 487
ance of the original, the stub to the original constituting
a part of the permanent records of the court.
8. No certificate of naturalization shall be issued to a
petitioner until after the judge of the court granting
naturalization has signed the order to that effect.
9. Clerks of courts will be furnished with requisition
blanks (Form 2201) on which are listed, by number and
title, all blank forms, including record and order books,
to be used in the naturalization of aliens, and these
forms must be obtained exclusively from the Depart-
ment of Commerce and Labor (Division of Naturaliza-
tion), none other being official. Manila envelopes or
jackets (Form 2211) will be furnished to clerks in which
to place the triplicate declaration of intention or the
original certificate of naturalization before delivering
them to the person making the declaration or to the
person naturalized.
10. The first supply of blank forms will be furnished
upon the written application of the clerks of courts hav-
ing jurisdiction to naturalize aliens, accompanied, in the
case of clerks of state courts, by authoritative evidence
(preferably the certificate of the attorney-general of the
state) that the courts of which such clerks are officers
have "a seal, a clerk, and jurisdiction in actions at law
or equity, or law and equity, in which the amount in
controversy is unlimited." Subsequent supplies of such
blank forms will be furnished the clerks of courts hav-
ing jurisdiction to naturalize aliens upon the receipt by
the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (Division
of Naturalization) of requisitions made on Form 2201.
11. Clerks of courts when first making applications to
the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (Division
of Naturalization) for supplies of the blank forms re-
quired in the naturalization of aliens shall state, as to
the two years next preceding the date of such applica-
tion, the number of declarations of intention filed with
488 NATURALIZATION
them and the number of orders of naturalization made
by their courts, respectively.
12. All applications for supplies of certificates of
naturalization (Form 2207) should be accompanied by
a statement of the number, if any, of certificates of
naturalization issued by the clerks of courts making
such applications since June 1, 1903, if such certificates
failed to comply with the requirements of the Immigra-
tion Act of March 3, 1903.
13. Where the same court holds sessions at different
places, whether a clerk is appointed at each of said
places or the one clerk is required to transact the busi-
ness of the court wherever it may sit, separate supplies
shall be kept, in order to comply with the requirements
of Section 14 of the Naturalization Act, which provides
that the bound declarations of intention and of petitions
for naturalization shall be in chronological order.
14. In every case in which the name of a naturalized
alien is changed by order of court, as provided in Sec-
tion 6, the clerks of courts are required to report to the
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (Division of
Naturalization), when transmitting to it the duplicate of
the certificate of naturalization of the alien whose name
is changed, both the original and the new name of the
said person.
15. Within thirty days after posting the notice (Form
2206) required by Section 5 of the Naturalization Act of
June 29, 1906, the clerk shall inform the Bureau of Im-
migration and Naturalization (Division of Naturaliza-
tion), on Form 2209, of the date, as near as may be, for
the final hearing of each and every petition for natural-
ization.
16. Applications for the issuance of declarations of
intention (Form 2203) or certificates of naturalization
(Form 2207), in lieu of declarations of intention or cer-
tificates of naturalization claimed to have been lost or
APPENDIX. 489
destroyed, shall be made under oath to the clerk of the
court by which any such declarations of intention or cer-
tificates of naturalization were originally issued, and shall
contain full information in regard to the lost or destroyed
papers, and as to the time, place, and circumstances of
such alleged loss or destruction. The clerk shall forward
to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (Di-
vision of Naturalization) the above-mentioned applica-
tions, together with such information as he may have
bearing upon the merits thereof, for investigation, and
no such paper so applied for shall be issued until the
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (Division of
Naturalization) reports the results of its investigation
as to the merits of the application.
17. In every case in which the clerk of a court issues,
in accordance with the preceding rule, a declaration of
intention (Form 2203) or a certificate of naturalization
(Form 2207), upon proof of the loss or destruction of the
original, he shall make an entry on the original declara-
tion, or on the stub of the original certificate of natu-
ralization, as the case may require, showing the issuance
of a new paper and the number thereof, and shall imme-
diately thereafter forward to the Bureau of Immigration
and Naturalization (Division of Naturalization) the du-
plicate of any such paper so issued.
18. If an alien is physically unable to speak, that fact
should be stated in his petition for naturalization in lieu
of the statement, " I am able to speak the English lan-
guage."
19. Within thirty days after the sitting of a court in
naturalization cases, the clerk of such court shall for-
ward to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
(Division of Naturalization) on Form 2210 a list contain-
ing the name of each and every alien who, during such
sitting of court, has been denied naturalization, and the
reason or reasons for such denial.
490 NATURALIZATION
20. The names of aliens making declarations of inten-
tion, or filing petitions for naturalization, must be entered
in full in the appropriate places on the various blank
forms, without abbreviation, and the signatures of such
aliens must also be written out without abbreviation.
Great care should be taken to get in every case the cor-
rect spelling of names.
21. Clerks of courts shall not receive declarations of
intention (Form 2203) to become citizens from other
aliens than white persons and persons of African nativity
or of African descent.
22. Beginning with October 1, 1906, and on the first
working day of each and every month thereafter, clerks
of courts shall forward to the Bureau of Immigration
and Naturalization (Division of Naturalization) dupli-
cate declarations of intention and petitions for naturali-
zation filed, and all duplicates of certificates of naturali-
zation issued, during the preceding month. Duplicate
petitions for naturalization and duplicate certificates
of naturalization shall be forwarded by registered mail;
and duplicate declarations of intention shall be sent
therewith, provided the combined weight of the docu-
ments does not exceed four pounds, otherwise they shall
be forwarded in a separate package by unregistered mail.
The clerks making such shipments are required to notify
the chief of the Division of Naturalization of the date
thereof, by unregistered mail, on Form 2208, provided
for that purpose. In transmitting petitions clerks of
courts are directed to state that the names of the peti-
tioners and their witnesses have been conspicuously
posted, as required by law.
23. All fees provided for in Sec. 13 of the Act of June
29, 1906, collected by clerks of courts during any quar-
ter of a fiscal year, shall be accounted for within thirty
days after the close of such quarter, on Form 2212,
APPENDIX. 491
provided for that purpose; and one-half of all moneys so
collected shall be remitted to the Chief of the Division
of Naturalization, Bureau of Immigration and Natural-
ization, with said quarterly accounts. In cases where no
naturalization business is transacted during any quarter,
said blank form shall be forwarded as aforesaid with the
words " No transactions " noted thereon.
24. Under Sec. 2166 of the Revised Statutes, an hon-
orably discharged soldier, who is of the age of 21 years
and upward, may be admitted to become a citizen of
the United States without making the declaration of in-
tention required of other aliens. Also, under the pro-
visions of the Act of July 26, 1894, Ch. 165, any alien,
of the age of 21 years and upward, who has enlisted, or
may enlist in the United States Navy or Marine Corps,
having been honorably discharged therefrom, after a
residence of five years may be admitted to become a citi-
zen of the United States without making the declaration
of intention required of other aliens. Clerks of courts are
therefore instructed to appropriately note upon the peti-
tion of such discharged alien soldier, or member of the
Navy or Marine Corps, and upon the stub of the certificate
of naturalization issued to him^ in lieu of the information
required thereon as to the filing of the declaration of in-
tention, that the petitioner was an honorably discharged
alien soldier, or member of the Navy or Marine Corps,
and applied for citizenship under the said Sec. 2166, or
the Act of July 26, 1894.
25. So far as is practicable, the clerks of courts hav-
ing jurisdiction under the provisions of the naturaliza-
tion laws will be furnished with appropriately addressed
envelopes for communicating with the Bureau. When
not using such envelopes, however, all communications,
in addition to the other necessary address, should be
plainly marked "Division of Naturalization."
492 NATURALIZATION
26. Clerks of courts having jurisdiction to naturalize
under the provisions of the Act of June 29, 1906, are re-
quested, in case the foregoing rules and regulations fail
to remove from their minds doubt as to the proper
course of action in any case, to write to the chief of the
Division of Naturalization, Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization, for instructions before taking such action.
APPENDIX. 493
LIST OF COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION UNDER
THE ACT OF JUNE 29, 1906, TO NATURALIZE
ALIENS.
ALABAMA.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Northern District, Birmingham.
Middle District, Montgomery.
Southern District, Mobile.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
City Courts:
Anniston.
Gadsden.
Birmingham.
Bessemer.
Mobile.
Montgomery.
Talladega.
Selma.
County Courts:
Tuscaloosa County Court.
Walker County Law and Equity Court.
ALASKA.
District Courts:
Division No. 1, Juneau.
Division No. 2, Nome.
Division No. 3, Fairbanks.
494 NATURALIZATION
ARIZONA.
United States District Courts:
First District, Tucson.
Second District, Tombstone.
Third District, Phoenix.
Fourth District, Prescott.
Fifth District, Solomonville.
District courts of the several counties within the ter-
ritory.
ARKANSAS.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Eastern District: Little Rock, Batesville, Helena.
Western District: Fort Smith, Texarkana, Harri-
son.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state
CALIFORNIA.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Northern District, San Francisco.
Southern District, Los Angeles.
Superior courtsof the several counties within the state.
COLORADO.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Denver.
District courts of the several counties within the
state.
CONNECTICUT.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Hartford.
Superior courts of the several counties within the
state.
APPENDIX. 495
DELAWARE.
United States Circuit and District Courts-'
Wilmington.
Courts of chancery in and for the several counties
within the state.
Superior courts in and for the several counties within
the state.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
FLORIDA.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Northern District, Pensacola.
Southern District, Jacksonville.
GEORGIA.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Northern District, Atlanta.
Southern District, Savannah.
Superior courts of the several counties within the
state.
HAWAII.
United States District Courts:
Honolulu.
Supreme court of the Territory of Hawaii.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the
territory.
IDAHO.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Boise.
District courts of the several counties within the
state.
496 NATURALIZATION
ILLINOIS.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Northern District, Chicago.
Southern District, Springfield.
Eastern District, Danville.
Appellate and Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.
Superior Court of Cook county.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
City Courts:
Alton.
Aurora.
Canton.
Chicago Heights.
East St. Louis.
Elgin.
Litchfield.
Matton.
Zion.
INDIANA.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Indianapolis.
Supreme Court of Indiana, Indianapolis.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
Superior Courts of the following tiamed cities:
Fort Wayne.
Marion.
Kokomo.
Frankfort.
Laporte.
Anderson.
Indianapolis.
Valparaiso.
La Fayette.
Evansville.
Terre Haute.
APPENDIX. 497
INDIAN TERRITORY.
United States Courts :
Northern District, Vinita.
Miami Division.
Nowata Division.
Claremore Division.
Pryor Creek Division.
Bartlesville Division.
Tahlequah Division.
Sallisaw Division.
Western District, Muskogee:
Wewoka Division.
Eufaula Division.
Sapulpa Division.
Tulsa Division.
Okmulgee Division.
Wagoner Division.
Central District, South McAlester:
Atoka Division.
Antlers Division.
Durant Division.
Poteau Division.
Wilburton Division.
Southern District, Ardmore.
Pauls Valley Division.
Ada Division.
Ryan Division.
Purcell Division.
Marietta Division.
Chickasha Division.
Tishomingo Division.
Duncan Division.
6233—32
498 NATURALIZATION
IOWA.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Northern District, Dubuque.
Southern District, Des Moines.
Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines.
District courts of the several counties within the
state.
Superior Courts of the following named cities:
Cedar Rapids.
Council Bluffs.
KANSAS.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Topeka.
District courts of the several counties within the
state.
KENTUCKY.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Eastern District:
Frankfort Division.
Covington Division.
Richmond Division.
London Division.
Catlettsburg Division.
Western District:
Louisville Division.
Owensboro Division.
Bowling Green Division.
Paducah Division.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
LOUISIANA.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Eastern District, New Orleans.
Western District, Shreveport.
District courts of the several parishes within the state.
APPENDIX. 499
MAINE.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Portland.
Supreme judicial courts of the several counties within
the state.
Superior Court of Cumberland County.
MARYLAND.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Baltimore.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore.
Superior Court of Baltimore.
MASSACHUSETTS.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Boston.
Supreme judicial and superior courts of the several
counties within the state.
MICHIGAN.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Eastern District, Detroit.
Western District, Grand Rapids.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
Superior Court of Grand Rapids.
MINNESOTA.
United States Circuit and District Courts :
St. Paul.
District courts of the several counties within the state.
MISSISSIPPI.
United States Circuit and District Courts :
Northern District, Oxford.
Southern District, Jackson.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
500 NATURALIZATION
MISSOURI.
United States Circuit and District Courts :
Eastern District, St. Louis.
Western District:
Kansas City Division.
St. Joseph Division.
Jefferson City Division.
Springfield Division.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
MONTANA.
United States Circuit and District Courts :
Helena.
District courts of the several counties within the
state.
NEBRASKA.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Omaha.
District courts of the several counties within the state.
NEVADA.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Carson City.
District courts of the several counties within the state.
NEW HAMPSHIRE.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Concord.
Superior courts of the several counties within the state.
NEW JERSEY.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Trenton.
Supreme Court of New Jersey, Trenton.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
APPENDIX. 501
NEW MEXICO.
United States District Courts:
Santa Fe Division.
Albuquerque Division.
Las Cruces Division.
Las Vegas Division.
Roswell Division.
Alamogordo Division.
NEW YORK.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Northern District, Utica.
Southern District, New York.
Eastern District, Brooklyn.
Western District, Buffalo.
Supreme courts of the several counties within the
state.
NORTH CAROLINA
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Eastern District:
Raleigh and Washington Division.
Wilmington Division.
Newbern Division.
Elizabeth City Division.
Western District:
Statesville Division.
Asheville Division.
Greensboro Division.
Wilkesboro Division.
Superior courts of the several counties within the
state.
502 NATURALIZATION
NORTH DAKOTA.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Fargo.
District courts of the several counties within the state.
OHIO.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Northern District, Cleveland.
Southern District, Cincinnati.
Court of common pleas of the several counties within
the state.
OKLAHOMA.
United States District Courts:
Guthrie Division,
El Reno Division.
Oklahoma Division.
Perry Division.
Enid Division.
Alva Division.
Anadarko Division.
OREGON.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Portland.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
PENNSYLVANIA.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Eastern District, Philadelphia.
Middle District, Scranton.
Western District, Pittsburg.
Court of common pleas of the several counties within
the state.
RHODE ISLAND.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Providence.
Supreme Court of the State of Rhode Island.
Superior courts of the several counties within the state.
APPENDIX. 503
SOUTH CAROLINA.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Charleston.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
SOUTH DAKOTA.
United States Circuit and District Courts :
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
TENNESSEE.
United States Circuit Courts:
Eastern District, Chattanooga.
Middle District, Nashville.
Western District, Memphis.
United States District Courts:
Eastern District, Knoxville.
Middle District, Nashville.
Western District, Memphis.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
TEXAS.
United States Circuit Courts:
Northern District, Dallas.
Southern District, Galveston.
Eastern District, Beaumont.
Western District, Austin.
United States District Courts:
Northern District, Fort Worth.
Southern District, Galveston
Eastern District, Sherman
Western District, Austin.
District courts of the several counties within the state.
UTAH.
United States Circuit and District Courts :
Salt Lake City.
District courts of the several counties within the state.
504 NATURALIZATION
VERMONT.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Burlington.
County courts of the several counties within the state.
VIRGINIA.
United States Circuit Cowts:
Eastern District, Richmond.
Western District:
Lynchburg Division.
Danville Division.
Abingdon Division.
Harrisonburg Division.
United States District Cour^ts:
Eastern District, Norfolk.
Western District:
Lynchburg Division.
Danville Division.
Abingdon Division.
Harrisonburg Division.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond.
Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond.
Chancery Court of the City of Richmond.
Law and Chancery Court of the City of Norfolk.
Corporation courts of the following cities:
Norfolk.
Newport News.
Lynchburg.
Roanoke.
Danville.
APPENDIX. * 505
Virginia — Corporation Courts — Continued.
Charlottesville.
Portsmouth.
Staunton.
Alexandria.
Bristol.
Fredericksburg.
Manchester.
Winchester.
Radford.
Buena Vista.
Petersburg.
WASHINGTON.
United States Cii^cuit and District Courts:
Eastern District, Spokane.
United States Circuit Court:
Western District, Tacoma.
United States District Court:
Western District, Seattle.
Superior courts of the several counties within the
state.
WEST VIRGINIA.
United States Circuit Court:
Northern District, Parkersburg.
United States District Court:
Northern District, Clarksburg.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Southern District, Charleston.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
506 NATURALIZATION
WISCONSIN.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Eastern District, Milwaukee.
Western District, Madison.
Circuit courts of the several counties within the state.
WYOMING.
United States Circuit and District Courts:
Cheyenne.
District courts of the several counties within the state.
APPENDIX. 507
LIST OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND THEIR
RULERS.
Department of Commerce and Labor,
Washington, November, 1906.
The following list of foreign countries and the names
and titles of their rulers is furnished for the information
of clerks of courts to assist them in preparing declara-
tions of intention and petitions for naturalization as re-
quired by law.
Several of these rulers are succeeded periodically, and
care should be taken in such cases to secure information
as to their successors before filling out the naturaliza-
tion forms. Revised lists will be sent out by the Bureau
from time to time.
Name of Ruler, Title, and Country.
Menelik II, Emperor of Abyssinia.
Habibullah Khan, Ameer of Afghanistan.
Thanh Thai, King of Annam.
*Dr. Jose Figueroa Alcorta, President of the Argentine
Republic.
tFrancis Joseph, Emperor of Austria-Hungary.
Mir Mahmud, Khan of Baluchistan.
Leopold II, King of the Belgians.
Sayid Abdul Ahad, Ameer of Bokhara.
*Dr. Ismael Montes, President of Bolivia.
Dr. Francisco de P. Rodrigues Alves, President of
Brazil.
* Renunciations by citizens of foreign republics should be to the re-
public only, as, for example, "The Argentine Republic," "The Republic
of Bolivia," etc.
t Austrians should renounce allegiance to " Francis Joseph, Emperor of
Austria;" Hungarians to " Francis Joseph, Apostolic King of Hungary,"
508 NATURALIZATION
Ferdinand, Prince of Bulgaria.
*Pedro Montt, President of Chile.
*General Rafael Reyes, President of Colombia.
Leopold II (King of the Belgians), Sovereign of the
Congo Free State.
*Cleto Gonzales Viquez, President of Costa Rica.
Frederik VIII, King of Denmark.
*Ramon Caceres, President of the Dominican Republic.
*Lizardo Garcia, President of Ecuador.
Abbas Pacha, Khedive of Egypt.
*Armand Fallieres, President of France.
William II, Emperor of Germany.
Edward VII, King of Great Britain and Ireland.
George I, King of Greece.
*Don Manuel Estrada Cabrera, President of Guatemala.
^General Nord Alexis, President of Hayti.
*General Manuel Bonilla, President of Honduras.
Edward VII, Emperor of the Empire of India.
Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy.
Muteuhito, Mikado of Japan.
Say id Mahomed Rahim, Khan of Khiva.
Yi Heung, Emperor of Korea.
*Arthur Barclay, President of Liberia.
William, Grand Duke of Luxembourg.
*General Porfirio Diaz, President of Mexico.
Albert, Prince of Monaco.
Nicholas I, Prince of Montenegro.
Mulai-Abd-el-Aziz, Sultan of Morocco.
Prithvi Bir Bikram-Shamsher Jang, Maharaja of Nepal.
Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands.
*General Jose S. Zelaya, President of Nicaragua.
Haakon VII, King of Norway.
Seyyid Feysil bin Turki, Sultan of Oman.
* Renunciations by citizens of foreign republics should be to the re-
public only, as, for example, " The Argentine Republic," "The Republic
of Bolivia," etc.
APPENDIX. 509
*Dr. Manuel Amador Guerrero, President of Panama.
*Juan B. Gaona, President of Paraguay.
Mohammed Ali, Shah of Persia.
*Jose Pardo, President of Peru.
Carlos I, King of Portugal.
Charles, King of Roumania.
Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia.
*Pedro Jose Escalon, President of Salvador.
Peter I (Karageorgevitch), King of Servia.
Chulalongkorn I, King of Siam.
Alphonso XIII, King of Spain.
Oscar II, King of Sweden.
*L. Forrer, President of Switzerland.
Sidi Mohamed, Bey of Tunis.
Abdul Hamid II, Sultan of Turkey.
*Jose Batlle y Ordonez, President of Uruguay,
*Cipriano Castro, President of Venezuela.
Seyyid Ali, Sultan of Zanzibar.
^Renunciations by citizens of foreign republics should be to the re-
public only, as, for example, "The Argentine Republic," "The Republic
of Bolivia," etc.
INDEX.
A
ABDOO'S CASE, 81-84.
ADOPTION.
citizenship not conferred by, 223.
AFFIDAVIT
of witnesses of applicant for naturalization, 90.
of chief of Passport Bureau, showing cause to institute proceedings
to cancel naturalization certificate, 138.
AFRICAN.
naturalization of, 40.
AFRICAN WOMAN.
naturalization of by marriage to a citizen, 230.
AGE.
qualification as to, of applicant for naturalization. 111.
AGENTS.
American, residing abroad, 355.
ALASKA.
citizenship of inhabitants, 291,
ALIEN ENEMIES.
ineligible to naturalization, 49, SO.
ALLEGIANCE.
renunciation of, 121.
'>ath of, 123.
AMERICAN ANTE-NATI, 272.
ANARCHISTS.
incapable of naturalization, 53, 88.
ARMY.
enlisted men not required to make declaration of intention, 61.
not required to prove more than one year's residence in United
States, 109, 110.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY,
naturalization convention with, 441.
treatment of former subjects naturalized in United States, 389.
(511)
512 INDEX
B
BADEN.
naturalization convention with, 444.
BAVARIA.
naturalization convention with, 447.
BELGIUM.
naturalization convention with, 451.
treatment of former subjects naturalized in United States, 390.
BLANK CERTIFICATES, 129.
BOND, see Disbursing Clerk.
BOYD'S CASE, 77.
BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP.
Passport Bureau now designated as, see Preface.
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION,
creation of, 36.
functions of, 36-39.
supervision of naturalization, 38.
as to registry of alien immigrants, 38.
as to blank certificates of citizenship, 37, 39.
as to naturalization fees, 39.
BURMESE,
ineligibility of, to naturalization, 44.
CANCELLATION OF NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE,
procedure, 34-36.
power of United States to impeach naturalization certificate, 138.
power of state to impeach naturalization certificate, 140.
CANCELLED CERTIFICATES, 29.
CAUCASIAN.
eligibility of, to naturalization, 40-44.
CERTIFICATE FROM DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND
LABOR, 93.
CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION, 26-31, 125-129, 133.
under Act of March 3, 1903, 125.
under Act of June 29, 1906, 126.
blank certificates, 26-28, 129.
accountability for, 28.
defaced and injured certificates, 28.
. form, 126-128.
duplicates, 29, 128.
stub, 29, 128.
INDEX 513
Certificate of Naturalization — Continued :
impeachment of, 134-189.
cancelled certificates, 29.
CERTIFICATES OF REGISTRATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS
ABROAD, 353.
CERTIFIED COPIES OF NATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS, 30.
CHANGE OF NAME,'.124.
CHIEF OF PASSPORT BUREAU.
affidavit of, showing good cause to institute proceedings to cancel
naturalization certificate, 138.
CHILDREN OF DECEASED DECLARANT,
naturalization of, 62.
CHINESE.
ineligibility of to naturalization, 42, 43.
citizens of Hawaii at time of annexation, 318.
CIRCULAR INSTRUCTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
reports on fraudulent naturalization, 136.
registration of women desiring to resume or retain American citizen-
ship, 241, 257.
expatriation, 341.
children born abroad^of citizens, 350.
registration of American citizens, 352.
issuance of passports, 380.
CLERKS OF COURTS.
functions of in naturalization proceedings, 22-34.
as to declaration of intention, 22-24.
as to petition for naturalization, 24, 26.
as to certificate from 'Department of Commerce and Labor, 25, 93.
as to notice of petition, 25, 92.
as to witnesses, 26.
as to final hearing, 26.
as to aliens denied naturalization, [26.
as to certificates of citizenship, 26-30.
as to blank certificates, 26-28, 39.
as to defaced or injured certificates, 28.
accountability for certificates, 28, 39.
duplicates, 29.
stub, 29.
cancelled certificates, 29.
crimes by, 24, 33, -34, 194, 195.
fees, 31-34.
for receiving and filing declaration of intention, 32.
for making, filing and docketing petition, 32.
for entering final order and issuance of certificate, 32.
514 INDEX \
Clerks of Courts — Continued:
for subpoenaing witnesses, 32, 33.
additional compensation to, for clerical assistance, 33, 38.
COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION, 265-332.
how effected, 266.
by conquest, 266-272.
by treaty, 273-317.
by special act of Congress, 317.
by admission of territory to statehood, 321-332.
COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION.
'registry of aliens, 39.
certificate of registry, 39.
COMMON LAW JURISDICTION,
definition of, 14-17.
CONGRESS.
power to establish uniform rule of naturalization, 6.
power to regulate naturalization, 6-9.
power to determine political status of native inhabitants of Porto Rico
and Philippine Islands, 295.
power over territories, 330.
CONQUEST.
naturalization by, 266-272.
CONSTITUTION.
citizenship clause of Fourteenth Amendment, 5.
judgment of naturalization comprehended in terms of section 1,
article 4, U.
treaty-making power conferred by, 273.
power to acquire territory conferred by, 273.
power to dispose of the territory of United States conferred by, 300.
CONSTRUCTIVE RESIDENCE, 105.
CONSULAR SERVICE. FOREIGN.
effect of engaging in, 360.
CONSULS.
registration of American citizens, 352.
registration of foreign-born wddow of American, 22, 241.
registration of American-born widow of foreigner, 256, 257.
reports of fraudulent naturalization, 35, 135.
statements certified under official seal admissible in evidence in courts
in proceedings to cancel certificate, 136.
passports, 381, 382.
"CONTINUED RESIDENCE," 95-104.
COURTS,
what courts can naturalize, 11-19.
list of, 493-506.
INDEX 515
Courts — Continued :
functions of in naturalization proceeding, 19-21.
in case of renunciation of citizenship by foreign-born widow of
American, 21, 22.
COURTS OF RECORD.
definition of, 11-14.
CRIMES AGAINST NATURALIZATION LAWS, 189-196.
false swearing, 189-194.
false personation, 189.
counterfeiting, 189.
uttering, l89.
selling certificate of citizenship, 189, 190.
use of forged or counterfeit certificate, 190, 191.
use of certificate fraudulently procured, 193.
unlawful possession of blank certificate, 193.
unlawful possession of plate or distinctive paper for printing certifi-
cate, 192.
unlawfully engraving, printing, or photographing plate designed for
certificate, 192.
unlawfully procuring naturalization, 194.
By Clerks.
unlawful issuance of certificate of citizenship, 194.
neglect to account for naturalization fees, 194.
charging or receiving more than lawful fees. 195.
false certificate in naturalization proceedings, 195.
Limitation of Actions.
Act of 1906.
indictments must be found within five years, 195.
time of going into operation, 196.
Under Prior Laws.
crimes committed before Act of 1906 went into effect prosecuted un-
der existing naturalization laws, 196.
D
DECLARATION OF INTENTION,
law relative to, 54.
time of making, 55.
place of making, 24, 56.
age of declarant, 55, 63.
life of declaration, 55.
before whom made, 55.
duties of clerk in relation to, 22-24.
form of, 57-59.
516 INDEX
Declaration of Intention — Continued :
to be filed with Department of Commerce and Labor with petition for
naturalization, 93.
exceptions to usual requirement, 61-64.
army, 6l.
navy and marine corps, 62.
widow and children of deceased declarant, 62.
in Hawaii, 63.
rights conferred by, 64-76.
under federal laws, 64.
under state laws, 64.
without the United States, 66, 67.
Burnato's case, 67-
Koszta's case, 68-73.
effect of on minor child, 224.
effect of on absent children, 224.
effect of on wife, 262.
DENMARK,
naturalization convention with, 453.
treatment of former subjects naturalized in United States, 391.
E.
EXECUTIVE ORDERS.
April 6, 1907:
children of citizens born abroad, 475.
wife of citizen, 476.
American woman who marries a foreigner, 476.
children of naturalized citizen, 476.
declaration of intention, 477.
expatriation, 477.
registration to resume or retain citizenship, 477.
oath of allegiance, 478.
duplica es of evidence of citizenship, 478.
passports, 478-481.
when protection should be denied, 482.
reports of fraudulent naturalization, 482.
April 8, 1907:
registration of American citizens, 483.
EXPATRIATION,
definition, 333.
right of, 333, 411.
statutes relating to, 334, 336, 411, 438.
treaties recognizing right of, 335-
modes of, 336-362.
by naturalization in foreign state, 337.
INDEX 517
Expatriation — Continued :
by taking oath of allegiance to foreign government, 338.
by residence in foreign country, 340.
b)' desertion from military or naval service, 357.
F.
FALSE PERSONATION, 189-
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS AS TO CITIZENSHIP, 193.
FALSE SWEARING IN NATURALIZATION PROCEEDING, l89,
193, 194.
FILIPINOS.
eligibility to naturalization, 48.
declaration of intention by, 60.
status of, 48, 49, 293, 309-316.
passports to, 316.
FINAL HEARING,
time of, 119.
place, 120.
duty of clerk as to, 26.
procedure, 120.
appearance and examination of applicant and witnesses, 120.
appearance of United States, 120.
proof of residence and moral character, 121.
renunciation of foreign allegiance, 121.
Filipinos and Porto Ricans, 122.
renunciation of title or order of nobility, 122.
oath of allegiance to United States, 123.
change of name, 124.
FINAL ORDER IN NATURALIZATION PROCEEDING.
to be under hand of court, 31.
FLORIDA TREATY, 327.
FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
list of, 507.
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.
right of, to impeach American certificate of naturalization denied, 142.
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.
impeachable for fraud, 167-170.
FORMS.
declaration of intention, 57.
petition for naturalization, 86.
affidavit of witnesses, 91.
notice of application for admission, 93.
certificate of naturalization, 126.
518 INDEX
Forms — Continued :
stub of certificate of naturalization, 128.
registration of foreign-born widow of American, 24 1, 242.
registration of American-born widow of alien, 257, 258.
certification by diplomatic or consular officer as to expatriation of
American citizens, 341, 342.
declaration of intention to conserve American citizenship by children
of citizens born abroad, 350, 351-
certificate of registration of American citizens residing abroad, 353, 354.
applications for passports, 384-386.
passport, 387.
emergency passport, 383.
FORGERY.
uttering and counterfeiting in naturalization proceeding, 189-191.
FRANCE.
treaty of 1803, 276.
treatment of former citizens naturalized in United Statesi 392.
FRAUD,
impeachment of naturalization judgment for, 134, 144, 153.
FRAUDULENT NATURALIZATION.
reports of by diplomatic aud consular officers, 135.
G
GERMANY.
naturalization convention with, 466.
treatment of former subjects naturalized in United States, 394.
GOxMZALES' CASE. 313.
GOOD BEHAVIOR.
proof of, of applicant for naturalization, 121.
GREAT BRITAIN.
naturalization conventions with, 456, 458.
treaty of 1794 with, 276.
GREECE,
treatment of former subjects naturalized in United States, 395.
H
HABERACKER'S CASE, 239.
HAITI.
naturalization convention with, 46l.
HAWAII.
naturalization by annexation of, 318.
HEISINGER'S CASE, 207.
HESSE.
naturalization convention with, 463.
INDEX 519
I
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN.
naturalization of, by naturalization of mother b)' marriage to reputed
father, 222, 223.
IMMIGRANT.
landing of, what constitutes, 82.
IMPEACHMENT OF NATURALIZATION, 134-189.
municipal practice, 134.
under Act of 1906, 135-138.
under prior laws, 138-141.
international practice, 141-189.
executive department of government, 141, 142.
power to treat certificate as invalid, 141.
right of foreign governments to impeach denied, 142.
international claims commissions, 142-189,
Spanish Claims Commission of 1871, 142.
Costa Rica Claims Commission of i860, 143.
Venezuelan Claims Commission of 1903, 143.
Spanish Treat}' Claims Commission (1905), 144.
INCORPORATION OF INHABITANTS OF ACQUIRED TERRI-
TORY, 295, 296-309.
INDIAN TERRITORY.
jurisdiction of United States courts in to naturalize, 12.
INDIANS.
naturalization statutes inapplicable to, 45-
status of, 316.
naturalization by special statute, 46, 319.
naturalization by treaty, 46, 31 6.
INDIAN WOMEN.
naturalization of by marriage to citizen, 230.
INSULAR CASES, 267, 273, 296-309.
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS COMMISSIONS.
practice as to impeachment of naturalization, 142-189.
ITALY.
treatment of former subjects naturalized in United States, 396.
J
JAPANESE.
ineligible to naturalization, 43, 44.
JUDGES.
functions in naturalization proceeding, 19-21.
renunciation of foreign-born widow of American, 21, 22.
JUDGMENT OF MUNICIPAL COURT.
not conclusive upon international tribunal, 142-189.
520 INDEX
JUDGMENT OF NATURALIZATION.
nature of 155-189.
impeachment of, 134-189.
JUDGMENT IN REM, 180.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, 195.
LOSS OF RECORD OF NATURALIZATION, 132.
LOUISIANA TREATY, 321.
M
MARINE CORPS.
enlisted men not required to make declaration of intention, 62.
not required to make other proof of residence in United States than of
service in marine corps, 110.
MARRIAGE.
naturalization by, 227-263.
"MARRIED."
meaning of term in statute, 231.
MARRIED WOMEN.
naturalization of, 51-53.
effect of death of husband upon, 240, 256.
registration of, 241, 257.
MERCHANT SEAMEN.
declaration of intention and three years service on American merchant
vessel, 75.
MEXICANS.
eligibility of to naturalization, 46-48.
meaning of "Mexicans" in Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 289.
MEXICO.
treaty of l848 (Guadalupe Hidalgo), 284.
treaty of 1853 (Gadsden), 291.
MILITARY SERVICE.
desertion from, effect of, 357.
in foreign country, effect of, 358.
MINOR CHILDREN.
naturalization of by naturalization of parent, 197-226.
naturalization of by resumption of citizenship of parent, 219, 220.
naturalization of by naturalization of mother by marriage, 220.
adoption does not confer citizenship upon, 223.
effect of declaration of intention of parent, 76-84, 224.
election of American citizenship by minors abroad, 349-351-
INDEX 521
MINOR RESIDENTS.
declaration of intention by, 63.
MINOR'S CLAUSE.
repeal of, 63.
MISSIONARIES, 356.
MONGOLIAN.
ineligibility of to naturalization, 42-44.
MORAL CHARACTER.
qualifications as to, of applicant for naturalization, 114-118.
what acts are immoral, 115, 11 6.
anarchists, II6.
polygamists, 115-118.
proof of, 118, 121.
MUNICIPAL COURTS,
practice as to impeachment of naturalization, 134-141.
N
NAME.
change of, 124.
misstatement of, 13O.
NATURALIZATION,
definition of, 5.
constitutional provisions relating to, 5, 6.
control of, 6-9.
laws of United States relative to, 409-440.
By formal papers, 1-196.
By naturalization of parent, 197-226.
By marriage, 227-263.
Collective, 265.
By special Act of Congress, 317-321.
By treaty, 220, 273-317.
By admission of territory to statehood, 321.
NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE, 124-129.
NATURALIZATION REGULATIONS, 485-492.
NATURALIZATION TREATIES, 441-473.
NATURALIZED CITIZENS.
protection of in foreign countries, 411, 438.
NAVAL SERVICE.
desertion from, 357.
in foreign country, effect of, 358.
NAVY.
enlisted men not required to make declaration of intention, 62.
enlisted men not required to make other proof of residence in United
States than of service in Navy, 110.
522 INDEX
NELLIE GRANT SARTORIS' CASE, 258.
NETHERLANDS.
treatment of former subjects naturalized in United States, 397.
NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION.
naturalization convention with, 466.
NORTHWEST TERRITORY.
naturalization of inhabitants of by admission of states carved there-
from, 324-327.
NORWAY.
treatment of former subjects naturalized in United States, 398.
NOTICE.
in proceedings to cancel naturalization certificate, 35-
NOTICE OF PETITION, 25, 92.
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE, 123.
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT,
effect of, 338.
ORDER OF NOBILITY,
renunciation of, 31, 122,
P
PASSPORT BUREAU.
designation changed to Bureau of Citizenship. See Preface.
PASSPORTS.
definition, 363.
laws relating to, 363.
rules and regulations, 365-384.
to persons who have declared intention and resided three years in
United States, 74, 378-380.
duties of diplomatic and consular officers relative to, 381-384.
emergency passports, 381-384.
forms, 384-387.
to be refused to naturalized citizens who go abroad and take up
permanent residence within five years after naturalization, 137.
not competent judicial proof of naturalization, 13O.
PERJURY, 18.
PERSIA.
treatment of former subjects naturalized in United States, 399.
PERSONAL STATUS,
rule of, 181.
PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION, 84-94.
time of filing, 85.
to whom made, 85.
INDEX 523
Petition for Naturalization — Continued :
docketing of, 26, 31.
duty of clerk as to, 25.
form, 85.
description of applicant, 88.
allegations of petition, 85-90.
of disbelief in anarchy and polygamy, 88.
of intention to become a citizen, 88.
to renounce allegiance, 88.
to reside permanently in United States, 88.
of previous denial of naturalization, 89.
as to residence, 89.
as to abilit}- to speak English, 89.
duplicate, 26.
signature of petitioner, 90.
verification of petition, 90.
witnesses, 90.
citizenship of, 90.
personal acquaintance with petitioner, 90.
form of affidavit, 91, 92.
fees of, 92.
notice of petition, 92,
form, 93.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
law of citizenship of residents, 310, note.
PHOTOGRAPHING PRINT OR IMPRESSION.
of certificate of citizenship unlawfully, 192,
POLYGAMISTS.
incapable of naturalization, 53, 54, 88.
PORTO RICANS.
status of, 309-316, 48, 49, 293, 305.
eligible to naturalization, 49.
declaration of intention by, 60.
passports to, 31 6.
PORTUGAL.
treatment of former subjects naturalized in United States, 399.
PRINTING.
impression of certificate of citizenship unlawfully, 192.
PROOF OF NATURALIZATION, 129-134.
record, 129.
where record has been lost or destroyed, 132.
certificate of naturalization, 133.
PROTECTION.
aliens who have declared intention and resided three years in United
States, 74.
524 INDEX
Protection — Continued :
merchant seamen who have declared intention and served three years
on merchant vessel of United States, 75.
PUBLIC OFFICE IN FOREIGN COUNTRY,
acceptance of, effect of, 360.
QUALIFICATIONS OF APPLICANT FOR NATURALIZATION,
111-119.
as to age, 111.
as to education, 112.
exceptions, 112, 113.
as to moral character, 114-119.
R
RECORD OF NATURALIZATION.
usual evidence, 129.
loss or destruction of, 132.
RECORD.
of final order in naturalization proceedings, 31.
RECORDER OF MUNICIPAL COURT.
clerk within meaning of Revised Statutes Sec. 2165, 23.
REGISTRATION.
of American citizens abroad, 352-355.
duties of consuls relative to, 352-355.
RENUNCIATION OF CITIZENSHIP BY FOREIGN-BORN WIDOW
OF AMERICAN, 21.
RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN ALLEGIANCE, 121.
RENUNCIATION OF TITLE OR ORDER OF NOBILITY, 31, 122.
RESIDENCE.
of applicant for naturalization, 94-111.
meaning of term, 95.
"continued residence," 95-104.
constructive residence, 105, 106.
merchant seamen, I05.
in countries in which United States has extra-territorial rights, 105
residence within states, 106.
in Philippine Islands and Porto Rico, 107.
in Hawaii, 107.
married women, 233-238.
proof of, 108.
exceptions to requirement as to residence, 109.
arm}', 109.
INDEX 525
Residence — Coutinued :
Navy and Marine Corps, 110.
merchant seamen, 110.
RESIDENCE IN FOREIGN COUNTRY OF NATURALIZED CITI-
ZEN.
effect of, 35.
RESIDENCE IN FOREIGN COUNTRY.
effect of, on citizenship of American, 340.
RESUMPTION OF CITIZENSHIP, 219, 220.
ROUMANIA.
treatment of former subjects naturalized in United States, 401.
RUIZ'S CASE, 144-189.
RULERS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
list of, 507.
RUSSIA.
treaty of 1867 with, 291.
treatment of former subjects naturalized in United States, 401.
SARTORIS, NELLIE GRANT.
case of, 258.
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE AND LABOR. ♦
functions of, in relation to naturalization, 36-40.
direction and control of Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,
36, 38.
rules and regulations, 37, 485-492.
as to blank certificates, 37.
additional allowances to clerks of courts, 38.
certificate of registry of alien, 39.
SELLING CERTIFICATE OF CITIZENSHIP, 190.
SERVIA.
treatment of former subjects naturalized in United States, 402.
SETTING ASIDE NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE,
procedure, 34-36, 138-141.
SPAIN.
treaty of I819 with, 283.
treaty of 1898, 293.
SPANISH TREATY CLAIMS COMMISSION (1905).
status of, 145.
impeachment of naturalization certificate before, 144-189.
526 INDEX
STATE COURTS,
jurisdiction to naturalize aliens, 12-19.
required to furnish Bureau of Naturalization with evidence of com-
petency to act under the law, 17.
STATE DEPARTMENT.
treats as invalid naturalization certificate which has been improperly
obtained, 141.
STATE LEGISLATURE.
power to prohibit state court from naturalizing, 19.
STATES.
power with respect to naturalization, 6-9.
power to impeach naturalization proceedings, 140, 141.
STUB OF CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION, 128.
SUPREME COURT OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
jurisdiction to naturalize aliens, 12.
SWEDEN AND NORWAY.
naturalization convention with, 468.
treatment of former subjects naturalized in United States, 403.
SWITZERLAND.
treatment of former citizens naturalized in United States, 404.
TEXAS.
citizenship of residents at time of admission into Union, 290, 291.
naturalization of citizens by annexation, 329.
TITLE.
renunciation of, 31, 122.
TRABING'S CASE, 79.
TREATIES OF CESSION, 275-316.
with Great Britain of 1794, 276.
with France of 1803, 276.
with Spain of 1819, 283.
of 1898, 293.
with Mexico of 1848, 284.
of 1853, 291.
with Russia of 1867, 291.
TREATIES OF NATURALIZATION, 441-473.
with Austria-Hungary, 441.
with Baden, 444.
with Bavaria, 447.
with Belgium, 451.
with Denmark, 453.
with Germany, 466.
INDEX 527
Treaties of Naturalization — Continued :
with Great Britain, 456, 458.
with Haiti, 46l.
with Hesse, 463.
with Sweden and Norway, 468.
with Wiirttemberg, 472.
TREATY, NATURALIZATION BY, 273-317.
TURKEY.
treatment of former subjects naturalized in United States, 405.
u
UNIFORM RULE OF NATURALIZATION,
power of Congress to establish, 6.
UNITED STATES.
appearance of in naturalization proceedings, 120. "
power to sue for cancellation of decree of naturalization, 138, 139.
power to acquire territory bj' treaty, 273.
power to prescribe terms upon which it will receive inhabitants of
ceded territory, 296.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT ATTORNEYS,
duties:
appearance in opposition to naturalization, 34.
proceedings to set aside or cancel naturalization certificate, 34, 138.
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF BLANK CERTIFICATES OF CITI-
ZENSHIP, 193.
UNLAWFULLY ENGRAVING PLATE DESIGNED FOR PRINT-
ING CERTIFICATE OF CITIZENSHIP, 192.
UNLAWFULLY PROCURING NATURALIZATION, 193.
V
VENEZUELAN CLAIMS COMMISSION OF 1903.
impeachment of naturalization certificate before, 144.
w
"WHITE PERSONS."
meaning of in naturalization law, 40-42,
WIDOW, AMERICAN-BORN, OF FOREIGN HUSBAND,
registration of, 256.
WIDOW OF DECEASED DECLARANT,
naturalization of, 62, 262.
528 INDEX
WIDOW, FOREIGN BORN, OF AMERICAN,
renunciation of citizenship by, 21.
registration of, 240.
WIFE,
of alien who has declared intention, right to enter United States, 84,
206.
WITNESSES IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT FOR NATURALI-
ZATION,
citizenship of, 90,
WOMEN.
naturalization of by formal papers, 51.
by marriage, 227-263.
common law doctrine, 227.
statutory rule, 228, 229.
what women are capable of, 229-231.
WURTTEMBERG.
naturalization convention with, 472.
ZARTARIAN'S CASE, 202.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY
Los Angeles
This book is DUE on the last date stamped below.
7 1970
JAN SI 1377
Form L9-Series 4939