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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
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AMERICAN 
 FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 BY A DIPLOMATIST 
 
 cLewIs TDavxi- ~E,n«> 
 
 • ,• • •> 
 
 BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
 
 HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 
 
 <$ht BiterfiDe }Dre?jS CambriDge 
 
 1909 
 

 COPYRIGHT, 1909, BY HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 
 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 
 Published October xgOQ . 
 

 PREFACE 
 
 It is no unmixed evil that the feeling 
 of confidence in the limitless extent of the 
 country's resources and in its economic 
 self-sufficiency should lately have been 
 shaken. So long as an apparently bound- 
 less horizon extended before us, we moved 
 on a plane different from the rest of the 
 world and indifferent thereto. To-day, 
 when for the first time we are beginning 
 to understand that our natural resources are 
 limited, that the end of the nation's possi- 
 bilities for internal development is almost 
 within sight, and that its capacity of con- 
 sumption has been unable to keep pace with 
 its production, the necessity of providing 
 foreign markets for our industry is increas-^/ 
 ingly felt. Accompanying this has come 
 the realization of the need for a navy suf- 
 ficiently powerful to protect our over-sea 
 
 227118 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 commerce and our coast line, our policies 
 in Latin America and our distant depend- 
 encies in the Pacific. The country has at 
 last realized the importance of a fleet as 
 an insurance against war. It has still to 
 be aroused to the necessity of an efficient 
 diplomacy as an adjunct to the navy, both 
 in the extension of our commerce and in- 
 fluence abroad and in the preservation of 
 peace while carrying out the national poli- 
 cies. 
 
 Hitherto our attainment to national great- 
 ness has been unaccompanied by the cor- 
 responding preparation in the public mind 
 ! for a foreign policy conforming to the 
 
 i magnitude of the country's new respon- 
 
 sibilities and the loftiness of its manifest 
 destiny. American public opinion, only 
 Q lately awakened to the importance of inter- 
 course with other nations, has still to be 
 I trained to the consciousness of what it may 
 ' rightly demand from diplomacy as an 
 instrument for the nation's welfare. It 
 remains weighted by the handicap of tradi- 
 
PREFACE vfi 
 
 tions which, though they have outlived their 
 utility, have not yet lost their hold. The 
 same process of renovation which, acting 
 in industry, has borne us into the forefront 
 of nations requires infusion into the mecha- 
 nism of our foreign policy, in order to adapt 
 it to the present and future exigencies of 
 the Republic's international position. 
 
 The purpose of these studies is to draw 
 attention to the duty of diplomacy to fur- 
 ther our foreign policy in different regions 
 of the world, and to the conditions of 
 national security upon which must rest its 
 assertion. 
 
 The Author. 
 
 June, 1909. 
 
 ^ 
 X 
 
 Q 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 I. The Policy of Understandings . 1 
 
 II. Relations with Europe. ... SO 
 
 III. The Recognition of the Monroe 
 
 Doctrine 56 
 
 IV. The Latin Republics .... 77 
 V. The Far East 105 
 
 VI. The Near East 129 
 
 VII. The Diplomatic Service and the 
 
 State Department .... 157 
 
 Vin. The Future of our International 
 
 Position f. 183 
 
AMERICAN FOREIGN 
 POLICY 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE POLICY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 
 
 Our prejudice against foreign alliances 
 has been handed down as the tradition of 
 a century, confirmed by the early difficul- 
 ties the Republic encountered. The result 
 of the Revolution had been to withdraw the 
 new federation from the orbit of European 
 politics. The French fleet sailing from 
 Yorktown cut the cord which linked us 
 with the Old World, and we were left to 
 pursue alone the destinies to which our 
 position and our energies were to summon 
 us. When the acquisition of Louisiana 
 extended the nation's frontiers to the Pa- 
 cific, our insular position towards Europe 
 offered, save from Canada, no basis for 
 
2 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 attack, and we were freed from that dread 
 of invasion never absent from the minds of 
 continental statesmen. After the War of 
 1812, our relations with other countries sub- 
 sided to a calm level of platonic cordiality, 
 interrupted only by outbursts of sympathy 
 for the cause of liberty abroad, and hardly 
 disturbed except for solicitude with regard 
 to Cuba, Confederate attempts at securing 
 foreign recognition, and, connected there- 
 with. Napoleon the Third's abortive Mexi- 
 can adventure. The attitude of aloofness 
 we preserved toward the Old World re- 
 mained practically unchanged for a cen- 
 tury. Almost our only point of continuous 
 contact came through the mass of emigrants 
 who were speedily absorbed by the nation's 
 phenomenal growth; and apart from certain 
 Irish eflForts to draw us into Anglophobia, 
 the foreign elements in the country have 
 never, in matters of importance, attempted 
 to influence our diplomacy with regard 
 to their lands of origin. The nation was 
 left to effect its internal evolution free from 
 
THE POLICY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 3 
 
 the consideration of problems of foreign 
 policy, and in struggle only with itself. 
 
 Where the very existence of a country is 
 at stake, international relations, when they 
 are not immediately threatening, appear 
 of minor consequence. The long struggle 
 leading up to the Civil War and the 
 period of Reconstruction evolving from it 
 had withdrawn our interest from abroad. 
 Occupied by its industrial evolution, the 
 internal development of the country, which 
 required and consumed its remaining en- 
 ergy, pointed to the West. For a century 
 foreign intercourse rightly appeared to the 
 nation to be of secondary importance. 
 In these years when the material founda- 
 tions of our present position were being 
 laid, the diplomatic experience early dif- 
 ficulties had given us came almost to be 
 forgotten. Economically and politically, 
 the nation's energies were all engaged and 
 abse^^bed in other directions. 
 
 To the outbreak of the Spanish War, we 
 had little or no foreign danger to fear. In 
 
4 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 that critical first century of the Republic's 
 development, the necessity for a national 
 policy of isolation was manifestly dictated 
 to our interests. Any other course would 
 have enmeshed us in the European system 
 of balances and obviously have hindered 
 our expansion, even had it led to no more 
 baneful result. The wisdom of this policy, 
 which had impressed itself on the leaders 
 of both parties, appeared to receive further 
 consecration from the political testament of 
 Washington. His counsel had been trans- 
 mitted from generation to generation, im- 
 pressive by the weight attached to his great 
 name. That it was directed not against 
 alliances, but against entangling alliances, 
 came almost to be overlooked. 
 
 Mr. Olney has justly observed in his 
 acute analysis * of the Farewell Address 
 that, correctly interpreted, it holds as true 
 to-day as when delivered. Washington 
 had founded his reasoning on our then 
 feebleness as a nation and on our remote- 
 
 * Atlantic Monthly, May, 1898, pp. 578 el seq. 
 
THE POLICY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 5 
 
 ness in distance and in interest from events 
 of a strictly European order. He had said, 
 to quote again oft-repeated words : — 
 
 "Europe has a set of primary interests, 
 which to us have none, or a very remote 
 relation. . . . Our detached and distant 
 situation invites and enables us to pursue 
 a different course. ... It is our true 
 policy to steer clear of permanent alliances 
 with any portion of the foreign world. . . . 
 Taking care always to keep ourselves, by 
 suitable establishments, on a respectable 
 defensive posture, we may safely trust to 
 temporary alliances for extraordinary emer- 
 gencies." 
 
 Three things ensue from this. While 
 we were to abstain from all participation 
 or interference in the internal affairs of 
 Europe on account of our remote relation 
 thereto, no mention is made of the rest of 
 the world. It may be argued that the 
 future of other continents did not present 
 itself as of importance to Washington's 
 mind. But even if this assumption were 
 
6 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 true, are we to allow a prescriptive force 
 to govern our attitude toward questions 
 ignored by our first President when he had 
 carefully limited the application of his ad- 
 vice to specific conditions ? Secondly, while 
 our remoteness invited a certain line of 
 policy, the need for this once ended, it is 
 presumable that our policy would likewise 
 change in conformity to new requirements. 
 Lastly, he advocated in the clearest un- 
 mistakable terms the expediency of tem- 
 porary alliances for extraordinary emergen- 
 cies. Indeed, who could have been more 
 sensible to the fact that without a foreign 
 alliance our national independence would 
 hardly have been established ? 
 
 The marvelous expansion of the country 
 during the last century appears to have 
 amply justified the success of all its policies. 
 But there is an unearned increment even 
 in statecraft. The force of impact of the 
 huge moving mass upon the American 
 continent has perhaps gained more for us 
 than any foresight of statesmanship. In 
 
THE POLICY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 7 
 
 the presence of such diplomatic problems 
 as we have hitherto had to solve, the wis- 
 dom or error of a few has been of second- 
 ary importance. The country's prosperity 
 has been built on the solid rock of common 
 effort rather than on the individual genius 
 of statesmen. Save perhaps with Lincoln, 
 its destinies have never been intimately tied 
 with those of any single man. This result, 
 while it has firmly established the founda- 
 tions of the nation's welfare by making 
 them largely independent of governmental 
 action, has not been without drawbacks 
 of another order. Little obvious as these 
 were so long as we remained within an in- 
 sular wall, they became manifest the day^ 
 of our emergence from political seclusion. 
 
 We had rejoiced in isolation without 
 realizing that the strength we were acquir- 
 ing was destined to outgrow its limitations, 
 and that almost unconsciously we were 
 laying the foundation upon which the 
 future assertion of our foreign policy was 
 to rest. The accumulation of wealth ap- 
 
8 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 peared to be the nation's principal interest. 
 Politically and economically, the aloofness 
 which had shielded our infancy, after hav- 
 ing been its protection, was beginning to 
 prove an obstacle to further development. 
 Yet, paradoxically, we failed to appreciate 
 the importance of the change which brought 
 our isolation to an end. 
 
 The training of our public life had for a 
 century been that of domestic politics. The 
 complications of international relations 
 with their new responsibilities flashed al- 
 most as a revelation before the entire nation, 
 which found itself on the morrow of the 
 Spanish War in the presence of problems 
 as novel as they were unforeseen. Without 
 realizing either their gravity or their solu- 
 tion, we have since approached these with 
 calm confidence, a loftiness of purpose char- 
 acteristic of our highest political ideals. 
 We have given in Cuba, and are giv- 
 ing now in the Philippines, an example of 
 national altruism that history has not often 
 paralleled. The remembrance of our own 
 
THE POLICY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 9 
 
 past security has caused us, however, to 
 consider the problems they present less in 
 their relation to us than in our relation to 
 them, and to devote correspondingly less 
 solicitude to the diplomatic and military 
 exigencies imposed by our dependencies 
 in order to forestall the possibility of later 
 humiliation. Our former weakness had 
 proved our strength. The conquests of 
 our strength and our fortune have now be- 
 come our weakness. 
 
 By the acquisition of the Philippines we 
 have assimilated the conditions of our pos- 
 session to those of other nations holding 
 Asiatic colonies. Beyond this the occu- 
 pation of the archipelago affects the asser- 
 tion of our influence elsewhere, curtailing 
 the independence of what would otherwise 
 have been an exclusively American policy 
 by holding in view the special requirements 
 of our Asiatic position. From a diplomatic 
 and military standpoint, the possession of 
 these dependencies is beyond question such 
 a source of weakness that it may well be 
 
10 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 asked if a public opinion with higher po- 
 litical training would ever have voluntarily 
 assumed the responsibility of their acquisi- 
 tion, had it been aware of its veritable im- 
 port. But even a greater weakness, when 
 considered in the light of similar deficien- 
 cies shared by other powers, is far from 
 being without remedy if we do not volun- 
 tarily deprive ourselves thereof. 
 
 Emerging from a century's isolation, we 
 find ourselves at the threshold of a new 
 era with two roads before us. The one 
 supposedly traditional in its character coun- 
 sels us to rely entirely upon our unaided 
 resources, to be strong in the conscious- 
 ness of our might as well as of that right 
 which every nation arrogates as peculiar 
 to itself. This policy appeals on the sur- 
 face to the manliness of the nation. Car- 
 ried to its logical conclusion it might be 
 practical, but at what sacrifice ! A triumph 
 of militarism would be the only effective 
 I means by which we could assure the safe- 
 ' guarding of our pretensions and over-sea 
 
THE POLICY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 11 
 
 possessions. Should our ambitions ever 
 clash against those of a state equal to us in 
 sea power, that had adopted the principle 
 of the nation in arms, we could successfully 
 oppose it only at the same cost. Even 
 greater sacrifices would be necessary on 
 our part, since other nations could rely 
 under certain conditions on the aid of allies, 
 from which we should presumably be de- 
 barred. In any measure short of an enor- 
 mous increase in armed strength, so great 
 that no nation or coalition would wish to 
 risk the challenge of our titles, lies dan- 
 ger ahead. A traditional policy inevitably 
 means for us a military policy. 
 
 Statesmanship is, above all, guidance in 
 economy of effort. To adjust the require- 
 ments of a national policy in conformity 
 with its resources, to see that no greater 
 effort is called for than may be necessary 
 to accomplish a given result, is its method. 
 Armed strength is certainly the foundation 
 of our security, and to neglect it would be 
 to incur greater risk. But while a nation's 
 
^ 
 
 12 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 safety is purchased only at the price of 
 constant vigilance and preparation, there 
 is a limit even to this. Our strength, how- 
 ever great, is only relative — proportionate 
 neither to the magnitude of our ambitions 
 nor to the defenselessness of our foreign 
 policies. 
 
 Any undue increase in armaments such 
 as would be necessary to guarantee us 
 against all dangers presents two serious 
 disadvantages. It is costly, especially in a 
 country without conscription, where mili- 
 tary expenditure already meets with mili- 
 tant opposition. It further conduces to 
 rivalry on the part of other nations. More- 
 over, any sudden or unlimited increase 
 would hardly be in tenor with our repeated 
 declarations of peaceful intentions. Yet 
 such is the force of an outworn tradition 
 that its alternative, or rather its supple- 
 ment, has hardly been considered. Diplo- 
 matic means of defense exist as potent as 
 military, and the presence of an ally's fleets 
 may preserve our own from action. The 
 
^/ 
 
 THE POLICY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 13 
 
 choice lies before the nation : either we must 
 maintain as many troops in the Philip- 
 pines as our military advisers judge neces- 
 sary against all contingencies, and provide 
 as many battleships to guard the oceans 
 which encircle us as our naval advisers 
 deem indispensable, or we must consider 
 the advisability of other measures. Com- 
 plete isolation from the world's affairs on 
 a nation's part is warranted only by ex- 
 treme feebleness or confident strength. The 
 fruit of recent victories has now deprived 
 us of former invulnerability. National great- 
 ness has not been achieved without the peril 
 of novel responsibilities. We find ourselves 
 exposed to danger both in our South Ameri- 
 can pretensions and in our Oriental posses- / 
 sions, yet without diplomatic recognition(^^ 
 of the first, or allies to aid in protecting 
 the second. It is possible that our strength 
 permits us to dispense with both. But for 
 a peaceful nation we may rely too much on 
 battleships, and not enough on diplomacy."^ 
 The most striking development in mod- 
 
14 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 ern diplomacy has been the vast extension 
 given within quite recent times to the sys- 
 tem of arrangements and understandings 
 which now link together the nations of 
 /Europe. These differ radically from the 
 /eighteenth-century idea of alliances, which 
 'were mainly offensive in purpose even 
 when restricted in their liability. The new 
 conception, on the contrary, is eminently 
 pacific in character, and limited in appli- 
 cation to comparatively narrow ends. It 
 aims within certain determined regions 
 to preserve actual conditions and to elimi- 
 nate possible causes of conflict, chiefly in 
 colonial spheres, by taking cognizance of 
 the special or mutual interests of the powers 
 concerned, and lending to the preservation 
 j of such agreements the force that is derived 
 j by cooperation of effort. 
 i There is reasonable certainty to-day that 
 Europe will never again witness such a 
 coalition as once annihilated Poland. In 
 fact, the dread of spoliation has given rise 
 to this system of mutual insurance. The 
 
THE POLICY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 15 
 
 European powers, confronted with greater 
 difficulties than our own, and, perhaps, 
 possessing more ancient experience in the 
 handling of foreign affairs, have founded 
 their security on mutual guarantees in-v/ 
 tended to preserve policies of common in- 
 terest. Even Japan, the last comer in the 
 comity of nations, has in recent years been 
 too painfully reminded of the absence of 
 similar precautions not to welcome the 
 first opportunity of preventing its recur- 
 rence. For us it may also become advisable 
 to consider the adoption of a foreign policy . 
 upon a non-partisan basis, upon broader 
 foundations than would have been war- 
 ranted by our former position, and in 
 greater conformity with actual necessities. 
 We are still somewhat unused to consider- 
 ing questions of this order in their world- 
 wide aspects. Our situation as a great 
 nation has been established by the logic of 
 facts, and without the corresponding intel- 
 lectual preparation, so impotent when it 
 does not possess the material foundation 
 
16 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 ^ for greatness. Circumstances have placed 
 ' us in the forefront of world powers. But 
 our position has been achieved almost too 
 easily. We have not experienced the dis- 
 cipline of adversity which has schooled 
 r. other great states. We have not felt the 
 ^:;|t<»l[ need for caution in our acts of international 
 significance. We have gone ahead almost 
 without a policy other than the Monroe 
 Doctrine and our traditional non-entan- 
 glement. At the present juncture, even 
 though the benefits of our new importance 
 are mainly apparent, and we rightly look 
 forward with confident hope to the future, 
 it may be advisable for a prudent state- 
 craft to take cognizance of the possibility of 
 shoals in the course that lies before us. Our 
 diplomacy ought to concern itself with the 
 preparation of a policy which will enable 
 us, so far as human foresight can foretell, 
 ^^ to escape such perils while pursuing our 
 *'^'*^ destiny as a great nation. * 
 
 The past has brought us into contact 
 with the Old World both in its collective 
 
THE POLICY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 17 
 
 form as an aggregate of states and with 
 the individual European powers. In the 
 formulation of any policy the experience of 
 history cannot be disregarded, and we have 
 to bear in mind the nature of the dan- 
 ger which may beset us. The continental 
 nations have always inclined, when their 
 contemplated action lay outside Europe, to 
 collective manifestations, as being of a * 
 
 nature to diminish their risk and increase ''•<****^ 
 their force, while protecting them from 
 danger behind. We have witnessed the 
 effects of such concerted action against 
 Japan, robbed at Port Arthur of the prize 
 of victory over China. We have seen it 
 operating with varying success against 
 Turkey. We have heard its rumblings, 
 however faint, even against ourselves. The 
 very admission that this peril may con- 
 ceivably exist means that we cannot with 
 impunity disinterest ourselves from Euro- , 
 pean politics. The future possibility of a^ J 
 concert of powers can never leave us indif- 
 ferent. More than ever our new depend- 
 
18 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 encies make us vulnerable and offer pawns 
 for possible enemies to take from us. 
 
 American diplomacy can have no more 
 important mission than that of guarding 
 against this danger, which would be brought 
 about by the hegemony of one state over 
 others in banding them together for a com- 
 mon purpose. The first principles of our 
 policy demand that we view with disfa- 
 vor the efforts of any power to assert its 
 own predominant superiority over weaker 
 neighbors. A coalition becomes dangerous 
 when it is guideoby^asingle power. When 
 nations enter upon a strictly equal footing 
 their efforts are too often at variance to be 
 easily effective. American diplomacy has 
 a definite scope before it in exercising 
 watchfulness against the occurrence of such 
 a peril. Nor is our solicitude exclusively 
 political. We should remember what a 
 European commercial union, advocated by 
 many foreign statesmen and economists, 
 would mean for us. Even if such union 
 were without apparent or immediate po- 
 
THE POLICY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 19 
 
 litical scope, its formation, directed mainly ^^^^^M- 
 against our trade, would create for America 
 a most serious peril : German customs unity 
 preceded German political unity. 
 
 Yet neither hostile alliance nor coalition 
 need alarm us so long as we do not volun- 
 tarily cripple ourselves by ignoring the 
 means at our command to resist these. 
 This does not imply the necessity for action 
 on our part in events of a strictly European 
 order. The disappearance of Dutch inde- 
 pendence, if so unfortunate an event were 
 ever to take place, would, for instance, be 
 keenly regretted by us, but, except for the 
 fate of Holland's colonies, it would not 
 warrant our intervention. Still less would 
 any concern we might feel in the ultimate 
 disposition of Austria be likely to justify 
 military action on our part. The diplo- 
 matic solicitude we have in Europe is and I 
 should remain that of spectators. But our 
 interests are now too widely spread to 
 permit us longer to disinterest ourselves 
 from any concerted action of the powers, 
 
20 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 with its almost inevitable extra-European 
 ramifications. 
 
 It is only a short step for European influ- 
 ence to extend beyond the Continent and 
 enter into spheres which concern us as well. 
 The line to draw is indeed far more subtle 
 than may at first appear. History bears 
 witness that in diplomacy unimportant 
 beginnings have often unexpected conse- 
 quences. It is to guard against unpleasant 
 surprises of this nature that we should 
 neglect no opportunity in identifying our 
 action with that of the European states. 
 The more we assert the equality of our rights 
 and responsibilities with theirs, the more we 
 make felt our legitimate influence in the 
 councils of nations, the less likelihood will 
 there be of the formation of any coalition, 
 commercial or political, in opposition to 
 our interests. Political movements possess 
 in themselves an organic growth, and such 
 future danger as may exist for us could more 
 easily acquire head by our aloofness at the 
 time of its inception than by our opposition 
 
THE POLICY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 21 
 
 thereto. Its maturity would present for us A/(h\ 
 greater peril than its infancy. Nor if we 
 act prudently need we ever feel ourselves 
 alone in resisting it. Europe, even under its 
 present cover of friendliness toward us, con- 
 tains many conflicting interests, and certain 
 of these would normally be favorable to 
 our policy. 
 
 We can hardly suppose, however, that 
 the extension unavoidably taken by our 
 diplomacy will not encounter resistance. 
 No power can hope to be successful with- 
 out incurring the antagonism of others, 
 even though our own peaceful proclivities 
 should preclude us from the former rapa- 
 cious ambitions of Old World states. But 
 whatever future struggles await us, we can- 
 not forget that diplomacy, like war, may 
 achieve for us victories or defeats. How- . 
 ever powerful we may become, a combina-\/ 
 tion may array against us power as great. 
 The burden of our weight, on whichever 
 side of the scales we incline, will inevitably 
 be counterpoised. Even more it will lead 
 
22 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 almost inevitably to fresh distributions of 
 strength. While the present grouping of 
 triple "entente" and triple alliance, each 
 reenforced by subsidiary aids, may not 
 prove everlasting, it is likely to provide the 
 basis upon which such new accretions will 
 form. Yet even future combinations need 
 not concern us. The balancing of strength 
 is no menace of war. On the contrary, 
 the distribution of liability in such an 
 event among several nations is the most 
 certain guarantee of peace. 
 
 Bellicose tendencies are far more likely 
 to exist in a single nation than where several 
 are allied together, and modern alliances 
 tend either to act in the direction of peace, 
 or else to limit the scene of conflict. The 
 recent Russo-Japanese War affords the 
 best example of how the efforts of Great 
 Britain and France, in spite of their respec- 
 tive alliances to each of the contestants, 
 succeeded in isolating the field of hostilities. 
 
 As for the argument that our present 
 strength is suflScient, examples are not want- 
 
THE POLICY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 23 
 
 ing of states with fleets and armies greater 
 than our own who feel that the interests of 
 peace would best be preserved by a policy 
 of understandings. England, with a sea 
 force far superior to ours, has looked to 
 diplomacy to aid her navy in guarding the 
 British Empire. Allied with Japan, an- 
 other understanding links her with France, 
 while in the event of war her fleets can 
 make use of Portugal's unrivaled strategic 
 position in the South Atlantic in return for 
 guaranteeing the latter's colonial posses- 
 sions. Diplomacy has been used by Eng- 
 land as an adjunct to naval strength, and 
 her policy has neglected no step to further 
 secure the safeguard of India as the pivot 
 of the British Empire. By these alliances, ^0iitf66 
 culminating in the recent agreement with ^*^18!U 
 Russia, she has guarded every avenue of 
 approach to her great colony. It may be 
 urged that England's exposed position ne- 
 cessitates such precautions. But has she 
 any possession more vulnerable than are 
 the Philippines ? 
 
24 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 The colonial position of France more 
 closely resembles our own. With depend- 
 encies situated at great distance from the 
 home country, she had felt herself unable 
 to protect these in the event of certain con- 
 tingencies. In spite of the lengthy period 
 of Anglophobia occasioned by colonial ri- 
 valry through which she had passed, her 
 diplomacy effected an understanding with 
 Great Britain. France by this means ob- 
 tained a protection for her dependencies 
 greater than her fleet could give. To this 
 she has added a further guarantee. The 
 defenselessness of Indo-China and the feel- 
 ing that it lay at the mercy of Japan had 
 been the first lesson of the late war to im- 
 press her. Without slighting the suscepti- 
 bilities of her Russian ally, France has been 
 able to negotiate an agreement with Japan 
 guaranteeing each other's possessions in the 
 Far East. 
 
 After these examples of nations pos- 
 sessing colonies, yet supplementing their 
 powers of defense by the aid of other states. 
 
THE POLICY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 25 
 
 we may consider the conditions in which a 
 similar understanding would be advisable' 
 for the United States. The problem pre- 
 sents itself of finding a desirable partner 
 willing to enter into a well-defined mutual 
 insurance, with whom no conflicting inter- 
 ests are likely to clash. Our old prejudice 
 against alliances had Europe in view, and 
 to-day, as in the past, any treaty or pact 
 which would entangle us in the internal 
 affairs of the Old World would be con- 
 demned. But it is difficult to see the inex- 
 pediency of an arrangement which, without 
 adding a ship to our fleet, or a dollar to our 
 expenditure, would restrict the nation's 
 liability to the American continent and 
 the islands of the Pacific, in return for 
 guaranteeing the status quo from Maine to 
 Manila; which would effectively protect 
 the Monroe Doctrine and the Panama 
 Canal, and safeguard the integrity of our 
 dependencies, and in removing the Pa- 
 cific from the sphere of political change 
 would assure us the sovereignty of the 
 
 \ 
 
 \ 
 
26 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 Philippines for such eventual disposition 
 as the American people deem fit to make. 
 Can it be doubted that an understanding of 
 this nature would immeasurably strengthen 
 our position and our policies, and be a 
 further guarantee for the preservation of 
 peace ? 
 kJ The price to pay for these benefits would 
 ^ be too heavy if we should be dragged as the 
 result into a continental conflagration, and 
 obliged to take sides in a struggle between 
 the nations of Europe. But the conse- 
 quence of our understanding with either 
 of the interested parties, in the event of 
 its being engaged in a European conflict, 
 would almost certainly be to restrict and 
 limit the seat of hostilities by removing the 
 American continent, and such parts of the 
 Pacific as might be included within its 
 scope, from the field of operations. The 
 alternative is obvious. If any hostile power 
 chose to disregard our warning and chal- 
 ^ lenge our ally within the bounds which we 
 had declared should be removed from the 
 
THE POLICY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 27 
 
 scene of conflict, the clearest dictates of 
 self-preservation would impel us to take 
 arms for a cause which would then become 
 our own. But this contingency is almost 
 too improbable to mention. 
 
 Such an understanding would thus be 
 of an essentially peaceful nature, tending 
 only to preserve existing conditions by re- 
 moving all motive for their disturbance. 
 In contracting it, we should be entering into 
 a mutual insurance limited by the terms of 
 the agreement, which would conceivably 
 restrict its provisions to the guarantee of 
 actual conditions within the lines of lon- 
 gitude embracing the American continent 
 and the Pacific. Providing, therefore, the 
 nation or nations with which such under- 
 standing had been entered into were suf- 
 ficiently powerful, we need feel no concern 
 for the future of the Philippines, the safety 
 of the Panama Canal, or the continuance 
 of the Monroe Doctrine. And while re- 
 spect for the latter may be obtained by 
 different means, the security of bur Asiatic 
 
28 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 possessions can hardly be assured by any 
 other feasible method. 
 
 As an American power and as an Asiatic 
 power, we have to deal with other American 
 and Asiatic powers, considering these in the 
 light of possible friends or adversaries with 
 the consequences attached to each con- 
 tingency. It is the province of statesman- 
 ship to sort the threads of our interests and 
 to see wherein these lie parallel with theirs, 
 and, where they may be dissimilar, to en- 
 deavor in times of national calm to adjust 
 causes of friction. The practical advan- 
 tages of such a process of diplomatic house- 
 cleaning have been witnessed in the recent 
 agreements effected by Great Britain with 
 France and Russia. Their differences have 
 now been reconciled. Their diplomatic 
 work has been a labor of peace, and 
 the danger of war, which for so long 
 appeared imminent, has been removed. 
 Diplomacy has given the lie to the "in- 
 evitable conflict" so long foreshadowed be- 
 tween these states, and spared each nation 
 
THE POLICY OF UNDERSTANDINGS 29 
 
 concerned its treasure and its blood, making 
 of former enemies present friends. 
 
 We have a far easier task. Yet although 
 no such differences or ambitions divide 
 us from other powers, causes of friction lie 
 not far away. But partly out of respect for 
 a tradition that has survived its utility, 
 partly because of still other reasons, we 
 have not availed ourselves of the diplo- 
 matic advantages at hand in fortifying our 
 position. We have not utilized the power 
 of diplomacy and made of it a veritable 
 instrument to strengthen national policies. 
 It still lies before us as a peaceful means 
 to forestall the danger of war and remove 
 the causes of national concern. 
 
/ 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 RELATIONS WITH EUROPE 
 
 We had so long been regarded as a 
 peaceful republic, occupied solely by trade, 
 that Europe was startled by our victory 
 over Spain to realize that we possessed 
 ambitions similar to those which for cen- 
 turies had spurred on her peoples to assert 
 their influence beyond the seas. It is only 
 half correct, however, to say that the war 
 caused our advent as a world power. It 
 inaugurated a new period less than it has- 
 tened the development of a growing move- 
 ment in American national evolution which 
 by its means attained to earlier maturity, 
 but which must in any event have sooner or 
 later made itself felt. 
 
 Certain causes would inevitably have 
 terminated our period of former isolation. 
 The extension given to our commercial in- 
 terests abroad had already for some time 
 
RELATIONS WITH EUROPE 31 
 
 aroused keener interest in the world's af- 
 fairs. So long as American export trade 
 formed but a relatively small proportion of 
 the country's industrial production we were 
 economically independent in our seclusion. 
 When foreign commerce, however, assumed ^ 
 an importance which has lately amounted 
 to over three thousand million dollars an- 
 nually, any curtailment in its volume meant 
 serious injury to our industry. Yet the 
 closer interest we now feel in the world's 
 affairs has been brought about, not so much 
 by the desire to enlarge our trade and the 
 pressure of material stakes as by the higher ^ 
 consciousness of new responsibilities. 
 
 Whereas formerly we accepted without 
 compunction, in questions of international 
 interest, the benefits of other powers' exer- 
 tions without ourselves incurring corre- 
 sponding liabilities, the nation's sense of 
 dignity has at last been awakened to this 
 impropriety, and can never again relapse in 
 such matters to its former callousness. The 
 yfelief of the legations at Pekin has demon- 
 
32 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 strated our readiness to participate in affairs 
 of joint concern to civilized states. 
 
 Except for Great Britain, the result of 
 the Spanish War had been little welcome 
 to the rest of Europe, grown accustomed 
 to the thought that the destinies of the 
 universe should forever be in the hands of 
 five or six of its states. The nations of 
 Europe have been aptly compared by M. 
 d'Haussonville to a party of gamblers 
 seated around a green cloth grown some- 
 what shabby with age, where each in turn 
 takes the bank. A newcomer enters, his 
 pockets bulging with gold, and startles 
 the players into a fear that he may at once 
 break the bank. 
 
 In destroying the time-worn conception 
 as to the exclusive supremacy of Europe we 
 appeared as intruders, and as such were un- 
 welcome. But this resentment has partly 
 disappeared since the more recent victory 
 of Japan made the Old World recover from 
 its first surprise. The Continent recog- 
 nized that our appearance might offer com- 
 
RELATIONS WITH EUROPE 33 
 
 pensations in neutralizing the new power of 
 the East, and viewed our recent Japanese ^ 
 difficulties with thinly veiled satisfaction. 
 Our single entry as a great nation had for 
 a time overturned all former calculations 
 and shifted the axis of power. But offset 
 by Japan, the scales are only more heavily 
 weighted than before, and the fulcrum has 
 been set back where it was, though the 
 balance is less delicately adjusted. Change 
 has come through the enlargement of what 
 had been a restricted horizon to its present 
 globe-embracing proportions. A concert >^w^v»i^' 
 of world powers has dispossessed the con- . 
 cert of Europe. i 
 
 While the European nations are rapidly^! 
 adapting their diplomacy to conform with 
 the new requirements, we have emerged 
 from our former aloofness handicapped by 
 the weight of a traditional policy no longer « 
 in touch with actual conditions. Brought 
 up to respect the wisdom of non-entangle- 
 ment in the affairs of Europe, we now find 
 ourselves called upon to assume our place 
 
34 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 as a world power, yet unable to separate 
 the international position of foreign states 
 from their strictly European position, or to 
 forget that the general interests of civilized 
 nations are likewise in great measure the 
 interests of Europe. Our attitude toward 
 such countries must be related to our colo- 
 nial situation, and it may even vary accord- 
 ing as their over-sea policy affects our own. 
 Foreign relations have grown for us in com- 
 plexity, and our requirements have ceased 
 to bear the same uniform hall-mark of 
 simplicity in every region of the globe. We 
 must scan more critically the movements 
 and the ambitions of other states, without 
 being able as before to disinterest ourselves 
 therefrom. The vital interests of each of 
 ( the great European powers concern us in 
 relation to our policy. 
 
 To begin with a sister republic, tradition 
 and sympathy cause us to regard France 
 as the most ancient of our friends, to whom 
 we have been bound by a debt of gratitude 
 not yet forgotten. Our friendship toward 
 
RELATIONS WITH EUROPE 35 
 
 her rests on a solid basis, nor are conflicting 
 ambitions likely again to clash between us. 
 As an American power, France's posses- 
 sions, of slight consequence and far scat- 
 tered from the St. Lawrence to Guiana, 
 are mainly of historical importance ; but as 
 Asiatic powers, the interests of the two 
 republics are similar. Even economically 
 there is little reason to anticipate between 
 the two nations that acute commercial 
 rivalry which so often precedes political 
 difliculties. The active participation of 
 France in the world's affairs is now con- 
 fined to a role of peace. There is slight 
 probability of her ever again seeking to pur- 
 sue the course of aggression that so often 
 made her in the past the disturbing factor 
 in Europe. With reason, therefore, may we 
 look to the future continuance of our an- 
 cient friendship. 
 
 From having been the most warlike, 
 France has in recent years become the most 
 peaceful of states. Her former policies of 
 adventure have been definitely dismissed. 
 
36 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 and like another and greater Holland she 
 has subsided into a rich capitalist nation, 
 farming out her millions for others more 
 active to employ profitably. Since the war 
 of 1870 her colonial policy has been dic- 
 tated less by need for expansion than 
 through fear on the part of her statesmen 
 lest their country be outdistanced in the 
 future, if new national interests were not 
 created beyond the seas. Successful in 
 this field, her colonial enterprise, save in 
 North Africa, is no longer aggressive. 
 
 France has ceased to be a menace to any 
 state. But her continental position im- 
 poses upon her a certain policy. Lying 
 between two powerful neighbors, the choice 
 had become necessary between accept- 
 ing the consequences of naval inferiority 
 toward Great Britain and military inferior- 
 ity toward Germany. Friendship with the 
 one power meant a guarantee for her colo- 
 nial empire in the event of war, but at the 
 risk of invasion; friendship with the other 
 meant inviolability of territory, but the al- 
 
RELATIONS WITH EUROPE 37 
 
 most certain loss of colonies in case of such 
 a contest. 
 
 Her feeling of resentment toward Ger- 
 many had been greatly lessened in recent 
 years. The sting of bitterness caused by 
 the remembrance of lost provinces, if not 
 forgotten, was at least relegated to the rear 
 by the more recent smart of national humil- 
 iation suffered at Fashoda. Counsels were 
 therefore divided as to what policy to adopt, 
 when the events which led to the Moroc- 
 can Conference demonstrated that France 
 could secure the Emperor's friendship only 
 by unreservedly accepting German hege- 
 mony. And however great the anxiety to 
 insure the safety of her eastern frontier, 
 French patriotism revolted at accepting a 
 situation which would have forced the 
 nation to acquiesce in the position of 
 an inferior power definitely submissive to 
 German policy. Hence the understanding 
 with England, at first of strictly colonial 
 interest, afterward assumed a new and un- 
 expected importance, the significance of 
 
S8 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 which recent developments have further 
 augmented. 
 
 While France to-day seeks only to pre- 
 serve her present possessions, Germany is 
 too lately born among great nations to have 
 enjoyed the inheritance of older states. 
 Hitherto her efforts to colonize have not 
 been altogether successful, and her foreign 
 dependencies remain far inferior to those of 
 even small powers like Holland or Portugal. 
 With a rapidly growing population ill con- 
 fined within the present frontiers, and con- 
 fronted by grave social problems, she aims 
 to follow the example of her neighbors in 
 securing outlets for over-sea trade and enter- 
 prise. But while other great powers have 
 reached a stage where they are content to 
 develop what is theirs, Germany feels that 
 she has not yet reached her full measure, nor 
 has her national energy attained its zenith. 
 She seeks a position where she will be able 
 to demand participation in, or compensa- 
 tion for, any alteration or change in existing 
 territorial conditions, in whatever quarter 
 
RELATIONS WITH EUROPE 39 
 
 of the globe it occurs ; and to prepare for 
 this the same careful labor is to-day going 
 on in the German navy as took place in 
 the Prussian army after the defeat of Jena. 
 Will a united Germany care to wait fifty 
 years to witness results? Success engen- 
 ders the wish for success, and the remem- 
 brance of past victories has been too vivid 
 not to spur on future hope. 
 
 Such ambitions as Germany may cher- 
 ish are accompanied by armaments of a 
 nature which not unnaturally cause solici- 
 tude among neighbors at whose expense 
 they would be carried out. However unfair 
 it would be to criticise her for an eflSciency 
 which her neighbors may envy, which has 
 proved the reason for her past success, and 
 the burden of which concerns her alone, it 
 would be unwise to fail to appreciate its 
 consequences. Her deficiency in sea power 
 alone prevents her from wielding the same 
 world power which she enjoys as a conti- 
 nental state, and to remedy this Germany's 
 present efforts are strained. Her imme- 
 
4fO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 diate goal is not the acquisition of a para- 
 mount naval position, which she knows 
 herself unable under existing conditions to 
 wrest from Great Britain, but the bringing 
 about of a state of armed peace on sea, as 
 on land, which would terminate the latter's 
 supremacy. The policy of armed peace 
 has made Germany the dominant force on 
 the Continent since 1870, and her success- 
 ful pursuit of a similar condition on the 
 high seas would no longer render hopeless 
 a possible naval contest with Great Britain. 
 German naval policy to-day aims so to 
 enlarge her present fleet as to make it, even 
 single-handed, a dangerous adversary, while 
 it would always constitute the nucleus of 
 a possible array of forces which might be 
 marshaled against a common foe. The con- 
 ception is Napoleonic in spirit. Napoleon 
 aimed to place himself at the head of a 
 European confederation definitely submis- 
 sive to his policy ; and German influence is 
 to-day dominant not only in Austria, her 
 avowed ally, but in several of the smaller 
 
RELATIONS WITH EUROPE 41 
 
 states of northern and eastern Europe. 
 But her political allies, while strong in their 
 military armaments, are crippled by an in- 
 adequacy of sea power which would render 
 their assistance of slight utility in the event 
 of naval war. In order to fulfill her ambi- 
 tion, Germany requires both to isolate her 
 rival and to obtain the aid of a power able 
 to prove of assistance to her on the sea. At 
 the present time we are the nation best fitted 
 to render her such services. Our resources 
 and our naval strength would be of inesti- 
 mable advantage to the emperor in a pos- 
 sible war with England, and the cultivation 
 of our friendship may well appear a desira- 
 ble goal toward which his diplomacy should 7 
 strive. 
 
 The former vapors of conflict between 
 Germany and ourselves are fortunately 
 long since dissipated. Her supposed covet- 
 ing of the Philippines after the battle of 
 Manila was keenly resented by us. But the \ 
 details of this episode would prove that her i 
 conduct, to which we then took exception. 
 
i 
 
 42 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 had been due to indiscretions for which she 
 was in no way to blame. Her subsequent 
 course has certainly been altogether loyal, 
 and we have even had occasion to appreci- 
 ate in regions of special interest to us the 
 friendliness of her present diplomacy. All 
 recollection of unpleasantness is happily 
 effaced, and German official relations have 
 more than oscillated to the extreme pole of 
 friendship. This is eminently desirable, 
 and so long as it does not cause us to forget 
 vital interests, we can but gain by the pre- 
 servation of the present fortunate cordiality. 
 We cannot blind ourselves, however, to the 
 fact that Germany desires our amity, in- 
 spired by deeper motives than may appear 
 on the surface. Even if our active aid could 
 not be enlisted, to endeavor to detach us 
 from other sympathies is legitimate diplo- 
 macy on her part. From our standpoint, 
 however, the benefits of any closer intimacy 
 than at present exists would be hardly com- 
 mensurate with the corresponding disad- 
 vantages suffered in other quarters. The 
 
RELATIONS WITH EUROPE 43 
 
 present cultivation of friendship with so 
 great a power, and from whom we have 
 much to learn, is to be earnestly desired, 
 but any closer understanding with Germany 
 would present for us too many obstacles to 
 be enduring or advantageous. 
 
 The preponderant influence of Germany 
 in European affairs has been somewhat 
 heightened by the temporary exclusion 
 of Russia from her accustomed place in 
 the councils of nations and her condemna- 
 tion for the next few years to a rigid policy 
 of internal development. The period of 
 Muscovite aggression is over, for a time at 
 least, and as a constitutional state she has 
 settled with good grace to the acceptance 
 of a new role of peace. Her recent under- 
 standing with Great Britain, which brought 
 to an end long-standing jealousies, was wel- 
 come to us. We had no cause to desire the 
 perpetuation of disputes between powers 
 whose interests so closely resemble our own. 
 In the past, amity with Russia has been 
 a wise tradition in our diplomacy, and its 
 
44 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 continuance should prove an important fac- 
 tor in our future European policy. The 
 causes of friction that have lately arisen 
 over questions of jurisdiction in Manchuria 
 are of passing significance. It is unlikely 
 that divergent interests of vital consequence 
 will ever separate the two nations, while cir- 
 cumstances are easily conceivable, in the 
 extreme Orient, in which they could render 
 each other mutual services. 
 
 In addition to political considerations, 
 our commercial interests cause us to desire 
 a closer intimacy with Russia, whose Asiatic 
 expansion, with its consequent needs, is not 
 unlike our own winning of the West. In the 
 struggle for the trade of the Near and Far 
 East, and even in the development of Euro- 
 pean Russia, numerous opportunities are 
 ^ ^ likely to occur where Russian influence, un- 
 able itself to profit, would incline to favor 
 our enterprise in preference to that of other 
 nations. 
 
 With the remaining continental powers, 
 apart from the extensive commercial rela- 
 
 v^ 
 
RELATIONS WITH EUROPE 45 
 
 tions we have with them, the protection 
 and development of which necessitate a 
 more watchful diplomacy than is commonly 
 supposed, our interest arises largely from 
 their affiliations with Germany, or with the 
 Dual Alliance, and Great Britain. While 
 Austrian diplomacy has in recent years been 
 increasingly subordinated to that of Berlin, 
 Italian has steered a more independent 
 course. The expression of fidelity to allies 
 and loyalty to friends, so frequently invoked 
 by succeeding Italian Ministers of Foreign 
 Affairs in explanation of their country's for- 
 eign policy, likewise characterizes its nature. ; 
 The course of conciliatory opportunism in \/ 
 harmony with the country's welfare predi- 
 cates for Italy a cordiality toward both sides 
 which would tend to make for her, neutrality 
 in the event of war. This augurs well for 
 the continuance of the many sympathies 
 which unite us to Italy, whose ambitions 
 are unlikely to forebode for us any unex- 
 pected or unwelcome developments. 
 
 At the present time, when every year 
 
46 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 witnesses a growth in the friendship ex- 
 isting between Great Britain and ourselves, 
 it may appear fanciful to speak of the pos- 
 sibility of conflict between two kindred na- 
 tions. But the recollection of a Venezuelan 
 boundary dispute is not long enough re- 
 moved to allow us to forget what might 
 have occurred without Lord Salisbury's wise 
 statesmanship. The efforts of the two gov- 
 ernments to smooth all sources of trouble 
 at a time like the present, when both nations 
 are animated by the friendliest feelings, is a 
 wise indication of the importance attached 
 to such amity. 
 
 Towards England the clearest dictates 
 of reason impel us to turn, — not because of 
 the intimate ties of language, blood, and civ- 
 ilization, nor because the two nations have 
 shared a common past. Bonds of sympathy 
 and kinship have never prevented fratrici- 
 dal strife ; where conflicting interests oppose 
 they offer a poor foundation upon which to 
 base an understanding. Identical interests 
 undivided by divergent ambitions afford 
 
RELATIONS WITH EUROPE 47 
 
 a far safer basis for friendship between 
 nations. 
 
 The most serious foreign danger which 
 has menaced us in the past as a nation was 
 the triumph of Napoleon over continental 
 Europe. As Mr. Olney has remarked/ 
 were his career ever again to approach or 
 even to threaten repetition, not merely sen- 
 timent and sympathy, but the strongest 
 consideration of self-preservation and self- 
 defense, might drive us to take sides. Had 
 the power of England then been annihi- 
 lated, it is unlikely that we would have at- 
 tained our present greatness. Great Britain, 
 though fighting us at sea, yet saved us from 
 greater peril. Danger for her, just as dan- 
 ger for us, lies in a coalition of powers, and, 
 in consequence, British diplomacy has to 
 oppose the combinations of Europe. For 
 the past three centuries England's continu- 
 ous policy has been to resist the efforts of 
 any state to achieve a European hegemony 
 or to assert a paramount influence. When 
 
 » Atlantic Monthly, March, 1900, p. 298. 
 
48 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 Spain was dominant she opposed her. A 
 century later she fought Louis the Four- 
 teenth, and alone she faced Napoleon, and 
 later resisted Russia. Time and time again 
 she has manifested her readiness to block 
 any concert of powers directed toward an 
 end distasteful to her. Canning barring the 
 action of the Holy Alliance on the morrow 
 of the Congress of Verona; Palmerston re- 
 fusing to unite with Napoleon the Third, 
 eager to destroy our unity by aiding the 
 South; Salisbury prepared to thwart any 
 European coalition at the outbreak of the 
 Spanish War, are so many illustrations in 
 point. The aid England was ready to extend 
 us during our recent war proved unneces- 
 sary, since no hostile coalition attained ma- 
 turity. But the fact that, had it been other- 
 wise, the dictates of self-preservation would 
 have compelled our acceptance thereof, just 
 as we accepted the aid of France in the Re- 
 volution, gives the lie to the reverence with 
 which we still regard a misinterpreted tra- 
 dition. ^Alliances can be entangling only 
 
RELATIONS WITH EUROPE 49 
 
 when they are disadvantageous. To guard ^ 
 against their being so is the duty of a wise 
 statesmanship. 
 
 Without regarding any power as hostile, 
 we cannot avoid the conclusion that only 
 from England, from the Continent, or from 
 Japan could serious danger menace us. 
 While England as the mistress of the sea 
 would be our most formidable adversary, 
 she could also be our most useful friend, 
 and her friendship is of as much importance 
 to us as is ours to her. Mutual benefit or 
 mutual injury would alike be greater than 
 either could experience at the hands of 
 other nations. While no incentive for hostil- 
 ity exists on either side, with no other power 
 would the advantages of an understanding \/ 
 be so great or the liabilities so small. Eng- 
 land controls the key of the situation for 
 us both toward the Continent and toward 
 Japan. Under existing circumstances, were 
 she unwilling, no power could menace us. 
 Nor are such circumstances likely to alter 
 so long as the Continent remains divided. 
 
50 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 To guard against this is the primary object 
 of British diplomacy, and her present guar- 
 antee against a united Europe lies in the 
 understanding with France. What France 
 is to England, England is to us. Hence the 
 preservation of the Anglo-French under- 
 standing, and in smaller degree the under- 
 standing with Russia, concern us only a 
 little less than the main participants. So 
 long as these subsist the British navy is su- 
 preme, and with our own maintained at such, 
 strength as to make us a formidable factor 
 in the event of complications, we need fear 
 no hostile coalition to menace our policies 
 or our dependencies. Looking toward the 
 Far East, Mr. Olney has reminded us that 
 except for Great Britain's countenance we 
 should almost certainly never have secured 
 the Philippines.^ Her alliance with Japan, 
 coupled with the consciousness of her naval 
 supremacy, holds that power in restraint; 
 while in China our policies are united in 
 upholding the open-door principle. In every 
 
 ' Atlantic Monthly, March, 1900, p. 300. 
 
RELATIONS WITH EUROPE 51 
 
 region of the globe we find similarity in 
 our political interests. And the reason is 
 unquestionably because England, with the 
 greatest colonial empire the world has yet 
 witnessed, can seek only to preserve her 
 birthright and not to expand further. Land- 
 glutted, she desires to retain her present 
 possessions without coveting the territories 
 of others. 
 
 The maintenance of that empire excites 
 no jealousy in us, and presents no incon- 
 venience. The Philippine experiment has 
 allayed whatever lurking ambitions existed 
 within us in the direction of colonial ex- 
 pansion beyond the western hemisphere. 
 While for better or for worse the nation's 
 destinies must for an indefinite time be 
 connected with our Oriental dependencies, 
 we have no desire to enlarge such experi- 
 ence. On the contrary, we should prefer to 
 see the colonial markets of the world con- 
 trolled by a state ready to throw them open 
 to all comers. 
 
 The problems of imperial responsibility 
 
52 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 for the acts of self-governing British colo- 
 nies still remain to be solved ; but their in- 
 tention to exclude the yellow races brings 
 these close to a policy which must hence- 
 forth be our own. In that as well lies the 
 opportunity for future cooperation of mu- 
 tual advantage. Lastly, we cannot forget 
 that Canada is too integral a part of the 
 American continent for its welfare not to 
 be connected with our own. While this is 
 not the place to enter into the problems, 
 more intricate than vital, that still remain 
 to be settled with our northern neighbor, it 
 is obvious that the closer the ties binding 
 us to the mother country, the easier will be 
 their solution. Questions like those of the 
 Newfoundland fisheries can never assume 
 a violent form if the colonists realize that 
 overt acts on their part will deprive them 
 of their government's support. 
 
 The furtherance of such a policy of close 
 intimacy with Great Britain necessitates a 
 frank exchange of views on all matters of 
 common interest. But such understanding 
 
RELATIONS WITH EUROPE 53 
 
 would have little in common with the nature V 
 of an alliance. It would base itself rather 
 on the desire to settle outstanding ques- 
 tions which have in the past been causes 
 of friction, and further to unite in the mu- 
 tual declaration of a policy of joint interest 
 which would tend to perpetuate existing 
 conditions, particularly in the Pacific, where 
 our desires are identical. The fact that our 
 policies would cause us to regard with dis- 
 favor the effort of any nation to disturb 
 present conditions within spheres of com- 
 mon interest, does not imply that we should 
 be drawn thereby into conflicts alien to us. 
 Contact even with the Old World is not 
 synonymous with entanglement, nor does 
 entanglement of necessity mean war. Eng- 
 land, which has continually mingled in con- 
 tinental affairs, has yet since Waterloo gone 
 through but one European war. Her efforts 
 in the direction of her traditional policy are 
 indeed more likely to be peacefully effective 
 if our own approval thereof be well under- 
 stood. The influence of the two great naval 
 
54 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 powers, already united by so many intimate 
 ties, directed toward this end would more 
 than in any other way strengthen the cause 
 of peace. 
 
 A guarantee on the part of the two coun- 
 tries to maintain the present territorial and 
 political conditions within certain deter- 
 mined regions could hardly be viewed as 
 an entangling alliance. It would rather be 
 a pledge against war, since it would permit 
 us to dispense with the unlimited extension 
 of armaments otherwise necessary to defend 
 our policies, while freeing England from 
 anxiety with regard to her American colo- 
 nies and uniting both nations in guaran- 
 teeing the integrity of weaker neutral states. 
 It would offer a permanent basis for our 
 foreign policy worthy of our dignity as a 
 great power. And if later, as a result of this, 
 additional agreements and understandings 
 tending to the preservation of certain de- 
 sired conditions within definite spheres 
 were to be contracted with other states simi- 
 larly interested, these could hardly be re- 
 
RELATIONS WITH EUROPE 55 
 
 garded as entangling us in the labyrinth 
 of European politics, or otherwise than as 
 bespeaking our sincere desire for peace and 
 our determination to assist its preservation 
 by diplomatic as well as by military means. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE RECOGNITION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 The external problems hitherto confront- 
 ing the nation have been mainly of a sim- 
 ple order. Since the birth of the Republic 
 we have been spared the intricate questions 
 of foreign policy that disturb the calm of 
 European statesmen. Our diplomacy, after 
 the remarkable success of its early efforts, 
 brought to the consideration of interna- 
 tional relations a directness of vision and of 
 method, differing, perhaps, from that of a 
 trained service, but not unsuited to accom- 
 plish its end. With neither the glamour 
 nor the brilliancy occasionally present 
 among European diplomatists, our public 
 men have for the most part treated foreign 
 relations with the sterling sense and integ- 
 rity of purpose characteristic of the best 
 traditions in our government. 
 
 So long as national conditions remained 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 57 
 
 unaltered there was little necessity for 
 change in method. Isolation afforded the 
 best guarantee for our security, and the 
 ocean provided an effectual barrier for possi- 
 ble diplomatic shortcomings. The Spanish 
 War, with the responsibilities it created, 
 sharply marks the inauguration of a new 
 era in the country's development, the impor- 
 tance of which history will only accentuate. 
 But nowhere have its effects been more 
 marked and less realized than in our diplo- 
 matic position. We have readily appre- 
 ciated the difference made in our status 
 from a colonial, military, naval, even from 
 a constitutional standpoint. To a less de- 
 gree have we been conscious of the change 
 caused in our international relations. 
 
 It is a common though hardly an accu- 
 rate remark that the Spanish War awakened 
 Europe to a sense of our greatness as a 
 nation. Though this was true of the masses 
 on the Continent, there were many public 
 men abroad fully aware of our resources 
 and our capabilities. It was rather that the 
 
58 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 Old World, having grown accustomed to 
 consider us as a colossus self-contained, and 
 voluntarily abstaining from all external in- 
 terference, suddenly realized, as we our- 
 selves with no less surprise realized, that 
 that day was over and that henceforth we 
 were ready to assume our part in the world. 
 With justifiably ambitious views of the 
 future to which we believe our destinies 
 direct us, we have not yet renovated, so to 
 speak, the mechanism of our action. Cer- 
 tain of our methods still remain unadapted 
 to new conditions, unchanged from what they 
 were at a time when the country's responsi- 
 bilities were slight and its foreign problems 
 simple. We still view international relations 
 with the same directness of vision as before, 
 without fully appreciating the possibilities 
 which lie before us or the methods which 
 a more difficult position would urge us to 
 employ. The nation at large is hardly con- 
 scious that we have to-day outgrown an 
 antiquated system which under actual con- 
 ditions is hardly conducive to our security. 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 59 
 
 Other measures have become necessary in 
 order to safeguard the foreign relations of 
 a great state that has to defend over-sea 
 dependencies and a policy which is one 
 of the greatest burdens ever voluntarily 
 assumed by any nation. 
 
 Although the Monroe Doctrine has passed 
 into an article of national creed which, irre- 
 spective of party, appears almost axiomat- 
 ieally to embody our foreign policy, the 
 reverence with which it inspires us does not 
 equally impress other nations. It would 
 be doing the country poor service to lull 
 it into believing that the European powers 
 accept the doctrine in the same spirit as 
 ourselves, or that its present maintenance 
 reposes on any other ultimate basis than 
 that of force. In the past we have tacitly 
 endeavored to secure its recognition by 
 abstaining from all assertion of our au- 
 thority abroad. We treated Europe as a 
 monarchical entity and expected similar 
 consideration for republican institutions in 
 America. But we lost sight of the fact that 
 
60 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 when this policy was inaugurated we were 
 in no position to warrant the great Euro- 
 pean powers entering into such a bargain. 
 Few things come gratuitously, particularly 
 in diplomacy. When in later years, although 
 able to make our voice heard, we offered 
 no direct compensation in return for favors 
 we did not ask, other nations felt under no 
 obligation to bind themselves to the accept- 
 ance of our view. 
 
 The acquisition of the Philippines, re- 
 sulting in the extension of American power 
 into Asiatic waters, deprived us, in the mind 
 of Europe, of whatever moral justification 
 we might previously have possessed for the 
 Monroe Doctrine. According to the idea 
 that had been prevalent abroad, the sole 
 basis for our right in venturing to exclude 
 the Old World from regarding the New as a 
 field for further colonial aggrandizement lay 
 in restricting our activities to the western 
 hemisphere. The fact that such had been 
 our course since the birth of the Republic 
 appeared to give additional sanction to this 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 61 
 
 idea. When, therefore, the Philippines be- 
 came an American possession, we seemed 
 in the eyes of Europe to have forfeited all 
 moral claim to our contention. This loss, 
 however, was more than counterbalanced 
 in other directions. The acquisition of new 
 dependencies and the vast growth of Ameri- 
 can influence in every quarter of the globe 
 gave us a prestige far more diplomatically 
 negotiable than the position we had left be- 
 hind. That we have fully availed ourselves 
 of the new benefits obtained is, however, 
 questionable. Antiquated traditions have 
 caused us to neglect the diplomatic means 
 wherewith to strengthen our position and 
 effect a security for our policies far greater 
 than any moral right could ever confer. 
 
 The nation, peace-loving, yet determined 
 at all costs to uphold the Monroe Doctrine, 
 has not devoted its attention toward the 
 pacific methods of bringing this about. We 
 have omitted to do in its support what 
 powers like France and England, in the face 
 of far stronger opposition than any encoun- 
 
62 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 tered by us, have accomplished in countries 
 where their action was less justifiable than 
 our own, but where they have acquired for 
 their position a sanction which the acqui- 
 escence of the only powers able to dispute 
 their titles has legitimized. England, for 
 instance, having first obtained the recogni- 
 tion of her occupation of Egypt from the 
 non-interested powers, secured it finally by 
 diplomatic means from France, in spite of 
 the latter's previous animosity, which on 
 more than one occasion had brought the two 
 nations to the verge of war. Similarly in her 
 seizure of Tunis, France first obtaining the 
 aid of Germany, eager at that time to divert 
 her former enemy to colonial enterprises, 
 and later winning over British support, her 
 position became legalized in the face of the 
 hostility of Italy, who felt unable to dis- 
 pute it single-handed and was finally forced 
 to content herself with the recognition of 
 shadowy eventual claims over Tripoli. 
 
 We have been unaccustomed to consider 
 this order of negotiation, and have not been 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 63 
 
 aroused by lack of success to the necessity of 
 taking diplomatic precautions. Under past 
 conditions, the simplicity of our former 
 methods and requirements was suflficient to 
 permit us to dispense therewith. But now 
 that our liabilities have more than kept pace 
 with enjarged resources we cannot afford 
 to forget the hostility which the "brazenly 
 impudent" Monroe Doctrine, as Bismarck 
 once termed it, has encountered abroad, or 
 the frank denunciation it has met on the 
 part of public men and political writers on 
 the Continent. Although this animosity is 
 temporarily quiescent, our diplomacy has 
 still abundant scope before it in endeavoring 
 to counteract such a prejudice. 
 
 But for the Philippines we might have 
 been indifferent to the dislike of Europe. To 
 the weakness caused by our pretensions in 
 South America we have added the weakness 
 caused by Asiatic acquisitions. If ever the 
 Monroe Doctrine is challenged, its fate may 
 well be disputed in the waters of Manila 
 Bay. There exists, however, an essential dif- 
 
\ 
 
 64 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 ference in the degree of exposure between 
 our position in the Philippines and our 
 assertion of the Monroe Doctrine. While 
 without a policy of understandings the se- 
 curity of the former can hardly be assured, 
 the latter may be safeguarded by obtaining 
 its recognition from the only powers able 
 to challenge it. By peaceful methods, as 
 effectively as by a more aggressive policy, 
 we are able to guarantee its preservation. 
 No nation will to-day break solemn obliga- 
 tions without considerable incentive or prov- 
 ocation. If ever the recognition of the great 
 European powers is, therefore, accorded to 
 a policy which menaces no peace-loving 
 state, the dangers of war in questions rising 
 out of the interpretation of the Monroe 
 Doctrine will be reduced to insignificance. 
 Where England and France have obtained 
 the acquiescence of other powers for colo- 
 nial ventures of questionable character, 
 we can secure similar recognition for our 
 policy. To certain nations of Europe its 
 acceptance would be a matter of indif- 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 65 
 
 ference; to one it would undoubtedly be 
 welcome. 
 
 Great Britain has often given us the 
 proof of her sincere friendship. An English 
 statesman first suggested the Monroe Doc- 
 trine, and the strength of England in the 
 days of our weakness made possible its 
 preservation. Great Britain, with a still 
 dominant trade in South America, is almost 
 as interested as ourselves that no portion of 
 that continent should be alienated to the 
 advantage of any European power. French 
 interests are similar to those of England. 
 Apart from the natural desire to round out 
 the boundaries of her great African empire, 
 France has to-day no other colonial ambi- 
 tion than to preserve what is already hers, 
 least of all one of the serious nature which 
 the challenge of our policy would require. 
 And although the doctrine has in itself been 
 an object of dislike to certain French polit- 
 ical writers, the influence of their ideas, 
 which tended in another sphere toward alli- 
 ance with Germany and a European con- 
 
66 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 federation, has greatly diminished in recent 
 years. 
 
 In Russia, as well, we have often found 
 a friend who would be the more ready to 
 recognize our contention in South America, 
 as she is herself without ambitions or inter- 
 ests in the western hemisphere. 
 
 Only two European powers are conceiv- 
 ably likely at any time to challenge the 
 Monroe Doctrine, and one of these could 
 not be in a position to do so for many years. 
 Germany and Italy are alike in possessing 
 great interests in South America. The dan- 
 ger of interference by the former in south- 
 ern Brazil has been frequently commented 
 upon, and although the present cordial re- 
 lations existing between the German Em- 
 pire and ourselves render such peril for the 
 time without foundation, in certain not 
 impossible events, coupled with any neglect 
 in our own watchfulness, it cannot be said 
 that the temptation for German interven- 
 tion in South America, with its inevitable 
 results, would not present itself. It would 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 67 
 
 certainly be dangerous to interpret Ger- 
 many's consulting us in her recent difficul- 
 ties with Venezuela as an indication of her 
 formal subscription to the Monroe Doctrine. 
 The convenience of negotiation might cause 
 her to treat with us repeatedly without 
 further binding her to the recognition of 
 any such principle. It may be well to recall 
 Napoleon the Third's words to Slidell, that 
 in diplomacy nothing was held to exist that 
 had not formally been written. (Had M. 
 Delcasse remembered this, he could not 
 have made the mistake of believing that 
 Germany assented to his Moroccan policy.) 
 While any challenge of the Monroe Doc- 
 trine may safely be set aside so long as our ^^^ 
 naval strength makes us a formidable an- 
 tagonist, it is doubtful if Germany or any 
 other nation would attach importance to 
 inferences which might be drawn from past 
 acts, provided the existing incentive was 
 adequate and the danger of action reduced 
 to insignificant proportions. Unless a na- 
 tion's hands are formally tied by written 
 
68 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 agreement, its acceptance of the Monroe or 
 any other doctrine against its own interests 
 cannot be presupposed. 
 
 The fear of Italian interference is fortu- 
 nately very remote, and Italy's recent arbi- 
 tration treaty with the Argentine proves the 
 peaceful intentions of her present policy. 
 Misfortunes in Abyssinia have for the 
 time removed from her all taste for colonial 
 ventures. But Italy, rapidly growing in na- 
 tional wealth and strength, wishes to regard 
 herself as the successor of Imperial Rome. 
 Her present policy is based on the preserva- 
 tion of existing conditions until such time as 
 she may be better able to avail herself of op- 
 portunities. While the inflammable nature 
 of her masses is to-day held in restraint by 
 an able governing power, a real or fancied 
 grievance suffered in a moment of violence 
 by Italians in South America, such as once 
 took place at New Orleans, might, without 
 attention on our part, lead to consequences 
 antagonistic to our policies. We cannot for- 
 get that in several'of the South American 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 69 
 
 states, notably in the Argentine, the Italians 
 are the dominant foreign element, and that 
 the national ethos of the Latin republics is 
 not always strong enough to cause emi- 
 grants to forget the links that bind them to 
 the land of their origin. Fortunately the 
 many existing ties of friendship between 
 Italy and ourselves, which were strengthened 
 by the aid it was our privilege to extend 
 during the recent Messina disaster, render 
 most unlikely any difference between two 
 states possessing so many mutual sympa- 
 thies. 
 
 The day may never come when either 
 Germany or Italy will seek to interfere in 
 the affairs of the southern continent. But 
 a nation, like the human body, acts differ- 
 ently under the stress of feverish excite- 
 ment, 'a he wisdom of diplomacy lies in 
 removing possible causes of friction be- 
 tween countries during normal conditions. 
 It would be prudence to endeavor to se- 
 cure from these powers at a time when 
 no popular passions have been aroused. 
 
-i 
 
 70 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 when neither national pride nor interests 
 are at stake, and when only the friendliest 
 relations exist between them and ourselves, 
 a recognition of the principles underlying 
 the Monroe Doctrine. If the acquiescence 
 of Great Britain, France, and Russia were 
 obtained, Italy would hardly care to place 
 herself in opposition to subscribing thereto. 
 And with the example of the other powers, 
 Germany and her Austrian ally value our 
 amity too greatly to take a position which 
 could be interpreted as unfriendly. Ger- 
 man diplomacy, realizing that such attitude 
 on her part would tend to draw us closer to 
 England, is far-sighted enough to accord 
 her recognition in this event to our South 
 American policies. 
 
 With the Monroe Doctrine thus officially 
 recognized by the only powers in position to 
 dispute it, its security would be as effica- 
 ciously guaranteed as by more aggressive 
 means. Even were we otherwise unable to 
 obtain such recognition, opportunities have 
 not been wanting to secure it where we 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 71 
 
 might have found the leverage necessary to 
 effect diplomatic action. For instance, the 
 United States had been invited to participate 
 in the conference which met in 1885 to settle 
 the future of the Congo and resulted in 
 dividing the then unapportioned remainder 
 of Central Africa. Our refusal to profit by 
 its decisions, which our delegate had been 
 instrumental in bringing about, may have 
 been justified at a time when we were not 
 yet a colonizing power; but the acquisition 
 of even a tract of African jungle might have 
 been of service later in securing, in exchange 
 for its cession or lease to some more inter- 
 ested power, the recognition on its part of 
 the Monroe Doctrine. 
 
 Certain more recent opportunities al- 
 lowed to slip occurred during the Algeciras 
 Conference. Germany on that occasibn, in 
 order to justify her position and give equity 
 to a procedure the high-handedness of 
 which did not escape the criticism of neu- 
 trals, had placed herself upon a self-deny- 
 ing basis and proclaimed as her intention 
 
72 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 the laudable desire to safeguard the in- 
 tegrity of Morocco. Her position towards 
 that state was, with far less justification, 
 analogous to the one we occupy towards 
 South America. But in spite of the appar- 
 ent justice of her contention, save for Aus- 
 tria, Germany could find for it no support 
 from any of the great European powers, 
 whose aid had, for different reasons, already 
 been pledged to France. Germany's efforts 
 were therefore directed to winning us over 
 to her side. As the only great power 
 enjoying complete freedom of action, our 
 role permitted considerable latitude. But 
 though its possibilities were wisely utilized, 
 our disinterestedness might, perhaps, have 
 been coupled with a vigilant diplomacy in 
 enlarging the scope of the German conten- 
 tion. Germany, professing eagerness to 
 preserve the integrity of Morocco as a field 
 of equal opportunity for all, would hardly 
 at the same time have acknowledged enter- 
 taining designs of a different order in the 
 western hemisphere. While her diploma- 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 73 
 
 tists were endeavoring to win us over to 
 their support, if a proposition had been 
 advanced aimed at guaranteeing the in- 
 tegrity of South America, in the same way 
 as Germany had put herself forward as the 
 champion of Morocco, it would have been 
 difficult for her to refuse us formal assur- 
 ances regarding the future of the Spanish 
 republics. A pledge thus secured might on 
 a later occasion have been an important 
 factor in the preservation of peace. The 
 hands of a nation are tied once it has made 
 official declarations; and though history 
 shows how conventions have been violated, 
 a country will be far more likely to abstain 
 from action when it has given pledges than 
 where none have been forthcoming. We 
 have only to remember how the French 
 omission to consult Germany in her Mo- 
 roccan venture was utilized by the latter as 
 the excuse for an interference which brought 
 the two nations to the verge of war. By our 
 neglect to commit the Great Powers to a 
 recognition of the Monroe Doctrine, we 
 
74 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 have lost a point in our favor which in a 
 future period of strained relations might 
 conceivably have swayed a wavering bal- 
 ance in the direction of peace. 
 
 Another opportunity occurred at the 
 same conference in connection with the 
 Moroccan state bank. Its foundation was 
 exceptional in every way. But in semi-civil- 
 ized states commerce and diplomacy are 
 intimately connected. The bank share in 
 question, to which we were entitled, was 
 first accepted by us and then allowed to 
 drop. The unprecedented inconvenience 
 in the government's ownership of foreign 
 bank stock, and the difficulties of its dis- 
 posal to a private concern, are obvious. 
 Representation, however, in the state bank 
 of Morocco would have given us an entirely 
 unexpected leverage to advance our com- 
 mercial interests in that country, and have 
 placed us on a footing of equality with na- 
 tions far more directly concerned than our- 
 selves. A less scrupulous diplomacy might, 
 perhaps, have utilized such share for still 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 75 
 
 another purpose. Even had it been of no 
 immediate advantage to us, it would always 
 have been so to a nation like France, pos- 
 sessed of special interests and ambitions in 
 Morocco. And, although its direct control 
 could not have been ceded to any for- 
 eign power, it is easy to imagine circum- 
 stances effecting the same purpose in return 
 for equivalent advantages obtained else- 
 where. The French possessions in the West 
 Indies and off the St. Lawrence are now of 
 little use to her, but would be of consider- 
 able importance to us. In the Moroccan 
 bank share, which after having claimed we 
 refused, there was lost to us a negotiable 
 asset, so to speak, for the furtherance of 
 our American policies. 
 
 We have not availed ourselves, in the 
 past, of the natural diplomatic advantages 
 which so often befall nations. We have 
 been too self-centred over matters which ap- 
 peared of more immediate concern, to have 
 noticed distant events from which, without 
 risk or loss, we might have profited. Simi- 
 
76 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 lar opportunities unnecessary to mention, 
 but where we could have gained substantial 
 advantages, have arisen elsewhere; they 
 are likely to occur again. The remedy lies 
 with our diplomacy to prevent such chances 
 from again being lost. By diplomacy as 
 well as with battleships we can seek the 
 advancement of our policies and the safe- 
 guarding of our possessions. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE LATIN REPUBLICS 
 
 The victory of a republican movement 
 parallel to our own, which resulted in liber- 
 ating the greater part of the New World 
 from the domination of the Old, could have 
 been viewed by us only with sympathy. We 
 welcomed as a complement to our own 
 Revolution the success of the Spanish 
 colonies in establishing their independence, 
 both by reason of the extension given to 
 the republican idea and because it re- 
 moved so great a portion of the western 
 hemisphere from the field of European 
 politics. 
 
 The real beginning of our interest in 
 Spanish America dates, however, from the 
 declaration of the Monroe Doctrine. In 
 proclaiming this we did not incur the risk 
 of war with Europe merely because of 
 friendship for struggling newborn states, or 
 
78 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 for any abstract sentiment in favor of a form 
 of government which was frequently to be- 
 come a cover for dictatorship. Our deter- 
 mination to resist any extension of foreign 
 influence was due to the nation's profound 
 conviction that its own vital interests would 
 thereby be imperiled. American foreign 
 policy has nowhere been more successful 
 than in securing the possibility for the New 
 World to develop free from European in- 
 terference. But the celebrity achieved by 
 the Monroe Doctrine has obscured the real 
 nature of our intercourse with our southern 
 neighbors. Superficially the doctrine has 
 appeared to sum up the different aspects of 
 our diplomacy toward them. In reality it 
 has had but little to do with such relations. 
 In the past, present, and future it repre- 
 sents a permanent policy toward European 
 but not toward American states. Its rela- 
 tion to the latter may be likened to an outer 
 wall on which we have mounted guard to 
 permit their free development. Behind it 
 a series of American policies, moulded in 
 
THE LATIN REPUBLICS 79 
 
 each case by the special exigencies of our 
 position, still remains to be formed. 
 
 Our relations with the Spanish republics 
 are far too diverse to be embraced by any 
 single formula. Their varying geographi- 
 cal situation, even if no other cause were 
 present, would necessarily be productive of 
 different degrees of diplomatic interest on 
 our part. Thus it is apparent that the 
 Caribbean concerns us more intimately 
 than the south Atlantic. Our policy in 
 Cuba could manifestly not be repeated in 
 Chili, while in Salvador we should act other- 
 wise than in Paraguay. The foreign policy 
 of any nation is dictated by its require- 
 ments, and the necessities of our position 
 are far from uniform. But in a general 
 way the Orinoco may be said to provide a 
 natural division for our policies in South 
 America. The interest we feel in the great 
 states to the south of it, Brazil and the 
 Argentine, is eminently one of disinterested 
 friendliness, aiming principally to cultivate 
 closer commercial intercourse. Moreover, 
 
80 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 the contemplated increase in the arma- 
 ments of the larger South American repub- 
 lics, coupled with their growing importance 
 as nations, bids fair in time to make these 
 independent of our aid. 
 
 For the maintenance of such relations as 
 we may wish to preserve with these states 
 we must prepare other measures than a mere 
 assertion of common Americanism. The 
 bond that unites us is hardly more evident 
 than is the Europeanism linking together 
 a Norwegian and a Greek, and the amica- 
 ble sentiments exchanged over toasts and 
 telegrams rest on a fragile basis so long as 
 our means of communication remain un- 
 improved. It is difficult to convince the 
 inhabitant of Buenos Ayres or of Rio de 
 Janeiro of the proximity of mutual inter- 
 ests when, in order to reach North America, 
 he finds himself obliged to go by way of 
 Europe. A direct communication between 
 our ports and theirs is as much a political as 
 it is a commercial necessity. For our trade 
 in almost every South American country. 
 
THE LATIN REPUBLICS 81 
 
 badly crippled by the present inadequate 
 system, finds itself relegated to an inferior 
 position. In order to justify the paramount 
 title to which we lay claim in the Spanish 
 republics, it still remains for us to prove 
 the superiority of our interests to those of 
 Great Britain, of Germany, and of France, 
 whose capital has constructed most of their 
 railways and financed their national and 
 municipal loans 
 
 On the Pacific coast we are fortunately in 
 better position. After developing Mexico, 
 our engineers have descended into Central 
 America, where the rails they are laying will 
 one day serve as links for the Pan-American 
 road. In Peru, and now in Bolivia, our 
 enterprise has not been behindhand. But 
 we have still considerable to accomplish 
 to overtake the financial and industrial 
 efforts of European powers in their South 
 American enterprise. 
 
 Europe has long since awakened to the 
 importance of Spanish America as a neutral 
 market that will not soon be closed to the 
 
r 
 
 82 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 products of manufacturing countries. We, 
 too, need anticipate there no discriminating 
 tariff to bar our exports, while the increase 
 of trade relations should be of mutual ad- 
 vantage. Our political interests can there- 
 fore be confined to the grateful task of 
 assuming obligations without demanding 
 corresponding equivalents. Our fleet is the 
 pledge we extend to exclude the possibility 
 of European interference. We need ask for 
 nothing in return, since we desire nothing 
 save the continuance of existing political 
 conditions. 
 
 Our diplomacy has, however, to assert 
 itself more emphatically in Venezuela, Co- 
 lombia, and the West Indian and Central 
 American republics, whose harbors com- 
 mand the approaches of the Panama CanaK 
 The cutting of the isthmus and the new 
 importance of the Pacific force us to real- 
 ize that whatever consequence we formerly 
 attached to the Caribbean has been im- 
 measurably increased since the West Indies 
 are to become a highroad to the Pacific, 
 
THE LATIN REPUBLICS 8S 
 
 instead of a blind alley as heretofore. In 
 determining the limits of our influence we 
 must apply there what might be termed a 
 Caribbean policy, in distinction from our 
 relations with the other South American 
 states, whose geographical situation renders 
 them of less vital importance. 
 
 It is fortunate for us that the countries 
 whose ports in unfriendly hands might 
 prove a menace to us are debarred by their 
 weakness from the possibility of taking 
 offensive action. It is less fortunate that 
 their weakness should not have constituted 
 a pledge against their misconduct. Vene- 
 zuela has so often in recent years ruflSed by 
 misdeeds the diplomatic calm of nations, 
 that our solicitude in her behalf has arisen 
 rather from the fear lest justifiable redress 
 be sought from her by foreign powers whose 
 action would necessarily take place in 
 waters of peculiar importance to us. Both 
 Venezuela and Colombia must always pos- 
 sess for us a special interest, due to their 
 coast line, which assimilates them to the 
 
84 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 other Caribbean nations, while their close 
 proximity to the isthmus makes it necessary 
 at all cost to preserve their independence 
 and guarantee their territory, even against 
 themselves. 
 
 The two states enjoy an altogether 
 anomalous situation, their position offering 
 in certain respects an American analogy to 
 the problem of the Dardanelles. In the 
 same way that England has twice saved 
 Turkey from dismemberment in order to 
 prevent these straits from falling into the 
 hands of a stronger power, it must be our 
 object to preserve the inviolability of both 
 countries, whatever be the provocation they 
 give. 
 
 In connection with this, a word may be 
 said of a frequent cause of dispute with 
 the Latin republics, and particularly with 
 Venezuela. Besides foreigners who possess 
 perfectly legitimate business interests in 
 Spanish America, there are others who, 
 actuated by the hope of larger profits, 
 employ more questionable methods. In 
 
THE LATIN REPUBLICS 85 
 
 return for special advantages or the expec- 
 tation of future benefits, it often happens 
 that they afiiliate themselves unduly either 
 with the government of to-day, who may 
 be the revolutionaries of to-morrow, or the 
 revolutiojiaries of to-day, who may be the 
 government of to-morrow. In either in- 
 stance, reprisals in the nature of fines or 
 confiscations are likely to occur, and out of 
 these grow claims for damages which our 
 government as well as others has frequently 
 been called upon to enforce. Such penal- 
 ties, however, are nearly always imposed by 
 decision of the country's highest court, 
 which, outwardly at least, complies with 
 the customary judicial forms. 
 
 It matters little that such courts are tools 
 in a dictator's hands, and that legally their 
 verdict may be questionable. If we op- 
 posed our own administrative judgment to 
 their judicial authority, whatever might be 
 our right in substance, we should, in view 
 of the high, equitable stand we have always 
 taken in such matters, err in form. Remedy 
 
86 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 exists, it is true, in the procedure of sum- 
 mary arbitration provided for by the recent 
 Hague Conference, but this has still to 
 prove its acceptability. It might be well, 
 therefore, to prepare for contingencies of 
 refusal, and either enlarge the jurisdiction 
 of one of our own superior federal courts, 
 or else establish a tribunal which might 
 equitably apportion the extent and nature 
 of claims of this nature prior to their being 
 filed. Whatever be the legal competence 
 of the State Department, its opinion in 
 points of law cannot carry with it the same 
 authority before the nation or before the 
 world as would that of a properly consti- 
 tuted court. Moreover, since the efforts to 
 adjudicate possible claims have necessarily 
 to pass through diplomatic channels at 
 some stage, it would be placing the govern- 
 mental department concerned with foreign 
 affairs in an unfair position, to demand that 
 it both judge and enforce its judgment. 
 Our diplomacy would escape much un- 
 necessary and unjust criticism if, before 
 
THE LATIN REPUBLICS 87 
 
 pressing for the settlement of any claim 
 against certain countries, we should insist 
 on its first being examined and passed on by 
 a competent tribunal. This accomplished, 
 public opinion will judge as to the relative 
 merit of our courts in comparison with 
 those of states like Venezuela; but without 
 this we lay ourselves open to the charge of 
 having used violence to enforce doubtful 
 claims against a weaker power. 
 
 While we could, if necessary, overrun or 
 occupy without great impediment any of 
 the West Indian or Central American states, 
 our action in South America, were it ever 
 to extend beyond the limits of diplomacy, 
 would experience diflSculty in going beyond 
 the seizure of ports and the blocking of 
 rivers. Hence Venezuela and Colombia 
 stand in peculiar relation to our policy, en- 
 joying practical invulnerability by nature 
 of their continental position. Their high- 
 lands sloping from the coast mark the bar- 
 rier we must impose as a southern limit to 
 our active intervention. 
 
88 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 Elsewhere in the Caribbean our position 
 may be compared to that of the owner of a 
 great estate surrounded by smaller neigh- 
 bors. While disposed to leave these in un- 
 disturbed possession, should their property 
 come into the market we should regard its 
 acquisition prudent, to save it from falling 
 into other hands. In Great Britain and, 
 in lesser degree, in France, Holland, and 
 Denmark, we have neighbors with whom 
 our future relations are likely to be as sin- 
 cerely cordial as are our present. We have 
 neither incentive nor desire to disturb their 
 actual colonial possessions. But if for any 
 reason there should ever be the wish to dis- 
 pose of these, we are not likely to repeat our 
 former error in neglecting to acquire St. 
 Thomas. And in case circui_xstances place 
 us again in possession of territorial or dip- 
 lomatic advantages in other regions of the 
 globe, our statesmen may find therein useful 
 pawns to offer in exchange for islands closer 
 to our shores. 
 
 The nation's policy demands that we im- 
 
THE LATIN REPUBLICS 89 
 
 pose in the Caribbean the pax Americana 
 by refusing to permit in it the turbulence 
 so often provocative of foreign interference. 
 In so doing, Porto Rico, Cuba, and San 
 Domingo offer the precedents for our fu- 
 ture action. The one presents a final goal 
 toward which our policy must tend; the 
 others, intermediary stages in the same pro- 
 cess. The possession of Porto Rico has 
 firmly established us as a West Indian 
 power, and our action in Cuba inaugurated 
 the beginning of a new policy toward the 
 islands within our national orbit. When 
 for the second time American intervention 
 had been invoked, the world marveled at 
 the political suicide Cuba was supposed to 
 have committed. It is characteristic of our 
 generosity that we pledged ourselves to re- 
 store the Cuban republic as soon as order 
 had been established, but we thereby like- 
 wise tied our hands by an unexpected de- 
 claration and put off an almost inevitable 
 result. The laws of gravitation operate 
 with states as with planets, and the ultimate 
 
90 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 future of Cuba can hardly be doubted. 
 Nor need our present forbearance be re- 
 gretted if the American people learn from 
 it the necessity devolving upon them of 
 insuring stable government at their doors. 
 The long road we are now traveling in 
 Cuba in order to achieve a predestined re- 
 sult may serve at least to abridge later steps 
 when next a similar contingency presents 
 itself. 
 
 A different stage in our intervention is 
 now witnessed in San Domingo, where, with 
 no risk to ourselves, we are showing how 
 the muddled finances of a country can be 
 placed on a sound basis of credit, and have 
 the opportunity of acting in a disinterested 
 capacity without imposing an unwelcome 
 interference. 
 
 The justification of the European sys- 
 tem of colonization over already populated 
 areas has always been that, whenever the 
 conditions of disorder in a country are such 
 that the principle of authority ceases to 
 exist and a menace is created to the life and 
 
THE LATIN REPUBLICS 91 
 
 property of foreigners, this state of anarchy 
 offers sufficient reason for the interference 
 of a more powerful nation better capa- 
 ble of maintaining order. In the western 
 hemisphere we have successfully opposed 
 the Monroe Doctrine to such pretensions. 
 But we should be lacking in equity if the 
 result of our policy should be only to give 
 a guarantee to the perpetuation of misrule 
 and the freedom from molestation of a fre- 
 quently irresponsible dictatorship. The jus- 
 tice of our position depends upon a firm 
 determination to remedy, where we can, the 
 flagrant abuses which would otherwise war- 
 rant foreign intervention; and since it is 
 particularly in the region where our inter- 
 ests are most vital that certain states appear 
 unable to maintain the requisite stability of 
 government, it becomes our duty to assist 
 these. \c;^^^N 
 
 In Mexico we have to-day an orderly 
 neighbor, the foundations of whose pros- 
 perity appear to be solidly laid. Our en- 
 terprise and capital have assisted largely in 
 
92 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 furthering economic expansion south of the 
 Rio Grande. But to what extent the pre- 
 sent conditions of order are due to the sig- 
 nal ability of its President, the retirement 
 of Diaz will alone prove. Has the genius of 
 a great statesman been suflScient to instill 
 habits of law-observance and a conception 
 of representative government in a country 
 unaccustomed thereto? The capacity of 
 Mexico as a modern state is a problem that 
 deeply concerns us, not only because it is 
 a neighboring country wherein we have 
 extensive interests, but because of the Cen- 
 tral American republics. In the past we 
 have protected these from Mexican en- 
 croachments, and even less could we per- 
 mit a change in their status now that they 
 have assumed an altogether new importance 
 by reason of the Panama Canal. Their 
 strategic position, commanding its northern 
 approaches on both the Caribbean and the 
 Pacific, is too great not to impose on our 
 policy the desirability of continuing the 
 present system of small independent states, 
 
THE LATIN REPUBLICS 93 
 
 practically under our protection and over 
 whom we are able to exert influence when 
 necessary. The alternative would be their 
 union with Mexico in what under a strong 
 dictator might become a powerful nation, 
 possibly antagonistic to our policies and 
 able to invoke the intervention of foreign 
 powers. This danger can be effectually pre- 
 vented only by guaranteeing their present 
 independence, a measure in line with our 
 policy of years. 
 
 There exists traditionally what might 
 be termed an unwritten corollary of the 
 Monroe Doctrine, which demands that the 
 American continent be not made the scene 
 of such territorial partitions and seizures 
 as have disgraced European warfare. And 
 while we cannot lay claim to having fol- 
 lowed this with strictness, the acquisition of 
 California was that of a practically unin- 
 habited territory, and not of a state which, 
 however disorderly, was yet self-governing. 
 Further land we neither seek nor require, 
 save the lease of such coaling stations as 
 
94 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 Amapala Bay on the west coast of Central 
 America, the possession of which would 
 offer the fleet a much-needed strategic base 
 on the Pacific close to the canal, while our 
 permanent retention of a small armed force 
 at this junction of three turbulent republics 
 would act as a wholesome restraint in curb- 
 ing local revolution and assisting the main- 
 tenance of order. 
 
 A natural sympathy with the principle of 
 arbitration has caused us to look favorably 
 on the recent conference of Central Ameri- 
 can states held under our auspices. It is 
 certainly to be desired that it fulfill the hopes 
 of its promoters. But the fear may be ex- 
 pressed that these states are not yet ripe 
 for the principles involved, and that by our 
 assent we may have made ourselves party 
 to a measure which will possibly deprive 
 us later of means of action in correcting 
 injustice when committed. Under existing 
 conditions it would hardly be wise for us 
 to curtail the assertion of our influence, and 
 any forbearance in this direction out of 
 
THE LATIN REPUBLICS 95 
 
 respect for abstract principles would only 
 be interpreted as a weakness which, in lands 
 of such peculiar interest to us, might lead 
 to fresh disturbances. 
 
 The southern limit of the United States is 
 no longer the Rio Grande, but the Panama 
 Canal, and although our territory is not un- 
 broken, our influence should be. The Piatt 
 amendment, which mapped out our present 
 policy in Cuba, offers a guiding precedent 
 for future action in Central America. Nor 
 is it believed by those best acquainted with 
 the situation that any insurmountable dif- 
 ficulty would be met with in effecting its 
 acceptance by the five republics. The recog- 
 nition of some such principle on the part 
 of all the states bordering on the Caribbean 
 would be a noteworthy achievement for 
 our diplomacy. In any event, it is most im- 
 portant that our envoys should everywhere 
 occupy in the Spanish republics a para- 
 mount position as friendly advisers to 
 the governments to which they find them- 
 selves accredited. Their disinterested coun- 
 
i 
 
 96 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 sel tactfully given in time could often obviate 
 entanglements with foreign powers and thus 
 relieve us from having recourse to pos- 
 sible measures as necessary as they would 
 be embarrassing. Such advice could be suc- 
 cessful, however, only if the influence and 
 sense of equity of our envoys were to be 
 acknowledged by both sides. Our policy 
 should therefore aim at a most careful se- 
 lection of diplomatic representatives who 
 would be acquainted, through long and spe- 
 cial training, with the peculiar problems 
 they would be called on to handle. More- 
 over, it should endeavor to obtain for these 
 higher consideration by methods similar 
 to those employed by European powers 
 in the Orient. Just as other nations have 
 organized picked services for their repre- 
 sentation in the Levant and in the Far 
 East, a like necessity impresses itself on us 
 in Latin America. But the organization of 
 such a body of men is insufficient without 
 giving it a prestige and advantages which 
 would make service of this nature prized 
 
THE LATIN REPUBLICS 97 
 
 in spite of undoubted drawbacks in climate 
 and life. The failure to provide advantages 
 counterbalancing the hardships would only 
 repeat the history of our student inter- 
 preters in China, where it has now been 
 found necessary to remedy a condition 
 which left within the service chiefly the 
 inferior men, the abler ones abandoning it 
 to accept more lucrative positions in com- 
 mercial life. It would be no less short- 
 sighted than unworthy of us as a nation, to 
 endeavor to dole out with a sparing hand 
 trifling benefits for arduous service of the 
 nature we should expect. 
 
 The government ownership of suitable 
 residences, and increases of pay in certain 
 capitals, would do much to mitigate the 
 present unpopularity from which Latin 
 America suffers among diplomatists, while 
 the former measure ought long ago to have 
 commended itself, if on no other ground 
 than as a national investment and a matter 
 of national pride. The most important step 
 is, however, for our representatives to enjoy 
 
08 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 when possible higher diplomatic rank than 
 that of their colleagues. The European 
 powers have been accustomed to send as 
 their envoys to the Latin American coun- 
 tries ministers resident or plenipotentiary. 
 In the same way France out of compli- 
 ment to a sister republic sends an ambas- 
 sador to Berne, our representative could in 
 either instance be of a higher grade. Hence 
 the recent amendment of the law on the 
 creation of ambassadors was in certain re- 
 spects unfortunate. Instead, for instance, 
 of discouraging Chili from sending us an 
 envoy of the highest rank, it would more 
 likely have proved to our advantage to have 
 had at Santiago an oflScial of that grade, 
 who by virtue of his grade would always 
 have been dean of its diplomatic body. 
 
 As a nation we are disinclined to attach- 
 ing significance to what would be irrelevant 
 forms were it not for the importance at- 
 tached thereto by other nations. With our 
 habits of thought it is difficult to realize 
 the advantage possessed by the dean of the 
 
THE LATIN REPUBLICS 99 
 
 diplomatic body not only in prestige, but in 
 all questions involving concert of action. 
 The Spanish republics, however, present a 
 field where American diplomacy may often 
 be at variance with that of the European 
 powers, and if our envoy be dean, he could 
 at times prevent possible concert on the 
 part of the foreign representatives prejudi- 
 cial to our interests. Conversely, it is not 
 difficult to conceive of circumstances where 
 a European dean might make use of his 
 position and enlist his colleagues in a com- 
 mon action far from agreeable to us. 
 
 We have done so much to cultivate 
 friendly relations with our southern neigh- 
 bors in recent years that it is unfortunate 
 our actions should at times have been mis- 
 interpreted. That a more correct apprecia- 
 tion of our motives should not invariably 
 have existed, can in a certain measure be 
 laid down at the door of diplomacy. In dip- 
 lomatic intercourse with the South Amer- 
 ican states we have always to avoid the 
 strictures of unfriendly criticism, remember- 
 
100 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 ing that we have been regarded in the past 
 with a not unnatural fear and distrust by 
 the Latin republics lest the Monroe Doc- 
 trine afford a subtle means of drawing them 
 into our nets. Pan-Iberism has been op- 
 posed to Pan-Americanism; "Against Mon- 
 roe we will pit Monroe and a half," a 
 Brazilian statesman is reported to have 
 said. In Chili especially an anti-American 
 movement had asserted itself, and the idea 
 was even mooted of a Latin American con- 
 federation, directed as much against us as 
 against the European powers. 
 
 Our policy of benevolent friendship has 
 not always been appreciated at its worth, 
 and we have found ourselves in the position 
 of having, without advantage to ourselves, 
 given unconscious offense to nations un- 
 able to retort and therefore hypersensitive 
 in their susceptibilities. A case in point 
 occurred during the recent Pan-American 
 Conference at Rio Janeiro. Our delegation 
 there was supposed to favor a so-called 
 "monitor" system, whereby it was intended 
 
THE LATIN REPUBLICS 101 
 
 that the greater powers should exercise a 
 general surveillance over the smaller coun- 
 tries in curbing their turbulent propensities 
 and keeping the peace. While the inten- 
 tion underlying this was eminently proper 
 and the result possibly beneficial, the dif- 
 ferentiation thus suggested among Latin 
 American states was not without giving 
 offense to the weaker countries at such ex- 
 pression of their inferiority. Nor is it cer- 
 tain, even if there existed no risk of the 
 larger powers seeking to abuse their posi- 
 tion, that the latter would be better able 
 to maintain order. The annals of Uruguay 
 are perhaps as orderly as those of Brazil. 
 
 It is not difficult to see that the beneficial 
 results of our policy in one quarter may be 
 nullified by unintentional offense given else- 
 where. Our interests are everywhere con- 
 nected, and concerted action is no less ne- 
 cessary on the part of diplomacy than in 
 other spheres. The recent Hague Confer- 
 ence provides further illustration of this. 
 Our advocacy there of compulsory arbitra- 
 
102 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 tion, while proving sympathy for humani- 
 tarian ideals, was not without imperiling 
 the friendliness of relations with the Latin 
 republics. Inseparably connected with the 
 principle at stake was the creation of a court 
 to judge questions of arbitration, and our 
 pitfall, which to certain powers proved not 
 unwelcome, lay in the composition of this 
 tribunal. If the great European powers 
 alone had been concerned, the solution 
 would have been simple ; but it was appar- 
 ent that we could not expect these to allow 
 questions of national interest to be decided 
 by the judicial representatives of Ecuador 
 and Paraguay. And while an ingenious 
 compromise smoothed out the major diffi- 
 culties of this thorny question, in view of 
 our friendly feeling towards Latin America 
 it might have been preferable for us to 
 have expressed our adhesion to the plan of 
 arbitration presented by some other nation 
 rather than to have proposed it ourselves. 
 In spite, however, of certain easily reme- 
 diable deficiencies, our relations with our 
 
THE LATIN REPUBLICS 103 
 
 southern neighbors, owing largely to the 
 wise policy recently pursued with eminent 
 success, have never been so cordial. And 
 since our friendship is sincere and our inter- 
 ests are in no way divergent, there is every 
 likelihood of the present amicable senti- 
 ments being continued. 
 
 Further than such friendship and our 
 self-imposed unilateral obligation in de- 
 fending the Monroe Doctrine it would be 
 unwise for us to venture. The dream of a 
 confederation of American republics headed 
 by us, and leagued together in defense of 
 common rights, would unfortunately be 
 mainly impressive by the number of its 
 states. It could not be regarded as a safe 
 working basis for political action or military 
 defense, nor would it find interest in our 
 Asiatic dependencies. While such federa- 
 tion might prove of considerable utility 
 under certain conditions, it would be rather 
 as a secondary than as a primary basis for 
 defense. An understanding, to be effective, 
 can be contracted only with naval and colo- 
 
104 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 nial powers of the first magnitude, having 
 interests similar to our own. 
 
 The instability of many of our southern 
 neighbors offers both the cause of their 
 weakness and the reason why we cannot 
 blind ourselves to the responsibilities which 
 may there devolve upon us. A skilled and 
 watchful diplomacy maintained by us in 
 these states, however, would contribute 
 more than anything else in averting this 
 danger and extending our legitimate influ- 
 ence without incurring the drawbacks of 
 new and undesired possessions. We desire 
 in Latin America only the furtherance of 
 commercial ties and the preservation of 
 their existing independence. In our own 
 interest we can wish for no more. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE FAR EAST 
 
 Our relations with the Far East have 
 pursued a distinct co urse since the early 
 days of the Republic when the enterprise of 
 New England merchantmen first bore the 
 flag into Chinese waters. In the struggle for 
 commercial success in the Orient we were 
 able to enter on an equal footing with the 
 nations of Europe. In Japan we even pre- 
 ceded these and opened the Island Empire 
 to the commerce of the world. American 
 intercourse with the Far East stands thus on 
 a different level from our foreign relations 
 elsewhere. We have abstained from all in- 
 terference in Europe, Africa, and the Le- 
 vant, and rightly upheld preeminence on the 
 American continent; in the extreme Orient 
 our equality with the European powers has 
 from the first been asserted. Geographi- 
 cally, politically, and economically alike, 
 
106 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 our interests predicated the position we 
 have there assumed. 
 
 American policy in the extreme Orient 
 has always been of a peaceful and c ommer- 
 cialnature. Where Russia and France 
 shaped for themselves colonial empires, 
 where Germany, and even England, were 
 ready to share in the spoils of an antici- 
 pated division of Chiiia, we have wisely 
 abstained from similar attempts. We alone 
 refrained from treating the Oriental na- 
 tions in the same high-handed manner to 
 which they were subjected at the hands 
 of European powers. Rather have we 
 given them abundant proof of the sincerity 
 of our friendship and the equity of our 
 conduct. 
 
 Even the acquisition of the Philippines, 
 which made us an Asiatic power, did not 
 alter previous relations, although forcing 
 us to consider far more attentively prob- 
 lems that had before been remote. Our 
 possession of the archipelago disturbed no 
 balance of power, cut short no other ambi- 
 
THE FAR EAST 107 
 
 tions than those of Filipino nationalism. 
 We entertained no further territorial desires 
 in the Far East, nor were likely ever to 
 do so. Hence the amicable spirit which had 
 characterized our former intercourse with 
 China and Japan bade fair to be continued. 
 We appeared to the Orientals as the one 
 nation in whom they could place confidence, 
 since we were devoid of political ambitions 
 menacing their own. 
 
 There was thus no reason to anticipate 
 that our Far Eastern interests need ever in 
 the future clash with the legitimate aspi- 
 rations of these powers. No fundamental 
 differences severed us; certainly no dif- 
 ferences of a nature necessitating violent 
 solution. 
 
 Yet out of this clear sliy, after a half cen- 
 tury of the most cordial relations, and on 
 the morrow of a period during which we 
 had manifested more than usual friend- 
 ship toward Japan, even at the cost of a 
 traditional amity with Russia, there arose 
 the talk of war."* From a trifling matter of 
 
108 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 school attendance the question was broad- 
 ened to that of mastery of the Pacific, and 
 sensation-mongers exploited that cry in 
 justification of their action. Fortunately 
 the governments of both nations realized 
 the wicked absurdity of a contest which 
 would have no object and would settle no 
 question. The Pacific is easily wide enough 
 for both Japan and America; no more than 
 the Atlantic can any one power now domi- 
 nate it. 
 
 That the shipping trade of the western 
 ocean is destined, in great measure, to fall 
 to the Japanese can hardly be doubted. 
 Their natural aptitude for the sea, coupled 
 with a cheap standard of wages and an in- 
 ferior scale of living, renders their competi- 
 tion dangerous not only for us but for every 
 maritime power. The very few American 
 vessels plying the Pacific are notoriously 
 able to do so only by virtue of agreement 
 with the Japanese companies. Without this 
 they would soon be driven from the seas 
 unless provided with governmental sub- 
 
THE FAR EAST 109 
 
 sidies of more liberal nature than yet con- 
 templated. 
 
 A war against Japan for the mastery 
 ofx^n ocean over which American vessels 
 undei\normal conditions could not hope to 
 sail, w<kild thus offer but a sterile victory 
 for our shipping. Moreover, it is hardly 
 likely that either contestant could so com- 
 pletely crush the other as to secure its 
 undisputed supremacy. Nor ought we to 
 forget that a prosperous Japan, able to pur- 
 chase our exports, is in many ways desirable 
 to us. The commercial ties binding the two 
 natipns work for their mutual benefit, and 
 the buffering of one cannot but react on the 
 othe^. Fortunately, too many common in- 
 terestb exist for the diplomacies of both 
 countries, instead of running counter, not 
 to find it desirable to cooperate in neutral 
 fields. 
 
 Even if Japanese protectionism be event- 
 ually applied to Korea, it cannot be easily 
 enforced elsewhere upon the Asiatic main- 
 land. We have sought to profit in the Far 
 
110 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 East only by the open door of equal oppor- 
 tunity for all, and Japan has, with cause, 
 pledged herself to the same programme. 
 Possessed of abundant cheap skilled labor, 
 resourceful and enterprising, she is already 
 underselling her commercial rivals in many 
 markets, and her industry has no need to 
 fear the competition of the western nations. 
 
 The source of the present difficulties be- 
 tween the two countries is based rather on 
 the white workingman's dread of the vir- 
 tues and not the vices of the yellow races. 
 The Pacific States intend to remain what 
 has become vulgarly known as a "white 
 man's country," with all the corollaries 
 thereof which are likely to become multi- 
 plying thorns of trouble in proportion to the 
 growing strength of Asiatic powers. With- 
 out entering into the moral or economic 
 aspects of the question, we must well under- 
 stand that henceforth our foreign policy 
 will be obliged to accept this attitude as a 
 fundamental condition for its action. 
 
 The problem is no new one. It is met 
 
THE FAR EAST 111 
 
 with in every land where a white self-gov- 
 erning community considers itself in dan- 
 ger through the economic competition of the 
 yellow races. The novelty of the present 
 situation arises from the fact that for the 
 first time an Asiatic state has found itself 
 in position to resent the discrimination and 
 insult to which its citizens have been sub- 
 jected. 
 
 While the essential features of the ques- 
 tion were, perhaps, unavoidable, in view of 
 the violence of opinion on this subject, a 
 similar result might have been accomplished 
 in California with, perhaps, less slight to 
 Japanese susceptibilities. We are, as a 
 people, too little conscious of the importance 
 of form, especially in dealing with a highly 
 sensitive and decorous Oriental race, among 
 whom politeness has passed into a second 
 nature. We frequently give offense where, 
 with a little care and under a slightly dif- 
 ferent form, the result aimed at could 
 have been otherwise attained. The refusal, 
 for instance, to permit Japanese pupils to 
 
112 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 attend certain San Francisco schools was 
 possibly justified. But such prohibition 
 should have been general and not specific. 
 Had all foreign children been excluded, 
 discrimination could not have been alleged 
 nor offense taken. Individual permission 
 might later have been granted exceptionally, 
 no matter in what numbers, and the same 
 general purpose would thereby have been 
 achieved if even a very few Japanese had 
 been included in order to take the force out 
 of their argument. Needless offense, how- 
 ever, was given, which more skillful hand- 
 ling could probably have greatly attenuated, 
 even had it not altogether removed its 
 ground. It is certain that any efforts on our 
 part to avoid giving offense to the pride 
 of the Japanese have been heartily appre- 
 ciated and seconded by the Mikado's gov- 
 ernment, which desires the preservation of 
 friendly relations as earnestly as does our 
 own. Japan still owes us a debt of grati- 
 tude; and though a certain section of her 
 public opinion may be trying to efface its 
 
THE FAR EAST 113 
 
 remembrance by directing attention to 
 present indignities, enough recollection of 
 former friendship still remains to render 
 unlikely any sudden revulsion. 
 
 If there is no reason to be pessimistic 
 with regard to the future, undue optimism 
 is hardly less dangerous. The present set- 
 tlement of the immigration difficulties is of 
 a strictly temporary nature. And while the 
 Japanese government will for the present 
 restrain emigration and continue to do so 
 as long as it suits its convenience, the vital 
 question at issue is kept in suspense and 
 may at any time be reopened. Our policy 
 has to take cognizance of these conditions, 
 and our diplomatic position at its point of 
 intersection between treaty and state rights 
 has not yet achieved permanent results, nor 
 established a broad harmonious foundation 
 for our future relations with the Island 
 Empire. 
 
 The success of negotiations between na- 
 tions usually depends on the concessions 
 which may be made by either side in return 
 
114 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 for proffered equivalents. We have been 
 unduly generous in the past in bestowing 
 diplomatic favors without obtaining or even 
 asking compensation. It is true that when, 
 in 1894, we abandoned our extra-territorial 
 privileges in Japan we obtained the treaty 
 right to regulate the emigration of laborers, 
 upon which rests the justice of our present 
 contention. But this right was not so clearly 
 indicated and defined as might have been 
 desirable, although at that time we could 
 more easily have secured concessions than 
 is possible to-day. 
 
 Even during the late Russian war the 
 more than benevolent neutrality and sym- 
 pathy shown by us toward the Japanese, 
 and the later abandonment of our legation 
 at Seoul, which we were the first to give up 
 in spite of our great interests in Korea, were 
 favors freely granted without return. How- 
 ever proper may have been our action in 
 so doing — and generosity on the part of 
 nations is not always an unwise policy — 
 it is conceivable that, had compensation 
 
THE FAR EAST 115 
 
 been demanded, it would have been to 
 Japan's interest, at a time when her na- 
 tional energies were engaged in a great war, 
 to have made us concessions which might 
 have prevented the present difficulties from 
 arising. Instead, we have lately found our- 
 selves in a position where negotiations be- 
 came necessary, and asking for favors when 
 we had no longer any to offer in exchange. 
 
 The demonstration made by our fleet's 
 cruise to the Pacific and thence around the 
 world has proved an act of audacious fore- 
 sight. It is a commonplace to say that the 
 surest guarantee for future peace is the 
 maintenance of so large an armed strength 
 as not to make it worth another nation's 
 while to disturb it. 
 
 But the Tokio government, however de- 
 sirous to avoid war, was more likely to turn 
 a deaf ear to possible popular clamor when 
 conscious of the magnitude of its risk than 
 in the case of an enterprise presenting no 
 peril, while bellicose clamor on the part of 
 the masses was also less likely to arise. 
 
116 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 Frank recognition of the danger of war 
 is a more certain means of preventing its 
 occurrence than the refusal to admit such 
 possibility. Such danger as exists to-day 
 lies in chance incidents taking place on 
 either side, as unfortunate as they may be 
 unforeseen. The violence of a mob, the act 
 of a lunatic, is sufficient, once popular pas- 
 sions have been aroused. And we cannot 
 afford to forget that in the event of conflict 
 our most vulnerable spots would be Hawaii, 
 where more than half the population is 
 Japanese; Alaska, which in its remote- 
 ness and uninhabited condition presents 
 points of danger like another Saghalien to 
 Russia; and the Philippines. With regard 
 to the latter especially, the position of Japan 
 would not be dissimilar to our own at the 
 outbreak of the Spanish War. We had then 
 no wish for the islands which force of cir- 
 cumstances were to place in our possession. 
 To-day the Japanese assure us in all good 
 faith how remote is their desire to pos- 
 sess them. Nor have we reason to doubt 
 
THE FAR EAST 117 
 
 their word. Japan's hands are tied in Ko- 
 rea, where a sullenly hostile population 
 has caused them unforeseen difficulties. In 
 Manchuria and China their course has 
 been far from smooth, and the pugnacious 
 insistency of the latter power in questions of 
 Manchurian jurisdiction and other matters 
 has afforded unexpected surprises. With 
 Formosa barely pacified, any effort to ac- 
 quire the Philippines would involve further 
 drain on their already strained resources at 
 a time when they are traversing a financial 
 crisis and have to face budgetary troubles. 
 Moreover, the issue of the war, in view 
 of our present superior naval strength, 
 would presumably be favorable to us. On 
 our side there certainly exists no desire to 
 spur it on. While Japan, as was proved by 
 the peace of Shimonoseki, will for years 
 smother insults until strong enough to 
 avenge them, yet in spite of weighty consid- 
 erations the future may cause present prob- 
 abilities of peace to alter. The actual dis- 
 parity in favor of our sea power will not long 
 
118 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 continue without greater efforts on our part. 
 Nor can we forget that the failure of Japan 
 to secure the much-coveted indemnity in her 
 recent war was attributed largely to our in- 
 tervention in the restoration of peace. The 
 capture of any of our territory in the event 
 of hostilities might easily appear to the 
 Japanese imagination as a surety to be re- 
 tained in pledge for an indemnity of which 
 we had previously deprived them. 
 
 Although ominous clouds impend, dan- 
 ger will be remote if we do not neglect the 
 natural advantages of our position, dip- 
 lomatic as well as military. We have in 
 the past willingly entered into cooperation 
 with other powers in sanitary matters of 
 mutual interest. A similar course com- 
 mends itself in questions of emigration. 
 The position of Australia, of New Zealand, 
 and of western Canada in refusing Japanese 
 coolie labor is in such matters entirely ana- 
 logous to our own. In Australia the laws 
 restricting Asiatic immigration are, if possi- 
 ble, even more stringent than ours. But the 
 
THE FAR EAST 119 
 
 gravity of the situation created by such hos- 
 tility has impressed itself upon the common- 
 wealth. Mr. Deakin's recent compulsory 
 service measures, aiming to create a nation 
 trained to arms, prove that his government 
 fully realizes its responsibilities with regard 
 to the dangers resulting from the attitude 
 assumed. 
 
 If only for future contingencies, we 
 should seek closer interchange of views 
 upon similar matters with the great self- 
 governing British colonies bordering on the 
 Pacific. Among obvious measures which 
 commend themselves would be the appoint- 
 ment of consuls-general at Melbourne, at 
 Wellington, and at Ottawa, who should be 
 diplomatic officers, in the same way that 
 European governments send diplomatists 
 as consuls to such capitals as Budapest 
 and Calcutta. Our interests are too identi- 
 cal not to be mutually reenforced. Nor 
 could Great Britain regard otherwise than 
 favorably the increase of our intimacy 
 with her colonies, since measures concerted 
 
120 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 in common would add to the weight of any 
 arguments that the course of diplomatic 
 negotiations might bring forth. By mak- 
 ing general the interest of any question, it 
 would be plain to Japanese statesmen that 
 wherever their position might be contrary 
 to ours it would likewise be opposed to that 
 of their ally's colonies. 
 
 The necessity for taking such precautions 
 arises, however, from our acquisition of the 
 Philippines. Had we not these to defend, 
 Japan would have been almost powerless 
 against us. Possessing them, a different 
 course of action imposes itself which bids 
 us seek an understanding with Great Britain 
 to maintain existing conditions and join in 
 a mutual guarantee for the preservation 
 thereof, a guarantee which it is likely 
 enough that Japan, realizing her conse- 
 quent impotence and desiring to identify 
 herself with the other Great Powers, would 
 herself subscribe to, as she lately has for the 
 French colonies in Indo-China; for Japan 
 diplomatically isolated would be powerless. 
 
THE FAR EAST 121 
 
 The alliance between England and Japan 
 may not be of indefinite duration. The 
 mutual desire to resist Russian encroach- 
 ments in China, which originally brought it 
 about, now appears removed, and already 
 conflicting interests and prejudices caused 
 by Great Britain's imperial position seem 
 prepared to assert themselves. The pres- 
 tige justly gained by Japan through her 
 recent war has extended over Asia, where 
 populations once submissive have had in- 
 stilled in them novel ideas of independence. 
 However remote it may be from the minds 
 of Japanese statesmen to profit by the new 
 feeling of unrest which has made itself felt 
 in India, it would be only human if con- 
 sciousness thereof were coupled with any 
 resentment that might be felt for the humili- 
 ation suffered by their compatriots in British 
 colonies. This feeling would naturally tend 
 to loosen the bonds of an alliance which 
 has more than accomplished the purpose for 
 which it was originally intended. 
 
 The future may well witness Japanese 
 
122 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 friendship inclining toward a nation like 
 Germany. The essentially military fabric 
 of both countries offers points of sympathy 
 which receive support from the fact that no 
 divergent interests separate the two powers, 
 while many draw them together, not- 
 ably the common dread of Russia. Now 
 that all hope of establishing a German co- 
 lonial empire in China has been abandoned, 
 and her colony at Kiauchau remains like a 
 beached vessel to mark the force of the wave 
 which stranded it, there are no longer rival 
 ambitions to clash. 
 
 In spite of his early warnings against 
 the yellow peril, the German Emperor has 
 every reason to feel as much sympathy 
 for the Japanese as for the Mohammedans, 
 to whom he once announced his all-em- 
 bracing friendship. Japan is better worth 
 German unity than Morocco, and an alli- 
 ance with her could be heralded as offering 
 further guarantees for the preservation of 
 peace. But we could not afford to regard 
 this contingency with indifference. Should 
 
THE FAR EAST 123 
 
 it ever approach consummation, German 
 ambitions with regard to the Philippines 
 may again be awakened under a more for- 
 midable guise, and in such event any course 
 for us other than a prompt understanding 
 with Great Britain is likely to be disastrous 
 to the preservation of our dependencies. 
 Even without this possibility, which fortu- 
 nately still belongs to the future, England 
 provides for us the effective means of safe- 
 guarding the possession of our colonies and 
 forestalling the peril which unfriendly com- 
 binations of powers present for us. 
 
 In lesser degree our diplomacy may de- 
 rive much benefit in strengthening our 
 Asiatic position by a frank understanding 
 with Russia. Now that the latter's Far 
 Eastern ambitions have been curtailed, the 
 two nations can find mutual advantage in 
 upholding a defensive policy aimed at the 
 preservation of existing conditions. Our 
 interests are mutual in so many respects 
 that a far-sighted policy would, perhaps, 
 even waive the assertion of certain claims, 
 
124 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 however justified they may be, in return for 
 a friendship of greater importance to the 
 future of our position. Japan would hesi- 
 tate in the assertion of any pretension on 
 her part if she felt that we were assured of 
 the joint support of Great Britain and 
 Russia. Hence our desire to recognize 
 Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria should 
 take Russian ambitions into consideration. 
 Especially at the present time, when that 
 power is unable to assert an aggressive 
 policy, such action on our part would be 
 appreciated far more than it would have 
 been a few years ago, or is likely ever to be 
 in the future. It rests with our diplomacy 
 to profit by opportunities when they are 
 best worth seizing. The Far East is to us 
 what the Levant has been to the European 
 powers. In China our commerce has been 
 intrenched by a century of effort. Mer- 
 chants and missionaries have extended 
 American enterprise throughout that em- 
 pire, while at home our educational insti- 
 tutions have been freely opened to Oriental 
 
THE FAR EAST 125 
 
 students. We cannot, therefore, regard with 
 indifference the impending industrial awak- 
 ening of China. Our energy and our capi- 
 tal have every right to participate therein at 
 least on terms of equal footing with those 
 of other powers; and the recent efforts of 
 American diplomacy to support the asser- 
 tion of such right in the matter of a railway 
 concession offer a welcome sign that the 
 nation is awakening to the growing impor- 
 tance of our over-sea interests, particularly 
 in the Far East. Within late years we have 
 taken a leading part both in virtually de- 
 feating the desired apportionment of the 
 Chinese Empire into rival spheres of so- 
 called economic development and influence, 
 and in forcing on other reluctant nations 
 the policy of the **open door." It has 
 rightly been our aim to preserve the Chinese 
 markets open for all. We should continue to 
 assert vigorously in the Far East a policy , 
 in conformity with the principles of equity 
 and our own best interests, which in Asia ^ 
 are commercial and cannot be political. / 
 
126 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 We should especially seek to continue to 
 play a leading part as a friendly adviser of 
 China. Nor ought this to be difficult. Our 
 political friendship has been manifested on 
 frequent occasions, although the late repay- 
 ment of the exaggerated indenmity claims 
 made after the Boxer rising was but the 
 correction of a former injustice, an example 
 which other powers have not seen fit to fol- 
 low. The recent developing of our Chinese 
 service, and our creating a body of student 
 interpreters from whose ranks it is hoped 
 that future consuls in the Far East will be 
 recruited, offer an indication of the increas- 
 ing importance the Orient has rightly as- 
 sumed in our foreign relations. It is to be 
 hoped that every effort will be made to 
 strengthen the prestige of our representation 
 which counts for so much in the East. 
 
 But if we have befriended China politi- 
 cally, in other questions our action has been 
 less amicable. Even though we need fear no 
 military consequence of her possible dis- 
 pleasure, the humiliation imposed upon Chi- 
 
THE FAR EAST 127 
 
 nese in America has in recent years caused 
 a boycott of our goods extending even to 
 Singapore. With China, just as with Japan, 
 tactful means should be found which would 
 accomplish the result demanded by our 
 .labor in the Pacific States in a manner less 
 offensive to Oriental dignity. Fortunately, 
 a marked improvement has lately been wit- 
 nessed in our relations with China, to which 
 the present resentment felt by that country 
 at the high-handed methods of Japan is 
 perhaps not foreign. This cannot be alto- 
 gether disagreeable to us ; and it should be 
 the constant object of our diplomacy, even 
 at the risk of seeming inconsistency, to avoid 
 uniting the two great yellow powers by fur- 
 nishing them with a common grievance. 
 
 Our policy in the Far East thus finds it- 
 self limited by certain existing factors im- 
 posed by labor conditions and over which 
 diplomacy has but a feeble control. Since 
 they exist, however, a course of action 
 becomes necessary for present and future 
 intercourse. To extend our commercial in- 
 
1«8 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 terests, and to preserve the Philippines 
 pending the decision with regard to their ul- 
 timate fate, must be our purpose. The goal 
 toward which our diplomacy should strive 
 is to mitigate as far as possible the offense 
 given by exclusion acts, while so intrench- 
 ing our position as to minimize the risk of 
 its ever being challenged. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE NEAR EAST 
 
 Even before the recent revolution in 
 Turkey, a decided revival of diplomatic 
 interest in the affairs of the Near East had 
 begun to be apparent. The conditions of 
 disorder which so often in the past had fur- 
 nished there the pretext for foreign inter- 
 ference appeared more ominous when the 
 danger clouds were for the time dissipated 
 in other regions of the globe. A feeling of 
 unrest leading to violence and anarchy had 
 further spread over the Moslem countries 
 from Morocco to Afghanistan. Never tran- 
 quil even in orderly times, their chronic tur- 
 bulence was once more excited. The East 
 was beginning to appreciate the failure 
 of Mohammedan institutions to renovate 
 themselves in conformity with modern re- 
 quirements, and its intelligence was realizing 
 
130 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 keenly the inferiority from which it suf- 
 fered. A political seething connected with 
 the idea of nationality and the victory of an 
 Asiatic over a European power, and influ- 
 enced by the constitutional struggle in Rus- 
 sia, became everywhere apparent. Western 
 forecasts regarding Oriental immutability 
 were rapidly being disproved. 
 
 Although almost our first foreign conflict 
 had been with the Barbary States, tradition 
 and interests alike would on the surface 
 seem to counsel us aloofness from the Mo- 
 hammedan countries. Having voluntarily 
 refrained from whatever might entangle 
 us in the internal affairs of Europe, how ] 
 much more remote must appear the inter- 
 nal affairs of the Near East! Such argu- 
 ments would have been irrefutable before 
 the Spanish War, and would still be so if 
 our international position had remained 
 unchanged and we could feel certain of 
 preserving our former policy without refer- 
 ence to the exigencies of a new situation. 
 But the diplomatic action of a great power 
 
 \ 
 
THE NEAR EAST ISl 
 
 is everywhere too closely interwoven to be 
 separate and distinct in each country. A 
 purely defensive diplomacy on the part of a 
 great state is as much a heresy as is a navy 
 built only for defense. 
 
 The acute interest taken by the European 
 nations in Turkish affairs has been not only 
 because of political and commercial oppor- 
 tunities there open, but also because the 
 problem of an empire's dismemberment, 
 which for so long seemingly presented itself 
 as imminent, caused the statesmen of the 
 Old World to realize that without the great- 
 est circumspection in their action a con- 
 flagration might be lit over the division of 
 the spoils, setting all Europe ablaze. Even 
 though we may regard the Near Eastern 
 question as entirely foreign to us, it can 
 hardly be anticipated that a European war 
 resulting from it and upsetting all former 
 balances of power could leave us completely 
 indifferent. Our desire to avert such dan- 
 ger is in fact second only to that of the Old 
 World powers. It behooves us as well as 
 
182 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 them to take the proper precautions toward 
 removing such causes as tend to disturb the 
 peace. Although we may not choose to for- 
 feit our independence of action by entering 
 into present or future concerts of nations, 
 American policy can no longer, as in the 
 past, afford to be oblivious thereto. Seen 
 in this light, the joint action of the Powers in 
 the Near East, which for thirty years has 
 contributed largely to maintaining peace 
 if only by isolating its occasional conflicts, 
 assumes new importance for us. We can 
 hardly disinterest ourselves with impunity 
 from events in a region where the interests 
 of other nations with whom we are else- 
 where intimately connected are in such 
 close juxtaposition. The Near East is at 
 one door of Europe and we are at the other. 
 The distance is too slight to leave us uncon- 
 scious of our neighborhood. 
 
 In this connection another possibility 
 presents itself as a living problem, even 
 though to-day its contingency is remote. 
 Only a few months ago, however, it looked 
 
THE NEAR EAST 133 
 
 as if a new congress might become necessary 
 to revise the thread worn Treaty of Berlin. 
 Had this occurred, as the questions it 
 would have been called upon to regulate 
 are of wider than strictly European order, 
 and as its aim would lie in the direction of 
 permanently establishing the bases of inter- 
 national harmony, we could not have been 
 indifferent to its deliberations. Any effort, 
 towards the preservation of peace in any] 
 region of the world concerns us as well as 
 Europe. It matters little that we have no 
 direct interest in determining the status of 
 territories formerly under Ottoman suze- 
 rainty. We feel a very deep interest, first, in 
 any measure contributing to securing uni- 
 versal peace, and secondly, that no concert 
 of nations should meet to decide questions 
 of more than particular or local interest in 
 any portion of the world without taking our 
 views into consideration. 
 
 Public opinion in the United States 
 should distinguish sharply between spheres 
 of influence with regard to our foreign 
 
184 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 policy and spheres of interest. There exist 
 many regions of the globe where any acqui- 
 sition of territory, or single responsibility, 
 would prove only an encumbrance for us. 
 But there is none where we do not feel 
 interested, however remotely. 
 
 Our special right to participate in any 
 international deliberations modifying or 
 altering in any way the status of the Otto- 
 man Empire is based, moreover, on the 
 existing treaties we possess with Turkey, 
 which cannot be changed without the con- 
 sent of the contracting powers. Hence any 
 alteration in the legal status of such terri- 
 tory would almost inevitably entail a cor- 
 responding modification of the numerous 
 rights emanating from the ancient capitula- 
 tions which we have assimilated by virtue 
 of our treaties with the Sublime Porte. And 
 while we may be indifferent to surrendering 
 these, we cannot permit their abrogation to 
 be effected by other powers without our 
 consent, unless at the same time we are will- 
 ing to permit other remaining rights, as well 
 
THE NEAR EAST 1S5 
 
 as our international prestige, to be seriously 
 jeopardized by such surrender. 
 
 Although in 1878 our position as a great 
 power was still not sufficiently established to 
 warrant a representation at the Congress 
 of Berlin, American over-sea interests have 
 since been so enlarged, American influence 
 so universally recognized, that we could not 
 absent ourselves from another such confer- 
 ence without endangering our legitimate 
 influence in the world's affairs. Participa- 
 tion would not, however, mean our being 
 dragged into acquisitions of undesirable 
 or indefensible territory. Certainly no Cy- 
 prus nor Bosnia should tempt us or dis- 
 tract our attention. Like France at Berlin 
 in 1878, it should be our boast to leave such 
 a conference with empty hands. Nor again 
 would such participation by us mean entan- 
 glement in the internal affairs of European 
 states. We have as little wish to so enmesh 
 ourselves as a century ago. But we are 
 unable to permit questions not of internal 
 but of international order, which might 
 
136 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 endanger the peace of other powers with 
 whom we are intimately connected, to be 
 decided entirely apart from our knowledge 
 and consent, without surrendering just so 
 much of our influence as the question's im- 
 portance in its international aspects may 
 involve. 
 
 It should further be our boast to employ 
 the Republic's efforts wherever possible in 
 the direction of justice and the extension 
 of liberal ideas. To possess a true meaning 
 in the world, our influence and civilization 
 must not remain confined to a single hemi* 
 sphere. Though its paramountcy in both 
 the Americas has rightly been the cardinal 
 point in our foreign policy, there is no 
 reason why it should be restricted thereto. 
 To refrain timidly from elsewhere assert- 
 ing ourselves will not add one iota to the 
 strength of our position in the western 
 hemisphere, where our claims repose on no 
 other ultimate basis than that of force. 
 
 But if a nation's hegemony can be as- 
 serted only with the adequate backing of 
 
THE NEAR EAST 137 
 
 strength, its pretensions to equality with 
 other powers, especially when disinterested, 
 may rest on more moral grounds. If the 
 direction of our foreign policy in other 
 regions of the world bears an ideal of justice 
 in view, there is no reason why our influence, 
 earning the respect due to its unselfishness, 
 should not contribute toward the advance- 
 ment of those general ideas of humanity 
 and international morality with which we 
 have always sympathized. And with the 
 growth of our influence abroad will follow 
 the extension of commercial interests in 
 regions before unknown. All these causes 
 contribute to the utility of our taking part 
 in future international conferences and ex- 
 changes of opinion, where our presence, 
 particularly to Great Britain and France, 
 would be welcome, while it is doubtful 
 if any power would care deliberately to 
 choose to incur our displeasure by opposing 
 our admission to the councils of great 
 nations. 
 
 Paradoxical as it may appear, the student 
 
138 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 of our national growth can hardly avoid the 
 conclusion that just as our former weakness, 
 with its dangers limited to a continent dis- 
 tant from the rest of the world, had been 
 our strength, our present strength, with the 
 new responsibilities thrust upon us, and 
 the rightly felt ambition to achieve great 
 deeds, has proved a source of weakness to 
 our material if not to our moral position. 
 It is curious to observe that the vast ex- 
 tension given within recent years to the in- 
 ternational influence of the United States 
 and to our supposed designs in other conti- 
 nents, which abroad has attracted so much 
 attention, has yet passed almost unnoticed 
 at home, because of the slight consideration 
 accorded to questions of foreign policy. 
 The European nations, with keener sense of 
 the scope of diplomacy, long since perceived 
 the significance of our advent as a great 
 power. Almost unknown to us we have 
 been included in their new world -balance 
 which has replaced the former continental 
 equilibrium. Indeed, our foreign move- 
 
THE NEAR EAST 1S9 
 
 ments are scanned abroad with far more 
 critical attention than they receive in 
 America. 
 
 A case in point occurred in 1906 in the 
 elevation of our legation at Constantinople 
 to the grade of an embassy. The impor- 
 tance of this measure passed almost unno- 
 ticed at home. But the ill-will it provoked, 
 especially in a certain section of the con- 
 tinental press, proved the consequence 
 attached by the Old World to a step inter- 
 preted as marking the entrance of America 
 in the Near Eastern question. Europe, 
 which jealously feared the appearance of 
 another claimant in the then anticipated 
 division of the spoils, realized the opportu- 
 nity awaiting us in the Levant, where with 
 no political traditions to continue, no stakes 
 to defend, no territorial ambitions, entirely 
 unpledged and free in our actions, a skillful 
 diplomacy could win for us on the Bospho- 
 rus the recognition of our policies in other 
 quarters. 
 
 The success of our position in Constanti- 
 
 / 
 
140 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 nople was fortunately never predicated on 
 the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. 
 We had no desire to see it divided, nor to 
 watch its provinces gradually apportioned 
 among the neighboring powers. It has al- 
 ways been to our advantage to have Turkey 
 preserved as one of the few neutral markets 
 still open to the world, where a fair field could 
 but be favorable to our foreign trade. Va- 
 rious conditions, past and present, have con- 
 spired together to prevent it from becoming 
 a manufacturing state. For many years 
 to come we need expect there no prohib- 
 itive tariff to bar our products, such as pro- 
 tects foreign markets and our own, while 
 the alienation of Ottoman territory would 
 have meant its probable inclusion within 
 the customs wall of some foreign power. 
 
 Our interests therefore coincided with 
 those of the powers desiring the preserva- 
 tion of Turkey. But not even her best 
 friends believed it possible long to avert the 
 doom which had appeared imminent. The l 
 revolution of July, 1908, exploded like a » 
 
THE NEAR EAST 141 
 
 bombshell to astonish the world and open 
 a new chapter in the Near Eastern question. 
 By its promise to make of Turkey a modern 
 state in place of a decrepit despotism, it 
 held forth the vision of a regenerated nation. 
 The European powers, some in all sincerity, 
 others not wishing to appear unfriendly, 
 welcomed the advent of a constitutional gov- 
 ernment. The empire which for two cen- 
 turies diplomatists have regarded as the 
 peculiar field for the exercise of their talents 
 of division, appeared by a miracle of mir- 
 acles to embark on a new life. For a 
 moment it seemed as if the bond of Otto- 
 man nationality founded upon the love for 
 a common soil might henceforth unite 
 without dissension the many creeds and 
 races inhabiting Turkey, and bring to an 
 end the conflict of racial ambitions fostered 
 from without, which had made it a menace 
 to the peace of Europe. 
 
 To-day, a year after the establishment of 
 constitutional government, if the aspirations 
 of the leaders of the new movement in 
 
142 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 Turkey are in certain respects less gener- 
 ous, they rest, perhaps, upon a stronger 
 foundation. The success of the revolution 
 had been too sudden and overwhelming. 
 It had not to fight its way against a grad- 
 ually receding opposition, but triumphed 
 almost at its birth. The elements of reac- 
 tion later made themselves felt with the real- 
 ization that the heritage of long years of 
 misgovernment could not be shaken off in a 
 day. A band of young enthusiasts, many of 
 them bred in exile, and without practical 
 experience, found themselves at the head 
 of a nation to govern which presented the 
 most diflScult problems of statesmanship, 
 from without as much as from within. The 
 ambitions of neighboring powers, the con- 
 flict of races and religions, the ignorance of 
 the masses, the ruined finances, an ineffi- 
 cient and frequently corrupt bureaucracy, 
 were all elements to be reckoned with; and 
 the fact that as each problem had been 
 the product of years, it was impossible to 
 solve it in a day, has caused many to be 
 
THE NEAR EAST 14S 
 
 unduly pessimistic regarding the future of 
 Turkey. 
 
 There is no reason, however, to take such 
 a dismal view of the situation. The neces- 
 sary transition between the old order and 
 the new will hardly be effected without 
 many anxious moments. But the patriot- 
 ism of the leaders of the reform movement 
 in Turkey, and particularly the devotion 
 to the constitutional cause of a disciplined 
 and highly efficient army composed of the 
 best elements in the nation, make one hope- 
 ful that a land so richly endowed by na- 
 ture, and whose dominant race is possessed 
 of so many military and other virtues, will 
 in time again assume its rightful place in 
 the world. 
 
 We can view with warm sympathy the 
 successive steps in the evolution through 
 which Turkey must necessarily pass to ac- 
 complish this desired result. We can even, 
 without prejudice to ourselves, extend it 
 valuable aid when the proper time comes, 
 by abandoning, as in Japan, the special 
 
144 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 rights of jurisdiction formerly acquired by 
 treaty, and aid a new Turkey, in the mea- 
 sure of our ability, to extricate itself from 
 one of the burdens of its inheritance derog- 
 atory to its sovereign rights. 
 
 The existence of a liberal Turkey is wel- 
 come to us both on sentimental and on 
 material grounds. We should, indeed, prove 
 unfaithful to our most ancient and most 
 generous traditions if we failed to view with 
 cordial satisfaction the success of a move- 
 ment securing liberty, equality, and justice 
 to a people hitherto deprived of the most 
 elementary guarantees of government. Be- 
 cause our history has served as a guide for 
 other nations in their fight for freedom, 
 they look toward us for sympathy in their 
 period of struggle and for friendship in their 
 success. When on the morrow of the pro- 
 mulgation of the constitution the crowd in 
 the streets of Constantinople cheered the 
 American flag; when a marshal of the em- 
 pire, the victorious hero of a former war, 
 returning amid the enthusiastic demonstra- 
 
THE NEAR EAST 145 
 
 tions of the multitude from an unjust exile, 
 paid his first visit to the American ambas- 
 sador as a tribute to the representative of a 
 nation which had been a cradle of liberty 
 and a refuge for the oppressed, it was be- 
 cause we are regarded as possessing funda- 
 mental feelings and traditions which must 
 cause us to welcome the success of other 
 nations who have followed our example in 
 the desire for representative institutions. We 
 have thus to fulfill a generous and pleasing 
 role in no way contrary to our real interests. 
 At the present time, when the demolition 
 of the old order in Turkey causes every 
 European nation to give an altogether fresh 
 direction to its Near Eastern policy, we are 
 able to enter on an equal footing with other 
 powers in availing ourselves of the oppor- 
 tunities certain to arise with the industrial 
 awakening of the Ottoman Empire. The 
 system is fortunately shattered which in 
 the past debarred from participation those 
 who scrupled in their choice of methods. 
 There is no longer to be the same disgrace- 
 
146 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 ful scrambling for concessions purchased 
 through palace favorites which stained 
 those who were most successful. A policy 
 of equal opportunity for all will permit our 
 enterprise to profit legitimately in what is, 
 perhaps, the richest of undeveloped nations. 
 Hence interest with sentiment counsels our 
 viewing favorably the new government 
 which in saving Turkey from dismember- 
 ment has preserved it as an open market for 
 the commerce of the world. 
 
 So long as all our energy and capital were 
 engaged in developing the United States, 
 we had regarded foreign lands rather as 
 convenient dumping-grounds for our sur- 
 plus products than as countries where our 
 industrial and financial influence could be 
 Continuously felt. Save along the Pacific 
 coast and to a certain extent in the Carib- 
 bean, the possibilities of great engineering 
 works, the building of harbors and bridges 
 and railways, the equipping of lighting, tele- 
 phone, and industrial plants, hardly dawned 
 upon our enterprise, while the possibili- 
 
THE NEAR EAST 147 
 
 ties of financial operations abroad, and par- 
 ticularly in extra-territorial countries, were 
 still uncontemplated. If it has not been 
 already reached, we are likely in the near 
 future to attain a stage where, the consum- 
 ing capacity of the country being reduced, 
 there will come a plethora of production 
 and of unemployed capital. It may even 
 be said that the recent industrial depres- 
 sion in the United States would have been 
 less acute if its foreign trade had been 
 greater and more widely distributed. The 
 gigantic strides taken at home in recent 
 years, however, have kept us from culti- 
 vating till quite lately over-sea outlets for 
 our production in the same way as other 
 powers have done. Now that an impetus 
 has at last been given to export trade, we 
 are likely to find other interests strongly in- 
 trenched in neutral markets, and our com- 
 petitors appearing more formidable than 
 would have been the case if our efforts to 
 undersell them had been ripened by the 
 experience of years. But in any event, our 
 
148 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 best openings will certainly be found in 
 lands where no discriminating tariffs exist 
 to favor home industry. 
 
 The preservation of the Moslem nations 
 as a fair field for all assumes fresh impor- 
 tance for us because of this. And the Near 
 East presents enough commercial attrac- 
 tions to warrant its receiving far closer 
 attention from our trade. The European 
 nations have better understood this advan- 
 tage in the Levant, where they have strained 
 every effort to secure the concession of 
 public franchises. In the Orient, where 
 commercial enterprise invariably passes 
 through official channels, diplomacy has to 
 concern itself with questions it elsewhere 
 ignores. German diplomacy was the first 
 to recognize this, and it was due largely to 
 its able efforts that German interests in 
 the past became so strongly intrenched in 
 the Ottoman Empire. Our own commerce 
 and enterprise, in spite of occupying a natu- 
 rally favorable position to extend American 
 trade and industry, has practically neglected 
 
THE NEAR EAST 149 
 
 a field where, only a few years ago, our 
 exports were not one twentieth those of 
 Belgium. It is interesting to note that one 
 of the causes contributing to the success 
 of Belgian diplomacy in securing valuable 
 concessions in foreign countries has been 
 that nation's political weakness. American 
 enterprise would be similarly benefited by 
 our remoteness and disinterestedness as a 
 nation. 
 
 Our participation in industrial competi- 
 tion would be welcomed by a government 
 aiming to distribute its favors widely and 
 realizing that we possess no territorial am- 
 bitions over the Turkish Empire. The rich 
 grants from which in recent years Ger- 
 man capital has benefited in Anatolia and 
 Mesopotamia, British in the Aidin Valley, 
 and French in Syria, are by no means ex- 
 hausted. Thousands of miles of railway re- 
 main to be built and railway material to be 
 ordered. The whole northern portion of Asia 
 Minor and the fertile valleys of the centre 
 are still destitute of adequate means of com- 
 
150 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 munication, although it is notorious that 
 such a road would traverse the richest part 
 of Turkey. The reason why it was left un- 
 built will also serve as an example to explain 
 the chance for our enterprise to profit from 
 the peculiar political position we enjoy in the 
 Near East. The first route for the Bagdad 
 Railroad had been planned fo pass through 
 this region. But Russia, unwilling to see 
 the interests of a powerful nation perma- 
 nently established close to her own Cauca- 
 sian frontiers, and in a district over which 
 she was supposed to cherish ultimate ambi- 
 tions, demanded the immediate repayment 
 of the remainder of the Turkish war indem- 
 nity owing her since 1878. As this was im- 
 possible, she obtained instead the guarantee 
 for such road to be built either by Russian 
 or Turkish enterprise, while the Sultan re- 
 scinded his first offer and granted the Ger- 
 man concession by the less favorable route 
 through the Taurus Mountains, and thence 
 across the semi-desert from Aleppo to Bag- 
 dad. The reasons which animated Russia 
 
>^ 
 
 THE NEAR EAST 151 
 
 to take such a position would not be so 
 likely to militate against American inter- 
 ests. Hence our very aloofness from politi- 
 cal ambitions in the East should stand us in 
 good stead. In the numerous concessions 
 for public franchises of every nature which 
 still remain to be granted in the Near East- 
 ern countries, while we may anticipate com- 
 mercial rivalry, our enterprise will hardly 
 suffer from political jealousy. On the con- 
 trary, we should obtain the aid in such ven- 
 tures of a nation like Russia, which, without 
 the ability to profit commercially herself, 
 would prefer to see our interests benefited 
 rather than those of other powers. In the 
 Near East almost as much as in the extreme 
 Orient our interests may work in harmony 
 with those of Russia. 
 
 Opportunities thus await American capi- 
 tal and commerce in the Levant which may 
 be further increased by judicious means. 
 The establishment of schools in the Orient 
 has offered a recognized method of extend- 
 ing the national influence of powers so doing. 
 
15« AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 Without governmental aid American mis- 
 sionary establishments scattered through- 
 out Turkey have accomplished the same 
 purpose and extended among natives the 
 use of the English language. Their util- 
 ity could in certain respects be still further 
 augmented. Many members of our cham- 
 bers of commerce contribute in their pri- 
 vate capacity to the support of the missions 
 abroad. It would appear to be supplement- 
 ing the influence and usefulness of the lat- 
 ter if a means of cooperation could be found 
 whereby selected mission pupils would be 
 assured a livelihood in advancing American 
 trade interests. In addition to the instruc- 
 tion now imparted, commercial courses 
 might be given which would prepare schol- 
 ars as competent agents for our business 
 enterprises. Among the present hindrances 
 to the extension of American trade in the 
 Levant is the absence of properly equipped 
 natives who alone can push it in the interior. 
 In our mission schools, which already ac- 
 complish much useful and beneficial work, 
 
THE NEAR EAST 153 
 
 we possess the nucleus at hand to remedy 
 this deficiency. Next to Turkey, and in spite 
 of its present anarchy, Persia offers the most 
 attractive outlook in the commercial future 
 of the Near East, as an almost entirely un- 
 developed country possessed of natural re- 
 sources, where only the most rudimentary 
 means of transportation and communica- 
 tion exist, and where possibilities of the 
 same character as in the Ottoman Empire 
 await foreign enterprise. In a land where 
 the dominant influence is that of Russia 
 in the north and England in the south, 
 we should be able to advance our com- 
 mercial interests without incurring the 
 political jealousy of two powers that are 
 friendly toward us. The recent Anglo- 
 Russian agreement stipulated that central 
 Persia should be left as a zone between the 
 spheres of influence of either nation. There 
 can be no question that both England and 
 Russia would choose to see American inter- 
 ests established in this buffer region in pre- 
 ference to those of other likely powers. 
 
154 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 The scope and direction for our diplomacy- 
 is therefore apparent, if our enterprise and 
 capital can be induced to venture into this 
 new field and reap the benefits which free- 
 dom from political ambitions should obtain 
 for us. 
 
 While geographically far removed from 
 the Near East, the conditions prevailing 
 in Morocco align it with other Moham- 
 medan countries as a non-manufacturing 
 state with yet undeveloped resources. Al- 
 though recent events have partly removed 
 it from the strife of political competition, 
 while the state of anarchy in which the coun- 
 try has been plunged during late years 
 has made the extension of any commerce 
 almost impossible, there is reason to anti- 
 cipate that greater tranquillity may in the 
 future prevail and peace be restored to a 
 distracted land. The guarantee of a fair 
 field for all nations was among the most 
 fortunate achievements of the Algeciras 
 Conference, although we unfortunately re- 
 fused to avail ourselves of the proffered 
 
THE NEAR EAST 155 
 
 share in the state bank of Morocco, which 
 would have secured for us a favorable posi- 
 tion to exert influence in behalf of American 
 enterprise. But proper diplomatic support 
 may yet place us on an equal footing with 
 other states in the future award of public 
 works and the distribution of concessions. 
 
 Our diplomacy skillfully handled can 
 perhaps still find in Morocco a pawn to 
 be utilized for advantages to be gained in 
 other quarters. We need only remember 
 the compensations secured by Great Britain, 
 Italy, and Spain in surrendering to France 
 their more or less shadowy Moroccan claims, 
 to realize that, possibly, even at this late 
 hour, we can secure certain advantages 
 from the latter power in regions of closer 
 interest to us, while, without injury to our- ^ 
 selves, we further possess the welcome op- 
 portunity of being of service to Spain in her 
 special ambitions over northern Morocco. 
 
 The Near East is by no means the remote 
 region it has so long seemed to us. Diplo- 
 matically and commercially, advantages are 
 
156 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 there presented which in the past we have 
 been slow to cultivate. It is natural that 
 Europe should have forestalled us in fos- 
 tering relations with the Moslem powers; 
 but for us longer to neglect the opportuni- 
 ties there open, and allow our diplomatic 
 and trade intercourse with the Levant to 
 continue in its present undeveloped state, 
 is unworthy of a great and ambitious na- 
 tion. With the extension everywhere given 
 to the protective-tariff system, the few neu- 
 tral markets remaining will be increasingly 
 prized. Turkey, Persia, and Morocco offer 
 lucrative opportunities to our enterprise 
 and to the extension of our influence. We 
 are still in time to profit by the possibilities 
 there open, while the natural advantages 
 we enjoy by reason of our remoteness and 
 political disinterestedness place us in a pe- 
 culiarly favorable position to find support 
 for our policies, and aid for our industrial 
 enterprises in lands where our advent would 
 be welcomed in preference to that of other 
 powers. 
 
 
 ,v- 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE AND THE STATE 
 DEPARTMENT 
 
 The brains and energy of the nation have 
 been largely absorbed, during the last cen- 
 tury, by its industrial expansion. Whereas 
 in the Old World they went by preference to 
 the service of the State, with us they have 
 gone rather into business life. The insecur- 
 ity of government employment was able to 
 offer but a scanty equivalent for the prizes 
 awarded to success in industry and com- 
 merce. Public services stagnated while in 
 all other directions the current of progress 
 bore the country swiftly along. The funda- 
 mental reason for any inferiority in our gov- 
 ernmental efficiency has been the political 
 nature of its recruitment, with the resulting 
 conditions little conducive to permanence 
 or training. The disadvantage of utilizing 
 
158 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 national services as instruments of politi- 
 cal reward, even though native talent has 
 occasionally compensated for lack of expe- 
 rience, requires no comment here. For 
 diplomacy, however, there has been and 
 still is a certain justification. Apart from 
 our scarcity of the prizes of political life, 
 which other nations are able to dispense 
 more lavishly, we have felt a certain pride 
 in the fact that our diplomatists stand for 
 the best traditions of American citizenship 
 rather than as the representatives of a caste. 
 The example of Franklin is still a living 
 one. Diplomacy, moreover, is no esoteric 
 mystery, and the qualities of shrewdness and 
 balance apparent in our business and polit- 
 ical intercourse are essential to the skillful 
 negotiator. There is no reason why any 
 administration should restrict the selection 
 of its ambassadors to the exclusive choice 
 of candidates appointed thirty or forty 
 years previously, as is the case in certain 
 continental services. There is especially 
 no likelihood of any American government 
 
THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 159 
 
 SO doing. A rapidity of action and success 
 is still manifest in our public life. We have 
 slight respect for the slow gradations 
 which lead in older nations to positions 
 of dignity. In examining our diplomacy 
 as it now is, these elements of actuality 
 have to be considered. The problem is not 
 to devise an ideal service in an ideal state, 
 but to increase the efficiency of existing 
 methods and adapt them, where necessary, 
 to modern requirements. 
 
 The former idea of utilizing the foreign 
 service as part of the spoils system sufficed, 
 however inadequately, for our requirements 
 so long as external questions were of simple 
 order. Even then certain elements of per- 
 manence and continuance of policy were 
 found to be necessary, and both the Depart- 
 ment of State and several of our missions 
 abroad contained men whose presence out- 
 lasted any administration. It seems likely 
 that this tendency will increase in the fu- 
 ture. No general can win a battle without 
 lieutenants, and the advantages of a skilled 
 
160 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 rank and file in diplomacy, as in other public 
 services, has become more widely appreci- 
 ated. Recent efforts in this direction have 
 certainly given considerable impetus to a 
 movement which must commend itself to 
 all intelligent observers. 
 
 The future success of our foreign policy 
 will undoubtedly depend in great measure 
 upon the skill of our diplomacy. The wel- 
 fare of the nation at large is indeed far more 
 intimately bound thereto than may be com- 
 monly believed. An idea has been widely 
 prevalent that with the increase of rapid 
 means of communication and the diffusion 
 of news through the press the importance of 
 diplomats was on the wane. Ambassadors 
 were pictured as clerks at the end of tele- 
 graph wires. Had diplomacy been unable 
 to renovate its eighteenth-century garb of 
 court intrigue, this might have been true. 
 But the proof of its utility is that it has 
 conformed itself to modern requirements. 
 It has become economic where economic 
 questions were at issue. It has arranged cus- 
 
THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 161 
 
 toms schedules; it has framed discriminat- 
 ing tariffs and forged the weapons for com- 
 mercial warfare. It has served the ends of 
 finance and industry. The preservation of 
 peace and the diplomatic preparation for 
 war are to-day but its occasional concern. 
 It is the will of the sovereign people, no 
 longer the whim of kings, that determines 
 the graver questions which now preoccupy 
 it. Herein diplomatists can act only as in- 
 termediaries, with no power save to register 
 decisions or transmit information. The 
 real scope of diplomacy is both narrower 
 and deeper, — narrower in effecting the 
 settlement of unimportant current ques- 
 tions that are daily met with in inter- 
 national relations; deeper in contributing 
 to lay the broad foundations for a na- 
 tion's future action by aiding to form its 
 opinion in foreign policy. Herein it be- 
 comes the instrument of statecraft in inter- 
 national relations. Its duty to keep the 
 central government informed of everything 
 of interest abroad should serve future as 
 
162 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 well as present. And since popular passions 
 cannot be causelessly stirred, it is the pro- 
 vince of diplomacy to see that such occasion 
 should never arise without good reason. 
 Diplomatists act thus as the scouts of na- 
 tions as well as the negotiators; and any 
 line of foreign policy which does not take 
 into view their action is hardly likely to 
 achieve success. The creation of a diplo- 
 macy able to supply the mechanism for the 
 assertion of our foreign policy thus com- 
 mends itself as a corollary to our future 
 position in the world. We have built up a 
 great navy which now provides the material 
 reserve upon which to base the means of 
 enforcing our contentions; but the navy is 
 incomplete without building up our diplo- 
 matic service and making of it a useful force 
 in the national life. 
 
 The improvements which remain to be 
 effected involve no radical changes alien 
 alike to our traditions and our habits of 
 thought. The foundations of reform which 
 have lately been laid in so many directions 
 
V 
 
 ^ THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 163 
 
 have been inaugurated as well in the foreign 
 services with a view to securing that har- 
 monious cooperation of effort essential to 
 success. 
 
 The necessity existing for reform arises 
 from the continuance of certain methods that 
 have survived the conditions for which they 
 were originally intended. While a perma- 
 nent service is able more easily to renovate 
 itself in conformity with new necessities, 
 a transient one can rarely do more than 
 pass to its successor the methods it has re- 
 ceived from its predecessor. The efficiency 
 of to-day only too easily degenerates into 
 the sterility of to-morrow, and the utility 
 of any governmental branch finds itself cur- 
 tailed because its development has not cor- 
 responded with the growth of other national 
 activities. While our diplomacy has hitherto 
 amply sufficed for the disposition of cur- \ 
 rent questions, it has hardly as yet adapted 
 itself to the new conditions which confront 
 us, or exercised its full scope as an instru- 
 ment in the nation's welfare. 
 
164 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 The spirit animating a service is the ele- 
 ment most conducive to its efficiency, and 
 its infusion into a body can alone weld the 
 latter into a homogeneous whole capable 
 of high achievements. The problem is how 
 to reconcile the conditions of permanence 
 necessary for this spirit with the peculiar 
 exigencies imposed by our political system. 
 The past has left an unfortunate heri- 
 tage in the artificial separation not only 
 of kindred branches, but of different divi- 
 sions of one service. The remembrance of 
 a former and purely political method of 
 recruitment of all officials still causes our 
 diplomatic posts abroad to feel perhaps too 
 isolated from one another, and not as parts 
 of one great system bound together by com- 
 mon action inspired by a common purpose. 
 The diplomatic service, as has been stated, 
 should be the eyes and ears of the nation 
 in its contact with foreign powers. While 
 journalism has to a certain extent taken its 
 place in the communication of news, even at 
 the present day, especially in the older coun- 
 
THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 165 
 
 tries, a diplomatist can reach sources not 
 accessible to the press. Information of na- 
 tional interest is usually, however, of a dif- 
 ferent order from the current news of the 
 press. Its acquisition and its transmission 
 in the shape of studied reports treating of 
 every phase in the life of a country count 
 among the elements which in foreign diplo- 
 matic services make most for their utility. 
 The subsequent diffusion of such reports in 
 the form of confidential prints circulated 
 in the service engenders a healthy rivalry 
 which links the post closer together by keep- 
 ing them informed with regard to events in 
 other lands and the character of the work 
 done by other missions. 
 
 In giving greater attention to junior 
 diplomatic officers the administration has 
 wisely recognized in them the element 
 most essential to permanence in the ser- 
 vice. The importance of a body of capa- 
 ble secretaries is felt especially in a service 
 such as ours, where the great posts are 
 usually granted to those who have gained 
 
166 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 prominence at home. A high degree of 
 efficiency can be secured only by the pre- 
 sence of a permanent element more famil- 
 iar with diplomatic traditions than could be 
 expected of envoys often fresh from civil 
 life. The art of diplomatic forms is acquired 
 mainly by experience and training, and the 
 value of such knowledge, somewhat alien to 
 our habits of thought, cannot be over-em- 
 phasized in view of the undue sensitiveness 
 which characterizes the international rela- 
 tions of the continental powers. The an- 
 cient tradition of the "point of honor" has 
 survived in the offense so easily taken, espe- 
 cially by European nations, at any departure 
 from the conventions of diplomacy. An 
 ambassador, in spite of otherwise signal 
 ability, may easily find the efficiency of his 
 mission impaired through having given un- 
 intentional offense by some trifling breach 
 of form. In this lies the need for an efficient 
 body of secretaries acquainted with tradi- 
 tions and able properly to embellish the phra- 
 seology of an envoy whose early training 
 
THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 167 
 
 may not have sufficiently prepared him for 
 the necessary suavity of a diplomatic style. 
 
 By far the most serious element preju-J^ 
 dicial to the unity of our diplomacy lies^ 
 however, in the complete division which 
 separates the diplomatic service from the 
 Department of State. In the army we have 
 adopted the system of interchange between 
 the line and the general staff; but in our 
 foreign and departmental services, the meth- 
 ods of recruitment and promotion being 
 entirely different, we have not yet been able 
 to follow the example of other nations who 
 have either fused or assimilated these in 
 grade. In Italy, for instance, by a recent 
 radical reform, all officials at the Ministry 
 in Rome have been given either diplomatic 
 or consular rank, varying with their posi- 
 tion. In every European foreign office, 
 moreover, interchange is encouraged be- 
 tween service at home and abroad, thus 
 bringing the personnel of the two branches 
 of one service into close cooperation. With 
 us, although a wise innovation now requires 
 
168 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 all new diplomatic appointees to undergo a 
 brief period of instruction in the depart- 
 ment, the subsequent separation is com- 
 plete. While the civil-service regulations 
 protecting departmental officials render later 
 assimilation difficult, means could proba- 
 bly be found to obviate this impediment 
 and bring about a closer fusion than now 
 exists, to the advantage of both services. 
 Reform within the diplomatic service can 
 only go hand in hand with reform in the 
 department, and either is well-nigh useless 
 without the other. 
 
 With the growing accumulation of work, 
 the limitations of human energy must make 
 themselves felt more and more. When, a 
 century and a quarter ago, John Jay be- 
 came Secretary of State, his only assistants 
 were two clerks. It is a striking tribute to 
 the devotion to duty of our cabinet officers 
 that even to this day they have retained so 
 great a body of work on their own shoulders. 
 But in spite of the aid of assistant secre- 
 taries, actual conditions still seem to impose 
 
THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 169 
 
 an unfair tax upon their energy. Amid the 
 rapidly increasing volume of foreign affairs, 
 a body of specialists with diplomatic train- 
 ing would permit the Secretary of State and 
 his immediate assistants to give greater 
 attention to the more important questions, 
 permitting matters of routine and special 
 knowledge to be treated by competent ex- 
 perts. Of late this necessity has impressed 
 itself on nearly all the European foreign 
 offices, which have been reorganized with 
 a view to enlarging the responsibilities of 
 juniors and the specialization of bureaus 
 along political-geographical lines. Where 
 formerly the entire labor devolved on the 
 ministers and under-secretaries, who utilized 
 their assistants in a purely clerical capacity, 
 this order of work has been reversed, and 
 the latter are now given opportunities for 
 proving their worth. 
 
 The great advantage in any specializa- 
 tion of bureaus is that it creates a body of 
 experts with detailed knowledge of the af- 
 fairs of foreign countries. The result has 
 
170 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 been to obtain a certain standard of action, 
 a certain norm of method, and coordination 
 of parts, which in the conduct of affairs of 
 state takes the place of genius. Ministers 
 of foreign affairs abroad are not depend- 
 ent on clerks alone to second or to inform 
 them, but can rely on the technical advice of 
 skilled officials possessing expert and usu- 
 ally personal acquaintance with the nations 
 whose affairs they are specially called upon 
 to handle. In Europe the foreign offices are 
 recruited in the same manner as the diplo- 
 matic services. Their staff rises to, and 
 interchanges with, similar grades in diplo- 
 macy. Their bureaus are presided over by 
 ministers and ambassadors. Their tradi- 
 tions are inspired by centuries of precedent. 
 It is obvious that a weight of moral au- 
 thority would therefore be attached to the 
 recommendations of the chief subordinate 
 officers which no politically constituted 
 cabinet would override without good cause. 
 Our own State Department, through no 
 fault of its own, can hardly as yet aspire 
 
THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 171 
 
 to the same authority in its recommen- 
 dations to Congress. Cognate to this there 
 arises a more important question. It has 
 often been remarked that we may demand 
 of foreign states that they live up to treaty 
 obligations which we ourselves are unable 
 to enforce. Our mixed order of government 
 contains unquestionably an element of 
 weakness in the occasional clash between 
 federal and state power. The equity of our 
 contentions abroad can at any time be 
 undermined by the inability of the govern- 
 ment to exercise its authority over sovereign 
 states. This problem, which only lately 
 assumed a pressing form, is likely to be 
 increasingly encountered with the growth of 
 our foreign intercourse. Among the reasons 
 which hitherto have militated against any 
 surrender by the states of their sovereign 
 rights has been a constitutional unwilling- 
 ness to see the executive power increased. 
 The eighteenth-century conception at the 
 basis of our Constitution looked to a balance 
 of the different governmental parts some- 
 
17« AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 what in the nature of a diplomatic equi- 
 librium. New accretions of power by any 
 governmental branch could be viewed only 
 as being at the expense of its other divisions, 
 and contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. 
 Any weakening in the assertion of state 
 rights appeared to signify a corresponding 
 increase in the power of the executive. But 
 this held true only because the adminis- 
 trative branches of the government were 
 directly subservient to the executive and 
 exclusively responsible thereto. Cabinet 
 ministers are still secretaries in practice as 
 in name, and as such theoretically presi- 
 dential clerks. If the states, therefore, were 
 ever to waive any portion of their sovereign 
 rights in favor of the federal government, 
 yet without unduly augmenting the execu- 
 tive power, it could be done only by increas- 
 ing the authority of certain departments 
 and removing these as much as possible 
 from the sphere of politics. The formation 
 upon a non-partisan basis of a permanent 
 diplomatic service and State Department 
 
THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 173 
 
 would appear to offer an advantageous 
 solution of the problem of equalizing the 
 extension of power accruing to the execu- 
 tive through any abrogation of state rights. 
 The increase of presidential power would 
 be balanced by the fact that any exercise 
 of such authority could be invoked only 
 through the agency of a department semi- 
 independent of the executive, and, save at 
 its head, independent of political change. 
 
 The close cooperation not only between 
 the different ramifications of one service, but 
 between the different services of a govern- 
 ment, is the condition essential to success, 
 and is especially necessary in an adminis- 
 trative personnel such as our own, composed 
 both of permanent and of temporary oflicials 
 whose maintenance in office depends on the 
 party in power. The efficiency of our for- 
 eign service is conditional as well upon its 
 relations with the other branches of the 
 government. The ability and devotion of 
 officials finds its scope restricted without 
 such cooperation of effort. A line of foreign 
 
174 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 policy is frequently adopted in conformity 
 with the means at a government's disposal. 
 To assert a pretension impossible to en- 
 force exposes the nation to the danger of 
 humiliation. A close cooperation between 
 departments of War, Navy, and State thus 
 becomes necessary. And while this is al- 
 ready obtained at cabinet meetings, there 
 are numerous problems that could advan- 
 tageously be discussed by experts of each 
 department, who would then be in better 
 position to advise their respective chiefs. 
 The general naval board instituted a few 
 years ago furnishes the type of a similar 
 advisory council which could to advantage 
 include representatives of the three depart- 
 ments concerned. 
 
 Opportunity for further cooperation 
 would appear to present itself in the rela- 
 tions between the Departments of State and 
 Justice. At present, the Secretary of State 
 is usually apprised through a foreign envoy 
 at Washington of cases concerning citizens 
 of his nation, and once such affairs have 
 
THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 175 
 
 been taken up diplomatically, they add to 
 the labors of the government. If, however, 
 the federal attorneys throughout the coun- 
 try were instructed to report to the State 
 Department all cases concerning foreign 
 subjects, it might frequently be possible to 
 settle difficulties out of court before they 
 had attracted public or diplomatic atten- 
 tion and assumed a form complicating their 
 solution or possibly even embittering inter- 
 national relations. 
 
 Our foreign policy is destined by the very 
 basis of American national existence to be 
 developed amid conditions differing from 
 those prevalent elsewhere. In European 
 states it lies within the power of the exe- 
 cutive to frame alliances without having 
 recourse to parliamentary approval, unless 
 budgetary considerations be involved. A 
 British Cabinet is able to negotiate a mili- 
 tary treaty with Japan unknown to the Brit- 
 ish nation, and even republican France can 
 sign an alliance with Russia the articles of 
 which still remain a secret. With us the 
 
176 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 Senate's necessary ratification, and the con- 
 sequent publicity in the case of all agree- 
 ments of a binding nature, entail a radically 
 different procedure. There can be no ques- 
 tion that the Senate's action has, in the main, 
 proved beneficial. If its decisions have not 
 always been marked by an appreciation of 
 our future needs, as in rejecting the pur- 
 chase of St. Thomas, as a rule it has had a 
 very clear comprehension of where lay the 
 nation's interests. Nor is it either likely or 
 desirable that it should divest itself of any 
 of its power in our foreign relations. As a 
 permanent committee, fairly representative 
 of the country at large, it gives the seal of 
 national approval to our policy abroad. 
 
 It may be hoped withal that the present 
 tendency to remove certain questions from 
 party considerations will more and more 
 find useful application in foreign affairs. 
 The Monroe Doctrine, which has always 
 been regarded as a non-partisan measure, 
 affords a precedent for this. The European 
 nations, divided internally along party 
 
THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 177 
 
 lines, have yet achieved a stability of policy 
 in their foreign relations and in questions 
 of defense. Any other course on our part 
 would be parading to the world dissensions 
 where it is most important that none ex- 
 ist. Our external policy should be national 
 and not partisan. Whatever be its trend, 
 it should at all times have behind it the 
 support of the entire country. Of late there 
 has been a fortunate disappearance of 
 that lack of sympathy which long existed 
 between Congress and the Department of 
 State. The good will of the Senate being 
 essential, it is only wisdom to take counsel 
 of its views beforehand and avoid a repeti- 
 tion of so unfortunate an incident as the de- 
 feat of the arbitration treaties a few years 
 ago. Nowhere is close cooperation between 
 the different branches of government more 
 important than in diplomatic questions, 
 where the nation ought to present a united 
 front. Nowhere is any misunderstanding 
 so likely to be fatal to our foreign policy or 
 so disastrous to the efficiency of the ser- 
 
178 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 vice. Strength at home permits of strength 
 abroad, and the department's complete har- 
 mony with Congress is the primary con- 
 dition for diplomatic success. It is an 
 unfair tax on any Secretary of State to 
 demand that in addition to attending to 
 administrative duties he be called upon 
 to appear personally before the Senate and 
 House committees on Foreign Relations. 
 This work could be accomplished as well 
 by a congressional secretary charged with 
 explaining details and answering questions 
 of foreign policy. An official who could act 
 as the recognized permanent link between 
 the Senate and House committee, at whose 
 constant disposal he would be, and the De- 
 partment of State, ready to give to the na- 
 tion's representatives the information they 
 desired, would be able to avoid misappre- 
 hensions and errors on either side, and effect 
 that close cooperation between the execu- 
 tive and legislative branches of the govern- 
 ment which is indispensable to the highest 
 success. 
 
THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 179 
 
 A more intimate union of sympathy 
 would further appear desirable between the 
 department and the nation at large. The 
 press has furnished a great medium of 
 communication between the government 
 and the country, and, with the growth of 
 democratic ideas, its importance has been 
 enlarged and its powers strengthened. It 
 therefore becomes of national interest to 
 possess a press ably directed and well in- 
 formed, which may intelligently influence 
 the masses. Our people have been too little 
 accustomed to judge of foreign affairs. 
 Often they have not fully appreciated the 
 significance of phases in international rela- 
 tions, or again have over-emphasized their 
 importance. The creation of a qualified 
 press bureau in the Department of State, as 
 the recognized channel of communication 
 between the government and the public in 
 all matters of foreign policy, would remove 
 a part of the burden which the reception 
 of newspaper correspondents still imposes 
 upon our public men. The views of the 
 
180 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 government on questions of foreign policy 
 \ could be given to the country through the 
 ! medium of some such channel as those 
 I which continental foreign oflfices possess, 
 j and which would allow public opinion to be 
 held in restraint or prepared for any course 
 of action or event. An official whose sole 
 duty would be to inform the press of our 
 national necessities in questions of foreign 
 policy could, without in any way improp- 
 erly interfering with the independence of 
 its judgment, exert a healthy influence in 
 educating the country by its means to an 
 intelligent appreciation of our international 
 relations. 
 
 With our new world-wide responsibilities, 
 the cultivation of a competent public opin- 
 ion in questions of foreign policy has be- 
 come an urgent necessity. On the one hand 
 the patriotism of the great majority of the 
 people is too easily led astray by unreason- 
 ing enthusiasms which reflect greater credit 
 on the generosity of its feeling than on 
 its mature judgment. On the other there 
 
THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 181 
 
 exists the small minority of those who cavil 
 at every manifestation of our influence or 
 authority abroad. Between the two re- 
 mains to be formed an enlightened and in- 
 intelligent body of opinion competent to 
 judge questions of foreign policy in the 
 same way as it judges questions of interior 
 policy. The press should furnish the vehi- 
 cle for the diffusion of such opinion. But 
 with a few noteworthy exceptions, it has not 
 yet displayed the same intelligence in con- 
 sidering our foreign interests that it mani- 
 fests in domestic matters. It is still inclined 
 to treat such questions with a levity or a 
 sensationalism which contrasts unfavora- 
 bly with the balanced judgment of serious 
 European journals. Keenly avid for news, 
 it has felt less interest in discerning the 
 importance of the information published, 
 or in weighing its consequences below the 
 surface of sensation. It still remains pro- 
 vincial and inadequate to the dignity to 
 which it should properly aspire in its 
 functions. 
 
182 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 While the remedy for this condition rests 
 ultimately with the nation, which has not 
 yet realized the importance of foreign ques- 
 tions, the Department of State through the 
 proposed press bureau ought to aim as well 
 to educate the country to a more intelligent 
 appreciation of our interests abroad. In 
 a democracy such as ours, public opinion 
 provides the final sanction against which 
 no government can rule. It becomes of the 
 highest consequence that this opinion be 
 intelligently formed, in order that it may 
 weigh with discernment the needs of the 
 nation in its relations with the world. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE FUTURE OF OUR INTERNATIONAL 
 POSITION 
 
 Our energy, our resources, and that 
 force of circumstance known as destiny 
 have hitherto contributed to carry us into 
 the forefront of nations. Our rightful place 
 has been won almost without present effort. 
 The Civil War made us a great nation be- 
 cause it proved that we possessed the spirit 
 of national sacrifice. The Spanish War, 
 with its diplomatic significance out of all 
 proportion to its military importance, noti- 
 fied the world that we were a great power. 
 But though possessing the material founda- 
 tion which entitles us to our new situation, 
 and though filled with a lofty resolution 
 which has hitherto saved the nation's ac- 
 tion, even when mistaken, from ever being 
 ignoble, our preparation for the new order 
 
184 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 of responsibilities before us has been inade- 
 quate, and we remain handicapped by a sys- 
 tem no longer in conformity with actual 
 requirements. We stand to-day at a transi-' 
 tion point where, feeling only the presenti- 
 ment of our high destiny, we trust rather 
 to chance and the wisdom of the moment 
 than to conscious effort to direct our 
 course. 
 
 Every age is as much trustee for the future 
 as it is heir to the past. Foresight is an 
 essential quality of statesmanship, and a 
 government would be remiss in its duty if it 
 failed to take into consideration the needs 
 of later generations. American foreign pol- 
 icy of to-day should be based not only on 
 the expediency of the moment, but on the 
 necessity of maintaining our international 
 position in the manner best calculated to 
 prepare for the future which properly 
 awaits us. 
 
 External problems of policy can never be 
 separated from their internal significance, 
 and both the material and moral aspects of 
 
OUR INTERNATIONAL POSITION 185 
 
 a foreign policy must be either the result or 
 the cause of siruilar tendencies within the 
 nation, and inevitably react on each other. 
 With the growth of our international rela- 
 tions such elements will become increas- 
 ingly important. Whatever necessity we 
 may at present experience for the assertion 
 of our influence abroad can only augment 
 in time. In less than a half century our 
 population should be one hundred and fifty 
 millions; were our territory as thickly set- 
 tled as Germany, it would be nine hundred 
 millions. 
 
 The problem lies in moulding a policy 
 which will gauge the nation's present and 
 future requirements in conformity with the 
 means it has and is likely to possess. Cer- 
 tain tendencies which must influence our 
 future course are already apparent. A grow- 
 ing industry will strengthen our interest 
 in the world's markets, and as we become 
 more dependent upon our over-sea trade, 
 closer scrutiny will inevitably be given to 
 foreign and colonial problems now remote. 
 
18« AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 and to the navy as a protecting accompani- 
 ment of commerce. 
 
 The tendency toward increased arma- 
 ments has received fresh strength from re- 
 cent developments. Economic reasons will 
 probably one day place a curb upon their 
 further extension, just as economic reasons 
 provide in ultimate analysis the necessity 
 for sea power. But forecasts into the future 
 can, for the present, neglect any schemes of 
 disarmament, and to propose these prema- 
 turely would be more likely to defeat their 
 purpose than to aid it. The rapid growth 
 of our fleet in recent years makes it safer 
 to presume that the efforts which have 
 carried us into our present place among 
 naval powers will not soon be discontin- 
 ued. American diplomacy has every reason 
 to anticipate from it the assistance which 
 armed strength alone is able to confer. 
 
 Whatever the future may hold in store 
 for us, we need anticipate as little the birth 
 of an order of events likely to transform 
 us into a world-conquering power as one 
 
OUR INTERNATIONAL POSITION X87 
 
 which will permit the nation to continue its 
 tranquil policy pursued before the Spanish 
 War. Our external problems will diminish 
 only in so far as increased force has made 
 of us a more redoubtable antagonist. While 
 certain of our pretensions are for this rea- 
 son less likely to encounter resistance than 
 before, consciousness of strength may also 
 lead to difficulties which would once have 
 been avoided. A world position inevitably 
 entails world responsibilities. 
 
 Whatever new questions may in time 
 arise, the present problems that confront 
 us are not likely to be dismissed soon. The 
 extension given to the Monroe Doctrine in 
 recent years is certain to make continual de- 
 mands on our vigilance, even if no stronger 
 measures become necessary. Coupled there- 
 with, the building of the Panama Canal has 
 widened our national interests and placed 
 the countries bordering on the Caribbean in 
 the same relation toward us as was formerly 
 Cuba alone. The necessity to preserve neu- 
 tral markets has further caused the extended 
 
188 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 assertion of our influence in the Orient, 
 where we have of late been rudely awak- 
 ened to the change caused by the rising 
 power of Japan. Everywhere our horizon 
 has been enlarged ; everywhere we are called 
 upon to handle new problems both in the 
 light of our own general interests and from 
 the more special point of securing the pre- 
 servation of the Philippines. 
 
 The nation, conscious of its responsibili- 
 ties and dangers, has in recent years de- 
 veloped its means of defense. The same 
 sentiment must inevitably make toward 
 renovating our diplomacy as the navy's 
 complement in preserving peace and safe- 
 guarding over-sea interests. This does not 
 signify the reversal of past traditions. We 
 may preserve their spirit while infusing into 
 them fresh life, enveloping what is vital 
 in a form appropriate to new requirements. 
 The navy would to-day cut a sorry figure 
 if, because the Monitor had once proved 
 so serviceable, we had never gone beyond 
 it as a type for our war-ships. Yet in the 
 
OUR INTERNATIONAL POSITION 189 
 
 handling of foreign affairs we have remained 
 "content with a diplomatic service always 
 inadequate and often positively detrimental 
 to our interests." ^ We have not recognized 
 in diplomacy the technique, so to speak, of 
 statesmanship in the nation's foreign rela- 
 tions. Having minimized its role as the act 
 of international intercourse, its importance 
 in securing economy of effort has been 
 minimized for us. One cannot draw from 
 a jar more than it contains; and diplomacy 
 has hitherto occupied too minor a part in 
 the national life to have been utilized as the 
 instrument of strength it should be. Its 
 possibilities still remain for us as virgin as 
 were our forests. 
 
 Fortunately we can start on our march 
 under unparalleled auspices. Where the 
 nations of the Old World have been 
 obliged hitherto to rely on comparatively 
 slight means, and where their success has 
 depended on a high power of organized 
 efficiency, we are already their equals in ca- 
 
 * Mr. Olney, AUantic Monthly , March, 1900, p. 289. 
 
190 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 pacity for organization, while our resources 
 are well-nigh boundless and our possibilities 
 unlimited. The possession of such national 
 baggage is not without consequence. The 
 fulfillment of certain duties from which we 
 can neither hope nor wish to dissociate 
 ourselves will in the future more and more 
 be impressed upon us. "A nation which 
 is at once the granary, the coal and iron 
 mine, and the cotton field of the world can- 
 not as formerly remain enclosed in its con- 
 tinent, indifferent to what occurs in other 
 parts of the globe. It is too great a parcel 
 of humanity to enjoy the right of isolation. 
 It feels that its power makes demands upon 
 it. Its strength creates a right; this right 
 turns to pretension, and this resolves itself 
 into a duty to pronounce on all questions 
 which the agreement of European powers, 
 formerly determined." ^ 
 
 While statecraft is in the first instance an 
 enlightened selfishness, and while we are 
 
 ^ E. Boutmy, Psychologie du Peuple Am^ricain, Paris, 
 1902, p. 337. 
 
OUR INTERNATIONAL POSITION 191 
 
 paramountly concerned in our own welfare, 
 present and future, in the history of nations, 
 as in the lives of individuals, occasions pre- 
 sent themselves when, with little or no risk, 
 the cause of humanity may be advanced. 
 Without indulging in Quixotic dreams of 
 redressing the evils of this world, we may 
 yet look forward to exemplifying in our for- 
 eign intercourse certain of the ideals which ' 
 are at the foundation of the Republic. Our ^^^ 
 diplomacy must rest primarily on the solid 
 basis of material interest, but it should seek 
 to identify such interest so far as possible 
 with that of humanity. The political legacy 
 bequeathed by our forefathers is not at 
 variance with this ambition. The tradi- 
 tions they have handed down should rather 
 ennoble and spiritualize our aim. No more 
 mischievous illusion exists than the belief 
 that because we are launched as a world 
 power our future course must be one of 
 rapacity, regardless of others' rights. The 
 goal before us has in it nothing that is base, 
 but likewise nothing that may not become 
 
192 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 either noble or ignoble. For better or for 
 worse, a wider scope has been held out. It 
 rests with us to decide what it shall be. 
 But our future course affects more than our- 
 selves. Our single action, supreme in one 
 hemisphere, second to none in the other, 
 will more than that of any other power 
 influence the political ethics of the world. 
 At Gettysburg, almost a half century 
 ago, Lincoln immortally proclaimed before 
 a divided nation the American gospel. To- 
 day, when we are united, his words offer a 
 reminder that the future should not find us 
 unworthy of the past. The higher our aim, 
 the more worthy will it be of those who in 
 the past served and saved the Republic. 
 
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