Ex Libris C. K. OGDEN STUDENT'S HANDBOOK PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS. ]>ESIOXED CHIEFLY FOK THE LONDON B.A. AND B.Sc. F. RYLAND, M.A. LATE SCHOLAR OF ST JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE. LONDON: W. SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & ALLEN, PATERNOSTER SQUA1M. 1880. rRlNTF.1.1 r,Y PORTED US &> DENHOLM, EDINBURGH PREFACE fTlHIS book is intended as, in some sort, a companion -- to the Mental and Moral Science of Professor Bain. Although the University of London makes no specific mention of that work, a tacit understanding between examiners and candidates seems to have been arrived at, that the papers for the B.A. (Pass) Examina- tion shall, in the main, be based upon it.* At the same time, questions are sometimes asked which imply a wider range of reading ; and the manual itself, admir- able in so many respects, is not always remarkable for clearness of style or symmetry of arrangement. It has been my desire to explain certain difficulties which experience has shown to be often felt by beginners who have only Professor Bain's treatise in their hands, and here and there to supplement his occasionally rather one-sided statements. With this object in view, I have * This applies also to some other examinations besides those of the University of London. As Professor Bain's book is the only tolerably complete and systematic treatise on Psychology in English, available for beginners, the reason is not far to seek. IV PKEFACE followed the general scope and arrangement of the Psychological part of his work. For instance, I have omitted, as a rale, physiological and sociological details, and avoided ontology; although the lack of a definite metaphysical basis, and the insufficient recognition of the objective method are among the gravest defects of that volume. In the Ethical part of this little book, Professor Bain has been less closely followed. Practical teaching has shown me that candidates found much less help from the Moral Science than from the companion work on Psychology. As my aim has been exclusively practical, I have felt it better not to burden my pages with controversy or opinions of my own. For the same reason, I have quoted largely, and thus let the writers speak for them- selves, wherever it was possible. The desire for concise- ness has often forced me to say things less accurately than I could have wished ; but here again the practical character of the book forbade diffuseness, and demanded definiteness and brevity. The extended list of books, and numerous references, will, I hope, help candidates to a really honest and intelligent study of the subject. LONDON, June 1SSO CONTENTS PART L PSYCHOLOGY PAGE (1) METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY ... .1 (2) MIND .7 (3) CONSCIOUSNESS ..... .8 (4) CONDITIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS . . . .11 (5) UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL MODIFICATIONS . . .13 (6) CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA . .16 (7) FEELING 19 (8) SENSATION : MUSCULAR FEELINGS . . .20 (9) SENSATION PROPER : ORGANIC SENSATIONS . .22 (10) TASTE 25 (11) SMELL 26 (12) TOUCH 28 (13) HEARING 31 (14) SIGHT .35 (15) SENSATION AND PERCEPTION . . . .40 (16) INSTINCT ........ 47 (17) APPETITES AND DESIRES 49 (18) LAW OF SELF-CONSERVATION : PLEASURE AND PAIN 51 VI CONTENTS PACE (19) THE INTELLECT 54 (20) LAW OP EELATIVITY : RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE . 59 (21) LAWS OF ASSOCIATION 61 (22) LAW OF CONTIGUITY ...... 63 (23) LAW OF SIMILARITY ...... 65 (24) LAW OF COMPOUND ASSOCIATION . . . .66 (25) LAW OF PREFERENCE 67 (26) MEMORY . . 68 (27) SPECIAL ACQUISITIONS ... . 69 (28) CONCEPTION AND ABSTRACTION . . 73 (29) REASON AND UNDERSTANDING . .76 (30) INFERENCE AND INTUITION : PERCEPTION . . 78 (31) THEORIES OF PERCEPTION 83 (32) MR BAIN'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION (IDEALISM) . 87 (33) MR SPENCER'S DEFENCE OF REALISM . . .88 (34) SPACE . . 90 (35) TIME . 94 (36) INNATE IDEAS ... .97 (37) IMAGINATION .99 (38) BELIEF . .100 (39) ATTENTION .... .101 (40) VOLITION . . .104 (41) FREEDOM OF THE WILL . .107 (42) ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WILL . .110 (43) MOTIVES . . . . . . .112 (44) MODE OF ACTION OF THE WILL . . .113 CONTENTS Vll PART II. ETHICS APPENDIX I. BOOKS RECOMMENDED . APPENDIX II. QUESTIONS FROM B.A. PAPERS PAGE (45) METHODS OP ETHICS 114 (46) RELATIVE AND INDEPENDENT ETHICS . . . 118 (47) INDUCTIVE AND INTUITIVE ETHICS . . .119 (48) EGOISM AND ALTRUISM . . . .119 (49) INTUITIONISM 120 (50) UTILITARIANISM 123 (51) OBJECTIONS TO UTILITARIANISM . . . .127 (52) BRIEF SKETCH OF ENGLISH ETHICAL THEORIES . 129 (53) MR BAIN'S ETHICAL THEORY . . .138 (54) THE MORAL FACULTY MORAL REASON . .140 (55) THE MORAL SENSE 142 (56) CONSCIENCE 144 (57) OBLIGATION . . . . . . .145 (58) MOTIVE AND INTENTION . . . . .146 (59) SANCTION .... . .147 (60) DUTY AND VIRTUE . . . . .147 (61) CLASSIFICATION OF THE VIRTUES . . .149 (62) JUSTICE . . .151 (63) NATURE . . .153 PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS PART I. PSYCHOLOGY (1) Methods of Psychology. IT is agreed by all that in Psychology we are not concerned with the substance of Mind, but with its phenomena or manifestations. Mind manifests itself as Thought, Feeling, and Volition ; it is natural to suppose that there is a something which wills, thinks, and feels, but modern psychologists are for the most part agreed that of this Something, apart from its attributes or phenomena, we can have no scientific knowledge ; we can (at most) only know that it is, not what it is. Accepting this important limitation of our inquiry, we seek to know by what means we are to learn the laws of mental phenomena ? Two methods have been followed, that of Introspec- tion, and that of External observation, or, as they are briefly termed, the Subjective and Objective methods. A PSYCHOLOGY Introspection is the turning of the Mind round on itself so as to view its own states. This power of internal observation we call Self-consciousness, the Internal Sense (Kant), or Reflection (Locke). An introspective element seems to be present in all mental states, though only implicitly, and this we can develope by a special effort of attention ; e.g., I may develope the consciousness that I see a house, into: I see a house, where the thing that is chiefly dwelt on is the sensation of sight and not the object seen ; or into : see a house, where my own personality is the thing chiefly, though not exclusively, prominent. The difficulties in the way of Introspection are these : (1) It is confined to adults, and to those adults who are of a more or less highly intellectual charac- ter. The appeal to the feelings and ideas of savages and children is therefore to be dis- trustedsince neither savages nor children can observe with any approach to accuracy their own mental states, and the appeal generally comes to mean that the observer transfers to the savage or child mere reflections of his own mental states. (2) It is subjective, and therefore isolated. introspection can at best only give me my own mental states. You cannot examine mine in order to see if you agree with me in my account of them ; nor can I examine yours. And we do not feel by any means certain that all men think and feel just alike (as, e.g., savages, and blind people) ; so I have no right to assume that METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY 3 the mental phenomena you perceive by intro- spection are similar to those I perceive by introspection. We cannot therefore apply to purely introspective data any comprehensive system of comparison ; in other words, we cannot erect a Comparative Psychology on the facts given us by self-consciousness. (3) It transforms the objects observed. When we begin to reflect on a mental phenomenon, say Anger, the emotional condition which we begin to observe, disappears and gives place to a state of an intellectual character ; the anger vanishes for the very reason that we have begun to be conscious of it as a fact to be observed by the Internal Sense. (4) Connected with this last objection, we must remember that our mental states are always vanishing. Consciousness is only maintained by reason of a .constant change in the elements of mental life. Hence what we nearly always observe is, not the mental state, but a remem- brance or idea of it. Notwithstanding these drawbacks, which have hardly been sufficiently recognised by English writers, Intro- spection must have an important place in any system of Psychology. Comte indeed rejected it, chiefly on the ground of the evanescent character of our mental states ; but it must be remembered that we should not have any notion of Mind at all, if it were not for Introspection. The other method of Psychological study is the 4 PSYCHOLOGY Objective or Biological method. It tends to regard Mental Phenomena as a special class of physiological phenomena ; it studies the Mind through its organ, the body and more especially the brain and nerves. To such a method we are led by the fact that there is a certain easily recognisable continuity between actions accompanied by consciousness and actions not known to be so accompanied, as in the case of reflex actions. It is a useful method, because (1) the study of objective facts, like those of physiology, is much easier and more accurate than the study of subjective facts, such as are given us by introspection ; and (2) it is susceptible of the " comparative method." We can compare with the greatest exactness the size, shape, etc., of the brains of a European, a negro, and a gorilla, but we cannot satis- factorily compare their feelings or other modes of consciousness. This method has been most successfully employed by physiologists, who have investigated the phenomena of Mind as a species of the phenomena of Life.* All the methods of physiological and pathological research have been resorted to. But there is no necessary divorce between the two methods. Little has been done by either apart from the other; together they have been pursued with the greatest success. Professor Ribot describes the method followed by the best English psychologists in the following words : * " The analogy of Life and Mind is the closest of all analogies, if indeed the latter is anything more than a special form of the other. Hence what is known of Life will be the best guide to what is knowable of Mind." (G. H. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, vol. i., p. 110). METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY 5 Their " method is double ; it studies psychological phe- nomena, subjectively, by means of [self-]consciousness, memory and reasoning : objectively by means of the facts, signs, opinions, and actions which interpret them. Psy- chology does not study the facts of consciousness simply in the adult ; it endeavours to discover and to follow their development. It has recourse to the comparative method. It does not disdain the humblest manifes- tations of psychical life, remembering that nothing has been more useful to comparative physiology than the study of minute organisms " (English Psychology, Eng. Transl., p. 323). A still better statement is to be found in Prof. Huxley's little work on Hume (in the " English Men of Letters" series): "Psychology is a part of the science of life or biology, which differs from the other branches of that science merely in so far as it deals with the psychical, instead of the physical, phenomena of life. As there is an anatomy of the body, so there is an anatomy of the mind ; the psychologist dissects mental phenomena into elementary states of consciousness, as the anatomist resolves limbs into tissues, and tissues into cells. The one traces the development of complex organs from simple rudiments ; the other follows the building up of complex conceptions out of simpler constituents of thought. As the physiologist inquires into the way in which the so-called ' functions ' of the body are performed, so the psychologist studies the so-called 'faculties' of the mind. Even a cursory attention to the works and ways of the lower animals suggests a comparative anatomy and physiology of the 6 PSYCHOLOGY mind ; and the doctrine of evolution presses for applica- tion as much in one field as in the other" (Huxley's Hume, p. 50). Psychology is thus a science closely related to Biology, resembling it in method, and to some extent depending on it; but differentiated from it by assuming a new ultimate fact, the existence of Consciousness, which is furnished us by Introspection. This new fact demands a special addition to the method of Biology, and we accordingly couple Introspection with the observation of external, or objective, existence. An important advance (at present hardly recognised with sufficient clearness by English psychologists), has been made in the method of Psychology as the result of sociological research. Man lives in Society, he is a unit of a complex organism ; hence, the individual is largely determined by the structure of which he forms part. Society develops powers which do not exist in the separate individuals which compose it. We can only adequately study Man by studying Humanity. We must therefore take into consideration not only data derived from Introspection and Physiology, but also Sociological data such as are furnished us by Language, Law, Religion, Art, and History. This view, which is associated in Germany with the names of Steinthal and Lazarus, has been recently put forward in England by the late G. H. Lewes.* * Problems of Life and Mind, i, pp. 152 scq. ; Study of PsychoL, pp. 71 seq., and 159 seq. MIND 7 "The co-operation of the medium is not less indis- pensable than that of the organism ; and in the case of man the medium is constituted by the education of the race and of the individual; so that the state of social evolution which has been reached at any given time in any given place, will be one of the necessary determinants in every individual mind." Only by re- lation to the General Mind as embodied in Language, Law, etc., do we come to have " conceptions, theories, and virtues." Language, above all, is of supreme importance : it enables each of us to " share in the general fund [of experience] which thus becomes for him an impersonal objective impulse." We have assumed that the Objective Method is co- extensive with the Biological ; but this will have to be modified if the above view of the social medium is accepted, for we shall have a second Objective Method in addition to that of Biology, viz., the Sociological, or, as it is also called, Anthropological. The methods of Psychology will thus be 1. Subjective the Introspective Method o r\i i.- ( (i) the Biological Method 2. Objective ? . I (ii) the Sociologies (ii) the Sociological Method (2) Mind. Professor Bain considers that the only satisfactory definition of Mind is the enumeration of its three properties or functions Feeling, Thought, and Volition. 8 PSYCHOLOGY This is called Definition by Complete Enumeration. In other words we define Mind by enumerating its leading attributes or functions. Philosophers, following the lead of common sense, make a more or less decided distinction between what has been variously called Mind, Ego, Self, Subject, on the one hand, and Matter, Non-ego, Not-self, or Object, on the other.* Matter has extension, Mind has not. The external world is known as existing in Space, while Mind is known as essentially out of Space, and, therefore, as not possessing any of those attributes which depend on existence in Space. For instance, Thought is not conceivable as square or oval ; nor can we speak of the colour of a volition or the breadth of an emotion, except by a conscious metaphor. Hence, we may define Mind, negatively, as the Non-extended. We may define Mental Phenomena by a reference to consciousness; e.g., as those phenomena which are " manifested through the medium of self-consciousness " (Sir W. Hamilton). (3) Consciousness. The first purely psychological fact which insists on our notice is the' existence of Consciousness; it "may be considered the leading term of Mental Science," says Prof. Bain. The word itself has been very ambigu- * It must not be supposed, however, that these terms are exactly equivalent Compare Hamilton, Led. Metaph. , Lect. ix. CONSCIOUSNESS 9 ously employed, but we may specify two or three main uses : (i) It sometimes denotes only the recognition by the mind of its own states (Self-consciousness). (ii) It sometimes is used to include all mental phe- nomena, with or without explicit reference to the Ego, in so far as these phenomena are not latent. " Consciousness is the word which expresses, in the most general way, the various manifestations of psychological life. It consists of a continuous current of sensations, ideas, volitions, feelings, etc." (Prof. Ribot). (iii) It sometimes is used as equivalent to Immediate Knowledge (Intuition) whether of the Ego or the Non-Ego. "Consciousness and immediate knowledge are terms universally convertible " (Sir W. Hamilton). Hamilton uses the word in all three senses ; so do many other psychologists. This has caused a great deal of intricate and somewhat uninteresting discus- sion (Cf., e.g., Hamilton, Led. Metaph., vol. i., pp. 206 seq. ; Mill, Examination of Hamilton, pp. 138 seq.}. There now seems to be a tendency to use the word more exactly in the second sense discriminated above. Taking the term in this sense we at once see that it would be impossible to explain what it means to any one who had it not. "Consciousness is to Mind 10 PSYCHOLOGY what Extension is to Matter. Though both are phe- nomena, yet both are essential qualities, for we can neither conceive mind without consciousness, nor body without extension." These words of Sir W. Hamilton's state the view taken by common sense, as formulated by Descartes ; though they are not easy to reconcile with the doctrine of Unconscious Mental Modifications. (See sec. 5.) Self, as we have seen above, is present in varying degrees in all our consciousness ; hence, sense (ii) passes into (i), as the recognition of Self becomes more and more explicit. Consciousness may be regarded as the genus under which stand the various species of Feeling, Thought, and Volition. Consciousness, therefore, in sense (i), i.e., Self-consciousness or the Internal Sense (Locke's " Reflection "), stands as a species under Con- sciousness in this second sense ; so also does Conscious- ness in sense (iii), i.e., Immediate Intuition. In the second sense given above, consciousness is not a special faculty, but a generic quality which all mental pheno- mena possess. If we observe it with sufficient care, we seem to be able to discriminate two stages in Self-consciousness, viz. : (a) Internal sense, as opposed to External per- ception, the "recognition by the mind of its own acts and affections" ; e.g., I am conscious that I am hungry, or that I am thinking, just as I perceive that this paper is white and this pen is soft, (b) The element of Self becoming still more explicitly developed, I am conscious that / am hungry and that 7 am thinking. CONDITIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 11 We may tabulate the above results, thus : f (a) = Internal sense (recog- nition of the phenomena i. Self-consciousness -| as mine). \ (b) = Recognition of the Consciousness = S I phenomena as mine. ii. Generic attribute of mental phenomena, as opposed to unconsciousness. iii. Immediate Knowledge, whether of the Ego or Non-Ego. (4) Conditions of Consciousness. Hamilton enumerates the following "special condi- tions of consciousness :" (1) It is actual, not potential, knowledge. A man is said to know that 9 + 7 = 16, even when he is not thinking of it ; but this is only potential knowledge. (2) It is immediate knowledge. (3) It implies Discrimination. We are conscious only so far as we distinguish the thing from what it is not. This is the Law of Relativity, explained by Prof. Bain. (4) Hence also are involved Judgment, and (5) Memory. After all, we do not learn much from this analysis of the elements of consciousness ; since a little reflection would appear to show that by actual, as opposed to potential knowledge, Hamilton only means conscious as 12 PSYCHOLOGY opposed to unconscious knowledge ; and, again, Dis- crimination seems to involve Consciousness. The second condition alone remains ; and thus we come back to the definition, that Consciousness is equivalent to Imme- diate Knowledge. Mansel says Attention becomes a necessary condition of Consciousness, when we use the word strictly. But Attention, on the other hand, may itself seem to involve Consciousness ; and has, in fact, been explained to be merely concentrated or intensified consciousness. Two conditions of Consciousness may be definitely laid down. " The condition on which alone conscious- ness can begin to exist is the occurrence of a change of state." And consciousness can only be maintained while changes take place. "It must be ever passing from some one state into a different state. In other words, there must be a continuous differentiation of its states." This gives rise to Discrimination, or recognition of un- likeness. But this alone is insufficient. There must also be an assimilation of these constantly differing states, they must be classified as being like previously experienced states. " In being known, each state must become one with certain previous states must be integrated with those previous states." Hence all con- sciousness involves a continual oscillation between these two. " Under its most general aspect, therefore, all mental action whatever is definable as the continuous differentiation and integration of states of conscious- ness." (Spencer, Prin. Psych, ii., pp. 300-1.) To pre- vent misunderstanding, it is necessary to point out that UNCONSCIOUS MODIFICATIONS 13 we are not really conscious of the psychical conditions which Mr Spencer here calls " states of consciousness," until they are differentiated and integrated. A mere sensation is not, strictly speaking, a " state of conscious- ness" until it has been discriminated and recognised as a sensation. (5) Unconscious Mental Modifications. Still employing the term Consciousness in sense (ii), the question arises, Can there be Unconscious Mental Modifications? Does the Mind ever exert energies, and is it ever the subject of modifications, of neither of which it is conscious, but which manifest their existence by effects of which we are conscious ? Sir W. Hamilton answers the question in the affirma- tive. He points out that various kinds of latency may be recognised. There is that normal kind which belongs to all our knowledge, which we are not thinking of at the very moment. There is also that abnormal latency, which occurs when the mind contains whole systems of knowledge, e.g., a language or a science, of which it is ordinarily unconscious, but which are revealed to con- sciousness in madness or delirium, or in some other extraordinary psychical condition. But, besides these, there is the very interesting case of true unconscious mental modifications, which we know must have existed on account of the results which they have produced in consciousness. To establish the existence of these 14 PSYCHOLOGY Hamilton appeals to certain facts of External Percep- tion, and to certain facts of Association. The separate leaves of a distant forest must each produce some effect on our mind of which we are unconscious, in order to give the general impression of greenness, of which we are con- scious. The murmur of the distant sea is a sum made up of the noise of separate waves, individually not strong enough to rise into consciousness. In these and similar cases, " the total impression of which we are conscious, is made up of an infinitude of small impressions of which we are not conscious."* Again, in Memory, one idea often suggests another into consciousness by the inter- mediate agency of one or more other ideas which do not themselves rise into consciousness. This may be represented by the well-known experiment with a row of billiard-balls ; the motion is communicated from the first to the last through a series of spheres which are themselves unmoved. (Hamilton, Led. Metaph. i., pp. 338 seq.). Mill, in his Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy (chapter xv.), while disapproving of some of Hamilton's arguments, says, " I am myself inclined to agree with Sir W. Hamilton, and to admit his unconscious mental modifications in the only shape in which I attach any very distinct meaning to them, viz., unconscious modi- fications of the newes" (p. 355). But it is very probable * Cf. a musical tone, produced by hundreds or thousands of separate vibrations, but yet perfectly homogeneous to the ear ; and a sensation of colour produced by millions of distinct vibrations. UNCONSCIOUS MODIFICATIONS 15 that to every material modification of brain and nerves there corresponds a mental modification ; which, how- ever, does not rise into consciousness unless the neural modification is sufficiently intense. We may have sensations which we do not perceive, and thoughts which we are not conscious of. A familiar instance is that of reading unconsciously to the bottom of a page and beginning to turn the leaf, when we awake to the fact that we have neither understood nor even perceived the words and sentences, which have yet been in some way impressing themselves on the mind ; or why did we turn over? Reverting to the case of musical tones, and other composite sensations, "There are three important principles which we may regard as established in the case of sound, and as clearly indicated in the case of the other sensations. The first is, that sensations which are apparently simple and elementary, and which can- not be analysed by mere observation of consciousness, are nevertheless compounded of many successive and simultaneous sensations, which are themselves com- pounded of still lower psychical affections. The second is, that two sensations, which differ only in the mode in which their elements are compounded, may appear in consciousness as generically different and irredu- cible to each other. The third is, that two or more psychical affections which, taken separately, are as non- existent to consciousness, may, nevertheless, when taken together, coalesce into a sensation which is present to consciousness." 16 PSYCHOLOGY (6) Classification of Mental Phenomena. A threefold division of mental phenomena is recog- nised by most psychologists Thought, Feeling, and Volition. The acceptance of this classification seems to be due to Kant. It is adhered to by Sir W. Hamil- ton and Professor Bain. The latter thus explains the meaning of the terms used : (1) " Feeling includes all our pleasures and pains, and certain modes of excitement, or of consciousness simply, that are neutral as regards pleasure and pain/' (2) " Will or Volition comprises all the actions of human beings in so far as impelled or guided by Feelings." Note the peculiarity of this statement. " Actions of human beings," whether voluntary or not, are not properly Mental Phenomena, and do not, therefore, belong to the science of Psy- chology. " Volition must be distinguished both from the judgment which precedes and from the external act which follows it." (Mansel.) (3) " Thought, Intellect, Intelligence, or Cognition includes the powers known as Perception, Memory, Conception, Abstraction/' etc. Hamilton's nomenclature differs slightly from that of Mr Bain, since he classes Will and Desire together, under the name of Conation. This, however, of itself does not indicate any real difference of opinion. Professor CLASSIFICATION OF FACULTIES 17 Bain's treatment of Desire is not so decided as might have been wished ; and he seems to hesitate between the alternatives of treating it as belonging to the divi- sion of Feeling and as belonging to the division of Volition. " Desire may be viewed as so much pain " (Ment. Sci. p. 368), and therefore may be viewed as Feel- ing ; but Mr Bain nevertheless finds it convenient to treat of it in Book IV., on the Will. Other psychologists have adopted different classifica- tions of mental phenomena. Reid, for instance, adopts the ancient dichotomy of Understanding or Intellec- tual Powers, and Will or Active Powers. This allows no satisfactory place for the Feelings, which are phe- nomena quite as distinct from Volition as Volition is from Thought. On the other hand, Mr Herbert Spencer gets rid of Volitions as fundamentally dis- tinct phenomena, and divides Consciousness into Feelings, and Relations subsisting between Feelings (Cognitions). But he also tells us that the Relations themselves are " a kind of feeling " (Princ. Psych. vol. i., p. 1G4). Thought, Feeling, and Volition are all present in every act of consciousness, though only one of them may be prominent. " In distinguishing the cognitions, feelings, and conations, it is not therefore to be sup- posed that these phenomena are possible independently of each other. In every, the simplest, modification of mind, knowledge, feeling, and desire or will, go to con- stitute the mental state ; and it is only by a scientific abstraction that we are able to analyse the state into B 18 PSYCHOLOGY elements which are never really existent but in mutual combination" (Hamilton, Lect. Metaph., vol. i., pp. 188-9). In the same way, every primary colour in the solar spectrum contains vibrations belonging to the other primary colours, and only owes its special character to the predominance of a certain class of vibrations. " Every mental state is thus a function of three vari- ables." The late Mr G. H. Lewes suggested the somewhat fanciful name " Psychological Spectrum " to designate these facts.* If this is kept clearly before the mind, we are not likely to fall into the old error of regarding the mind as made up of a number of more or less independent Faculties, which has been the source of considerable confusion in Psychology. There is no special faculty of Perception in general, which always perceives ; there is no special faculty of Memo^, which preserves what has T^een handed over to it by Perception, and so on. The whole mind thinks, the whole mind feels, the whole mind wills. The faculties are not distinct entities, but modes of operation of the conscious mind. These modes of activity are not perfectly independent, but everywhere presuppose one another, and pass into each other. If evolution has taught us not to expect fixity and definiteness in the science of Life, but shows us species shading off into species, and function passing * Mr Lewes's "Spectrum" is, however, not quite the same as Sir W. Hamilton's. His " three fundamental modes of [nervo-muscular] excitation " are Sensation, Thought, and Motion. Problems of Life and Mind, vol. i., pp. 146-7. CLASSIFICATION OF FACULTIES 19 into function, we must not look for such fixity and definiteness in the science of Mind, which deals with phenomena still more complex and unstable. Of the three chief classes of phenomena, Feeling is the simplest and lowest. Accordingly, Professor Bain commences his Mental Science with a consideration of Feeling in its simplest forms. But at the same time he finds it convenient to treat of " Volition in the Germ," instead of placing all that relates to Volition in Book IV. The higher forms of Feeling the Emotions are discussed separately in Book III. This is justi- fied by what has just now been said. The divisions of mental phenomena into Feeling, Thought, and Volition are only logical, made for scientific purposes. In actual consciousness they are always united. Hence, while a certain amount of difficulty to the student is caused by Professor Bain's arrangement of his treatise, the advantage gained by gradually tracing the development of the more complex phenomena upward from the simpler forms of consciousness more than compensates for it. The student will, therefore, prepare himself to find in Book I. of Mental Science discussions of matters which would occur in Book II. (on Intellect), or in Book IV. (on Will), had the threefold division been strictly ad- hered to in the order of exposition. (7) Feeling. " Feeling comprehends pleasures and pains, and states of excitement that are neither." There are two great 20 PSYCHOLOGY divisions of Feelings the Sensations, which are the primary forms of consciousness arising directly in re- sponse to external excitation ; and the Emotions, which are secondary or derived. Sensations are relatively simple, and immediately presentative mental pheno- mena ; while Emotions are complex and representative that is, they are " feelings produced by the fusing together of a number of minor feelings." Sensations are, in general, capable of definite localisation, and have a definite character ; while Emotions are vague and diffused. Sensations are " peripherally initiated " that is, have their origin on the surface of the body, whether external or internal ; while Emotions are " cen- trally initiated " that is, arise within the body. The following table exhibits the divisions and sub- divisions of Feeling : Feeling Sensation Emotion Muscular Sensation Proper Organic Special Mechanical Chemical (8) Sensation: The Muscular Feelings. Under the head of Sensation we class (1) The Mus- cular Feelings (feelings of muscular exertion), and (2) The Sensations Proper viz., those of organic life, and those of the Five Senses. The former are active, involving movement ; the latter passive. MUSCULAR FEELINGS 21 The Muscular Feelings proper must be clearly dis- tinguished from those sensations which arise from the organic condition of the muscles. These latter belong to the class of Sensations Proper ; they are such as arise from hurts, diseases, fatigue, rest, and nutrition of the muscles; while the Muscular Feelings proper include the feelings which accompany the actual con- traction of the muscles. The chief of these is the sense of Expended (or rather, Expending) Energy. It is essen- tially active, and is clearly distinct from Sensation, which is passive. Most physiologists hold that it accompanies the outgoing current in the motor nerves, and does not arise, as a sensation does, by the afferent or sensory fibres. By the " discriminative sensibility" of muscle Professor Bain means only the " intellectual side" of the feelings connected with muscular exer- cise i.e., their " susceptibility to discrimination and agreement," and " degree of retainability." These intel- lectual characteristics are very highly developed. Most modern psychologists (e.g., Mill, Bain, and Spencer) hold that all, or nearly all, our knowledge of Space depends on this power of discriminating the feelings of expended energy, especially in the very delicate muscles of the eye. We discriminate, according to Mr Bain, (1) the degree of exertion, or expended force; (2) the degree of con- tinuance of the exertion; and (3) the degree of the velocity of the movement. These discriminations he considers as ultimate deliverances of our Muscular Sense, and as not involving any reference to Time or 22 PSYCHOLOGY Space. He then builds up his theory of Space know- ledge on this assumption. Its validity has, however, been constantly questioned.* He does not state expli- citly, but appears to imply, (4) a discrimination of the direction of the movement.^ The Muscular Feelings are usually associated with sensations of Touch, but they are not the same thing. The latter are passive, and have their physical con- comitants or causes in the afferent nerves ; the former are active, and have their seat in the efferent nerves and those parts of the cerebral ganglia connected directly with them. (9) Sensation Proper: Organic Sensations. "A Sensation is defined as the mental impression, feeling, or conscious state, resulting from the action of external things on some part of the body." It is thus distinguishable from Muscular Feeling and from Emotion, neither of which arise from the excitation of a sensitive surface. (Ment. Sci., p. 27). The Sensations are usually classified according to their bodily organs. This classification seems to be imme- diate and innate, not acquired by experience ; we cannot confound a sight with a sound. Psychology merely * Velocity, for instance, seems to presuppose Space. Quicker or Slower have no meaning but with reference to the greater or smaller space traversed in a given time. t This, however, he seems to consider is given by Touch and the Muscular Feeling combined. ORGANIC SENSATIONS 23 recognises the old distinctions. Thus we get the Five Senses. To them we must, however, add the Sensations of Organic Life, which are very important as feelings (pleasure and pain) ; though of small intellectual value. These last, which are also called Systemic Sensations (the older Sensus communis, Sensus vagus, etc.), for the most part originate on the inner surfaces of the body. They are thus distinguishable from Sensations of the Five Senses, which originate on the exterior surface, and from the Emotions, which do not originate on the surface at all. As might be anticipated the several kinds of Sensation are not capable of being very sharply distinguished, since the feelings arise from nerves distri- buted on surfaces placed at all gradations of depth. Professor Bain gives the following classification of the Organic Sensations : (1) Organic Sensations of Muscle, Bones, etc. : e.g., those caused by wounds, cramp, fatigue, etc. (2) Organic Sensations of Nervous Tissue : e.g., neu- ralgia. (3) Feelings connected with Circulation and Nutrition, e.g., thirst, starvation, not hunger. (4) Feelings of the Respiratory organs, e.g., suffocation. (5) Feelings of Heat and Cold, connected chiefly with the Skin, though not exclusively. (G) Organic Sensations of the Alimentary Canal (not to be confounded with Taste proper) e.g., relish, hunger, nausea, dyspepsia. (7) Feelings connected with the Sexual Organs, mammary and lachrymal glands, etc. 24 PSYCHOLOGY These Organic Sensations are much vaguer than those of the Five Senses ; they are difficult to discriminate, they pass into one another, and are not often clearly localisable in Space and Time. Hunger, for instance, begins unobtrusively, and does not associate itself definitely and closely with any other feeling. While, on the other hand, the External Sensations (Sight, Hearing, etc.) are clearly limited and defined, and readily cohere with each other; they are easily referred to exact positions in Space and Time. Our knowledge of Space is due to the association of visual, muscular and tactual sensations ; our formation of words and sentences is only possible by reason of the firm cohesion of separate sensations of sound. The revivability of the Organic Sensations is very slight. It is extremely difficult to realise hunger, when we are not hungry ; or to imagine ease from pain when we are suffering from gout or rheumatism. On the other hand, sights, sounds, etc., are all more or less recoverable. The Organic Sensations are, however, ot supreme importance in relation to pleasure and pain. In the treatment of the Special Senses below, the Organic Sensations associated with some of the Special Senses are enumerated apart, and it is noticeable how large a proportion of the pleasure or pain we connect with the ideas of Taste, Smell, and Touch, is due to these elements. The Systemic Sensations are the main factor in the general feeling of comfort or discomfort which forms at any given time a sort of background to our psychical life. TASTE 25 A clear notion of the difference between Organic Sensation and the Special Sensation of Touch can be got by placing the edge of a sharp knife on the skin. Here we have a sensation of Touch, in which the intellectual side predominates, we refer the feeling to the object which causes it, and thus readily pass from Sensation to Perception. If, however, we cut the skin, the intellectual element almost disappears, a state of consciousness ensues mainly characterised by the pre- sence of pain, and we no longer refer the feeling to an external object but regard it as eminently a change in us ; we pass from the objective to the subjective point of view. (10) Taste. Object. Liquids and soluble substances. Organ. Mucous membrane of the tongue. It is at present doubtful, whether the under surface of the tongue, and the soft palate and fauces have taste. The papillae on the upper surface of the tongue are supposed to be the chief agents ; they vary in size and form from the tip to the rear of the tongue (filiform, fungiform, etc.). They are supplied with filaments from the trigeminal and glosso-pharyngeal nerves; of which the latter seems to be of primary importance.* * On the Organs of the Special Sensations, see Prof. Huxley's Elementary Physiology Lessons VIII. and IX. 26 PSYCHOLOGY Mode of Action. Probably chemical. Prof. Bain distinguishes : (i) Organic Sensations connected ivith Taste, viz., those of the Alimentary Canal. Relishes and their opposites. (ii) Taste Proper. Sweet and bitter. (iii) Taste combined with Touch Acid, astringent, and fiery tastes. The nerves of touch (trigeminal) appear to be affected as well as those of taste (glossopharyngeal). To these we may add. (iv) Taste combined with Smell. "We can recognise by taste a solution of 1 part of sulphuric acid in 1000 parts of water. One drop of this solution, sufficient for discrimination by the tongue, will contain about j^ of a grain of the acid. (11) SmeU. Object. Gaseous and volatile bodies. Organ. The lining membrane of the nose ; this is disposed also over the surface of the turbinal (spongy) bones, thus giving a greatly increased area. This membrane is supplied by a special pair of nerves, the first of the cerebral nerves. Mode of Action. Probably chemical. Professor Bain distinguishes the following Sensa- tions : SMELL 27 (i) Organic Sensations connected with Smell, viz., those of the lungs and other parts of the re- spiratory organs. To them we must add those Organic Sensations of the stomach, which are excited by nauseous and appetising smells, (ii) Smell Proper. (Fragrant odours and stinks.) (iii) Smell combined with Touch. This element of Touch we get in pungent odours ; it appears to be due to the nerves of touch supplied to the nose (trigerninal), not to the olfactory nerve. A gaseous form seems to be necessary in order to affect the sense of Smell, although the action, as stated above, is probably chemical, since the smell varies with the chemical composition. "Those gases are odorous which have a great tendency to combine and to react rapidly upon organic tissues. Those gases on the contrary which are not odorous have no chemical action upon organic tissue, or only a very slow one." To the former class belong chlorine, sulphuretted hydrogen, and the vapours of alcohol and ether; to the latter, nitrogen, hydrogen and carbonic acid. A current of air is necessary to the maintenance of the sensation ; if we hold our breath the sensation ceases. A noticeable characteristic of Smell is its extreme delicacy. "Valentin has calculated that we are able to perceive about the -nnr.Trinr.Tnnr f a grain of musk- The delicacy of our sense of Smell thus far surpasses that of the other senses. . . . Even spectrum analysis, which can recognise T.TnnrlTmr of & grain, is far surpassed in delicacy by our organ of Smell " (Bernstein). 28 PSYCHOLOGY (12) Touch. . Object. Chiefly solids and liquids ; not exclusively, however, since gases in motion are felt. Organ. The skin, together with some parts of the mucous membrane (viz., at the orifices), and the subjacent tissues. Where the sense is 'most acute, we always find papillae, which are less deeply covered by the outer layer of the skin ; into these enter the terminations of nerves often enlarged into " tactile corpuscles." Mode of Action. Usually by contact; not always, however, in the case of Heat. We may distinguish : (i) Organic Sensations connected with Touch due to the condition of the tissues. Among these may be placed the sensations of Temperature and Pressure. Pressure is, however, frequently regarded as a distinct division of tactile im- pressions, and not included under the Organic Sensations. (ii) Touch Proper by contact. (iii) Touch combined ivith Muscular Sensations. Professor Bain seems to have somewhat over-rated the intellectuality of Touch. The superior persistence and discriminability which he ascribes to it belong rather to the associated Muscular Feelings. Professor Bain considers the Sensations of Touch under three heads. First, from the emotional side, as affording Pleasure and Pain, and thus influencing the will ; un- TOUCH 29 der which he discusses soft touches, pungent and painful sensations of Touch, sensations of Temperature, and Tickling, together with some analogous sensations. Secondly, from the intellectual side, he discusses dis- crimination as to Plurality of Points ( = extent of the sensation) and Pressure ( = intensity of the sensation). Lastly, he treats of Touch as related to the feeling of Expended Energy describing the methods by which the ideas of Resistance, Weight, and Extension, in its various modes are formed without the aid of Sight, as in the case of a blind man. Experiments of Weber, etc. (a) Contact. The Ger- man physiologist, Weber, first ascertained by experiment that the skin is not equally discriminative in all parts of the body. Contacts, made by the ends of a pair of compasses, coalesce and are perceived as a single sen- sation when the distance between them is Less than 5 or 6 centimetres (1'97 to 2 '36 inches) on the back. ,, 3 or4 centimetres (1 '18to 1 '58 inches) on forearm (lengthwise). ,, 4 or 5 millimetres (1 - 57 to 1 '96 inches) on back of hand. , , 2 millimetres ( '079 inches) on tip of finger. ,, 1 millimetre ('039 inches) on tip of tongue. The spaces within which two points are not discriminated as double are called " Sensory Circles," though they are not exactly round. Indeed, on the limbs they are oval, the longest axis being in the direction of the limb's length. The size of the sensory circle at any given place on the skin varies in different persons, and even for the same person at different times. Practice diminishes the distance which must intervene between 30 PSYCHOLOGY the two points ; and accordingly we find that the sensory circles are smaller in the blind than in other people. (b) Weight. Weber showed that when weight is dis- criminated by means of the feelings of Pressure and Expended Energy combined, viz., by lifting the object in the hand, 19 oz. could be distinguished from 20 oz., but not 19f oz. from 20 oz. When Weight is discriminated by Pressure alone, 19| oz. cannot be discriminated from 20 oz., but only 14| oz. from 15 oz. (c) Temperature. Weber ascertained that he could distinguish by the finger a difference of about half a degree Fahrenheit, in the temperature of water. The degree of sensibility seems to depend to some extent on the thinness of the skin ; yet not entirely, for we can drink hot liquids with impunity in which we could not bear our fingers, although the skin of the latter is much thicker than that of the lips. Another well known fact is, that we can bear the immersion of a small part of our body in water too hot to place a whole limb in ; water which seems only comfortably warm to a single finger will scald the arm or leg. It is probable that the other more complex senses arose by degrees out of the general irritability of nervous tissue, or, in other words, from the undeveloped sense of Touch. " The saying of Democritus that all the senses are modifications of Touch, modem science goes far to confirm. Smelling obviously implies the contact of dispersed particles with a specially modified part of the organism. . . . Hearing results when we feel the vibrations of the air lying in contact with our bodies. HEARING 31 As the skin at large is sensitive to a succession of mechanical impulses given by dense matter, so certain external auditory structures, easily moved, are sensi- tive to a far more rapid succession of mechanical impulses given by matter of greater tenuity. The organ of sight, again, is one through which the pulses or undulations of a yet more delicate medium are im- pressed on us. ... So that in every case the sensation produced in us by something in the environ- ment involves mechanical action on some part of our periphery. In every case, therefore, touch, of a coarse or refined order, is implied. . . . The organs of the special senses are every one of them developed from the dormal system are modifications of that same tissue in which the tactual sense in general is seated."* (13) Hearing. Object. " Material bodies in a state of tremour or vibration." Organ. The Ear is divisible into the external ear, the tympanic cavity, and the internal ear. The exact part played by the concha, or external organ, is not ascertained; it is certainly not necessary to the sensation. The memlranum tympani, a loosely stretched curtain, when thrown into vibration by the waves of air, com- * Spencer, Princ. Psych., vol. i., pp. 304-5. Cf. also Hamilton, Lect. Mctaph., vol. ii., pp. 152-3. 32 PSYCHOLOGY municates these vibrations by means of a chain of small bones (malleus, incus, and stapes) to the membrane which covers the fenestra ovalis. The Labyrinth of the inner ear embraces two curious formations, the semi-circular canals, and the cochlea, which meet in a central cavity, the vestibule, into which opens the fenestra ovalis and another aperture (called the fenestra rotunda) also covered with a membrane. The walls of the bony labyrinth are lined throughout with a membrane (the membranous labyrinth), and filled with fluid. The semi-circular canals are situated in three planes at right angles to each other, two vertical and one horizontal ; the membranous labyrinth is here covered with fine hairs connected with nerve fibres, and furnished with otoliths. The membranous lining of the cochlea is furnished with a series of fibres (the fibres of Corti) placed like bows, numbering about 3000. It is highly probable, though not certain, that each of these fibres is supplied by at least one filament of the auditory nerve. They are of extreme minuteness. Mode of Action. When the vibrations of the tym- panic membrane have been communicated to that of the fenestra ovalis, the fluid of the labyrinth is thrown into vibration, and conse- quently also the minute hairs of the semi-circular canals, and the fibres of Corti in the cochlea. These in their turn affect the filaments of the HEAEING 33 nerve of hearing (the 8th pair, or, as it is other- wise called, the portio mollis of the 7th pair). Professor Bain's discussion is perhaps somewhat con- fusing. He takes up first the emotional effects of sound, under which he considers the Quality (sweetness, etc.), the Intensity (loudness), and Quantity (or volume). He then discusses Musical Sounds, taking into consideration Pitch, Waxing and Waning, Harmony and Discord. And lastly, he treats of the " more intellectual sensations of sound " such as Articulate Sounds, Clearness, Timbre, Distance, and so on. It is difficult to see why Clearness should be considered a more intellectual sensation than Pitch or Harmony ; or why Timbre should be discussed apart from Harmony, to which it is closely related. The two highest sensations are not very liable to be confused with any accompanying organic or tactual sensations. This, however, sometimes occurs. In the case of Sound, for instance, when a very deep organ note is played, the auditory sensation tends to lose itself in the tactual and organic sensations due to the vibration of the air, floor, etc. Sounds are of two kinds Musical and Unmusical. The former are caused by regularly recurrent vibrations, the latter, which are called noises, by irregular vibrations. It seems probable, however, that even in the case of noises, real musical notes are often, if not always, pre- sent ; low tones being heard in grating and heavy noises, while in creaking and hissing noises we get tones of high pitch. It has been thought that the perception c 34 PSYCHOLOGY of noises is mainly due to the otoliths, which help to irregularly irritate the nerves in the labyrinth, having been themselves thrown into irregular movements by the vibration of the labyrinthine fluid. The intensity and direction of sounds, whether musical or otherwise, are probably discriminated through the assistance of the membranous labyrinth. On the other hand, the cochlea discriminates the pitch of sounds, by means of the fibres of Corti, which are to the sense of Hearing what the retina is to Sight. They have been likened to the keys of a piano, each fibre corresponding to a note. When a tone is produced the corresponding fibre is agitated. " Our perception, therefore, of tones of different pitch is pro- duced entirely by an irritation of different fibres of the auditory nerve." (Bernstein.) The notes produced by musical instruments, however, are never quite simple. They all contain harmonics, and these affect, though more feebly than does the fundamental note, the fibres which vibrate in sympathy with them. The same fun- damental note sounded by a flute, a violin, and the human voice, has three different sets of harmonics, and thus arise differences of timbre. It is generally considered that the lowest note per- ceptible as a musical tone is that produced by 1 6 vibra- tions a second ; while the highest is produced by some 40,000 or 50,000 vibrations. SIGHT 35 (14) Sight. Object. " Nearly all material bodies." These are either self-luminous, or they reflect light emitted by self-luminous bodies. Organ. The Eye consists of an arrangement of lenses which bring the rays to a focus on a sensitive surface the retina. The outer coat (sclerotic) becomes transparent in front, and is then called the cornea. Behind the cornea lie the aqueous humour, the crystalline lens, and the vitreous humour. The crystalline lens (double convex) is capable of change of shape, becoming more convex by the action of the automatic ciliary muscle. The iris serves to cut off the marginal rays, ancl thus helps to secure a clear image. The eye is lined internally by the dark choroid membrane. The retina itself consists of several layers ; which, beginning at the back of the eye (nearest the outside), are arranged as follows : (1) the choroid, (2) layer of rods and cones, (3) several layers of a granular character, (4) layer of nerve-cells, (5) layer of fibres from the optic nerve. In the centre of the retina is the yellow spot, where we see most distinctly ; over this the innermost layer that of nerve fibres disappears, the other layers, except that of cones and rods, become very thin, and in that layer the cones are more abundant than else- where. The following remarks may be made : 3G PSYCHOLOGY (a) The optic nerve itself, although lying above the retina, is insensible to light; the spot where it enters the eye is called the blind spot, and light falling on it is not perceived. (6) The rods and cones are the direct' means by which the vibrations of the ether are communicated to the optic nerve, and thus carried to the brain, (c) The only way in which the optic nerve can respond to a stimulus is by causing the sensation of light, which follows, not only when the nerve is excited in a normal manner through the retina, but also when it is cut, bruised, or irritated by electricity, (d) The sensation of light is not in the retina, which is only a special kind of re- ceptive apparatus, but is produced in the brain. (e) It has been surmised that there are three different sets of fibres, each of which is sensitive only to one of the primary colours red, green, violet but that all three kinds of fibres are distri- buted over every part of the retina. (/) The optic nerves, leaving each eye a little to the inside of the centre, meet and form the chiasma, but the fibres do not coalesce there ; it is in the brain that the impressions derived from the two eyes be- come united. The eye is held in its place and governed by six- muscles : the superior, inferior, external, and internal recti, and the superior and inferior obliqui. It is im- portant to note that a given movement of the eye is always effected in the same way, by the contraction of SIGHT 37 the same muscles to the same extent. This leaves what Professor Bain calls " a characteristic muscular trace cor- responding to the visible form." Mode of Action. This has already been partly indi- cated. The ethereal vibrations probably cause some kind of molecular motion, which may pos- sibly be due to chemical action, in the rods and cones. " The Sensations of Sight are partly Optical, the effect of light on the retina, and partly Muscular, from the action of the six muscles. We can scarcely have a sensation without both kinds " (Ment. ScL, p. 60). The retinal sensations are those of light simple, as of one of the primary colours, or complex, as in white light. Lustre is a special case of light sensation. In the retinal sensations we may distinguish Extent (or retinal magnitude), Intensity, and Colour (or position in the spectrum, corresponding to pitch in sound). The feelings of muscular innervation give us Form, Size, etc. Professor Bain lays great stress on the muscular sensations of the eye, but it seems probable that even without these we could acquire some space knowledge by means of the retinal sensations alone.* Still, it is almost certain that in ordinary cases the sensations of the muscles of the eye are the chief element in our perception of visible * The retina has a power of discriminating points as distinct in space, and this power has been measured. At the centre of the yellow spot two points are distinguished if they are from '0046 to '0052 millimetres apart. This power of discrimination grows less delicate towards the outer edges of the retina, where the cones are less numerous. 38 PSYCHOLOGY movement, visible form, apparent size, etc. It might seem that Movement could hardly be distinguished in this way from Form, since in both cases muscular con- tractions, accompanied by the feeling of expended energy, take place in the same order. The great distinction, however, is, that in the case of Form we may repeat the same muscular movements and obtain the correspond- ing series of retinal sensations ; or we may repeat the movements in an inverted order, and obtain the same retinal sensations also in an inverted order.* Binocular Vision. How is it that, although we have two eyes, each with a distinct indeed, as a rule, somewhat different retinal image, we do not see objects double ? We must remember that what we call simple sensations are very often extremely complex combina- tions of sensations, of various senses, together with recollections of former sensations, all of them held to- gether by certain intellectual relations. The sensations derived from the two eyes are really distinct, but they are united in one perception; just as muscular and tactual, muscular and retinal sensations are united, the bond of union being of the nature of inference.-f- We have learned by experience that when the centres of two similar images fall on " corresponding parts " of the two retinas, the object producing the two images is single. Hence the mind immediately, by a kind of automatic inference, judges that the object is single in * The perception of Distance is discussed in the section on Space. See also what follows in this section on Binocular Vision, t See section 15. SIGHT 39 such a case. In other words, there exist in the two retinas certain "corresponding parts;" when similar images fall on these simultaneously we regard them as single they tend to coalesce. This is due partly to individual experience, partly to inheritance from our ancestors. In squinting, the axes of the eyes do not converge properly, and the two images do not fall on " corresponding parts " of the two retinas, and double vision is the result.* This often happens in drunken- ness, when command of the muscles of the eye is temporarily lost. Our customary vision is binocular, although it is a question whether we do not use the right eye chiefly and mainly, the left serving as an auxiliary. We judge of Direction not in relation to the single eye, but in relation to the median plane of the body. The use of the two eyes is of supreme importance in the perception of Distance. We could, indeed, acquire a knowledge of the third dimension in space by the employment of only one eye, if this were supplemented by muscular sensations ; but the immediateness and directness of our actual knowledge of it would be want- ing. The chief thing to be borne in mind is, that, in the case of near objects, the eyes give more or less dissimilar images, and that the convergence of the two eyes is measured by the muscular exertion needed to produce it (Ment. Sci., p. 192 ; cf. section 34, below). * Not always, since individual experience is sometimes sufficient to establish new retinal relations ; that is, to cause parts which do not normally ' ' correspond " to do so. 40 PSYCHOLOGY Wheatstone constructed a stereoscope which gave experimental evidence of this theory of the percep- tion of Distance. Two pictures of an object, as seen by the right and left eye respectively, were reflected by mirrors along the axes of the two eyes ; and these pictures were found to be combined in one perception of a solid object placed at the intersection of the axes. This instrument has been superseded by Dr Brewster's familiar refracting stereoscope. The rays of light from the two pictures are refracted by wedge- shaped lenses, so that they are referred to a single object lying midway between the two eyes, as in actual perception of a solid object. The case of Erect Vision is explained on the same general principles. We learn to call a position high or low, left or right, by association of muscular with retinal sensations. One object is lower than another because it takes a certain muscular movement to reach it ; the situation of the image of that object on the retina only serves as a hint or suggestion as to the real position of the thing (Of. Ment. Sci., p. 60). (15) Sensation and Perception. We must be careful to distinguish Sensation, which is a mode of Feeling, from certain things with which in ordinary usage it is liable to be confounded. When we have a sensation, there is first the external cause of the feeling, whatever that may be. It is only known to us by means of our Sensations ; but Ave have every SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 41 reason to believe that in itself it is something entirely different from these. The vibrations of ether may give us sensations of heat or of light ; the pulsations of the air may produce in us the feelings of sound, musical or otherwise, or may be felt as touches. If the same external cause may produce such widely different feel- ings, it is only reasonable to assume, what on other grounds is probable, that this cause itself in no way resembles its effects. Again, every Sensation is accom- panied by a certain physical change in the organism ; certain re-arrangements take place in the molecular structure of the nerves. This neural change, however, is not the Sensation, although it always accompanies it. We are conscious, not of any re-arrangement of nerve- substance, but of a feeling; that such neural change takes place at all has only been discovered by careful physiological investigation. But, further, it is necessary to make a clear distinc- tion between the simple Sensation and the highly complex state called Perception, which commonly goes along with the simple Sensation. This important point is discussed more fully later on.* When I have certain visual Sensations say, a yellowish colour and a round shapef I immediately perceive an orange. But the act of Perception embodies a great deal more than those two Sensations : a number of ideas or remem- * See section 30. t To recognise even the colour and retinal form as yellow and round, respectively, involves intellectual elements. But for con- venience sake they are here considered as mere feeling. 42 PSYCHOLOGY bered Sensations, such as those of a peculiar odour and taste, of a certain degree of hardness and of weight, are called up ; and I attribute these also to the object which I infer to exist before me, at a certain distance, in a certain direction, and so on. It would have been quite possible for me to have those two sensations of colour and form, and yet make a wrong inference. Suppose a waxen orange had been put on a plate to deceive me; or that, owing to some disease of the optic nerves, the feelings had been called up without any external cause at all. In either case my classifica- tion or inference would have been wrong. All Perception embodies Thought as well as Sensa- tion. In all Perception we have Classification, the bringing of new impressions under some concept or notion ; in other words, it involves Judgment, Infer- ence, Thought. Directly even that we localise a Sen- sation, it is no longer a mere impression, but an object of Perception, known in Space and Time, and related to previously experienced Sensations. All Sen- sation is really felt in the sensory ganglia, not in the part to which the external stimulus is applied. By an act of implicit inference we refer the Sensation of Sight to the eye, of Sound to the ear, and of Touch to the particular area affected. This projection of the sensa- tions to the peripheral terminations of the sensory nerves has been termed the " Eccentricity of Sensation." A curious instance of it is the illusion by which a person who has lost a leg or arm continues to refer sensations to the amputated part. He still seems to feel sen- SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 43 sations of contact and pain in his toes or fingers, and only very gradually, if at all, learns to localise these sensations where the stimulus really affects him at the extremity of the stump. Such cases go far to show that the localisation of Sensation is due to Experience that is, to conscious or unconscious inference. We spoke just now of simple Sensation. But Sen- sation is not, properly speaking, ever simple. If we take a musical note, as sounded on the pianoforte, we know that it is produced by many hundreds or even thousands of vibrations. Nor is this all : such a note has several harmonics, which give rise to the difference in timbre, to produce these there are several co-exis- tent series of other still more rapid vibrations. It is probable that each of these vibrations causes some phy- sical change in the nerve of hearing ; and hence an apparently simple note is really an enormously com- plicated thing, since in all likelihood some feeling though, of course, not fully conscious feeling accom- panies each nervous shock* (cf. sec. 5). All Sensations are not so complex as those of Sound ; and we might arrange them in order of complexity thus : Touch (apart from Muscular Feeling), Taste, Smell, Hearing, Sight. This answers in the main to Professor Bain's arrangement. As we have already seen (sec. 12), the opinion has been held that all our senses are modifications of Touch, and that the more * Taine On Intelligence, Part I., Book iii., chap i. and ii. Spencer, Priitc. of Psych., Part II., chap. i. 44 PSYCHOLOGY complex forms are only developments of this primary mode of susceptibility. In all cases except Touch proper and Hearing, Sen- sation seems to depend on some Molecular movement in the external cause. In Taste and Smell the mode of action is probably chemical. In Sight (which is also reckoned a " chemical Sense "*), the vibrating mole- cules of the luminous body affect the eye through the medium of the ether; and the same thing is true of Heat, one of the sensations of Touch. But Pressure and Sound are the results of molar movement in the external cause in the one case, in immediate contact with the organ, in the other communicated by the air. We may notice, too, that as we ascend the scale of senses we find that the external cause acts at an increas- ing, distance. The lowest, Touch and Taste, require immediate contact (the case of Temperature is an exception) ; in Smell, the object which produces the sensation may be yards away; Sound makes itself heard at still greater distances ; while Sight bridges over spaces only to be measured by millions of miles. In the treatment of the special senses we have seve- ral times alluded to the minima of sensation. To determine these minima for the different senses, in their different relations, intensity, extent, duration, etc., has been one of the special tasks of recent Ger- * E.g., by Wundt. "We may suppose that in the rods and cones a substance is present which undergoes chemical change by the action of light." Bernstein. SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 45 man psychology. The following facts, some of which have been already mentioned, are among the results of experiments with regard to the minimum intensity of Sensations. No Sensation is felt when the stimulus is less than Pressure of '002 to '05 of a gramme, in the case of - - Touch Change in existing bodily tem- perature of Centigrade, in the case of - - Temperature Contraction of "004 millimetres , (the muscle being the internal rectus of the eye), in the case of - Muscular Effort Sound of a ball of cork, weighing 001 grammes, falling on a plate of glass, the ear being 91 mm. distant, in the case of Hearing Illumination of a black velvet surface by a wax candle 8 feet off, in the case of - Sight* * The above table is taken from Uibot's La PsycJwloyic allcmandc contcmporaine. 46 PSYCHOLOGY I. TASTE II. SMELL III. TOUCH Tabular Vieiv of the Sensations ( (a) ofalimentary R i: h ptp i. ' Organic Sensa- J canal K ies > etc ' tions 1 (b) of tissues of | Pungent tastes, mouth etc. ii. Taste Proper ... iii. Combined with Muscular Feeling Grittiness (?) i. Organic Sensa- tions ii. Smell Proper (a) of lungs (b) of stomach (c) of tissues of nose Fresh odours Nauseating odours Pungent odours Fragrant odours Stinks iii. Combined with Muscular Feeling ^stance"/?? !Pain of wounds, P,.? S sure' riir t*-p- ii. Touch Proper ... Contact ( Resistance | Movement iii. Combined with Muscular Feeling -{ Form | Distance I Extension - taking as an-[ l The four dependent theories may be respectively called Egoistic and Universalistic Perfectionism, and Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism.* Practically, however, the Moralists, who take Perfection or Excellence as the rational end of conduct, consider Virtue as by far the most important element in the Excellence aimed at, and Virtue (unless we accept the Hedonistic view) consists in " the observance of certain rules of Duty intuitively known." Hence, to a large extent, the first Dependent Method * Hedonism means a system of Ethics that takes Pleasure (rjdovri) as the ultimate end of all truly rational action. We may add here, that a theory of absolute Altruism, or regard only for others, is perhaps ideally possible. 116 ETHICS coincides with the Independent or Intuitive Method. On the other hand, if the Hedonistic view of Virtue be taken Ly a Perfectionist, his theory of conduct will hardly differ from those pure Hedonists who explicitly set Happiness or Pleasure as their ultimate end. Thus we reduce the Methods to three : (1) Intuitionism, the theory of absolute rules of Duty intuitively known ; (2) Egoistic Hedonism, the theory which takes as the proper end of conduct the happiness of I-myself ; (3) Universalistic Hedonism, which takes as its end the happiness of all. It is this third method that is pro- perly called " Utilitarianism," using the word in its his- torical meaning, to denote the moral philosophy of Bentham and Mill. This classification of the systems of Ethics has been arrived at by a consideration of the possible answers which might be given to the question, " What is the ultimate standard of Right and Wrong?" " Why ought I to do some given action ?" Professor Bain briefly indicates the "leading answers" which have been given (Moral Sci., p. 429), and we shall see that his list can be reduced to the above. He enumerates (1) The Arbitrary Will of the Deity ; but no one would advo- cate the acceptance of this standard unless he believed that God was omniscient and all-holy, and that, con- sequently, everything ordered by God was right. (2) The commands of the Sovereign or State ( = Law) ; this was advanced by Hobbes, but on the ground that absolute government tended to the greatest happiness of the individual ; hence Hobbes was really an Egoistic METHODS OF ETHICS 117 Hedonist* (3) The Intellectual or Rational theory, and (4) the Moral Sense theory, are both forms of the Intuitional theory, the difference between them being psychological, and not ethical viz., whether the Intui- tion, which perceives moral distinctions, is of the nature of Reason or Emotion. (5) Self-interest = Egoistic Hedo7iism. The student should guard against the assumption that this theory was originated by Mande- ville, a writer of whose importance Professor Bain seems to entertain a somewhat exaggerated opinion. It was implicit in nearly all Greek ethical thought, and had been " put forth " by several English writers (e.g., Hobbes) before Mandeville's time. (6) Utilitarianism = Universalistic Hedonism. In addition to the views mentioned above, there is a way of looking at Ethics which is not so easy of classifi- cation. Instead of beginning with the notions of Right, Ought, etc., and trying to find an answer to the ques- tion, " Why ought I to do so and so ?" it begins with the notions Goodness, Excellence, etc., and tries to answer the question, "What is good ?" "What is intrin- sically desirable '{" This was the old Greek way of approaching the question of Ethics, and is allied to the Perfectionist, and hence to the Intuitionist, point of view. Its most distinguished English representative is Shaftesbury (Meth. Eth., Bk. I., ch. ix., sees. 1-3). * It may be remarked that Professor Bain's own theory, which he appears to consider Utilitarian, mainly coincides with this view of Hobbes. 118 ETHICS (46) Relative and Independent Ethics. As we have seen, the Intuitionist usually regards Morality as consisting of a number of Moral Truths (which are also moral rules), that are independent and absolute in their character. Other thinkers regard morality as a series of truths or rules that are relative to an end, such as Perfection or Happiness for oneself or people in general. Such a view makes the Tightness of the rules dependent on the Tightness of the end. Thus the latter thinkers are sometimes said to hold a relative theory of Ethics. The term -relative is also used of morality in other senses. It is sometimes said, that since the received rules of morality vary in different ages and countries, we have no right to regard any moral laws as absolute. Theft, for instance, is regarded as praiseworthy in nearly all communities of a low degree of civilisation. But this does not prove that there is no absolute right and wrong, any more than does the existence of error show there is no such thing as absolute scientific truth. Again, it is alleged that, since duty varies with the individual, all morality is relative. In a sense this is no doubt true, but it is quite compatible with the assertion that certain kinds of conduct are objectively right ; for apparent exceptions may be explained on grounds of universal validity. To go further than this, and to assert that an action may be right without coming under some general ethical principle, valid for all men, is practically to deny the existence of morality at all. INDUCTIVE AND INTUITIVE 119 (47) Inductive and Intuitive Ethics. The terms Inductive and Intuitive are often used to express the distinction between Hedonism and Intui- tionism. So also the words d posteriori and d priori. " But such a contrast seems to indicate a certain con- fusion of thought. For what the ' inductive ' moralist professes to know d posteriori by induction from experience, is commonly not the same thing as what the intuitive moralist professes to know by intuition. In the former case it is the conduciveness to pleasure of certain kinds of action that is methodically ascertained; in the latter case, their lightness : there is, therefore, no proper opposition. . . . Experience can at most tell us that all men always do seek pleasure ; it cannot tell us that anyone ought to seek it. The latter proposition is, therefore, as 'intuitive' as the statement of any other ultimate end" (Sidgwick). This passage is an important criticism of such arguments as those in Bain's Mor. Sci., pp. 441-3 ; and Mill's Utilitarianism, p. 58, seq. (Meth. Eth., Bk. I., ch. viii., sec. 2.) (48) Egoism and Altruism. An Egoistic view of Ethics recognises as ultimate only duty to oneself, viz., to seek one's own good. If good be taken to mean Pleasure and absence of Pain, the theory will be what Mr Sidgwick calls Egoistic Hedonism. If good is not interpreted to mean mere Pleasure and absence of Pain, the theory, although 120 ETHICS Egoistic, is not Hedonistic. All the Greek theories of Ethics were at least implicitly Egoistic, though not necessarily Hedonistic. On the other hand, Altruism, strictly speaking, should mean vivre pour autrui it is the doctrine of Self- Sacrifice. A is to care only for the happiness of B, C, D, etc. Utilitarianism puts my happiness on the same level as that of others; Altruism refuses to acknowledge it at all. Nevertheless, the term Altruism is used as equivalent to Utilitarianism by most English writers. (49) Intuitionism. The term Intuitional is used to denote that Ethical theory which makes Rightness " a quality inherent in actions independently of their conduciveness to any end." " When w r e say that Right conduct is known by Intuition, we are understood to mean that it is ascer- tained by simply ' looking at ' the actions themselves without considering their consequences " (Meth. Eth., Bk. I., ch. viii., sec. 1). Among moralists who have adopted this view of Ethics, there are, however, some important differences. I. As to Logical Method Inductive or Deductive. Is it individual action that is in the first place appre- hended to be right, and are all valid propositions in Ethics obtained by generalisation from such particular judgments? This was the "induction" which Socrates IXTUITIONISM 121 used ; his plan was to work towards the true definition of each ethical term by examining and comparing dif- ferent instances of its application. The popular view of conscience seems to point to such a method, since the dictates of conscience are commonly thought to relate to particular actions. This inductive method, which is at once ultra-intuitional and ultra-empirical, may be called Instinctive Intuitionism* Another logical method followed by the typical Christian Moralists (Butler, etc.), assumes that we can discern general moral rules with clear and finally valid intuition. Such rules are sometimes called moral axioms, and compared with the axioms of geometry, in respect of definiteness, certainty, and self-evidence. Here the method is deductive; a given action is brought under one of these rules, and then pronounced right or wrong. Mr Sidgwick calls this Dogmatic Intuitionism, and distinguishes it from another deduc- tive method, Philosophic Intuitionism, which attempts to find some one or two principles, from which these current moral rules may themselves be deduced, and thus reduced to a more systematic form. Such attempts have been made by Clarke, Kant, etc. II. Besides these differences as to logical method, Intuitional Moralists differ as to ivhat it is that is intuitively apprehended. For instance, the following * The Intuition here, however, is not "Rational Intuition," since Reason is the faculty of apprehending universal, not particular truths. (See sec. 29, above. ) 122 ETHICS views have been held : (1) The quality perceived is the lightness of actions, and the moral obligation to perform them (Butler); (2) Their goodness, or desira- bility ; or (3) Their moral beauty. III. And there are further differences as to the ulti- mate reason for doing what is intuitively ascertained to be right, e.g. : (1) The reason for obeying it is con- tained in the intuition itself (Kant) ; (2) Conformity to the Divine Will (ordinary Christian Moralists) ; (3) Conformity to Nature (Shaftesbury) ; (4) Our own happiness in this world or the next (Locke). A word or two may be said of the first and last of these. The mere recognition that " I ought to do this," is the only adequate reason why I should do it, says Kant ; if I do the action for any other reason, the act is not truly moral ; it is only when we do w r hat we ought because we ought, that we are truly moral. This bindingDess of duty for its own sake alone, is what Kant calls the Categorical (as opposed to a hypothetical)* Imperative. The view that the ultimate reason for doing one's duty is because of the present or future happiness to be got, is the direct opposite of this ; but it has been advanced by Intuitionists such as Locke, and Utilitarians such as Paley. By such writers the idea of God is assumed, and the rewards and punishments of a future life are considered to constitute the real reason for virtue. Such * A hypothetical imperative prescribes an action merely as a means to an end Justice, for instance, as a means to Happiness, as in the Utilitarian theory. UTILITARIANISM 123 systems are a kind of compromise between Egoistic Hedonism and Intuitionism, or some other Non-Egoistic principle (Metli. Etli., Book I., ch. viii.). (50) Utilitarianism. We must very carefully distinguish between the two forms of Hedonism, viz., Egoistic and Universalistic. These have been, and still are, constantly confounded by writers of all schools. The former, however, posits as the ultimately reasonable end of action, my happi- ness ; the latter posits the happiness of all. And we must guard with equal care against con- sidering that any particular psychological theories concerning the genesis of moral ideas are necessarily connected with the purely ethical theory of Utili- tarianism, e.g., a Utilitarian is not bound by his theory to accept the psychological view that the moral sentiments are derived, by " Association of Ideas " or otherwise, from experience of non-moral pleasures and pains resulting from different kinds of conduct. The validity of a moral principle is not to be settled by any investigation of its origin. " By Utilitarianism," Mr Sidgwick, its latest and most logical exponent, understands, "the Ethical theory first distinctly formulated by Bentham, that the conduct which, under any given circumstances, is externally or objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole," or more precisely, the conduct which will produce " the greatest possible 124 ETHICS happiness to the greatest possible number." Ben- thara's own statement is, that, " He who adopts the principle of utility esteems virtue to be a good only on account of the pleasures which result from it; he regards vice as an evil only because of the pains which it produces." Again, "Nature has placed Mankind under the government of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do." " By the principle of utility is meant, that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question." * The late Mr Mill enunciated it thus : "Actions are right in pro- portion as they tend to promote happiness, and wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." In the above definitions, Happiness means simply "pleasure and the absence of pain ;" while unhappiness means "pain and the privation of pleasure." And Bentham expressly guards against giving to the words any ideal elevation ; " in this matter we want no refinement, no metaphysics;" for as he elsewhere says, " given equal amounts of pleasure, pushpin is as good as poetry." Mill endeavoured to make such a " refined" or "metaphysical" distinction between different kinds of pleasure on the ground of quality, apart from the actual quantity of pleasure experienced ; he held that * Bentliam often, as in this sentence, confuses Egoistic Hedonism with his own Universalistic Hedonism, which is alone properly known as Utilitarianism. UTILITARIANISM 125 certain pleasures are better in Idnd than others. But if pleasurableness is the test of goodness, a pleasure which is less pleasant than another is less desirable, less good. " If of two pleasures the one that is ' higher,' or more ' refined,' is at the same time less pleasant, the Hedonist must consider it unreasonable to prefer it " (Sidgwick, Meih. Eth., Bk. II., ch. ii., sec. 2). If happiness is desirable, the Greatest Happiness will be the most desirable the summum bonum. Hence this will be the ultimate end of all our actions. But Utilitarians have not explained whether they mean the greatest total happiness, or the greatest average happiness (Metli. Eth., Bk. IV., ch. i., sec. 2). Passing over this difficulty, and granting that Pleasure is to be the ultimate aim of our actions, how are we to distribute it ? Whose happiness are we to take into account, and in what way? "The principle which most Utilitarians have tacitly or expressly adopted is that of pure equality ; as given by Bentham's formula, ' Everybody to count for one, and nobody for more than one.'" This equality, it will be noticed, is not pre- scribed by the main axiom of Utilitarianism that we should seek the greatest Happiness of the greatest Number but comes ab extra. "We have to supple- ment the principle of seeking the greatest happiness on the whole by some principle of Just or Right distribu- tion of this happiness," as Mr Sidgwick says. And who are the persons among whom we are to distribute the greatest happiness ? > It is disputed whether we should take into consideration all sentient 126 ETHICS creatures, and hence the lower animals. But to scien- tifically take into consideration the pleasures and pains of the lower animals introduces so much difficulty that, as a rule, the effect of an action on the hedonic condition of sentient creatures other than men cannot be taken into account. Is each of the lower animals to " count for one ? " If not, what fraction of a unit is to be assigned to it ? Or are we to take different fractions according to the position of the animal in the scale of being? The same difficulty recurs with respect to Posterity. If the greatest happiness at which we are to aim is to be the greatest possible sum total of happi- ness, we should certainly not strive to repress population. On the other hand, if we are to aim at producing the greatest possible average happiness, this will probably be secured by very much limiting the increase of population. Understanding by Greatest Happiness the greatest possible surplus of pleasure over pain and not attempt- ing to solve the difficulties alluded to above we see that " the assumption is involved that all pleas^p are capable of being quantitatively compared with OTe another and with all pains; that every feeling has a certain intensive quantity, positive or negative (or, perhaps, zero), in respect of preferableness or desirable- ness and that this quantity may be known, so that each may be weighed in ideal scales against any other." This weighing c" pleasure and pains against counter- balancing pains and pleasures has been termed by Bentham " Mora' Arithmetic," and by Mr Sidgwick " the Utilitarian calculus." OBJECTIONS TO UTILITARIANISM 127 (51) Objections to Utilitarianism. Putting aside the various psychological hypotheses which have been mixed up with Utilitarianism both by adherents and opponents, the following objections, amongst others, have been urged against the ethical theory. They may be arranged under three heads (1) Difficulties connected with the Calculus ; (2) Difficulties connected with the rule of Distribution ; and (3) Prac- tical Difficulties. (1) Pleasure is essentially subjective and individual, and, hence, incapable of measurement. This is shown by the doubts and difficulties which accompany all attempts to construct a "scientific" Hedonism. Our estimates of our own past experience of pleasure and pain are neither definite nor consistent ; still less can we appro- priate the past experience of others. We must acknow- ledge, that "scientific Hedonism does not rest on an empirical basis" (Meth. Eth., Bk. II., ch. iii.). This applies, of course, both to Utilitarianism or Univer- salistic Hedonism, and to Egoistic Hedonism.* (2) Tendency to produce Happiness is not the sole meaning of Right, since we have to seek for a right rule of Distribution, which we ought to follow, from some other source apart from the " greatest Happiness of the greatest Number" principle. Hence this prin- ciple cannot be called the sole standard of right * Here come in the objections derived from the vagueness of the principle of Utility itself, already noticed. Do we mean total or average Happiness ? Are we to include all sentient creatures ? 128 ETHICS action. We must assume an independent standard of justice. (S) Besides these difficulties there are others of less weight, which Mill has answered more or less satis- factorily. For instance ; always to seek the Happiness of all is too high a standard of conduct, it exacts more than ordinary people can practice. Mill replies that the greatest Happiness of the greatest Number principle is only a test of the objective Tightness of actions, and we are not bound to perform every action from this motive. On the other hand, it has been urged that it is a low and unspiritual doctrine, chilling the sympathies and placing the Expedient in place of the Right. Mill points out the difference between Utilitarianism and Egoism, and shows that enlightened Hedonism con- demns the sacrifice of future happiness to present hap- piness which is involved in the breach of moral rules. The Right is after all the most Expedient ; what is often called expedient (in contradistinction to Right), is only expedient in a relative and temporary sense. But, it is also objected, " there is not time, previous to action, for calculating the effects of any line of conduct on the general happiness." Mill answers that there may be secondary principles (a kind of axiomata media) which, though deducible from the ultimate formula, are more convenient to work with. " Nobody argues that the art of Navigation is not founded on Astronomy, because sailors cannot wait to calculate the Nautical Almanac " (Mill, Utilitarianism, ch. ii.). HISTORICAL SKETCH 129 (52) Brief Sketch of English Ethical Theories. Hobbes (1588-1679). The real end for each is to seek his own good that is, his own pleasure or means of pleasure his self-preservation. Hence the natural state of mankind is war. But this Egoism is self-limiting ; a kind of compact, or treaty of peace, is entered into the result of selfishness and fear. Thus arise Society and the State. Since any settled social order is better than the state of nature, a good man will always obey the laws of the State, for fear of weakening the social order. For the same reasons a strong government is needed; and thus we are led to the peculiar absolutism supported by Hobbes. What the sovereign commands is right ; what he forbids is wrong. If there were no law there would be no justice, no distinction of meum and tuum. At the same time it is reasonable for me to obey moral rules only as long as others obey them; hence, again, the necessity for a strong government. Thus the system of Hobbes was essentially Egoistic. Hobbes's system aroused great opposition. Attacks were made on it from two sides. (1) It was not denied by one set of writers, that happiness, well-being, etc., were the proper aim and end of action ; only they urged that the good at which we ought to aim is the general good as distinguished from the good of the agent himself, the " common good of all rationals " (Cumber- land), the "good of the publick" (Shaftesbury). This line of argument gradually led to Utilitarianism, as good came to be more and more clearly identified with I 130 ETHICS pleasure. (2) Other writers, however, approached the question from a wholly different point of view, and assimilated the rules of morality to the propositions of mathematics ; they were truths which could be deduced from the very nature of man, the world, and God. There are in " Morals, as in Geometry, certain unalterable relations, aspects and proportions of things, with their consequent agreements and disagreements." No one will deny this, and refuse to see the truth of moral axioms, unless from " the extremest stupidity of mind, corruption of manners, and perverseness of spirit." For men to act wrongly and wickedly is to act "contrary to that understanding, reason, and judgment, which God has implanted in /their nature, on purpose to enable them to discern the difference between good and evil. 'Tis attempting to destroy that order by which the universe subsists" (Clarke). To this Rational or Intui- tive school of Ethics belonged Cudworth, another opponent of Hobbes, as well as Clarke. Butler (1692-1752) in some degree combined both lines of argument. He tells us "that there are two ways in which the subject of morals may be treated. One begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things [Clarke, etc.] : the other from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or constitution; from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is which is correspondent to this whole nature [Shaftesbury]. In the former method the conclusion is expressed thus: that vice is contrary to the nature and reason of things, HISTORICAL SKETCH 131 in the latter, that it is a violation or breaking in upon our own nature. They both lead us to the same thing, our obligations to the practice of virtue ; and thus they exceedingly strengthen and enforce each other. . . . The following discourses [Butler's own Sermons] proceed chiefly in this latter method." Butler points out that in human nature there are two supreme impulses self- love and conscience. He lays stress on the disinterested- ness of our benevolent impulses ; and shows that in all our desires except self-love itself, the primary end, the object desired, is not our own pleasure but some external tiling, i.e., they are extra-regarding. The two principles, Self-love and Conscience ( = Moral Sentiment), preside over these inferior impulses ; but Butler does not quite clearly determine the relative positions of self-love and conscience with regard to each other, whether they are strictly co-ordinate, or one of them subordinate to the other. On the whole, however, Butler seems to give the supremacy to conscience ; which is the guide assigned to us by the Author of Nature. " Every man is naturally a law to himself ; " or in other words, " every one may find within himself the rule of right and obligations to follow it." We arrive, then, at a conception of man as a Hier- archy of impulses, conscience being supreme. No man can " be said to act conformably to his constitution of nature unless he allows to that superior principle the absolute authority which is due to it." " You cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea. . . . Had it strength 132 ETHICS as it had right ; had it power as it had manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world." All mention of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), a most important thinker, is omitted by Professor Bain in his summary. Although the predecessor of Butler, and the predecessor to whom he is most indebted, it suits our arrangement better to notice him here. The general view of Ethics taken by him has been already indicated in the quotation from Butler ; but we may here add a few details. Nothing is absolutely ill except what is absolutely detrimental to the whole system to which it belongs ; hence even " private self-affection " is good, except when it militates against the good of the species, which only happens when it is too strong. We have a " reflex affection," that is, we reflect on our own affections (impulses), and approve or disapprove them. A creature which has this " reflecting faculty " invariably approves what is right and disapproves what is wrong. It is this reflex goodness which constitutes Virtue: Shaftesbury calls it the " Sense of Right and Wrong." Good actions done from fear and hope, that is, from egoistic reasons, are not virtuous ; even if the object of the fear or hope be God. As soon as any one " is come to have any affection toward what is morally good, and can like or affect such good for its own sake, as good and amiable in itself ; then he is in some degree virtuous, and not till then." Shaftesbury divides the impulses into (1) Natural or kindly affections, leading to the "good of the Public ;" (2) Self-affections leading to the "good of the Private;" and (3) Unnatural affections, HISTORICAL SKETCH 133 contrary to all good. And he lays down, that to have the natural affections strong is to " have the chief means and power of self-enjoyment," and "to want them is certain misery ; " that to have the self-affections too strong, or " beyond their degree of subordinacy " to the natural affections is also miserable; and that to have the unnatural affections is to be miserable in the highest degree. We thus see Shaftesbury laying down the "hierarchy of impulses," on which Butler afterwards built his system. Hutcheson (1694-1747) went still further. He showed that the happiness derived from the kindly affections does not prevent them from being really disinterested. The good man is benevolent for other reasons than that of the pleasure which he gains from Benevolence. There is a natural sense which recognises by " an immediate and undefinable intuition " what is good in our affections and approves of them in conse- quence ; while it disapproves of those that are base and unworthy. Hutcheson sets himself to prove " (1) that some actions have to men an immediate goodness ; or that by a supreme sense, which I call a moral one, we have pleasure in the contemplation of such actions in others, and are determined to love the agent (and much more do we perceive pleasure in being conscious of having done such actions ourselves), without any view of further natural advantage from them. (2) That what excites us to these actions, which we call virtuous, is not an intention to obtain even this sensible pleasure ; much less the future rewards from sanctions of laws, or any 134 ETHICS other natural good, which may be the consequence of the virtuous action ; but an entirely different principle of action from interest or self-love." Hutcheson " de- finitely identified virtue with benevolence." The doctrine of a Moral Sense, originated by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, is accepted by Hume (1711-1776), and developed by him, while an intellectual element is more explicitly admitted. " I am apt to suspect that reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions. It is probable . . . that this final sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling"; but to appreciate or discover moral beauty, like beauty in art, apparently " demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties." But what it approves is no longer mere undefined " goodness," but Pleasure, either for oneself or others. It is thus that Hume may be regarded as in some sense the founder of modern Utilitarianism. His attitude, however, is rather that of the psychologist than the moralist. He analyses our moral ideas and finds the character of utility in all kinds of virtuous conduct. Adam Smith (1723-1790) agrees with Hume that the quality of utility will be universally found in the objects of moral approbation. But the utility is not the cause of the approbation. " We either approve or dis- approve of our own conduct according as we feel that, when we place ourselves in the situation of another man, and view it, as it were, with his eyes, and from his station, we either can or cannot entirely enter into and sympathise with the sentiments and motives which HISTORICAL SKETCH 135 influence it." Thus the Moral Sense is analysed into a kind of complex sympathy. By seeing what kinds of conduct are universally approved of by the Moral Sense, we can lay down rules of conduct, general moral principles. Paley (1743-1805) defines Virtue as "the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." He thus resolves all virtue into benevolence, which is (roughly speaking) the Utilitarian point of view, but introduces an egoistic element, since virtue is to be done for the sake of our own ultimate happiness. He overlooks the fact that many virtuous actions are, and have been, done without any reference to God's will or a future life, as by atheists. And he is only on the verge of Utilitarianism, since he does not resolve good into pleasure ; indeed, he expressly excludes pleasures of sense from his idea of happiness. He lays great stress on the social affections and on the pleasures of action. But his general system is little affected by this ; he seems to drop out of sight this arbitrary definition of happiness ; and in the working out of his principles he is perhaps more consistently Hedonistic than any of his predecessors. Paley was a Conservative Utilitarian ; it was his object to show that the current morality was thoroughly justifiable from the utilitarian point of view. On the other hand Bentham (1748-1832) was a Radical Utilitarian, whose object was to criticise and reconstruct Ethics and Jurisprudence from the utilitarian point of view. Bentham was the first to make Utilitarianism quite definite, by identifying 136 ETHICS good and happiness, with pleasure and by getting clear of the older egoistic view.* He laid down that (1) Actions are right according as they conduce to the general happiness i.e., to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. (2) By Happiness we mean Pleasure. (3) This must be the sole test of Tightness and wrong- ness ; we must not admit any rival principle even for a moment. (4) We must allow the possibility of some kind of " Moral Arithmetic," by which sve can compare the amount of Happiness produced by different kinds of actions. These propositions Bentham stated, and sup- ported, with great precision and effect. He eliminated the theological element which hampered Paley ; and, in working out the details of his system, was hindered by no tenderness for existing beliefs or institutions. He based his ethical theory on a full and careful psycho- loo-ical investigation; since his "moral arithmetic" demanded exactitude and completeness in his review of the sources and effects of different kinds of feeling. J. S. Mill (1806-1873) was a disciple of Bentham. He popularised the doctrines of his master and did a great deal towards rendering them less offensive to outsiders. While Bentham never sought to conciliate orthodoxy by compromise, Mill was always ready to explain and extenuate. The only points to which it is here necessary to allude are: (1) His attempt to distinguish quality (kind) as well as quantity (degree) in Pleasures ; and * But even in Bentham we discover some purely egoistic elements. (See p. 124 above.) HISTORICAL SKETCH 137 (2) His attempt to exhibit more clearly the connection between Justice and the principle of Utility. The former has been already alluded to;* the best recent writers on Utilitarianism, Professor Grote (an Intui- tionist) and Mr Sidgwick (an Utilitarian), consider it subversive of the possibility of that " moral arithmetic " which Utilitarianism pre- supposes. The latter attempt is a psychological account of the various sentiments and notions which cluster round the conception of Justice in the minds of ordinary people, rather than an ethical analysis of what, on Utilitarian principles, this idea of Justice involves.*!" Tabular View of English Ethical Theories : Intuitionist Utilitarian! Egoistic - 1. The motive for doing the right action lies in the Intuition itself, 2. The motive is my own Happi- ness. 1. The motive for doing the right action lies in the fact that it tends to the greatest happi- ness of all. 2. The motive is my own happi- ness. Clarke Shaftesbury Hutcheson Locke Bontham Mill Paley Hobbes The Irituitionists are divided on the (psychological) question as to the nature of the Intuitive faculty : 1. The Intuitive faculty is of the nature of a sense ( Shaftesbury (cf. Sense of Beauty). ( Hutcheson 2. It is equivalent to Moral Reason - j See p. 124 above. t See sec. 62 below. 138 ETHICS To Hobbes replied : I. Cudworth II. Cumberland Clarke | | Shaftesbury Hutcheson Hume Butler Smith Paley Bentham Mill (53) Mr Bain's Ethical Theory. Professor Bain is nominally a Utilitarian ; but he differs in several important particulars from orthodox Utilitarians : (1) He confuses psychological with ethical problems, and gives us an account of how men do act, rather than an account of how they ought to act. (2) He imports into his ethical theory elements which properly belong to Politics or Jurisprudence. As an example we may take the following quota- tions : " The Ethical End is a certain portion of the welfare of human beings living together in society, realised through rules of conduct duly enforced" (Mor. Sci., p. 434). On purely Utilitarian principles the ethical end, that is the aim of all virtuous action, is the greatest happiness of the greatest number; not merely a certain portion of the happiness of those MR BAIN'S ETHICAL THEORY 139 particular human beings who live together in society. The words " duly enforced " point to the Hobbist view, that to be obligatory the rules of morality must be adequately enforced by the State or Society. And that Mr Bain holds this view, which is certainly not that of Universalistic Hedonism, is seen by the statement that "the peculiar attribute of Rightness" is due to " the institution of Government or Authority " (Mor. Sci., p. 455). We thus see Professor Bain considers that apart from Law there could be no moral distinc- tions. He goes on to say : " A moral act is not merely an act tending to reconcile the good of the agent with the good of the whole society " (this itself is not how a real Utilitarian would define a moral act) ; " it is an act prescribed by the social authority, and rendered obligatory upon every citizen. Its morality is con- stituted by its authoritative prescription" (p. 456). This is a direct negative of the Utilitarian principle, although Professor Bain does not appear to be aware of any important differences between his own view and that of Bentham and Mill. Going back to the definition of the ethical end, it will be noticed that Professor Bain uses the word Welfare. He nowhere clearly states, however, that he means by Welfare what Mill and the other more orthodox Utilitarians mean by Happiness, viz., pleasure and the absence of pain. In the same way the terms Good and Wett-being are repeatedly used without any clear indication that their meaning is (for a Utilitarian moralist) purely Hedonistic (Mor. Sci., pp. 442-3). 140 ETHICS (54) The Moral Faculty : Moral Reason. Professor Bain is careful to point out (Mor. Sci., p. 431) that his conception of a complete ethical theory embraces certain questions which are really psycho- logical, i.e., which have to do with how the Mind acts, and have no direct reference to the nature of Right and Wrong. Such a question is that of the Moral Faculty. How do we recognise moral facts ? Do we perceive Right and Wrong in actions directly or indirectly ? by a simple act of the mind or by a complex series of inferences ? and so on. We must notice that there are three separate questions, which are often confused : viz., as to the (1) Nature, (2) Origin, and (3) Validity, of our Moral perceptions. These three issues have been mixed up by writers of all schools, not perhaps with sufficient excuse. For instance, it has been commonly assumed, that the validity of Moral judgments depends on their innateness, or on their universal acceptance. Yet the Ethical question can hardly be solved by answering the psychological one ; nor vice versd. To take a parallel case ; no one doubts the conclusions of geometry, what- ever views he may hold as to the origin or nature of our mathematical knowledge (Sidgwick, Metli. Eth., Bk. III., ch. i., sec. 4). We must also distinguish between (1) the "induce- ments to what is right in action ; " and (2) the faculty by which we recognise what is right in action. Professor Bain appears to confuse these two issues MORAL REASON 141 (see MOT. Sci., p. 453, seq.). A philosopher may hold that he perceives an action to be right by an intellectual process ; and yet acknowledge, that the real cause which determines him to do the action (motive) is some kind of feeling. When we are in doubt as to whether we ought to do an action, an act of reasoning takes place, which might be represented as a syllogism ; e.g. Benevolence is right (ought to be done), This is an act of benevolence, . . It is right (ought to be done). The major premise is a synthetic judgment, in which there is an element of a purely ethical character; in other words the predicate involves the idea of oughtness. It is impossible to imagine any proof of an ethical principle unless some other ethical principle, involving ought or right, has been given from which to start. The truth of this ultimate major premise in the ethical syllogism, must be cognised by Reason ; since it is not a, fact which can be guaranteed by internal or external perception, nor can mere feeling be a sufficient warrant for the truth of a proposition. We see, then, that the Intellect has here a double function, viz., (1) to guarantee the truth of the moral axiom which forms the major premise (Intuitive Reason) ; and (2) to draw the conclusion from it (Discursive Reason). To put it in another way, knowledge of moral quality is of the nature of Judgment or Reasoning, implying the subsumption of a particular act under the general idea of Rightness or Oughtness. The ultimate Ethical 142 ETHICS major premises are known by Intuition of the Reason. They cannot be the results of purely psychological or sociological investigations, because such investigations cannot give us the conception of oughtness, which is their essential characteristics. When Reason perceives that a certain course of conduct is right, or ought to be done, it may be said to prescribe or dictate it as an End or Rule. " That principle which determines what is right, determines what is law for me. ... As the first principles of morals are of the nature of absolute truth, so are they absolute law, involving a ' categorical imperative ' " (Calderwood). Or, as Mr Sidgwick puts it, " By saying that ' Reason prescribes or dictates an end,' I mean to imply two things ; first, that in judging ' this action ought to be done,' or ' this end sought,' I am exercising what Hume calls the 'judgment of truth or falsehood ; ' and secondly, that this intellectual process is, or is inseparately connected with, a motive to action " (Meth. Eth., Bk. I., ch. iii., sec. 1). (55) The Moral Sense. In opposition to the exaggerated intellectualism of Cudworth and Clarke, who had overlooked the part played in morality by Emotion, Shaftesbury and Hut- cheson formulated the doctrine of the Moral Sense. They laid down that moral distinctions are perceived by a kind of feeling, which gives a direct and infallible verdict on the quality of actions. This " sense of right and wrong" was compared to the sense of Beauty, and THE MOKAL SENSE 143 represented as a kind of Instinct. It is probable, how- ever, that they meant by Moral Sense something more than the mere feeling or sensation which their un- guarded language seemed to indicate. That their language was unguarded will be seen from the fact that " we find Hutcheson asking why the moral sense should not vary in different human beings, as the palate does, without dreaming that there is any peril to morality in admitting such variations as legitimate" (Meth. EtJi., Bk. I., ch. viii., sec. 4). But their opponents rightly insisted, that we cannot have cognition of any kind as the result of mere sense ; and, as we have seen, Hume, although maintaining the Moral Sense theory, allowed that there was an intellectual element in our ethical perceptions. A special kind of feeling, indeed, seems to accompany the judgments of Moral Reason, though it is not the ground of those judgments. When we judge an action to be right we have a feeling of moral approbation. This emotion has a specific character, although it has in all probability been developed from non-moral feel- ings e.g., Sympathy (Mor. Sci., p. 453, seq.; Princ. Psych., Pt. VIII., ch. vii., viii.). It is "inseparably bound up with the conviction, implicit or explicit, that the conduct approved is ' right,' or ' ought to be done.' " In itself it is no guarantee that the conduct is objec- tively right, since it readily associates itself with ethical judgments, which reflection afterwards shows to have been erroneous. But when we have come to see that we have been mistaken in our estimate, the Moral 144 ETHICS Sense, or, as it is better called, Sentiment, is as firmly attached to the conduct we now approve as it was to the conduct we formerly approved. A distinction must be drawn between the Moral Sentiment proper the love of right because it is right and what Mr Sidgwick calls the " quasi-moral'' senti- ments, which usually accompany it. These, as for instance the love of truth or of purity, attach them- selves to various kinds of conduct without direct refer- ence to the Moral Reason. Sometimes, indeed, they stand in opposition to the Moral Sentiment proper. To use Mr Sidgwick's example : A man, who is habitually influenced by the quasi-moral sentiment of love of veracity, is one day convinced that, under certain cir- cumstances, to speak the truth will be wrong. Not- withstanding this, "a certain liking for veracity will probably remain in his mind : he will feel a repugnance against violating the rule of truth-speaking : but it will be a feeling quite different in kind and degree from that which prompted him to veracity as a department of virtuous action" (Metli. Etli., Bk. I., ch. iii., sec. 1). (56) Conscience. We must distinguish between (1) Conscience as the Moral Reason, or faculty for perceiving moral truths ; (2) Mere particular judgments passed on our own con- duct ; and (3) Moral Sentiments. When we say that " Conscience tells us that it is wrong to steal/' we use the word in the first sense. The particular judgments OBLIGATION 145 which we pass on our own conduct are associated with moral (or quasi-moral) sentiments of approbation or the reverse ; and it is these feelings that we denote by the expressions " good conscience," and " bad conscience." Professor Bain confuses the intellectual element (judg- ment) with the emotional element (sentiment of appro- bation or disapprobation). He regards Conscience as a feeling due to association between the ideas of pain and of the forbidden action, with which are also connected feelings of Sympathy, etc. It is "an imitation within ourselves of the government without us." " By a familiar effect of Contiguous Association, the dread of punish- ment clothes the forbidden act with a feeling of aversion, which, in the end, persists of its own accord and without reference to the punishment" (Mor. Sci., pp. 456, seq.}. The " authority of conscience " is a periphrasis for the "authority of Moral Law/' which Conscience (used here as equivalent to Moral Beason) recognises. The authority, or bindingness, is not to be found in the faculty. (57) Obligation. " The general conception of Obligation is subjection of personality to moral law." A judgment of oughtness is implied by a judgment of Tightness ; the former referring to the agent, the latter to the action (Calder- wood, Mor. Philos., p. 88). Our cognition of Brightness is accompanied by an impulse to action the true Moral Sentiment ; but there exist in us other impulses tending to thwart it. " This K 146 ETHICS possible conflict of motives is implied in the term ' dictate ' or ' imperative ; ' which describes the relation of Reason to mere inclinations or non -rational im- pulses, by comparing it to the relation between the will of a superior and the wills of his subordinates. This conflict seems also to be implied in the terms ' ought, 5 ' duty,' ' moral obligation : ' and, hence, these terms can- not be applied like the generally equivalent terms ' right ' and ' reasonable,' to the action of rational beings to whom we cannot attribute impulses conflicting with reason " e.g., God. There is another view, that of a certain class of Utilitarians * viz., that " when we say a man ' ought ' to do anything, we mean that he is bound under penalties to do it ; the particular penalty con- sidered being the pain that will accrue to him directly or indirectly from a kind of conduct which his fellow- creatures dislike." This view, however, seems to be erroneous, since " there are many things which we judge men ' ought' to do, while perfectly aware that they will incur no serious social penalties for omitting them" (Meth. Eth., Bk. I, ch. iii.). (58) Motive and Intention. "By 'motive' we mean the conscious impulse to action, whether desire or aversion." But the word is also used to denote what is better called Intention, viz., the end aimed at in an action, especially if that end be * Cf. Bain, Mor. Sci., pp. 456 seq. ; 685, 690 scq. SANCTION DUTY AND VIRTUE 147 pleasure of some kind. Briefly, Intention means the intended effects of an action, effects as foreseen in the act of willing ; while Motive denotes the impulse which precedes volition whether called Appetite, Desire, or Affection (Metli. Eth., Bk. III., ch. i., xii. ; Austin, Lect. on Jurisprudence, Lects. XVIII., XIX.). (59) Sanction. "The pain or pleasure which is attached to a law, forms what is called its sanction " (Bentham). On the other hand, Austin restricts the term to mean the " evil (i.e. pain) which will probably be incurred in case a demand be disobeyed." Bentham distinguishes four kinds of Sanctions : (1) Physical due to nature, acting without human intervention. (2) Moral or social due to the spontaneous disposi- tion of our fellow-men, their friendship, hatred, esteem, etc. (3) Political or legal due to the action of the magistrate in virtue of the laws. (4) Religious. (60) Duty and Virtue. All right actions are not duties, at least in the ordinary sense of the word. " It is right that we should eat and drink enough ; but we do not commonly speak of this as a duty. It would appear that those actions to 148 ETHICS which we are sufficiently impelled by natural desire are not called duties, because no moral impulse is needed for doing them. . . . "We shall keep most close to usage if we define duties as 'those Right actions or abstinencies, for the adequate accomplishment of which a moral impulse is at least occasionally necesssary.' . . . Virtue is a species of excellence, and we do not regard behaviour as excellent when it is such as the majority of mankind would exhibit, and such as a man would be severely blamed for not exhibiting. Between the ac- tions for which a man is praised and those for which he is blamed there seems to be an intermediate region where the notion of duty applies but not that of virtue." For instance it is a duty to pay one's debts, though to pay one's debts is hardly a virtue. " Each term seems to include something excluded from the other ; " but the lines of distinction are not very clear. Virtue has a two-fold application. We call both character and action virtuous. The former is the more important use ; and we may therefore define Virtue as, " a disposition to do, or habit of doing, such right volun- tary actions as require a moral impulse for their adequate accomplishment." In this, the ordinary usage of the word, we include the " performance of duty, as well as whatever good actions may be thought to go beyond duty." Duty is also used in a slightly different sense, as necessarily implying that view of morality which may conveniently be called jurat, the looking at ethics as a system of rules or laws. In this sense duty may be CLASSIFICATION OF VIRTUES 149 regarded as an idealisation of law. We note the follow- ing characteristics of duty, when used in this way as distinguished from virtue. (1) It is conceived as distinct and explicit. (2) It takes cognisance not of any risings above but only of fallings below the standard " we may fail in our duty, but we cannot do more than our duty. Thus while virtue is a scale rising indefinitely upwards, duty is the top of a scale descending downwards ." And (3) unlike virtue, it is conceived as involving a second party to whom we owe something, and a third party with an enforcing power (Grote, Moral Ideals, ch. vii. ; Sidg- wick, Met/i. Mh., Bk. III., ch. ii.). (61) Classification of the Virtues. Socrates taught that Virtue is knowledge; more particularly, the knowledge of ends i.e., of rational objects of choice. It is assumed that each man seeks his own good, as far as he knows it ; hence Virtue, or Right Conduct, depends on knowledge. Hence, too, the Virtues are one, because they are only applications of Wisdom, the supreme excellence, to the varying exigencies of life. Plato added further elements which tended to place Wisdom in a less important posi- tion. In the Republic we find the following list of virtues : o-cxfria, Wisdom ; dvSpeta, Courage ; o-oxfrpoa-vvr), Temperance ; and SIKO.KXTVVT], Justice. The three first- mentioned are the virtues of the intellect, the heart, and the senses respectively ; while the last is the duly-har- monised activity of all three. Aristotle's classification 150 ETHICS is in the main determined by that of Plato, although he adds others e.g., Liberality, Mildness, etc ; but his list is unsystematic and unscientific. Egoism resolves all virtue, ultimately, into Prudence, or practical \visdom, which teaches us what ends to seek in order to secure our own happiness. Utilitarianism resolves Virtue mainly into Benevolence ; not, how- ever, exclusively, since it is not mere altruism, and holds that our own Happiness is to count as much as, but no more than, that of other people. Thus both Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism tend to syste- matise and to introduce unity into the list of virtues. The ordinary common-sense view divides duties into duties towards God, towards one's neighbour, and towards oneself. But this classification is not altogether satisfactory, because all duties are in a sense duties towards God. If we leave out this as a separate head, excellencies of conduct may be brought under two classes, extra-regarding and self-regarding. But the lines of demarcation are not, it must be confessed, very clear. Even drunkenness and suicide are considered to be offences against the family of the man who com- mits them, as well as against himself. Perhaps, how- ever, this is the best available classification. Under the head of extra-regarding Duties and Virtues we should bring Benevolence, Justice, and Truth; under the head of self-regarding we should bring Temper- ance, Purity, Courage, and Prudence. Besides these main virtues, there are others which need classification. In some cases this is easy to do. JUSTICE 151 For instance, we readily associate Caution with Pru- dence, Endurance with Courage, Mercy with Benevo- lence, and so on. But there are other cases more difficult to deal with. Shall Good Faith, or keeping promises, come under Truth or Justice ? Or might not Truth itself be brought under Justice ? or Purity under Temperance ? (Meth. Eih., Bk. III., ch. vi., sec. 1.) (62) Justice. Aristotle recognises two kinds of Justice proper Distributive and Corrective. The former aims at "equa- lity," or what is right and fair, in distributing property, privileges, and so on; the latter restores equality by reparation, when the other kind of Justice has been violated. Our common notion of Justice includes the following elements : (1) Mere Impartiality in carrying out dis- tribution ; (2) Reparation for injury ; (3) Conservative Justice, or observance of those relations, determined by law and custom, which regulate the greater part of our conduct towards others ; (4) Ideal Justice. If we look at these closely, we shall see that (1) is simply an exclusion of irrational arbitrariness, partiality, and is so obvious as to be unimportant ; while we may refer (2) to Benevolence, rather than Justice. There remain two more important elements. By Conservative Justice is meant the observance of law, and contracts, and definite understandings, and also the fulfilment of natural and normal expectations. By Ideal Justice 152 ETHICS is meant that kind of Justice which is exhibited in right distribution ; the standard, or Ideal, of just dis- tribution being sometimes Individualistic realisation of Freedom ("just value" made equivalent to market value determined by free competition) ; sometimes Soci- alistic, the principle of rewarding Desert ("just value" cannot be determined by mere competition of buyers, on this view).* We thus get two chief elements of Justice, which we must try to reconcile, if we want to be consistent the Conservative, since we think we ought to uphold the customary distribution of rights, privi- leges, and penalties ; and the Ideal, since Ave seem to recognise an ideal system of rules of distribution which ought to exist, though ivhat the Ideal ought to be is uncertain (Meth. Eth., Bk. III., chap. v.). J. S. Mill discusses Justice in relation to the doctrine of Utility at considerable length. He points out much the same elements as those just recognised, but does not get at them in the same scientific way as Mr Sidgwick, nor is his analysis so complete and systematic. He considers that the central core of the idea of Justice is Law. He sees in Justice two main elements, the prin- ciple of Utility, and a sentiment, viz., the desire that punishment should overtake those who infringe the * This is what Aristotle seems to have had in his mind in Nic. EtJi., Bk. V., ch. iii. : " All men are agreed that a just distribution must involve reference to some standard, although they are not agreed as to what that standard ought to be ; democrats asserting that the standard ought to be Mividual freedom, while oligarchs propose wealth, others noble birth, and true aristocrats personal merit " (Williams' Transl.). NATUEE 153 principle. This sentiment is moralised by being in subordination to the principle of Utility ; in itself it is non-moral, being simply " the animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself, or to those with whom one sympathises, widened so as to include all persons, by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy and the human conception of intelligent self-interest " (Utilitarianism, p. 79). It has been usual to repre- sent Revenge as a perversion of the desire for Justice ; but Mill reverses this order, and explains Justice by Revenge. To tabulate the results of Mr Sidgwick's discussion : The common idea of Justice includes 1. Impartiality 2. Reparation for injuries ( = Benevolence) (i) in observance of Laws and Contracts, 3. Conservative Justice there appear to be two distinct concep- and definite understandings (ii) in fulfilment of natural and normal expectations 4. Ideal Justice, of which (a) The Individualistic (b) The Socialistic tions Meth. Mh., Bk. III., ch. v. ; Utilitarianism, ch. v. (63) Nature. The Stoics taught that Virtue was Life according to Nature. This view was taken up by Butler and other modern thinkers. Butler himself discriminates three meanings of the word Nature, as employed in Ethics : (1) It may be applied to any impulse what- 154 ETHICS ever anger and love are alike natural; (2) It may mean our strongest passions, those which have most influence over us, in which sense Vice may be natural ; or (3) It may mean, and this is the meaning Butler accepts, following our highest impulses. He goes on to point out that if a brute is allured by a bait into a snare, the action is natural; for there is a correspond- ence between the brute's whole nature and such an action. But if a man, following his desire for present gratification, rushes into certain and foreseen ruin, there is a manifest disproportion between the man's nature and such an action, because he acted in obedience to a lower impulse, and in disobedience of a higher. This leads up to Butler's doctrine of a Hierarchy of im- pulses.* Nature, . Spencer Principles of Psychology. Sully Sensation and Intuition. Taine On Intelligence (transl.) 158 APPENDIX I. Sidgwick Methods of Ethics. Article Ethics in Ency. Brit., 9th Edit. Bain Moral Science. Calderwood Hand-look of Moral Philosophy. Grote Moral Ideals. t Whewell Lectures on the History of Moral Philo- sophy. (B} SPECIAL Sec. 1. Methods of Psychology. Lewes. Study of Psychology. Ribot, English Psychology (transl.), Introd. and passim. Ribot, La Psychologic allemande, Introd. Spencer, Princ. Psych., Pt. I., ch. vii. Maudsley, Physiology of the Mind, ch. i. 2. Mind. Spencer, Princ. Psych., Pt. II., ch. i., ii. 3., 4. Consciousness. Mill, Exam. Ham., ch. viii., ix. Hamilton, Led. Metaph., Lect. xi. Note H to Reid's Works. 5. Unconscious Mental Modifications. Bastian, The Brain as an Organ of Mind, ch. x. Carpenter, Ment. Phys., ch. xiii. Hamilton, Lect. Metaph., Lect. xviii. Mill, Exam. Ham., ch. xv. APPENDIX I. 159 Sec. 6. Classification of Mental Phenomena. Hamilton, Led. Metaph., Lect. xi. 7. Feeling. Bain, Em. and Will, Pt. I., ch. i. 8. Muscular Feeling. Bastian, TJie Brain, App. Maudsley, Phys. of the Mind, pp. 487, seq. 9. Organic Sensations. Bain, Senses and Int., Bk. I., ch. ii. 10. Taste. Bernstein, Five Senses, Pt. IV., ch. ii. Taine, On Intell., Pt. I, Bk. III., ch. ii. 11. Smell. Bernstein, Five Senses, Pt. IV., ch. i. Taine, On Intell, Pt. I, Bk. III., ch. ii. 12. Touch. Bernstein, Five Senses, Pt. I. Taine, On Intell., Pt. I., Bk. III., ch. ii.- 13. Hearing. Bernstein, Five Senses, Pt. III. Taine, On Intell, Part I., Bk. Ill, ch. i. Sully, Sensation and Intuition, Essay vii. 160 APPENDIX I. Sec. 14. Sight. Bernstein, Five Senses, Pt. II. Taine, On IntelL, Pt. I., Bk. III., ch. ii. 15. Perception and Sensation. Bastian, The Brain, ch xi. Hamilton, Note D * to Reids Works. Kibot, La Psychologie allemande, ch. vi., vii. Sully, Sens, and Int., Essay iii. Maudsley, Phys. of the Mind, ch. iv. 16. Instinct, Reflex Action, etc. Bastian, The Brain, ch. xiv., xxvi., xxvii. Carpenter, Ment. Phys., ch. i., ii., viii., passim. Lewes, Problems, Vol. L, pp. 226-238. Spencer, Princ. Psych., Pt. IV., ch. iv., v. 17. Appetite and Desire. Stewart, Active and Moral Powers, Bk. L, ch. i. ; and Introd. to ch. ii. Maudsley, Phys. of the Mind, pp. 350, seq. 18. Pleasure and Pain. Bain, Mind and Body, p. 58, seq. Hamilton, Led, Metaph., Lect. xlii.-xliv. Mill, Exam. Ham., ch. xxv. Spencer, Princ. Psych., Pt. II., ch. ix. APPENDIX I. 161 Sec. 19. Intellect. Hamilton, Led. Metaph., Lect. xx. Spencer, Princ. Psych., Pt. VI. , ch. xxvii. 20. Relativity. Mill, Exam. Ham., ch. ii., iii. Spencer, Princ. Psych., Pt. II. , ch. iii., iv. 21-25. Laws of Association. Hamilton, Note D*** to Reid's WorJcs. Lect. Metaph., Lect. xxxi., xxxii. Mill, Exam. Ham., ch. xiv. Kobertson, Article Association in Ency. Brit. (9th Ed.) Spencer, Princ. Psych., Pt. II., ch. vii., viii. ; Pt. VI, ch. xvii., xxiv. 26. Memory. Carpenter, Ment. Pliys., ch. x. Hamilton, Lect. Metaph., Lect. xxx. Spencer, Princ. Psych., Pt. IV., ch. vi. Maudsley, Phys. of the Mind, ch. ix. 27. Special Acquisitions. Carpenter, Ment. Phys., ch. viii. 28. Conception, Abstraction, etc. Bastian, The Brain, ch. xxii. Mansel, Prolegomena Logica, ch. i., ii. Mill, Exam. Ham., ch., xvii. Spencer, Princ. Psych., Pt. VI., ch. ix. Taine, On Intell, Pt. II., Bk. V., ch. i. 162 APPENDIX I. Sec. 29. Reason and Understanding. Locke, Essay, Bk. IV., ch. xvii. Whewell, History of Moral Philosophy, additional Lectures, Lect. xiv. 30. Inference and Intuition : Perception. Carpenter, Ment. Pliys., ch. iv., v. Mill, Exam. Ham., ch. x.-xiii. Spencer, Princ. Psych., Ft. VI, ch. xvii., xviii. Taine, On Intell, Pt. II., Bk. L, II. Thompson, in MIND, July, Oct., 1878. 31. Theories of Perception. Hamilton, Lect. Metapli., Lect. xvi. ; note C to ReicCs Works. 32. Idealism. Berkeley, Hylas and Philonous. Mill, Exam. Ham., ch. xi. 33. Defence of Realism. Spencer, Princ. Psych., Pt. VII. Lewes, Problems, Vol. L, pp. 176-195. 34. Space. Mahaffy, Critical Philos., Vol. L, ch. iii., iv. Mill, Exam. Ham., ch. xiii. Ribot, La Psych, allemande, ch. iv., v. Spencer, Princ. Psych,., Pt. VI., ch. xiii., xiv. Sully, in MIXD, Jan., Apr., 1878. APPENDIX L 1 63 Sec. 35. Time. Locke, Essay, Bk. II. , ch. xiv. Spencer, Princ. Psych., Pt. VI., ch. xv. Mahaffy, Critical Philos., Vol. L, ch. iii. Eomanes, in MIND, July, 1878. 36. Innate Ideas. Huxley, Hume, pp. 82-88. Lewes, Problems, Vol. L, pp. 207-248. Locke, Essay, Bk. I. Spencer, Princ. Psych., Vol. I., pp. 465-471 37. Imagination. Carpenter, Ment. Phys., ch. xii. 38. Belief. Sully, Sens, and Int., Essay IV. Thompson, in MIND, July, 1877. 39. Attention. Carpenter, Ment. Phys., ch. iii. Hamilton, Lect. Metaph., Lect. xiv. Sully, in MIND, Jan., 1876, pp. 36, seq. 40. Volition. Bastian, The Brain, ch. xxvi. Caldervvood, Moral. Philos., Pt. III., ch. i., ii. Mansel, Metaph. , p. 171, seq. Spencer, Princ. Psych., Pt. IV., ch. ix. 164 APPENDIX I. Sec. 41. Freedom of the Will. Mill, Exam. Ham., ch. xxvi. Calderwood, Moral Philos., Pt. III., ch. in., iv. ' Sidgwick, Meth. Etli., Bk. I., ch. v. Spencer, Princ. Psych., Pt. IV., ch. ix. Sully, Sens, and Int., Essay V. 42. -Origin of Will Bain, Em. and Will, Pt. II., ch. i.-iii. 43. Motives. Bain, Em. and Will, Pt. II., ch. v., vi. Grote, Moral Ideals, ch. xii. 'Sidgwick, Meth. Eth., Bk. I., ch. iv. 44. Mode of Action of the Will. Carpenter, Metit. Phys., ch. ix. Bain, Em. and Will, Pt. II., ch. iv. 1 Sidgwick, Meth. Eth., Bk. I., ch. v., sec. 4. 45-48. Methods of Ethics, etc. *' Sidgwick, Meth. Eth., Bk. I. in MIND, Jan., 1876. Pollock, in MIND, July, 1876. Balfour, in MIND, Jan., 1878. Spencer, Data of Ethics, ch. xi.-xv., and .pcww'w. APPENDIX L 165 Sec. 49. Intuitionism. Calderwood, Moral Philos., Pt. L, Div. II. Sidgwick, Meth. Eth., Bk. I, ch. viii.; Bk. III. 50, 51. Utilitarianism. Calderwood, Moral Philos., Pt. L, Div. II. Grote, Exam, of Utilitarianism. Sidgwick, Meth. Eth., Bk. IV. - Mill, Utility ch. i.-iii. Spencer, Data of Eth., ch. ix. 52. Historical Sketch. Sidgwick, Article Ethics in Encij. Brit. (9th Ed.) Bain, Mor. Sci., Pt. II. - Whewell, Hist, of Mor. Philos. 53. Eairis Ethical Theory. Bain, Mor. Sci., Pt. I. 54 Moral Reason. ' Sidgwick, Meth. Eth., Bk. L, ch. iii. Stewart, Active and Moral Powers, Bk. II. , ch. v. 55. Moral Sense. Sidgwick, Meth. Eth., Bk. L, ch. iii. Stewart, Act. and Mor. Poicers, Bk. II., ch. v., vi. (sec. 4 only). 166 APPENDIX I. Sec. 56. Conscience. Calderwood, Mor. Philos., Pt. I., Div. I., ch. iv. ; Div. II., ch. iii. Stewart, Ad. and Mor. Powers, Bk. II., ch. vu., sec. 2. Grote, Moral Ideals, p. 166, seq. 57. Obligation. Calderwood, Mor. Philos., Pt. I., Div. I, ch. v. ; Div. II., ch. iv. Stewart, Act. and Mor. Powers, Bk. II., ch. vi. Spencer, Data of Etli., ch. vii. 58. Motive and Intention. Austin, Lect. on Jurisprudence, Lect. xix.-xxi. 59. Sanctions. Austin, Lect. on Jurisprudence, Lect. xxii., xxiii. 60. Duty and Virtue. Grote, Moral Ideals, ch. vii., viii. ' Sidgwick, Meth. Eth., Bk. III., ch. ii. 61. Classification of Virtues. ' Sidgwick, Meth. Eth., Bk. III., ch. HL-ix., passim. ' Whewell, Hist, of Mor. Philos., additional Lectures, Lect. ii. APPENDIX I. 167 Sec. 62. Justice. Grote, Moral Ideals, p. 262, seq. - Mill, Utilit., ch. v. Sidgwick, Meth. Eth., Bk. III., ch. v. 63. Nature. Maine, Ancient Laiv, ch. iv. Sidgwick, Meth. Eth., Bk. I, ch. vi., sec. 2 ; Bk. III. ch. v., sec. 2. APPENDIX II. QUESTIONS FROM LONDON B.A. (Pass) EXAMINATION PAPERS Metlwds, etc. 1. Give an account of the Method or Methods by which an accurate knowledge of Mental States is to be obtained. (1875.) 2. Describe the modes in which we obtain the data of Mental Philosophy. (1877.) 3. What is meant by the Testimony of Consciousness, and within what limits do you consider such testimony to be valid? (1879.) 4. Give briefly what you consider to be the best classifica- tion of the various Mental Phenomena. Give also some other classification, pointing out in what respects you regard it as deficient. (1874.) The Senses, etc. 5. Answer the following question carefully : How many senses does a man usually possess 1 ? (1877.) APPENDIX II. 169 6. What is meant by an Intellectual Sense, and how would you arrange the Senses according to their degree of intellectuality] (1878.) 7. Are there any points of agreement between the senses and Sensations of Taste and Smell? (1875.) 8. Describe the structure and area of the Organ of Touch. To what extent does discrimination vary in different parts of the organ 1 Do we instinctively localize any of our tactile perceptions? (1875.) 9. Describe how it is that a man may have a particularly good ear for languages, and yet be deficient in musical sensibility 1 (1879.) 10. Describe the various sensations of which the Eye is the medium, showing the nature and extent of the knowledge of the external world which we thereby acquire. (1874.) 11. Explain the theory of the Stereoscope and of Binocular Vision generally. (1877.) 1 2. By what means does the Eye estimate the real magni- tude of objects 1 How is it that a room when empty looks smaller than when furnished 1 (1878.) 13. Compare together the several senses with reference to their importance in affording us a knowledge of the properties of Space. (1876.) Pleasure and Pain, etc. 14. Describe Aristotle's or Hamilton's theory of Pleasure and Pain, and criticize it. (1877.) 170 APPENDIX II. 15. Discuss the question whether Pleasure is something more than a mere satisfaction of desire. (1879.) 16. Define Appetites, and distinguish Appetites from Volitions properly so called. (1878.) 17. What is meant by Desires] How are they dis- tinguished from Appetites and from Affections 1 (1874.) Intellect, etc. 18. Distinguish the processes of Mind which we sum up under the word Memory. Can you form any idea of the physical explanations of Memory? (1877.) 19. Is Memory a simple mental operation, or can it be resolved into more elementary processes ? How is it we can often recall the initial letter of a person's name without being able to recall the whole name 1 (1879.) 20. Describe the Laws of the Association of Ideas. (1876.) 21. Describe the process of acquiring habit or skill, as in the case of learning to play a musical instrument. (1877.) 22. Describe the principal kinds of Association required for learning a new language. How is it that few or no persons of mature age ever acquire perfect mastery of a new language? (1874.) 23. Give definitions of Sensation, Perception, Imagination, and Conception, and point out the relations which exist between them. (1879.) APPENDIX II. 171 24. Distinguish between the doctrines of Nominalism, Ultra-Nominalism, and Conceptualism. Mention some of the principal philosophers who have upheld each of these doctrines. (1876.) 25. Explain the proposition that all Perception is a process of Classification. (1878.) 26. Reasoning has been defined as an act of Mediate Com- parison. What mental powers are involved in such an act, and IIOAV far are they possessed by the lower animals? (1875.) 27. What exactly is meant by saying that we " under- stand " a proposition ? Take, for examination, some proposition in which both the subject and the predicate are abstract terms. (1874.) 28. Distinguish between Sensuous and Rational Intuitions, and exemplify the latter. (1876.) 29. What is meant by an Innate Idea "? Is the hypothesis of Innate Ideas compatible with the doctrine that all knowledge is derived from experience ? (1878.) 30. What do you know of the opinions of philosophers as to the origin of our ideas of Time 1 (1876.) 31. What is Attention 1 To what extent is it voluntary 1 ? (1874.) 32. Give the opinions of any philosophers as to the supposed faculty of Attention. Inquire how far it is pos- sible to attend to several things at the same time. (1877.) 172 APPENDIX II. The Will, Reflex Action, etc. 33. How would you classify actions according to the degree in which mind or consciousness enters into them 1 Is it possible to derive voluntary and involuntary actions alike from one fundamental type? (1879.) 34. State exactly what is meant by Habit ; and distinguish as far as possible between habitual, reflex, auto- matic, and instinctive actions. (1877.) 35. What elements may be discriminated in the full ana- lysis of a Voluntary Act ? (1875.) Ethics. 36. Describe the moral system of any one of the following philosophers : Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, Hume. (1877.) 37. Name some of the objections which may be raised to the Greatest Happiness principle as the foundation of morality. (1876.) 38. To what person or persons belongs the right, according to the Utilitarian theory, of deciding upon the moral Tightness or wrongness of actions'? (1877.) 39. Give some of the different views held by moralists respecting the province of reason in moral action. (1878.) 40. Describe some of the modifications in which the Moral Sense doctrine has been put forth. (1876.) APPENDIX II. 173 41. What do you regard as the exact relation between the sentiment of Moral Obligation and the experience of social discipline 1 (1879.) 42. Show how the place of Prudence or Self-love in an ethical system will vary according to the particular standard of morality adopted. (1878.) 43. 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