nia 0^: K Publications of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Division of Economics and History John Bates Clark, Director JAPANESE MONOGRAPHS EDITED BY BARON Y. SAKATANI, D.C.L. Formerly Minister of Finance of Japan Conscription System in Japan, by Gotaro Ogawa. Expenditures of the Russo-Japanese War, by Gotaro Ogawa. Military Industries of Japan, by Ushisaburo Kobayashi. War and Armament Loans of Japan, by Ushisaburo Kobayashi War and Armament Taxes of Japan, by Ushisaburo Kobayash Expenditures of the Sino-Japanese War, by Giichi Ono. War and Armament Expenditures of Japan, by Giichi Ono. CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM IN JAPAN Ta.KcckL J ' <-^oa cu BY GOTARO OGAWA, D.C.L. Professor of Finance in the University of Kioto NEW YORK OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS AMERICAN BRANCH: 35 West 32nd Street LONDON, TORONTO, MELBOURNE. AND BOMBAY 1921 COPYRIGHT I 92 I BY THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE THE RUMFORD PRESS, CONCORD TS T3 SANTA BARBARA COLLEGE LIBRARY inn NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR The plans of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace have been transformed by the World War. Problems now calling for study transcend in importance those with which this Division has been dealing and material for research and record so far transcends any that was formerly available that it will demand almost exclusive attention for some years to come. A new world has evolved suddenly out of the world which we knew and the transformation extends to the foundations of gov- ernment and of economic life. The process of warfare itself is now so unlike that of former days that many military rules of the past have gone into the scrap basket. The late war ended when its deadliest tools had barely been brought into action. The peoples have fought as they had worked, by machinery, mechanical and chemical engines of destruction have decided the result and will decide in like manner the result of all wars of the future. Machine shops and chemical laboratories will so largely determine what armies shall win that fighting strength will be as much a matter of available capital and of science in applying it as of numbers of troops and strategy in directing them. It is safe to say that the death dealing arts and instru- ments will far surpass in destructiveness those which made the late war so deadly, and to a soldier of the future the order to march into a cloud of poisonous gas and a whirlwind of missies will resemble an order to plunge into the rapids of Niagara. This is one central and obvious fact which the war has taught us and it has many corollaries, some of which have to do with the increased costs of war and the importance of the particular resources that make a nation powerful for offense and defense; but there are less conspicuous economic facts which are more fundamental, since they may determine where and when, if at all, wars shall hereafter occur. Causes of warfare are always partly economic and those which incited the recent one were mainly so. The business plans of a powerful state reached to the ends of the earth VI NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR and so crossed and interlaced the claims of other states that some writers, then and afterwards, pronounced the war inevi- table. If we assume a settled purpose on the part of such a state to encroach on the rights of others, we may say that it doubtless was inevitable. The victory of the defending countries has saved them from an immediate and intolerable domination, but it can not be taken as an assured fact that similar attempts will never again be made. The economic inducement continues and the means may at some time be forthcoming. \\'ithin the several states war has democratized industry, giving to labor an increase of control — a change that if con- tinued will entail momentous consequences; but still greater effects have been produced on the relations of states to each other. The world as a whole has changed more than its component parts and the new relation of the parts to one another is the critical element in the situation. The great increase in the economic functions of governments is one cause of this condition. Within the great international com- munity in which the se\ eral states are units extensive eco- nomic functions have gravitated into the hands of govern- ments and caused them to face each other as business rivals and to deal with each other in a multitude of ways in which the merely self-seeking policy of private business is intoler- able. Power to invoke principles of justice and international law as interpreted by a competent court has become an in- dispensable means of allaying strife and this fact exalts to supreme importance the high court of nations which has just been established. It magnifies also the importance of the economic facts and principles with which the law itself will have to deal. It is not merely individual men or private corporations who now meet each other in the rough and tumble of a world-wide mart but states themselves, each representing its own population and seeking to foster its interests as a zealous and faithful agent. The chances of friction that are inherent in ordinary commerce inhere today in vast international transactions and will increase in the measure in which the intercourse grows. All this means a NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR VU great Increase in incentives to warfare, on the one hand, and in the motives for preventing it, on the other. Private com- merce unites more than it separates those who participate in it, and it remains to be seen whether international commerce will act in the same way; but, in view of what modern war means, the human race will deserve to perish, and much of it will probably do so, if the forces of strife are allowed to get the upper hand. Whether they will or not — whether the recent economic changes will tend to reduce warfare or to increase it — depends on the ability of nations to create and maintain the instrumentalities that in the new state of the world are necessary. Certain it is that the feeling which prevails today, the world over, is not one of security. The dread of further war is greater than it was before 1914. In some areas war still prevails, in others peace is held by a precarious tenure and in all it can be firmly established only by conscious and intel- ligent action by the states themselves. Mere exhaustion holds war dogs temporarily in leash, but it will take more than that to tame them as they must be tamed if peace is to endure. We here confront a wide difference between the several states in comparative desire for peace and disposition to maintain it. One portentous fact is the grim determination of Russian communists to extend their system by crude force from state to state. Bolshevism is government by the few and largely the bad masquerading as government for and by the people. In its mother country, Russia, the economic meas- ure by which it began its career was confiscation of private wealth — in itself an ultra-democratic measure. If this had brought in a true communism, it would have been a ruthless and unjust measure for creating a peace-loving state. A just and orderly democratizing of industry in the several states would give new strength to the forces of peace, and it would be highly improbable that any state so influenced would try to extend its system over foreign countries by military invasion. Democracy, socialism, communism and bolshe- vism all appear in the aftermath of the war. The first of Vlll NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR them makes for future peace and so does even the conserva- tive element In the second, while all else in the series means certainty of civil strife and danger of international war. The fact that during the war governments had to take on innumerable functions that were formerly in private hands has lent an impetus to socialism and to the per\'erted growths that have accompanied it, and it has created a new inter- national system the meaning of which is profoundly signif- icant, though he who runs can not so easily read it. There are dangerous features in the system which the war evoked and, happily for mankind, there are available safeguards which were evoked with them and need to be retained if human effort can do it. By a compulsion that there was no resisting, the war forced the nations of the Entente into economic cooperation with each other. Commissions centering finally in the Supreme Economic Council adjusted in a harmonious way questions that would otherwise have led to rivalry and conflicting action in purchasing war materials, securing ships, appor- tioning food, controlling railroads, financing the war and doing a multitude of other things with the one common pur- pose of victory. The special compulsion of the struggle is over, but it has left an aftermath of issues grave enough to make peace insecure unless something equivalent to the Supreme Economic Council survives in full efficiency. The agency that did so much to win the war can do so much to prevent another one, but to that end it will have to be guided by economic principles and it is a saving fact that these still surA'ive. The war has not abolished the law of demand and supply, though governments may forget it. In the coming era they must build better than they now know. Economic knowledge must either go in advance of action and prevent disaster or follow action and be learned from disaster. Be- yond computation is the importance of attaining the knowl- edge and using it when evil impends and prevention is possible. John Bates Clark, New York. Director. September 27, ig20. PREFACE Upon my return from the conference at Berne, I requested Mr. Y. Takata to investigate the system of conscription and its economic effects, because I regarded him as a scholar well versed in sociological, statistical and economic subjects. He is certainly well fitted for such work. After two years' hard labor he has completed this great work. Many were the difficulties with which he was confronted. There were but few books that he could rely upon. Nor were there any official statistics to furnish him with accurate information. To trace the historical development of the system of con- scription, he had no other way than to study the successive changes in the conscription law. For the economic effects of the system, the only material that he could work upon was the Annual Statistics. He had to visit different Divisions, in order to make personal investigations concerning the eco- nomic effects of this system. Mr. Takata certainly deser\^es our admiration, as he now lays before us the result of his laborious work. Special mention should be made of his painstaking collection of new material and of his arguments based upon it. (i) Concentration of Soldiers in Towns (Part H, Chapter HI). As there was no available material concerning the concentration of soldiers in towns, he had to resort to an indirect way of using such information as came to his notice. Such an indirect method lacks in force of demonstration. We fail to do him justice, however. If we do not perceive his fair and candid treatment of the materials he managed to collect. (2) Formation of Military Towns (Part H, Chapter HI). As to the formation of military towns, the author, starting his work with a general survey of the places where regiments are quartered, proceeded to a particular investigation of the town of Zentsuji, which was but a little village previous to the establishment of a division there. He made a visit to this town and collected material. His idea was that this ix Xll EXPLANATORY TABLES Chronological T 'able — {Contin lied) i\Ieiji29th 1896 A. D. Meiji 41st 1908 A. " 30th 1897 ' " 42cl 1909 ' " 31st 1898 ' " 43d 1910 ' " 32d 1899 ' " 44th 1911 ' " 33d 1900 " 45th \ Taisho ist J 1912 ' " 34th 1901 ' " 35th 1902 ' 2d 1913 ' " 36th 1903 ' " 3d 1914 " " 37th 1904 ' 4th 1915 ' " 38th 1905 ' " 5th 1916 ' " 39th 1906 ' " 6th 1917 • " 40th 1907 ' D. Weights, Measures and Money With English, American, French and German Equivalents Japan Ri-36 Clio = 2,160 Ken = 12,960 Shaku . Great Britain 2 . 44030 Miles I 15152 Miles Ri (Marine) Snuare 7?/ / 5 -95505 bquare/(NrOOO ^■5 00 t^ i^ Ti- msO C4 o -^ -^ row (>OOrOrO'*tt^(ON 2o OH (--■-ir^r-OO'-' WNo" CC N r^NvOl^O Ov'^'^ fO'^l^'^'^f^rOfO^'^ - ^ (J m i-i ro IN r-O p*^ (N 0> 0^ r- > C OvCJ O-^rop^-^O r^oO rt 4J WPC'3'NMiM^HiNi-i'-' "rtn Oc t;"? N O "^ ^ P') f^ >"23 * ' * * O O t^ Tf M lO ! . . i 9. o f^. "-i "N ^ ^§o ^S "S J ^ aj 0) O N aS.H »0 i>ovO 0» O f*) "^ o» ;xem fro Serv rOO lOTfiO»Drot^O O ■^ ^ -rf (N «-<" Tt Tt 00 O 6" w NOOoO'-'COoOMlNrO \0 o Oi . . . . so o d oo" i^ .... r^oO lO N (N W [5 HI N r* •T3 hi p^-O Ou-)OOCnOoOt1- OOO r^^O H. rot^inoo (TJ-^l/^iO t^t^N I--OOM 't r-^ -T CO* r^ d . ^ « (N - (N o \rt o^ (^ o <: QC o •-. E2 N OO t^'i-i^NCO f^O ^w o opoo^p^i^'-i r>. ,2 o O roi-vO rOt^sO r^w O WH 00 O O O O '^ 'to N tN t_>->rj>-i MI-4I-1I-IM « a >— ..,,^-N ol 00 N ^-. 5 ^^O; O 'too Ov ■<* I'l ro lO UTO rj CN -^ in 0\ -!t »* rooo >-• rf T^sO ro 'too O- t-i 00 sO >. J w > \ri -^00 O C> Ooo i/i«0 CO o. N CS O»O0C OiOOOO NO 2; w M W l-l I-. « IT) 't 'to 4. lO o o o >00 lO O O t- > 0*0 ITJIOO ■^fOi/^iO'^ ■4-' MrotNfONt to M (N t^m f o^tn rri mmo OOO -^ rroo OiO^OO rt o^. d O t-'ior^rOOwO "NO E 1m 2 (N "^sO-^ "^-^ in p^ o t^ w int^OoOt^M (N 'to o» < •"■ "^ "^ l-l (-1 M l-l > 0\P0'tt^t-0\t'NO t^ OOO HisO r^Hi irjOO O -^ ro C^oq oo_ *t '^. ^. '-^ '^.. "^ < r^r-roO>oo 0*0 0>0 HI Mi-if^WMi-iMi-tMiN n >< inO t^OO OvO M !N POt ooocoooooo 0\OC>00 Ov 0000000000000000 OiOO a; bo C IS E "3. a 3 SATSUMA REBELLION TO SINO-JAPANESE WAR 39 The fluctuation of the number in the following years is shown below: 1887 Colonial troops, 3 battalions and i company; telegraph corps, abolished. 1888 Engineers, 6 battalions and i company; musicians, 2 corps. 1889 Gendarmes, 4 corps; Colonial troops, 5 battalions. 1890 Cavalry, 6 battalions; Gendarmes, 6 corps; fortress artillery, 2 battalions (4 regiments under consideration). 1891 Fortress Artillery, 2 regiments (4 regiments under consideration); Colonial troops, 4 infantry battalions and i cavalry, i artillery and i engineering corps. 1892 Imperial Guards, i engineering company enlarged into i engineering battalion. 1893 No change. 1894 Fortress artillery, 3 regiments; Gendarmes, i corps added. Number of Conscripts ^ Year (Meiji Era) Active Service Supplementary Reserves Total 1878 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 10,158 10,299 25,374 f 15,000 of < which were [ commissariat 24-767 24,817 26,208 26,288 3,888 3,888 24,293 8,754 8,746 9,952 15-046 14,187 49,667 33-521 33,563 36,160 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 Proportion of Conscripts to Population and to Males of Con- script Age Table L — Conscripts for Active Service per 1,000 Population Conscripts for Per 1,000 Year Population 1878 34,898,540 1879 35,768,584 1880 35,929,060 1881 36,358,994 1882 36,700,118 1883 37,017,302 1884 37,451,764 1885 37,868,984 1886 38,507,177 8 In these years, \^ of 15,000 commissariats were deducted from the figures given in preceding table, because only one twentieth of them were enrolled, according to the regulations. ^ Based on the table of annual conscripts in The Compendium of Laws and Ordinances. Active Service Population 10,158 291 10,299 287 II,I24» 309 10,214* 269 10,567" 288 11,958'' 323 12,038* 344 13,423" 354 18,261 466 40 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: HISTORICAL SURVEY Table I. — Continued. Conscripts for Per i ,000 Year Population Active Service Population 1887 39,069,691 20,008 .512 1888 39,607,234 20,115 507 1889 40,072,020 18,782 .468 1890 40,453,461 20,365 .534 1891 40,718,677 20,689 501 1892 41,089,940 20,012 .487 1893 41,388,313 20,625 .498 1894 41,813,215 22,354 -535 Table II. — Conscripts per 1,000 Population Conscripts Year per 1,000 1878 402 1879 397 1880 1.382 1881 922 1882 915 1883 1 .606 1884 1885 4.764 1886 5.015 Conscripts Year per 1,000 1887 5095 1888 2.701 1889 2.329 1890 3.657 1891 3-593 1892 3-987 1893 2.934 1894 2.887 Table III. — Conscripts for Active Service per 100 males of Military Age Year Males of Military' Conscripts Age Per Cent Conscripts Examined Conscripts for Active Service per 100 Conscripts Examined 1880 273,307 4.325 1881 306,724 3.330 1882 280,813 3-763 1883 308,723 3874 1884 347,748 3-462 1885 387,389 3-495 1886 421,278 4-339 [391,366 (first examination) ] 1887 ■{ 386,606 (second examina- 1888 427,846 1889 360,357 1890 361,422 1891 350,369 1892 392,763 1893 432,340 1894 436,246 tion) 4.700 212 635 905 044 /64 124 352,236 379-706 856 887 SATSUMA REBELLION TO SINO-JAPANESE WAR 41 Table IV.— C Conscripts per 100 Males of Military Year Age 1880. . . ... 18.173 1881... 10.932 1882... ... 11-953 1883... 11.756 1884... 1885... 46.566 1886... ... 45-837 1887... Conscripts per 100 Men of Military Age Conscripts per ICO Men Examined Year 1888. 1889. 1890. 1891. 1892. 1893. 1894. Conscripts per 100 Males of Military Age .056 25 46 41 41 28 903 097 763 702 079 668 Conscripts per 100 Men Examined 37 31 280 789 Reasons for the Changes This was the period of the completion of the conscription law, whose contents underwent great and rapid changes. These remarkable changes were due to the idea of raising the army from the whole nation, without any distinction of class; and this idea was in turn due to the rapid changes in the political and social conditions of the people. This idea had already existed even at the time of the pro- mulgation of the law. In the Imperial mandate, issued in 1872, we find these words: "According to our ancient sys- tem, the whole people were eligible for military service. In case of emergency, the Emperor raised expeditionary forces among the able bodied males and took command of them." The nation had, however, not felt the full force of this idea until the Satsuma Rebellion. The burden of con- scription had as yet been very light, in respect of the number, term, postponement and exemption. It was only in this period that the idea was put into practice to the fullest extent. The circumstances at the time of the Restoration deterred the nation from making any preparations for the emergencies on the continent that may affect the independence of the country. Nor was the new government yet strongly estab- lished in power. There was a great deal of dissatisfaction among the military people, who were deprived of their tra- ditional privileges, social and political. The remnant of the Shogunate party was still "loitering with intent." Consolidation of the state and military prepa- 42 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: HISTORICAL SURVEY rations were of urgent necessity, and to this the whole energy of the government authorities was devoted. The use of the standing army for local guard was the result of their great effort. Both the conscription law, issued in 1873, and the law revised in 1875, contain the following words: "Men of the different branches of the army are to be raised in the district under the jurisdiction of each garrison. They shall serve in the army for a certain period of time at their respec- tive garrisons. They are for local defense." The ordinary way of distributing men over the districts other than their own, especially when a civil war was feared, was not resorted to by the new government. Their system was based upon the principle of assigning men to the place from which they came. The whole country was divided into six military jurisdictions; and each garrison was to defend the district under its own jurisdiction with men raised from that district. The Imperial Guards were an exception to this rule. This circumstance was due to the influence of the old apportion- ment of men adopted by the feudal lords under the Shogunate Government, who held their own in different localities. As the result of this circumstance, men raised by the different garrisons had already been of different fiefs. Hence there was no need of redistribution of men by the military authorities. The government had always felt uneasy until the suppres- sion of the insurrection at Saga (1874) ^^^ o^ the Satsuma Rebellion (1877), after which they saw no cause for appre- hension. Their attention was now turned to the great prob- lem of national expansion. Two years after the Satsuma Rebellion, the conscription law was revised, by which the term of service was extended. The conditions tor postponement and exemption were made somewhat more rigorous. But this was not sufficient. In accordance with the Imperial rescript given to the army and the navy in 1882 and the Imperial edict issued in the same year relating to the expansion of the military and naval systems, the authorities started that reorganization. In 1883, another revision of the law was effected in order to pre- SATSUMA REBELLION TO SINO-JAPANESE WAR 43 pare for emergencies abroad. The term of service was again extended, the system of substitution was aboHshed, and the conditions for exemption and postponement were made still more severe. Besides, the provision for one-year volunteers was established, by which the way was opened for filling vacancies in the list of reserv^e officers. It was in 1889 that another revision was made. The conditions for postpone- ment and exemption were made extremely rigorous. All the regulations that were intended for the protection of the family system were done away with. The whole nation was now eligible for service. CHAPTER IV FROM THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR TO THE RUSSO- JAPANESE WAR Since its enactment in 1889, the conscription law has under- gone little change, except a slight amendment made by State Order No. 15, issued in March, 1895, and it remained the same until the time of the Russo-Japanese War. This was perhaps because the revision of 1889 was so complete as to make any further change needless. Changes in the Conscription Law We need not go over the whole of the law revised in 1895. Let us look over only those points that were changed, (i) The term for reserve service in the army was changed from four years to four years and four months (clause 3). (2) The old system of filling up vacancies in the active and reser\'e services was changed into the supplementary reserve service (Hoju-eki), the first supplementary reserve service and the second supplementary reserv^e service. The term for the former extends over seven years and four months. These resersdsts are taken from among the surplus men for active service. The term for the latter extends over one year and four months, the required number of men being taken from among the surplus men for the former. In the case of the navy, the required number of men is taken among the surplus men for active service (clause 5). (3) The militia service is divided into the first militia serv- ice and the second militia service. Those who have com- pleted the term for the first supplementary reserve service are enlisted in the former service. In the latter service is enlisted those who have completed the active, the reserve and the supplementary service and the first militia service (clause 6). (4) The period of temporary exemption (yuyo) for stu- 44 SINO-JAPANESE WAR TO RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 45 dents of the schools prescribed is now extended to twenty- eight years of age (formerly twenty-six years) (clause 23). (5) Those studying abroad were temporarily exempted from enrollment until' twenty-six years of age. In regard to this, we notice the following changes: Those staying abroad (excepting those in Korea) may be postponed at their own request. But they will be enrolled, if they return home before reaching thirty-two years of age. When they are above thirty-two years of age, they will be enlisted in the militia service. But they may apply for one-year volunteer service (clause 23). Statistics of Conscription Increase in the Number of Army Corps At the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, an increase of armaments was effected (1896). The colonial troops were organized into a division, and five new divisions were created. These six new divisions added to the existing six divisions, together with the Imperial Guards, now numbered thirteen in all. Besides, there were now three composite brigades in Formosa. The number of army corps was accordingly increased as follows: 1896 The cavalry battalion attached to the Imperial Guards was increased to one regiment. The number of the infantry regiments increased to forty-eight, that of the cavalry regiments to sixteen, that of field artil- lery regiments to eighteen, that of engineers and com- missariats to twelve battalions, and that of fortress artillery corps to four regiments and four battalions. The seventh division consisted of one independent infantry battalion, one independent field artillery battalion, and one independent engineering com- pany, besides which this di\'ision included four battal- ions of colonial infantry, one cavalry, one artillery and one engineering corps. The composite brigades in Formosa consisted of six infantry regiments, three 46 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: HISTORICAL SURVEY H Z o U b O n s i) « M 1 Toll n of ptA Tt in U^ -^ ■s ro O" to M CO co_ wj O c 4> .— nSS On Oi r- N E ^00 r^ O , « o o ^^ Tl-lO c« (S OvO 00 " o o O CJ o o t^ fo o> ^ c CI t^ t^ O ^ 0\ ^3i o M t^ lo O 0\ O E o 00 -^00 00 -^ "^ U^ ►H kH M i: « N ^ N_00 •^ rO ro ro ro *«-• N C< fO fO t^ O W s rO n fO fO N rO Q. m »n >-i E 3 f^ o fS) »-t «j a X 3 W Cfl 1 s r^ t^ O 00 •!-> from EnroUm ►-_ ^_ f^ M 0) E 61 N O oo" M N W M 1 W t^ N 00 O r^ N M \0 O 0\ N 00 1 -o o C\ tN OGO E CO (^sO ro M li^ ■S I' S (N 0\ r^ •-» o W Oi O O 0^ 'I- O ro N to t-i O 00 O Ov N o »<-• C>4 tH C4 H4 M M (N CO cs O T3 4J -4-> a 00 r^ O N E is O Tj-^ w > > 0! d 3 M M 00 -^ •- OOoOvO ro ■^ Oi f) 00 W t~ M N O Oi m 0> N 0> to '^ ■^ "-^ ^^^ o N t^ m" r^ ro fO E 1> O r^ (^ M > CO n r^ "-" "5 •M r^ N -^^ c < i-T N « W o a avo "3 «-. PO -^ ro 4^ o w ro O; ^^ H t^ r^ ro r* Tt POOOO >» 1/5 m i/j Ov E a Tt Tj- l-> O •o oo 00 t^ N ^ 3 11 Oi ro M i-i N 00 ^ < w lO ro 0» M 1 c W 00 ao •<{00 N eisO M t^ ro 0» 00 00 Os O\oo o „ « « ii .-■ N a; NnO *-" O > O 00 o\ ■^ O 00 t-; o 4-> o I-. cs u^ M < (N Tf^ l/l i/^O r^oo 0» O •-' (s ro Tt Oi o> O^ Oi Oi O O O O O 00 00 CO 00 00 o> o. a ©■ c>> ^ f4 W M M (-1 Kl M M •-• M Ht SINO-JAPANESE WAR TO RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 47 cavalry companies, three field artillery companies, two fortress artillery battalions, three engineering companies and one railway guard corps. 1897 The independent engineering company ot the seventh division was enlarged into one battalion. One inde- pendent fortress artillery battalion was added. 1898 The number of divisions was increased to twelve. 1899 Four new regiments were added to the existing colo- nial infantry of the seventh division. 1900 One cavalry regiment, one field artillery regiment, one engineering battalion and one commissariat battal- ion were added to the seventh division. The army stationed in China consisted of four infantry battal- ions and one field artillery company. 1903 The army stationed in China now consisted of one infantry corps. One infantry corps was stationed in Korea. The colonial infantry of the seventh division was reduced to one corps. The schemes for the expansion of armaments made out In 1896 was at last completed, when the number of the dif- ferent corps, increased in 1899, was filled up. Proportion of Conscripts to Population and to Males of Conscript Age Table I. — Number Enrolled in Active Service per 1,000 Population Enrolled in Per 1,000 Year Population Active Service Population 1895 42,270,620 22,442 .503 1896 42,708,264 44.113 1-032 1897 43,228,863 48,264 1. 1 16 1898" 43,763,855 53,452 I -221 "There is no official table of those enrolled in active serv'ice after 1898. Table II. — Number Enrolled per 1,000 Population Per 1,000 Year Population Population 1895 See above i . 898 1896 " " . 4099 1897 " " 3-273 1898 " " 4-070 1899 44,260,642 4-132 1900 44,815,980 4. 171 48 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: HISTORICAL SURVEY Table II. — Continued Year Population 1901 45,437,032 1902 46,022,476 1903 46,732,841 1904 47,219,566 Per 1,000 Population 4.217 4.289 3-933 5 703 Table III. — Number Enrolled in Active Service per 100 Men of Conscript Age Year Men of Conscript Age Per Cent in Active Service Men Examined Ratio of Men Enrolled in Active Service per 100 Examined 1895 1896 1897 1898 449,834 489,895 477,555 502,924 4.987 9.002 10.108 10.626 386,613 423,178 401,952 421,654 5-804 10.426 12.006 12.677 Enrolled per 100 Examined 20.747 41 244 35 185 42 265 43 526 44 376 44 691 45 794 53 349 66 000 Table IV. — Number Enrolled per 100 Men of Conscript Age Enrolled per 100 Year Men of Conscript Age 1895 17S31 1896 35-731 1897 29.821 1898 35-417 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 Reasons for the Changes According to Count Okuma's "History of the Fifty Years Since the Opening of the Country," the field of battles during the Sino-Japanese War was so wide that there was a great lack of men.i This was the reason wh}' the period of the entire service was extended to twelve years and four months, and why the system for filling up vacancies in active and reserve service was reorganized into what is called the supple- mentary reserv^e service (hoju-eki), whose term ranges from one year and four months to seven years and four months. These changes were made in March, 1895. The increases in the number of divisions and in the men to be enrolled in active service that followed the above changes were also due to the same reason. ^See section in which Prince Yamagata deals with our military system. CHAPTER V FROM THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR TO THE PRESENT TIME Since the Russo-Japanese War, the law has twice under- gone changes. The first revision by Imperial Ordinance No. 212, issued in September, 1904, relates to the following points: (i) the extension of the five years' term of the military second reserve service to ten years, (2) the extension of the seven years and four months' term of the supplementary first re- serve ser\'ice and of the one year and four months' term of the supplementary second reser\'e service to twelve years and four months, (3) the establishment of a detailed system of militia sers'ice in both the army and the navy, and (4) the extension of the term of the second reserve service for one year volunteers. It was by the revision in 1906 that all these changes made by this ordinance were drafted into law. We shall next study the essential points of the conscription law, issued in 1906. All through this period the most im- portant change was the Imperial Ordinance concerning the two years' service. Changes in the Conscription Law The essential points of the law as revised in 1906 are as follows : I. The Duty of Service. — The same as in the former law. II. Kinds of Service. — Service is of four kinds, the regular, the reserve, the supplementary and the militia (clause 2). The regular service is divided into the active and the active reserve. As to the three years' term in the army, and the four years' term in the navy of active service, and the four years and four months' term in the army and the three years' term in the navy of active reserve service, we find that they are the same as those prescribed in the law of 1889. The reserve service in the army extends over ten years and in the 49 50 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: HISTORICAL SURVEY navy five years (clauses 3 and 4) . The supplementary service in the army extends over twelve years and four months, and that in the navy, one year. In the latter case, the required number for the service is taken from the number that exceeds the required quota for active service (clause 5). The militia service is divided into first militia and second militia. The list of the former service in the army is filled by those com- pleting the reserve service, or those supplementary reserves called out and completing their service. In the navy, the list is filled by those completing the reserve ser\dce. The list of the second militia service is filled by those who are not in the regular, the reserve, the supplementary or the first militia service (clause 6). III. Specialization in Service. — No change in active, active reser\^e and reserv^e services (clause 16). Supplementary reserves both of the army and the navy are to fill vacancies in the list of active service, and are to be called out in case of war or emergency. But this filling up of vacancies is limited to the first year of active service. In the case of the army, the reserves are called out for training, which will last one hundred and fifty days, in peace time. They will be called out for review and inspection, in the same way as the active reserves (clause 17). IV. Special Cases. — (i) Volunteers. No change. (2) One year volunteers. Those are eligible as one year volunteers who are seventeen to twenty-eight years of age, and desire to be officers of the active reserves or the supple- mentary reserves. They must be graduates of those schools that are prescribed in the old law, or must pass the required examination. While in service, they must pay all the nec- essary expenses, although the government may defray part of their expenses, as the case may require (clause 13). They are as a rule to serve in the garrison that is quartered in their locality, but may be transferred to other places, in case of necessity. The branch of service they enter will be deter- mined by their wish and by the convenience of the authori- ties. Those completing certain courses of study may apply RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR TO PRESENT TIME 51 for the service, as accountants, surgeons, veterinary sur- geons or pharmacists. Their expenses must be paid in advance, according to regulations issued by the War Minister (clauses i, 2, 3 and 7 of the Regulations for One Year Volunteers in the Army). Those completing one year's service as volunteers will be enrolled in the active reserve for six years and four months and at the completion of this, in the reserve service for ten years (clauses 10 and 13 of the regulations above). (3) Six weeks' active service. Those who are seventeen to twenty-eight years of age, and have such qualifications as prescribed by the old law, may be enrolled in this service. In case their names are dropped out of the teacher's list before they are twenty-eight years old after the active service, they will be enrolled in the active service for two years without a drawing, and in the active service and the supplementary service, successively (clause 13), when the term for the active service is completed. V. Rejection and Exemption. — Those convicted of felony are not admitted into any branch ot the service (clause 8). Those sentenced to imprisonment or punished for gambling, are not eligible for the one year volunteer service (clause 14). The rules concerning exemption from service are the same as those of the old law. VI. Postponement of and Exemption from Enrollment. — • Postponement of enrollment takes place in any of the follow- ing circumstances: (i) Same as that prescribed in the old law. (2) Same as that in the old law. (Clause 20 of the new law corresponds to the items above.) (3) Same as that prescribed in the old law. (See clause 21 of the new.) (4) Same as that of the old law. (See clause 22 of the new.) (5) Same as that of the old law. (See clause 27 of the new.) (6) Residents of the different schools stated under the item of one year volunteers may have their enrollment post- 52 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: HISTORICAL SURVEY poned until they are twenty-eight years of age. But such postponement is granted only when they apply for it. When their conditions are changed, before twenty-eight years of age, or when their conditions still remain unchanged at that age, they will be enrolled, without drawing lots (clause 23). (7) Those staying abroad. Their enrollment is post- poned only at their own request. They will be enrolled with- out a drawing if they return home before they are thirty-two years of age (clause 23). Residents in Formosa, Saghalien, the Loochoos, Korea, the Kuriles, Hongkong and Amoy, are not granted postponement, but may take their examination at the neighboring garrisons or consulates, in accordance with the orders that will be issued by the War Minister (Impe- rial Order No. 318, issued in December, 1904). The case of postponement that takes place under the last two conditions is called ywyo (temporary exemption from enrollment), in order to distinguish it from the other cases. Exemption from enrollment takes place under the follow- ing conditions: (i) The first of the items stated in the old law concerning exemption (clause 20 of the new law). (2) The second of the items stated in the old law concern- ing exemption (clause 22 of the new law). (3) When those residing abroad (except in those countries specified above) and obtaining the permission for postpone- ment at their own request are more than thirty-two years of age (clause 23). (4) When the number of those winning the lots as supple- mentary reserves exceeds that of the actual vacancies to be filled (clause 11). VII. Punishments. — The same as those prescribed in the old law. The foregoing are the essentials of the new law issued in 1906. The rules concerning the two years' service also demand our special attention. In Imperial Ordinance No. 332, issued in October of the same year, are found the follow- RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR TO PRESENT TIME 53 ing statements, concerning the release of infantry soldiers in the active service: Those infantry soldiers in the active service who prove proficient in their Hne may be discharged from their duties at the end of two years' service. It should, however, be understood that a certain number of them as deemed necessary, will be detained in case of war or emergency (clause i, ordinance No. 332). This rule is also applicable to men belonging to other branches of the army (clause 2). This ordinance is binding upon all those to be enrolled after 1905. Part of those to be enrolled that year will, however, be released (supplementary rules). / The departmental order, issued in February, 1908, states that after 1905, men of the military medical corps may be released at the end of two years' service. There have been no changes since. But we understand that additional changes are in contemplation, among which are the following: (i) All those who attain the age of twenty should go through the conscript examination, without exception. (2) Residents of different schools wishing postponement of enrollment may obtain permission until they are twenty-six years of age. The Investigation Committee on Education contemplates changes of almost the same import. Statistics of Conscription Increase in the Number of A rmy Corps After the Russo-Japanese War, the number of divisions was increased from thirteen to nineteen. Military Order No. 4, issued in September, 1907, and amended in April, 1908, by Order No. 12, contains a table concerning the dis- tribution of the standing military corps. Our present sys- tem is based on this table, according to which the number of military corps is as follows : 19 Divisions: Infantry, 26 brigades (76 regiments) Cavalry, 4 brigades (27 regiments) Field artillery, 25 regiments (8 of which are formed into three brigades) 54 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: HISTORICAL SURVEY Mountain artillery, 3 battalions Engineers, 19 battalions Commissariat, 19 battalions Hea\y Artillery, 6 regiments and 6 battalions (4 of which are formed into 2 brigades) Communication corps (railway regiments, telegraph and aeroplane corps), I brigade Defense guards, i battalion Musicians, 2 corps The standing army corps stationed in Formosa, Saghalien, Manchuria and Korea are not inchided in the above table. The division increase bill having passed through the Impe- rial diet at its special session in May, 191 5, there will be an increase of two divisions, to be stationed in Korea. The full strength of the army corps belonging to these new divi- sions will then be as follows: Infantry divisions, 2 Cavalry regiments, 2 Heavy artillery battalions, Engineering battalions, 2 Field artillery regiments, 2 The plan is to complete the organization in six years, begin- ning with the filling up of one third of the infantry force (that is, of sixteen companies), in one division, and in the other division, with the filling up of one-twelfth of the infantry force (that is, of four companies), and with that of two cav- alry companies, two artillery companies and two engineering companies. Number of Conscripts Year 1905 1 906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 Em oiled 201,714 245.257 252,103 257,293 257,507 258,201 258,893 Postponed 3,428 3,300 4,685 7,652 6,950 7,464 6,993 Exempted from Enrollment 158,220 136,007 150,343 156,631 140,230 114,731 157,640 Exempted from Service 33,388 28,279 32,036 31,565 27,741 19,877 17,466 Total Examined 396,750 412,843 439,167 453,141 432,428 400,273 440,992 "The number for 1905 was not officially announced. RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR TO PRESENT TIME 55 Proportion of Conscripts to Population and to Males of Conscript Age Table I. — Number ,of Conscripts per i,ooo Population Conscripts per i,ooo Year Population Population 1905 47,678,396 6,520 1906 48,164,761 4,188 1907 48,819,630 5,023 1908 49,588,804 5,084 1909 50,254,471 5,120 Table II. — Conscripts per 100 Males of Military Age Conscripts per 100 Conscripts per 100 Year Examined Year Examined 1905 78.107 1909 56.759 1906 50.707 1910 59468 1907 59.169 1911 61.010 1908 57426 1912 57378 Reasons for the Changes The military authorities learned in the Russo-Japanese War that the old conscription law was insufficient to fill the needs in war time and as a result the amendment of the law was, as we have already seen, effected by the Emergency Ordinance, issued by the Emperor in September, 1904. This amendment had as its primary aim the immediate increase of men by the extension of the term of service. The authori- ties saw, however, that the necessity of increasing the num- ber of men would continue to exist in the future, and the present conscription law was enacted in 1906. The number of men in active service was, of course, increased during this period. The exact number is not officially announced, but it is believed that 22 or 23 per cent of the conscripts examined are now enrolled in active service. Such an increase of men in active service is plain, when we see that the divisions that had been thirteen in all were increased to nineteen after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. As to the two years' service, there is no doubt that it owes its existence partly to the post-bellum movement. But we must not forget that the establishment of this service had already been recog- nized as necessary for the curtailment of national expenses, 56 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: HISTORICAL SURVEY even before the Russo-Japanese War. We can understand how necessary was the curtailment, when we see the rapid increase in the number of men in active service. Sixty thou- sand men in the said service were increased to one hundred and fifty thousand, after the Sino-Japanese War; and the full war time force of two hundred thousand was increased to five hundred thousand. The state paid about one hun- dred million yen for the expansion, besides the annual ex- penditure of thirty-eight million yen, which had been twelve million yen formerly. The armament thus expanded could not be reduced, while the heavy burden had to be reduced. This was the reason that the influence of the advocates of the two years' service began to tell upon the people after 1902. The Imperial Ordinance issued in 1907 is to be regarded as a partial solution of this great problem. CHAPTER Vl CONCLUSION We have thus far studied the historical development of our conscription law, its changes and reasons. Let us now sum up our results. It is a fact worthy of note that the Satsuma Rebellion was a turning point in the history of the law. Pre- vious to that event, the law had aimed at the maintenance of peace and order at home, but since that time it has always been the object of the law to prepare for emergencies on the continent. This policy of preparedness has ever since been supported by the increase of population at home. So far as the general trend of the world is for military competition, this policy of ours must be pursued. Completion of arma- ments must be aimed at. Our conscription law had under- gone various changes, in order to meet such circumstances, making the burden of military servdce heavier and heavier. The principle that the whole people are eligible for service is being realized almost to perfection. We have seen the proc- ess of such changes separately through each period. Let us give a general view of the process through which the burden of military service has gradually increased. It will be con- venient, if we divide our survey into (i) the term of service and its nature; (2) exemption from services, and postpone- ment of and exemption from enrollment; (3) the sphere of the operation of the law, and (4) the increase in the number of men enrolled. Term of Service and Its Nature Above all, changes in the term of service call for our atten- tion. Although the different periods of the military sers'ice are distinguished from each other by such names as the active, the active reserve, the reserve and the supplementary ser\dce, yet there is one point common to all these services, in regard to the expansions of the list of men in each service. It is a 57 58 CONSCRIPTION system: HISTORICAL SURVEY considerable extension of the term for the military service as a whole, except the militia servdce. This is shown by the following tables: Army Year Active Active Reserve Reserve Total Supple- mentary 1873 1879 1883 1889 1895 1904 3 years (Regular) 3 years (Regular) 3 years 3 " 3 " 3 " 2 years (ist res.) 3 years 4 years 7 yrs. (ist res.) 5 yrs. (2d res.) 4 years 4 years 6 4 mos. 4 years & 4 mos. 2 years (2d res.)" 4 years 5 " 5 " 5 " ID " 7 years ID " 12 " 12 " 12 yrs. & 4 months 17 yrs. & 4 months I year (90 days aft. 1875) I year I " I " 7 yrs. & 4 mos. (ist sup.) I yr. & 4 mos. (2d sup.) 12 yrs. & 4 months Navy Year Active Active Reserve Reserve Total Supple- mentary 1889 1895 1904 4 years 4 years 4 years 3 years 3 years 3 years 5 years 5 years 5 years 12 years 12 years 12 years I year I year I year Since the enactment of the Imperial Ordinance in 1907, concerning the two years' active service, men of the active service in the army are permitted to go home, at the expira- tion of two years' term. We have no means of knowing the actual character and nature of the military service. It is almost impossible to know what changes there have been in barrack life and how restrictive the life has been. We can, however, get some information concerning these points if we look at the length of the term and the various conditions for exemption and postponement. CONCLUSION 59 Active Service. — First of all, let us turn our attention to those rules concerning the release of soldiers. In the con- scription law as enacted for the first time is found the follow- ing statement: Those of the standing army (regulars) must be in service for three years, but in peace time they may be permitted to go home when they have served at least two years and when they prove proficient in their service. There has since been no change in this respect. The law revised in 1883 says: Those of the active service, who prove to be especially skilful in their arts and excellent in their conduct, or those who are in possession of certificates for mili- tary training at the different government schools — -these may be permitted to go home even before the expiration of their term. However, it is a mistake to think that, compared with the above statement, the conditions for release were made some- what lenient. For we find that such a privilege had already been given to the graduates of the said schools, by the ordi- nance of 1879, and that the ordinance of 1889 deprived them of the privilege. This privilege was replaced by the privilege of the one-year volunteer service and six-weeks active serv- ice. Imperial Ordinance No. 332, issued in 1907, concern- ing the two years' service and the release, states : Those men in the active service, in the infantry or in other branches, may be permitted to go home when they have acquired full knowledge of their arts, at the end of a two years' term (clauses i and 2, Imperial Ordinance No. 332). This provision, however, can by no means be construed as mitigating the burden. It means quite the contrary, for the provision aims at the raising of more men for both the active and the reserve service, with the same amount of expenditure. Active Reserve and the Reserve Service. — -According to the Imperial Ordinance issued in 1879, oflficials, headmen of villages, religious teachers, teachers in government and pre- fectural schools, members of prefectural assemblies and those in possession of licenses for medical profession were exempted from enrollment. But the provision for this privilege was 6o CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: HISTORICAL SURVEY dropped from the law by the ordinance of 1883. The only mitigation in service now consisted of the exemption of the active reserves and the (second) reserves from the calling out for inspection once a year. Even this small mitigation was upon the condition that the state council may require them to come out, in such cases as are deemed necessary (clause 20). Later, in 1889, there were made some more changes in this respect, in which those government or prefectural officials, whether in the active reserve service or in the (second) reserve service, were exempted from the calling out, in case their substitutes can not be obtained. The same provision was made for members of different assemblies, organized accord- ing to law, while in session. Supplementary Reserve Service. — ^At first, this was not regarded as a proper and independent service, but consisted of men under the general name of " hojuheV (those in reserve for any vacancies in the list of the other services). It was by the ordinance of 1895 that this service came to be recognized as an independent service, when the "vacancy-fillers" were ordered to come out for inspection or review, on a peace foot- ing. A glance at the changes in the provisions for this newly organized service, will show the following facts: According to the conscription law, enacted in 1873, these "vacancy- fillers," or supplementaries, were called out for one year, only when there were vacancies. (The term was only ninety days, from 1875 to 1879.) This remained the same in the law revised in 1879. However, in the ordinance of 1883, we find some changes in this respect. The ordinance required them to come out, according to the number of the lot, and serve in the army for one year, not only when vacancies oc- curred in the list of the active service, but also when emer- gencies required more men. The ordinance also contained a provision for another kind of reserves to be regarded as sup- plementaries, who have completed the one year's service, or those who were postponed from enrollment for seven years. They were to be called out in cases of emergency and enlisted in the commissariat or other services. In the ordinance of CONCLUSION 6 1 1889, a provision was made for calling out these supple- mentaries under the name of yobi-choin (men called out as reserv^es), but this was merely a matter of name and con- tained no change in substance. It contained no provision for the yobi-chohei, conscript reserv^es, such as we found in the ordinance above. As has already been stated, this supplementary service came to be recognized as an independent servdce, by the amendment of the law in 1895. This service is of two kinds. The first supplementaries (like the naval supplementaries) are to fill vacancies in the active service, and are to be called in case of war or emergency, besides serving in the army for one hundred and fifty days. They are, in this respect, like the reserves. The second supplementaries are to be called out, after the first, when there is need for more men. By another amendment in 1906, the provision for the second supplementaries was removed. But this did not mean mitiga- tion of the burden on the people. Departmental Order No. 72, issued in October, 1908, declared that the supplementaries would not be called out for the time being. We see, how- ever, that the provision is now revived, without any change in the wording. From the above, it is quite plain that not only was the term of service extended, but the burden of the service upon the people made heavier. This increasing burden of the service, both in its term and its effect upon the people, shows the tendency toward militarism. We shall find the same situa- tion when we proceed to the next subject. Exemption and Rejection from Service and Postpone- ment OF AND Exemption from Enrollment The conditions for rejection from service were penal servi- tude, or a heavier punishment, according to the ordinance of 1873; one year's penal servitude or more, and one year's imprisonment or more for political offenses, according to that of 1879; and felony, according to the ordinances of 1889 and later years. Thus we see no real changes in the conditions all through these years. 62 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: HISTORICAL SURVEY As to the exemption from service, no provision for it is found in the ordinance of 1873. This absence of provision was due to the fact that there was as yet no distinction between the exemption from service and that from enroll- ment. Concerning the provision for the inveterately diseased and deformed, there has never been any change since the issue of an ordinance in 1879, according to which they are to be exempted from service, if they are found, after examina- tion, to be unfit for it. The regulations concerning the medi- cal examination have since undergone changes, into which we need not go now. Remarkable were the changes in the conditions for exemp- tion from and postponement of enrollment. It is these changes that show vividly the stages through which our con- scription system has advanced towards militarism, by which is here meant the idea of the eligibility of the whole people for service without any distinction. Militarism, considered from the viewpoint of postponement and exemption, has had to encounter various difficulties, of which the greatest were the family system and the privileged class. Let us now see how influential was the family system in giving a check to the expansion of armaments. According to the conscription law enacted in 1873 the following were exempted from enrollment: (i) the head of a family, (2) heirs and lineal grandsons, (3) the only sons and grandsons, (4) those who take the place of their fathers or elder brothers in the family, on account of sickness or some other circumstances of the latter, (5) adopted sons, and (6) brothers of those who are in ser\-ice. It is now plain that of these six conditions, the first five were meant for the con- tinuance of the family, while the sixth was meant to con- tribute to its prosperity. But each of the above conditions has undergone changes by the successive revisions of the law. In 1879, the following changes were introduced: (i) the head of a family is exempted from enrollment, but those are not who set up a new family, or assume the name of the wife setting up a new family, or revive an extinct family, CONCLUSION 63 or succeed a head under fifty years of age as his adopted heir. (2) Heirs and Hneal grandsons are not necessarily exempted from enrollment; they are exempted (a) when the head is above fifty years of age, (b) or when the head is under the said age in peace times, (c) But those younger brothers who become heirs are not exempted when their elder brothers, previous to the age of conscription, establish new families, are adopted by those under fifty years of age, revive extinct families, or adopt the name of the female head, establishing a new family. (3) The only sons and grandsons, when they are heirs or lineal grandsons. (4) Those taking their father's or elder brother's place in the family are exempted from enrollment, when they are the heirs, but, if they are not the heirs, they are granted postponement for one year in peace time. They will be exempted from enrollment, when their condition remains unchanged, even at the time of the exami- nation that takes place in the third year of the regular service. But this exemption occurs only In peace time. (5) The adopted sons of those who have no heirs at the age of fifty years or up are exempted from enrollment, but not if they are the heirs of retired persons. The heirs or adopted sons of those who are under fifty years but are inveterately dis- eased or deformed, are exempted from enrollment. (6) Brothers of those in active service are no longer exempted from it unconditionally. • Only one brother of noncommis- sioned soldiers in active service, whether in the army or the navy, is granted postponement of enrollment, and in peace time only. The conscription law of 1883 also shows the gradual restric- tion of the conditions intended for the protection of the family, (i) The head of a family is granted postponement of enroll- ment only in peace time, but those are not who are (a) the head of the dependent house (fuseki-koshi), (b) the heads of new families, of extinct or abolished families, and (c) the heads who succeed those, under sixty years of age, not de- formed or inveterately diseased, nor incapable of supporting their families, nor punished for grave offenses. (2) Heirs or 64 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: HISTORICAL SURVEY lineal grandsons are exempted from enrollment, (a) when the head of their family is above sixty years of age, (b) or when the head is inveterately diseased or deformed. This exemp- tion takes place only in peace time, when postponement extends for three years and has so many exceptions that there is no room left for any devices to escape enrollment. Accord- ing to the old law, the heirs or grandsons of those even under fifty years were exempted from enrollment, but they are now to be enrolled, if the latter is under sixty years. (3) No change, as to the only sons or grandsons. (4) Those taking their father's or brother's place in the family are now granted postponement of enrollment in peace time, only when they are heirs or lineal grandsons. They are exempted from en- rollment, only when their conditions remain the same, even in the third year of postponement. Thus the privilege given to those taking their father's or brother's place in the family is well-nigh disappearing. (5) No privilege for adopted sons. As to the cases in which they are heirs or grandsons, see (2) above. (6) The elder or younger brother of those in active service is granted postponement only in peace time; one of several brothers is granted postponement only in peace time, if they happen to be called out at the same time; the enroll- ment of the elder or the younger brother of those becoming sick, or wounded, while in service, is postponed only in peace time, and they are exempted if this condition remains for three years. From the above, it is now quite plain that the law revised in 1883 has reduced the conditions or privileges for post- ponement or exemption to much rarer cases than those pro- vided in the laws of 1873 and 1879. Yet, even in this law, we can find some traces, slight as they are, of the spirit that makes for the family system. It is by the law revised in 1889 that all these conditions were done away with. The whole people, whatever their family relations may be, are now to be enrolled, the only exception being the case in which a family can not get along without the man to be called out, and this only when there is positive proof of the condition in CONCLUSION . 65 question. If this condition still remains even at the end of the third year, then he will be registered in the list of the militia. Needless to say, this last provision is not to be construed as meaning the protection of the family system. So much for the changes in the conscription law in its rela- tion to the family system. Let us now go a step further and see how the privileged class has stood in the way of mili- tarism. The protection of the privileged class can be seen from the three following aspects: (i) Exemption from enrollment for those who pay a certain amount of money, (2) exemption from enrollment for those of certain professions or certain social standing, and (3) postponement of exemption for the residents or graduates of certain schools. (i) Exemption from Enrollment Obtained with a Certain Amount of ]\Ioney. — It was provided in the law of 1873 that those paying 270 yen as the "proxy-fee" were free from service, except in the militia. Now, at that time this amount of money was about equal to 270 koku (a koku is about 5 bushels), and is equal to 2,000 yen today. Hence, we see that those who obtained this privilege were comparatively few in number. The law revised in 1879 contains a similar provision for those who pay the exemption or proxy-fee of 270 ye7i, or for those who pay 135 yen, when they are to be called out on the peace footing. No such provision, entitling a man to postponement or exemption on payment of a sum of money, is found in the law of 1883. (2) Members of Certain Professions and Social Standing. — It was provided in the law of 1873 that departmental and prefectural officials were to be exempted from enrollment (clause 3). This privilege was extended by the law of 1879 to (a) the officials above hannin rank, religious teachers above probationary rank, and headmen of villages, (b) mem- bers of prefectural assemblies, (c) teachers of public schools and teachers of schools under the direct control of the educa- tional or other departments and offices, and (d) those of different departments, bureaus and offices, whose place can jiot be filled by others. But a great change was introduced 66 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: HISTORICAL SURVEY in this regard by the law of 1883, hmiting this privilege to the narrowest possible sphere. The tendency is clearly dis- cernible to limit this privilege to those who are necessary for the advancement of culture. According to this law, all those proxdded in (2) above were excluded from the privilege, while those officials could be granted postponement of enrollment whose substitutes were not obtainable. And even this postponement was possible only after the case had gone through the state courts. Teach- ers in public or government schools were exempted from enrollment only when they were in possession of diplomas conferred at government or prefectural schools. Those coming under the provisions above, (a), (b) and (c), and those possessing diplomas conferred by government or pre- fectural medical schools and engaging in medical practice, were exempted from calling out for inspection or review, if they were in the active reserve or the reserve service. It was by the law of 1889 that this privilege was entirely abol- ished, except for the officials mentioned above and the rev- enue officials and deputy mayors of cities, towns and villages, who were exempted from the calling out for review or inspec- tion. As to the provision by which members of the different assembHes instituted by law were exempted from the calling out, we may well regard it as a necessity, rather than as a privilege given to certain classes. (3) Pri\ileges Given to the Graduates and Residents of Certain Schools. — It was provided in the law of 1873 that the privilege of exemption from enrollment could be obtained by those who specialized at the schools under the direct con- trol of the Educational, the Engineering, and the Colonial Department, or by those studying abroad, or by those pos- sessing licenses for the practice of medicine or veterinary surgery. In 1879, the following slight changes in these pro- visions were introduced: (a) Those in possession of medical licenses, (b) graduates of public normal schools, (c) graduates of public middle schools or of public technical schools, (d) CONCLUSION 67 graduates of the schools under direct control of the Educa- tional Department or of other departments and offices, (e) those studying abroad and possessing certificates for at least a two years' course of study. In 1883, this was narrowed to the regular students of government universities, or govern- ment schools on an equal footing with them, who had finished at least a two years' course. In 1889 all these conditions were abolished. With regard to the privilege of postponement given to the graduates and students named above, we find the following changes: In 1879, this privilege was given to (a) students who had finished at least a one year's course at government schools or at prefectural normal schools, (b) who had finished at least a three years' course at public middle schools or at public technical schools, and (c) who were staying abroad for study, postponement for one year, and exempted from enroll- ment on peace footing, when still staying away, through three successive postponements. In 1883, this privilege was lim- ited to (a) regular students of government universities or government schools on equal footing with them (exempted from enrollment on peace footing, after successive postpone- ments for seven years), and (b) students of government or prefectural schools, who had finished at least a one year's course. In this case, the postponement was for six years. In 1889, the provision (a) was abolished, students under this provision being treated in the same way as those under (b). At the same time, this privilege of postponement was extended to students of certain private schools, the provision for which runs as follows: The privilege of postponement of enrollment until the age of twenty-six obtains to those whose names are registered at government schools, prefectural normal schools, prefectural middle schools, private schools recognized by the educational minister as on an equal footing with middle schools, or private schools where law, politics, and political economy are taught according to the rules approved by the minister; the same privilege for those who stayed abroad. In 1895, the age limit was extended to twenty-eight years. There has since been no change in this provision. Either the 68 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: HISTORICAL SURVEY one-year volunteer service or the six weeks' active servdce may be regarded as a privilege similar to that above. We have thus far traced the different stages through which the provisions for various sorts of privileges have been abol- ished, one after another. The only privilege now remaining is the privilege that obtains to the graduates and under- graduates of certain schools. Even this privilege has been reduced to the narrowest possible limits. There are now some who advocate the abolition of this privilege. But this would probably be impossible, for the privilege is intended not so much for the protection of certain classes as for the advancement of education and culture. The further reduc- tion of the privilege may, however, be effected before long. The Sphere of the Operation of the Law The conscription law enacted in 1875 does not make any reference to conscription in Hokkaido, the Loochoos and the Bonin Islands, except the clause in which mention is made of the defense of Hokkaido. According to the law revised in 1879, conscription seems to have been enforced in the province of Hakodate alone of all the provinces of Hok- kaido. In 1884, conscription is said to have been enforced at Hakodate, Esashi and Fukuyama. It was in 1896 that we find it enforced in the four provinces of Oshima, Shiribeshi, Iburi and Ishikari, and in 1898 that conscription was enforced in the seven provinces of Teshio, Kitami, Hitaka, Tokachi, Kushiro, Nemuro and Chishima. But the enrollment was temporarily to be postponed for the immigrants whose period of domicile in these provinces was less than five years after its registration (Imperial Ordi- nances Nos. 126 and 336 issued in September, 1895, and August, 1899, respectively). Imperial Ordinance No. 258, issued in July, 1897, reters to the enforcement of conscription in the islands of Okinawa and Ogasawara from the first of January, 1898. CONCLUSION 69 Increase in the Number of Soldiers Table I. — Increase of Ratio of Conscripts to Men of Conscript Age^ Conscripts Conscripts Year per 100 Men per 100 Men of Age 1880 18,173 1881 10,932 1882 11,953 1883 11,756 1884 1885 46,566 1886 45,837 1887 1888 25,056 1889 25,903 1891 46,097 1892 41.763 1893 41.702 1894 28,079 1895 27,688 Examined 37,280 31,787 20,747 Conscripts Year per 100 Men of Age 1896 17,831 1897 35.731 1898 29,821 1899 35.417 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 Conscripts per 100 Men Examined 41.244 35.185 42.265 43.526 44.376 44,691 45.794 53.349 66,000 78,107 50.707 59.169 57.426 56,759 59.468 Table II. — Yearly Increase in the Number of Soldiers Year 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 Officers 2,262 2,432 2,520 2,449 2,500 2,475 2,495 3.268 3,341 3,822 4.308 Men Above Semi- Officers 6,863 7,216 7.705 7.913 8,127 1 1 ,064 12,400 12,269 12,326 12,640 13,086 13,411 Semi-officers and Noncommis- sioned Officers 5.682 5.795 5.457 5,670 5.803 5,868 6,319 11,674 10,872 12,504 14,494 Specialists At- tached to Dif- ferent Officers 4.124 4.095 4,441 4.175 4,080 5.406 4.831 5.540 5.408 5.594 5.532 5.541 Men 47.607 48,112 49.212 49.463 51.283 52,583 54,554 146,722 87,411 104,801 124,328 Men Below Non- commissioned Officers 132,311 129,678 131,514 134.899 138,610 173.712 197,898 207,957 212,824 214,476 217,032 Total 55,551 56,339 57,189 57,582 59,586 60,926 63,368 161,664 101,624 121,127 143,130 143,298 140,989 143,660 146,987 150,817 190,943 215,707 225,691 231,058 233,094 235,984 ^ This is a summary of the tables already given above, under each heading. PART II ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE SYSTEM OF CONSCRIPTION CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Only forty-two years have elapsed since the establish- ment of the system of conscription, but many have been the changes introduced, as we have seen in the first part of this treatise. If we wish to know its economic effects, we must see how each of the stages of this system has affected the economic conditions of the corresponding period, and how the changes in the system have been accompanied by corres- ponding changes in our economic world. There is no doubt that the influence of conscription upon economic conditions is an important subject. But it is not for us to know it as an apparent, obvious fact, but as a matter based upon inferences. We, however, deem it too tedious for our purpose to repeat the inferences at each period or stage. Let us therefore limit the sphere of our investigation to the economic effects of the system at present. Before entering upon our subject, it may be necessary to state here the reasons why our con- clusions must be based upon indirect inferences. It is an easy matter to know the economic effects of temporary events, such as wars or natural calamities. But we find it very diffi- cult to ascertain the economic effects of things or events that are in permanent existence, very difficult to distinguish the effects from institutions of permanent and constant existence. The degree of the effects will only be known after a very careful examination of complicated circumstances. The sys- tem of conscription has never been abolished or reestablished, and is one of the very things that are permanent and constant in their existence. Hence, our dependence upon indirect inferences in our investigation of its economic effects. One may think that they might easily be observ^ed at the time of its establishment. We must, however, take into considera- tion the fact that the country was then in a very confused and disordered condition, not only as regards the system of 73 74 CONSCRIPTION system: economic effects conscription, but also in almost all other respects, so that it is very difficult to point out the economic effects alone of conscription. Even supposing that we might do this to a certain extent, it would be of no direct advantage to us, because circumstances in those times were so different from those of the present that the inference from one are of little avail for the understanding of the other. Besides, most of the circumstances in those times are now beyond our reach. We must make our problem still more definite. The sys- tem of conscription is the backbone of our military prepara- tions, especially of our army. All acknowledge the fact that the armament of a nation has great effects upon its economic conditions, according to its foreign policy. The armament is necessary not only for the defense and utilization of newly acquired territories, but also for the extension of markets. Besides, so long as armed peace is a necessity for all nations, the armament is, of course, a guarantee of their economic life at home. The maintenance of armaments by taxes and "blood taxes" must therefore be an insurance system on a large scale. But we must extricate ourselves from such con- siderations for two reasons. The economic effects of arma- ments through foreign policies are so vague and far reaching that they are beyond our definite and exact calculation. And the other reason is that — even admitting that calculation of such effects is possible — we can then only know the effects as those of armaments, and not of conscription. To try to distinguish the economic effects of conscription in such a calculation is as if we were to try to assign to one hand a definite quantity of sound from the clapping of both hands. Such being the case, let us now study the economic effects of conscription, putting aside the question of foreign policy and its relation to economic life. Our problem is, what are the economic effects of the system of conscription, by which hundreds of thousands of the able bodied are yearly taken from productive labor? Let us begin with the effects upon the population. For, of all the condi- INTRODUCTION 75 tions that affect the economic Hfe of a nation, the most import- ant is the population in its relation to conscription.^ Our next task is to see its effects upon the national economic life in two aspects, namely, production and consumption; and then to obtain a general view of the effects. ^ We shall then proceed to a survey of the effects upon the domestic economy of those who participate in this national economy. ^ Our last task is to give a summary of our results.^ 1 Chapters II and III. 2 Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII. 3 Chapter VIII. * Chapter IX. CHAPTER II EFFECTS ON POPULATION Of the factors of population that control economic life, increase and concentration are the most important. Our surv'ey will then fall under the two headings: What are the effects of conscription upon the increase of population? And what are the effects of the same upon concentration? On the increase of population, we must consider the effects of conscription upon birth rates and death rates. Those who are in the active service must stay away from home for two, three or four years, and this must mean a decrease of the birth rate. Another aspect that must be considered in connection with these rates is the fact that the training in the army is conducive to health, which reflects upon the birth rate. Looked at from the other viewpoint, this would lower the death rate among them. As to concentration, the ex- istence of barracks in cities or nearby causes a concentra- tion of population. The tendency of these men to live in cities, even after their barrack life is over, and the tendency of the places where troops are stationed to absorb inhabi- tants from the surrounding districts, are also instrumental in bringing about the results in question. The present chapter deals with the influence of the economic effects upon the in- crease of the population. Birth Rates Decrease oj Birth Rate Due to Barrack Life Those joining a corps are not permitted, except for a few days after the enrollment, to return home for two years in the case of infantry men, three years in the case of the men of other branches, and four years in the case of sailors. They are all permitted to go home on Sundays, but not permitted to stay at home over night. ^ It follows then that there are 1 Of the men belonging to special branches in the army, the assistant artillery men, artillery transport men, commissariat men, and nurses are in their respective EFFECTS ON POPULATION 77 almost no cases in which the wives of the married soldiers have opportunities to conceive. Of course, in those societies where the custom of conception-prevention or abortion obtains, owing to the anxiety of living, barrack life may mean only postponed birth, and the life has nothing to do with the birth rate of the whole population. But with the present state of our people, it is not too much to say that the impossibility of conception during these years of barrack life means a corresponding decrease of the birth rate. To what extent then are our yearly birth rates affected by such a life? In order to know the rates, we must first know the number of married men in active service, but we have no means of ascertaining this. The only way would then be to resort to inferences from other facts. Presumptive Number of Married Men in Active Service. — Since it is very rare that men get married during the term of service, these actives must have married previous to en- listment. In order to estimate their probable number from the rate of the married men at large, we must base our cal- culation upon the men of twenty or twenty-one years of age, that is, the men who are of the same age as those enlisted. The statistics that show the number of the married and the unmarried, according to age, are published every five years. Table for 1908, as of December 311 Age Married Unmarried Total Men Women Men Women Men Women 19-20 20—21 17,876 33.133 45,100 92.119 128,060 155,881 448,094 421,197 367,110 359.114 309,228 248,851 465.970 454.330 412,210 451.233 437,288 404.732 21-22 services for two years and four months. The first of these live in barracks for one year, the second for four months, the third for three months and the fourth for four months. Noncommissioned officers, gendarmes and musicians are per- mitted to live outside. Certain classes of men such as guardsmen, corporals, accountants, etc., may be permitted to live outside. * Figures taken from Imperial Statistics. 78 CONSCRIPTION system: economic effects The ratio of married men to the total: Age 19-20 3 • 80 per cent " 20-21 7 30 per cent " 21-22 13 .30 per cent Table for 1903, as of December 31^ Age Married l^nmarried Total Men Women Men Women Men Women iq-20 20,253 36,401 55,256 94,174 134,901 163,786 397,700 398,991 373,869 295,680 316,730 252,611 417,953 435,392 429,125 410,904 20-21 430,581 21-22 416,397 The ratio of married men to the total: Age 19-20 4.8 per cent " 20-21 8.3 per cent " 21-22 12.9 per cent From the two tables above, it is seen that the percentage of the married who are of the same age as enlisted men, was 8.3 per cent in 1903 and 7.3 per cent in 1908. Now, even granting that the rate has since fallen, it is reasonably certain that the rate at present is not below 6 per cent. We may expect the same rate among the men in the army. The probable number of married actives would then be the number of those in the active service multiplied by this rate. Army^ Number of men, including noncommissioned officers 212,824 Number of experts attached to different offices, schools, etc., including noncommissioned officers 3,078 Total about 215,900 Those noncommissioned officers living out of barracks about 3,300' Balance of men and noncommissioned officers living in barracks, .about 212,600 1 Figures taken from Imperial Statistics. ' Military Department Statistics, 1910. ' *This figure is obtained in the following manner: The number of noncommis- sioned officers at home, 11,442, plus that of those abroad, 2,050 (probably), plus that of experts, attached to different offices, 3,078, gives the total of noncommis- sioned officers as 16,570. The ratio of those outside the barracks to those in the barracks is approximately one fifth. The total multiplied by one fifth is 3,314. For the sake of convenience, we omit the figures 14, and the result is 3,300. EFFECTS ON POPULATION 79 Navy 1 Number of noncommissioned officers and men 45,576 (noncommissioned officers, 9,996, and men, 35,580) Presumptive number of volunteers 22,788 (one half of the total above) Balance of noncommissioned officers and men 22,788 (the other half of the total) Presumptive number of noncommissioned officers living outside naval stations about 5,000 (half of the total number) Balance of men living in naval stations about 17,200 Total (army and na\^) " 229,800 The whole number of those in the active service (both in the army and the navy) is presumably 230,000. Now, sup- posing the 6 per cent of this number as constituting the num- ber of the married, we obtain 13,800. Annual Birth Rates to Married Women. — Supposing women ranging from fifteen to forty-two years of age as capable of production, the number of married women, according to statistics prepared on December 30, 1908, is as follows: Age Married Women 15-20 193-978 20-25 902,999 25-30 1,315.482 30-35 1,341,403 35-40 1,068,154 40-42 442,387 Total 5,264,403 The number of births in 1908 was 1,508,365; in 1907, 1,466,914. The ratio of this number to the number of mar- ried women is i to 3.6. Decrease of Birth Rate, resulting from Conscription. — If the 13,800 of the men we have seen above had remained at home, their wives would have given birth to about 4,000 children (that is, 13,800-^3.6 = 3,833) annually. Moreover, if they had remained at home, they would have married earlier than the age at which their term of service expires. And this means that conscription makes the birth rate still less by postponing marriage. Putting aside this question for the time being, we find some other reasons for considering the figure 4,000 as too small, and these are: ^ Nav\ Department Statistics, 191 1. 8o CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS (i) Early marriage obtains more in the country than in cities. (2) The rate of conscription for active service from the country is greater than that of conscripts for the same from cities. Let us now look at the evidences for these statements. The ages of marriage in the three urban prefectures, whose centers are Tokyo, Kyoto and Osaka, and in the five rural prefectures, Miyagi, Fukushima, Iwate, Aomori, and Yama- gata, in 1904, were as follows, the population of the two groups being approximately the same. Number of Marriages at a Given Age — Urban Prefectures Age 15-16 16-17 17-18 18-19 19-20 20-21 21-22 22-23 23-24 24-25 25-26 26-27 27-28 28-29 Tokyo o 4 31 81 119 316 614 818 1.074 1,189 1,301 1,327 1,212 1,058 Kyoto o I 29 42 89 203 317 425 599 639 781 793 700 601 Osaka I 47 78 ^33 313 484 729 818 1,021 1,174 1,138 1,077 898 Total I 6 107 201 341 832 I-415 1,972 2,491 2,849 3,256 3,258 2,989 2,557 Number of Marriages at a Given Age — Rural Prefectures Age 15-16 16-17 17-18 18-19 19-20 20-21 21-22 22-23 23-24 24-25 25-26 26-27 27-28 28-29 Miyagi o 6 135 193 293 465 544 600 728 653 596 541 447 335 Fukushima Iwate Aomori 3 3 29 19 II 259 319 200 338 338 298 480 503 366 662 620 532 759 649 586 759 585 593 753 611 646 723 549 565 661 444 464 536 312 364 470 270 268 357 229 215 Yamagata I 7 189 257 368 474 567 593 664 641 626 536 453 362 Total 7 72 1,102 1,424 2,010 2,753 3,105 3,130 3,401 3,131 2,791 2,289 1,908 1,498 EFFECTS ON POPULATION 8i In the three urban prefectures, the greatest number of marriages takes place at the age of twenty-six or seven, while in the five rural prefectures, at the age of twenty-three or four. If we now compare the number of the married at the age of fifteen to twenty with the whole number of the married of all the ages given above, we shall see that the age of mar- riage in cities is considerably higher than that in the country. Marriages between Total Number 15-21 of Marriages The three urban prefectures^. ...... 656 37>949 Five rural prefectures 7,368 37,02i Per cent under Age of 2 1 1-7 19.9 The following table compares these figures with those of the married men alone in Tokyo, ranging from nineteen years of age to twenty-four years : Age 19-20 20-21 21-22 22-23 23-24 Married III 197 340 759 1,218 Unmarried Total 9,212 9,323 8,940 9.137 8,008 8,348 8,805 9.564 8,195 9,413 Married Men in Tokvo Per cent of Total in Tokyo 1 .1 2.2 41 7-9 12.9 Per cent of Total in Country 2 3-8 7-3 13-3 16.7 22.6 We are now to see how the number of men from the country in active service is greater than is that from the cities. The rates in the urban prefecture of Kyoto are as follows : Men of Actives Men of Age per Age One of Actives The city of Kyoto* 3,291 652 5.04 Rural districts 6,199 ii537 4 03 The same situation obtains in the prefecture of Tokyo Men of Age The city of Tokyo I4,35i Rural districts 7,805 Men of Age per Actives One of Actives 2,033 7 06 1,665 4 69 1 No data were obtainable for comparison of cities with urban prefectures. 2 Seventh Statistical Report for 1908 by the city of Tokyo. 'Statistical Report for 191 1 by the city of Kyoto. 82 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS The fact that people in the country marry earlier than those in cities and that a comparatively greater number of men of age in the country is enlisted in active service shows that there are really more married men in active ser- vice than the calculation based on the average of the whole people indicates. Accordingly, the decrease of birth rates, caused by the barrack life, must be greater than the 4,000 we have obtained without taking this circumstance into consid- eration. However, we have no means of ascertaining how much greater it is. The decrease of birth rates is not a matter of mere infer- ence. During the Russo-Japanese ^^'ar the rate actually diminished, owing to the fact that men were away from home. We must admit that not only such great events as the Russo- Japanese War, but also lesser events of similar nature have always to do with the decreased rates. In connection with this, we give below the birth rates per 1,000 of the popula- tion, — 32.9 in 1902; 32.0 in 1903; 30.6 in 1904; 30.6 in 1905; 29.1 in 1906; 33.2 in 1907; 33.7 in 1908. The years 1904, 1905 and 1906 were the years in which the people were engaged in the Russo-Japanese War. Development of the Physique We shall see later how barrack life is conducive to the development of the physique. And it is certain that such a life increases the vitality of men to such extent that it results in a diminished death rate, which in turn exerts a favor- able influence upon the birth rate. As to the extent of this influence, it is not possible for us to show in exact figures. One thing that claims our particular attention is the fact that the birth late in this country has increased with the develop- ment of the system of conscription. Of course, we do not know whether the increase is due to economic causes, or to what extent it has been afi"ected by the system. At any rate, this is rather a remarkable fact, when we see that the general tendency among civilized nations is in the oppo- site direction. EFFECTS ON POPULATION Birth Rate Per i.ooo Population 83 Year 1872 24.1 1873 24.6 1874 25.3 1875 26.1 1876 25.5 1877 24.5 1878 24.4 1879 24.3 1880 25.6 1881 24.7 Year 1882 26.8 1883 25.8 1884 26.7 1885 27.3 1886 27.1 1887 29.6 1888 30.2 1889 28.3 1890 26.7 1 89 1 29.4 Year 1892 28 1893 28 1894 29 1895 30 1896 1897 30 1898 31 1899 31 1900 31 1901 33 Year 1902 32.9 1903 32.0 1904 30.6 1905 306 1906 29.1 1907 33-2 1908 33-7 1909 33-9 1910 33-9 1911 340 This increase of the rates is not due to the increase of the rates of marriage. Year 1788. 1893. 1898. Number of the Married Per 100 Females Year 18.73 18.39 18.23 1903- 1908. 17 .61 17-31. Death Rates The system of conscription has also affected the death rate of the population. It is now forty years since the estab- lishment of the system, during which time there have been several wars of varying magnitude. Many soldiers were killed and wounded. In the Russo-Japanese \\'ar alone, sixty- five thousand were disabled, of which some fifteen thou- sand^ were still living at the end of 1912, all others having died in the course of five or six years. The number of deaths and the death rate due to the direct effects of wars must be great. But this can not be regarded as the effect of the system of conscription. By the effect of this system upon death rates is meant the effect of the military service and training. It is insisted upon, among the European nations, that conscription has caused a decrease of death rates to a considerable extent. But we are not able to say for certain that this is also the ^ Osaka Mainichi, December 16, 1913. 7 84 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS case in Japan, because our statistics at the beginning of the Meiji Era were very imperfect. A comparison of death rates before and after the increase of the standing army, accompanying that of the divisions, will enable us to see whether or not our system of conscription has caused a decrease in death rates. For this purpose, let us first compare the death rates before 1 898-1 899 with those after these years, and those before 1 908-1 909 with those after these years, limiting the age of men to from twenty-five to thirty-five. At the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the number of the enrolled was suddenly increased, and this tendency to increase the number was kept up by the organ- ization of the five new divisions immediately after the war. Now, those whose age fell between twenty-five and twenty- six in 1 898-1 899 were already within the scope of the increase, while those above twenty-seven years of age escaped it. In 1 908-1 909, all those above fifteen years and below thirty- five years were within the scope of the increase. The following is a comparison of the death rates in each of the two periods .Annual Death Rate Per 1,000 Mex ■ Age ii ear 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 1898 \ 1899/ •• 1908 \ 1909/ •• 8.38 8.80 7.76 8.46 8.19 8.00 8.08 7.84 7.88 7.68 8.38 7.68 7-73 7.60 8.77 7.72 8.47 7.66 7-72 7-71 8.31 8.08 above with those of the ordinary men, whose age corresponds to each of the ages above. Before showing the comparison, a word is necessary to explain our method of calculation. We base the number of population and the death rate upon ''The Static and Dynamic Statistics of the Population of Japan." The average death rate of each of the two years above is divided by the total number of the ordinary men EFFECTS ON POPULATION 8.^ of the corresponding age in 1 898-1 899 and in 1 908-1 909, respectively. It is necessary for the divisor to be the average of the men of the same age in the two years above. As our static statistics give the number of the population, according to ages, only every five years, we are obliged to use the average of men for one year. From the above table, it is seen that death rates are less in the case after the increase of enrolled men than in the case before the increase. Those of twenty- five or six years of age, who are not at all under the influence of the increased enrollment, or are under the least influence of it, have higher rates than those before the increased enrollment. There may be some other reasons for this, which we are not able to state here. We can not ascribe this decrease of death rates to the ad- vancement of medical sciences, or to the progress of sanitary conditions. If such is the case, there should not be any dif- ference in the rates between men and women, whereas we find the rates for women somewhat on the increase in 1898 and 1908. Of course there may be particular reasons for this, but we can hardly consider it as due to the progress of medicine or hygiene. We rather believe that the increase of enrollment is at least one of the important causes of the decrease of the death rate. Death Rate Per 1,000 Womex Year 1898 1908 26 8.22 10.45 27 7-95 10,79 Age 7.82 10.34 29 7.80 10,31 30 8.89 10,02 Summary We have seen that the system of conscription gives rise to the two contrary effects. It causes a decrease of birth 86 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS rate, on one hand, while it causes an increase of birth rate and a decrease of death rate, on the other. We can not say definitely which of these two effects has the tendency to predominate over the other, because we can not measure the definite quantity of the latter. At any rate, we can say that the effects of the system upon these several rates are not very great. True, we have seen the birth rate decrease temporarily, owing to the absence of men for two or three years. The decrease of the birth rate may have left its effects not only temporarily, but also for several years to come. But, as such effects can not be regarded as due to the system of conscription, we leave the matter as it stands, without entering into further details. CHAPTER III EFFECTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TOWNS As has already been stated, the effects of the system upon the concentration of population may well be viewed from two aspects. The concentration caused by the tendency among the discharged soldiers to live in towns is one. The other is the tendency among the people at large to crowd together into the towns or places where troops are stationed. Let us now take up each of these two aspects. Concentration of Soldiers in Towns A general tendency has developed among our agricultural people to leave their native homes and to crowd together in towns. Does not the system of conscription encourage such a tendency? The reasons that it does so are plain. Barracks and naval stations are usually located in towns, or in their neighborhoods. Naval stations and places for anchorage are mostly located in towns containing more than one hun- dred thousand inhabitants. Of the seventy-six infantry regiments, only sixteen are stationed outside cities or suburbs. And of these sixteen regiments, all except four are stationed in towns of above ten thousand inhabitants. ^ Those who live a rigorous life in the barracks, away from comforts of home, must find compensation in the pleasure of cities or towns when they are permitted to spend a few hours outside the barracks. The more strict is their military discipline, the more pleasant must seem the city life. Thus they get used to the pleasures of cities. Therefore when they are discharged and return home, they can not forget those pleas- ures, while they feel a repugnance for their former agricul- tural life. We are now to see how these observations are borne out by facts. Theoretically speaking, the best way of demonstrating such observ^ations would be first to get the number of the dis- 1 Report of the Military Department, March, 1908. 87 88 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS charged soldiers from the country who live in cities and then to establish a comparison between that number and the ordi- nary people of the corresponding age who have left their homes in the country and removed to the cities. This is, however, impossible for private individuals to accomplish, nor are there any official statistics available for the purpose. We must, therefore, resort to some indirect methods. Let us admit the assumption that the number of country people who come together in cities or towns runs parallel to that of those who remove their domicile to such places. This assumption seems to be almost an actual fact. This will be seen from statistics for the city of Sasebo, where a rapid increase of inhabitants was accompanied by that of temporary residents, who apply for the registration of their domicile in that city. Year 1898 1899 I goo 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 191 1 1912 Residents 8,750 9,928 10,144 1 1 ,408 12,251 13923 15,200 15407 16,121 20,123 22,626 23.872 25.109 26,370 Population Sojourners Total 25.790 34-540 28,632 38,560 33.679 43.823 38,010 49,418 50,968 42,878 55,129 47,707 61,630 55.503 70,703 58,756 74.163 59,891 76,012 58,655 78,778 57,641 80,267 58,230 82,102 61,300 86,409 63,983 90,353 Ratio of "Nonresi- dents per 100 Inhabitants 74 74 76 77 77 77 78 79 78 74 71 70 70 69 During all these years, the population has increased at the rate of about 15 per cent; the ratio of nonresidents to the inhabitants was rather stationary, that is, between 71 per cent and 79 per cent. This shows that the number of those removing their domicile into the said city accompanies the EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT OF TOWNS 89 increase of nonresidents. Working on this basis, we believe we can say that whenever the number of removals in certain particular classes is large, that of the sojourners of certain particular classes is also large, unless there are some partic- ular circumstances, in which the former wish to move. On the strength of this assumption, we may make the assertion that the discharged soldiers from the country would be rela- tively more numerous among the sojourners when the number of such soldiers is relatively larger among the men who change their domicile. Our problem would then be somewhat as follows: Is the number of the said soldiers, who change their domicile to the cities, greater than that of ordinary movers? Here again, we have no direct means of solving the question. The only way is to resort to a certain indirect method. Supposing that the ratio of soldiers enrolled in the active service to the male population is the same in a city and in a district from which the soldiers flow into that city, our formula will be: ^^ r Number of actives A' = Same in the other city.^ [ in one city R= / Number of active t>,_ ,, a a << ~ \ reserves or reserves p_ f Number of male p/_ u u .< << ~ \ residents (i) In case of the concentration of discharged soldiers in towns — B b; A A' (2) In case this concentration is larger among the said soldiers than among ordinary people — B b; P P' But as the ratio of the actives to the male population is greater in the country than in towns, we must take this cir- cumstance into consideration. Our method of calculation would then become a little more complex. 1 If necessary, we may in some cas3s use the actual figures of the active instead of the signs, A, A'. 90 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS (i) If there be a concentration of the soldiers in towns, as we have seen above, then there will be such a relation as — A A' And if there be no such concentration, then the question whether its rate is especially great in towns or not is negatived from the outset. (2) If there obtain such a relation as — B b; • , p P' in spite of the fact that the rate of the actives to male population is less in towns than in the country, then it goes without saying that the tendency toward concentration is stronger among the discharged soldiers from the country. Even supposing that there obtains no such relation, we can still say that this is the case, if there be the following fact: A , /A/ _ A V / A_' B-^P ^P; Ph^^BfwB P' P' A/ P\ P' PA, P' ^ p \P' Pjn Sign, - represents the rate of the total of the removers into the city in question n and of the newly born out of them to the whole population, since the enlistment in service of the oldest of the active reserves or of the reserves. Let us explain the above somewhat in detail. If soldiers flow into cities in the same rate as ordinary people, then the rate of the above two classes of reserves to the male popula- tion of cities would be equal to the left side of the formula above. But if — is actually greater, then this is an evidence that the reserv'es are especially numerous. Strictly speaking, the factor B' in — in the left side must be replaced with B'+X, with X indicating the numbei of soldiers that have gone to the towns. But we may well overlook the X as against the comparatively greater P'. We are now to see EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT OF TOWNS 91 whether or not the rate of concentration is especially great on the part of soldiers, by using the method explained above. According to statistics prepared in 1910 for the city of Kyoto, the number of soldiers from the country is as follows: District Actives Active Reserves Reserves Male N.C.O. Men Total N.C.O. Men Total N.C.O. Men Total Residents Upper Lower 23 29 826 1,032 849 1,061 74 112 778 1,021 852 1,133 212 290 795 1,059 1,007 1,349 Total . . 52 1,858 1,910 186 1,799 1,985 502 1,854 2,356 167,246 If we wish to know what localities send out the most people to be domiciled in the city, we must ascertain what localities have sent out the most sojourners into the city. According to statistics prepared in 191 1, the whole number of sojourners and the localities where sojourners above five thousand were found in the said year, is as follows : Number of Localities Sojourners Districts in Kyoto prefecture 28,091 Osaka prefecture 1 1.545 Hyogo prefecture 11,141 Shiga prefecture 37,474 Gifu prefecture 6,122 Fukui prefecture 7,303 Ishikawa prefecture 9,824 Other districts . 48,535 Total 160,035 Per cent of Whole Number of Sojourners 17.6 7 7 23 4 3 8 4 5 6 2 20 1 v3 lOO.O B' A' For — and — in the left side of our formula above, we .... g, must find the average that is given by weighing these — and A' — of the different prefectures, according to the respective numbers of sojourners. But we can not, to our regret, secure B' A' the accurate figures for — and — of all the prefectures above, except those of Shiga, Ishikawa and H\'ogo. And we have 92 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS found that their figures are very near those of Kyoto, as is evident from the following comparison: I. Between Kyoto and Ishikawa Prefectures (1907) Actives (A) Male Population (P) Kyoto 5,184 Ishikawa 4,150 512,343 411.450 II. Between Kyoto and Shiga Prefectures (1909) Actives (A) Male Population (P) Kyoto 6,601 Shiga 4,838 526,358 381,692 III. Between Kyoto and Hy^ogo Prefectures (1909) Actives ( ~ ) Male Population (P) Kyoto 2,189 Hyogo 4,092 1,005,211 544,363 A P .9012 .01009 A P 127.3 126.7 nP 40.7 40.2 It seems that all other prefectures are very similar to the B' A' ^ , above, and we think we can use — and — of Kyoto instead of the average we have obtained above by weighing. It B' A' would be more accurate, if we use the — and — of the Kyoto districts alone, leaving out that of the city of Kyoto. Soldiers in the Districts of Kyoto (1910) Actives Active Reserves Reserves Male N. C. 0. Men Total N. CO. Men Total N. C. 0. Men Total Residents 127 2,435 2,562 169 2,272 2,441 514 2,14s 2,659 206,297 According to the above method, the rate of these two /B B'\ reserves to that of the actives I — > —J is as follows: Active Reserves Actives Against Actives Reserves Against Actives City 100% 103.9 Districts 100% 95 .3 123.3% 103.9' (f) » (I') Active Reserves Reserves .0119 .0141 .0118 .0129 EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT OF TOWNS 93 Either with the active reserves or with the reserves, we find the relation t>T7- Hence, the certainty of the fact of con- centration among the soldiers from the country. Let us see next the ratio of the men of the different services to the male population. Actives City 01 16 Districts 0124 Since the rate of the two reserves to the male population is greater in the city than in the districts, their rate is to be greater than that of ordinary people In order to make the comparison still more accurate, we again use the above formula : A /A'_Ay B' P Vp' P/n Active Reserve — P A^ =.0118 F ■^ il6+(i24-ii6)Xl/3 X — = .0118 ,. 116+8X1/3 o^"6 + - But— A , B B' P Vp' P/n B p = .oii8 .-. p-,X ^7 >p /A'AV Vp' P/n P' Reserves — ^ X "\, '^" = .01 29 /A'_A\j, VP' P/n_ P A' P' _ ii6+(i24-ii6)X^ ^120 ,, X F^i = .oi29X— =.0120- * Note: - — . The oldest of the active reserves were enrolled seven years ago, during which the number of the removals into the city has not been more than I one third of the male population. Hence, ~. o * Note: — ~ — . The h indicates the rate of removals seventeen years hence for n 2 ^ ■' B the same reason as above. But, p = .0141 .oi4i>.oi25 94 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS We can see from the above that the rate of concentration from the country is greater among the discharged soldiers than among ordinary people. To what extent is this rate due to the effects of military life? In order to answer this question, we must first know whether or not the said soldiers have a stronger tendency toward concentration even without the effects of military life. But we have no material to ascer- tain it quantitatively. Let us once more see what is the case with some other A' B' great cities, taking — , — of the district, in which lies the city, instead of the weighted average obtained from the said quantities of the districts wherefrom the soldiers are removed. City of Tokyo (1910) Actives City. 5,740 Districts 4,399 Actives City 100 Districts 100 The above shows that either in the active reserves or in B . B' . . the reserv'es, — is greater than — , from which will be seen the fact of concentration among them. Ratio to Male Population Actives Active Reserves Reserves City 0093 .0117 .0128 Districts 0114 .0131 .0124 \Mth this alone, we can not ascertain the stronger tendency toward concentration among the said soldiers. Now — Active Male Reserves Reserves Population 7,237 7,923 5,066 4,799 619,139 385,834 Active ReserA'es to One Hundred Actives Reser%'es to One Hundred Actives 126 115 138 109 EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT OF TOWNS 95 A+/A'_AV B B' Pj_VP^P/n Q3 + (ri4-93)l p=.oii7 pX — = .oi3iX- — ICO = ^3iX — =.0115+^ A + fA'_AV B^B' P Vp' P/n .oii5<.oii7 ■". p>p^ X^ We see that the rate of concentration is greater among the active reserves. It is still more evident among the reserves. B_ P-.0138 A+/A'_Ay jvp^Vp' pyn By P'-^ X' = .0124 ^ 93+(ii4-93)' , I03-5 X — =.oi24X-Y^ = .oi23 A, /A'_AV = . B^B' P l,P' P/n .oi38>.oi23 that is,p> p X ^^ P City of Kobe (191 i) Active Male Actives Reserves Reserves Population City 1,224 1,730 1,830 120,648 Districts 10,512 I4,330 11,241 878,731 Ratio of the Two Reserves to Actives Active Reserves Reserves to to One Hundred One Hundred Actives Actives Actives City 100 141 149 Districts 100 137 107 • . BR' ■■ A A' Ratio to Male Population Actives Active Reserves Reserves City oioi -0043 0152 Districts 0120 0152 .0128 1 Note: ~ ~ T, according to the circumstances given above. 2 Note: ~~2> according to the circumstances given above. 96 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS Active Reserves — B B'_P Vp P'/n = .0143 B' P a; p' =.0127 Provided, —~- n 3 Reserves — B p=.OI52 B' P + fA_A'V Vp F'/n a; p' :.0Il8 I _ I Provided, — n 2 In either case, the concentration is remarkable among soldiers, especially among the reserves. And this is so in the larger cities. This fact is, however, not so evident in the smaller cities, in some of which the contrary is often the case. Take for example those of the Fukuoka Prefecture: Actives Active Reserves Reserves Male N.C.O. Men Total N.C.O. Men Total N.C.O. Men Total Population Fukuoka . . Kurume. . . Kokura. . . . Moji 4 15 5 7 286 158 87 109 290 173 92 116 30 36 9 26 378 197 141 129 408 233 ISO 155 97 53 43 24 321 169 iSi 118 418 222 194 142 31.844 15.548 10,067 8.811 Total Districts . . 31 451 640 8,189 671 8,640 lOI 773 845 11,684 946 12,457 217 1.954 759 11,050 976 13,004 66,270 840,878 Ratio of the Two Reserves to the Actives Active Reserves Actives to 100 Actives City 100 141 Districts 100 144 Ratio to Male Population Actives Active Reserves City Old .0141 Districts 0104 .0148 Active Reserves — A , /A'_A\i B B' p'^Vp' P/n p = .0141 p7 X ^^7 = .01 47 F Reserves to 100 Actives 145 150 Reserves .0147 •0155 EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT OF TOWNS 97 Reserves — In either case — A , /A'_AV B B' P VP' Pyn p = -0147 p- ^ X' ^ •°'53 P' B < B'yA /A'_AV P' P Vp' P/n A/ P' This may be due to the fact that this prefecture has many small mines in the districts, thereby causing the concentra- tion of discharged soldiers to an extent greater than in other prefectures. But it is also due to the fact that smaller towns have a smaller rate of concentration. The same thing can be said of many other smaller towns. We have thus far seen that the rate of concentration in towns is greater among the discharged soldiers than among the ordinary people. We believe we are doing justice to the fact when we ascribe it to the effects of military life. Only we are not able to ascertain the extent of the effects, as we can not know the extent of the effects that are caused by some other conditions. The particular local conditions of the places where troops are stationed make a difference in Prefecture of Tokyo Age 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 Men 503.1 508.7 462.3 447-0 S20-I 437-5 638.0 517.5 564. 1 543.7 522.4 503.4 460.7 410.9 370.8 317.0 319 .6 Womf^n 272 I Throughout the Country Age 0-5 S-IO 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 Men 607.2 595-9 581-3 561-5 525-5 516-6 470-4 469-5 405.8 428.4 401.6 407.0 379.0 370.1 309.1 296.7 294-6 274. 3 Women ' Statistics of population, prepared in 1908. 98 CONSCRIPTION system: economic effects the effects, of which, however, we have no material to work upon. Concerning our investigation above, there is one thing that demands our particular attention, and it is whether there is more or less difference between the rate of the age classes of removals of the discharged soldiers and of the ordinary people of a corresponding age. If the rate is greater among the former, then it follows that the rate of concentration among the discharged soldiers is not necessarily great. But our investigation into the actual circumstances shows that the rate of removal is especially great among the people below a corresponding age. The above statistics do not give the rate of each age among the removals to the city, but the rate of each age for the year previous to it is as follows: Age 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 Tokyo 112 91 123 90 88 86 93 99 81 The whole country 94 We thus see that the rate of removals into cities is con- siderable among people ten to twenty years of age. The rate among people ranging from twenty to twenty-five years of age merely make up the difference of death rate; that among people of twenty-five to thirty falls short of the dif- ference; and that among people thirty to thirty-five falls short of the difference to a still greater extent. Our con- clusion is therefore not at all affected by such circumstances. Formation of Military Towns The places in which troops are stationed have a tendency to form into towns, for they naturally invite commercial and industrial people, especially retailers. If these places have EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT OF TOWNS 99 already been towns, they will undergo a rapid expansion after they become stations for troops. This is because many peo- ple flow into them in order to earn their livelihood as suppliers of materials for the troops, or as suppliers of labor and mate- rials both for the troops and the people who are connected with them in various ways. But it is difficult to estimate the extent of concentration caused by the stationing of troops. This difficulty is two- fold, (i) Most of the military stations are located, not in cities or towns, but in their suburbs. Of the seventy-six infantry regiments, thirty-five are stationed in suburbs; of the twenty-four field artillery regiments, twelve; of the twenty-two cavalry regiments, nineteen; of the eighteen engineering battalions, ten; and of the eighteen commissariat battalions, nine are in suburbs. Many of the suppliers men- tioned above are naturally led to live in the suburbs, and their number does not appear in the statistics of cities or towns. It is not possible to secure the exact number of the inhabitants of each village around the military stations. The only way left is to obtain the number of the inhabitants of each city or town that lies in the neighborhood of the stations. This is, of course, indirect and insufficient for our purpose. (2) There is another difficulty of a contrary nature. If the statistics of the cities are depended upon, how are we to dis- tinguish between the increase of the city populations caused by the annexation of the neighboring villages and the increase caused by other circumstances? The former is liable to underestimation, while the latter is liable to overestimation. Difiiculties such as these He in our way. Insufiicient as our method is, we must pursue our investigation, basing it upon the statistics of the cities. After the Sino-Japanese War, the number of the divisions was increased from seven to twelve. At the same time, twenty new infantry regiments were organized (the 29th regi- ment to the 48th regiment). Of these regiments, some were stationed at the places where the divisions had already located while others had to be stationed at new places. As new 100 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS divisions are accompanied by new regiments of the infantry and other branches, the increase of divisions means the increase of population to a greater extent than the increase of regiments alone. Let us now see how this assertion is borne out by the table below. We except from the table Osaka, Kyoto, Nagoya and Sendai, on the one hand, and the two small towns, Muramatsu and Sabaye, on the other, because the former contain more than one hundred thousand inhabitants and accordingly the fluctuation of the figures for inhabitants is caused more by other reasons than by the increase of troops, while the latter are wanting in the statistics of population. The following table, ^ therefore, concerns the fourteen (out of twenty) cities and towns, where regiments were newly organized : T^ppiment Population (Infantry) Towns 1894 1903 Increase N o "^I Hirosaki* Yamagata Shizuoka Kanazavva" Himeji'' Tottori Fukuyama Yamaguchi Zentsuji^ Kochi Kagoshima Ohmura Kokura* Kurume 30 934 28 565 37.824 89.975 31 134 27,776 15.476 15.075 8,083 (1896) 37.112 55.495 7649 (1898) 18,826 26,962 36443 40,248 48,744 99,657 26,509 31.023 16,976 19876 1 1 ,044 35.518 .59001 7.847 36825 33.273 5 509 ' 7,2 11,683 ' -lA 10 920 ' T,=, 9,682 ' -in 5375 .1 ' 4.0 3,247 « ' Al I 500 ' 42 4,801 ' AT. 2,961 ' 4.4 1.544 ' 4S 3 506 46 198 47 48 17.999 6,311 * New div'isions. The average increase of population throughout the five towns where new divisions were established is about 8,300 (perhaps, the average would be a little more than this, if we were able to include the increase at Zentsuji, since 1894). 'The above figures are taken from the Imperial Statistics, except those of Zentsuji and Ohmura, which are taken from the Prefeclural Statistics, EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT OF TOWNS lOI The average in those towns where regiments alone were newly organized is 4,550. The difference must be regarded as due to such special branches as cavalry, artillery, engineering, etc. Thus, new troops mean an increase of population in certain towns. But what relation is there between this increase and the size of the towns? It is difficult to give an accurate answer with the scanty data at hand. But, examination of this material reveals that the smaller the town, the larger the increase of population that is due to the new organization of troops. Of the towns in the above table, the increase in the towns of ten thousand to twenty thousand inhabitants, in the towns of twenty thousand to thirty thousand, and in the towns of thirty thousand to forty thousand, is as follows: Size of Towns X umber of Towns Total Popula- tion (1894) Total Popula- tion (1903) Increase Average (A) I0,000''-20,000 (B) 20,000 -30 000 (C) 30,000 -40,oo( 3 3 4 49.377 83,303 137.004 73-677 104,544 157.214 24,300 21,241 20,210 8,100 7,080 5.050 ■One of (A) is the place where a division is stationed, and two of (C) have each a division. The above figures show that the smaller the size of the towns, the larger the increase in the population. Let us next see how this is the case with the towns of the three following classes, — those above ten thousand, those above twenty thousand and those above thirty thousand but below forty thousand, the number of each, according to statistics pre- pared in 1894. The increase of the population of each up to 1903 is as follows: Size of Towns Number of Towns Total Popula- tion (1894) Total Popula- tion (1904) I ncrease Average (A) I0,000-20,0C0. (B) 20,000-30,000. (C) 30,000-40,000. 43 II 19 1,473,512 304,392 1,596,694 373.255 123,182 68,863 96,805 2,865 6,260 5.095 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORN lA xoa CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS Comparing the average of each town with that of the same in the other table, we find that the increase caused by new troops is greater in the smaller towns. Average of the Places Increase of Towns ' for new Troops Average Total Comparison A 8,ioo 2,865 5.235 : B 7,080 6,260 820 C 5.050 5,095 45 ' That the increase of population is greater in the places where new divisions are established than in the places where new regiments are organized, and that the increase of popula- tion caused by new troops is especially large in the smaller towns, can be seen by looking at the places where new troops were stationed after the Russo-Japanese War. Twenty-four regiments were newly established after the war. Below is a comparison between the population before the establishment and that after the establishment in the places where regiments are stationed, excepting Hiroshima and other cities containing a population above one hundred thousand, and Sasayama and Sakura, whose population we have no means of ascertaining: Regiment No. 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 58 =59 and 66 . 60 61 62 63 64 65 67 68 69 Towns Kofu Matsumoto Tsu Hirosaki Nara Okayama^' Saga Kurume" Takata=' Utsunomiya'' Toyohashi-'' Wakayama Tokushima Matsiiye Miyakonojo W'akamatsu Hamamatsu (;ifu Tovama Oita 1903 44,188 33,493 36,408 36,443 33.735 81,025 35,083 33,273 19,557 35,953 28,315 68,527 63,710 35,081 14,716 32,534 23,306 40,168 56,275 11,927 1908 49,882 35,011 41,229 37,489 93.421 36,051 35.928 28,021 45,183 43.980 77.303 65.561 36,209 18,345 39,265 32.381 41,488 57.437 29,547 Increase 5,694 1,518 4,821, 1,046' 1,003 12,396 968 2,655 8,464 9,230 15.655 8,776 1. 85 1 1,128 3.629 6,731 9.075 1,320 1,162 17,620 * Towns where new divisions were established. Besides these, Kyoto had a new division. But its population is too large for our purpose, so it is omitted from the table. All the above figures are based upon statistics. EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT OF TOWNS 103 • Let us again compare the increase of population in the places where new divisions were formed with that in the places where new regiments were organized. ' Number of Towns 1903 1908 Increase Average Places of new di\'isions . . . Places of new regiments . . . 5 15 198,123 565,594 246,533 629,928 48,110 64.334 9,682 4,289 Of these two classes of towns, the increase in the former is twice as large as that in the latter. We shall now find that the smaller towns have greater increase of population by the stationing of new troops when we look at the population of each of the above classes of towns: (i) Increase Throughout Towns, Garrisoned by New Divisions Size of Towns Number of Towns Population 1903 Population 1908 Increase Average 10,000-25,000 .... 25,000-50,000 .... 5 12 69,506 429,674 152,274 474.345 82,668 44.571 16,533 3.63 1 "^ " It must be remembered that such an increase is due not only to new troops but also to other circumstances. (2) Increase in Towns, Not Garrisoned by New Divisions . Size of Towns Number of Towns Population 1903 Population 1908 Increase Average 10,000-25,000 .... 25,000-50,000 .... 3 9 49.949 327,133 80,273 349,354 30,324 22,221 10,108 2,525 The increase in the smaller towns of 10,000 to 25,000 during this period has been — Number of Towns Population 1903 Population 1908 Increase Average 103 1,581,109 1,719,061 137.952 1,281 r04 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS Therefore it follows that however small the average increase of the larger towns of 25,000 to 50,000 may be, the increase caused by new troops is greater in the towns below 25,000. Now for the reasons why the increase is larger in the smaller towns. Some of the new trades demanded by the estab- lishment of new troops are not found in the smaller towns. Even if found, men of those trades are few. Hence, the necessity of concentration, in order to meet the new demand. The larger towns have such trades already even before the establishment, and the number of men engaged in the trades is large. However, they have to extend their businesses by greater effort. Hence, the lesser increase of population in the larger towns. Of course, a new event such as the estab- lishment of new troops may cause a boom among the traders, which will in turn attract people from other quarters. But such a psychological circumstance fails computation. Our statistical investigations have shown that the towns for new divisions have greater increase of population than the towns for new regiments, that the increase of population is caused by the establishment of troops, and that the increase is greater in the smaller towns than in the larger towns. But the results arrived at are only of a general nature. For those towns are mostly provincial centers of commerce, education, local administration, etc., and have other and more varied causes for the increase of population than the establishment of troops. In order to obtain more accurate results, we should have to take a place where there was no cause for the increase other than the establishment of new divisions or regiments. But such places can not be found. The town of Zentsuji, however, approaches this ideal, which we shall now consider. Previous to the establishment of a new division, this town had consisted of a smaller town, containing some three thou- sand inhabitants, and an agricultural village, containing some five thousand inhabitants. There were scarcely any circum- stances that would attract people except the establishment of new troops. But it has now developed into a town of more than 14,000 inhabitants, including the surrounding villages. The following statistics show the process of its growth: EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT OF TOWNS Population of Zentsuji i05 Year Town of Zentsuji Number of Houses Inhabitants Men Women Total f Village Yoshida 410 654 555 .... 2,294 3.058 2,731 1896 < " Zentsuji " Asano Total 1,619 8,08^ [ V^illage Yoshida 558 932 607 1,427 1,947 1,423 1,335 1,972 1,426 2,762 1898 < " Zentsuji 3,918 2,849 " Asano Total 2,097 4,797 4.732 9,529 f Village Yoshida 1.458 2,342 1.398 1.599 2,321 1,390 3,057 4,663 2 788 1899 i " Zentsuji " Asano Total 5,198 5,310 10,508 1901 2.344 3.199 2,385 3422 2,542 2,627 2,704 3,806 3,684 6,780 7,502 5,616 7,019 7,237 7,563 7645 7,273 7,036 4,952 5,122 5.428 5.244 6,561 6,642 6,786 7.348 7,072 I I 7'?2 1002 12,624 11,044 12,263 13,798 14,205 14.431 14,621 1903 1904 190S 1906 1907 1908 1909" IQIO* I9II 14,108 14,363 I912 ^ No statistics for 1909 and 1910. Let us next see the fluctuation of the figures in the neigh- boring towns and villages, where no division was established, in order to estimate the speed of increase. Population of Neighboring Towns and Villages Places 1897 1899 1902 1905 1908 1911 A (Tadotsu) 7,763 2,944 2,757 3,396 2,494 2,512 7,979 2,938 2,823 3,356 2,476 2,601 7,483 3,402 2,492 3,529 2,561 2,808 7,715 2,904 3.036 3,578 2.517 2,849 7,863 2,826 2,974 3,537 2,568 3,034 8,572 3,030 2,967 3.723 2.677 2,870 B (Toyohara) C (Shirakata) D (Shikamura) E (Yoshiwara) F (Fudeoka) Total 21,866 22,173 22,275 22,599 22,802 23,939 I06 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS Ratio of Increase in Neighboring Towns and Villages Year 1897 1899 1902 1905 1908 1911 Villages (excluding A) Popula- tion 14,103 14.194 14.792 14,884 14.939 15.367 Ratio of Increase 100 100 104 105 106 109 Towns and Villages (including A) Popula- tion 21,866 22,173 22,275 22,599 22,802 23,939 Ratio of Increase 100 loi .4 loi .9 103.3 104.2 109.5 Ratio of Increase in Zentsuji Year 1897 1899 1902 1905 1908 1911 illages Estimated Increase'' 8,083b 8,140 8,479 8,536 8,568 8,811 Actual Excess over Estimate 8,196 8,237 8,350 8,423 8,851 Towns and Villages Estimated Increase" 2,368 3.695 5.262 6,053 5,397 Actual Excess over Estimate 2,311 3,937 5,448 6,198 5,257 * Estimated on supposition that ratio of increase is same as of neighboring towns and villages. ''The figures are for 1896. We have no rate for 1897. From the above it will be seen that the increase of popula- tion caused by the establishment of a new division is about five thousand and a fraction. Moreover, the towns in which divisions are stationed are usually places where are stationed not only infantry regiments, but also regiments, battalions, corps, etc., of other special branches, and hospitals, armories and regimental and divisional headquarters. The full force of an infantry regiment is about eighteen hundred, while that of two regiments and battalions of other special branches is never more than nineteen hundred and fifty. But there are other men belonging to special offices and bureaus. Taking all this into consideration, it would be probably correct to EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT OF TOWNS 10/ state that the increase of population, at the towns where new divisions are estabHshed, is about one-third of the above num- ber, that is, sixteen or seventeen hundred. Again, changes in the Hst of soldiers would make a difference. If the establish- ment of new divisions should take place in larger towns, the rate of the increase of population would be still less. Summary As we have seen above, the system of conscription tends to attract soldiers to cities, and, as a consequence, to attract civilians to these places where troops are stationed. We may therefore say that the system is an effective factor in encourag- ing concentration in towns. However, concentration is also encouraged in other ways. The manufacture of military materials and the business of supplying raw materials for this manufacture, even in towns where troops are not sta- tioned, causes concentration. Then, again, increase in popu- lation is often the result of the construction of improved means of communication and of sanitary equipments for the convenience of the troops. These circumstances must of course not be overlooked, even though we have not the means at hand to study them in definite quantities. CHAPTER IV EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT The following four chapters will be devoted to an investiga- tion of the effects of the system of conscription upon national economy. Our investigation falls under two general head- ings — the effects upon production and the effects upon consumption. Let us first study the economic effects upon production. That capital and labor must be united in order to carry out production is undeniable. In other words, employment and labor must go hand in hand. Other things being equal, the productive power of a nation is determined by the quantity of labor plus employment. If we wish to determine the effects of the system of conscription upon the productive power of our nation, we have first to note its effects upon employment, then its effects upon labor, and lastly its effects upon the combination of the two. Loss of labor is usually pointed out as the effect of this system. But how this is so can be known only when the question whether there is enough opportunity for employment is answered. In this chapter, we shall observe the effects upon employment, dividing it into two sections, that concerning agriculture and that concerning manufac- tures and commerce. Agriculture The effects of the system upon agricultural employments can not be said to be great. They are little compared with those upon commerce and manufactures. The agricultural effects are to be seen from two aspects — that of the increase of employments, and that of their decrease. Decrease of Agricultural Employments The chief cause of the decrease is to be found in the de- crease of the area of arable land, owing to the larger area 1 08 EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT 109 being used for military purposes. As the selection of the sites for barracks is determined by the conditions that are convenient for military purposes, such as defense or mobili- zation, the ground in the neighborhood of cities or towns is liable to utilization. And such ground is usually fertile soil. Of course, the decrease of the area from such a cause is not very considerable, and yet not so little as to justify overlooking it. We can not know the exact amount of such decrease, but we can obtain an approximate estimate of the arable area utilized by the Military Department when we sum up the areal amounts of those lots whose estimated values are above ten sen per tsubo (thirty yen per acre). The following figures are based on the "Annual Report" prepared by the department on December 31, 1910: Arable Land Used for Military Purposes Offices The Land Survey Dept Headquarters of Special JVIilitary Works. Headquarters of Fortifications The Tokyo Arsenal The Osaka Arsenal The Senju Woolen Factory The Horse Administration Bureau The Imperial Guard Division The First The Second The Third The Fourth The Fifth The Sixth The Seventh The Eighth The Ninth The Tenth The Eleventh The Twelfth The Thirteenth The Fourteenth The Fifteenth The Sixteenth The Seventeenth The Eighteenth Total Division . Area Tsubo 242 3,856,932 5,993-675 768,212 569 547 32,358 643,555 1,008,092 9,505,228 5,942 3,884,731 2.333,580 1,903,070 6,032,110 o 457,064 2,108,566 4,725,054 2,709,864 1,297,140 1,131,219 858,139 7,526,973 863,361 10,362,452 836,702 72,868,770 Land Value per Tsubo 13 15 10 TOO 156 1300 17 33 19 100 12 100 22 22 24 25 16 10 84 28 36 24 23 13 57 Sen 3- 61 6- 143 .4- 28 .0- 854 . I-I2GO ,0 .7- 19 3- 348 .8- 478 ,0 313 598 119 150 4- o- I- 5- o 9 5 9 8- 3- 6 5 7 6- 2- 5- 234 ■) 122 .7 115. 146.6 78.4 no CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS According to another statistical report prepared by the department in the same year (1910), the total area under its control is 765,230,891 tsuho. Deducting from the total the area in Korea, Formosa, Manchuria and that under the con- trol of the headquarters of special military works but lying outside the country, we get 729,513,004 tsuho, which is the total area within the country. Of this total area within the country, nearly one-tenth is supposed to be arable land. Hence, we must say that the decrease of the arable area means the decrease of agricultural employment. If there be any objection to the method that regards the land value of thirty yen up per tan ( = \ acre) as a mark of arable land, let us then exchange this estimate for that of one hundred yen. Now, according to the statistical report above, there are 22,493,313 tsuho of such land. To the extent that this much of the arable land is turned into military use, agri- cultural laborers are deprived of their employment. In 1 91 2 and 1 91 3, a fraction of the land under the control of the department was sold, but we have no means of know- ing just how much. Increase of Agricultural Employments Troops are better provided with food and clothing than the people at large, which we shall see later. For the supply of raw materials we have to depend upon primitive industry. The better the conditions of living of the troops, the more we depend upon it. Most of the cotton and wool for military use comes from foreign lands, but rice and other grains, vege- tables, fish and meat and leathers are obtained at home. The fact that these materials, especially those of better qualities, are in large demand in the army must be one of the sources of the livelihood of agricultural and fishing laborers. We must put this matter aside for the time being, because the investigation into such a matter is accompanied by too intri- cate conditions, and because the extent of its being a source of their livelihood is not so considerable. We say not con- EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT III siderable, since such necessaries as specified above would be in demand among the masses, if their prices were reduced a Httle. Troops cause an increase of agricultural, especially stock farming, employments from circumstances other than those mentioned above. They demand war horses and forage. Industry connected with war horses and forage is possible only because of troops. We can not, of course, obtain any definite estimate of the increase of employments in the production of war horses. But there is no doubt that industrial laborers derive more benefit and more em- ployment than if there were no demand for war horses. And we can estimate the extent of the demand for war horses and forage. In order to know how troops are supplied with horses, let us see what are some of the provisions made in the Horse Administration Regulations (Military Department, No. 69, issued in 1908). All corps (except the Horse Supply Bureau and those corps whose horses are supplied out of the surplus horses of military schools) shall fill up their number of horses every year, at the rate of one-tenth of the prescribed number. (Chapter 2, clause 4.) The following horses are to be supplied with those bred at the Horse Supply Bureau, — cavalry horses, field artillery horses, horses belonging to the cavalry training school and those belonging to the field artilleiy training school, and which are to be supplemented peiiodically. (Chapter 2, clause 5.) The following horses are to be replaced with young horses purchased: mountain artillery horses, heavy artillery horses, commissariat horses, telegraphic battalion horses, those used by the different schools, those used by ofificers, those to be provided lor the first time and those to be supplied temporarily. (Chapter 2, clause 6.) The Horse Supply Bureau shall purchase every year two-year-old horses to the number of one-third of the horses that are being bred at the bureau, and to train them for about three years. The horses to be purchased may be three years old if necessary. (Chapter 3, clause 14.) 112 CONSCRIPTION system: economic effects The average number of horses per day, in 1910, is as follows: Division Schools 1st Division Imperial Guards 2d Division 3d " 4th " 5th " 6th " 7th " 8th " 9th " loth " nth " I2th " 13th " 14th " 15th " i6th " 17th " i8th _" \ Troops in Korea Troops in Formosa Troops in China and Manchuria The Branch Office of Horse Supply Bureau at Shirakawa The Branch Office at Hagino " " Kushiro " " Takanabe " " Kawakami " " Sanbongi " " Muhara " " Shichinohel " " Oyama Total I9I0 1911 1,912 1,984 5 f'li 5,061 3 439 3,472 790 623 I 141 1. 138 I 401 1,406 1,388 956 901 1,147 I -145 1,156 2,4«3 2,495 I -134 1,138 1,137 1,139 478 1,259 1,656 1,703 1,139 1,158 1,156 1,165 2,465 2,478 1. 134 1,139 I 247 I 293 I 254 I 287 I 917 I 522 150 148 1,036 I 773 1,470 1.429 949 1,135 689 698 928 941 497 512 I 35 s I 404 898 873 U4 1,193 636 672 44,080 45 397 I9I2 1,992 5,062 3,468 1,298 1,123 1,420 762 1,165 1,165 2,016 1,150 1,156 1,153 1,723 1,174 1,192 2,496 1,163 316 1 273 1,480 156 1,223 I 341 I 094 764 939 549 I 433 861 1,266 683 44,025 One-third of this total, that is, some three thousand head, is to be replaced every year with a fresh supply, purchased by the Horse Supply Bureau. The different military schools need also an annual fresh supply of horses to the extent of one-tenth of the prescribed bed number. One-seventh of the total number of war horses has to be supplied annually, according to our calculation based on the "regulations." We find the same situation with the number of the head actually filled up. EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT 113 1912 Number of Years Horses Were Used Horses o- I 197X 1= 197 1-2 224X 2= 448 2-3 293X 3= 879 3-4 248X 4= 992 4- 5 273X 5=1,365 5- 6 216X 6= 1,296 6- 7 447X 7 = 3,129 7-8 819X 8 = 6,552 8-9 614X 9 = 5,526 9-10 117X10=1,170 lo-ii 255X11=3.905 11-12 26X12= 312 12-13 30X13= 390 13-14 16X14= 224 14-15 11X15= 165 15-16 6X16= 96 16- 6X17= 102 3,898 26,748 26,748-3,898 = 6.87 1910 Number of Years Horses W'ere Used Horses 0- I 294X 1= 294 1- 2 299X 2= 598 2-3 452 X 3=1,356 3-4 209X 4= 836 4- 5 473X 5 = 2,365 5-6 888X 6 = 5,328 6-7 711 X 7 = 4,977 7- 8 156X 8=1,248 8-9 142X 9=1,278 9-10 151X10=1,510 lo-ii 285X11=3,135 11-12 24X12= 286 12-13 18X13= 234 13-14 9X14= 126 14-15 14X15= 210 15-16 7X16= 112 16- 6X17= 102 4,140 23,997 23.997^4,140 = 5 80 Thus the number of years during which horses are em- ployed is about six or seven years, which shows that about one-seventh of the horses in employment is to be filled up every year. The following figures indicate the number of horses purchased in recent years: Years Kinds Head Total Cost Average Amount Per Head r Ridinff horses 4,272 1,780 513 Yen 598,161 256,026 59,992 Yen I 40 . 00 143-83 116.44 1910 • Cart horses Pack horses Total r Riding horses 6,565 914,179 139-25 3,194 1,488 300 453.529 201,362 36,422 141.994 135 324 121. 407 1911 ■ Cart horses Pack horses Total f Riding horses 4,982 691,312 138.762 2,911 1,158 308 407.371 156,133 36,497 139 942 134-830 118.497 1912 i Cart horses Pack horses Total 4,377 600,001 137.081 114 CONSCRIPTION system: economic effects It is further provided in the Officers' Horse Riding Regula- tions (Imperial Ordinance, No. 4) issued in January, 1907, that officers above field officers must keep a certain number of their own. For the first provision and for supplementing them thereafter they must purchase them from the people. The number of such officers is about two thousand, and their horses number at least twenty- five hundred. Of this number of horses, one-sixth or more than four hundred, is to be sup- plied anew every year. Altogether, the stock farmers have to supply the army with at least five thousand head per year. The amount of money that is paid per horse is seven thou- sand yen, roughly estimated, all of which goes into the hands of stock farmers. In its effect upon the live stock considered as a whole, this demand for war horses is, however, not very great. The total number of horses in this country is more than 1,500,000, and the number annually produced is about 120,000. Number of Horses Horses Produced 1910 1,564,643 117-950 1909 1,551,156 116,380 1908 1,494,506 107,847 1907 1,465,466 107,072 Considered quantitatively, the number of fifty thousand is not very large when compared with the figures above. But we must not overlook the effect of war horses upon the improvement of live stock. In time of war, a much greater number of war horses is demanded. And the effects of a war upon the quality of horses are important. The number of horses requisitioned during the Russo-Japanese War was more than 150,000. Years 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 Horses 1,515,108 1,523,745 1,390,017 1,367,615 1,465,466 The military authorities are doing their best for the improve- ment of war horses, and the effects upon horse industry will be great. The increase of agricultural employment is also caused by EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT 115 the demand for forage, which is supplied by the Horse Supply Bureau and by the agricultural people at large. It is pro- vided in the regulations that all the horses belonging to the bureau are to be fed with forage raised on its own fields, though it may be purchased in the common markets in some special cases. ^ The cultivation work of the Military Horse Supplement Department shall be planned according to the required amount after harvest to be estimated by the number of trained horses and of other horses. ^ We shall not be far from correct, when we assume that the fodder of the said department is obtained by its harvest. The following figures will give some idea of the farming work of this bureau : Year 1903 . 1906. 1907. Cultivated Fields Clw 3143 92 4229.45 3830.00 New- Fields Clw 1256.41 353-43 100.30 Yield Koku 26. 71 1 48.276 35-777 Kan 3,298.612 3,335.626 3,950.144 C/;o = 2.45 acres. ivofez( = five bushels, short. iva» = 8.28 lbs. We have no information yet about the area and yield after 1907. Now, the average number of war horses per day was 33,000 head in 1907. After 1910 this average was increased to the extent of one-third of this figure. We may well sup- pose that the Horse Supply Bureau increased its horses to the same extent. The area of the fields would then be about five thousand cho. As to the thirty-five or six thousand heads not belonging to the bureau, and two thousand and odd belonging to officers above field officers, their forage is all supplied by the common people. The following is an estimate of the forage demanded of them, basing it upon a table in the "Horse Allowance Regulations, "^ ' Military Horse Management Regulations, No. 17. ^ Ibid., Ko. 16. 3 According to the regulations, the allow-ance of straw may be increased to an extent not exceeding .400 in cold regions. Oats may be used instead of barley, and hay instead of forage, at the rate of .900 of oats to i.ooo of barley and of .800 of hay to i.ooo of forage. ii6 CONSCRIPTION system: economic effects Class of Horses Horse Allowance per Day Increased Allowance of a Horse per Day ■ Barley Forage Straw Barley First class Kan 1 .400 1.300 I .000 I .000 Kan 1 .000 i i I i i i Kan I .000 H ti 1 1 Kan Second " Not more than . 350 Third " Fourth " From the above table, it will be seen that the average of barley is about i . 200. Setting aside the increase allowance, let us see the amount of horse allowance for some thirty- eight thousand head of horses. Kind of Feed Horse Allowance per Day Horse Allowance per Year Horses Total Allowance per Year Barley Straw Forage Kan I .200 I .000 I .000 Kan 438 . 000 365.000 365.000 Head 38,000 38,000 38,000 Kan 16,724,000 13,870,000 13,870,000 One-sixth of the barley is replaced with oats. As the oats raised in Hokkaido have no other use than for feeding horses, the whole amount is turned to military uses. Barley is some- what above oats in price, but regarding both as of the same price, for the sake of convenience, we find one hundred kan of barley is worth about seventeen yen (including carriage). The yearly amount is then worth about 2,800,000 yen. We must not forget that the horses belonging to ofiicers are fed with a better grade and a greater quantity of barley. Barley is purchased, as in the case of cleaned rice and wheat, by means of written bids, the required amount being delivered by the successful bidder at the respective corps. The amount of oats to be purchased in Hokkaido is about 1,000 kan, which is apportioned to the several villages beforehand, and each village has to bring its yield to the Provision Department. In 1 9 14, there were fifty-five such villages and two farms, EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT 117 the apportioned amount of each ranging from 15,000 to 850,000 kan. Straw is purchased in the same manner. In the fiscal year 191 3, the amount of straw purchased by a cer- tain division from two bidders was as follows, the amount being divided into four lots: A certain K A certain M Total Quantities Unit Price (100 Kan) Kan Yen 120,000 3 30 120,000 3.80 200,000 2.40 180,000 1.79 620,000 Hay is usually purchased directly from farms, not through intermediary merchants. In some cases it is purchased from the industrial guilds under the village agricultural asso- ciation, or from the village officer representing a certain num- ber of farmers. In the fiscal year of 19 14, 1,500,000 kan of hay was apportioned to the several agencies in Hokkaido, as follows: Sent in by Quantity 400,000 K 40,000 A 20,000 K An industrial guild 300,000 M 75>ooo N 25,000 c f A representative of the \ district 60,140 H 20,000 Sent in by Quantity D r A village agricultural \ association 4i,74i M c f An industrial guild of a 35,000 town 8,000 T 80,000 c / A village agricultural \ association 240,120 H 100,000 rp / A village agricultural \ association 30,000 A. 250,000 As we shall see later, the value of the above hay is about 1,500,000 yen, 400,000 yen of which was for straw. From the above it follows that agricultural employments are both increased and decreased as an effect of the military system. A rough estimate of the extent of increase is as follows: •• ■ - Il8 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS Yen Barley and oats 2,800,000 Straw 400,000 Hay 1, 100, GOO Horses 700,000 Total 5,000,000 As efforts are made not to deal through intermediary mer- chants in the purchase of forage, it may be supposed that almost the whole amount of money paid out goes directly into the hands of the agricultural and stock farming people. Supposing the cost of production to be half of the amount, that is, 2,500,000 yen, the other half will be net profit. If three hundred is sufficient to support a laborer's family, then the amount of 2,500,000 yen will be able to support 7,500 such families. Such Is the extent of the increase of employ- ment. It has been seen that the decrease of the area of arable land is 22,493,313 tsubo, which is equal to 7,500 cho. As the average area of arable land per family is about one cho, the said decrease means the decrease of the employment for 7,500 families. The increase of employment caused by the conscription system, disregarding the employments con- nected with the Horse Supply Bureau, is only sufficient to balance the decrease. Manufacture and Commerce The system of conscription no doubt exercises considerable effect upon commercial and manufacturing employment. The exact extent of these effects is, however, more difficult to ascertain than in the case of agriculture. Let us begin with the effects upon commerce. We find an increase of employment on various sides. Most of the sol- diers come from farmers' homes, which are self-supporting. But once enlisted in service, all their needs must be met through merchants. Moreover, they are better supplied at the barracks than at home, and this makes for the increase of employment on the part of merchants. Not only that, but the demands peculiar to military life give a wider field of EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT II9 activity to merchants. All this means an increase in com- mercial employment. But we do not know the exact extent of the increase, and we must be satisfied with a rough esti- mate. We may be sure that the extent of the increase will presumably not exceed our estimate. The following are the various merchants who get their livelihood from troops: (i) Those dealing in goods that go to the Provision Bureau, that is, those engaged in the production of canned food and in the transportation of raw materials necessary for such production. (2) Those dealing in goods demanded by the arsenals, that is, dealers in metals, leathers, timbers, raw materials for gunpowder and other articles. (3) Those dealing in goods demanded by the Senju Woolen Factory and the Clothing Department, i.e., dealers in furs, hides, leathers, dyestuffs, cotton, etc. (4) Those dealing in goods demanded by the Divisional Accountants' Bureau, i.e., dealers in cleaned rice and wheat, forage, underwear, stockings, such articles as are necessary for repairing clothing, etc. Those goods in demand at the Divisional Headquarters are not included in these. (5) Those dealing in goods in demand by the different bodies of troops, i.e., dealers in provisions and materials for cooking (vegetables, meat, fish, grains, sugar, fuel, etc.), articles for consumption in barracks (desk, chairs, clocks, stationery, tents, brooms, etc.), such articles as are necessary for the repair of arms (cotton, grease, paper, etc.), sundries used in military exercises, etc. (6) Camp hawkers. Dealers in articles necessary to the in- dividual soldier, such as stationery, beverages, comestibles, etc. (7) Dealers in articles disposed of by the troops, such as empty bales and bottles, old clothing, etc. (8) Those engaged in such businesses as restaurants, thea- tres, baths, bars, fruit stores, confectioneries, the sale of daily necessaries such as handkerchiefs, towels, tooth powder, soap, stationery, the sale of souvenirs and noted local products. 120 CONSCRIPTION system: economic EFFECTS (9) Hotel keepers accommodating visitors to the barracks. (10) Dealers in articles in demand by the soldiers living outside barracks, and their families, such as daily necessaries, furniture, luxuries, etc. The enumeration above is nearly complete, so far as the leading goods and articles are concerned. It is possible for us to make an estimate of the amount of money that is expended for some of them. Let us now make an investigation into this amount of money and the classes to which the merchants concerned belong. The total amount for barley and oats used as forage is about 2,800,000 yen, as we have already seen. Each of the divisions that has no cavalry attached to it needs annually barley and oats valued at 100,000 to 120,000 yen. The total amount for hay is about 1,100,000 yen, of which 40,000 to 50,000 yen is paid by each division. The total amount for straw is about 400,000 yeyi, of which 15,000 to 20,000 is paid by each division. These estimates include transportation charges. Barley and straw are purchased through merchants of smaller means, who collect them from among the farmers, while hay, and oats, raised in Hokkaido, are purchased directly from the producers. The amounts of raw materials that are sent in to the arsenals are as follows: 1910 1911 Tokyo Arsenal Osaka Arsenal Tokyo Arsenal Osaka Arsenal Metals Leathers Yen 1,174,800 1,243,242 966,333 448,147 663,107 Yen 2,216,430 1,107,017 603,560 745,803 516,760 Yen 1,365,119 1,233,566 967,708 1,067,196 875,808 Yen 1,962,649 183,840 Timbers Gunpowder materials Sundries 812,057 570,875 670,057 Totals 9,685,199 Yen 9,708,875 Yen EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT 121 Goods Furnished the Clothing Department, Including Those to the Senju Woolen Factory, IQIJ (i) Raw materials and their values : (a) Those obtainable at home — wool oil, leather oil, raw materials for gloves and socks, dyestuffs (acetic acid, indigo, ammonia, sulphuric acid, etc.), and coal. The values of all these goods amount to 46,246 yen. (b) Those imported — wool oil, leather oil, wool, dye- stuffs, grease, etc., the values of which amount to 1,427,738 yen. (2) Manufactured goods and their values: (a) Those obtainable at home — light brown woolen cloth, cloth for gaiters, cloth for badges, woolen thread for knitting, thick weave cotton, spun cot- ton, calicoes, various sorts of hemp cloth, leathers, belts, sewing threads, ammonia, sulphuric acid, cocoanut resin, oils, cement, bricks, accessories to apparatus and machines, etc. The values amount to 4,307,082 yen. (b) Those imported — woolen threads, furs, nails and threads for shoes, pegs, hemp cloth, oleate oils, olivine oils, accessories to machines, leather made articles, etc. The values amount to 194,002 yen. The total value of goods that are purchased by the Clothing Department is 5,995,068 yen. Goods Furnished the Provision Bureau, 191 3 (i) Raw materials: {a) Those obtainable at home — meat, flour, sugar, soy, salt, sweet sake, potatoes, seasame, pickles, fir- boards, coal, etc., amounted to 885,597 yen. (b) Those imported — tin, hops, lead, raw gum, varn- ish, ammonia for cold storage, shellac, etc., amounted to 16,922 yen. (2) Manufactured goods: (a) Those obtainable at home — powdered salt, solid salt, 122 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS paper bags, wooden boxes, ropes, cotton thread, straw bags, etc., amounted to 133,418 yen. {b) Those imported — nails, tin-plates, etc., amounted to 111,957 yen. The total amount of goods that are purchased by the Pro- vision Bureau is 1,147,894 yen. We have seen the amount of goods that are purchased by the two arsenals, the Clothing Department, and the Provision Bureau, and also their value. Roughly estimated, the whole amount of the purchases by the Military Department is more than 16,000,000 yen. All these purchases are made on large scales by means of written bids. Merchants of smaller means can, therefore, not engage in such business. The Senju Woolen Factory purchased wool, in 1913, to the quan- tity and value of to 3,451,236 pounds and 1,566,759 yen. Except 19,200 pounds (value 7,653 yen) of this wool, supplied by the Imperial Farm at Shimosa, the Matsukata Farm at Nasuno at Tochigi Prefecture, and the Koiwai Farm at Iwate Prefecture, all of it was imported from Australia and South America by such great companies as the Okura Gumi, the Mitsui Bussan and the lida Co. (The Osaka Mainichi, December 25, 1913.) Below is a table of the purchases by the Senju Woolen Factory: 1910 1911 Yen Yen Furs and woolen yarn 1,412,021 1,475,251 Dyestuffs 15-242 86,571 Hides 2,170 Total 1,427,263 1,563,992* a The purchase made by the Clothing Department in the two years above is not published. The same is true for the two commodities of rice and wheat. Only wealthy merchants reap the benefits. The rice pur- chased by the Accountants' Bureau is worth about twenty- two yen per koku (about five bushels), and the amount paid by the bureau is 7,500,000 yen. Each of the divisions pur- chases cleaned rice to the amount of about 350,000 yen. The price of cleaned wheat is about eleven yen per koku. The EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT 1 23 Accountants' Bureau pays about 1,500,000 yen for the wheat, while each division pays about eighty thousand yeyi. In the case of cleaned rice, the purchase is made by means of written bids on units of two hundred koku, which is the quantity required at each division for two months. The purchase of cleaned wheat is made by means of written bids, on units of one hundred koku, which is the quantity required at each division for two months. Such being the case, merchants of smaller means are not able to handle the business. It is carried on by a few wealthy merchants, some of whom supply the required quantities to several divisions. Accord- ing to our law, any merchant may engage in a business like this, if he has been engaged in it for at least two years and is furnished with a certificate issued by the village officials. But, as a result of competition, wealthy merchants have come to monopolize the business. The amount paid by each division for the materials to be used in the repair of clothing ranges from 25,000 to 30,000 yen. The purchase of these materials is made by dividing them into smaller lots, and some ten merchants are engaged in their supply. One division divides the materials into the following lots: Materials to be used in tailoring and laundry work, those to be used in the repair of caps, those to be used in laundry work, train oil, those to be used in the repair of sewing machines, leathers, naphthalin, scissors, patent leather belts. Turning our attention to the purchase of provisions at each division, let us first look at the apportionment of boarding per day. Boarding of a Soldier per Day " Sen II .7 The First Jurisdiction (the 7th division) 9.3 The Second Jurisdiction (the ist and the 4th divisions) 9.0 The Third Jurisdiction (the 2d, the 8th, the 12th, the 13th, the 14th, and the i6th divisions) 8.7 The Fourth Jurisdiction (the 6th, the 9th, the loth, the nth, the 15th, and the l8th divisions) 8 .4 The Fifth Jurisdiction (the 3d, the 5th, and the 17th divisions) * Allowance of 2.4 more, on a field day, and of 2.0 on other occasions. 124 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS For the sake of convenience, let us take nine sen as the average. The number of soldiers in all the divisions in the country is 220,000, and the amount paid for their boarding every year is about 7,300,000 yen. Each division pays 300,000 to 350,000 yen. The number of suppliers at a cer- tain infantry regiment is as follows: Dealers in vegetables and dried vegetables, 3; dealers in fish, 3; dealers in soy and pickles, 3; dealers in beef and pork, 2; dealers in sugar, 3; dealers in chicken and eggs, i ; dealers in confectioneries, 3 ; dealers in fuels, 2 ; dealers in wines, 2. In cases where several corps are quartered at the same place, the same class of dealers transact their business with the several corps. The articles required for encampment and the articles of consumption vary a great deal, according to the different branches of the army. The quantities will be given later. Roughly estimated, the amount of money paid for these things by each division is about 80,000 yen. In this case, as in the case of boarding, the suppliers are divided into small classes. In a certain infantry regiment, they are as follows: dealers in new articles for encampment, 2; dealers in metals to be used for repairs, i ; dealers in fuels, 2; dealers in timber for repairs, I ; dealers in holders for maps and atlases, 2 ; dealers in electric lamps and batteries, I ; dealers in cotton, i ; dealers in drugs, I. All of these dealers are merchants of small means. Of the twenty-eight dealers connected with the headquarters of a certain division, only three possess property above ten thou- sand yen in value. Sutlers sell wines, rice cakes, sweet cakes, vermicelli, cooked food, stamps, handkerchiefs, canned food, etc., the kinds and quantities of these things being determined by the head offi- cer of each company. The proceeds of the sale vary accord- ing to the place where troops are stationed, but the amount is about equal to that of the wages soldiers receive. This can be said even of the proceeds of the sutlers in the Eighth Divi- sion, whose soldiers come from the most impoverished dis- tricts in the country. EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT 125 Amount Expended at Sutlers' by a Certain Company, Eighth Division, April-June, 1914 April May June Articles Amount Expended Average per soldier per day Amount Expended Average per soldier per day Amount Expended Average per soldier per day Eatables and drinks Wine Stamps Handkerchiefs, tooth powder, etc Canned food . . . Tobacco Yen 612 . 150 49 ■ 700 59.000 32.210 22.375 190.380 Yen 0.034 0.0027 0.0032 0.0021 0.0012 O.OIO Yen 726. 190 57.000 71.65c 68.220 13 939 165.520 Yen 0.040 . 0032 0.0039 0.0037 . 0007 0.009 Yen 649.150 56 . 000 64.100 67 . 700 17.900 157.290 Yen 0.036 . 003 1 0.0035 0.0037 0.009 0.007 Total 965815 0.054 1,102.525 0.061 1,012.192 0.056 Average wages, per soldier, per week . Noncommissioned officers. . . 0.0724 Soldiers o . 0538 About the. same situation is found in the Seventh Division. The following is the amount expended at the sutlers belong- ing to this division, per soldier, per year, April, 1913, to March, The 25th Infantry Regiment 16 .06 The 26th " " 14 . 34 The 27th " " 15.62 The 28th " " 14.17 The 7th Cavalry Regiment 2 1 . 20 The 7th Field Artillery Regiment 23 . 70 The Hakodate Heavy Artillery Corps 17 57 The 7th Commissariat Battalion 22 . 26 The Asahigawa Hospital 34 . 30 The 7th Engineering Battalion 1 8 . 94 Statistics prepared by the Fourteenth Division indicate similar facts. The following is the proceeds of the sutler of this division, per soldier, per month, April, 1912, to March, 1913: The 2d Infantry Regiment i The 15th " " The 59th " " The 66th " " The i8th Cavalry Regiment The 20th Field Artillery Regiment , The 14th Engineering Battalion The 14th Commissariat Battalion , Yen 66 02 45 68 40 84 47 87 126 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS As the soldier's average wage per year is some nineteen yen, nearly the whole of their wages is spent at the sutlers. Of the statistics prepared by the Sixteenth and Eighteenth Divisions, we shall see later. The average sum expended at the sutlers per division would then be 180,000 to 200,000 yen. In short, the wages of soldiers go into the hands of sutlers, but not into the hands of merchants at large. But the net proceeds of the sutlers are very little. According to statistics prepared by the Sixteenth Division, they range, from 18 per cent to 43 per cent, the average being only 30 per cent. As to the amount of the total expenses of the soldiers, it is difficult to estimate. Admitting as true certain statements to be made later, the amount of money that they get from home annually is thirty yen, on an average. As we have seen above, their wages are spent at the sutler, and their savings out of their wages are too little to be of any account. And the thirty ye7i that they get from home is spent outside the barracks. The amount throughout the divisions will reach six million yen at least. As to the amount of money spent by the soldiers living out of the barracks, and by the parents, relatives, or friends who pay visits to the soldiers living in the barracks, we have no means of ascertaining. There is no doubt that the merchants who get the benefit from such soldiers and such people are below the middle class. So much for commerce; now for manufactures. The vari- ous manufacturers that are supported by the system of con- scription may be classified as follows: (i) Those who meet the demands of each corps or each individual soldier at the place where they are quartered. They manufacture tools for encampment, or make articles of consumption, or make cloth- ing. They engage in the construction or repair of barracks and other buildings. (2) Those who engage in the works belonging to the different factories under the direct control of the Military Department. The factories are the arsenals and their branches, the Provision Bureau and its branches, the Clothing Department, and the Senju Woolen Factory, etc. EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT 127 (3) Those who make goods or articles that are to be sent in to the different factories above as manufactured goods. Gen- erally speaking, the third class of manufacturers must be wealthier, for they must produce large quantities of goods of a uniform quality. The first class of manufacturers meet individual demands and, therefore, need not necessarily carry on their business on a large scale. It is thought in some quarters that the system of conscription gives benefits only to capitalists, but this is not so, for both the great manufac- turing works that are carried on by individual capitalists, and the different factories under the direct control of the Military Department, have to employ a great number of workmen. According to the annual report of the Military Department, published in 191 1, the number of the workmen employed at the different factories is as follows: T^artoriP'^^ Employes Laborers Total of Male Employes and Laborers Men Women Men Women Total Tokyo arsenal Osaka arsenal Clothing Department in- cluding branches Provision Bureau, includ- ing branches Senju Woolen Factory.. . Draughtsmen 14,727 9,915 1,406 264 504 15 3,129 813 1,891 214 566 172 103 75 33 95 26 172 198 lOI 33 14,727 10,087 1,509 339 537 15 Total 26,831 6,613 383 121 504 27,214 Our estimate is that in the factories above are employed about 25,000 workmen, excepting men below age twenty and women not supporting their families. Our next task is to ascertain the number of the manufac- turers who meet the individual demands of troops or soldiers at the place where they are stationed. But this is by no means easy. The same difficulty will be found when we want to know the exact number of merchants belonging to the different classes enumerated at the beginning of this section, from the fourth downwards. We have but one way to get 128 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS the total number of such people, and that is an indirect way. Suppose that there is a given town of small size that has no particular cause of prosperity other than the establishment of new troops. We may then regard the increase of its mer- chants or manufacturers as the result of the establishment of new troops. Of course, the establishment may give rise to some other conditions in which people come together. So, we may not say, even in this case, that the whole of the in- crease in the inhabitants is due directly to the stationing of troops. We may, however, say this much, that the increase of inhabitants due directly to the establishment is not more than that whole. The more remote the place, the more would the actual increase approach the increase of employments due directly to the establishment. We take the town of Zentsuji as the example. What is then the increase of employments at Zentsuji, since the establishment of a new division? The records of the town ten years ago were not kept in good order, but we can make a generalization from the fragments. The number of merchants and manufacturers at about the time of the estab- lishment was as shown on the facing page. Until 1898 these three villages existed separately, and were united into a town, Zentsuji by name, in 1899. Some of the figures above do not belong to the same year. But the difference of one year was little in these villages, so our total overlooks this difference. The year 1910 was the year in which this division was despatched to Manchuria; hence, a considerable decrease in the figures. The fact that the average of the figures for the four years, 1905 to 1908, rose to 1,600, but came down to the average of 1,500, in the succeeding years, may be taken as an evidence that the increase of employments caused by the establish- ment of the div'ision, reached its maximum. Excepting the figures for 1910, the average of the last three years in the above table is about 1,500. And the number of manufacturers and salesmen, previous to the establishment, was about six hun- EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT 129 Year Village 1893 Yoshida. 1893 Asano. . 1894 Zentsuji. Total . . . Manu- Restau- Bath- Sales- fac- rant Bar house Bar- Rikisha men turers keepers keepers keepers bers Men 84 33 10 I 41 97 13 19 I 24 153 70 I 24 4 5 9 334 126 I S3 S 6 74 Total 169 164 266 599 Between 1894 AND 1897 THE Division Was Established 114 no 200 55 45 4 30 31 3 3 3 63 IS 272 1897] Asano. Zentsuji 204 200 Total 424 100 4 61 3 6 78 676 f Yoshida 1898 i, Asano 1 Zentsuji 1899 Zentsuji 174 151 282 67 S3 201 II 25 ■38 85 S I 7 4 5 22 55 8 II 334 218 282 351 Total 607 321 36 123 13 31 74 1,20s 1903 807 906 926 888 790 915 853 820 861 857 327 312 328 318 367 384 353 327 359 342 42 44 SS 34 33 22 24 14 53 41 139 178 207 190 164 161 152 123 106 109 17 19 17 19 23 21 21 22 21 23 48 57 56 59 55 SI SS 54 63 58 103 54 69 SO 41 SO 47 44 52 69 1.483 1.570 1904 1905 1906 1.658 1,558 1907 1908 1909 1.473 1,604 1.S05 1,404 1,515 1910 191 1 1912 1.499 dred. Hence, the increase 1,500 less 600 is 900. On the other hand, the average increase of inhabitants in the sur- rounding villages, during the same period, was 9 per cent, from which we may infer that the increase of employments in these villages was also 9 per cent. Of the difference of 900 above, some 50 would represent the natural increase — 600X9 per cent = 54. The increase, directly caused by the establishment of new troops, was, therefore, 850. Suppose each of these 850 em- ployments supports five people, then their total number will be 4,250. Now, the special increase of the population of this town, compared with that of other villages near by, is about 5,400. Deducting 4,250 above from this 5,400, we get the balance of 1,150. If the three hundred families of the soldiers stationed at Zentsuji consist each of four persons, then w^e get 1,200, w^hich is approximate to the 1,150 above. Following is a table showing the number of specialists and 130 CONSCRIPTION system: economic effects men above noncommissioned officers who belong to the dif- ferent miHtary offices and troops at Zentsuji. The Ordnance Depot 14 Headquarters of the Regiment District 13 The Administrative Staff 26 The Accounts Office 22 The Veterinary Surgeons' Office . 2 The 43d Infantry Regiment. ... 99 The nth Field Artillery Regi- ment 52 The I ith Commissariat Battalion 24 The nth Garrison Hospital 46 The nth Garrison Prison 10 The Judiciary Office 4 The Surgeons' Office 3 Headquarters of the 22d Brigade 3 The nth Cavalry Regiment. ... 30 The nth Engineers Battalion. ... 26 The Gendarmerie 18 Total 392 Supposing that about 80 per cent short of this total num- ber have their famiHes, we get the figures, 300. All other branches of the army, except the infantry, are usually quartered at the place where a division is stationed. But of the four regiments that belong to a division, three are usually stationed away from it. How many get their liveli- hood from these three regiments can only be known indirectly. The number of the manufacturers and merchants is deter- mined by the amount of money that is expended by troops. The approximate number of the noncommissioned officers and men of a regiment is eighteen hundred, and that of the non- commissioned officers and men of the special branches (the field artillery, the cavalry, the engineering, commissariat, etc.) is about nineteen hundred and fifty. The number of soldiers at the place where regiments are quartered is about half of the number of soldiers at the place where a division is stationed. It may appear, at first thought, that half of the money that is spent at the latter place goes to the former place. But this is not really so, for (i) men of the special branches have more expenses than those of the infantry (especially in horses and fodder) ; (2) in some divisions, some articles are purchased altogether for their companies {i.e., socks, shirts, etc.) ; (3) higher officials of special offices are stationed where divisions are. We think, therefore, that only one-third of the money spent by a division, including the special branches, goes to the place where regiments are quartered. In other words, the number of the manufacturers and merchants who EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT I3I earn their livelihood from the regiments is about two hundred and eighty, that is, ^. In this estimate of ours, we have taken into consideration such circumstances as will cause slight variations in the incidentals of individual soldiers. Of the seventy-six infantry regiments, forty-nine are quar- tered at places where divisions are not stationed. Six of them are stationed at the same places as divisions. The eleven places that have each a division have each two regiments. Asahigawa and Tokyo, where a division is stationed, have three and six regiments, respectively. Our estimate of the total number of commercial and manufacturing employments supported by these regiments would then be — 850X19+280X18+280X49-16,150+5040+13,720 = 24,910. Besides these regiments, there are a few more, such as the four cavalry regiments at Narashino, the two cavalry regi- ments at ToyohashI and at Morioka, the four field artillery regiments at Kokubudai and Shimoshidzu, the six heavy artillery regiments, distributed among Yokosuka, Yura, Hiroshima and Shimonoseki, and one railway regiment at Chlba. According to our estimate, these regiments support about half of the total number of the commercial and manu- facturing employments supported by the regiments we have seen in the preceding paragraph, which would then number about twenty-seven hundred. Adding this number to the twenty-four thousand and odd In the preceding paragraph, we get the total of about twenty-eight thousand. Furthermore, we must get the number of employments that are obtained through the transaction of raw materials and manufactures supplied to the different factories of the army, and that of employments that are obtained through the manufacture ot the finished articles. Let us first consider the former: Yen The amount supplied to the Provision and Clothes Department about 6,000,000 The amount supplied to the Arsenal Department about 9,000,000 The amount supplied to the Fodder Department about 1,000,000 Total about 16,000,000 Other amounts about 3.200.000 Grand total about 19,200,000 10 132 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS According to the Yorodzii, September, 1914, ordinary com- mercial interest is about i per cent. If we calculate the sum total of interests, and suppose that one employment needs three hundred yen (but the dealers are in fact rich merchants, who need much more), the number of employments that we seek will not be more than 6,000. In the case of the latter: Yen Homemade manufactures supplied to the Clothes Department about 4,300,000 Homemade manufactures supplied to the Fodder Department about 100,000 Total about 4,400,000 The industrial interest today will not be more than 2 per cent.^ The number of employments obtained will be about two thousand. The above is only a rough estimate, but when we consider the number of employments obtained by the conscription system, we shall find it to be — Military factories , 25,000 Manufacturers and merchants at places where troops are stationed 28,000 Those obtained by manufacture of finished articles supplied to military factories 8,000 Total 61 ,000 Summary We may now summarize the separate treatments of the effects of the system of conscription upon the increase of employments, agricultural, commercial and manufacturing. We have seen that the increase of agricultural employ- ments is balanced by their decrease. The work of the Horse Supply Department has been neglected, because the 5,000 cho of arable land, belonging to the department, had been cultivated land before it was turned to its present use. The part that was brought under cultivation by the department was so little that we might well overlook it. There was scarcely any room for new employments. As to the decrease of the arable land to the extent of 7,500 cho, our estimate is 1 Yorodzu, September, 1914. EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT 133 perhaps too moderate. Hence, we have Httle reason to rec- ognize any increase of agricultural employments. The effects upon commercial and manufacturing emplo>- ments are their increase, as we have shown above. Our estimate was that the increase would not exceed sixty thou- sand. Even if sixty thousand, not the whole of it is due to the system of conscription. The chief employments are, as we have seen, either those concerning munitions, such as arms and clothing, and those concerning the individual wants, such as eatables or drinkables or miscellaneous goods of daily use. Now, there is no doubt that a greater part of the latter will be in demand, even if the system of conscription did not require men to be enlisted in the army. To our mind, there are only four circumstances in which the individual wants of soldiers have to be met by commercial and manufacturing employments that owe their existence to the system of conscription. (i) Where even self-supporting soldiers ha\'e to buy the articles of daily necessity from the merchants connected with troops; (2) where soldiers are in want of more articles than at home, because they are paid better in the army than at home; (3) where they are in want of more and better articles, because of emulation and imitation of city life; and (4) where the uniformity of wants among soldiers requires the supply from such merchants. Apart from these circum- stances, the increase of employments, consequent to the establishment of new troops, only balances the decrease of employments, consequent to the soldiers' leaving home. Such being the case, it is absolutely impossible to tell just how many of the sixty thousand new employments are the sole result of the establishment of new troops. Let us, how- ever, admit, for the sake of argument, that the whole of the number is due to troops. All of the employments discussed above are productive. But we must not overlook those nonproductive employments, of which there are three classes. The employments of officers are permanent, those of noncommissioned officers last for a 134 CONSCRIPTION system: economic effects considerable period and those of soldiers are entirely tem- porary. The first are purely professional, the second half professional, and the third not professional at all. Our estimate of the number of these three classes, based on the Military and the Naval Annual Report, is as follows: ARMY, 1912 Officers, Including Semi-Officers and Cadets Offices, General and Special Troops Gendarmerie Total Generals, and those ranking with them.. 64 85 2 151 Field officers, and those ranking with them . 594 i-i43 41 i,778 Company officers, and those ranking with them 1,443 9,998 220 11,661 Semi-officers and cadets 360 2,185 73 2,618 Total 2,461 13,41 1 336 16,208 Noncommissioned Officers Offices, general and special 3,077 Troops (at home) 12,286 Gendarmerie 1,171 Troops (abroad; roughly estimated) ' 2,435 Total 18,969 Common Soldiers, Including All Soldiers Not Mentioned Above Troops (at home) 166,688 Troops (abroad; roughly estimated) 33,358 Gendarmerie 7, 811 Total 207,857 Those Attached to the Army Offices, general and special 8,009 Troops 1 ,326 Gendarmerie 1 ,335 Total 10,670 NAVY, 191 2 Officers Admirals, and those ranking with them 105 Captains 1,187 Junior officers 3,003 Cadets ' 224 Semi-officers 1,167 Total 5,686 Noncommissioned officers 10,516 Sailors 37,873 Those attached to the navy 1,189 EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT 1 35 In the army, the total number of the officers and noncom- missioned officers whose employments are either permanent or last for a considerable period is 35,000. The officers and others in the navy are 16,000 of the total number. Of these 51,000 military and naval officers and others, most of the regular officers did not originally belong to the producing classes. Now, when we see that many who belong to the same class as the officers are in want of employment, we can understand that the employments in the army and the navy are to that extent a help to those who seek employment in other lines. As to the noncommissioned officers and others below them, we all know that most of them are from the lower classes, and are originally productive laborers. Their number, throughout the army and the navy, is about 30,000. The nation is therefore deprived of so much labor in the same manner as it is deprived of the 200,000 laborers in the case of common soldiers. If we want to know exactly the effects ot the system of conscription upon the national economy, we must first know how many people get their employment by the existence of these 30,000 noncommissioned officers and 200,000 common soldiers. We must also consider the ques- tion whether or not the increase of the sixty thousand com- mercial and manufactural employments is purely the result of the existence of troops. CHAPTER V EFFECTS ON LABOR Of the two factors that determine production — employ- ment and labor — the former has already been considered. The next problem is the effect of the system of conscription upon labor, which has two aspects, the quality and the quan- tity of labor. Any changes in either of these two aspects have a significance of great importance in the determination of pro- ductive power. By the quality of labor, we mean the effi- ciency of laborers, and by the quantity of labor, their num- ber. We are now to study the effects of conscription upon these two aspects oi labor. Efficiency of Labor Laborers' efficiency is determined by their skill, strength and character, especially their discipline. The effects of con- scription upon such qualities are difficult to ascertain, except through various, indirect ways. Molding oj Character The army is a national school, so to speak. This is espe- cially the case with the Japanese Army, which aims at the cultivation of such virtues as courage, loyalty, uprightness, deriving the fundamental principles of discipline from the Imperial Rescript given to the soldiers in 1882. In no schools is emphasized the importance of spiritual education as in the aimy. The military life is as regular and as punctual as a machine. Soldiers get accustomed to this life until it becomes their second nature. Remarkable is the effect of such a life for two or three years upon the improvement of their charac- ter. Soldiers are looked up to among the people, especially among the laboring classes. Those who have served in the army feel a moral strain in their efforts not to dishonor their standing. Consequently, the discharged soldiers in the country are generally regular and rigorous in their habits and 136 EFFECTS ON LABOR 137 devoted to their trade. This is a fact not only emphasized by the soldiers themselves but recognized by the people at large. This being the case, there can be no doubt that the military life has a wholesome effect upon the efficiency of laborers. Although we have no direct proof of such an effect, yet we are able to produce evidences of an indirect nature. (i) The number and percentage of the prisoners among discharged soldiers, in a certain regimental district, during the year 191 2, is as follows (both the number of prisoners and that of soldiers being multiplied by n) : en -*-> rt U} CO C ■4-1 V a B 6 rt -a c « Field Artillery Soldiers Heavy Artillery Soldiers c 'So c c/l 'b n d +-» c 3 u < Medical Privates 2 224 34 4 8 172 2 446 Branches Number of Soldiers Per- centage Branches Number of Soldiers Per- centage Gendarmerie Infantry Cavalry ... ... 68 41,488 1,270 6,514 2.65 0.54 0.68 Engineers Commissariat . . . Accountant Health Dept. . . Total 2,102 26,214 336 788 3.80 0.66 Field and Heav>' Artillery 0.25 78,780 0.552 We can not know what difference there is between the criminal percentage of this regimental district and that of other districts. But the former percentage is presumably not smaller than the latter, for we know that about one-sixth of the population of this district lives in a large town, where cases of criminal offenses take place frequently. Let us now look at the percentage of prisoners of the same age as these soldiers : 138 CONSCRIPTION system: ECONOMIC EFFECTS Ages 20 to 30 Ages 30 to 40 Year Heavy Offense Light Offense Total Heavy Offense Light Offense Total IQ07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 1906 05 IQOS 0.4 In this average percentage is included that of both men and women of the same age. We must find the average percent- age of men alone. Women Prisoners per 100,000 Men Prisoners per 100,000 Year For Light Offenses For Heavy Offenses Total For Light Offenses For Heavy Offenses Total IQ07 25 -7 26.8 19 I 7 27.6 28.5 329 -3 333 • I 17.0 18.3 346 -3 1906 351 -4 On the strength of the above table, the percentage of pris- oners to the total number of men between twenty years and forty years of age, supposing the number of men as being equal to that of women, is estimated as follows: (329-3+I7-0) + (333-I + l8-3) v, = nn9=: °-5^(329-3 + i7-o) + (333.i + i8.3)+(257 + i-9) + (26.8+i.7)^^ ^-^^S- Those convicted of heavy offenses may not serve in the army, according to the law of conscription (article 8). As they are expelled from the list of available conscripts, this will mean a decrease of so much in the criminal percentage among dis- charged prisoners. But we shall not consider this question for the time being, because the number of discharged soldiers convicted of heavy offenses is very small, compared with that of ordinary people of the same age, and because those who are enlisted in the army are able bodied, and consequently are prone to crime. We shall see later how it comes that the able bodied are prone to crime. If we now compare the per- EFFECTS ON LABOR 1 39 centage of 0.925 among the common men with that of 0.552 among discharged soldiers, we shall see that the military life has had much to do with producing such a difference.' The number of prisoners during these years was as follows: 1905 75-402 1906 79.409 1907 78,873 1908 78,265 1909 104,896 (2) The branches to which the prisoners and convicts among discharged soldiers belong have to be considered, in their bearing upon the character of soldiers. The following is a table showing the percentage of the convicts from Janu- ary I to December 31, 1912, and the prisoners of another regimental district from January i to December 31, 191 1, together with the branch of service. Percentage of Prisoners (Including Contraventions of Police Regu- lations) TO Soldiers and Noncommissioned Officers of Army Branches Percentage of Prisoners Percentage of Convicts Average of the Two Percentages Gendarmerie 2.647* 0.622 0.583 0.951 0.694 0.507 2.647* 0.448 0.522 0.571 0.610 0.254* 2.647=^ 0.504 Infantry Cavalry Field and heavy artillery. . . . Engineering 0.552 0.761 0.652 Commissariat Accountant Medical 0.371- Total 0.640 0.500 0.566 "Left out of consideration because their absolute numerical basis is too small. Of the average figures above, those of engineering are greatest, for which there are certain special reasons. Most of the crimes committed by the discharged soldiers of this branch are committed in cities. The total number of conscripts belonging to this regimental district was 10,478 in 191 2, of which 3,291 belong to the subdivisions of the regimental ^ Objections may be raised to our basing the comparison upon the figures taken from the years in which the present criminal cases among the common people have increased since 1908, when the Criminal Code went into effect. The differ- ence due to the military life will then be still greater. 140 CONSCRIPTION system: economic effects districts. The rate of the distribution of discharged soldiers may be regarded as ahnost the same as that of the conscripts above, that is, seven in the country against three in the cities. Of the two hundred and fifty-two prisoners above, two hundred and fifteen, that is, 85 percent, belong to cities. Of the one hundred and ninety-seven convicts above, one hundred and sixty-one, that is, 86 per cent, belong also to cities. Most of the discharged soldiers belonging to the engi- neering branch are residents of cities, the reasons for which are not far to seek. Of the special branches of the army, the engineering especially selects its men from those connected with mechanics. Such men are more usually found in cities than in the rural districts. Therefore, most of the engi- neering soldiers are from cities, and hence the percentage of their crimes is large. We may therefore say that there are special reasons for the large percentage of crimes in this case. Next to them in percentage comes the commissariat soldiers. The average percentage of either convicts or prisoners among the commissariats is only exceeded by the engineers. And this is so not because most of the former are from the districts as in the case of the latter, but because most of them, espe- cially the auxiliaries, receive military training only for a short period. Of the total number of men, 13,000, belonging to this branch of the army, only three hundred receive military education for two or three years, as in the case of men belong- ing to other branches. All others are either lacking in mili- tary training or are trained incompletely. Sixty-seven per cent of them are lacking in training, and 31 per cent receive it only for a short time. In other words, they have far less chances of living in the moral atmosphere of the army than the other regular soldiers. It is therefore not surprising that the percentage of their crimes is large. This is not merely a personal opinion, but a fact generally recognized by the officers in the army. We have also to consider another question. Why is it that the percentage of crimes among the supple- mentaries of the infantry is comparatively small, in spite of the fact that they, as well as the commissariat auxiliaries, are either lacking or incomplete in their training? In fact, the EFFECTS ON LABOR 141 percentage of their crimes is less than that of the crimes com- mitted by the soldiers of the artillery. Of the total number of the discharged soldiers of the infantry, 10/21 are lacking in training, and 3/21 are trained incompletely. And the crime percentage of the infantry soldiers who receive training for the full length of their term is larger than that of the com- missariats. This is the reason why the former have .504 per cent of crimes against the .654 of the latter. As to the tact that the infantry has a comparatively large number of men deficient in education, we can say that their 62 per cent is not very large, for even the artillery has 55 per cent of the men deficient in education. We can easily see why the in- fantry has .504 of crimes against .552 of the artillery, if we take into consideration the following circumstances: (i) Both the infantry and the cavalry can devote their whole energy and time to military discipline, while both the artillery or the engineering must devote their energy and time to special arts as well as to military discipline. This is one reason why the infantry and the cavalry ha\"e a less percent- age of crimes. (2) The artillery selects its men from the conscripts who are of greater size and strength. Consequently, ill beha\'ior and bad manners and habits obtain among them. A larger quantity of wine and tobacco is in greater demand among them than among any others. Average Amount Expended at Sutlers per Soldier per Month, 191 i Regiments and Battalions Tobacco Sundries Sweet Cakes Stamps Wine Other Eat- ables and Beverages The 9th Infantry Regiment . The 19th Regiment The 38th Regiment The 53rd Regiment The 20th Cavalry Regimeni The 20th Field Artillery Reg- iment The i6th Engineering Bat- talion The i6th Commissariat Bat- talion Sen 34 22 24 23 43 50 33 39 Sen 9 18 9 10 13 12 II 18 Sen 70 7 78 46 68 37 50 43 Sen 12 II 7 II 19 19 13 13 Sen 5 6 9 8 7 49 20 15 Sen 21 72 30 36 37 43 ' 38 64 142 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS The table above confirms the opinion that the percentage of crimes is larger in the artillery than in the infantry. Taking all the special circumstances of each branch of the army into consideration, wc may say that the larger the percentage of soldiers deficient in training, the larger the percentage of Clime. In other words, the military life has a great influence upon the molding of character. (3) Of the total number of noncommissioned ofificers and common soldiers within the regimental district above, the percentage of the former is 3.34 per cent. Of this number of noncommissioned of^cers, none was convicted of any crimes in 1 91 2, while only three were arrested in 1911. But, if it be true that they have a tendency to crimes in the same way as common soldiers, then there should have been six prisoners among the former and eight prisoners among the latter. The fact that there were only three prisoners among the noncom- missioned officers in the said year may be taken as an evidence of the healthy effects of the military life upon their character. Although we have not been able to give direct proof that the military life enhances the character of soldiers, yet the small percentage of crimes among soldiers must be indirect e\ddence that their character is being molded by the military discipline. Of the different good qualities that they get from such a discipline, regularity or punctuality seems to be the greatest, of which, however, we can produce no evidence. Spread of Education The skill of laborers has much to do with their efficiency, and the degree of their skill depends, broadly speaking, upon two conditions — the physical and the mental habit, or the autom- atism of the bodily and the mental powers and the increase of knowledge. Does the military life promote or impede such automatism? To such a question, we can not make any sweeping answer. With those whose business requires the use of the fingers, two or three years of military life may cause retrogression in their skill. This would especially be the case with those engaged in art. On the contrary, there are certain classes of people, who acquire their skill because of their life in the army. Of 230,000 soldiers, about 10,800 are employed EFFECTS ON LABOR I43 in engineering, railway or telegraphic works (about 8,000 engineers, about 1,800 railway corps, and about 1,000 tele- graph corps). Their business may be different from what they engage in when at home, but there is no doubt that they get a certain degree of skill because of such work in the army. Cobbleis in the army are the only soldiers that engage in productive work exclusively, but their average number, including 44 first class cobblers per day and 171 first and second class cobblers per day, is little more than two hundred per day.^ No doubt they get their skill because of their life in the army, but their number is so small that we may ov^er- look them. The degree of skill, if understood in the sense of the increase of knowledge, is clearly accelerated by military training. But, if we mean by knowledge only the advanced knowledge that is not necessary for productive laborers, we should say that soldiers are deprived of any chances of gaining such knowl- edge. Let us now look at the actual conditions in barrack life. We do not find any considerable progress in knowledge among those soldiers, who have finished the higher elementary course before entering banacks, because the degree of knowl- edge they have gained is sufficient for the military life. But those meet with difficulties who enter barracks before finishing the course. This is especially the case with those who have finished only the ordinary elementary course, but, after entering barracks, wish to become superior privates. In order to escape from the difficulties and inconveniences, con- sequent upon the insufficiency of knowledge, they spend their private hours in reading. Some of them are so stirred in their desire for learning that they study transcripts of lectures ol middle school grades. Such studies are not compulsory but are encouraged by superior officers, who help them in their studies. Of course, one's talent has much to do with the progress of learning, and we can not make any general state- ment about the degree of progress among soldiers. But it is a fact generally recognized that those who were entirely lack- ing in the knowledge of reading and arithmetic are now able to understand them to a certain extent. Those who could not 1 Military Department Annual Report, 1910. 144 CONSCRIPTION system: ECONOMIC EFFECTS write their own letters home are now able to write them in the kana syllabary. And those, who have acquired this amount of learning will, before leaving barracks, have attained a scholarship equal to the ordinary elementary course. With regard to those who are already in possession of the scholar- ship equal to this course, their degrees of progress are varied to a large extent. Some of the superior privates show con- siderable progress, while others show no signs of progress. The following tables will give an idea of the progress of learning among soldiers: . • Degree of Scholarship of Conscripts, 1908 A B c D G H Conscripts University graduates . . . Those on equal footing with the above College graduates Those on equal footing with the above Those completing the middle school course Those on equal footing with the above Those completing the higher elementary course .... Those on equal footing with the above Those completing the ordinary' elementary course Those on equal footing with the above Those having some knowledge of reading and arithmetic Illiterates Total First Class Second Class Third Class Fourth Class Fifth Class A B 70 57 102 195 107 4 156 52 154 55 186 52 327 91 118 34 13 2 129 112 107 170 73 8 2,549 1.428 1.438 2,419 933 105 3,621 1,949 1.783 2,490 807 137 35,010 13.942 10,770 15.239 4.235 744 19,200 7.487 5,791 9,029 2.279 422 71.476 28,878 23,709 38,480 11.338 1,595 13.509 6,196 4.986 8,734 2.532 372 19.429 6,842 8.825 3.538 8,057 3,169 14,352 6.797 4.849 4,684 496 241 172,043 72,621 60,150 98,323 31,989 4.140 Total 535 954 286 599 8,872 10,787 79,940 44.208 175.476 36,330 56,008 25.271 439.266 Degree of Scholarship ( DF Conscripts , 1909 First Class Second Class Third Class Fourth Class Fifth Class Conscripts A B Total A 82 136 75 153 2,765 3,551 38,117 17,807 77,456 12.326 18.726 6. 121 90 ISO 85 139 1,631 1.945 16.965 7,571 34.643 S.630 8,856 3,153 no 168 97 116 1,624 1.69s 12,449 5. 212 25,265 4.088 7,795 2,745 245 32s 189 269 2,552 2,280 15,202 7,720 39,520 7,549 13.554 5.776 no lOI 72 97 958 742 4.278 2.155 II. 671 2.360 4.655 4.366 2 8 3 8 168 170 1,320 583 2,936 572 832 390 6^0 B 888 C S2I D E F 782 9,698 10,383 G 88,331 H 41,048 191,491 I J K 32,525 54,418 22.<;^i L Total 177.315 80.858 61,364 95.152 31.565 6.992 453,275 EFFECTS ON LABOR Degree of Scholarship of Conscripts, 1910 145 First Class Second Class Third Class Fourth Class Fifth Class Conscripts A B Total A 120 lOI 81 114 2,678 3,139 38,177 17,313 74,597 11,987 17,921 4,922 102 119 63 125 1.548 1,676 15,918 6,728 30,555 5.039 7.723 2.415 144 148 100 177 1,813 1,912 14.059 5,560 24.479 4.246 6.479 2.067 381 328 207 2.^4 2.542 16.S18 8,104 38,668 7,793 11,933 4,733 S3 57 26 50 630 505 3,926 1,878 10,346 2,153 4,027 4.088 7 7 6 8 169 178 1,199 584 2,467 591 705 291 807 B 7SS C 483 D 777 E 9,822 F • 9,952 G 89,797 H 40,167 I 181,112 J 31,809 K 48,788 L 18,516 Total 1-1.150 72,011 61,184 94,494 27,739 6,212 432,783 Of the different grades of the first class conscripts, the a\'erage number for the three years above of those whose progress in learning was considerable, is as follows: L 5,962 K 18,692 J • 12,274 1 74.530 Total 111,458 The percentage of this total number to the total of the first class conscripts is 64 per cent. Now, if all the first class con- scripts are to be alike enrolled in the active service, then about half of them will become actives. In other words, about fifty-five thousand of the annual conscripts for the active service are raising the standard of scholarship, because of their military life, though we must deduct from the number the commissariat and the artillery auxiliaries, who receive military training only for a short time. As these fifty-five thousand soldiers have to earn their livelihood by some sort of industry when they are discharged, the acquisition of this knowledge while in the active service must be of much help to the efficiency of their labor. This effect of military dis- cipline upon labor will the more strongly be felt as the demand for skilled laborers increases. There may be some people who think that the acquisition cf knowledge by soldiers will make them abhor productive labor. But, to our mind, it 146 CONSCRIPTION system: ECONOMIC EFFECTS seems that men with such a degree of knowledge as we have seen have no other way to earn their HA-elihood than by physi- cal labor. Physical Training The dependence ot the efficiency of labor upon one's bodily strength is a fact as evident as the healthy effect of the military life upon physical training. Our task now is to produce evidences for such effects. There are some who try to get the necessary materials for their investigation by comparing the bodily development of soldiers with that of students in schools or of those engaged in various industries. But this is a dangerous method, because either students or those in busi- ness are constitutionally inferior to the soldiers of the same age. Those who are constitutionally different undergo also different developments. Supposing that there is a difference of development between soldiers and students, such a differ- ence alone is not sufficient for proving the efficiency of military training. The efficiency can only be known when we establish a com- parison between those who are under the strict discipline of military life and those whose constitution is almost similar to theirs, but whose business is entirely diff'erent. It is difficult to obtain proper materials for such an investigation. Fortu- nately, however, we have one thing which suits our purpose, and that is the development of the physique of the soldiers belonging to the different branches of the army. Let us now compare the physique of infantry soldiers with that of the privates of the medical corps, for they are the two extremes of the military life. The former have little to do with technique, but devote their time to physical and mental training, while the very nature of the work of the latter leads them away from military training. If there is any difference between them, it is because one leads a purely military life, while the latter leads a semi-military life. Originally, both of them were selected and enrolled according to the same constitution. Besides, all the conditions concerning food, clothing, dwelling, etc., are the same. The only difference EFFECTS ON LABOR 147 would then be that of training and work. The following is based on the Military Department Annual Report, published in 1909 and 1910: Physique of Infantry Soldiers, 19 10 Period of Examination Number of Conscripts Examined Age Height Weight Chest Expan- sion First period'* Second " Third " 49,648 20.07 21 .07 22.07 Shaku 5 29 5 31 532 Kan 14.815 15358 15 -473 Shaku 2.78 2.83 2.85 2.3 2.4 2.5 1909 First period Second " Third " 43,900 20.07 529 21 .07 5 30 22.07 532 4-757 2.78 5-294 2.81 5-433 2.82 2-3 2.4 2.3 *The first period means the first month of enroHment, the second, one full year after enrollment, and the third, the next one full year. Physique of Priv .\TES OF Medic-^l Corps, 1910 Period of Examination Number of Conscripts Examined Age Height Weight Chest Expan- sion First period Second " Third " 2,370 20.06 21 .06 22.06 Shaku 5-35 5-36 5-37 Kan 14-654 15.276 13.203 Shaku 2.72 2.77 2.76 2.3 2-55 2.6 1909 First period Second " Third " 808 20.09 21 .09 22 .09 5 - 35 5-36 5-37 14-675 15.212 15-230 2.74 2.78 2.80 2-5 2.6 2.7 Infantry Soldiers — Average for Two Years Period of Examination First period Second " Third " Number of Conscripts Examined Height Shaku 5 29 5-305 5-32 Weight Kan 14.786 15 326 15-453 Chest Shaku 2.78 2.82 2-835 Expan- sion o 2 2.4 2.45 H 148 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS Privates of Medical Corps — Average for Two Years Period of Examination First period Second " Third " Number of Conscripts Examined Height Weight Chest .... Shaku 5-35 536 5-37 Kan 14.665 15-244 15.217 Shaku 2.775 2.78 Expan- sion 2.4 2.55 2.65 Increase Between Periods Period of Examination Branch of Service Height Weight Chest Expan- sion From first period to second From second period to third From first period to second From second period to third • Infantry - Aledical ' Corps 1 Shaku .015 .015 .01 .01 Kan ■540 .107 •579 .027 Shaku .04 .015 -045 • 05 .1 •05 •15 .1 We shall gain nothing in the comparison of the height, weight, etc., of each different period. But the increase be- tween periods, as shown above, should be noted. During the time that extends from the first to the second period, medical privates, as well as infantry soldiers, receive the same military training, and their duties are also almost alike. But during the time between the second and the third period, a differentiation takes place between these two classes of soldiers, the medicals engaging in nonmilitary work. When we now examine the stature in each period, we find that the increase is ,015 with infantry soldiers, while it is ,01 with medical privates. The latter are, even at the time of enroll- ment, taller than the former, by .06, and, consequently, they do not grow in stature so much as infantry soldiers after enrollment. The increase of chest during the time between the first and the second period is .04 with infantry soldiers, while that of medical privates is .045. This is but natural. Against the 2.78 shakii^ chest measure of infantry soldiers, that of medical privates is .05 less at the time of enrollment. This shows that the latter have still room left in which to grow. There is nothing remarkable in all these comparisons. But when we find the chest increase is only .05 with medi- cal privates, against ,15 with infantry soldiers, during the 1 One shaku = .994 foot. EFFECTS ON LABOR 149 time between the second and the third period, we must be struck with the poor results in the case of the former. With regard to weight, the difference between them in the first hah" of their term is very sUght, but in the second half the increase is ,107 with infantry soldiers, while the rate with medical privates is .027. We have nothing to say about expansion. In short, there is no doubt that the difference of physical development be- tween infantry soldiers and medical privates is considerable, after their differentiation in training and duties. Let us again look at the statistics for 1910, in which all contingent elements were, it seems, eliminated according to the law of large numbers. There we find that infantry soldiers hav^e an increase of .115 in weight during the time between the second and the third period, while medical privates have a decrease of .073 in their weight and of .01 in their chest measure during the same length of time. It is stated above that we can not treat the development of students' physique in the same manner as that of the soldiers. The following table will, however, be a side light in our investigation : Physique of Students in Schools Under Direct Control of the Edu- cational Department 1 Age Period of Examination Number of Students Examined Height Weight Chest 21 22 23 f Corresponds to first period 1 \ of conscripts J f Corresponds to second period 1 \ of conscripts J f Corresponds to third period "I \ of conscripts j 3,099 3,447 3,026 Shaku 5-34 5-37 5-35 Kan 14.400 14-453 14.400 Shaku 2.69 2.71 2.69 The figures for each period above are not those of the same persons, as is the case with conscripts. But we can get an idea of the general tendency of the development of students' physique. This table shows that students above the age of twenty-one make no improvement in physique. Compare 1 Educational Department Annual Report, 191 1. 150 CONSCRIPTION system: economic effects the student life, with no improvement in physique, with the mihtary Hfe, in which there is a certain increase of weight and chest, and we can see clearly the good effects of military training. Let ug next compare the common soldiers with the sewing and cobbling privates. The latter are also selected and enrolled according to the same standards as the former and live under the same conditions as the former. But they en- gage in work that is quite nonmilitary. No statistics of their physique are published, the only material being the statistics of the sick patients among soldiers. Patients of Different Classes in Barracks and Hospitals, 19 io Class Noncommissioned officers of differ- ent branches Those of Account Department Those of Health Department Higher privates Higher sewing and cobbling privates . Higher medical privates First and second class soldiers First and second class sewers and cobblers First class medicals Average Number Per Day 1 1 ,005 115 282 20,730 44 1,404 133,832 171 1,917 New Pa- New Pa- tients in tients m Barracks Hospitals 4,912 1,154 14 10 24 34 11,924 216 33 5 195 148 97,983 19,086 156 23 638 234 Total of New Patients 6,066 24 58 14,085 38 343 117,069 179 872 Patients of Different Classes in Barracks and Hospitals per 1,000 Men, 1910 Class Noncommissioned officers of different branches Those of Account Department Those of Health Department Higher privates Higher sewing and cobbling privates . . Higher medical privates First and second class soldiers ........ First and second class sewers and cobblers First class medicals New Patients in Barracks 446 90 85 575 750 139 732 912 333 New Patients in Hospitals 105 65 121 104 114 105 143 Total 551 155 206 679 864 244 875 1,074 455 EFFECTS ON LABOR I5I Since the noncommissioned officers li different branches of the army are under better sanitary conditions than higher privates, and the latter are under better sanitary conditions than first and second class soldiers, the percentage of new patients is larger among common soldiers and smaller among the officers. We have now to compare the classes on an equal footing with each other. Higher privates have 679 new patients per 1,000, while higher sewing and cobbling privates have 864 per 1,000. First and second class soldiers have 875, while first and second class sewers and cobblers have 1,047. From this comparison, we can see that the sewers and cobblers who engage in productive work like the common' mechanics, have not the advantage of healthful working conditions as the common soldiers, who are under strict military discipline. Leaving out of consideration agri- cultural, stock farming, and fishing laborers, the mechanics m cities engage in unhealthy businesses, similar to the sewers and cobblers in the army. Now, when we consider the fact that the system of conscription takes these common mechan- ics away from cities, and gives them two or three years' training, we can not but admit the wholesome effect of such a training upon the development of their physique. Conclusion We have seen that the military life is conducive to the improvement of character, gives to the illiterates who are enrolled a knowledge necessary for livelihood and contributes to the cultivation of physical strength. We can not doubt that all these good results gained while in the army will remain when the soldiers are discharged and enhance the effi- ciency of their labor. The system of conscription also has an indirect effect upon the physical development of the peoJDle. Men of conscript age receive a preparatory training before the examination and enrollment. The officials of villages and towns call out those who will be of age in about six months, and give them a preparatory examination. If there are found among them cases of syphilis or trachoma they are required to 152 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS take necessary steps for remedy, the negligence of which is often visited with punishment. Such measures as these will be of much help in the prevention of the spread of such dis- eases and will contribute to the improvement of physique. The officials also take every possible measure to prevent sickness among those who have passed the conscript examina- tion, so that there will be no cases of sickness among them at the time of enlistment. The Discharged Soldiers' Association and its branches attend to meetings of various sorts, in which conscripts are given preparatory lessons. In the evening (for such meetings are usually held in the evening) they gather together, and receive instruction in various military rules and their exposition. They are often required to attend military drill. As they want to alleviate difficulties after enrollment, they try hard to learn these preparatory lessons. Such preparatory measures as the above will no doubt reflect upon the efficiency of their labor, after their discharge. Number of Laborers Rate of Productive Laborers Among Those Enrolled in Active Service The system of conscription has a great effect upon the number of laborers, because it takes many of the able bodied laborers away from their work. But the actual number of the productive laborers enrolled in the service is difficult to learn because statistics of the distribution of trades among those enrolled are entirely lacking. We can, however, ob- tain some estimate of their rate from other sources. In the present state of our society, those who have completed the elementary course alone can hardly engage in any occupation requiring brain work, but go into productive trades that require physical strength. Of course, wealthy people need not engage in such trades, even when possessed of the same grade of education and, besides, they are usually far advanced in their education. EFFECTS ON LABOR 153 Those who have completed the middle school course, or those of the same grade, usually live by brain Avork. Of these, however, there are some who have completed technical courses of some kind and engage in productive labor, but their number is comparatively so small that we may overlook them, for the time being. By productive laborers, we mean those who by the exercise of their own bodily strength engage in the production of goods. We exclude from this class such as engage in office work, or such as are superintendents of laborers. Taking our stand upon the above premises, we believe we may go a step further and estimate the number of conscripts who previous to their enrollment in the active service were engaged in productive labor. In order to do this, the amount of their education must be known, whic h we dedu( e from that of the first class conscripts. Percentage of Conscripts Having Education of Elementary Grade, Who Passed the Conscript Examination, to Men of Conscript Age 1910 Conscripts A University graduates B Those on equal standing with above C College graduates D Those on equal standing with above E Those completing middle school course F Those on equal footing with above G Those completing higher ele- mentary course H Those on equal footing with above I Those completing ordinary elementary course J Those on equal footing with above K Those having some knowledge of reading and arithmetic . . . L Illiterates Total First Class 0.09 0.06 o. 21 0.28 1.73 2.13 22.18 12.31 33.95 12. 14 II .92 3 00 100.00 Second Class A o. 29 0.22 0.44 0.53 2.27 2.79 21.48 11.72 33-40 10.76 13.00 3-10 100.00 o . 63 0.46 0.85 1 .04 3.66 4.14 21.98 11.48 30.29 11.84 10.83 2.80 Third Class 0.72 0.53 0.92 0.80 3.00 2.72 15-71 11.52 31-51 13-98 14-15 4-44 100.00 Fourth Class 0.23 0.17 0.32 0.30 2.38 1 .62 11.84 7-92 30.32 12 .64 16.69 15 - 57 100.00 Fifth Class 0.36 0.36 3-50 4.46 19.06 11.82 30.40 11.94 14-36 3-62 100.00 Aver- age 0.36 0.26 0.52 0.55 2.4s 2.63 19-64 11-63 32.50 12 .40 12.85 4-17 154 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS Percentage of Conscripts Having Education of Elementary Grade, Who Passed the Conscript Examination, to Men of Conscript Age 1909 First Class Second Class Third Class Fourth Class Fifth Class Aver- Conscripts A B age A B 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.09 1.56 2.00 21.50 10.04 43.68 6.95 10.56 3-45 O.II 0. 19 O.II 0.17 2.02 2.41 20.98 936 43.84 6.96 10.95 3-90 0.18 0.28 0. 16 0. 19 2.65 2.76 20.29 8.49 41.17 6.66 12.70 4-47 0.26 0.34 0.20 0.28 2.68 2.40 15-97 8. II 41-52 7.93 14-24 6.07 0.35 0.32 0.23 0.31 3-03 2-35 13-55 6.83 36.97 7.48 14-75 13.83 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.12 2.40 2.43 18.88 8.34 41.99 8.18 11.90 5-57 0. 14 0.19 II C D 0.17 E 2.14 2 .29 19.49 9.06 42.25 7.17 12 01 F : G H I T K L. . 4-98 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 According to the two tables above, the total number of those conscripts above the middle school grade is 5.04 per cent of the total number of all the conscripts of different grades, in 1909, and 6.77 per cent, in 1910. But since the number of those conscripts who pass the examination becomes less as the grade of education becomes higher, and accordingly since the number of the conscripts to be enlisted in the active service grows smaller among those of higher grades of edu- cation, the percentage of those actives above the middle school grade must be below the 5.04 per cent or the 6.77 per cent of the total number of actives of different grades. Now, when we examine the number of the first class conscripts who pass the examination every year, we find it is about double the required number. Of course, in such a reg'mental district as Osaka, in which a great city like Osaka is situated, the number of the first class conscripts is not sufficient to fill the required number of actives. But this we may regard as an exception. As a rule, there is no necessity of enrolling the second class conscripts. Such being the case, in order to obtain the percentage of the actives above the middle school grade to the total number of the actives of all grades, we must obtain the percentage of the first class conscripts above the said grade who have passed the examination, to the total EFFECTS ON LABOR . 1 55 number of all the first class conscripts. Of course, we must make allowances for the fact that those favored with the privilege of postponement of enrollment are called out at the expiration of the term of postponement without the drawing of lots. But the majority of such conscripts are above the higher school grade, and their percentage is as small as i per cent of the total number of conscripts. We may well over- look such a circumstance, for the time being. Now to return to the two tables above. According to those tables, the percentage of the first class conscripts above the middle school grade was only 3.82 per cent in 1909, and 4.50 per cent in 1910. To go still further back, it was 3.82 per cent in 1908, and 4.54 per cent in 1907. The average for these four years was about 4.42 per cent. In recent years, the number of conscripts above the middle school grade ought to have had more or less of an increase. But our inference from the said average of percentage would be that the per- centage at present will be about 5 per cent. Now, even sup- posing that the conscripts of the second class A are, as a rule, enrolled in the active service, there is still no necessity for changing the percentage of 5 per cent. The percentage of the second class B above the middle school, who have passed the examination, was 6.54 per cent in 1910, 5 per cent in 1909, 5.17 per cent in 1908, and 6.41 per cent in 1907. Putting these percentages with those of the first class conscripts above, and assigning their relative value (the number of the first class conscripts is about double that of the second class conscripts), we get the following averages: 5.18 per cent in 1910, 4.22 per cent in 1909, 4.27 per cent in 1908, and 5.16 per cent in 1907. The average for these four years is about 4.71 per cent. Hence our estimate of 5 per cent is nearly correct. Taking the basis for our investigation upon the foregoing premises, let us now make an estimate of the number of pro- ductive laborers among those in the active service, but we have first to know the total number of the men below non- commissioned officers in the active service. The actual 156 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS number, however, is not published. We have, therefore, to go to the average number of men per day, as pubHshed in the Health Section of the Military Department Annual Report. The figures for several years in the report are as follows: Year Men Above Semi-officers Noncommis- sioned Officers and Common Soldiers Men of Special Offices and Schools Total IQ07 12,400 12,269 12,326 12,640 173,712 197,898 207,957 212,824 4,831 5,540 5,408 5,594 190,943 215,707 225,691 231,058 1908 1909 1910 The number of 231,058 in 1910 nearly accords with that referred to in the American Army and Navy Magazine. The Military Club Report quotes the following from that maga- zine : Infantry 149,402 Cavalry Field Artillery 18,918 Foot Artillery. . Coast Artillery 6,889 Expert Soldiers. Commissariats 11,427 Health Dept. . . Total 221,432 plus X 14.585 p 16,727 3-484 Roughly estimated, the total is 230,000, which may be increased to 1,228,000 after the mobilization in war time.^ From this total, 230,000, we must now subtract the number of men above semi-officers, which is 15,156 (of which those belonging to troops are 12,640, and those of special offices and schools 2,516). The balance is 214,502. From this number, we have again to subtract 14,770 noncommis- sioned officers. The balance is then 199,780. We may regard this number as that of the men enrolled, according to the system of conscription; that is, the number of actives is about two hundred thousand. But we must not forget that this is the average per day, and, therefore, that the actual number will be greater than that, if we take into our estimate the number of the different auxiliaries, who are enrolled only for a short time. The average of 200,000 per day is, however, ' American Army arid Navy Magazine, May 20, 191 1. EFFECTS ON LABOR 157 sufficient for our purpose. If we suppose that 5 per cent of this number engage in brain work after they are discharged, then their number would be ten thousand. The balance, one hundred and ninety thousand, must engage in productive labor, after being discharged. Add to this the 14,770 non- commissioned officers who would have to engage in productive labor, if they had stayed at home. The military life then takes some 205,000 men out of productive labor, in order to have them engage in such nonproductive work as military drill. When we turn our attention to the navy, we find that the total noncommissioned officers and sailors, according to statistics prepared at the end of 191 1, is 45,576, of which 9,996 are officers. As half of the sailors are taken from vol- unteers, 17,790 of them (half of 35,580) should be regarded as conscripts. Suppose we subtract from this number the 5 per cent who would have engaged in brain work, if not en- rolled. The total of the naval conscripts would still be some 22,000, for the number of noncommissioned officers, picked from among the conscripts, is about half of the total number of noncommissioned officers. Adding the figures 22,000 to those of the army, we get 227,000, which is the total number of men taken from productive labor. Loss of Labor Days We have seen above that the number of those who live in barracks the whole year and are deprived of their productive labor is 227,000. If we wish to know how many labor days are lost to the nation, the answer is quite simple. They are equal to 227,000 multiplied by the number of labor days per man per year, not counting holidays. The total would be 82,855,000. But there are other circumstances to be con- sidered. Article XVI of the Conscription Law now in force runs as follows: " Reserv'es and Supplementaries are called out in cases of war or other emergency." In peace time, they are called out for military exercises, for a period not exceeding sixty days every year. They are called out for military 158 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS inspection once every year. According to this article, they must be called out every year for military exercises, but, actually, this does not take place, on account of the expense that would be entailed. The annual appropriations of the Military Department for such exercises are about two million yeyi (i, 949-575 yen in 1912, 1,847,533 yen in 191 1, 2,137,933 yen in 1910, 2,094,401 yen in 1909). But this sum is not sufficient to pay such expenses for all the resei'V'es and supple- mentaries. As a rule, the appropriations are distributed among the different divisions, each of which calls out the men as far as it can with the funds available. Setting aside the special manoeuvers that take place every year in different districts, the number of the reserves and supplementaries called out every year is only a fraction of the total. Also their annual number is not uniform, because the apportioned amount is not. A rough estimate of the amount is about 40,000 yen per division. V\q are not able, therefore, to make any estimate of the number of such re- serves and supplementaries that will hold good throughout all the divisions. • In a certain regimental district, the number was 1,960 in 1910, and 1,600 in 191 1, from which we infer that the annual number of each regimental district is 1,800 or so. This inference seems to be based upon too little mate- rial, but we have no other proper way to get the required number. But when we see that the number of soldiers of each .regimental district is about the same, our inference is not necessarily out of place. Basing our investigation upon the estimate of 1,800, we find that the approximate number of all the reserves and supplementaries that are called out every year is equal to 1,800 multiplied by 72, which is the number of regimental districts. In other words, the annual number is 129,600, that is, 130,000, roughly estimated. But we shall see that this annual number is larger, actually, when we take into consideration the fact that in some regimental districts the reserves and supplementaries of the Imperial Guard Divi- sion are called out together with those of other divisions, and, therefore, their annual number exceeds 1,800, which is our EFFECTS ON LABOR 159 estimate. Besides, these figures are of those regimental districts that do not participate in the special grand man- oeuvers. The figures will be greater for the regimental dis- tricts that participate in these manoeuvers. Taking all these circumstances into account, we shall not be too far from the truth when we say that the annual total does not exceed 140,000. Now, these 140,000 soldiers must serve in the army for at least three weeks every year. Setting aside the number of the days that are spent in the preparations and trips, the number of labor days lost will reach 2,940,000 or more. The time for the calling out is not fixed, but it takes place during the term that extends through September, October and November, which is the harvest season. The season may not be the busiest season for farmers, but it is not a leisure season by any means. This loss of labor days is equal to the loss of the labor of 365 days for 8,000 laborers. In this is not included the loss on the part of the naval reserves and supple- mentaries. Summary From the above, it follows that the system of conscription has a good effect upon the quality of labor, while it has a bad effect upon its quantity. Of these contradicting effects, we are not able to determine which is the more far reaching. We can not make any quantitative estimate of the difference. And there may naturally be room enough for disputes. The military authorities emphasize the good effects upon the quality of labor, as a set-off to the loss of productive labor. But any one who looks into the matter without bias, will admit that the effects upon the quality is not sufficient to compen- sate the loss of labor days. We can not, of course, deny that the military life increases the efiiciency of labor. But this is a slight matter after all. That hundreds of thousands of able bodied laborers are taken from productive work must be a great loss in the national economy, so far as there is opportunity for employment. Whether there is such oppor- tunity is our next question. CHAPTER \1 EFFECTS ON PRODUCTIVITY The effects of the system of conscription upon employment and labor were studied in the preceding chapters. This alone, however, would not be sufficient for an accurate knowledge of its effects upon productivity. The fact that military life takes away many able bodied men from productive labor will not justify us in thinking that so much of the productive power of a nation is thereby lost. For, there may be a limit to the amount of employment which may cause among discharged soldiers various difficulties in the gaining of their livelihood. Even admitting that the conscription system gives rise to certain employment, as we have already seen to be the case, this does not necessarily mean the Increase of employment among the people at large. We must know whether or not those who get their livelihood because of the army have some other means of getting employment, even in a case where there Is no such system as that of conscription. It is neces- sary for us to investigate the conditions in which labor and employment go hand in hand. In other words, we must see whether or not those who get their means of subsistence from and in the army would be able to find employment outside the army, and without depriving others of their employment. Agriculture Let us now see how far labor and employment are in accord with each other; how far our agriculture is able to furnish labor with employment. Tendency Among Agricultural Laborers to Concentrate in Cities The concentration of agricultural laborers In cities is a phenomenon common to all civilized nations, and this is now the case with our nation. Of course, this tendency throughout 1 60 EFFECTS ON PRODUCTIVITY l6l all the nations is not peculiar to the present age, but the feature that is new to the present age is its assuming an un- healthy character. And this unhealthy character of the tendency is now being realized in our countr>^ as in other countries. Percentage of Inhabitants in Various Cities, Towns and THE Whole Population Villages to Cities, Towns and Villages 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1903 1908 Below 500 Inhabitants 500-2,000 2,000-5,000 5,000-10,000 " 10,000-20,000 " 20,000-50,000 " 50,000-100,000 " 100,000-200,000 " 200,000-300,000 " 300,000-400,000 " 400,000-500,000 " Above 500,000 " 4. II 3-54 1.98 0.74 0.48 0.76 1. 14 2.89 4.08 3-78 1.74 0.99 0.49 0.78 1 .11 2 .90 4.22 3.60 1.85 1.07 0.55 0.77 4.08 391 3.56 1-97 I .12 0.57 0.75 4.68 0.44 13.20 53 -So 14.92 4-39 3.85 1.70 0-93 I .01 0.78 4-98 0.23 9-57 51.80 17-70 5 -11 4.16 2 .22 0.77 1. 18 1.46 5,80 0.12 7.30 46.91 20 . 75 6.93 4.68 2.61 1.03 2.22 0.86 6-59 Total (below 10,000) " (above 10,000) 84.36 15.64 84.31 15-87 83-56 16. 14 83-44 16,56 82,36 17.64 79-30 20.70 75-08 24.92 City censuses for the ten years preceding 1908, except for 1898 and 1903, and for the years since 1908 have not been published. The towns and villages possessing a population above 10,000 are, with a few exceptions, the local centers of commerce and manufactures, and their life is similar to city life. Those of less than 10,000 inhabitants, except a few that are manufacturing and commercial, are agricultural in character. Such being the case, if the percentage of the inhabitants in cities and towns above 10,000 is found to be on the increase, and if the percentage of those in towns and villages below 10,000 is found to be on the decrease, then this is evidence that a concentration of population in cities is taking place. As the birth rates of cities are lower than those of the country, and death rates are higher in the former than in the latter, even the very fact that the percentage of increase is stationarv Is an evidence of concentration. And 1 62 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS this is more evident when there is a gradual increase of the percentage in cities. According to the table above, the per- centage of the towns and villages below 10,000 decreased gradually from 84.36 to 75.08 in the fourteen years from 1894 to 1908, and the rate of decrease was greater in the years following 1900. On the contrary, the percentage of the towns and villages above 10,000 increased gradually from 15.64 to 24.9. Judging from these figures, we must say that concen- tration is an actual fact, and that the rate of increase has been especially great since 1900. We also recognize the fact that the rate was great during the two years 1909 and 19 10, when the price of rice was very low, but the statistics for these years are not obtainable. This fact of concentration may indicate an excess of agri- cultural people, but is not conclusive evidence of the excess. Of course, it is often the case that agricultural people move to cities when their farms no longer yield sufficient for their support. But this is by no means the only reason for their removal. The farms may be enough for their support, but the trades and occupations in cities may give them more return than those in the country. And this is often the case. It is but natural that many are attracted to the cities, and this is true of all the civilized nations. Many a farm is deserted, because many a tiller leaves his home for the city. That people can get a better living in cities than in the country may account for concentration, but does not necessarily mean an excess of agricultural people. In other words, we must go a step further, if we want to ascertain the relation between the concentration in cities and the excess in the country. This is a problem of great importance to us. Area of Cultivated Fields Our task now is to study the area of arable land, in order to see whether or not the concentration in cities is due to an excess of agricultural people. Before proceeding any further, let us bear in mind that the phrase "excess of agricultural laborers" carries with it two meanings. On the one hand, it EFFECTS ON PRODUCTIVITY 163 means that the area of the arable land is not sufficient for the whole labor of agricultural people, and, on the other, that the area is either not sufficient for giving employment to all of the agricultural population, or is barely sufficient for doing so. The former relates to a physical comparison between the arable land and man's labor; the latter, to a social and eco- nomic comparison between the profits derived from the arable land and the number of people. A comparison of the areas of the cultivated fields of the last sixteen or seventeen years would be of much value. That the Russo-Japanese War (i 904-1 905) took away about one million men from among the people is suggestive of its effects upon agricultural labor. Seeing that this war dealt no blow" to the rice crops, in spite of the fact that it deprived our agri- cultural labor of the most able-bodied men, the conclusion is reached that this is an evidence of an excess of agricultural population, that is a physical excess in the comparison between labor and land. They contend that the number at least of those taken to the battlefields is not necessary to agriculture. This contention is not altogether groundless. The following table shows the areas of rice fields for more than a decade: Area of Year Rice Fields Cho 1897 2,845,339 1898 2,836,036 1899 2,839,550 1900 2,828,459 1901 2,847,357 1902 2,847,191 1903 2,864,139 1904 2,880,714 1905 2,881,548 1906 2,898,792 1907 2,906,091 1908 2,922,387 1909 2,938,073 Comparison with is Pre' v'ious Year 4 + 52,840.4 •/ — 9.303 2 + 3,513-5 9 — 11,090.3 3 + 18,897.4 9 — 165.4 .1 + 16,947.2 •9 + 16,575-8 •5 + 833.6 9 + 17,244.4 •9 -f 7,299.0 .8 -f 16,295.9 .8 + 15,686.0 The area in 1904 and in 1905 did not decrease, but rather increased to a certain extent in the same manner as in the year preceding and following them. As to the deficiency of 12 164 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS labor in these two years, we are unable to get any clear evi- dence from rice crops. We can only draw an indirect inference. The average of rice crops per cJio in the successive years was as follows: Year 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 Rice Raised on Wet Fields Koku .209 .720 •430 ■497 .686 .328 .665 •«34 ■353 .632 .722 .815 .823 Glutinous Rice Koku 076 530 310 343 513 185 498 653 200 465 558 638 665 Rice Raised on Dry Fields Koku 0.706 0.920 0.770 0.875 0.902 0.721 0.768 0.704 0.791 0.901 1 .012 I 054 1 .021 Average Koku 185 681 400 466 648 297 628 785 325 597 688 777 785 As rice crops are controlled to a large extent by conditions of weather, it is difficult to ascertain the amount of labor from them alone. In 1904, there was a good har\'est, from which we judge that the labor was also sufficient. The bad harvest in 1905 was not the worst in history. Besides, if this bad harv'est was due to the deficiency of labor, the harvests in all of the provinces would have been uniformly bad, which was not the case. Of the deficit in that year's har\^est, 6,000,000 koku (compared with the average of the preceding years), 75 per cent, is credited to the nine northeastern provinces — Fukushima, Miyagi, Iwate, Aomori, Yamagata, Akita. Niigata, Ibaraki and Tochigi. Such provinces as Shizuoka, Tokushima, Kagawa, Oita, Wakayama, Shiga and Ehime had all har\'est increases of from 30,000 koku to 80,000 koku. Theiefore, we can not attribute the har^-est decrease in 1905 to deficiency of labor. We shall find the same fact when we consider the areas of wheat, including barley and naked barley fields. EFFECTS ON PRODUCTIVITY 1 65 Cho 1897 1.749,571 7 1898 1,806,667.4 ■ 1899 1,809,822 .6 1900 1 ,806,668 . 6 1901 .' 1,816,200.8 1902 1,804,938.0 1903 1 .799.346 I 1904 1,800,393.0 1905 1 ,817,522 .4 1906 1,813,913.1 1907 1.797.447 -6 1908 1 ,782,401 . 2 1909 1. 771. 855. 6 1910 • 1,765,176.8 In 1904 and 1905 we have a remarkable increase in the area, and the year 1905 has no equal in this respect in the year preceding or following it in which we have nothing that indicates a deficiency of labor. As to the yield of wheat, we shall say nothing, because we can make no definite state- ment, as in the case of rice crops. At any rate, our investi- gation so far seems to justify the contention referred to at the beginning of this clause.^ At least, there seems to be no posi- tive evidence against the contention. But it is, to our mind, based upon an imperfect observation of the matter. Rice and wheat are the most important agricultural products of our country, and the greater part of the income of our agri- cultural people depends upon them. Even supposing that there are some cases in which they are in want of labor, we can hardly believe that they would reduce the area of their rice or wheat fields on that account. Is it not very natural that in such cases they would try to meet the deficiency of labor by reducing the labor for transplanting other grains of lesser importance, so that there may be sufficient harvests of rice and wheat? If we want to know whether labor was deficient or not during the Russo-Japanese War, we must go a step further, and ascertain the area of the fields of some other agricultural products. The total area of the fields devoted to the eight important food products, ^ except rice, and of the five other products ^ is as follows : ^ We understand that the authorities of the Commercial and Agricultural Department are of the same opinion. ^ Wheat, beans, red beans, millet, sorghum, buckwheat, potatoes and sweet potatoes. ^ Cotton, hemp, indigo, tobacco, and rape seed. 1 66 Year CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM Total Cho 1897 3,469,634.5 1898 3,499,687.1 1899 3,497,702.0 1900 3,511,555.1 1901 3,485.976.7 1902 3,466,709.6 1903 3,470,277.0 : ECONOMIC EFFECTS Year Total Cho 1904 3,428,424.8 1905 3,380,619.8 1906. 3,404,629.9 1907 3,415,313 o 1908 3,417,140.0 1909 3,363,369 -9 We shall find a very interesting relation between these figures and the area of cultivated rice fields, in the accom- panying diagram. Let the red line denote the area of rice fields, and the black that of the other important products. We shall perceive that there exists a constant relation between the two lines. The diagram shows that they run symmetrically from the hori- zontal line in the center. The fluctuation of one corresponds to that of the other. There was some irregularity in this relation in 1904, 1905 and 1906 only. If these existed in the same regular relation in these three years as in other years, the black curv^ed line would have run the dotted course. There is no other reason than the war that will account for the irregularity in the said years. To express the same thing in another way, the area of rice fields and that of other fields were constant in the successive years. But we find that the total of the area of these two kinds of fields falls short of the usual figures, despite the increase in the area of rice fields. This shows that there was a decrease in the area of the fields other than rice fields, and the difference is due to the deficiency of labor, caused by the departure of able-bodied laborers for the front. Below we give the total area of fields in the successive years: Year Total Cho 1897 6,314,973.9 1898 6,337,252.2 1899 6,335,723.8 1900 6,340,015.0 1901 6,333,334.0 1902 6,313,901.5 1903 6,334,416.1 Year " Total Cho 1904 6,309,139 1905 6,262,168 1906 6,303,422 1907 6,321,404 1908 6,339,527 1909 6,301,443 <7» 00 O o 0> o en o o o in o <0 o 0> o 03 o o 351 296 \ 350 295 \ 349 294 \ / 348 293 \ 1 347 292 \ \ 346 291 \ \ \ \ \ N J 345 290 \ ^\/ 344 343 289 \ / \ ^ \ 288 A 342 341 340 339 287 286 285 \^ A -^ 284 "v \ 338 283 \ 337 382 336 381 (ten (tea thou- thou- sands) sands EFFECTS OX PRODUCTIVITY 1 67 Except the figures for 1909, those of other years make 6,330,000 cho their basis, the fluctuation being not more than 15,000 cho. But the decrease in the three years of the war was too irregular, and, especially, that in 1905 was only 60,000 or 70,000 cho, as compared with the average for the preceding years. Let us go a step further, and ask, why is the annual area of fields almost stationary? It is not because the area of arable land is settled and has all been utilized for cultivation, so that there is no more room for increase. On the contrary, there was a remarkable increase in the area.^ There are certain reasons by which we recognize the constancy of the number of agricultural laborers, despite the increase of the area.^ On the strength of these reasons, we may say as follows: We may regard the quantity of labor that is necessary for the cultivation of one cho of rice field or other fields as nearly fixed. Therefore, there is no way other than by cultivating the same area, even though there is an increase of the area of arable land. Since they have used their labor to its furthest limit, they can not take care of the increased area. However, such an explanation of the matter is not entirely free from difficulties. Assuming that about half the number of soldiers at the front are agricultural laborers, their number would have been at least 400,000, to which about 600,000 more must be added who were enlisted in rear ser\dce. The loss of men from agricultural labor would thus have been about one million. If now we suppose that they would have de- voted their whole energy to their work in the fields which amounted, as we have seen, to 6,300,000 cho, why did the loss of at least 300,000 or 400,000 of them in 1905 result in the small decrease of 60,000 or 70,000 cho in the area of the cultivated land? The only explanation now remaining for us would be that there would be no change in the quantity of labor per cho, in usual times, for there is a certain limit to the quantity of 1 Infra, p. 169. 2 Ibid. 1 68 CONSCRIPTION system: economic effects labor, owing to certain customs among Japanese agricultural people. So far as there is no increase in the number ot men, the area of cultivated land would remain the same, despite the increase of arable land. The increase of rice fields would then mean the decrease of other fields. Now, about 400,000 men were taken to the front in the war and those who re- mained at home had to forego their customary labor limita- tions. Even children, women and old people, who remain at home in usual times, were compelled to go to the fields. The result was the small decrease of 60,000 or 70,000 cho. If we indorse such an explanation as this, our conclusion would be that Japanese agricultural laborers are in excess, in the physical sense ; that is, there would be a lack of arable land if they devoted their whole energy and time to cultiva- tion. The war took away at least 400,000 and still the deficiency of laborers was not more than 80,000. ^ Then, the number of all the reserves and supplementaries at the front, less 80,000 men, must be the excess, considered in their rela- tion to the area of the arable land. If other laborers had devoted their whole energy to farming, they would have been unnecessary. The area of arable land has since increased considerably. But it would still be insufficient for calling forth the whole energy of the surplus number. Of the in- crease in the area, we shall see later. Agricultural laborers are thus in excess, considered in their physical relation. But our problem is whether there is an economic surplus or not, whether or not our agriculture has any more room for employment. A physical surplus does not necessarily mean an economic surplus, for is it not a fact that our agricultural laborers, who were in excess physically, have been employed in some sort of farming woik? Is the num- ber of our farming people in excess economically? If not, to what extent is our agriculture still able to give employment to attract more laborers? For the answer we must go to the ^ The total number of agricultural families is 5,400,000. Supposing the number of actual laborers per family to be one and a half persons, the total of the laborers will be 8,100,000. This number of laborers cultivate about 6,000,000 cho. Hence the number required for the cultivation of 60,000 cho is about 80,000. EFFECTS ON PRODUCTIVITY 169 materials other than the area of cultivated land, hardly go further than to draw mere inferences. We can Fluctuation in the Area of Arable Land and in the Number of Agricultural Laborers In order to see whether our agriculture has more room for employment, we must look at the fluctuation in the area of arable land. It is unfortunate that we can not gain access to the conditions previous to 1903. Year 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 Increase from 1904 to 19 12 Wet Fields CJio 2,818,276.3 2,832,569.2 2,840,308. 1 2,849,760.7 2,873,562.1 2,894,050.6 2,902,189.4 2,916,793 6 2,932,832.0 1 14.555 -7 Drv Fields Cho 2,476,584.2 2,488,098.7 2,497,400.7 2,586,895.1 2,630,761.4 2,723,576.0 2,750,473-2 2,782,425.7 2,826,278.2 349,694.0 Total Cho 5,294,860 5,320,667 5,337,708 5,436,655 5,504,323 5,617,626 5,652,662.6 5,699,219.3 5,759,110.2 464,249 7 During these years, the increase in wet fields was some 100,000 and that in dry fields some 300,000. When we now look at the numbers of farming people during the same period, we find little increase. Year Number of Houses in Country Number of Farmers' Houses Number of Semi- farmers Total Farmers Percentage of Farmers to tlie Number of Houses Farmers Semi-farmers 1904 8,413,688 8,486,772 8,689,735 8,730,259 8,964,986 9,084,710 9.020,021 9,245.253 3,776,798 3.759,163 3,819.625 3.778.250 3.747.633 3.702,558 3,694.970 3.682,344 1,639,905 1,620,806 1.558,712 1,627,922 1,660,730 1,706,941 1,721,967 1.739,782 5,416,703 5.379,969 5.378,337 5,406,172 5.408,363 5,409.499 5.416,937 5,422,126 44 80 19.49 1905 . 44 43 43 41 40 40 39 29 96 SI 80 76 97 83 19. 10 1906 17-94 1907 18.56 1908 1909 18.52 18.79 1910 19.09 191 1 18.82 Except 1905 and 1906, in which the effects of the war were remarkable, the total number of farmers' houses was 5,400,000 to 5,410,000, these figures remaining the same throughout; 1 70 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS from which we may infer that the figures preceding 1904 remained ahnost the same. Indeed the very fact that there was a decrease of about 80,000 in the number of farmers' houses, while there was an increase of about 80,000 in that of semi-farmers' houses, is a sufficient evidence of the decrease of those who had employment on farms alone. Some will think that if there be any decrease of agricultural employment, this should necessarily be in our own case, for we see that the number cf cattle and horses for farming work has in- creased to some extent. Percentage of Wet and Dry Fields, for which Cattle and Horses Are Used, and of Those for which They Are Not Used Year 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 W'et Fields Used 53-87 53 7« 54 35 55 62 57 00 57 28 57 87 Not Used 46.13 46 . 22 45-65 44 38 43- 00 42.72 42 13 Dry Fields Used 32.85 32 31 32 24 34 II 37 61 33 61 34 79 Not Used 67-15 67-69 67.76 65.89 62.39 66.39 65.21 The area of arable land increased about 400,000, while there was little increase in that of cultivated land. As to the number of farmers' houses, there was not an increase but a slight decrease. This does not at all mean that there was an economic surplus, nor that there was no room for more em- ployment. E\'en subtracting the area of 400,000 cho, which is the increase since 1904, from the area of arable land at present, the present number of farmers could gain their livelihood by using the balance of the area as they did before. But as the new increase of population left its own district for cities, in order to seek some better means of livelihood, there we find no increase in the number of farmers. On the other hand, there is an increase in the area of arable land, which means that the area per man is on the increase. EFFECTS ON PRODUCTIVITY 171 The increased area of 400,000 cho ought to give them more employment, though the standard of their Hving may thereby fall somewhat. Of the area of cultivated land, we shall find almost the same thing to be true. If the area of arable land already in existence in 1904 had been used in the same way as before, this alone would have caused an increase in the area of cultivated land, to the extent that it would have amounted to 6,330,000 cho. The area of arable land, 400,000 cho, is suf- ficient margin for additional increase of the area of cultivated land and can, therefore, give an additional increase of employ- ment. The concentration of agricultural laborers in cities is by no means due to the fact that they can not find employ- ment in the country. It is due to the fact that they want to find better means of livelihood in the cities. In the country there is still much employment left. Let us secure a rough estimate of the amount: Area of Arable Land per Farmer Year 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 Wet Fields Cho .5200 .5218 •5224 ■5224 •5308 •5315 .5318 Dry Fields Cho •4521 .4606 .4612 •4724 .4818 •5015 .5027 Total Cho .9721 .9824 .9836 .9948 I .0126 I .0330 I 0345 The area per farmer is thus about one cho. Now, if we estimate the number of agricultural laborers per house to be one man and a half, the arable land of 400,000 cho would sup- port at least 500,000 or 600,000 laborers. This estimate requires, however, some discount, because newly opened fields can not be considered on an equal footing with well cultivated fields. However, we have no means of knowing the amount to discount. But we believe we can say that however large may be the number of agricultural laborers, compared with the area of arable land, our farms ought to give more employment to the soldiers who are originally from the 172 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS laboring classes, and to about 300,000 of those who gain their livelihood by the employment connected with the army. As we have included in the above the estimate of the in- crease of the area of wet and dry fields in Hokkaido, we now give it below separately, by way of parenthesis: Year 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 Increase from 1904 to 1910 Wet Fields Cho 20,584 . 7 21,402 3 22,827 7 24,637 28,696 I 36,432 5 37,902.7 17.318 Dry Fields Cho 319,620.3 341,962.3 366,349.0 403,337 -9 432,878.2 481,455 I 500,131.1 180,510.8 Total Cho 340,205.0 363,364.6 389,176.7 427,974.9 461,574 -3 517,887.6 538.033-8 197,828.8 Subtracting this amount from the estimate above (that is, total increase of the area of arable land) we get the increase of all the other parts of the country, from 1904 to 1910. Wet Fields 66,733 I Dry Fields 93,371 o Total 160,104.1 If we add to this total that of 1911, the increase of the area would then be 180,000 cho at least. As we have already seen, the area per house is about one cho. Hence, the said total of the increase of the area would support 18,000 houses. On the other hand, there was, during these years, a decrease of about 35,000 houses against the area existing previous to these years. If we suppose that labor could be increased in the same degree as before, the area of arable land, except that in Hokkaido, would be enough to support 210,000 or 220,000 laborers. As to the area in Hokkaido, during the same period there should have been an increase of 100,000 or 1 10,000 houses, if we esti- mate the area per house to be about two cho. But this was not the case. The increase was only 36,000, which means that the area would still be able to support 60,000 or 70,000 more houses. In other words, the total of the increased area EFFECTS ON PRODUCTIVITY 173 ought to support at least 250,000 houses. Now, if we suppose that the average labor of adults per house is one man and a half, then the area would support 370,000 or 360,000 laborers. Increase of Agricultural Houses in Hokkaido" Year 1904. 1905- 1906. 1907. 1908. 1909. 1910. Increase. Farmers 79.214 81,697 87,921 96,377 103,554 103,809 106,757 27,543 Semi-farmers 36,751 33,816 33,540 34,311 35.465 43,611 44,621 4,870 Total 115,965 115,513 121,461 130,688 139,019 147,420 151.378 35.413 ^ Because there was an increase of 35,000 in Hokkaido, whose agricultural popu- lation is a part of the whole agricultural population, in which there was almost no change during the said years. Let us now proceed still further, and see how much of the area of our land could yet be turned into wet and dry fields. According to an investigation made by a reliable authority^ the estimate is as follows:^ Area That Could Be Turned into Wet Fields Cho Increase as the result of the rearrangement of arable land^ 36,000 Dry fields in interior to be turned into wet fields 250,000 Dry fields in Hokkaido to be turned into wet fields 100,000 Land in interior to be reclaimed 250,000. Land in Hokkaido to be reclaimed 100,000 Total 736,000 Area That Could Be Turned into Dry Fields Land to be reclaimed 500,000 Dry fields to be turned into wet fields 350,000 Balance 150,000 The above estimate is the safest and the least possible estimate. Of the whole area of the country, about 9,529,110 cho is regarded as arable, the maximum angle of slope being fifteen degrees. If we deduct from this area that of the land ^ Hokkaido Agricultural Association Report, No. 4, Vol. XIX. 2 The estimate is that there will be an increase of the 3 per cent of 1,213,000 cha of the land to be rearranged. 174 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS already cultivated, which amounts to 5,759,110 cho, the balance will be 3,769,902 cho. Of this area of arable land, it would not be very difficult to get about one million cho of wet and dry fields. Setting aside the circumstances in Korea and Formosa, the area will be enough for the support of all the soldiers in 'the army, and of all those who are getting their livelihood from the army. Manufactures and Commerce We will now study our commercial and industrial conditions There are persons prone to believe in the excess of labor, but we have already seen that even in our agriculture alone there is yet much room for labor. People leave the country for the cities, in spite of this fact, because the city life is more profit- able than the life in the country. What we would lose by the military system would be made up by what we gain in the agricultural life. But is there, in our commerce and manu- factures, any possibility of giving more employment, as we have seen to be possible in agriculture? The most valuable data for our study would be statistics of those who are not employed, but as there have yet been no statistics of the kind, we shall have to base our arguments upon indirect inferences from various observations. Increase of City Population In a preceding section, we have studied the concentration in cities. Our task now is to study the increase of the abso- lute city population for several years in succession. Assum- ing that the cities and towns above ten thousand population are industrial and commercial, and that towns and villages below that size are agricultural, let us, for the sake of con- venience, call the former simply cities. Until 1897, the yearly increase in cities was 200,000 or so, but, in 1898, the increase jumps to 650,000 or 660,000. We further find that this great increase went hand in hand with the increase of about 150,000,000 yen, for two years, in the total amount of imports and exports. The yearly increase of EFFECTS ON PRODUCTIVITY /:> in s c O H < o < . [ O — i^-'O — CI o 1-1 O C 00 vO -- r^O O 00 o 00 ^ a^\r) o\ ■ r^ "^ r^ lo ^ o On \c rT ci o" '. c tN ci oo" G^ 00 PI ID ro . lO -Tl- — Ov ■* ^^ ID •* CO UO H- -t -* oo 00 ro M ►- ^- CO 01 01 vD rOOO O >- rO O t-1 w ^ C> >0 M rj- C O 00 ■* ro n >- O t^O O ■ O O 00 O « w t^ Tj- rOO ! -^ o m 00 01 t^ t^ t^ O . " ^o *"* Tf O O CO lO r^ 00 o o M 01 1- 01 O M rO O ►- O IC O yD '^-^ r^ t^oo c^ 01 ro lo CO r^ 00 -■_^ .0_ -^ -^ CT; >-<_ -co 01 O o m r^ 01 ro 0^ <~o ' " CO O^ 00 ri -1- i^ 01 UO li^ . vO tJ- lO C_ t-; t^ ^ -^ CO 01_ 0_vO of " 01 oo" c oi m ON o^, •+ hj o "0 vC -t t^ I-^ O t~~ -co O lO r-» ^l ^ '^l -[l"^- '^ ' "^^ 1-c 00 c> go" vcT c o" oT oT ; vo" "^lO 00 -t-X OC O^ "O CO 00 00 lO t-H t-^inx tJ- N CO 0_ CO 01 i-T w" 01 t-^ 01 C^O >-i lO i-i 1- \n t~^ co "i- 01 00 00 O CO o o vO 00 vO ^ CO O 1-1 ■ ^ CO 01 ON 01 o ^o 1-1 01 n .CO 00 1-1 CO O ON 1-1 t^ -+ •+ . o 01 ON l-H C» inoO -t- 01 CO 00__ i-t y-t h- M HI l>. 00 O lO t^ CO H- ^ o 00 o 01 lOO C~00 O 00 CO ro CO lO HH ir)\0 CO O ^-1 1-1 C^ O 01 0\ oTi- o H^ too t^oo t-^rf 00 00 mo CO 1- 'i-OO vC CO O t-^ I^O t^ -^ 01 CO -^ 01_ On 01 M l-l l-l o oo'+oioii-it^"* 00 00 C>t^cOTfi-' cOOl o Tj- ^CO"_^'^t--.':t;0N01 00_ • 0^ CA oT lO C-'^COCC Ol" oT ! 00 VOOllOi-iOOlOO'^ <^ . (-H t--. UJOO CO 01 CO 'd- 01_ t^ 1— ( HH HH \o" . f— ■ c in o en c o C 03 bC ^ -i-i .s o IS ---- = -- "V H ca s -o r- !" c c3 oooooooo u a to oooooooo u, _qj o o q_ o o o o q_ -M o' 6 6 6 6 6 6 d • 1^ — o u H-OliOOOOOO B cj -H 01 CO 't "0 O tn > o------- >-. x> < c 1— ( ON O o o HH C7^ l-l o o \o Tfln (U o ^ , -^ ^ _J o o ? ;s 0) a> t/1 C/J OJ n1 o . >. u u rt rt a> o >. >» HH -o-a o o u u 0) o; a a. u u 03 0) OJ .>v (U (U > > y2ij2 03 OJ t-, u o o %-l rn o Z o H O (/} H z O a o a Q O X s o o w g H O > o O H o < CQ - >0^-OC>0 rC>^ Is- i-_Tt;"*;C<_MrO «'-ir^M l-l l>^ t-l H-l a: t/5 4-) O-^r^OOO fCO O^O t^O .& c •* Ov O 1-1 O OMO "i- r^vO I- 'S Pi 3 o "^ Tl-x - rOf^OOOOO t^r^ < sOOO rOiO^CS^vO I^iOt^ VO lOP4 00_'^H->-i (N " ■^t^ cT rO 't' n >-i c o 4-> c OvOOO rOOOC O o r>.c>n QJ H- 1/^00 vO t^oo t^ t^c» fO t^ !£■ 0_ ~ r^OO " " " (^ -1 ^ 'u »— HH HI -t-) o o 0^ .!-> O « rt-oo O O O O C uo O c "Of^O>-^" "OO O 3 CO o iTSrO"^'-' O ON-^C ■^'Tt-io Ui e < oiooo t^ioo irj-Tt-r^" O lOt^HHMr^iO ►«c^rMoo O ^ "H ■^00 ^+00 lO (N 1-1 00 CT>00 1-1 re ro " Q <-«- c 03 u U tJ-OO r^ O^^ " vO t^ rC rO 1- c .IJ in i^ ooo o c^ C fC o m t^ ^ "O I^ t^O (N rCvO fO rO M -1-04 c "o '-"'—'•—'— — ■Si 2 4-* • U x.< < >. 4-J .^ > U >^ nj 1/5 < > u U3 — ^ ?3: "s Inf. it Cav. Fielr It. At bo H( asaki , Eng Com O J j=j:j=^_^<5 .fcJijTJ*J !''r3i:^-t^ vo m 00 \o (N '4-"0 0! p-i; 00 00 Ti- lo •* lo CM (s fOCT, <. 1-1 PI a>ajcji>4;iuo(UI«H. ^u 4 J3 3 4-> o 0) U3 » d) o E bo C o in a (U E U} lU tn < EFFECTS ON CONSUMPTION 199 A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K. Table II Percentage of Soldiers Receiving Money in Other Percentage of Soldiers Ways than by Money Receiving Money Order 67 84 78 93 70 55 31 56 75 74 93 411. 458. 2.584- 273- 126. 221 . 294. 669. 102. 213. 254- Total Number of Soldiers 9 095 Total Amount of Money Yen 21,210.45 Table III Average per Soldier Yen 2-335 Average per Month Yen .4667 Average per Year Yen 5.604 From the above tables, it is noted that the number of those who get money from the hands of \dsitors, or by other similar ways, is a great deal larger than that of those who get money by money order. The former is about double the latter, except that it is twenty-five times as much in the Forty- eighth Regiment. The money that soldiers get directly from visitors or friends can be concealed if they so desire. But from the fact that so much of the amount received in this way is published in the statistics, we can infer that it is actually not less than the amount received by money order. In other respects, we can hardly rely upon these statistics. For example, how could it be possible that only 50 to 70 per cent of the soldiers get money from home? Even the officers themselves can hardly know the actual amount of money their men get from home. The amount sent by money order seems to be quite obvious, yet it is often the case that soldiers get money through a money order addressed, not to themselves, but to friends, in order to escape the notice of the officers. And the friends are usually restau- rant keepers, etc. Even the amount received by money orders is, therefore, not to be exactly ascertained. Our only clue in the matter is the statistics of the amount paid on 200 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS money orders at the Eleventh Division is Zentsuji, there are two Sakade and Kotohira. center of the district, \v account of its shrine, is about equal to that present. Sakade . Zentsuji. Post Office of Zentsuji, where the quartered. In the neighborhood of other towns almost equal to it in size, The former is a small commercial hile the latter is a place well known on The population of the former (Sakade) of Zentsuji, though slightly larger at Year Ending 1902 1908 191 1 10,759 14.470 15-866 12,174 14,621 14,108 Zentsuji depends for its prosperity upon the division and the Zentsuji Temple, while Sakade is a commercial center. If we exclude from our consideration the amount of money sent to soldiers, we can hardly believe that Sakade is below Zentsuji in the amount paid in money orders. The population of Kotohira is almost equal to that of Sakade, and in them the amounts of money paid on money order are about equal. We give this comparison because we want to show that Sakade is not particularly less in its amount of the money order paid. In other words, we want to show that we are justified in selecting Sakade, which is about equal in population to Kotohira, and comparing it with Zentsuji. Comparison of Amounts Paid on Money Orders in Zentsuji, Kotohira AND Sakade Year 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 Zentsuji Kotohira Sakade Yen Yen Yen 11,596.245 36,405.738 22,035 .499 44,444.287 38,728.025 25.953 899 61,648.704 40,987.075 38,383 915 62,761 .426 50,166.549 34.528 314 67,671.988 44,898.560 29.530 6X1 206,220.084 53.371.431 46,007 962 261,380.443 69,201 .508 67.539 050 132,680.492 68,742.741 65.496 257 128,587.083 96,930.893 63,205 785 109,483.048 66,968.034 73.384 434 123,986.000 64,184.000 59.357 000 t^- CO cr> o M CO tn >* in o N CO G^ (T> 0> (r> o o o o O o o O o o CO OO CO o CT> o 0^ 0^ Oi o (T> (-1 ,-i i-H .-1 (-( 0 i/'.oo O sO O O 00 •^ 0. 00 >/; (N rj O- "2 r^ u o XOOO>OrorO'-'NO • Distribu- tion of Souvenirs jjOrOoOirjOONO ■ OO 00 \rt r- 1/^ M M ro IT) rOGO C) Dinners and Enter- tainments O O O lOOD ooo o o 00\f^tN«CNOOfO o 4 ^ ^ t^ "^vO 00 f«5 Oi " O\t^^ n" M W m' f^ M to OJ to c a X Id tc c E o •g S c '•5 GJ o. ^ui r^oo « ro « vO N S Ot^l'^OOO MOO lO(N o 4 "c3 O l/^ ir^ IT) O IN -I- TfOO O M -^N a O M in-i--i-TtTtcjsO M 00 00 m' m of r^ m" (n I 73 §1 OiOOOr^OOOv • O '- OOMCNOJt^OO ■■^ n vO -^ rooo 00 M u^ T)- IN M a lO " vO Presents of Wines and Food OCOOOOOOO ■ lO o lo co' '^ojoOr^OiMMNOl^ ■^ M_ I^ ■^OO !-._ IS i/J r^ «■ m" «■ M 1 to C C ■ 00 • ro O r^ • LO ■ g -in ■ O O O • ro ■ O s. fO to OOv"*iomO"CN K o l^c^-^O mo too 00 ro M Construc- tion of Arciies O O O O O • • O • J. O M IN "VO • • t-i ■ O ^ O t^ 00 o • ■ o • >^ M •* 00 >-< M Tho Total of Soldiers, Sped and Welcomed OMOO t^O T|-t^lOt~ M 00 O O oo rfvO ^ O. ti- ro District A . District B . District C . District D . District E . District F . District G . City A City B O EFFECTS ON CONSUMPTION 20 = !0 to s •a H Kl ^sc 0\ CN -^ M Ov H 1-0 t^ 05 1 M „ooo -oooo • O w ■5§ gi/:oo -oooo • •^ C w ^vO"". tn -oiflOO • M o il ^ „ Tl-M M Oi a <-■ ^ .2 2 o '.4_i .^ 00000000 • 3 C aooomoooo ■ 10 i-f >1U-, NlorJ-OCOO • t 3 m 5 <^ w 1-1 « N 'Tfro ro n«j'"0000r' 00 w ) 1-1 rf *^fOt^^O>'''50r^i>"-^C E W C 'Zj vi ~ c • • 'i^S J « • ■ I" r^ t; ^ r^ ^ in ^ • • i-1 c < U < K !_ c fe t c "rt e2 ^ ^ y y.y .si.ij>> 1 WCOC/3U3WMtfl4_»4_ c c c c c c c 'C c 1 206 CONSCRIPTION system: economic effects to s 8 a W c o o c a i<; W M C E o C Ci M a ■4-1 O H I CO O O O to 3 C 5 ^ >-l L. t- flOOOOO gioOO'-'^^^OC^i^ V ^ C\ 0\ >^ 0> I^O -^ 0\ CN o o o , o o o o o o o ly^ O lO O •^ ro CN ro OOOlrtOOOO SOOOC^OOOO •w ■ o o \n o sooooooooo ^, Ot-lO (NOMMCM o O O O O 500 • C> "0 w O 4_) ■«-> 4-) •<-» -t-> -M -t-> ■-^ ^ — ^.iii.y .« <^ 2Q 'ji vi m 'Ji wtfltfi^^ 'p(5(5qqqquu o H EFFECTS ON CONSUMPTION 207 5a a ,0 H '^ ~ 00 M ifl N "3 ^ CN r^ r*^ Ttoo ^ »^ " H^rOro>-'wO^NO'^N •* H C* w 1 CO -oooooom • iri u m CO ^ ■^ ■ " • « a SI c c ^ 2 „ • c oxo 000 • — — £ £"0^ ►^ -O^OOt-ic^M • -0 _aj h 3 -*-* ?s "O to vr w D ■0 , c c cd — CO S00000"000 t-4 2tc ^O-^i/: "^N\OCOto r^ >, OJ S «i fJNOOOOronN 10 Sl6 w Qf^ „ C >«oo roi- iri vO "rt ^ini/^oo c^nO ^rtiTi c ^^NCIOmOO^c^'-' ^ H M 1 CO -'0" • CO U KHOOOOOOroO ■ 4 OT si 0) CO C U a •0 tS C mOOOO^OOO • JOOiuiOCCMOW ■ fO C3t3 bO CO •^NmOmOOOO • vO C .5fe tH E ^ "3 ^ • ro ■ • • ro •a 1>H 5 ■ ■ ■ n ■ ■ <^ 10 a >^ '. d '. '. '■ '■ -1 "O _ -WlooOc^l^Ol/JO 00 m CO M ^ -M^OOMirjc^O n ca ^ -OOOOOOO" N E CO „ . • • • ■ 4J n 1 i^ ■ • ■ ■ • M M < < cc c c [I. tL c c: ouooyuy<;tt *cn'C'CC*n"n *J^_»*J*J♦-|*-.^ >»> COCOCOCOCOtflCO^j^ C C C c c c Q C L 1 208 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS Table III. — Statistics of Expenses Prepared for a Certain Division in THE Northeastern Districts The following is the result of an investigation by an ofificer well acquainted with the local circumstances. The investigation is concerned with the expenses of the soldiers in the said division who belong to the middle class. The result is, we believe, quite approximate to the actual facts. /. — Expenses of Soldiers, When They Enter Barracks Yen (1) Expenses at the conscript examination. (a) Expenses for clothing 20. 00 (Conscripts take this opportunity to get new clothing made, not for this occasion alone, but for the marriage that they have in view.) (b) Traveling expenses • • ■ 3-00 (Those who were schoolmates gather together on this occasion. They put up at the same hotel, hold meetings, take photographs, etc.) (2) Expenses for dinner party ■ ■ 8 .00 (Just before or after the examination, friends visit the conscripts and participate in a dinner.) (3) Expenses from examination to the entrance to barracks 15 00 (Farewell meetings; visits to shrines or temples, or to relatives and friends, living far from the conscripts; the purchase of books neces- sary to the military life, etc.) (4) The expenses at the time of entering barracks 8 .00 (Farewell meetings, traveling expenses, incidental expenses, etc.) Total 5400 11. — Expenses When They Leave Barracks Yen (i) Purchase of souvenirs, etc 5-00 (Wine cups, tea trays, hanging pictures, etc.) (2) Clothing ■■••. •••• 5 00 (Most soldiers have their clothing already made at the time ot the examination, and now they purchase hats, shoes or clogs, shirts, etc.) (3) Dinners ...... 10.00 (Dinners and meetings of various sorts, when soldiers get home.) Total 20 .00 EFFECTS ON CONSUMPTION For Purchase of Souvenirs on Departure for Home 209 Corps A B D E F G H I J K Infantry II Cavalry Field Artillery Engineering. . Commissariat Hospital Number of Soldiers 746 720 410 710 2bl 10 Amount of Money Yen 1,971.14 3.999 1,464 962 95 150 30 90 50 25 00 00 00 Average per Head Yen 64 50 57 35 00 00 00 35 00 00 00 Note. — The average per head for E, F, G and J is a supposition by the author- ities concerned. The small amount of H is due to the shortness of the term for service. According to the table above, soldiers spend 3 to 4 yen on an average, in the purchase of souvenirs. But it happens frequently that they purchase them through the merchants or friends at home. Our estimate is, therefore, 5 yen per head. Judging from the above, the least esthnate of the expenses at the time of entering barracks must be 5 yen for clothing, 5 yen for dinners and another 5 yen for traveling expenses, etc., that is, 15 yen in all. About the same amount is spent at departure. Few are the soldiers who wear uniform when they leave barracks for home. It is very often the case that, when they are about to leave barracks, they tease their parents or brothers into making a new dress that is in fashion. Do not say that it is only a suit of clothes. The very suit they obtain indicates their tendency to an extravagant life as the result of their living in towns or cities. Think of their influence upon the rustics. ^ Infantry soldiers and medical privates serv^e in the army ior two years. Hence, they need the amount of 15 yen twice — at their entrance into barracks the first year, and at their departure from barracks the second year. Soldiers of other special branches need it also twice, for their term extends over three years. The ratio of the distribution of the actives, according to the branches of the army, is four of the infantry ^ Jiji Shimpo, December 3, 1913. 210 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS soldiers against one of other special branches. Besides, many supplementaries and transport auxiliaries incur expenses at their entrance and departure every year. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, we shall not be very far from the truth when we say that such an amount as the above is needed once every year. To avoid overestimate, let our estimate of the amount be lo yen per head, every year. Conclusion We have studied under separate headings the different expenses incurred by our soldiers. Let us now. sum up all the expenses in order to see how much is expended by each soldier. The common soldiers, whose number is the largest of all classes of military men, have the following expenses per head: Yen A Amount paid out by the national Treasury About 140.00 B Amount soldiers receive from home " 30.00 C Amount spent by soldiers at the entrance to and departure from barracks " 10.00 Total .About 180.00 When we turn our attention to the amount of the expendi- ture by the national Treasury for noncommissioned officers, we shall find that there is much difference between it and the corresponding amount for common soldiers, which we have seen above. But the difference is only that of salaries. The former, whose salary is about no yen per year, do not spend the whole of it, but send a part of it home for saving, as we have already seen to be the case. They do not receive money from home, nor incur any expenses at their entrance to and departure from barracks. But there is nothing different from the common soldiers in their living. As they are paid somewhat better than common soldiers, and are more free than they, these men may spend their money to a greater extent than the common soldiers. Taking these various circumstances into consideration, our estimate of the amount of the expenses per noncommissioned officer is that it is about equal to that of the common soldier. EFFECTS OX CONSUMPTION 211 Yen Amount paid out by the national Treasury About 235.00 The amount sent home or saved " 55-00 Balance About 180.0a The conscript sailors do not, as a rule, receive any money from home, and almost the whole of their salary is spent upon themselves. As their term of active service extends over four years, the amount of their expenses at enrollment and at discharge is about one-half of the yearly average of common soldiers. Yen Amount paid 6ut by the national Treasury About 187 .00 Amount of expenses at enrollment and at discharge " 5 00 Total .About 192 .00 Noncommissioned ofhcers of the navy spend by far a greater amount of money. But, in order to avoid any overestimate, let us estimate it to be about equal to that of the common sailors. The estimate above has been of the average amount of expenses per head, both in the army and the navy. Below we give the estimate of the amount of expenses for all the men of the army and the navy: The army 180 FenX2i5,ooo= 38,700,000 Yen The navy 190 YenX 18,000= 3,420,000 " Total 42,120,000 Yen The total of about 42,120,000 yen is being spent every year by the men of the army and the navy. Expenditure per Head of Population A Comparison of Expenditure Between Soldiers and Populace It is not an easy thing to establish a comparison of expendi- ture between soldiers and populace. As we have, however, obtained the average amount per soldier, we shall perhaps be able to accomplish our object, if we can find the amount of the expenses of the populace; but this is almost impossible to as 212 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC SYSTEM learn exactly. First of all, let us take it for granted that soldiers spend more money than common people, and then compare the necessaries of life for the common people with those of soldiers. Rice. — With the common people, rice forms the staple food, but they usually mix it M'ith wheat. It would be a luxury for them to feed on rice alone. On the other hand, the ration of rice per soldier was formerly 6 go per day; at present, it is slightly over 4 go, because wheat is now mixed with rice for hygienic reasons. The amount of cleaned rice consumed by a soldier in one year would then be about 1,530 go (that is, about eight bushels). But the common people consume about 1,000 go (that is, one koku, about five bushels) of un- cleaned rice and the amount consumed by 54,000,000 of the population is 54,000,000 kokii. Taking i per cent of this population to be children below seven or eight years of age, the average amount per head would be i.i koku (five bushels and a half). Beef. — In the present state of living In Japan, beef is a luxury. The average quantity per soldier is about 22 kin (about 29.3 lbs.) a year. On the other hand, the average quantity per head of the population Is as follows: Kin 1908 1 .326 1909 1 .369 1910 1 .800 191 1 1 .400 The quantity of lieef consumed by soldiers is then about fourteen or fifteen times as much as that consumed by the common people. Strictly speaking, the quantity of beef should be compared with the quotient divided by the number of consumers. In the quantity of fish consumed, also, the common people are far below the soldiers. Clothing. — We shall not be far from the truth when we say that the quantity of textile fabrics produced ev^ery year may well be regarded as Indicating the quantity of clothing EFFECTS ON CONSUMPTION 213 used by the people. The quantity of textile fabrics consumed a.t home in 191 2 was as follows: Production Yen Imported Yen Exported Yen Home Consumption Yen 337,230,151 20,280,379 57,540,177 299,970,353 That is, only 5.50 yen per head, while the average amount per soldier is usually above 30 yen, every year. If we add to the former amount the expenses for sewing and the profit that goes to retailers, even then we can not deny the great difference between the two. The foregoing are only a few instances of many. In other various respects, too, soldiers are by far greater consumers than the common people. But we shall make a further investigation into this matter in order to ascertain as approx- imately as possible the degree of the difference. Let us now make an estimate of the expenses of soldiers when at home. Classes to Which Soldiers Belong In order to know the expenses of soldiers when they are at home, we must first look at the state of their distribution among the different social classes. Statistics of the conscript examination in the city of Kyoto in 1912 give us valuable information concerning the relation between physique and means of living, and the ratio of conscripts to the actives. Direct National Tax in the City of Kyoto, Lower District Physique 0-5 5-10 10-20 20-50 50-100 Above 100 First class Yen 234 60 274 Yen 16 2 10 Yen . 8 6 20 Yen 31 4 29 Yen 33 3 52 Yen 17 3 18 Yen 9 2 20 Second " A " B Total of eligibles Third class 568 267 50 28 II I 34 16 4 64 23 2 88 37 7 38 18 I 31 16 Fourth " 5 Total 885 40 54 89 132 57 52 Percentage of eligibles to conscripts First class eligibles to con- scripts 64.2 26.4 70.0 40.0 63.0 16.5 71.9 36.5 66.6 25.6 66.7 315 88.0 18.0 214 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS Direct National Tax in the City of Kyoto, Upper District Physique First class Second " Total of eligibles Third class Fourth " Total Percentage of eligibles to conscripts First class eligibles to con- scripts Yen 272 322 594 280 938 63 -3 29.0 0-5 Yen 14 II 25 14 3 42 59-5 33 I 5-10 Yen 7 19 26 14 3 43 60.5 16.3 10-20 Yen 25 33 58 19 85 68.2 29.4 20-50 Yen 26 36 62 29 3 94 66.0 27.7 50-100 Yen 18 9 27 10 I 38 71. 1 47-4 Above 100 Yen 6 16 22 4 I 27 81. 5 22.2 The Sum Total First class 506 1,824 30 82 15 91 56 165 59 223 35 92 15 Conscripts 77 Percentage of first class eli- gibles to conscripts 27.7 36.6 16.5 33-9 26.5 38.0 19.6 If we classify the conscripts in the Lower District according to the standards of living recognized by the officials of the District Office, we shall get the following result. The divi- sion of the middle class into A and B is the author's. Pay- ment of the national tax is the division line between the two. Standard of Living ^ Physique Higher Middle A Middle B Lower First class 15 I 23 23 5 95 21 III 98 13 127 32 141 138 30 113 Second class A . . 25 Second class B 130 Third class 135 Fourth class 27 Total 67 338 468 430 Percentage of first class eligibles to conscripts 22.4 58.2 28.0 67.1 274 64.0 26.3 Percentage of eligibles to conscripts 62.3 1 Figures are based on materials collected by the City Office of Kyoto. EFFECTS ON CONSUMPTION 215 The percentage is greatest in the Middle A, which means that the largest percentage of the first class, and consequently of the active, belongs to the Middle Class A. The figures get smaller suddenly in the higher, while in the Middle B and the lower, they also fall off, but the difference between them and the Middle A is not very large. In other words, the first class eligibles, and consequently the actives, come from those classes who pay a national tax to the amount of 50 to 100 yen. The percentage of those who pay a national tax above 100 yen falls off considerably. On the other hand, the percentage of those who pay a tax of less than 50 yen falls off, but not so considerably as the former. The percentage, of the actives to conscripts is 29.9 among those who pay the national tax below 100 yen, while the percentage among those who pay a tax above 100 yen is 19.6. The ratio is 3 to 2, Our statistical investigation has so far been limited to one city only, but we think that in other cities there exist similar circumstances as regards the percentages given above. But in the provinces this is not necessarily true, for which there are two reasons. One is that the provinces are different from the cities in their various circumstances, especially in sanitary conditions, and the other is that the national tax in cities is usually the income tax or the business tax, while that in the provinces is mainly the land tax. In order to know the rela- tion between the amount of the tax paid in the province and the physique of conscripts, we have to go to statistics of the localities concerned. For this purpose we quote the accom- panying table from Lieut. Col. Motojiro Tanabe's work, en- titled History of the Japanese Army. These statistics were prepared by him in 1906 for the Sakura Regimental District. In spite of the differences In circumstances, the different classes of tax payers down "to below 100 yen'' show compara- tively slight differences In physique, while those who pay the tax "above 100 yen'' fall far below, in the percentage of the first class conscripts. The highest percentage of those "below 100 yen" is 50.1, the average being 43.4. If we compare this average percentage with that of those "above 100 yen," 2l6 CONSCRIPTION system: economic effects o On H u 2 H S o u Pi D < C/5 X < H o H U 2; o U t. o a tn >< CL, b O O H i; u Pi ^ -4-' O .& M C O 4-J 00 1-1 N 00 '^ "^00 r^ ■& C 0) r-.\o lo •^ ■^ c* m •+ ^ U r!oo n cc o a; .s- tao 1^ d t^OOOOO ir^ON^C) i-i a\ rO rO n O f^OO c o (v4„i-ii-.wi-ii-,M HH u OJ U2 0-, u u o X: lo^u^r) mic-^vc vO -c E u^ O "/^ >/i\0 c^ t^ (N vC Lh uo r^ « HH t^ :z; ^"1 tfi -*-' o .2- t* o c >- ^ C^X C^ t^ O O CI (S O w O t^oo CO re c o CJ rOrorOrO-^fOc^r^ re U ^ en 1« u o J3 cs 00 t^oo ro " ^ T) o Id p CMON'+'^i-MCS'Hro o c 00 « r^ fO (S " (^ re o o 3 1— « re en Cfi o tuO tn c o J-u-5i-i\0 CI OOs-Tf 00 o 3 CI O On CI 00 " ON re Tj- uo ^ -t f^, Tj- rj ^ O U Oh 0! u u 0) re O -+ re C iC M r^ •i- 4-1 E 3 CO t^\0 -+0) CI re CI vO OS iC uo UO CI — CI CI u] ^ i"* Tf ^2 u, .t^ Ct^-t-O — — -t-ci UO ^ OS CI c^ CI CI m c^ \C \n^ — O lo te "^ ON E c 3 O cT ce 1-1 i-i" cf^ •z'^ • • • ' o • T~* • o o o o ■ ^.^ C CI re -t " • c s "III 1 o 1 c 6 o o o "rt N lo m « CI re '^ " o 3 o ^^ > H p ^ 5- - - - o ^7- 3(695) (199,4004-17,800) =16,600 (The same above 300 yen?) 27,172 (199,400 + 17,800) =191,300 (The same below 300 yen?) 27,172 191,300+16,500 = 207,800 (The same below 300 yen, including noncommissioned officers). We have yet no reliable statistics concerning household economy, but taking recourse to Western statistics, and to ^ The table is for the District of Saga, in 1912. EFFECTS ON CONSUMPTION 221 some investigations made in our own country, narrow as the field may be, we shall find the different items of expenses to be in the following ratio: food, 5; habitation, 2; clothing, i; fuel, i; other necessities, i.^ Of these expenses, the greater part of those for food, clothing and other necessities may be saved when conscripts leave home for the army. As the number of inhabitants per house is 5.59 at present, we may consider the average per house, except little children, as being four persons. A quarter of the expenses, other than those for habitation and fuel, will then be saved by the enrollment of conscripts. Such being the estimate of the expenses of con- scripts, the actual expenses of seven-eighths of all the con- scripts when they are at home will not exceed 50 yen. Even in the case of those whose income is above 300 yen and below 500 yen, their expenses when at home will not be more than 70 yen, on an average. We can not estimate the average expenses of those whose income is above 500 yen, but their number is only one twenty-fifth of the total number of con- scripts. Now, compare these estimates of the expenses of conscripts when at home with the preceding conclusion con- cerning their expenses when in the army or navy, and it will be enough to convince us that the conditions in the military life are much better than those in the life at home. Summary We have seen that the conditions among the army and navy men, during enrollment, are much better than the conditions when they are at home. There are yet two things that de- mand our attention: (i) The better Hfe in the army will surely exercise its influence upon the life at home after the soldiers are discharged. All people experience difficulty in leading a life inferior to what they have been accustomed. It is natural that soldiers should desire to continue their better life even when they return home. And this will be more so, when they have got used to the city life and when 1 The Problem of Household Expenses, prepared by the Society for Sozial Politik. 222 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS they have got into the habits of imitating a life of pleasure. (2) In addition to this tendency to raise the standard of Hving, the miUtary life fosters the tendency to intensify one's desires, and wants are scattered and various in the ordinary life, while they become similar and uniform in the collective life of the army. Not only the quantity of consumable goods is large in the army, but the concentration of the desires for such goods is also intense in such a collective life. Now this concentra- tion and uniformity of desires is one of the reasons for the creation of new employment in commerce and manufactures. It bears a close relation to what we observ^e in the next chapter concerning the national life. CHAPTER VIII SOCIAL EFFECTS The economic effects of conscription upon the individual life of the nation are now our subject matter. Such effects are, of course, different, according to the social class to which an individual belongs. It is believed that the effects upon the higher classes are fa\'orable, whereas they are unfavorable to the livelihood of those below the middle classes. Hence, our survey in this chapter falls naturally under the two head- ings, the effects of conscription that are favorable to the higher classes, and those that are not favorable to the lower classes. Favorable Tendencies The effects of conscription upon at least a part of the higher classes have been favorable when viewed from the economic and other points of view. The circumstances by which the favorable effects have been produced are, primarily, (i) the development of capitalism and (2) the purchasing and con- tract system. The Development of Capitalism That the development of those productive industries which require capital benefits the capitalists, is a matter of -course. The system of conscription has contributed to its develop- ment, and is still contributing to it. Let us now see how this is so. (a) Accumulation of Desires. — The system of conscription always brings with it the system of supplying soldiers with all that they need at government expense. Consequently, markets have to meet all the demands of soldiers, as one whole or as a few partial wholes. When they are at home, their demands are met by retailers. But when enlisted in the 223 224 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS army, their individual demands are collected into a great whole, which merchants and manufactures have to supply. Seventy per cent of the actives now belong to the agricultural classes who are yet self-supporting. Soldiers' demands upon merchants and manufactures have thus been accumulated into big wholes, and the quantity of their demands has also been increased. (b) Accumulation of Capital. — Demands of munitions, consequent to the system of conscription, have contributed to the growth of large fortunes, almost to extremes. This has been especially the case in the past war, of which we do not like to make any detailed statements. But it is well known by all that Baron Iwasaki of Tokyo and Baron Fujita of Osaka are now in possession of large fortunes because they have been the suppliers of munitions. Let us quote from The Millionaires of the Meiji Era, by Gennosuke Yokohama: Many were the merchants of Osaka who left home for Kyushu during the Sat- suma RebelHon. Denzaburo Fujita was the foremost of all those who profited by it. "What was the amount of the government expenses during the said war? Of the 41,500,000 yen of its expenses, 5,000,000 yen for arms and greater part of the expenditure for clothing came into the hands of the Fujitas. As for Iwasaki, he profited 3,000,000 yen from transportation and 700,000 yen as a government grant. His net profit was more than 4,000,000 yen. Of those who gained great profits during the Russo-Japa- nese War, we may count such as Mitsui, Iwasaki, Fujita, Okura, the supplier of canned food, Takata, the merchant to the Na\^ Department, and many owners of ships and coal mines. It is said that the profits of these merchants from the said war, great as they were, were not so great as those from the Sino- Japanese War. This accumulation of large fortunes must be going on even in peace time, though the rate may not be rapid. In Japan, merchants under government patronage are usually regarded as coveting excessive profits, and typical of such merchants are the suppliers of munitions. (c) Concentration in Towns and Cities. — We have already considered this in detail in Chapter II. The increase of pop- ulation in cities and towns has no doubt encouraged the development of those productive industries that require SOCIAL EFFECTS 225 large capital by the accumulation of demands and by the supply of laborers. (d) Gro\vi:h of Desires. — Soldiers in cities and towns are under the influence of a \'ain and extravagant life. They are after fashions. When they return home, they are looked up to among the rustics. The new desires and wants that such soldiers carry with them spread among the provincials by the psychological process of "superiority imitation." The growth of such desires furnishes capitalist industry with wider fields. Purchasing and Contract System The purchasing and contract system that is now prevalent has also a tendency to profit the higher classes. In order to get rid of excessive profits to the merchants patronized by the government, and to facilitate business transactions on the part of the military authorities, the manufacture of munitions was committed to the care of the Military Department. Arsenals were established, in accordance with the Arsenal Regulations, enacted in April, 1900, by the Imperial Ordi- nance No. 159; the Pro\'ision Department, in accordance with the Provision Ordinance No. 23 and with the Provision Regulations. But arms and clothing that these arsenals and departments can not supply and the raw materials that are needed in their manufacture must be obtained either by purchase or by contract. In such cases, the military author- ities seek their market among capitalists, because it is con- venient to make the purchase or contract in large amounts. Legal qualifications for such purchase or contract are very simple, but, actually, it is only those who possess large capital that can meet the military demands. Although the author- ities make efforts to obtain the necessary- materials directly from the producers, yet they are limited to those who carry on productive industry on a large scale. Straw and hay, and a few other things, are almost the only materials supplied by individual producers through the trade associations. And this circumstance will continue for a long time yet. The greater the accumulation of individual desires, the greater 226 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS will be the amount of demands that are supplied, not by the ordinary merchants or manufacturers, but by great capitalists. The profits consequent to the system of conscription are thus absorbed by the higher classes, while the burden of conscrip- tion is heavy upon the lower classes, and very light upon the higher classes, as will be seen in detail in the following section. Aggravation of Distress The system of conscription is a great blow to the conscripts' families, especially to those families below the middle classes. Such families are deprived of their chief laboring members by the system. Besides, they have to send more or less money every month to their sons or brothers, while they are in the army. In case of war, it often happens that many of them are taken away from their families forever, and the pension is not sufficient for the support of their families. We are now to see these circumstances in detail. Actives from the Lower Classes The number of the actives from the lower classes will be determined by a definition of the general term "lower classes." If the meaning is fixed as above, then the distribution of the actives among the difterent classes that we saw in the pre- ceding chapter will help us in our study of this subject. In the preceding chapter, we have seen that about 208,000 of the noncommissioned officers and common soldiers belong to the families whose income is below 300 yen. In the present state of living in Japan, they shall be regarded as of the lower classes. It would be a great loss to their families if they were enrolled in the army, as they are. Now', the abso- lute number of such actives is, of course, important in our study, but the ratio of such actives to the members of the respective classes is a question still more important. (i) Result of Conscript Examination in the City of Kyoto, 1912 Higher Middle A Middle B Lower Percentage of first class conscripts . . 22.4 28.0 27.4 26.3 SOCIAL EFFECTS 227 o u s < a S 5 < en c < s < u a: (J z o CJ b O H J a N < oc N u il -J 00 — 1/". 2G is 03 \r. -a '■$■ c 03 5 PI CI re -2 a:. ON •4- u 0) be 8 >l SI < Percentage of first class eligibles among con- srrints . c 03 "o! c _o o O c c 1^ a u 16 228 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS Generally speaking, the ratio is smallest among the rich and greatest among the middle classes. This ratio goes down gradually, as the standard of living goes down, but it is far greater with the lower classes than with the rich. The ratio is especially small with the rich who have received higher education. Hence, we may say that the present system of conscription enlists a comparatively greater number of soldiers out of the middle classes, and exempts a great number of the higher classes. Of course, this circumstance is due to differences of physique, but it is recognized implicitly by all that it is also due to the discretion of the examiners in the conscript examination. The table opposite shows that of those who belong to the higher or the lower classes, those who have received higher education are practically exempted from service. There is, of course, no express provision in the conscription law to make lighter the burden of service for the rich. But the actual result shows that the rich who are entirely free from difficulties in living escape from conscription very often, while those whose families will suffer from difficulties when they are enrolled are enlisted to a great percentage. Not only that, but most of the conscripts from the higher classes enjoy the privilege of the one year volunteer ser\ice, because they are usually those who have completed the middle school course. They can easily pay the amount of money required by the government for the volunteer service. On the other hand, those who have much difficulty in gaining a livelihood have to spend two or three years in the army. The Amount of Loss per Family Co?isequent to Enlistment The amount of loss consequent to enlistment is to be con- sidered from two viewpoints. One is the amount of the expenses of each soldier, not paid out of his salary but out of the money that he receives from home, and the other is the value of the loss of labor consequent to his two or three years' service in the army. Of course, the living expenses of each soldier are saved, so long as he is in service. As to the ex- SOCIAL EFFECTS 229 o (— I H Oh »-l Pi O o u o si b O H b s m X W 2; o U w O m 1 r- »/: i« c> c> i>- C^ tT IT! -0 t^ 00 t^ 1-2 ■^ X X c> c ■* ^H J _; ^ X 1- >. E-^ II 11 II 11 II II II II II II 11 II c„-a c-l ^\z H^ ■0 r^ f*; ^ 1/^ f^ 00 00 lO C| 10 1^ t^ 00 00 «J l/l C* 00 ro f^ r^ ■" N I/: 00 ol re Tf cj oc CI X"^ . « r» « « c* C ^ 0» f*2 - r~| t- C « N ^ •B:> N n ^ ■* ^ ti ►-< (^D __ ^ r^ X r^ c XT DC \n ~5 t^ 00 a 4_t ^ - rN f*; t^ n X 10 ^ M H = c ?1 01 "l C^ Tf 1^ — ■* '■C- n X u_, ri c;. i^I r- \n t?i C'c n .- iH m' C- X ^ r- \ri rn Si ^ M N ^ C? — •* f^ .»- fa^ OT §2 S-n Ov -^ X I^ ^ ir r^ N •* ?< 5 r-i X " i^ "^ r- \ri I^ 6 ri ^ -^ i^ t~ t rt I ~ -^ *^ — -^ 1 ou b ""5 t N r^ CO so M 10 «: hH T -; ri -0 •—1 'rj- 1/5 O" r4 •s X ^ c c c ^ fO ?« r^ 00 ao M m g5 M ■* ^H Sffl JSCO Uq ■* ^ so M CO C> _J rr C' cc •a '5 M ?4 rl ^ C^ c u- 00 C M c N i-i w C\ c \C c ro c f^ ^ V c^O s< JS w <-^a t t^ ^ r- ir '^ Tf ^ e ~5 i« ~5 1 ^- r*5 •0 C w C c c M r» fs 0. N r- c fO c r^ •3- MH ^.^ CO M M -M Ol Q. r- ir r^ -0 _ ^) X r- 00 C"B -^ C !/■ CC ^ - »/" -t 00 ■S! - c" C C ^ (H N ^ t^ N £0 « ^ " E^ ■5 'S _c; _>. >> "o 3 rt C3 Si, > J3 J "s *C •a aj c C. J2 -*-> i . , ■5 cd •J u > t4 ■5 5£ c t ; ::j ; >> c t g • E ? c 1 ^ 1 .5 M c 1 CO i: s = ■■*-« > "2 c ^ c* ^ ::? c C" 4 C r W c ^ w 8z s s '"' c y & JC ^ y ■5 1 W Gy p "S s c c "c ■*-» s a 1i £ a i aj a ^ 1 •c m •0 -r Vi M — 'fi 73 W S rt rt -7 2 -^ C fe Q ^ " u ^ V -fl -• w — i— c H H H H H H H P H S 230 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS penses that soldiers incur during their service, and those at their entrance to, and departure from, barracks, we are In a position to make an approximate estimate. W^e have already seen that the average amount of money that they receive from home is 30 yen per head. The average amount at the entrance and departure is about 10 yen per head, In which, however, those expenses paid by their relatives or friends are Included. About one-half of this amount then Is to be de- ducted. In other words, about 35 yen per year is to be paid out by each family when one of its members is enlisted. Of course, this Is the average amount, and we are aware that in \'er>' rare cases some of the soldiers send part of their salary home. The amount of labor lost by a family, one of whose mem- bers is enlisted, differs according to the class to which a soldier belongs. It is comparatively easy to make an estimate of the amount among the lower classes. And we can say beforehand that the amount is greater among the middle classes. There are many of the lower classes who do not depend upon employers for their livelihood, and this is especially the case among the agricultural laborers. But the Income of such independent laborers will not be greater to any considerable extent than that of the employes. Such being the case, we wish to know first the wages of employes, and then to infer from them the amount of income lost by enlist- ment. According to an investigation concerning the wages of different laborers made in 1910 by the Agricultural and Commercial Department, the average, not weighted, of the wages of forty-two kinds, is .65 yen. The average may be somewhat less than that In the case of agricultural laborers, whose number is very large. Unless there has since been considerable change In the average, we may regard the aver- age at present as being 65 sen or so. Deducting holidays, the working days throughout the whole year number 276, that is, 23 days per month. The yearly amount of a laborer's wage is then about 150 yen. This much is then lost to a family, one of whose members is enrolled. Besides, we must SOCIAL EFFECTS 23 1 take into consideration those circumstances in whicii some trades make it impossible for conscripts to engage in them, even previous to their enrollment, and after their discharge. This is especially the case with those soldiers who want new employment after their discharge. In cases like this, the amount lost will be more than the estimate above. In Japan at present, laborers, except skilled ones, receive the average wage when they reach the age of twenty. But we must see how much of the living expenses per fam- ily will be diminished when one of the members is enrolled. Usually a conscript's family has, besides himself, one other male member (father or brother), who is able to work. Or, it is often the case with some families that the female mem- bers, including children, engage in work, when one of their members is enrolled. In such cases, the income may be increased, that is, its amount be greater than 150 yen. In order to avoid an overestimate, let our estimate in such cases be about 200 yen. About 30 per cent of this amount, as we have seen to be the case in the preceding chapter, goes into the expenses of a conscript enrolled, which amount to 60 yen or so. The balance of what the enrolled soldier spends and of what his family saves would be about 90 yen, which is the amount of the loss to his family consequent to his enroll- ment. This is our estimate for the laborers. As to those above the middle classes, the amount of the loss will be greater, because the income from their labor is greater than that of the lower classes. Those of the higher classes who lead an idle life, and those students that have no calling of their own, must be excepted from our consideration. Except those above the middle classes that live in cities, the size of Japanese families is still large. Therefore, they do not suffer very much, even when one of their members is enrolled, because they have some other male members that can take up his work. If, on the contrary, such members are lacking, then it must be a great hardship upon the family, especially upon the families in the rural districts. In cities, women or children may engage in retail business, or be em- 232 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM: ECONOMIC EFFECTS ployed in factories. The case is quite otlierwise in the agri- cultural districts. Women and children may be of some help only when they have the chief laborer. It is often the case in the districts that all the members of a family are left helpless when the male member is enrolled. Postponement of and Exemption from the Calling Out The twenty-second article of the Conscription Law now in force runs as follows : If there is confirmed evidence concerning the helplessness of the family when he is called out, postponement will be granted at his own request. In case the said circumstance still exists, even after three years, he will be registered in the militia service. Now it may be thought that conscripts can be granted postponement or exemption when their family can not subsist without them. The law seems to provide for such cases, although this is so only in appearance. According to the annual report of the Educational Department for 1911, about 1.3 of the children of school age are not able to attend school because of poverty. On the other hand, the annual report of the Military Department tells us that for the three years, 1908 to 191 o, only 5/10,000 of the conscripts of the first, second and fifth classes were exempted from enrollment for the same reason. Is this not a strange situation? It is often the case that those houses that produce conscripts have male laborers besides them, while those houses that have children of school age are in lack of male laborers except the father, the grandfather being dead and the brothers being yet too young. But such circumstances alone would not be sufficient to explain this discrepancy between i .3 per cent and 5/10,000. The loss of labor can be endured, if it is only for the two or three years that conscripts have to spend in the army. But how will it be if they are killed on the battle field or are dis- abled? Is this not a permanent loss of labor, wholly or partially? Of course, the system of pensions and aids pro- vides for such cases. Soldiers below noncommissioned officers will be granted pensions, "when they are exempted from SOCIAL EFFECTS 233 o *-* f- Oi a X W < O tn (d Oh t. O M a < OT 11 W< U — m "O M -^ cd — t'^U „ i:H| 1 :? ^hI ^■2 5 b! o; K m (-■ .2 m •0 ^S M tX w_ i2 S?-2 •s ° d Js 3 >. "^ C/3 oH(« c •fci'O 25 cd m 1-1 (L> 2 T3 "o C if) 10 •n-o-^ r*< t. ocfl Cj OJ ^73 M K M CC n m ^* fc- ■I - ii:c/} E i-i .- R s £" ^ iE •a HI s § '% hD ^ « E E "2 "= 1 C 75 d — .- §. =jU »-*i (/2 c u > _i; "iJ 73 ^ u rt _o •a 1; rt u ^■o J3 3 > "o J3C/3 tn SE E 0! a; Z 1) d (2 < o Q < O Q O H en Q m li u 4J „ •^ t» -0 m ^- rt 0-^ 1/3 X i'S-a m 1/5 CO.^ '^ Tf ro ^ ri-c « Uf_w 8§ 7} m 1-. ^ .siss •3_d OCJ M CO W_ I. ;_ ^ ^"2:2 •^t^ rt2 3 10 ro " 1 UH« c ^•0 OT l-i flj is -o "o c w to CO woo Ov 10 ro M ^is OJ u ^(A _M hU « en C3 CO — t-. 00 M w _^ • "t PI 2r>: fe m li 050^ L. t^ ■* N 1^ SE T3 a; c ■ "^ « "tt- x: — 00 w^ « 2 HO £ 5 "2 M a 000 11 T3 C3 V, 2 U ■3 £ •a ^?J .b s^J= 1 ti. 7- t- 1 •o c o J3 Li V J3 •a D J3 ct) J3 *^ •a c o -3 '5 i) ■«-> > ■33 3; U3 C3 C O o o > V u V V 234 CONSCRIPTION system: economic effects service owing to wounds received, whether in war time or in peace time, by which they have lost more than one Hmb." "When they are killled in battle, or die from wounds, their bereaved widows or orphans are entitled to aid.''^ But will the amount of pensions and aids be sufficient? The amount of pension for the first class soldiers, when disabled, is only about 50 yen, and that of aids to the bereaved family of the first class soldiers, when killed in battle, is only about 50 yen ; in case they die of sickness while on the battle fields, their family receives only about 35 yen. The following are statistics prepared in 191 2: Pension Regulations Kinds of Pension Noncommissioned Officers Soldiers Number Amount Number Amount - Yen Yen Exemption pen- sion 20,380 1,702,000 53,449 2,742,508 Additional pen- sion 1,429 64,625 13,908 411,058 Aids 13,335 787,277 77,133 3,152,699 The Army Pen- Pension to sion Regula- wounded 137 8,368 637 31,206 tion, issued in 1876 Aids 141 6,659 206 7,091 The Officers Aids Aids to wounded 6 620 43 1,433 Regulation, is- ] Aids in case of sued in 1875. . death 19 889 42 1,232 Aids Regulation, No. 4, issued in \ i8qi [ Aids 227 11,836 1,055 35,59S Total 35.674 2,582,274 146,473 6,382,820 Total number of men, except those receiv- ing additional pension 34,245 .... 132,565 .... 2,582 ,274 6,382,82 34,245 75 yen 132,565 49 yeii Now could the amount of pension or aids, which we have seen to be some 50 yen per disabled soldier or per bereaved family, make up for the loss of labor per male? It is but natural that the families of the disabled or the killed suffer distress. ^Soldiers Pension Regulations, Articles 5, 27 and 31. SOCIAL EFFECTS 235 The Patriotic Ladies Association made an investigation concerning the families of the disabled and the killed, dividing them into the following classes: (i) those in want of daily sustenance; (2) those in poverty, though having slight means of gaining daily sustenance; (3) those in possession of slight means of livelihood ; (4) those in possession of sufficient means of livelihood. The association regards those of the first and second classes as needing help, and is giving a little help to them, but it leaves the third and fourth classes to themselves, as needing no help. The number of those who receive more or less help from the association, according to the standards above, is 83,465 throughout the whole country, that is, about one-half of the w^hole number (34,245 + 132,565 = 168,810) of those who receive pensions or aids, and 63 per cent of those soldiers the amount of whose pension or aids is smallest. This shows how hard is the life of the families of the disabled and the killed. Summary The effects of the system of conscription upon the liveli- hood of the people are now sufficiently clear. That the great- est number of the actives come from the lower classes, that their families suffer from the double effects of the loss of labor and of the amount of money that they have to send to those enrolled, and that postponement or exemption is only appar- ent, and not actual, except in very rare cases, — all these cir- cumstances show that the largest number of the lower classes suffer most from the effects of conscription. Of course, there are certain reasons which make us think that the system is favorable to better living, but this is the case only with the higher classes who are armed with large fortunes. The num- ber of the enrolled among thos6 above the middle classes is comparatively small, because they escape from enrollment by reason of weak physique, of studies pursued abroad, or of the discretion in the conscript examination. But almost all those who belong to the lower classes have not the benefit of these reasons and are enrolled, to the aggravation of distress. CHAPTER IX CONCLUSION We now hasten to our conclusion. Let us sum up what we have seen of the economic effects of conscription upon the people. At the beginning of our survey, we said that we should not touch upon the question of its effects, through international relations, upon the economic life at home. That question will also be excluded from our concluding remarks. The system of conscription robs our productive world of its most valuable laboring power. If the laborers were not enrolled as soldiers, they would engage in productive work, to the increase of our national wealth, because there is every opportunity for them to get employment. As we have seen already, there are some reasons that make us admit the in- crease of efficiency, as a result of conscription. But this may well be ignored, when we see that more than two hundred thousand of the most able bodied workers are turned to such unproductive work as the military ser^dce. Besides, the calling out of such able bodied men causes a greater amount of consumption than there would otherwise be, which means that so much of the national wealth is wasted. Not only that, but soldiers, once under the influence of the extravagant life of the cities, can hardly get rid of the unwholesome habit, even after their return home. And their influence upon their neighbors can but be deplorable. As to the effects of conscription upon population, there are two contrary^ facts, — the increase and the decrease of popu- lation. And it is difficult to state the net result. But, if we take the effects of war into consideration, it is plain that conscription causes the decrease of population. The con- centration in towns, caused by the existence of troops, has some good effects, because it encourages the commerce and manufactures of those places. When we come to the effects upon the livelihood of the people, we see that they are worst 236 CONCLUSION 237 Upon the lower classes. It seems as if conscription were the sole diit^,- of the lower classes. E\-en the most needy have almost no means of escaping conscription. The provisions in the law concerning the privileges of postponement and exemption are almost empty words, as regards the utterly destitute people. Some students of economics think that the only effects of armaments, that is, of conscription, upon our economic life are those connected with the diminution of productive labor, that the military expenditure has no considerable eft'ects because all the moneys paid out by the militar>- authorities come back to the people, and that the expenses find, in many cases, their equivalents in goods. ^ It is true, of course, that the greater part of the military' expenses comes back to the people and that large quantities of goods are gained as the equivalent of those expenses. But such reasons as these are not sufficient to justify the position that the military- outlays have no effects upon our economic life. True, the military expenditures have their equivalent in goods. But we must not forget that those goods are mostly consumable goods. Besides, such goods, except clothing and provisions, can only be used for military purposes, and do not therefore contribute to the national wealth. If the amount of the productive labor spent in producing such unnecessary consumable goods were turned into the production of some other goods of economic value, how great would be the benefits to the nation! Moreover, there are many cases in which pro- ductiA-e commodities, such as land, are converted into con- sumable goods, in order to make the unproductive use for the army. Thus, the people are doubly robbed of their pro- ductive acti\4ty. Even granting that all the militars' expenses return to the people in the end, we can not say that they have no economic effects. The military expenses, especially in the rapid ex- pansion of armament, cause the overissue of currency, on the one hand, and the increase of taxes, on the other. The in- 1 Colonel Sato, History of the National Defense of Japan, vol. 11. 238 CONSCRIPTION system: economic effects crease of the indirect tax, especially, causes an increase of the expenses of production, and thereby causes a rise of prices. The former also encourages this tendency of the rise of prices not only directly, but also indirectly, because the amount of commodities purchased with the military outlays are not used as productive capital. This is especially the case \vith extra- ordinary military expenses. Now, there is no question that this artificial rise of prices is harmful to the international economic relations. Such being the case, we can not think, as some do, that the only economic effects of the military expenditures are the loss of the productive labor of able bodied men. But we have not discussed effects other than the loss of productive labor and the increase of consumption, only because the other effects can not be considered as the direct effects of the system of conscription, although they may be regarded as effects of the military expenditures. Besides, such effects can only be discussed theoretically, and can not be treated statistically. INDEX Agriculture, effect of conscription, io8- 109; decrease of employment in, 109- lio; increase of employment with demand for forage, 115, 118; concen- tration of agricultural laborers in cities, 160-161; effect of Russo-Jap- anese War on, 163; labor by women and children, 168; increase of farm houses in Hokkaido (1904-1910), 173; National Agricultural Associa- tion, 219; percentage of the actives to those of conscripts other than actives engaged in, 220. Agricultural laborers, concentration of, in cities, 160-162; excess of, 168; numbers of (1904-1911), 169; reasons for concentration in cities, 171 ; wages of and amount lost by conscription, 230. Akita, deficit in rice crop in (1905), 164. Aomori, number of marriages (ages 15- 29) in, 80; deficit of rice crop in(i905), 164. Arsenals, at Tokyo, 120, 127; at Osaka, 120, 127; establishment of, 225. Artillery, organization of, 9; number of sections, 15, 37, 39; increase of (1900), 47; present size, 53; location of regi- ments, 99; reason for large percent- age of crime among, I4i-i42;expenses of soldiers in Eighteenth Division of, Asahigawa, division at, 131. Asano, population of (i 896-1 899), 105. Australia, wool imports from, 122. Beef, quantity consumed by soldiers and people, 212. Barley, amount purchased, 116; increase in production, 118; area (1897-1916), 165. Birth rate, decrease due to barrack life, 76-77, 82; decrease due to Russo- Japanese War, 82; increase with the development of conscription, 82; per 1,000 population (1872-1911), 83; in city and country, 161. Bonin Islands, conscription in, 68. Bushi, (anti-military class), 3-4, 6. Cavaln>% number of regiments, 15, 37, 39; increase of, in 1896, 45; in 1900, 47; present size, 53; location of regi- ments, 99; savings of soldiers of Eight- eenth Division, 190; monthly average proceeds of sutlers and salaries of soldiers of Sixteenth Division, 194; proceeds of sutlers in the Sixteenth Division from, 196; expenses of sol- diers in Eighteenth Division of, 197. Chiba, railway regiment at, 131. China, Japanese army stationed in (1900-1903), 47; number of horses used by troops in, (1910-1912), 112. Chishima, conscription in, 68. Clothing, average amount per soldier and common people, 213. Clothing Department, 119, 126, I92r goods furnished to (1913), 121 ; num- ber of workmen in, 127; supplies needed by, 131. Coast Artillery, number of corps, 15, 37-. Colonial troops, number of battalions, 37, 39; increase of, in 1899, 47. Commissariat, number of sections, 15, 37; term of service, 20; increase in 1896, 45; in 1900, 47; present size, 54 r location of regiments, 99; reasons for large percentage of crime among, 140; savings of soldiers of i8th Divi- sion, 190; monthly average proceeds of sutlers and salaries of soldiers of i6th Division, 194; proceeds of sutlers- in the i6th Division from, 196; ex- penses of soldiers in i8th Division, ^97- Communication corps, present size, 54. Conscription, law and origin, 3; in France and Prussia, 3; objections to, 4; Imperial mandate (November, 1872), 4; reasons for, 6-7; organiza- tion of, 9; Conscript Regulations, 9- 10; provisions of law of 1873, 11-13, 187; amendments (1873-1875), 15; (1879), 19-20; numbers of conscripts (1873-1877), 16-17; proportion of conscripts to population, (1873- 1877), 17; changes in system and rea- sons, 17-18; law of 1883, 26-27; amendments to law, (1883-1889), 33-35, 42-43; number of conscripts (1878-1884), 39; proportion of con- scripts to males of conscript age and population (i 878-1 886), 39; changes in law, 44-45; number of conscripts 239 240 INDEX (1905-1912), 53; proportion of con- scripts to population and to males of conscript age (1905-1909), 55; law of 1906, 55; influence on economic con- ditions, 73; importance of, 74; effects on population, 74-75; effect on birth rate, 79-80; effect on death rate, 83- 84; effect on migration to cities, 87; concentration of soldiers in towns, 89-90, 167; effect on agricultural employment, 108-109; effect on mer- chants,! 18-1 19, i28;effectoncommer- cial and manufacturing employment, 132; effect on character of conscripts, 136-137, 142; degree of scholarship among conscripts (1908-1910), 144- 145; effect of physical training, 146, 151; effect on number of laborers, 152; percentage of conscripts having education of elementary grade (1909- 1910), 153-154; number of actives, 156; number of men lost to produc- tive labor by, 157; loss of labor days by, 157-159; condition of conscripts in Meiji Era, 186; tendency to raise standard of living and intensify de- sires, 222; effect on development of productive industries, 223; effects of demands for munitions on accumula- tion of capital, 224; effect on family of conscript, 226; result of conscript examination in city of Kyoto (1912), 226; result of conscript examination in Sakura (1906), 227; large propor- tion of middle classes selected for, 228; percentage conscripted from various classes, 229 ; postponement of, where proposed conscript is needed by family, 232. Criminals, barred from service, 13, 23, 52, 61, 138; criminal percentage in a regimental district (1912), 137; per- centage of prisoners between ages of 20-40 ( 1 905-1 907), 138. Death rate, annual, ages 25-35, (1908- 1909, 1898-1899), 84; per 1,000 women, (1898-1908) ages 26-30, 85; in city and country, 161. Defense guards, number of corps, 37; present size, 54. Discharged Soldiers' Association, work of, 152. Education, among soldiers, 143; degree of scholarship among conscripts (1908-19 10), 144-145; percentage of conscripts having (1909-1910), 153- Ehime, increase in rice crops in, 164. Employment, occasioned by proximity of regiments and divisions, 131-132; by conscription system, 132. Engineers, number of sections, 15, 37, 39; increase in 1896, 45; in 1897, 47; present size, 54; reasons for large per- centage of crime among, 140; savings of Eighteenth Division, 190; monthly average proceeds of sutlers and sala- ries of soldiers of Sixteenth Division, 194; proceeds of sutlers in the Six- teenth Division, 196; expenses of sol- diers in Eighteenth Division, 197. Enrollment, postponement or exemp- tion caused by death or sickness, 13- 14, 22, 35-36, 62; other exemptions from, 14, 22-23, 29-31; revision of rules of, 43; rejection from, because of imprisonment, 61; exemption from, by money payment, 65; exemptions from, of certain professions and those with social standing, 65-66; privileges given university graduates and cer- tain classes of students, 66-67. Esashi, conscription in, 68. Exemption: from service, 23 el seq., 31 et seq.; 36, 51-52, 62; revision of rules of, 43; under conscription law of 1873, 62; of 1879, 62-63; of 1883, 63- 64 ; of 1 889, 64-65 ; where family needs conscript, 232. Expenses: of training soldiers, 187-188; of training noncommissioned officers, 188; of training sailors and noncom- missioned naval officers, 189; of sol- diers at sutlers, 194 et seq.; boarding expenses of soldiers, 202; other, 203, 230; statistics of Second Division concerning, 203; at entrance and de- parture in a certain prefecture, 204; greatest amount of expense for each item, 205; average amount of expense for each item, 206; smallest amount of expense for each item, 207; statistics of expenses prepared for a certain division in the northeastern districts, 208; for purchase of souvenirs on de- parture for home, 209 ; of common sol- dier, 210; of noncommissioned soldier, 210-21 1 ; of sailors, 211; of noncom- missioned officers of navy, 211; ratio of different items of, 221. Exports, increase of (1904-1905), 180. Factory Investigation Committee, re- port of, 182. Feudal system, decay of, 3-4; unpopu- larity of, 7. Fish, quantity consumed by people and soldiers, 212. INDEX 241 Formosa, no, 174; soldiers in, 45; standing army, 54; number of mili- tary horses in (1910-1912), 112. Fortress artillery, number of battalions, 39; increase of, in 1896, 45. Fudeoka, population (1897-1911), 105. Fujita, Baron, munitions manufacturer, 224. Fukuchiyama, regiment at, 195. Fukui prefecture, number of sojourners (i9ii),9i. Fukuoka prefecture, actives, active re- serves, reserves and male population, 96 ; ratio of two reserves to the actives, 96; ratio to male population, 96. Fukushima, number of marriages, ages 15-29, 80; deficit in rice crop (1905), 164. Fukuyama, conscription in, 68; popula- tion and increase (1894-1903), 100. Gendarmes, number of battalions of, 37. 39- , , . Gifu prefecture, number of sojourners (191 1), 91; population before and after estai)lishment of regiments (1903-1908), 102. Hagino, number of military horses (1910-1912), 112. Hamamatsu, population before and after establishment of regiments (1903-1908), 102. Hay, amount purchased, 117; increased production, 118; obtained through trade associations, 225. Himeji, population and increase (1894- 1903), 100. Hirosaki, population and increase (1894-1903), 100; population before and after establishment of regiments (1503-1908), 102. Hakodate, conscription in, 68. Heavy Artillery, 54. Hiroshima, garrison at, 15; artillery regiment at, 131. Hitaka, conscription in, 68. Hokkaido, organization of army in (1875), 16; conscription in, 6!?; oats raised in, 116, 120; hay grown in, 117, 120; increase of area of dry and wet fields in (1904-1910), 172; increase of agricultural houses in (1904-1910), 173- Horses, demand for military purposes, 1 1 i-i 12 {Administration Regulations, III; Horse Supply Bureau, in; aver- age number of horses per day (1910- 1912), 112; life of, 113; purchases (1910-1912), 113; officers', 114; total number in country and number pro- duced (1907-19 10), 114; number req- uisitioned during Russo-Japanese War (1902-1906), 114; Military Horse Supplement Department, 115; allowance per day for, 116; allowance for 38,000, 116; used in cultivation of wet and dry fields (1904-1910), 170. Horse Supply Bureau, work of, i n ; at Shirakawa and other towns, 112; supply of forage by, 115. Hyogo prefecture, number of sojourners at (1911), 91; comparison of actives and population with Kyoto (1909), 92. Ibaraki, deficit of rice crop in (1905), 164. Iburi, conscription in, 68. Imperial Guards, 42; makeup of, 16, 37, 39; conscription law for (1875), 18; term of service of, 20. Imperial power, move toward restora- tion of, 4-5; decline of, 6. Infantry, organization of, 9; number of regiments, 15, 37, 39; increase in 1896, 45, 99-100; present size, 53; location of regiments, 99; physique of soldiers (1909-1910), 147-148; savings of sol- diers of Eighteenth Division, 190; salaries and sutlers' average proceeds from Sixteenth Division, 194-195; proceeds of sutlers in Sixteenth Divi- sion, 196; expenses of soldiers in Eighteenth Division, 197. Ishikawa prefecture, number of sojourn- • ers (1911), 91; comparison of actives and population with Kyoto (1907), Ishikari, conscription in, 68. Iwasaki, Baron, munition manufacturer, 224. Iwate, number of marriages (ages 15- 29) in, 80; deficit in rice crop (1905), 164. Jimmu, Emperor, 6. Kagawa, increase of rice crop in, 164. Kagoshima, population and increase (1894-1903), 100. Kanazawa, population and increase (1894-1903), 100. Kawakami, number of military horses (1910-1912), 112. Keio Era, French officer as advisory councilor during, 7. Kitami, conscription in, 68. Kobe, actives, active reserves, reserves and male population, (1911), 95; 242 INDEX ratio of two reserves to actives, 95; ratio to male population, 95; wages of day laborers (1900-1912), 177. Kochi, population and increase (1894- 1903), 100. Kof u, population before and after estab- lishment of regiments in (1903-1908), 102. Kokubudai, artillery regiments in, 131. Kokura, actives, active reserves, re- sers'es and male population, 96; pop- ulation and increase (1894-1903), 100. Korea, no, 174; standing army at, 54; number of military horses (1910- 1912), 112. Kotohira,population (1902-1908-191 1), 200; money orders cashed by soldiers at (1897-1909), 200-201. Kumamoto, garrison at, 15. Kurume, actives, active reserves, re- serves and male population, 96; pop- ulation and increase, (i 894-1903), 100; population before and after establishment of regiments (1903- 1908), 102. Kushiro, conscription in, 68; number of military horses (1910-1912), 112. Kyoto, number of marriages (ages 15- 29), 80; number of men in service and percentage of total population, 81; number of soldiers from country' in (1910), 91 ; comparison of actives and population (1907), 92; comparison of actives and population with Shiga (1909), 92; comparison of actives and ' population with Hyogo (1909), 92; soldiers in the districts of (1910), 92; boarding expenses of soldiers in, 202; direct national tax (Upper and Lower District), 214; result of conscript ex- amination in the city of (1912), 226. Kyushu, location of Eighteenth Divi- sion, 191. Laborers; increased skill obtained by conscription, 143; effect of conscrip- tion on numbers of, 152; total taken from productive labor by military life, 157; loss of time to, by conscrip- tion, 159; increase in wages of, and comparison with average increase in prices of foodstuffs (1900-1912), 177; wages of day (1900 and 1912), 177; lack of male, 178-179; yearly increase of, 179; numbers in commercial and manufacturing, 180-181; scarcity of, 1 81-182; methods employed to at- tract, 182-183; kidnapping of, 183; lossofthoseconscriptecl, 228, 237-238. Loochoos, conscription in, 68. Manchuria, no; standing army in, 54' number of military horses (1910- 1912), 112. Marriages, number of (ages 15-29), 80. Masuda, Captain, estimate of boarding expenses, 203. Matsumoto, population before and after establishment of regiments (1903- 1908), 102. Matsuye, population before and after establishment of regiments (1903- 1908), 102. Medical corps, 53; physique of (1909- 1910), 147-148. Meiji Restoration, aim of, 3-4; effect of, on conscription, 5; control of mili- tary system by French during, 7; millionaires of, 224. Military Horse Supplement Depart- ment, farming work of, 115. IMilitary towns, formation and expan- sion of, 99 et seq. Mitsui, 224. Miyagi, number of marriages (ages 15- 29), in, 80; deficit in rice crop (1905), .164- Miyakonojo, population before and after establishment of regiments (1903-1908), 102. Moji, actives, active reserves, reserves and male population, 96. Money orders, amounts paid on, 200. Morioka, cavalry regiments at, 131. Mountain artillery, present size, 54; savings of soldiers of Eighteenth Division, 190; expenses of soldiers in Eighteenth Division, 197. Muhara, number of military horses (1910-1912), 112. Musicians, number of corps, 37, 39; present size, 54. National Agricultural Association, table on number of farm houses and land-owning and tenant farmers, 219. Nagoya, garrison at, 15; wages of day laborers (1900 and 19 12), 177. Nara, population before and after estab- lishment of regiments (1903-1908), 102. Narashino, cavalry regiments at, 131. Nemuro, conscription in, 68. Niigata, deficit in rice crop (1905), 164. Oats, amount purchased, 1 16; increased production, 118. Ogasawara, enforcement of conscrip- tion, 68. INDEX 243 Ohmura, population and increase (1894- 1903), 100. Oita, population before and after estab- lishment of regiments (1903-1908), 102; increase of rice crop, 164. ■Okayama, population before and after establishment of regiments (1903- 1908), 102. Okinawa, enforcement of conscription in, 68. Okuma, Count, 48. Okura, canned food manufacturer, 224. Omura, Masujiro, advocate of conscrip- tion, 7. Orphans, pension to, 232 et seq. Osaka, 10; garrison at, 15; number of marriages (ages 15-29), 80; sojourn- ers at(i9ii),qi;raw material sen t to (1910-1911), 120; number of work- men in arsenal at, 127; conscription in, 154; wages of day laborers (1900 and 1912), 177; high expenses of sol- diers stationed at, 195; boarding ex- penses of soldiers at, 202; land, in- come and business taxes in, 219. Oshima, conscription in, 68. Oyama, number of military horses (1910-1912J, 112. Patriotic Ladies Association, investiga- tion of families of disabled and killed, 235- Pensions, under Conscription Regula- tion, 10, 232 et seq.; inadequacy of, 226; table of, and aids to widows and orphans, 233; number and amount of (I9I2),234. Population, effect of conscription on in- crease of, 76 et seq., 224, 236; etTect of conscription on urban, 87; increase in towns with newly organized regi- ments, 100; increase in towns of 10,- 000 to 40,000, loi; before and after establishment of regiments in certain towns, 102; increase in places where new divisions and new regiments were formed, 103; increase throughout towns, garrisoned by new divisions, 103; increase in towns, not garrisoned by new divisions, 103; increase in smaller towns, 103; of Zentsuji (1896- 1912), 105; of neighboring towns and villages (1897-1911), 105; percentage of inhabitants in various cities, towns and villages to the whole, 161; in- crease of absolute city population, 174-175- Provision Bureau, 119, 126; goods fur- nished to (1913), 121; number of workmen in, 127; supplies needed by, ^3.1- Punishment, for infractions of rules for enrollment, 14-15; 26, 32, 52. Reserve service, rules of, 12, 21, 34; changes in 44; annual inspection of, .158. Rice, amount purchased, 122-123; area of fields and comparison with previous year (1897-1909), 163; total crop (1897-1909), 164; relationship of area of other fields and rice, 166; con- sumption of, by soldiers and people, 212. Russo-Japanese War, 44, 49, 53; in- creased need for conscription after, 55; decrease of birth rate during, 82; casualties of, 83; horses requisitioned during, 114; effect on agricultural labor, 163, 165; number of soldiers used in, 179; merchants who profited by, 224. Sabaye, regiment at, 196. Saga, suppression of insurrection at, 42; population before and after establish- ment of regiment at (1903-1908), 102; figures of Regimental Office con- cerning the percentage of the actives to those conscripts other than actives, 220. Saghalien, standing army at, 54. Sakade, population (1902-1908-1911), 200; number of money orders cashed by soldiers at (1897-1909), 200. Sakura, relation of physique of con- scripts to tax paid in (1906), 216; result of conscript examination in (1906), 227. Sanbongi, number of military horses (1910-1912), 112. Sasebo, population (resident and foreign, 1898-1912), 88. Satsuma Rebellion, 8, 41, 57; impor- tance of, 19. Sendai, garrison at, 15. Senju Woolen Factory, 119, 126, 192; wool purchases of, 122; number of workmen at, 127. Service, term of conscript, 10, 28, 57- 58; kinds of, 11, 20, 27, 33, 49-50;' specialization in, II-12, 20-21, 27-28, 33-34. 50; supplementary, 12-13, 21, 28, 48, 50; active, 59-60; reserve, 60; supplementary reserve, 60-61. Shichinonel, number of military horses (1910-1912), 112. 244 INDEX Shiga prefecture, number of sojourners, (191 1), 91 ; comparison of actives and population, with Kyoto, (1909), 92; increase in rice crop, 164. Shikamura, population (1897-1911), 105. Shimonoseki, artillery rcgmients at, 131. Shimoshidzu, artillery regiments at, 131. Shirakata, population (1897-1911), 105. Shirakawa, military horses (1910- 1912), 112. Shiribeshi, conscription in, 68. Shizuoka, population and increase (1894-1903), 100; increase in rice crop, 164. Shogunate party, 41-42. Sino-Japanese War, 44-45, 48; increase of military force after, 56, 84, 99; profiteering of merchants during, 224. South America, wool imports from, 122. Straw, amount purchased, 117; in- • creased production, 118; obtained through trade associations, 225. Sutlers, activities of, 124-125; profits of, 126; average amount expended by soldiers per day at, 141 ; proceeds of, from Eighteenth Division, 194 et seq. Tadotsu, population (1897-1911), 105. Takanabe, number of military horses in (1910-1912), 112. Takata, population before and after establishment of regiments (1903- 1908), 102. Takata, merchant supplying Navy- Department, 224. Tanabe, Lieutenant Colonel Montojiro, 37; on taxes, 215; table on result of conscript examination in Sakura (i906),_227. Taxes, direct national tax in Kyoto, 213-214; relation of physique of con- scripts to tax paid in Sakura (1906), 216; number paying, 218; land, 218- 219; income and business, 219; in- crease of, due to conscription, 237- 238. Telegraph corps, number of, 37, 39. Teshio, conscription in, 68. Tochigi, deficit in rice crop in (1905), 164. Tokachi, conscription in, 68. Tokushima', population before and after establishment of regiments (1903- 1908), 102; increase in rice crop in, 164. Tokyo, garrison at, 15; marriages from ages 15-29, 80; married and unmar- ried men and percentage with regard to rest of country, (ages 19-24), 81 ; percentage of men of age in serv- ice, 81; number of actives, active re- serves, reserves and male population (1910), 94; ratio to male population of actives, active reserves and re- serves, 94; rate of removal to (ages 5^45)' 97; raw materials sent to arsenal at (1910-1911), 120; number of workmen in arsenal at, 127; divi- sion at, 131; wages of day laborers, (1900-1912), 177. Tottori, population and increase (1894- 1903), 100. Toyama, population before and after establishment of regiments (1903- 1908), 102. Toyohara, population (1897-1911), 105. Toyohashi, population before and after establishment of regiments (1903- 1908), 102; cavalry regiments at, 131- Tsu, population before and after estab- lishment of regiments in (1903- 1908), 102. Utsunomiya, population before and after establishment of regiments (1903-1908), 102. Uzuhiko (governor of Katsuragi), 6. \'olunteers, 28-29; 34-35; one year, 50-51- Wages, 187; of soldiers under Conscrip- tion Regulation (1870), 10; under Conscription law (1873), 12; increase in, of laborers in comparison with average increase in prices of food- stuffs (1900-1912), 177; of day labor- ers (1900-1912), 177; rise of (1916), 180; of noncommissioned officers, 191; during calling out, 194; of sol- diers of Sixteenth Division, 194; of noncommissioned officers of Sixteenth Division, 195; average of different laborers, 230. Wakamatsu, population before and after establishment of regiments ( 1 903-1 908), 102. Wakayama, population before and after establishment of regiments (1903- 1908), 102; increase of rice crops in, 164. Wheat, amount purchased, 122-123; area of (1897-19 10), 165. \\ idows, pensions to, 232 et seq. INDEX 245 Yamagata, Aritomo, 48; constructor of conscription system, 7; results of tour of inspection of European sys- tems, 17-18. Yamagata, number of marriages in (ages 15-29), 80; population and in- crease (1895-1903), 100; deficit in rice crop in (1905), 164. Yamaguchi, population and increase in _ (1894-1903), 100. Yokohama, wages of day laborers (1900-1912), 177. Yokohama, (iennosuke, 224. Yokosuka, artillery regiments at, 131. Yoshida, population (1896-1899), 105. Yoshiwara, population, (1897-1911), 105. Yura, artillery regiments at, 131. Zentsuji, population and increase (1894- 1903), 100; (1902-1908-1911), 200; growth of population due to estab- lishment of a new division at, 104- 105; increase of employment due to establishment of a new division at, 128-129; higher officers stationed at, 130; money orders cashed by soldiers (1897-1909), 200-201; boarding ex- penses of soldiers at, 202. University of California SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 305 De Neve Drive - Parking Lot 17 • Box 951388 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90095-1388 Return this material to the library from which it was borrowed. 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