PHILOSOPHIES 
 
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 BERT SPENCER 
 
 JAM HENRY' HUDSON 
 
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PHILOSOPHIES ANCIENT AND MODERN 
 
 HERBERT SPENCER 
 
RELIGIONS: ANCIENT AND MODERN 
 
 Animism. By EDWARD OLODD, author of The Story of Creation. 
 Pantheism. By JAMES ALLANSON PICTON, author of The Religion of t\* 
 
 Universe. 
 The Religions of Ancient China. By Professor GILES, LL. D. , Professor 
 
 of Chinese in the University of Cambridge. 
 The Religion Of Ancient Greece. By JANB HARBISON, Lecturer at 
 
 Newnham College, Cambridge, author of Prolegomena to Study of Gretk 
 
 Religion. 
 Islam. By the Rt. Hon. AMEER ALI SYED, of the Judicial Committee of His 
 
 Majesty's Privy Council, author of The Spirit of Islam and Ethics of Islam. 
 Magic and Fetishism. By Dr. A. C. HADDON, F.R.8., Lecturer on 
 
 Ethnology at Cambridge University. 
 The Religion Of Ancient Egypt. By Professor W. M. FLINDERS PETRIB, 
 
 P.B.S. 
 The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria. By THEOPHILUS G. PINCHES, 
 
 late of the British Museum. 
 Early Buddhism. By Professor RHYS DAVIDS, LL.D., late Secretary of 
 
 The Royal Asiatic Society. 
 Hinduism. By Dr. L. D. BARNETT, of the Department of Oriental Printed 
 
 Books and MSS., British Museum. 
 Scandinavian Religion. By WILLIAM A. CRAIOIE, Joint Editor of the 
 
 Oxford English Dictionary. 
 Celtic Religion. By Professor ANWYL, Professor of Welsh at University 
 
 College, Aberystwyth. 
 
 The Mythology of Ancient Britain and Ireland. By CHARLES 
 
 SQOIRE, author of The Mythology of the British Islands. 
 
 Judaism. By ISRAEL ABRAHAMS, Lecturer in Talmudic Literature in Cam- 
 bridge University, author of Jewish Life in the Middle Ages. 
 
 The Religion of Ancient Rome. By CYRIL BAILEY, M.A. 
 
 Shinto, The Ancient Religion of Japan. By W. G. ASTON, C. M. G. 
 
 The Religion of Ancient Mexico and Peru. By LEWIS SPENCE, M.A. 
 
 Early Christianity. By S. B. BLACK, Professor at M'Gill University. 
 
 The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion. By Professor 
 J. H. LEUBA. 
 
 The Religion of Ancient Palestine. By STANLEY A. COOK. 
 
 Mithraism. By W. J. PHYTHIAN- ADAMS. 
 
 PHILOSOPHIES 
 
 Early Greek Philosophy. By A. W. BENN, author of The Philosophy oj 
 
 Greece, Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century. 
 Stoicism. By Professor ST. GEORGE STOCK, author of Deductive Logic, 
 
 editor of the Apology of Plato, etc. 
 Plato. By Professor A. E. TAYLOR. St. Andrews University, author of 
 
 The Problem of Conduct. 
 Scholasticism. By Father RICKABY, S.J. 
 Hobbes. By Professor A. E. TAYLOR. 
 Locke. By Professor ALEXANDER, of Owens College. 
 Comte and Mill. By T. WHITTARER, author of The Neoplatonists Apollo- 
 
 nius of Tyana and other Essays. 
 Herbert Spencer. By W. H. HUDSON, author of An Introduction to 
 
 Spencer's Philosophy. 
 Schopenhauer. By T. WHITTAKER. 
 
 Berkeley. By Professor CAMPBELL FRASER, D.C.L., LL.D. 
 Swedenborg. By Dr. SEWALL. 
 
 Nietzsche: His Life and Works. By ANTHONY M LUDOVICL 
 Bergson. By JOSEPH SOLOMON. 
 Rationalism. By J. M. ROBERTSON. 
 Pragmatism. By D. L. MURRAY. 
 Kudolf Eucken. By w. TUDOR-JONM. 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 By 
 WILLIAM HENRY HUDSON 
 
 LONDON 
 CONSTABLE & COMPANY LTD 
 
 10 ORANGE STREET LEICESTER SQUARE W.C. 
 1916 
 

PREFACE 
 
 THE aim of this little book is almost entirely 
 expository. I have tried in it to give a simple 
 outline of the cardinal ideas and more im- 
 portant hearings of the Synthetic Philosophy. 
 The accomplishment of this task within the 
 limits allowed me has made more than sufficient 
 demands upon my powers of presentment and 
 condensation. Absence of recorded disapproval 
 must, therefore, not be regarded as necessarily 
 implying assent. Where I have departed from 
 interpretation to express judgment, I have done 
 so simply for the purpose of indicating certain 
 points at which, in respect ot fundamental 
 matters, Spencer's account of things seems to me 
 to be most seriously open to criticism. 
 
 WILLIAM HENRY HUDSON. 
 
 '61956 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAP. PAGE 
 
 i. HERBERT SPENCER : His LIFE AND CHARACTER, 1 
 
 ii. * FIRST PRINCIPLES,' 16 
 
 in. *THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY,' ... 28 
 
 iv. * THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY,' ... 39 
 
 v. 'THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY,' ... 50 
 
 vi. 'THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS,' .... 64 
 
 vii. ON THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION, ... 76 
 
 CHIEF DATES AND AUTHORITIES, ... 88 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 CHAPTER l m ... 
 
 I'iS LIFE AND. CHARACTER 
 
 HERBERT SPENCER was born at Derby on 27th 
 April 1820. His father, a teacher, was a man of 
 pronounced individuality, independent in thought 
 and action, rigidly conscientious, but somewhat 
 captious and austere. His mother was a woman 
 of only average intelligence, in whom, in marked 
 contrast with the Spencer stock, ' altruism was too 
 little qualified by egoism.' Spencer believed that 
 such of his ' specialities of character and faculty ' 
 as were ' due to inheritance ' were derived from 
 his father. Certainly his father's influence was 
 the most important factor in his early life. It 
 was largely owing to his mother's subordination in 
 the household that the home-atmosphere, while 
 unusually clear and bracing, was rather chilly 
 
 A I 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 /**> 
 
 and dry. The conditions of his childhood tended 
 
 to foster self-reliance, originality, critical power. 
 <^ They did little to develop the emotional side of 
 V his nature. 
 
 The elder Spencer was strongly opposed to 
 the educational methods then in vogue, and 
 though the boy was sent for a time to a day- 
 school, he knew little of mental pressure or the 
 discipline of a regular routine. Judged by ordi- 
 nary standards,- his early -progress was therefore 
 extremely unsatisfactory. ' But, .meanwhile, he 
 gained in i^anyirolspBcis -from /the /miscellaneous 
 intellectual training ' which he received at home. 
 He was ' a frequent listener ' to discussions among 
 his father's friends on politics, religion, and 
 ethics. His taste for science and natural history 
 was encouraged. His father's principle being 
 ' that of self-help carried out in all directions/ the 
 boy was continually challenged to explain things 
 by the question ' Can you tell me the cause of 
 this ? ' This, he considered, did much to estab- 
 lish in him ' a habit of seeking for causes, as well 
 as a tacit belief in the universality of causation/ 
 
 At the age of thirteen, he was placed in charge 
 of an uncle, the Rev. Thomas Spencer, perpetual 
 curate of Hinton Charterhouse, near Bath, a 
 radical clergyman, well known for his activity in 
 
 2 
 
HIS LIFE AND CHARACTER 
 
 social reform, and characterised, like all the 
 Spencers, by vigour of intellect and strongly- 
 marked individuality. At Hinton, where he 
 remained three years, his education was taken 
 more systematically in hand, though unfortun- 
 ately history and general literature had no place 
 in his course. In some ways he profited little. 
 Hating the study of languages, mainly because it 
 involves the rote-learning of words and arbitrary 
 rules, he made slight progress with Greek, Latin, 
 and French. But, on the other hand, physics and 
 mathematics greatly attracted him, and helped 
 the development of his reasoning powers. One 
 incident of this period is worth recording even in 
 the briefest sketch. While reading with his uncle 
 Dr. Arnott's treatise on Physics, he boldly dis- 
 sented from the doctrine of inertia as there set 
 forth; and when his uncle supported Arnott's view, 
 he remained unshaken in his opposition. He 
 notes this as an early illustration of his ' constitu- 
 tional disregard for authority.' It reveals, more- 
 over, the growth of various other salient features 
 of his mind and character, especially his indepen- 
 dence of thought, his immense self-confidence, 
 and his indomitable will. ' Anything like passive 
 receptivity,' he elsewhere remarks, was always 
 1 foreign to my nature.' Neither then, nor at any 
 
 3 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 other time, did lie pay the smallest respect to 
 dogma or tradition. A chief ground of his quarrel 
 with ordinary methods of education was that 
 ' they encourage submissive receptivity instead of 
 independent activity.' 
 
 Thomas Spencer for a time entertained the 
 hope that his nephew would go to Cambridge. 
 This was, however, relinquished ; and on leaving 
 Hinton, Herbert returned home. After a short 
 experiment in teaching, for which (unlike another 
 great educational theorist, Rousseau) he seems 
 to have possessed conspicuous qualifications, he 
 turned his attention, in 1837, to railway engineer- 
 ing as a profession in which he had every chance 
 of success. Yet when, after ten years, a combina- 
 tion of reasons led him to abandon it, he did so 
 apparently without much regret. At twenty- 
 eight, he had to start life afresh. These ten 
 years had, however, counted greatly in his in- 
 tellectual development. At twenty, while engaged 
 on the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway, he 
 became much interested in geology. As a result, 
 he bought Lyell's recently-published Principles 
 of Geology. One chapter in that work 'was 
 devoted to a refutation of Lamarck's views con- 
 cerning the origin of species.' He rose from its 
 perusal with a 'decided leaning' towards such 
 
HIS LIFE AND CHARACTER 
 
 views. That Lyell's arguments thus produced 
 'the opposite effect to that intended' was, he 
 afterwards believed, chiefly due to the harmony 
 of the development hypothesis (as the evolution 
 theory was then called) with the whole move- 
 ment of his mind towards a purely naturalistic 
 interpretation of things. Ridiculed as he was for 
 entertaining ideas then so much at variance with 
 current scientific opinion, his belief in evolution 
 never afterwards wavered. Two years later he 
 opened his career as an author by the publication 
 in the Nonconformist of a series of twelve letters, 
 presently revised and reissued in pamphlet form, 
 on The Proper Sphere of Government. This little 
 work is remarkable for the clearness with which 
 it enunciates that uncompromising individualism 
 which was to be the key-note of his later political 
 writings. The influence of the development 
 hypothesis upon the young thinker's mind is 
 shown in his contention that the phenomena of 
 social life, no less than those of organic nature, 
 conform to law, and that social progress depends 
 upon the gradual adaptation of constitution to 
 conditions. The practical inference drawn is, 
 that such progress is a process of natural self- 
 adjustment, which is not helped but hindered by 
 State interference, and that the true and only 
 
 5 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 function of government is to maintain such 
 ' equitable relations among citizens ' as will allow 
 this process to go on unimpeded ' in a word, to 
 administer justice.^ 
 
 Engineering having failed him, Spencer looked 
 next to journalism, and there he was fortunate 
 enough to find, almost immediately, an open door. 
 In December 1848 he became sub- editor of The 
 Economist, a position which he held till 1853, 
 and then resigned, that he might devote himself 
 entirely to independent literary work. The step 
 was prompted by the feeling that he had now 
 discovered his true field. In 1850 he had pub- 
 lished his first important book, Social Statics. 
 In this, the naturalistic theories of society and 
 the extreme individualism of the Letters on 
 Government are more fully developed, and the 
 evolutionary conception of progress as a transi- 
 tion from the uniform to the multiform is clearly 
 implied. It was followed, in the course of the 
 next few years, by various essays, in which it is 
 now both easy and interesting to trace the move- 
 ment of his thought along many lines towards 
 the doctrines which form the foundation of his 
 philosophic system; and by a large volume on 
 the Principles of Psychology (1855), in which the 
 phenomena of mind are interpreted from the 
 
 6 
 
HIS LIFE AND CHARACTER 
 
 evolutionary point of view. A further stage in 
 the expansion and consolidation of his ideas is 
 marked by the essay on Progress : Its Law and 
 Cause (1857), in which the conception of evolu- 
 tion as universal is elaborated and illustrated in 
 detail. The next year, while writing a long 
 defence of the nebular hypothesis, he became 
 possessed of the idea that the doctrine of evolu- 
 tion might be made the basis of a systematic 
 interpretation of life, mind, and society. This 
 was the origin of the Synthetic Philosophy. The 
 prospectus of the proposed series of volumes was 
 drawn up in January 1858, revised in 1859, and 
 issued in March 1860. 
 
 Spencer thus set his hand to a task which he 
 then calculated would absorb all his energies for 
 twenty years. Under the most favourable condi- 
 tions the undertaking would have been a gigantic 
 one. Spencer's circumstances at the time were the 
 reverse of favourable. His financial outlook was 
 disquieting. A nervous breakdown which had 
 followed the strain of writing the Psychology had 
 left him a martyr to sleeplessness and dyspepsia, 
 and with sadly curtailed powers of work. He 
 himself afterwards realised to the full the wildly 
 extravagant character ot' his project, which 'to 
 any unconcerned bystander* might well have 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 appeared 'almost insane.' 'To think that an 
 amount of mental exertion great enough to tax 
 the energies of one in full health and vigour, and 
 at ease in respect of means, should be under- 
 taken by one who, having only precarious re- 
 sources, had become so far a nervous invalid that 
 he could not with any certainty count upon his 
 powers from one twenty-four hours to another ! ' 
 Yet with rare and admirable courage and tenacity 
 he persevered against all the difficulties thrown in 
 his way by financial embarrassments, the meagre- 
 ness of public support, adverse criticism, and 
 ever-increasing ill-health; and ultimately, after, 
 not twenty, but thirty-six years of toil, he was 
 able to write ' finis ' to his immense life-work. As 
 a monument of patient labour, self-sacrifice, and 
 superb devotion to a great purpose, the Synthetic 
 Philosophy must always hold a high place in the 
 history of thought. 
 
 Spencer was just forty when he began First 
 Principles. From this point on, the main interest 
 of his biography must be sought in the progress 
 of his work. For some twenty years the stress 
 of labour and the monotony of existence were 
 relieved by frequent holidays, undertaken some- 
 times for simple relaxation, more often in search 
 of health. Of these the most important were a 
 
 8 
 
HIS LIFE AND CHARACTER 
 
 tour in Italy in 1868, an excursion up the Nile in 
 1879, and a visit to America in 1882. But, mean- 
 while, the troubles arising from a disordered 
 nervous system had been steadily growing upon 
 him ; and after his return from the United States, 
 his fast-waning strength compelled him more and 
 more to husband his powers by resolutely shut- 
 ting himself off from all outer distractions. This 
 brought about his gradual withdrawal from the 
 interests of the social world. At length he 
 became almost a recluse, hardly accessible to his 
 closest friends, and to others not accessible at all. 
 He had never married. He had no home ties. 
 To avoid the evils of solitude, he lived for many 
 years in boarding-houses in London. This sub- 
 stitute for domestic life presently grew intoler- 
 able. He thereupon tried various experiments in 
 making a home of his own; and finally took a 
 house on the East Cliff at Brighton. There he 
 lapsed rapidly into absolute invalidism. The 
 completion of the Synthetic Philosophy brought 
 him little pleasure beyond what was afforded by 
 the simple sense of emancipation from long- 
 continued toil. But his task finished, the great 
 purpose of his life achieved, existence was left 
 blank of interest or desire. The years that re- 
 mained were fraught with much weariness and 
 
 9 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 depression. He died peacefully in the early 
 morning of 8th December 1903. His body, in 
 accordance -with his directions, was cremated at 
 Golder's Hill; and there his old friend, Mr. 
 Leonard (now Lord) Courtney, delivered an im- 
 pressive address. 
 
 The briefest analysis of Spencer's character 
 shows that certain closely related mental and 
 moral qualities stand out with striking distinct- 
 
 That which perhaps first arrests attention is 
 what he himself calls the 'ingrained noncon- 
 formity' of his nature. The 'chronic insubor- 
 dination' of his boyhood continued throughout 
 life. Authority had no meaning for him. He 
 was wholly uninfluenced by the power of the 
 past, by the weight of creed and social opinion, 
 by the prestige of established doctrines and great 
 names. To quote some one else's views in support 
 of his own would have seemed to him almost 
 the abnegation of his right to think for himself. 
 Always an impatient reader, he went to books 
 only for facts not otherwise obtainable, and cared 
 nothing for the theories and conclusions of pre- 
 ceding thinkers. The only indebtedness he 
 recognised to them was 'the indebtedness of 
 P antagonism.' ' All along,' he once wrote to Leslie 
 
 v 
 
HIS LIFE AND CHARACTER 
 
 / Stephen, ' I have looked at things through nay 
 own eyes, and not through the eyes of others.' 
 Independent, self- confident, self-assertive, he was 
 ready, like Athanasius, to stand against the 
 world. That this 'constitutional disregard for 
 authority' led him to extremes, he afterwards 
 admitted. It caused him at times to 'under- 
 estimate the past/ It only too evidently bred 
 such a habit of dissent that, as the Autobiography 
 clearly shows, he found a positive pleasure in 
 cultivating and proclaiming opposition to current 
 ideas on anything and everything. It is thus 
 impossible to acquit him of the charge of an 
 occasional tendency to intellectual arrogance. 
 Yet his independence and fearlessness have of 
 course to be reckoned among the characteristics 
 which enabled him to accomplish his own work 
 as a pioneer in thought. 
 
 Even more obviously that work was made 
 possible only by his extraordinary originality, his 
 penetration and grasp, his rare capacity for both 
 analysis and synthesis. He possessed in an 
 astonishing degree the power of ' constructive 
 imagination.' The immense fertility of his mind 
 is illustrated in the way in which he threw out 
 fresh and pregnant ideas on every subject he 
 touched. Outside the field of philosophic specu- 
 
 II 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 lation it was equally shown in the long list of 
 his inventions, which includes all sorts of in- 
 genious devices and contrivances from a scheme 
 for aerial locomotion on the one hand to a new 
 fork for toasting bacon on the other. 
 
 A third outstanding characteristic was his ' ab- 
 normal tendency to criticism/ Much as he 
 regretted this, he seems never to have made any 
 resolute effort to check it. He was, in fact, some- 
 what censorious ; prone to fault-finding, and little 
 given to praise. This ' incurable habit ' led to 
 many unfortunate results. In ordinary conversa- 
 tion it caused him continually to seek reasons for 
 disagreement and disapproval. It made him 
 appear, even when he was not really, unsym- 
 pathetic. It gave a flavour of harshness to many 
 of his judgments. It interfered seriously, as he 
 acknowledges, with his appreciation of works of 
 literature and art, and to some extent with his 
 enjoyment of music, of which he was genuinely 
 fond. He suspected that it had even been ' a chief 
 factor in the continuance' of his 'celibate life/ 
 He makes the distressing confession that ' readi- 
 ness to see inferiorities rather than superiorities, 
 must have impeded the finding of one who 
 attracted me in adequate degree ' for marriage. 
 
 The more important defects of Spencer's genius 
 
 12 
 
HIS LIFE AND CHARACTER 
 
 and character were the defects of his qualities. 
 They arose almost entirely from the undue pre- 
 dominance of his intellectual faculties and the 
 subordination of the emotional nature. In him 
 the brain was always in the ascendant, while the 
 feelings were perpetually restrained. Hence that 
 lack of warmth and spontaneity which affected 
 even his style; hence also the reserve and 
 austerity of manner which unfavourably im- 
 pressed those who came casually into contact^ 
 with him. It is to be deplored that the whole 
 course of his life, from childhood up, should have 
 tended towards emotional repression, and that, in 
 part because of his peculiar temperament, in part 
 on account of the sacrifices entailed by his work, 
 he should have shut himself off so completely 
 from common human relationships and responsi- 
 bilities. His real genius for friendship shows that 
 he might have profited greatly by larger oppor- 
 tunities for the culture of the feelings. As it was, 
 his emotional deficiencies adversely influenced in 
 many ways his whole converse with life. He cared 
 little for literature. Poetry made but slight ap- 
 peal to him. In his views of art he was some- 
 thing of a Philistine. His repeated attacks upon 
 history as commonly conceived and written, 
 though up to a certain point fully justified, 
 
 13 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 exhibit a want of interest in personalities which 
 is unmistakably suggestive of his limitations. In 
 opposing the unwisdom of much that is miscalled 
 philanthropy, he must, even to those who most 
 fully agree with him, often seem hard. His atti- 
 tude towards the ' creed of Christendom,' which 
 he curtly dismissed as ' alien to my nature, both 
 emotional and intellectual,' proves conclusively 
 that the spiritual claims of Christianity were never 
 apprehended by him. 
 
 In private life other defects were often pain- 
 fully apparent. He was too exacting in his 
 demands upon others, and intolerant of their 
 weaknesses and shortcomings. He was frequently 
 impatient, irritable, sharp of tongue. But these 
 peculiarities were largely due to ill-health to 
 sleeplessness, dyspepsia, and the morbid mental 
 condition which was in part the cause and in 
 part the effect of persistent hypochondria. It 
 would be improper, therefore, to attach too much 
 importance to them. 
 
 All deductions made, there was much of moral 
 strength and greatness in Spencer's character 
 which deserves our admiration. He was a 
 genuine seeker after truth. He was a genuine 
 apostle of righteousness. Wholly superior to all 
 worldly ambitions, he pursued the path he had 
 
 14 
 
HIS LIFE AND CHARACTER 
 
 marked out for himself without regard for per- 
 sonal consequences. Wealth and fame had no 
 attractions for him. Domineering as he often 
 was, he was yet, unlike many of his religious 
 antagonists, scrupulously fair in controversy. He 
 showed a splendid zeal for great causes, and in 
 upholding what he believed to be right, he 
 never paused to consider the unpopularity which 
 might result. He was the very incarnation of 
 integrity. Upright, conscientious, transparently 
 honest in word and deed, he governed his life, 
 even in its minutest details, by the highest prin- 
 ciples of rectitude and justice. 
 
 Spencer's work is very voluminous; but his 
 miscellaneous writings may be regarded as, in the 
 main, ancillary to the System of Synthetic Philo- 
 sophy. This comprises ten volumes First Prin- 
 ciples, The Principles of Biology, The Principles 
 of Psychology, The Principles of Sociology, and 
 The Principles of Ethics. Our plan here will be 
 to pass the contents of these volumes under brief 
 review, reserving a few pages at the end for a 
 consideration of Spencer's interpretation of 
 religion. 
 
CHAPTER IP 
 
 'FIRST PRINCIPLES' 
 
 IT is not the business of philosophy, as defined 
 by Spencer, to undertake an interpretation of the 
 universe different in kind from that which science 
 gives. Philosophy builds with the materials 
 furnished by science. Its sphere is, therefore, 
 that of phenomena. It makes no attempt to 
 transcend these, or to explore the problems of 
 Absolute Being. Insistence on this limitation is 
 not tantamount to a denial of a Reality, of which 
 phenomena are merely manifestations. On the 
 contrary, consciousness of such Reality is involved 
 in all our thinking. But it is a consciousness of 
 which ' no logical account can be given.' Recog- 
 nising the Absolute not only as unknown but 
 also, owing to the constitution of our intelligence, 
 as everlastingly unknowable, philosophy proceeds 
 to its own task of reporting upon phenomena. 
 Something will be said later of Spencer's Doctrine 
 
 16 
 
' FIRST PRINCIPLES ' 
 
 of the Unknowable in its religious aspects. Here 
 it should be noted that he elaborated it in the 
 forefront of his positive undertaking for the 
 purpose only of denning the scope and object of 
 his philosophy. It was no part of his plan to 
 employ agnosticism as a basis for his interpreta- 
 tion of the knowable. That interpretation must 
 therefore be regarded as independent of his 
 metaphysical prolegomena and judged apart from 
 any ontological considerations. 
 
 While, however, the field of philosophy is con- 
 terminate with that of science, it aims within that 
 field at results beyond those which science sets 
 out to achieve.* Each science seeks the widest 
 generalisations possible within its own limits. By 
 such generalisations its special phenomena are 
 summed up, correlated, unified. But, these widest 
 generalisations reached, the bounds of each 
 separate science are reached also. Here the work 
 of philosophy begins. It carries the process of 
 generalisation and unification, a stage further, It 
 seeks such most general statements as shall 
 ' comprehend and consolidate the widest general- 
 isations of science.' Its purpose is to find those 
 universal truths under which all the truths of 
 the sciences may be subsumed ; to formulate the 
 ultimate laws of which the highest laws of the 
 
 B 17 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 sciences are merely corollaries. Philosophy, there- 
 fore, is the complete unification of knowledge 
 knowledge reduced to a coherent whole. > 
 
 However rigorously inductive its method, such 
 philosophy must assume something to begin with. 
 Assumptions made provisionally will afterwards 
 be justified if the conclusions deducible from 
 them are shown to correspond with the facts 
 given by experience. But as this statement itself 
 postulates the existence of likenesses and differ- 
 ences among phenomena and the competence of 
 consciousness as judge of these, one datum is 
 already reached. The next step must be the dis- 
 covery of some ultimate antithesis to which all 
 other likenesses and differences are referable. 
 This is found in our ' deepest cognition/ the dis- 
 tinction between self and not-self, or subject and 
 object. But this is not all. In considering the 
 conditions under which the Unknowable Power 
 is manifested, we are brought directly to the 
 conceptions of space, time, matter, and motion. 
 The reality of these ' most general forms ' of 
 thought is taken for granted alike by common 
 sense and by science. But these ' necessary data 
 of consciousness' are shown by psychological 
 analysis to be susceptible of decomposition. 
 Space, time, matter, motion, are all translatable 
 
 18 
 
< FIRST PRINCIPLES ' 
 
 into terms of force, which itself remains untrans- 
 latable into any other terms. To force, then, 
 we come at last as the ' ultimate of ultimates. 
 But since it is impossible to conceive force, 
 throughout all its transformations, as arising out 
 of nothing or lapsing into nothing since con- 
 stancy in its quantity is a presupposition and 
 condition of all science it follows that ' the force 
 or energy manifested, now in one way now in 
 another, persists or remains unchanged in amount.' 
 In the Persistence of Force (which is Spencer's 
 phrase for Conservation of Energy), we therefore 
 reach the ultimate universal truth which at once 
 forms the basis of all science, and, as underlying 
 all other truths, itself transcends demonstration. 
 If we ask what this force is, there is no answer 
 which carries us beyond the phenomenal effects 
 wrought by it. We know it in and through its 
 manifestations. Of its nature we know nothing. 
 1 By the Persistence of Force, we really mean the 
 persistence of some cause which transcends our 
 knowledge and conception.' 
 
 That completely unified account of things 
 which we ask from philosophy will therefore take 
 the shape of an account of the transformations 
 of force under the modes of matter and motion. 
 Such an account becomes possible on recognition 
 
 19 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 of certain universal truths which are deducible 
 from our datum. That matter is indestructible 
 and motion continuous, is clearly implied in it. 
 But since force persists, the force which produces 
 a given change cannot be lost in producing that 
 change; it must simply undergo metamorphosis 
 into an equivalent amount of some other force or 
 forces. Hence the connection between the mani- 
 festation of force which we call cause and that 
 which we call effect is an invariable connection. 
 'Our belief in the necessity and universality of 
 causation is the belief that every manifestation 
 of force must be preceded and succeeded by some 
 equivalent manifestation/ The doctrines of the 
 Transformation and Equivalence of Forces and 
 the Uniformity of Law are thus restated as 
 deductions from the ultimate datum of conscious- 
 ness. Two other corollaries have to be added. 
 Co-existent forces of attraction and repulsion 
 being everywhere at work, motion follows the line 
 of least resistance or of greatest traction or of the 
 resultant of the two. Where there is a conflict of 
 forces not in equilibrium, since the force mani- 
 fested in motion in a given direction cannot be 
 annihilated, if it disappears as action it reappears 
 as reaction. Hence, within limits, the direction 
 of motion is continually being reversed. The law 
 
 20 
 
'FIRST PRINCIPLES' 
 
 of the Rhythm of Motion universally illustrated 
 by all classes of phenomena is thus affiliated 
 upon the Persistence of Force. Rhythm is not 
 simply, as shown by the facts, a characteristic of 
 all motion. It is a necessary characteristic of all 
 motion. 
 
 We have here, then, a number of truths having 
 that universality which philosophy demands, 
 since they are truths which, holding good in all 
 the special sciences and thus transcending their 
 class-limits, may be used to ' unify concrete phen- 
 omena belonging to all divisions of Nature.' But 
 we have as yet advanced no further than the 
 materials for our philosophy. We have learned 
 what are the factors of all phenomena. We have 
 now to investigate the co-operation of these 
 factors in the production of the universe and all 
 its parts. Each science, reaching its own special 
 synthesis of factors, undertakes to show how its 
 phenomena in all their complexity arise from the 
 combined action of these factors. Philosophy 
 must seek ' a universal synthesis ' in which all 
 these special syntheses may be gathered up. 
 What is required, then, is the formulation of a 
 law which will cover the entire history of phen- 
 omena as known to us, by expressing ' the com- 
 bined consequences' of the forces which have 
 
 21 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 been separately formulated. The universe, in 
 general and in all its parts, exhibits itself in per- 
 petual change. Every change manifestly involves 
 change in matter and motion. The law we seek, 
 therefore, must be the law of all transformation 
 given in terms of matter and motion. With this 
 law to interpret all change, philosophy will become 
 synthetic ; it will provide a systematised genetic 
 history of the cosmos, an ' account of the Trans- 
 formation of Things/ and 'of the ultimate uni- 
 formities they present,' under a formula which 
 embraces them all This law of the perpetual 
 redistribution of matter and motion going on 
 throughout the universe is the law of evolution 
 and dissolution. 
 
 Necessarily, that it may cover all changes, from 
 those of the sidereal system to those of everyday 
 social life, this law has to be stated in the most 
 abstract phraseology. Spencer's full formula of 
 evolution stands thus: 'Evolution is an integra- 
 tion of matter and concomitant dissipation of 
 motion ; during which the matter passes from an 
 indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite 
 coherent heterogeneity; and during which the 
 retained motion undergoes a parallel transforma- 
 tion.' While the more abstruse terms of this 
 formula cannot now be discussed, the gist of it 
 
 22 
 
'FIRST PRINCIPLES' 
 
 may be stated in somewhat simpler language. 
 That redistribution of matter and motion which 
 results in the formation of an aggregate constitutes 
 evolution. Evolution, therefore, is integration, or 
 an increase of defmiteness and coherence ; as the 
 opposite process, dissolution, is disintegration, or 
 a lapse into indefiniteness and incoherence. But 
 this is the primary aspect only of the evolutionary 
 process. It is commonly accompanied by a 
 parallel movement in the direction of increasing 
 heterogeneity or diversity. The increasing unity 
 of structure which characterises an evolving 
 aggregate is that unity in complexity which is 
 gained when a number of unlike specialised parts 
 are brought into organic interdependence. Evolu- 
 tion in structure, whether it be in the growth of 
 a seed into a tree, of an ovum into an animal, or 
 of a primitive into an advanced society, always 
 means a change from uniformity or homogeneity 
 to multiplicity or heterogeneity. The unevolved 
 is the simple. The evolved is the complex. But 
 such increase in complexity constitutes evolution 
 only on condition that the primary process of 
 integration is meanwhile maintained. Advance 
 in complexity, if not accompanied by correspond- 
 ing advance in organic unity, manifestly tends to 
 the breaking up of an aggregate, and is therefore 
 
 23 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 in the line not of evolution but of dissolution. 
 In evolution, the parts of a developing aggregate, 
 while they become differentiated from one another 
 and specialised in function, work together for the 
 life of the whole. 
 
 We have thus a formula which, in the most 
 highly generalised statement, covers all phases 
 of that 'continuous transformation which the 
 universe undergoes.' Or, more strictly speaking, 
 we have the formula of all changes in the ascend- 
 ing scale of life. To make our statement com- 
 plete, we have to remember that the ascending 
 scale implies a descending scale. Since all 
 motion is rhythmical, the forces which make for 
 integration are perpetually in conflict, locally and 
 generally, with the forces which make for dis- 
 integration. Evolution and Dissolution together 
 constitute the entire cycle of change. Through 
 this cycle all things pass. To what we meta- 
 phorically call the ' law ' of evolution and decay, 
 all things conform. The same law of trans- 
 formation holds good throughout the cosmos. 
 A universal principle is thus given in terms of 
 which a systematised account of things may 
 be attempted. 
 
 But before we apply our formula in those 
 various departments into which for convenience 
 
 24 
 
1 FIRST PRINCIPLES ' 
 
 we divide a universe which is one and whole, 
 another step has to be taken. The formula of 
 evolution is only empirical. It expresses merely 
 the widest generalisation in which all other 
 generalisations merge. Philosophy seeks not only 
 a systematic account of the transformations of 
 things, but also the rationale of such tranforma- 
 tions. It must do more than show that evolution 
 is universal. It must provide not only the history 
 of the facts, but also their causal nexus. It must 
 show why evolution is universal, and why the 
 changes must have taken place in the way 
 described, and could have taken place in no other 
 way. The formula of evolution must, therefore, 
 be restated deductively. 
 
 This is done by reference to three universal 
 laws. 'First, the condition of homogeneity (or of 
 relative homogeneity, for of absolute homogeneity 
 we know nothing) is a condition of instability; 
 as the different parts of any finite mass are un- 
 equally exposed to incident forces, differentiation 
 must result ; the relatively homogeneous becomes 
 heterogeneous; the heterogeneous continually 
 becomes more and more heterogeneous. Secondly, 
 every cause necessarily produces more than one 
 effect. Thirdly, unlike units in any aggregate 
 tend to separate while like units tend to cluster 
 
 25 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 together, and thus differentiations are made 
 sharper and more definite. These three laws the 
 Instability of the Homogeneous, the Multiplication 
 of Effects, and Segregation together explain the 
 necessity of those evolutionary processes described 
 in the formula. These three laws being exhibited 
 as deductions from the Persistence of Force, the 
 formula of evolution is presented under a rational 
 character. 
 
 The foundations of philosophy as completely 
 unified knowledge are thus laid. To the estab- 
 lishment of these universal truths Spencer's intro- 
 ductory volume, First Principles, is devoted. In 
 the nine volumes which follow, these universal 
 truths are carried forward as an organon into the 
 special phenomena which form the subject-matter 
 of biology, psychology, sociology, and ethics. 
 
 A word of warning is here desirable. For the 
 purposes of his philosophy Spencer kept close to 
 a mechanical phraseology. He sought to give a 
 genetic history of the universe in terms of matter, 
 motion, and force. This might seem to imply 
 that his system is patently materialistic. To 
 regard it as such, would, however, be to take it in 
 a sense which he himself repudiated. When we 
 speak of matter, motion, and force, we are only 
 endeavouring to reduce our complex symbols of 
 
 26 
 
'FIRST PRINCIPLES' 
 
 thought to the simplest symbols. But we are 
 still dealing with symbols. 'The problem of 
 existence is not solved ; it is simply moved further 
 back.' Matter, motion, force, are themselves in- 
 volved in the ultimate mystery of things. They 
 are concepts with which we have to work. But 
 they are only signs of the Unknowable Reality 
 underlying them all. 
 
 27 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 'THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY* 
 
 UNBROKEN continuity in the great chain of things 
 is of course a postulate of the evolutionary philo- 
 sophy. ' Evolution being a universal process, one 
 and continuous throughout all forms of existence, 
 there can be no break, no change from one group 
 of concrete phenomena to another, without a 
 bridge of intermediate phenomena.' The com- 
 plete unification of knowledge demands that we 
 should do more than show that one law of evolu- 
 tion explains the development of the solar system, 
 of our own planet, of life at large, of mind, of 
 society. It demands that we should trace the 
 sequence of development not only throughout 
 each division of our inquiry, but also from each 
 division to the next. Our proper course would, 
 therefore, be to outline the evolutionary process 
 in the inorganic world, and then pass on to the 
 organic across a bridge which should connect the 
 two. Owing to the vast compass of his scheme, 
 
 78 
 
'THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY' 
 
 however, Spencer was compelled to omit alto- 
 gether the discussion of the phenomena of 
 inorganic evolution, and with it, the projected 
 consideration of ' the evolution of organic matter/ 
 as ' the step preceding the evolution of living 
 forms.' The result is that we reach the pheno- 
 mena of life not by a bridge, but by a leap. 
 The required continuity fails at the outset. 
 L Of the origin of life, Spencer speaks only tenta- 
 tively. Rejecting the theory of the spontaneous 
 generation of organic forms, he assumes the risev 
 of organic matter out of inorganic under condP 
 tions no longer existing, and thence of 'the earliest 
 living things probably minute units of proto- 
 plasm smaller than any the microscope reveals to 
 us.'" Organic matter provides the physical basis 
 of life. Yet ' even to imagine those processes 
 going on in organic matter out of which emerges 
 the dynamic element of Life,' is, Spencer admits, 
 ' impossible.' 
 
 "With the phenomena of life in their simplest 
 cognisable forms, we have, however, a fresh start- 
 ing-point for systematic investigation. ~ x Every 
 organism presents certain vital phenomena in its 
 development and decay. The organic world as 
 a whole presents an ensemble of such phenomena. 
 In the interpretation of these we have to choose 
 
 29 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 between two possible hypotheses. 'Either the 
 multitudinous kinds of organisms which now 
 exist, and the far more multitudinous kinds which 
 have existed during past geologic ages, have 
 been from time to time separately made ; or they 
 have arisen through actions such as we see habit- 
 ually going on.' r Spencer subjects the former 
 - hypothesis, that of Special Creation, to searching 
 examination, and finds it untenable. The pheno- 
 mena of life will thus have to be interpreted 
 according to the alternative hypothesis as pheno- 
 mena of evolution. The implication is not, 
 however, that which is commonly supposed. 
 In ordinary language, the evolution-theory is 
 Described as the naturalistic theory of the origin 
 I of things, as contrasted with the Special Creation 
 v theory, which is spoken of as supernaturalistic. 
 But the evolution theory no less than the Special 
 Creation theory demands a Cause, and finds that 
 Cause inscrutable. The question merely is, ' How 
 this inscrutable Cause has worked in the produc- 
 tion of living forms.' Evolution interprets all the 
 phenomena of life at large, in all their range and 
 variety, as arising gradually, through the play of 
 natural forces and in obedience to what, symboli- 
 cally, we call natural laws. 
 
 Spencer, therefore, undertakes to exhibit the 
 30 
 
'THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY' 
 
 great general facts of organic life as illustrations 
 of the law of evolution. The phenomena of life, 
 whether we regard life in its totality or confine 
 ourselves to any one of its phases, everywhere 
 present those parallel movements towards in- * 
 creasing complexity and increasing unity which A 
 are formulated in that law. The lowest organisms 
 are the simplest, and in them there is least inter- 
 dependence among the parts which exist. Higher 
 organisms show a greater degree of multiformity 
 and a correspondingly greater degree of integra- 
 tion. In the highest organisms the greatest 
 degree of complexity in unity has been reached.'* 
 In the star-fish, for instance, we have a repetition 
 of similar parts performing similar functions and 
 having little vital interdependence. In man, we 
 have many unlike parts, specialised to perform 
 different functions, and thus, by a ' physiological 
 division of labour/ carrying on the far ampler life 
 of the organism as a whole. ^These 'leading facts 
 of organic evolution ' may further be presented in 
 deductive form. Organic matter is characterised 
 by extreme instability, and must, therefore, ' be a 
 substance which is beyond all others changeable 
 by the forces acting on it from without/ Changes 
 which originate in differentiations thus brought 
 about will go on cumulatively through the pro- 
 Si 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 cesses described as the Multiplication of Effects 
 and Segregation. 
 
 Here the question arises, What is Life ? In 
 the most generalised statement, Life may be de- 
 fined as ' the continuous adjustment of internal ' 
 relations to external relations.' * ' All vital i 
 actions, considered not separately but in their 
 ensemble, have for their final purpose the bal- 
 ancing of certain outer processes by certain inner * 
 processes. There are external forces having a 
 tendency to bring the matter of which living 
 bodies consist, into that stable equilibrium shown 
 by inorganic bodies ; there are internal forces by 
 which this tendency is constantly antagonised.' 
 Life is perfect only when the correspondence 
 between outer and inner is perfect. Life con- 
 tinues only so long as a sufficient correspondence 
 continues. When the correspondence fails, life 
 ends. Life, therefore, is a moving equilibrium, a 
 balance between the forces of an organism and 
 the forces of the environment.* This definition, it 
 must be understood, refers to phenomenal life only. 
 Beneath the phenomenal manifestations there is 
 a ' dynamic element in life ' which is indeed * its 
 essential element.' But this dynamic and essen- 
 tial quality 'the noumenal reality which is 
 revealed in the manifestations ' is unknown and 
 
 32 
 
THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY ' 
 
 unknowable/ 'Life in its essence,' Spencer goes 
 so far as to confess, dismissing in one phrase all 
 materialistic theories of it, ' cannot be conceived 
 in physico-chemical terms.' It is thus with 
 phenomenal life only that we have to deal. But 
 so far as life comes within the field of scientific 
 investigation, the definition is sufficient. 
 
 It follows that the degree of life varies with 
 the degree of correspondence. Life may be tested 
 by its amount that is, by the number, com- 
 plexity, and length of the correspondences shown 
 between inner and outer. < In a low organism, even 
 if the series of correspondences be long main- 
 tained, and life be thus preserved for a considerable 
 time, the correspondences themselves are rela- 
 tively few and simple. In higher organisms the 
 correspondences become more and more numer- 
 ous and complex. ' The highest life ' is ' that 
 which, like our own, shows great complexity in the 
 correspondences, great rapidity in the succession 
 of them, and great length in the series of them.' 
 
 Fresh light is thus thrown on the evolution of 
 life. Increase in heterogeneity throughout the 
 universe at large means increase in the hetero- 
 geneity of the environments of many organisms. 
 When the environment becomes more complex 
 the internal forces of the organism must become 
 
 c 33 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 more complex in order that the moving equili- 
 brium may be maintained. Simple conditions in 
 surroundings are easily balanced by simple re- 
 sponse on the part of the organism. But change 
 in the direction of greater intricacy on the one 
 side must be met by change in the direction of 
 increasing intricacy on the other, or the balance 
 will be brought to an end. This fact may also be 
 regarded from the opposite point of view. Every 
 increase in the heterogeneity of an organism, how- 
 ever caused, makes for increase in the hetero- 
 geneity of the surroundings. With every advance 
 in life the environment becomes larger and more 
 comprehensive. The general truth is thus dis- 
 closed that ' the superior organisms inhabit the 
 more complicated environments.' 
 
 We are thus introduced to the phenomena of 
 adaptation. While organic types are marked by 
 comparative stability, because they are the pro- 
 ducts of ' the almost infinite series of actions and 
 reactions to which ancestral organisms have been 
 exposed/ yet in the absence of a capacity for 
 modification sufficient to assure adjustment to 
 changing conditions no evolution of life would be 
 possible. Here the principle of heredity comes 
 into play ; changes set up in an organism tending 
 to reproduce themselves in succeeding genera- 
 
 34 
 
'THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY' 
 
 tions along with the more permanent character- 
 istics of the organism in which they have arisen. 
 In life at large, adaptation is brought about by 
 both Direct and Indirect Equilibration. The action 
 of the environment produces change, as in the 
 skin of a labourer's hand. Functional change, 
 within limits, produces structural change, for 
 parts increase by use, as in the muscles of a 
 blacksmith's arm, and diminish through disuse. 
 Such ' acquired characters ' being transmitted to 
 offspring, tend, where conditions favour, to become 
 permanent elements in the equilibration of a race. 
 But with this principle only to guide us the 
 larger part of the phenomena of evolving life 
 must remain unexplained. Meanwhile, a fact of 
 the profoundest importance comes into view. 
 This is the fact of variation. No two individuals " 
 of a species are ever quite alike. However the varia- 
 tions may originate which is a separate question 
 one result is clear. Such variations as assist an 
 organism or a race in maintaining or perfecting 
 equilibrium will give it an advantage in life as 
 against other organisms or races in which they 
 do not occur or in which other variations occur 
 tending to destroy or impair equilibrium. ' Those 
 individuals whose functions are most out of 
 equilibrium with the modified aggregate of ex- 
 
 35 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 ternal forces, will be those to die ; and those will 
 survive whose functions happen to be most nearly 
 in equilibrium with the modified aggregate of ex- 
 ternal forces. But this survival of the fittest im- 
 plies the multiplication of the fittest. . . . And by 
 the continual destruction of the individuals least 
 capable of maintaining their equilibria . . . there 
 must eventually be reached an altered type com- 
 pletely in equilibrium with the altered conditions.' 
 Concerning these generalisations two remarks 
 have to be made. ~ Spencer's doctrine of Indirect 
 I Equilibration, or the Survival of the Fittest, is, it 
 \ will be seen, a restatement of Darwin's doctrine 
 I of Natural Selection. As early as 1852, in his 
 essay, ' A Theory of Population,' Spencer had him- 
 self come within measurable distance of Darwin's 
 great contribution to biology. But the full signi- 
 ficance of the idea then expressed that ' among 
 human beings the survival of those who are the 
 select of their generation is a cause of develop- 
 ment' was unperceived by him until he read 
 The Origin of Species. Natural Selection was 
 then absorbed into his system as a part of the 
 universal process towards equilibrium. > 
 r In the second place it should be noted that in 
 relying upon the theory of the transmission of 
 ' acquired characters/ Spencer committed himself 
 
 36 
 
' THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY ' 
 
 to a position which, though commonly accepted 
 at the time, has since been vigorously challenged 
 by many practical scientists. Whether such 
 alleged transmission is a fact remains a question 
 dividing biologists, and upon which it would be 
 impertinent for one who is not a biologist to 
 hazard an opinion. * Spencer to the end fought 
 hard for his view; and it was natural that he 
 should have done so, since the inheritance of 
 functionally-produced characters is, as we shall 
 see, a vital principle in his philosophy. 
 
 Considered in its widest bearings, the law of 
 equilibration will be found to lead to conclusions 
 of the utmost importance. That any race may 
 continue to exist, it is necessary that its preserva- 
 tive forces shall successfully balance the forces 
 which tend to destroy it. Now the race-preserva- 
 tive forces are two: the power of each unit to 
 preserve itself, which we may call individuation ; 
 and its power to propagate other members of the 
 race, which we may call genesis. Spencer dis- 
 covered that there is a ' necessary antagonism ' 
 between these two powers that one acts at the 
 expense of the other. His law is that they vary 
 inversely. When the organism is low, there will 
 be little individual ability to contend with ex- 
 ternal dangers ; and for this inability compensa- 
 
 37 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 tion must be provided by great fertility, or the 
 race will die out. In this case a high death-rate 
 will be offset by a high birth-rate. Where a high 
 degree of organisation brings much capacity for 
 self-preservation, a correspondingly low degree of 
 fertility will suffice to maintain the race. In this 
 case a low birth-rate will be enough to balance 
 the low death-rate. He shows deductively that 
 ' ability to multiply ' must decrease ' as ability to 
 maintain individual life increases ' ; the force ex- 
 pended on individuation being taken from repro- 
 duction. Thus we reach the law of declining 
 fertility that the higher the organism, the lower 
 the race -increase. " By this law, as applied to the 
 multiplication of the human race, Spencer over- 
 threw the Malthusian doctrine that population 
 everlastingly tends to outrun its means of sup- 
 port, and that the evils of over-population are 
 inherent in the very conditions of life. The 
 movement of the human race towards more and 
 more complete equilibrium with its surroundings, 
 physical and social, thus reveals itself as a move- 
 ment towards an ideal condition in which, death- 
 rate and rate of reproduction being both reduced 
 to a minimum, the largest possible amount of life 
 may be achieved with the least possible expense 
 to the individual. 
 
 38 
 
CHAPTER IY 
 
 'THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY* 
 
 FAILURE to establish that inter-connection among 
 all classes of phenomena, which is a condition of 
 the complete unification of knowledge, is again 
 encountered when we turn from biology to 
 psychology. If we pass from the phenomena of 
 the inorganic to those of the organic world not 
 by a bridge but by a leap, it is by another leap 
 that we have to pass from the phenomena of life 
 in general to those of consciousness. The 
 thorough-going evolutionist having already as- 
 sumed the potentiality of life in matter is equally 
 compelled to assume the potentiality of mind in 
 life. However resolutely we may seek to affiliate 
 psychology upon biology, we must, therefore, start 
 on our psychological investigations from a fresh 
 point of departure. Whether even then we can 
 hope to pursue our inquiry without check or 
 break whether, for instance, we can satisfactorily 
 explain the higher faculties of man as results of 
 antecedents in lower forms of intelligence is a 
 
 39 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 question which sooner or later must be raised, 
 but cannot now be discussed. To prove such 
 unbroken sequence was of course an essential part 
 of Spencer's plan. ' From the simple reflex action 
 by which the infant sucks, up to the elaborate 
 reasoning of the adult man, the progress is by 
 daily infinitesimal steps.' By such infinitesimal 
 steps, from * the automatic actions of the lowest 
 creatures ' to ' the highest conscious actions of the 
 human race/ we must trace the development of 
 psychological phenomena in life at large. 
 
 The conception of psychology as only a special 
 part of a general science of life based upon the 
 principles of evolution, thus involves a total 
 change in point of view and method. The adult 
 human intelligence can no longer be treated as 
 isolated and unique. To understand mind, we 
 must learn how mind has evolved. The highest 
 and most complex manifestations of consciousness 
 must be explained by reference to the lower and 
 more simple, and these, again, by reference to the 
 still lower and more simple, until we have suc- 
 ceeded in tracking psychological phenomena back 
 to the point where they are undistinguishable 
 from the merely physical. 
 
 ^ Now consciousness as we know it depends 
 upon and is correlated with the nervous system. 
 
 40 
 
'THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 1 
 
 Spencer therefore opens his inquiry on the 
 physiological side, f He subjects the structure 
 and functions of the nervous system to exhaustive 
 analysis, and shows that its evolution conforms to 
 the general law of evolution, since, while in its 
 most rudimentary forms it consists of 'a few 
 threads and minute centres' and is 'very much 
 scattered/ it exhibits in development increase in 
 relative size, and in the complexity, variety, and 
 concentration of its connections.*' This done we 
 have to turn to a class of facts ' absolutely with- 
 out any perceptible or conceivable community of 
 nature' with these physical facts. The subjective 
 aspects of those phenomena which, objectively 
 viewed, are ' as purely physical as the absorption 
 of nutriment or the circulation of the blood/ have 
 now to be considered. ' The changes which, re- 
 garded as modes of the Non-ego, have been 
 expressed in terms of motion, have now, regarded 
 as modes of the Ego, to be expressed in terms of 
 feeling/ > 
 
 Physical science deals with the connection among 
 phenomena in the outer world ; biology with the 
 connection among phenomena in the organism.- 
 The business of psychology is with the connection 
 between these connections. Whatever relations 
 appear in consciousness connote relations outside ; 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 and psychology is concerned with the relations 
 between the two sets of relations. Psychological 
 phenomena thus emerge as a result of that ' con- 
 tinuous adjustment of internal relations to ex- 
 ternal relations ' in which, according to previous 
 definition, life at large has been found to consist. 
 The evolution of life, biologically considered, is 
 due to the increasing complexity of these rela- 
 tions. But it is up to a certain stage only that 
 the required adjustment can be maintained in an 
 automatic way. A point is presently reached at 
 which the complexity becomes so great that auto- 
 matic adjustment is insufficient. Here conscious- 
 ness begins to appear. The phenomena of 
 intelligence therefore present only another aspect 
 of the general phenomena of life, in that, 
 'regarded under every variety of aspect, intelli- 
 gence is found to consist in the establishment of 
 correspondences between relations in the organism 
 and relations in the environment.''" As the outer 
 relations continue to increase in number, com- 
 plexity, and heterogeneity, so the inner relations 
 must continue to increase in number, complexity, 
 and heterogeneity to keep pace with them ; and 
 psychical evolution is the result. 
 
 The various degrees and modes of intelligence 
 commonly known as instinct, memory, reason, 
 
 42 
 
' THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY ' 
 
 emotion, the will, must therefore be exhibited as 
 stages in the evolution of intelligence as thus 
 conceived. They must be explained * in terms of 
 the relation which obtains between inner and 
 outer phenomena/ 
 
 Certain fundamental truths must be recognised 
 at the outset. The evolution of mind, no less 
 than the evolution of body, is brought about by 
 the converse of the organism with its environ- 
 ment. Now the persistence of the connection 
 between states of consciousness must be propor- 
 tionate to the persistence of the connection 
 between the external agencies to which they 
 answer. Mental states tend to cohere according 
 to the degree of constancy characterising the con- 
 nections among the phenomena to which they 
 refer. It is on this principle that we explain the 
 fact that ' when any two psychical states occur in 
 immediate succession, an effect is produced, such 
 as that if the first subsequently recurs, there is a 
 certain tendency for the second to follow it/ 
 This, it will be seen, is only a fresh statement of 
 the familiar law of the Association of Ideas. "> But 
 besides being thus grounded upon the general 
 conception of the relations of consciousness and 
 environment, this law undergoes great amplifica- 
 tion when affiliated upon the doctrine of evolu- 
 
 A* 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 tion. We have now something more than a 
 theory of the association of ideas in the in- 
 dividual. The results of repeated experiences of 
 the connections among external phenomena, 
 being transmitted as modifications of nervous 
 structure from generation to generation, become 
 organised in the race. The implications of this 
 principle we shall note directly. We have first to 
 outline the broad stages of psychical evolution. 
 
 When in the lowest living creature a single 
 stimulus from the environment is followed by a 
 single responsive motion, we have what is called 
 reflex action. This is the ' rudimentary psychical 
 act, not yet differentiated from a physical act.' 
 This 'nervous shock' must be regarded as the 
 primordial unit of consciousness. Instinct is 
 reflex action in a higher phase of development. 
 It arises when, with increase in the complication 
 of the relations between organism and surround- 
 ings, 'a combined cluster of stimuli produce 
 automatically a combined cluster of motions.' 
 We have seen that the more frequently psychical 
 states occur in a certain order, the stronger 
 becomes their tendency to cohere in that order. 
 This tendency being inherited, there will ulti- 
 mately result in any given race of creatures an 
 automatic connection of nervous actions corre- 
 
 44 
 
'THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY' 
 
 spending to the external relations perpetually 
 experienced, and thus an average balance between 
 the activities of the individual creature and the 
 demands of that environment, under the influ- 
 ence of which the race to which it belongs has 
 been moulded. ;' But the correspondence of inner 
 and outer, which is thus regular enough in the 
 simpler forms of life, becomes irregular with the 
 increase of complexity on the one side and the 
 other. With advancing heterogeneity and de- 
 creasing frequency of occurrence in the groups of 
 external relations to which inner adjustments have 
 to be made, the response of organism to environ- 
 ment ceases to be automatically fixed and certain. 
 Adjustments are therefore made slowly and with 
 hesitation, and in this way conscious perception, 
 memory, and reason begin to arise. That conscious 
 perception, memory, and reason grow out of in- 
 stinct is shown by the familiar converse fact that 
 actions which at first are performed deliberately 
 and by their aid become automatic or instinctive 
 through frequent repetition ; conscious adjust- 
 ments which originate when the co-ordination 
 between inner and outer is broken pass back into 
 unconscious adjustments when it is re-established. 
 The genesis of the feelings is similarly explained 
 on the principle that when psychical changes 
 
 45 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 become too complicated to be simply automatic, 
 they become incipiently sensational. Once more, 
 the development of the will is only another 
 aspect of the same general process of evolution. 
 When through increasing complexity and im- 
 perfect coherence of relations actions are no 
 longer performed without hesitation, there results 
 antagonism among nascent motor changes. The 
 element of volition thus emerges; but it dis- 
 appears again when actions which were once 
 voluntary are so frequently repeated that they 
 become automatic. On the ground thus taken, 
 the freedom of the will, as commonly understood, 
 must be rejected as a subjective illusion. 'Will 
 is no more an existence separate from the pre- 
 dominant feeling, than a king is an existence 
 separate from the man occupying the throne.' > 
 
 Such being the basis of Spencer's evolutionary 
 psychology, his treatment of the question at issue 
 between the empiricists and the intuitionalists 
 will be foreseen/^ The empiricists assert that all 
 ideas without exception are derived from experi- 
 ence. The intuitionalists reply that certain of 
 our ideas transcend experience and are innate. > 
 Spencer offers an eirenicon in the doctrine that 
 ideas which have arisen through immense ac- 
 cumulations of experience in the race may 
 
 46 
 
'THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY' 
 
 become so completely organised as to appear as 
 intuitions in the individual. Such, he argues, is 
 the genetic history of our ideas of space and time. 
 The indissoluble mental relations constituting 
 such ideas have been formed in response to ex- 
 ternal relations which are absolutely constant and 
 universal. To these relations, therefore, all organ- 
 isms have been exposed at all instants of their 
 waking lives. The ideas of space and time, then, 
 being the outcome of an absolutely constant and 
 universal relation between the organism and the 
 environment, are consolidated into mental states, 
 the cohesion of which cannot be destroyed. In 
 the same way Spencer reaches his theory of the 
 Universal Postulate or Test of Truth. In an 
 ultimate analysis, it is contended, we accept a 
 proposition as axiomatic when its negation is in- 
 conceivable ; and the negation of a proposition is 
 inconceivable when the terms of it have been so 
 perpetually connected in universal experience as 
 to have become indissolubly welded together. 
 In thus explaining individual intuitions as con- 
 solidated results of racial experience, Spencer of 
 course rests his case upon the supposition that 
 the results of experience are transmitted in the 
 form of changes in nervous organisation. In con- 
 sidering his interpretation, we have therefore to 
 
 47 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 remember that, as I have said, this theory is still 
 under discussion. 
 
 Spencer's aim in his Psychology is to trace the 
 evolution of psychical phenomena side by side 
 with that of their physical mechanism, as two 
 aspects of one and the same process. He is, how- 
 ever, most solicitous to guard himself against the 
 charge of materialism which might therefore be 
 laid against him. As we know life only through 
 its phenomenal manifestations, so we know mind 
 only through its phenomenal manifestations ; and 
 as there is a dynamic element in life which eludes 
 all our analysis, so there is such a dynamic 
 element in mind. The 'subject' cannot be re- 
 solved into states of consciousness. It is 'the 
 unknown permanent nexus . . . which holds states 
 of consciousness together.' The Ego which con- 
 tinuously survives its changing states can only be 
 regarded as 'that portion of the Unknowable 
 Power which is statically conditioned in special 
 nervous structures pervaded by a dynamically 
 conditioned portion of the Unknowable Power 
 called Energy.' No explanation can therefore be 
 given of the connection between intelligence and 
 its mechanism. After subjection to the most 
 searching analysis, 'mind still continues to us 
 something without any kinship to other things.' 
 
'THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY' 
 
 1 Were we compelled to choose between the alter- 
 natives of translating mental phenomena into 
 physical phenomena, or of translating physical 
 phenomena into mental phenomena, the latter 
 alternative would seem . the more acceptable of 
 the two ' ; the translation of ' so-called Spirit into 
 so-called Matter ' being, indeed, ' wholly impos- 
 sible.' But Mind and Matter are only symbols of 
 an Ultimate Reality underlying both; and the 
 whole question at issue is in fact ' nothing more 
 than the question whether these symbols should 
 be expressed in terms of those or those in terms 
 of these a question scarcely worth deciding, 
 since either answer leaves us as completely out- 
 side of the reality as we were at first.' 
 
 Whatever may be made of this contention, it is 
 evident that in Spencer's psychology we are a 
 long way away from the crude materialism which 
 once taught that the brain secretes thought as the 
 liver secretes bile, and from all attempts to estab- 
 lish the identity of the physical accompaniments 
 of consciousness as we know it and consciousness 
 itself. Those who uphold the spiritualistic view 
 are well entitled to describe Spencer's concessions 
 as enormous and far-reaching. 
 
 49 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 ' THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY ' 
 
 FROM the phenomena ot life and mind as ex- 
 hibited in the individual organism, Spencer passes 
 to those even more complex phenomena which 
 are presented by aggregates of individuals living 
 in the associated state. We thus enter the field 
 of what he calls super-organic evolution. But in 
 this field we must pursue the same methods of 
 induction and deduction. The aim of Sociology, 
 or the science of society, is to establish the widest 
 possible generalisations concerning the origin, 
 growth, and significance of social structures and 
 functions, and to interpret these by reference to 
 the ultimate laws of universal evolution. 
 
 Our starting-point is the conception of the 
 organic nature of all society. This is fully 
 worked out in Spencer's theory of the Social 
 Organism. In four important ways he shows that 
 a society resembles an individual organism. In 
 the first place, it increases in mass. Secondly, 
 
 50 
 
'THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY' 
 
 while it grows, it increases continually in com- 
 plexity of structure. Thirdly, this increase of 
 complexity is accompanied by corresponding in- 
 tegration ; the parts become more and more inter- 
 dependent, till at length the life and activity of 
 each part is involved with the life and activity 
 of the rest. Finally, the life and development of 
 the whole are independent of the life and develop- 
 ment of the component units, which are born, grow, 
 give birth to other units, and die, while the body 
 politic continues to live, grow, and increase in the 
 organic completeness of its structure. Further 
 analogies are also indicated. In the social organism 
 there is a sustaining system, composed of its in- 
 dustrial agencies ; a distributing system, composed 
 of its commercial agencies; a regulative system, 
 composed of its various governmental agencies. 
 It is true that at several important points the 
 comparison fails. Societies have no specific exter- 
 nal forms ; their units are dispersed individuals, 
 while the living tissue of an individual organism 
 constitutes a continuous mass; social units are 
 capable of moving from place to place, while the 
 ultimate living elements of an individual 
 organism are usually fixed in their relative posi- 
 tions; and more fundamental than all in a 
 society all the members are endowed with feeling, 
 
 Si 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 while in the body of an animal the power of 
 feeling is limited to a specialised tissue. These 
 differences the importance of which Spencer 
 attempts with much ingenuity to minimise 
 suffice to show that, suggestive as the parallelism 
 is, it may easily become misleading. It is pro- 
 bable, indeed, that Spencer's influence has led 
 many sociologists to take too narrowly biological 
 a view of their subject. But the conception of the 
 organic nature of society is the foundation of the 
 Spencerian sociology. That it is essentially an 
 evolutionary conception is evident, since it 
 excludes ' the notion of manufacture or artificial 
 arrangement/ and asserts instead the principle of 
 ' natural development. 1 
 
 T Society, then, like the individual organism, 
 evolves; that is, it undergoes in the course of 
 development both differentiation and integra- 
 tion. In the lowest social groups, organisation 
 is at most only rudimentary. Practically homo- 
 geneous in structure for the only marked differ- 
 ences are those which accompany difference of 
 sex a savage tribe is scarcely more than a loose 
 cluster of families living together indeed, but 
 exhibiting little interdependence. Specialisation 
 has hardly begun. Like parts carry on like 
 functions. ' Every man is warrior, hunter, fisher- 
 
 52 
 
THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY ' 
 
 man, tool-maker, builder ; every woman performs 
 the same drudgeries'; while, except within the 
 family group itself, there is little indication of 
 any distinction of governing and governed. 
 Mutual dependence among these unspecialised 
 units is in fact so slight that 'every family is 
 self-sufficing, and, save for purposes of aggression 
 and defence, might as well live apart from the 
 rest/ At the other extreme, we have our enor- 
 mously complex modern societies which, in both 
 their political and their industrial systems, present 
 a vast and ever-increasing number of highly speci- 
 alised parts performing unlike functions as inter- 
 dependent elements of an organic whole. Thus 
 social progress is brought under the general law 
 of evolution. Beginning in a condition of relative 
 simplicity, social aggregates, and presently the 
 larger aggregates which arise from the compound- 
 ing and recompounding of these, develop through 
 successive differentiations and integrations in 
 heterogeneity, definiteness, and coherence. Two 
 important truths here come to light. In the 
 social, as in the individual organism, repetition 
 of similar parts denotes a relatively low stage 
 of development. In both cases, specialisation of 
 parts can arise only on condition that, for the due 
 performance of its own particular functions, each 
 
 53 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 organ shall be relieved by other organs of the 
 necessity of carrying on other functions, v 
 ~ As super- organic evolution presents the same 
 essential characteristics as organic evolution, it is 
 a natural inference that it arises from the opera- 
 tion of the same causes. Interpreting social \ 
 progress as the necessary result of the instability I 
 of the homogeneous, the multiplication of effects, 
 and segregation, Spencer is able to restate his 
 generalisations in deductive form, and to affiliate 
 his sociology upon the general body of his philo- 
 sophy. Every law of the evolutionary process 
 will thus be found illustrated on a gigantic scale 
 in the intricate phases of social change. In the 
 domain of the super-organic, therefore, as in that 
 of the organic, ' equilibration is the final result ' 
 of the ' transformations which an evolving aggre- 
 gate undergoes/ The tendency of all social 
 development, through countless rhythmical varia- 
 tions, is towards a state of moving equilibrium. 
 Each society displays this process 'in the con-| 
 tinuous adjustment of its population to its means i 
 of subsistence'; in the industrial phenomena of 
 supply and demand ; in the gradual moulding of 
 governmental institutions into more and more 
 complete harmony with the natures of the people. 
 As in the individual, so in the social organism, 
 
 54 
 
'THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY' 
 
 functional modifications are followed by modifi- 
 cations of structure. As in the one case, so in 
 the other, 'increase of heterogeneity must go on 
 while there remain any outer relations affecting 
 the organism which are unbalanced by inner 
 relations.' Each increment of heterogeneity in 
 the individual as social unit therefore implies 
 'some increase of heterogeneity in the arrange- 
 ment of the aggregate of individuals.' But the 
 perpetual interaction between the individual and 
 the aggregate must, in the course of ages, bring 
 about such corresponding modifications on the 
 one side and the other as to lead at length to 
 an approximately complete adjustment between 
 the two, * 
 
 The most important aspect of this evolutionary 
 process is the gradual shaping of the individual 
 to the requirements of the associated state. The 
 social man is the product of society. It is by the 
 prolonged and severe discipline of corporate life 
 that the aggressive egoism of primitive savagery 
 has been restrained and controlled, and the 
 altruistic nature fostered and strengthened. De- 
 veloping civilisation results from developing 
 humanity, and in turn makes for the further 
 development of humanity. > 
 
 In this making of the social man much has 
 55 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 throughout depended upon the elementary con- 
 ditions of group-life. Potential sociality pre- 
 supposed, the origin of all society is to be found 
 in the fact that association gave men an immense 
 advantage in the struggle for existence. By 
 mutual aid, alike in warlike and in peaceful 
 activities, they were able to resist enemies and 
 to provide for wants far more successfully by 
 combination than separately. The better the 
 association the greater the advantage. But co- 
 operation in its simplest form implies some 
 amount of self-denial, and with the growth of 
 co-operation, as society evolves, the necessity for 
 self-denial continues up to a certain point to 
 increase. To gain the advantage of the associated 
 state men must learn to subordinate personal 
 welfare to the welfare of the group. 
 
 ^ So important indeed does subordination become 
 that powerful agencies of coercion begin to evolve 
 as soon as group-life passes into permanent form. 
 
 [Society takes complete control of the individual 
 and proceeds to break down his crude egoism 
 and to drill him into line with its own needs. It 
 
 ; . does this by bringing to bear upon him the com- 
 
 : bined force of state-authority, with its temporal 
 punishments, of religion, with its supernatural 
 rewards and penalties, and of custom, with its 
 
 56 
 
' THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY ' 
 
 less defined but hardly less effective instruments 
 of social approval and condemnation. Of such 
 agencies, the first originates in fear of the living ( 
 ruler ; the second, in fear of the dead ancestor or j 
 chief; the third, in fear of the group. They have, 
 of course, undergone enormous transformations 
 in the process of social differentiation and inte- 
 gration. But whatever shapes they may have 
 assumed, the political, ecclesiastical, and cere- 
 monial institutions in which they have been 
 respectively embodied have always been the great 
 factors in the evolution of the social man. The 
 race has been educated by force and feary 
 
 It must not, however, be assumed that man is 
 to be permanently subjected to the tyranny of 
 such external authorities. ' Within each em- 
 bodied set of restraining agencies . . . there 
 gradually evolves a special kind of disembodied 
 control, which eventually becomes independent.' 
 Political government habituates men 'to obey 
 regulations conducive to social order ' ; there 
 presently emerges ' a consciousness that these 
 regulations have not simply an extrinsic authority 
 derived from a ruler's will, but have an intrinsic 
 authority derived from their utility ' ; the dictates 
 of the king, often arbitrary and irrational, ' grow 
 into an established system of laws, which formu- 
 
 57 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 late the needful limitations to men's actions aris- 
 ing from one another's claims ' ; and these limita- 
 tions ' men more and more recognise and conform 
 to' without any thought of regal command or 
 parliamentary enactment. ' Out of the supposed 
 wishes of the ancestral ghost, which now and 
 again developing into the traditional commands 
 of some expanded ghost of a great man, become 
 divine injunctions, arises the set of requirements 
 classed as religious ' ; little by little within these 
 ' there evolve the rules we distinguish as moral ' ; 
 such rules, at first obeyed only because of their 
 supposedly sacred origin, come ultimately to be 
 regarded as imperative because of ' their observed 
 utility in controlling certain parts of human 
 conduct . . . not controlled, or little controlled, 
 by civil law.' Similarly with the ceremonial 
 code.> ' From observances which, in their primi- 
 tive forms, express partly subordination to a 
 superior and partly attachment to him, and 
 which, spreading downwards, become general 
 forms of behaviour, there finally come observ- 
 ances expressing a proper regard for the indi- 
 vidualities of other persons, and a true sympathy 
 in their welfare.' Social evolution in its higher 
 stages, therefore, means the gradual liberation of 
 men from all forms of control by external autho- 
 
 58 
 
1 THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY ' 
 
 rity. But this can be achieved only in pro- 
 portion as the discipline of external authority 
 having done its work men may safely be left to 
 be a law unto themselves. 
 
 A further fact of great importance has now 
 to be recognised. From pressure of population 
 and other causes has arisen an almost incessant 
 struggle for existence among social groups. This 
 struggle has throughout been the main factor in 
 the compounding and recompounding of such 
 groups into larger and larger aggregates and in 
 social consolidation. War, therefore, has every- 
 where played an enormous part in social evolution, 
 for it is mainly by war that great communities 
 have been formed and their structures developed. 
 But in proportion as social integration advances, 
 war necessarily declines. As an agent of progress 
 it is in fact self-destructive. By the formation 
 of larger and larger organic masses it brings 
 about industrial co-operation over wider and 
 wider areas. We may therefore anticipate a 
 time far distant though it may be when the 
 struggle for existence among civilised nations 
 themselves interdependent parts of a vast 
 industrial community will entirely disappear. 
 'As, when small tribes were welded into great 
 tribes, the head-chief stopped intertribal war- 
 
 59 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 fare ; as, when small feudal governments became 
 subject to a king, feudal wars were prevented by 
 him; so, in time to come, a federation of the 
 highest nations, exercising supreme authority 
 (already foreshadowed by occasional agreements 
 among " the Powers ") may, by forbidding wars 
 between any of its constituent nations, put an 
 end to the rebarbarisation which is continually 
 undoing civilisation.' 
 
 The results, in the internal life of society, of 
 this world-movement from militarism to indus- 
 trialism must also be noted. Social structures 
 depend on social needs and activities. With the 
 decline of the struggle for existence and the 
 growth of mutual aid among nations, political 
 organisations therefore pass out of forms appro- 
 priate to a state of almost chronic warfare to 
 forms appropriate to a state of well-established 
 peace. Great prominence is given in the Spen- 
 cerian sociology to the contrast between the 
 militant and the industrial types of society. It 
 is true, indeed, that during social evolution there 
 has * habitually been a mingling of the two,' and 
 that no civilised nation has yet advanced beyond 
 the transitional stage. Yet ' it is possible to 
 trace with due clearness those opposite characters 
 which distinguish them in their respective corn- 
 do 
 
< THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY ' 
 
 plete developments.' While the struggle for 
 existence continues, the first concern of the state 
 is its own preservation. Everything else is made 
 secondary to that. Hence, in the militant type 
 of society, the individual is owned by the state ; 
 corporate action is secured by despotic centralised 
 control ; life is ordered on the principles of regi- 
 mentation; and government pursues the citizen 
 into the details of his private interests and 
 enterprises. But when the struggle for exist- 
 ence subsides, and the state is no longer jeopar- 
 dised from without, all need, and therefore all 
 ethical warrant, for the coercion of the individual 
 by the state necessarily lapse. Hence in the 
 industrial type of society ' the citizen's indi- 
 viduality ' emerges as the primary consideration ; 
 the protection of this becomes ' the society's 
 essential duty ' ; despotic centralised control and 
 all the elaborate machinery of regimentation 
 disappear ; the range of governmental activity 
 shrinks to the task of maintaining ' the con- 
 ditions requisite for the highest individual life ' ; 
 and the state ceases to interfere with the citizen's 
 private concerns. The inference is obvious. The 
 evolution of society from the regime of enforced 
 co-operation resulting from militarism, to the 
 regime of voluntary co-operation resulting from 
 
 61 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 industrialism, is necessarily attended by the re- 
 duction of state control to the minimum required 
 for the purposes of co-operative life, and the 
 expansion of individual liberty to the maximum 
 possible in the associated state. Following the 
 lines of social evolution, Spencer thus reaches 
 that principle of individualism which, clearly 
 enunciated in his very first essay the Letters on 
 the Proper Sphere of Government remained 
 throughout the central thesis of all his political 
 teaching. Any movement towards the enlarge- 
 ment of the power of the state, and therefore all 
 forms of socialism, are thus condemned by him 
 as retrograde efforts to revive in industrial com- 
 munities a form of social organisation fitted only 
 to the regime of militarism. This doctrine is 
 further reinforced by the principle of specialisa- 
 tion. The true function of government is the 
 maintenance of equitable relations among citizens; 
 and as it fits itself more and more completely 
 for the due performance of this, it becomes of 
 necessity correspondingly unfit for anything else. 
 Moreover, Spencer finds his analogy between the 
 social and individual organisms fall into line 
 with his argument precisely at the point where 
 it most conspicuously breaks down. For the 
 individual organism has a corporate conscious- 
 
 62 
 
' THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 ness, while in the social organism consciousness 
 exists only in the individual members. In a 
 community, therefore, ' the corporate life must 
 . . . be subservient to the lives of the parts, 
 instead of the lives of the parts being subservient 
 to the corporate life.' The individual does not 
 exist for the state. The state exists for the 
 individual" 7 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 4 THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS* 
 
 THE science of ethics, according to Spencer, has for 
 its subject-matter those ' last stages in the evolu- 
 tion of conduct ' which are ' displayed by the 
 highest type of being, when he is forced, by increase 
 of numbers, to live more and more in presence of 
 his fellows.' Conduct at large is distinguished as 
 the adjustment of acts to ends, and the evolution 
 of conduct is seen to conform to the general law 
 of evolution, since, as we ascend the scale of life, 
 we find increase at once of heterogeneity and of 
 definiteness in such adjustments. These adjust- 
 ments may be contemplated under a threefold 
 aspect. There are, first, those which subserve indi- 
 vidual life. There are, secondly, those which sub- 
 serve the life of the species. These two kinds of 
 conduct, which are throughout interdependent 
 and therefore evolve together, comprise all the 
 adjustments that are called for in the case of 
 
' THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ' 
 
 non-gregarious creatures. But the moment we 
 pass from creatures leading solitary to those 
 leading associated lives, a third set of adjustments 
 is required those which subserve the life of the 
 group. With the evolution of the associated 
 state these often become of pre-eminent import- 
 ance. But those adjustments which make for the 
 life of the individual and for the life f the race 
 are, in the vast majority of cases, more success- 
 fully made in the associated state than in the 
 solitary state. Co-operation brings with it the 
 opportunity of a fuller life for all the units. 
 ' Living together arose because, on the average, it 
 proved more advantageous to each than living 
 apart ; and this implies that maintenance of com- 
 bination is maintenance of the conditions to more 
 satisfactory living than the combined persons 
 would otherwise have.' 
 
 < An important truth is thus brought to light. 
 The evolution of conduct the more and more 
 complete adaptation of means to more and more 
 varied ends has clearly tended from the first 
 to increasing fulness of life. Adopting for the 
 moment the language of teleology, we may there- 
 fore say that increasing fulness of life is the ' end ' 
 of evolution. 7 This is an induction from the 
 phenomena of evolving life. We may now trans- 
 E 65 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 late the conclusion reached into the vocabulary ot 
 ethical judgment. Conduct which is relatively 
 highly evolved is what we call good conduct. 
 Conduct which we describe as good 'rises to 
 conduct we conceive as best' when it 'simul- 
 taneously achieves the greatest totality of 
 life in self, in offspring, and in fellow men.' 
 Otherwise phrased, the ' highest conduct is that 
 which conduces to the greatest length, breadth, 
 and completeness of life.' 
 
 A principle of the profoundest moral signifi- 
 cance is thus introduced. / Following the evolu- 
 tion of life from stage to stage, we find that 
 conduct is adjusted less and less to immediate 
 and personal ends merely, and more and more to 
 ends that are remote and impersonal. This means " 
 that in the evolution of life the impulses of the 
 moment are more and more overruled by impulses 
 of wider derivation. In cases of conflict, this 
 implies subordination of the claims of the present 
 to those of the future in the conduct of the indi- 
 vidual acting in the interests of self ; subordination 
 of self for the welfare of the species ; subordina- 
 tion of the unit for the preservation of the group. 
 The conclusion is that, speaking generally, life is 
 made fuller and richer the ' end ' of conduct is 
 more perfectly attained when the earlier-evolved 
 
 66 
 
'THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS' 
 
 and therefore lower impulses are governed by 
 those that are later- evolved and therefore higher. 
 The 'end' is not fulness of individual life, but 
 fulness of life at large. 
 
 If, however, fulness of life is to be postulated 
 not only as the ' end ' of evolution but also as a 
 desirable end if, in other words, we may properly 
 consider it as our duty to co-operate with the 
 processes which make towards it the assump- 
 tion is clearly required that life as a whole 
 brings with it more pleasure than pain. We 
 are therefore committed to Hedonism. ' There 
 is no escape from the admission that in calling 
 good the conduct which subserves life, and 
 bad the conduct which hinders or destroys it, 
 we are inevitably asserting that conduct is good 
 or bad as its total effects are pleasurable or 
 painful.' 
 
 In this way Spencer joins hand with those 
 who assert that virtue is not an end in itself but 
 the means to an end, and who hold, as Mill put 
 it, ' that actions are right in proportion as they 
 tend to promote happiness ; wrong, as they tend 
 to produce the reverse of happiness/ In regard to 
 the first of the two great questions with which 
 ethical theory is specially concerned that of the 
 ultimate standard of conduct he thus adopts the 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 utilitarian point of view. In common with the 
 utilitarians in general, he therefore falls into 
 several serious mistakes. Neglecting the element 
 of character and motive, he treats ethics as con- 
 cerned only with 'conduct considered objectively 
 as producing good or bad results/ He fails to 
 grasp the fundamental difference in quality be- 
 tween different kinds of happiness, and to see 
 that, as pleasure varies with character, it can be 
 properly evaluated only when character is taken 
 into account. He quite overlooks the enormously 
 important problem of the reaction of action on 
 character. And he distinctly enunciates the 
 principle that the extent to which any concomi- 
 tant of pain enters anywhere into the consequences 
 of an action is the measure of the extent to which 
 it fails to reach the standard of the absolutely 
 right a view which leads him into some extra- 
 ordinary vagaries of reasoning. Yet he breaks at 
 one most important point with the crude expedi- 
 ency-morality of the older utilitarian schools. 
 These had not advanced beyond the empirical 
 stage of ethical inquiry. They had rested in 
 generalisations, and had therefore in their inter- 
 pretation of conduct got no further than the 
 direct estimation of results. Spencer, as we 
 have already seen, maintained that in every 
 
 68 
 
' THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ' 
 
 science the work of induction has to be completed 
 by deduction. In his view there could thus be 
 no real science of ethics until the principles of 
 conduct had been translated from truths of the 
 empirical into truths of the rational order. ' I 
 conceive it to be the business of moral science,' he 
 wrote to Mill, ' to deduce from the laws of life and 
 the conditions of existence what kinds of conduct 
 necessarily tend to produce happiness and what 
 kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done 
 this/ he significantly adds, ' its deductions are to be 
 recognised as laws of conduct, and are to be con- 
 formed to, irrespective of a direct estimation of 
 happiness or misery/ This marks an immense 
 advance upon the older Hedonistic position. 
 Spencer's attempt to reconstruct naturalistic 
 ethics upon a deductive basis is undoubtedly to 
 be regarded as his most important contribution 
 to moral theory. He demurred, indeed, and 
 rightly, when Mill classed him among the anti- 
 utilitarians. Yet his ethical system manifestly 
 rests on foundations widely different from those 
 of expediency, since, while recognising happiness 
 as the ultimate end of conduct, he detached the 
 principles of right living from all consideration of 
 happiness as its proximate end. Though accept- 
 ing the Hedonistic criterion, he was thus able, to 
 
 69 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 the great advantage to his system, to reject 
 entirely the Hedonistic calculus. > 
 
 To the other great question of ethical theory 
 that of the faculty within us which answers to 
 the distinction between right and wrong Spencer 
 of course replies in terms of his evolutionary psy- 
 chology. He interprets the genesis of the moral 
 sense as he has already interpreted that of our 
 ideas of space and time. Our * moral intuitions 
 are the results of accumulated experiences of 
 utility, gradually . . . organised and consolidated 
 through all past generations of the human race. 
 These experiences, it is argued, 'have been 
 producing corresponding nervous modifications 
 which, by continued transmission and accumula- 
 tion, have become in us certain faculties of moral 
 intuition certain emotions responding to right 
 and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis 
 in the individual experiences of utility,' and have 
 indeed become in the modern civilised adult 
 ' quite independent of conscious experience/ < In 
 this way he once more enters the field as mediator 
 between the empiricists and the intuitionalists. 
 As his account of the genesis and growth of con- 
 science must, in any event, stand or fall with the 
 theory of the transmissibility of acquired char- 
 acters, it is evident that for the present it remains 
 
 70 
 
' THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ' 
 
 in the domain of hypothesis. But even if we 
 grant the foundation of his argument, it is still 
 open to question whether the proposed interpre- 
 tation is not more ingenious than convincing, and 
 whether any doctrine which rests on the mere 
 consolidation of the results of the experiences of 
 utility in the race will satisfy us as an adequate 
 explanation of the authoritativeness of conscience 
 and its emphatic report of the difference between 
 the expedient and the right,* At the same time, 
 Spencer's system gains much because, so far as 
 the individual is concerned, he is able to yield so 
 much to intuitivism. 
 
 <^As the end of conduct is complete living, and 
 as this end can be achieved only when all activi- 
 ties, as they subserve the life of individual, of 
 species, and of group, are duly harmonised, it is 
 necessary to define the conditions pre-requisite to 
 complete living, and to define them in such a way 
 as to take account of all the activities involved. 
 This is done in the formula of absolute justice 
 that ' every man is free to do that which he wills, 
 provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any 
 other man/ Each individual is thus conceived as 
 having a right to carry on all the activities which 
 conduce to his own life and to that of his offspring 
 unimpeded save by the collateral exercise of the 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 same right by his fellows. This ' law of equal free- 
 dom ' is to be regarded on a priori and a pos- 
 teriori grounds, as the ' ultimate ethical principle, 1 
 having 'an authority transcending every other.' 
 It is thus ' the supreme moral law.' This law will 
 indeed be qualified among individuals by the 
 exercise of beneficence, for life cannot reach its 
 highest until altruism has free play, and the 
 ' requirements of equity ' are ' supplemented by the 
 promptings of kindness ' and ' spontaneous efforts' 
 on the part of each ' to further the welfare of 
 others.' Reciprocal aid among individuals is 
 thus given a large place in the development of 
 the cornpletest living. But the exercise of benefi- 
 cence must always remain a private function. 
 The function of the state is limited to the enforce- 
 ment of the primary law of social co-operation 
 the law of justice. Its one business, as we have 
 already said, is the maintenance of equitable 
 relations among the members of a community. 
 It can exercise beneficence only by infringing 
 upon the rights of the individual and thus break- 
 ing the very law it exists to secure. The bearings 
 of this doctrine upon the problem of the functions 
 of the state and the limits of legislation will be 
 obvious. Spencer again reaches the principle of 
 individualism. ' 
 
 72 
 
' THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ' 
 
 <That moral evolution is necessarily bound up 
 with social evolution is an inference which we 
 cannot fail to draw. We have shown that social 
 evolution has throughout been a process towards 
 ever-increasing solidarity (or the production of 
 larger and larger organic wholes made up of 
 interdependent parts), the decline of the struggle 
 for existence between group and group, and the 
 corresponding extension of industrial co-operation 
 over ever- widening areas. Now, moral ideals and 
 sentiments arise in response to demands, and 
 moral sanction is stage by stage given to the 
 kinds of activity called for by the average require- 
 ments of life. It is clear, therefore, that the 
 gradual evolution of the conditions of complete 
 living must be entirely contingent upon a gradual 
 change in society from the military to the indus- 
 trial regime. So long as the struggle for existence 
 continues between group and group, the right of 
 the individual to the unimpeded exercise of his 
 own activity must, as we have said, inevitably be 
 over-ridden by the claims of the group ; while the 
 spirit of antagonism kept alive by the struggle 
 must hinder the growth of sympathetic feelings 
 even within the group itself. Moral evolution 
 therefore depends upon the decline of warlike 
 activities and the concurrent reconstruction of 
 
 73 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 society on an industrial and completely peaceful 
 basis. Only thus can the rule of absolute justice 
 be established and the exercise of beneficence 
 become general. 
 
 We are thus brought round again to the pheno- 
 mena of adaptation. Moral evolution, like bio- 
 logical and psychological evolution, is the result 
 of the converse of the organism with its environ- 
 ment; the environment in this case being the 
 whole evolving fabric of society and civilisation. 
 Moral evolution is therefore only a phase of the 
 universal tendency towards equilibration. ' The 
 highest type of living being, no less than all lower 
 types, must go on moulding itself to those require- 
 ments which circumstances impose.' How long will 
 this process of equilibration continue ? Spencer 
 replies that ' the adaptation of man's nature to the 
 conditions of his existence cannot cease until the 
 internal forces we know as feelings are in equili- 
 brium with the external forces they encounter ' ; 
 until, in other words, ' a state of human nature 
 and social organisation ' is reached { such that the 
 individual has no desires but those which may be 
 satisfied without exceeding his proper sphere of 
 action, while society maintains no restraints but 
 those which the individual voluntarily respects/ 
 That sense of obligation which we distinguish as 
 
THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS' 
 
 moral is a late product of evolving social life. The 
 earlier forms of coercion and restraint are, as we 
 have seen, those created by fear of outer authority 
 of the gods, of political rulers, of society. Out 
 of these slowly emerges the moral form of coercion 
 and restraint, which is that inner compulsion 
 or inhibition which follows upon the realisation 
 of the intrinsic character of actions and their 
 necessary bearings upon life. Yet this sense of 
 moral obligation is itself only a stage in the higher 
 evolution of man. The equilibration between the 
 individual and the conditions of the associated 
 state must continue until moral conduct becomes 
 purely natural and instinctive, and all sense of 
 compulsion and restraint, even that which arises 
 from within, altogether disappears. Spencer thus 
 anticipates a final balance ('complete* in his 
 earlier view, ' approximately complete/ according 
 to his later and more tempered statement) be- 
 tween men's natures and the highest possible 
 form of the associated life. This is presented as 
 the evolutionary millennium. The vision may 
 seem attractive. Yet on the other hand it may 
 surely be urged that a world without moral effort, 
 and therefore without moral enthusiasm, would 
 after all be a consummation hardly to be wished^* 
 
 75 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 ON THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION 
 
 WE have seen that, while asserting an Absolute 
 Reality behind appearance as the ultimate fact of 
 facts, Spencer held that this Reality ' transcends 
 not only human knowledge but human conception/ 
 The Power manifested in the phenomenal universe 
 being itself inscrutable, philosophy must rest con- 
 tent with the study of its manifestations. All 
 questions of the theologico-metaphysical class are j 
 thus relegated to the category of the Unknowable, j > 
 But religion is practically universal. It has at all 
 times filled an immense place in human life. It 
 has everywhere played an enormous part in the 
 development of civilisation. It has, therefore, to 
 be investigated as a social phenomenon. '"We are 
 thus committed to an inquiry into its origin and 
 evolution. This will lead in turn to some con- 
 sideration of its probable changes in the future. 
 
 The religious consciousness is concerned with 
 that which lies beyond the sphere of sense What 
 
 76 
 
ON THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION 
 
 suggests the thought of agencies transcending 
 human perception ? How does the supernatural 
 evolve out of the natural ? 
 
 <C Spencer regards ancestor- worship as the ulti- 
 mate root of all religious ideas and ceremonies. 
 Such ancestor- worship is explained by the Ghost- 
 theory. The savage dreams. What he dreams is 
 to him as real as his waking experience. Thus 
 arises the conception of another world the spirit 
 world. If he dreams of his dead father, he accepts 
 the dream image as his father's double or ghost. 
 The other self which wanders away in dreams and 
 returns to the body, and which becomes visible 
 in shadow and reflection, is conceived as leaving 
 the body permanently in death, yet surviving in 
 a fainter, though still material, form. Hence 
 arises the conception of an after-life. But such 
 after-life is, of course, the counterpart of this life. 
 The double carries with it into the shadow- world 
 its earthly appetites, desires, passions. The rela- 
 tions of the son to the living father are main- 
 tained, after the father's death, with his ghost. 
 The dead man will need food and companionship. 
 Flesh, bread, and wine are laid upon his grave, 
 and there his horse and dog, sometimes his 
 slaves, occasionally his wife, are slain, that their 
 spirits may accompany his own. Sacrifices thus 
 
 77 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 originate which are continued with the further 
 object of pleasing and propitiating the dead man, 
 and of making him friendly to the living. The 
 grave, as the spot which the double is most likely 
 to haunt, becomes a place of special resort and 
 veneration. It assumes a sacred character. For 
 purposes of identification it is at first marked by 
 stakes or stones. As wealth and skill increase, it 
 is walled in and covered for better protection. 
 The grave grows into a shrine ; the shrine into a 
 temple. Hither the living repair to minister by 
 oblations to the dead man's needs or desires, to 
 gratify him by reciting or chanting his praises, to 
 petition him for help. Here we have the begin- 
 nings of religious worship and ritual. As a natural 
 result of the influence of memory and lengthening 
 tradition, the ghost undergoes continual expan- 
 sion, and little by little becomes endowed with 
 distinctly superhuman characteristics. Differences 
 in rank and power presently arise as the inevitable 
 consequence of such differences among living men. 
 The ghost of the strong man, or head of the tribe, 
 becomes the chief of the tribal ghosts and the 
 object of general tribal worship, With the com- 
 pounding and recompounding of social groups 
 effected by war changes in the ghost-world 
 following changes in society the gradations be- 
 
 78 ' 
 
ON THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION 
 
 come more numerous and more regular. In course 
 of time, while the ghosts of ordinary ancestors 
 remain gods, the ghosts of mighty conquerors and 
 rulers grow into gods-in-chief. Mythologies and 
 pantheons are thus consolidated. Finally, with 
 the further progress of moral and intellectual 
 evolution, the national god-in-chief becomes the 
 one universal God. The cult of apotheosised 
 ancestors gives birth to polytheism. Then when 
 the scattered supernatural powers are merged in 
 one supreme power, monotheism arises. Yet this 
 monotheism bears traces of its origin in its sub- 
 stantially anthropomorphic character. 
 
 The theory is ingenious, and it has an attractive 
 simplicity. But it is extremely doubtful whether, 
 despite the imposing array of facts which Spencer 
 marshals in its support, it is really borne out by 
 such evidence as is available of the first stages of 
 religious thought among primitive peoples. Our 
 present business, however, is not to discuss, but 
 merely to outline it. Starting with this interpreta- 
 tion of the genesis of religious ideas, Spencer pro- 
 ceeds to show that the whole tendency of thought 
 during the higher stages of culture and civilisation 
 is towards what Fiske called deanthropomorphisa- 
 tion. This is due in part to moral and in part to 
 intellectual development. When monotheism has 
 
 79 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 been reached, the conception of the one supreme 
 God is gradually purged of manlike attributes. 
 The grosser attributes the more glaring moral 
 imperfections are, of course, the first to disappear. 
 In the moral progress of the race men cannot con- 
 tinue to ascribe to Deity qualities which have 
 become odious in humanity. This moralisation of 
 the idea of God is largely dependent upon the 
 gradual transition of society from a condition of 
 chronic warfare to one of well-established peace. 
 'Ascribed characters of deities are continually 
 adapted and readapted to the needs of the social 
 state. During the militant phase of activity the 
 chief god is conceived as holding insubordination 
 as the greatest crime, as implacable in anger, as 
 merciless in punishment; and any alleged attri- 
 butes of milder kinds occupy but small space in 
 the social consciousness. But when militancy 
 declines and the harsh despotic form of govern- 
 ment appropriate to it is gradually qualified by the 
 form appropriate to industrialism, the foreground 
 of the religious consciousness is increasingly filled 
 with those ascribed traits of the divine nature 
 which are congruous with the ethics of peace; 
 divine love, divine mercy, divine forgiveness are 
 now the characteristics enlarged upon/ Yet in- 
 tellectual progress entails the elimination of even 
 
 80 
 
ON THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION 
 
 these higher attributes, since it necessarily forces 
 upon men a more and more distinct realisation of 
 the impossibility of thinking of the Power every- 
 where revealed in the universe in any terms 
 derived from human thought and feeling. Here- 
 after, then, men will gradually drop ' the higher 
 anthropomorphic characters from the First Cause, 
 as they have long since dropped the lower.' What 
 will be the result? 'The conception which has 
 been enlarging from the beginning must go on 
 enlarging, until, by disappearance of its limits, it 
 becomes a consciousness which transcends the 
 forms of thought, though it for ever remains a 
 consciousness.' 
 
 Spencer thus traces the growth of religious 
 ideas from that crudest anthropomorphism, in 
 which they are alleged to have originated, to that 
 final stage where all definite conceptions vanish 
 and nothing is left beyond an indefinite though 
 inexpugnable sense of Creative Power 'an 
 Infinite and Eternal Energy, from which all 
 things proceed.' But here we are confronted by 
 a difficulty. If this account of the transformation 
 of religious ideas be accepted, have we not also 
 to accept the conclusion which seems to be in- 
 volved in it that philosophical agnosticism, 
 which expresses our right attitude towards the 
 
 F 81 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 mystery of the universe, is only the last term in 
 the development of thought out of a conception 
 which was utterly untrue? We begin with the 
 savage's baseless belief in the material double of 
 his dead ancestor. Out of this, by the process 
 of gradual expansion and dematerialisation, arises 
 the general idea of supernatural agencies. By 
 the continuation of the same process, some of the 
 original human attributes being dropped while 
 others are transfigured, the conception of Deity 
 is attained. Then, deanthropomorphisation being 
 carried to its utmost limits, the ultimate form of 
 religious consciousness is reached. The objection, 
 then, may clearly be urged that if this ultimate 
 form of religious consciousness is to be interpreted 
 as emerging out of primitive superstition, it, too, 
 must be condemned as merely a refinement of 
 superstition. ' ' Surely if the primitive belief was 
 absolutely false, all derived beliefs must be 
 I absolutely false.' " 
 
 Admitting that the objection looks fatal, 
 Spencer replies that it is not really so because 
 its premiss is not valid. The primitive belief was 
 not absolutely false. It contained an element of 
 truth ' the truth, namely, that the Power which 
 manifests itself in consciousness is but a differ- 
 ently-conditioned form of the Power which mani- 
 
 82 
 
ON THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION 
 
 fests itself beyond consciousness.' In every 
 voluntary act the primitive man recognises 'a 
 source of energy within him/ He inevitably 
 ascribes all changes in the world about him to 
 the same kind of energy. At first he conceives 
 this energy as exercised in precisely the same way 
 as his own ' as put forth by beings like himself.' 
 With the development of thought the purely 
 human connotations and associations gradually 
 fall away, and the idea of objective force is more 
 and more differentiated from the idea of force as 
 known in consciousness. Yet even the man of 
 science, in whom this differentiation is most com- 
 plete, 'is compelled to symbolise objective force 
 in terms of subjective force from lack of any 
 other symbol.' The implications are important. 
 'That internal energy which in the experiences 
 of the primitive man was always the immediate 
 antecedent of the changes wrought by him that 
 energy which, when interpreting external changes, 
 he thought of along with those attributes of a 
 human personality connected with it in himself; 
 is the same energy which, freed from anthropo- 
 morphic accompaniments, is now figured as the 
 cause of all external phenomena. The last stage 
 reached is recognition of the truth that force as 
 it exists beyond consciousness, cannot be like 
 
 83 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 what we know as force within consciousness ; and 
 that yet, as either is capable of generating the 
 other, they must be different modes of the same. 
 Consequently, the final outcome of that specula- 
 tion commenced by the primitive man, is that 
 the Power manifested throughout the universe 
 distinguished as material, is the same Power 
 which in ourselves wells up under the form of 
 consciousness/ Thus * the final form of religious 
 consciousness ' is the ultimate product, not of a 
 belief which was wholly false, but ' of a conscious- 
 ness which at the outset contained a germ of 
 truth obscured by multitudinous errors.' In the 
 continued development of thought the errors 
 have been slowly eliminated and the underlying 
 truth disengaged. 
 
 r From this point we advance naturally to 
 Spencer's heroic attempt to reconcile religion and 
 science. We have already seen that the ultimate 
 truth of science is the persistence of force, and 
 that by persistence of force we really mean ' the 
 persistence of some Cause which transcends our 
 knowledge and conception.' We now learn that 
 the ultimate truth of religion is the existence of 
 such an inscrutable Power. Science finds incom- 
 prehensible energy behind all the phenomena 
 which it investigates. This consciousness of an 
 
 84 
 
ON THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION 
 
 incomprehensible energy, 'called Omnipresent 
 from inability to assign its limits/ is ' just that 
 consciousness in which religion dwells.' Science 
 everywhere leads to the mystery in which religion 
 begins. The Persistent Force of the one is the 
 Eternal God of the other. ' Here, then, is a truth 
 in which religions in general agree with one 
 another, and with a philosophy antagonistic to 
 their special dogmas. If Religion and Science 
 are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation 
 must be this deepest, widest, and most certain of 
 all facts that the Power which the universe 
 manifests to us is inscrutable.' 
 ~~ To the vast majority of men it will certainly 
 appear that this reconciliation is effected only by 
 the sacrifice of everything they are accustomed 
 to consider as specifically and positively religious. 
 They will, moreover, regret that Spencer did not 
 push his argument, as he might naturally have 
 done, beyond the purely negative position in 
 which he rests. As it is, religious thought and 
 sentiment are reduced by him, as Sidgwick put it, 
 'to a perfectly indefinite consciousness of the 
 Unknowable, and the emotion that accompanies 
 this peculiar intellectual exercise.' That he was 
 himself fully satisfied with this conclusion, and 
 was rarely troubled by any sense of our common 
 
 85 
 
HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 human need for religious hope and consolation, 
 is probably to be explained by reference less to 
 his philosophy than to his temperament. He 
 was well aware that * in the genesis of a system 
 of thought the emotional nature is a large factor ; 
 perhaps as large a factor as the intellectual 
 nature/ Because his own nature was deficient on 
 the emotional side, he was able to accept the agnosti- 
 cism to which, as it seemed to him, his reasoning 
 committed him, without any recoil of feeling 
 against the unbroken darkness in which it left 
 the universe enshrouded. He realised indeed 
 that ' an immense majority ' will resent, ' with more 
 or less of indignation/ his proposed substitution of 
 ' an unthinkable abstraction ' for ' a Being towards 
 whom we may entertain definite feelings/ He 
 further admitted, not only that current religious 
 conceptions 'are indispensable as transitional 
 modes of thought/ but also that in all probability 
 'under their most abstract forms, ideas of this 
 order will always continue to occupy the back- 
 ground of consciousness. Very likely there will 
 ever remain a need to give shape to that indefinite 
 sense of an Ultimate Existence, which forms the 
 basis of our intelligence. We shall always be 
 under the necessity of contemplating it as some 
 mode of being ; that is of representing it to our- 
 
 86 
 
ON THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION 
 
 selves in some form of thought, however vague. 
 And we shall not err in doing this so long as we 
 treat every notion we thus frame as merely a 
 symbol.' Science rolls back the problem of the 
 universe, but it does not solve it. A sphere of 
 consciousness will thus always remain which 
 'rational interpretation' will never serve to 
 occupy ; and as this sphere ' can never become 
 an unfilled sphere ' as men will never outgrow 
 their sense of the final mystery of things and 
 their desire to penetrate it religion can never 
 be destroyed. Yet the religious progress of the 
 race hereafter, as Spencer forecasts it, can be 
 scarcely more than a series of lutile endeavours 
 after transcendental truth, in which the mind of 
 man, repeatedly baffled, will again and again be 
 driven to take refuge in agnosticism. ' By con- 
 tinually seeking to know and being continually 
 thrown back into a deepened conviction of the 
 impossibility of knowing, we may keep alive our 
 consciousness that it is alike our highest wisdom 
 and our highest duty to regard that through 
 which all things exist as Unknowable.' 
 
CHIEF DATES AND AUTHORITIES 
 
 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 
 
 1820. Herbert Spencer born, April 27. 
 1837. Begins work as Civil Engineer. 
 
 1842. Publication of Letters on the Proper Sphere of Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 1848. Becomes sub-editor of The Economist. 
 1850. Publication of Social Statics. 
 1850. The System of Synthetic Philosophy projected. 
 1860. First Principles commenced. 
 1862. Publication of First Principles. 
 1882. Visit to America. 
 1896. Completion of the Synthetic Philosophy, 
 1898. Settles at 5 Percival Terrace, Brighton. 
 1903. Death, December 8. 
 
 BRIEF LIST OF ENGLISH BOOKS DEALING WITH 
 SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY 
 
 COLLINS, F. H., An Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy. 
 
 1901. A digest of the system, published with Spencer's 
 
 authority. 
 DUNCAN, D., The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer. 1908. 
 
 The authoritative biography written at Spencer's request. 
 
 It contains (pp. 533-576) a most important essay on ' The 
 
 Filiation of Ideas,' left by Spencer for publication in this 
 
 volume. This gives the history of his theories and a 
 
 * sketch plan ' of his philosophy. 
 88 
 
CHIEF DATES AND AUTHORITIES 
 
 FISKE, J., Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, based on the 
 
 Doctrine of Evolution. 2 vols. 1874. An elaborate 
 
 presentation of evolutionary philosophy, founded on 
 
 Spencer's principles. 
 HUDSON, W. H., An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
 
 Herbert Spencer. 1904. Expository and popular. 
 MACPHERSON, H., Herbert Spencer: The Man and his Work. 
 
 1904. Expository and popular. 
 ROTCE, J., Herbert Spencer: An Estimate and a Review. 
 
 1904. A brief, critical examination of Spencer's leading 
 
 ideas. Appended is a chapter of personal reminiscences 
 
 by J. Collier. 
 SIDGWICK, H., Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr. 
 
 Herbert Spencer, and J. Martineau. 1902. 
 SIDGWICK, H., The Philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer (in 
 
 The Philosophy of Kant and other Lectures). 1905. 
 SORLET, "W. R, The Ethics of Naturalism. 1904. 
 
 The above three works contain much valuable 
 
 criticism. 
 SPENCER, H., An Autobiography. 2 vols. 1904. Invaluable 
 
 as an intellectual record, and for the light which it 
 
 throws upon the evolution of Spencer's thought. 
 THOMSON, J. A., Herbert Spencer (in * English Men of Science '). 
 
 1906. Particularly valuable for its critical estimate of 
 
 Spencer's work as a biologist. 
 
 Printed in Great Britain by 
 
 T. and A. CONSTABLE, Printers to Hia Majesty 
 
 at the University Press, Edinburgh 
 
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