E 
 
 384 
 
 .3 
 
 W4 
 
 MAIN 
 
 I 
 
 NOT A COMPACT 
 
 by Damd Webster, in the Untied Stales Senate, 16th February, 1833. 
 
 le 21st of January, 1833, Mr. "WILKINB, Chairman of the 
 Committee of the Senate, introduced the bill further to 
 for the collection of duties. On the 22d day of the same 
 [r. CALHOUN submitted the following resolutions: 
 
 That the people of the several States composing these United States 
 
 is parties to a constitutional compact, to which the people of each State 
 
 a separate sovereign community, each binding itself by its own partic- 
 
 [jation ; and that the union, of which the said compact is the bond, is a 
 
 een the /States ratifying the same. 
 
 That the people of the several States thus united by the constitutional 
 forming that instrument, and in creating the general government to 
 sflfect the objects for which they were formed, delegated to that govern- 
 lat purpose, certain definite powers, to be exercised jointly, reserving, 
 , time, each State to itself, the residuary mass of powers, to be exercised 
 [separate government; and that, whenever the general government as- 
 texercise of powers not delegated by the compact, its acts are unauthor- 
 [re of no effect; and that the same government is not made the final 
 le powers delegated to it, since that would make its discretion, and not 
 Uion, the measure of its powers ; but that, as in all other cases of compact 
 Nreign parties, without any common judge, each has an equal right to 
 self, as well of the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress. 
 That the assertions, that the people of these United States, taken col- 
 individuals, are now, or ever have been, united on the principle of 
 smpact, and, as such, are now formed into one nation or people, or that 
 fever been so united in any one stage of their political existence ; that 
 Iof the several States composing the Union have not, as members thereof, 
 leir sovereignty; that the allegis;nce of their citizens has been transferred 
 leral government ; that they have parted with the right of punishing 
 lough their respective State governments ; that they have not the right 
 [in the last resort as to the extent of the powers reserved, and of conse- 
 "aose delegated are not only without foundation in truth, but are con- 
 most certain and plain historical facts, and the clearest deductions of 
 Id that all exercise of power on the part of the general government, or 
 jlepartmenta, claiming authority from such erroneous assumptions, must 
 |y be unconstitutional must tend directly and inevitably to subvert the 
 of the States, to destroy the federal character of the Union, and to rear 
 a consolidated government, without constitutional check or limitation, 
 I must necessarily terminate in the loss of liberty itself. 
 
 hurday, the 16th of February, Mr. CALnotnr spoke in op- 
 jto the bill, and in support of these resolutions. He was 
 {by Mr. WEBSTER in this speech : 
 
 (RESIDENT The gentleman from South Carolina has ad- 
 us to be mindful of the opinions of those who shall come 
 
 iv&3* 
 
V4 
 
 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT 
 
 A Speech, by Daniel Webster, in the United States Senate, 16th February, 1833. 
 
 ON the 21st of January, 1833, Mr. WILKINS, Chairman of the 
 Judiciary Committee of the Senate, introduced the bill further to 
 provide for the collection of duties. On the 22d day of the same 
 month, Mr. CALHOUN submitted the following resolutions : 
 
 Resolved, That the people of the several States composing these United States 
 are united as parties to a constitutional compact, to which the people of each State 
 seceded as a separate sovereign community, each binding itself by its own partic 
 ular ratification ; and that the union, of which the said compact is the bond, is a 
 union between the States ratifying the same. 
 
 Resolved, That the people of the several States thus united by the constitutional 
 compact, in forming that instrument, and in creating the general government to 
 carry into effect the objects for which they were formed, delegated to that govern 
 ment, for that purpose, certain definite powers, to be exercised jointly, reserving, 
 at the same time, each State to itself, the residuary mass of powers, to be exercised 
 by its own separate government ; and that, whenever the general government as 
 sumes the exercise of powers not delegated by the compact, its acts are unauthor 
 ized, and are of no effect; and that the same government is not made the final 
 judge of the powers delegated to it, since that would make its discretion, and not 
 the Constitution, the measure of its powers ; but that, as in all other cases of compact 
 among sovereign parties, without any common judge, each has an equal right to 
 judge for itself, as well of the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress. 
 
 Resolved, That the assertions, that the people of these United States, taken col 
 lectively as individuals, are now, or ever have been, united on the principle of 
 the social compact, and, as such, are now formed into one nation or people, or that 
 they have ever been so united in any one stage of their political existence ; that 
 the people of the several States composing the Union have not, as members thereof, 
 retained their sovereignty; that the allegiance of their citizens has been transferred 
 to the general government ; that they have parted with the right of punishing 
 treason through their respective State governments ; that they have not the right 
 of judging in the last resort as to the exient of the powers reserved, and of conse 
 quence of those delegated are not only without foundation in truth, but are con 
 trary to the most certain and plain historical facts, and the clearest deductions of 
 reason ; and that all exercise of power on the part of the general government, or 
 any of its departments, claiming authority from such erroneous assumptions, must 
 of necessity be unconstitutional must tend directly and inevitably to subvert the 
 sovereignty of the States, to destroy the federal character of the Union, and to rear 
 on its ruins a consolidated government, without constitutional check or limitation, 
 and which must necessarily terminate in the loss of liberty itself. 
 
 Dn Saturday, the 16th of February, Mr. CALHOUN spoke in op 
 position to the bill, and in support of these resolutions. He was 
 followed by Mr. WEBSTER in this speech : 
 
 ME. PRESIDENT The gentleman from South Carolina has ad 
 monished us to be mindful of the opinions of those who shall come 
 
 
54 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 after us. "We must take our chance, Sir, as to the light in which 
 posterity will regard us. I do not decline its judgment, nor with 
 hold myself from its scrutiny. Feeling that I am performing my 
 public duty with singleness of heart and to the best of my ability, 
 I fearlessly trust myself to the country, now and hereafter, and 
 leave both my motives and my character to its decision. 
 
 The gentleman has terminated his speech in a tone of threat and 
 defiance toward this bill, even should it become a law of the land, 
 altogether unusual in the halls of Congress. But I shall not suf 
 fer myself to be excited into warmth by his denunciation of the 
 measure which I support. Among feelings which at this moment 
 fill my breast, not least is that of regret at the position in which 
 the gentleman has placed himself. Sir, he does himself no justice. 
 The cause which he has espoused finds no basis in the Constitu 
 tion, no succor from public sympathy, no cheering from a patriotic 
 community. He has no foothold on which to stand while he might 
 display the powers of his acknowledged talents. Everything be 
 neath his feet is hollow and treacherous. He is like a strong man 
 struggling in a morass every effort to extricate himself only sinks 
 him deeper and deeper. And I fear the resemblance may be carried 
 still further ; I fear that no friend can safely come to his relief, that no 
 one can approach near enough to hold out a helping hand, without 
 danger of going down himself, also, into the bottomless depths of 
 this Serbonian bog. 
 
 The honorable gentleman has declared, that on the decision of 
 the question now in debate may depend the cause of liberty itself. 
 I am of the same opinion ; but then, Sir, the liberty which I think 
 is staked on the contest is not political liberty, in any general and 
 undefined character, but our own well-understood and long-enjoyed 
 American liberty. 
 
 Sir, I love Liberty no less ardently than the gentleman himself, 
 in whatever form she may have appeared in the progress of human 
 history. As exhibited in the master states of antiquity, as break 
 ing out again from amid the darkness of the Middle Ages, and 
 beaming on the formation of new communities in modern Europe, 
 she has, always and everywhere, charms for me. Yet, Sir, it is our 
 own liberty, guarded by constitution and secured by union, it is 
 that liberty which is our paternal inheritance, it is our established, 
 dear-bought, peculiar American liberty, to which I am chiefly de 
 voted, and the cause of which I now mean, to the utmost of my 
 power, to maintain and defend. 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 55 
 
 Mr. President, if I consider the constitutional question now be 
 fore us doubtful, as it is important, and if I suppose that its deci 
 sion, either in the Senate or by the country, was likely to be in 
 any degree influenced by the manner in which I might now dis 
 cuss it, this would be to me a moment of deep solicitude. Such a 
 moment has once existed. There has been a time when, rising in 
 this place, on the same question, I felt, I must confess, that some 
 thing for good or evil to the Constitution of the country might 
 depend on an effort of mine. But circumstances are changed. 
 Since that day, Sir, the public opinion has become awakened to 
 this great question ; it has grasped it ; it has reasoned upon it, as 
 becomes an intelligent and patriotic community, and has settled it, 
 or now seems in the progress of settling it, by an authority which 
 none can disobey, the authority of the people themselves. 
 
 I shall not, Mr. President, follow the gentleman step by step, 
 through the course of his speech. Much of what he has said he 
 has deemed necessary to the just explanation and defense of his , 
 own political character and conduct. On this I shall offer no com 
 ment. Much, too, has consisted of philosophical remark upon the 
 general nature of political liberty and the history of free institu 
 tions, and upon other topics, so general in their nature as to pos 
 sess, in my opinion, only a remote bearing on the immediate sub 
 ject of this debate. 
 
 But the gentleman s speech, made some days ago, upon intro 
 ducing his resolutions, those resolutions themselves, and parts of 
 the speech now just concluded, may, I presume, be justly regarded 
 as containing the whole South Carolina doctrine. That doctrine 
 it is my purpose now to examine, and to compare it with the Con 
 stitution of the United States. I shall not consent, Sir, to make 
 any new constitution, or to establish another form of government. 
 I will not undertake to say what a constitution of these United 
 States ought to be. That question the people have decided for 
 themselves ; and I shall take the instrument as they have estab 
 lished it, and shall endeavor to maintain it, in its plain sense and 
 meaning, against opinions and notions which, in my judgment, 
 threaten its subversion. 
 
 The resolutions introduced by the gentleman were apparently 
 drawn up with care and brought forward upon deliberation. I 
 shall not be in danger, therefore, of misunderstanding him, or 
 those who agree with him, if I proceed at once to these resolu 
 tions, and consider them as an authentic statement of those opinions 
 
56 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 upon the great constitutional question, by which the recent pro 
 ceedings in South Carolina are attempted to be justified. 
 
 These resolutions are three in number. 
 
 The third seems intended to enumerate, and to deny, the several 
 opinions expressed in the President s proclamation, respecting the 
 nature and powers of this government. Of this third resolution, 
 I purpose, at present, to take no particular notice. 
 
 The first two resolutions of the honorable member affirm these 
 propositions, viz. : 
 
 1. That the political system under which we live, and under 
 which Congress is now assembled, is a compact, to which the people 
 of the several States, as separate and sovereign communities, are 
 ihe par ties. 
 
 2. That these sovereign parties have a right to judge, each for 
 itself, of any alleged violation of the Constitution by Congress; 
 and, in case of such violation, to choose, each for itself, its own 
 mode and measure of redress. 
 
 It is true, Sir, that the honorable member calls this a " constitu 
 tional" compact ; but still he affirms it to be a compact between 
 sovereign States. What precise meaning, then, does he attach to 
 the term constitutional? When applied to compacts between sove 
 reign States, the term constitutional affixes to the word compact no 
 definite idea. Were we to hear of a constitutional league or treaty 
 between England and France, or a constitutional convention be 
 tween Austria and Russia, we should not understand what could 
 be intended by such a league, such a treaty, or such a convention. 
 In these connections, the word is void of all meaning; and yet, 
 Sir, it is easy, quite easy, to see why the honorable gentleman has 
 used it in these resolutions. He can not open the book, and look 
 upon our written frame of government, without seeing that it is 
 called a constitution. This may well be ^appalling to him. It 
 threatens his whole doctrine of compact, and its darling deriva 
 tives, nullification and secession, with instant confutation. Be 
 cause, if he admits our instrument of government to be a constitution, 
 then, for that very reason, it is not a compact between sovereigns ; 
 a constitution of government and a compact between sovereign 
 powers being things essentially unlike in their very natures, and 
 incapable of ever being the same. Yet the word constitution is 
 on the very front of the instrument. He can not overlook it. He 
 seeks, therefore, to compromise the matter, and to sink all the sub 
 stantial sense of the word, while he retains a resemblance of its 
 sound. He introduces a new word of his own, viz., compact, as 
 importing the principal idea, and designed to play the principal 
 part, and degrades constitution into an insignificant, idle epithet, 
 attached to compact. The whole then stands as a "constitutional 
 compact /" And in this way he hopes to pass off a plausible gloss, 
 as satisfying the words of the instrument. But he will find him 
 self disappointed. Sir, I must say to the honorable gentleman, 
 that, in our American political grammar, CONSTITUTION is a noun 
 substantive ; it imports a distinct and clear idea of itself; and it is 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 57 
 
 not to lose its importance and dignity, it is not to be turned into a 
 poor, ambiguous, senseless, unmeaning adjective, for the purpose 
 of accommodating anj new set of political notions. Sir, we reject 
 his new rules of syntax altogether. We will not give up our forms 
 of political speech to the grammarians of the school of nullification. 
 By the Constitution, we mean, not a " constitutional compact," 
 but, simply and directly, the Constitution, the fundamental law ; 
 and if there be one word in the language which the people of the 
 United States understand, this is that word. We know no more 
 of a constitutional compact between sovereign powers, than we 
 know of a constitutional indenture of copartnership, a constitu 
 tional deed of conveyance, or a constitutional bill of exchange. 
 But we know what the Constitution is ; we know what the plainly 
 written, fundamental law is ; we know what the bond of our Union 
 and the security of our liberties is ; and we mean to maintain and 
 to defend it, in its plain sense and unsophisticated meaning. 
 
 The sense of the gentleman s proposition, therefore, is not at all 
 affected, one way or the other, by the use of this word. That 
 proposition still is, that our system of government is but a compact 
 between the people of separate and sovereign States. 
 
 Was it Mirabeau, Mr. President, or some other master of the hu 
 man passions, who has told us that words are things ? They are 
 indeed things, and things of mighty influence, not only in addresses 
 to the passions and high-wrought feelings of mankind, but in the 
 discussion of legal and political questions also ; because a just con 
 clusion is often avoided, or a false one reached, by the adroit sub 
 stitution of one phrase, or one word, for another. Of this, we 
 have, I think, another example in the resolutions before us. 
 
 The first resolution declares that the people of the several States 
 " acceded" to the Constitution, or to the constitutional compact, as 
 it is called. This word "accede," not found" either in the Consti 
 tution itself, or in the ratification of it by any one of the States, 
 has been chosen for use here, doubtless, not without a well-con 
 sidered purpose. 
 
 The natural converse of accession fs secession; and, therefore, 
 when it is stated that the people of the States acceded to the 
 Union, it may be more plausibly argued that they may secede from 
 it. If, in adopting the Constitution, nothing was done but acced 
 ing to a compact, nothing would seem necessary, in order to break 
 it up, but to secede from the same compact. But the term is 
 wholly out of place. Accession, as a word applied to political as 
 sociations, implies coming into a league, treaty, or confederacy, by 
 one hitherto a stranger to it ; and secession implies departing from 
 such league or confederacy. The people of the United States have 
 used no such form of expression in establishing the present govern 
 ment. They do not say that they accede to a league, but they de 
 clare that they ordain and establish a Constitution. Such are the 
 very words of the instrument itself; and in all the States, without 
 an exception, the language used by their conventions was, that they 
 "ratified the Constitution;" some of them employing the addi- 
 
58 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 tional words, "assented to" and "adopted," but all of them "rat 
 ifying." ^ 
 
 There is more importance than may, at first sight, appear, in the 
 introduction of this new word by the honorable mover of these 
 resolutions. Its adoption and use are indispensable to maintain 
 those premises, from which his main conclusion is to be afterward 
 drawn. But before showing that, allow me to remark, that this 
 phraseology tends to keep out of sight the just view of a previous 
 political history, as well as to suggest wrong ideas as to what was 
 actually done when the present Constitution was agreed to. In 
 1789, and before this Constitution was adopted, the United States 
 had already been in a union, more or less close, for fifteen years. 
 At least as far back as the meeting of the first Congress, in 1774, 
 they had been in some measure, and for some national purposes, 
 united together. Before the Confederation of 1781, they had de 
 clared independence jointly, and had carried on the war jointly, 
 both by sea and land ; and this not as separate States, but as one 
 people. When, therefore, they formed that Confederation, and 
 adopted its articles as articles of perpetual union, they did not 
 come together for the first time; and therefore they did not speak 
 of the States as acceding to the Confederation, although it was a 
 league, and nothing but a league, and rested on nothing but plighted 
 faith for its performance. Yet, even then, the States were not 
 strangers to each other ; there was a bond of union already sub 
 sisting between them ; they were associated, united States ; and 
 the object of the Confederation was to make a stronger and better 
 bond of union. Their representatives deliberated together on these 
 proposed articles of Confederation, and, being authorized by their 
 respective States, finally "ratified and confirmed" them. Inas 
 much as they were already in union, they did not speak of acceding 
 to the new articles of Confederation, but of ratifying and confirm 
 ing them ; and this language was not used inadvertently, because, 
 in the same instrument, accession is used in its proper sense, when 
 applied to Canada, which was altogether a stranger to the existing 
 union. "Canada," says the eleventh article, "acceding to this 
 Confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, 
 shall be admitted into the Union." 
 
 Having thus used the terms ratify and confirm, even in regard to 
 the old Confederation, it would have been strange indeed if the 
 people of the United States, after its formation, and when they 
 came to establish the present Constitution, had spoken of the 
 States, or the people of the States, as acceding to this Constitution. 
 Such language would have been ill-suited to the occasion. It would 
 have implied an existing separation or disunion among the States, 
 such as never has existed since 1774. No such language, there 
 fore, was used. The language actually employed is, adopt, ratify, 
 ordain, establish. 
 
 Therefore, Sir, since any State, before she can prove her right to 
 dissolve the Union, must show her authority to undo what has 
 been done, no State is at liberty to secede on tho ground that she 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 59 
 
 and other States have done nothing but accede. She must show 
 that she has a right to reverse what has been ordained, to unsettle 
 and overthrow what has been established, to reject what the people 
 have adopted, and to break up what they have ratified ; because 
 these are the terms which express the transactions which have 
 actually taken place. In other word*, she must show her right to 
 make a revolution. 
 
 If, Mr. President, in drawing these resolutions, the honorable 
 member had confined himself to the use of constitutional language, 
 there would have been a wide and awful hiatus between his prem 
 ises and his conclusion. Leaving out the two words compact and 
 accession, which are not constitutional modes of expression, and 
 stating the matter precisely as the truth is, his first resolution 
 would have affirmed that the people of the several States ratified 
 this Constitution or form of government. These are the very words 
 of South Carolina herself, in her act of ratification. Let, then, his 
 first resolution tell the exact truth ; let it state the fact precisely as 
 it exists ; let it say that the people of the several States ratified a 
 constitution, or form of government, and then, Sir, what will be 
 come of his inference in his second resolution, which is in these 
 words, viz.: "that, as in all other cases of compact among sove 
 reign parties, each has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of 
 the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress ?" It is 
 obvious, is it not, Sir, that this conclusion requires for its support 
 quite other premises : it requires premises which speak of accession 
 and of compact between sovereign powers; and, without such 
 premises, it is altogether unmeaning. 
 
 Mr. President, if the honorable member will truly state what the 
 people did in forming this Constitution, and then state what they 
 must do if they would now undo what they then did, he will una 
 voidably state a case of revolution. Let us see if it be not so. He / 
 must state, in the first place, that the people of the several States /, 
 adopted and ratified this Constitution, or form of government ; and, 
 in the next place, he must state that they have a right to undo J7 
 this; that is to say, that they have a right to discard the form 
 of government which they have adopted, and to break up the Con 
 stitution which they have ratified. Now, Sir, this is neither more 
 nor less than saying that they have a right to make a revolution. 
 To reject an established government, to break up a political con 
 stitution, is revolution. 
 
 I deny that any man can state accurately what was done by the 
 people, in establishing the present Constitution, and then state 
 accurately what the people, or any part of them, must now do to 
 get rid of its obligations, without stating an undeniable case of the 
 overthrow of government. I admit, of course, that the people 
 may, if they choose, overthrow the government. But, then, that 
 is revolution. The doctrine now contended for is, that, by nullifi 
 cation or secession, the obligations and authority of the government 
 may be set aside, or rejected, without revolution. But that is what 
 I deny : and what I say is, that no man can state the case with 
 
0Q THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 / historical 2 
 I ing that th 
 ^S* sion, is a r 
 
 accuracy, and in constitutional language, without show- 
 he honorable gentleman s right, as asserted in his conclu- 
 revolutionary right merely; that it does not and can not 
 exist under the Constitution, but can come into existence only 
 when the Constitution is overthrown. This is the reason, Sir, 
 which makes it necessary to^abandon the use of constitutional Ian* 
 guage for a new vocabulary, and to substitute, in the place of plain 
 historical facts, a series of assumptions. This is the reason why it 
 is necessary to give new names to things, to speak of the Constitu 
 tion, not as a constitution, but as a compact, and of the ratifica 
 tions by the people, not as ratifications, but as acts of accession. 
 
 Sir, I intend to hold the gentleman to the written record. In 
 the discussion of a constitutional question, I intend to impose upon 
 him the restraints of constitutional language. The people have 
 ordained a Constitution; can they reject it without revolution? 
 They have established a form of government ; can they overthrow 
 it without revolution ? 
 
 These are the true questions. 
 
 Allow me now, Mr. President, to inquire further into the extent 
 of the propositions contained in the resolutions and their neces 
 sary consequences. 
 
 Where sovereign communities are parties, there is no essential 
 difference between a compact, a confederation, and a league. They 
 all equally rest on the plighted faith of the sovereign party. A 
 league or confederacy is but a subsisting or continuing treaty. 
 
 The gentleman s resolutions, then, affirm, in effect, that these 
 twenty -four United States are held together only by a subsisting 
 treaty, resting for its fulfillment and continuance on no inherent 
 power of its own, but on the plighted faith of each State ; or, in 
 other words, that our Union is but a league ; and, as a consequence 
 from this proposition, they further affirm that, as sovereigns are 
 subject to no superior power, the States must judge, each for itself, 
 of any alleged violation of the league ; and, if such violation be 
 supposed to have occurred, each may adopt any mode or measure 
 of redress which it shall think proper. 
 
 Other consequences naturally follow, too, from the main propo 
 sition. If a league between sovereign powers have no limitation 
 as to the time of its duration, and contain nothing making it per 
 petual, it subsists only during the good pleasure of the parties, 
 although no violation be complained of. If, in the opinion of 
 either party, it be violated, such party may say that he will no 
 longer fulfill its obligations on his part, but will consider the whole 
 league or compact at an end, although it might be one of its stipu 
 lations that it should be perpetual. Upon this principle, the Con 
 gress of the United States, in 1798, declared null and void the 
 treaty of alliance between the United States and France, though it 
 professed to be a perpetual alliance. 
 
 If the violation of the league be accompanied with serious in 
 juries, the suffering party, being sole judge of his own mode and 
 measure of redress, has a right to indemnify himself by reprisals 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. gj 
 
 on the offending members of the league ; and reprisals, if the cir 
 cumstances of the case require it, may be followed by direct, 
 avowed, and public war. 
 
 The necessary import of the resolution, therefore, is, that the 
 United States are connected only by a league ; that it is in the good 
 pleasure of every State to decide how long she will choose to remain a 
 member of this league ; that any State may determine the extent 
 of her own obligations under it, and accept or reject what shall be 
 decided by the whole; that she may also determine whether her 
 rights have been violated, what is the extent of the injury done 
 her, and what mode and measure of redress her wrongs may make 
 it fit and expedient for her to adopt. The result of the whole is, 
 that any State may secede at pleasure ; that any State may resist a 
 law which she herself may choose to say exceeds the power of 
 Congress ; and that, as a sovereign power, she may redress her 
 own grievances, by her own arm, at her own discretion. She may 
 make reprisals ; she may cruise against the property of other 
 members of the league; she may authorize captures and make 
 open war. 
 
 If, Sir, this be our political condition, it is time the people of the 
 United States understood it. Let us look for a moment to the 
 practical consequences of these opinions. One State, holding an 
 embargo law unconstitutional, may declare her opinion, and with 
 draw from the Union. She secedes. Another, forming: and ex 
 pressing the same judgment on a law laying duties on imports, 
 may withdraw also. She secedes. And as, in her opinion, money 
 has been taken out of the pockets of her citizens illegally, under 
 pretense of this law, and as she has power to redress their wrongs, 
 she may demand satisfaction; and, if refused, she may take it with 
 the strong hand. The gentleman has himself pronounced the col 
 lection of duties, under existing laws, to be nothing but robbery. 
 Robbers, of course, may be rightfully dispossessed of the fruits of 
 their flagitious crimes ; and, therefore, reprisals, impositions on the 
 commerce of other States, foreign alliances against them, or open 
 war, are all modes of redress justly open to the discretion and 
 choice of South Carolina ; for she is to judge of her own rights, 
 and to seek satisfaction for her own wrongs, in her own way. 
 
 But, Sir, a third State is of opinion, not only that these laws of 
 imposts are constitutional, but that it is the absolute duty of Con 
 gress to pass and maintain such laws; and that, by omitting to 
 pass and maintain them, its constitutional obligations would be 
 grossly disregarded. She herself relinquished the power of pro 
 tection, she might allege, and allege truly, and gave it up to Con 
 gress, on the faith that Congress would exercise it. If Congress 
 now refuse to exercise it, Congress does, as she may insist, break 
 the condition of the grant, and thus manifestly violate the Consti 
 tution ; and for this violation of the Constitution, she may threaten 
 to secede also. Virginia may secede, and hold the fortresses in 
 the Chesapeake. The Western States may secede, and take to their 
 own use the public lands. Louisiana may secede if she choose. 
 
62 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 form a foreign alliance, and hold the mouth of the Mississippi. 
 If one State may secede, ten may do so, twenty may do so, twenty- 
 three may do so. Sir, as these secessions go on, one after another, 
 what is to constitute the United States? Whose will be the army? 
 Whose the navy ? Who will pay the debts ? Who fulfill the public 
 treaties ? Who perform the constitutional guarantees ? Who govern 
 this District and the Territories ? Who retain the public property ? 
 
 Mr. President, every man must see that these are all questions 
 which can arise only after a revolution. They presuppose the 
 breaking up of the government. While the Constitution lasts, 
 they are repressed ; they spring up to annoy and startle us only 
 from its grave. 
 
 The Constitution does not provide for events which must be pre 
 ceded by its own destruction. SECESSION, therefore, since it must 
 bring these consequences with it, is REVOLUTIONARY, and NULLIFI 
 CATION is equally REVOLUTIONARY. What is revolution? Why, 
 Sir, that is revolution which overturns, or controls, or successfully 
 resists the existing public authority ; that which arrests the exer 
 cise of the supreme power ; that which introduces a new para 
 mount authority into the rule of the State. Now, Sir, this is the 
 Erecise object of nullification. It attempts to supersede the supreme 
 jgislative authority. It arrests the arm of the executive magis 
 trate. It interrupts the exercise of the accustomed judicial power. 
 Under the name of an ordinance, it declares null and void, within the 
 State, all the revenue laws of the United States. Is not this revo 
 lutionary? Sir, so soon as this ordinance shall be carried into 
 effect, a revolution will have commenced in South Carolina. She 
 will have thrown off the authority to which her citizens have 
 heretofore been subject. She will have declared her own opinions 
 and her own will to be above the laws and above the power of 
 those who are intrusted with their administration. If she makes 
 good these declarations, she is revolutionized. As to her, it is as 
 distinctly a change of the supreme power, as the American Eevo- 
 lution of 1TT6. That revolution did not subvert government in all 
 its forms. It did not subvert local laws and municipal administra 
 tions. It only threw off the dominion of a power claiming to be 
 superior, and to have a right, in many important respects, to exer 
 cise legislative authority. Thinking this authority to have been 
 usurped or abused, the American Colonies, now the United States, 
 bade it defiance, and freed themselves from it by means of a revo 
 lution. But that revolution left them with their own municipal 
 laws still, and the forms of local government. If Carolina now 
 shall effectually resist the laws of Congress ; if she shall be her 
 own judge, take the remedy into her own hands, obey the laws of 
 the Union when she pleases and disobey them when she pleases, 
 she will relieve herself from a paramount power as distinctly as 
 the American Colonies did the same thing in 1776. In other words, 
 she will achieve, as to herself, a revolution. 
 
 But, Sir, while practical nullification in South Carolina would 
 be, as to herself, actual and distinct revolution, its necessary ten- 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 53 
 
 dency must also be to spread revolution, and to break up the Con 
 stitution, as to all the other States. It strikes a deadly blow at 
 the vital principle of the whole Union. To allow State resistance 
 to the laws of Congress to be rightful and proper, to admit nulli 
 fication in some States, and yet not expect to see a dismemberment 
 of the entire government, appears to me the wildest illusion and 
 the most extravagant folly. The gentleman seems not conscious 
 of the direction or the rapidity of his own course. The current 
 of his opinions sweeps him along, he knows not whither. To 
 begin with nullification, with the avowed intent, nevertheless, not 
 to proceed to secession, dismemberment, and general revolution, 
 is as if one were to take the plunge of Niagara, and cry out that 
 he would stop half way down. In the one case, as in the other, 
 the rash adventurer must go to the bottom of the dark abyss below, 
 w r ere it not that that abyss has no discovered bottom. 
 
 Nullification, if successful, arrests the power of the law, ab 
 solves citizens from their duty, subverts the foundation both of 
 protection and obedience, dispenses with oaths and obligations of 
 allegiance, and elevates another authority to supreme command. 
 Is not this revolution ? And it raises to supreme command four- 
 and-twenty distinct powers, each professing to be under a general 
 govepnment, and yet each setting its laws at defiance at pleasure. 
 Is not this anarchy, as well as revolution ? Sir, the Constitution 
 of the United States was received as a whole, and for the whole 
 country. If it can not stand altogether, it can not stand in parts ; 
 and if the laws can not be executed everywhere, they can not long 
 be executed anywhere. The gentleman very well knows that all 
 duties and imposts must be uniform throughout the country. He 
 knows that we can not have one rule or one law for South Caro 
 lina, and another for other States. He must see, therefore, and 
 does see, and every man sees, that the only alternative is a repeal 
 of the laws throughout the whole Union, or their execution in 
 Carolina as well as elsewhere. And this repeal is demanded be 
 cause a single State interposes her veto and threatens resistance ! 
 The result of the gentleman s opinion, or rather the very text of 
 his doctrine, is, that no act of Congress can bind all the States, 
 the constitutionality of which is not admitted by all ; or, in other 
 words, that no single State is bound, against its own dissent, by a 
 law of imposts. This is precisely the evil experienced under the 
 old Confederation, and for remedy of which this Constitution was 
 adopted. The leading object in establishing this government, an 
 object forced on the country by the condition of the times and 
 the absolute necessity of the law, was to give to Congress power 
 to lay and collect imposts without the consent of particular States. 
 The Revolutionary debt remained unpaid ; the national treasury 
 was bankrupt; the country was destitute of credit; Congress 
 issued its requisitions on the States, and the States neglected them ; 
 there was no power of coercion but war ; Congress could not lay 
 imposts, or other taxes, by its own authority ; the whole general 
 government, therefore, was little more than a name. The Articles 
 
64 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 of Confederation, as to purposes of revenue and finance, were 
 nearly a dead letter. The country sought to escape from this con 
 dition, at once feeble and disgraceful, by constituting a government 
 which should have power, of itself, to lay duties and taxes, and to 
 pay the public debt, and provide for the general welfare ; and to 
 lay these duties and taxes in all the States, without asking the 
 consent of the State governments. This was the very power on 
 which the new Constitution was to depend for all its ability to do 
 good ; and without it, it can be no government, now or at any 
 time. Yet, Sir, it is precisely against this power, so absolutely 
 indispensable to the very being of the government, that South 
 Carolina directs her ordinance. She attacks the government in 
 its authority to raise revenue, the very mainspring of the whole 
 system ; and if she succeed, every movement of that system must 
 inevitably cease. It is of no avail that she declares that she does 
 not resist the law as a revenue law, but as a law for protecting 
 manufactures. It is a revenue law ; it is the very law by force of 
 which the revenue is collected ; if it be arrested in any State, the 
 revenue ceases in that State ; it is, in a word, the sole reliance of 
 the government for the means of maintaining itself and perform 
 ing its duties. 
 
 Mr. President, the alleged right of a State to decide constitutional 
 questions for herself necessarily leads to force, because other States 
 must have the same right, and because different States will decide 
 differently ; and when these questions arise between States, if there 
 be no superior power, they can be decided only by the law of force. 
 On entering into the Union, the people of each State gave up a 
 part of their own power to make laws for themselves, in consider 
 ation that, as to common objects, they should have a part in mak 
 ing laws for other States. In other words, the people of all the 
 States agreed to create a common government, to be conducted 
 by common counsels. Pennsylvania, for example, yielded the 
 right of laying imposts in her own ports, in consideration that the 
 new government, in which she was to have a share, should pos 
 sess the power of laying imposts on all the States. If South Car 
 olina now refuses to submit to this power, she breaks the condition 
 on which other States entered into the Union. She partakes of 
 the common counsels, and therein assists to bind others, while she 
 refuses to be bound herself. It makes no difference in the case 
 whether she does all this without reason or pretext, or whether 
 she sets up as a reason that, in her judgment, the acts complained 
 of are unconstitutional. In the judgment of other States, they 
 are not so. It is nothing to them that she offers some reason or 
 some apology for her conduct, if it be one which they do not ad 
 mit. It is not to be expected that any State will violate her duty 
 without some plausible pretext. That would be too rash a de 
 fiance of the opinion of mankind. But if it be a pretext which 
 lies in her own breast ; if it be no more than an opinion which 
 she says she has formed, how can other States be satisfied with 
 this ? How can they allow her to be judge of her own obligations? 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. (55 
 
 Or, if she may judge of her obligations, may they not judge of 
 their rights also ? May not the twenty -three entertain an opinion 
 as well as the twenty -fourth ? And if it be their right, in their 
 own opinion, as expressed in the common council, to enforce the 
 law against her, how is she to say that her right and her opinion 
 are to be everything, and their right and their opinion nothing? 
 
 Mr. President, if we are to receive the Constitution as the text, 
 and then to lay down in its margin the contradictory commenta 
 ries which have been, and which may be made by different States, 
 the whole page would be a polyglot indeed. It would speak with 
 as many tongues as the builders of Babel, and in dialects as much 
 confused, and mutually as unintelligible. The very instance now 
 before us presents a practical illustration. The law of the last ses 
 sion is declared unconstitutional in South Carolina, and obedience 
 to it is refused. In other States it is admitted to be strictly consti 
 tutional. You walk over the limit of its authority, therefore, when 
 you pass a State line. On one side it is law, on the other side a 
 nullity; and yet it is passed by a common government, having the 
 same authority in all the States. 
 
 Such, Sir, are the inevitable results of this doctrine. Beginning 
 with the original error, that the Constitution of the United States 
 is nothing but a compact between sovereign States ; asserting, in 
 the next step, that each State has a right to be its own sole judge 
 of the extent of its obligations, and consequently of the constitu 
 tionality of the laws of Congress ; and in the next, that it may 
 oppose whatever it sees fit to declare unconstitutional, and that it 
 decides for itself on the mode and measure of redress the argu 
 ment arrives at once at the conclusion, that what a State dissents 
 from, it may nullify ; what it opposes, it may oppose by force ; 
 what it decides for itself, it may execute by its own power; and 
 that, in short, it is itself supreme over the legislation of Congress, 
 and supreme over the decisions of the national judicature ; supreme 
 over the Constitution of the country ; supreme over the supreme 
 law of the land. However it seeks to protect itself against these 
 plain inferences, by saying that an unconstitutional law is no law, 
 and that it only opposes such laws as are unconstitutional, yet this 
 does not in the slightest degree vary the result, since it insists on 
 deciding this question for itself; and, in opposition to reason and 
 arguments, in opposition to practice and experience, in opposition 
 to the judgment of others, having an equal right to judge, it says 
 only, " Such is my opinion, and my opinion shall be my law, and I 
 will support it by my own strong hand. I denounce the law ; I 
 declare it unconstitutional ; that is enough, it shall not be executed. 
 Men in arms are ready to resist its execution. An attempt to en 
 force it shall cover the land with blood. Elsewhere it may be 
 binding, but here it is trampled under foot." 
 
 This, Sir, is practical nullification. 
 
 And now, Sir, against all these theories and opinions, I main 
 tain 
 
 1. That the Constitution of the United States is not a league 
 
QQ THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 confederacy, or compact between the people of the several States 
 in their sovereign capacities; but a government proper, founded 
 on the adoption of the people, and creating direct relations between 
 itself and individuals. 
 
 2. That no State authority has power to dissolve these relations; 
 that nothing can dissolve them but revolution ; and that, conse 
 quently, there can be no such thing as secession without revolu 
 tion. 
 
 3. That there is a supreme law, consisting of the Constitution of 
 the United States, and acts of Congress passed in pursuance of it, 
 and treaties ; and that, in cases not capable of assuming the char 
 acter of a suit in law or equity, Congress must judge of, and finally 
 interpret, this supreme law so often as it has occasion to pass acts 
 of legislation, and in cases capable of assuming, and actually assum 
 ing, the character of a suit, the Supreme Court of the United States 
 is the final interpreter. 
 
 4. That an attempt by a State to abrogate, annul, or nullify an 
 act of Congress, or to arrest its operation within her limits, on the 
 ground that, in her opinion, such law is unconstitutional, is a direct 
 usurpation on the just powers of the general government, and on 
 the equal rights of other States ; a plain violation of the Constitu 
 tion, and a proceeding essentially revolutionary in its character and 
 tendency. 
 
 Whether the Constitution be a compact between States in their 
 sovereign capacities, is a question which must be mainly argued 
 from what is contained in the instrument itself. We all agree that 
 it is an instrument which has been in some way clothed with pow 
 er. We all admit that it speaks with authority. The first question 
 then is, what does it say of itself? What does it purport to be? 
 Does it style itself a league, confederacy, or compact between sove 
 reign States? It is to be remembered, Sir, that the Constitution 
 began to speak only after its adoption. Until it was ratified by 
 nine States, it was but a proposal, the mere draught of an instru 
 ment. It was like a deed drawn, but not executed. The Conven 
 tion had framed it; sent it to Congress, then sitting under the 
 Confederation; Congress had transmitted it to the State legisla 
 tures ; and by these last it was laid before the convention of the 
 people in the several States. All this while it was inoperative 
 paper. It had received no stamp of authority, no sanction ; it 
 spoke no language. But when ratified by the people in their 
 respective conventions, then it had a voice, and spoke authentically. 
 Every word in it had then received the sanction of the popular 
 will, and was to be received as the expression of that will. What 
 the Constitution says of itself, therefore, is as conclusive as what it 
 says on any other point. Does it call itself a " compact ?" Certainly 
 not. It uses the word compact but once, and that is w r hen it declares 
 that the States shall enter into no compact. Does it call itself a 
 "league," a "confederacy," a "subsisting treaty between the 
 States ?" Certainly not. There is not a particle of such language in 
 all its pages. But it declares itself a CONSTITUTION. What is a con- 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. ffi 
 
 stitution ? Certainly not a league, compact, or confederacy, but a 
 fundamental law. The fundamental regulation which determines 
 the manner in which the public authority is to be executed, i.3 
 what forms the constitution of a State. Those primary rules which 
 concern the body itself, and the very being of the political society, 
 the form of government, and the manner in which power is to be 
 exercised all, in a word, which form together the constitution of 
 a State these are the fundamental laws. This, Sir, is the language 
 of the public writers. But we do not need -to be informed, in this 
 country, what a constitution is ? Is it not an idea perfectly familiar, 
 definite, and well settled. We are at no loss to understand what is 
 meant by the constitution of one of the States ; and the Constitu 
 tion of the United States speaks of itself as being an instrument of 
 the same nature. It says, this Constitution shall be the law of the 
 land, anything in the State constitution to the contrary notwith 
 standing. And it speaks of itself, too, in plain contradistinction 
 from a confederation ; for it says that all debts contracted, and all 
 engagements entered into, by the United States, shall be as valid 
 under this Constitution as under the Confederation. It does not 
 say as valid under this compact, or this league, or this confedera 
 tion, as under the former confederation, but as valid under this 
 Constitution. 
 
 This, then, Sir, is declared to be a constitution. A constitution 
 is the fundamental law of the State ; and this is expressly declared 
 to be the supreme law. It is as if the people had said, " We pre 
 scribe this fundamental law," or "this supreme law," for they do 
 say that they establish this Constitution, and that it shall be the 
 supreme law. They say that they ordain and establish it. Now, 
 Sir, what is the common application of these words ? We do not 
 speak of ordaining leagues and compacts. If this was intended to 
 be a compact or league, and the States to be parties to it, why 
 was it not so said ? Why is there found no one expression in the 
 whole instrument indicating such an intent ? The old Confedera 
 tion was expressly called a league ; and into this league it was de 
 clared that the States, as States, severally entered. Why was not 
 similar language used in the Constitution, if a similar intention had 
 existed ? Why was it not said, " the States enter into this new 
 league," "the States form this new confederation," or "the States 
 agree to this new compact ?" Or why was it not said, in the lan 
 guage of the gentleman s resolution, that the people of the several 
 States acceded to this compact in their sovereign capacities ? What 
 reason is there for supposing that the framers of the Constitution 
 rejected expressions appropriate to their own meaning, and adopted 
 others wholly at war with that meaning ? 
 
 Again, Sir, the Constitution speaks of that political system which 
 is established as "the government of the United States." Is it not 
 doing strange violence to language to call a league or a compact 
 between sovereign powers a government f The government of a 
 State is that organization in which the political power resides. It 
 is the political being created by the constitution or fundamental 
 
68 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 law. The broad and clear difference between a government and a 
 league or compact is, that a government is a body politic ; it has a 
 will of its own ; and it possesses powers and faculties to execute 
 its own purposes. Every compact looks to some power to enforce 
 its stipulations. Even in a compact between sovereign communi 
 ties, there always exists this ultimate reference to a power to in 
 sure its execution ; although, in such case, this power is but the 
 force of one party against the force of another ; that is to say, tho 
 power of war. But a government executes its decisions by its own 
 
 ^ supreme authority. Its use of force in compelling obedience to its 
 own enactments is not war. It contemplates no opposing party 
 having a right of resistance. It rests on its own power to enforce 
 its own will ; and when it ceases to possess this power, it is no 
 longer a government. 
 
 Mr. President, I concur so generally in the very able speech of 
 the gentleman from Virginia near me, that it is not without diffi 
 dence and regret that I venture to differ with him on any point. 
 His opinions, Sir, are redolent of the doctrines of a very distin 
 guished school, for which I have the highest regard, of whose doc 
 trines I can say, what I can also say of the gentleman s speech, that, 
 N while I concur in the results, I must be permitted to hesitate about 
 some of the premises. I do not agree that the Constitution is a 
 
 I compact between States in their sovereign capacities. I do not 
 agree, that, in strictness of language, it is a compact at all. But I 
 do agree that it is founded on consent or agreement, or on com 
 pact, if the gentleman prefers that word, and means no more by it 
 than voluntary consent or agreement. The Constitution, Sir, is 
 1 not a contract, but the result of a contract ; meaning by contract 
 I no more than assent. Founded on consent, it is a government 
 proper. Adopted by the agreement of the people of the United 
 States, when adopted, it has become a Constitution. The people 
 have agreed to make a Constitution ; but when made, that Consti 
 tution becomes what its name imports. It is no longer a mere 
 agreement. Our laws, Sir, have their foundation in the agreement 
 or consent of the two Houses of Congress. We say, habitually, 
 that one House proposes a bill, and the other agrees to it; but the 
 result of this agreement is not a compact, but a law. The law, the 
 statute, is not the agreement, but something created by the agree 
 ment ; and something which, when created, has a new character, 
 and acts by its own authority. So the Constitution of the United 
 ] States, founded in or on the consent of the people, may be said to 
 | rest on compact or consent ; but it is not itself the compact, but 
 \ its result. When the people agree to erect a government, and 
 actually erect it, the thing is done, and the agreement is at an end. 
 The compact is executed, and the end designed by it attained. 
 Henceforth, the fruit of the agreement exists, but the agreement 
 itself is merged in its own accomplishment; since there can be 
 no longer a subsisting agreement or compact to form a constitution 
 or government, after that constitution or government has been 
 actually formed and established. 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 69 
 
 It appears to me, Mr. President, that the plainest account of the 
 establishment of this government presents the most just and philo 
 sophical view of its foundation. The people of the several States 
 had their separate State governments; and between the States 
 there also existed a Confederation. With that condition of things 
 the people were not satisfied, as the Confederation had been found 
 not to fulfill its intended objects. It wj_.r^^ z j^ej^foe,to 
 yect_a,jija r , .common government, wm ch shouItTpossess "certain 
 di-lmite powers, such as regarded the prosperity of the people of all 
 the States, and to be formed upon the general model of American 
 constitutions. This proposal was assented to, and an instrument 
 was presented to the people of the several States for their con 
 sideration. They approved it, and agreed to adopt it, as a Consti 
 tution. They executed that agreement ; they adopted the Consti 
 tution as a Constitution, and henceforth it must stand as a Con 
 stitution until it shall be altogether destroyed. Now, Sir, is not 
 this the truth of the whole matter ? And is not all that we have 
 heard of compact between sovereign States the mere effect of a 
 theoretical and artificial mode of reasoning upon the subject? A mode 
 of reasoning which disregards plain facts for the sake of hypothesis ? 
 
 Mr. President, the nature of sovereignty or sovereign power has 
 been extensively discussed by gentlemen on this occasion, as it 
 generally is when the origin of our government is debated. But I 
 confess myself not entirely satisfied with arguments and illustrations 
 drawn from that topic. The sovereignty of government is an idea 
 belonging to the other side of the Atlantic. No such thing is 
 known in North America. Our governments are all limited. In 
 Europe, sovereignty is of feudal origin, and imports no more than 
 the state of the sovereign. It comprises his rights, duties, exemp 
 tions, prerogatives, and powers. But with us, all power is with 
 the people. Thjftvjn]nTie_n.rft sovereign ; and they erect what gov 
 ernments they please, and confer on them such power as they 
 please. None of these governments is sovereign, in the European 
 sense of the word, all being restrained by written constitutions. 
 It seems to me, therefore, that we only perplex ourselves when we 
 attempt to explain the relations existing between the general gov 
 ernment and the several State governments, according to those 
 ideas of sovereignty which prevail under systems essentially differ 
 ent from our own. 
 
 But, Sir, to return to the Constitution itself; let me inquire what 
 it relies upon for its own continuance and support. I hear it often 
 suggested that the States, by refusing to appoint Senators and 
 Electors, might bring this government to an end. Perhaps that is 
 true ; but the same may be said of the State governments them 
 selves. Suppose the Legislature of a State, having power to ap 
 point the governor and the judges, should omit that duty, would 
 not the State government remain unorganized? No doubt all elec 
 tive governments may be broken up by a general abandonment, on 
 the part of those intrusted with political powers, of their appro 
 priate duties. But one popular government has, in this respect, as 
 
> 
 
 fQ THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 much security as another. The maintenance of this Constitution 
 does not depend on the plighted faith of the States, as States, to 
 support it; and this again shows that it is not a league. It relies 
 on individual duty and obligations. 
 I % The Constitution of the United States creates direcj. relation^ 
 * between this government and indi v idualj. Sfe*s-goT5fnment may 
 punish individuals for treason, and all other crimes in the code, 
 when committed against the United States. It has power, also, 
 to tax individuals, in any mode, and to any extent ; and it possesses 
 the further power of demanding from individuals military service. 
 Nothing certainly can more clearly distinguish a government from 
 a confederation of States than the possession of these powers. No 
 closer relations can exist between individuals and any govern 
 ment. 
 
 On the other hand, the government owes high and solemn duties 
 to every citizen of the country. It is bound to protect him in his 
 most important rights and iaterests. It makes war for his protec 
 tion, and no other government in the country can make war. It 
 makes peace for his protection, and no other government can make 
 peace. It maintains armies and navies for his defense and security, 
 and no other government is allowed to maintain them. He goes 
 abroad beneath its flag, and carries over all the earth a national 
 character, imparted to him by this government, and which no other 
 government can impart. In whatever relates to war, to peace, to 
 commerce, he knows no other government. All these, Sir, are 
 connections as dear and as sacred as can bind individuals to any 
 
 (government on earth. It is not, therefore, a compact between 
 States, but a government proper, operating directly upon individ 
 uals, yielding to them protection on the one hand, and demanding 
 from them obedience on the other. 
 
 There is no language in the whole Constitution applicable to a 
 confederation of States. If- the States be parties, as States, what 
 are their rights, and what their respective covenants and stipula 
 tions? And where are their rights, covenants, and stipulations 
 expressed ? The States engage for nothing, they promise nothing. 
 In the articles of Confederation, they did make promises, and did 
 enter into engagements, and did plight the faith of each State for 
 their fulfillment ; but in the Constitution there is nothing of that 
 kind. The reason is, that, in the Constitution, it is the people who 
 speak, and not the States. TEe "people ordain the ! Constitution, 
 and therein address themselves to the States, and to the Legisla 
 tures of the States, in the language of injunction and prohibition. 
 The Constitution utters its behests in the name and by the author 
 ity of the people, and it does not exact from States any plighted 
 public faith to maintain it. On the contrary, it makes its own 
 preservation depend on individual duty and individual obligation. 
 Sir, the States can not omit to appoint Senators and Electors. It 
 is not a matter resting in State discretion or State pleasure. The 
 Constitution has taken better care of its own preservation. It lays 
 its hand on individual conscience and individual duty. It incapa- 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. fa 
 
 citates any man to sit in the legislature of a State, who shall not 
 first have taken his solemn oath to support the Constitution of the 
 United States. From the obligation of this oath no State power 
 can discharge him. All the members of all the State legislatures 
 are as religiously bound to support the Constitution of the United 
 States as they are to support their own State Constitution. Nay, 
 Sir, they are as solemnly sworn to support it as we ourselves are, 
 who are members of Congress. 
 
 No member of a State legislature can refuse to proceed, at the 
 proper time, to elect Senators to Congress, or to provide for the 
 choice of Electors of President and Vice-President, any more than 
 the members of this Senate can refuse, when the appointed day 
 arrives, to meet the members of the other house, to count the 
 votes of those officers, and ascertain who are chosen. In both 
 cases the duty binds, and with equal strength, the conscience of 
 the individual member, and it is imposed on all .by an oath in the 
 same words. Let it then never be said, Sir, that it is a matter of 
 discretion with the States whether they will continue the govern 
 ment, or break it up by refusing to appoint Senators and to elect 
 Electors. They have no discretion in the matter. The members of 
 their legislatures can not avoid doing either, so often as the time 
 arrives, without a direct violation of their duty and their oaths ; 
 such a violation as would break up any other government. 
 
 Looking still further to the provisions of the Constitution itself, 
 in order to learn its true character, we find its great apparent pur 
 pose to be, to unite the people of all the States under one general 
 government, for certain definite objects, and, to the extent of this 
 union, to restrain the separate authority of the States. Congress 
 only can declare war ; therefore, when one State is at war with a 
 foreign nation, all must be at war. The President and the Senate 
 can only make peace ; when peace is made for one State, therefore, 
 it must be made for all. 
 
 Can anything be conceived more preposterous than that any 
 State should have power to nullify the proceedings of the general 
 government respecting peace and war? When war is declared by 
 a law of Congress, can a single State nullify that law, and remain 
 at peace? And yet she may nullify that law as well as any other. 
 If the President and Senate make peace, may one State, neverthe 
 less, continue the war ? And yet, if she can nullify a law, she may 
 quite as well nullify a treaty. 
 
 The truth is, Mr. President, and no ingenuity of argument, no 
 subtility of distinction can evade it, that as to certain purposes, the 
 people of the United States are one people. They are one in mak 
 ing war, and one in making peace ; they are one in regulating com 
 merce, and one in laying duties of imposts. The very end and 
 purpose of the Constitution was, to make them one people in these 
 particulars; and it has effectually accomplished its object. All 
 this is apparent on the face of the Constitution itself. I have 
 already said, Sir, that to obtain a power of direct legislation over 
 the people, especially in regard to imposts, was always prominent 
 
ff% THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 as a reason for getting rid of the Confederation, and forming a new 
 Constitution. Among innumerable proofs of this, before the assem 
 bling of the Convention, allow me to refer only to the report of the 
 committee of the old Congress, July, 1785. 
 
 But, Sir, let us go to the actual formation of the Constitution ; 
 let us open the journal of the Convention itself, and we shall see 
 that the very first resolution which the Convention adopted was, 
 
 " THAT A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO BE ESTABLISHED, CON 
 SISTING- OF A SUPREME LEGISLATURE, JUDICIARY, AND EXECUTIVE." 
 
 This itself completely negatives all idea of league, and com 
 pact, and confederation. Terms could not be chosen more fit to 
 express an intention to establish a national government, and to 
 banish forever all notion of a compact between sovereign States. 
 
 This resolution w.as adopted on the 30th of May, 1787. After 
 ward, the style was altered, and, instead of being called a national 
 government, it was called the government of the United States ; 
 but the substance of this resolution was retained, and was at the 
 head of that list of resolutions which was afterward sent to the 
 committee who were to frame the instrument. 
 
 It is true, there were gentlemen in the Convention who were for 
 retaining the Confederation, and amending its articles ; but the ma 
 jority were against this, and were for a national government. Mr. 
 Patterson s propositions, which were for continuing the Articles of 
 Confederation with additional powers, were submitted to the Con 
 vention on the 15th of June, and referred to the committee of the 
 whole. The resolution forming the basis of a national government, 
 which had once been agreed to in the committee of the whole, and 
 reported, were recommended to the same committee, on the same 
 day. The Convention, then, in committee of the whole, on the 
 19th day of June, had both these plans before them ; that is to say, 
 the plan of a confederacy, or compact, between States, and the 
 plan of a national government. Both these plans were considered 
 and debated, and the committee reported, " That they do not agree 
 to the propositions offered by the Honorable Mr. Patterson, but 
 that they again submit the resolutions formerly reported." If, Sir, 
 any historical fact in the world be plain and undeniable, it is that 
 the Convention deliberated on the expediency of continuing the 
 Confederation, with some amendments, and rejected that scheme, 
 and adopted the plan of a national government, with a legislature, 
 an executive, and a judiciary of its own. They were asked to 
 preserve the league; they rejected the proposition. They were 
 asked to continue the existing compact between States ; they re 
 jected it. They rejected compact, league, and confederation, and 
 set themselyes about framing the constitution of a national govern 
 ment, and they accomplished what they undertook. 
 
 If men will open their eyes fairly to the lights of history, it is 
 impossible to be deceived on this point. The great object was to 
 supersede the Confederation by a regular government ; because, 
 under the Confederation, Congress had power only to make requi 
 sitions on States, and if States declined compliance, as they did, 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 73 
 
 there was no remedy but war against such delinquent States. It 
 would seem, from Mr. Jefferson s correspondence, in 1786 and 1787, 
 that he was of opinion that even this remedy ought to be tried. 
 " There will be no money in the treasury," said he, "till the con 
 federacy shows its teeth;" and he suggests that a single frigate 
 would soon levy, on the commerce of a delinquent State, the defi 
 ciency of its contribution. But this would be war ; and it was 
 evident that a confederacy could not long hold together, which 
 should be at war with its members. The Constitution was adopted 
 to avoid this necessity. It was adopted that there might be a gov 
 ernment which should act directly on individuals, without borrow 
 ing aid from the State governments. This is clear as light itself 
 on the very face of the provisions of the Constitution, and its 
 whole history tends to the same conclusion. Its framers gave this 
 very reason for their work in the most distinct terms. Allow me 
 to quote but one or two proofs, out of hundreds. That State, so 
 small in territory, but so distinguished for learning and talent, Con 
 necticut, had sent to the general Convention, among other mem 
 bers, Samuel Johnston and Oliver Ellsworth. The Constitution 
 having been framed, it was submitted to a convention of the people 
 of Connecticut for ratification on the part of that State, and Mr. 
 Johnston and Mr. Ellsworth were also members of this conven 
 tion. On the first day of the debates, being called on to explain 
 the reasons which led the Convention at Philadelphia to recom 
 mend such a Constitution, after showing the insufficiency of the 
 existing confederacy, inasmuch as it applied to States, as States, 
 Mr. Johnston proceeded to say : 
 
 " The Convention saw this imperfection in attempting to legis 
 late for States in their political capacity, that the coercion of law 
 can be exercised by nothing but a military force. They have, there 
 fore, gone upon entirely new ground. They fraveJrtT-mAfl rm^ n^g 
 nation out of the individual States. Tlio Constitution vests in the 
 genera] legislature :i -power to make laws in matters of national con 
 cern ; to appoint judges to decide upon these laws ; and to appoint 
 officers to carry them into execution. This excludes the idea of an 
 armed force. The power which is to enforce these laws is to be a 
 legal power, vested in proper magistrates. The force which is to 
 be employed is the energy of law ; and this force is to operate 
 only upon individuals who fail in their duty to their country. This 
 is the peculiar glory of the Constitution, that it depends upon the 
 mild and equal energy of the magistracy for the execution of the 
 laws." 
 
 In the further course of the debate, Mr. Ellsworth said 
 " In republics it is a fundamental principle that the majority gov 
 ern, and that the minority comply with the general voice. How 
 contrary, then, to republican principles, how humiliating, is our 
 present situation! A single State can rise up and put a veto upon 
 the most important public measures. We have seen this actually 
 take place ; a single State has controlled the general voice of the 
 Union; a i-ninnrity^ a. yp.rj_sTTiR]1 Tninnrjty, has governed us. So 
 
(^4 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 far is this from being consistent with republican principles, that it 
 is, in effect, the worst species of monarchy. 
 
 " Hence we see how necessary for the Union is a coercive prin 
 ciple. No man pretends the contrary. We all see and feel this 
 necessity. The only question is, shall it be a coercion of law, or a 
 coercion of arms ? There is no other possible alternative. Where 
 will those who oppose a coercion of law come out ? Where will 
 they end ? A necessary consequence of their principle is a war of 
 the States, one against another. I am for coercion by law ; that 
 coercion which acts only upon delinquent individuals. This Con 
 stitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, States, in their 
 political capacities. No coercion is applicable to such bodies, but 
 that of an armed force. If we should attempt to execute the laws 
 of the Union by sending an armed force against a delinquent State, 
 it would involve the good and bad, the innocent and guilty, in the 
 same calamity. But this legal coercion singles out the guilty in 
 dividual, and punishes him for breaking the laws of the Union." 
 
 Indeed, Sir, if we look to all cotemporary history, to the num 
 bers of the Federalist, to the debates in conventions, to the pub 
 lications of friends and foes, they all agree that a change had been 
 made from a confederacy of States to a different system ; they all 
 agree that the Convention had formed a Constitution for a national 
 government. With this result some were satisfied and some were 
 dissatisfied ; but all admitted that the thing had been done. In none 
 of these various productions and publications did any one intimate 
 that the new Constitution was but another compact between States 
 in their sovereign capacities. I do not find such an opinion ad 
 vanced in a single instance. Everywhere the people were told 
 that the old Confederation was to be abandoned, and a new system 
 to be tried ; that a proper government was proposed, to be founded 
 in the name of the people, and to have a regular organization of 
 its own. Everywhere the people were told that it was to be a 
 government with direct powers to make laws over individuals, and 
 to lay taxes and imposts without the consent of the States. Every 
 where it was understood to be a popular Constitution. It came to 
 the people for their adoption, and was to rest on the same deep 
 foundations as the State constitutions themselves. Its most distin 
 guished advocates, who had been themselves members of the Con 
 vention, declared that the very object of submitting the Constitu 
 tion to the people was, to preclude the possibility of its being 
 regarded as a mere compact. "However gross a heresy," say the 
 writers of the Federalist, " it may be to maintain that a party to a 
 compact has a right to revoke that compact, the doctrine itself has 
 had respectable advocates. The possibility of a question of this 
 nature proves the necessity of laying the foundations of our na 
 tional government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated 
 authority. The fabric of, American Empire ought to rest on the 
 solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE." 
 
 Such is the language, Sir, addressed to the people, while they yet 
 had the Constitution under consideration. The powers conferred 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 75 
 
 on the new government were perfectly well understood to be con 
 ferred, not by any State, or the people of any State, but by the 
 people of the United States. Virginia is more explicit, perhaps, in 
 this particular than any other State. Her convention, assembled 
 to ratify the Constitution, " in the name and behalf of the people 
 of Virginia, declare and make known, that the powers granted 
 under the Constitution, being derived from the people of the United 
 States, may be resumed by them whenever the same shall be per 
 verted to their injury or oppression. 
 
 Is this language which describes the formation of a compact be 
 tween States, or language describing the grant of powers to a new 
 government, by the whole people of the United States ? 
 
 Among all the other ratifications, there is not one which speaks 
 of the Constitution as a compact between States. Those of Massa 
 chusetts and New Hampshire express the transaction, in my opinion, 
 with sufficient accuracy. They recognize the Divine goodness " in 
 affording THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES an opportunity of 
 entering into an explicit and solemn compact with each other, ly 
 assenting to and ratifying a new Constitution" You will observe, 
 Sir, that it is the PEOPLE, and not the States, who have entered 
 into this compact ; and it is the PEOPLE of all the United States. 
 These conventions, by this form of expression, meant merely to 
 say, that the people of the United States had, by the blessing of 
 Providence, enjoyed the opportunities of establishing a new Con 
 stitution, founded in the consent of the people. This consent of 
 the people has been called, by European writers, the social com 
 pact ; and, in conformity to this common mode of expression, these 
 conventions speak of that assent, on which the new Constitution 
 was to rest, as an explicit and solemn compact, not which the 
 States had entered into with each other, but which the people of 
 the United States had entered into. 
 
 Finally, Sir, how can any man get over the words of the Con 
 stitution itself? "WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, DO 
 
 OEDAIN AND ESTABLISH THIS CONSTITUTION." TllCSO WOrds must 
 
 cease to be a part of the Constitution, they must be obliterated 
 from the parchmeut on which they are written, before any human 
 ingenuity or human argument can remove the popular basis on 
 which that Constitution rests, and turn the instrument into a mere 
 compact between sovereign States. 
 
 The second proposition, Sir, which I propose to maintain, Isp 
 that no State authority can dissolve the relations subsisting be 
 tween the government of the United States and individuals ; that 
 nothing can dissolve these relations but revolution; and that, 
 therefore, there can be no such thing as secession without revolu 
 tion. All this follows, it seems to me, as a just consequence, if it 
 be first proved that the Constitution of the United States is a gov 
 ernment proper, owing protection to individuals, and entitled to 
 their obedience. 
 
 The people. Sir, in every State, live under two governments. 
 They owe obedience to both. These governments, though distinct, 
 
76 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 are not adverse. Each, has its separate sphere, and its peculiar 
 powers and duties. It is not a contest between two sovereigns 
 for the same power, like the wars of the rival houses in England ; 
 nor is it a dispute between a government de facto and a govern 
 ment de jure. It is the case of a division of powers between two 
 governments, made by the people, to whom both are responsible. 
 Neither can dispense with the duty which individuals owe to the 
 other; neither can call itself master of the other; the people are 
 masters of both./ The division of power, it is true, is, in a great 
 measure, unknown in Europe. It is the peculiar system of 
 America ; and, though new and singular, it is not incomprehensible. 
 The State constitutions are established by the people of the States. 
 This Constitution is established by the people of ah 1 the States. 
 How, then, can a State secede ? How can a State undo what the 
 whole people have done ? How can she absolve her citizens from 
 their obedience to the laws of the United States ? How can she 
 annul their obligations and oaths? How can the members of her 
 legislature renounce their own oaths ? Sir, secession, as a revo 
 lutionary right, is intelligible ; as a right to be proclaimed in the 
 midst of civil commotions, and asserted at the head of armies, I 
 can understand it. But as a practical right, existing under the 
 Constitution, and in conformity with its provisions, it seems to me 
 to be nothing but a plain absurdity ; for it supposes resistance to 
 government, under the authority of government itself; it supposes 
 dismemberment, without violating the principles of union ; it sup 
 poses opposition to law, without crime ; it supposes the violation 
 of oaths, without responsibility ; it supposes the total overthrow 
 of government, without revolution. 
 
 The Constitution, Sir, regards itself as perpetual and immortal. 
 It seeks to establish a union among the people of the States, which 
 shall last through all time. Or, if the common fate of things hu 
 man must be expected at some period to happen to it, yet that 
 catastrophe is not anticipated. 
 
 The instrument contains ample provisions for its amendments at 
 all times ; none for its abandonment, at any time. It declares that 
 new States may come into the Union, but it does not declare that 
 old States may go out. The Union is not a temporary partnership 
 of States. It is the association of the people, under a constitution 
 of government, uniting their power, joining together their highest 
 interests, cementing their present enjoyments, and blending in one 
 indivisible mass all their hopes for the future. Whatsoever is 
 steadfast in just political principles ; whatsoever is permanent in 
 the structure of human society ; whatsoever there is which can de 
 rive an enduring character from being founded on deep-laid princi 
 ples of constitutional liberty and on the broad foundations of public 
 will all these unite to entitle this instrument to be regarded as a 
 permanent constitution of government. 
 
 In the next place, Mr. President, I contend that there is a su 
 preme law of the land, consisting of the Constitution, acts of Con 
 gress passed in pursuance of it, and the public treaties. This will 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. fjfj 
 
 not be denied, because such are the very words of the Constitu 
 tion. But I contend, further, that it rightfully belongs to Congress, 
 and to the courts of the ^ Umteci StaldtL Itii gutU* 1 J rhfl <iimf*H "" ni 
 
 this supreme luw, in doubtful cases. This is denied; and here 
 arises a great practical question : Who is to construe finally tlic, 
 the Constitution of the United Sttofajl we all agree tnat the 
 Constitution is the supreme law ; but wHo shall interpret that law ? 
 In our system of the division of powers between different govern 
 ments, controversies will necessarily sometimes arise, respecting 
 the extent of the powers of each. Who shall decide these contro 
 versies ? Does it rest with the general government, in all or any 
 of its departments, to exercise the office of final interpreter? Or 
 may each of the States, as well as the general government, claim 
 this right of ultimate decision? The practical result of this whole 
 debate turns on this point. The gentleman contends that each 
 State may judge for itself of any alleged violation of the Consti* 
 tution, and may finally decide for itself, and may execute its own 
 decisions by its own power. All the recent proceedings in South 
 Carolina are founded on this claim of right. Her convention has 
 pronouaced the revenue laws of the United States unconstitutional : 
 and this decision she does not allow any authority of the United 
 States to overrule or reverse. Of course she rejects the authority 
 of Congress, because the very object of the ordinance is to reverse 
 the decision of Congress ; and she rejects, too, the authority of the 
 courts of the United States, because she expressly prohibits all ap 
 peal to those courts. It is in order to sustain this asserted right of 
 being her own judge, that she pronounces the Constitution of the 
 United States to be but a compact, to which she is a party, and 
 a sovereign party. If this be established, then the inference is 
 supposed to follow, that, being sovereign, there is no power to con 
 trol her decision ; and her own judgment on her own compact is, 
 and must be, conclusive. 
 
 I have already endeavored, Sir, to point out the practical conse 
 quences of this doctrine, and to show how utterly inconsistent it is 
 with all ideas of regular government, and how soon its adoption 
 would involve the whole country in revolution and absolute anarchy. 
 I hope it is easy now to show, Sir, that a doctrine bringing such 
 consequences with it is not well founded ; that it has nothing to 
 stand on but theory and assumption ; and that it is refuted by plain 
 and express constitutional provisions. I think the government o 
 the United States does possess, in its appropriate departments, tho 
 authority of final decision on questions of disputed power, I think 
 it possesses this authority, both by necessary implication and by 
 express grant. 
 
 It will not be denied, Sir, that this authority naturally belongs 
 to all governments. They all exercise it from necessity, and as a con 
 sequence of the exercise of other powers. The State governments 
 themselves possess it, except in that class of questions which may 
 arise between them and the general government, and in regard to 
 which they have surrendered it, as well by the nature of the case 
 
^g THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 as by clear constitutional provisions. In other and ordinary cases, 
 whether a particular law be in conformity to the Constitution of 
 the State is a question which the State legislature or the State 
 judiciary must determine. We all know that these questions arise 
 daily in the State governments, and are decided by those govern 
 ments; and I know no government which does not exercise a 
 similar power. 
 
 Upon general principles, then, the government of the United 
 States possesses this authority ; and this would hardly be denied 
 were it not that there are other governments. But since there 
 are State governments, and since these, like other governments, or 
 dinarily construe their own powers, if the government of the 
 United States construes its own powers, also, which construction 
 is to prevail in the case of opposite constructions ? And again, as in 
 the case now actually before us, the State governments may under 
 take, not only to construe" their own powers, but to decide directly 
 on the extent -of the powers of Congress. Congress has passed a 
 law as being within its just powers ; South Carolina denies that 
 this law is within its just powers, and insists that she has a right 
 to decide this point, and that her decision is final. How are these 
 questions to be settled ? 
 
 In my opinion, Sir, even if the Constitution of the United States 
 had made no express provision for such cases, it would yet be diffi 
 cult to maintain that, in a Constitution existing over four-and- 
 tweuty States, with equal authority over all, one could claim a 
 right of construing it for the whole. This would seem a manifest 
 impropriety ; indeed, an absurdity. If the Constitution is a gov 
 ernment existing over all the States, though with limited powers, 
 it necessarily follows that, to the extent of those powers, it must 
 be supreme. If it be not superior to the authority of a particular 
 State, it is not a national government. But as it is a government, 
 as it has a legislative power of its own, and a judicial power co 
 extensive with the legislative, the inference is irresistible thatjkliis 
 government, thus created jby the whole, and for the whole, must 
 Lave an authority superior to that of the particular government of 
 any one part. Congress is the legislature of all the people of the 
 United States; the judiciary of the general government is the 
 judiciary of all the people of the United States. To hold, there 
 fore, that this legislature and this judiciary are subordinate in 
 authority to the legislature and judiciary of a single State, is doing 
 violence to all common sense, and overturning all established prin 
 ciples. Congress must judge of the extent of its own powers so 
 often as it is called on to exercise them, or it can not act at all ; and it 
 must also act independent of State control, or it can not act at all. 
 
 The right of State interposition strikes at the very foundation of 
 the legislative powers of Congress. It possesses no effective legis 
 lative power, if such right of State interposition exists ; because it 
 can pass no law not subject to abrogation. It can not make laws for 
 the Union, if any part of the Union may pronounce its enactments 
 void and of no effect. Its forms of legislation would be an idle 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. tjg 
 
 ceremony, if, after all, any one of four-and-twenty States might bid 
 defiance to its authority. Without express provision in the Consti 
 tution, therefore, Sir, this whole question is necessarily decided by 
 those provisions which create a legislative power and a judicial 
 power. If these exist in a government intended for the whole, 
 the inevitable consequence is that the laws of this legislative power, 
 and the decisions of this judicial power must be binding on and 
 over the whole. No man can form the conception of a government 
 existing over four-and-twenty States, with a regular legislative and 
 judicial power, and of the existence at the same time of an author 
 ity, residing elsewhere, to resist, at pleasure or discretion, the enact 
 ments and the decisions of such government. I maintain, there 
 fore, Sir, that from the nature of the case, and as an inference 
 wholly unavoidable, the acts of Congress and the decisions of the 
 national courts must be of higher authority than State laws and 
 State decisions. If this be not so, there is, there can be, no gen 
 eral government. 
 
 But, Mr. President, the Constitution has not left this cardinal 
 point without full and explicit provisions. First, as to the authority 
 of Congress. Having enumerated the specific powers conferred on 
 Congress, the Constitution adds, as a distinct and substantive clause, 
 the following, -viz. : "To make all laws which shall be necessary 
 and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and 
 all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of 
 the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." If this 
 means anything, it means that Congress may judge of the true ex 
 tent and just interpretation of the specific powers granted to it, 
 and may judge also of what is necessary and proper for executing 
 those powers. If Congress is to judge of what is necessary for 
 the execution of its powers, it must of necessity judge of the ex 
 tent and interpretation of those powers. 
 
 And in regard, Sir, to the judiciary, the Constitution is still more 
 express and emphatic. It declares that the judicial power shah 1 
 extend to all cases in law or equity arising under the Constitution, 
 laws of the United States, and treaties ; that there shall be one 
 Supreme Court, and that this Supreme Court shall have appellate 
 jurisdiction of all these cases, subject to such exceptions as Con 
 gress may make. It is impossible to escape from the generality 
 of these words. If a case arises under the Constitution, that is, if 
 a case arises depending on the construction of the Constitution, 
 the judicial power of the United States extends to it. It reaches 
 the case, the question ; it attaches the power of the national judica 
 ture to the case itself, in whatever court it may arise or exist ; and 
 in this case the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over all 
 Courts whatever. No language could provide with more effect 
 and precision than is here done, for subjecting constitutional ques 
 tions to the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court. And, Sir, this 
 is exactly what the Convention found it necessary to provide for, 
 and intended to provide for. It is, too, exactly what the people 
 were universally told was done when they adopted the Constitu- 
 
80 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 tion. One of the first resolutions adopted by the Convention was 
 in these words, viz. : " That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary 
 shall extend to cases which respect the collection of the national 
 revenue, and questions which involve the national peace and har 
 mony." Now, Sir, this either had no sensible meaning at all, or 
 else it meant that the jurisdiction of the national judiciary should 
 extend to these questions with a paramount authority. It is not to be 
 supposed that the Convention intended that the power of the national 
 judiciary should extend to these questions, and that the power of the 
 judicatures of the States should also extend to them, with equal 
 power of final decision. This would be to defeat the whole object 
 of the provision. There were thirteen judicatures already in ex 
 istence. The evil complained of, or the danger to be guarded 
 against, was contradiction and repugnance in the decisions of these 
 judicatures. If the framers- of the Constitution meant to create a 
 fourteenth, and yet not to give it power to revise and control the 
 decisions of the existing thirteen, then they only intended to aug 
 ment the existing evil and the apprehended danger by increasing 
 still further the chances of discordant judgments. Why, Sir, has 
 it become a settled axiom in politics that every judgment has a 
 judicial power coextensive with its legislative power ? Certainly, 
 there is only this reason, namely, that the laws may receive a uni 
 form interpretation and a uniform execution. This object can not 
 be otherwise attained. A statute is what it is judicially inter 
 preted to be ; and if it be constructed one way in New Hampshire, 
 and another way in Georgia, there is no uniform law. One Supreme 
 Court, with appellate and final jurisdiction, is the natural and only 
 adequate means, in any government, to secure this uniformity. The 
 Convention saw all this clearly ; and the resolution which I have 
 quoted, never afterward rescinded, passed through various modifi 
 cations, till it finally received the form which the article now bears 
 in the Constitution. 
 
 It is undeniably true, then, that the framers of the Constitution 
 intended to create a national judicial power, which should be 
 
 Earamount on national subjects. And after the Constitution was 
 amed, and while the whole country was engaged in discussing 
 its merits, one of its most distinguished advocates, Mr. Madison, 
 told the people that it icas true that, in controversies relating to 
 the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is 
 ultimately to decide is to be established under the general govern 
 ment. Mr. Martin, who had been a member of the Convention, 
 asserted the same thing to the legislature of Maryland, and urged 
 it as a reason for rejecting the Constitution. Mr. Pinckney, him 
 self also a leading member of the Convention, declared it to the 
 people of South Carolina. Everywhere it was admitted, by friends 
 and foes, that this power was in the Constitution. By some it was 
 thought dangerous, by most it was thought necessary ; but by all 
 it was agreed to be a power actually contained in the instrument. 
 The Convention saw the absolute necessity of some control in the 
 national government over State laws. Different modes of estab- 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. gl 
 
 lishing this control were suggested and considered. At one time 
 it was proposed that the laws of the States should, from time to 
 time, he laid before Congress, and that Congress should possess 
 a negative over them. But this was thought inexpedient and in 
 admissible ; and in its place, and expressly as a substitute for it, 
 the existing provision was introduced ; that is to say, a provision 
 by which the federal courts should have authority to overrule such 
 State laws as might be in manifest contravention of the Constitu 
 tion. The writers of the Federalist, in explaining the Constitution, 
 while it was yet pending before the people, and still unadopted, 
 give this account of the matter in terms, and assign this reason for 
 the article as it now stands. By this provision Congress escaped 
 the necessity of any revision of State laws, left the whole sphere 
 of State legislation quite untouched, and yet obtained a security 
 against any infringement of the constitutional power of the general 
 government. Indeed, Sir, allow me to ask again, if the national 
 judiciary was not to exercise a power of revision on constitutional 
 questions over the judiciaries of the States, why was any national 
 judicature erected at all? Can any man give a sensible reason for 
 having a judicial power in this government, unless it be for the 
 sake of maintaining a uniformity of decision on questions arising 
 under the Constitution and laws of Congress, and insuring its exe 
 cution? And does not this very idea of uniformity necessarily 
 imply that the construction given by the national courts is to be 
 the prevailing construction? How else, Sir, is it possible that 
 uniformity can be preserved ? 
 
 Gentlemen appear to me, Sir, to look at but one side of the 
 question. They regard only the supposed danger of trusting a 
 government with the interpretation of its own powers. But will 
 they view the question in its other aspect ? Will they show us 
 how it is possible for a government to get along with four-and- 
 twenty interpreters of its laws and powers? Gentlemen argue, 
 too, as if, in these cases, the State would be always right, and the 
 general government always wrong. But suppose the reverse ; 
 suppose the State wrong (arid, since they differ, some of them 
 must be wrong) ; are the most important and essential operations 
 of the government to be embarrassed and arrested because one 
 State holds the contrary opinion ? Mr. President, every argument 
 which refers the constitutionality of acts of Congress to State de 
 cision, appeals from the majority to the minority ; it appeals from 
 the common interest to a particular interest ; from the counsels 
 of all to the counsel of one ; and endeavors to supersede the judg 
 ment of the whole by the judgment of a part. 
 
 I think it is clear, Sir, that the Constitution, by express- pro 
 vision, by definite and unequivocal words, as well as by necessary 
 implication, lias constituted tlie Supreme Court of the United States 
 the appellate tribunal in all cases of a constitutional nature which 
 assume the. shape of a suit, in law or .equity. And I think I can 
 lot do Letter than to leave this part of the subject by reading the 
 remarks made upon it in the convention of Connecticut by Mr. 
 
82 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 Ellsworth a gentleman, Sir, who has left behind him, on the 
 records of the government of his country, proofs of the clearest 
 intelligence and of the deepest sagacity, as well as of the utmost 
 purity and integrity of character. "This Constitution," says he, 
 u defines the extent of the powers of the general government. If 
 the general legislature should, at any time, overleap their limits, 
 the judicial department is a constitutional check. If the United 
 States go beyond their powers, if they make a law which the Con 
 stitution does not authorize, it is void; and the judiciary power, 
 the national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are to be 
 made independent, will declare it to be void. On the other hand, 
 if the States go beyond their limits, if they make a law which is 
 a usurpation upon the general government, the law is void ; and 
 upright, independent judges will declare it to be so." Nor did 
 this remain merely matter of private opinion. In the very first 
 session of the first Congress, with all these well-known objects, 
 both of the Convention and the people, full and fresh in his mind, 
 Mr. Ellsworth, as is generally understood, reported the bill for the 
 organization of the judicial department, and in that bill made pro 
 vision for the exercise of this appellate power of the Supreme 
 Court, in all the proper cases, in whatsoever court arising ; and 
 this appellate power has now been exercised for more than forty 
 years, without interruption, and without doubt. 
 
 As to the cases, Sir, which do not come before the courts, those 
 political questions which terminate with the enactments of Con 
 gress, it is of necessity that these should be ultimately decided by 
 Congress itself. Like other legislatures, it must be trusted with 
 this power. The members of Congress are chosen by the people, 
 and they are answerable to the people ; like other public agents, 
 they are bound by oath to support the Constitution. These are 
 the securities that they will not violate their duty, nor transcend 
 their powers. They are the same securities that prevail in other 
 popular governments ; nor is it easy to see how grants of power 
 can be more safely guarded, without rendering them nugatory. 
 If the case can not come before the courts, and if Congress be not 
 trusted with its decision, who shall decide it? The gentleman 
 says, each State is to decide it for herself. If so, then, as I have 
 already urged, what is law in one State is not law in another. 
 Or, if the resistance of one State compels an entire repeal of the 
 law, then a minority, and that a small one, governs the whole 
 country. 
 
 Sir, those who espouse the doctrines of nullification reject, as it 
 seems to me, the first great principle of all republican liberty; that 
 is, that the majority must govern. In matters of common concern, 
 the judgment of a majority must stand as the judgment of the 
 whole. This is a law imposed on us by the absolute necessity of 
 the case ; and if we do not act upon it, there is no possibility of 
 maintaining any government but despotism. We hear loud and 
 repeated denunciations against what is called majority government. 
 It is declared, with much warmth, that a majority government can 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 83 
 
 not be maintained in the United States. What, then, do gentlemen 
 wish ? Do they wish to establish a minority government ? Do 
 they wish to subject the will of the many to the will of the few? 
 The honorable gentleman from South Carolina has spoken of abso 
 lute majorities, and majorities concurrent; language wholly un 
 known to our Constitution, and to which it is not easy to affix defi 
 nite ideas. As far as I understand it, it would teach us that the abso 
 lute majority may be found in Congress, but the majority concurrent 
 must be looked for in the States ; that is to say, stripping the mat 
 ter of this novelty of phrase, that the dissent of one or more 
 States, as States, renders void the decision of a majority of Con 
 gress, so far as that State is concerned. And so this doctrine, run 
 ning but a short career, like other dogmas of the day, terminates 
 in nullification. 
 
 If this vehement invective against majorities meant no more than 
 that, in the construction of government, it is wise to provide checks 
 and balances, so that there should be various limitations on the 
 power of the mere majority, it would only mean what the Consti 
 tution of the United States has already abundantly provided. It is 
 full of such checks and balances. In its very organization it adopts 
 a broad and most effective principle in the restraint of the power 
 of mere majorities. A majority of the people elects the House of 
 Representatives, but it does not elect the Senate, The Senate is 
 elected by the States, each State having, in this respect, an equal 
 power. No law, therefore, can pass without the assent of the 
 representatives of the people, and a majority of the representa 
 tives of the States also. A majority of the representatives of the 
 people must concur, and a majority of the States must concur, in 
 every act of Congress ; and the President is elected on a plan com 
 pound of both these principles. But having composed one house 
 of representatives chosen by the people in each State, according to 
 their numbers, and the other of an equal number of members from 
 every State, whether larger or smaller, the Constitution gives to 
 majorities in these houses thus constituted, the full and entire pow 
 er of passing laws, subject always to the constitutional restrictions 
 and to the approval of the. President. To subject them to any 
 other power is clear usurpation, The majority of one house may 
 be controlled by the majority of the other, and both may be re 
 strained by the President s negative. These are checks and bal 
 ances provided by the Constitution, existing in the government 
 itself, and wisely intended to secure deliberation and caution in 
 legislative proceedings. But to resist the wjjl of the majority in 
 both houses, thus constitutionally exercised ; to insist on the law 
 fulness of interposition by an extraneous power; to claim the right 
 of defeating the will of Congress, by setting up against it the will 
 of a single State is neither more nor less, as it strikes me, than a 
 plain attempt to overthrow the government. The constituted au 
 thorities of the United States are no longer a government, if they 
 be not masters of their own will; they are no longer a government, 
 if an external power may arrest their proceedings ; they are no 
 
84 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 longer a government, if acts passed by both houses, and approved 
 by the President, may be nullified by State vetoes or State ordi 
 nances. Does any one suppose it could make any difference, as to 
 the binding authority of an act of Congress, and of the duty of a 
 State to respect it, whether it passed by a mere majority of both 
 houses, or by three fourths of each, or the unanimous vote of each ? 
 "Within the limits and restrictions of the Constitution, the govern 
 ment of the United States, like all other popular governments, acts 
 by majorities. It can act no otherwise. Whoever, therefore, de 
 nounces the government of majorities, denounces the government 
 of his own country, and denounces all free governments. And 
 whoever would restrain these majorities, while acting within their 
 constitutional limits, by an external power, whatever he may in 
 tend, asserts principles which, if adopted, can lead to nothing else 
 than the destruction of the government itself. 
 
 Does not the gentleman perceive, Sir, how his argument against 
 majorities might here be retorted upon him ? Does he not see how 
 cogently he might be asked, whether it be the character of nullifi 
 cation to practice what it preaches ? Look to South Carolina at^ 
 the present moment. How far are the rights of minorities there 
 respected ? I confess, Sir, I have not known, in peaceable times, 
 the power of the majority carried with a higher hand, or upheld 
 with more relentless disregard of the rights, feelings, and principles 
 of the minority a minority embracing, as the gentleman himself 
 will admit, a large portion of the worth and respectability of the 
 State, a minority, comprehending in its numbers men who have 
 been associated with him, and with us, in these halls of legislation ; 
 men who have served their country at home and honored it abroad ; 
 men who would cheerfully lay down their lives for their native 
 State, in any cause which they could regard as the cause of honor 
 and duty; men above fear and above reproach; whose deepest 
 grief and distress spring from the conviction that the present pro 
 ceedings of the State must ultimately reflect discredit upon her. 
 How is this minority, how are these men regarded? They are 
 enthralled and disfranchised by ordinances and acts of legislation ; 
 subjected to tests and oaths, incompatible, as they conscientiously 
 think, with oaths already taken, and obligations already assumed ; 
 they are proscribed and denounced as recreants to duty and patriot 
 ism, and slaves to a foreign power. Both the spirit which pursues 
 them, and the positive measures which emanate from that spirit, 
 are harsh and prescriptive beyond all precedent within my knowl 
 edge, except in periods of professed revolution. 
 
 It is not, Sir, one would think, for those who approve these pro 
 ceedings, to complain of the power of majorities. 
 
 Mr. President, all popular governments rest on two principles, or 
 two assumptions : 
 
 First. That there is so far a common interest among those over 
 whom the government extends, as that it may provide for the de 
 fense, protection, and good government of the whole, -without injus 
 tice or oppression to parts ; and 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 85 
 
 Secondly. That the representatives of the people, and espe 
 cially the people themselves, are secure against general corruption, 
 and may be trusted, therefore, with the exercise of power. 
 
 Whoever argues against these principles argues against the prac 
 ticability of all free governments. And whoever admits these, 
 must admit, or can not deny, that power is as safe in the hands of 
 Congress as in those of other representative bodies. Congress is 
 not irresponsible. Its members are agents of the people, elected 
 by them, answerable to them, and liable to be displaced or super 
 seded, at their pleasure ; and they possess as fair a claim to the 
 confidence of the people, while they continue to deserve it, as any 
 other public political agents. . 
 
 If then, Sir, the manifest intention of the Convention, and the 
 cotemporary admission of both friends and foes, prove anything ; 
 if the plain text of the instrument itself, as well as the necessary 
 implication from other provisions, prove anything; if the early 
 legislation of Congress, the course of judicial decisions, acquiesced 
 in by all the States for forty years, prove anything then it is 
 proved that there is a supreme law and a final interpreter. 
 
 My fourth and last proposition, Mr. President, was, that any 
 attempt by a State to abrogate or nullify acts of Congress, is a 
 usurpation on the powers of the general government, and on the 
 equal rights of other States, a violation of the Constitution, and a 
 proceeding essentially revolutionary. This is undoubtedly true, if 
 the preceding propositions be regarded as proved. If the govern 
 ment of the United States be trusted with the duty, in any depart 
 ment, of declaring the extent of its own powers, then a State ordi 
 nance, or act of legislation, authorizing resistance to an act of 
 Congress, on the alleged ground of its unconstitutionality, is mani 
 festly a usurpation upon its powers. If the States have equal rights 
 in matters concerning the whole, then for one State to set up her 
 judgment against the judgment of the rest, and to insist on execut 
 ing that judgment by force, is also a manifest usurpation on the 
 rights of other States. If the Constitution of the United States be 
 a government proper, with authority to pass laws, and to give them 
 a uniform interpretation and execution, then the interpretation of 
 a State, to enforce her own construction, and to resist, as to her 
 self, that law which binds the other States, is a violation of the 
 Constitution. 
 
 If that be revolutionary which arrests the legislative, execu 
 tive, and judicial power of government, dispenses w r ith existing 
 oaths and obligations of obedience, and elevates another power 
 to supreme dominion, then nullification is revolutionary. Or if 
 that be revolutionary, the natural tendency and practical effect of 
 which are to break the Union into fragments, to sever all connec 
 tion among the people of the respective States, and to prostrate 
 this general government in the dust, then nullification is revolu 
 tionary. 
 
 Nullification, Sir, is as distinctly revolutionary as secession ; but 
 I can not say that the revolution which it seeks is one of so respect- 
 
gg THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 able a character. Secession would, it is true, abandon the Consti 
 tution altogether ; but then it would profess to abandon it. What 
 ever other inconsistencies it might run into, one, at least, it would 
 avoid. It would not belong to a government, while it rejected its 
 authority. It would not repel the burden, and continue to enjoy 
 the benefits. It would not aid in passing laws which others are to 
 obey, and yet reject their authority as to itself. It would not un 
 dertake to reconcile obedience to public authority with an asserted 
 right of command over that same authority. It would not be in 
 the government, and above the government, at the same time. But 
 though secession may be a more respectable mode of attaining the 
 ^object than nullification, it is not more truly revolutionary. Each 
 and both resist the constitutional authorities; each and both would 
 sever the Union and subvert the government. 
 
 Mr. President, having detained the Senate so long already, I will 
 not now examine at length the ordinance and laws of South Caro 
 lina. These papers are well drawn for their purpose. Their authors 
 understood their own objects. They are called a peaceful remedy, 
 and we have been told that South Carolina, after all, intends nothing 
 but a lawsuit. A very few words, Sir, will show the nature of this 
 peaceful remedy, and of the lawsuit which South Carolina contem 
 plates. 
 
 In the first place, the ordinance declares the law of last July, and 
 all other laws of the United States laying duties, to be absolutely 
 null and void, and makes it unlawful for the constituted authorities 
 of the United States to enforce the payment of such duties. It is 
 therefore, Sir, an indictable offense, at this moment, in South Car 
 olina, for any person to be concerned in collecting revenue under 
 the laws of the United States. It being declared, by what is con 
 sidered a fundamental law of the State, unlawful to collect these 
 duties, an indictment lies, of course, against any one concerned in 
 such collection ; and he is, on general principles, liable to be pun 
 ished by fine and imprisonment. The terms, it is true, are, that it 
 is unlawful "to enforce the payment of duties;" but every custom 
 house officer enforces payment while he detains the goods in order 
 to obtain such payment. The ordinance, therefore, reaches every 
 body concerned in the collection of the duties. 
 
 This is the first step in the prosecution of the peaceable remedy. 
 The second is more decisive. By the act commonly called the re 
 plevin law, any person, whose goods are seized or detained by the 
 collector for the payment of duties, may sue out a writ of replevin, 
 and by virtue of that writ the goods are to be restored to him. A 
 writ of replevin is a writ which the sheriff is bound to execute, 
 and for the .execution of which he is bound to employ force, if 
 necessary. He may call out the posse, and must do so, if resistance 
 be made. This posse may be armed or unarmed. It may come 
 forth with military array, and under the lead of -military men. 
 "Whatever number of troops may be assembled in Charleston, th.ey 
 may be summoned, with the governor, or coinmander-in-chief at 
 their head, to come in aid of the sheriff. It is evident, then, Sir, 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. g^ 
 
 that the whole military power of the State is to be employed, if 
 necessary, in dispossessing the custom-house officers, and in seizing 
 and holding the goods without paying the duties. This is the 
 second step in the peaceable remedy. 
 
 Sir, whatever pretenses may be set up to the contrary, this is 
 the direct application of force, and of military force. It is unlawful, 
 in itself, to replevy goods in the custody of the collectors. But 
 this, unlawful act is to be done, and it is to be done by power. 
 Here is a plain interposition, by physical force, to resist the laws 
 of the Union. The legal mode of collecting duties is to detain the 
 goods till such duties are paid or secured. But force comes, and 
 overpowers the collector and his assistants, and takes away the 
 goods, leaving the duties unpaid. There can not be a clearer case 
 of forcible resistance to law. And it is provided that the goods 
 thus seized shall be held against any attempt to retake them, by the 
 same force which seized them. 
 
 Having thus dispossessed the officers of the government of the 
 goods, without payment of duties, and seized and secured them by 
 the strong arm of the State, only one thing more remains to be 
 done, and that is, to cut off all possibility of legal redress ; and 
 that, too, is accomplished, or thought to be accomplished. The 
 ordinance declares, that all judicial proceedings, founded on the 
 revenue laws (including, of course, proceedings in the courts of the 
 United States), shall be null and void. This nullifies the judicial 
 power of the United States. Then comes the test-oath act. This 
 requires all State judges and jurors in the State courts to swear 
 that they will execute the ordinance, and all acts of the legislature 
 passed in pursuance thereof. The ordinance declares, that no ap 
 peal shall be allowed from the decision of the State courts to the 
 Supreme Court of the United States; and the replevin act makes 
 it an indictable offense for any clerk to furnish a copy of the record, 
 for the purpose of such appeal. 
 
 The two principal divisions on which South Carolina relies, to 
 resist the laws of the United States, and nullify the authority of 
 this government, are, therefore, these : 
 
 1. A forcible se z.ire of goods, before duties are paid or secured, 
 by the power of the State, civil and military. 
 
 2. The taking away, by the most effectual means in her power, 
 of all legal redress in the courts of the United States ; the confining 
 of judicial proceedings to her own State tribunals; and the com 
 pelling of her judges and jurors of these her own courts to take 
 an oath, beforehand, that they will decide all cases according to 
 the ordinance, and the acts passed under it ; that is, that they will 
 decide the cause one way. They do not swear to try it on its own 
 merits ; they only swear to decide it as nullification requires. 
 
 The character, Sir, of these provisions defies comment. Their 
 object is as plain as their means are extraordinary. They propose 
 direct resistance, by the whole power of the State, to laws of Con 
 gress, and cut off, by methods deemed adequate, any redress by 
 legal and judicial authority. They arrest legislation, defy the ex- 
 
88 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 ecutive, and banish the judicial power of this government. They 
 authorize and command acts to be done, and done by force, both 
 of numbers and of arms, which, if done, and done by force, are 
 clearly acts of rebellion and treason. 
 
 Such, Sir, are the laws of South Carolina ; such, Sir, is the peace 
 able remedy of nullification. lias not nullification reached, Sir, 
 even thus early, that point of direct and forcible resistance to law 
 to which I intimated, three years ago, it plainly tended ? 
 
 And now, Mr. President, what is the reason for passing laws 
 like these ? What are the oppressions experienced under the Union, 
 calling for measures which thus threaten to sever and destroy it ? 
 What invasions of public liberty, what ruin to private happiness, 
 what long list of rights violated, or wrongs unredressed, is to jus 
 tify to the country, to posterity, and to the world, this assault upon 
 the free Constitution of the United States, this great and glorious 
 work of our fathers ? At this very moment, Sir, the whole land 
 smiles in peace and rejoices in plenty. A general and a high pros 
 perity pervades the country ; and, judging by the common stand 
 ard, by increase of population and wealth, or judging by the opin 
 ions of that portion of her people not embarked in these dangerous 
 and desperate measures, this prosperity overspreads South Caro 
 lina herself. 
 
 Thus happy at home, our country, at the same time, holds high 
 the character of her institutions, her power, her rcpid growth, and 
 her future destiny, in the eyes of all foreign states. One danger 
 only creates hesitation, one doubt only exists to darken the other 
 wise unclouded brightness of that aspect which she exhibits to the 
 view and to the admiration of the world. Need I say that that 
 doubt respects the permanency of our Union ? And need I say 
 that that doubt is now caused, more than anything else, by these 
 very proceedings of South Carolina ? Sir, all Europe is, at this 
 moment, beholding us, and looking for the issue of this contro 
 versy ; those who hate free institutions, with malignant hope; 
 those who love them, with deep anxiety and shivering fear. 
 
 The cause, then, Sir, the cause ? Let the world know the cause 
 which has thus induced one State of the Union to bid defiance to 
 the power of the whole, and openly to talk of secession. Sir, the 
 world will scarcely believe that this whole controversy, and all the 
 desperate measures which its support requires, have no other foun 
 dation than a difference of opinion upon a provision of the Consti 
 tution, between a majority of the people of South Carolina, on one 
 side, and a vast majority of the whole people of the United States, 
 on the other. It will not credit the fact, it will not admit the pos 
 sibility, that, in an enlightened age, in a free, popular republic, 
 under a constitution where the people govern, as they must always 
 govern under such systems, by majorities, at a time of unprece 
 dented prosperity, without practical oppression, without evils such 
 as may not only be pretended, but felt and experienced evils not 
 slight or temporary, but deep, permanent, and intolerable a single 
 State should rush into conflict with all the rest, attempt to put 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 89 
 
 down the power of the Union by her own laws, and to support 
 those laws by her military power, and thus break up and destroy 
 the world s last hope. And well the world may be incredulous. 
 "We, who see and hear it, can ourselves hardly yet believe it. Even 
 after all that had preceded it, this ordinance struck the country 
 with amazement. It was incredible and inconceivable that South . 
 Carolina should plunge headlong into resistance to the laws on a 
 matter of opinion, and on a question in which the preponderance 
 of opinion, both of the present day and of all past time, was so 
 overwhelmingly against her. The ordinance declares that Con 
 gress has exceeded its just power by laying duties on imports, in 
 tended for the protection of manufactures. This is the opinion of 
 South Carolina ; and on the strength of that opinion she nullifies 
 the laws. Yet has the rest of the country no right to its opinion 
 also? Is one State to sit sole arbitress? She maintains that 
 those laws are plain, deliberate, and palpable violations of the 
 Constitution; that she has a sovereign right to decide this matter; 
 and that, having so decided, she is authorized to resist their 
 execution by her own sovereign power; and she declares that she 
 will resist it, though such resistance should shatter the Union into 
 atoms. 
 
 Mr. President, I do not intend to discuss the propriety of these 
 laws at large ; but I will ask, How are they shown to be thus 
 plainly and palpably unconstitutional ? Have they no countenance 
 at all in the Constitution itself? Are they quite new in the history 
 of the government ? Are they a sudden and violent usurpation 
 on the rights of the States ? Sir, what will the civilized world 
 say, what will posterity say, when they learn that similar laws 
 have existed from the very foundation of the government, that 
 for thirty years the power was never questioned, and that no State 
 in the Union has more freely and unequivocally admitted it than 
 South Carolina herself? 
 
 To lay and collect duties and imposts is an express power granted 
 by the Constitution to Congress. It is, also, an exclusive power.; 
 for the Constitution as expressly prohibits all the States from exer 
 cising it themselves. This express and exclusive power is unlim 
 ited in the terms of the grant, but is attended with two specific 
 restrictions : first, that all duties and imposts shall be equal in all 
 the States ; second, that no duties shall be laid on exports. The 
 power, then, being granted, and being attended with these two 
 restrictions, and no more, who is to impose a third restriction on 
 the general words of the grant ? If the power to lay duties, as 
 known among all other nations, and as known in all our history, 
 and as it was perfectly understood when the Constitution was 
 adopted, includes a right ojf discriminating while exercising the 
 power, and of laying some duties heavier and some lighter, for 
 the sake of encouraging our own domestic products, what author 
 ity is there for giving to the words used in the Constitution a new, 
 narrow, and unusual meaning ? All the limitations which the 
 Constitution intended, it has expressed ; and what it has left nn- 
 
90 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 restricted is as much a part of its will as the restraints which it 
 has imposed. 
 
 But these laws, it is said, are unconstitutional on account of the 
 motive. How, Sir, can a law be examined on any such ground? 
 How is the motive to be ascertained ? One house, or one member, 
 may have one motive; the other house, or another member, an 
 other. One motive may operate to-day, and another to-morrow. 
 Upon any such mode of reasoning as this, one law might be un 
 constitutional now, and another law, in exactly the same words, 
 perfectly constitutional next year. Besides, articles may not only 
 be taxed for the purpose of protecting home products, but other 
 articles may be left free, for the same purpose and with the same 
 motive. A law, therefore, would become unconstitutional from 
 what it omitted, as well as from w^hat it contained. Mr. Presi 
 dent, it is a settled principle, acknowledged in all legislative halls, 
 recognized before all tribunals, sanctioned by the general sense and 
 understanding of mankind, that there can be no inquiry into the 
 motives of those who pass laws, for the purpose of determining on 
 their validity. If the law be within the fair meaning of the words 
 in the grant of the power, its authority must be admitted until it 
 is repealed. This rule, everywhere acknowledged, everywhere 
 admitted, is so universal and so completely without exception, that 
 even an allegation of fraud, in the majority of a legislature, is not 
 allowed as a ground to set aside a law. 
 
 But, Sir, is it true that the motive for these laws is such as is 
 stated ? I think not. The great object of all these laws is, un 
 questionably, revenue. If there were no occasion for revenue, the 
 laws would not have been passed ; and it is notorious that almost 
 the entire revenue of the country is derived from them. And as 
 yet we have collected none too much revenue. The treasury has 
 not been more reduced for many years than it is at the present 
 moment. All that South Carolina can say is, that, in passing the 
 laws which she now undertakes to nullify, particular imported 
 articles were taxed, from a regard to the protection of certain arti 
 cles of domestic manufacture, higher than they would have heen 
 had no such regard leen entertained. And she insists that, ac 
 cording to the Constitution, no such discrimination can be allowed ; 
 that duties should be laid for revenue, and revenue only ; and that 
 it is unlawful to have reference, in any case, to protection. In 
 other words, she denies the power of DISCRIMINATION. She does 
 not, and can not, complain of excessive taxation ; on the contrary, 
 she professes to be willing to pay any amount of revenue, merely 
 as revenue ; and up to the present moment there is no surplus of 
 revenue. Her grievance, then, that plain and palpable violation 
 of the Constitution, which she insists has taken place, is simply 
 the exercise of the power of DISCRIMINATION. Now, Sir, is the 
 exercise of this power of discrimination plainly and palpably un 
 constitutional ? 
 
 I have already said, the power to lay duties is given by the Con 
 stitution in broad and general terms. There is also conferred on 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. gj 
 
 Congress the whole power of regulating commerce, in another dis 
 tinct provision. It is clear and palpable, Sir, can any man say it 
 is a case beyond doubt, that, under these two powers, Congress 
 may not justly discriminate, in laying duties, for the purpose of 
 countervailing the policy of foreign nations, or of favoring our 
 own home productions f Sir, what ought to conclude this question 
 forever, as it would seem to me, is that the regulation of commerce 
 and the imposition of duties are, in all commercial nations, powers 
 avowedly and constantly exercised for this very end. That unde 
 niable truth ought to settle the question ; because the Constitution 
 ought to be considered, when it uses well-known language, as using 
 it in its well-known sense. But it is equally undeniable that it has 
 been, from the very first, fully believed that this power of discrim 
 ination was conferred on Congress ; and the Constitution was it 
 self recommended, urged upon the people, and enthusiastically 
 insisted on in some of the States, for that very reason. Not that, 
 at that time, the country was extensively engaged in manufactures, 
 especially of the kinds now existing. But the trades and crafts 
 of the seaport towns, the business of the artisans and manual 
 laborers those employments, the work in which supplies so great 
 a portion of the daily wants of all classes all these looked to the 
 new Constitution as a source of relief from the severe distress 
 which followed the war. It would, Sir, be unpardonable, at so 
 late an hour, to go into details on this point ; but the truth is as 
 I have stated. The papers of the day, the resolutions of public 
 meetings, the debates in the conventions, all that we open our 
 eyes upon in the history of the times, prove it. 
 
 Sir, the honorable gentleman from South Carolina has referred 
 to two incidents connected with the proceedings of the Convention 
 at Philadelphia, which he thinks are evidence to show that the 
 power of protecting manufactures by laying duties, and by com 
 mercial regulations, was not intended to be given to Congress. 
 The first is, as he says, that a power to protect manufactures was 
 expressly proposed, but not granted. I think, Sir, the gentleman 
 is quite mistaken in relation to this part of the proceedings of the 
 Convention. The whole history of the occurrence to which he 
 alludes is simply this. Toward the conclusion of the Convention, 
 after the provisions of the Constitution had been mainly agreed 
 upon, after the power to lay duties and the power to regulate 
 commerce had both been granted, a long list of propositions was 
 made and referred to the committee, containing various miscel 
 laneous powers, some or all of which it was thought might be 
 properly vested in Congress. Among these was a power to estab 
 lish a university ; to grant charters of incorporation ; to regulate 
 stage-coaches on the post-roads ; and also the power to which the 
 gentleman refers, and which is expressed in these words : " To 
 establish public institutions, rewarcte, and immunities, for the pro 
 motion of agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures." The 
 committee made no report on this or various other propositions in 
 the same list. But the only inference from this omission is, that 
 
92 
 
 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 neither the Committee nor the Convention thought it proper to 
 authorize Congress " to establish public institutions, rewards, and 
 immunities," for the promotion of manufactures and other inter 
 ests. The Convention supposed it had done enough at any rate, 
 it had done all it intended when it had given to Congress, in 
 general terms, the power to lay imposts and the power to regu 
 late trade. It is not to be argued, from its omission to give more, 
 that it meant to take back what it had already given. It had 
 given the impost power; it had given the regulation of trade; 
 and it did not deem it necessary to give the further and distinct 
 power of establishing public institutions. 
 
 The other fact, Sir, on which the gentleman relies is the declara 
 tion of Mr. Martin to the legislature of Maryland. The gentleman 
 supposes Mr. Martin to have urged against the Constitution, that it 
 did not contain the power of protection. But if the gentleman will 
 look again at what Mr. Martin said, he will find, I think, that what 
 Mr. Martin complained of was, that the Constitution, by its pro 
 hibitions on the States, had taken away from the States themselves 
 the power of protecting their own manufactures by duties on im 
 ports. This is undoubtedly true; but I find no expression of 
 Mr. Martin intimating that the Constitution had not conferred on 
 Congress the same power which it had thus taken from the 
 States. 
 
 But, Sir, let us go to the first Congress ; let us look in upon this 
 and the other house, at the first session of their organization. 
 
 We see, in both houses, men distinguished among the framers, 
 friends, and advocates of the Constitution. We see in both, those 
 who had drawn, discussed, and matured the instrument in the 
 Convention, explained and defended it before the people, and were 
 now elected members of Congress, to put the new government into 
 motion, and to carry the powers of the Constitution into benefi 
 cial execution. At the head of the government was WASHINGTON 
 himself, who had been President of the Convention ; and in his 
 cabinet were others most thoroughly acquainted with the history 
 of the Constitution, and distinguished for the part taken in its dis 
 cussion. If these persons were not acquainted with the meaning 
 of the Constitution, if they did not understand the work of their 
 own hands, who can understand it, or who shall now interpret it 
 to us? 
 
 Sir, the volume which records the proceedings and debates of the 
 first session of the House of Representatives lies before me. I open it, 
 and I find that, having provided for the administration of the neces 
 sary oaths, the very first measure proposed for consideration is, the 
 laying of imposts; and in the very first committee of the whole into 
 which the House of Representatives ever resolved itself, on this its 
 earliest sutvject, and in this its very first debate, the duty of so laying 
 the imposts as to encourage manufactures was advanced and enlarged 
 upon by almost every speaker, and doubted or denied by none. 
 The first gentleman who suggests this as the clear duty of Con 
 gress, and as an object necessary to be attended to, is Mr. Fitzsim- 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 93 
 
 raons, of Pennsylvania; the second, Mr. White, of VIRGINIA; the 
 third, Mr. Tucker, of SOUTH CAROLINA. 
 
 But the great leader, Sir, on this occasion, was Mr. Madison. 
 Was lie likely to know the intentions of the Convention and the 
 people ? Was Tie likely to understand the Constitution ? At the 
 second sitting of the committee, Mr. Madison explained his own 
 opinions of the duty of Congress, fully and explicitly. I must not 
 detain you, Sir, with more than a few short extracts from these 
 opinions, but they are such as are clear, intelligible, and decisive. 
 " The States," says he, "that are most advanced in population, and 
 ripe for manufactures, ought to have their particular interest at 
 tended to, in some degree. While these States retained the power 
 of making regulations of trade, they had the power to cherish such 
 institutions. By adopting the present Constitution, they have 
 thrown the exercise of this power into other hands; they must 
 have done this with an expectation that those interested would not 
 be neglected here." In another report of the same speech, Mr. Madi 
 son is represented as using still stronger language ; as saying that, 
 the Constitution having taken this power away from the States and 
 conferred it on Congress, it would be & fraud on the States and on 
 the people were Congress to refuse to exercise it. 
 
 Mr. Madison argues, Sir, on this early and interesting occasion, 
 very justly and liberally, in favor of the general principles of unre 
 stricted commerce. But he argues, also, with equal force and 
 clearness, for certain important exceptions to the general principle. 
 The first, Sir, respects those manufactures which had been brought 
 forward under encouragement by the State governments. " It 
 would be cruel," says Mr. Madison, "to neglect them, and to 
 divert their industry into other channels ; for it is not possible for 
 the hand of man to shift from one employment to another without 
 being injured by the change." Again: "There may be some 
 manufactures which, being once formed, can advance toward per 
 fection without any adventitious aid ; while others, for want of the 
 fostering hand of government, will be unable to go on at all. 
 Legislative provision, therefore, will be necessary to collect the 
 proper objects for this purpose; and this will form another excep 
 tion to my general principle." And again: " The next exception 
 that occurs is one on which great stress is laid by some well- 
 inforrned men, and this with great plausibility ; that each nation 
 should have, within itself, the means of defense, independent of 
 foreign supplies ; that, in whatever relates to the operations of 
 war, no State ought to depend upon a precarious supply from any 
 part of the world. There may be some truth in this remark ; and 
 therefore it is proper for legislative attention." 
 
 In the same debate, Sir, Mr. Burk, from SOUTH CAROLINA, sup 
 ported a duty on hemp for the express purpose of encouraging its 
 growth on the strong lands of South Carolina. " Cotton," he said, 
 " was also in contemplation among them, and, if good seed could 
 be procured, he hoped might succeed." Afterward, Sir, the cot 
 ton was obtained, its culture was protected, and it did succeed. 
 
94 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 Hr. Smith, a very distinguished member from the SAME STATE, 
 observed: "It has been said, and justly, that the States which 
 adopted this Constitution expected" its administration would be 
 conducted with a favorable hand. The manufacturing States 
 wished the encouragement of manufactures, the maritime States 
 the encouragement of ship-building, and the agricultural States the 
 encouragement of agriculture." 
 
 Sir, I will detain the Senate by reading no more extracts from 
 these debates. I have already shown a majority of the members 
 of SOUTH CAEOLINA, in this very first session, acknowledging this 
 power of protection, voting for its exercise, and proposing its ex 
 tension to their own products. Similar propositions came from 
 Virginia; and, indeed, Sir, in the whole debate, at whatever page 
 you open the volume, you find the power admitted, and you find it 
 applied to the protection of particular articles, or not applied, 
 according to the discretion of Congress. No man denied the pow 
 er, no man doubted it; the only questions" were, in regard to the 
 several articles proposed to be taxed, whether they were fit sub 
 jects for protection, and what the amount of that protection ought 
 to be. Will gentlemen, Sir, now answer the argument drawn from 
 these proceedings of the first Congress ? Will they undertake to 
 deny that that Congress did act on the avowed principle of protec 
 tion ? Or, if they admit it, will they tell us how those who framed 
 the Constitution fell, thus early, into this great mistake about its 
 meaning ? Will they tell us how it should happen that they had 
 so soon forgotten their own sentiments and their own purposes ? 
 I confess I have seen no answer to this argument, nor any respect 
 able attempt to answer it. And, Sir, how did this debate termin 
 ate ? What law was passed ? There it stands, Sir, among the 
 statutes, the second law in the book. It has & preamble, and that 
 preamble expressly recites, that tlie duties which it imposes are 
 laid " for the support of government for the discharge of the debts 
 of the United States, and the encouragement and protection of man 
 ufactures. 1 Until, Sir, this early legislation, thus coeval with the 
 Constitution itself, thus full and explicit, can be explained away, 
 no man can doubt of the meaning of that instrument, in this respect. 
 
 Mr. President, this power of discrimination, thus admitted, 
 avowed, and practiced upon in the first revenue act, has never been 
 denied or doubted until within a few years past. It was not at all 
 doubtod in 1816, when it became necessary to adjust the revenue 
 to a state of peace. On the contrary, the power was then exer 
 cised, not without opposition as to its expediency, but, as far as I 
 remember or have understood, without the slightest opposition 
 founded on any supposed want of constitutional authority. Cer 
 tainly, SOUTH CAROLINA did not doubt it. The tariff of 1816 was 
 introduced, carried through, and established, under the lead of 
 South Carolina. Even the minimum policy is of South Carolina 
 origin. The honorable gentleman himself supported, and ably 
 supported, the tariff of 1816. He has informed us, Sir, that his 
 speech on that occasion was sudden and off-hand, he being called 
 
THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 95 
 
 up by the request of a friend. I am sure the gentleman so remem 
 bers it, and that it was so; but there is, nevertheless, much 
 method, arrangement, and clear exposition in that extempore 
 speech. It is very able, very, very much to the point, and very 
 decisive. And in another speech, delivered two months earlier, 
 on the proposition to repeal the internal taxes, the honorable 
 gentleman had touched the same subject, and had declared, " that 
 a certain encouragement ought to fie extended at least to our 
 woolen and cotton manufactures." I do not quote these speeches, 
 Sir, for the purpose of showing that the honorable gentleman has 
 changed his opinion ; my object is other and higher. I do it for 
 the sake of saying that that can not be so plainly and palpably un 
 constitutional as to warrant resistance to law, nullification, and 
 revolution, which the honorable gentleman and his friends have 
 heretofore agreed to and acted upon without doubt and without 
 hesitation. Sir, it is no answer to say that the tariff of 1816 was 
 a revenue bill. So are they all revenue bills. The point is, and 
 the truth is, that the tariff of 1816, like the rest, did discriminate ; 
 it did distinguish one article from another ; it did lay duties for 
 protection. Look to the case of coarse cottons under the minimum 
 calculation : the duty on these was from sixty to eighty per cent. 
 Something besides revenue, certainly, was intended in this ; and, in 
 fact, the law cut up our whole commerce with India in that article. 
 
 It is, Sir, only within a few years that Carolina has denied the 
 constitutionality of these protective laws. The gentleman himself 
 has narrated to us the true history of her proceedings on this point, 
 lie says, that, after the passing of the law of 1828, despairing then 
 of being able to abolish the system of protection, political men 
 went forth among the people, and set up. the doctrine that the sys 
 tem was unconstitutional. "And the people" says the honorable 
 gentleman, "received the doctrine" This, I believe, is true, Sir. 
 The people did then receive the doctrine ; they had never enter 
 tained it before. Down to that period, the constitutionality of 
 these laws had been no more doubted in South Carolina than else 
 where. And I suspect it is true, Sir, and I deem it a great misfor 
 tune, that, to the present moment, a great portion of the people of 
 the State have never yet seen more than one side of the argument. 
 I believe that thousands of honest men are involved in scenes now 
 passing, led away by one-sided views of the question, and following 
 their leaders by the impulses of an unlimited confidence. Depend 
 upon it, Sir, if we can avoid the shock of arms, a day for recon 
 sideration and reflection will come ; truth and reason will act with 
 their accustomed force, and the public opinion of South Carolina 
 will be restored to its usual constitutional and patriotic tone. 
 
 But, Sir, I hold South Carolina to her ancient, her cool, her un 
 influenced, her deliberate opinions. I hold her to her own admis 
 sions, nay, to her own claims and pretensions, in 1789, in the first 
 Congress, and to her acknowledgments and avowed sentiments 
 through a long series of succeeding years. I hold her to the prin 
 ciples on which she led Congress to act in 1816 ; or, if she have 
 
96 THE UNION NOT A COMPACT. 
 
 changed her own opinions, I claim some respect for those who still 
 retain the same opinions. I say she is precluded from asserting 
 that doctrines, which she has herself so long and so ably sustained, 
 are plain, palpable, and dangerous violations of the Constitution. 
 
 Mr. President, if the friends of the nullification should be able to 
 propagate their opinions, and give them practical effect, they would, 
 in my judgment, prove themselves the most skillful "architects of 
 ruin," the most successful extinguishers of high-raised expectation, 
 the greatest blasters of human hopes, that any age has produced. 
 They would stand up to proclaim, in tones which would pierce the 
 ears of half the human race, that the last great experiment of 
 representative government had failed. They would send forth 
 sounds, at the hearing of which the doctrine of the divine right of 
 kings would feel, even in its grave, a returning sensation of vitality 
 and resuscitation. Millions of eyes, of those who now feed their in 
 herent love of liberty on the success of the American example, 
 would turn away from beholding our dismemberment, and find no 
 place on earth whereon to rest their gratified sight. Amid the 
 incantations and orgies of nullification, secession, disunion, and 
 revolution, would be celebrated the funeral rites of constitutional 
 and republican liberty. 
 
 But, Sir, if the government do its duty, if it act with firmness 
 and with moderation, these opinions can not prevail. Be assured, 
 Sir, be assured, that among the political sentiments of this people, 
 the love of union is still uppermost. They will stand fast by the 
 Constitution, and by those who defend it. I rely on no temporary 
 expedients, on no political combination ; but I rely on the true 
 American feeling, the genuine patriotism of the people, and the im 
 perative decision of the public voice. Disorder and confusion, in 
 deed, may arise ; scenes of commotion and contest are threatened, 
 and perhaps may come. "With my whole heart, I pray for the con 
 tinuance of the domestic peace and quiet of the country. I desire, 
 most ardently, the restoration of affection and harmony to all its 
 parts. I desire that every citizen of the whole country may look 
 to this government with no other sentiments than those of grateful 
 respect and attachment. But I can not yield even to kind feelings 
 the cause of the Constitution, the true glory of the country, and 
 the great trust which we hold in our hands for succeeding ages. 
 If the Constitution can not be maintained without meeting these 
 scenes of commotion and contest, however unwelcome, they must 
 come. We can not, we must not, we dare not, omit to do that 
 which, in our judgment, the safety of the Union requires. Not 
 regardless of consequences, we must yet meet consequences ; see 
 ing the hazards which surround the discharge of public duty, it 
 must yet be discharged. For myself, Sir, I shun no responsibility 
 justly devolving on me, here or elsewhere, in attempting to main 
 tain the cause. I am bound to it by indissoluble ties of affection 
 and duty, and I shall cheerfully partake in its fortunes and its fate. 
 I am ready to perform my own appropriate part, whenever and 
 wherever the occasion may call on me, and to take my chance 
 
JACKSON S PKOCLAMATION IN 1882. 97 
 
 among those upon whom blows may fall first and fall thickest. I shall 
 e-xert every faculty I possess in aiding to prevent the Constitution 
 from being nullified, destroyed, or impaired ; and even should I see 
 it fall, I will still, with a voice feeble perhaps, but earnest as ever 
 issued from human lips, and with fidelity and zeal which nothing 
 shall extinguish, call on the PEOPLE to come to its rescue. 
 
 PRESIDENT JACKSON S PROCLAMATION, 
 
 Issued in 1832, when South Carolina undertook to Annul the Federal Revenue 
 
 Law. 
 
 WHEREAS a convention, assembled in the State of South Carolina,, 
 have passed an ordinance, by which they declare " that the several 
 acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States, pur 
 porting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the 
 importation of foreign commodities, and now having actual opera 
 tion and effect within the United States, and more especially * two 
 acts for the same purposes, passed on the 29th of May, 1828, and 
 on the 14th of July, 1832, are unauthorized by the Constitution 
 of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent 
 thereof, and are null and void, and no law," nor binding on the 
 citizens of that State or its officers ; and by the said ordinance it is 
 further declared to be unlawful for any of the constituted authori 
 ties of the State, or of the United States, to enforce the payment 
 of "the duties imposed by the said acts within the same State, and 
 that it is the duty of the legislature to pass such laws as may be 
 necessary to give full effect to the said ordinances: 
 
 And whereas, by the said ordinance it is further ordained, that, 
 in no case of law or equity, decided in the courts of said State, 
 wherein shall be drawn in question the validity of the said ordi 
 nance, or of the acts of the legislature that may be passed to give 
 it effect, or of the said laws of the United States, no appeal shall 
 be allowed to the Supreme Court of the United States, nor shall 
 any copy of the record be permitted or allowed for that purpose ; 
 and that any person attempting to take such appeal, shall be punished 
 as for a contempt of court : 
 
98 JACKSON S PEOCLAMATION IN 1832. 
 
 And, finally, the said ordinance declares that the people of 
 South Carolina will maintain the said ordinance at every hazard ; 
 and that they will consider the passage of any act by Congress 
 abolishing or closing the ports of the said State, or otherwise 
 obstructing the free ingress or egress of vessels to and from the 
 said ports, or any other act of the Federal Government to coerce 
 the State, shut up her ports, destroy or harass her commerce, or to 
 enforce the said acts otherwise than through the civil tribunals of the 
 country, as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Caro 
 lina in the Union ; and that the people of the said State will thence 
 forth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation to main 
 tain or preserve their political connection with the people of the 
 other States, and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate 
 government, and do ah 1 other acts and things which sovereign and 
 independent States may of right do : 
 
 And whereas the said ordinance prescribes to the people of 
 South Carolina a course of conduct in direct violation of their 
 duty as citizens of the United States, contrary to the laws of their 
 country, subversive of its Constitution, and having for its object 
 the destruction of the Union that Union, which, coeval with our 
 political existence, led our fathers, without any other ties to unite 
 them than those of patriotism and common cause, through a 
 sanguinary struggle to a glorious independence that sacred Union, 
 hitherto inviolate, which, perfected by our happy Constitution, has 
 brought us, by the favor of Heaven, to a state of prosperity 
 at home, and high consideration abroad, rarely, if ever, equaled 
 in the history of nations ; to preserve this bond of our political 
 existence from destruction, to maintain inviolate this state of na 
 tional honor and prosperity, and to justify the confidence my fel 
 low-citizens have reposed in me, I, Andrew Jackson, President of 
 the United States, have thought proper to issue this my PKOCLAMA- 
 TION, stating my views of the Constitution and laws applicable to 
 the measures adopted by the Convention of South Carolina, and to 
 the reasons they have put forth to sustain them, declaring the course 
 which duty will require me to pursue, and, appealing to the under 
 standing and patriotism of the people, warn them of the conse 
 quences that must inevitably result from an observance of tho 
 dictates of the Convention. 
 
 Strict duty would require of me nothing more than the exercise 
 of those powers with which I am now, or may hereafter bo, in 
 vested, for preserving the Union, and for the execution of the laws. 
 
JACKSON S PKOCLAMATION IN 1882. 99 
 
 But the imposing aspect whiclropposition has assumed in this case, 
 by clothing itself with State authority, and the deep interest which 
 the people of the United States must all feel in preventing a resort 
 to stronger measures, Avhile there is a hope that anything will be 
 yielded to reasoning and remonstrances, perhaps demand, and will 
 certainly justify, a full exposition to South Carolina and the ration 
 of the views I entertain of this important question, as well as a 
 distinct enunciation of the course which my sense of duty will re 
 quire me to pursue. 
 
 The ordinance is founded, not on the indefeasible right of re 
 sisting acts which are plainly unconstitutional, and too oppressive 
 to be endured, but on the strange position that any one State may 
 not only declare an act of Congress void, but prohibit its execu 
 tion that they may do this consistently with the Constitution 
 that the true construction of that instrument permits a State to retain 
 its place in the Union, and yet be bound by no other of its laws than 
 those it may choose to consider as constitutional. It is true they 
 add, that, to justify this abrogation of a law, it must be palpably con 
 trary to the Constitution ; but it is evident, that to give the right of 
 resisting laws of that description, coupled with the uncontrolled right 
 to decide what laws deserve that character, is to give the power 
 of resisting all laws. For, as by the theory, there is no appeal, 
 the reasons alleged by the State, good or bad, must prevail. If it 
 should be said that public opinion is a sufficient check against the 
 abuse of this power, it may be asked why it is not deemed a suffi 
 cient guard against the passage of an unconstitutional act by Con 
 gress. There is, however, a restraint in this last case, which makes 
 the assumed power of a State more indefensible, and which does 
 not exist in the other. There are two appeals from an unconstitu 
 tional act passed by Congress one to the judiciary, the other to the 
 people and the States. There is no appeal from the State decision 
 in theory ; and the practical illustration shows that the courts are 
 closed against an application to review it, both judges and jurors 
 being sworn to decide in its favor. But reasoning on this subject 
 is superfluous, when our social compact in express terms declares, 
 that the laws of the United States, its Constitution, and treaties 
 made under it, are the supreme law of the land ; and for greater 
 caution adds, "that the judges in every State shall be bound there 
 by, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the con 
 trary notwithstanding." And it may be asserted, without fear of 
 refutation, that no federative government could exist without a 
 
100 JACKSON S PEOCLAMATION IN 1832. 
 
 similar provision. Look, for a moment, to the consequence. If 
 South Carolina considers the revenue laws unconstitutional, and 
 has a right to prevent their execution in the port of Charleston, 
 there would be a clear constitutional objection to their collection 
 in every other port, and no revenue could he collected anywhere ; 
 for all imposts must be equal. It is no answer to repeat that an 
 unconstitutional law is no law, so long as the question of its legal 
 ity is to be decided by the State itself; for every law operating 
 injuriously upon any local interest will be perhaps thought, and 
 certainly represented, as unconstitutional, and, as has been shown, 
 there is no appeal. 
 
 If this doctrine had been established at an earlier day, the Union 
 would have been dissolved in its infancy. The excise law in Penn 
 sylvania, the embargo and non-intercourse law in the Eastern 
 States, the carriage tax in Virginia, were all deemed unconstitu 
 tional, and were more unequal in their operation than any of the 
 laws now complained of; but, fortunately, none of those States 
 discovered that they had the right now claimed by South Carolina. 
 The war into which we were forced, to support the dignity of the 
 nation and the rights of our citizens, might have ended in defeat 
 and disgrace, instead of victory and honor, if the States, who sup 
 posed it a ruinous and unconstitutional measure, had thought they 
 possessed the right of nullifying the act by which it was declared, 
 and denying supplies for its prosecution. Hardly and unequally as 
 those measures bore upon several members of the Union, to the 
 legislatures of none did this efficient and peaceable remedy, as it is 
 called, suggest itself. The discovery of this important feature in 
 our Constitution was reserved to the present day. To the states 
 men of South Carolina belongs the invention, and upon the citizens 
 of that State will, unfortunately, fall the evils of reducing it to 
 practice. 
 
 If the doctrine of a State veto upon the laws of the Union car 
 ries with it internal evidence of its impracticable absurdity, our 
 constitutional history will also afford abundant proof that it would 
 have been repudiated with indignation had it been proposed to 
 form a feature in our government. 
 
 In our colonial state, although dependent on another power, we 
 very early considered ourselves as connected by common interest 
 with each other. Leagues were formed for common defense, and 
 before the Declaration of Independence, we were known in our 
 aggregate character as the United Colonies of America. That de- 
 
JACKSON S PROCLAMATION IN 1832. JQJ 
 
 cisive and important step was taken jointly. TVe declared our 
 selves a nation by a joint, not by several acts; and when the terms 
 of our confederation were reduced to form, it was in that of a solemn 
 league of several States, by which they agreed that they would, col 
 lectively, form one nation, for the purpose of conducting some cer 
 tain domestic concerns, and all foreign relations. In the instrument 
 forming that Union, is found an article which declares that "every 
 State shall abide by the determinations of Congress on all ques 
 tions which by that Confederation should be submitted to them." 
 
 Under the Confederation, then, no State could legally annul a 
 decision of the Congress, or refuse to submit to its execution ; but 
 no provision was made to enforce these decisions. Congress made 
 requisitions, but they were not complied with. The government 
 could not operate on individuals. They had no judiciary, no means 
 of collecting revenue. 
 
 But the defects of the Confederation need not be detailed. Under 
 its operation we could scarcely be called a nation. "We had neither 
 prosperity at home nor consideration abroad. This state of things 
 could not be endured, and our present happy Constitution was 
 formed, but formed in vain, if this fatal doctrine prevails. It was 
 formed for important objects that are announced in the preamble 
 made in the name and by the authority of the people of the United 
 States, whose delegates framed, and whose conventions approved, it. 
 
 The most important among these objects, that which is placed 
 first in rank, on which all the others rest, is " to form a more per 
 fect Union." Now, it is possible that, even if there were no ex 
 press provision giving supremacy to the Constitution and laws of 
 the United States over those of the States, it can be conceived 
 that an instrument made for the purpose of "forming a, more per 
 fect Union 1 than that, of the confederation, could be so constructed 
 by the assembled wisdom of our country as to substitute for that 
 confederation a form of government, dependent for its existence 
 on the local interest, the party spirit of a State, or of a prevailing 
 faction in a State ? Every man, of plain, unsophisticated under 
 standing, who hears the question, will give such an answer as will 
 preserve the Union. Metaphysical subtlety, in pursuit of an im 
 practicable theory, could alone have devised one that is calculated 
 to destroy it. 
 
 I consider, then, the power to annul a law of the United States, 
 assumed by one State, incompatible with the existence of the Union, 
 contradicted expressly ~by the letter of the Constitution, unauthor- 
 
102 JACKSON S PEOCLAMATION IN 1832. 
 
 ized "by its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was 
 founded, and destructive of the great object for ichich it was formed. 
 
 After this general view of the leading principle, we must examine 
 the. particular application of it which is made in the ordinance. 
 
 The preamble rests its justification on these grounds: It assumes 
 as a fact, that the obnoxious laws, although they purport to be 
 laws for raising revenue, were in reality intended for the protection 
 of manufactures, which purpose it asserts to be unconstitutional ; 
 that the operation of these laws is unequal ; that the amount raised 
 by them is greater than is required by the wants of the govern 
 ment; and, finally, that the proceeds are to be applied to objects 
 unauthorized by the Constitution. These are the only causes alleged 
 to justify an open opposition to the laws of the country, and a 
 threat of seceding from the Union, if any attempt should be made 
 to enforce them. The first virtually acknowledges that the law 
 in question was passed under a power expressly given by the Con 
 stitution, to lay and collect imposts; but its constitutionality is 
 drawn in question from the motives of those who passed it. How 
 ever apparent this purpose may be in the present case, nothing 
 can be more dangerous than to admit the position that an uncon 
 stitutional purpose, entertained by the members who assent to a 
 law enacted under a constitutional power, shall make that law 
 void ; for how is that purpose to be ascertained ? Who is to make 
 the scrutiny? How often may bad purposes be falsely imputed? 
 In how many cases are they concealed by false professions ? In how 
 many is no declaration of motive made? Admit this doctrine, and 
 you give to the States an uncontrolled right to decide, and every 
 law may be annulled under this pretext. If, therefore, the absurd 
 and dangerous doctrine should be admitted, that a State may annul 
 an unconstitutional law, or one that it deems such, it will not apply 
 to the present case. 
 
 The next objection is, that the laws in question operate une 
 qually. This objection may be made with truth to every law that 
 has been or can be passed. The wisdom of man never yet con 
 trived a system of taxation that would operate with perfect equal 
 ity. If the unequal operation of a law makes it unconstitutional 
 and if all laws of that description may be abrogated by any State 
 for that cause, then, indeed, is the federal Constitution unworthy 
 of the slightest effort for its preservation. "We have hitherto relied 
 on it as the perpetual bond of our Union. We have received it 
 as the work of the assembled wisdom of the nation. We have 
 
JACKSON S PEOCLAMATION IN 1832. 103 
 
 trusted to it as to the sheet-anchor of our safety, in the stormy times 
 of conflict with a foreign or domestic foe. We have looked to it 
 with sacred awe as the palladium of our liberties, and with all the 
 solemnities of religion have pledged to each other our lives and 
 fortunes here, and our hopes of happiness hereafter, in its defense 
 and support. Were we mistaken, my countrymen, in attaching 
 this importance to the Constitution of our country ? Was our de 
 votion paid to the wretched, inefficient, clumsy contrivance, \Thich 
 this new doctrine would make it ? Did we pledge ourselves to the 
 support of an airy nothing a bubble that must be blown away by 
 the first breath of disaffection ? Was this self-destroying, visionary 
 theory the work of the profound statesmen, the exalted patriots, 
 to whom the task of constitutional reform was intrusted? Did 
 the name of Washington sanction, did the States deliberately ratify, 
 such an anomaly in the history of fundamental legislation ? No. 
 We were not mistaken. The letter of this great instrument is free 
 from this radical fault ; its language directly contradicts the impu 
 tation ; its spirit, its evident intent, contradicts it. No, we did not 
 err. Our Constitution does not contain the absurdity of giv 
 ing power to make laws, and another power to resist them. The 
 sages, whose memory will always be reverenced, have given us a 
 practical, and, as they hoped, a permanent constitutional compact. 
 The Father of his Country did not affix his revered name to so pal 
 pable an absurdity. Nor did the States, when they severally rati 
 fied it, do so under the impression that a veto on the laws of the 
 United States was reserved to them, or that they could exercise it 
 by application. Search the debates in all their conventions exam 
 ine the speeches of the most zealous opposers of federal author 
 ity look at the amendments that were proposed. They are all 
 silent not a syllable uttered, not a vote given, not a motion made, 
 to correct the explicit supremacy given to the laws of the Union 
 over those of the States, or to show that implication, as is now 
 contended, could defeat it. No, we have not erred ! The Consti 
 tution is still the object of our reverence, the bond of our union, 
 our defense in danger, the source of our prosperity in peace. It 
 shall descend, as we have received it, uncorrupted by sophistical 
 construction, to our posterity ; and the sacrifices of local interest, 
 of State prejudices, of personal animosities, that were made to 
 bring it into existence, will again be patriotically offered for its 
 support. 
 The two remaining objections made by the ordinance to these 
 
104. JACKSON S PKOCLAMATION IN 1832. 
 
 laws are, that the sums intended to be raised by them are greater 
 than are required, and that the proceeds will be unconstitutionally 
 employed. The Constitution has given expressly to Congress the 
 right of raising revenue, and of determining the sum the public 
 exigences will require. The States have no control over the exer 
 cise of this right other than that which results from the power of 
 changing the representatives who abuse it, and thus procure redress. 
 Congress may undoubtedly abuse this discretionary power, but the 
 same may be said of others with which they are vested. Yet the 
 discretion must exist somewhere. The Constitution has given it to 
 the representatives of all the people, checked by the representatives 
 of the States, and by the executive power. The South Carolina 
 construction gives it to the legislature, or the convention of a single 
 State, where neither the people of the different States, nor the 
 States in their separate capacity, nor the chief magistrate elected 
 by the people, have any representation. Which is the most dis 
 creet disposition of the power? I do not ask you, fellow-citizens, 
 w r hich is the constitutional disposition that instrument speaks a 
 language not to be misunderstood. But if you were assembled in 
 general convention, which would you think the safest depository 
 of this discretionary power in the last resort ? Would you add a 
 clause giving it to each of the States, or would you sanction the 
 wise provisions already made by your Constitution? If this should 
 be the result of your deliberations when providing for the future, are 
 you can you be ready to risk all that we hold dear, to establish, 
 for a temporary and a local purpose, that which you must acknowl 
 edge to be destructive, and even absurd, as a general provision? 
 Carry out the consequences of this right vested in the different 
 States, and you must perceive that the crisis your conduct presents 
 at this day would recur whenever any law of the United States 
 displeased any of the States, and that we should soon cease to be a 
 nation. 
 
 The ordinance, with the same knowledge of the future that char 
 acterizes a former objection, tells you that the proceeds of the tax 
 will be unconstitutionally applied. If this could be ascertained 
 with certainty, the objection would, with more propriety, be re 
 served for the law so applying the proceeds, but surely can not be 
 urged against the laws levying the duty. 
 
 These are the allegations contained in the ordinance. Examine 
 them seriously, my fellow-citizens -judge for yourselves. I appeal 
 to you to determine whether they are so clear, so convincing, as to 
 
JACKSON S PEOCLAMATION IN 1832. JQ5 
 
 leave no doubt of their correctness ; and even if you should come 
 to this conclusion, how far they justify the reckless, destructive 
 course which you are directed to pursue. Keview these objections, 
 and the conclusions drawn from them once more. What are they ? 
 Every law, then, for raising revenue, according to the South Caro 
 lina ordinance, may be rightfully annulled, unless it be so framed 
 as no law 6 ver will or can be framed. Congress have a right to 
 pass laws for raising revenue, and each State has a right to oppose 
 their execution two rights directly opposed to each other ; and yet 
 is this absurdity supposed to be contained in an instrument drawn 
 for the express purpose of avoiding collisions between the States 
 and the general government, by an assembly of the most enlight 
 ened statesmen and purest patriots ever embodied for a similar pur 
 pose. 
 
 In vain have these sages declared that Congress shall have power 
 to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises in vain have 
 they provided that they shall have power to pass laws which shall 
 be necessary and proper to carry those powers into execution, that 
 those laws and that Constitution shall be the " supreme law of the 
 land ; and that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
 anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
 notwithstanding." In vain have the people of the several States 
 solemnly sanctioned these provisions, made them their paramount 
 law, and individually sworn to support them whenever they were 
 called on to execute any office. 
 
 Vain provisions ! Ineffectual restrictions ! Vile profanation of 
 oaths ! Miserable mockery of legislation ! If a bare majority of 
 the voters in any one State may, on a real or supposed knowledge 
 of the intent with which a law has been passed, declare themselves 
 free from its operation say here it gives too little, there too much, 
 and operates unequally here it suffers articles to be free that ought 
 to be taxed, there it taxes those that ought to be free in this case 
 the proceeds are intended to be applied to purposes which we do 
 not approve, in that the amount raised is more than is wanted. 
 Congress, it is true, are invested by the Constitution with the right 
 of deciding these questions according to their sound discretion. 
 Congress is composed of the representatives of all the States, and 
 of all the people of all the States ; but WE, part of the people of 
 one State, to whom the Constitution has given no power on the 
 subject, from whom it has expressly taken it away we, who have 
 solemnly agreed that this Constitution shall be our law ice, most 
 
106 JACKSON S PKOCLAMATION IN 1832. 
 
 of whom have sworn to support it we now abrogate this law, 
 and swear, and force others to swear, that it shall not be obeyed 
 and we do this, not because Congress have no right to pass such 
 laws ; this we do not allege ; but because they have passed them 
 with improper views. They are unconstitutional from the motives 
 of those who passed them, which we can never with certainty 
 know, from their unequal operation ; although it is impossible from 
 the nature of things that they should be equal and from the dis 
 position which we presume may be made of their proceeds, although 
 that disposition has not been declared. This is the plain meaning 
 of the ordinance in relation to laws which it abrogates for alleged 
 un constitutionality. But it does not stop here. It repeals, in ex 
 press terms, an important part of -the Constitution itself, and of 
 laws passed to give it eifect, which have never been alleged to be 
 unconstitutional. The Constitution declares that the judicial powers 
 of the United States extend to cases arising under the laws of tho 
 United States, and that such laws the Constitution and treaties 
 shall be paramount to the State constitutions and laws. The judi 
 ciary act prescribes the mode by which the case may be brought 
 before a court of the United States, by appeal, when a State tribunal 
 shall decide against this provision of the Constitution. The ordi 
 nance declares there shall be no appeal ; makes the State law para 
 mount to the Constitution and laws of the United States ; forces 
 judges and jurors to swear that they will disregard their provisions ; 
 and even makes it penal in a suitor to attempt relief by appeal. It 
 further declares that it shall not be lawful for the authorities of the 
 United States, or of that State, to enforce the payment of duties 
 imposed by the revenue laws within its limits. 
 
 Here is a law of the United States, not even pretended to be un 
 constitutional, repealed by the authority of a small majority of 
 the voters of a single State. Here is a provision of the Constitu 
 tion which is solemnly abrogated by the same authority. 
 
 On such expositions and reasonings, the ordinance grounds not 
 only an assertion of the right to annul the laws of which it com 
 plains, but to enforce it by a threat of seceding from the Union, 
 if any attempt is made to execute them. 
 
 This right to secede is deduced from the nature of the Constitu 
 tion, which they say is a compact between sovereign States, who 
 have preserved their whole sovereignty, and therefore are subject 
 to no superior; that because they made the compact, they can 
 break it when in their opinion it has been departed from by the 
 
JACKSON S PROCLAMATION IN 1832. JQ7 
 
 other States. Fallacious as this course of reasoning is, it enlists 
 State pride, and finds advocates in the honest prejudices of those 
 who have not studied the nature of our government sufficiently to 
 see the radical error on which it rests. 
 
 The people of the United States formed the Constitution, acting 
 through the State legislatures, in making the compact, to meet and 
 discuss its provisions, and acting in separate conventions when they 
 ratified those provisions; hut the terms used in its construction 
 show it to be a government in which the people of all the States 
 collectively are represented. We are OXE PEOPLE in the choice of 
 the President and Vice-President. Here the States have no other 
 agency than to direct the mode in which the votes shall be given. 
 The candidates having the majority of all the votes are chosen. 
 The electors of a majority of States may have given their votes for 
 one candidate, and yet another may be chosen. The people, then, 
 and not the States, are represented in the executive branch. 
 
 In the House of Representatives there is this difference, that the 
 people of one State do not, as in the case of President and Vice- 
 President, all vote for all the members, each State electing only its 
 own representatives. But this creates no material distinction. 
 When chosen, they are all representatives of the United States, not 
 representatives of the particular State from which they come. 
 They are paid by the United States, not by the State ; nor are they 
 accountable to it for any act done in performance of their legisla 
 tive functions ; and however they may in practice, as it is their 
 duty to do, consult and prefer the interests of their particular con 
 stituents when they come in conflict with any other partial or local 
 interest, yet it is their first and highest duty, as representatives of 
 the United States, to promote the general good. 
 
 The Constitution of the United States, then, forms a government, 
 not a league, and whether it be formed by compact between the 
 States, or in any other manner, its character is the same. It is a 
 government in which all the people are represented, which operates 
 directly on the people individually, not upon the States ; they re 
 tained all the power they did not grant. But each State having 
 expressly parted with so many powers as to constitute jointly with 
 the other States a single nation, can not from that period possess any 
 right to secede, because such secession does not break a league, but 
 destroys the unity of a nation, and any injury to that unity is not 
 only a breach which would result from the contravention of a com 
 pact, but it is an offense against the whole Union. To say that any 
 
108 JACKSON S PEOCLAHATION IN 1832. 
 
 State may at pleasure secede from the Union, is to say that the 
 United States are not a nation ; because it would be a solecism to 
 contend that any part of a nation might dissolve its connection 
 with the other parts, to their injury or ruin, without committing 
 any offense. Secession, like any other revolutionary act, may be 
 morally justified by the extremity of oppression ; but to call it a 
 constitutional right, is confounding the meaning of terms, and can 
 only be done through gross error, or to deceive those who are willing 
 to assert a right, but would pause before they made a revolution, or 
 incur the penalties consequent upon a failure. 
 
 Because the Union was formed by compact, it is said the parties 
 to that compact may, when they feel themselves aggrieved, depart 
 from it ; but it is precisely because it is a compact that they can 
 not. A compact is an agreement or binding obligation. It may by 
 its terms have a sanction or penalty for its breach, or it may not. 
 If it contains no sanction, it may be broken with no other conse 
 quence than moral guilt; if it have a sanction, then the breach 
 incurs the designated or implied penalty. A league between inde 
 pendent nations, generally, has no sanction other than a moral one ; 
 or if it should contain a penalty, as there is no common superior, it 
 can not be enforced, A government, on the contrary, always has 
 a sanction, express or implied ; and, in our case, it is both necessarily 
 implied and expressly given. An attempt by force of arms to de 
 stroy a government is an offense, by whatever means the constitu 
 tional compact may have been formed ; and such government has 
 the right, by the law of self-defense, to pass acts for punishing the 
 offender, unless that right is modified, restrained, or resumed by the 
 constitutional act. In our system, although it is modified in the 
 case of treason, yet authority is expressly given to pass all laws 
 necessary to carry its powers into effect, and under this grant pro 
 vision has been made for punishing acts which obstruct the due 
 administration of the laws. 
 
 It would seem superfluous to add anything to show the nature 
 of that union which connects us; but as erroneous opinions on 
 this subject are the foundation of doctrines the most destructive 
 to our peace, I must give some further development to my views 
 on this subject. No one, fellow- citizens, has a higher reverence 
 for the reserved rights of the States than the magistrate who now 
 addresses you. No one would make greater personal sacrifices, 
 or official exertions, to defend them from violation ; but equal 
 care must be taken to prevent, on their part, an improper inter- 
 
JACKSON S PKOCLAMATION IN 1882. 
 
 ference with, or resumption of, the rights they have vested in the 
 nation. The line has not been so distinctly drawn as to avoid 
 doubts in some cases of the exercise of power. Men of the best 
 intentions and soundest views may differ in their construction of 
 some parts of the Constitution; but there are others on which 
 dispassionate reflection can leave no doubt. Of this natnre ap 
 pears to be the assumed right of secession. It rests, as we have 
 seen, on the alleged undivided sovereignty of the States, and of 
 their having formed in this sovereign capacity a compact which 
 is called the Constitution, from which, because they made it, they 
 have the right to secede. Both of these positions are erroneous, 
 and some of the arguments to prove them so have been antici 
 pated. 
 
 The States severally have not retained their entire sovereignty. 
 It has been shown that in becoming parts of a nation, not mem 
 bers of a league, they surrendered many of their essential parts 
 of sovereignty. The right to make treaties, declare war, levy 
 taxes, exercise exclusive judicial and legislative powers, were all 
 functions of sovereign power. The States, then, for all these im 
 portant purposes, were no longer sovereign. The allegiance of 
 their citizens was transferred in the first instance to the govern 
 ment of the United States ; they became American citizens, and 
 owed obedience to the Constitution of the United States, and to 
 laws made in conformity with the powers vested in Congress. 
 This last position has not been, and can not be, denied. How, 
 then, can that State be said to be sovereign and independent 
 whose citizens owe obedience to laws not made by it, and whose 
 magistrates are sworn to disregard those laws, when they come 
 in conflict with those passed by another ? What shows conclu 
 sively that the States can not be said to have reserved an un 
 divided sovereignty, is that they expressly ceded the right to pun 
 ish treason not treason against their separate power, but treason 
 against the United States. Treason is an offense against sovereignty, 
 and sovereignty must reside with the power to punish it. But the 
 reserved rights of the States are not less sacred because they have 
 for their common interest made the general government the de 
 pository of these powers. The unity of our political character (as 
 has been shown for another purpose) commenced with its very 
 existence. Under the royal government we had no separate char 
 acter ; our opposition to its oppression began as UNITED COLONIES. 
 We "were the UNITED STATES under the Confederation, and the 
 
HO JACKSON S PROCLAMATION IN 1832. 
 
 name was perpetuated and the Union rendered more perfect by 
 the federal Constitution. In none of these stages did we consider 
 ourselves in any other light than as forming one nation. Treaties 
 and alliances were made in the name of all. Troops were raised 
 for the joint defense. How, then, with all these proofs, that under 
 all changes of our position we had, for designated purposes and 
 with defined powers, created national governments how is it that 
 the most perfect of these several modes of union should now be 
 considered as a mere league that may be dissolved at pleasure ? 
 It is from an abuse of terms. Compact is used as synonymous 
 with league, although the true term is not employed, because it 
 would at once show the fallacy of the reasoning. It would not do 
 to say that our Constitution was only a league, but it is labored to 
 prove it a compact (which, in one sense, it is), and then to argue 
 that as a league is a compact, every compact between nations must, 
 of course, be a league, and that from such an engagement every 
 sovereign power has a right to recede. But it has been shown 
 that in this sense the States are not sovereign, and that even if 
 they were, and the national Constitution had been formed by com 
 pact, there would be no right in any one State to exonerate itself 
 from the obligation. 
 
 So obvious are the reasons which forbid this secession, that it is 
 necessary only to allude to them. The Union was formed for the 
 benefit of all. It was produced by mutual sacrifice of interest and 
 opinions. Can those sacrifices be recalled ? Can the States, who 
 magnanimously surrendered their title to the territories of the West, 
 recall the grant ? Will the inhabitants of the inland States agree 
 to pay the duties that may be imposed without their assent by those 
 on the Atlantic or the Gulf, for their own benefit ? Shall there be 
 a free port in one State, and enormous duties in another ? No one 
 believes that any right exists in a single State to involve all the 
 others in these and countless other evils, contrary to engagements 
 solemnly made. Every one must see that the other States, in self- 
 defense, must oppose it at all hazards. 
 
 These are the alternatives that are presented by the convention : 
 A repeal of all the acts for raising revenue, leaving the govern 
 ment without the means of support ; or an acquiesce in the disso 
 lution of our Union by the secession of one of its members. When 
 the first was proposed, it was known that it could not be listened 
 to for a moment. It was known if force was applied to oppose the 
 execution of the laws, that it must be repelled by force that Con- 
 
JACKS02TS PKOCLAMATION IN 1S32. m 
 
 gress could not, without involving itself in disgrace and the country 
 in ruin, accede to the proposition ; and yet if this is not done in a 
 given day, or if any attempt is made to execute the laws, the State 
 is, by the ordinance, declared to be out of the Union. The major 
 ity of a convention assembled for the purpose have dictated these 
 terms, or rather this rejection of all terms, in the name of the people 
 of South Carolina. It is true that the governor of the State speaks 
 of the submission of their grievances to a con vention of all the States; 
 which, he says, they "sincerely and anxiously seek and desire." 
 Yet this obvious and constitutional mode of obtaining the sense of 
 the other States on the construction of the federal compact, and 
 amending it, if necessary, has never been attempted by those who 
 have urged the State on to this destructive measure. The State 
 might have proposed a call for a general convention to the other 
 States, and Congress, if a sufficient number of them concurred, 
 must have called it. But the first magistrate of South Carolina, 
 when he expressed a hope that, " on a review by Congress and 
 the functionaries of the general government of the merits of 
 the controversy," such a convention will be accorded to them, 
 must have known that neither Congress, nor any functionary in 
 the general government, has authority to call such a convention, 
 unless it be demanded by two thirds of the States. This suggestion, 
 then, is another instance of the reckless inattention to the provis 
 ions of the Constitution with which this crisis has been madly hur 
 ried on ; or of the attempt to persuade the people that a constitu 
 tional remedy has been sought and refused. If the legislature of 
 South Carolina " anxiously desire" a general convention to con 
 sider their complaints, why have they not made application for it 
 in the way the Constitution points out? The assertion that they 
 " earnestly seek" it is completely negatived by the omission. 
 
 This, then, is the position in which we stand. A small majority 
 of the citizens of one State in the Union have elected delegates to 
 a State convention : that convention has ordained that all the 
 revenue laws of the United States must be repealed, or that they 
 are no longer a member of the Union. The governor of that State 
 has recommended to the legislature the raising of an army to carry 
 the secession into effect, and that he may be empowered to give 
 clearances to vessels in the name of the State. Uo act of violent 
 opposition to the laws has yet been committed, but such a state of 
 things is hourly apprehended, and it is the intent of this instrument 
 to PEOCLAIM, not only that the duty imposed on me by the Consti- 
 
112 JACKSON S PKOCLAMATION IN 1832. 
 
 tntion, "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed," shall 
 be performed to the extent of the powers already vested in me by 
 law, or of such others as the wisdom of Congress shall devise and 
 intrust to me for that purpose ; but to warn the citizens of South 
 Carolina, who have been deluded into an opposition to the Iaws 7 
 of the danger they will incur by obedience to the illegal and disor 
 ganizing ordinance of the convention to exhort those who have 
 refused to support it to persevere in their determination to uphold 
 the Constitution and laws of their country, and to point out to all 
 the perilous situation into which the good people of that State 
 have been led, and that the course they are urged to pursue is one 
 of ruin and disgrace to the very State whose rights they affect to 
 support. 
 
 Fellow-citizens of my native State I let me not only admonish you, 
 as the first magistrate of our common country, not to incur the pen 
 alty of its laws, but use the influence that a father would over his 
 children whom he saw rushing to a certain ruin. In that paternal 
 language, with that paternal feeling, let me tell you, my country 
 men, that you are deluded by men who are either deceived them 
 selves or wish to deceive you. Mark under what pretenses you 
 have been led on to the brink of insurrection and treason on which 
 you stand ! First a diminution of the value of our staple commod 
 ity, lowered by over-production in other quarters and the conse 
 quent diminution in the value of your lands, were the sole effect 
 of the tariff laws. The effect of those laws was confessedly injuri 
 ous, but the evil was greatly exaggerated by the unfounded theory 
 you were taught to believe, that its burdens were in proportion to 
 your exports, not to your consumption of imported articles. Your 
 pride was roused by the assertions that a submission to these laws 
 was a state of vassalage, and that resistance to them was equal, in 
 patriotic merit, to the opposition our fathers offered to the op 
 pressive laws of Great Britain. You were told that this opposition 
 might be peaceably might be constitutionally made that you 
 might enjoy all the advantages of the Union and bear none of its 
 burdens. Eloquent appeals to your passions, to your State pride, 
 to your native courage, to your sense of real injury, were used to 
 prepare you for the period when the mask which concealed the 
 hideous features of DISUNION should be taken off. It fell, and yon 
 were made to look with complacency on objects which not long 
 since you would have regarded with horror. Look back to the 
 arts which have brought you to this State look forward to the 
 
JACKSON S PKOCLAMATION IN 1832. 113 
 
 consequences to which it must inevitably lead ! Look back to 
 what was first told you as an inducement to enter into this dan 
 gerous course. The great political truth was repeated to you that 
 you had the revolutionary right of resisting all laws that were pal 
 pably unconstitutional and intolerably oppressive it was added 
 that the right to nullity a law rested on the same principle, but 
 that it was a peaceable remedy ! This character which was given 
 to it, made you receive with too much confidence the assertions 
 that were made of the unconstitutionally of the law and its oppress 
 ive effects. Mark, my fellow-citizens, that by the admission of your 
 leaders the unconstitutionality must be palpable, or it will justify 
 either resistance or nullification! "What is the meaning of the 
 word palpable in the sense in which it is here used ? that which is 
 apparent to every one, that which no man of ordinary intellect will 
 fail to perceive. Is the unconstitutionality of these laws of that 
 description ? Let those among your leaders who once approved 
 and advocated the principles of protective duties, answer the ques 
 tion ; and let them choose whether they will be considered as in^ 
 capable, then, of perceiving that which must have been apparent 
 to every man of common understanding, or as imposing upon our 
 confidence and endeavoring to mislead you now. In either case, 
 they are unsafe guides in the perilous path they urge you to tread. 
 Ponder well on this circumstance, and you will know how to ap 
 preciate the exaggerated language they address to you. They are 
 not champions of liberty emulating the fame of our Revolutionary 
 fathers, nor are you an oppressed people, contending, as they repeat 
 to you, against worse than colonial vassalage. You are free mem 
 bers of a flourishing and happy Union. There is no settled design 
 to oppress you. You have, indeed, felt the unequal operation of 
 laws which may have been unwisely, not unconstitutionally passed ; 
 bi^t that inequality must necessarily be removed. At the very mo 
 ment when you were madly urged on to the unfortunate course you 
 have begun, a change in public opinion has commenced. The 
 nearly approaching payment of the public debt, and the consequent 
 necessity of a diminution of duties, had already caused a consider 
 able reduction, and that, too, on some articles of general consump 
 tion in your State. The importance of this change was underrated, 
 and you were authoritatively told that no further alleviation of 
 your burdens was to be expected, at the very time when the con 
 dition of the country imperiously demanded such a modification 
 of the duties as should reduce them to a just and equitable scale. 
 
114 JACKSON S PROCLAMATION IN 1882. 
 
 But, as apprehensive of the effect of this change in allaying your 
 discontents, you were precipitated into a fearful state in which you 
 now find yourselves. 
 
 I have urged you to look back to the means that were used to 
 hurry you on to the position you have now assumed, and forward 
 to the consequences it will produce. Something more is necessary. 
 Contemplate the condition of that country of which you still form 
 an important part ; consider its government uniting in one bond 
 of common interest and general protection so many different States 
 giving to all their inhabitants the proud title of AMEEICAN CITI 
 ZEN protecting their commerce securing their literature and arts 
 facilitating their intercommunication defending their frontiers 
 and making their name respected in the remotest parts of the earth ! 
 Consider the extent of its territory, its increasing and happy popu 
 lation, its advance in arts, which render life agreeable, and the 
 sciences which elevate the mind! See education spreading the 
 lights of religion, morality, and general information into every 
 cottage in this wide extent of our Territories and States ! Behold 
 it as the asylum where the wretched and the oppressed find a refuge 
 and support ! Look on this picture of happiness and honor, and 
 say, WE, TOO, AEE CITIZENS OF AMEEICA Carolina is one of these 
 proud States her arms have defended her best blood has cemented 
 this happy Union ! And then add, if you can, without horror and 
 remorse, this happy Union we will dissolve this picture of peace 
 and prosperity we will deface this free intercourse we will inter 
 rupt these fertile fields we will deluge with blood the protec 
 tion of that glorious flag we renounce the very name of Ameri 
 cans we discard. And for what, mistaken men ! For what do you 
 throw away these inestimable blessings for what would you ex 
 change your share in the advantages and honor of the Union? For 
 the dream of a separate independence a dream interrupted, by 
 bloody conflicts with your neighbors, and a vile dependence on a 
 foreign power. If your leaders could succeed in establishing a 
 separation, what would be your situation ? Are you united at 
 home are you free from the apprehension of civil discord, with 
 all its fearful consequences ? Do our neighboring republics, every 
 day suffering some new revolution or contending with some new 
 insurrection do they excite your envy ? But the dictates of a 
 high duty oblige me solemnly to announce that you can not succeed. 
 The laws of the United States must be executed. I have no dis 
 cretionary power on the subject my duty is emphatically pro- 
 
JACKSON S PKOCLAMATIOX IN 1832. H5 
 
 nounced in the Constitution. Those who told you that you might 
 peaceably prevent their execution, deceived you they could not 
 have been deceived themselves. They know that a forcible op 
 position could alone prevent the execution of the laws, and they 
 know that such opposition must be repelled. Their object is dis 
 union ; but be not deceived by names ; disunion, by armed force, 
 is TREASON. Are you re^Rly ready to incur its guilt? If you are, 
 on the head of the instigators of the act be the dreadful conse 
 quenceson their heads be the dishonor, but on yours may fall the 
 punishment on your unhappy State will inevitably fall all the evils 
 of the conflict you force upon the government of your country. It 
 can not accede to the mad project of disunion of which you would 
 be the first victims its first magistrate can not, if he would avoid 
 the performance of his duty the consequence must be fearful for 
 you, distressing to your fellow-citizens here, and to the friends of 
 good government throughout the world. Its enemies have beheld 
 our prosperity with a vexation they could not conceal it was a 
 standing refutation of their slavish doctrines, and they will point 
 to our discord with the triumph of malignant joy. It is yet in 
 your power to disappoint them. There is yet time to show that 
 the descendants of the Pinckneys, the Sumpters, the Rutledges, and 
 of the thousand other names which adorn the pages of your revo 
 lutionary history, will not abandon that Union to support which so 
 many of them fought and bled and died. I adjure you, as you 
 honor their memory as you love the cause of freedom, to which 
 they dedicated their lives as you prize the peace of your country, 
 the lives of its best citizens, and your own fair fame, to retrace 
 your steps. Snatch from the archives of your State the disorgan 
 izing edict of its convention bid its members to re-assemble and 
 promulgate the decided expressions of your will to remain in the 
 path which alone can conduct you to safety, prosperity, and honor 
 tell them that compared to disunion, all other evils are light, be 
 cause that brings with it an accumulation of all declare that you 
 will never take the field unless the star-spangled banner of your 
 country shall float over you that you will not be stigmatized when 
 dead, and dishonored and scorned while you live, as the authors 
 of the first attack on the Constitution of your country ! its de 
 stroyers you can not be. You may disturb its peace you may in 
 terrupt the course of its prosperity you may cloud its reputa 
 tion for stability-r-but its tranquillity will be restored, its prosperity 
 will return, and the stain upon its national character will be trans- 
 
HQ JACKSON S PROCLAMATION IN 1882. 
 
 ferred and remain an eternal blot on the memory of those who 
 caused the disorder. 
 
 Fellow-citizens of the United States ! the threat of unhallowed 
 disunion the names of those, once respected, by whom it is ut 
 tered the array of military force to support it denote the ap 
 proach of a crisis in our affairs on which the continuance of our 
 unexampled prosperity, our political existence, and perhaps that 
 of all free governments, may depend. The conjuncture demanded 
 a free, a full, and explicit enunciation, not only of my intentions, 
 but of my principles of action ; and as the claim was asserted of a 
 right by a State to annul the laws of the Union, and even to secede 
 from it at pleasure, a frank exposition of my opinions in relation 
 to the origin and form of our government, and the construction I 
 give to the instrument by which it was created, seemed to be 
 proper. Having the fullest confidence in the justness of the legal 
 and constitutional opinion of my duties which has been expressed, 
 1 rely with equal confidence on your undivided support in my 
 determination to execute the laws to preserve the Union by all 
 constitutional means to arrest, if possible, by moderate but. firm 
 measures, the necessity of a recourse to force ; and, if it be the 
 will of Heaven that the recurrence of its primeval curse on man 
 for the shedding of a brother s blood should fall upon our land, 
 that it be not called down by any offensive act on the part of the 
 United States. 
 
 Fellow-citizens ! the momentous case is before you. On your 
 undivided support of your government depends the decision of 
 the great question it involves, whether your sacred Union will be 
 preserved, and the blessing it secures to us as one people shall 
 be perpetuated. No one can doubt that the unanimity with 
 which that decision will be expressed, will be such as to inspire 
 new confidence in republican institutions, and that the pru 
 dence, the wisdom, and the courage which it will bring to 
 their defense, will transmit them unimpaired and invigorated to 
 our children. 9 
 
 May the Great Euler of nations grant that the signal bless^ 
 ings with which He has favored ours may not, by the madness 
 of party, or personal ambition, be disregarded and lost, and 
 may His wise providence bring those who have produced this 
 crisis to see the folly, before they feel the misery, of civil strife, 
 and inspire a returning veneration for that Union which, if we 
 may dare to penetrate His designs, He has chosen, as the only 
 
JACKSON S PEOCLAMATION IN 1832. nf 
 
 means of attaining the high destinies to which we may reason 
 ably aspire. 
 
 In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of the United States 
 to be hereunto affixed, having signed the same with my hand. 
 
 Done at the City of "Washington, this 10th day of December, in 
 the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, 
 and of the independence of the United States the fifty-seventh. 
 
 ANDREW JACKSON". 
 
 By the President. 
 
 EDW. LIVIXGSOE, Secretary of State. 
 
HOME INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
 OF NEW YORK. 
 
 OFFICE, 112 & 114 BROADWAY. 
 
 This Company continues to insure Buildings, Furniture, etc., agaiust 
 Loss or Damage by Fire, ou favorable terms. 
 
 Cash Capital One Million Dollars. 
 
 Assets, July 1, 1860 $1,481,819.27 
 
 Liabilities 54,058.67 
 
 DIRECTORS. 
 
 WILLIAM G. LAMBERT, 
 GEORGE C. COLLINS, 
 DANFORD N. BARNEY, 
 Lucius HOPKINS, 
 THOMAS MESSENGER, 
 WILLIAM H. MELLEN, 
 CHARLES J. MARTIN, 
 CHARLES B. HATCH, 
 B. WATSON BULL, 
 HOMER MORGAN, 
 LEVI P. STONE, 
 JAMES HUMPHREY, 
 GEORGE PEARCE, 
 WARD A. WORK, 
 JAMES Low, 
 A. J. WILLS, 
 WILLIAM H. TOWNSEND, 
 I. H. FROTHIXGHAM, 
 CHARLES A. BULKLEY, 
 
 RICHARD BlGELOW, 
 
 GEORGE D. MORGAN, 
 THEO. MCXAMEE, 
 CEPHAS H, NORTON, 
 
 OLIVER E. WOOD, 
 ALFRED S. BARNES, 
 GEORGE BLISS, 
 ROE LOCKWOOD, 
 LEVI P. MORTON, 
 CURTIS NOBLE, 
 JOHN B. HUTCHINSON, 
 SAMUEL B. CALDWELL, 
 CHARLES P. BALDWIN, 
 AMOS D. D WIGHT, 
 H. A. HURLBUT, 
 JESSE HOYT, 
 WILLIAM STURGIS, JR. 
 JOHN R. FORD, 
 GEORGE T. STEDMAN, 
 SIDNEY MASON, 
 A. F. WILMARTH, 
 CYRUS YALE, JR., 
 F. H. COSSITT, 
 W. R. FOSDICK, 
 DAVID I. BOYD, 
 LEWIS ROBERTS. 
 
 CHARLES J. MARTIN, President 
 A. F. WILMARTH, Vice-President. 
 
 J. MILTON SMITH, Secretary. 
 
 JOHN McGEE, Assistant Secretary. 
 
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 SIXTEEN NUMBERS ARE READY. 
 
 No. 1. The Rev. T. L. CUTLER S Sermon on CHRISTIAN RECREATION AND 
 UNCHRISTIAN AMUSEMENT. 
 
 No. 2. The celebrated Addresses of the Rev. HENRY WARD BEECHER and JAMES 
 T. BRADY, Esq., on MENTAL CULTURE FOR WOMEN. 
 
 No. 3. The eloquent Discourse of Prof. 0. M. MITCHELL, of the Cincinnati Obser 
 vatory, on the GREAT UNFINISHED PROBLEMS OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 No. 4. THE PROGRESS AND DEMANDS OF CHRISTIANITY. By the Rev. 
 WM. H. MILBURN (the blind preacher). With an interesting Biographical Sketch. 
 
 No. 5. The great Sermon of Rev. A. KINGMAN NOTT (recently deceased), on 
 JESUS AND THE RESURRECTION, delivered in the Academy of Music, New 
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 No. 6. THE TRIBUTE TO HUMBOLDT. Addresses on the career of the great 
 Cosmopolitan, by Hon. GEO. BANCROFT, Rev. Dr. THOMPSON, Profs. AGASSIZ, LIBBER, 
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 No. 7. COMING TO CHRIST. By Rev. HENRY MARTIN SCUDDER, M.D., D.D., 
 Missionary to India. 
 
 No. 8. EDWARD EVERETT S ORATION at the Inauguration of the Statue of 
 Daniel Webster, at Boston, Sept. 17, 1859. 
 
 No. 9. A CHEERFUL TEMPER ; a Thanksgiving Discourse by Rev. WM. ADAMS, 
 of Madison Square Church, N. Y. 
 
 No. 10. EDWARD EVERETT S Address, and Rev. JOHN A. TODD S Sermon on the 
 Death of WASHINGTON IRVING. 
 
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 Artist, and Prayer of Rev. B. H. NADAL, D.D., on the occasion of the inauguration 
 of the Mills Statue of Washington, in the City of Washington, February 22, 1860. 
 
 No. 12. TRAVEL, ITS PLEASURES, ADVANTAGES AND REQUIREMENTS. 
 A Lecture by J. H. SIDDONS, the distinguished English Lecturer. 
 
 No. 13. ITALIAN INDEPENDENCE ; Addresses by Rev. HENRY WARD BEECHER, 
 Rev. HENRY W. BELLOWS, D.D., Rev. Jos. P. THOMPSON, D.D., and Prof. 0. M. 
 MITCHELL. Delivered hi New York, Feb. 17, 1860. 
 
 No. 14. EDWARD EVERETT S FOURTH OF JULY ORATION at Boston, 1860, 
 on " The Success of our Republic." 
 
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