U G 
 
 ^C-HBLF 
 
 ^ 167 
 
 'qh- 
 
FORTIFICATIONS 
 
 PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS 
 
 AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY 
 
 POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES 
 
 WCD 4896-4 
 
 ARMY WAR COLLEGE : WASHINGTON 
 
 NOVEMBER, 1915 
 
 513 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 
 1916 
 
• . • • • • • •/ • ♦ 
 
 « • • 
 • -• • •, 
 
 
 ¥ 
 
 War Department, 
 
 Document No. 513. 
 
 Office of the Chief of Staff . 
 
D 
 
 SYNOPSIS. 
 
 I. Introduction, 
 
 Page, 
 
 1. Influence of forts and fortified cities, as distinguished from intrenched areas, 
 
 upon operations on land 5 
 
 Fortifications of Liege 5 
 
 Fortifications of Namur and along the French frontier 6 
 
 Antwerp ... 7 
 
 Verdun 7 
 
 Przemysl and the Russian fortifications 7 
 
 The fortified city of the future 8 
 
 2. Influence of seacoast fortifications with particular reference to the attack by 
 
 allied fleet on Dardanelles fortifications 10 
 
 Description of the Dardanelles 10 
 
 ^ Fortifications of the Dardanelles 10 
 
 (a) Power of the guns 11 
 
 (6) Character of the batteries 12 
 
 Reduction of the forts at the entrance 12 
 
 Operations against the forts at the narrows 13 
 
 Final attack of March 18 13 
 
 Efficiency of seacoast fortifications 14 
 
 Requisites for successful defense 15 
 
 Necessity for mobile troops 15 
 
 3. Summary of attempt to take Dardanelles fortifications by mobile troops 16 
 
 Initial delay 16 
 
 Terrain 17 
 
 Strength of forces 17 
 
 Allies' plan 17 
 
 Landings at south end of peninsula 18 
 
 Landing by the Australian-New Zealand corps 19 
 
 Diversion by the French 19 
 
 Attempts to advance 19 
 
 Landing at Suvla Bay and subsequent operations 20 
 
 Necessity for heavy mobile guns 21 
 
 The value of mobile troops in coast defense 21 
 
 513 (3) 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 2008 with funding from 
 
 IVIicrosoft Corporation 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/fortificationsOOunitrich 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION. 
 
 In a memorandum from the Chief of Staff dated November 15, 
 1915, dh^ections were given for the preparation of a brochure upon 
 the subject of " Fortifications,'' with sole reference to the present 
 European war, giving especial attention to the following points: 
 
 (a) "What influence forts and fortified cities, as distinguished from 
 intrenched areas, have exerted on the operations on land. 
 
 (h) Influence of seacoast fortifications with particular reference 
 to the attack of the allied fleet against the fortifications of the Dar- 
 danelles. Give in detail the total armament, with calibers of arms of 
 the fleet as well as of the land forts, and the losses in personnel and 
 material suffered by both fleets and forts. 
 
 (c) A brief summary of the attempt to take these forts by the 
 operation of the mobile troops ; the number of mobile troops, as near 
 as can be determined, used to date, both in the attack and in the 
 defense, with total losses. 
 
 This has been done as far as practicable with the data now avail- 
 able, and the results are noted in the following paragraphs : 
 
 1. INFLUENCE OF FORTS AND FORTIFIED CITIES, AS DISTIN- 
 GUISHED FROM INTRENCHED AREAS, UPON OPERATIONS ON 
 LAND. 
 
 FORTIFICATIONS OF LIEGE. 
 
 At the outbreak of the present European war the Germans, in 
 their march through Belgium, were, on the evening of August 4, 
 1914, closing in on Liege, which lies astride the Meuse Eiver near 
 the eastern boundary of Belgium. The fortifications of Liege had 
 been constructed by Brialment, a Belgian officer, who also designed 
 the fortifications of Namur and Antwerp. They were completed in 
 1892, and consisted of a circle of forts commanding the main ap- 
 proaches to the city and about 4 miles therefrom. There were six 
 main forts of the pentagonal type and six smaller, triangular in 
 shape; the greatest distance between forts was 7,000 yards, and the 
 average less than 4,000 yards. Each fort had a garrison of about 80 
 men and an armament of two 6-inch guns, four 4.T-inch guns, two 
 8-inch mortars, and three or four quick-fire guns, the total number 
 of guns in the 12 forts being about 400. It was intended to construct 
 
 513 
 
 (5) 
 
6 
 
 between the forts lines of trenches and redoubts for infantry and 
 gun pits for artillery, but this had not been done. 
 
 The fort itself consisted of a low mound of concrete or masonry, 
 roofed with concrete and covered with earth; a deep ditch sur- 
 rounded the mound, the top of the latter barely showing above the 
 margin of the ditch. The top was pierced with circular pits, in 
 which " cupolas " or gun turrets moved up and down. Within the 
 mound there were quarters, machinery, stores, etc. 
 
 Wlien the Germans appeared the Belgian mobilization was still in 
 progress, and it is probable that the garrison, instead of being 30,000 
 as was intended, was only 20,000. The Germans, numbering about 
 30,000, concentrated the attack 'on the four forts at the southeast 
 sector and opened up with field gims on the night of August 4-5. 
 One of the forts was silenced by this fire on the 5th, and on the 6th 
 the Germans brought up their 8.4-inch howitzers and probably some 
 11-inch mortars, outranging the Belgian guns. Shells are said to 
 have gone through 12 feet of concrete. The accurate firing of the 
 Germans showed that the forts could not long withstand, and in the 
 afternoon of the 6th the Belgian field force was withdrawn from the 
 city and all the forts abandoned except the northern ones. The Ger- 
 mans left the remaining forts in peace until the 13th, when the 
 11-inch mortars opened on them, and by the 15th all had been cap- 
 tured. The cupolas had been smashed and shells had penetrated the 
 roofs and exploded the magazines. 
 
 FORTIFICATIONS OF NAMUR AND ALONG THE FRENCH FRONTIER. 
 
 Namur was defended by a ring of nine forts, 2J miles from the 
 city, with an armament similar to that in the Liege forts. The 
 garrison of 26,000 had prepared the defense of the intervals by in- 
 trenchments and wire entanglements, and a vigorous defense was 
 intended, as French help was expected. The Germans brought up 
 32 modern siege pieces, including the 42-centimeter howitzer, its 
 first appearance, and the Austrian 12-inch mortar, and placed them 
 3 miles from the Belgian lines. The attack began August 20. On 
 the next day the Belgians had to withdraw from the advanced 
 trenches owing to their inability to reply to the German fire; two 
 forts fell; three others were silenced after an attack of two hours. 
 On the 23d Namur was occupied, and on the 25th the last fort had 
 fallen. One fort had fired only 10 times and was itself struck by 
 1,200 shells fired at the rate of 20 per minute. The speedy fall of 
 Namur came near playing havoc with the allies' plans, as with the 
 delay caused by its resistance they had intended to complete the 
 concentration along the Belgian frontier. 
 
 513 
 
Other fortified places, such as Lille, Laon, La Fere, and Rheims, 
 along the northeastern French boundary fell before the advancing 
 Germans without striking a blow. The advance was on such a broad 
 front that an attempt at defense would have endangered the safety 
 of the garrisons, and it was imperative that the garrisons join the 
 field army. By August 28 Mauberge of all the northern strong- 
 holds alone held out. The defenses had been brought to a high 
 state of efficiency, the intervals well prepared with an armored train 
 running on a track encircling the main line of defenses. The German 
 infantry invested the place August 27, but the siege guns did not 
 go into action until September 3. The place fell September 8 with 
 a loss of 40,000 men. 
 
 ANTWERP. 
 
 Antwerp, said to be the second most strongly fortified city of 
 Europe, encircled by a girdle of 20 permanent forts and 12 earthen 
 redoubts, was in similar manner quickly reduced by the heavy siege 
 guns. The garrison, beginning to profit by the lessons learned at 
 Liege and Namur, attempted to keep the enemy's big howitzers 
 beyond range of the forts, but were driven back by the superior 
 numbers of the Germans, whose siege guns were then brought up 
 and quickly demolished the masonry forts. Thus the garrisoix 
 was deprived of any further assistance from its larger guns and, 
 being but poorly entrenched and unable to withstand the overwhelm- 
 ing artillery fire, was forced back to the inner line, thereby per- 
 mitting the siege gims to come within range of the city, which had 
 therefore to be abandoned promptly in order to prevent its destruc- 
 tion by bombardment. 
 
 VERDUN. 
 
 Verdun, however, on the eastern French frontier, with a ring of 
 forts 5 miles from the city, is still in the hands of the French, 
 because with a field army employing earthworks the fortified zone 
 has been largely extended and the German howitzers have been kept 
 6 miles from the forts. The unfortified city of Nancy has withstood 
 several heavy attacks, being protected by a field army on the hills 
 forming the " Grand Crown." 
 
 PRZEMYSL AND THE RUSSIAN FORTIFICATIONS. 
 
 The Russians invested the fortress of Przemysl on September 22, 
 1914, but later the siege was raised and on November 12 it was 
 invested a second time. As the Russians had no heavy siege guns, the 
 siege resulted in an attempt to starve out the garrison, which suc- 
 
 513 
 
8 
 
 ceeded March 22, 1915. With the return of the Teutonic allies in 
 May, 20 days was sufficient to recapture the place. The Eussians 
 stated that their ammunition supply was low, but it is safe to 
 assume that the presence of the heavy siege guns with the Germans 
 had a great deal to do with the recapture. 
 
 The fortresses guarding Warsaw and the Russian frontier on the 
 west were quickly taken during the advance of the Teutonic allies 
 in the summer of 1915, either by maneuvering the defenders out of 
 them or by bringing up the heavy guns and shattering the fortifi- 
 cations, as at Novo Georgievsk. The fortress of Ossowetz on the line 
 Niemen-Bobr-Narew had a different history. In February, 1915, 
 the Russians fell back across the Bobr River to the protection of 
 Ossowetz, which stood on the east bank along a long ridge covered 
 with woods, affording good artillery jDositions, and commanding the 
 opposite bank, where artillery positions were poor. There were ex- 
 tensive marshes along the river, but at this time of the year they 
 were frozen. The Germans at first tried to turn the position, but 
 failing, brought up their heavy mortars, eyen the 42-centimeter 
 howitzer. The Russian batteries were so well concealed that the 
 Germans could not locate them and their big guns did no damage. 
 The Russians silenced several batteries without suffering from their 
 fire. As the warm weather advanced, the marshes made it difficult 
 to emplace the heavy gims. Ossowetz did not fall until August 22 
 in the general Russian retreat after the capture of Warsaw. 
 
 THE FORTIFIED CITY OF THE FUTURE. 
 
 The failure of the forts in the present war is due to several causes : 
 
 First. Being built some years before the war, their position was 
 accurately known to the enemy, thus losing the advantage of conceal- 
 ment ; also, the details of their construction leaked out and guns .were 
 especially designed to destroy them. 
 
 Second. Their armament had not been kept up to date and was 
 entirely overpowered by gims of recent construction and of a type 
 unknown to the defense. 
 
 Third. The garrisons permitted the enemy to emplace his guns 
 within their effective range, but beyond range of the forts' guns. 
 
 The favorable effect of concealment, as a defensive measure, is 
 illustrated by the operations against Ossowetz, and that of keeping 
 the enemy at a distance by the operations against Verdun. 
 
 The experiences of this war confirm the conclusion reached during 
 the siege of Port Arthur in 1904, '' that the mounting of large-caliber 
 guns in a fort for use against the siege guns of the enemy is a fatal 
 518 
 
error." It would therefore seem preferable to place the fixed heavy 
 guns in emplacements located in rear of the line of forts, depending 
 for protection upon concealment rather than masonry or other cover. 
 The forts themselves, whether permanent or improvised after the 
 outbreak of war, should be designed for an infantry garrison only, 
 and the main line of defense should consist of a continuous system of 
 infantry entrenchments (including machine-gun emplacements), lo- 
 cated in advance of the line of forts. These latter would serve mainly 
 as supporting points for organizing a counter attack in case the 
 front were penetrated. 
 
 To check the enemy's advance before his heaviest guns have 
 reached points within effective range of the city, naval base, or other 
 vital object to be protected, a garrison sufficiently strong to operate 
 well in advance of the forts, is indispensable, and its action should be 
 assisted by long-range fire from the fixed armament, which should 
 be superior in caliber and range to the guns usually supplied to an 
 army in the field. 
 
 The guns of the fortress, both fixed and mobile, should be dis- 
 tributed over a large area and advantage taken of the terrain to 
 secure concealment, which must be had at any price. It is important 
 to bear in mind that the number of guns permanently emplaced 
 should be comparatively small compared with the total heavy arma- 
 ment of the fortress, or, in other words, the main reliance will be 
 placed on the mobile guns, some of which should be at least as pow- 
 erful as any the enemy can bring against them. 
 
 The fortress of the future should consist of a large area so 
 organized as to insure extreme mobility both to troops and guns. 
 There will be no conspicuous forts of masonry and armor. Per- 
 manent gun emplacements should be constructed only at important 
 points with the primary intention of compelling the enemy to lose 
 time in bringing up his heaviest siege guns. The mobile guns would 
 be located in earthen emplacements well concealed from the enemy's 
 observers who might endeavor to direct fire on them. The point 
 to be emphasized is that unless the garrison be strong enough in both 
 mobile troops and mobile guns to keep the enemy from breaking 
 through the line or coming within effective range of the city proper 
 or other vital point or object to be protected, then there is no hope 
 of offering a prolonged resistance. 
 
 In view of the foregoing it is apparent that intrenched areas with 
 mobile troops and guns are a more dependable protection than a 
 stereotyped system of permanent forts. 
 
 30669°— No. 513—16 2 
 
10 
 
 2. INFLUENCE OF SEACOAST FORTIFICATIONS, WITH PARTICULAR 
 REFERENCE TO THE ATTACK BY ALLIED FLEET ON DARDA- 
 NELLES FORTIFICATIONS. 
 
 DESCRIPTION OF THE DARDANELLES. 
 
 The western approach to the city of Constantinople from the 
 Aegean Sea is through the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora. 
 The Dardanelles (ancient Hellespont) is a long winding channel, 47 
 miles in length, but the really narrow portion, extending from the 
 Aegean Sea to the town of Gallipoli, represents a sea passage of 
 about 33 miles. The passage is at no point wider than 7,000 yards, 
 and at one point, the Narrows, 14 miles from the entrance, it con- 
 tracts to 1,400 yards. The surface current flows westward into the 
 Aegean at an average speed of IJ knots, which is sometimes trebled 
 in the Narrows after strong northerly winds. The depth in mid- 
 channel varies from 25 to 55 fathoms, and there are shallows at 
 some of the bays in the wider sections. Owing to the narrowness, 
 the strong current, and the cross currents set up at some of the 
 bays, maneuvering of large vessels is difficult. The weather is 
 treacherous and uncertain; the prevailing winds for nine months 
 of the year are northeasterly, but south winds spring up quickly, 
 and blows last from three to five days. Unfavorable weather and 
 frequent haze and mist were encountered during the earlier stages 
 of the naval operations. 
 
 The long narrow tongue of land to the north is the Gallipoli 
 Peninsula. It has its greatest width, 12 miles, just above the Nar- 
 rows or opposite Suvla Bay; it is narrowest at Bulair, 3 miles; at 
 the Narrows the width is 5 miles. Ships can therefore lie in the 
 Gulf of Saros and fire across the peninsula. The Asiatic shore of 
 the Dardanelles is lower than the European. The hills are low 
 and wooded, while on the peninsula they are bare and rocky cliffs. 
 On both shores there are heights which give advantage to defensive 
 artillery and at the Narrows both shores tower above the ships. 
 
 FORTIFICATIONS OF THE DARDANELLES. 
 
 The original fortifications were the "Dardanelles Castles"; the 
 two inner, the " Old Castles," at the Narrows, were built by the 
 Sultan Mohammed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, in 1462 ; 
 the two at the entrance, the " New Castles," were built in 1659. At 
 the instigation of Great Britain new fortifications were built in the 
 Narrows between 1864 and 1877. After the peace of San Stefano in 
 1878 the Germans designed new fortifications and all the new fortifi- 
 cations were armed with Krupp guns. 
 
 513 
 
11 
 
 From the best obtainable information, in the spring of 1915 the 
 armament was as follows: At the entrance between the towns of 
 Seddel-Bahr near Cape Helles on the Europeon side, and Kum Kale 
 on the Asiatic side, there were four forts or batteries, two on each 
 side, with an armament of ten 10.2-inch guns, four 9.2-inch guns, and 
 two 6-inch guns. 
 
 Proceeding towards the Narrows, there were on the Asiatic side 
 fortifications on Dardanes Hill, 4 miles south of the Narrows, and 
 two forts at the Narrows near the town of Chanak — the whole 
 mounting an armament of four 14-inch guns, six 10.2-inch guns, one 
 8.3-inch howitzer, and nine 6-inch guns. On the European side there 
 were three batteries south of the town of Kilid Bahr at the Narrows, 
 and a number of batteries on the hills around Kilid Bahr, the total 
 armament being four 14-inch guns, one 11-inch gun, eight 10.2-inch 
 guns, fourteen 9.2-inch guns, fifteen 8.3-inch howitzers, and twenty- 
 four 6-inch guns. The armament between the entrance and the Nar- 
 rows thus amounted to eight 14-inch guns, one 11-inch gun, fourteen 
 10.2-inch guns, fourteen 9.2-inch guns, fourteen 8.3-inch howitzers, 
 and thirty-three 6-inch guns. 
 
 The fortifications extended 4 miles farther north to the line 
 through Nagara, beyond which the Dardanelles turns to the north- 
 east and broadens out. The armament on both sides amounted to 
 two 14-inch guns, five 10.2-inch guns, five 9.2-inch guns, eight 8.3- 
 inch howitzers, and fifteen 6-inch guns, all except six 6-inch guns 
 being on the Asiatic side. 
 
 In addition to the above there were smaller guns to protect mine 
 fields. 
 
 From an examination of the chart, it seems that a hostile fleet, 
 after silencing the guns at the entrance and proceeding towards the 
 Narrows, would be subject to the fire of the following guns when it 
 had reached a point 4 miles from the Narrows: ten 14-inch guns, 
 eighteen 10.2-inch guns, eight 9.2-inch guns, twenty-one 8.3-inch 
 howitzers, and thirty-seven 6-inch guns. 
 
 (a) Power of the guns: 
 
 The guns in the batteries vary greatly ; alongside old guns are guns 
 of very great power. The heaviest gun, of which there were 10, the 
 14-inch Krupp, with a projectile weighing 1,365 pounds, appears 
 superior to our 14-rnch seacoast gun with its 1,600-pound projectile, 
 as it has a reported penetration in Krupp hardened steel armor at 
 8,000 meters of 20 inches, while our gun has 16.3 inches. Its life, 
 however, is limited to 80 or 90 rounds, and hence it is probably not 
 as accurate as ours after firing a number of shots. 
 
 The next heaviest gun is the 11-inch, but there was only one of 
 that caliber. Then comes the 10.2-inch, of w^hich there were 29, a 
 
 513 
 
12 
 
 gun manufactured some years ago by the Krupps. It is not as power- 
 ful as our 10-inch gun; its projectile weighs 450 pounds, as against 
 our 575 pounds, and its penetration at 3,000 meters is 6 inches, while 
 our gun penetrates 9.3 inches at 8,000 meters. The other heavy- 
 caliber gun is 9.2 inches, of which there were 25, with a projectile 
 weighing 420 pounds, and still more inferior to our 10-inch gun. 
 
 It is believed that Krupp guns of later pattern were mounted after 
 the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, and it seems to be certain that 
 heavy mobile howitzers or mortars were used against the allies. 
 
 (h) Character of the batteries: 
 
 The batteries were built with great care, but groups were formed 
 of different calibers and types, which rendered serving them difficult 
 and slow in action. The emplacements are of concrete and steel 
 with earthen cover, with guns in embrasures rather than in turrets. 
 There was a mo'dern system of seai'chlights, telephones, and range 
 finders, and good communication by roads. They were generally 
 invisible from the sea, but their positions were detected by the stone 
 barracks, which were usually close behind them and in full view of 
 passing ships. 
 
 One of the batteries was mamied entirely by Germans, but the 
 others had Turkish crews that had been drilled by German- officers. 
 The movable howitzer batteries appeared- to have had German coast 
 artillerymen with German naval officers in command. 
 
 REDUCTION OF THE FORTS AT THE ENTRANCE. 
 
 On November 3, 1914, the allied fleet bombarded the forts at the 
 entrance, but the real operations began February 19, 1915, with a 
 fleet of British battleships and cruisers, aided by a strong French 
 squadron. The attack was at first at long range, to which the forts 
 could not reply, being outranged. In the afternoon the ships closed 
 in and opened fire with the secondary batteries; the forts returned 
 the fire. The forts on the European side were apparently silenced ; 
 one on the Asiatic side continued firing. The damage was subse- 
 quently found to be comparatively small and many of the guns were 
 still intact. Eight battleships were engaged with a total of 46 guns of 
 major caliber, 30 being 12-inch, and 58 gims of minor caliber from 
 7.5-inch to 4-inch. The shore guns were ten 10.2-inch, six 9.2-inch, 
 and two 6-inch. No ship was hit. In general the guns Avere mounted 
 in open works near the old masonry castles, with the sea faces pro- 
 tected by earth. 
 
 Action against these forts continued until February 25, when the 
 reduction of all four was completed. In the meantime the new bat- 
 tleship, the Queen Elizabeth^ with eight 15-inch guns and twelve 
 6-inch guns, had arrived, giving the allies 16 armored ships of 
 
13 
 
 the line, 12 British and 4 French. The British casualties had been 
 three killed and five wounded. Landing parties had been sent 
 ashore as quickly as possible to complete the work of destruction, 
 but were driven back by the Turks before completing the job. It 
 was reported by the British that all forts were completely demolished 
 with the exception of one at Kum Kale. 
 
 OPERATIONS AGAINST THE FORTS AT THE NARROWS. 
 
 Sweeping operations to clear the channel of mines and obstructions 
 began February 25, and on March 1 three ships entered the strait 
 and attacked Fort Dardanes with its five 6-inch guns in rectangular 
 turrets on the military crest of a hill 350 feet high ; these were said 
 to be the only Turkish guns with telescopic sights. Sweeping opera- 
 tions and the attack on Fort Dardanes with its outlying smaller bat- 
 teries continued until March 5, the French division and the Queen 
 Elizaheth using indirect fire from the Gulf of Saros on the forts at 
 Kilid Bahr at the Narrows. An aeroplane ship with sea planes and 
 aeroplanes accompanied the fleet. But not a shot hit the forts dur- 
 ing the indirect bombardment; according to the Turks, the aero- 
 planes did not remain long enough in the air to direct the fire. On 
 March 8 the Queen Elizabeth entered the strait and fired on Kilid 
 Bahr at 21,000 yards range. This long-range bombardment of the 
 forts at the Narrows and closer action by the other ships against the 
 batteries south of the Narrows, together Avith mine sweeping, con- 
 tinued until March 18. The ships were hit several times, including 
 the Queen Elizabeth^ w^hich was struck by field guns, but no material 
 damage was done and the casualties were slight. Fort Dardanes and 
 other concealed batteries near by were almost daily under the fire of 
 from four or five ships, sixteen 12-inch guns and forty-eight 6-inch 
 guns being used against five 6-inch guns. No battery on the Turkish 
 side was put permanently out of action. The Turkish casualties, 
 omitting those in the forts at the entrance, which were heavy, were 
 23 killed and 10 wounded. 
 
 FINAL ATTACK OF MARCH 18. 
 
 On March 18 there was a general attack on the Narrows, partici- 
 pated in by 12 British and 4 French ships, mounting a total of 82 
 major caliber guns from 15-inch to 9.2-inch, and 178 minor caliber 
 guns from 7.5-inch to 4-inch. As stated in paragraph 2, subpara- 
 graph 2, " Fortifications of the Dardanelles," pages 4 and 5, the 
 number of guns that the Turks could bring into action against this 
 fleet was 36 major caliber direct-fire guns and 21 howitzers, a total 
 of 57, and 37 minor caliber guns. In addition there were fieldpieces 
 
 513 
 
14 
 
 and movable heavy howitzers, the number being indeterminate. In 
 the forenoon the Qu^en Elizabeth^ just inside the entrance, 10^ miles 
 from the Narrows, and three older British ships bombarded the forts 
 at the Narrows, while two other British ships at closer range at- 
 tacked Dardanes and the batteries south of the Narrows. Shortly- 
 after noon the French division of four ships advanced to the sup- 
 port of these two ships, taking up a position near Kephez Point, 3 
 miles south of the Narrows.* A heavy fire was now returned by the 
 forts, but as the ships were maneuvering in circles, few hits were 
 made. The 10 ships that were engaged at this time mounted 58 
 major caliber guns. At 1.25 p. mt the forts ceased firing. A fresh 
 British squadron of six ships now arrived to relieve a correspond- 
 ing number of ships well within the strait. As this squadron neared 
 Kephez Point, the other ships turned to withdraw when the French 
 ship, Bouvet^ was struck several times and blew up, the cause of the 
 explosion probably being a drifting mine. The new squadron con- 
 tinued the advance, attacking in line; the ships just within the en- 
 trance continued the bombardment, but it was manifest that the 
 forts had not been silenced. Mine sweeping operations continued, 
 but drifting mines sunk the British ships Irresistible and Ocean^ 
 and a mine and gunfire so badly damaged the Irvfiexible that it with 
 difficulty reached the harbor of Mudros, 40 miles away. The French 
 ship Gaulois was also badly damaged by gunfire. The attack ceased 
 when darkness fell. 
 
 The attack had been badly repulsed and was not again renewed. 
 The British casualties were slight, 61 all told, practically all the 
 crew from the Irresistible and Ocean being saved; but the French 
 lost nearly the entire crew of the Bouvet, The Turks lost 23 killed 
 and 60 wounded. The 6-inch guns in the turrets at Dardanes, which 
 had received such a heavy fire, were not damaged; the turrets were 
 hit only three times. On the European side three 10-inch guns were 
 put out of action, but three weeks later all were ready again. The 
 stone barracks in rear of the batteries were destroyed; 86 shells 
 fell in a space 300 feet deep in rear of one battery, but the battery 
 was untouched. The shells easily penetrated earth, but not one 
 passed through sand parapets. After March 18, the Turks substi- 
 tuted sand for earth to a large degree in the parapets and divided 
 up the large interior rooms of the batteries into smaller ones by 
 hollow walls filled with sand. 
 
 EFFICIENCY OF SEACOAST FORTIFICATIONS. 
 
 The operations in the Dardanelles have been the only instance in 
 this war of a naval attack on seacoast fortifications, except the minor 
 attack of the Japanese Navy against the Grerman fortifications at 
 Tsingtau. Elsewhere, by virtue of their existence, they have per- 
 
15 
 
 formed their functions of protecting harbors, fleets, and naval bases. 
 The German fleet, under the protection of the shore guns, has main- 
 tained its existence in spite of the proximity of the superior British 
 fleet. 
 
 These operations have emphasized the fact that has been thor- 
 oughly demonstrated by history that a purely naval attack can not 
 succeed against seacoast fortifications adequately armed and manned, 
 and that in such actions the proper function of the navy is to convoy 
 the army, which will make the attack by land, and to protect its line 
 of communications. 
 
 REQUISITES FOR SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE. 
 
 The forts at the entrance fell and those in the Narrows were 
 scarcely damaged, though in both cases there was an overwhelming 
 fire from the ships. The difference in the two cases is this: At the 
 entrance the guns were outranged and the ships had plenty of sea 
 room in which to maneuver and bring the heavy guns to bear, free 
 from danger of mines ; in the narrow mined channel of the Narrows, 
 with both shores lined with guns, some of them equal or nearly so 
 to the heaviest ship gun, the ships had to come within range and 
 could attack with only a portion of the force. In such a position, a 
 fleet, exposed to fixed and floating mines, shore torpedoes and sub- 
 marines, will fail. The slight damage sustained by the shore bat- 
 teries is illustrated by Fort Dardanes, which withstood the fire from 
 the British ships, admittedly inferior to none in marksmanship. 
 An interior city, with its approach channel protected with well- 
 placed and concealed guns, equal in range to the enemy's, and pro- 
 vided with the accessory means of defense, need not fear capture by 
 bombardment or a run by the forts. A fort on the seacoast proper, 
 exposed to the fire from ships at sea, must have guns of greater range 
 than the ships' guns; otherwise the ships could silence the gims on 
 shore at their pleasure, and under their fire could land troops to 
 complete the destruction of the forts. 
 
 Concealment and dispersion are also necessary. The aeroplane 
 observation of fire by the allies does not seem to have been very effi- 
 cient, but this can not always be relied on, and concealment from 
 aerial observation should be obtained. Without such observation, 
 long-range indirect bombardment is worthless. By taking advantage 
 of the terrain and resorting to dispersion, the amount of concrete 
 might be reduced, and the money thus saved put into more guns. 
 
 NECESSITY FOR MOBILE TROOPS. 
 
 The power of coast fortifications, to repel a direct attack by an 
 enemy fleet, is limited to the area within range of their guns, but 
 their influence is extended considerably further whenever they cover 
 
16 
 
 a base from which submarines operate. These fortifications must 
 therefore be recognized as of supreme importance within the scope 
 of their proper functions, and this is especially true of a country 
 possessing an enormous frontage on two oceans. Their paramount 
 value is that they relieve the navy of the local defense of important 
 harbors or other strategic points and thus release our seagoing fleet 
 for operations against the enemy on the high seas, and furnish a 
 refuge for it in the face of overpowering odds. But beyond the 
 sphere of influence of our seacoast forts, enemy ships may approach 
 the shore with impunity and, under the cover of their gvms, may 
 land troops that can then proceed against the important places de- 
 fended by the forts or even against the forts themselves, since they 
 are vulnerable from the land side. With our long coast lines, the 
 guarding of every possible landing place by seacoast fortifications 
 is out of the question, and, although the development and employ- 
 ment of heavy mobile seacoast armament along our coastal railroads 
 will further restrict the landing places open to an enemy, there will 
 still remain many places affording facilities for landing operations 
 which can only be opposed by mobile troops acting without the 
 cooperation of Coast Artillery. For these reasons it is evident that 
 there must also be available a mobile force properly trained, organ- 
 ized and equipped, to send against the enemy at the landing and 
 defeat them there, or at least prevent his advance toward his objec- 
 tive, should a landing be effected. Until we have adequately pro- 
 vided for this dual defense of our coasts, having full regard to both 
 fixed defenses and mobile troops, our Navy will never be free to 
 perform its primary function, but will be frittered away in response 
 to clamor for protection from our coast population. 
 
 An illustration of the value of mobile troops in coast defense is 
 afforded by the operations at the Dardanelles, described in the last 
 subhead under paragraph 3, page 12, of this study. 
 
 3. SUMMARY OF ATTEMPT TO TAKE DARDANELLES FORTIFICA- 
 TIONS BY MOBILE TROOPS. 
 
 INITIAL DELAY. 
 
 Before the attack of March 18 it had been decided to undertake 
 operations by land at the Dardanelles. An official French note 
 stated on the 12th that a force was on its way to the Levant, and 
 Gen. lam Hamilton was appointed commander of the British force 
 and arrived in time to witness the action of the 18th. Both the 
 French and British forces had arrived in the harbor of Mudros on 
 the island of Lemnos, west of the Dardanelles; but as the British 
 transports had not been loaded with a view to make a landing in 
 force on a hostile shore and the lack of facilities in Mudros made 
 51 s 
 
17 
 
 redistribution impossible there, they had to be sent back to Alex- 
 andria for reloading. A month was lost, which it is safe to say 
 was well employed by the Turks. 
 
 TERRAIN. 
 
 The Gallipoli Peninsula is covered by hills which rise to a height 
 of 1,000 feet; on the southern end Achi Baba, 600 feet high, domi- 
 nates the end of the peninsula; just west of the Narrows, Kilid 
 Bahr, 700 feet high, covers the forts from an attack from the 
 Aegean ; and northwest of the Narrows, Sari Bair Mountain reaches 
 a height of 970 feet. These hills must be taken before an advance 
 can be made to the shores of the Narrows. The hills do not run in 
 a regular or well-defined direction, and between the hills there are 
 a confusing number of valleys. The area is practically roadless and 
 most of it covered with prickly scrub. The sides of the hills are 
 almost vertical. At the water's edge there is generally a narrow 
 beach with a steep bank 10 feet high, and then the rolling hills with 
 their crests 1,000 yards from the beach. Every trail leading to the 
 beach was covered with one or more machine guns in screened pits, 
 and the roads were covered with field guns in groups of from three 
 to six. 
 
 STRENGTH OF FORCES. 
 
 The British force consisted of the Twenty-ninth (Eegular) Divi- 
 sion, the East Lancashire (Territorial) Division, a- naval division 
 of bluejackets and marines, some Indian troops, and the Australian 
 and New Zealand Corps, with 20 battalions of infantry, together 
 with artillery and engineers. The strength was approximately 
 100,000. The territorials and colonial troops had been wintering 
 in Egypt. The French force was about 35,000. The Turks were in 
 greater force and better posted than was expected; the number on 
 the European side has been giA^en as over 150,000. Besides, they 
 were supported by the Germans. 
 
 allies' plan. 
 
 The coast being precipitous, landing places few, and trenches and 
 entanglements being visible on shipboard at most of them. Gen. 
 Hamilton decided to throw the whole of his troops very rapidly 
 ashore at a number of places, and selected five beaches at the tip 
 of the peninsula and two on the west coast, near Sari Bair Mountain, 
 as landing places. He could thus advance up the peninsula or cross 
 it where it was about five miles wide, and obtaining possession of the 
 high hills, secure observation points whereby the navy could assist 
 in the reduction of the forts. 
 
 518 
 
18 
 
 LANDINGS AT SOUTH END OF PENINSULA. 
 
 April 25 was the date of the landing. The Twenty-ninth Divi- 
 sion, 20,000 men, was to land at the end of the peninsula at the five 
 beaches, the three at the tip, near Sedd-el-Bahr, being the main 
 ones. At the other two places, the landing was to take place at 
 dawn, while at the main places the landings were to be simultaneously 
 at 5.30 a. m., after half an hour's bombardment by the fleet. The 
 landing parties, covering the advance of the division, were placed 
 on naval vessels the previous day and before dawn on the 25th 
 were in the small boats in which they were to be towed ashore. The 
 accompanying squadron of four battleships and four cruisers began 
 the preliminary bombardment. At S beach, in Morto Bay, the 
 farthest to the east, three companies (750 men) made a successful 
 landing, with a loss of 50 men, and kept the position. On Y beach, 
 the westernmost landing, two battalions (2,000 men) landed on an 
 undefended beach, but were subsequently attacked and driven to the 
 boats with heavy losses. On X beach, 3 miles south of Y beach, 1 
 battalion (1,000 men) made a successful landing, under cover of 
 the fire of the Iiruplcbcahle^ which stood close inshore, firing with 
 every possible gun, thus preparing the way for a subsequent force 
 of 2,000 men, which joined hands with the force landing at W 
 beach, the next to the south. On W beach, 1 battalion (1,000 men) 
 landed on a beach 350 yards long and 15 to 40 yards wide, well 
 protected with intrenchments and entanglements, the latter extend- 
 ing under water. The Turks reserved their fire until the first boat- 
 load of soldiers grounded, and under this fire the assailants had to 
 make their way through the entanglement. A foothold was gained 
 and, more infantry following, connection was made with X beach. 
 At V beach, west of Sedd-el-Bahr, the site of the seacoast forts that 
 had previously been reduced by the navy, a force of about 3,000 
 attempted to land on a beach 350 yards long by 10 yards wide, over- 
 looked by a natural amphitheater rising back from the beach, with 
 concave slopes. On the very margin of the beach ran a wire entangle- 
 ment and up the slopes were two other lines, the whole covered 
 with fire of rifles, machine guns, and pom-poms. Three companies 
 (750 men), landing in small boats, were almost annihilated, the 
 survivors obtaining shelter under the lee of a low sandy bank 4 
 feet high, at the inner edge of the beach; the boat crews were all 
 killed. It was intended to land 2,000 men from a collier, the Clyde^ 
 which was to be run ashore, and lighters used to form a gangway 
 between ship and shore. The attempt failed; of 1,000 men who left 
 the colliers, 50 per cent were kill or wounded. Nothing could be 
 done until night, when the remainder of the infantry from the 
 Clyde went ashore. On the 26th, under cover of the fire from the 
 
19 
 
 ships, the troops established themselves on the crests of the sur- 
 rounding hills. During the night of the 25th, the disembarkation 
 of the remainder of the Twenty-ninth Division was proceeding on 
 W and X beaches. 
 
 LANDING BY THE AUSTRALIAN-NEW ZEALAND CORPS. 
 
 This corps of 35,000 men landed north of Gaba Tepe, near the foot 
 of Sari Bair Mountain. This rugged and difficult part of the coast 
 was chosen because it was believed it would be undefended. The 
 landing was to be a surprise and the preliminary bombardment was 
 omitted. The covering force of 4,000 men in ships' boats was 
 towed by destroyers to within 500 yards from the beach, which was 
 1,000 yards long, when the destroj^ers dropped behind and steam 
 launches towed the boats in. In the darkness the boats were close 
 to the shore before they were discovered. About a battalion of 
 Turks disputed the landing, but they were driven back. The main 
 body came up in the transports and by 2 p. m. 12,000 men and two 
 batteries of mountain artillery were ashore. The Turks promptly 
 rallied and reinforced to 20,000 by 11 a. m., made counter attacks. 
 These counter attacks continued for several days, but with the 
 assistance of the ships' fire the British maintained their position. 
 On this first day — April 25 — 29,000 men were landed. 
 
 DIVERSION BY THE FRENCH. 
 
 As a diversion to draw the fire of the Asiatic guns from Sedd-el- 
 Bahr, a regiment of the French corps landed at Kum Kale on the 
 Asiatic shore on the 25th, but on the 26th they reembarkeyd, after a 
 loss of 754, one-fourth of its effective strength, and the French corps 
 began landing at V Beach. 
 
 ATTEMPTS TO ADVANCE. 
 
 On April 28 the allies held a line across the peninsula, three miles 
 north of Sedd-el-Bahr, and an attempt was made to capture the 
 hill of Achi Baba, which failed. The troops landing on the west 
 coast also tried to advance, but were held to a semicircle 1,100 yards 
 in dia;neter from the beach. Here they were holding open a door 
 to the vital point of the Turkish p.osition and were keeping 24,000 
 of the best Turkish troops out of the main action around Sedd-el- 
 Bahr. By May 5 the landing of the allies was completed. The 
 British official report gives the losses among the British at this time 
 as 602 officers and 13,377 men, which is about 13.5 per cent of the 
 total estimated force of 100,000. It is estimated that the Turks lost 
 18,000 in the operations of April 25-27. 
 
20 
 
 May 6 a general advance was attempted against the town of Krithia 
 and the hill of Achi Baba, but the attack was unsuccessful. May 18 
 the Turks, estimated at 30,000, attacked the force at Anzac Cove 
 (the name given to the landing place of the Australian-New Zealand 
 Corps, themselves termed " Anzacs"), and were repulsed with a loss 
 of 7,000, the Anzacs losing 500. To May 31 the British losses were 
 38,636 (1,722 being officers), the French about 5,000, and the Turkish 
 estimated at 60,000. The total battle losses of the British in the three 
 years of the Boer War were 38,156. According to a Turkish report 
 at this date the number of British and French troops amounted to 
 90,000. The Turks had received 60,000 reenforcements. 
 
 June 4 there was another general attack by the allies from Sedd- 
 el-Bahr ; on the right there were two French divisions, the rest of the 
 line, 4,000 yards, being held by 24,000 British infantry. The net 
 result was a gain of 200 to 400 yards along a front of three miles. 
 The line then held extended from south of Krithia southeast across 
 the peninsula, about 4 miles from Sedd-el-Bahr. The appearance of 
 German submarines caused the withdrawal to Mudros Harbor of the 
 transports and the sending of supplies in small boats. The Turks 
 under Enver Pasha made a general attack in the vicinity of Krithia 
 Juaie 30-Ju«ly 2, but accomplished little, with a loss of 5,150 killed 
 and 15,000 wounded. To July 18, the British losses were 49,283, 
 2,144 being officers. 
 
 LANDING AT SU\XA BAT AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS. 
 
 August 7 another landing was made at Suvla Bay, 4 miles north 
 of Anzac Cove. The landing began at 2 a. m. on three beaches and 
 by day a force of two divisions was firmly established. The Anzac 
 force joined in the attack, the intention being to connect the two 
 fmxes and capture the Sari Bair Ridge. The attack from Anzac 
 was carried to the summit of the ridge, but as the Turks had been 
 heavily reenforced, the attp.ck from Suvla Bay did not make the 
 expected progress, and the line had to fall back. The two forces 
 were finally joined on a line 12 miles long. The number of men land- 
 ing at Suvla Bay is not known; the British speak of it as a fresh 
 army and the Turks estimated it as 70,000. The British losses were 
 heavy ; according to the Turks, 30,000. 
 
 According to a German estimate, on August 30 the allies had from 
 20,000 to 25,000 troops at Sedd-el-Bahr, of whom 9,000 were French, 
 all that was left of the original 35,000; 9,000 at Anzac Cove, and 
 70,000 at Suvla Bay. These numbers were not materially increased 
 after that date, though the losses in the trench warfare since then 
 had brought the casualties on November 9 to 106,610 among the 
 British. The Turkish losses are unknown. On December 20 it was 
 
21 
 
 announced that the troops at Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove, about 
 100,000, had been withdrawn from the peninsula for service else- 
 where; the troops at Sedd-el-Bahr were left there until January 
 9, 1916, when they, too, were withdrawn. 
 
 NECESSITY FOR HEAVY MOBILE GUNS. 
 
 Although the Turks had ample warning of the impending attack, 
 with an abundance of men to draw upon, and had guarded the most 
 probable landing places with intrenchments and entanglements, the 
 allies succeeded in getting ashore. With the limited number of 
 beaches suitable for landing, the Turks apparently had sufficient force 
 to guard every one ; but some were overlooked and the success of the 
 allies is due partly to that fact. The main reason for the success, 
 though, is due to the fire of the covering ships, which could come in 
 close enough to use all their guns and thus keep down the fire of the 
 Turks. If the Turks had employed guns heavy enough to stand the 
 ships off, the landing would not have taken place, for experience has 
 shown that even the most powerful naval guns at long range are un- 
 able to put well concealed shore guns out of action. Even chance hits 
 have little effect upon the sand or earthen parapets. 
 
 It may be accepted then as a fact, that to prevent a hostile force 
 from landing there must be in addition to the usual infantry defense 
 at all the possible landings, guns of sufficient power to keep the naval 
 vessels at such a distance that their secondary batteries can not be 
 used. Thus the landing of troops or supplies from ships at so great 
 a distance from the shore can readily be prevented by the infantry 
 and field guns. 
 
 In the case of a landing on our coast, the stretch to be covered is so 
 long that it is impracticable to implace in prepared positions enough 
 of these guns to cover all the possible landing places. It will there- 
 fore be necessary to use mobile guns that can be quickly transported 
 to the point threatened. The quickest method of transportation 
 appears to be a railroad paralleling the beach, from which spurs 
 could be run to points near enough to the front to keep ships at 
 about 8,000 yards from the shore. The railroad, spur tracks, and 
 gun locations should be prepared in time of peace. 
 
 THE VALUE OF MOBILE TROOPS IN COAST DEFENSE. 
 
 After the allies had succeeded in the landing operations and had 
 assembled on the peninsula the entire expeditionary force, their fur- 
 ther advance was small, and after maintaining a position near the 
 water's edge for over nine months, the force was withdrawn. The 
 reason for the failure appears to be threefold : First, the size of the 
 
 513 
 
22 
 
 Turkish force was underestimated and an insufficient number of troops 
 was sent at first, and these troops were not sufficiently reinforced; 
 second, the terrain was favorable to the Truks ; third, most important 
 of all, the Turks had sufficient troops to prevent the allies from 
 advancing. 
 
 Considering our own requirements, it should be noted that the ter- 
 rain along our Atlantic Coast is not so favorable to the defense 
 as that of the Gallipoli Peninsula, as the landing beaches are nu- 
 merous and extensive and the ground in rear is generally favorable 
 for an advance. Moreover, our coast is too extended to permit the 
 preparation of defenses in advance at all possible landing places. 
 There is consequently the more necessity for mobile troops. 
 
 With a well-trained and equipped force equal or superior to the 
 force that had succeeded in landing, the operations on the Gallipoli 
 Peninsula lead us to believe that an advance from the beach away 
 from the cover of the ships, can be prevented; but without such a 
 force, once the outer line of defense at the beach has been penetrated, 
 the forces must be withdrawn to some thoroughly prepared position 
 covering the objective of the enemy. Unless such a position of suit- 
 able extent has been prepared in advance, further resistance is hope- 
 less. 
 
 513 
 
 o 
 
I 
 

 :-! 
 
PAT. JAN. 21. 1908 
 
 6 67370 
 
 A 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA UBRARY