PRESENT DAY TRACTS. 
 
SPECIAL VOLUME OF PRESENT DAY TRACTS. 
 
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 No. 18. Christianity and Confucianism Compared in their Teach- 
 ing of the Whole Duty of Man. By Prof. Legge, LL.D. 
 
 No. 25. The Zend-Avesta and the Religion of the Pdrsis. By 
 J. Murray Mitchell, M.A., LL.D. 
 
 No. 33. The Hindu Religion a Sketch and a Contrast. By J. 
 Murray Mitchell, M.A., LL.D. 
 
 No. 46. Buddhis?n : a Comparison and a Contrast between Buddh- 
 ism and Christianity. By Henry Robert Reynolds, D.D. 
 
 No. 51. Christianity and Ancient Paganism. By J. Murray 
 Mitchell, M.A., LL.D. 
 
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 The branch of the series of Present Day Tract"! devoted to the discussion 
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 Christian Religions of the World." Christian Commonwealth. 
 
PRESENT DAY TRACTS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 ^<ttt=^ft|i$iiatt IllttksirpIiUs ifi i^ ^jj^ 
 
 BY 
 
 The Eevs. Noah Porter, D.D., The Late 
 
 W. F, Wilkinson, M.A., Prof. W, G. Blaikie, D,D., 
 
 Prof. ^ James Iverach, M.A., and Prof. J. 
 
 Radford Thomson, M.A. 
 
 Containing Eight Tracts of the Seriec, Nos. 7, 8, 17, 29, 34, 40, 47, 
 
 
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 THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIl 
 
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 164, Piccadilly. 
 

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PREFACE. 
 
 rpHE Tracts contained in this Yolume are already in the 
 -*- hands of readers of the Present Day Series, in their 
 separate form, or in the bound volumes, in the order of 
 their issue ; but it is believed that it will meet the needs 
 and convenience of many readers and teachers to have 
 them brought together in a group by tbemselves. The 
 success which the volume on the ITon-Christian Religions 
 of the World has already met with encourages the hope 
 that this one on the I^on-Christian Philosophies of the Age 
 will meet a real want and be equally acceptable to the 
 public. 
 
 The systems discussed in this Yolume are widely re- 
 ceived in our day, and their baleful influence extends far 
 beyond the circle of those who study them systematically 
 and read the . books of their leading expositors and 
 advocates. 
 
 The writers of the Tracts are all men who have made 
 a special study of their subjects, and it is the life work of 
 several of them to expound the true philosophy and refute 
 the erroneous philosophies that are prevalent. What they 
 
vi Preface. 
 
 write may be read with confidence by the Christian public, 
 and placed in the hands of the unsettled with the con- 
 viction that it is well fitted to counteract the error that is 
 abroad, and commend the truth to the minds of earnest 
 and honest inquirers. 
 
 In order to give completeness to the Volume it has been 
 necessary to include eight Tracts instead of six, and . to 
 issue it at a higher price than the Non- Christian Religions 
 of the World, or any of the ordinary volumes of the Series. 
 
 January, 1888. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 VII. 
 
 CHRISTIANITY AND SECULARISM COMPARED IN 
 
 THEIR INFLUENCE AND EFFECTS. 
 
 Bv THB Rev. Professor BLAIKIE, D.D. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 /^ AGNOSTICISM: A DOCTRINE OF DESPAIR '' ' 
 
 By thh Rbv. NOAH PORTER, D.D., LL.D. 
 
 XVII. 
 
 MODERN MATERIALISM. 
 
 By THB LATB Rev. "W. F. WILKINSON, M.A. 
 
 XXIX. 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERBERT SPENCER EXAMINED. 
 
 Bv TUB Rev. Professor JAMES IVERACH, M.A. 
 
 XXXIV. 
 
 MODERN PESSIMISM. 
 By the Rev. Professor J. RADFORD THOMSON, M.A. 
 
 XL. 
 
 UTILITARIANISM: AN ILLOGICAL AND IRRELIGIOUS 
 
 SYSTEM OF MORALS. 
 
 By the Rev. Professor J. RADFORD THOMSON, M.A. 
 
 XLVII. 
 
 AUGUSTE COMTE AND THE "RELIGION OF HUMANITY." 
 
 By the Rev. Professor J. RADFORD THOMSON, M.A. 
 
 XLvin. 
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION EXAMINED. 
 Bv the Rev. Pkcfessor JAMES IVERACH, M.A. 
 
CHRISTIANITY AND SECULARISM 
 
 COMPARED IN THEIR 
 
 INFLUENCE AND EFFECTS. 
 
 BY 
 
 The Rev. W. G. BLAIKIE, D.D, LL.D. 
 
 ^Professor in the New College^ EdinbuvgJi), 
 
 author of 
 
 Better Days for Working People," "The Personal Life of David 
 
 Livingstone," etc. 
 
 THK J 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY: 
 
 56, Paternoster Row ; 65, St. Paul's Churchyard ; and 
 164, Piccadilly. 
 
^rgiuucut of the Tract. 
 
 Christianity and Secularism are to be tested by their 
 fruits. Early and recent achievements of Christianity show 
 the excellence of the fruit-tree. Objections on the ground 
 of corruption, imperfect fruits, etc., are examined and met. 
 Secularist objections are then specially dealt with. First, 
 the attack of Secularism on the principles of Christianity is 
 stated and examined. Christianity does not teach men to 
 despise this life, nor to succumb to all injustice and 
 oppression ; it appeals to men's hopes and fears of future 
 retribution, but at the same time it calls in and exercises all 
 that is noble in us. George Eliot's article on Worldliness 
 ajid Other- Worldliness is examined and criticised. Chris- 
 tianity does not demand a submission to arbitrary authority, 
 but requires obedience to the will of God as the expression 
 of all that is best and most wholesome. Secular obedience 
 to natural law is shown to involve the same principle as 
 Christian obedience to revealed law. The principles of 
 Secularism are then examined, and found wanting. The 
 place of atheism in secular systems is indicated. From 
 Dr. Flint's criticism of certain secular principles it is seen 
 that they are open to great objection. The want of a 
 fnoral dynamic in secularism is pointed out. It is shown 
 that secularism borrows certain principles from the Bible, 
 not the Bible from secularism. The outstanding facts 
 connected with the efforts of the two systems are next 
 examined. It is shown that secularism has no great list 
 of benefactors to the race, while in every department 
 Christianity abounds in such. It is shown too that efforts 
 for civil and religious liberty in this country have been 
 greatly stimulated by religion. The paper concludes with 
 a story of a waif showing that only a full, free Gospel is 
 capable of reaching the wanderer and restoring him to his 
 Father's house. 
 
CHRISTIANITY AND SECULARISM 
 
 COMPARED IN THEIR 
 
 INFLUENCE AND EFFECTS. 
 
 j^^o men crather crapes of fhorns or fip^s of systems 
 
 ;Si w o o r o tested bv 
 
 thistles?" Is not the tree known by their friiiits. 
 *^ its fruits ? Christianity and Secularism 
 
 both claim to be good fruit-trees, in respect of 
 their civilizing and elevating influence. It ought 
 not to be very difiicult to decide which is best. 
 We believe that the decision must be wholly 
 in favour of Christianity ; but Secularism cries 
 '' No ! '' and demands a scrutiny. 
 
 When Christianity first appeared there was no J/gXat the 
 need for any scrutiny. Its purifying, elevating, Christianity 
 and civilizing effects were plain to every one who 
 had eyes to see. Under the influence of Paganism, 
 society, in the Eoman world, had become almost 
 hopelessly corrupt. Eoman poets, historians, and 
 philosophers bear frightful testimony to the un- 
 disguised abominations which abounded in Rome 
 itself, the most refined city in the world. Yice 
 was not only rampant, but it was utterly shame- 
 less. On all hands it is admitted that Christianity 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 was like tlie introduction of fresli life-blood into a 
 wasted body, ready to perisb. It was a new tbing 
 to see men enduring torture and surrendering their 
 lives ratber than utter a boUow word. It was a 
 new tbing to see strong men exposing tbemselves 
 to peril to protect tbe weak, or sacrificing tbeir 
 comforts to feed tbe bungry or to clotbe tbe naked. 
 " How tbese Cbristians love one anotber ! " was 
 tbe exclamation wbicb sucb sigbts provoked. 
 " Wbat women tbese Cbristians bave ! " was tbe 
 remark wben tbe life-long virtue of sucb a woman 
 as Antbusa, tbe widowed motber of Obrysostom, 
 passed under review. In later times, alas, Cbris- 
 tianity was less marked for its purity, and we find 
 instances of men, wben pressed to become Cbristians, 
 retorting, "Wbat good would it do us to be Cbris- 
 tians, wben sucb a one is a cbeat in business, and 
 sucb anotber a tyrant in bis bouse ? " 
 Modem In our owu time we bave bad some beautiful 
 
 instances. 
 
 illustrations of tbe power of Cbristianity to civi- 
 lize and elevate tbe most barbarous communities. 
 Fiji. i^Q liave seen some of tbe Fiji and otber islands 
 
 transformed from tbe wildest savagery and canni 
 balism, into orderly, industrious, and intelligent 
 communities.^ We bave seen brigbt oases springing 
 up at Kuruman and Lovedale, and otber spots in 
 tbe Kaffrarian desert. And tbe wbole liistory of 
 eighteen centuries has sbown more or less tbat tbe 
 
 ^ See, inter alia^ Miss Gordon Cumming's At Home in Fiji, i 88^. 
 
Christianity ana Secularism. 
 
 progressive civilization of the world is found Principles of 
 under the shadow and shelter of Christianity, civilization. 
 We fear no challenge when we affirm that in its 
 purest form Christianity has fostered the ideas and 
 encouraged the habits out of which all true civili- 
 zation springs. It has fostered regard for man as 
 essentially a noble being, having an immortal soul 
 made in God's image, with boundless capacities of 
 expansion and improvement ; regard for woman 
 as the helpmeet and companion of man, not 
 his drudge, or slave, or concubine ; regard for 
 marriage as a holy contract, entered into before 
 God, not to be lightly set aside ; regard for children 
 as the heritage of the Lord, not burdens and in- 
 cumbrances, but lent by the Lord to be brought 
 up for Him ; regard for the family as a divine insti- 
 tution, intended to be a fountain of holy joys, and 
 a nursery of all estimable habits and all kindly 
 affections ; regard for the sick, the infirm, and the 
 aged, whose sorrows we are ever to pity, and whose 
 privations we are to make up in some measure from 
 our more ample stores. The very word Christian, 
 in its true spirit, has been identified with all these 
 ideas and habits; in that sense it has a glory all 
 its own ; and no juster criticism can be passed on 
 persons outraging truth and rectitude, than that 
 they are a disgrace to the Christian name. 
 
 More than this, we affirm that in the region of Moral 
 
 ^ influence of 
 
 morality, Christianity has fostered a spirit of truth Christianity. 
 
CJuistianity and Secularism. 
 
 and fair dealing between man and man; so that 
 over tlie world Christian traders, for example, 
 bear on the Avhole a different character from those 
 who are not Christian. Thus much we may still 
 say in spite of painful drawbacks. Christian tri- 
 bunals have a reputation for justice unknown in 
 Mahometan and other countries, where bribery and 
 corruption are so prevalent ; more regard is paid to 
 the rights of the poor ; and the oppression of the 
 defenceless is counted shameful. In the region o5 
 political life greater pains are taken to secure 
 orderly government, to protect life and property, 
 and to encourage industry and commerce ; greater 
 pains are taken too (alas, sometimes far too little \) 
 to maintain peace and friendship with other com- 
 munities, and, as the result of this, commodities 
 are more freely exchanged, and the welfare of both 
 sides is advanced. Moreover, under the shadow 
 of Christianity, art, science, and literature have 
 flourished and advanced; indeed, there is hardly 
 such a thing as enlightened science or literature 
 in any modem nation not professing Christianity. 
 Yet the salt ^q rcadilv admit that Christianity is capable of 
 
 may lose it^ ' J x. 
 
 being corrupted on the one hand, and reduced to 
 dead formalism on the other ; and that in both of 
 these cases the salt loses its savour. That this 
 would happen in the history of the Church, that 
 there would be most grievous error and declension, 
 followed by wild violence and bitter persecution, 
 
 bavour. 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 argUMicnt 
 
 was clearly foretold by Christ and His Apostles.^ 
 But wherever Christianity exists in its true cha- 
 racter, it always acts beneficially on human society. 
 It gives its tone to the laws and institutions of the 
 country ; it educates the people, it liberates the 
 slave, it cares for the poor, it heals the sick, it 
 fosters the arts of peace, it mitigates the horrors 
 of war ; and, not content with improving the con- 
 dition of those at home, it takes to its heart the 
 remotest nations of the earth, and plans, labours, 
 and prays that all its blessings and privileges may 
 flow out to the whole family of man. 
 
 We are not allowed, however, in these days to ^^ 
 say all this unchallenged. Our argument on the cJ^aiienged 
 elevating influence of Christianity on society has 
 been questioned both on general and on special 
 grounds. In this tract our chief business will be 
 with the special objections of Secularists ; we will 
 therefore touch but lightly, in the first place, on 
 some of the more general objections to the argu- 
 ment arising from the effects of Christianity. 
 
 It is objected (a) that Christianity has not even Sctions 
 been able to keep itself pure, free from the cor- 
 ruption of foreign or worldly elements ; (b) that it 
 has failed to absorb and supersede all other religions, 
 as it would have done had it really been the only 
 divine religion for man ; (c) that it has often shown 
 
 1 Matt. xiii. 25; xxiv. 12 ; Acts xx. 29, 30 ; 2 Thess. ii. 8, j 
 2 Tim. iii. 2. 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 Corruptibi- 
 lity of Chris- 
 tianity 
 implies 
 essential 
 piiiity. 
 
 a persecuting spirit, and a reliance on force as the 
 instrument of its advance ; and {d) that it has failed 
 conspicuously to extirpate evils of the grossest and 
 most repulsive kind : it has failed to aholish war 
 it has failed to root out drunkenness and de- 
 bauchery, so that in our large cities even now, 
 towards the end of the nineteenth century, we 
 find much of the old pagan disorder and sensuality 
 under the very shadow of the Christian Church.^ 
 In reply to all this we have to remark, 
 {a) That the liability of Christianity to become 
 corrupted by worldly elements, so far from proving 
 that it is of mere human origin, is a proof of the 
 opposite. As we have said, Christ and His apostles 
 foretold it. But besides this, let it be observed 
 that if, like the pagan religions, or like Mahometan- 
 ism or Mormonism, Christianity had been of man, 
 it would have been sure to have enough of worldly 
 elements in its own composition, and half-hearted 
 adherents would not have required to borrow these 
 from a foreign source. The Christianity of the 
 New Testament is too pure for human nature 
 before it is changed by Christian influence ; and 
 when men do not yield themselves to it wholly, 
 they are glad to mix it with more palatable 
 
 - I'hese and similar objections to Christianity, as an agent of 
 civilization and human progress, will be fonnd more or less 
 formally stated by Buckle, Lecky, Amberloy, Paine, Holyoake, 
 Lradlaugh, Watts, and other opponents of Christianity. 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 materials in order to adapt it in some degree to 
 their unrenewed taste. This explains the corrup- 
 tion of Christianity. But Christianity itself ought 
 no more to be rejected because it has been 
 corrupted by worldly admixture, than silver should 
 be pronounced worthless because it is tarnished by 
 exposure to the air. 
 
 (h) Again, the failure of Christianity to absorb Nature of 
 
 ... . . T . provision foi 
 
 other religions is no argument against its divme gji'^.^*^."'^-. 
 origin when the nature of the provision for 
 spreading it is considered. It was never in- 
 tended to be made known directly or at once to 
 all; it was first to be communicated to a selected 
 few, and these were charged with the duty of 
 making it known to others. This is uniformly the 
 method enjoined in the Christian books. It depends 
 for efficiency on the faithfulness of those to whom 
 the charge is given first. But in a vast number of 
 cases, the recipients of the Gospel have been 
 careless of this duty, and hence the limited diflPusion 
 of Christianity. Is that to be pleaded against its 
 divine origin ? Many parents neglect their duty 
 to their children, but for all that, we all hold 
 that the family institute is a blessed arrangement. 
 The best system in the world is helpless if it 
 be not worked by an efiicient executive. Surely 
 it would be the very essence of unfairness to 
 confound the system with its officers, and condemn 
 
10 
 
 Christianity and Secularisjn. 
 
 Charge of 
 
 intolerance 
 
 met. 
 
 the one for the manifest and inexcusable negligence 
 of the other. 
 
 (c) In lilie manner the charge of intolerance and 
 persecution does not tell against Christianity itself, 
 but against its mistaken and faithless administrators. 
 It is not pretended by our opponents that the 
 Christian books enjoin intolerance and persecution. 
 No word can be quoted from the lips of our Lord 
 or His apostles that gives the faintest countenance 
 to such a policy. Such words as the following 
 point in the opposite direction: **Be ya wise as 
 serpents, and harmless as doves." " All they that 
 take the sword shall perish with the sword." " My 
 kingdom is not of this world, else would My 
 servants fight." It is indeed lamentable to think 
 how much intolerance and persecution have pre- 
 vailed in some branches of the Christian Church. 
 But in so far as these weapons have been used, 
 violence has been done to the true spirit of Christ. 
 It is no real objection to our argument that 
 Christianity propagated by force has not been a 
 blessing to the world; for force kills love, and 
 Christianity without love is like a body without 
 the soul. 
 
 {d) It is a more serious objection that Christianity, 
 even where it has been most successful, has failed 
 to root out gross corruption such as drunkenness, 
 greed, cruelty, and war. But here it is indis- 
 pensable to bear in mind how Christianity works. 
 
 Failure of 
 Christianity 
 to eradicate 
 great evils. 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 11 
 
 It is not like the light or the air, influencing all 
 men alike. It becomes a great transforming and 
 renewing power only in the case of those who 
 receive Christ into their hearts. Our Lord Him- 
 self taught emphatically that in order to fruit- 
 fulness there must he such a union with Him as 
 that of the branch to the vine. JSTo phrase occurs 
 more frequently in the writings of St. Paul than 
 "in Christ." Christians, therefore, so called, are 
 really of two kinds, those who have Christ in their 
 hearts, and those who make only a profession of 
 following Him. It is the first only who can be 
 expected to manifest the real spirit of Christianity. 
 Now, the force of the Christian current in any 
 community can only be in proportion to the number 
 and earnestness of such persons. Unhappily, 
 hitherto, no great community has ever consisted 
 permanently and wholly of such elements. 
 
 Christianity, therefore, has never yet been seen systems to 
 in this world in its full strength. It has always \l^l^^^ 
 had an antagonist, and its nett results have been 
 only in the proportion in which its own power 
 has prevailed over antagonistic forces. If, in spite 
 of this antagonism, the influence of Christianity 
 on society has on the whole been wholesome and 
 beneficent, the testimony thus arising to its heavenly 
 origin is all the more striking. If a goodly croj) of 
 wheat has been reaped even where the enemy has 
 been busy sowing tares, the excellence of the 
 
 essential 
 tendencies. 
 
J 2 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 wheat and of the husbandry which produced it is 
 the more fully shown. It is ever to be borne in 
 mind that in many respects Christianity is not 
 acceptable to the human mind as it exists 
 unchanged ; that while on the whole it commends 
 itself as a divine provision for man's need, it 
 encounters much dislike and opposition from man's 
 waywardness and wilfulness, and to a correspond- 
 ing extent its influence is neutralized. But, as 
 Butler's Butler remarks in his Analogy, the merits of 
 
 argument. ^ oj ^ 
 
 systems are often to be judged by their essential 
 tendencies, rather than by their actual achievements. 
 It is objected to Butler's doctrine of the govern- 
 ment of the world being founded on virtue, that 
 virtue does not always overcome vice. True, says 
 Butler; but virtue even in this world tends to 
 prevail, and hence you may infer that the 
 government of the world rests on virtue. 
 Essential go Christianity even in Christian countries 
 
 tendencies of '' 
 
 chiistianity. ]^r^g j^q^ wholly overcomo drunkenness, greed, 
 dishonesty, ambition and other sins, but it tends 
 to overcome them. Can this be doubted ? Take 
 
 Its precepts, its most characteristic percepts " Thou shalt love 
 the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all 
 thy soul ; and, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as 
 
 Its motives, tliysolf." Take its most characteristic motives 
 ^' Ye are not your own, ye are bought with a price ; 
 therefore glorify God in your bodies and in your 
 spirits, wliich are God's." " Walk worthy of the 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 13 
 
 vocation wherewitli ye are called." '^ Grieve not 
 the Holy Spirit of God, whereby ye are sealed 
 unto the day of redemption." Take its most 
 characteristic models "Let this mind be in you, its models, 
 which was also in Christ Jesus." "Such an 
 high priest became us, who is holy, harmless, 
 undefiled, and separate from sinners." "Be not 
 slothful, but followers of them who through faith 
 and patience inherit the promises." Take its most 
 characteristic rewards "Blessed are the pure in itsiwarda 
 heart, for they shall see God." " Father, I will 
 that they also whom Thou hast given Me be with 
 me." " We know that when He shall appear, 
 we shall be like Him." Take its grand con- its fmaie. 
 summationy the glorious result of all its efforts and 
 achievements " Christ also loved the church, and 
 gave Himself for it, that He might . . . present 
 it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot 
 or wrinkle or any such thing." Who will dare to 
 say that the essential tendency of such a system is 
 not contrary to all vice and moral disorder; and 
 that if Christianity does not succeed in this world 
 in eradicating all sin, it is not because its tendency 
 is defective, but because the antagonism it en- 
 counters both in the hearts of its own servants and 
 in the world where it wages its warfare impedes 
 and thwarts its beneficial intention ? 
 
 But still, in opposition to all these explanations, it ^ons'l'nd 
 is sometimes urged, that if Christianity were really ob[icfed'to 
 
14 
 
 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 divine, it stould not need all these apologies and 
 explanations ; it would have such a force about it 
 as to preserve its own true character in spite of all 
 contrary influences, to secure administrators of the 
 proper spirit, to bear down opposition and antagon- 
 ism of every kind, and to prevail far more decidedly 
 over the devil and all his works. To have to speak 
 of it apologetically, as has now been done, is to 
 defend its goodness at the expense of its strength ; 
 as you sometimes say of a feeble brother, that he 
 has good intentions but cannot carry them into 
 eifect. 
 
 Is this a just objection ? We affirm that it is 
 contrary to all analogy. All truth is of Divine 
 origin, but how slowly does truth prevail over 
 ^ Eighteousness is of Divine origin ; but 
 
 0?)Jection 
 coutrary to 
 analogy. 
 
 Truth. 
 
 Righteous- 
 ness. 
 
 Frecdons. 
 
 error 
 
 what a warfare it has to wage, and how slowly 
 it wins the day over injustice and selfishness! 
 Freedom is of Divine origin ; but what a painful, 
 difficult, and tedious process has it been to vindicate 
 its claims ! It is not God's way to bear down all 
 opposition to the good and the true, as a swoUen 
 river sweeps everything before it. Men are dealt 
 with as reasonable and responsible beings ; they 
 are placed under probation in this matter; their 
 power of choice is recognized ; and they are per- 
 mitted to offer that opposition to the claims of the 
 Gospel which proves such a hindrance to its progress 
 and rapid triumph. Secularism, with all its loud 
 
Christianity and^, Secularism. 15 
 
 claims, must confess that it finds it no easy thing 
 to conquer the forces that are opposed to it. 
 
 The real question is not which system sweeps The question 
 
 -'is one of 
 
 away everything that opposes the true progress of fitn^^ss. 
 mankind, hut which system is most effectual in 
 grappling with these hindrances. Absolute triumph 
 is not to be looked for, at least at the present stage ; 
 the question is, where are the forces that do most 
 and that promise best ? In a dark and disordered 
 world, where is the power that does most to make 
 the dark light, the crooked straight, and the rough 
 placos plain ? Who that fairly surveys the history 
 of the world can fail to admit that Christianity is 
 that power? 
 
 Passing from these general views, let us now special 
 examine the special objections which modern secu- secularism.* 
 larism advances to the position that Christianity, 
 more than any other force, tends to ameliorate and 
 elevate human society, and let us weigh the claim 
 which it makes on behalf of itself to much greater 
 efficiency in this respect. 
 
 The tone of secularism on this subiect is loud its confident 
 
 ** appeal to 
 
 and confident. It is here we find the attraction that *^e working 
 
 man. 
 
 is constantly presented in tracts, articles, speeches, 
 and controversies, in order to draw into its ranks 
 those who feel most keenly the defective arrange- 
 ments of society at the present day. Societ}' is 
 out of i<^int, it says, and the poorer class are 
 
16 
 
 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 suffering grievously from its condition. No wonder ! 
 Hitherto society has been moulded by Christianity, 
 and Christianity teaches men to despise the present 
 life, to count all its advantages as evil, and to 
 accept as blessings all the ills and sorrows of time, 
 not trying to lessen them, but waiting for a life to 
 come where all will be put right.^ Secularism, on 
 the other hand, bestows all its attention on the 
 present life, and strives with all its might to rectify 
 the disorders which are so numerous and so glaring. 
 Having come to see very clearly that all these dis- 
 orders are due to one cause, violation of the laws 
 of nature, physical, moral, and social, it pro- 
 claims with unbounded confidence that for every 
 such evil there is just one remedy, but a remedy 
 all-sufficient, viz., to find out and follow the laws 
 of nature. It is the great aim of secularism to do 
 
 The one 
 Secularist 
 leniedy for 
 all disorder. 
 
 * " Christianity aims solely at preparing men for a future 
 life, and it does this by teaching them to despise the advan- 
 tages and the pleasures of the present life. It teaches men, aa 
 they say, not to look at the things which are seen, not to set 
 their afiFections on things below ; and declares that those who 
 love the world and the things of the world do not love God and 
 cannot be saved. It represents riches, plenty, cheerfulness, and 
 the good things and pleasures of the present life, as dangerous, 
 as enemies to the soul. It pronounces woes on those who arc 
 rich and full, and those who laugh, and represents a jest and an. 
 idle word as exposing a man to damnation. Afflictions, want, 
 pain, reproach, persecution, etc., that the men of the world 
 regard as calamities, it represents as blessings, not joyous for 
 the present, but calculated to yield the peaceable fruits of right- 
 eousness afterwards." Secular Tracts, No. 1. 
 
Christianity and Secular ism. 17 
 
 tkis, and the more tliat it can induce men, especially 
 tlie toiling multitude, to abandon the guidance of 
 Christianity, and accept that which it offers in its 
 stead, the speedier will be the advent of a well- 
 ordered world, where peace and plenty, happiness 
 and prosperity will reign among the children of 
 men. Secularism has its millennium, and that 
 will come when men have learned to give universal 
 obedience to the laws of nature.^ 
 
 In its attack on Christianity, as bearing on the p^ntf S"the 
 elevation of society, secularism does two things : Sck?'^*^ 
 I. It denies that the principles of Christianity are 
 adapted to social improvement, and maintains that 
 they tend to social disorganization and ruin, 
 while the principles of secularism are perfectly 
 adapted to the good of man. II. It denies that 
 the facts usually pointed to as showing the good 
 results of Christianity, bear out that conclusion, 
 any good of that kind that Christianity has 
 appeared to accomplish being due not to itself, 
 but to secular principles which it has unconsciously 
 accepted. 
 
 ^ Secularists "believe all nature to be governed by fixed lawa, 
 in conformity to which our well-being depends. To teach men 
 to understand and obey these laws is therefore the great aim of 
 all their efibrts, both in educating the young and addressing 
 adults. It is hardly necessary to add, that their objects and 
 jirinciples are directly opposed to those of Christianity." 
 Secular Tracts^ No. 1. 
 
objected to. 
 
 18 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 Principles. I. ^PRINCIPLES. 
 
 Alleged The alleged principles of Christianity wlicli 
 
 grinciples of , . , . . . ^ 
 
 hristianity secularism condemns as oi pernicious mnuence 
 
 are mainly these: (1.) Christianity despises this 
 life, counts poverty a virtue and wealth a sin, 
 rebukes the spirit that thinks of to-morrow, and 
 thus cuts at the very root of all social improve- 
 ment and comfort.^ (2.) It encourages men to 
 succumb to injustice, to take no steps for the 
 protection of their property or their persons ; when 
 one smites them on the one cheek they are to turn 
 to him the other also, and when one would rob 
 them of their coat, they are to let him have their 
 cloak likewise.^ (3.) The great motive which 
 Christianity urges for doing right is the fear of 
 hell on the one hand, and the hope of a future 
 reward on the other; a motive which appeals to 
 nothing higher than selfishness, and which even if 
 
 ^ *' Christians in this island must take no thought for the 
 morrow. Economy and a desire for the future of this world 
 must be entirely ignored. It would be a crime to establish 
 post-of3&ce savings banks, inasmuch as laying up treasures on 
 earth is strictly forbidden." Christianity, its Nature and In- 
 Jluence on Civilization. By Charles Watts. 
 
 2 "If an enemy is cruel enough to invade this Christian 
 island, the inhabitants dare not interfere because Christ told 
 them to resist not evil. " " Christians clearly and emphatically 
 teach submission to physical evil, tjranuyj and oppression." 
 Ihid. 
 
 
Christianity and Secularism, 19 
 
 it were more effectual than it is, cannot develop ^^fp^ie^of 
 anything of a high and noble order, cannot make Ejected tof 
 men brave, generous, and truly good.^ (4.) Chris- 
 tianity compels men to receive truth on mere 
 authority ; they are to believe just what they are 
 told, neither more nor less ; in this way reason is 
 superseded, all free thought and inquiry is repressed, 
 and the soul becomes a mere machine, with a 
 slow, hard, grinding movement, instead of a living 
 being, soaring gracefully in the regions of light, 
 welcoming every truth which is disclosed to it, and 
 shaping its life in harmony with all that is good 
 and true.^ 
 
 * "If yoii feel no motive to common morality but from fear 
 of a criminal bar in heaven, you are decidedly a man for tlie 
 police on earth to keep their eye upon, since it is matter of 
 world-old experience that fear of distant consequences is a very 
 uisufficient barrier against the rash of immediate desire. Fear 
 of consequences is only one form of egoism which will hardly 
 stand against a dozen other forms of egoism bearing down upon 
 it. ' ' Westminster" Revieio. 
 
 2 " What stimulant did Christ give to think freely when He 
 said, * I am the way, and the truth, and the life ; no man 
 Cometh unto the Father but by Me. . . If a man abide not 
 in Me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered, and men 
 gather them and cast them into the fire, and they are burned V 
 la there any incentive to impartial investigation in the gloomy 
 words, ' He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved ; but 
 he that believeth not shall be damned V Once establish among 
 mankind the erroneous notion that truth is confined to one par- 
 ticular channel, and that those who do not go in that direction 
 are to be cast forth as a withered branch, and then the impossi- 
 bility of vm fettered thought will be immediately appax-ent, "-^ 
 
 ^ OF ^rHE '^l 
 
 UNI VERSIT 
 
20 
 
 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 Christianity 
 said to 
 despise the 
 present life. 
 
 Srrmon on 
 the Mount. 
 
 Trie 
 
 interpreta- 
 tion of the 
 sijimon. 
 
 (1.) The objection to Christianity as teaching 
 men to despise the present life, and as representing 
 poverty a virtue and wealth a sin, is founded on 
 well-known sayings of Christ in the Sermon on the 
 Mount and elsewhere. " Blessed are ye poor, for 
 yours is the kingdom of heaven. Woe unto you that 
 are rich, for ye have received your consolation." 
 " How hardly shall they that have riches enter into 
 the kingdom of heaven ... It is easier for a camel 
 to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich 
 man to enter into the kingdom of heaven." It is, 
 however, maintained by secularists that these views 
 were confined to the Founder of Christianity, and 
 that they have been repudiated by the great body 
 of His followers. The truth is, that Christians 
 generally have interpreted Christ's words in a 
 relative sense, not as condemning absolutely all 
 regard for property, or all concern for the morrow, 
 but as condemning that idolatrous and mischievous 
 use of property which puts it in the place of God, 
 giving it the first place in the heart, and that 
 cankering anxiety for the morrow which makes no 
 account of His fatherly care and love. That this 
 
 Free ThoufjU and Modern Progress. By Cliailes Watts. ** The 
 Bible is no authority to Secularists. The will of God, as the 
 clergy call it. in their eyes is mere arbitrary, capricious, dog- 
 matical assumption ; sometimes indeed wise precept, but oftener 
 a cloak for knavery and a pretext for dogmatism." G. J, 
 Ilolyoake, Principles of Secularism. 
 
Chrhtxanity and Secularism. 21 
 
 is the true view to be taken of Christ's words is 
 proved by many considerations ; it is in barmony 
 witb tlie wise, sensible, unexaggerating tone of His 
 teaching generally; it is in harmony with Old 
 Testament teaching, which Christ came not to 
 destroy but to fulfil, especially that of Moses and 
 Solomon, by whom every encouragement was given 
 to the people to practise thrift and industry, and to 
 exercise a becoming forethought ; it is in harmony 
 with other parts of Christ's teaching and other 
 actions of His life; for, on the one hand. He 
 did not require rich men like Zaccheus and 
 Nicodemus to part with their wealth, nor did He 
 charge the woman with the alabaster box with 
 cheating the poor. On the other hand, in His 
 parable of the talents, and in other parables. He 
 recognized the duty of industry and the benefit of 
 thrift. 
 
 The condemnation passed on Christ is really a con- o^r Lord'o 
 
 ^ ' use of 
 
 demnation for the use of a mode of expression well orientalisms 
 understood in the East, which, to give emphasis to a 
 point, substitutes the absolute for the comparative. 
 Who could imagine that Christ meant to enjoin it 
 as a duty absolutely to hate our father and mother 
 and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea, 
 and our own life also, if we would be His dis- 
 ciples ? ^ To interpret this passage thus would be 
 to make Christ guilty of extreme and unaccountable 
 
 ^ Luke xiv. 26. 
 
22 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 damnation self-coiitradictioii. The true shade of idea is given 
 0? avarir j^y Himself in Matt. x. 37, " He that loveth father 
 or mother more than Me.'' Is He then to be 
 condemned for warning men by a strong Oriental 
 idiom against the worship of money? Has that 
 passion been so harmless, has it caused so little of 
 the disorder and miseries of the world as to deserve 
 to be passed lightly by? Have the sorrows and 
 sufferings of the poor been so little due to the 
 greed and ambition of the rich ? Have the de- 
 vourers of widows' houses, and those who have 
 withheld from their labourers their hire, been so 
 rare or unknown in the world's history that no 
 emphatic blast of the trumpet behoved to be given 
 against them ? "Who will venture to say so ? 
 What true friend of the labouring multitude can fail 
 to be grateful to Christ for having raised His voice 
 so loudly against that greed of gold which has so 
 often proved a double curse a curse to those from 
 whose sinews the gold has been wrung, and a curse 
 to those whom it has bloated and pampered ? If 
 He showed in strong terms that the blessings of the 
 kingdom usually lie much nearer the path of the 
 poor than that of the rich, is He to be discredited 
 for that reason, especially among those who eat 
 their bread, in the sweat of their face ? 
 Christianity (2.) It IS ou the samo misinterpretation of the 
 
 alleged to be ^ ^ . , . . . 
 
 indifferent spirit of Christ's words that the obiection is 
 
 TO temporal ^ " 
 
 wiongs. founded, that Christianity requires men to succumb 
 
Christianity and ISecularism. 23 
 
 to all the evils of life, to be Tiniformly meek, 
 patient, and longsuffering, ^never resisting evil, 
 and never denouncing wrong. Here again it is 
 alleged that Christians have usually repudiated 
 this injunction, and especially that Paul, instead 
 of resembling Christ in this respect, was a contrast 
 to him. " The Christianity of Paul," it is said, raui and 
 " was widely different from that of his ' Divine 
 Master.' The character of Christ was submissive 
 and servile; Paul's was defiant and pugnacious. 
 We could no more conceive Christ fighting with 
 wild beasts at Ephesus, than we could suppose 
 Paul submitting without protest or resistance to 
 those insults and indignities which are alleged to 
 have been heaped upon Christ."^ The writer of 
 these words, with a mind darkened by prejudice, 
 may not have been able to conceive of Paul mani- 
 festing the meek spirit of his Master ; but no such 
 difficulty will embarrass those who read his 
 words, "Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, 
 but rather give place unto wrath. . . . Therefore 
 if thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, 
 give him drink ; for in so doing thou shalt heap 
 coals of fire upon his head " (Rom. xii, 19, 20). 
 
 As to the alleged servility of Christ's spirit, it f^l^f^^f. ^^ 
 will occur to most men that there was little indeed ^^Siu^ 
 of that shown when again and again He resisted 
 the devil in the wilderness ; or when He made 
 
 ^ Watts, Christianitij, its relation to Civilization, p. C. 
 
24 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 His whip of small cords, and drove tLe traders 
 
 from tlie temple ; or wlien before the multitude 
 
 and His disciples, He rebuked the hypocrisy of 
 
 the scribes and pharisees, and in words of scathing 
 
 reprobation denounced the men that devoured 
 
 widows' houses and for a pretence made long 
 
 prayers. It is strange how little the witnesses 
 
 against Christ agree among themselves in our day, 
 
 any- more than they did in His. At the very time 
 
 when the secularist is accusing Christ of submission 
 
 ScuKm ^^^ servility, Kenan proclaims that He had carried 
 
 eacfoS. t^6 denunciation of His opponents to such a height 
 
 as to make the country too hot for Him, so that 
 
 He actually welcomed the cross as a deliverance 
 
 from complications that could not longer be borne ! 
 
 Combination ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^ describo the holy instinct that 
 
 and meek! taught Christ whcu to Submit and when to 
 
 Sst denounce, but the records of His life show that 
 
 He Himself knew well the proper time for each, 
 
 and that He was equally at home as the lion and 
 
 the lamb whether He was called to denounce the 
 
 tyranny of the rulers, or to stand as a sheep dumb 
 
 And in before its shearers. The same spirit of combined 
 
 courage and meekness was shown by Stephen, 
 
 when he arraigned so boldly the impiety of the 
 
 nation, and then surrendered his life so touchingly 
 
 with prayer for his murderers. Who shall say 
 
 that in any essential respect Paul was different ? 
 
 The combination of qualities is rare and heavenly, 
 
 Stephen. 
 
Chrmtianity and Secularism. 25 
 
 not likely to be comprehended by those who on chri.-t.nniiy 
 
 , . combines 
 
 principle fix their gaze only on the things of earth. J^^p^ j^g 
 But this we may safely say, and history will bear 
 us out, that the best and bravest of those who have 
 stood up against the oppressor and defied his 
 force and fury, have derived no small share of their 
 courage from the words and the example of Him 
 who said to His disciples " Fear not them that 
 kill the body ; " while, at the same time, the best 
 and meekest of the martyrs, manifesting the sub- 
 limity of patience in dismal dungeons and at the 
 fiery stake, have been no less indebted to the 
 influence and example of Him " who, when He was 
 reviled, reviled not again; when He suffered He 
 threatened not, but committed himself to Him who 
 judgeth righteously." 
 
 (3.) But again it is represented that the great AUegeri 
 motive furnished by Christianity for doing right is chn^aanity 
 the fear of hell on the one hand, and the hope of p^J* ^^^ ""^^ 
 a reward in heaven on the other. It is said that 
 Christianity teaches us to regulate our whole 
 conduct by a regard to our interests in the world 
 to come. We are not to sin, because if we do we 
 shall suffer for it in hell. We are to do the will 
 of God, whatever it may be, in this life, because 
 if we do we shall get a prize for doing it in heaven. 
 Christianity, in short, is nothing but an appeal to 
 'our fears on the one hand, and our greed on the 
 other; it is a system of threats and bribes; its 
 
26 
 
 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 Twofold 
 answer. 
 
 motives in themselves are mean and ignoble, and in 
 their influence they can have but little good effect. 
 To illustrate their want of power the saying of one 
 of the worst criminals in England, who ended his 
 life on the gallows (Dick Turpin), is sometimes 
 quoted, that he believed both in God and the devil, 
 and did not care a straw for either. He had not 
 even the faith of the devils, who believe and 
 tremble. 
 
 The answer to this representation is twofold : 
 First, that the appeal which Christianity does 
 make to the fears and hopes of men in regard 
 to their future welfare is thoroughly right; and 
 second, that it is a miserable misrepresentation 
 to say that this appeal constitutes the sole or the 
 chief means by which it seeks to persuade them 
 to a holy course of life. 
 
 To say that you are not in any way to rouse the 
 fears and the hopes of men in regard to the future 
 would be simply absurd. Christianity appeals to 
 our whole nature, and surely both hope and fear 
 are integral parts of that nature. For what 
 purpose are our fears and hopes given us if they 
 are not to move us when our welfare, and it may 
 be our eternal welfare, is concerned ? In the state 
 of mind in which men are when the first appeals 
 of Christianity are made to them, their hopes and 
 fears in. reference to the future life as contrasted' 
 with the present, are almost the only channels 
 
 Place due to 
 hopes and 
 fears. 
 
 At the 
 
 beginning of 
 
 spiritual 
 
 lildtory 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 27 
 
 tlirougli wHcli they may be arrested, and shaken 
 out of their sleepy indifference to all spiritual 
 tilings. It is only a beginning that is made 
 through such hopes and fears ; but great preachers 
 do not scruple to make this beginning. When 
 John the Baptist saw the Sadducees come to his 
 baptism he said, "0 generation of vipers, who 
 hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come ?" 
 In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus urged men 
 to cut off their right hand when it caused them 
 to offend, rather than allow their whole body to be 
 cast into hell. 
 
 But what critic, desiring to convey a fair im- ^f^H 
 pression of the motives appealed to in the Sermon ^^^"^ 
 on the Mount, would ever say that they were 
 connected with the lower part of our nature? 
 " Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see 
 God;" is not the appeal here to something 
 infinitely higher than dread of pain or greed of 
 possession ? Or let us consider the first words 
 of the Lord's prayer : " Our Father, which art in 
 heaven ; " is that an appeal to selfishness ? Or 
 was it a low selfish feeling, to be gratified hero- 
 after, that our Lord addressed, when, bidding His 
 followers consider the ravens and the lilies, He 
 called them to filial trust in the love of the Father 
 who cared for them ? No gospel precept is more 
 assailed by secularists than this, "Seek first the 
 kingdom of God and His righteousness, and ail 
 
^8 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 liiese things shall be added unto you." Does that 
 mean that we are to be careless of all that tends to 
 our material good in tbis life, and that if we are, 
 we shall be rewarded with abundance of it in the 
 future ? Has it not an infinitely loftier meaning ? 
 That the attainment of righteousness, goodness, 
 every holy principle and habit, is far more valuable 
 than of earthly property ; and that if the first place 
 in our hearts be given to these, we need never 
 dread, either here or hereafter, that we shall be 
 left empty of other things. 
 Christ's Men are not long in the company of Christ 
 
 enlarges and bef oro their uaturc is expanded and purified, and 
 
 elevates the .... sr ^ 
 
 ^^''^^- desires arise in their hearts that no amount of 
 
 earthly good, here or hereafter, could ever satisfy. 
 The idea of a heaven of sensual pleasure is the 
 grovelling imagination of the Mahometan. Ilardly 
 less carnal is the conception of a heaven consisting 
 of an unlimited supply of what are called "the 
 good things " of this life. How infinitely beyond 
 such vulgir lines have all the men and women 
 risen who have become eminent in the Churcb for 
 the purity of their devotion, the consistency of 
 their character, or the warmth of their untiring 
 philanthropy ! 
 oeorgeEhot Somo ycais ago an article appeared in the 
 ness and Westminster Bsvieiu entitled " WorldKness and 
 
 other- 
 
 woridiiness Qther-WorldHness," now known to have been 
 written by Miss Marian Evans, the distinguished 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 29 
 
 George Eliot of literature."^ It is a somewhat trencli- George EUot 
 
 o on worldli- 
 
 ant and even bitter criticism of the poet Young, "^^^^^ 
 the author of Night-Thoughts, both as a poet and ^^i^^ 
 a religious man. What rouses her feeling against 
 Young is the sharp antithesis he is charged mth 
 drawing between this world and the next, and the 
 belief he seems to hold very strongly, that the groat 
 foundation of morality in this life is the doctrine of 
 retribution in that which is to come. No doubt Young's 
 
 Night 
 
 Young exposes himself in some degree to criti- Thoughts, 
 cism, but the critic runs to the opposite extreme. 
 George Eliot affirms strongly that in point of fact 
 men are very little influenced by the fear of a 
 distant retribution. Where there is a fierce passion 
 at work, the distant future will be little thought of, 
 will be no restraint on the passion ; and as to 
 acts of goodness, if there be not a love of goodness 
 in the heart, the mere hope of reward will not 
 produce such acts. Or if it should, they would be 
 mere selfish acts, performed from a selfish motive, 
 and therefore not acts of goodness at all. Inherent h^^'iSSe. 
 regard to what is right and true, and genuine 
 sympathy with our fellow-men, are, in this writer's 
 view, far more efficient motives to goodness than 
 regard to our own interests in a coming life. She 
 goes so far as to say that " it is conceivable that 
 
 ^ Since this Tract was first publislied, the authorship of the 
 article lias Leon avowed, both in George EHot's Life, and in a 
 volume of her Essays, wliere it stands first in order. 
 
30 
 
 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 Influence of 
 
 iuture 
 
 retribution. 
 
 Sjinpathy 
 and love of 
 goodness 
 stronger 
 forces. 
 
 But how are 
 they to be 
 produced 1 
 
 in some minds the deep pathos lying in the thought 
 of human mortality that we are heie for a little 
 while and then vanish away, that this earthly life 
 is all that is given to our loved ones, and to our 
 many suffering fellow-men, lies nearer the fountains 
 of moral emotion than the conception of extended 
 existence." 
 
 There are several positions here liable to remark. 
 The first is, that in point of fact, men are little 
 influenced by the dread of retribution in a life to 
 come. Is this an enlightened view of human 
 motive, as shown in history? Is it the doctrine 
 of the Greek tragedians, of Dante, of Shakespeare ? 
 "Why should " conscience make cowards of us all," 
 if the doctrine of future retribution is so impotent? 
 Take away the doctrine of retribution in a future 
 life from Shakespeare, and would you not strip 
 him of one great element of his strength ? 
 
 Another position is, that inherent love of good- 
 ness and genuine sympathy for our fellow-men are 
 much more powerful motives to the doing of what 
 is right than either the fear of punishment or the 
 hope of reward in the life to come. Undoubtedly 
 they are; but the two classes of motives do not 
 exclude one another, and both of them have their 
 place in the Christian heart. It is a more relevant 
 question, How are you to get men inspired with 
 pure love of goodness and tender human sympathy ? 
 We affirm that this is a part of Christian education, 
 
Christianity and Secularism, 31 
 
 and that, whatever may be true in exceptional 
 cases, it is only under the teaching and influences 
 of the Gospel, in the case of mankind generally, 
 that this spirit can be formed. Is not the forma- 
 tion of this spirit one of the highest aims of 
 Christianity? What are we to make of the ^.^^iLlonfor 
 eulogy of charity in the 13th chapter of 1st tw'"^ * 
 Corinthians? Or of this earnest word to the 
 Philippians : " Finally, brethren, whatsoever things 
 are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever 
 things are just, whatsoever things are pure, what- 
 soever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of 
 good report, if there be any virtue and if there be 
 any praise, think on these things." What more 
 powerful motive can be furnished to tender human 
 sympathy than the example of Christ? Where 
 was it ever more touchingly instilled than in the 
 parable " I was a stranger, and ye took Me in " ? 
 Or where, among the children of men, was there 
 ever a more beautiful development of this spirit 
 than in the great heart of the Apostle Paul ? 
 
 But the most questionable position in George immortafity^ 
 Eliot's statement has yet to be noticed. She con- rouses 
 
 ' sympathy 
 
 ceives that, in some cases, the pathos of human ^^^^^^ 
 life is more moving, has more power over our 
 hearts, when death is conceived of as ending all, 
 than when there is the thought of a life to come. 
 Does this mean that men are moved to more sym- 
 pathy with their fellows, and to greater eiforts to 
 
32 
 
 Gliristinnity and Siecularism. 
 
 Expenence 
 at French 
 Kevolution. 
 
 Experience 
 of Living- 
 
 help them, when they think of them as having no 
 hereafter, than when they think of them as immortal 
 beings ? In that case, one of the tenderest periods 
 of human history should have been the period of 
 the French Revolution, when death was voted " an 
 eternal sleep." "Was human life regarded then 
 with exceptional feelings of sanctity, when each 
 morning furnished its new batch of victims for the 
 guillotine ? If it be said that at that time fierce 
 passions were too much roused for men to act 
 according to their nature, we may turn our atten- 
 tion to another scene. When Dr. Livingstone was 
 trying to establish Christian missions in the Trans- 
 vaal, for the benefit of the natives, he was bitterly 
 opposed by certain Boers, and one reason for their 
 opposition to his missions and of their general 
 treatment of the negroes was that in their view 
 they had not souls. Did the thought that " death 
 ends all" to the negro fill the heart of the Boer with 
 a more tender sympathy for him ? If seizing his 
 cattle, making slaves of his children, compelling 
 him to work without remuneration, and sending 
 him into battle in front of the white man to 
 receive the charge of the enemy, be proofs of such 
 sympathy, undoubtedly the negro received them 
 without stint. Most men, however, would be 
 inclined to think that the sympathy of Dr. Living- 
 stone was of a healthier order, when he gave his 
 life v/ith such unwearied devotion to the cause of 
 
Ghristmnity and Secularism, 33 
 
 the Africans, strove to enlist the civilized world 
 on their side, proclaimed to them the story of God's 
 love in Christ, and hy the example of the heavenly 
 Father tried to engage them to hehave to one 
 another as hrethren.^ Whatever may be true of 
 the "some minds" that, according to George Eliot, 
 are so moved to sympathy for their fellows by the 
 thought that there is no hereafter, it is certain that 
 with the mass the effect is quite the opposite ; that 
 sympathy and the desire to help are intensely 
 quickened by the thought of the eternal future, 
 and that the lives and interests of the feebler 
 classes would have but little consideration from 
 the stronger if it were the common belief that they 
 pass away into forgetfulness like the beasts that 
 perish. 
 
 (4.) The fourth obiection of Secularism to Alleged 
 
 ^ ' '' imposiuon 
 
 Christianity is, that it subjects us to a hard autho- JiJiSJ^of a 
 rity in our belief and practice ; it puts reason authority 
 in fetters, checks all freedom of movement, and 
 prevents the soul from welcoming truth, and from 
 shaping its life in harmony with what is simply 
 good and true. It compels us to pay strict regard 
 to what it calls the will of God, both in what we 
 believe and in what we do. We may see strong 
 reasons for believing or foi doing what is different 
 from this will of God ; but be the reasons ever so 
 
 ^ See Personal Life of David Livingstone, p^). 80, 90, etc. 
 
 on 
 the soul.' 
 
34 
 
 Christianity and Secularism, 
 
 Authority in 
 
 other 
 
 spheres. 
 
 Secularists 
 themselves 
 recognize a 
 hard 
 authority. 
 
 powerful, it is impious to give effect to them ; there 
 is nothing" for us but blind submission to a will 
 which we dare not question. 
 
 There is probably no piece of moiiern poetry that 
 has been more admired than Tennyson's Charge of 
 the Light Brigade^ and no lines that have been 
 regarded as happier, or bringing out more vividly 
 the sublimity of the occasion, than these : 
 
 '''Forward the Light Brigade!' 
 "Was there a man dismay' d ? 
 Not though the soldier knew 
 
 Some one had blundered : 
 Their's not to make reply, 
 Their's not to reason why, 
 Their's but to do and die ! 
 Into the Valley of Death 
 
 Eode the six hundred." 
 
 Yet what was this but a case of entire surrender 
 to another will, blind submission to hard authority ? 
 Will men allow that there may be occasions when 
 submission to a human will is not only right but 
 noble, but question, nay deny the duty of such 
 submission to the revealed will of God ? 
 
 That secularists and other sceptics should deny 
 that the Bible is the supernatural revelation of 
 God^s will to man on matters of faith and practice, 
 and should refuse it all claim to authority, is con- 
 sistent enough, though, in our view, utterly wrong ; 
 but that they should reprove Christians for rendering 
 submission to what they believe to be the Divine 
 will, or represent such submission as a poor super- 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 35 
 
 stition and miserable bondage, is inconsistent and 
 ridiculous. The fact is that they themselves act in 
 the very same way towards what they believe to be 
 the supreme authority in the world. "What they 
 hold to be the supreme authority is the laws of 
 nature, and to these laws they maintain that 
 implicit obedience is due.^ Men must conform 
 themselves to the laws of physiology, nay, they 
 must even accept the laws of hereditary disease, 
 however hard and unreasonable it may be that 
 through these laws their lives should be endangered 
 by the ignorance of their forefathers or the care- 
 lessness of their neighbours. Now, why do secu- 
 larists make it " the great aim of all their efforts 
 to understand and obey the laws of nature?*' 
 Because they believe this course to be on the 
 whole most salutary and advantageous for human 
 beings, most conducive to the prosperity of human 
 life. 
 
 This being the case, is it unreasonable for Chris- authoiity 
 tians to have a similar belief in the excellence of ?fp?estnts 
 their supreme authority, the will of God ? Is it good and 
 
 perfect. 
 
 not natural that since God is a perfect Being, 
 infinitely wise and infinitely good. His will should 
 be regarded as identical with what is best and 
 highest for man? Now, the Scriptures are to 
 the Christian the revelation of the will of God. 
 In accepting the Scriptures as his authority, he 
 
 * See Note quoted at p. 17. 
 
36 
 
 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 Analogy 
 between laws 
 of nature 
 and laws of 
 revelation. 
 
 believes that they express in summary form that 
 wise and holy will which is the surest guide to all 
 prosperity and blessing. The Christian does not 
 reject the laws of nature, but he accepts over and 
 above the law of revelation. He conforms to the 
 laws of nature because they require what is most 
 beneficial to his material welfare; he obeys the 
 laws of revelation because they require what is 
 most beneficial to his moral and spiritual well- 
 being. Are we to be blamed and ridiculed because 
 we obey the one as implicitly as the other ? The 
 will of God expressed in revelation may seem to 
 us not fitted to its end, just as the laws of nature 
 sometimes appear not fitted to their end, when 
 they bear hard on human life and weKare; but 
 just as, in the latter case, we may be sure that, on 
 a wider view, they are the best laws that can be 
 given, so in the former we may rest assured that 
 the goodness and wisdom of God are capable of 
 the fullest vindication. Wo say again, that if 
 men choose to deny Revelation, they are consistent 
 in finding fault with the Bible ; but if they charge 
 those with dishonouring their reason who bow 
 to the authority of God in the Bible, they are as 
 inconsistent as if they should charge their own 
 friends with dishonouring their reason for accepting 
 the authority of the laws of nature. 
 
 To determine the boundaries of reason and 
 revelation is a somewhat delicate matter, and we 
 
 Sphere of 
 reason in 
 regard to 
 nature and 
 revelation 
 analogous. 
 
Christianitif-MX^ Secularism. 
 
 will not attempt the problem here. We will 
 merely note the analogy between the spheres of 
 nature and revelation. In nature, reason is called 
 to investigate, to verify, to compare, to arrange 
 phenomena, and to draw conclusions corresponding 
 to them ; but reason must not alter or modify 
 phenomena, nor draw any conclusions which they 
 do not warrant. In revelation, reason is called to 
 read, verify, explain, compare, and systematize the 
 contents of the record, but not to alter or modify 
 any. In both cases, reason is minister et interpres 
 a servant and an interpreter ; in neither case 
 must reason bo a judge. 
 
 Haviug thus vindicated the principles of Chris- Principles of 
 tianity in their bearing on the welfare and progress "^^^ ^^^ 
 of the human family, let us now examine the prin- 
 ciples of secularism, and inquire whether they are 
 adequate to the end in view. 
 
 It is well known that secularists are not agreed '^}Ff:^^. ^^ , 
 
 o Atheism iiii-,! 
 
 i&m 
 nee 
 
 among themselves as to whether atheism is an ?!Siiferi^ 
 essential element of secularism. Mr. Bradlaugh sSfnsta, 
 has led the party that maintain that it is ; Mr. 
 Holyoake has taught that it is not. Atheism is 
 at the foundation of Mr. Bradlaugh's paper, the 
 National Reformer, 
 
 According to Mr. Bradlaugh, all religion has a 
 
38 
 
 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 Mr. Brad- 
 laugh's 
 atheism. 
 
 AH religion 
 pernicious: 
 
 pernicious influence on human welfare and progress. 
 Religion is superstition, it encourages reliance on 
 false methods, it creates confusion, it perverts the 
 mind, and draws it mischievously away from the 
 true lines of improvement. ^ Mr. Bradlaugh's 
 secularism, therefore, not only makes no use of any 
 religious view, but holds it to be only evil, and that 
 continually. To believe in a holy Father, who 
 guides and strengthens His children to do justly, 
 and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with their 
 God ; in a gracious Saviour, who gave Himself 
 for us to redeem and purify us, and alike by precept 
 and example taught us that the servant of all, the 
 man who does most for the good of the world, is 
 the greatest of all ; and in a Holy Spirit, whose 
 ofiice it is to convert the soul, turn the wilderness 
 into a garden, and prepare men for a blessed life 
 where there shall be none to hurt or destroy in all 
 God's holy mountain : such faith is the most per- 
 nicious enemy to the cause of human welfare and 
 the civilization of the world. The self-restraint 
 
 1 '* There is another point that I do not think I need trouble 
 to discuss whether secularism is atheism or not, because I 
 think it is. I have always said so, I believe, for the last thirteen 
 years of my life, whenever I have had an opportunity of doing 
 BO." Mr. Bradlaugh, in debate with Mr. Harrison. *'I am, 
 too, an atheist, and I hold that the logical and ultimate conse- 
 quence of adopting secularism must be atheism." National 
 Reformer^ Oct. 16, 1881. On the other hand, "There are many 
 secularists who disagree with me. . . Clearly all secularists are 
 not atheists." Dahatc with the Rev. J. M'Cann, D.D, 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 39 
 
 and devotion to duty that come from the sense of 
 a Divine eye upon us; the inspiration for the work 
 of faith and labour of love springing from fellow- 
 ship with a Divine Brother who loved us and gave 
 Himself for us ; the hope darted into our soul in 
 moments of despondency by the thought of a 
 Divine Spirit brooding over the moral chaos of this 
 world, and by many diverse instruments slowly but Man can 
 
 Z ' , . . and must do 
 
 surely working out the new creation all this is to ^^ 
 be remorselessly discarded. If we will but believe it, 
 the voice of man is loud enough to still the winds 
 and the waves ; the arm of man is strong enough 
 to subdue all the powers of evil; every valley shall 
 be exalted, and every mountain and hill shall be 
 made low; the crooked shall be made straight, 
 and the rough places plain, and the glory of man 
 shall be revealed, to the confusion of all who dream 
 that there is a God in heaven, and who refuse to 
 serve the god of this world, or to bow down before 
 the golden image which atheistic secularism has 
 set up. 
 
 As advocated by Mr. Gr. J. Holyoake, secularism ^i;5\^"ce 
 does not deny the existence of a God, nor denounce 'or religion, 
 religion absolutely. It maintains, however, that 
 it is not by religion that the social welfare of 
 humanity is to be advanced. The welfare of man 
 in this world is a thing by itself, and is to be pro- 
 moted solely by secular means.^ The main attention 
 
 * *' If we are told to 'fear God and keep His commandments,* 
 
40 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 of all men should be given to the things of the 
 present life. The aim of men in this world should 
 be to seek their own highest good, and the highest 
 good of their family, their country, and their race. 
 True good is that which is in accordance with the 
 laws of nature, especially physiology; and evil is 
 that which contradicts these laws. Duty is syno- 
 nymous with ascertained utility to the greatest 
 number; for Providence, secularism substitutes 
 science ; for prayer, prudence and well-directed 
 labour ; for the worship of God, the service of man ; 
 for faith, knowledge ; for submission to authority, 
 reverence for truth ; and for religion, all the plea- 
 sures of domestic and social life. 
 FUnt'?"'^ Some of these positions of secularism have been 
 
 fheorts!''' very ably discussed by Professor Flint in his 
 Antiiheistic Theories^ especially the three following : 
 1. That precedence should be given to the 
 duties of this life over those which pertain to 
 another. 
 
 lest His judgments overtake us, the indirect action of this 
 doctrine on human character may make a vicious timid man 
 better in this life, supposing the interpretation of the will of 
 God, and the commandments selected to be enforced, are moral ; 
 but such teaching is not secular, because its main object is to fit 
 men for eternity. Pure secular principles have for their object 
 to fit men for time, making the fvilfilment of human duty here 
 the standard of fitness for any accruing future. Secularism puv' 
 poses to regulate human affairs by considerations purely human,'* 
 Principles of Secular2'sm, by George J. Ilolyoake. 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 41 
 
 2. That science is the providence of man, and Three 
 
 * I , secular 
 
 that ahsolute spiritual dependency may involve positions. 
 material destruction. 
 
 3. That man has an adequate rule of life 
 independently of belief in God, immortality, or 
 revelation. 
 
 In reply to the first of these positions, Dr. Flint First sccuLix 
 
 ^ '' ^ ' position 
 
 shows that of all the counsels that men need to 
 have pressed on them, surely the last is to attend 
 more to this life and less to the future the very 
 course to which most men are already much too 
 prone; that the distinction between the two sets 
 of duties is unfounded, for if there be a God, duty 
 to Him is a duty of this life ; and if there be a 
 future world, it is our present duty to take heed 
 of the fact ; nor can anything but evil come to any 
 good cause from disregarding the eternal mercy 
 and justice of God. M. Pasteur lately conveyed 
 the same thought in the French Academy, when 
 he charged Positivism with failing to take account 
 of the most important of all positive notions that 
 of the Infinite. In reply to the second position, ^econd 
 Dr. Flint shows that it is a mistake to oppose p^"'^^- 
 providence and prayer to science, for we honour 
 science as much as secularists, and yet we believe 
 both in providence and prayer as harmonizing with 
 science; and as to science becoming a substitute 
 for providence, the idea is absurd, inasmuch as 
 
42 Christianity and Secularism, 
 
 science tlie science of gunnery, for example may 
 
 be directed to purposes of destruction; unless 
 
 science be directed by goodness, it is nothing. In 
 
 Third reply to the third, be admits that there is in our 
 
 secular ^ " 
 
 position. nature a sense of morality, a sense of right and 
 wrong, apart from religion. But morality can 
 have no valid obligation, unless there be a God 
 who enforces and who administers the moral law. 
 Moreover, it is religion that gives sanction and in- 
 spiration to morality. " One glance of God," says 
 Archbishop Leighton, "a touch of His love, will 
 free and enlarge the heart, so that it can deny all, 
 and part with all, and make an entire renunciation 
 of all, to follow Him." The alliance of secularism 
 with utilitarianism in morals is regarded rather as 
 Religion ^ wcakucss than a benefit to secularism. The mass 
 morality! * of pcoplo canuot eutor into the speculative labyrinth 
 to which this question leads. And if the reason 
 why we are to do our duty is only because it is on 
 the whole our interest to do it, we may well ask 
 why should we do any act which would involve 
 sacrifice, why should we sacrifice our interest to 
 the interest of others? The very definition of 
 morality which secularism adopts seems to be fatal 
 to all noble and self-sacrificing action. 
 
 In the same line we offer two observations : 
 
 Djbamic 1. Secularism makes very light of the dynamic 
 
 wanting. powcr which is to propel men to act in the way 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 43 
 
 most conducive to their own true welfare and tlie 
 welfare of the community. In one of the Secular 
 Tracts to which we have referred, the expectation 
 is confidently expressed that " bringing men to 
 an acquaintance with the facts of physiology and in knowledge 
 general science will gradually annihilate drunken- physiology 
 ness, licentiousness, excessive indulgences, prostitu- 
 tion, and intemperance of all kinds." This expresses 
 correctly the general drift of secular teaching. 
 The world is an ignorant world ; enlighten it, and 
 it will become good. 
 
 Now, apart from all questions of theology, we 
 ask, Is this notion founded on a true view of human 
 nature ? Is there nothing in the old pagan maxim, 
 "Video meliora, proboque; deteriora sequor ;" or, in 
 the words of the Christian Apostle, " The good that 
 I would I do not ; but the evil that I would not, 
 that I do." Has the simple enlighteniDg of men's - 
 understandiDgs ever been found enough to turn 
 them from evil ways ? Has mere light such a 
 i power to subdue the fever of lust, to restrain the 
 I drunkard's thirst, to humble the ambition of the 
 conqueror, to bridle the greed of the miser, that 
 nothing else is required? Who does not know tms trust 
 
 . . opposed to 
 
 that the giant enemy of society is selfishness, and tuman 
 till that spirit is cast out, society can never be either 
 prosperous or happy ? And how are secularists to 
 \ cast him out ? They are to show men that while 
 a lower selfishness may incline them to disorderly 
 
44 
 
 Christianity and Seciilarisin. 
 
 The 
 
 Christian 
 (lyuainic. 
 
 -ways, a higher selfishness, a wiser regard to their 
 true interest, will make them reverse their action. 
 Thus selfishness is to be cast out by selfishness in 
 another form. Unfortunately, this way of casting 
 out Satan has never proved a very successful 
 process. A much higher dynamic is needed. 
 
 I!^ow, of all that is grand in Christianity, nothing 
 excels its moral dynamic. Talk of the enthusiasm 
 of humanity, it is a mere idea. But the en- 
 thusiasm of Christian love is a mighty power. 
 The enthusiasm of hearts arrested by the mighty 
 love of Christ, drawn into sympathy with ILim, 
 reflecting on their fellow-sinners the compassion 
 that has embraced themselves, seeing in this 
 disordered world a blessed sphere of service to God 
 and man, and throwing their energies into the work 
 of blessing it that is a wonder-working power ! 
 It goes on unweariedly in the work of faith and 
 labour of love ; never deemiag that it has done 
 enough, or that it can ever do enough for Him 
 whose love has fallen on it so richly, and is so 
 well fitted to bless the whole family of man. 
 
 2. Our second observation is that secularists are 
 in the habit of doing Christianity a great injustice 
 by denying to it the benefit of some of its own 
 principles, and representing these as the property 
 of secularism alone. 
 
 If the question concern the efficacy of prayer 
 or the reality of Providence, it is assumed that 
 
 Sucularists 
 rob Chris- 
 tianity of 
 some of its 
 own 
 principles. 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 45 
 
 Cliristianity cannot recognize tlie uniformity of tlie 
 laws of nature. If it concern some practical end 
 to be gained, such as exemption from an epidemic, 
 it is averred that Christianity trusts for this 
 to prayer only, and makes no use of natural 
 means. If in connexion with Christianity some 
 human interest is found to he flourishing, 
 education, for example, or freedom, that state of 
 things is not due to Christianity proper, hut to 
 certain of the principles of secularism which it has 
 for the nonce adopted! All this is unfair and 
 even absurd. 
 
 We grant to secularists the credit of trying to Jf5^eo 
 make the most of the earthly conditions of human ^^'^^^^^^' 
 welfare. We allow that there has been some call 
 for their exertions. When Socialism and Com- 
 munism arose in France, labour was in a disorgan- 
 ized condition, and evils prevailed which undoubt- 
 edly there was need to reform. The Communists 
 wore not wholly wrong, but their methods were 
 wild and impracticable. Secularists in certain 
 respects desire to do good, they desire a more 
 thorough recoguition of the earthly conditions of 
 human welfare, and in so far they are entitled to 
 credit. But they are quite wrong in supposing Error in 
 that the relisrion of the Bible does not include and Christianity 
 
 ^ ^ indifferent 
 
 involve an enlightened regard to the conditions ^^.^^g^^ 
 of human welfare. The actual Christian Church 
 may often have overlooked much of this, but 
 
46 
 
 ChrisHanity mid Secularhm. 
 
 Human in- 
 terests fully 
 recognized 
 in the Old 
 Testament. 
 
 Palestine, 
 
 Paradise. 
 
 Book of 
 l^roverbs. 
 
 undoubtedly it is in the Bible. In times of great 
 spiritual awakening, the overwhelming importance 
 of the unseen and eternal may have been so put as 
 to make temporal considerations appear to be of no 
 importance whatever ; but certainly this is not the 
 teaching of the Bible. 
 
 Everything that is good in secularism is in the 
 Bible. What system could have been better adapted 
 to develop the simple enjoyments of human life than 
 that which was prescribed for the Jews in Palestine, 
 when they dwelt under their vine and under their 
 fig-tree, contented, happy, prosperous, as if in a very 
 Arcadia ? We may go further back than the days 
 of the Jews in Palestine, back to the days of Adam 
 and Eve ; and in the arrangements of the happy 
 garden we may see how carefully the requirements 
 of the physical frame were provided for, and a life 
 inaugurated in which full regard was had to ma- 
 terial welfare as well as to spiritual fellowship and 
 growth. Advance if you will to the sketch of the 
 virtuous woman in the last chapter of Proverbs, 
 seeking wool and flax, and working willingly with 
 her hands ; like the merchants' ships bringing the 
 food from afar ; considering a field and bujdng it ; 
 holding the distafl and laying her hands to the 
 spindle ; stretching out her hand to the poor, and 
 reaching forth her hands to the needy ; making 
 herself coverings of tapestry, and clothing heri 
 household with scarlet : you see in her the model 
 
Christianity and Seculai'ism, 47 
 
 woman of the Book, for "many daughters have 
 done virtuously, but thou excellest them all." 
 
 Yet we are told that when in any way we 'Borrowing 
 contribute to the welfare of human life, we are principles of 
 
 Secularism.'' 
 
 borrowing the principles of secularism. We retort 
 the charge, and maintain that any good that 
 secularism does is done by principles which are 
 found in the Bible. Where was secularism when 
 the Book of Proverbs was written ? The funda- 
 mental principle of that book is that " the fear of 
 the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,'* and yet on 
 that foundation a place is found for every real 
 maxim of human wisdom. Thrift, economy, dili- 
 gence, looking well to the flocks and the herds, 
 have all a place in this book, which seeks above 
 all things to extol i-he fear of the Lord. 
 
 Does, then, the New Testament supersede the Se^New^' 
 lessons of the Old ? When St. Paul rebuked the as to this 
 
 life. 
 
 busy-bodies at Thessalonica, and enacted the rule 
 that if any would not work neither should they 
 eat, it seemed very like going back to the Book of 
 Proverbs. When St. James denounced the em- 
 ployers that robbed their workmen of their earnings, 
 he seemed to echo the thunders of Isaiah or of Amos. 
 The New Testament brings the future life more to 
 the front; it shows more clearly and fully the 
 need of redemption and regeneration, while it 
 unfolds the provision made for these ; and it urges 
 more explicitly the infinite importance of our ever- 
 
48 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 lasting well-being. But it does not disparage the 
 life that now is. "What it is so eager to effect in 
 regard to the present life is that it be used wisely 
 as a training and preparation for the life to come. 
 Most powerfully does it show how utterly it is 
 thrown away and perverted, when it is regarded as 
 complete in itself, when it is viewed in the light 
 in which the secularist delights to place it. The 
 woridhness world in its wroug place the idol and treasure of 
 sense. the soul is what the New Testament is so con- 
 
 stantly reproving. B ut the ISTe w Testament carefully 
 guards all the principles of human welfare ; the 
 body is to be kept in subjection, lest evil defile it, 
 and to be honoured as the temple of the Holy 
 Ghost ; the bread we need for its sustenance is to 
 be asked in the prayer that at the same time seeks 
 the most spiritual blessings; the various social 
 relations of this life, that of husband and wife, 
 parent and child, master and servant, subject and 
 Our earthly rulcr, baptized now into the spirit of Christ, are 
 
 life elevated i i i ^ r, p i t 
 
 in the Bible, raiscd to a higher platform of obligation; while 
 every attribute of human life, sin only excepted, is 
 elevated and glorified by our relation to Him who 
 being the Eternal Son of God, became by incarnation 
 the Son of man. 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 49 
 
 II. Facts. Facts. 
 
 Passina: now from the influence of Christianity outcome of 
 
 . '' the two 
 
 end Secularism in their principles, we proceed to systems. 
 view the two systems in relation to the resulting 
 facts. What, so far as can be ascertained, has 
 been the outcome of each in practical life ? 
 
 Who are the heroes of secularism ? Who are Theheroesof 
 
 Seciilarisin. 
 
 the benefactors of the world that have adorned 
 its ranks? Who are its philanthropists and 
 patriots ? Where is their Yalhalla, crowded with 
 the portraits of the great and good ? 
 
 In reply to our challenge we get the names of 4^ obscure 
 some half a dozen men who bore imprisonment for 
 blasphemy, early in the century, and helped the 
 cause of liberty of speech ; we are told of Eobert 
 Owen, the founder of New Lanark, and the first, 
 it is said, to have advocated infant schools; 
 perhaps we are told of Yoltaire, and his gallant 
 fight against the shameful persecution of Pro- 
 testants ; and of Girard, a rich merchant of Phila- 
 delphia, who left money for the magnificent Girard 
 College. Mr. Bradlaugh, in his debate with 
 Dr. M'Cann, besides referring to himself as the 
 uniform and consistent advocate of every reform, 
 tells of William Washington, a secularist miner, 
 who volunteered to go down on a perilous mission 
 
 
 
50 
 
 Gkristianihj and Secularism. 
 
 Comparison 
 
 with 
 
 Christianit}'. 
 
 Pioneers of 
 
 British 
 
 civilization. 
 
 after an explosion in a pit; and the name of 
 John Stuart Mill usually brings up the rear. It 
 cannot be said to be a very imposing list. 
 
 It is not a very formidable rival to the Christian 
 Valhalla. "What name could Secularism ever daro 
 to place beside the incomparable name of Jesus 
 Christ ? What influence could it venture to com- 
 pare with that which we vaguely but significantly 
 indicate as the spirit of Christ ? Who can be 
 matched with the Christian pioneers of British 
 civilization, the Patricks and Columbas, the 
 Cuthberts and Ninians, and, in another sphere 
 of life, the Alfreds of our early history? 
 Where shall we find women like Elizabeth of 
 Hungary, or Catharine of Sienna ? What names 
 emit the aroma of Bernard of Clairvaux, Francis 
 of Assisi, or Thomas a Kempis ? If struggles for 
 freedom be spoken of, what champions of human 
 rights ever equalled in courage and in character 
 the Eliots and Pyms and Hampdens of the 
 seventeenth century ? What fabric of liberty has 
 proved so enduring as that which they helped to 
 establish in England, and their like-minded country- 
 men, the Pilgrim Fathers, in America? If the 
 reclaiming of barbarous nations be the topic, what 
 has secularism got to match our modern missions, 
 with names like those of Carey and Schwartz, 
 Vanderkemp and Judson, Eliot and Zinzendorf, 
 WiUiams and Moffat, GutzlaS and Burns, 
 
 IToly 
 women. 
 
 Holy men. 
 
 Champions 
 of liberty. 
 
 Beclaiming 
 Gavages. 
 
Chridianity and Secularism. 51 
 
 Livingstone and Patteson, besides hosts of others 
 
 that have become household words for devotion 
 
 and self-sacrifice? If the slave has had to be thSi"??. 
 
 rescued from unlawful bondage, who have toiled 
 
 for him like Macaulay and Clarkson, William 
 
 Wilberforce and Sir Powell Buxton? If an Koformcf 
 
 prisons. 
 
 atrocious jail-system has had to be reformed, and 
 
 abuses corrected in Britain and the other countries 
 
 of Europe the record of which now fills us with 
 
 horror, what secularist ever flung himself into the 
 
 work with the ardour and seK-sacrifice of John 
 
 Howard? If projects for the amelioration of ^j^gg. 
 
 humanity have been started, what can be set over 
 
 against Pastor Fliedner's work at Kaiserswerth, 
 
 or John Best's enterprise at Laforce ? What ^ca^dtics. 
 
 secularist ever did for humanity what was done 
 
 for our crreat cities by Dr. Chalmers ? Was Nursing the 
 
 . . . sick. 
 
 Florence jSTightingale a secularist, or Agnes Jones, 
 
 or Sister Dora ? The crreat temperance reformers, Temreranco 
 
 ^ ' reform. 
 
 the men whose appeals go to the hearts of the 
 
 multitude, and move them like the leaves of the 
 
 forest, such as John Gfough and Francis Murphy, 
 
 are not secularists, but Christian men. The man bomcr.*^^ 
 
 who passed the Ten Hours* Act, who has identified 
 
 himself so conspicuously with the Ragged and 
 
 Ueformatory movement, and with every scheme 
 
 for the relief of toiling humanity, is no secularist, 
 
 but the eminently Christian Earl of Shaftesbury, ^."jfi^;^^ 
 
 The very animals get benefit from Christian 
 
52 
 
 ChristianitTj and Secularism. 
 
 Undistin- 
 guished 
 ]>liiiauthro- 
 pists. 
 
 Sunday- 
 
 scliool 
 
 tcaciicrs. 
 
 philanthropy, for the founder of the movement for 
 cattle fountains and watering troughs was a 
 Christian Friend, the late Samuel Gurney. The 
 names which we have mentioned are stars of the 
 first magnitude, shedding a glory over the firma- 
 ment ; but who does not know of scores of like- 
 minded Christian men and women toiling more 
 obscurely but not less earnestly in the crowded 
 haunts of labour, opening coffee palaces, rearing 
 cabmen's shelters, providing creches, establishing 
 schools, institutes, and classes, sparing no effort to 
 do good where their services are needed among 
 their fellows ? What has secularism got to be 
 compared to the great army of Sunday-school 
 teachers, giving their service so readily and so 
 freely for the Christian good of the young ? True, 
 it is but a small proportion of our Christian people 
 who are actively engaged in such disinterested 
 labour ; but that is just because the mass of men 
 are so slow to realize their responsibilities ; beyond 
 all doubt it is the duty of every Christian to labour 
 for the good of others ; it ought to be true of the 
 whole Christian community that " no man liveth 
 to himself." 
 
 No reasonable man will doubt that under any 
 system a few strong-minded men maj' be found, 
 able to resist the immediate influence of their 
 system, and to stand forth as men of energy and 
 courage, the friends and protectors of freedom. We 
 
 Some strong- 
 minded men 
 may be 
 found in any 
 system. 
 
 i 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 53 
 
 cheerfully admit that there have been such men in 
 the ranks of secularism. But they are not repre- 
 sentatives of a system. Take the case of Voltaire. '^^^^^- 
 The great writer of the eighteenth century had 
 undoubtedly an active spirit of humanity. His nia service 
 
 '' ^ 'to humanity 
 
 service in the cause of the shamefully -oppressed 
 Calas, and other victims of ecclesiastical tyranny, 
 was a noble service. His efforts on behalf of 
 Ferney were worthy of all praise; the buildings 
 he erected, the industries he encouraged, were real 
 services to mankind. But Yoltaire was a man by 
 himself a man of marked individualism. And ^^''^^"^*'' 
 for every hundred that followed him in his sneers 
 and jibes at religion, there was not one who 
 adopted his spirit of humanity. Nor does Voltaire's 
 general character serve to adorn his principles. His 
 life was guided by a combined love of money, lovo 
 of pleasure, and love of fame ; he was eaten up 
 with vanity ; as a writer, he was cynical, sneering, 
 lying, and most scurrilous and abusive, not taking 
 the trouble to conceal his antipathies to what he 
 believed to be Christianity, or to offer any apology 
 for the unrestrained abuse he poured on its friends. 
 Of Eobert Owen we will sav that he was nobcrt 
 
 *' Owen. 
 
 one of those strong men who break away from 
 
 the common ruts, and devise liberal things ; but 
 
 did not Owen find that his system was unworkable, 
 
 and his house built on the sand ? If he was 
 
 early advocate of infant schools, let him hcy^^^f-^^ '-'^^z 
 
 pp. 
 
64 
 
 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 A humble 
 Christian, 
 school- 
 master. 
 
 credit for it ; but after all, what was this service to 
 the cause of education compared with the splendid 
 enterprise of John Knox, wrung in part from the 
 unv/illing hands of the Scottish nobility, which 
 contemplated universities, high schools, parish 
 cchools all that was needed for a good education 
 alike for high and low ? 
 
 If personal effort is the true measure of a 
 man's philanthropic spirit, we could more than 
 match the achievements of Robert Owen with that 
 of a humble Christian schoolmaster of the name of 
 Davies, in an obscure district of Wales. Planting 
 himself in a very destitute district, he not only 
 established a school and acted as teacher of the 
 young, with a salary of about 20, but he repaired 
 a church, he established trade, he worked as a 
 colporteur, he distributed Bibles and Christian 
 books on a scale of wonderful liberality ; and in 
 his old age, when his good work was sufficiently 
 established, he removed to an entirely new sphere 
 to begin his philanthropic labour from the very 
 foundation.^ If the history of all the schools 
 established in the British Empire were written, what 
 an immense proportion of the great achievement 
 would be found to be due to the devoted zeal of 
 Christian men and women. 
 
 We have made mention of Scotland. That 
 
 1 See a book entitled James Davies, Sclcoolmaster of Devauclen, 
 bj Sir Thomas Phillips, 1850. 
 
Chrisfianity and Secularism, 
 
 country gets hard measure from the secularists Its g^^ciaiY^ 
 rehgion is "a gloomy nightmare."^ According to ^^^"^^^^"^ 
 Buckle, Scotland and Spain go together for ignor- 
 ance and superstition. Whenever religion has 
 been powerful, the people have been miserable, and 
 " the noblest feelings of human nature have been 
 replaced by the dictates of a servile and ignominious 
 fear." But is it not a somewhat notable fact that 
 in the battles for freedom and independence, Scot- 
 land has always borne so conspicuous a part ? Is 
 it not remarkable that her sons have gone over the 
 world, and, to say the least, have not as a rule 
 sunk into that condition of dull misery that might 
 have been expected of a people reared under such an 
 incubus ? There is no country whose outward con- 
 dition at the present day, in spite of faults and 
 blemishes that are not denied, shows a more won- 
 derful contrast to its condition before the Beforma- 
 tion, when it had neither agriculture nor commerce, 
 industry nor art, learning nor science, and when 
 the energies of its clans and nobles were spent in 
 mutual destruction. 
 
 The treatment which some of the srreatest and champions 
 
 of English 
 
 noblest champions of English freedom receive at freedom. 
 the hands of secularists is odd, and even amusing. 
 " Our Eliots, our Hampdens, and our Cromwells, 
 a couple of centuries ago, hewed with their broad- 
 swords a rough pathway for the people. But it 
 
 ^ Watts : Christianity, its Nature and Influence on Secularism, 
 
5G 
 
 Ckristianify 'and Secularism, 
 
 Their 
 
 alleged 
 
 successors. 
 
 The St, 
 iJartliolo- 
 luew men. 
 
 was reserved for the present century to complete 
 the triumph which the Commonwealth hegan." ^ 
 And who do oxn reajiers suppose were the men 
 that put the copestone on the edifice which the 
 men of the seventeenth century began ? Paine, 
 Hone, Carlile, "Williams, Hetherington, "Watson ; 
 being the leading men who suffered prosecution for 
 blasphemy, and the too free utterance of their 
 religious b*entiments in the beginning of this 
 century. Yerily, " the world knows nothing of its 
 greatest men.*' It is a pleasure to come upon 
 unexpected wealth, but we fear we are so much 
 under "the nightmare of superstition" as not to 
 be elated by the discovery that the heroes of the 
 seventeenth century have been eclipsed in modern 
 days by so much greater men. 
 
 Again, we read that when, in 1662, the two 
 thousand clergymen " resigned their benefices and 
 gave up the national religion of the time because 
 they could not submit to the pet doctrine of the 
 Church, which was passive submission, they adopted 
 the very basis of free-thought principles.'* ^ But 
 why not go back fully sixteen hundred years? 
 When the apostles stood before the Jewish 
 Council, decliued the pet doctrine of passive 
 submission, and declared that they must obey 
 God rather than man, did they not, as much as 
 the two thousand clergymen, adopt free- thought 
 
 1 Watts : Frc'i Thowjid and Modern Progress. 
 
GTivMianitij and Secularism. 57 
 
 principles? Undoubtedly they did. But is not Y^^^^^ 
 this a reductio ad ahsurdiim ? The apostles adopt ^^"JJ'^Pled 
 free-thought principles ! There is a world of SS! ^^"^" 
 difference between the conduct of the apostles, and 
 that of freethinkers. It was not at the bidding 
 of their own reason that the apostles declined the 
 authority of man. It was at the bidding of God. 
 Free thought declines the authority of other men 
 at the call of reason ; the apostles declined it at 
 the call of God. The two thousand clergymen too 
 believed that they were obeying God; and when 
 His Yoice was heard commanding them, no other 
 course was for a moment to be thought of. 
 
 It is very important to observe to what an ex- Reiigous 
 
 ^ element in 
 
 tent the conflict with the tyranny of the Stuart SstufS^^ 
 kings, which did so much to establish our liberties, ^J^'^^y* 
 was a religious conflict. The men that took a 
 leading part in it had their consciences quickened, 
 their nerves braced, and their imaginations roused 
 by a sense of religion. However difficult the 
 struggle, they took heart from the assurance that 
 God was on their side. He was calling them to 
 the battle could they refuse His call? Their 
 religion gave them a lofty sense of the value of the 
 men whom the king was disposed to treat as 
 nonentities " dumb driven cattle." Who was 
 Charles Stuart, or any man, that he should lord it 
 over the consciences of men made in God's image, 
 and possessing immortal souls? Who was any 
 
58 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 earthly king that he should treat redeemed men 
 as if they owed no allegiance to Him who had 
 bought them with His blood? Was it to be 
 tamely submitted to, that in this land the oppor- 
 tunity should be denied of working out, in accord- 
 ance with God's will, that blessed scheme of 
 spiritual renovation which Christ had established ? 
 Was the very Gospel of salvation to be put in 
 fetters at the pleasure of an earthly king ? 
 
 We do not say that these were the only considera- 
 tions that nerved the arm of the champions of civil 
 and ecclesiastical freedom in the seventeenth century. 
 No doubt they were animated too by the instinctive 
 recoil of Englishmen from tyranny, and the sturdy 
 determination to resist it hy every lawful means. 
 No doubt they felt the stimulus of ancestral example, 
 and would have thought it foul scorn to refuse the 
 other than leojacv of freedom's battle, " bequeathed by bleed- 
 
 rehs'ious . . . . 
 
 motives. \^^ gjj.^ ^q SOU." But the religion which taught 
 them to "fear God" and "honour all men" gave a 
 new dignity to the struggle. It magnified the 
 interests involved, it connected the battle with 
 eternity, it mixed it up with the overwhelming 
 value of the soul. Whether or not the struggle 
 would have been an absolute failure but for these 
 considerations it w^ere hard to say ; but this we 
 know, that the battle was hot enough and long 
 enough to require the full force of all the resources 
 that could be mustered in the cause of freedom. 
 
 I 
 
The Pilgrim 
 Fathers. 
 
 Christianity and Secularism. 51) 
 
 A secularist has made tlie supposition of a com- secularist 
 
 ^ -^ supposition 
 
 pany of men and women going to an uninhabited andite^^ 
 island, and there attempting to form a constitution p^^^^^pI^^- 
 to meet the requirements of modern society, based 
 upon the teachings of the New Testament. And 
 he has tried to show that any such attempt must 
 end in ridiculous failure. Did the secularist not 
 remember that the experiment had actually been Experiment, 
 tried ? Did he never read the history of the tried. 
 Mayflower and the Pilgrim Fathers ? That cer- 
 tainly was a community of men and women who 
 went, not to a desert island, but to a desert con- 
 tinent, for no other purpose than to carry out in 
 all their fulness the principles o the New Testament. 
 Did the experiment end in disastrous failure ? Is 
 that marvel of modern history, the rise and progress 
 of the United States, a proof of disastrous faiUue ? 
 In the very earnestness of their loyalty the 
 Pilgrim Fathers committed some mistakes, and 
 certainly no man would set up the United States 
 as a faultless community ; but undoubtedly that 
 country would have had a different history but for 
 them. These good men gave a tone to the new 
 country which has stood it in good stead to the 
 present day ; under them, great and good principles 
 acquired a vitality which has been a preserving 
 salt to the nation amid the endless rush of hetero- 
 geneous elements which the tide of emigration has 
 poured upon its shores. 
 
60 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 Value to It was an unspeakable boon to America that the 
 
 colonies of a 
 
 religious foundations of its society were laid by men who did 
 not go there to make fortunes, but to find freedom 
 to serve God. Would that all the other colonies 
 of Great Britain had been founded by men with 
 similar principles ! There are some of our colonies 
 where the principles of secularism have had almost 
 unlimited scope, for churches have been but slow 
 to follow to gold-diggings and diamond-fields the 
 hordes that have rushed to them for temporal gain. 
 But where is the colonial paradise, that secularism, 
 pure and simple, has established ? If we ask for 
 colonial pandemoniums that have grown up under 
 its auspices, we are more likely to find an answer. 
 The history of the Far West in America may tell 
 a similar tale. It is ludicrous to think how " the 
 greatest happiness of the greatest number " prin- 
 ciple would fare, in raw, wild communities, where 
 " every man for himself " is the order of the day. 
 We should fancy that when the schoolmaster had 
 taught the first moral lesson of secularism, that it 
 is the duty of every man to aim at what he regards 
 as his own greatest good, his scholars would think 
 they had got enough, and would proceed to carry 
 out the lesson very faithfully. If he should go on 
 to teach next that it was their duty also to aim at 
 the highest good of their country and their race, 
 we can fancy them much more puzzled. In the 
 first " standard," there would be no failures ; but 
 how many would pass the second ? 
 
Christianity and Secularism. 61 
 
 \ In July, 1880, the present writer, being in Testimony 
 America, chanced to see a number of the New ^c^dtothe 
 York Herald^ containing a remarkable letter with SfSanity, 
 the signature of " Thurlow Weed.'* All Americans 
 are familiar with the name of the octogenarian who 
 some years ago was among the greatest and most 
 conspicuous of American politicians. His letter, 
 or, as the editor called it, " sermon," in the Herald^ 
 was not in his olden strain. It was occasioned by 
 the public career of Colonel IngersoU, the Brad- 
 laugh of the United States. Colonel IngersoU goes 
 about the country delivering addresses against the 
 Bible, and making men infidels. Mr. "Weed's letter 
 contained a comparison between the work of D. L. STifSou 
 Moody and that of Mr. IngersoU. Mr. Moody led ^""^ '^"'^^' 
 men to think of the highest of all subjects ; and 
 while promoting their salvation, stimulated self- 
 control, temperance, beneficence, and every other 
 virtue. The line of his progress was marked by the 
 reform of drunkards, the union of divided families, 
 the consecration of young men's energies to nobler 
 objects, the drying up of the sources of the world's 
 misery, and the opening of fountains of benediction 
 and prosperity. What could IngersoU point to, 
 to match such work? What drunkard had he 
 reformed ? what home had he made happy ? what 
 life had he rescued from selfishness, and made great 
 and noble? The drift of Mr. Weed's letter was 
 that, tried by its fruits, Christianity was infinitely 
 
62 Christianity and Secularism. 
 
 better than anytliiiig that IngersoU could substitute 
 for it. The letter was interesting not only as written 
 by a man who in his old age had undergone a great 
 spiritual change, but as presenting the view of a 
 man of aifairs, a man who knew human nature, and 
 understood something of the forces by which men's 
 lives are moulded. It showed that in the view of 
 such men it is only the gospel of Christ that is the 
 power of God unto salvation, both for the life that 
 now is and that which is to come. 
 What is needed is the gospel, pure and simple, but 
 t ^jS^aM^ large and wide-reaching, full of charity, faith, and 
 ^Swcr. syiiipathy, and proclaimed in simple reliance on the 
 power of Grod. In a town in the north of Scotland, 
 a benevolent Unitarian minister once took to 
 preaching in the streets. He spoke of the beauty 
 of goodness, and invited sinners to the happiness of 
 a virtuous and orderly life. A group of waifs 
 and harlots hovered near, one of whom, who had 
 not lost all her mother- wit, replied to him in her 
 native dialect " Eh, man, your rape's nao lang 
 Ehort. eneuch for the like o' hiz " (your rope is not long 
 
 enough for the like of us). His gospel was not 
 capable of reaching down to the depths to which 
 waifs and harlots had fallen. It was a longer rope, 
 a profounder gospel, that was entrusted to the 
 Apostle, when Christ sent him to the Gentiles, " to 
 open their eyes, and to turn them from darkness 
 unto light, and from the power of Satan unto God'' 
 
AGNOSTICISM 
 
 A DOCTRINE OF DESPAIR. 
 
 BY THE 
 
 REV. NOAH PORTER, D.D. LL.D. 
 
 {President of Yale College, Newhave7t, Connecticut, U.S.A.), 
 
 author of 
 
 'The Human Intellect," "Elements of Intellectual Science," etc. 
 
 THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY: 
 
 56 Paternoster Row, and 65 St. Paul's Churchyard, 
 London. 
 
^nalgsiB oi the Tvart 
 
 The purpose of the Tract is practical. It is intended to 
 show the tendency of the really Atheistic Agnosticism so 
 prevalent in the present day. It destroys hope for science, 
 which cannot cast out God from its thinking. Ir inter- 
 preting facts, science is inevitably led into the very presence 
 of a thinking God. Order in nature is best explained by a 
 directing God, especially if the great law of evolution be 
 accepted. Science anticipates greater discoveries than any 
 yet made. Though it is not necessary for eminence in any 
 special science, that any question should be raised as to the 
 foundation of this hope, Christian theism is the best solution 
 of all the problems raised by all the special sciences. The 
 recognition of a personal intelligence, which all science 
 accepts as possible and rational, gives an assured hope to 
 science, and the denial of it takes its hope from science. 
 A personal God is also necessary, in order to give energy 
 and Ufe to conscience. A redeeming God is necessary 
 to give men hope of deliverance from sin and its conse- 
 quences, and enable them to realize the moral ideal. All 
 hope of this is cut off by Agnostic Atheism. The agnostic 
 ideal is destitute of permanence. Without God's plans and 
 purposes for human well-being, there is no rational ground 
 of hope for man's future. The history of the past affords 
 no hope for the future. Hope for the conduct of 
 individual life in the present, and the certain attainment of 
 another life hereafter, are dependent on faith in God. In 
 as far as God is denied, hope of every kind is abandoned, 
 and life loses its light and dignity, and becomes a worthless 
 farce or a sad tragedy. 
 
AGNOSTICISM 
 
 ^ gaj:tnne of ge^irair. 
 
 JHE descriptive phrase of the Apostle 
 Paul, in his Epistle to the Ephesians, 
 " having no hope, and without God in 
 the world," when condensed to its Ephesians 
 utmost might be read thus: Hopeless because 
 Godless. Each of these epithets is sufficiently 
 significant when taken alone. When coupled 
 together their force is more than doubled. To ^g*^*^ 
 be Godless is to fail to acknowledge Him whom s<^^^*- 
 men naturally own. It is to refuse to worship 
 the Creator and Father in heaven, whom all 
 the right-minded and loyal-hearted instinctively 
 reverence. It is to forsake God, and therefore to 
 be God-forsaken, as the homely phrase is : that 
 is, to be a man whom the sunshine warms with 
 no heat and the rain blesses with no refreshment 
 because in the wide world which God has made 
 he finds no living and loving God. No wonder 
 that such a man has no hope that he is classed 
 
Agnosticism : 
 
 with those " to Avhom hope never comes that 
 comes to all." 
 SfSn^o? "^^^ condition of the persons referred to by 
 JefeS-ed to ^t, Paul was simplj negative. They are described 
 y St. Paul. ^^ -without God and without hope. Possibly they 
 did not deny or disbelieve in God. They might 
 have been so occupied with the world itself in its 
 brightness and beauty, that God was absent from 
 all their thinking. Possibly one or another might 
 have had daring enough to say there is no God. 
 Perhaps, though not probably, in those times, 
 some of them held that God could not be known, 
 and invested this dogma with a religious halo to 
 which they responded with mystic wonder. But 
 to them all there was no God, and with them all 
 there was no hope. So wrote our apostle out of 
 Jxpewenc?'^ his frcsh and vivid experience of the hope which 
 had come to him from the new and vivid mani- 
 festation of God to himself, as revealed in the 
 face of Jesus Christ a hope which thrilled every 
 fibre of his being with electric life. Since his 
 time men in all generations have been transported 
 God-forget- with the same joyous hope. And just so often 
 hopelessness, as God has bccu forgottcu or denied has hope 
 left the hearts and habitations of men. But in 
 all these times, ignorance of God has been more 
 commonly regarded as a calamity or a sin. In 
 our days, as is well known, it comes to us in a 
 new form. Ignorance of God is now taught as 
 
A Doctrine of Despair. 
 
 a necessity of reason. \Tlie unknowableness of ignorance 
 
 ^ L- of God 
 
 God has been formulated as a Philosophy. It regardedas 
 
 ' a necessity 
 
 has even been defended as a Theology and * reason. 
 hallowed as a Kehgion. The sublimation of 
 rational piety has been gravely set forth as that 
 blind wonder which comes from the conscious 
 and necessary ignorance of God. In contrast with 
 this new form of worship, the confident joyous- 
 ness of the Christian faith has been called " the 
 impiety of the pious/' and the old saying has 
 almost reappeared in a new guise that even 
 for a philosopher " ignorance is the mother of 
 devotion.'M 
 
 I do not propose to argue concerning the 
 truth or falsehood of these doctrines. I shall 
 spend no time in discussing the logic or philoso- 
 phy of the atheistic agnosticism which is some- 
 what currently taught and received at the pre- 
 sent time. I shall simply treat of it inpts 
 practical tendency as being destructive of hope Atheistic 
 
 - J t/ %> J. agnosticism 
 
 in man, and therefore necessarily leading to the <ie^rading. 
 degradation of mans nature^ and the loicering 
 of his life. I observe 
 
 I. That tcithout God there is no well-grounded no hope for 
 
 science 
 
 hope for science. ^ithout 
 
 God. 
 
 This may seem to be a very daring or a very 
 paradoxical assertion. There is more truth in it, 
 however, than appears at fiist sight. Inasmuch 
 
Agnosticism : 
 
 Science 
 cannot cast 
 out God 
 from its 
 thought. 
 
 as it is in the name of science that ignorance of 
 God is exalted into supreme wisdom, it may- 
 be worth while to inquire what the effect upon 
 science would be, could it cast out Crod from all 
 its thinking. I say could it do this, for it would 
 be very hard for it to succeed should it try 
 ever so earnestly. Our newly-fledged agnostics 
 are apt to forget that all our modern science has 
 been prosecuted in the broad and penetrating 
 sunlight of faith in one living and personal 
 God that not a single theory has been pro- 
 posed or experiment tried in nature, except 
 with the distinct recognition of the truth that 
 a wise and loving Mind at least may uphold 
 and direct the goings-on of nature. The most 
 passionate atheist cannot deny that this is the 
 conviction of most of the living and breathing 
 men about him. The most restrained agnostic 
 cannot but know and feel that the theory which 
 he strives to cherish is rejected by most of the 
 women and children in Christendom who look 
 up into the sky and walk upon the earth. The 
 simple teachings of Christian theism are capable 
 
 The 
 
 Khristiln of being expanded into the grandest conceptions 
 
 theism. . i / i 
 
 that science ever attempted to lormulate con- 
 ceptions so grand that human reason is over- 
 whelmed with their sublime relationships, and 
 the human imagination is dazed to blindness 
 when it would make them real The first pre- 
 
A Doctrine of Despair. 
 
 position of the creed which the infant pronounces 
 with confiding simplicity " I believe in God the 
 Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth " 
 is easily expanded into those conceptions that 
 the man necessarily and intuitively accepts as 
 the background upon which science traces all its 
 formulae and axioms, and by which it connects 
 its theories and proceeds to its conclusions. 
 
 That science must have both faith and hope 
 appears, whether we consider it as an interpreter, 
 an historian, or a prophet. Science is first of all science 
 
 * * strives after 
 
 an interpreter. Though it begins with facts, it theinvisioie. 
 does not end with facts. Though it begins with 
 the seen, it looks beneath the visible and strives 
 after the invisible. So soon as it compares and 
 explains, it connects phenomena and interprets 
 events by forces and laws, by hypotheses and 
 theories. Let it test its theories by experiments 
 a thousand times repeated, what it tests is some- 
 thing it has gained by interpretation, that is, 
 something not seen but believed. Following the 
 unseen along the lines of interpreting thought, 
 science is inevitably, even if reluctantly, led into 
 the very presence of a thinking God. 
 
 Having gained some insight into the present science 
 
 gearches into 
 
 by this process, science applies this insight in the past. 
 the form of history^ going backwards into the 
 remotest past and unrolling its records, whether 
 Jiie^se are written on indestructible tables of stone 
 
Agnosticism : 
 
 or suggested by the casual deposits of heaps of 
 4terprS I'efuse. But history of every kind, even of nature, 
 law. is interpreted force and law ; and force, to be 
 
 interpreted by law, must be orderly in its actings; 
 naturibest ^^^ ordcr in nature, if it does not require a 
 rdirerting^^ directing God, is, to say the least, best explained 
 by such a God. [Especially if the great law of 
 evolution or development is accepted, and so a 
 long story of progress is traced in the past, there 
 emerges and shapes itself into being a continuous 
 plan, a comprehensive thought wide enough to 
 embrace all the events which have successively 
 germinated into being, and long enough to pro- 
 vide for their gradual succession. . This requires 
 a single mind as wide as that of one forecasting 
 God, and as unwearied as His understanding. 
 Science But scionce is also a prophet. It revels in its 
 
 anticipates 
 
 further and confidence in the future. Science believes that 
 
 unparalleled 
 
 discoveries, '^g interpretations of the present and its solutions 
 of the past will be surpassed by the discoveries 
 that are to be ; that both nature and man shall 
 continue as heretofore, obeying the same laws as 
 from the beginning that the revelations already 
 made of both shall be lost sight of and forgotten 
 in the revelations of force and law which the 
 future shall disclose, and that in all this progress 
 one of these revelations shall prepare the way 
 for another, as naturally and as gently as the 
 
 The hope of , . i . -, tt i 
 
 science. dawn brightcns into the sunrise. Here is hope. 
 
A Doctrine of Despair. 9 
 
 ardent, confident, passionate hope, and, we may- 
 add, rational and well-grounded- hope. On what 
 does this hope rest this hope for the stability 
 of nature's laws and the promise of the evolving 
 future ? We need not answer by any abstract 
 analysis or refined ^ilosophizing. We concede 
 tliat it is not necessary for success or eminence Eminence in 
 in any special science that this fundamental sSLceTJt 
 
 . - dependent 
 
 question should be raised. We know that tor on faith in 
 eminence in any speciality, the natural faith and 
 hope of men in science as interpretation and 
 history and prophecy, is altogether sufficient, 
 whether it is or is not expanded into actual faith 
 in the living God. We do not object in the 
 least that science stops short in its explanations 
 of phenomena, at molecules, and motion, and 
 inertia, and attraction, and heat, and electricity, 
 and heredity, and development, and variation, 
 and environment. But we do contend that 
 atheistic agnosticism gives no solution of those 
 explanations that are fundamental to science 
 which can be so satisfactory as is the creed of christian 
 
 '' theism the 
 
 Christian theism. We also contend that the bestsoiution 
 
 of the ques- 
 
 personal thinker is more than the scientist who {jy^iY 
 interprets and prophesies, and that the living 
 man demands and accepts a personal God as the 
 best solution of all the problems which every 
 special science raises, but which no special science 
 can solve. 
 
 raised 
 the 
 pecial 
 sciences. 
 
10 
 
 Agnosticism 
 
 luustration. Perhaps you have traversed a forest at mid- 
 night, and have painfully and slowly felt out 
 your path among the objects which the darkness 
 seemed to conceal rather than reveal. You have 
 mastered it by slow but sure steps, such as the 
 blind man feels out by exact and reasoning touch. 
 Anon you traverse the same forest by noon. How 
 luminous has it become by the aid of the alL 
 pervading light ! Possibly you do not think of 
 the glorious sun from which this light proceeds, 
 but you cannot but know that what was once an 
 obscure thicket, beset with dimness and shade, 
 is now flooded with the revealing light, and 
 that hope and joy have taken the place of caution 
 and doubt and fear. In like manner does the 
 recognition of a personal Intelligence who may 
 be known by man give an assured hope to what 
 men call science. In this way has it been to its 
 
 toSni?^^ advancing hosts a pillar of fire by night and a 
 cloud by day. The denial of such an Intelligence, 
 or the assertion that he cannot be known, takes 
 from science its hope, because it withdraws from 
 the universe the illumination of personal reason 
 and personal love, which all scientific thinking 
 accepts as possible and rational. 
 
 The 
 
 recognition 
 of a know- 
 able personal 
 Intelligence 
 gives 
 
A Doctrine of Despair. 11 
 
 II. To be without God is to be without hope in 
 respect to man's moral culture and perfection. 
 
 What we are is of far greater importance than 
 
 what we Icno7/^. Strength and perfection of 
 
 character are the supreme aim of all right-judg- character 
 
 inof men. When they think of what man was important 
 f' '^ than know- 
 
 made to be, and of what they themselves might ^*^^^^' 
 
 become, they cannot but aspire. But strong 
 
 as conscience is to elevate, control, and command, 
 
 a personal God is needed by man to sfive to his a personal 
 
 ^ ^ -^ P ^ God alone 
 
 conscience energy and life. Personality Avithout fj^^iif" t?^ 
 is required to reinforce the personality within, conscience. 
 Conscience itself is but another name for the 
 moral person within, when exalted to its most 
 energetic self-assertion and having to do with 
 the individual self in its most characteristic 
 manifestation, as it determines the character by 
 its individual will. The theory that denies that Denial of the 
 God is a person very naturally and logically de- of goT 
 nies that man is a person. It makes him only a denial ot; the 
 
 - '^ personality 
 
 highly-developed set of phenomena flowering out of man. 
 from a hidden root the unknowable unknown. 
 What we call his personality, his ^yill, his 
 character, are all as unreal as the clouds of a 
 summer noon one moment apparently as fixed 
 as mountain summits, and another dissolving 
 as you gaze. 
 
 On any theory of man a personal God is 
 needed to give energy to the moral ideal and to 
 
12 
 
 Agnosticism 
 
 The better 
 self. 
 
 Man a 
 siuner. 
 
 Needs de- 
 liverance 
 and hope. 
 
 Experience 
 of failure 
 
 proclaim it as his personal will. The other self 
 within us is often powerless to enforce obedience. 
 Much as we may respect its commands when 
 forced to hear them, we can, alas, too easily shut 
 our ears to its voice. But when this better self 
 represents the living God, who, though greater 
 than conscience, speaks through conscience, then 
 conscience takes the throne of the universe, and 
 her voice is that of the eternal king to which 
 all loyal subjects respond with rejoicing assent 
 and with the exulting hope that the right will 
 triumph they rejoice that God^ reigns in right- 
 eousness. 
 
 But man is not always loyal either to con- 
 science or to God. As a sinner against both, he 
 has need of deliverance and hope. What he 
 most needs and longs for is to be delivered from 
 the narrowness of selfishness, the brutality of 
 appetite, the fever of ambition, the meanness of 
 envy, the fiendishness of hate, and the righteous 
 displeasure of God against all these. When men 
 know what they are, as measured by what they 
 might have become, they cannot but be ashamed. 
 When they review their failures after trial they 
 cannot but despair. They find no rational ground 
 in themselves for hope that thej shall actually 
 become better in the springs of feeling or the 
 results of their life. If there is no God, or if they 
 know of none who can show them what they 
 
A Doctrine of Despair. 13 
 
 ought to be, and who can and will help them, 
 and whom it is rational to ask to guide and help 
 them, they are without hope of lasting and no hope of 
 
 ' " i. o success 
 
 triumphant success. But if God has made Him- ^^^^^^^ ^^^ 
 self known in Christ in order to give us a living 
 example of human excellence, and also to inspire 
 us to make this excellence our own, and above 
 all in order to remove every hindrance or doubt 
 in the way then we may hope, by trusting our- 
 selves to this redeeming God, at last to be like Christ the 
 
 . source of 
 
 Him. His life, His death. His words, His acts, inspiration 
 
 ' .... and hope. 
 
 His living self, are full of the inspiration of hope. 
 That inspiration has wrought with mighty power 
 through all the Christian generations. The more 
 distinctly and lovingly Christ has made God to 
 be known, the more confidently has man re- 
 sponded with hope that he shall be emancipated 
 into^likeness to God. 
 
 (From all these hopes the agnostic atheism Ejects of 
 cuts us off. It first weakens and shatters our atheism. 
 ideal of excellence; next it denies the freedom 
 by which we may rise ; and finally it withdraws 
 the inspiration which is mipistered by our per- 
 sonal deliverer and friend. ; It weakens man's 
 ideal. It cannot do otherwise, for it derives the 
 law of duty from the changing feelings of our 
 fellow-men. It degrades the law of duty into a 
 shifting product of society, it resolves conscience 
 with its rewards and penalties into the outgrowth 
 
14 
 
 Agnosticism : 
 
 It sets free- 
 dom aside. 
 
 of the imagined favour or dislike of men as 
 unstable as ourselves when this is fixed and 
 transmitted by hereditary energy. Such an ideal, 
 or law, or tribunal, can be neither sacred nor 
 The agnostic Quickeninof nor bindino^ because it has no per- 
 
 idealhasno ^ , ^ 
 
 permanence, manencc. To bc a good or perfect man in one 
 aeon is not the same thing as to be a good man 
 in another. It is altogether a matter of taste or 
 fashion, and each age under the law of develop- 
 ment sets a new fashion for itself 
 
 It also sets freedom aside. To reach any part 
 of this ideal is the result of simple mechanism. 
 Character is the joint product of inheritance 
 and circumstances. Freedom, with its possi- 
 bilities and its kindling power, is but a fancy 
 and a shadow the mocking phantom of man's 
 romantic longings or the vain surmising of his 
 idle regrets. 
 
 There is neither inspiration nor hope for such 
 
 DiTine help, r^ j^r^j^ jj^ ^]^q j^gjp Qf QqJ jJq ccrtaiuly needs 
 
 help from some one greater than himself If 
 his moral ideals are not fixed, and he has no 
 freedom with which to follow or reject such as 
 he has, he is like a man who is bidden to walk 
 in the sand that fails beneath his tread, and 
 whose limbs are at the same time frozen with 
 paralysis. Or he is like a bird with stiffened 
 wings when dropped into an exhausted receiver. 
 God cannot encourage or help him. To him 
 
 Leaves no 
 hope of 
 
A Doctrine of Despair. 15 
 
 there is no God, or none of whom he can know 
 that He can or will give him aid. 
 
 He has no certain or fixed ideal to which to 
 aspire. He has no freedom with which even to 
 pray. He has no God to whom to pray. What T?nbridied 
 
 ^ <J L J hcence the 
 
 better can such a man do than to give himself ^^* ^^^^^^ 
 up to the passions and impulses of the moment, 
 which at least may divert his thoughts from his 
 degradation, or amuse his aimless and hopeless 
 existence, or throw startling and lurid lights over 
 the darkness of his despair. 
 
 III. Belief in God is the only condition of hope in 
 the advancement of public and social morality ^ and 
 consequently in social stability and progress. 
 
 The universe in which we live represents two 
 factors, the physical and moral. Both of these 
 are apparent in social phenomena. If God is 
 required as the ground of our hope in nature 
 and in physical science, and also in the sphere 
 of morals, how much more in that sphere in 
 
 Agnosticism 
 
 which nature and spirit meet together ! \Those reasKjr^ 
 who deny God or who assert that we cannot hopefn 
 
 . / 1 f. 1 human 
 
 know Him, can give no reason lor their faith progress, 
 and hope in human progress. \ Force and law 
 alone, whether physical or moral, do not answer 
 ill! our questions here. Social forces, too, are 
 
16 Agnosticism 
 
 less easily discerned than those purely physictl. 
 Even if we could resolve these forces into material 
 agencies, and assume that their laws can be 
 expressed in mathematical formulae, this would 
 avail us but little, because the forces are so 
 complex and subtle, less easily traced, less 
 readily analyzed, and less confidently interpreted, 
 God'B plans and less readily turned into prophecy. But if 
 
 the ground . "^ . . 
 
 of hope for vve bcHeve these forces to be largely spiritual and 
 
 man's future. o ./ x 
 
 personal, and accept freedom in both man and 
 God, then our only rational ground of hope for 
 man's future is that the Eternal has His own 
 plans concerning man's future well-being, and 
 will fulfil them in a consummation of good. 
 The past The developments of the past, except as they 
 
 fu*tu?e^^' reveal some plan of God, give no hope for the 
 progress. future. lu the facts of the past there is no 
 security that the movement of man is onward. 
 Manifold phenomena in human history suggest 
 fearful forebodings of degeneracy, depravity, and 
 retrogression. Long periods of darkness and 
 eclipse have gathered in gloomy folds over the 
 human race. Sudden collapses of faith have 
 spread like the plague. Fearful convulsions 
 have opened like the chasms of an earthquake 
 to swallow up the gathered fruits of culture and 
 art. But so soon as we know that God rules 
 over man for man's moral discipline, and that 
 Christ is setting up a kingdom of righteousness 
 
A LoctrinS of Despair. ^^^^ 17 
 
 and peace and joy in the HoIy^Gl:^Q^^j|;j[j^/we 
 lift up our hearts, and gather courage fofman's 
 future history. We find good reason to con- 
 elude that man will continue to make progress 
 in the knowledge of whatever is true, and just, JJi^^/^tT^ 
 and honest, and of good report. We become Christianity. 
 well assured that the simple law of Christian love 
 will in due time be expanded by Christian science 
 [ into thousands and tens of thousands of those 
 special precepts of Christian ethics, which future 
 generations shall joyfully accept, and that these 
 will be light as air in their facile applications to 
 the varying conditions of human existence, and 
 strong as links of iron to hold men to every form 
 ^ of duty. We triumph in the faith that the time 
 ^ will come when this unwritten law shall sound 
 within every obedient soul as winningly and as 
 lovingly as the evening breeze that rests on the 
 I. wind harp, and shall thunder as terribly in the 
 i ear of the disobedient as the voice of God from 
 Sinai. 
 
 Such a faith in human progress is rational. j^tg^iJ^o"^*^;^ 
 It is true indeed that if God is personal and man ^^^^f 
 is free, the relations of God to man may be more ^^^'^^^ 
 complicated, and less easily known than if man 
 is material and God an unknowable and im- 
 personal force. On the other hand, social science 
 gains nothing, but loses much, in telling us that 
 the laws of society are as fixed as the laws of 
 c 
 
18 
 
 Agnosticism 
 
 Faith in 
 order and 
 purpose 
 necessary to 
 a science of 
 the future. 
 
 Order and 
 purpose pre- 
 suppose a 
 personal 
 thinker. 
 
 the planets, and that man is as plastic to their 
 moulding as Stardust or protoplasm are to the 
 cosmic forces. For on either theory, if we are to 
 have a science of the future, we must have faith 
 in order and a purpose as the ground of our hope 
 for that' progress in which we confide. But order 
 and purpose suppose a personal thinker. If we 
 have no God, or a God whom we cannot know, 
 we are without rational hope for that moral and 
 social progress in which we all believe. We can 
 only believe that men will make progress, because 
 we desire it. The socialistic agnostic is a dog- 
 matic sentimentalist, instead of a rational philo- 
 sopher. 
 
 The believer 
 in God alone 
 has solid 
 ground for 
 hope touch- 
 ing his own 
 life. 
 
 IV. Atheism., whether positive or negative y gives 
 no hope for the conduct or comfort of individual Ufe. 
 
 Each man's personal life is ever present to 
 himself as the object of his hopes or fears. 
 Shall this life be long or short? Shall it be 
 bright or dark ? Shall it be a failure or a success ? 
 The man who believes in God and trusts in His 
 guidance, he, and he alone, has solid ground for 
 hope. He knows God as a force acting by law, 
 and he knows Him no less as a person acting in 
 personal relations of influence and love. From 
 both he gathers hope. He knows Him through 
 
A Doctrine of Despair. 19 
 
 the forces of the universe which surround and 
 
 confront him at every step, and he knows Him 
 
 as the heavenly Father who animates and directs 
 
 these forces in every single joy or sorrow. In hirSJn*"" 
 
 both relations he is in harmony with him ; with ^'*^ ^'"^' 
 
 the first so far as he knows them, and with the 
 
 God Himself who controls both the known and 
 
 the unknown to his true well-being, and makes 
 
 even his ignorance and mistakes a blessing. 
 
 He knows and obeys God as revealed in nature. 
 He believes most profoundly that He acts in the He believes 
 
 ^ \ , that God 
 
 maiestic forces of the universe and their un- acts in the 
 
 J forces and 
 
 changing laws. He recognizes the truth that both J^^^^. 
 are everywhere present in the world of matter 
 and of spirit. He watches these forces as they 
 move, often seemingly like the summer cloud 
 that broods lazily over the quiet earth at noon ; 
 sometimes like the cloud also in that it needs only 
 to be touched by another as quiet as itself, and 
 the thunderbolt and tornado will leap forth with 
 destructive energy. But he does not limit His 
 presence and his rule to physical agencies alone. 
 He recoofnizes also His moral and spiritual forces Hercoct-- 
 
 O i msesthe 
 
 and laws. Though the moral are less obtrusive, Ky^of " 
 they are none the less sure; though slower in and'spS-l 
 their working, they are none the less energetic. 
 Their energy is even greater, resembling in this 
 tliose subtler agents of matter which, though 
 they glide into one another in secret hiding- 
 
20 Agnosticism , 
 
 places and under Protean phases, are for that 
 very reason the more easily gatliered for a fearful 
 retribution. 
 Man in the Within this vast enofinerv of force and law 
 
 midst of . 
 
 ?orc^?lnd ^^^^ stands in his weakness and his strength. 
 
 laws. ipi^Q spectacle of this enginery is sublime, and 
 
 every day is making it more magnificent, for 
 every day reveals something new in force or lav? 
 which manifests more of the thought and power 
 of God. But while man continually finds his 
 strength in his power to interpret by scientific 
 thought the forces and laws which had been be- 
 fore unknown, he is in the same proportion made 
 more and more sensible of his weakness in his 
 augmented apprehension of what is unrevealed. 
 He is beset with fear lest he shall make some 
 
 His question, fatal mistake. Hence he asks earnestly. Is there 
 nothing more in this wide universe than force 
 and law ? If there is nothing more, no man is so 
 much to be pitied as he the man of scientific 
 knowledge and scientific imagination, for no man 
 
 nis loneu- feels so lonely and helpless as he. He is alone I 
 
 ness and ' * 
 
 on^i^^^^^ alone ! as he muses upon the vastness of this 
 BuSSon. great solitude, peopled though it be with the 
 enormous agents that haunt and overmaster him 
 with their presence, but are without a thought or 
 care for his personal life. Could he but see be- 
 hind these forces a personal being like himself, 
 and capable of directing both force and Jaw to 
 
A DoctHne of Despair. 21 
 
 issues of blessings to men, how welcome would 
 that knowledge be to his lonely heart. That God folT^^"" 
 he may see and find if he will. He is suggested 
 by his own personahty, which is his nobler, nay, 
 his essential self He is demanded by the weak- 
 ness and limitations of his own nature. Why 
 should there not be a personal and living God 
 behind this machinery of force and law which we 
 call nature ? Why should I not know a living 
 spirit, as well as unknown force and definite law? 
 and why should I not accept personality in God 
 as the best explanation of both ? There is, there 
 must be such a Person; He fills this vast solitude 
 by His immanent presence and His animating 
 life. He directs the forces which I cannot con- 
 trol. While I dare not transgress any known 
 manifestations of His will either in force or law, I 
 can trust myself to His personal care even though 
 I err from limited knowledge or foresight. 
 
 What natural theism thus suggests. Christian Godaccord- 
 
 o^ ' ing to Christ- 
 
 theism declares for man's guidance and comfort, ian Theism. 
 
 The living God becomes our Father in heaven, 
 the Guardian of our life, our ever-present Friend, 
 who understands our most secret thoughts, our 
 weakest fears, our blushing shame, our conscious 
 guilt, and who can bring to each and to all the 
 sympathy, and comfort, and guidance, of a per- 
 sonal friendshij) and an assured blessing. In 
 what words of sublime condescension and moving 
 
i2 
 
 Agnosticism 
 
 The declara- 
 tions of 
 Cluist. 
 
 Illustrated 
 by His life. 
 
 Confirmed 
 by His 
 resurrection. 
 
 Repfiated 
 from iiea\ en, 
 
 pathos have these truths been declared : " Even 
 the very hairs of your head are all numbered. 
 Ye are of more value than many sparrows. Take 
 no thought for the morrow. Your heavenly 
 Father knoweth that ye have need of all these 
 things. Seek ye first the kingdom of God and 
 His righteousness, and all these things shall be 
 added unto you." These are words of Him who 
 spake as never man spake. Nor did He speak 
 them alone. He lived them in His life, exempli- 
 fying them in look and demeanour, and showing 
 their import by His loving trust. The same 
 revelations of God were confirmed by His resur- 
 rection and His ascending majesty as He went 
 into the presence of His Father and our Father, 
 of His God and our God. From that presence 
 we hear the assuring words: "He that spared 
 not His own Son, but freely gave Him up for us 
 all, how shall He not with Him also freely give us 
 all things. Be careful for nothing, but in every- 
 thing by prayer and supplication with thanks- 
 giving, let your requests be made known unto 
 God; and the peace of God, which passeth all 
 understanding, shall keep your hearts and minds 
 through Christ Jesus." In this faith in God as 
 the guide of their personal life. Christian believers 
 by myriads have lived and died. In this hope, 
 and in this alone, can the living of this generation 
 stand. 
 
A Doctrine of Despair. 23 
 
 V. The man without God is without hope for a 
 future life. 
 
 For such a man, at best, another life is simply no certainty 
 
 . .of a future 
 
 possible. He has no rational assurance that it iifetothe 
 
 7 ^ man without 
 
 is certain. The universe is so vast and man's cJo<i- 
 dwelling is so contracted; its inhabitants are so 
 manifold, and one among them is of so little 
 moment; the distances are so enormous, and 
 man's power to traverse them is so limited ; the 
 histories of the prehistoric ages are so gigantic 
 in their forgotten details, and yet the title of 
 each chapter is but an inscription over millions 
 of the dead, that men tremble before nature, as 
 when a child looks upward on the face of an 
 overhanging cliff, or peers over the edge of a 
 yawning gulf. 
 
 Man shudders before nature's remorseless in- Nature's 
 
 insensibility. 
 
 sensibility. He notices how little she makes of 
 the dead, and how little she cares for the living 
 how she mocks at and trifles with sensibility 
 and with life. An earthquake swallows up tens 
 of thousands of living men. The jaws of the 
 gulf that opened to receive them swing back to 
 their place, and forthwith flowers adorn the 
 ghastly seam, as if in mockery of the dead who 
 are buried beneath. A great ship founders in 
 the ocean, freighted with a thousand living souls. 
 As they go down they raise one shriek of anguish 
 that it would seem should rend the sky. But 
 
S4 Agnosticism i 
 
 the cry is over, and the waters roll over the place 
 as smoothly as though those thousand lives were 
 not sleeping in death below. Of another life 
 there are no tidings and few suggestions, a 
 possibility, or perhaps a probability, but no 
 hope. 
 Thepossi- Nowadays even this possibility is denied by 
 denSdb? i^any, and the probability against such a life is 
 many. hardened into a certainty, and men strive to 
 
 prove that they are not immortal as men strive 
 for a great prize. All the analogies of nature 
 are interpreted to prove the extinction of man's 
 being. Those who acknowledge no God but a 
 mysterious force, those who deny to God per- 
 sonality and thought and affection and sympathy, 
 most reasonably find no evidence in nature for a 
 future life, for when they look upon her stony 
 and inflexible face, they find all the evidence to 
 be against it. 
 The awaken- Let sucli a man awake to the fact that God is, 
 fact of God's that He lives a personal life, that nature is not 
 
 existence * 
 
 ana person- gQ much His hiding- placc as it is a garment of 
 the revealing light ; that the forces of nature are 
 His instruments, and the laws of nature His 
 steadying and eternal thoughts; that man is 
 made after God's image, and can interpret His 
 thoughts and commune with His living self; that 
 life is man's school, every arrangement and lesson 
 of v/hich points to a definite end ; that this end 
 
A Dodrine of Despair. 25 
 
 is not accomplished here then not only does The effect oi 
 there spring up in his heart the hope that this in|.^^^ ^"' 
 life shall be continued in another, but this hope 
 becomes almost a certainty. But this hope is a 
 certainty so long, and only so long, as this life is 
 interpreted by the light of God's thought and 
 God's personality. So long as this light continues 
 to shine, every difficulty that would make against 
 another life is turned into an argument in its 
 favour, and every new doubt suggests the necessity 
 of a new hope. Every roughness that has cast a 
 shadow on the picture reflects a gleam of light, 
 and the hard, inexpressive face of nature herself 
 becomes radiant with promise and hope. 
 
 Now let God be seen to break forth from Hi;; The effect nt 
 hiding-place, and to manifest himself in the Christ i^^ Christ. 
 who conquers death and brings the immortal life 
 to light through His rising and ascension, and the 
 hope that had been reached as a conclusion of 
 assured conviction is shouted forth in the, song 
 of triumph, " Blessed be the God and Father of 
 our Lord Jesus Christ, who, according to His 
 abundant mercy, has begotten us again unto a 
 lively hope, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ 
 from the dead, to an inheritance incorruptible 
 and undefiled, and that fadeth not away." 
 
 I know that this argument, which sustains the 
 hope of another life, is set aside by the agnostics The value of 
 
 . . . a future life 
 
 with the denial that another life is of any value denied. 
 
26 Agnosticism 
 
 or that men care for it. The next step is to 
 argue that it is weak and ignoble to expect or 
 mte for f" desire it. The next is to substitute for it an ideal 
 future ufo. existcncc in the lives of others by the continu- 
 ance of our thoughts and activities in those of 
 others, in whose lives we may expect to prolong 
 our own. Let those accept this substitute for a 
 future life who can, and find in it what satis- 
 faction they may. They will certainly confess 
 that this fancied contentment with personal 
 annihilation falls immeasurably short of what 
 men call hope, and preeminently of the Christian 
 hope that is full of immortality. 
 
 The doctrine itself seems to us to be simply 
 The agnostic inhuman and unnatural, and to be refuted by the 
 practically slmplcst practical test. If men do not care for a 
 
 tested. ^ . ^ 
 
 future life, how should they, and why do they, 
 care for any future of the present life ? If they 
 do not dread annihilation, why do they not more 
 frequently commit suicide ? If the hope for a 
 nobler future existence does not animate and 
 inspire men as an original and inextinguishable 
 impulse, how happens it that men cleave with 
 such tenacity to the hope for a brief and perhaps 
 ignoble hour in the present ? Why is it so rare 
 that even the most disciplined of modern philo- 
 sophers is ready to exchange the briefest hour of 
 personal being for the lauded immortality of 
 thought or emotion in the person of another ? It 
 
A Doctrine of Despair. 27 
 
 is not bravery, it is simple bravado to deny or 
 weaken the longing for a future life which every 
 man confesses and feels. The laboured apostrophes 
 of GeorG^e Eliot, and the studied declamations George Euot 
 
 o ' and 
 
 of John Morley over the entrancing prospect Joi^^^oricy 
 of annihilation, are silenced by the pithy con- 
 fessions of Shakespeare in Hamlet. The very 
 earnestness of the denial is but a confession of 
 the strength of the desire. I know that when Denial of a 
 a man half or wholly denies that God is, or that involved in 
 
 ^ ' denial of 
 
 God is anything to him, he must, to be con- ^o^- 
 sistent, deny in the next breath that there is a 
 future life. I know that the temptation is very 
 strong that he should then seek to persuade him- 
 self that he cares nothing for that life. But he 
 cannot succeed. He must have hope for this 
 life, and he must have hope for the future. And 
 he needs to know God and to believe in God if 
 he would have hope for either. 
 
 This, then, is our conclusion : That so far as Abandon- 
 
 ment of 
 
 man denies God, or denies that God can be g^Pfy'^tind 
 known, he abandons hope of every kind that Sii'S'^'^ 
 intellectual hope which is the life of scientific 
 thought; hope for his own moral progress; hope 
 for the progress of society; hope for guidance 
 and comfort in his personal life; and hope for 
 that future life for which the present is a pre- 
 paration. As he lets those hopes go one by one, 
 his life loses its light and its dignity ; morality 
 
28 Agnosticism : 
 
 loses its enthusiasm and its energy, science has 
 no promise of success, sin gains a relentless hold, 
 sorrow and darkness have no comfort, and life 
 becomes a worthless farce or a sad tragedy 
 neither of which is worth the playing, because 
 agnostic? ^^"^ both end in nothing. Sooner or later this 
 agnostic without hope will become morose and 
 surly, or sensual and self-indulgent, or avaricious 
 and churlish, or cold and selfish, or cultured and 
 hollow, in a word, a theoretical or a practical 
 pessimist, as any man must who believes the 
 world as well as himself to be without any worthy 
 end for which one man or many men should care 
 to live. Possibly, under special advantages of 
 culture, he may be a modern Stoic without the 
 moral earnestness with which the ancient Stoic 
 grimly confronted fate, or a modern Epicurean 
 without the unconscious gaiety that Christianity 
 has rendered for ever impossible ; or he will grope 
 through the world seeking the shadow of a religion 
 that he knows can never give him rest, and a 
 God whom he denies can ever be found. But in 
 either case, the story of his life will be summed 
 up in the fearful epitaph, " He Iked without God, 
 and died without hope" 
 
 Agnosticism Aguosticism is a topic of present interest, on 
 
 Sterest. ^oih its speculative and its practical side. As a 
 
 speculation, however, it is not new. It is as old 
 
A Doctrine of Despair. 29 
 
 as human thought. The doubts and misgivings 
 from which it springs are older than the oldest 
 fragment of human literature. The questions a?a%*S- 
 which it seeks to answer are as distinctly uttered *^^' 
 in the book of Job as are the replies of sneering 
 despair which are paraded in the last scientific 
 periodical. Modern science and philosophy have 
 not answered these questions. It may be doubted 
 iv^hether they have shed any light upon them. 
 They have simply enlarged man's conceptions of what^ ^^^ 
 the finite, and thus made it more easy for him to ^ve done! 
 overlook or deny his power and his obligation to 
 know the Infinite and the Self-existent. Culture The effect of 
 
 culture and 
 
 and literature, to say the least, do not justify literature. 
 the modern contempt for positive faith. They 
 simply widen our knowledge of human weakness 
 and error, but most rashly conclude that every 
 form of faith and worship is an attitude of blind 
 wonder before the unknown, or a sentimental 
 groping after what can never be found. These 
 inferences are hasty and unwarranted, for the 
 reason that modern culture and literature were 
 never so enriched by the Christian faith, and 
 never could find reasons so abundant for acknow- 
 ledging Christ to be divine. And yet we must 
 acknowledge that to the superficially educated 
 and the hasty thinker, Agnosticism offers many 
 
 , , . , . . . Attractions 
 
 attractions, because it answers so many questions of agnostio- 
 
 ism. to the 
 
 by a simple formula, and gathers or disposes of superficial. 
 
30 
 
 Agnosticism : 
 
 The popu- 
 larity; of its 
 theories. 
 
 Its tenden- 
 cies restrain- 
 ed by 
 counter- 
 acting in- 
 fluences in 
 many cases. 
 
 many phenomena under plausible generalizations, 
 and above all, because it releases the conscience 
 and the life from present obligations of duty. 
 Hence its theories run like wildfire among the 
 multitudes, whose superficial or unfinished cul- 
 ture and training, or whose moral preferences 
 prepare them to receive it. With many persons 
 these tendencies are comparatively harmless, at 
 least for a time. The old traditions of duty and 
 self-control, of decorum and worship, still remain, 
 even though God and conscience are speculatively 
 abandoned, and Christ is an unsolved enigma, 
 and Christian hopes are harmless dreams, and 
 the future life a questionable inheritance, and this 
 life is a prize in a lottery, and the fervors and self- 
 denials and self- conquests of the Christian life 
 are innocent but vapid sentimentalities. "With 
 others, after a longer time, the God at first un 
 known is openly denied, and Christ is rejected 
 with passionate scorn, and the inspiration and 
 restraints of Christian sentiment are contemp- 
 tuously abandoned. By others the theory is 
 applied still further. Their motto is, Let us cat 
 and drink, for to-morrow tee die. To one or another 
 of these dangers very many are exposed, most of all 
 to the danger that the energy of their faith may 
 be weakened, and the fire of their zeal may be 
 lowered, and the tone of their moral and spiritual 
 life may be relaxed by sympathy with this 
 
 Ultimrite 
 results in 
 others. 
 
A Doctrine of Despair, 31 
 
 paralysis of faitli, which is everywhere more or 
 less prevalent. 
 
 No calamity can befall a younof man which is The greatest 
 
 ^ "- calamity to 
 
 so serious as the loss of that fire and hopefulness m^" 
 and courage for this life and the future, which are 
 so congenial to the beginning of his active life. 
 Hence no sign of our times is more depressing 
 than that so many refined and thoughtful young 
 men so readily accept the suggestions of doubt, 
 and take a position of indifference or irresponsi- 
 bility in respect to the truths of Christian theism 
 and the personal obligations which they enforce. 
 Against these tendencies would I warn young ^^u^'^^*^ 
 men earnestly, by the consideration that so fast 
 and so far as God is unknown by any man, so fast 
 and so far does hope depart from his soul : hope 
 for all that a man should care to live for ; hope 
 for scientific progress, for his own moral welfare, 
 for the progress of the race, for a successful life 
 and for a happy immortality. Therefore do I 
 declare to them as they soberly look back upon 
 their past life, and wistfully look forward to the 
 unknown future, that if they would live a life of Sfonrof a 
 cheerful, joyful, and buoyant hopefulness they ^^^^^^"^ ^^'^ 
 must live a life that is controlled and hallowed 
 and cheered by God's presence and by a constant 
 faith in His forgiving goodness. All else that a 
 man should care for is secured by this living hope 
 in the living and ever-present God intellectual 
 
32 Agnosticism, 
 
 What living success and satisfaction as he grows in all know- 
 secures, ledge and culture, sure progress in moral good- 
 ness, prosperity in his efforts for the well-being 
 of man, the kind direction of his earthly life, and 
 the assurance and anticipation of the life which 
 is immortal. " All things are yours ; . . . and ye 
 are Christ's ; and Christ is God's." 
 
 ^. Present Day Tracts, No. 8. Y^ 
 
 . . 
 
MODERN MATERIALISM 
 
 BY THE LATE ' 
 
 REY. W. R WILKINSON, M.A., 
 
 Rector of Luttertoorth. 
 
 AUTHOR OP 
 
 Christ ouk. Gospkt,,'* (Sermons preached before the University of Cambridge,) 
 "SrKCiAL Providence and Peaydr," etc. 
 
 THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY: 
 
 55 PATERNOSTER ROW, AND 65 ST. PAUL'S CHURCHYARD, 
 
^rgnment (xt the TtacU 
 
 The mystery of Being is impenetrable. We only know the 
 attributes and qualities of things. Elementary substances are 
 few. The universal basis of the objects of sense is designated 
 '* matter." A large proportion of the objects of sense are living 
 beings. They have certain characteristics and constituents in 
 common. Life does not result from their combination. The 
 mystery of life is as impenetrable as the mystery of matter. 
 Mind involves life, but is not co-extensive with it. Thought is 
 not a product of living matter, nor a movement of matter. 
 Mind underlies thought. The changes of organic bodies, as 
 well as their mutual attractions, and the action of chemical 
 affinities, are due to force. There are different kinds of 
 force. Matter is incapable of motion without force. The 
 difficulties of materialism are insuperable. No answer is 
 attempted to be given to the question, Whence were 
 matter and motion? The attempt to reduce all existence 
 to a material origin lands us in ideaHsm. Materialistic prin- 
 ciples lead to the conclusion that matter has a dependent and 
 derived existence, and are utterly incapable of explaining the 
 mysteries of life and thought. The construction of the system 
 of nature must depend on something that is not law on the 
 v.ill of an omniscient and omnipotent God, Materialism 
 necessarily denies the immortality of the soul. The atomic 
 theory is not necessarily inconsistent with Theism. The views 
 cf Cudworth, Descartes, and Newton are quoted. 
 
MODERN MATERIALISM. 
 
 ^-^Ts^^F^^^t- ' 
 
 MoxG the wonders by wliicli we arc sur- simpb 
 
 ' Being. 
 
 rounded there is no greater wonder than 
 that of Being. Contemplating any one 
 of the most familiar objects of our 
 senses, when we ask what it is which presents to 
 us certain observable qualities, what it is to which 
 they belong and are due, what is the thing itself, 
 apart from the combination of qualities by which 
 it is known to us, we cannot get a satisfactory and 
 intelligible answer; we find ourselves in the pre- 
 sence of a great mystery, and that the mystery 
 of Eeing. 
 
 If we consider, for example, a specimen of the 
 isubstance called Gold : it is known to us, generally, 
 ^by its colour, its malleability, fusibility, and relative 
 weight ; and to some it is known as possessing other 
 qualities or attributes. But, whatever the number 
 and character of these, it is not, and it cannot be 
 ^thought of, as an assemblage of certain qualities fg'^^u^Jj^JJj. 
 and attributes, but as that in which they are as- 
 sembled or united, that to which they belong. This 
 
Modern Materialism. 
 
 inner ultimate something, the subject in which 
 such qualities are inherent, the substance, the un- 
 derlying reality, of the presence and nature of 
 which they are the indications, must have an 
 actual existence. They are not, but it is gold. 
 They, taken altogether, do not form Y, but it is so 
 constituted as to possess and exhibit them. And 
 yet no analysis has ever revealed it to our senses, 
 nor can our minds form any distinct conception of 
 it. As Sir Isaac Newton says in the conclusion of 
 the "Principia,'* 
 
 "We only see the forms and colours of bodies, we only hear 
 sounds, we only touch the outer surfaces, we only smell their 
 odours, and taste their flavours ; the inmost substances v.'o 
 apprehend by no sense, by no reflex action." 
 
 Attribntcs Extending our observation, we notice that most 
 objects of sense are compounds, consisting of 
 various substances in combination, and having 
 qualities arising from such combination. The 
 elementary substances, however those of which all 
 others are composed have been, perhaps, most of 
 them discovered, and are not very numerous. 
 Each of these is simple, and although it may have 
 qualities which are common to others, it possesses 
 them in virtue of its own nature alone. 
 
 If, in order to get as near as possible to the 
 foundation and root of Being, we inquire what it 
 i& which all these elementary substances possess 
 In common, and in all their minutest portions, 
 without which they could not be material sub- 
 
 of lieinf 
 
Modern Materialism. 
 
 i stances at all, and ^vliich suffices to give them The 
 
 necessary 
 
 ^ merely the character of material substance, we find elements ( 
 
 J ' Material 
 
 these three necessary attributes or elements of ^^"s 
 material Being : extensioUy moveableness, and imjoe- 
 inctr ability. That is, a thing, to be a material sub- 
 i stance, must take up some room in space, it must \ 
 
 'la capable of being moved from one place to 
 another, and its place, while it is in it, cannot be 
 occupied by anything else. 
 
 But here again we do not say or think that the 
 combination of extension, moveableness, and im- 
 penetrability, makes up a body, but that a body 
 is something which is extended, moveable, and im- 
 penetrable. Wc are still far enough from com- Matter tt 
 
 ^ , basis of 11 
 
 prehending what that something is. It is that, '^^^^^^^^ 
 however, which, as forming the universal basis of 
 objects of sense, we designate by the term matter. 
 
 Before we proceed to notice the attempts which Living 
 have been made to discover the nature and con- 
 stitution of this unknown reality which meets us 
 everywhere and in everything, we must attend to 
 the fact that a large proportion of the objects of 
 lOur senses consists of active or self-acting sub- 
 jstances, that is, of living beincrs. They differ from Their dis- 
 the rest of the objects of sense by the possession, gJks?*''''" 
 seven in their lowest forms, of an organisation, and 
 iof the faculties of feeding, growing, and producing 
 Itheir like. They are all compound substances, 
 tand all composed of the same elementary sub- 
 
Modern Materialism. 
 
 stances, which, let it be remarked, have none ol 
 these faculties. 
 Lifo. But, although we know what are the material 
 
 constituents of every living structure, we cannot 
 ascribe life itself to their combination. Such com- 
 bination may be necessary to life, but it does not of 
 itself constitute nor produce life. 
 
 **Life," says the great naturalist Cuvier, "exercising upon 
 the elements which at every instant form part of the living 
 body, and upon those which it attracts to it, an action contrary 
 to that wliich would be produced without it by the usual 
 chemical affinities, it is inconsistent to suppose that it can itself 
 be produced by those affinities." 
 
 Kot a Vie cannot therefore conceive of life as the ae:2rrc- 
 
 cuiubination ^ . 
 
 ofatuibutes. gate of the material substances composing the 
 living Being, or of their affinities, any more than 
 we can conceive of a substance as the aggregate of 
 the qualities or powers which meet in it, and by 
 which it is distinguished and manifested. The 
 mystery of Life is as impenetrable as the mystery 
 of simple Being. 
 
 2-j^^ The remaining, and perhaps the most mysterious 
 
 phenomenon of existence is Mind. Mind involves 
 life. But as life is not co-existent with all matter, 
 so neither is mind co-existent with all life. And 
 as life is not accounted for, or caused, by the 
 mere assemblage or action of those elementary 
 substances which are always found united in every 
 living thing, so neither is mind accounted for or 
 caused by the union or operation of all those 
 
Modern Materialism. 
 
 substances, properties, and powers which in our 
 experience are found combined in every thinking 
 Being. 
 
 Mind is, in all cases known to us, connected with Distinct 
 
 . , , . from its 
 
 a certain organization, and also with the faculties environment 
 of feeding J groiolngy and propagating. But it is 
 difficult to conceive of these as essential and ab- 
 solutely necessary to the origination, development, 
 and exercise of thought. They may be the condi- 
 tion of the existence of material Beings who have 
 mind, without being the conditions of the existence 
 of mind itself. Thought, even in its lowest phase Thought not 
 of mere volition, or conscious choice, cannot be a Hving 
 
 matter. 
 
 product of Kving matter, for then it would be itself 
 a material object of sense. 
 
 IMor can it be a movement of matter, such as a Nora 
 
 ., . (, L '^ 1' c movement 
 
 Vibration ; for not every movement or vibration of of matter, 
 the matter the grey pulp brain, let us say which 
 is the organ of thought, is a thought ; consequently 
 there is a difference between such movement or 
 vibration as is merely mechanical, and such as is 
 simultaneous or identical with thought ; whence it 
 follows that something more than movement or 
 vibration is necessary to constitute thought. Mind Mind 
 
 '' ^ ^ ^ underlies 
 
 underlies thought as matter underlies all perceptible t^iought. 
 substance, and as life underlies all organic substance. 
 Life, in o?zr experience, is invariably connected with 
 matter, and mind with life and matter ; that is, 
 with living matter. But the connection of life with 
 
Modern Materialism. 
 
 Life 
 
 independent 
 of matter. 
 
 Mind 
 
 independent 
 of life and 
 matter. 
 
 Force. 
 
 matter is, so to speak, arbitrary : that is, it is not 
 traceable, as an eSect, to the action of material 
 elements. Life is something of itself independent 
 of matter. Similarly, the connection of mind with 
 life appears from observation and reasoning equally 
 arbitrary. Mind is not due to mere life nor a 
 function or development of it ; but it is something 
 of itself independent of life and matter. 
 
 We must also take into consideration an attribute 
 or property of all being known to us, which indeed 
 some think entitled to be accounted an element of 
 being. This is Porce. That to which movement, 
 and the changes of organic bodies are due, as well 
 as their mutual attraction and the action of chemical 
 affinities, is Force. The growth, nutrition, repro- 
 duction and spontaneous motion of organised bodies 
 depend upon force, called, for distinction's sake, 
 Vital force. The same term expresses the distinct 
 idea arising from the exercise of what are called the 
 various powers of the mind. There is mental force 
 as well as vital force and physical force. Each differs 
 from the other as to the subjects specially and 
 appropriately affected by it, and in the mode of its 
 action, but they have that in common of which we 
 can form an abstract apprehension, designated by 
 the term Force. 
 
 DiflFeren* 
 
 kinds of 
 force. 
 
 Force in 
 relation to 
 material 
 existence, 
 life, and 
 thouglit. 
 
 Considering force in its relation to the three 
 modes of being simple material existence, life, 
 and thought we cannot conceive of the faculties 
 
Modern Materialisvi, 
 
 of life otherwise than as present in and exerted by 
 that which has life ; nor of mental faculties, or the 
 power of thought, otherwise than as inherent in 
 and essential to mind. But we can conceive of 
 physical force as external to that which has a 
 material existence only. Indeed, it seems impossiblo 
 to conceive that such forces as gravitation, or 
 attraction and repulsion, can he possessed and 
 exerted independently, as inherent, essential powers, 
 by matter, the subjection of which to action by 
 those forces can only be explained by its own 
 incapacity of action its undoubted attribute of 
 inertia. 
 
 All mere matter, or matter without life, must, ?^reSt*-:i 
 in physical calculations in mechanics, for instance, ^^^^^^' 
 or astronomy be treated as incapable of motion 
 or change, except as acted upon from without, and 
 by some force applied. Newton has been careful Jg^J^^^^^^ 
 to state that he employs the word " attraction," in ^Strac 
 speaking of the action of bodies on each other, not *^^"" 
 in a physical sense. Indeed, in another passage of Definition a, 
 the "Principia," he says that attractions, physically ^^'j^',^''^^- 
 spealdng, are rather to be considered as impulses, b. i, section 
 
 xi., Intro- 
 
 In the end of his great work he seems inclined to duction. 
 the opinion that there is some subtle spirit by the 
 force and action of which all movements of matter 
 are determined. In his letter to Dr. Bentley, he says : fetter to 
 
 " The supposition of an innate gravity essential to and in- 
 herent in matter, so that a body can act upon another at a 
 
10 
 
 Modern Materialism, 
 
 Early 
 
 objection to 
 tlie doctrine 
 of gravita- 
 tiuu. 
 
 iratefialism 
 an ancient 
 syatem. 
 
 distance, and through a vacuum, without anything intermeJiato 
 to convey from one to another their force and reciprocal action, 
 is to my mind so great an absurdity, that I do not believe that 
 any person who possesses an ordinary faculty for reflecting 
 upon objects of a physical character can ever admit it." 
 
 Objection was early made against the doctrine 
 of rravitation that it involved the revival of the 
 old scholastic belief in occult qualities, which the 
 whole philosophical and scientific world had agreed 
 in rejecting. JN'ewton's language, above quoted, is 
 a protest against this charge. Euler, in the next 
 generation of men of science, also showed that no 
 such belief was necessitated by the observed facts 
 and demonstrated laws of gravitation. Among 
 modern mathematicians and natural philosophers, 
 Le Sage, Biot, and Arago, may be cited as re- 
 pudiating the notion that the power of attraction 
 resides in matter as an inherent and essential 
 quality. 
 
 From the very earliest known times of philo- 
 sophical inquiry, however, down to the present, 
 there have been those who held the opinion that all 
 existence is to be traced back to mere matter, and 
 that all the phenomena of existence of every kind 
 are to be ascribed to the capabilities or qualities 
 inherently possessed by the ultimate particles of 
 matter. Those, including the most ancient and 
 the most recent, who have carried the process of 
 simplification to the greatest extreme, limit these 
 original attributes of material elements to mag- 
 
Modern Materialism, 11 
 
 nitudc, figure, position, and mobility. From these, 
 all other qualities of all known existences are sup- 
 posed to have been developed, and to be due to 
 diversities of arrangement and combination of the 
 primordial atoms. 
 
 The first difficulty in this system is clearly to J-^jJjgJjg^^ 
 account for the existence of an infinite number of 
 atoms ; the next, to account for their movement, 
 so as to coalesce and form the conditions for sub- 
 sequent interaction. Most of the ancient and 
 modern physicists who have maintained this theory, 
 being opposed to the belief of a Creator, or the 
 direct action of a Divine Being in the original 
 production or subsequent formation of all things, 
 have adopted the hypothesis of the eternal and 
 necessary self-existence of the atoms of matter. 
 For, supposing there was a time when no substance SaS.^^ 
 existed possessing the primary qualities which we 
 ascribe to matter, it is impossible and inconceivable 
 that any such substance should come into existence 
 without the exertion of an Almighty will, that is, 
 tlie will of a personal Being who is absolutely 
 Almighty. 
 
 Again, movement, without which the atoms of ^^ motion, 
 the universe must have for ever remained separate 
 and independent particles, was assumed, by the 
 older theorists of the materialistic school, to have 
 been eternally co- existent with these atoms, and 
 to have possessed a rotatory or vorticular character, 
 
12 
 
 Modem Material 
 
 mm. 
 
 Aristotle 
 
 Golution of 
 Epicurus. 
 
 His funda- 
 mental 
 hj'pothesis 
 crude. 
 
 whence their ultimate conglomeration into existing 
 forms. Aristotle, in Ms Metaphysics/ treats this 
 assumption with deserved contempt, reproaching 
 its authors with neglect or inability to assign any 
 cause of motion, and claims for those alone who 
 referred the origin of all substance to a supreme 
 intelligence the credit of establishing a principal 
 which is the cause of motion to things. 
 
 Epicurus, indeed, endeavoured to account for 
 motion by the supposed necessity of a continual 
 descent of the primordial atoms in space by this 
 action of gravity ; a notion, duo, of course, to his 
 ignorance of the fact that " up " and " down,'' 
 '* above " and *' below," *' ascent " and " descent," 
 are relative terms, and that gravity could not ac- 
 count for motion in any one direction rather than 
 another, nor, indeed, for any motion at all. Per- 
 ceiving, also, that this theory implied motion in 
 parallel lines, and therefore did not provide for 
 concourse and coalescence, without which matter 
 could not have acquired its rudimentary forms, 
 Epicurus proceeded to imagine a slight deviation 
 or swerving from their original direction of move- 
 ment by some atoms, so as to come into contact 
 with others; but for such deviation its where, 
 when, and how, no cause was, or on his principles 
 could be, assigned. His whole system, moral as 
 well as physical, is based upon this crude hypo- 
 
 ^ Book I., close of Chapters 3 & 4. 
 
Modern Materialism. 13 
 
 theory. 
 
 thesis, "a childish fiction," as Cicero very justly DeFimbus, 
 
 . i. 19. Do 
 
 designates it " a fond thing vainly invented. Fato, i. 9. 
 
 The modern theory, substantially that of Kant 
 and La Place, is, as enunciated by the latter, that 
 matter originally existed in a state of 
 
 *'nejulosity so diliase that its existence could hardly havo 
 been sus]3ected," 
 
 and that the formation of nuclei, and of separate 
 zones revolving around them, breaking up after- 
 wards into detached spherical masses, was due to 
 the action of gravitation, or mutual attraction, the 
 collision and condensation of the cosmical particles 
 producing intense heat, which resulted in the fusion 
 of the masses, which were afterwards solidified by 
 the cooling caused by radiation. 
 
 This theory is equally inadequate with that of inadequate 
 
 ' ^ -^ ^ to account 
 
 Epicurus to account for matter and motion. For, and^^otion. 
 however diffuse the nebulosity, it must have con- 
 sisted of separate particles, each of which, if not 
 self-subsisting and eternal, must have been created. 
 And motion, arising from gravitation, must have Diicmrrr.. 
 been either an original and therefore essential 
 and co-eternal property or state of the mass of 
 atoms, or it must have been communicated to it by 
 some independent cause. In the former case it is 
 impossible to understand what should have deter- 
 mined the commencement of the processes which 
 have resulted in the present state of things. In 
 the latter, matter was put into a different state 
 
14 Modern Materialism. 
 
 from that in wliicli it originally existed received 
 a property wliicli it had not before ; but whence 
 could this come, how could this be effected, but by 
 the will and power of a Creator ? 
 
 It may be said, and, for scientific purposes, with 
 apparent reasonableness, that those who maintain 
 the theory that, given matter and motion, all things 
 that are may be accounted for without the necessity 
 of supposing final causes, are not obliged also to 
 account for the existence of matter and motion. 
 Demand. But the mind, in contemplating this system, and 
 endeavouring to realise the principle on which it is 
 based, is logically compelled to examine its primary 
 conditions, and to apply to them its radical principle, 
 and therefore to ask, If from matter and motion, 
 progressively, and step by step, each deducible by 
 natural law from the preceding, all things and all 
 states of things have proceeded, whence were matter 
 and motion? 
 
 II. 
 
 Remarking, and registering the important fact, 
 tc?]?Sbic that no answer is attempted to be given to this 
 inquiry, or none sufiiciently plausible to be adopted 
 or countenanced by any eminent physicist, and that 
 therefore nothing has been proposed which can 
 supply the place of an intelligent personal Being as 
 the Creator of the elements of existence, we pro- 
 ceed to the consideration of the system of modern 
 
 reply. 
 
Modern Materialism. 15 
 
 Materialism, as propounded by its latest and boldest 
 professors, and interpreted by various physiologists 
 among us, who, without admitting its extravagant 
 assumptions, accept it as the basis of the theory of 
 the construction of all things by development and 
 evolution. 
 
 Pure Materialism resolves all Being into matte)' creed of 
 and force, denying the fact or possibility of the materialism. 
 existence of aught that is not material. Its 
 maxims are : 
 
 '* No matter without force, and no force without matter ; 
 matter and force are inseparable, eternal and indestructible ; 
 there can be no independent force, since all force is an inherent 
 and necessary property of matter, consequently there can be no 
 immaterial creating power ; inorganic and organic forms are 
 results of different accidental combinations of matter ; life is a 
 particular combination of matter taking place under favourable 
 ch'cumstances ; thought is a movement of matter ; the soul is 
 a function of material organisation. " 
 
 Such a system, it is obvious, is essentially atheistic : J^e^Ji^i^ 
 it excludes God from the universe. To those who ^^^^^'^- 
 receive it, the idea not only of the action but of 
 the existence of a purely spiritual Being, infinite 
 and omnipotent, is impossible : equally so the im- 
 materiality and immortality of the human soul. 
 
 One of the first physiologists of the age, Pro- ^^^^^f^i^^n? 
 fessor Huxley, in a remarkable treatise on the uJ[ey!'^'^' 
 "Physical Basis of Life," published in the Fort- 
 nightly Review for February, 1869, asserts that 
 
 " the materialistic position, that there is nothing in the world 
 but matter, force, and necessity, is as utterly devoid of justi- 
 fication as the most baseless of theological dogmas." 
 
16 
 
 Modern Materialism. 
 
 But not in 
 
 its pre- 
 misses. 
 
 But, althougli he tlius pronounces against the 
 ultimate conclusions of materialism, regarding 
 tliem as unscientific, unphilosophical, and, indeed, 
 immoral, he assents to some of its most important 
 and most startling propositions, those, in fact, from 
 which its advocates, and others beside them, think 
 that the conclusions which he considers unjustifiable 
 must necessarily and immediately follow. He 
 believes, and produces his reasons for believing, 
 that all vital action, or life, is the result of the 
 molecular forces of the elementary living substance, 
 acting in a manner purely mechanical 
 
 ** the product of a certain disposition of material molecules ; " 
 
 and he thinks it an inevitable deduction from this 
 statement, that 
 
 The 
 
 propositi 01-3 
 which he 
 accepts. 
 
 He admits 
 that their 
 tonus are 
 materialistic. 
 
 What h-s 
 reason lor 
 this 
 
 admission 
 iiiiplies. 
 
 "thought is the expression of molecular change in that matter 
 of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena." 
 
 He admits that the terms of these propositions 
 are distinctly materialistic, and contends for the 
 employment of materialistic terminology in the 
 investigation of the order of nature, alleging, as 
 a special and indeed the principal reason for his 
 demand, that this terminology connects thought 
 with the other phenomena of the universe. This 
 reason implies that all the other phenomena of the 
 universe are material, and that thought cannot be 
 conceived of as connected with them unless it be 
 conceived of as material assumptions by no means 
 allowable as axioms in the outset of this inquiry. 
 
Modern Materialism. 17 
 
 There can be no better preparation for the dis- 
 cussion of the principles of materialism than a 
 summary exhibition of the train of observations 
 by which Professor Huxley brings us face to face 
 with the great problem of the origin of life. The 
 following will be found a fair representation of his 
 statements. 
 
 All living substances, from the lowest to the nuxieya 
 highest, possess a unity of faculty or power ; all 
 exercise the functions of feeding, moving, growth, 
 and reproduction. They all possess a unity of 
 form. They are all composed of corpuscles, or 
 structural units, fundamentally of the same cha- 
 racter, to which the name of protoplasm or " first 
 formation," has been given. He instances the 
 human being and the nettle. A nucleated mass of 
 protoplasm is the structural unit of the human Protopiasci. 
 body ; and the human body in its perfect condition 
 is a multiple of such units, variously modified. 
 The nettle arises, as the man does, in a particle of 
 nucleated protoplasm ; and similarly the whole 
 substance of the nettle is made up of a repetition 
 of such masses. 
 
 But there exist innumerable living creatures 
 which are each a single particle of protoplasm ; 
 each being nothing more than a unit of living 
 substance, yet having an independent existence. 
 And these, and all things that live, are composed 
 of the same material elements carbon, hydrogen, 
 
 
 
18 Modern Materialism, 
 
 The material oxvgen, aiid nitrogen. These, in various combina- 
 
 elements of , . . . 
 
 gi living tions, produce carbonic acid, water, and ammonia, 
 wbicb compounds, under certain conditions, give 
 
 ^^! rise to tlie complex body, protoplasm, tlie basis of 
 
 life. These elementary substances are themselves 
 lifeless ; and in their combination they can only 
 
 dJrive^Se ^^rm a living substance when appropriated and 
 
 sub?tanc^e? acted upon by a living substance already existing. 
 !N^or can every living substance so employ them im- 
 mediately. Plants alone can do this. The animal 
 depends for protoplasm upon the already formed 
 protoplasm of the vegetable, whereas vegetable 
 matter converts carbonic acid, water, and ammonia 
 immediately into protoplasm. It must, however, 
 be living vegetable matter. Without the agency 
 of pre-existing living protoplasm these substances 
 cannot form the matter of actual life. 
 
 Central pro- "VYc have now arrived at a fact upon which it 
 
 position. . - . 
 
 IS desirable to pause, and which should be kept 
 steadily in mind, for it is a cardinal fact in this 
 inquiry. The material elements of which every 
 living substance is composed cannot of themselves 
 combine into a living compound. Life must act 
 upon them before they can contribute to life. 
 Vital action There must be vital action employed upon the 
 
 necessary to ,.. i -i 
 
 the produc- hf elcss substauccs necessary to life m order that m 
 
 tion of life. ^ ^ ^ ' 
 
 their combination they may form a living sub- 
 stance. Life can only come from life. This looks 
 very much like a scientifically ascertained ncccs- 
 
Modern Materialism, 19 
 
 sity for an original infusion of life into matter by 
 a separate act of creation. The well-known ex- 
 periments of Professor Tyndal], which have dis- Tyndau. 
 proved the alleged fact of spontaneous generation, 
 powerfully support this conclusion. 
 
 But both these physiologists, in their zeal for unwarrant- 
 the construction of a continuous chain of material conclusion. 
 agency, without proof, and contrary to proof, 
 deduce from the fact that a combination of carbon, 
 hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen is necessary to 
 life, the wholly " ultra- experimental conception,'* 
 as Professor Tyndall himself calls it, that life is 
 the immediate resultant of the properties of these 
 elementary substances, the product of a certain 
 disposition of material molecules, and all vital 
 action the result of the molecular forces of the 
 protoplasm which displays it. And if this be 
 conceded, there is drawn from it the conclusion that 
 thought is the expression of molecular change in 
 that matter of life which is the source of our other 
 vital phenomena. 
 
 To ordinary, perhaps also to logical minds, it inevitaWa 
 will appear, that from this conclusion, by an 
 almost immediate deduction, we derive the doctrine 
 of the most advanced materialists, viz., that the 
 thinkiDg substance, the soul, is a material organisa- 
 tion, its attributes and powers merely properties 
 of matter, results of a certain aggregation and 
 arrangement of its molecules. 
 
20 
 
 Modern Materialism, 
 
 Disclaimed 
 by Iluxley, 
 
 Ontlio 
 ground of 
 our ignor- 
 ance. 
 
 WMcli 
 ought to 
 have pre- 
 vented hia 
 coiicluflion. 
 
 Let it not bo supposed that Professor Iluxley 
 is chargeable with maintaining this doctrine. In 
 repudiating materialism, and asserting that he is 
 "individually no materialist," he must bo under- 
 stood to reject it. 
 
 He promises in his Essay to point out " the only 
 path " by which, in his judgment, extrication from 
 what he truly calls " the materialistic slough " of 
 the conclusion to which he has conducted us is 
 possible. On examination, it is found that the 
 relief and refuge from materialism which he offers 
 consists in acquiescence in our total ignorance of 
 cause and effect, and of the nature of matter 
 and spirit, which, he says, are but names for 
 the imaginary substrata of groups of natural 
 phenomena. 
 
 The point at which he interposes a check in 
 the descent through materialistic interpretation of 
 vital and mental phenomena to absolute material- 
 ism is somewhat arbitrarily chosen. He draws the 
 line between the materialism of the process of 
 thought, which he allows, and the materialism of 
 the thinking substance, which he is not prepared 
 to allow. Ignorance of the nature of causation 
 and of matter and spirit, is held to be a sufficient 
 obstacle to further progress. He might have 
 applied this principle earHer, for he had occasion 
 for it. In the course of his previous investigation 
 he had arrived at a term where, in tho words ol 
 
Modern Materialism. 21 
 
 Mr. Disraeli, he had " met the insoluble." His 
 continuous straight line of reasoning had ended in 
 a circle. He had discovered the material elements 
 of life, hut he had discovered also that they do not 
 of themselves produce life, and that life is necessary 
 to render them vital. But he would not accept the 
 position. JN'ot content at that point to pause before 
 the absolutely unknown, he endeavoured to bridge 
 over the void with a conjecture. The confessedly 
 unintelligible influence by which the matter of life 
 is made to live, is assumed to be something which 
 has a representative or correlative in the lifeless 
 elements of which it is composed ; that is to say, Husicy's 
 
 assumption 
 
 it is supposed to be a strictly material asrencv, a- ^}^^ ^^'^^- 
 
 ^ -^ *' o .; ' sistency. 
 
 result of the yet undiscovered and perhaps undis- 
 coverable properties of certain dead matter. 
 
 And this assumption is necessary in order to 
 proceed to the next proposition, that thousrht, His next 
 
 * ^ . o ' proposition 
 
 mental feeling, and will, are the expression of J-fa^sum^ 
 molecular changes in the matter of life, originating, *^^" 
 as life itself is supposed to originate, in the pro- 
 perties and arrangements of its elementary particles. 
 So that, if he had acted consistentlv with his former 
 course by following only experience and observa- 
 tion, and with his consequent course, by stopping 
 short at the great blank created by our ignorance 
 of matter and causation, he could not have ad- 
 vanced so near to the materialistic doctrine of the 
 origin of life or the nature of thought. 
 
22 Modern Materialism. 
 
 The Kor can any fail to notice the formidable advan- 
 
 advantage 
 
 consisten"c ^^^^ givon to tlio advocates of absolute materialism 
 by this inconsistency. When once we have 
 arrived at the position that thought is a result of 
 the properties of matter, the inference that the 
 thinking substance, the soul, is material, seems 
 direct and immediate. We are not, however, 
 justified, according to Professor Huxley, in making 
 this inference, because of our ignorance of matter 
 and causation. But in forming the previous con- 
 clusion that all vital phenomena, including thought, 
 are results of elementary properties of matter, he 
 takes no account of this ignorance, although it is 
 plainly suggested by the difficulty which he has 
 acknowledged. 
 
 The materialist may fairly demand that if oui 
 ignorance presents no obstacle to the acceptance of 
 the grand and general proposition it shall not be 
 alleged as a sufficient reason for the rejection of 
 one of its corollaries. He may say to the Pro- 
 fessor, 
 
 The _ "If you believe that Kfe is tlie result of the interaction, 
 
 rejoinder!' ^'^ meclianical, cliemical, or electric, of lifeless material elements, 
 although you have no proof that such interaction ever produced 
 life, or can take place without a living agency, why should you 
 not believe that thought, the chief activity of life, which you 
 say is the expression of molecular changes in the matter of life, 
 is tlie action of a purely material substance, although you 
 cannot trace the relation between cause and effect, or between 
 the material and spiritual?" 
 
 It is, however, certain that our ignorance of 
 
Modern Materialism. 23 
 
 matter, which the Professor fully recognises, and 
 to which, in fact, in the interest of materialism, 
 he makes appeal, involves a principle which must principle 
 
 .-,..., t> !( involved in 
 
 entirely mvalidate the materialistic theory oi lite, tiie acknow- 
 
 ' "^ ledgment of 
 
 thought, and spiritual heing, and which suggests ignorance. 
 encouragement and consolation to those that main- 
 tain the old instinctive belief that mind is different 
 from matter, and that mind and m-atter are due to 
 that which is neither matter, nor force, nor law, 
 nor necessity. 
 
 If we attempt to reduce all existence to a 
 material origin, we shall arrive at a conclusion 
 which overthrows the foundation of materialism, 
 and substitutes its very opposite absolute idealism Materialism 
 
 . , supplanted 
 
 m its room. Fixing our attention upon that by idealism. 
 inseparable compound without which, according to ^^ /- 
 the materialistic theory, there can be nothing, and 
 besides and beyond which there is nothing matter 
 and- force we observe that every particle of matter 
 is matter because it possesses the attributes of 
 extension, impenetrability, and mobility. Of these 
 attributes the two latter are due to force, or are 
 exhibitions of force. Pure matter, then, becomes 
 mere extension endued with force. But if it be 
 admitted that all that is essential to matter is ex- 
 tension, then every particle of matter is nothing 
 but a portion of space. And so the idea of matter 
 vanishes entirely. Or if it be said that matter is 
 the unknown subject of which extension, impeno- 
 
24 
 
 Modern Materialism, 
 
 trability, and mobility are the attributes, then, 
 since tbese attributes alone give us our perception 
 and conception of matter as such, the subject 
 underlying them, whatever it is, is not matter, but 
 an inconceivable and necessarily immaterial prin- 
 ciple of being. 
 
 M. Paul Janet with great clearness demonstrates 
 the necessity and exhibits the significance of this 
 conclusion : 
 
 Paul Janet 
 on the 
 sisnificance 
 of this 
 couclusion. 
 
 Le Mat^'iial- 
 isme Coii- 
 temporaire 
 en AUe- 
 magne, 
 chap. iv. 
 
 " If I am told," he says, "that the molecule itself is not the 
 ultimate element of matter, that beyond the molecule there is 
 a something, and that this something is absolute and in- 
 dependent, I reply that this is very possible, but that in this 
 case we give up what I call materialism for another hypothesis 
 which is not here in question. The molecule is the ultimate 
 representative of matter that is possible or conceivable : what- 
 ever is beyond is some other thing ; it is no longer matter, but 
 another principle which is conceivable by abstract thought alone, 
 and which we may call idea, substance, force, as we please, but 
 no longer matter. Matter is that which is presented to me by 
 the senses ; that which is beyond and out of the range of my 
 senses and immediate experience, is not matter. In what I call 
 a body I can easily, it is true, resolve certain qualities into other 
 qualities ; secondary qualities into primary ; smell, taste, colour, 
 into form and motion ; but, as long as there remains anything 
 of which I have a perception, it is still a body, and when I say 
 that everything is body and matter I mean that everything is 
 reducible to elements more or less similar to those which are 
 perceived by my senses. But if in what I perceive by my senses 
 everything is phenomenal, everything is mere appearance, if the 
 basis of the object of sense is absolutely different from the 
 object itself, I say that this object of sense which I call matter 
 is relative only, and reduced to a superior principle, the power 
 and value of which I can no longer estimate by means of my 
 senses. Matter then vanishes in a principle superior to itself, 
 end materialism abdicates in favour of idealism. " 
 
 This conclusion is not urp-ed in the interest of 
 
Modern Materialismfi. 25 
 
 idealism, for the purpose of proving tliat matter The 
 has no existence. On the contrary, the reason- not urged 
 
 in the 
 
 ine: by which materialism is thus reduced to a interest of 
 
 o J idealism. 
 
 contradiction of itself is founded upon the evidence 
 of the senses, which report to us the existence of 
 something presented to them, and not resulting 
 from them, our perception of which as so attained, 
 satisfies us that what we perceive is an objective The 
 
 Trt t 1 -!- 1 rcasoninj? 
 
 reality different from ourselves. But what we m- founded in 
 
 '' the evidence 
 
 sist upon is that we are compelled to believe, even of ti^e senses, 
 by following out materialistic principles and pre- 
 misses, that matter has a dependent and derived Matter 
 existence, and that that from which it is de- and derived. 
 rived, and upon which its reality depends, is not 
 matter. "We need not argue the case of force. 
 All materialists agree in denying its independ- 
 ence, and assert that there can be no force with- 
 out matter, as no matter without force. Force, 
 therefore, like matter, is dependent and derived ; 
 it originates in that which is not force. There Soisforco 
 is no mechanical basis of force, as there is no 
 material basis of matter. 
 
 If, then, materialism is incapable of explain- Application 
 ing matter itself, we may reasonably conclude with pundpie of 
 M. Janet that 
 
 "a fortiori it cannot explain the two still greater mysteries 
 presented by nature that is to say, life and thought." 
 
 The doctrine that the existence and properties of 
 matter supply all that is necessary for the develop- 
 
 ignorance. 
 
26 
 
 Modern Materialism. 
 
 Ex-aminstion 
 ot the 
 
 constitution 
 of matter, 
 loads to 
 the same 
 result. 
 
 Molescliott 
 
 rjid 
 
 Liichner. 
 
 ment of life and thought is no longer tenable when 
 we find that something beside and essentially dif- 
 ferent from matter is necessary to its existence. 
 
 The same result will be found to follow from 
 the consideration of the elementary constitution of 
 matter; and equally whether we acknowledge its 
 infinite divisibility, or adopt the hypothesis, so use- 
 ful for practical purposes, of the indivisibility of its 
 ultimate particles or atoms. 
 
 The most advanced school of materialism, repre- 
 sented by the German writers, Moleschott and 
 BUchner, rejects the atomic theory almost uni- 
 versally adopted by modern physiologists, and 
 maintains that every particle of matter is in reality, 
 as in conception, divisible. It is, therefore, a com- 
 pound, and every compound has necessarily a re- 
 lative and dependent existence. Its existence de- 
 pends upon that of its constituent parts. But each 
 of these is also a compound ; and so on in infinite 
 scries. "Whatever, therefore, may be the final abso- 
 lute condition of the existence of matter, it is plain 
 that-it cannot be material, since whatever is material 
 must be relative and dependent. And so with 
 regard to force. The force of every particle is the 
 resultant of the forces of its constituent particles ; 
 an absolute force, one, that is, not resolvable into 
 component forces, being nowhere to be found. 
 Therefore the existence of force depends ultimately 
 upon something which is not force. 
 
Modern Materialism. 27 
 
 Dal ton's great discovery of definite proportions Daiton. 
 demonstrates, in tlie opinion of most men of science, 
 tlio existence of ultimate indivisible particles of 
 matter. Every molecule, or elementary constituent 
 of any kind of matter is, on his theory, an aggregate 
 of smaller parts called atoms, which are severally 
 uncompounded, and, as their name imports, indi- 
 visible. But by their indivisibility n:.us^ be meant .^'^)^.t.,., 
 
 ' '' indivisibility 
 
 not that they are actually without parts, but that ^^ Particles. 
 their parts are inseparable one from another ; not 
 that they are essentially and absolutely indivisible, 
 but that such is the constitution of nature that 
 they are never divided. 
 
 For atoms are of different weie-hts : the weiorht Atoms are 
 
 ^ ofdiflterciit 
 
 of an atom of oxygen is eight times that of an atom 'n^eights. 
 of hydrogen ; and the weight of a body is dependent 
 upon its mass ; we cannot then avoid the conclusion 
 that an atom of oxygen contains eight times as 
 much matter as an atom of hydrogen, that its eighth 
 part is as heavy as an atom of hydrogen, and 
 that therefore it has parts. Atoms are also, as 
 Professor Tyndall says, 
 
 ** probably of diflferent sizes; at all events it is almost certain Qj^g^j^^fcaf 
 that the ratio of the mass of the atom to the surface it presents Rays in the 
 to the action of the waves of light is different i.i different cases." ;^em'e" ^ 
 
 If an atom has a surface extended over more space 
 than the surface of another atom, there must be 
 points on that surface distant from each other ; and, 
 therefore, by the action of a sufficient povrer, gucj 
 
 February, 
 1809. 
 
28 Modern Materialism. 
 
 An atom is an atom would be divisible. An atom, tlien, is, like 
 
 I compound, 
 
 a molecule, an aggregate, a compound consisting 
 
 perhaps, of perfectly homogeneous parts, but still 
 
 having parts, and these also having parts, and so 
 
 ?omYt^^as ^^ without limit. Consequently, the existence of 
 
 matter i?^* the atom is relative and dependent; and therefore 
 
 -S.^derh4a. the atomic theory fails to establish the independent 
 
 and absolute existence of matter. 
 
 If it be said that the terms weight and surface 
 are not to be understood when applied to the ultimate 
 elements of matter, in the same sense as when applied 
 to its particles appreciable by the senses, we repeat 
 the remark of M. Janet, that then we are dealing 
 with somethiDg totally different from what we know 
 or conceive as matter, an unknown something, a 
 principle which, whatever it may be, is certainly 
 not material. 
 The atomic There are other considerations arisina^ out of the 
 
 theory "-" 
 
 sipremo ^tomic theory which are worthy of some attention. 
 
 ^^ If the ultimate elements of all substances are 
 
 particles which, although not essentially indivisible 
 since they are aggregates consisting of parts, are 
 yet actually, and as a matter of fact, uniformly 
 indivisible, such an arrangement cannot be con- 
 ceived of as necessary, but must be conceived of as 
 arbitrary. It amounts to a contradiction in terms 
 to say that non-essential indivisibility depends upon 
 necessity ; it must depend upon will. 
 
 Again, if the constituent atoms of a molecule are 
 
Modern Materialism. 29 
 
 practically and actually indivisible, thougli they are Proof of a 
 composite, and this indivisibility is a condition of ^jJ^\^^^*J y^ 
 the constitution of nature, and since, therefore, ^^^^'^ 
 nature would not be nature if any conceivable force 
 existing in nature, could sever the atom into its 
 parts, it follows that there is no conceivable force 
 existing in nature which could condense those parts 
 into their present inseparable state, and which can 
 maintain them in it. If there is no possibihty in 
 nature, as it is, for the one, there is no possibility 
 in nature, as it is, for the other. Ilence the actual 
 indivisibility of these particles is due to something 
 which is not nature, nor in nature, something be- 
 yond and different from everything which we ex- 
 perience or conceive of as force. This is a power 
 of which matter and force may be creations, but 
 of which they are certainly not representatives, and 
 with which they have no conceivable affinity. 
 
 It appears, then, that our ignorance of matter ^^H^l^^^^ 
 and force, pleaded by Professor Huxley in defence origiiVtedt 
 of the materialistic theory of life and thought, when 
 pursued into its darkest recesses, renders necessary 
 tlio conclusion that matter and force do not originate 
 in anything which is of their own nature, and that 
 therefore their continued existence and action do 
 not depend upon ultimate elements which are 
 material and mechanical. 
 
 But the fundamental difficulty of materialism 
 arising from our ignoranco of matter occurs not for 
 
'60 Modern Materialism 
 
 Tiiefundti- the first time at the last stas^e of the inquiry into 
 
 mental . . ^ "^ 
 
 difficulty of the basis of all ohiects of sense. It was encoun- 
 
 materialism "^ 
 
 occurYorthc ^c^'^d, as WO liavG seen, in the attempt to trace to 
 
 tiif]astSa% its origin the connection of life with matter. For 
 
 c m^iury. ^^]^g^ -^ ^^g ascertained that the material consti- 
 
 tuents of living substances cannot, by mere com- 
 bination and interaction, produce life, but that life 
 in its lowest forms depends upon previously existing 
 life, it was already time to acknowledge the in- 
 competency of matter and force to account for the 
 phenomena of life, and to recognize the presence 
 and the power of an element of life which is cer- 
 tainly not material. The result arrived at by sub- 
 sequent investigation, viz., that matter and force 
 do not contain in themselves the principle of their 
 own existence, but that they also depend upon 
 something that is beyond them and not of them, is 
 more than an analogy to this conclusion, it is essen- 
 tially connected with it ; and it is impossible to 
 evade its significance as to the immaterial origin 
 both of life and matter. 
 
 III. 
 
 Lr.w3 cf Let us pass now from the constitution of matter 
 
 uature. ^ 
 
 to the consideration of what are called " laws of 
 nature," or, by the more advanced materialists, 
 "necessity/* names given to conditions under 
 which the properties of matter act, and have come 
 
Modern Materialism. 31 
 
 into action, so as to produce the phenomena of the Require- 
 
 , . TT imits for 
 
 universe. Given matter and force, space and tilne, g^^^^[J,"^ ^^ 
 then, according to the materialistic philosophy, IZor^iu^t'i 
 nothing more is required to construct a world. 
 The molecules of matter, under the impulse of 
 molecular force, must so act hy the operation of 
 law or necessity as to originate combinations, the 
 results of which through a series of developme nts 
 are all existing forms. All that is needed is 
 sufficient time for the process, and of that, in a 
 past eternity during which matter has been in 
 existence, there is of course an unlimited supply. 
 
 But it is here, in the first conditions for the K-itoaaiism 
 
 ' suffers 
 
 operation of law, that materialism suffers ship- tKrs?^*^ 
 wreck, as before, in the first conditions for the forthe^ 
 existence of matter or force. Supposinsr, for matter or 
 
 ^^ .^ force. 
 
 example, the matter of which our system is com- 
 posed to have been, in its normal state, an ex- 
 tremely diffuse nebulosity, a mass of incandescent 
 vapour or gas (a hypothesis by no means exclusively 
 materialistic, though accepted by every materialist), 
 the commencement of the present order of things 
 must have been the formation of a central nucleus, 
 and its acquisition of a rotatory movement. 
 
 Let us date as far back as we please the tran- ^nlSntea 
 sition from the normal state of uniform or irregular opeStiSTof 
 diffusion to this incipience of organisation, no ^*^' 
 reason can be assigned by the materialist why this 
 transition had not occurred any number of ages 
 
32 
 
 Modern Materialism. 
 
 Materialism 
 can j^ive no 
 reason why 
 our system 
 did not 
 arrive at its 
 present 
 condition at 
 an earliei" 
 period. 
 
 previously. It has taken from that point of time 
 to this to hring the matter composing our system 
 into its present condition. Materialism can give 
 no reason why it had not arrived at its present 
 condition by the time whence we date the com- 
 mencement of the process of which the present 
 condition is the result. There are discovered by 
 the telescope numerous masses of nebulous matter, 
 some apparently in the entirely diffused state, 
 some possessing nuclei already formed, all probably 
 destined to become systems like our own suns, 
 planets, and satellites, worlds of organised and 
 inorganic substances. Now, the matter of which 
 they are composed, like that of our system, has, 
 according to the materialist, been in existence 
 from eternity, and the laws of nature are equally 
 eternal. What has retarded the formation of 
 these masses into systems ? What has determined 
 their various stages of progression ? and what is 
 to account for the advanced state of the solar 
 system ? 
 
 It cannot be said that the operation of law 
 which produced the initial nucleus or initial 
 rotation in any case, was a necessary result of a 
 previous series of operations or developments, ex- 
 tending backwards into a past eternity; for this 
 would apply to all matter alike, all being eternal, 
 and subject to the same eternal laws; and there- 
 fore every mass of matter would be at any period 
 
Modem Materialism, 33 
 
 in the same stage and condition. There would be 
 no reason, from the operation of fixed and necessary- 
 laws, for the commencement of one system which 
 would not be equally valid for the commencement 
 of every other at the same time. 
 
 Chance, the old Epicurean doctrine of the for- 2^"^^ 
 tuitous concourse of atoms, is, with apparent creatSi^'^ 
 seriousness, relied upon by some men of science, 
 even in the present day, as sufficient to account 
 for the origination of a system of worlds. But 
 what is chance ? What action or movement can 
 exist, or be imagined, which is not in sequence to 
 some previous action or movement, and in some 
 relation to it which could be represented by what 
 we call a law ? And so we are thrown back upon J^g^ity of 
 the difficulty offered by the eternal existence and e^stence*^ 
 operation of law. But, adopting the mathematical SonofTaw. 
 notion of chance, that is, probability, let us say 
 that certain combinations of circumstances in the 
 relations among the particles of matter are required 
 for the production of the nucleus of a system of 
 worlds, and that there is a certain amount of 
 probability of their occurrence. One such com- 
 bination has resulted in the production of the 
 nucleus of our system. But the conditions necessary why were 
 
 *' *' not existing 
 
 to, and occasioning its occurrence, at any date, oJfgJ^teT' 
 cannot fail to have existed repeatedly in the SirUeri 
 eternal past antecedently to that date. The exist- 
 ence of so many millions of systems each, upon 
 D 
 
34 Modern Materialism. 
 
 the chance hypothesis, due to such a fortuitous 
 combination, corroborates the conclusion arrived 
 at by abstract reasoning, that, in the case of every 
 separate mass of matter, the formation of which 
 into a system commenced at any definite period, 
 the probabilities were immensely in favour of the 
 commencement of the process many times over 
 before that period. Whenever it bef^an, it ousrht 
 
 The doctrine tip t p i i 
 
 of the to have bearun before. In fact, the doctrme of 
 
 eternity of '-^ 
 
 matter fatal i\^q eternity of matter is fatal to the doctrine of 
 
 evoiSn':' evolution.! 
 
 That combinations and developments of matter 
 may begin at different perbds, and may be in 
 different stages, is only possible and conceivable on 
 the supposition that the different masses of matter 
 in which they take place came into existence at 
 different periods. They must have had each a 
 normal condition, and that at different times. The 
 normal condition of the more advanced must have 
 preceded that of the less advanced by the number 
 of ages necessary to bring the latter into the 
 present condition of the former. And a normal 
 condition is necessarily, by its definition, the 
 primary condition of existence, that which had no 
 predecessor from which it was evolved, that before 
 which was nothing. 
 
 These considerations lead us to the conclusion 
 
 ' i.e. Godless evolutiou evolution supposed to be directed by iat? 
 without will. 
 
Modern Mat&riatisiri, " ^^^ ^v *' 35 
 
 ' ^ ^ '^:^:^U7o^o^;^ 
 
 that the operation of law in the constructicmrof'tne The system 
 
 of nature 
 
 system of nature depends upon somethms^ which is depends on 
 
 ^ r Jr o something 
 
 not law ; that the operation of chance to the same J^^^ ^^ ^"^ 
 eifect, supposing it to be distinguishable from that 
 oi law, requires conditions which are independent 
 of chance. Matter and force we found could not 
 exist except by the agency of something which is 
 not matter or force. And now we find that some- 
 thing which is not law must determine action ac- 
 cording to law, and something which is not chance 
 must limit the range of probabilities. In a word, we are shut 
 
 ^ ' # 1 T up to the 
 
 we are shut up to the necessity of believing m a necessity of 
 
 - ' *-* _ behevmgin 
 
 creative power, and a determining and directing 
 will, that is, an immaterial, conscious, intelligent, 
 personal Being, the Author and Designer of nature 
 an omnipotent and omniscient God. 
 
 a creative 
 power. 
 
 materialism. 
 
 lY. 
 
 Upon the materialistic theory, consciousness, in- J^^^J,^^^^ 
 telligence, thought, and moral sense, are but the 
 highest developments of the faculty by which th^ 
 lichen draws nutriment from the air or the rock. 
 The conscious, intelligent, thinking, moral being is 
 as much a material substance as the lichen. Its 
 intellectuality is due to the organisation to which 
 it has attained, that is, to a certain combination of 
 its material elements, and the forces with which 
 they are endowed. Consequently, when, in each 
 
36 
 
 Modern Materialism, 
 
 Materialism 
 renders 
 immortaKty 
 inconceiv- 
 able. 
 
 particular instance or product, the organisation 
 ceases to act, and the combination is dissolved, the 
 result of the organisation and combination, that 
 is, the separate individual intelligence what we 
 call mind or soul vanishes entirely. So that 
 materialism necessarily denies the immortality of 
 the soul ; in fact, renders it inconceivable. 
 
 The evolutionist, who refuses to be bound by the 
 materialistic conditions of evolution, may perhaps 
 maintain that the human being has attained to 
 immortality by a process of development, as it has 
 attained to a life of consciousness, thought, and 
 moral feeling.^ But we are immediately arrested 
 by a difficulty which inevitably arises out of the 
 notion of such a development. It is essential to 
 the very fact of development that the highest con- 
 dition attained should be but a step from one next 
 below it, should indeed be evolved from it. What 
 is the condition of limited existence next lower than 
 immortality ? It is as impossible for such a con- 
 
 Evolution of 
 immortal 
 being 
 impossible. 
 
 Evolution 
 must 
 
 proceed step 
 by step. 
 
 ' Sir C. Lyell in his Antiquity of Man, chap, xxiv., as quoted 
 by Professor Mozley in his Bampton Lectures (on Miracles) Lect. 
 iii. note 3, says : *' If, in conformity with the theory of progression, 
 we believe mankind to have risen slowly from a rude and humble 
 starting-point, such leaps (in intelligence) may have successively 
 introduced not only higher and higher forms and grades of intellect, 
 but at a much remoter period may have cleared at one bound the 
 space which separated the highest stage of the unprogressive intelli- 
 gence of the inferior animals from the first and lowest form of im- 
 proveable reason manifested by man." But, as the Professor truly 
 remarks, " such a leap is only another word for an inexplicable 
 mystery. Sxich a change cuts asunder the identity of the being 
 which precedes it and the being which succeeds it." 
 
Modern Materialism. 87 
 
 dition to exist as for a number to be found next 
 less than infinity. Personal immortality, therefore, 
 must be as entirely a separate independent creation, 
 or endowment, as we have ascertained life itself 
 in its origin to have been. 
 
 Eminent materialists of the last generation ac- S^ctriJi?of^ 
 cepted the doctrine of Cabanis, that thought is a *^"sw. 
 secretion of the brain, just as bile is a secretion of ^^^^^^ / 
 the liver. But modern materialism rejects this 
 doctrine, and affirms that thought is not matter 
 which the brain produces, but the very action of 
 the brain itself. It is described as the resultant of 
 forces that exist in the brain, or, according to 
 Moieschott, "thought is a movement of matter." opMo^ 
 If so, then thought is the action of the molecules 
 which compose the brain of the ultimate atoms 
 which are the constituents of these molecules. 
 And this action, whether originating in the mutual Brain action, 
 attraction and repulsion of those atoms, or in a 
 material impulse communicated from without, must 
 be regulated by the ordinary laws of motion. And 
 if thought is the motion of certain molecules, this 
 motion must, as such, determine the character and 
 quality of thought, and be mechanically appro- 
 priate to its various applications. The character 
 and quality of thought must, therefore, depend 
 upon the magnitude and direction of molecular 
 force, and vary according to the form of its line of 
 action. This inference is inevitable ; Given that inference. 
 
38 Modem Materialism, 
 
 tlie thinMng substance is material, that thinking is 
 the movement of its particles, that every thought 
 is the resultant of forces acting upon those par- 
 ticles, then every thought must have a particular 
 intensity of mechanical force, and a particular 
 direction in space, and there is nothing to distin- 
 guish it from, another thought except the difference 
 in intensity and direction. 
 iiGsuitg of The laws which regulate rectilinear and curvi- 
 
 txu8 doctrine. ^ ^ 
 
 linear motion must therefore be the laws which 
 regulate thought. And thoughts will be right or 
 wrong, true or false, good or bad, according to their 
 direction in space, and the linear form in which 
 they move circular, elliptical, or parabolical, or 
 any of the endless variety of curves. Hence the 
 treatises with which mathematical students are 
 familiar on the dynamics of a single particle may 
 be expected to have an important bearing upon 
 mental science when established upon materialistic 
 principles. The formulse of these treatises must 
 necessarily express, if we could but interpret them, 
 laws or conditions of thought. 
 r)ipcjaimcd It is possiblo that those who have adopted the 
 materialistic creed, " There is nothing but matter, 
 force, and necessity," may accept these conclusions. 
 It is obvious that they must, if they would claim 
 credit for simple consistency. For, according to 
 this creed, all action of mind must be action of 
 matter, and there can be no laws of mind which 
 
Modern Materialism. 39 
 
 are not laws of matter, and therefore all the known 
 laws of matter must act upon mind, and produce 
 its phenomena. Professor Huxley rejects and re- 
 probates this creed. He will not tell us that mind 
 is matter, or that thought is nothing hut a move- 
 ment of matter, or that tha soul is material. But 
 if we understand him aright, he would have us 
 pursue our psychological inquiries on the hypo- 
 thesis that these propositions are true. He says, 
 
 "With a view to the progress of science, the materialistic ter- But dis- 
 minology is in every way to be preferred ; " coStent!* 
 
 and again, 
 
 ** There can be but little doubt that the further science advances 
 the more extensively and consistently will all the phenomena 
 of nature be represented by materialistic formulae and symbols. " 
 
 "What is to he inferred from these statements but 
 that the investigations of mental science, the study 
 of the nature and attributes of mind, t)ught to be 
 conducted on strictly mechanical and mathematical 
 principles, and the world of thought considered as 
 subject to the same conditions of existence and 
 action as the material world? There needs not 
 the absurdity which, as we have just seen, is in- 
 volved in the necessary conclusions to which we 
 are brought by this demand, to convince the intel- 
 ligent, honest, and earnest thinker, unbiassed and 
 unembarrassed by theories, of its utterly imprac- 
 ticable character.^ 
 
 ' " All this show of philosophy is pure illusion. No mind that 
 is capable of considteut thought can bring the forms and phrtises 
 
1 
 
 40 
 
 Modem Materialism. 
 
 Atomic 
 theory 
 consistent 
 with theism. 
 
 t^udworth. 
 
 It would be unjust and unreasonable to assume 
 that all wbo maintain the atomic theory of the 
 constitution of the universe are absolute material- 
 ists, denying that there is any original and neces- 
 sary existence except that of matter and force. 
 On the contrary, there is reason to believe that 
 those very ancient physiologists who first broached 
 the doctrine of elementary atoms applied it only 
 to sensible substances, and fully admitted the 
 existence of incorporeal substances distinct from 
 matter, and principles of life and thought distinct 
 from the qualities and powers of matter. Dr. 
 Cud\North, the author of The Intellectual System 
 of the Universe, has investigated this subject with 
 profound learning, and affirms that he has 
 
 "made it evident that those atomical physiologers that were 
 before Democritus and Leucippus were all of them incorporealists, 
 joining theology and pneumatology, the doctrine of incorporeal 
 substance and a Deity with their atomical physiology." 
 
 lie also contends, with much force of reasoning, 
 
 of physical science into relationship with the processes, or the vary- 
 ing conditions of the mind. 
 
 " Mind and matter must each have its philosophy to itself. The 
 modes of reasoning proper to the one can only be delusive if carried 
 over to the other. That this is the fact might very safely be in- 
 ferred from what hitherto has been the issue, without an exception, 
 of the many ingenious theories propounded with the intention of 
 laying open the Avorld of mind by the help of chemistry, or any of 
 those sciences that are properly called physical. Every theory 
 resting upon this basis has presently gone off into some quackery 
 noised for a while among the uneducated, and soon forgotten." 
 Isaac Taylor, irorld of Mind, cviii. 
 
Modem Materialism. 41 
 
 from considerations similar to those whicli we have 
 alleged, that the 
 
 *' intrinsical constitution of this (the atoniical) physiology is Book I, 
 such that, whosoever entertains it, if he do but thoroughly un- ^ *^' ^' 
 derstand it, must of necessity acknowledge that there is some- 
 thing in the world beside body, " 
 
 The following is his summary of the opinions of nis 
 
 .,,.,. . summary of 
 
 the earlier and better atomical physiologists, opi- the opinions 
 nions which were very clearly his own, and which ^"o'LSca?^ 
 prove how thoroughly he understood the theories Physiologists. 
 of modern materialism, and the true reasons for 
 rejecting them : 
 
 ' * Our ancient atomists never went about, as the blundering 
 Democritus afterwards did, to build up a world out of mere 
 passive bulk and sluggish matter, without any active princii^lea 
 or incorporeal powers ; understanding well that thus they 
 could not have so much as motion, mechanism, or generation in 
 ; it ; the original of all that motion that is in bodies springing 
 from something that is not body, that is, from incorporeal 
 (immaterial) substance. And yet if local motion could have 
 been supposed to have risen up, or sprung in upon this dead 
 lump and mass of matter, nobody knows how, and, without 
 dependence upon any incorporeal being, to have actuated (acted 
 upon) it fortuitous!}^, these ancient atomists would still have 
 thought it impossible for the corporeal (material) world itself to 
 be made up, such as it now is, by fortuitous mechanism, without 
 the guidance of any higher principle. But they would have 
 concluded it the greatest impudence, or madness, to assert that 
 animals also consisted of mere mechanism, or that life and sense, 
 reason and understanding, were really nothing else but local 
 motion, and consequently that (they) themselves were but mere 
 machines and automata. Wherefore they joined both active 
 and passive principles together, the corporeal and incorporeal 
 nature, mechanism and life, atomology and pneumatology ; and 
 from both these united they made up one entire system of 
 philosophy correspondent with and agreeable to the true and 
 real world without them. And this system of philosophy, thus 
 
42 
 
 Modern Materialism. 
 
 Book I, 
 chap. i. 41. 
 
 Modem 
 materialism 
 not modern, 
 but 
 antiquated. 
 
 Ancient 
 theories 
 revived. 
 
 Cudworth's 
 strictures 
 
 consisting of the doctrine of incorporeal substance (whereof God 
 is the head) together with the atomical and mechanical 
 physiology seems to have been the only genuine perfect and 
 complete (system)." 
 
 His strictures, in a later part of tlie work, on the 
 most advanced school of materialists in his day, 
 are singularly applicable to the revived theories of 
 Democritus and Epicurus, which find so much 
 favour with some of our modern physicists, and 
 show that there is nothing in them new or originah 
 and that they have no claim to be received as the 
 results of the progress and discoveries of the science 
 of the nineteenth century : 
 
 " But as for that prodigious paradox of atheists, that cogitation 
 itself is nothing but local motion, or mechanism, we could not 
 have thought it possible that any man should have given en- 
 tertainment to such a conceit, but that this was rather a mere 
 slander raised upon atheists, were it not certain, from the 
 records of antiquity, that whereas the old religious atomists did, 
 upon good reason, reduce all corporeal action (as generation, 
 augmentation, and alteration) to local motion or translation fronk 
 place to place (there being no other motion beside this con- 
 ceivable in bodies), the ancient atheisers of that philosophy 
 (Leucippus and Democritus) not contented herewith, did really 
 carry on the business still further, so as to make cogitation 
 itself nothing but local motion. And it is also certain that a 
 modern atheistic pretender to wit,^ hath publicly owned the 
 same conclusion, that mind is nothing else hut local motion in the 
 organic parts of man's body. These men have been sometimes, 
 indeed, a little troubled with the fancy, apparition, or seeming, 
 of cogitation, that is, the consciousness of it, as knowing not 
 well what to make thereof, but then they put it off again, and 
 satisfy themselves worshipfully with this, that fancy is but 
 fancy, but the reality of cogitation nothing but local motion ; 
 as if there were not as much reality in fancy and consciousness 
 as there is in local motion. That which inclined these men so 
 
 * Hobbes. Physic. Chap. xxv. Levianthian Pt. 1, Chap. i. ii. 
 
Modern Materialism. 43 
 
 much to this opinion was only because they were sensible aiiu 
 aware of this, that if there were any other action besides local 
 motion admitted, there must needs be some other substance 
 acknowledged beside body. Cartesius (Descartes) indeed un- 
 dertook to defend (maintain) brute animals to be nothing else 
 but machines ; but then he supposed that there was nothing 
 at all of cogitation in them, and consequently nothing of true 
 animality or life, no more than is in an artificial automaton, as 
 a wooden eagle or the like ; nevertheless this was justly thought 
 to be paradox enough. But that cogitation itself should be 
 local motion, and men nothing but machines, this is such a 
 paradox as none but a stupid and besotted, or else an en- 
 thusiastic, bigotical or fanatic atheist could possibly give 
 entertainment to. Nor are such men as these fit to be disputed 
 with any more than a machine is." Chap. v. 
 
 Descartes above mentioned, the well-known Descartes. 
 French philosopher, perhaps the most eminent phi- 
 losopher of the seventeenth century, held that all 
 space was originally occupied by matter of a uniform 
 nature, divisible into innumerable parts, all in 
 motion ; and constructed a theory of the origin of 
 the universe from matter in motion, very similar to 
 that of Epicurus, or modern materialists. But he The 
 
 necessity of 
 
 freely acknowledged the necessity, not only of God's ^i 
 
 ^ J ' J origination 
 
 causing motion for the origination of the universe, sS-y^^onac 
 but of his conserving motion in it for its sustenta- byS^^^^ 
 tion. The hypothesis of the evolution of the 
 existing universe from matter in motion did not, 
 therefore, seem to him to exclude, but on the con- 
 trary, did seem to require, the existence and agency, 
 primary and constant, of a spiritual principle dis- 
 tinct from matter and motion. 
 
 Sir Isaac Newton was inclined to believe in the 
 
44 
 
 Modern Materialism. 
 
 Newtun 
 inclined to 
 bfeliove in 
 the atomic 
 constitution 
 of the 
 original 
 matter of 
 the universe. 
 
 Book IV. 
 p. 2G0. 
 
 His 
 
 language 
 
 almost 
 
 identical 
 
 with that of 
 
 Lucretius. 
 
 Book 1. 
 
 503-564. 
 
 The doctrine 
 not 
 
 necessarily 
 atheistic. 
 
 Newion 
 ascribes the 
 formation of 
 matter to 
 the act of 
 God. 
 
 atomic constitution of the original matter of the 
 universe. He wrote in his Optics 
 
 ' * It seems probable to me, that God in the beginning formed 
 matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles, 
 of such sizes and figures, and with such other properties, and in 
 such proportion to space, as most conduced to the end for which 
 He formed them ; and that these primitive particles, being 
 solids, are incomparably harder than any porous bodies com- 
 pounded of them, even so very hard as never to wear out or 
 break to pieces." 
 
 He also speaks of these particles of matter as 
 
 *' perhaps of different densities and forces." 
 
 This language is almost identical with that of 
 Lucretius, the chief exponent of the ancient ma- 
 terialistic and atheistic philosophy. But we are 
 quite sure that the doctrine which it expresses is 
 not necessarily connected with the materialism 
 which denies all primary existence except that 
 of matter and its movements, or with the atheism 
 avowed hy Lucretius, and implicitly taught hy the 
 modern professors of the Epicurean system. For 
 it was not connected with such materialism m the 
 mind of Newton, who, as we have seen, in a passage 
 before referred to, would not allow that matter 
 possessed any inherent capability of action, or that 
 by matter and its properties the phenomena of at- 
 traction, electricity, light, heat, sensation, and the 
 voluntary movements of animal bodies, could be 
 accounted for. Still less was it connected, in his 
 judgment, with atheism ; for, as in the passage last 
 
Modern Materialism, 45 
 
 quoted, lie ascribes the formation of matter to tlie 
 act of God, so elsewhere, repeatedly, in his most 
 scientific writings, he recognises the necessarily ex- 
 isting deity as the original cause and continual 
 support of all things that are, J^To mind was ever 
 so intimately and profoundly conversant as his with 
 the subject of matter and motion. The intellect 
 which grasped the idea of the primary force which 
 rules the movements of all bodies of the universe, 
 which measured it and discovered its laws, was 
 capable, beyond that of any other man, of realising 
 the constitution of force in the abstract, and the 
 extent and modes of its operation. Yet that in- The 
 
 . conception 
 
 tellect utterly reiected the conception of force as of force as 
 
 Jo J- independent 
 
 dependent upon matter, or as independent of the ^J^^^tion 
 will and action of God. On the contrary, Newton's ^tSy 
 contemplation of matter and force, sustained Newton. 
 throughout the composition of the most wonderful of 
 all mathematical works, the Principia, in which he 
 revealed and demonstrated his discoveries, led him 
 to close it by a formal and solemn acknowledgment 
 of the creation and conservation of the universe by 
 the will and power of an almighty personal Being. 
 With his profession of his philosophical creed we 
 may suitably conclude the strictures we have offered 
 on the modern materialism which would banish 
 from philosophy and science all consideration of 
 final ca-uses, or of God : ' 
 
 "Tkis admirably beautiful structure of sun, planets, :iud 
 
46 Modern Materialism, 
 
 The comets, could not have originated except in the wisdom and 
 
 philosophical sovereignty of an intelligent and powerful Being. He rules all 
 Xewton. things, not as the soul of the world, but as the Lord of all. He 
 
 is eternal and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient ; that is, His 
 duration is from eternity to eternity, and His presence from 
 infinity to infinity. He governs all things, and has knowledge 
 of all things that are done or can be done. He is not eternity 
 and infinity, but eternal and infinite. He is not duration and 
 space, but He is ever, and is present everywhere. We know 
 Him only by means of His properties and attributes, and by 
 means of the supremely wise and infinite constructions of the 
 world, and their final causes : we admire Him for His per- 
 fection ; we venerate and worship Him for His sovereignty. 
 For we worship Him as His servants ; and a God without 
 sovereignty, providence, and final causes is nothing else than 
 fate and nature. From a blind metaphysical necessity which, 
 of course, is the same always and everywhere, no variety could 
 originate. The whole diversity of created things in regard to 
 _. . places and times could have its origin only in the ideas and the 
 
 pp. 22-26. Yill of a necessarily existing Being." 
 
 ^ PRESENT Day Tracts, No. 17. f-^ 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 OF 
 
 MR. HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 EXAMINED. 
 
 BY THE 
 
 REV. JAMES IVERACH, M.A., 
 
 Author of "Is God Knovvable?" 
 
 THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY: 
 
 56, Paternoster Row; 65, St. Paul's Ciiukchyaru; and 
 164, Piccadilly. 
 
lirgumcnt (xf the Tract 
 
 Agnosticism, a new word ; definition of its meaning. Reasons 
 for taking Mr. Herbert Spencer as the typical Agnostic. Funda- 
 mental position of Mr. Spencer. His Agnosticism based on his 
 doctrine of consciousness ; statement of that doctrine gathered 
 from his works. Inadequacy of it, and the inconsistency between 
 Mr. Spencer's analysis of consciousness, and his use of language. 
 Consciousness cannot be resolved into states ; must belong to a 
 personal being. We must regard consciousness as the con- 
 sciousness of a being who feels, wills, thinks. Criticism of 
 Mr. Spencer's Fi'rsi Principles. The attempt to make the ulti- 
 mate generalizations of science into a priori intuitions of the 
 mind is a failure, contradicted by scientific men, and by the 
 experience of mankind. In discarding these intuitions which 
 are universal and necessary, and in substituting in their place 
 the ultimate generalizations of science, Mr. Spencer has been 
 unreasonable and absurd. The Spencerian doctrine of the 
 Unknowable founded on a misconception. The antinomies 
 of Kant, and their solution. There are different kinds of being 
 Xi the world. There are infinite being and finite being, 
 beings who are conscious, and beings who are unconscious.; 
 and the antinomies cease to be contradictory when we re- 
 cognise different orders of being. Conclusion that the action 
 of our intelligence is true and trustworthy, 
 
THE 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER 
 
 EXAMINED. 
 
 GNOSTICISM is a new word, lately intro- Agosticism 
 
 ' a new word 
 
 duced into tlie English language, for 
 the purpose of expressing a certain 
 attitude of mind. It is doubtful whether 
 the word is an advantage, but it has become so 
 popular that we are constrained to use it. At The 
 
 necessity of 
 
 first sight it appears a very innocent word. "What ^si^ig it- 
 can be more innocent or more proper than to say, 
 " I do not know," or " I do not know completely 
 and thoroughly." If this were all, we should 
 certainly have no controversy with the Agnostics. 
 But Agnosticism has now come to have a larger 
 meaning. It has advanced beyond the affirmation xiie system 
 
 throws 
 
 that our knowledge is partial and incomplete ; and t^^^rust- 
 it has thrown doubt on the trustworthiness of our o/Jur"*"^^ 
 intelligence. It dogmatically affirms that true or ^^*^^^^^^'* 
 real knowledge is impossible to man. It tends to 
 destroy the foundation on which belief, knowledge, 
 and action rest. 
 
 The reality of knowledge does not involve the 
 
The Philoso2')hy of 
 
 The 
 
 limitations 
 of our 
 knowledge. 
 
 The trust- 
 worthiness 
 of necessary 
 beliefs. 
 
 The 
 
 literature 
 of Agnos- 
 ticism. 
 
 Mr. H. 
 
 Spencer 
 acknow- 
 ledged to 
 be the 
 greatest 
 of the 
 Agnoetics. 
 
 omniscience of the person who knows. We may 
 have to submit to ignorance because of lack of 
 evidence ; we may also have to submit to ignorance 
 because we are finite beings. All that we need to 
 contend for is that within the range of our faculties, 
 and in the normal exercise of our powers, we may 
 attain to real knovrlcdge. The beliefs which are 
 necessary to us are true and trustworthy, and 
 have a true correspondence with the reality of 
 things. We must trust the necessary beliefs, in 
 correspondence with which we must think. Know- 
 ledge is one ; and if at any one point the action of 
 our intelligence is untrustworthy, it can never be 
 trusted at all ; and the result is self-contradiction 
 and universal scepticism. 
 
 The literature of Agnosticism has grown to a 
 great bulk, and for the sake of clearness, we have, 
 in any discussion of it, to make a selection. We 
 shall do no injustice to Agnosticism in taking the 
 writings of Mr. Herbert Spencer as the chief ex- 
 position of the Agnostic view. He is recognised on 
 all hands, and particularly by the Agnostics them- 
 selves, as their chief apostle. From the references 
 to him and to his writings, which abound in current 
 literature, we gather that the best presentation of 
 the Agnostic view is to be found in his works. Ac- 
 cording to these references, Mr. Spencer with one 
 hand has shut the door which seemed to lead the 
 human mind into the region of the infinite and eter- 
 
Mr. Herbert Spencer Examined. l 
 
 nal, and with the other hand has opened the gate 
 which leads into the fruitful fields of positive know- 
 ledge. He is the "Modern Aristcile," who has 
 unified our knowledge, and has accomplished for us, 
 after the accumulated experience of two thousand 
 years and more, what Aristotle had accomplished for 
 the smaller world of knowledge of his time. 'No 
 Agnostic, then, can complain when we take the 
 writings of Mr. Spencer as typical of this intellec- 
 tual movement. On their own showing he is the 
 strongest, wisest of them all. They have called 
 him " Our Philosopher." We proceed then to 
 examine the argument for Agnosticism as set 
 forth hy Mr. Herbert Spencer. 
 
 His argument is briefly this : Emotion, volition, ms 
 
 " , IP argument. 
 
 thought, are states of consciousness, and therefore 
 cannot co-exist. Consciousness is formed of suc- 
 cessive states, and to think of the Divine Being as 
 possessing a consciousness, consisting of successive 
 states, is to stop short with verbal propositions. 
 We are using unreal words. It is quite true on 
 the terms proposed by Mr. Spencer, we cannot 
 speak of emotion, volition, thought, in relation to 
 the Divine Being, any more than we can speak of 
 them in relation to any being, if consciousness be 
 only a series of states. We shall therefore discuss of^the'^^^^- 
 the subject in the following order : cussion. 
 
 I. We shall show by reference to the works of 
 
The Philosophy of 
 
 Mr. Spencer, that ho does resolve consciousness 
 into a series of states. 
 
 II. We shall show that he is compelled to 
 disregard his own analysis of consciousness, and to 
 speak of mind as a being which experiences these 
 states. 
 
 III. We shall show that the ultimate general- 
 izations of science which Mr. Spencer elevates into 
 first principles, have not these qualities of univer- 
 sality and necessity which first principles ought to 
 have, and that we must return to those primary 
 beliefs which he has discarded. 
 
 lY. We shall examine the grounds on which 
 he propounds his doctrine of the Unknowable. 
 
 I, 
 
 Mr. Spencer's Doctrine of Consciousness. 
 
 Mr. 
 
 sp^e^ccr's \ye shall take, as the starting-point of our 
 
 starting^ crlticism, one of the latest utterances of Mr. 
 pomt. Spencer, in which he has himself summarised for 
 
 us the principles of his philosophy, and their bear- 
 ings on religion. This summary, no doubt, pre- 
 supposes a knowledge of the voluminous works of 
 Mr. Spencer, and we shall have to refer to some of 
 these in the course of this argument. Meanwhile 
 
Mr. Herlert Spencer Examined. 
 
 we extract from the article in question the fol- 
 lowing : ^ 
 
 "All emotions can exist only in a consciousness that is His 
 limited. Every emotion has i^ s antecedent ideas, and antecedent of the case 
 ideas are habitually supposed to occur in God : he is represented of Agnos- 
 as seeing and hearing thia or the other, and as being emotionally 
 affected thereby. That is to say, the conception of a divinity 
 possessing these traits of character, necessarily continues anthro- 
 pomorphic : not only in the sense that the emotions ascribed 
 are like those of human beings, but also in the sense that they 
 form parts of a consciousness which, like the human conscious- 
 ness, is formed of successive states. And such a conception of 
 the divine consciousness is irreconcilable both with the un- 
 changeableness otherwise alleged, and with the omniscience 
 otherwise alleged. For a consciousness constituted of ideas and 
 feelings caused by objects and occurrences cannot be simul- 
 taneously occupied with all objects and all occurrences through- 
 out the universe. To believe in a divine consciousness, men 
 must refrain from thinking what is meant by consciousness 
 must stop short with verbal propositions ; and propositions which 
 they are debarred from rendering into thought will more and 
 more fail to satisfy them. Of course, like difficulties present 
 themselves when the will of God is spoken of. So long as we 
 refrain from giving a definite meaning to the word will, we may 
 say that it is possessed by the Cause of All Things, as readily 
 as we may say that love of approbation is possessed by a circle ; 
 but when from the words we pass to the thoughts they stand 
 for, we find that we can no more unite in consciousness the 
 terms of the one proposition than we can those of the other. 
 Whoever conceives any other will than his own must do so in 
 terms of his own will, which is the sole will direct] y known to 
 him all other wills being only inferred. But will, as each is 
 conscious of it, presupposes a motive a prompting desire of 
 some sort ; absolute indifference excludes the conception cf 
 will. Moreover will, as implying a prompting desire, connotes 
 some end contemplated as one to be achieved, and ceases with 
 the achievement of it ; some other will referring to some other 
 
 ^ "Religion; a Retrospect and Prospect." By Herbert 
 Spencer. Nineteenth Century, January, 1884. 
 
8 
 
 The Philosophy of 
 
 end, taking its place. That is to say, will, like emotion, ne- 
 cessarily supposes a series of states of consciousness. The 
 conception of a divine will, derived from that of the human 
 will, involves, like it,Jocalization in space and time ; the willing 
 of each end excluding from consciousness for an interval the 
 vrilling of other ends, and therefore being inconsistent with that 
 omnipresent activity which simultaneously works out an infinity 
 of ends. It is the same with the ascription of intelligence. 
 Not to dwell on the seriality and limitation implied as before, we 
 may note that intelligence as alone conceivable by us, pre- 
 supposes existences independent of it and objective to it. It is 
 carried on in terms of changes primarily wrought by alien 
 activities, the impressions generated by things beyond con- 
 sciousness, and the ideas derived from such impressions. To 
 speak of an intelligence which exists in the absence of all such 
 alien activities, is to use a meaningless word. If to the corollary 
 that the First Cause, considered as intelligent, must be con- 
 tinually affected by independent objective activities, it is replied 
 that these have become such by act of creation, and were pre- 
 viously included in the First Cause : then the reply is that in 
 such case the First Cause could, before this creation, have had 
 nothing to generate in it such changes as those constituting 
 what we call intelligence, and must therefore have been unin- 
 telligent at the time when intelligence was most called for. 
 Hence it is clear that the intelligence ascribed answers in no 
 respect to that which we know by the name. It is intelligence 
 out of which all the characters constituting it have vanished." 
 
 This is perhaps the strongest statement of the 
 case for Agnosticism which we have been able to 
 find. It appears again and again in the works of 
 Mr. Spencer. On it he lays great stress, and he 
 seems to regard it as more effective, if not more 
 decisive, than the argument derived from the 
 nature of the Infinite, the Absolute, and the Un- 
 conditioned, which bulk so largely in the opening 
 chapters of the F'wd Frincijjles. The strength 
 
 stress laid 
 by Mr. 
 Spencer 
 on his 
 analysis of 
 conscious- 
 ness 
 
Mr. Herbert Spencer Examined. 
 
 of the argument lies in the assumption that " con- ^^^^^ ., 
 
 sciousness cannot be in two states at the same aig^entia 
 
 time," that consciousness is formed of successive Snsdous- 
 
 states, and is nothing but the succession of these be^in two 
 
 states at 
 
 states. It seems at first siarht difficult to believe the same 
 
 tune. 
 
 that such a position could be really held by a 
 writer of the reputation of Mr. Spencer ; all the 
 more difficult it is when we read those parts of his 
 voluminous works in which he does not deal directly 
 with consciousness, but is using his consciousness 
 as an instrument for the discovery of truth. He 
 continually assumes that man has the power of 
 looking before and after ; that states of conscious- 
 ness can be compared, classified, and arranged ; and 
 that somehow there is a principle of continuity in 
 knowledge. We find a vivid contrast between what 
 Mr. Spencer describes consciousness to be, and what 
 consciousness is able to accomplish. He will not 
 allow us to regard consciousness as anything but a 
 series of successive states ; Avhile he continually J^J^^" ^,f 
 uses language which implies a permanent self who i^guage. 
 is conscious of these states. 
 
 The question is of such importance that we feel 
 bound to make sure of the meaning of Mr. Spencer. 
 It is difficult indeed to be sure, for the language he 
 uses is by no means consistent with itself. Take 
 the following from the First Principles : 
 
 '* Belief in the reality of self is, indeed, a belief which no 
 hypothesis enables us to escape. What shall we say of these 
 
10 
 
 The Philosophy of 
 
 Mr. 
 
 Spencer's 
 
 view 
 
 that reason 
 
 cannot 
 
 justify the 
 
 belief in 
 
 the reality 
 
 of the 
 
 individual 
 
 mind. 
 
 successive impressions and ideas which constitute consciousness ? 
 Shall we say that they are the affections of something called 
 mind, which as being the subject of them, is the real ego ? If 
 v/e say this we manifestly imply that the ego is an entity." ^ 
 
 We need not quote the passage at greater length. 
 It consists in showing first that we " must admit 
 the reahty of the individual mind/' and second, 
 that this belief admits of no justification by reason, 
 nay, that " it is a belief which reason, when pressed 
 i'or a distinct answer, rejects.'' Mr. Spencer tells 
 us that 
 
 **The mental state in which self is known, implies like every 
 other mental act, a perceiving subject and a perceived object. 
 If then the object perceived is self, what is the subject that 
 perceives ? or if it is the true self which thinks, w-hat other self 
 can it be that is thought of ? Clearly, a true cognition of self 
 impHes a state in which the knowing and the known are one 
 in which subject and object are one; and this Mr. Mansel 
 rightly holds to be the annihilation of both. So that the per- 
 sonahty of which each is conscious, and of which the existence 
 is to each a fact beyond all others the most certain, is yet a 
 thing which cannot truly be known at all ; the knowledge of it 
 is forbidden by the very nature of thought." ^ 
 
 In almost all his writings, Mr. Spencer returns 
 to this analysis of consciousness. To quote again 
 from the passage on the freedom of the will 
 
 "Considered as an internal perception, the illusion consists 
 in supposing that at each moment the ego is something more 
 than the aggregate of feelin;];s and ideas, actual and nascent, 
 which then exists. A man who, after being subject to an impulse 
 consisting of a group of psychical states, real and ideal, per- 
 forms a certain action, usually asserts that he determined to 
 
 1 First Principles, p. 84. * Ibid, pp. 65, 60. 
 
Mr. Herbert Spencer Exanfiined. 
 
 11 
 
 perform the action ; and by speaking of his conscious self as 
 having done something separate from the group of psychical 
 states constituting the impulse, is led into the error of sup- 
 posing that it was not the impulse alone which determined the 
 action. But the entire group of psychical states which constituted 
 the antecedent of the action also constituted himself at that 
 moment, constituted his psychical self, that is, as distinguished 
 from his physical self. It is alike true that he determined the 
 action, and that the aggregate of his feelings and ideas determined 
 it, since during its existence this aggregate constituted his then 
 state of consciousness, that is, himself. " ^ 
 
 It is necessary to give attention to this view of f"^;^^^^,^ 
 Mr. Spencer, for it is the main foundation of the X^^m&m 
 
 foundation 
 
 Agnostic position. On it he bases his argument of 
 as he unfolds it in the Nineteenth Century. 
 bears all the weight of the great inference that 
 there can be no mind equal to the creation, main- 
 tenance, and government of the universe. To 
 illustrate this point we make one more quotation : 
 
 * ' If, then, I have to conceive evolution as caused by an 
 'Originating Mind,' I must conceive this Mind as having at- 
 tributes akin to those of the only mind I know, and without 
 which I cannot conceive mind at all. I will not dwell on the 
 many incongruities hence resulting by asking how the * Origina- 
 ting Mind ' is to be thought of as having states produced by 
 things objective to it ; as discriminating among these states, and 
 classing them as like and unlike, and as preferring one objective 
 result to another. I will simply ask, What happens if we 
 ascribe to the * Originating Mind ' the character absolutely 
 essential to the conception of mind, that it consists of ,a series 
 of states of consciousness ? Put a series of states of consciouij- 
 ness as cause, and the evolving universe as effect, and then 
 endeavour to see the last as flowing from the first. It is pos- 
 bible to imagine in some dim kind of way a series of states of 
 consciousness serving as antecedent to any one of the move- 
 
 the 
 -p. Agnostic 
 it argument. 
 
 1 Principles of Psychology, Vol. I., pp. 500-501. 
 
12 
 
 The Philosophy of 
 
 ments I see going on, for my own states of consciousness are 
 often indirectly the antecedents to such movements. But how 
 if I attempt to think of such a beries as antecedent to all actions 
 throughout the universe, to tho motions of the multitudinous 
 stars through space, to the revolution of all their planets around 
 them, to the gyration of all these planets on their axes, to the 
 infinitely multiplied physical processes going on in each of these 
 suns and planets ? I cannot even think of a scries of states of 
 consciousness as causing the relatively small group of actions 
 going on over the earth's surface ; I cannot even think of it as 
 antecedent to all the winds and dissolving clouds they bear, to 
 the currents of all the rivers and the grinding action of all the 
 glaciers ; still less can I think of it as antecedent to the infinity 
 of processes simultaneously going on in all the plants that cover 
 the globe, from tropical palms down to polar lichens, and in all 
 the animals that roam among them, and the insects that buzz 
 about them. Even to a single small set of these multitudinous 
 terrestrial changes, I cannot conceive as antecedent a series of 
 states of consciousness, cannot conceive it as causing the 
 hundred thousand breakers that are at this instant curling over 
 the shores of England. How, then, is it possible for me to 
 conceive an * Originating Mind, ' which I must represent to 
 myself as a series of states of consciousness, being antecedent 
 to the infinity of changes simultaneously going on in worlds too 
 numerous to count, dispersed throughout a space which baffles 
 imagination."^ 
 
 We thus find that the view which Mr. Spencer 
 takes of consciousness is deliberate. At various 
 times, and in many ways ho has declared that 
 " consciousness cannot be in two distinct states at 
 the same time." 
 
 Mr. 
 
 Spencer's 
 view 
 
 of conscious- 
 ness is 
 deliberate. 
 
 From the publication of the First 
 FrincipleSy in 1862, on to the publication of the 
 article in the Nineteenth Centiiri/, he has never 
 wavered in this assertion, and has made it the main 
 
 1 Popular Science Monthly, July, 1872. Quoted in The 
 Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, by B. P. Bowue, A.B., p. 117 
 8, 9. Phillips & Hunt, New York, 1881. 
 
Mr. Herhevt Spencer Examined. V6 
 
 support of his agnosticism. The position has such 
 grave consequences, not only with respect to 
 religion, but to science, and to the possibility of 
 knowledge generally, that it was necessary to set 
 forth Mr. Spencer's view in his own words. 
 
 II. 
 
 Mr. Spencer's disregard of his own Analysis 
 OF Consciousness. 
 
 It seems, however, that Mr. Spencer has the ^^^^i^e 
 
 ' ' i conscious- 
 
 power of forgetting his own deepest views to an splncL'^as 
 unusual degree. The consciousness which he has to do.*^ 
 brought down to the vanishing point of a single 
 state, has strange expansive power, and is equal to 
 any demand made on it. In the first edition of 
 the First Principles there is a preface con- 
 taining in outline Mr. Spencer's " system of Philo- 
 sophy." He there issues a prospectus of the 
 various works which are to form the system. Most 
 of these works have been published. Year by 
 year Mr. Spencer has toiled, and we have before 
 us a series of works which has carried into effect 
 the purpose formed by him long ago. He 
 claims to have reached conclusions of great 
 generality and truth regarding all that can be 
 known by man. In particular he believes himself 
 to have unified our knowledge, and to have framed 
 a formula, adequate to express all orders of change 
 
14 
 
 The Philosophy of 
 
 in their general order, whether these changes be 
 astronomic, geologic, biologic, psychologic, or 
 sociologic. We must infer that this formula 
 answers to a state of consciousness on the part of 
 Mr. Spencer. - There can be no other conclusion, 
 for " consciousness cannot be in two distinct states 
 at the same time." We do not at present express 
 our wonder at the assumption that a series of states 
 of consciousness can conceive a law which can 
 express all orders of change in itself and beyond 
 itself. It is sufficiently marvellous : but our 
 present purpose is to place the achievement of 
 Mr. Spencer alongside of what he regards as in- 
 conceivable. He cannot conceive how a series of 
 states of consciousness can be the antecedent of all 
 the changes he knows to be going on in earth and sea 
 and sky. Why not, if a single state of conscious- 
 ness is equal to the construction and conception of 
 the formula of evolution ? If the law of all orders of 
 change can be grasped in a single state of con- 
 sciousness, why may not the changes themselves 
 also be? That the law of evolution may be grasped 
 by consciousness is manifest from the fact that 
 Mr. Spencer complains of Professor Tait and 
 Mr. Matthew Arnold, because, owing to defective 
 training, they " are unable to frame ideas answer- 
 ing, to the words in which evolution at large is 
 expressed." It is possible, then, if we are rightly 
 trained, to frame ideas which will correspond to 
 
 If a con- 
 sciousness 
 like Mr. 
 Spencer's 
 can do so 
 much, what 
 may'not a 
 greater con- 
 sciousness 
 effect ? 
 
AFr. Herhert Spencer Examined. 15 
 
 the formula of evolution. But this is a great feat 
 
 on the part of a consciousness which can only be 
 
 in a single state at a time. If a single state can 
 
 do so much, what may not the whole series be able 
 
 to accomplish, more particularly if it should ever 
 
 become aware of itself as a series. The states of 
 
 consciousness of Mr. Spencer have been able to act 
 
 as antecedent to all the feelings, volitions, thoughts, 
 
 which have found expression in the volumes before 
 
 us ; may not there be other states of consciousness 
 
 of a larger order equal to the production of changes 
 
 on a greater scale ? If Mr. Spencer would only J^nL^'^' 
 
 consider what a burden he lays on a consciousness Ji^^'^qo^. 
 
 which can only exist in a single state at a time, he burden h? 
 
 would do one of two things ; either he would revise consdous- 
 
 his description of consciousness, and make it more single etate. 
 
 adequate to the task required of it, or he would 
 
 despair of acquiring knowledge of any kind, and 
 
 land himself in utter scepticism. At present 
 
 the whole pyramid of his synthetic philosophy 
 
 stands on the small end, and is poised in unstable 
 
 equilibrium on a single state of consciousness, and 
 
 must fall with the first breeze that blows. 
 
 We naturally ask if consciousness can only exist if con- 
 
 ' *' SC10UST1CS3 
 
 in a single state at a time, as Mr. Spencer con- ^r^gpencei 
 stantly affirms, how it is possible for us to be con- reSoii^g 
 scious of more states than one ? But Mr. Spencer possible. 
 as constantly affirms the latter as he does the 
 former. " To be known as unlike," he says. 
 
10 Tlic Philosophy of 
 
 " conscious states must be known in succession/' 
 and lie has no explanation of the puzzle how they 
 can be. The only explanation we have been able 
 to find is the following : 
 
 "By a process of observation we find that our states of con- 
 sciousness segregate into two independent aggregates, each held 
 together by some principle of continuity within it. The prin- 
 ciple of continuity, forming into a whole the joint states of 
 consciousness, moulding and modifying them by some unknown 
 energy, is distinguished as the ego ; while tlie non-ego is the 
 principle of continuity holding together the independent 
 aggregate of vivid states."^ 
 
 We shall perhaps find a clue to the incon- 
 sistencies of Mr. Spencer's reasoning if we look 
 closely at this passage. For we have been utterly 
 puzzled to discover how a single state of con- 
 sciousness could compare, abstract, generalize, 
 and perform the operations ascribed to it by 
 S'aifob-"^'' Mr. Spencer. The key to the mystery will be 
 doaThe found in the opening clause of the foregoing 
 sciousness " Quotatiou I " by a process of observation we find " 
 
 cannot do. t 
 
 Mr. Spencer postulates a dismterested observer, 
 who can look calmly down on consciousness, and 
 as a *' spectator " keep an account of the process 
 of segregation into aggregates. The qualifications 
 of this observer are of a most distinguished order. 
 He can compare, remember, in short, he has 
 all the attributes which Mr. Spencer denies to the 
 ego itself. Por the most part Mr. Spencer 
 
 1 Psychology, Vol. II., p. 487. 
 
Mr. Herbert Spencer Examined. 17 
 
 identifies Himself with, the disinterested ohserver 
 who looks on, and keeps a register of the changes 
 of the universe, and the law which regulates them. 
 As such he is present at the rude beginnings of 
 things ; as such he observes all the successive 
 differentiations and integrations which have 
 taken place; as such he has marked the place 
 where memory begins, and has set it down by 
 the clock as the moment when the organic 
 structure fails to correspond with the environment, 
 and therefore brought memory to its help, a 
 feeble substitute, but a necessary one : as such he 
 prophesies of a future when the correspondence 
 between organism and environment will be again 
 complete, and remembrance of the past shall be 
 needed no more. 
 
 It is because he so often occupies the place of Mr, 
 
 ^ ^ Spencer's 
 
 the disinterested observer that Mr. Spencer finds ^J^^^ 
 
 ^ of per- 
 
 he can reduce the ego to a series of states of ^eceSSy 
 consciousness. If it were more than this, the system, 
 result would be rather inconvenient for his 
 philosophy. If he were compelled to regard 
 consciousness as an agent, capable of interaction 
 with other agents in a related world, he would 
 have to widen his calculus, and could no longer 
 hope to express all changes in terms of matter 
 and motion. On the other hand, by regarding 
 consciousness as a series of states, which are 
 dependent for their existence and for the order of 
 C 
 
18 The Philosophy ojr 
 
 tlieir succession on causes beyond themselves, he 
 has been able to show a plausible possibility for 
 the truth of his philosophy. But he purchases 
 the possibility at a great cost. For there is not 
 a single argument in any of Mr. Spencer's works, 
 which does not imply the opposite of his deliberate 
 and repeated statement that consciousness can 
 only exist in a single state at a time. We may 
 take any argument we like, we may choose at 
 random. Take the following from the chapter on 
 " The Universal Postulate " : 
 
 *' If, having touched a body in the dark, and having become 
 instantly conscious of some extension as accompanying the 
 resistance, I wish to decide whether the proposition ' whatever 
 resists has extension ' expresses a cognition of the highest 
 certainty, hov/ do I do it ? I endeavour to think away the 
 resistance. I think of resistance, and endeavour to keep exten- 
 sion out of thought. I fail absolutely in the attempt. " ^ 
 
 Yet in the One would like to ask Mr. Spencer how the 
 
 denying of i -i i i p 
 
 it he mental operation described m the loregomg 
 
 paragraph is possible. For he makes a distinction 
 between himself, the thinking person, and the 
 thoughts which he thinks. He distinguishes 
 between himself and the states of consciousness 
 which he has. He assumes that he can pass from 
 one state of consciousness to another, and back 
 again, and have a vivid feeling somehow of the 
 likeness or unlikeness between the two. It would 
 appear, therefore, that Mr. Spencer assumes that 
 
 1 Psychology, Vol. II., pp. 40G, 407. 
 
Mr. Herbert Spencer Examined. 19 
 
 consciousness can be in three states at the same 
 time, if not in more. For every judgment involves 
 at least three states : two states which are com- 
 pared, and a third state which affirms the agree- 
 ment or disagreement between the other two. 
 
 We are anxious to observe that this remark is based 
 on the procedure of Mr. Spencer himself, while he 
 is describing the process of reasoning, as a spectator, 
 and apparently in forgetfulness of what he has 
 said about consciousness. We are not unmindful The prin. 
 
 ciples of 
 
 of all that he has written regarding the genesis of cann^of^^'^ 
 consciousness, nor of the principle of association menSfiSS 
 which he calls segregation. But no more in his 
 hands than in the hands of Stuart Mill has the 
 principle of association shown itself equal to the 
 task laid upon it. For it is evident that, if the 
 principle of the association were adequate to explain 
 our mental life, we should never have been able to 
 ask how and why ideas or states of consciousness 
 associate themselves together. To ask such a 
 question shows that we have somehow got beyond 
 the principle of association, which would be im- 
 possible if association could explain everything. 
 The theory of Mr. Spencer, which simply substi- 
 tutes the experience of the race for the experience 
 of the individual, has not altered in any degree the 
 nature of the problem. Even if we were able to 
 trace the steps by which consciousness grew to 
 what it is at present, that would not help us much 
 
20 The Philosojohy of 
 
 in determining the nature of consciousness as it 
 now is. Before entering on this topic, however, 
 we shall seek to make it clear that Mr. Spencer's 
 account of consciousnesss is inadequate. We mean, 
 of course, his formal analysis of it. For when we 
 pass from that, and have regard only to what 
 consciousness is able to accomplish, we find in the 
 works of Mr. Spencer ample testimony to self as a 
 permanent activity, and to the synthetic unity of 
 self-consciousness as the permanent unity, to which 
 all the experiences we have is constantly referred. 
 Conscious states past, present, and future are 
 bound together and formed into unity, because 
 they are states of the personal self, who knows 
 itself as present in all the variety of its experience. 
 Quotation Let US take in this relation the following quota- 
 
 from Lotze. . _ 
 
 tion irom Lotze : 
 
 "To whatever act of thought we direct our attention, we 
 never find that it consists in the mere presence of two ideas 
 a and h in the same consciousness, but always in what we call 
 a Relation of one idea to the other. After this relation has been 
 established, it can in its turn be conceived as a third idea C ; 
 but in such case Ois neither on the one hand homogeneous with 
 a and h, nor is it a mere mechanical effect of interactions which 
 in accordance with some definite law have taken place between 
 the two as psychical processes with definite magnitudes and 
 definitely various natures. We may take as the simplest 
 examples of what I mean, the identification and the distinction 
 of two ideal contents. If we assume a and 6 identical with 
 each other, then unquestionably the idea a is present twice over 
 in our mind ; but the only result to which this circumstance 
 can lead us, on mechanical analysis, will be either that the two 
 ideas must count as one, because they exactly cover each other, 
 
Mr. Serhert Spencer Examined. 21 
 
 or that as similar affections of the soul they will become fused 
 into a tliird idea of greater strength, or that they simply remain 
 apart without any result at all. But that which we call the 
 comparison of them, which leads to the idea of their identity C, 
 consists neither in the mere fact of their co-existence, nor in 
 their fusion : it is a new and essentially single act of the soul, 
 in which the soul holds the two ideas side by side, passes from 
 one to the other, and ia conscious of experiencing no change in 
 its condition, or in the mode of its action during or by reason 
 of that passage from the one idea to the other. 
 
 "Again : let us compare two different ideas a and 6, red and 
 yellow. Two external stimidi, which 'acting by themselves 
 would have awakened severally one of the two sensations, might 
 acting simultaneously coalesce in the nerve, through which they 
 propagate themselves still as physical states, into a third excita- 
 tion intermediate between the two, so as to occasion in the soul 
 only a third simple sensation. But two ideas which have once 
 arisen as ideas in the soul never experience this sort of fusion. 
 If it were to occur, if the distinctive experience of the two ideas 
 were to vanish, all opportunity and possibility of comparison, 
 and therewith as a remoter consequence, all possibility of 
 thought and knowledge would vanish also. For clearly all 
 relation depends upon preservation in consciousness of the 
 different contents unfalsified by any interactions of one upon 
 the other : the single undivided energy of thought which is to 
 comprehend them must find them as they are in themselves, so 
 that passing to and fro between them it may be conscious of 
 the change which arises in its own condition in the transition."^ 
 
 This account of the nature of comparison differs Differs from 
 
 ^ Mr. Spencet 
 
 from that of Mr. Spencer in only one respect. But ^^j^^ ^^^ 
 the one point of difference is vital. Lotze pos- 
 tulates an active soul which can compare its ideas 
 one with another, and affirm or deny their 
 identity. But the postulate of Lotze, reasonahlo 
 though it seems, evidently puts Mr. Spencer into 
 
 ^ Lotze, Lojic, p. 474. English Translation, Clarendon Press. 
 
 point. 
 
22 
 
 The Philosophy of 
 
 Self-know- 
 ledge the 
 postidate 
 of aU 
 knowledge. 
 
 a state of uncontrollable alarm. " If we say this 
 we manifestly imply tliat the ego is an entity." 
 Well, suppose we do, what then? It will certainly 
 have grave consequences for the philosophy of 
 Mr. Spencer, but no other serious results which we 
 can see. For it is the one postulate which makes 
 knowledge and experience possible and intelligible, 
 as it is the postulate on which Mr. Spencer con- 
 tinually acts, as we have seen, whenever he describes 
 any process of thought. The only unity of ex- 
 perience which we can possibly have is that which 
 refers all experience to a conscious self, which is 
 the abiding subject of them all. For any possible 
 theory of knowledge assumes the reality of self. 
 If we are not sure of our own existence we are 
 sure of nothing. We are certain of our own 
 identity also ; that we are ourselves and not some 
 other. But this is the precise certainty which 
 Mr, Spencer in terms denies, even while he recog- 
 nizes the existence of self as constantly as any one 
 can do. 
 
 One great difficulty which besets the critic of Mr. 
 Spencer's philosophy lies in the fact that people 
 will scarcely beKeve that he actually holds such 
 opinions, unless they themselves are students of 
 his works. Denying as he actually does the exis- 
 tence and activity of self, it is scarcely credible that 
 he should as constantly affirm it. Yet so it is. 
 If we take his chapter on "the Composition of 
 
Mr. Sevhert Spencer Examined. 23 
 
 Mind/' and read therein the way in which, according in Mr.^^^ 
 to him, mind is built up, we shall be surprised to If^^^^ 
 find that mind is postulated to preside over its own ITSa, 
 
 T, T mind is 
 
 genesis. I'or example: postulated 
 
 to preside 
 over its owii 
 "To complete this general conception it is needful to say genesis and 
 that as with feelings, so with the relations between feelings. 
 Parted so far as may be from the particular pairs of feelings, 
 and pairs of groups of feelings they severally unite, relations 
 themselves are perpetually segregated. From moment to 
 moment relations are distinguished from one another in respect 
 of the degrees of contrast between their terms, and the kinds of 
 contrast between their terms ; and each relation, while dis- 
 tinguished from various concurrent relations, is assimilated to 
 previously-experienced relations like itself."^ 
 
 On the previous page he speaks of sensations being 
 at once known as unlike other sensations that limit 
 them in space and time. He speaks of sensations 
 as known, and of relations as recognized before 
 there is any conscious subject present to act in 
 these capacities. For by his hypothesis he regards 
 the subject as not yet built up nor come to con- 
 sciousness and yet the subject is present, active, 
 knowing, recognising, segregating. He has to ac- 
 count for feeling, thought, memory, and he accounts 
 for them by a theory which at the same time affirms 
 and denies the activity of thought and of the 
 thinking being. When we question Mr. Spencer 
 further as to the origin of all these changes, which 
 30 to form the ego, we find no other account than 
 
 i Pijcholouy, Vol. I., p. 183. 
 
24 
 
 The Philosophy of 
 
 Mr. 
 
 Spencer's 
 argument 
 meaning- 
 less if, for 
 states of 
 conscious- 
 ness, we 
 substitute 
 ' conscious 
 self," "con- 
 scious 
 person." 
 
 this, that the principle of segregation lies not in 
 the conscious subject, but in the nervous system. 
 On the nervous system, as it has been developed 
 through all the past, lies the burden of accounting 
 for all the states of mind, and for all the processes 
 of thinking. He sometimes seems to attribute to 
 the nervous system the power of recognising re- 
 lations of appreciating differencos, and of storing 
 up memories, which most other philosophers regard 
 as operations of the conscious ego. Even if we 
 attribute to nerve vesicles this extraordinary power 
 we simply remove the difficulty one step further 
 back, and we get no nearer a solution of the pro- 
 blem; and we have the added absurdity of at- 
 tributing to the nervous system all the results and 
 characteristics of mind. 
 
 "We return now to the statement of Mr. Spencer 
 in his recent article.^ We have seen that the 
 formal doctrine that consciousness is formed of suc- 
 cessive states, is repeated by Mr. Spencer in almost 
 all his works, and we have seen also that he is, 
 notwithstanding, constrained to speak as if ho 
 believed in a self distinct from, and cognisant of, 
 all the successive states of consciousness. Supposo 
 that instead of using the phrase " successive states 
 of consciousness,*' we were to use the phrase 
 conscious self in the extract quoted above, Mr. 
 Spencer's argument becomes meaningless. 
 
 ^ Nineteenth Century y January, 1884. 
 
Mr. Herbert Spencer Examined, 25 
 
 " Such a conception of the divine consciousness is irreconcil- 
 able both with the unchangeableness otherwise alleged, and 
 with the omniscience otherwise alleged. For a consciousness 
 constituted of ideas and feelings caused by objects and occur- 
 rences, cannot be simultaneously occupied with all objects and 
 all occurrences throughout the universe." 
 
 "We purpose to construct a parallel sentence : ^^^^ 
 " The conception of a consciousness wHch. is formed 
 of successive states, is irreconcilable with, the per- 
 manence otherwise claimed, and with the know- 
 ledge otherwise claimed by Mr. Spencer. For a 
 consciousness constituted of ideas and feelings 
 caused by objects and occurrences cannot have been 
 simultaneously occupied with, or even successively 
 occupied with the thoughts contained in his works. 
 To believe in Mr. Spencer as the permanent subject 
 who produced all these works, would be to stop 
 short with verbal propositions." A similar series 
 of propositions may readily be framed to run 
 parallel with all the other propositions in the 
 quoted paragraph, and the result would be that 
 we have no right to speak of emotion, of will, or of 
 intelligence in connection with Mr. Spencer. We 
 cannot speak of him without attributing to him a 
 selfhood which has persisted from the pubKcation 
 of the First Principles onward, and this is precisely 
 what he will not permit us to do. Still we can 
 hardly be sure even of this, for we remember that 
 the persistence of force rests for final proof on tlio 
 persistence of consciousness ; " and our inability to 
 
26 The Philosophy of 
 
 conceive matter and motion suppressed, is our 
 inability to suppress consciousness itself.*' Con- 
 sciousness cannot be suppressed, and persists, it 
 would appear, and yet can only be in a single state 
 at a time ! 
 
 We may, however, be allowed to exhaust the 
 possibihty of the known before we take refuge in 
 the unknowable. We are entitled to try what can 
 be accomplished by a knowing subject who knows 
 itself as an agent in all the forms of its activity, 
 before we pass into the unknown, and postulate an 
 energy which is the hypothetical cause of our con- 
 scious states. No one ever laid stronger stress on 
 the separation between subject and object than 
 incon- Mr. Spencer has. It is an antithesis which ac- 
 
 sistencies ^ 
 
 t ^cer cording to him can never be transcended ; and yet 
 Mr. Spencer constantly transcends this antithesis, 
 and identifies the two in the unknowable energy in 
 which we live and move and have our being. We 
 can only speak of matter, he tells us, in terms of 
 mind, and of mind in terms of matter ; and this he 
 maintains, while he also maintains that there can 
 be no resemblance between a feeling and a motion, 
 or between a thought and a material fact. The 
 passage we now quote is exceedingly curious : 
 
 "No effort of imagiuation can enable us to think of a sliock, 
 however minute, except as undergone by an entity. We are 
 compelled, therefore, to postulate a substance of mind that is 
 affected before we can think of its affections. But we can form 
 no notion of asubdtauce of Mind ubrfuiutely divested of attributes 
 
Mr. Herbert Spencer Examined, 27 
 
 connoted by the word substance ; and all such attributes are 
 abstracted from our experience of material phenomena. Expel 
 from the conception of mind every one of these attributes by 
 which we distinguish an external something from an external 
 nothing, and the conception of mind becomes nothing. If to 
 escape this difficulty we repudiate the expression * state of con- 
 sciousness/ and call each undecomposible feeling * a conscious- 
 ness,' we merely get out of one difficulty into another. A con- 
 sciousness, if not the state of a thing, is itself a thing. -And 
 as many different consciousnesses as there are, so many dif- 
 ferent things there are. How shall we think of these so many 
 independent things, having their differential characters, when 
 we have excluded all conceptions derived from external phe- 
 nomena ? " ^ 
 
 The last question can be answered very simply. 
 When we have excluded all conceptions derived 
 from external phenomena, we can think of conscious 
 persons in conceptions derived from internal phe- 
 nomena. Usually we describe a thing in terms of 
 the modes of its activity, and we say a thing is 
 where it acts, and the qualities of a thing are the 
 modes of its action. We therefore take one of the 
 sentences in the above quotation, and amend it to 
 read as follows : " Expel from the conception of S* mmd^" 
 mind every one of the attributes by which we dis- ^ot n'Jga- 
 tinguish an external something from an external i/termsof 
 nothing, and the conception of mind will still of matter, 
 retain that which is its essential characteristic. It 
 will still be a thing which feels and thinks and 
 wills. It will still remain conscious of itself, and 
 have the power of looking before and after.'* 
 
 1 Psycholorjy, Vol. I., p. C2G. 
 
28 
 
 The Philosophy of 
 
 This is indeed the final statement of Mr. Spencer's 
 favourite theory, that our knowledge consists of 
 equations worked out with symbols, which can 
 never be known save as symbols. It is his final 
 statement of the necessity which compels us to 
 ** find the value of x in terms of y, and of y in 
 terms of x/* and to go on so for ever without 
 coming nearer to a solution. But we have seen 
 that when we abstract all that we have gained from 
 material phenomena, we still have a conception of 
 mind, and a positive conception, not a negative, 
 which can be explained in terms of affections of 
 mind itself, and which can be realized in conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 We have dealt with this analysis of conscious- 
 ness at some length, for it is the key of the position. 
 And Mr. Spencer knows this to be true. Hence 
 the great trouble he has taken, and hence also the 
 necessity under which he lies of returning to the 
 question again and again, in order to give fresh 
 strength to the proof of it. The proof has failed 
 in every essential particular. It cannot even be 
 stated, except by implicitly affirming what is in 
 terms denied. The pre-supposition of all knowledge 
 is the knowledge of self; and the first unity of 
 things is the unity which refers all things to a 
 personal self, as the abiding subject of all possible 
 experience. , 
 
 Conscious- 
 ness of self 
 the key 
 of the 
 position. 
 
Spencer'3 
 
 Mr. Herhevt Spencer Examined. 29 
 
 IIL 
 
 Mr. Spencer's First Principles not Universal 
 
 AND iN'ECESSARY. 
 
 From this point onwards, we now proceed ; and 
 as we go on we shall find occasion to challenge the 
 competency of Mr. Spencer's reasoning on many Mr. 
 occasions. We find in particular, that Mr. Spencer's If^^^^ 
 account of the forms of thought, and of the neces- JSought'. 
 sities of thought, to be most inadequate. The long 
 controversy between associationalists and intuition- 
 alists has been decided, and decided in favour of 
 the latter. As far as the individual is concerned, 
 Mr. Spencer acknowledges that there are forms of 
 intuition which are transcendental. 
 
 ** If at a birth there exists nothing but a passive receptivity 
 of impressions, why is not a horse as educable as a man ? Should 
 it be said that language makes the diflference, then why do not 
 the cat and dog, reared in the same household, arrive at equal 
 degrees and kinds of knowledge?"^ 
 
 The question is unanswerable; but Mr. Spencer 
 comes to the help of the associationalists, and 
 endeavours to reconcile the traditional experience 
 doctrine with the doctrine of true forms of thought. 
 The reconciliation is attained through the widening 
 of the meaning of experience. Mr. Spencer has irrational 
 indefinitely lengthened tho time through which inadequate 
 
 1 Psycliology, Vol. I. p. 4G8. 
 
30 
 
 The Philosophy of 
 
 experience may act, and through which habit may 
 grow into necessity. 
 
 "The human brain is an organised register of infinitely 
 numerous experiences received during the evolution of life, or 
 rather during the evolution of that series of organisms through 
 which the human organism has been reached. The eflfects of 
 the mosD uniform and frequent of these experiences have been 
 successively bequeathed, principal and interest, and have slowl}'- 
 mounted to that high intelligence which lies latent in the brain 
 of the infant, which the infant in after-life exercises, and 
 perhaps strengthens or further complicates, and which, with 
 minute additions, it bequeaths to future generations." ^ 
 
 Tlie 
 
 meaning 
 of the 
 proposition 
 that _ 
 experience 
 can evolve 
 intelligence. 
 
 Let us see clearly what is meant by the propo- 
 sition that experience can evolve intelligence. It 
 is quite true that a man can inherit from his 
 ancestors constitutional peculiarities of disposition 
 and temper. It is another thing altogether to 
 assume, as Mr. Spencer does, that modes of thought 
 fixed forms of knowledge can be transmitted 
 or inherited. Unless the forms of thought were 
 already implicit in experience, there seems no pos- 
 sibility of their ever emerging from experience 
 If these forms are already in the mind, they can 
 readily be applied to the organization of experience ; 
 and we can thus understand how common experi- 
 ence is possible. For the mass of sensations which 
 any one may have comes to him in one way, and 
 to another man in another way, and can never 
 generate out of themselves the forms which are to 
 make them an intelligible experience. 
 
 J Psychology, Vol. I. p. 471. 
 
Mr, Herbert Spencer Examined. 31 
 
 It is therefore no solution of the problem to say Experience 
 
 cannot 
 
 that forms of thought which are a priori to the evolve fonns 
 
 *-' -* of thought. 
 
 individual are a posteriori to the race. The problem 
 is how to account for experience, and the answer is 
 that experience is possibly because of the activity of 
 the subject. But Mr. Spencer assumes that the ex- 
 perience of the individual is one thing, and the ex- 
 perience of the race is another. For he acknowledges 
 that experience does presuppose mental activity 
 in the case of the individual, but not in the case of 
 the race. He gains time, no doubt, by the sup- 
 position; but he has not sought to explain how 
 the mere lapse of time can alter the meaning of 
 experience, and what is needed is an explanation 
 of experience as we have it ourselves. 
 
 That there are certain forms of mental activity Forms oi 
 
 ' mental 
 
 we may therefore take as granted by all kinds of activity, 
 schools. Mr. Spencer insists on them no less than 
 others. He has no doubt discarded those forms, 
 which by the consent of philosophers have usually 
 been regarded as intuitions of the mind. It is univer- 
 sally conceded, however, that the mind has the power 
 of knowing some things to be true, without any 
 process of verification. There are truths which are 
 universal and necessary, which are seen to be true 
 as soon as they are understood. Experience does 
 not make them true, for the truth of them is in- 
 dependent of experience, and by means of them 
 unconnected sensations become orderly thought. 
 
32 
 
 The Philosophy of 
 
 Necessary- 
 truth not 
 the result 
 of habit. 
 
 How do we come by these universal and necessary- 
 truths ? Mr. Spencer's reply is, that they are the 
 result of habit. 
 
 "Being the constant and infinitely-repeated elements of 
 thought, they must become the automatic elements of thought 
 the elements of thought which it is impossible to get rid of 
 ' the form of intuition. ' " 
 
 Quotation 
 from 
 Professor 
 Bowne. 
 
 Obviously, however, the conception of automatic 
 elements does not help us. For we can never 
 rise above automatism, and can only assert of our 
 primary beliefs that we have experienced them, 
 and we can say nothing more. As Professor 
 Bowne says: 
 
 *By Mr. Spencer's own principles, our subjective inability to 
 get rid of these intuitions, is no proof f their objective 
 validity. The inability results entirely from habit. If we had 
 formed other habits, we should have thought otherwise. Besides, 
 Mr. Spencer is the last man who should appeal to our necessary 
 beliefs in support of any thing, for no one has done them 
 greater violence. We have already seen how he insists upon the 
 dually of subject and object as the most fundamental datum of 
 thought, and one which it is impossible for us to transcend ; yet 
 in spite of the impossibility, Mr. Spencer declares them one. 
 He further insists that no effort will enable us to think of 
 thought and motion as alike : yet he assumes it as a first prin- 
 ciple, that they are identical. We inevitably believe that per- 
 sonality is more than a bundle of feelings ; but Mr. Spencer 
 turns this belief out of doors without ceremony. We cannot 
 help thinking that we see things as they are, that the qualities 
 we attribute to them are really in them ; but this belief too, 
 Mr. Spencer cannot abide. There is scarcely a deliverance of our 
 mature consciousness which Mr. Spencer has not insulted and 
 denied. However, something must be saved in the midst of 
 this universal denial, or the universe would vanish in the abysf 
 01 nihilism ; and accordingly Mr. Spencer asks us to grant 
 
ATr. Herbert Spencer Examined. 83 
 
 blra objective existence, and an infinite force, on the sole testi- 
 mony of the same mind which he has loaded with opprobrium 
 as a false witness. He insists upon these things because he 
 cannot start liis system without them ; he denies all the rest, 
 because they are hostile to his system. Can anything be n\ore 
 convenient than this privilege of taking what we like and 
 rejecting what we like ? Who could not build up a system if 
 we could indulge in this little thing ? We cannot grant it, 
 however. The elementary affirmations of the mind must stand or 
 fall together, for no one has any better warrant than the rest."^ 
 
 Mr. Spencer has, however, got a number of first ^^-^^ ^. 
 principles of his own, which he has promoted to principles. 
 the place formerly occupied by the universal and 
 necessary truths he has sought to discredit. These 
 first principles of his are the ultimate generaliza- 
 tions of science; conclusions reached by observa- 
 tion and experiment, and by reasoning based on the 
 results of these. These results have been reached 
 by assuming the stability of the system with which 
 they deal. And physicists are careful to tell us so. 
 There is no diversity of opinion among men who 
 are competent to speak of natural philosophy. 
 We shall quote only one testimony from one of 
 the latest text-books on ' physics ; a testimony 
 which might be endlessly repeated. 
 
 **It cannot be too strongly insisted on that these general 
 principles, the Constancy of Nature, the Law of Causality, 
 Galileo's principle, the Three Laws of Motion, the Indestructi- 
 bility of Matter and of Energy, are of no value for us except in Generalisa- 
 80 far as they are supported by experimental evidence. Tliey g^^^^ * 
 are grouped together here, for the statement of them is necessary not first 
 principles. 
 
 * The Philosophi/ of Uerhert Spencer, pp. 21G, 217. New 
 Yurk, 1881. 
 
34 The Philosophy of 
 
 for comprehension of the results which liave been obtained 
 through their aid. AYe are not here called upon to go through 
 the steps by which they have been arrived at, but we must bear 
 in mind that no a jpriori deduction of them by any metaphysical 
 reasoning is for a moment admissible. The doctrine of the 
 Conservation of Energy is very simple when stated as the result 
 of experiment, and its simplicity has led to statements that the 
 contrary is unthinkable, and that a belief in this doctrine is 
 deeply grounded in the constitution of the mind of man ; but 
 all conclusions derived from such reasoning must be regarded 
 with suspicion, for we must take warning by the example of the 
 ancients, who believed circular motions to be perfect, and 
 heavy bodies to fall faster than light ones, until experimental 
 evidence was adduced to the contrary." ^ 
 
 View of Tlie process described by Mr. Daniell as illegiti- 
 
 Bcientific , ' n Tii/rr ! 
 
 men. mate, is the process pursued by Mr. bpencer m his 
 
 First Principles, The second part of the First 
 Princi^^les may be described as an attempt to trans- 
 form the widest generalizations of science into a 
 priori principles, and the attempt must be charac- 
 terized as a failure. For the results of science 
 have reference to the particular system, which as 
 a matter of fact we have learnt to know. As a 
 system, the finite world we know is of a particular 
 kind. There are definite forces which interact with 
 each other, in ways which may be known, measured, 
 and expressed in mathematical formulaa. But the 
 only way we have of knowing these forces is by 
 way of observation and experiment. This is proven 
 both by the success of the experimental method, 
 and by the well-known failure of the method which 
 
 ^ Danidl'a Text-Book of Physics, p. 8. 
 
Mr. Herbert Spencer Examined. 35 
 
 in a disguised form has been sanctioned by Mr. 
 Spencer. 
 
 Foremost of the laws of the knowable, as enun- P^ 
 
 law 01 
 
 ciated by Mr. Spencer, is the law of evolution, evolution. 
 jNTow we wish to say, that with regard to the theory 
 of evolution .as inunSatedoy Mr. Darwin we do 
 not profess to speak. That theory may be 
 held in such a form as to have no dangerous 
 consequences for philosophy or theology. But 
 the theory of Mr. Spencer, with its far-reaching 
 consequences, is altogether different from the 
 scientific theory of Mr. Darwin, with its limited 
 range and carefully guarded statements. Even 
 Mr. Darwin's theory can never from the nature of 
 the case rise beyond the dignity of a good working 
 hypothesis, an hypothesis attended with many 
 difiiculties. But the view taken by Mr. Spencer 
 may be disproved, and shown to be an untenable 
 hypothesis. 
 
 The starting-point of Mr. Spencer's law of f^^^;^^^^^^ 
 evolution is found in the science of embry- f^^^l^^ 
 ology. "It is settled beyond dispute," he says, 
 "that organic evolution consists in a Aange 
 from the homogeneous to the lieterog^^eouk" 
 This law of organic evolution is extended to all 
 changes whatsoever, and is made the law of all 
 evolution. Now, one would like to know what is 
 meant by homogeneousness. The acorn under 
 favourable conditions becomes an oak ; and from 
 
o6 The FJiilosophy of 
 
 the minute jelly-like cell the completed organism 
 grows. But in what sense can the acorn or the 
 cell he said to be homogeneous ? Only in that sense 
 in which all things are alike in the absence of 
 light. It is obvious that there are differences 
 present in the germ- cell, or why does one become 
 a horse and another a man ? To the eye of reason 
 the germ-cell is as complex as the completed 
 structure. The one is the other made visible. 
 
 The same remark applies to the law of evolution 
 at large. For homogeneousness is never defined 
 by Mr. Spencer, nor is it ever present in any of 
 the illustrations he uses. There are differences, 
 even in the diffused state of matter postulated by 
 the Nebular hypothesis ; and differences are 
 present everywhere. In fact the difficulty with 
 regard to evolution is this, granted homogeneous- 
 ness to account for differentiation. And yet 
 differentiation, or variation, is just that part of 
 evolution which is supposed to account for every 
 thing, and which itself is unaccountable. 
 Difierentia- It Certainly is quite unaccounted for in the 
 
 tion Tin- n -KIT o ^ ^ I' ^ 
 
 hccountabie. systom of Mr. Speucer. We have no rational 
 account of whence it comes, or whither it goes : 
 only this, that differences arise somehow. One of 
 two courses was open to Mr. Spencer : either to 
 admit that all differences are present at the outset, 
 in which case homogeneousness vanishes ; or else 
 to assume a power outside of the homogeneous, 
 
Mr. Herbert Spencer Examined. 37 
 
 which can institute changes, preside over them, 
 and guide them on to a purposed end. The actual 
 course taken by him can have arisen only from 
 lack of clearness of thought. 
 
 Let us glance for a moment at these ultimate 
 generalizations of science which Mr. Spencer has 
 elevated into first principles. There is quite a 
 number of them, but we can only look at one or 
 two. The law of the conservation of energy has 
 become in his hands the persistence of force. As 
 we know the conservation of energy from the 
 researches of natural philosophers, it is intelligible, 
 and has reference to the universe as a conservative 
 system. Science teaches that energy is either 
 kinetic or potential, may be the energy of motion, 
 or the energy of position. Energy is being in- Energy a 
 cessantly stored as virtual power, and restored as ^^^ntity, 
 actual motion. The sum of energy is a constant 
 quantity, but the amount of it which is available 
 is continually decreasing. One result of the doctrine 
 of the conservation of energy is that we are dealing 
 with a finite system which has had a beginning, 
 and will have an end. The universe is likened by 
 Balfour Stewart to a burning candle. 
 
 "We are forced to realize a precise instant before which there r>egrada- 
 were no phenomena, such as those with which we are acquainted, energy 
 and since which the phenomena due to the relations of matter 
 and energy have been occurring : while in the future we have 
 to contemplate a moment at which the whole physical universe 
 will have run itself down like the weights of a clock, and after 
 
38 
 
 The FJiilosophy of 
 
 Force an 
 
 tinreal 
 
 abstraction. 
 
 which an inert uniformly warm mass will represent the whole 
 material order of things."^ 
 
 This doctrine of the conservation of energy is 
 named by Mr. Spencer "the persistence of force," 
 and the nature of it changed in the naming. We 
 make bold to say that no physicist will recognizo 
 the scientific doctrine of energy in the strango 
 presentation of it given by Mr. Spencer, while a 
 medieeval schoolman would hail it with delight as 
 an old friend with a new face. ** Ex nihilo nihil 
 fit " is the olden maxim, which has been renamed 
 the persistence of force, and raised to the position 
 of universal datum, from which all else is deduced. 
 It was a barren maxim in the olden time, nor is it 
 likely to be more fruitful now. Mass and energy 
 are real things, which cannot be increased or 
 diminished, but force is only an abstraction which 
 has no corresponding reality in the world of actual 
 experience. Of course the concrete language of 
 physicists would not lend itself readily to the uses 
 of a philosophy. Had he used their language it 
 would not have been easy for Mr. Spencer to speak 
 of matter and motion as forms of force, and of force 
 as the ultimate of ultimates. 
 
 We here again come across the idea of the 
 homogeneous. But the forces we know are far 
 
 Distinction 
 between 
 gravitation 
 end other 
 forces. 
 
 from being homogeneous. It is true indeed that 
 a number of the physical forces are convertible into 
 
 1 DanidVs Text- Bool: of Physics, p. 45, 
 
Mr. Herbert Spencer Examined. 39 
 
 each other; that light, heat, electricity, etc., may 
 pass each into each and back again. But there is 
 one force which is unique in its nature and action. 
 Other forces are propagated with a finite velocity, 
 the force of gravitation seems to act instan- 
 taneously over the whole universe ; other forces 
 depend on many conditions for their action and 
 existence, gravitation acts on all bodies alike under 
 all conditions, I^o obstacle stays its action, or 
 can hinder it from proceeding in the straight line 
 between the centre of attracting masses. It cannot 
 be exhausted nor increased, but remains constant, 
 every body attracting every other body in pro- 
 portion to the quantity of matter in it. It is 
 unlike all other forces that we know, and yet seems 
 to be the universal condition and measure of them 
 all. It may be remarked here that the work of 
 physicists is not yet finished ; and the doctrine of 
 the conservation of energy, and of the correlation 
 of force, needs a good deal of illustration yet. 
 
 "When Mr. Spencer speaks of the persistence of Kinds of 
 force, we are therefore entitled to ask what kind of 
 force ? Is it a force like gravitation, which is constant, 
 unchangeable, incessant, and inexhaustible ? or is 
 it a force like light, heat, or electricity, which is 
 limited in its manifestations to certain states of 
 body ? Is it a force like life, limited to certain 
 forms of organised matter ? or a force like mental 
 action, which appears only in more limited forms 
 
40 
 
 The Philosophy of 
 
 What wo 
 know is a 
 system of 
 forces. 
 
 Correlation 
 of forces. 
 
 still ? It affords us no rational explanation of tlie 
 world in which we live, or of our own experience, 
 to hypostatise a verbal abstraction, and call it by 
 tlie name of force. What we do know is not force, 
 but a system, of forces, bound together in definite 
 relations ; and these relations can only be rightly 
 understood, or understood at all, when we bring in 
 the purpose of the system, and regard it as a system 
 meant to be conservative. 
 
 It is well to point out also that, while the force 
 of gravitation is used as the final measure of 
 energy, and we measure energy by foot-pounds, 
 yet the force of gravity does not pass into other 
 kinds of force, or if it does, it increases not, nor 
 diminishes. The energy of the sun, which now 
 comes to us as light, as heat, or in other forms, 
 will by and by be exhausted. The molecular 
 movements in the body of the sun will cease, and 
 the sun will no longer be a source of that kind of 
 energy. But even then gravitation will remain, 
 for the force of gravitation depends on the mass 
 and the distance, and will continue to act in a 
 dead universe. The doctrine of the correlation of 
 forces has been established because modes of 
 motion pass into each other, and because Vv^o 
 assume that the system of things is a closed 
 system. But the doctrine of the correlation of forces, 
 excellent though it be as a working hypothesis, 
 and proven true of certain modes of motion, ia 
 
V |:e^SE UBf^ 
 
 I r T. 
 
 OF THE 
 
 AFr. Herbert Spencer Exarrnn^^^^^^^Q^^^^s 
 
 yet not demonstrated true of gravitation, for 
 example. 
 
 It may be granted that it is very likely true of 
 organic forces, though there is as yet only a strong 
 presumption in its favour. But there is not the 
 shadow of presumption in favour of the correlation 
 of mental and physical forces. We write this 
 advisedly, and in full view of Mr. Spencer's oft- 
 repeated statement to the contrary. One of the 
 strongest of these statements is the following : 
 
 " That no idea or feeling arises, save as a result of some 
 physical force expended in producing it, is fast becoming a 
 commonplace of science : and whoever duly weighs the evidence 
 will see that nothing but an overwhelming bias in favour of a 
 pre-conceived theory, can explain its non-acceptance." ^ 
 
 We can account for his affirmation of the corre- Mental ar 
 lation of the mental and physical forces only by forces 
 supposing in Mr. Spencer an overwhelming bias in correlate, 
 its favour. So far is it from being a common- 
 place of science that physical force is expended 
 in producing feeling, that the contradictory of 
 it may be regarded as a commonplace of science. 
 Of the many scientific witnesses we might call, we 
 shall content ourselves with the testimony of one, 
 and that one is an ardent supporter of Mr. Spencer's 
 philosophy : 
 
 " Does the motion produce the feeling, in the same sense that 
 heat produces light ? Does a given quantity of motion dis- 
 
 1 First Principles, p. 280. 
 
42 
 
 The Philosophy of 
 
 Mr. Fislce's 
 testimony. 
 
 Mr, Fislre' 
 
 statement, 
 
 if true, 
 
 fatal 
 
 to Mr. 
 
 Spencer'3 
 
 EVBtem. 
 
 appear, to be replaced by an equivalent quantity of feeling ? 
 By no means. The nerve-motion, in disappearing, is simply 
 distributed into other nerve-motions in various parts of the 
 body; and these other nerve-motions, in their turn, become 
 variously metamorphosed into motions of contraction in muscles, 
 motions of secretion in glands, motion of assimilation in tissues 
 generally, or into yet other nerve-motions. . . If the law of the 
 * correlation of forces ' is to be applied at all to the physical 
 processes which go on within the living organism, we are of 
 necessity bound to render our whole account in terms of motion 
 which can be quantitatively measured. Once admit into the 
 circuit of metamorphosis some element such as feeling that 
 does not allow of quantitative measurement, and the correlation 
 can no longer be established ; we are landed at once in absurdity 
 and contradiction. So far as the correlation of force has any- 
 thing to do with it, the entire circle of transmutation, from the 
 lowest physico-chemical motion all the way up to the highest 
 nerve-motion, and all the way down again to the lowest physico- 
 chemical motion, must be described in physical terms, and no 
 account whatever can be taken of any such thing as feeling or 
 consciousness." ^ 
 
 A bias to tlie contrary cannot be supposed true of 
 Mr. Fiske, or of Dr. David Ferrier, or Du-Bois- 
 Raymond, or of others who have spoken on the 
 subject, all of whom agree with Mr. Fiske, and 
 disagree with Mr. Spencer. If the statement of 
 Mr. Fiske is true, it is fatal to the system of 
 Mr. Spencer ; and if the statement of Mr. Spencer 
 be true, he will have to show its consistency with 
 the conservation of energy. Mr. Spencer shows 
 that strong mental action is accompanied by 
 motion in the blood, as can be seen from a flushed 
 face, and in other ways. But strong mental 
 action ought, on the theory, to be accompanied, 
 
 * Darwinism and other Essays, by John Fiske, p. 72, 
 
Mr. Herbert Spencer Examined. 43 
 
 not by an evolution, but by a disappearance of 
 force. It may be noticed also that Mr. Spencer's 
 mochanical explanation of the origin and differ- 
 entiation of the nervous system, by the supposi- 
 tion of motion in the line of least resistance or 
 of greatest traction, or of the resultant between 
 the two, has now been shown to be inconsistent 
 with embryological facts.^ 
 
 The teaching of science gives no support to The 
 
 persistenco 
 
 Mr. Spencer's datum of the persistence of force, of force un- 
 
 ^ ^ ^ scientific. 
 
 Science discloses to us the working of a system of 
 forces, which by reason of the activity of their 
 interaction must work themselves out, and cease to 
 exert energy. If we wish to get persistence as a 
 foundation for our thought, we must in thought 
 go outside of the system of interacting forces, and 
 postulate some other kind of power. It is eminently 
 unreasonable to abstract from the various kinds of 
 force which we know, only one phase or aspect, 
 and credit that abstraction with the infinite variety 
 of the system. Still more unreasonable is it to 
 identify the eternal energy with the lowest and 
 simplest kind of energy which we can know. And 
 the most unreasonable course of all is to call it 
 " homogeneous." For neither homogeneous force, 
 nor a homogeneous unity of force can be found 
 either in science or in the works of Mr. Spencer. 
 If Mr. Spencer's datum of the persistence of 
 
 1 See Nature, Vol. XXII., p. 420. 
 
44 The Philosophy of 
 
 force is doubtful, much, more doubtful are the other 
 mental forms, so-called by bim, wbicb he deduces 
 spencer's from it. The number of these is great. The 
 dog?aas.^ indostructibility of matter, the continuity of motion, 
 the correlation and equivalence of force, and others. 
 Each, chapter closes with an attempt to show that 
 th.e principle is a direct corollary from the persistence 
 of force, and an a priori truth of the highest cer- 
 tainty. What a pity that the discovery had not 
 been made sooner, what endless travail our toiling 
 men of science would have been spared had they 
 known that mere cogitation could have made them 
 masters of the results won by protracted labour 
 and experiment ! But on Mr. Spencer by the 
 necessity of his system is laid the harder task of 
 proving that laws which have been discovered by 
 Semblance iuductiou, are really a priori truths. The laws 
 entities and which ho calls tt prlori truths bear a suspicious 
 
 quiddities of .. i'it'pt 
 
 the^schooi- resomblauce to the entities and quiddities of the 
 schoolmen. One of these we have already men- 
 tioned, '^ex nihilo nihil fit" is the scholastic equiva- 
 lent of the persistence of force and the indestruc- 
 tibility of matter, while the continuity of motion 
 is nothing else than the old doctrine that " nature 
 abhors a vacuum," or "nature never makes a leap." 
 The only way of knowing whether these are or are not 
 true, is to find out. For many ages it was believed 
 as a matter of fact that matter was destructible, 
 and many people believe it still; no doubt this 
 
 men. 
 
Mr. Herbert Spencer Examined. 45 
 
 belief is incorrect. But its incorrectness is not to 
 be demonstrated on a priori grounds, but in other 
 ways. Mr. Spencer feels obli2:ed Mr. spencer 
 
 *' -^ '- rejects a 
 
 large 
 "to reject a large part of human thinking as not thinking at portion of 
 n , , , ,?. 1 human 
 
 all, but pseudo-thmking ; thinking 
 
 as pseudo- 
 
 and the reason for rejecting it is that it is incon- because^in- 
 
 , , conceivable. 
 
 ceivable. 
 
 "Our inability to conceive matter becoming non-existent is 
 immediately consequent upon the nature of thought itself. 
 Thought consists in the establishment of relations. There can 
 be no relation, and therefore no thought framed, when one of 
 the terms is absent from consciousness."/ 
 
 Now, if tbis sort of argument is good for Mr. f^^^^^^,^ 
 Spencer's purpose, it is good for more. Let us try fJ'loS^^* 
 it with change. Our inability to conceive of change than hS 
 
 is consequent on the nature of thought itself. 
 Thought consists in the establishment of relations. 
 " Only the permanent can change," says Kant. 
 But permanence and change cannot be united in 
 the same act of thought. Let us, however, take 
 Mr. Spencer himself. Let us remind him of his 
 own argumentation about motion,^ and he must 
 acknowledge how vain his argument is about the 
 indestructibility of matter, and how idle his de- 
 monstration of the continuity of motion. 
 
 In truth this endeavour to translate ultimate 
 results of science into a priori truths is exceed- 
 ingly dangerous. Science teaches that the universe 
 
 1 Fir&t Princivlcs, p. 57, etc. 
 
 purpose. 
 
46 
 
 The Philosophy of 
 
 Further 
 incon- 
 sistencies. 
 
 Continuity 
 of motion. 
 
 tends, in virtue of the expenditure of energy, 
 to a state of rest, Avhen all differences of tempera- 
 ture, which are the conditions of motion, shall 
 be merged in identity. In such a state of matters 
 motion will be impossible, and yet Mr. Spencer 
 states that the continuity of motion is an a priori 
 truth. Is not this to throw doubt on the nature 
 of our intelligence, and to bring the dicta of intelli- 
 gence into direct conflict with the system of things? 
 The only proof of the continuity of motion 
 which Mr. Spencer gives is derived from the 
 doctrine of the conservation of energy. Molar 
 motion is continued, and passes into molecular 
 motion. And it is difiicult to think of motion as 
 discontinuous since this discovery has been made. 
 Men have, however, thought that motion was dis- 
 continuous, and could be lost. They could never 
 have thought so if the continuity of motion were 
 an a priori truth, like the truth that two and two 
 make four. If Mr. Spencer should say " that the 
 explanation is that in this, as in countless other 
 cases, men have supposed to think what they do 
 not think," we reply by pointing to the opinion of 
 I^ewton, who was certainly a competent thinker in 
 matters of natural philosophy. We quote from 
 his Optics: 
 
 * From which instance it appears that motion may be gained 
 or lost. By reason of the tenacity of fluids, and attrition of 
 their parts, and the weakness of elastic force in solid bodies. 
 
Ilr. Ilevhevt Spencer Examined. 47 
 
 motion is more readily lost than gained, and is continually de- 
 creasing."^ 
 
 We quote this statement simply for tlie sake of 
 showing that the principle of the continuity of 
 motion cannot he an a priori truth, whatever kind 
 of truth it may he. It has reference to the system 
 of things which we actually find in existence, and 
 is a deduction from the thought that postulates the 
 stahility of the system. 
 
 The truth is that Mr, Spencer's highest postulate ^f- 
 is not the persistence of force, hut the assumption assumption 
 that the present system of things is the only 
 possible system. This assumption can he justified 
 only when we bring in another conception, which 
 Mr. Spencer never uses until he comes to speak of 
 sociology and ethics. The conception of purpose is 
 raised at the very outset of any system, and without 
 it it is impossible to have an intelligent conception 
 of the collocations of matter, or even of the nature 
 of molecular combination, and of the laws of 
 molecular action. The laws of matter are so and 
 so, because they have been made so. In other 
 words, the mechanical explanation of things in- 
 variably leads us beyond itself, and lands us in 
 intelligence as the only rational explanation we 
 can by any possibility have. The persistence of 
 force is a barren postulate, as fruitless and as 
 useless as the companion abstraction of "pure being." 
 1 Optics, p. 341. Ed. 170G. ^ ,. 
 
 UNI VK'RSI-] 
 
48 
 
 The Philosophy of 
 
 Test of 
 truth. 
 
 Its positive 
 as Trell as 
 negative 
 form. 
 
 IV. 
 
 The Grounds of Mr. Spencer's Doctrine of 
 THE " Unknowable." 
 
 This leads us to the test of truth which Mr. 
 Spencer uses. A proposition is true when its 
 opposite cannot be conceived. We remark, how- 
 ever, that the inconceivableness of the opposite 
 is only one of the marks of universal and necessary- 
 truth. It has the disadvantage also of being 
 stated in a negative form. In a positive form, the 
 statement is that a priori truths are self-evident as 
 soon as they are seen and understood. The mind 
 asserts the knowledge of them to be true and valid, 
 and self-evident. Mr. Spencer's principle is the 
 same principle in a negative form. We try to 
 think the contrary to be true, and we find it im- 
 possible. If the principle be a primitive and 
 universal one, the impossibility to thought of its 
 contradictory is universal. 
 
 The advantage of having this test of truth stated 
 in its positive as well as in its negative form lies 
 here. It shows to us our primitive beliefs do not 
 arise from mental weakness, but from mental power. 
 It is not a negation of knowledge arising from our 
 inability to think, but an assertion of mental 
 activity so positive that it carries in itself the 
 consciousness that it is impossible io think the 
 
Mr, Herbert Spencer Examined. 4V 
 
 opposite. Hamilton's theory of mental imbecility, 
 professedly applied by him to explicate the causal 
 judgment, vanishes at once when it is seen that 
 the causal judgment is an act, not of mental weak- 
 ness, but of mental power. 
 
 In the application of this test of knowledge in 
 its negative form, Mr. Spencer varies. Sometimes 
 he means by inconceivable what cannot be pictured 
 in imagination, sometimes what cannot be expressed 
 in a concept, and sometimes what is unthinkable. 
 But the conceivable cannot be limited to the 
 imaginable ; if it were, all knowledge expressed in 
 abstract terms would be unreal and untrue. We 
 have positive knowledge of what we mean by the 
 word book, to our imagination we can only picture 
 one particular book. Sometimes Mr. Spencer uses 
 the word inconceivable in this sense; but it is 
 obvious that he only does so when no other test of 
 inconceivability would readily apply. 
 
 More frequently, however, he uses the word in- ^^^^"^^l^^ 
 conceivable to indicate that which cannot be ab^^^^" 
 classed. This is the difficulty which he has himself 
 added to the verbal dexterities he has borrowed 
 from Hamilton and Mansel, and he elaborates it 
 with great delight in the chapter on the relativity 
 of knowledge. If we say that the knowledge of 
 the individual precedes the knowledge of the general 
 notion, and the knowledge of the general notion is 
 dependent on the knowledge of the individual, wo 
 
 
60 The Philosophy of 
 
 only say what every one knows to be true. But 
 Mr. Spencer will not allow us to suppose tliat we 
 can know a concrete individual unless we can class 
 it under a logical concept. In which case, we may 
 remark, we can never know an individual. We 
 must assert, however, that the concrete individual 
 is the starting-point of thought, and knowledge of 
 the individual precedes the formation of the concept. 
 The qualities of the individual are known before 
 they can be known as characteristics of a kind or 
 class. The procedure of Mr. Spencer is based 
 on the assumption that our knowledge of an indi- 
 vidual is derived from the general notion, and can 
 extend no further, and affirms nothing else than we 
 can obtain from the analysis of the concept. This 
 is not the only instance of atavism which we have 
 found in Mr. Spencer's reasoning. It is the method 
 of the schoolmen; and if it be true, there is no 
 possibility of synthetic judgment either a priori or 
 a posteriori. 
 
 In dealing with The Universal Postulate of Mr. 
 
 Spencer, we have been insensibly led on to his 
 
 Theun- doctriue of the ** unknowable." To this dogma of 
 
 knowable. 
 
 his, we now direct attention. At the outset we 
 have to complain that he has applied one measure 
 to the truth of science, and another to the truth of 
 religion. He has endeavoured to prove that the 
 ultimate scientific realities, represented by ultimate 
 scientific ideas, are unknowable because unthink- 
 
Mr. Herbert Spencer Examined. 51 
 
 able. Mind, matter, space, time, force, are forms 
 of the " unknowable." But this does not prevent 
 Mr. Spencer from dealing with all these realities, 
 or from formulating a certain number of propo- 
 sitions regarding their nature and action. The 
 dread of committing himself to alternate impossi- 
 bilities has not hindered him from tracing in his 
 own way the genesis of our conceptions of these 
 "unthinkable" realities. But it was a sufficient 
 justification for denying the truth of religious ideas 
 and affirmations, to show that the affirmation of 
 the object of religion committed us "to alternate 
 impossibilities of thought." On his own showing, 
 the truths of religion must have, or may have, as 
 great a relative validity as the truths of science 
 aijd philosophy. 
 
 In conclusion, we shall look at the reasonings 
 by which Mr. Spencer believes himself to have 
 demonstrated that the ultimate reality is utterly 
 unknowable. The reasonings he has excogitated 
 for himself as well as those which he has borrowed 
 from Sir William Hamilton and Dean Manse], 
 are dearraded forms of the antinomies of Kant. The 
 
 o antinomies 
 
 They suffered their first degradation when o^^ant. 
 Hamilton changed the positive affirmations of 
 mind into mental weakness, and substituted for 
 the positive judgment of causality the negative 
 conception of being unable to conceive a be- 
 ginning. They suffered a second degradation 
 
52 The Philosophy of 
 
 at the hands of Dean Mansel, and a third 
 degradation at the hands of Mr. Spencer. But 
 what cogency the argument may have is all 
 derived from Kant, and has gained nothing, hut 
 rather lost in the hands of the others. The 
 strength of the argument lies here, that from the 
 nature of the reason we necessarily helieve in two 
 contradictory propositions. Kant's antinomies are 
 four, and they emerge when we consider the idea of 
 tlie world. The thesis is that the world is limited 
 in time and space, and the antithesis equally affirms 
 that it is not thus limited. A second antinomy is 
 that the world consists of simple parts, and the anti- 
 thesis is that no simple substances exist. The third 
 antinomy is, that free will exists, and the antithesis 
 is that it does not exist, but everything happens 
 necessarily under the laws of nature. And the 
 fourth is that an absolute Being exists, and the 
 antithesis is that absolute Being exists nowherej 
 Are they lu thoso antinomies we have the type after which _ 
 
 dictory? all the argumentation of Hamilton, Mansel, and 
 Spencer has been fashioned. Once we get the 
 model, the manufacture may go on without limit. 
 But the question arises are the antinomies con- 
 tradictory of each other ? and the apostles of the 
 "unknowable" answer in the affirmative. But if 
 we must believe in contradictory propositions, then 
 reason is no longer trustworthy, and cannot be 
 trusted in any affirmation it may happen to make. 
 
Mr. Herbert Spencer Examined, 53 
 
 The contradiction arises only when we lamly (JfTxpianation 
 
 . . . ofanti- 
 
 assume that there is only one kind of being in the ^o^^es. 
 universe. If we suppose that there are more kinds of 
 beings than one, then the thesis may be true of one, 
 and the antithesis of another. There is no contra- 
 diction when we say that the material universe is 
 limited in time and space, and apply the unlimited 
 not to the universe but to time and space, which 
 cannot be conceived as limited except by further 
 time and space. There is no contradiction if we 
 say that the world is limited, and say that God is 
 unlimited. To pass to the second antinomy, can 
 we rationally affirm both the thesis and antithesis 
 here. I can affirm both of myself. I am conscious 
 of myself persisting in self-identity throughout the 
 years ; and I am also conscious of the actions, 
 feelings, thoughts, which are mine. Both sides of 
 the antinomy are realised as complementary of 
 each other, in the unity of self- consciousness. The 
 antinomy is reconciled also in any unity in which 
 opposites meet, or where many qualities manifest 
 the nature of any one thing. The third antinomy 
 finds its solution in the affirmation that some beings 
 are free and others are not free, because some beings 
 are personal and others are impersonal. Freedom 
 and necessity may also be predicated of the same 
 person. I express the antinomy thus, " I am free 
 to bind myself," a proposition which at once 
 unites the antinomy, and which everyone knows to 
 e2 
 
64 
 
 The Philosophy of 
 
 be true. With regard to the fourth autiuomy of 
 Kant, which refers to the existence of the absolute 
 and both affirms and denies its existence, we may 
 remark that the contradiction vanishes when we 
 assume that there is an absolute, and that there is 
 a relative, which is rooted and grounded in the 
 absolute. 
 
 Thus the exercise of a little common sense will 
 largely set us free from the tyranny of the antinomies 
 of pure reason, and will lead us on to see that 
 reason does not belie itself in its deepest affirma- 
 tions. What has enabled us to escape from the 
 antinomies of Kant will also lead us out of the 
 dilemmas of Herbert Spencer. Let us take one of 
 the antinomies or contradictions paraded by him : 
 
 Examina- 
 tion of 
 a specimen 
 contra- 
 diction. 
 
 " If we now go a step further, and ask what is the nature of 
 the First Cause, we are driven by an inexorable logic to certain 
 further conclusions. Is the First Cause finite or infinite ? If 
 we say finite we involve ourselves in a dilemma. To think 
 of the first cause as finite, is to think of it as limited. To 
 think of it as limited, necessarily implies a conception of some- 
 thing beyond its limits : It is absolutely impossible to conceive 
 a thing as bounded, without conceiving a region surrounding its 
 boundaries. What now must we say of this region ? If the 
 First Cause is limited, and there consequently lies something 
 outside of it, this something must have no First Cause must 
 be uncaused , But if we admit that there can be something 
 uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause for anything." ^ 
 
 We place alongside of this the following sentence 
 from Mr. Spencer : 
 
 ^ First Principles, p. 37. 
 
Ilr, Herbert Spencer Examined. 55 
 
 , ** Amid the mysteries which become the more mysterioii. the The one 
 more they are thought about, there will remain the one absolute f^lfai^^ 
 certainty, that he is ever in presence of an Infinite and Eternal 
 Energy, from which all things proceed,"^ 
 
 We are not aware that any one interested in 
 religion or in philosophy demanded anything more 
 from a First Cause than this. "What reason asks 
 from a First Cause is that it he equal to the pro- 
 duction of all the effects. It is not necessary for 
 reason to say whether it is limited or unlimited, 
 any more than it is necessary to say that it is 
 black or white. I "If we admit that there can be 
 something uncaused, there is no reason to assume 
 a cause for anything.'' We do not assume a cause 
 for existence ; what reason demands is that every 
 beginning or that every change must have a cause. 
 Cause is necessary to account for beginning and for 
 change, and as the correlative of this axiom it 
 assumes as another principle that there is a being 
 itself unchanged, which is the cause of all changes." 
 
 It were tedious to pass through the various 
 contradictions heaped together by Mr. Spencer. 
 More strange than anything we have seen is the 
 affirmation which lie makes of the absolute cer- 
 tainty we have of an Infinite and Eternal Energy 
 from which all things proceed. If we were to 
 treat this after the Spencerian fashion, we should 
 have to ask how a conditioned and relative intelli- 
 
 ^ Nineteenth Century, January, 1884. 
 
56 The Philosophy of 
 
 gence can attain to absolute certainty ? How a 
 being can be called unknowable when we know it 
 to be Infinite and Eternal Energy ? "When we 
 gather together into one thought all that Mr. 
 Spencer affirms regarding the "unknowable," we 
 find that it is an absolute being, that it is an 
 omnipresent power, that it is incomprehensible, 
 and that it is the proper object of religious rever- 
 ence, and that we are ever in its presence, and 
 from it all things proceed. Truly we must come 
 to the conclusion that the word " unknowable " 
 is used only in a Spencerian sense. We have only 
 to say further of this Power, that it is conscious 
 spirit, and is intelligent and personal, and we shall 
 have all that is needed for religious life and 
 thought. If we can be absolutely certain that we 
 are in presence of an Eternal Infinite Energy, we 
 can be certain of more. By this affirmation Mr. 
 Spencer has transcended his own manufactured 
 contradictions as much as if he had gone on to 
 transcribe the Creed of Christendom in order to 
 conclude with it his Nineteenth Century article. 
 Summary "We have sceu then that Mr. Spencer's objections 
 
 and con- 
 clusion, from the nature of consciousness breaks down 
 
 when we come to understand what consciousness 
 
 really means. "We have seen that he could Lot 
 
 even describe consciousness without implying the 
 
 continued existence of the self-conscious subject. 
 
 "We have seen also that the self-conscious subject 
 
 I 
 
Mr. Herbert Spencer Exaonined. 57 
 
 has definite ways of acting, willing, thinking ; 
 forms into which all its experience falls. We 
 have seen also that Mr. Spencer's attempt to 
 manufacture a priori principles, and to change the 
 ultimate generalisations of science into first prin- 
 ciples, resulted in failure, because they all involved 
 the stability of the system of things. We have 
 seen also that the " alternate impossibilities " of 
 thought arise only from confounding one kind of 
 being with another; and in conclusion that the 
 afiirmations of Mr. Spencer had only to be extended 
 a little further in order to include all we need. 
 
 The contradictions detailed at such length in the 
 opening part of First Principles do not prove what 
 Mr. Spencer supposes them to do : on the contrary, 
 they prove only that there are different orders 
 of being, and that our knowledge of being is real, 
 and that the distinction we draw between the 
 absolute and the relative, between independent and 
 dependent being, between personal and impersonal 
 being, is true and valid; and the contradictions 
 arise only when Mr. Spencer blends in one con- 
 fusion, and utterly.disregards the distinctions which 
 reason draws. If God exists, then reason is in 
 harmony with itself and with reality as known. 
 We have a real knowledge of God, just as we have wehave 
 a real knowledge of ourselves. In neither case do knowledge 
 
 1-11 11- of God. 
 
 we claim that our knowledge is complete and ex- 
 haustive. The mystery of existence may overpass 
 
58 Philosophy of Mr. Herbert S])encer Examined. 
 
 God has 
 
 wrought 
 and spoken. 
 
 our kuowledge. To-day, as in former days, man 
 must say, " "Who can find out the Almighty unto 
 perfection ? ", And yet, when all is said that can 
 be said about the measureless mystery which 
 wraps us round, and the unexplored heights and 
 depths which are around us on every side, we may 
 rest secure in the persuasion that our knowledge is 
 true and real. Eeverence bows low in the presence 
 of the eternal silence ; and uplifts itself to hear the 
 voice that breaks the silence. The living God has 
 wrought, and the living God has spoken, and we 
 have heard His voice. We do not need to go back 
 to the time when men built altars to the unknown 
 God, for He whom men did ignorantly worship has 
 been revealed. We do know ,the God who has 
 revealed Himself in the universe, who is the Author 
 of its beauty, the Upholder of its order, and the 
 Guide of it to its appointed goal. We do know 
 the Eedeemer God, the Eestorer of the course of 
 the sinful world to eternal purity and peace ; we 
 do know the living God and Jesus Christ whom 
 He has sent. And though much remain unknown, 
 yet the knowledge is sure, and may be vindicated 
 on grounds of reason, that " of Him, and through 
 Him, and unto Him, are all things. To Him be 
 the glory, for ever. Amen." 
 
 Our 
 
 knowledge 
 of God 
 may be 
 vindicated 
 on grounds 
 oi reason. 
 
 -s>-^ Present Day Tracts, No. 29. |-- 
 
MODERN PESSIMISM. 
 
 BY THE 
 
 BEY. J. EADFOED THOMSON, M.A., 
 
 AUTHOR OP 
 
 "The "Witness of Man's Moral Nature to CHRisriAxiTY." 
 
 
 
 THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY: 
 
 56 Paternoster Row, and 65 St. Paul's Churchyard. 
 
^rrjumcrjt of iTuc TrtxcU 
 
 Human life being composite, joy and sorrow being alike 
 facts of experience, various theories have been advanced 
 for its explanation. Pessiraism is the doctrine that all 
 things are for the worst, that there is no Benevolent Ruler 
 of the Universe, and no hope of happiness for man. A 
 revival of Oriento.l Buddhism, Pessimism at present prevails 
 largely in several countries of Europe. The metaphysical 
 bases of Pessimism are described, and its doctrines, as 
 wrought out by Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann, are 
 explained. Specimens are given of the gloomy view taken 
 by Pessimists of human existence. 
 
 The unreasonableness of Pessi mism as a Phi losophy i s 
 then exhibi ted. The error and unfairness of the Pessimist 
 view of life are next exposed. An estimate is offered of the 
 value of life, and it is shown that Christianity alone is able 
 to solve the problem. 
 
 The Tract concludes with a picture of the evils which 
 the prevalence of Pessimism would involve, and with a 
 contrast between the fruits of this system and those of the 
 Religion of Christ 
 
MODERN PESSIMISM, 
 
 Pessimism a Philosophy of Human Life. 
 
 fEN. in tlie exercise of observation, r eflec- 
 
 j Jjon, find rPflgnm'n^ nnnTinf ]} nt endeavo ur 
 
 to construct a philosophy (^ life. The 
 children of nature may indeed accept 
 all experience without inquiry ; they may be con- 
 tent without seeking a harmony in life's varied 
 voices, without asking for a clue to life's perplexing 
 mysteries. But as soon as men begin to regard Men are 
 
 .. ^ ^ ! 1-1 11 constrained 
 
 existence as a whole, to consider the world as a to construct 
 
 n , . a philosophy 
 
 problem, to demand reasons for their own nature otme. 
 and experiences, for their own history and hopes, 
 ^they must theorize, j In fashioning for themselves 
 a p hilosophy of life, men will of nece ssity ]?f iti 
 ^^A ienced by individual temperament ; some are by 
 nat ure cheerful, and some are by nature morose. 
 ^rcumstances, too, both personal and domestic^ 
 
 both social and political, will largely affect their 
 s peculations and determine t heir con clusions.^ 
 
Modern Pessimism, 
 
 Human life 
 
 composite 
 
 Joy and 
 (iorrow aliko 
 natural and 
 jucvitable. 
 
 How can it 
 be ex- 
 plained ? 
 
 To the 
 Christian, 
 enlightened 
 by Reve- 
 lation, life 
 appears a 
 probation 
 and a dis- 
 cipliue. 
 
 It needs little experience, little observation, to 
 discern that life is a many-coloured web, in whicb 
 the bright warp of happiness is crossed by the dull 
 sombre weft of pain and sadness. Human experi- 
 ence abounds in sorrow and privation, in perplexity 
 and difficulty, in misfortunes and disappointments, 
 in sins and fears. Man's body is often weak, and 
 unfit for the demands made upon it; his intellect 
 is beset by doubts which cannot be solved; his 
 liaart has aspirations which cannot be satisfied; 
 his lot is liable to vicissitudes, to calamities, to 
 untimely end. 
 
 What explanation can be given of our existence ? 
 where shall its unity bo grasped ? whence shall 
 its purport and its prospects bo beheld ? Is a 
 philosophy of life possible? and if so, who will 
 help us to achieve it? 
 
 As Christians, accepting the Word of God as of 
 Divine authority, wc are not dependent for guid- 
 ance in such a path, of inquiry upon the specula- 
 tions of unaided human reason. We claim for 
 revealed religion that its representations of human 
 life are just and adequate, satisfying to the intellect 
 and the conscience. This is because the Scriptures 
 support and amplify the soundest and loftiest 
 teaching of reason, and add to this teaching declara- 
 tions, sanctions, motive^, and prospects peculiarly 
 their own. Christians have learned to exalt the 
 spiritual nature of man, at the same time that they 
 
Modern Pessimism. 
 
 realize tlie fact of human sin. To them man's 
 earthly course is a probation and a discipline, the 
 moral relations of man with his Divine Lord and 
 Father are of supreme importance, and this state 
 of being is preparatory to one ampler, richer, and 
 immortal. 
 
 As a matter of fact, philosophies of life have various 
 been wrought out in all cultivated communities, proposed. 
 both in ancient and in modern times. They have 
 differed from one another, both in the measure of 
 fairness with which they have contemplated the 
 facts of human existence, and in the measure of 
 sagacity and insight with which they have appre- 
 hended the true and Divine meaning underlying 
 what is apparent. 
 
 arize, ife 
 Hmism \ 
 
 To particularize, /chore are two opposite theories T woopposito, 
 
 known as Dptimiwf and pp.mmiRm: two thfiorins Sxl'l'^^ 
 which regard the -sami^ facts in entirely opposite _S ^'^.''''" 
 lights^ According to the adv no.nfpa nf fhft first-^f and"^''"" 
 th ese doctrines, this is the hesf: of oil pnnn'blf* 
 worlds, life_is fraug ht with happitiessJ-jnaa-i^ -. 
 cap able of development in all excelle d ^?, npd f^^ 
 ^prospect ^j^fore the humnn rnce is hngbt arid 
 
 _alluring. Tf. is^ TinwftvPr^ fr> fh^ pVn'1r>gr>pTiy wliinli - 
 
 is diametrically oppo site to tbi^ fhnt wp invifp fba 
 attent ion of the rea der.! ^ 
 (Pe ssimism is the very expressive name given t o 
 tke doctrine that this is the worst of all possible 
 worlds, that human life necessarily contains moro 
 
Modern Pessvniism, 
 
 Pessimism 
 defined. 
 
 Taken here 
 in a strict 
 Beiise. 
 
 pain than pleasure, that there is no prospect of 
 improvement in the human lot, that life is not 
 worth livinp^, and th a t conscious existence mu st 
 b eregarded as the worst of all possible evils . [ 
 I It is true that the term in question is often more 
 loosely employe d. In popular la nguage those 
 persons^r e called Pe ssi mists who take a gloomy 
 ^nd despondent view of their own lot, and of the 
 prospects of society at larg e. \ Wq meet with 
 manifestations of the pessimistic spirit ih a cynical' 
 style of conversation not uncommon among educated 
 men of a certain temperament, and in the sceptical, 
 hopeless tone of very much of modern literature. 
 But we have to deal here with a reasoned and 
 elaborate system of belief, having all the preten- 
 sions of a philosophy. 
 
 Occasional 
 signs of the 
 Pessimistic 
 spirit in the 
 ancient 
 Hebrew and 
 Greek 
 literature. 
 
 II. 
 
 Pessimism a Eevival of Ancient Buddhism. 
 
 Symptoms of a Pessimistic spirit are to be remarked 
 occasionally in ancient literature. In the Old Tes- 
 tament books of Job and Ecclesiastes are sweeping 
 statements regarding the misery of life, prompted 
 by phases of experience through which certain 
 characters are recorded to have passed. Some of 
 the great Greek tragedies pour tray the helplessness 
 of man in the presence of an iiTCsistible and 
 apparently malignant fate. But it is generally 
 
Modern Pessimism, 
 
 admitted that the tone of tlio earlier Hebrew 
 literature, and tlie tone of classical antiquity is 
 rather optimistic than otherwise. Life seemed, 
 especially to the Greeks, a thing beautiful and 
 precious in itself, and man was regarded by them 
 as born for happiness. 
 
 The most remarkable development of Pessimism 
 in ancient times is to be sought in the theosophies 
 and religions of the distant East. /Fov thousands 
 of years India has been the home of the philosophy The hopeless 
 
 ' . tone of the 
 
 of hopelessness. It may have been owmg par::ly \f^^^^'^ 
 to the poverty, want, and misery, which have been and religion. 
 for ages the lot of untold myriads of Orientals, 
 and partly to the prevalence of cruelty and oppres- 
 sion in political relations ; in any case, the Hindus 
 see m always to have found a solution of their 
 difficulties, and a shelter from their wretchedness, 
 in a philosophy which has fully admitted the evils 
 they have experienced, and has in some measure 
 armed them for endurance, j Brahmanism has ever 
 taught the vanity and misery of human life, and 
 held out the prospect of absorption into the Infinite 
 Being as the highest attainable blessedness. 
 
 But whilst the Brahmanic philosophy represents 
 the created world as a fact to be mourned over, 
 the evil of which can only be remedied, or rather 
 neutralized, in the way proposed, Buddhism is Jj^'^/^J^^JJ^j 
 far more thorough-going in its Pessimism. This i*essimism. 
 influential system of belief and of conduct, which 
 
8 Modem Pesaimism. 
 
 came into existence five centuries before Christ, 
 and whiciL has exercised influence so immense in 
 India, Ceylon, Thibet, and China, has been desig- 
 nated " the great heresy of the East." Much as 
 has been written upon Buddhism, discussion is strU 
 carried on with regard to some of its leading doc- 
 trines. The author of Esoteric Buddhism would 
 have us believe that we in the West are still all 
 Holding but ignorant of this pretentious theosophy. Still, 
 humanity '^ye may bc assured that Buddhism is Pessimism, 
 
 no hope save ' ' 
 
 kuoa!" P^^^ ^^^ simple, that it acknowledges no Creator, 
 no absolute Being, whilst its only desirable prospect 
 in the future is that Nirvana, which is understood 
 to be utter extinction and annihilation, or at all 
 events an eternal and passionless repose. 
 
 "Buddha, Eckhart, and myself," said Schopen- 
 hauer, "in the main teach the same doctrine." 
 Pessimism is indeed the Buddhism of the nineteenth 
 century. Buddha was a theologian, Schopenhauer 
 
 Modern a phHosopher. Buddhism was a Gospel for sages ; 
 
 Pessimists , ^ . 
 
 ^cknow-icdge Pessimism professes to be a Gospel for humanity. 
 
 Luddhism. ^^^ modern Pessimism has been well described as 
 *' Buddhism without Buddha/' Sakya Mouni was 
 not a philosopher who constructed a system for the 
 adoption of others only, while he himself dwelt apart 
 from human experiences of privation; he had a 
 deeply-rooted conviction of the evil and misery of 
 life, a conviction manifested not only in his 
 teaching, but in his whole life and ministry. 
 
Modern Pessimism. 
 
 That Buddhism should prove itself the great 
 missionary faith of heathendom, that it should have 
 been accepted by so many millions as the true phi- 
 losophy of life and the true relieion, that it should '^^^ power 
 
 ^ , , o J ^ andpopu- 
 
 have retained its hold upon vast populations for 5?iddMsm 
 successive generations and ages, that it should 
 afford some satisfaction to multitudes of thoughtful 
 and virtuous men as the best solution of life's 
 enigmas, and the best guide in life's perplexities : 
 all this is proof that there is in it a doctrine, 
 a principle, which responds to some deep-seated 
 sentiments in the human breast. It is very re- 
 markable that in our own day there should be an 
 attempt to introduce the Buddhist theosophy, with- 
 out any disguise, among the educated classes of 
 Britain and America, as the most profound and 
 satisfying of all known theories of man and of the 
 universe ! 
 
 It is certainly singular that the very same 
 Pessimism, which has prevailed so widely and so The strango 
 
 '^ .... revival of 
 
 long in the East, should be revived. in this nine- ?f^j^^^^ 
 teenth century among the most educated and JSnetLntia 
 advanced peoples of Europe, How is it to be ^^*^y- 
 explained that an age of enlightenment, of wide- 
 spread education, of unexampled material, me- 
 chanical and scientific progress, of political energy, 
 of social liberty, of missionary enterprise, should 
 give birth to so strange a product ? In a state of 
 society stationary, dull, unenterprising, such a 
 
10 
 
 Alodeim Fessimism. 
 
 phenomenon would appear explicable, if not natural. 
 Its apparent J3ut in tlio natious of Western Europe there seems 
 
 discordance 
 
 with the 
 temper of 
 the ajrc. 
 
 much scope for activity, so much appreciation 
 of mental power, so much room for progress, and 
 so much stimulus to hope, that Pessimism seems 
 altogether out of place. Especially is this so, 
 when we consider the vitality and the growth of 
 Christianity, which, notwithstanding repeated and 
 powerful attacks, does far more than hold its own 
 in the moral conflict of the world. 
 
 However, the fact must be acknowledged, an.l 
 the issue must be faced. In Germany, the de- 
 pressing doctrines of Schopenhauer and Von Ilart- 
 raann have been received by multitudes among 
 the educated classes as a Gospel of despair ; a 
 Pessimistic school of philosophy has been formed, 
 and a Pessimistic literature has arisen. The same 
 way of regarding human life and the universe has 
 spread to other nations, and Pessimism is not 
 without its adherents and its influence in Franco 
 and in England. In fact, much of the sceptical 
 and cynical writing of our day, to be met with 
 in our reviews and magazines, is simply saturated 
 with Pessimism. We meet constantly with a tone 
 of cynicism and despondency, for the explanation, 
 the source, of which, we must look to the philosophy 
 in question. A vein of Pessimism runs through the 
 conversation and the literary compositions even of 
 those who might be supposed exempt from an in- 
 
Modern Pessimism. 11 
 
 fluence of the kind. The young, the cultured, the 
 wealthy, the fortunate and prosperous, are to bo 
 found among the disciples of this school.^ 
 I ^e question, which has been so keenly debated . 
 " Mljfe tcorlh living ? " could never have arisen in 
 an age which was alien from Pessimistic specul a- 
 tions. It is certainly an indication of a habit niiferencft 
 
 T .^ - of estimate 
 
 of going down to the vovy roots of controversy. -^^/^Vo/ufe. 
 that such a question should have been mooted an d 
 disc ussed. 12 plea sure be re garded as the only, o r 
 tl ie chief element which gives value to life, it i s 
 certain that different sides will be taken in this 
 debate. Mr. Herbert Spencer maintains that th e 
 a nswer to .^he question depends upon th ^ prppon - 
 d e ranee of pleasure over pain, or of pain ov^r 
 pleas ure; and evidently inclines to thf^ opinion thai. 
 "the excess of pleasures decides the value of life . 
 The same test however, when applied by th e 
 school of Schopenhauer, leads to the convictio n 
 that pain is the master force, and that conscious 
 existence is in itself an evil, j] 
 
 * It has been remarked by an Edinburgji reviewer (April, 
 1879) that many of the extreme departures from Christian 
 orthodoxy which have marked our own times have been revivals 
 of ancient systems. Certainly modern Materialism is simply 
 the old doctrine of Epicurus and Lucretius, adapted to the state 
 of modern physical science. The new Catholicism which has 
 made way among some classes of our own countrymen is the medicc- 
 V val theology reanimated. Mr. Matthew Arnold's moral Idealism 
 h little more than Confucianism. In like manner the Pessimism, 
 in exposition of which so many volumes have been written, 
 especially in Germany, is substantially the Buddhism of live 
 cciituries before Christ. 
 
12 Modern Pessimism. 
 
 III. 
 
 The Advocacy and Prevalence of Pessimism 
 IN Italy, Eussia, England, and especially 
 IN Germany. 
 
 It would be impossible, and it is unnecessary, 
 here to enumerate all the symptoms of Pessimism 
 which have appeared in our century, or even to 
 mention the names of all the notable champions 
 of the system. It must suffice to refer to the 
 poetical Pessimism of the Italian Leopardi, to the 
 social and literary Pessimism of Russia, and to the 
 philosophical Pessimism of Gfermany; the last 
 being by far the most important and influential. 
 Even so limited a review will serve to convince the 
 reader that the philosophy which we are here 
 treating is amongst the great forces of our age. 
 The life of Lcopardi, the Italian poet, who was bom ten 
 Leo*'ai-di jeai'S after Schopenhauer, and who died before he 
 was forty (1798-1837), was a thorough-going 
 Pessimist. He does not seem to have been in 
 any way acquainted with the speculations of his 
 German contemporary, nor were his views of life 
 based upon any metaphysical doctrines. In his 
 youth he was devoted to study, and acquired con- 
 siderable classical learning ; he was regarded as a 
 man of genius, from whom great things were 
 
Modern Pessimism. 
 
 hoped. Tnough of a noble family, his means were 
 very narrow, and circumstances no doubt concurred 
 with wretched health to sadden and darken his 
 views of liie. His reputation rests upon his original 
 poetry, his translations, and upon some critical 
 works. He himself denied that his philosophical 
 opinions were the result of his misfortunes. "I nis misery 
 
 A and hatreti 
 
 would beg of my readers," he wrote, "to bum my ^^^^- 
 writings rather than attribute them to my suffer- 
 ings." Still, how otherwise can we account for 
 the weariness and disgust of life which took 
 possession of him in the spring-time of youth? 
 When only nineteen he spoke of " the obstinate, 
 black, and barbarous melancholy '' which devoured 
 and destroyed him ; when twenty he wrote, 
 
 " I have passed years so full of bitterness, that it seeras im- 
 possible for worse to succeed them." 
 
 At a later period he thus expressed his feelings : 
 
 * ' I am weary of life, and weary of the philosophy of indiffer- 
 ence, which is the only cure for misfortune and ennuis b'lt 
 which at length becomes an ennui itself. I look and hope for 
 nothing but death." 
 
 In 1830, when dedicating his Canti to his Tuscan 
 friends, he thus referred to his ill-health and dis- 
 appointments : 
 
 "My sufferings are incapable of increase; already my mis- 
 fortune is too great for tears. I have lost everything, and am 
 but a trunk that feels and suffers. " 
 
 Leopardi cannot be suspected of affectation. It 
 is reasonable to regard his distressing emotions and 
 
14 
 
 Modern PesshMsm, 
 
 of las state 
 of laind. 
 
 Explanation \ his pessimistic doctrines as largely the consequence 
 of bodily weakness and pain, and of disappointed 
 social and literary ambition, uncbastened by any 
 faith in Divine Providence, unrelieved by any 
 prospect of a happier life in the future. Physically 
 incapable of many of life's pleasures, he passionately 
 yearned for them. He was conscious of abilities 
 which his circumstances would not allow to develop 
 and mature. He loved apparently in vain, j 
 
 Soured and dissatisfied, Leopardi evidently em- 
 bodied in his letters, his dialogues, his poems, his 
 distorted views of life. Nothing in literature is 
 more sad than his language regarding human 
 existence. Infelicitd misery is, according to 
 him, the only explanation which can be given of 
 human affairs ; this is universal and irremediable, 
 such is our only certainty. " The most happy 
 lot," said he, "is not to live." " Human conscious- 
 ness is itself a curse, and the brute and the plant 
 are happier than man." "Our life, what is it 
 worth, but to despise it ? " " When will Infelicitd 
 perish ? When all ends ! " 
 
 His philosophy has thus been summarized by 
 Edwards, the translator of his works: 
 
 His 
 
 judgment 
 of the 
 human lot, 
 and his 
 despair. 
 
 " The universe is an enigma totally insoluble. The sufferings 
 of mankind exceed all good that men experience. Progress, or 
 as we call it, civilization, instead of lightening men's sufferings, 
 increases them ; since it enlarges man's capacities for suffering, 
 without propoi-tionately augmenting his means of enjoyment." 
 
 In short, Leopardi explicitly envied the dead, and 
 
Modern Pessimism. 15 
 
 lamented the infinite vanity of all things. (L'infinita 
 vanita del tutto.) 
 
 Yet Leopardi was a patriot, a patriotic poet. 
 In the Italy of his time there was little to encourage 
 hope. His poetry sang of Italy's past greatness and 
 glory; ho cherished no expectation of national 
 revival. Events have shown that his estimate 
 was mistaken ; his pessimism, as far as his country 
 was concerned, has heen proved unjustifiable. 
 
 There is one country in Europe in which Pessi- 
 mism has penetrated to the lower strata of society. 
 That country is Eussia, the empire of absolutism 
 in political life, of ignorance and superstition in 
 religion. It is remarkable and suggestive that, Nihilism 
 notwithstanding the emancipation of the serfs, and ?^^^^"^^? 
 other steps taken in keeping with the march of 
 modern civilization, discontent so largely pervades 
 the Muscovite empire. The young and the intel- 
 lectual, women as well as men, furnish active and 
 enthusiastic supporters to the cause of revolution ; 
 Europe is periodically startled by proofs of the 
 boldness, the secrecy, the self-immolation of the 
 Nihilists. The existence of Pessimist sects among 
 the common people may be a symptom of that deep 
 unrest which cannot but prevail in a community 
 where personal liberty is unknown, where corrup- 
 tion is the canker of the official classes, where there 
 is no publicity in the administration of so-called 
 justice, and where there are no open and legitimate 
 
16 Modern Fessir}iism. 
 
 means for the expression of dissatisfaction, and for 
 the furtherance of reform. It has for many years 
 been known that there are in Russia secret societies 
 comprising large numbers of adherents, whose great 
 uniting principle is a common conviction of the 
 The secret worthlcssuess and hatefulness of life. And it is 
 
 societies 
 
 RusSIn^^ also well known that in some such societies the 
 reasants. practice of barbarous mutilation prevails, with a 
 view to the prevention of offspring, and ultimately 
 to the extinction of the species. There must bo 
 something more than a philosophical theory to 
 account for fanaticism so extravagant ; the explana- 
 tion must be sought in the insufferable conditions 
 of society, and in the absence of a vital Christianity, 
 capable of assuaging sorrow, and of inspiring forti- 
 tude, toil, and hope. 
 
 But Russia contains Pessimists of the highest 
 
 literary grade. Among these may be mentioned 
 
 Literary tho popular author, fTolstoi. It has been surmised 
 
 Pessimism i. . . 
 
 in Russia, that Ms uuhappy disposition may have been fos- 
 tered by the premature success he met with in his 
 literary career, which left him little to look forward 
 to and to hope for. Though favoured with health, 
 fortune, family connections, and literary renown, 
 he found no satisfaction in his vocation, and pro- 
 fessedly hated life, and despised the human 
 
 species. ) 
 
 In accounting for principles so monstrously per- 
 verted, it is not sufficient to remember that in 
 
Modern Pessimism. 
 
 Russia literature and art are afflicted with, melan- Explanation 
 
 , of Russian 
 
 clioly, that Nature is for the most part sombre and Pessimism, 
 hard, that the Russian people seem to be by nature 
 and education insusceptible to those Western ideas 
 which are adopted rather than appropriated by 
 the cultivated and political classes. The political 
 state of the empire, perplexing and unique as it is, 
 may well engender hopelessness. The cynical tone 
 Baid to be characteristic of the society of St. Peters- 
 burg, and the prevalence of despair among the 
 sects just referred to, are evidences from widely 
 different quarters of a state of feeling favourable 
 to the reception and the spread of Pessimistic 
 views of human life. 
 
 The Pessimistic theory, however, has a hold upon The strain 
 the minds of many of the intellectual and literary ?f ^S^j?^ 
 class amongst our fellow-countrymen, and Pessi- lit^^^^t^e- 
 mistic doctrines and views of human life are openly 
 advocated by English writers in this country. 
 
 A very few years since, Mr. James Payn, a very The avowed 
 successful litterateur y wrote in the Nineteenth Gen- f^l^ 
 turf/ an article ^ entitled The Midway Inn, con- ^*^^ 
 taining such reflections as may be supposed to 
 occur to a hard-working professional man, who 
 has reached middle age. It is impossible to read 
 this original and interesting, but very mournful, 
 article, without feeling that the writer regards 
 
 ^ May, 1879. The article has since been republished in a 
 volume oressays by Mr. Payn. 
 
18 
 
 Modern Pessimism, 
 
 human life, even to the successful, as a bitter 
 disappointment. He puts the matter very plainly 
 in this language : 
 
 ** The question, Is Life 'worth Living ? is one that concerns 
 philosophers and metaphysicians ; but the question, Do I wish 
 to be out of it ? is one that is getting answered very widely, 
 and in the affirmative. This was certainly not the case in the 
 days of our grandsires." 
 
 And again: 
 
 "The gift of old age is unwished-for, and the prospect of 
 future life without encouragement. It is the modern conviction 
 that there will be some kind of work in it ; and even though 
 what we shall be set to do may be wrought with * tumult of 
 acclaim,' we have had enough of work. What follows, almost 
 as a matter of course, is that the thought of possible extinction 
 has lost its terrors." 
 
 It might he supposed that weariness and disgust 
 of life will lead to something worse than bitter 
 words. If existence is so wretched, it is not to be 
 supposed that men will continue to endure it, 
 when (as Epictetus phrased it) " the door is open." 
 Mr. Payn affirms that suicide is probably far more 
 frequent than is publicly admitted, and is of opinion 
 that it would be even more common were it not 
 for the fear lest the life-assurance companies should 
 withhold from the mourning family the sum secured 
 as a provision against want. 
 
 The Sjycdator ^ commenting in a leading article 
 upon Mr. Payn's essay, remarked upon one pe- 
 culiarity of the Pessimism it revealed : 
 
 1 May 3rd, 1879, 
 
 assertions 
 concerning 
 men's 
 weariness 
 of life. 
 
Modem Pessimism. 10 
 
 ** Melancholy, ennui, weariness to-day comes chiefly to the tj^q 
 workers, and makes men miserable who are toiling like navvies mclanclioly 
 for a success, or an object, which, when attained, will be, they middle ago, 
 know, like ashes in their mouths. . . . They ai'e weary of it all, 
 even in middle age." 
 
 In the opinion of the Spectator this state of 
 mind is due partly to a want of hope in a future / 
 life, and partly to a dovclopment of the imagina- 
 tion, producing a chasm between what men arc 
 and what they would if they could be, a disparity 
 between their " brain muscle,'' and the work un- 
 consciously required of it. 
 
 Mr. Eichard JefPeries, a charming and popular 
 writer upon natural history, in The Story of my 
 Heart, a sort of autobiographical confession, thus 
 avows his Pessimism : 
 
 *' How can I adequately express my contempt for the assertion ^^^^r. _ 
 that all things occur for the best, for a wise and beneficent end, avowal of 
 and are ordered by a humane intelligence ? It is the most utter I^essimism 
 falsehood, and a crime against the human race. . , . Human 
 suifering is so great, so endless, so awful, that I can hardly write 
 of it. I could not go into hospitals and face it, as some do, lest 
 my mind should be temporarily overcome. The whole and the 
 worst the worst Pessimist can say is far beneath the least paiticle 
 of the truth, so immense is the misery of man. It is the duty 
 of all rational beings to acknowledge the truth. There is not 
 the least trace of directing intelligence in human affairs. . , , 
 Any one who will consider the affairs of the world at large, and 
 of the individual, will see that they do not proceed in the manner 
 they would do for our happiness if a man of humane breadth of 
 view were placed at their head with unlimited power^ such as is 
 credited to the intelligence which does not exist. A man of 
 intellect and humanity could cause everything to happen in an 
 infinitely superior manner."^ 
 
 1 Pp. 134-G. 
 
20 
 
 Modern Fessimism. 
 
 Here is another passage from the same book, 
 inexpressibly mournful : 
 
 pisbclid "For grief there is no known consolation. It is useless to 
 
 benevolent ^^^^ ^^ hearts with bubbles. A loved one is gone, and as to 
 Creator. the future if there is a future it is unknown. To assure our- 
 
 selves otherwise, is to soothe the mind with illusions ; the 
 bitterness is inconsolable." 
 
 Pessimism 
 ill poetry. 
 
 Nor is contemporary Pessimism confined to 
 prose. The following very beautiful but very 
 sad stanzas are from a short poem significantly 
 entitled T/te Age of Despair, included in a little 
 volume of poems by Mr. H. D. Traill, Rccapiured 
 RJiymes. 
 
 ** Dead is for us the rose we know must die ; 
 Long ere we drain the goblet it is dry; 
 And even as we kiss, the distant grave 
 Chills the warm lip, and dims the lustrous eye. 
 
 Too far our race has journey 'd from its birth ; 
 Too far death casts his shadow o'er the earth. 
 Ah, what remains to strengthen and support 
 Our hearts since they have lost the trick of mirth? 
 
 The stay of fortitude ? The lofty pride 
 Wherewith the sages of the Porch denied 
 That pain and death are evils, and proclaimed 
 Lawful the exit of the suicide ? 
 
 Alas, not so ! no Stoic calm is ours ; 
 We dread the thorns who joy not in the fiowcrCo 
 We dare not breathe the mountain -air of pain, 
 Droop as we may in pleasure's stifling bowers. 
 
 What profits it, if here and there we see 
 A spirit nerved by trust in God's decree, 
 Who fronts the grave in firmness of the faith 
 Taught by the Carpenter of Galilee ? 
 
Modern Pessimism. 21 
 
 Who needs not wlue nor roses, lute nor lyre, 
 Scorns life, or quits it by the gate of fire, 
 Erct and fearless what is that to us 
 Who hold him for the dupe of vain desire 1 
 
 Can we who wake enjoy the dreamer's dream ? 
 Will the parched treeless waste less hideous seem 
 Because there shines before some foolish eyes 
 Mirage of waving wood and silver stream?"' 
 
 Germany is however the favoured and congenial 
 home of theoretical Pessimism. The two great 
 German advocates of this doctrine Schopenhauer 
 and Yon Hartmann have obtained European re- *-* 
 putation; and their works are now being repro- 
 duced in English in the Foreign Philosophical 
 Library, so that there is every probability of their 
 becoming very much more generally known in this 
 country. f \ 
 
 The great work of Schopenhauer Die Welt f/Zs/ Germany \ 
 
 
 Wille und Vorstelhmg (The World as Will and ash^^^^^^ 
 Representation, or Idea), has every claim to be re- V^^^^^^^^^^j 
 garded as the authoritative manual of German 
 Pessimism, of which it both lays the metaphysical 
 foundations and explicates the practical consequences. 
 
 Schopenhauer was until late in life almost utterly schopcn- 
 
 ^ " hauei'a 
 
 unnoticed by the devotees of Philosophy; it Avas career, 
 only during the last ten years of his course that 
 he became famous, and that was in consequence 
 of his less systematic and more comprehensible 
 work, published in 1851, the Parcrga und Para- 
 hpojJU'ita, In contrast to this neglect was tho 
 
22 Modern Pessimism. 
 
 nartmann's popularity sGcured and enjoyed by Hartmann, the 
 second great light of the Pessimistic philosophy, 
 whose chief work was published in 1868, and 
 has gone through many editions. More a man 
 of the world than his master, although a vastly 
 inferior writer, he has gained the attention of the 
 reading public of Germany, and his writings are 
 eagerly read by a large circle of admirers. 
 The German Ih ondeavouring to account for the rise of spcc- 
 mcta- ulative Pessimism in Germany, the land beyond 
 
 physical 
 
 novelty, and all othors of G:eneral education, the land in which 
 
 quest of 
 
 of kS.w-^ the learned class holds the largv^st ratio to the 
 ledge and population, WO must not lose sight of the philo- 
 sophical tendency which has so conspicuously 
 characterised the Teutonic mind during the whole 
 of the present century. Ever since the new im- 
 pulse given by Kant's Critique {Kritik) at the 
 close of the last century, an almost unbroken suc- 
 cession of theories of knowledge and of being have 
 claimed the attention of the inquisitive lovers of 
 novelty. It would seem as if, with Hegel, the 
 circle of possible metaphysic must have been com- 
 pleted, as if no other path could be struck out. 
 And the original speculations of Schopenhauer and 
 Von Hartmann partake of the nature of paradox, 
 pessimists I^casou liaviug exhausted itself, it would seem that 
 thlphuo- a Philosophy of Unreason alone remained, by which 
 S^eascn. to startlo the human mind, and to acquire notoriety. 
 The Idea, the Reason, might be altogether dis- 
 
Modern Pessimism. 23 
 
 placed, and the blind and purposeless TFill, or the 
 incomprehensible and uncomprehending Uncon^ 
 scions, might take its place. 
 
 IV. 
 
 The Metaphysical Bases of Pessimism. 
 
 ethics of 
 
 a meta- 
 physical 
 foundation. 
 
 TpjT? ofVn>.nT ^nntriTips of the Pessirm sts are based ^^^ 
 
 ^ - - ethi( 
 
 upon i g etaphysical f ounda tions . It is necessary, bScd^p^n 
 therefore, to give a brief outline of the philosophy 
 of Schopenhauer and Yon Hartmann. These meta- 
 physical speculations are somewhat abstruse ; and 
 many persons adopt Pessimistic views, as they do 
 the views advocated by the expounders of othei 
 theories of life, without concerning themselves with 
 their philosophical bases. 
 
 Kant had taught that all our knowledge, being ^F^t's. 
 conditioned by the forms of thought supplied by f//e^"ti^Q 
 our mental constitution, is phenomenal, and of sub- p^e^o^^enai. 
 jective value only. At the same time he believed 
 in the Ding an sich, or " thing in itself," although 
 he regarded this as unknowable. These doctrines 
 suggested many speculations regarding the nature 
 of knowledge, speculations which have constituted 
 the bulk of German metaphysics during this century. 
 The names of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, will 
 occur to readers of philosophical literature, as in- 
 dicating the successive developments of post-Kantian 
 philosophy during the first half of this century. 
 
24 
 
 Modern Pessimism. 
 
 Schopen- 
 hauer's 
 repudiation 
 of Hegel- 
 ianism. 
 
 Hia 
 
 acceptance 
 of the 
 Kantian 
 distinction 
 between the 
 phenomenal 
 and the 
 real. 
 
 ^ 
 
 His con- 
 viction that 
 we do know 
 the real, 
 viz., The 
 WILL. 
 
 Now, Schopenhauer took no notice of the 
 German metaphysicians who followed Kant, and 
 indeed was bitterly hostile to his great and for- 
 tunate rival, Hegel. It was an evidence of the 
 meanness of his character, that he despised the 
 " Professors '* of the German Universities, who, as 
 he maintained, taught doctrines agreeable to the 
 Governments and to the Churches, for the sake of 
 place, profit, and social consideration. For him- 
 self, he was soured by the utter neglect which his 
 philosophy met with for more than thirty years, 
 and was no doubt confirmed by his ill-fortune in 
 his hatred and contempt of his fellow-men. 
 
 Accepting the doctrine of the Critical Philosophy, 
 so far as it distinguished between the phenomenal 
 and the real, Schopenhauer asserted that we have 
 knowledge of the latter. In his view, the real 
 essence, the substantial source and explanation of 
 all things, is "Will. But by "Will he means not 
 only what we are accustomed to designate by 
 
 that terra, but the great forces of Nature, the 
 
 instincts and impulses of organic life, as seen in 
 plants and animals, and the promptings and pur- 
 poses of human beings. Motion, in all its varied 
 forms, seems thus to be metaphysically accounted 
 for. The one real, deep, eternal, and irresistible 
 Power of Nature is "Will, which manifests itself 
 in all the processes of inanimate existence, as 
 well as in all the activities of living things. 
 
Modern Pessimism. 
 
 The World has, so to speak, two sides. On the 
 one side it is Represei^tation, or Idea (Die Welt 
 fst Vorstellung). The world, as representation, The world 
 has two indivisible halves, the Obiect and the Representa- 
 
 '' tiou or Idea. 
 
 Subject, every object existing under the forms of 
 time, space, and causality, and having a relative 
 existence, i.e., through and for something beside 
 itself. By a process of reasoning, which cannot 
 be made intelligible in a few words, Schopenhauer 
 comes to the conclusion that we must seek else- 
 where than in that " representation,*' which is one 
 aspect of the world, and which consists of the two 
 elements mentioned, for the innermost essence of 
 the Universe. 
 
 The other side of the World is this : The it is also 
 
 2. Wm, by 
 
 World is my Will (Die Welt ist mein Wille). l^^^^_ 
 We can go deeper than that "representation," jiowe."''''"' 
 which, if it were all, would make the Universe a 
 dream. We are conscious that movements of our 
 body are due to acts of Will. Although in reflec- 
 tion we can distinguish between Will and action, 
 in reality the two are one. Pain and joy are 
 immediate affections of the will. The body is, to 
 use the awkward language of German metaphysics, 
 "the objectification of the will." In self-con- 
 sciousness the will is known immediately, bodily 
 impulses are apprehended as symptoms of the 
 action of the will. 
 
 Now, by analogy, Schopenhauer recognizes Will 
 
26 
 
 Modern Pessimism, 
 
 as universally present in nature. Tho Will is 
 "objectified" by certain steps, e.g,, forces in in- 
 organic nature, forms in organic nature, partially 
 corresponding to the Platonic "ideas." But it is 
 one and the same Will whose presence is recognized 
 on every side. It is this that accounts for all the 
 changes, movements, and processes of nature, of life. 
 The universal Will is a will to live. A^lid-its 
 " ~ ^ " " The 
 
 Willis "the 
 will to live." 
 
 It issues of 
 necessitjr 
 ia suffering 
 to the 
 individual. 
 
 The * will 
 to live" 
 prompts to 
 love and 
 marriage 
 
 man ifold appearan ces we discern its unity. 
 rush of this vast Force into activity accounts for 
 al l the phenomena of the Universe. Hence the 
 endless and irreconcilable strife which the world 
 presents to the observer, and which indeed he feels 
 in his own nature. The impulses come into conflict 
 with one another, .so that none can be reaKzed, can 
 find satisfaction. (Life, Consciousness, Suffering, 
 these arc the results of " the Will to live," which 
 realizes itself in individual experience, and in the 
 history of the human race. EadL-ixuiJX-liaa.^a_ 
 natural des i re to live , wroughtjwithin him by the 
 unconscious Force of nature, a desire which it is 
 his mys terious prerogative to affirm or to deny. In 
 affirming it, he seals h is doom to irremediable misery. 1 
 "" This same " Will to live " manifests its nature' 
 and its power in another direction. It works upon 
 the individual for ends beyond himself. As a 
 means to secure the continuance of the species, it 
 takes within the individual the form of sexual 
 love. The reproductive instinct is thus the ally and 
 
Modern Pessimism. 27 
 
 the complement of the nutritive instinct. Whilst 
 
 the individual is deluded into believing that in it iiius 
 
 ^ secures tlia 
 
 marriage he is acting for his own gratification and S^S'the 
 satisfaction, the truth is that he is seeking, though ^ery.*^ ^^ 
 unco nsciously, the perpetuation of the race. He ^ 
 tT^ iia hfi(^,o Tn<:>s th ft unwitting instrument in prolonging 
 human misery . The individual must vanish, and 
 his own personal wretchedness may be lulled into ,^.,,^ 
 oblivion. But crafty nature takes care that by 
 begetting children he shall do his part to per- 
 petuate the misery of mankind! - 
 
 The ethical doctrine of Schopenhauer if ethical 
 it may be called is based upon his teaching with 
 regard to the Will. In the fourth book of his 
 great work he treats of " the conscious affirmation 
 and denial of the Will to live." ( 
 
 I It is Will t hat is the source of all beiner; the Hcreiatho 
 
 Y ^ ^ . . root of all 
 
 world has come into existence because Will is. ^Q^Jf^^" 
 This supreme power of the Universe, manifesting 
 itself as the " will to live,'* is at the root of all 
 evil. To resist death is alike a necessity and a 
 misfortune. The individual man is impelled by the 
 great natural force to dread and to avert the cessa- 
 tion of being, and to use means for the preservation 
 of life, to provide nourishment for the body, andT; 
 to repel disease ^nd death. Nature thus secures 
 the perpetuation jof human wretchedness. ) 
 
 If the Will is the key-note to Schopenhauer's 
 philosophy; that of Ilartmann's doctrines is the 
 
28 Modern Pessimism. 
 
 UxcoNscious. lEduard von Hartmaiin ag,reed with 
 hi s predecessor in the b elieftha t the world, being 
 due to a n^n-rational Will, is a blunder^ is.^ajbad 
 w orld, and that non-existence is better th an exist- 
 Hartmann's cncc. ] Accordiug with tho ethical superstructure 
 theuncon- reared' by his master, Hartmann sought to lay for 
 
 BCIOUS. 
 
 it a deeper and broader metaphysical foundation. 
 Opposed as all the Pessimists have been to 
 Hegel, he utterly rej^ected jleason, as the ultimate 
 and absolute principle of the Universe. He intro- 
 duced the philosophy of the Unconscious {Philoso- 
 phie des Unbeiciissten), which represents the great 
 secret force and explanation of all things as being 
 T/ie Unconscious; which, however, has virtue to 
 organize, and which, in the pursuit of a great aim 
 (Zweck) gives rise to the Universe in all its 
 phases. 
 
 Kant had said that to claim to possess ideas, 
 
 and yet not to be conscious of them, is a contra- 
 
 aoing below dictiou in terms. Hartmann admits that " uncon- 
 
 Conscious- , . 
 
 pfs lie scions representation has the air of a paradox. 
 
 believes that ^ ^ 
 
 ?he??the -^^^ ^^^^^ *^ domain of Consciousness is a well- 
 pSfpi^eof tilled vineyard which can yield little more to 
 ^"^' the labour of the student, perhaps he who digs 
 below the surface may find golden treasure in the 
 hidden depths of the Unconscious. Well-known 
 mental phenomena suggest the existence of un- 
 conscious representations and volitions ; may they 
 not be indications of that *' all- one " principle. 
 
Modern Pessimism, 29 
 
 which may be accepted as the final and universal 
 explanation furnished by monistic philosophy ? 
 
 From the Vedanta philosophy of the East down intimations 
 to Schopenhauer, profound speculators so Hart- Principle 
 
 IT p ^ prepared the 
 
 mann thought-t^had gamed, glimpses of the great ^^y/^ 
 truth that the tUnconscioud is the central prin- 
 ciple of phiJosophy, and /(the central power of 
 the world. | But the bold and ardent young Pessi- 
 mist of Germany claimed to have been the first to 
 bring this truth into the full light of day. 
 
 We intuitively know that many of our own "4^ 
 actions are the expression of purpose ; and analogy 
 leads us to suppose that there is intention in \ 
 Nature, that design may be recognized in the con- 1 
 stitution of the world. There are, however, auto- 
 matic movements and instinctive actions, pur- 
 poseful, without any consciousness of purpose. 
 Unconscious Will is to be postulated as accounting 
 for such movements as these. 
 
 pfhat Christians refer to a Divine Artificer, who 
 acts according to wisdom and goodness, Hartmann 
 refers to the Unconscious Will. He thus accounts unconsdous 
 for the great emotions and impulses which are regarded 
 
 , , ^ as the key 
 
 characteristic of humanity, for ccsthetic and moral to many 
 
 J ' mysteries, 
 
 judgments, for a priori beliefs, for religious prin- 
 ciples, and for the development of human history. 
 So-called philosophy has given birth to no more 
 signal master-piece of unreason than Hartmann's 
 account of the emergence of Consciousness into ^ 
 
80 Modern Pessimism. 
 
 existence, out of a Universe governed by Uncon- 
 The genesis scious Will. Consciousness is said to owe its being 
 sciousness. to the tearing away of the Representation from 
 its mother-eartb, i.e., from the Will, to its realiza- 
 tion of itself, and to the opposition of the Will to 
 this emancipation of the Representation from its 
 own control. The shock which follows this rebel- 
 lion, the penetration of the Representation into the 
 Unconscious, is Consciousness I 
 
 The reader will judge from these representations 
 of Pessimist metaphysics, as to the likelihood of 
 such writers producing a sober, credible, reason- 
 able system of morals. It must be admitted that, 
 however sophistical his reasoning, Hartmann has 
 the art, when he comes to deal with real life, of 
 interesting the curious, inquisitive reader. Ilis 
 aim is to depict the marvellous wisdom of the 
 Unconscious! Leibnitz had taught, in the con- 
 fidence of Optimism, t hat of all possible worl ds 
 -this is tlie besf. Schopenhauer had maintained 
 'the 'opposite theory Vfjia t^ this world is the worst 
 )ossible. Strangely enough, Hartmann holds, in 
 language at least, by the belief of Leibnitz. IIow 
 can this be Pessimism ? \Th^ fjifit \f, thnt Fnrt- 
 r mann means that no worse world could have rc - 
 mainecL in^exi stence, for, in jiis^pinion^this world 
 ia sn had tliatiiQ world at all would have b^ en^r 
 ^^i^r i^T^^^^^Annp ig p] 'eferable to th isexist- 
 ' ence, and in deed to any existence that is possi ble^ I J 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
MoJei^ Fessimism. 31 
 
 \Tl ie obvious question arises: Since huma n life 
 is so wrctclied, how is it that men not only 
 continue to live, hut either find, or fancy that they 
 find, in life compensation for its ills? The 
 Pessimist's nns wer is ! Men are renonciled to The 
 
 ,___________ ~~~~^ j ^ Illusions by 
 
 l ife by the power of succes'sive illusions, devised ^nconsdous 
 by the craft and cunning of t he Unconscious ! If men t"uve?^ 
 men saw existence as it really is. thev would not 
 
 submit to endure it. ^But nature has provide d 
 against such an issue. The unconscious Wi ll has 
 implanted in the human heart illusions so powerful, 
 and so rapidT in their successive appeara nce, that 
 men are willing and even anxious to live. 
 
 Three stages of illusion are described by Hart- 
 mann in a passage which has become somewhat 
 famous. 
 
 1. Happiness is thought to be actually attainable The first 
 in this present life. Such is the belief of youth, present ufo 
 and of the childhood of the race. Eeviewing in JTaTpSe^ 
 detail the several occasions of pleasure and satis- 
 faction, Hartmann exhibits what he deems the 
 l^ excess in every case of pain over pleasure. ' The ""I 
 imagination is prompted to depict joys which are / 
 never realized. Health, youth, liberty, give no / 
 positive excess of pleasure. Love is not only disap- / 
 pointing; it is, for the individual experiencing it, an I 
 actual evil. Sympathy, friendship, family relations, 
 yield no real happiness. Vanity, prido, glory, are 
 all delusive. Eell^ious edification has, it is true, 
 
32 
 
 Modern Pessimism. 
 
 The vanity 
 of earthly 
 delights. 
 
 its own consolations ; but in its higher stages joy 
 is seldom attained, and then only by means of 
 severe self^^^il, whilst the lower stages of the 
 religious life are accompanied by fear, doubt, and 
 anguish. Immorality is practised for the sake of 
 the gratification it is expected to yield ; but on the 
 whole it is productive of pain. The delights of 
 science and art are accessible to but a small 
 minority of mankind, and they render their 
 cultivators liable to keen and varied suffering. 
 Sleep and dreams bring no real, lasting relief. 
 The quest of property is laborio us, anxious, and 
 disappointing, ilope its e lf is delus ive and vain, 
 I In this desultory and illogical way the Pessimist 
 endeavours to show that, whilst nature urges men 
 to seek enjoyment in a multiplicity of ways, she 
 always mocks the victims she deludes. AH is 
 vanity : pains are many, and pleasures few. 
 The second 2. The Unconscious is not satisfied to rob the 
 that there is present of all its joy; it attacks the future; first 
 
 a heaven of ^ . . 
 
 thifulire deluding men by promising blessings in im- 
 mortality, and then blasting the hopes it has 
 fostered. Those who have renounced all hope of 
 happiness in this world may, nevertheless, look 
 forward to a world to come, and may support and 
 cheer themselves with the fond hope of eternal 
 felicity. The religion of Christ is represented by 
 Hartmann as corresponding with this phase of in- 
 dividual experience; for long centuries Christian 
 
Modern Pessimism, 83 
 
 FaitTi has encouraged men to bear the ills of life 
 with fortitude, upheld by the hope jj||iplessedness 
 
 
 business to exhibit the baselessness of such a hope, 
 the utter vanity of the cherished expectation of the 
 individual, conscious life beyond the grave. 
 
 3. The qreat Unconscious power of the Universe The third 
 
 o J- illusion : 
 
 has not, in these two stages of illusion, exhausted a^trijhf ^ ^ 
 its malignant hostility to man. Amongst those befo?^' 
 who have ceased to hope, either for pleasure in this society oa 
 
 . earth. 
 
 life, or for the joys of immortality, there are some 
 who cherish bright anticipations of the future of 
 huraapity. Thus there opens up to many unselfish 
 souls a golden dream. Hartmann presumes 
 that many of his readers will, at this point, 
 abandon his guidance, will refuse to cast away 
 their hope of the amelioration of the human lot, 
 will dare to anticipate that coming generations 
 may find life a better and a brighter thing, 
 perhaps, in some slight measure, through their 
 own efforts and sacrifices. lie accordingly makes 
 it his aim to cloud this bright vision of the future. 
 He argues that there is no reasonable prospect of 
 substantial improvement in the condition of man- 
 kind, no ground for hoping that the progress of 
 civilization, of art, of knowledge, of religion, will 
 remove or relieve human ills, will bring any acces- 
 sion to human happiness. There is no more hope 
 for humanity in this life than in any life to come* 
 D 
 
34 
 
 Modern Pessimism. 
 
 The success 
 of the 
 charmer. 
 
 Tims the Unconscious flings her enchantment 
 hut too successfully over the sanguine anic 
 visionary nature of man, only to laugh at those 
 whom she has ensnared. In Philosophy, comfort, 
 strength, hope, are not to he found ; her light is 
 clear, but unsympathetic and cold. The veil of 
 Maja is on the face of mortal men. 
 
 The energy 
 of will 
 arouses 
 desire and 
 effort which. 
 are de- 
 Btructive of 
 happiness. 
 
 The Pessimism of Schopenhauer and Vqn 
 
 ;,. ....!:: -.. Hartmann Explained. 
 
 ' Schopenhauer's central ethical doctrine was 
 the essential evil and misery of Will. This is the 
 spring of efforts the most painful, of desires the 
 most unquenchable. Will awakens from the Un- 
 conscious, witii boundless wants, and with inex- 
 haustible claims. Every satisfied wish immediately 
 begets a new craving. Thus Life proves itself a 
 deceit, affording no satisfaction, no repose. Happi- 
 ness may be imagined in the past or in the future, 
 the present certainly knows it not, being filled with 
 insatiable desire. The will to live still asserts 
 itself under a thousand disappointments. What 
 are old age and death but the sentence of condem- 
 nation, passed and executed by nature, upon man's 
 will to live ? The happiest moment of life is that 
 of falling asleep, and forgetting life's wretchedness; 
 
Modern Pessimism. 
 
 le most miserable moment is that of awaking to 
 sSd reality. Who would persevere in life were 
 death less frightful? 
 
 I The great principle of Pessimism is, that all life., 
 is suffering (alles Lehcn Leiden ist). Man, being. The many^^^ 
 what Schopenhauer calls ''the most perfect objec- i^^^^tuse^t 
 
 tificationof the will to live," is of all beings the S?;w 
 most necessitous, the most dissatisfied, and the are wretched 
 
 because of 
 
 most unhappy. He is constrained by his nature' enr.iu. 
 to long for what he has not. If ho desires, and 
 endeavours to obtain, such experience of effort is 
 merely painful ; if, on the other hand, he comes to 
 possess what he seeks, possession takes away all 
 charm from the object he has desired. Thus his 
 alternative is between the wretchedness of unsatis- 
 fied desire, and the ennui of satiated possession ; 
 and in either case no happiness can be realized !) 
 
 It is part of the Pessimistic doctrine that nothing Pain is 
 
 . \ . . positive ; 
 
 is absolutely good, although some things are better P^^^^f^l^^'^ .; 
 
 than others, that pain is positive, and that pleasure 
 
 is only negative.^ This unjust and gloomy dictum 
 
 is in opposition to Leibnitz's optimistic judgment, 
 
 that pleasure is positive, and pain is negative only. 
 
 There does not seem to be much meaning in the 
 
 language so employed. The two are opposites, 
 
 and the affirmation of the one is the denial of the 
 
 other. But both pleasure and pain are real, actual 
 
 experiences. By asserting that pleasure is only 
 
 negative, the !Pessimist^' intend to depreciate its 
 
36 
 
 Modern Pessimism. 
 
 The hatred 
 felt by the 
 Pessimists 
 for_ 
 Optimism. 
 
 value, and so far the epitliet is one it is unfair to 
 apply. Just as pleasure is nothing but the nega- 
 tion of pain, so right is merely the negation of 
 wrong: a dogma evidently intended to disparage 
 rectitude and duty. 
 
 Tha Pessimist not only differs from the Optimist, 
 he regards the Optimistic system with hatred, as 
 " an impious system." He who maintains that all 
 things are for the best, and that happiness is within 
 the reach of man, is regarded as holding a doctrine 
 which is a reproach and insult to the human lot, 
 as a lot of necessary and ceaseless suffering. It is 
 thus made every man's duty, if the word " duty " 
 is admissible, to be miserable himself, and to 
 account all other men equally miserable. 
 W It is an obvious question to ask; If existence 
 be so evil, and if death be annihilation, why does 
 not the Pessimist put an end, by suicide, at once 
 1o life and to suffering? But his answer is, that 
 he suicide is a witness to the value of life, and to 
 ;he evil of pain only, for he slays himself not to 
 bscape life ^but to avoid pain^l Physical suicide 
 ts vain. Moral suicide should ]be tried. Let a 
 man be truly wise, and see the vanity of willing ; 
 let him by meditation rise above volition, and so 
 seek annihilation, which alone is blessedness; let 
 him quit the life of effort, and enter the Nirvana 
 of eternal rest ! 
 
 The only prospect for humanity which can afford 
 
 N 
 
 Suicide is 
 
 condemned, 
 as promptei , 
 not by 
 hatred of 
 life, but by 
 hatred of 
 pain. 
 
Modern Pessimism. 
 
 37 
 
 fchopen- 
 l^auer 
 would have ^ 
 each man 
 deny the 
 "U to live. 
 
 Ilartmann 
 
 wonld have 
 
 [the indi- 
 idual affirm 
 he -will to 
 
 ivo until 
 
 men are 
 )repared 
 'multa- 
 [eously to 
 my it. 
 
 7 
 
 any comfort is the prospect of annihilation. This, 
 according to tlie Pessimist theory, is to be brought 
 about (as has been said) by a denial of the will to 
 live. But there is upon this point a difference, 
 almost amusing to consider, between the two German 
 champions of the doctrine. The elder Schopen- 
 hauer would have each man act for himself, and! 
 negative that will to live which involves menjnl 
 misery so great. The younger Hartmann thinks 
 that each man should for the present affirm the 
 will to live, and that efforts should be made to 
 promote amongst men a knowledge of the cause 
 and of the cure of life's wretchedness, so that a 
 general determination may in due time be arrived 
 at by all the members of the race, who may by 
 one great and combined effort achieve the wished- 
 for and happy result, the extinction of human life 
 and consciousness, and the relapse into universal 
 oblivion and repose ! 
 
 Meanwhile, however, it is fair to remark that 
 the exponents of the system have done little in the 
 way of example to further the desiderated end. 
 Schopenhauer was a sensual and selfish hermit, 
 who husbanded his inherited resources, and lived 
 in misanthropy indeed, but in comfort, to a fair 
 old age, fearing nothing more than sickness and' 
 death. Hartmann lives, it is said, a happy family 
 life, in competency an'd elegance, and in social 
 esteem. 
 
 The InconA 
 sistoncy \ 
 between \ 
 profession I 
 and actwal j 
 life. / 
 
38 
 
 Modern Pessimism, 
 
 The contrast 
 in this 
 respect 
 between 
 Sakya 
 Mouni and 
 Paul on the 
 one hand, 
 and Scho- 
 penhauer 
 and Von : 
 Ilartmann 
 on the 
 other. 
 
 of re: 
 siinisi 
 
 V^XArt. 
 
 It would not, indeed, be fair in every case to test 
 doctrines by the life and practice of tbeir exponents 
 and promulgators. But it is instructive to re- 
 member tliat the greatest missionaries of the world 
 have been men whose conduct has accorded with 
 their teaching. Sakya Mouni, the founder of the 
 Oriental Pessimism, renouuced the position, the 
 dignities, the wealth, the opportunities of ease and 
 enjoyment to which he was born, and lived a self- 
 sacrificing life 6f sympathy and charity amongst 
 men. Paul, th6 apostle of Christ to the Gentiles, 
 war? not satisfied with bidding men live, not to 
 themselves, but to the Lord ; he actually did 
 count all things but loss for his Saviour's sake, and 
 lived, suffered, and died to promote the gospel 
 he proclaimed. Ycry diiferent has been the 
 practice of those who, in our own time, have 
 made it their business to publish to their fellow- 
 men the depressing tidings of a godless universe, 
 and of irremediable despair! 
 
 It may be asked, What temporary practical 
 relief or consolation does Pessimism offer? Di- 
 vested of metaphysical terminology, the answer of 
 Schopenhauer to this question is threefold. 
 ' 1. Art The works of genius, embodied in archi- 
 tecture, painting, poetry, and music, when contem- 
 plated by the mind, ^afford a real delight. The 
 artist perceives and communicates the everlasting 
 ideas, which are apprehended by pure contemplation, 
 
 .N'A 
 
 Tlie 
 
 consolations \ 
 res- 
 
Modern Pesshnis-ni. 
 
 and whicli are esteemed tlie substantial and en- 
 during part of all tlie phenomena encountered in 
 the world of sense. It will be observed by the 
 reader that the author of Natural Religion has 
 warmly adopted this part of the creed of Schopen- 
 hauer. " ''' '-'"-' '- ' '-<'' -' - :' , ; 
 
 2. Sympathy. All men are fellow-sufferers, -and svmpatiiy; 
 it is well to acknowledge this community in a heri*- 
 
 tage of woe. The admission that compassion and 
 love are virtues to be cultivated, is the best feature 
 in the Pessimist teaching; but instead of sympathy 
 being based upon brotherhood in a divine family^ , 
 it is here merely commiseration with those who 
 are doomed to the same misfortunes with ourselves. 
 
 3. Asceticism. The denial of the will to live will Asceticism. 
 most appropriately take this form. Let a man 
 
 refuse to be deluded by the craft of the unconscious 
 Will, let him voluntarily abstain from the deceitful 
 pleasures of this life, let him regard with indiffer- 
 ence those interests which appear to be his, but 
 which are in reality the interests of the species, let 
 him be upon his guard against the delusive " prin^ ' 
 ciple of individuation,'' and he will do all that inJ^ 
 him lies to defeat the machinations of the great 
 enemy, and to secure the diminution of the ills of 
 conscious and voluntary existence. The mysticsj 
 whose quietism is an abdication of the faculty of 
 willing; the ascetics, whether Oriental or Chris-"- 
 tian, who live apart from society, and indifferent 
 
40 
 
 Modern Pesshnisvi'u 
 
 The 
 
 estimation 
 in which the 
 Pessimist 
 philosophers 
 hold the 
 Scriptures. 
 
 Their dislike 
 of the 
 general 
 teaching of 
 the Old 
 Testament. 
 
 to the pursuits and pleasures of mankind ; these 
 have chosen the better part. For true salvation 
 and release from life and its accompanying pain 
 are utterly impossible without the abnegation of 
 Will. 
 
 It is instructive to notice what is the attitude of 
 the Pessimists towards the revealed Word of God. 
 Schopenhauer makes a marked distinction between 
 the Scriptures of the Old Testament and those of 
 the New. 
 
 The Pessimists are severe, and even bitter, in 
 their condemnation of what they regard as the 
 Optimistic teaching and spirit of the Old Testa- 
 ment. Their resentment is roused by the account 
 given in Genesis of the Creation, in which all 
 things are pronounced to be *' very good." The 
 bright and cheerful view of human life, taken by 
 the ancient Hebrews generally, is repugnant to the 
 tastes and principles of the Pessimists ; but certain 
 passages, as for instance some of the mournful con- 
 clusions of the writer of Ecclesiastes, are more to 
 tbeir mind than the rest. The one Old Testament 
 doctrine with which Schopenhauer is in full 
 sympathy is that of the fall of man. 
 
 The Christianity of the New Testament, on the 
 other hand, is commended, as according with the 
 ethical spirit of Brahmanism and Buddhism! "In 
 the New Testament . . . the world is represented 
 as a vale of tears, life is a means of purifying the 
 
Modern Pessimism. 41 
 
 soul, and an instrument of martyrdom is the symbol 
 of Christendom." 
 
 Of Redemption^ as propounded in the Christian Their 
 Scriptures, Pessimism takes no notice. So far as the Ne^ 
 
 ^ . . Testament 
 
 Christ renounced the will to live, Schopenhauer is based 
 
 ' t r ... * - upon a mis- 
 
 approves His choice and His example. So far as conception, 
 the Christian takes up his Master's cross, i.e., lives 
 a life and dies a death of self-mortification, the 
 Pessimist commends his conduct. But this morti- 
 fication is, in his view, a mere ahjuring of life's 
 pleasures ; and Christ^s work he regards not as a 
 rescuing of men from sin and destruction, hut as 
 an example of the renunciation of the will to live. 
 The Christian rejoices in salvation, the Pessimist 
 only hopes for annihilation.) In the Pessimist's Christianity 
 
 . ... would 
 
 view Christianity represents the will to live as JroS^^i^" 
 personified in Adam, with whom we sin ; and that wou?d"^* 
 unwillingness to live, which is the only method of fr^om the ^ 
 relief, as personified in Christ. But to the Chris- conscious 
 
 . . . . . being. 
 
 tian his religion represents the Saviour as living and 
 dying for man's deliverance from sin, and its curse 
 and power. Life is indeed admitted to ahound in 
 suffering, hut the inspired writers exhibit pain and 
 weakness, sorrow and trouble, temptation and per- 
 plexity, as the appointed means of spiritual disci- 
 pline, of progress in a God- ward course. The 
 Pessimist views life's ills not so much as means by 
 which we may, by God's grace, cease from sin, as 
 means by which we may cease to live, and cease to 
 
42 Modern Pessimism. 
 
 suffer. The Christian doctrine of salvation by 
 faith, and not by works, is oddly distorted by 
 Schopenhauer. In works he sees the expression 
 of the will which he hates ; but for him fait/i is 
 in knowledge, and intellectual contemplation brings 
 Opposition man some small relief from woe! Christianity 
 
 between 
 
 Pessunism holds out a prospcct of improvement in the state 
 tianity. q humau socioty, and of a moral perfection to be 
 attained in the eternal Hereafter. In Schopen- 
 hauer's judgment, all that man can do to ameli- 
 orate his condition is to turn away from life and 
 its pains, and seek, like the Hindu who longs 
 for absorption into Brahma, like the Buddhist 
 who aspires to Nirvana, to be restored to that, 
 nothingness which alone is painlessness and peace. 
 The No wonder that the great Pessimist preferred 
 
 Pessimist's , , . . . . 
 
 prefcrcneeof Catholicism to Protcstautism I for its asceticism, 
 
 Catholicism 
 
 teste^ism. monasticism, and mortification, were, in his view, 
 wise exercises of the Will in the denial of life. 
 
 It will assist the reader to realize the extra- 
 ordinary and extravagant beliefs of the Pessimists 
 if we collect and lay before him a few of the obser- 
 vations and reflections which human life has sug- 
 gested to Schopenhauer. Some of them are shocking 
 to the moral sensibility, and some of them approach 
 blasphemy. But it is well that it should be under- 
 stood what are the sentiments of a school credited 
 by many in our day and in our civilized and Chris- 
 tian society with profound and practical wisdom. 
 
Modom Pessimism. 43 
 
 Here are some statements regarding our existence 
 generally : 
 
 "The end of human existence is suffering." "The life of man 
 is a struggle for existence, with the certainty of being con- 
 quered j "." a voyage in which there is before every mariner 
 the sure prospect of shipwreck." "It is the superior know- The 
 lodge of man which renders his life more rich in suffering than paradoxes of 
 tliat of the animals." "When we consider the suffering on 
 this planet, we see that the moon, where is no life, is preferable 
 to the earth." "Accustom yourself to consider this world as a 
 penal colony." ^**The world, and consequently man, are such 
 that they ought Siot to exist. A man should^ot address his 
 neighbour as Sir! but as My fellow-sufferer ! 't| " Consideiring 
 life under the aspect of its objective worth, it is at least 
 doubtful whether it is preferable to nothingness, and I would 
 even say that, if experience and reflection could make them- 
 selves heard, it is in favour of nothingness that they would 
 raise their voice." "The life of man oscillates, Hke a pendulum, 
 between suffering and weariness." -i.-- 
 
 Sucli being represented as the real condition of TheiUusiona 
 humanity, how is it accounted for that men are so crafty 
 
 / . Nature 
 
 little alive to their wretchedness ? Hero is the deceives 
 
 men. 
 
 answer : 
 
 " Few men come to penetrate by reflection, the illusion 
 of the principle of individuation. . . . Our will needs to be 
 broken by a great suffering: before it comes to renounce itself ; " 
 
 i.e., man has to be taught, by bitter experience, 
 that life yields no personal happiness, that nature 
 is careless regarding the individual, and seeks only 
 to secure her own blind ends. 
 
 Love and marriage are regarded with aversion, \ 
 as the crafty means whereby the IJnconscious (as \ 
 Hartniann expresses it) perpetuates the race, and \ 
 so perpetuates human misery. 
 
44 Modern Pessimism, 
 
 The "Sextial love is the will to live, i.e., in the species. The 
 
 Pessimistic importance of love cannot be exaggerated ; it is the perpetua- 
 marriage. tion of the race which is its aim." ** Marriages of love are 
 
 concluded in the interests of the species, not for the profit of 
 
 the individual." 
 
 A}\ this wretchedness is the work of hard, un- 
 feeling Fate. 
 
 The irony " It seems as if Fate had wished to add derision to despair, 
 
 filling our life with all the misfortunes of tragedy, and denying 
 to us the dignity of tragic persons. Far from that, we 
 inevitably play the sorry part of the comic." 
 
 Hostility to religion is, as a matter of course, 
 
 characteristic of the whole system. 
 
 - ' 
 
 The hostility " The misery which fills the world protests aloud against the 
 sii^sm to hypothesis of a perfect work, due to a Being absolutely wise 
 religion. and good, and also almighty." ** If a God has made this 
 
 world, I should not like to be that God ; the misery of the 
 world would break my heart." ** Religions are the daughters 
 of ignorance, and cannot long survive their mother." "Every 
 positive religion usurps the throne which belongs to philosophy. 
 Thus philosophers will always be at enmity with religion. " ^ 
 
 Among the extravagancies to which Pessimism 
 has given rise may be mentioned such thorough- 
 going cynicism and despair as those of Eahnsen, 
 who believes that annihilation is impossible, that 
 it is in vain to hope for any cessation of sorrow, in 
 Specimens of fact that misorv is inevitable and eternal ! With 
 
 Pessimist ' 
 
 ganS" ^^^^ ^^y ^ classed such melancholy absurdities as 
 that of the Eussian Pessimist poet, Tolstoi, who 
 expressed his deep regret that the arts of writing 
 
 1 Some of the above quotations are taken from Bourdcau, 
 PertsJes, etc. 
 
Modem Pessimisvi. 45 
 
 and of printing had been invented, and that, in 
 consequence, it was not possible for his own writings 
 to be destroyed, and so to cease from influencing 
 the minds of his fellow-men. 
 
 VI. 
 
 The Unheasonableisess of Pessimism as a 
 Philosophy. 
 
 y^' Pessimism is to hp. rftjecfftd, in t he first place,. 
 Mcause its metaphysical foundations are utterl y 
 
 irrational. T b/^ pygfPTn rpgfg npnn q liqgi'a nf 
 
 nvowpd TTnrfi^finn ^-iipnn ^1ip pngfulafA fT^of hllTlfl. The phUo- 
 
 ; ] . . . sophical 
 
 unconscious "Will is t h^ primPj ^ll-^^ntr^^lb'ng powp^ bases of 
 ^ the Universe. The aim of many mfin nf Science ?7ational. 
 
 as shall credibly account for all things without 
 affirming, without requiring, the admission that 
 there is a Divine Creator of all that exists, whose 
 government is one of reason. They desire to 
 evolve the reasonable out of irrationality. That itevoive3 
 there is purpose in the Universe, the most ordinary able from 
 I intelligence must recognize as evident. There is 
 1 mathematical law, there are mechanical forces, 
 there are vital powers, above all, there is the 
 nature of man, marvellous for intellectual, and 
 still more for moral and spiritual, capacity and 
 faculty. What explanation is to be given of these 
 tokens of design, of these apparent evidences of 
 
46 
 
 Modern Pessimism. 
 
 Man's mind 
 naturally 
 looks for 
 ideas, laws, 
 causes, to 
 account for 
 phenomena. 
 
 mind, planning, governing, co-ordinating all things? 
 It may be answered : Our minds are not capable 
 of constructing the theory that seems to, be re- 
 quired. We must coijtent ourselves with the 
 knowledge of phenomena. This reply is, of 
 course, that of philosophical scepticism. It is 
 to be observed, however, that those who profess 
 to adopt this theory do not consistently carry it 
 out, but constantly introduce ideas, laws, powers, 
 whenever it suits their purpose to do so, in 
 order to satisfy the natural desire for explanation 
 and for unity. /' And there is no likelihood and no 
 possibility of thinking men being content with a 
 mere knowledge of phenomena; they will ever 
 ., obey the intellectual depaand for a knowledge of 
 
 '" * laws, causes, purposes, intellectual and moral aim^ 
 . Heuce it is that theories have been devised 
 
 .^^^hich aim at satisfying the natural tendencies of 
 men to theorize, and to construct satisfactory ex- 
 planations of phenomena, without having recourse 
 to what is sometimes called the. hypothesis of a 
 personal, rational, eternal, designing Creator and 
 Lord. Pessimism has been described as offering 
 a " metaphysic of materialism," as propounding a 
 principle which may serve as a philosophical 
 justification for atheism. We are told that it is 
 far more reasonable to postulate an impersonal, 
 unconscious Force named Will as the essence 
 and cause of all material things and of all 
 
 Attempts to 
 satisfy this 
 intellectual 
 longing 
 without 
 admitting 
 a Personal 
 Creator and 
 Ruler. 
 
Modern Fesshnism. 47 
 
 living and all rational beings, than to believe 
 in God. Now, it is difficult to understand 
 what can possibly be meant by Purpose, unless a 
 Being capable of foresight and of design be pre^ 
 sumed, in whom purpose can reside, and operate, BeUefin 
 
 . ^ ^ . ' ^ God is philo- 
 
 and by whom it can be carried into actuality. A sopMcaUy 
 
 more 
 reasonable 
 
 greater absurdity than unconscious Will was never San^beUef 
 
 in tli( 
 Unco 
 WiU. 
 
 fashioned, in the brain of an enthusiast. If we unconscious 
 
 are told that by will we are to understand power, 
 TVe ask, Whose power? or. The power of what 
 Being, or Substance, or Cause ? If an omnipotent "., 
 will and an omniscient intelligence are included in 
 the Unconscious, and if this Unconscious has ac- 
 cordingly created the mental and material universe, 
 what can the Unconscious be, except another 
 and misleading name for God, who so far from 
 being unconscious is Himself Infinite Intuition 
 and Infinite Reason ? A more retrogressive and 
 incredible doctrine than that of the Pessimists has 
 never been devised, a doctrine so paradoxical as 
 to set blind, unconscious Porce above Beflection, 
 Intelligence, and Reason ! 
 
 2. Another ohjoction to the fonn dflfinps nf Ppa. The 
 
 ' . Psychology 
 
 simism is suggested by the unreasonableness of its andPsy- 
 
 . . .-^ _^,_, -r-^ chosenyof 
 
 psychology. If the blind' Will, or the "Dnconscio us. arJgSty. 
 
 hp. thf^ ahsolnff^ e xistence, how can we account f or V. 
 the emergpup.p of Donso.imisT^ess ? Rpligion has a 
 very simple and sublime, and, to our minds, a 
 very satisfactory answer to the inquiry as to the 
 
48 
 
 Modern Pessimism 
 
 origin of tlie human soul : " God made mau in 
 His own image," "The inspiration of the Al- 
 mighty giveth him understanding." But what 
 does Pessimism say on this matter ? According 
 to Schopenhauer, the Will, moved by its blind 
 and unconscious desire to live, at length reaches 
 consciousness of itself in the human brain ; but 
 there also it loses all the illusions which had 
 sustained, or rather bewildered it. The Will 
 discovers, when in man it reaches the elevation 
 of consciousness, that all reality is vain, that life 
 
 The 
 
 failure of 
 Pessimism 
 to account 
 for Con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 is painful, that annihilation would be preferable. 
 The height of perfection is the negation of the 
 will to live. And, according to Hartmann, Con- 
 sciousness arises through the shock which the 
 Will experiences upon the rebellion of the Idea 
 against the authority of its lord and master : 
 when Eepresentation penetrates into the Uncon- 
 scious, then Consciousness springs into being. 
 
 Who can be convinced that this is a just 
 account of the origin of the mind of man, of the 
 faculties which observe and reason upon the facts 
 of Nature ? The passage from unconsciousness to 
 consciousness is a passage which cannot be thought. 
 One mechanical force is changed into another 
 without break of continuity, for all such forces 
 are naturally correlated. But the chasm between 
 mechanical force and mind is a chasm which 
 cannot be bridged. 
 
Modern Pessimism, 49 
 
 3. We deny tlie assumption made by Scliopen - Thoaccpuut 
 hauer reffardinej tlie chara cter of volition. Ac- andefforfc 
 
 ^ ; 2 2 1 ; 1 '^'^ ^ ^ given by 
 
 cording to the Pessimist, Will, effort, is in itself pg^gsimistsis 
 "evil, and is productive only of Tnisery . Because "^^^^'^'^^^^o* 
 
 said to be destined to wrfi tfrhf^dT^P^*^ Pleasure is 
 
 j2assive. as is sensation, or the aestbetic percep- 
 tion. To desire, to strive after, to toil for, any 
 
 supposed satisfaction, this is depicted as of 
 
 Now, this doctrine Is not likely to meet with 
 much acceptance from healthy, energetic natures, 
 nor indeed from any who consider the high value 
 of resolution and strenuous effort. A^ sound p hi- 
 Josophy of human nature regards will, endeavour, 
 vpersistent striving after a worthy obje ct, as_ tho 
 truest and noblest discipline of humanity. It 
 is not just to account Will to be the master, Endeavour, 
 
 in subjection 
 
 and Eeason the servant : on the contrary Eeason to reason, 
 ' ' IS the glory- 
 
 prescribes both the ends and the means of na?urT.^^ 
 
 life, and the Will is entrusted with the office of 
 carrying out the purposes conceived, approved, 
 and adopted. And the pursuit of reasonable and 
 righteous ends is the best of all employments. 
 Endeavour is the indispensable condition of our 
 highest life, our most precious knowledge and ex- 
 perience, and, so far from being the chief cause 
 of human misery, is the chief cause of the greater 
 
Modern Fssi7)iism. 
 
 part of our cheerfulness, contentment, and even 
 happiness. 
 
 4. A very obvious objection to the Pessimist ic 
 re medy for the evils of ex istence, has often been 
 urged. . Granting the possibility of a conspir acy 
 among men to put an end to human consciousness, 
 granting that the measures taken may prove 
 effectual, what guarantee is there that the whole 
 tragedy will not be repeated ? Is the crafty un- 
 conscious Will to be checkmated bv the short- 
 sighted wisdom of those in whom it has become 
 objectified ? Surely the same force, which in some 
 way has given birth to consciousness, may well 
 refuse to be defeated in its design by the machina- 
 tions of its own offspring ! The prospect of a final 
 escape from life and all its attendant and inevitable 
 miseries, is a prospect which the Pessimist cannot 
 reasonably expect to realize. IsTature will prove 
 too strong for man. 
 
 yii. 
 
 The Error and Unfairness of the Pessimist's 
 Eepresentation of Life. The True 
 Solution OF the Problem. 
 
 Looking at the great question before us, not 
 now in the philosophical light in which it has just 
 been considered but in the light afforded by the 
 daily experience of practical men, we do not hesi- 
 
Modern Pessimism. 51 
 
 tate to say that the representation of human life The injustice 
 
 ... * . , of the 
 
 given by the Pessimists is altogether unjust. It is ^fg;;;'^^'^ 
 their unfair custom to quote as the deliberate ii^u^^ajiiife. 
 judgment of great and wise men, passages from 
 their works, which in some cases evidently ex- 
 pressed a passing or occasional feeling of dissatis- 
 faction or despondency. But a difference is to 
 be observed between the hasty or passionate 
 utterances of men in certain moods, sincere 
 enough at the time, and deliberate judgments 
 gathering up lifeloug experience. 
 
 Thus, passages like the following, however 
 touching in themselves, and however effective in 
 quotation, are scarcely authorities for Pessimism. 
 Petrarch wrote : " Mille piacer non vagliono un Bitter 
 
 sayings are 
 
 tormento" (A thousand pleasures are no compen- J^^J^J*^ 
 sation for a single agony). Yoltaire testified: ^^^od'sani 
 " Le bonlieur n'est qu'un reve, et la douleur est moments, 
 reelle. Il-y-a quatre-vingt ans que je I'eprouve *' 
 (Happiness is but a dream, and pain is real. For I 
 
 eighty years I have experienced this). Calderon 
 is quoted as having said : '* The greatest crime of 
 man is to have been born." Schopenhauer quotes, 
 as descriptive of the ills of human society, the 
 apophthegm : " Homo homini lupus " (Man is a 
 wolf to his fellow-man). 
 
 v/<Language such as this may be quoted in abun- 
 dance even from great and high-minded writers. 
 AndCfhere are few men who, when vexed with the 
 
52 Modern Pessimism. 
 
 cares of life, perplexed by its problems, disappointed 
 
 in its projects, weary of its toils, have not now and 
 
 again given way to the temptati' i to think and 
 
 speak ill of this human existence./ A>ut let a just 
 
 The actual and impartial mind carefully consider the eni ov- 
 en] oyments * *' "^ '' 
 
 li^are'^^ ments, the comforts, the opportunities of healthful 
 JJSigh fts exercise of body and of mind which this life affords ; 
 
 ills 
 
 and let him then compare them with life's inevitable 
 evils, with sickness, suffering, distressing weariness, 
 privation, and disappointment ; and the result will 
 be a conviction that the good, in th6 majority 
 of cases, far outweighs the evil. l^This seems 
 established by the fact that those ?^ho complain 
 so bitterly of life are nevertheless usually most ' 
 unwilling to part with it. They hold it dear, and 
 use every method to prolong it.\ It is indeed not 
 commonly from the afflicted that these complaints 
 arise ; they are very often the morbid utterances 
 of the discontent cherished by the favoured and 
 Life's evils prosperous. Many of the illusions which make 
 
 are often the . . ( i -!- 
 
 result of sin. human life, m the view oi the Pessimist, so 
 grievously evil, are simply the result of his own 
 sin. If men expect from life what it is not in- 
 tended to yield, if they desire everything to minister 
 at all cost to their own personal gratification, if 
 they regard the creature more than the Creator, 
 no wonder if they are rudely awakened from their 
 dream, and discover to their dismay that univenjal^^ 
 enjoyment is not the great end of God*s universe. / 
 
Modern Pessirmsm, 63 
 
 The philosophy of Pessimism may well he 
 helieved to have met with acceptance all the more, 
 hecause the generation to which it has appealed is 
 largel}/ a materialistic, money-getting, pleasure- 
 seeking generation. \ The royal author of the Book ^^^ ^^<^ 
 
 of Ecclesiastes seems to have sought satisfaction in SS^worid 
 all carnal delights, in the exercise of power, in the S?ap- ^ 
 enioyments of wealth, in the experience of material their 
 
 "* , ^ , , Hedonism 
 
 prosperity. And every reader of his instructive ^"J*?" 
 
 ^ -' ' '' revxilsion 
 
 record of his thoughts and sentiments, must have Sk^sm. 
 had forced upon his mind the conclusion that his 
 Pessimistic tone of mind was chiefly owing to the 
 weariness of satiety to which he doomed himself 
 to the sinful endeavour to find satisfaction where 
 satisfaction ought never to have heen sought. This 
 view of life continued until he was at length 
 brought to the conclusion that the fear of God 
 and the keeping of His commandments are the 
 whole duty of man. The inclusion of this Book 
 in the Canon of Scripture seems intended to remind 
 men that this world cannot truly, fully, and for 
 ever, bless those who regard created things rather 
 than the Creator, the gifts rather than the Giver, 
 The process by which the wise man came to his 
 conclusion, " Yanity of vanities : all is vanity," is 
 a process which multitudes have repeated, and it 
 is not surprising that the result has been the same. 
 Men yield themselves to the fascinations of sense, 
 they become lovers of the world, they live for self, 
 
54 
 
 Modern Pessimism. 
 
 If pleasure 
 were the 
 highest good, 
 then indeed 
 to many life 
 would not be 
 worth living. 
 
 for pleasure, wealth, and fame. And they wake 
 to find they have been chasing an ignis fatuus, that 
 they have been speeding towards a mirage of the 
 desert never to be reached. And their disappoint- 
 ment lands them in despair, and the wail of hollow 
 hopeless misery evinces at once the emptiness of 
 the world and the retribution of a righteous God. 
 I If life is to be estimated simply by balancing 
 pains and pleasures, it may be a question whether, 
 in all cases, life is worth living. In the teeming 
 cities of China, as is well known, life is held very 
 cheap, and men are found willing, for a small sum 
 of money, to undergo a death penalty in the place 
 of a condemned criminal. There are even in 
 Europe countries where poverty is so burdensome, 
 and where the conditions of life are so hard, that 
 to live must be to suffer rather than to enjoy. 
 And there are those in all communities who, from 
 birth or by accident, are so crippled and disabled 
 that they have of necessity a lot of pain and of 
 infirmity, with few capacities for pleasure, and with 
 lictle prospect of the alleviation of afiliction. There 
 are also what are called unfortunate tenrjDeraments, 
 disposed to irritability or to melancholy. / 
 
 Now, human beings whose lot is so pitiable, 
 may well supposing them to be without the prin- 
 ciples and consolations of Heligion come to the 
 conclusion that life is a burden, that to exist is to 
 suffer, that it were better not to be. The only 
 
 Tlie lessons 
 of religion 
 alone can 
 suffice to 
 console the 
 unfortunate. 
 
Modern Pessimism, 
 
 way in which to bring to them true relief of mind, 
 patience, fortitude, and hope, is to convince them 
 of the care of a superintending Providence, to lead 
 them by the path of faith into the rest of sub- 
 mission, and to inspire them with the hope that 
 as they are chastened, not for God*s pleasure, but 
 for their own profit, so the time shall come when 
 they will look back with gratitude upon the dis- 
 cipline appointed for them, and will recognize in 
 it the means by which they were taught lessons 
 inestimably precious, and made partakers of a 
 happiness unspeakably glorious. 
 
 The Pessimists represent all conscious life and Enjoyment 
 
 ^ , , derivable 
 
 all active exertion as of necessity miserable. We ffomthe 
 
 ^ right 
 
 ovr 
 faculties. 
 
 contend that this representation is unjust. It is exercise of 
 often said that in a state of health the mere con- 
 sciousness of existence is happiness. Without 
 going to such a length, we would ask the reader 
 to consider the several faculties of his nature, and 
 to put to himself the question, Is their exercise, 
 naturally and on the whole, in their normal con- 
 dition, pleasurable or otherwise? Our senses, 
 sight and hearing, for example ; are they not the 
 occasion of hourly enjoyment ? That we see 
 unpleasant sights, and hear discordant sounds, is 
 true, but it is undeniable that the active exercise 
 of the senses yields a preponderance of pleasure. 
 It will scarcely be contended that to become deaf 
 and blind would be an advantage, as rendering a 
 
56 Modern Pessimism. 
 
 man insensible to tlie usually disagreeable sights 
 and sounds to which the possessor of these senses 
 IS necessarily exposed. We are created with 
 appetites and instincts ; can it be seriously main- 
 tained that these arc the occasions of more pain 
 rrovision than pleasure ? ' The same Power that has given 
 
 made for tho ^ 
 
 iatisSSn ^^^^ craving has also provided for the legitimate 
 appetites Satisfaction of the craving. In varying degrees 
 fnstincts. these natural and primitive impulses of our nature 
 are evidently the means of almost constant enjoy- 
 our social meut. Our social affections, if duly regulated, are 
 
 affections r i-a i i t 
 
 sources of the sourccs of life-long pleasure. It is not denied 
 
 pleasure. *-" " 
 
 that here we are especially vulnerable. But love 
 and friendship, notwithstanding the assertions of 
 Pessimists to the contrary, are the wealth of our 
 humanity. And who will question that even the 
 wounded heart is not without compensations ? 
 
 **'Tis better to have loved and lost, 
 Than never to have loved at all." 
 
 The exercise \ The intellectual powers, again, in their just and 
 ^'i*T?er?brfn<' temperate exercise, bring the purest delight. We 
 deUght. are told that he that increaseth knowledge in- 
 creaseth sorrow. True, yet the capacity for joy 
 is enlarged with the susceptibility to unhappiness 
 arising from doubt and a widened horizon of 
 sjTnpathy. In fact, whilst we admit that human 
 existence is a chequered -iscene, and that only the 
 superficial can pronounce life all pleasure, we 
 gtill maintain that the proper exercise of human 
 
\ 
 
 Modern Pessimism 57 
 
 powers brings satisfaction and happiness to the 
 thoughtful and virtuous man. The arrangements 
 of our life are decisive as to the benevolence of 
 the Creator. 
 
 But do we deny the existence of evils, of pain, Existing 
 disease, and privation ? of sorrow and disappoint- ^^""tted 
 ment ? of bereavement and anguish ? By no 
 means. The ills of human existence are real, and 
 in very many cases are such that, if life were to 
 be judged by a balancing of pains and pleasures, 
 it would not be worth living. But those who be- 
 lieve in God, as revealed -in the Scriptures, as 
 manifested in Christ, are not without some kind 
 of key to these phases of human experience. There The key 
 is no malevolence in the Divine government. On of^Jfg"^"^" 
 the contrary, the ills as well as the joys of life are 
 intended for the truest, highest good of men. Such 
 good is not necessarily and always secured by 
 trouble and sorrow. But in some measure it is so 
 secured in the case of the submissive and obedient 
 disciple of Christ, who learns to wear his Master's 
 yoke, to bear his Saviour's cross. It is his happy 
 conviction that whom He loveth God chasteneth, 
 that they who partake Christ's death shall share 
 His life, that if they suffer with Him they shall 
 also reign with Him. 
 
 [in fact, there is no possibility of understanding 
 the perplexities of the human lot except by the 
 perception of the two greatest facts in human 
 
58 Modern Pessimism. 
 
 Sin and history, Sill and Redemption. / Sin accounts for 
 the greater part of human misery, which is not a 
 sign of Divine heartlessness or indifference, but of 
 the rule of a righteous moral Governor, who, in 
 the maintenance of His authority, and for the 
 highest good of His subjects, will not suffer sin 
 to be unpunished. All this the Pessimistic theory 
 overlooks. 
 
 The evil of And the Christian is assured that the evil of the 
 
 not Ti^-e- world is not irremediable. His belief in the re- 
 demption of man body and soul by the obedience 
 and sacrifice of the Incarnate Son of God, itself 
 saves him from Pessimism. The mediatorial work 
 of Christ changes the curse into a blessing. If sin 
 abounds, grace much more abounds. The power 
 of the Saviour's love, the efficacy of the Holy 
 Spirit's operations are such that in their presence 
 no evil is invincible, despair gives way to hope, 
 and earth's darkest shades are pierced and irra- 
 diated by the beams of a heavenly day. 
 
Modern Pcssimi^^^ ^ -^^ .-xjT 
 
 0^^ Lisft^ 
 
 t .? THE y^ 
 
 y^-^ ' V ERSITY 
 
 VIII. 
 
 The Practical Evils connected with Pessi- 
 mism. A Comparison between Pessimism 
 AND Christianity. 
 
 It will bo well now to glance at the consequences 
 which might be expected to follow the prevalence 
 of each of the alternative systems : Pessimism and 
 Christianity. 
 
 A very natural result of the adoption of Pessi- The pre- 
 
 ^ ' valence of 
 
 mistic views must needs be the general prevalence ^oJiJ^ci f 
 of depression and of discontent. Pessimism is ^^^<^<'"*^^*- 
 worse than some other forms of error, inasmuch 
 as it not only undervalues the enjoyments of the 
 present, but takes from its disciple all hope either 
 of an improved condition of human society in this 
 world, or of a blessed immortality hereafter. What 
 motive is left to labour for human welfare, when 
 human welfare is believed to be an impossibility ? 
 Who can bear the inevitable ills of human life, 
 when unsupported by any prospect of alleviation, 
 any expectation of future happiness ? f To be other 
 than depressed, melancholy, and discontented, would 
 in a Pessimist be unreasonable and inconsistent. 
 What would be the consequence of the general 
 acceptance of such views as those described? 
 Fancy a society, a nation, a world of Pessimists ! 
 It would become a society, a nation, a world of 
 
60 Modem Pessimism. 
 
 madmen! And individuals adopting such prin- 
 ciples could not fail to be a source of wretchedness 
 in any community. ^ 
 ressimism The " strength-iuspiriug aid " of hope is no in- 
 Jf'hTe'*^ considerable factor in human society. This has 
 been well expressed by^^ Qolerid ge in the familiar 
 lines :~ 
 
 ; Work, without hope, draws nectar in a sieve ; } 
 I And hope without an object cannot live." j 
 
 A community of persons deprived of all expecta- 
 tion of individual happiness and social progress 
 must be utterly paralyzed for all honest toil, all 
 heroic self-devotion, all patient endurance. And 
 if expectations are cherished, only to prove illusions, 
 and to mock the misery of the disappointed, the 
 case must be, if possible, even worse; by how 
 much a cynical despair exceeds in wretchedness a 
 settled stolid gloom. 
 It would As to the morality which would accompany the 
 
 ^ce. "^ popular acceptance of the Pessimistic theory, we 
 may safely say that that theory supplies but few 
 restraints from vice and crime, and but few motives 
 to virtue. Asceticism might be the result in some 
 few cases, but experience of human nature leads 
 to the belief that the denial of God and the culti- 
 vation of hopelessness would more frequently issue 
 in self-seeking and sensuality. 
 
 Compare the influence of the two systems re- 
 spectively upon the conduct of human life. Men 
 
Modem Pessimism. 61 
 
 by their constitution and their circumstances are, 
 generally speaking, required to work and to 8uffet\ 
 That these are two great provinces of moral dis- 
 cipline can scarcely be questioned. The propor- 
 tion of those who are exempt from toil and from 
 "trials," and who, as life-long favourites of fortune, 
 are largely occupied in enjoyment, is too small to 
 be taken into account. Take human life at the tho 
 
 inliuence of 
 
 average, and Christian and Pessimist will agree f^^^gjj^^ 
 that it is chiefly occupied with bodily or mental Smaa"^'''' 
 toil, varied with frequent experiences of weakness, ufe'Sfm-^ 
 pain, sorrow, and disappointment. It is a fair test 
 of the two theories of life, to consider which of 
 them is the more fitted to assist men in the dis- 
 charge of necessary duty, and in the endurance of 
 inevitable trouble. 
 
 Why should the Pessimist work with cheerfulness, Man must 
 
 '' . / work ; but 
 
 diligence, and perseverance ? The effort which is *^^f^^g 
 necessary is, in his apprehension, itself an evil. S2)tii?to''^ 
 The ends to be attained by labour are for him the n^ to eu- 
 mere illusion created for its unconscious purposes affliction, 
 by an unconscious force, having no excellence, and 
 affording no satisfaction. In labour, he feels 
 himself the wretched and passive instrument of a 
 power which he hates. Nor is there any prospect 
 of future results which can inspire the worker with 
 a bright anticipation. He is satisfied that no real 
 good can result from human effort. Human nature 
 is essentially bad and unimprovable. Human life 
 
(52 Modern Peeswiism. 
 
 is evil, and the alleviations are few and slight. 
 Human history has no future to bo contemplated 
 with satisfaction, save the prospect of its own 
 eternal annihilation. Why should the Pessimist 
 consent to work for himself or for others ? 
 On the other On the othcr hand, let it be considered what 
 
 hand, Chiis- 
 
 lianity motivcs tlio plainest and the least fortunate of 
 
 places wovs * 
 
 highest Christians has to fulnl vrhat he believes to bo his 
 furnishesThi appointed task, to pass through what to him is 
 the highest an ordaiucd probation and discipline. Ills active 
 nature he regards, not as a curse, but as a bless- 
 ing ; iu its exercise he fulfils the true functions of 
 his nature, realizes his ideal of human excellence, 
 acquires those virtues which are the crown and 
 glory of his being. To him, daily work is not the 
 enforced service of a cruel serfdom, the tribute 
 wrung from him by the violence of a ruthless 
 tyrant. It is rather the opportunity of showing 
 his fidelity and gratitude to a benevolent Euler, an 
 honoured and beloved Father. What he does, he 
 aims at doing " as unto the Lord, not to men." 
 Eemembering his Master*s words : " My meat and 
 my drink is to do the will of my Father iu heaven/' 
 . he makes it his daily business to tread in that 
 Master's steps, and to please and glorify his God. 
 Christianity 13^|J it {g ^q^ to be lost sight of, that the Christian 
 is not exempt from the afflictions which befall men 
 generally. It is instructive to observe, however, 
 that these afflictions are, in his view, neither un- 
 
 impart 
 fortitude and 
 hope to 
 li:3 suiferer. 
 

 Modern Pessimisvi. 63 
 
 mitigated evil nor unrelieved by a prospect of their 
 serving as means to highest good. They are be- 
 lieved and they are found, in common with all 
 experiences providentially appointed, to " work to- 
 gether for good to them that love God ; " and they 
 are also believed to work out for such " a far more 
 exceeding and eternal weight of glory." 
 
 A comparison such as this furnishes us with the 
 best reasons as practical beings for congratu- 
 lating ourselves upon being Christians rather than 
 Pessimists. Strenprth to work and strength to ncasonand 
 
 ^ ^ experience 
 
 suffer, doubtless depend, to no small extent, upon approvhi 
 the convictions which, as intelligent persons, we aiSIn^^^'' 
 cherish with regard to our present position and our pcssimisiu.'' 
 future prospects. Pessimism is not only unwar- 
 ranted by reason ; it is condemned by experience 
 as an unpractical and unworkable system. A 
 community of Christians who lived up to their 
 Christianity, would be heaven ; a community of 
 Pessimists who lived down to their Pessimism, 
 would be hell. 
 
 Let Pessimism triumph, and become the TheawM 
 
 * prospect, 
 
 Philosophy, the Eeligion, of the future; and p^^^^n^i,;-, 
 what will the future witness? The brightest ^^^^^ 
 prospect which opens up is a prospect of uni- 
 versal destruction, annihilation, the cessation of 
 consciousness ; and that can scarcely bo called in 
 any sense a prospect, which is the prevalence of 
 unconsciousness, of infinite, eternal night. 
 
64 Modern Pessimism. 
 
 The glorious L et ChrJstiam'iy hft Yi' fi^or ious. and re alize IQO 
 
 conse- -' '' ^ \ "^ \ ; ' 
 
 thivicto? purp oses and the predictions of its Divine Founde^ -, 
 
 tiLSty^ a nd how utterly opp osite, how unsp eakabl y mor e 
 
 "Tlessed and glorious, the fu t ure of humanity 1 
 
 Vhp.n nil -mpn flTpTrlrn.wn nntii-XlhrlRt by the 
 
 attractive power of His Cross, and by the gracious 
 constraint of the Comforter whom He has sent; 
 when the one new humanity is constituted and 
 is complete in Him ; when the reign of righteous- 
 ness is established, and the law of love is supreme ; 
 then shall the spiritual Kingdom ol the Eternal 
 have come, and then shall the Will of the Holy 
 Father- not the blind, unconscious, imaginary 
 force which the Pessimists have fashioned into 
 an idol, before which they have fallen down and 
 worshipped, then shall the Will of the Holy 
 j?A.TaEit be done on Earth as in Heaven! 
 
 '-^ 
 
 -^4 Present Day Tracts, No. 34. \-^ 
 
UTILITARIANISM : 
 
 AN 
 
 llldgital aitb |m%iMs Clje^rg ai Slflxals. 
 
 BY THB 
 
 EEV. J. RADFORD THOMSOlSr, M.A., 
 
 attthor op 
 
 "The Witness of Man's Mo ral Nature to Cheistianity ; * 
 
 "Modern Pessimism," Eia 
 
 THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY: 
 
 S6 PATERNOSTER ROW, AND 65 ST. PAUL'S CHURCHYARD, 
 
^xgnm^xii of the TrncU 
 
 While Christianity regards man as a spiritual being, amenable 
 to a Divine law, Physical Ethics consider him as an organism 
 susceptible of pleasure and pain, and governed in conduct by 
 this susceptibility. 
 
 Utilitarianism is defined as the system of Morals which 
 teaches that Pleasure is the chief good, and the standard of 
 right, but that the pleasures of others than the agent are to be 
 sought. The ethical theories of Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick, and 
 Herbert Spencer are explained. The prevalence and influence 
 of Utilitarianism are shown and accounted for. 
 
 The first principle of this system, viz., that Pleasure is the 
 standard of right, is contested. Pleasure is shown to have no 
 fclaim to such a position, either when sought by the individual 
 Ifor himself, or when sought by the individual for society. The 
 fimpossibility is made manifest of applying the test of pleasure 
 and pain as consequences following upon action. The dangerous 
 results which would ensue upon the adoption of the Utilitarian 
 standard are exhibited. The relations between virtuous conduct 
 and happiness are considered. It is shown that Utilitarianism 
 gives no account of the moral imperative, of duty and con- 
 science. What is termed Christian Utilitarianism is considered, 
 and its inconsistency is made apparent. Right is shown to be 
 discoverable by considering human nature in its completeness, 
 by examining the moral order discernible in the Universe, 
 by pondering the character of the Divine Ruler. 
 
 The superiority of Christianity over Utilitarianism is then 
 a conclusion exhibited in detail. 
 
UTILITARIANISM: 
 
 AN 
 
 ill09ti:al mxb IxulmoxxB Shears oi iRords* 
 
 Introductory. 
 [heke is no question of the present day The need of 
 
 11-1 111.1 * reasonable 
 
 more deDated among tnougntful men, foundation 
 or more vital to the prospects of human conduct, 
 society, than the question as to tho 
 foundation of right and duty. If to this opinion 
 it he objected that men are generally agreed 
 that certain actions are good and praiseworthy, 
 and that others are evil and blamable, and that, 
 this being the case, we need not trouble ourselves 
 about " the why and the wherefore," the reply is, 
 that to all who think, and sooner or later to all 
 men, it must greatly matter what is the nature of 
 the ground upon which obligation is believed to 
 rest. A well-built house needs a sound foundation. 
 Men will not always act, certainly in the times at 
 hand they will not act, simply from habit, from 
 tradition, from authority. Our times are times in 
 which men ask a reason for everything, and in 
 which they will not be content without a reason, 
 
Utilitarianism, 
 
 To neglect 
 the prin- 
 ciples 
 underlying 
 morality- 
 would be 
 fatal to the 
 best hopes of 
 the future of 
 humanity. 
 
 There are 
 mainly two 
 opposed 
 theories of 
 man's 
 moral life. 
 
 It is not to be expected that disagreeable duties 
 will be readily performed, that a laborious and 
 self-denying life will be cheerfully led, by men 
 who do not understand why they should not 
 abandon themselves to self-indulgence. = Virtue 
 must have its grounds, its sanctions, whether 
 political, philosophical, or religious, or all com- 
 bined. Society will fall to pieces unless there are 
 bonds strong enough to bind it together. If in- 
 dividual impulse and the desire for individual 
 gratification become the principle of human action, 
 men will return to the condition of the brute- 
 beasts that roam through desert steppes or savage 
 jungles. There are passions and notions and even 
 principles abroad which, if unchecked, will lead 
 to anarchy and to animalism. There would be no 
 surer way of bringing these horrible evils upon 
 mankind, than to cultivate indiiference with regard 
 to the principles of morality. It may be taken 
 for granted that, if Christians do not inculcate and 
 defend sound principles, there are those in abun- 
 dance the worst enemies of human society who 
 will take advantage of every opportunity to diffuse 
 doctrines debasing and disastrous in their effects. 
 
 There are now taken throughout civilised society, 
 
 two contrasted and opposed views of human 
 
 nature, human conduct, human life, and human 
 
 prospects. 
 
 (^ On the one hand is the distinctively Christian view, 
 
Utilitarianism, 
 
 that man is the offspring of the eternal God, made ri'garKSi 
 originally in the Divine image, and consequently spiritual 
 sharing in some measure the Divine Reason, and capable of 
 capable of apprehending and approving the Divine God, and of 
 Righteousness. If this is so, then, although man ^jt^t^uL 
 has a body, which is the link that connects him ^^^' 
 with the realm of matter, man is a spirit. Related 
 to the eternal order, man is endowed with a moral 
 nature, and is called to a moral life. The con- 
 ditions of his earthly existence, and the fact of his 
 sinfulness, no doubt interfere with his perfect vision 
 of God, and his perfect sympathy with Divine 
 law. Yet he is susceptible of teaching both by 
 Nature and by Revelation, and he is capable of 
 being affected by those spiritual influences which 
 are as real as physical forces. He can recognise 
 moral authority ; he can decline the imperious sum- 
 mons of the body, and the more imperious summons 
 of society ; he can consent to the demand of 
 Conscience, he can obey the behest of Law, he can 
 do the will of God. 
 
 Those who take the spiritual view of human Difference 
 
 among 
 
 nature and morality differ, no doubt, among them- J^^g^^X. 
 selves. But all agree that man is spiritual, that questions of 
 the voice of Duty speaks from above, that Right nSterfero 
 is to be sought in what is higher and more reverence in 
 
 common for 
 
 authoritative than feeling, whether the sensations gj.^* ^^'^ 
 of the body or the emotions of the soul. 
 
 There is however another view of morality 
 
Utilitarianism* 
 
 The otlier 
 theory 
 regards man 
 as a superior 
 oigaiiism, 
 with a wider 
 range of 
 function 
 and of 
 Bensitive- 
 ness. 
 
 This 
 
 physical 
 
 theory of 
 
 Ethics 
 
 naturally 
 
 regards 
 
 pleasure 
 
 and pain as 
 
 the true 
 
 criteria of 
 
 conduct. 
 
 widely different from that now explained, and a 
 view which has unhappily been adopted during the 
 present century even by many whose sympathies 
 are with the cause of virtue, so far as virtue subsists 
 between man and man. The progress of physical 
 science, and especially of physiology, the wide- 
 spread acceptance of the modern theory of De- 
 velopment or Evolution, have concurred to prepare 
 the way for a so-called scientific theory of morals in 
 complete opposition to the rational and religious 
 theory above set forth. The starting-point of this 
 opposing theory of ethics is to be discerned in the 
 very common belief that man is an organism, and 
 nothing but an organism, that he is simply the 
 most highly developed of the animals which inhabit 
 this globe, whose highly organised brain and 
 nervous system have taken on Avider and finer 
 functions than those discharged by the inferior 
 creatures from which he is diiferentiated. Upon 
 this theory mind is feeling, more or less com- 
 plicated. The theory in question does not pretend 
 to do away with the mystery of Consciousness ; it 
 maintains the perfect distinction between the 
 physical nervous shock and its psychical symbol in 
 consciousness. But it regards all that is mental as 
 the outgrowth of what is bodily. According to the 
 Philosophy of feeling, pleasure and pain are the 
 accompaniment of proper function, and accordingly 
 the guide-posts pointing to proper conduct. By do- 
 
utilitarianism. 
 
 ing what is pleasurable and avoiding what is painful, 
 men will thus secure their own well-being, and pro- 
 mote the development of the race, both physically 
 and socially. There is, according to this doctrine, no 
 other law and no other motive for human conduct 
 than the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of 
 pain. As will be shown presently, there are in- 
 troduced by ethical philosophers various consider- 
 ations qualifying the crude dicttcfUy that what gives 
 pleasure is therefore right. Still it will not be 
 denied that the advocates of physical ethics, 
 whether Epicureans, Utilitarians, or Evolutionists, 
 are of one mind as to the criterion^ the law, the 
 motive, the sanction, of human conduct, depending 
 upon the experiences of pleasure and of pain alone. 
 
 The reader will now see clearly for what reasons Hence the 
 we invite his attention to the doctrine of Utili- S^examin- 
 tarianism. "We know that this doctrine is held refuting its 
 
 claims. 
 
 and propagated by sincere Theists, and even (it 
 must be admitted) by some Christians. But we 
 believe that it can be shown that its acceptance is 
 inconsistent with Theism and with Christianity, 
 and is antagonistic to that cause of independent 
 and disinterested morality which those who profess 
 Theism and Christianity should have at heart. 
 
6 
 
 Utilitarianism, 
 
 utilitarian- 
 ism is a 
 variety of 
 Hedonism. 
 
 Hedonism 
 teing the 
 doctrine 
 that 
 
 Pleasure is 
 the standard 
 and test of 
 right action. 
 
 The Central Doctkine and the Definition op 
 Utilitarianism. 
 
 What is the chief and central doctrine of 
 Utilitarianism, tlie one characteristic by which 
 it is distinguished from other theories of morals, 
 that by which it is defined and described ? The 
 answer to this question is plain and unambiguous : 
 that course of action is right which issues in the 
 largest amount of pleasure, or the least a7nount of 
 pain, to all sentient beings who are affected hy the 
 action. It is evident that two propositions are 
 included in this definition: viz., 1. Pleasure is 
 the chief good, and Pain the chief evil; and 2. 
 the Pleasure and Pain to be considered are not 
 simply those of the agent, but of all concerned. 
 
 "Hedonism" is the term used to denote the 
 doctrine that pleasure is the standard and criterion 
 of moral good, of right action. There have been 
 and are, Hedonists who think that whatever gives 
 pleasure to the agent, ^.e., the most pleasure on 
 the whole, is therefore the right thing for him to 
 do. Such Hedonists are called Egoistic, because 
 the beginning and end of morality, according to 
 them, is the pleasure of the agent. The higher 
 and nobler Hedonists, however, take a very different 
 
UtilifaHanism. 
 
 view. As the proper aim of conduct, according to utnitarfens 
 
 ^ ^ , . holdthat 
 
 them, is the promotion of the happiness of the *^dp?ope?^ 
 community generally, they are properly named, ^^man 
 Unwersalistic Hedonists. Hedonists of this type, promotion 
 who aim at the general diffusion of pleasure, are diffusion of 
 
 ... . . Pleasure. 
 
 commonly designated Utilitarians. Pleasure is still 
 " the one thing needful," the one thing all-sufficient ; 
 hut the pleasure sought is that which is diffused 
 throughout society. This theory is thus far from 
 being selfish : it is in its very essence benevolent 
 
 With regard to the first of the two propositions 
 involved in the definition of Utilitarianism, mis- 
 understanding is scarcely possible. It affirms that 
 Pleasure is the summum bomcm, the hest thing in 
 the universe, that to seek pleasure and to shun 
 pain is the sum and suhstance of morality. Other 
 things may he desired, but they are all desirahle 
 for the sake of the pleasure they yield. But 
 Pleasure is an ultimate, self-sufficient end, is desired 
 and is desirahle for its own sake, and not for the 
 sake of anything else. There is no need to bring it is easy to 
 forward any reason why Pleasure should he thus that 
 
 PleasTire 
 
 sought. The reason is engraved deeply upon our swd be 
 own constitution J it is in the very nature of things S|?Jsr*^ 
 that Pleasure should be the ultimate end and ^'^' 
 justification of action. This principle is held to be 
 intuitively apprehended. 
 
 With regard to the second of these propositions, 
 there is some opening for difference of opiuion as 
 
10 Utilitarianism, 
 
 It is not very to its Gxact meaniiifir. For, whilst Utilitarianisni 
 
 easy to see , , 
 
 th^rS^e^^ IS certain that an agent ought not to seek merely 
 ted bTt^hose ^^^^ ^^^ pleasure, it leaves it an open question how 
 uniVersaS^ wido shall bo tho range within which the quantity 
 nedonism. of pleasure following upon any action is to be 
 calculated. We are to act so as to give pleasure 
 to others, and then we shall certainly act aright ; 
 ., but as to whom we are to please by our action, 
 Xl^^ith regard to this there may be room for discus- 
 sion. Those immediately connected with us are too 
 few, and offer a scope too limited. Yet to include 
 all sentient creatures that are, or may be, in distant 
 places and times,' in'Sirectly affected, seems, on the 
 other hand, to give too wide a range. 
 The Although the Hedonist regards Pleasure as above 
 
 utilitarian . . . 
 
 ay. all thinpis to be desired, and Pain as above all 
 
 consistently o ' 
 
 suffeT'pIhi things to be dreaded and avoided, it must not be 
 of ViJlsure^ supposed that he is unwilling in all circumstances 
 beatt!u"ned to encountor pain, bodily and mental. Whether 
 an Egoist or an Altruist, he is bound to brave 
 suffering, when by doing so he can add to the total 
 stock of pleasure. \_The benevolent Utilitarian re- 
 cognizes that the plan of the world is such that 
 some must bear ills from which their nature shrinks, 
 in order that others may experience relief and joy. 
 To him Pleasure is so excellent, that in order to 
 increase its sum, he is willing to submit to the 
 often grievous conditions by which only the general 
 happiness can be secured and increased. 
 
Trtilita'i ianisml 1 1 
 
 "What docs Utilitarianism claim to be? Its 
 pretensions are large and bold. 
 
 1. Its upholders assert that Utilitarianism is the utilitarians 
 
 . claim that 
 
 one true theory of Morals. It is well known that for they have 
 
 '^ '^ ^ ^ found the 
 
 more than two thousand years various theories have the'^^uStSn 
 been maintained for the scientific exposition and agYtScd^ 
 establishment of the morally good, the right, in ceSuries;'^ 
 human character and conduct. Apart from Eeve- have 
 
 reached tho 
 
 lation philosophers thought, speculated, and wrote, T^^th upon 
 upon these themes. And even since Christianity has ^tfrestT^ 
 shed light of priceless, peerless value upon Morality, 
 discussions have still prevailed, even amongst those 
 who acknowledge the Divine origin and authority 
 of our Beligion, with regard to the foundations of 
 right and of duty. Some have regarded Reason as 
 the criterion of morality; some have sought the 
 supreme test of Eight in a " moral sense," others 
 have looked for the standard of duty to the Will 
 of God, as declared in Nature, and as more fully 
 revealed in Scripture. There are those who seek 
 the authoritative law of conduct in the organiza- 
 tion of man's nature, ^in the perfect exercise of 
 human powers, ^in the structure of Society, or in 
 the law of the State, or in that Universal Order 
 which is recognizable in the creation. But the 
 Hedonist seeks the solution of the vast question 
 in man's capacity for pleasure, and the Utilitarian 
 in that capacity for pleasure as possessed both by 
 the human race, and by all sentient beings. 
 
12 
 
 Utilitarianism. 
 
 They claim 
 to have laid 
 a scientific 
 basis for the 
 legislation 
 of all States. 
 
 They claim 
 to apply an 
 intelligible 
 and 
 
 unfailing 
 rule to the 
 conduct of 
 individuals. 
 
 2. Utilitarianism further offers itself as the 
 ultimate principle of legislation. Tlie advocates of 
 the system rely for its general acceptance, in uo 
 slight measure, upon its supposed applicability to 
 questions of political and legislative interest. They 
 urge that no consideration is more potent with 
 law-makers than the consideration of Utility. Is 
 it not the aim of unselfish and public-spirited 
 legislators to seek the increase of the pleasures and 
 the diminution of the privations and miseries of 
 the community ? Statesmen and politicians have 
 been accustomed to test measures proposed for 
 their adoption by their agreement, or otherwise, 
 with the formula : ** Aim at the greatest happiness 
 of the greatest number." 
 
 3. The principle in question claims to be the one 
 all-sufficient practical rule of individual conduct. We 
 are told that the endeavour to apply other criteria 
 will frequently involve us in perplexities and diffi- 
 culties, and will lead to no definite and satisfactory 
 result ; but that nothing can be simpler than the 
 inquiry, What course of action will yield most 
 general pleasure? and that no moral law can be 
 more plain and unquestionable than that which is 
 yielded by translating the answer to that inquiry 
 into the imperative mood. It is not denied that 
 there are other more familiar and more *' handy" 
 rules of conduct, e.g.^ What is customary ? What 
 is the law of the land ? What is the dictate of 
 
Utilitarianism, 13 
 
 Relirion ? Nay, it is admitted that there is such They 
 
 " '' consider 
 
 a quality as Virtue, that it is right to do virtuous {.^f^w^eTen^ 
 acts, that a man may properly ask concerning any J^ll^^^ 
 proposed conduct, Is this according to Virtue ? for^ 
 But as the Utilitarian considers that Virtue is good 
 simply because its prevalence is a means to the 
 increase of Pleasure, which is the supreme end 
 of conduct, ^he does not look upon Virtue as con- 
 flicting with Utility, for the laws of Virtue are in 
 his view only the subordinate rules framed for the 
 purpose of promoting the pleasurable experiences 
 of mankind. 
 
 II. 
 
 The Historical Genesis of Utilitarianism. 
 
 [Like most systems of philosophy and morals, ^^Hg^J^f' 
 
 that now under consideration had its roots in An- JougM^nthl 
 
 cient Greece, where Aristippus and the Cyrenaics, of IncSnt^^ 
 
 and Epicurus and his school, advocated pleasure thouprh'the 
 
 ^ ^ . ^ growth 
 
 as the highest good. In modern times, Hobbes ^^J"^^-"^ 
 and Locke revived the doctrine of Hedonism, and anVistii 
 Hume by his writings gave it a powerful philo- ^*^^^^' 
 sophic impulse. But we will come direct to those 
 names associated with our modern Utilitarianism, 
 and with contemporary controversy. 
 
 Utilitarianism, as a principle held and advocated 
 by a powerful school of ethical and political philo- 
 sophers, owes its origin to the writings of Jeremy 
 
14 
 
 Utilitarianism. 
 
 BenthL Bentham. The first sentences of his work on The 
 Snodem' Principles of Morals and Legislation are so plain 
 utaxtanan- ^^^ outspoken that they may with advantage be 
 
 quoted verbatim: 
 
 Bentham's 
 
 undisguised 
 
 Hedonism. 
 
 He considers 
 Pleasure and 
 Pain not 
 only as 
 criteria of 
 ends to be 
 sought ; but 
 also as 
 means to be 
 employed 
 by Society. 
 
 ** Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two 
 sovereign masters, 'pain and 'pleasure. It is for them alone to 
 point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what 
 we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and 
 wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened 
 to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in 
 all we think. . , , The principle of utility recognises this 
 subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, 
 the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the 
 hands of reason and of law .... By the principle of utility 
 is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every 
 action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears 
 to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party 
 whose interest is in question .... An action then may 
 be said to be conformable to the principle of utility .... 
 when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the 
 community is greater than any it has to diminish it." 
 
 According to Bentham, pleasure and pain are 
 not only of supreme importance as ends of human 
 action, i.e.y to be sought and shunned respectively ; 
 they are equally important to Society, and par- 
 ticularly to the Law, as means by which those ends 
 are to be secured. That is to say, the pleasure of 
 the community is to be promoted by the infliction 
 of suffering upon those individuals whose conduct 
 tends to diminish the sum of the general pleasure. 
 Although he expressly mentions physical, moral 
 or popular, and religious sanctions, Bentham lays 
 the greatest stress upon the political sanction, in- 
 
Utititarianism. 15 
 
 asmuch as legislation is, in his view, the most im- 
 portant department of the science of human conduct. 
 
 In Bentham's view not only must conduct he Bentham 
 
 regards the 
 
 judged by its tendency to promote pleasure or pain. ^^^^^^ 
 Pleasure is a good, and the only good; pain an evil, avoidance of 
 and the only evil. But these experiences, actual oniy moth^es 
 or prospective, act also as motives. The only 
 motives which can induce men to act are the hope 
 of securing pleasure or avoiding pain. Thus Ben- 
 tham is led into the paradox, that 
 
 ** There is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a 
 bad one." 
 
 Even the pleasure of malice, envy, and cruelty 
 is good, and 
 
 "While it lasts, and before any bad consequences arrive, it is 
 as good as any other that is not more intense." (!) 
 
 And although Bentham does not directly attack He identifies 
 
 . . , ' the Divine 
 
 Religion, he resents every representation of the Jf^g^"^'^ 
 Deity which does not identify the Divine will with l^^^fZ 
 the intention to promote universal happiness, i.e., ^^i^^^^^^- 
 the prevalence of pleasure. He complains that 
 few of the votaries of religion are believers in the 
 benevolence of God. 
 
 In our own time Utilitarianism has been re- Mr. j. s. 
 
 Mill's 
 
 commended to public favour by the advocacy of teaching is 
 
 ^ ' 'an advance 
 
 Mr. J. S. Mill. The interest and charm of Mr. Seam's. 
 Mill's work on Utilitarianism do not lie merely in 
 its style and its illustrations, but still more in the 
 attempt to build a noble life upon a theorv^^^ 
 
 ^ V^ OK THK 
 
 f UNIVERSITT 
 
16 Utilitarianism. 
 
 together insufficient to sustain it. His philosophy 
 
 was a philosophy of pleasure, of utility; yet in 
 
 two ways it differed from ordinary Epicureanism. 
 
 L It had regard to the welfare of the whole species 
 
 without exception ; and may justly be designated 
 
 n"ifiihes TJniversalistic Hedonism. This was one character- 
 
 pi?a?uresin istic ; there was a second : viz., that it did not, 
 
 quauty" and as lias too ofteu beou done, sink all distinctions 
 
 prefers . tot i t 
 
 higher to m the quality of pleasures, reducmg them to one 
 pleasures. common level. He differed from his master, Ben- 
 tham, in laying stress upon the qualities character- 
 istic of different kinds of pleasures, varying with 
 their sources and occasions. 
 
 It must not, however, be lest sight of that 
 Mr. Mill maintained Pleasure to be the one only 
 standard of right. 
 
 "The creed," he wrote, "which accepts as the foundation of 
 morals, Utility or the greatest happiness principle, holds that 
 actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness ; 
 wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By 
 happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain ; by 
 unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure." " Pleasure 
 and the freedom from pain are the only things desirable 
 as ends^" 
 
 Mr. Mill, like some others of the Epicurean 
 school, assigns a higher place to 
 
 " the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, 
 and of the moral sentiments," 
 
 than to the pleasures of sensation. But his 
 peculiarity is that he recognizes the former class 
 as of superior excellence by reason of their intrinsic 
 
utilitarianism. 17 
 
 nature, and not merely because of tlieir greater To introduce 
 
 rrn . * principle 
 
 permanence, safety, and uncostlmess. The question qualifying 
 
 ^ ^ J ' J- pleasure is 
 
 of course occurs, How is it to be decided whicli ^consistent 
 pleasure of two is the higher ? to which the answer goiig"^^' 
 is given, That one which is preferred by those who ^ ^^^^' 
 are equally aicquainted with, and equally capable 
 of appreciating and enjoying both. Mr. Mill 
 makes the very obvious mistake of supposing that 
 no one who knows a higher pleasure will choose a 
 lower. In this he judged men by the standard 
 of his own preferences. He was right in saying 
 
 "It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied, than a fool 
 satisfied ; " 
 
 but in saying this he virtually gave up the cardinal 
 principle of Utilitarianism. If pleasure is the 
 standard of good, a world of well-fed, mirthful 
 fools is a better world than one peopled by dis- 
 contented sages. 
 
 Bentham repudiated the term eudsomonism (from 
 evdaifjioyia^ happiness) as less suited to describe 
 his theory than hedonism (from v^ovrj, pleasure). 
 The former seemed to him to point to a too elevated 
 and refined theory of life. To Bentham, quantity 
 of pleasure was the main thing : in an oft-quoted 
 sentence he says : 
 
 "Given equal amounts of pleasure, pushpin is as good as 
 poetry." 
 
 And this is sound hedonism, which Mill's doc- 
 trine of difference in quality of pleasure is not. 
 
18 
 
 Utilitarianism, 
 
 Sidgwick has well observed upon Mill's refined 
 doctrine : 
 
 " If of two pleasures the one that is * higher' or more ' re- 
 fined ' is at the same time less pleasant, the Hedonist must 
 consider it unreasonable to prefer it." 
 
 Mr. 
 
 Sidgwick 
 renounces 
 the dogma 
 that 
 
 Pleasure is 
 the only 
 thing 
 desirable. 
 
 Mr. Herbert 
 
 Spencer 
 dis- 
 tinguishes 
 between 
 absolute and 
 relative 
 ethics. 
 
 Mr. H. Sidgwick, in his Methods of Ethics, whilst 
 dealing with the several systems of morals in a 
 spirit of calm impartiality, still accepts the Utili- 
 tarian method as that which, in his opinion, has 
 fewer difficulties than the others, and is, upon the 
 whole, more satisfactory. It is, however, observ- 
 able that he frankly gives up the dogma that 
 Pleasure is the only desirable thing, whilst he 
 holds fast to the belief that Pleasure is the ultimate 
 standard of good. 
 
 The latest exposition of Utilitarianism that de- 
 mands notice is that presented by Mr. Herbert 
 Spencer, in his Data of Ethics. In the preface to 
 this work we are informed that the author's 
 
 ''ultimate purpose, lying behind all proximate purposes, has 
 been that of finding for the principles of right and wrong in 
 conduct at large, a scientific basis." 
 
 To the establishment of satisfactory principles of 
 morals he deems all the preceding parts of his 
 task as subsidiary. 
 
 In accordance with his special theory, Mr. Spencer 
 considers 
 
 *'that Ethics has for its subject-matter that form which 
 universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolu 
 tion." 
 
Utilitarianism, 19 
 
 As, however, these stages have not yet been gene- 
 rally reached, '* absolute ethics " have to be fore- 
 gone in favour of those "relative ethics" which 
 are adapted to the present state of society. 
 
 Now conduct is regarded as good or bad accord- 
 ing to its effect on " the complete living " of one's 
 self, one's family, and society. And 
 
 " life is good or bad, according as it does, or does not, bring a 
 surplus of agreeable feeling."^ "The good is universally the 
 pleasurable." - 
 
 Our ideas of the goodness and badness of forms Morality 
 
 n T . according to 
 
 01 conduct Mr. Spencer 
 
 must be 
 
 "really originate from our consciousness of the certainty or rv^^v*^v+^ 
 
 probability that they will produce pleasures or pains some- Eyolution. 
 
 where." ^ 
 
 Pleasure is the ultimate moral aim, and 
 
 "is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a 
 necessary form of intellectual intuition."* 
 
 But Mr. Spencer objects to the ordinary induc- 
 tions of Utilitarians as crude and unscientific, and 
 thinks them 
 
 " but preparatory to the Utilitarianism which deduces principles 
 of conduct from the processes of life as carried on under es- 
 tablished conditious of existence." 
 
 The consideration of ultimate causal connections 
 will, he thinks, lead us to wider views of human 
 conduct. When moral phenomena are treated as 
 phenomena of evolution, it is seen that the conduct 
 
 1 Data of Ethics, p. 28, 2 jj^i^^ ^^ 3q^ a ^j^^ p, 32 
 * Rid. p. 46. 
 
20 Utilitarianism. 
 
 is morally good wliicli furthers the higher develop- 
 ment of humanity, that is to say of human 
 society. Singular results are reached by this 
 method; e.g.y it is held that 
 
 ** the performance of every function is, in a sense, a moral obli- 
 gation. " ^ 
 
 Two things have to be considered : the connec- 
 tion between pleasure and normal development, 
 I and the influence of heredity. It is thus that 
 Y Morality arises and is improved. On the whole, 
 that conduct is good which is adapted to the main- 
 tenance and development of human society. The 
 end is the prevalence of pleasure, the means are to 
 be found in the connection between life-furthering 
 conduct and pleasure. So that whilst in reading 
 
 
 Mr Spencer Mr. Spencor's hpok, the student is sometimes 
 
 prefers tf- ^ 
 
 ES|Ji?^li tempted to class the author with the " Perfectionists," 
 Sm and^^" as seckiug the supreme good in the highest develop- 
 
 deduces laws , "iipi l i 'ii* 
 
 of conduct ment possible oi human nature and society, he is 
 
 consider- constraiuod by Mr. Spencer himself to assign to 
 
 ideal society, j^im i}^q designation of a Rational as distinguished 
 
 from an Empirical Utilitarian. Consistency there 
 
 is not in this philosophy: Mr. Spencer sets out 
 
 thl^ ^^^ ^ ^'^^ ^^ most sweeping assertions of the supremacy 
 
 S^itoufsm^ of pleasure; he ends with a picture of ideal society, 
 
 vith egoism. ^y]^gj,g altruism tempers egoism, and where most 
 
 of life's evils are averted, and sets this before men 
 
 j as the aim to which effort should be directed. The 
 
 1 Data oj Ethics^ p. 76. 
 
Utilitarianism. 21 
 
 author of the Evolutional Philosophy leaves us in 
 a state of uncertainty as to whether pleasure or f 
 progress is the chief aim, the highest motive, of 
 human conduct. 
 
 It is not difficult to account for the popular it is not 
 acceptance with which the system under con- that 
 
 . ...... Utilitarian- 
 
 sideration has met. There is much in Utilitarianism i^m is 
 
 popular. 
 
 which is peculiarly suited to the temper of our 
 
 age. .1. Its apparent simplicity and compre- it has a 
 
 hensihility are in its favour. Whilst it requires simpUcity. 
 
 application and reflectiveness to comprehend 
 
 Aristotle's definition of well-heing, JoufProy's 
 
 doctrine of the universal order, or Mr. Green's 
 
 theory of perfection, every one is persuaded that, 
 
 as pleasure is so familiar a fact of experience, he 
 
 is ahle to apply such a test as the measure in 
 
 which human actions promote men's enjoyments 
 
 or miseries. 2. This system falls in with what it displays 
 
 '' sensitiveness 
 
 may he called the henevolently sentimental ten- to suffering, 
 dencies of the times. If the ancients erred in laying 
 almost exclusive stress upon the sterner virtues, 
 it must he admitted that in our times the softer 
 excellences of character are put too prominently 
 forward. Sensitiveness to suffering, especially to 
 the suffering of others, is doubtless a virtue ; but 
 there are many signs that this is carried to an 
 unwarrantable extreme. There are worse things 
 in the world even than pain and weakness. But 
 the pseudo-humanitarianism so prevalent in a 
 
22 Utilitarianism. 
 
 somewhat luxurious and effeminate state of society, 
 is apt to look upon suffering as the one thing above 
 all to be avoided, and a diffusion of general enjoy- 
 ment as the one thing to be sought. And with 
 this temper it is obvious that Utilitarianism exactly 
 poin^l of harmonizes. 3. There is a superficial compatibility 
 wlth^Sr* with Christianity, which recommends the system 
 chSsti^ty. under consideration to many who would shrink 
 from an obviously un- Christian doctrine. Mr. 
 Mill has taken advantage of this fact. He 
 remarks : 
 
 ** In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the com- 
 plete spirit of the ethics of Utility. To do as we would be 
 done by, and to love our neighbour as ourself, constitutes the 
 ideal perfection of Utilitarian morality." 
 
 The real connection between this system and 
 our religion will be considered presently ; we here 
 simply point out an apparent and superficial cor- 
 respondence which has assisted Utilitarianism into 
 It has public favour. 4. And yet again, it should be 
 
 convenience i i i i 
 
 as applied to noticcd that there is so much m "the greatest 
 
 legislation, ... . . 
 
 happiness principle " which agrees with the theory 
 and practice of our legislators, that in the view 
 of many minds Utilitarianism, having entered by 
 the open gate of Law, has taken full possession of 
 the very citadel of Morality. 
 
Utilitarianism. 2S 
 
 III. 
 
 Against the system of Morals now sketched, it is an 
 
 ^ error to 
 
 we first contend that SSureas 
 
 the highest 
 
 The Eadical Doctrine of Utilitarianism, viz., good. 
 THAT Pleasure is the " summum bonum," 
 is erroneous. 
 1. Pleasure is not the natural, universal, and su- Amoral 
 
 ' ' being shoulQ 
 
 preme end of the actions of a moral being. Pleasure X^^i^o^as 
 and Pain are facts in human experience of great Se.^^*^ ' 
 interest and significance. They are accompani- 
 ments of function, normal and healthy, or abnormal 
 and unhealthy. But they are not, ordinarily, ends 
 to be sought. It is not pleasure which is desired, 
 
 I but the exercise of some power, the satisfaction of 
 some want. Pleasure is an inducement to eat ; 
 but hunger craves food, not the gratification of the 
 palate. Pleasure is an inducement to exercise, but 
 the impulse is towards the employment of the 
 muscular powers, not towards the ensuing pleasure. 
 Mr. Sidgwick, a powerful reasoner, himself in- 
 clining to Utilitarianism, has attacked the doctrine 
 that men are ever aiming at pleasure as the end 
 of their actions. He contends that another im- 
 pulse, the love of virtue for its own sake, comes 
 into conflict with the desire for pleasure.^ 
 
 To make pleasure, even refined and religious 
 ^ Methods of Ethics, p. 41. 
 
24 
 
 UtilitaHanism. 
 
 There is no 
 satisfaction 
 in a life 
 which aims 
 at pleasure 
 as the chief 
 good. 
 
 pleasure, the end of all our aims, seems very un- 
 worthy of such a being as man. There is something 
 mean and ignoble, something degrading and to be 
 ashamed of, in such a principle of action, as the 
 supreme principle applying to all the many depart- 
 ments of human life. It is true that Utilitarians 
 do not require that we should always consciously 
 set this aim before us, that we should always con- 
 sciously pursue it. But they do require that, when 
 we reflect and analyse, we should recognize this as 
 the substantial element in moral excellence, as the 
 all-including and all-satisfying end of life. Now, 
 that which is ultimate and elemental should surely 
 be somethiog upon which we can reflect with satis- 
 faction, as meeting our most lofty aspirations, and 
 fulfilling our noblest ideals. Can as much bo 
 asserted for pleasure, of whatever grade ? 
 
 Utilitarianism debases the noblest virtues of 
 which rational and voluntary beings are capable, 
 to a position in which they are subordinate and 
 subservient to pleasure. If asked. Why should 
 men be, just towards their fellow-creatures ? Why 
 should they cultivate and practise purity of life 
 and of heart ? Why should they revere and con- 
 fide in a God of faithfulness and love ? the answer 
 which the Utilitarian gives is this : Because justice, 
 purity, and piety, are productive of personal and 
 of general pleasure, and because the practice of 
 these virtues will involve less suffering than their 
 
 Can we 
 cultivate 
 justice, 
 purity, and 
 piety, for 
 the sake of 
 the enjoy- 
 ment they 
 may yield? 
 
Utilitarianism. 25 
 
 neglect or repudiation ! An answer this which 
 it must need great prepossession in favour of his 
 own theory, and great indifference to the realities 
 of the case, for a thinker to accept with acquies- 
 cence and satisfaction. 
 
 Yet the Utilitarian does not hesitate to avow The lengths 
 
 to which a 
 
 that what we call sin would not be sin, or at all utouSn 
 events what we call crime would not be crime, "^"^*so. 
 were it not productive of suffering. 
 
 ** If it can be shown by observation," writes Professor Huxley, 
 " or experiment, that theft, murder, and adultery do not tend 
 to diminish the happiness of society, then, in the absence of 
 any but natural knowledge, they are not social immoralities."^ 
 
 This is a doctrine which confuses an accident 
 with the essence of morality. 
 
 2. If Pleasure is not the proper end of individual Pleasure 
 lifey it cannot he that of the life of society. There ^^X^^^dof 
 are many who would be ashamed to avow that fndividuai, 
 their own pleasure is the one aim they seek by all unsuitable 
 
 . . . 1. Ji when 
 
 their actions, that personal enjoyment is the sought over 
 ultimate object of existence. Yet they think it a ^^^^ge- 
 praiseworthy principle to seek nothing higher than 
 the comfort and ease, the pleasure and enjoyment 
 of their fellow- creatures. But reflection must con- 
 vince us that an end, which is not satisfactory 
 upon a small scale, cannot lose its unsatisfactory 
 character when the scale is enlarged. If knowledge 
 is good for the community, it is good for the 
 
 1 Nineteenth Century. No. 3. May, 1877. 
 
26 UtilitarianisTYi, 
 
 individual. The volume makes no difference in 
 morality. Pleasure is a good both for one and for 
 many ; but as it is not the supreme good for one, 
 it is not the supreme good for the nation or the 
 race. 
 As far as we 3. Pleasure cannot he deemed the Jiiqhest end con- 
 
 can trace tne '' 
 
 Govern- tcmplated by the government of God. All who believe 
 no't"find that in ^ Diviuo Ruler and Lord, who is the Eternal 
 its supreme Roason, must beliove that there is intention in the 
 
 end. 
 
 Universe. To decide what the ultimate aim of all 
 things really is, may be beyond our limited powers. 
 Still, facts are accessible to us ; we daily make our 
 observations upon the course of Providence, and 
 we draw our inferences. If Pleasure were the 
 highest good, we should surely see in the world 
 some evidences that this is the case. The Creator 
 designs that Pleasure should be largely diffused 
 among men ; still Pain is an unquestionable fact, 
 and its existence presents formidable obstacles in 
 the way of believing what a religious Utilitarian 
 must feel it a necessity to believe, viz., that God 
 desires for His creatures as their highest good the 
 largest possible amount of enjoyment. Indeed, 
 Mr. J. S. Mill was so impressed by the magnitude 
 of human suffering that he deemed it necessary, 
 in order to retain faith in the benevolence of God, 
 to renounce belief in His omnipotence. 
 
 It is apparent to the thoughtful observer that the 
 end contemplated by the Author of all being is a 
 
Utilitarianism, 
 
 far higher end than conscious enjoyment. God holf^esfSnd 
 
 desires that His intelligent creatures should he happiness is 
 
 conformed to His own holy character; "man's ordinated; 
 
 /-N T -I 1 n 1 man there- 
 chief end is to glorify God; and to this all else, fore should 
 
 even religious pleasures, must be subordinated; {J^Itofand 
 
 albeit the highest kind and degree of pleasure f^^^^^, 
 
 will be experienced by all who fulfil the chief end 
 
 of their existence. They will "enjoy Him for 
 
 ever." Enjoyment of the highest kind comes to 
 
 the man who truly glorifies God. ^ 
 
 lY. 
 
 The Impossibility of Applying the TJtili- 
 
 TARIAISr EULE OR TeST. 
 
 At the very outset we ask, What pleasures are to The 
 
 ^ , . -^ , utilitarian 
 
 he calculated ? Are we to include in our reckoning the *est is one 
 
 <-' which can- 
 pleasures of intellectual exercise, of aesthetic appro- appuld. 
 ciation, which are enjoyed by comparatively few ? 
 On what ground can we exclude the pleasure of 
 gambling, which is evidently to many persons one 
 of the most intense of delights ; for otherwise they 
 would not sacrifice for its sake reputation, wealth, 
 domestic happiness, and other ffoods. On what y^.^^^^^t 
 
 nr ' o ^ decide what 
 
 ground can we exclude the pleasure of witnessing llH^^^ *** 
 a bull-fight in Spain, or a pugilistic encounter in 
 England ? To multitudes, such spectacles afford 
 the keenest enjoyment. On what ground are we y 
 
 to exclude the pleasures of malice, felt by many 
 
28 
 
 Utilitarianism, 
 
 We are at a 
 loss whose 
 pleasures to 
 consider. 
 
 who delight in the failures, the losses, the suffer- 
 ings of their fellow-men ? 
 
 Whose pleasures are to he taken into account? 
 Are we to regard the happiness of our family, our 
 social circle ? or are we to take a more extended 
 view, and include our fellow-countrymen, those of 
 our own race, or even all mankind, i.e., so far as 
 they may he supposed to he slightly and remotely 
 affected hy our actions ? Are we to think of the 
 present generation only, or of our successors in 
 distant ages ? Shall we deny ourselves, with the 
 hope of promoting the welfare of generations that 
 may never come into existence ? There are other 
 sentient heings upon the earth hesides men : shall 
 human happiness be sacrificed in order that multi- 
 tudes of the inferior animals may live, and enjoy 
 life's pleasures? 
 
 Are the pleasures of men to he regarded without 
 reference to their character ? The rule proposed is : 
 
 * ' Every person to count for one ; no person for more than 
 
 It is unjust 
 to regard 
 man's 
 pleasures 
 irrespective 
 of their 
 moral 
 character. 
 
 If this is in any sense benevolence, it is certainly 
 injustice. The rule seems to imply that the plea- 
 sures of the selfish, the vicious, the criminal, the 
 idle, the injurious, are to be as much a matter of 
 concern to us as those of the virtuous, the self- 
 denying, the noble ! Can this be what the Utili- 
 tarian intends ? Or are we to suspend or modify 
 the principle in certain obviously diQ.cult cases ? 
 
utilitarianism, 29 
 
 The unreasonableness of Bentham's doctrine, 
 taken by itself, has been well sbown by Mr. 
 Herbert Spencer, who concludes tbus : 
 
 " If the distribution is not to be indiscriminate,; then the 
 formula disappears. The something distributed must be appor- 
 tioned otherwise than by equal division."^ 
 
 How are we to estimate the ^^leasures of people in what gives 
 
 great 
 
 different stages of moral development ? Men's natural pleasure to 
 constitution differs in different cases : to one man f^H^l to 
 pain is so repulsive that he will deem no pleasure ^^^^^^- 
 worth acquiring which costs suffering ; to another 
 pleasure is so alluring that he will readily brave 
 pain in its pursuit. Further, what is joy to one 
 man is tedium to another. We cannot attribute 
 capacity for intellectual pleasures to savages, or 
 even to the lower types to be met with in civilized 
 communities. Is that conduct to be commended 
 which contributes to the enjoyment of the multitude, 
 or that which favours the happiness of the cultivated 
 few? 
 
 Sow are pleasures to be weighed against pleasures, Pleasure ana 
 
 77 7 J u T 7 I*ain are not 
 
 and how are pleasures and pains to be compared ? measurable. 
 Many rules have been formulated, most of them 
 expansions of the *'* Canons of Epicurus." All 
 these rules presume that these experiences can be 
 dealt with as lines which can be measured, or as 
 solids which can be weighed. That pleasure is 
 said to be preferable which involves least pain, etc. 
 But however well these rules look upon paper, 
 
 ^ Data of Ethics, p. 222. 
 
30 
 
 UtUitarianism. 
 
 The calculus 
 not appli- 
 cable to 
 experiences 
 BO varying 
 with 
 different 
 individuals. 
 
 The 
 
 question 
 must arise, 
 At what cost 
 of pain is it 
 lawful to 
 purchase 
 pleasure ? 
 
 their uselessness is apparent when we attempt to 
 put them in practice. 
 
 The operations of weighing one pleasure against 
 another, and any pleasure against any pain, are 
 operations not simply difficult but impossible. 
 Bentham tells us that we need a " moral Arith- 
 metic " for the purpose, and Sidgwick terms the 
 process the " Utilitarian calculus." But as there 
 is no acknowledged unit of either pain or pleasure, 
 there is absolutely no possibility of performing the 
 balancing operation. For a comparison of the 
 kind required will yield quite different results 
 according to the temperament, the character, the 
 circumstances of the persons undertaking it. Plea- 
 sure and pain are experiences too decidedly subjec- 
 tive to admit of such treatment as that proposed. 
 And if the process were possible upon the under- 
 standing that quantity of feeling only is to be con- 
 sidered, it becomes impossible when qualities of 
 experience are discriminated from one another. 
 
 How far is it justifiable to inflict pain, if there is 
 a prospect that an excess of pleasure may ensue '^ 
 The gladiatorial shows practised in ancient Eome 
 yielded intense enjoyment to thousands of all ranks 
 in life. And this enjoyment was purchased by the 
 pain and death of a few wild beasts, and of a few 
 men who were presumably of a more or less 
 brutalized nature. If the pleasure preponderated 
 over the pain, was the exhibition right ? 
 
Uiilitarianism. 31 
 
 It is often impossible so to calculate the consequences 
 of actions, as to foretell what pleasures and what pains 
 will follow. If the morality of actions depends upon 
 such a calculation, great uncertainty cannot but 
 attach to their moral quality ; and the man who is 
 anxious to do right must always be liable to make 
 the discovery that he has been doing wrong. 
 
 Who shall he entrusted with the responsible offices The 
 
 prediction of 
 
 of estimating and foretelling consequences, and so oj the con- 
 
 deciding xchat conduct is virtuous and praiseworthy, 5?^^^t'|^J 
 
 and tvhat is 7iot? Shall every man do what is JS'at^^^Se 
 
 " right in his own eyes " ? Then, one person will sulh^- 
 
 Ipraise as virtuous acts which another will condemn shcuM u 
 
 K ^ possible bo 
 
 as wrong. Shall the general sentiment, the public avoided, 
 opinion, be accepted? Then the standard must 
 vary with successive generations, and with differing 
 communities. Shall a congress of philosophers be 
 entrusted with the decision ? Then we must wait 
 for the promulgation of their decrees ! 
 
 Tho^e is an obvious ambiguity in the expression. The ambig- 
 
 " " '' uity of the 
 
 *' The greatest happiness of the greatest number." ^'^^^^^ 
 One course of action may be such as to involve hap'Jfnessof 
 an equal distribution of pleasure amongst many ; nuiSer.'^ 
 another course of action may be productive of 
 great pleasure to the vast majority, and yet 
 may be the means of rendering a few intensely 
 wretched : which course should be adopted in 
 order to fulfil the rule laid down in the above 
 words of Bentham ? 
 
3i^ Utilitarianism. 
 
 Are we to understand by it (1) the highest sum 
 total of pleasure, all sentient beings considered ; or 
 (2) the highest average of pleasure diffused amongst 
 those sentient beings ? If the first interpretation 
 be adopted, then it is good to inflict misery upon 
 a few for the sake of the enjoyment of the many. 
 If the second interpretation, then it is necessary to 
 be very careful to avoid any actions which may 
 lower the measure of happiness experienced by any. 
 We are thus involved by the doctrine in a maze of 
 casuistry. 
 
 UriLITARIANlSM MISAPPREHENDS THE RELATIONS 
 
 BETWEEN Virtue and Pleasure. 
 Its un- The best feature in the system known as Utili- 
 
 selfishness _ ^ 
 
 benevolence ^^^i^^^sm, or Univcrsalistic Hedonism, is its 
 felturl^?? hostility to selfishness, a feature borrowed from the 
 ^itanan- j-gj^g^Qj^ ^f j^q Lord Jcsus Christ. But even this 
 cannot make amends for its exaltation of Pleasure 
 to the highest rank in the moral standard and in 
 the moral motive. In fact, there is a discrepancy 
 between the two leading principles of the Utilitarian 
 theory which has sometimes escaped observation. 
 
 There is no logical pathway from pure Hedonism 
 to what is called Utilitarianism. Hedonism means 
 nothing if it does not mean that pleasure, personal 
 happiness, is the one supreme end of life. 
 
Utilitarianism, 33 
 
 It is often and justly said that if we seek the Aspieasuro 
 
 good of others in order that we may please our- twng 
 
 ^ ^ *' * personal, to 
 
 solves, we are not acting benevolently, but selfishly, ^re^ourllii 
 
 as egoistic hedonists. If, on the other hand, we Sstenwlth 
 
 make the happiness of others our law, we desert bSI^oienc. 
 Iledonism altogether, surrendering pleasure, and 
 adopting quite another principle of morals. 
 
 Is it a fact that all virtuous action tends to promote 
 immediate ha2^piness, if by happiness we are to 
 understand pleasure or the absence of pain ? The 
 Utilitarians maintain that there is no excellence, 
 no moral merit, in virtue except in so far as 
 virtue furthers happiness. Now so far as observa- As far as 
 
 , , , , observation 
 
 tion goes, and the Utilitarian holds experience fj^'pieal^^ 
 to be the only source of knowledge, it cannot XajTcJn- 
 be shown that all conduct which is admittedly iSalifo? 
 virtuous does, as a matter of fact, increase the 
 stock of pleasure enjoyed by mankind in this state 
 of being. We see suffering result from right 
 actions ; yet sometimes strain our eyes as we will 
 we can discern no compensating happiness en- 
 suing. Only faith in goodness, only a conviction 
 in a Divine Ruler of righteousness, can sustain us 
 in the persuasion that such disinterestedly virtuous 
 conduct should be approved and imitated. There 
 have been cases in which Christians have endured 
 torture and martyrdom from Pagans, or Protestants 
 from Papists. Rather than abjure Christ, such 
 holy sufferers have endured and even died. "No 
 D 
 
84 
 
 Utilitarianism, 
 
 On 
 
 Dtilitarian 
 principles 
 how can the 
 Belf-sacrifice 
 of the mar- 
 tyr and the 
 patriot be 
 justified? 
 
 doubt there have been instances in which martyrs 
 have experienced an inward consolation, and even 
 a joy of spirit approaching rapture. But generally 
 speaking, those who have suffered death for the 
 truth have endured pain amounting to anguish. 
 Is their conduct to be admired and commended ? 
 If so. Why? Their sufferings were fearful, and 
 they sank under them. If the spectators of 
 these sufferings experienced no pain of sympathy, 
 as tl y probably did, thus increasing the sum 
 of misery, we can scarcely set the malevolent 
 enjoyment of a fiendish or brutal inquisitor over 
 against the martyr's anguish. But were there 
 compensating advantages in remote and general 
 happiness ? Alas ! in many cases, so far as earth 
 is concerned, the purpose of the persecutor was 
 fulfilled ; independence of thought and speech was 
 crushed, and bigotry triumphed! 
 
 If all kinds of pleasure-yielding actions cannot 
 fairly be termed morally good, where shall we look 
 for the distinguishing feature which confers this 
 quality ? Dr. Bain seeks it in the civic or social 
 authority by which certain courses of conduct are 
 prescribed. "Utility made compulsory" is moral 
 goodness or rightness. The Government enjoins 
 certain actions which are for the public good, i.e., 
 which are productive of general pleasure. Con- 
 science is the mirror of social authority, and 
 confirms inwardly the injunction imposed from 
 
 Dr. Bain's 
 
 teaahinp, 
 that social 
 authority- 
 sanctioning 
 fiction pro- 
 ductive of 
 happiness 
 constitutes 
 rightness 
 is rather 
 Hobbism 
 than Utili- 
 taxianism. 
 
Utilitarianism. 35 
 
 c^ithout. Fear of punishment is the essence of 
 noral obligation. This doctrine is scarcely Utili- 
 :arianism, high as is the value it sets upon Utility. 
 I [t seems to make the State or Society the arbiter 
 )f right and wrong, and gives us no direction 
 ivhen our personal view of expediency points one 
 f7ay, and the strong hand of the law points the 
 )ther. 
 
 The system now under discitssion certainly bases f^Sf^' 
 Morality far too much upon the passive nature of Such upon "" 
 naUf upon his sentiencyy and capacity for enjoyment, padties.r 
 
 man s ca- 
 
 , no: 
 enough 
 
 [t has been said by Professor Grote, in technical upon'his 
 
 ^ ' faculties. 
 
 anguage, that we have to consider in Ethics, not 
 )nly the summum bonum, which corresponds to the 
 -vant of human nature, the acquirendum; but 
 dso the summum jusy the right, which corresponds 
 |io human activity, the /ac^e?^^^m. He means to S^f*^ijj\ 
 nsist upon the great truth that a good man will agreTabSf 
 )e actuated in his conduct, not so much by con- ^^^* 
 iidering what he may attain in the way of enjoy- 
 nent, as by considering in what way he may 
 exercise his powers and fulfil his actual duties. 
 jS^ot what affords most pleasure, but what calls jliL^ft-y^S 
 ut the powers of our nature in healthy and Pi 
 
 ippropriate exercise, is the true moral ideal, at 
 7hich ethical endeavour must always aim, and 
 hort of which ethical endeavour cannot do other 
 han fail. 
 It is sometimes asserted that Utility is an ob- 
 
Utilitarianism. 
 
 utility, 
 when ana- 
 lysed, ap- 
 pears to be a 
 very 
 
 decidedly 
 subjective 
 standard of 
 conduct. 
 
 Virtue is 
 not always 
 rewarded 
 upon earth 
 with recom- 
 pense of 
 enjoyment. 
 
 jective standard of morality, one that can accord- 
 ingly be represented to the mind, and applied 
 without difficulty or ambiguity. JN'ow, this is a very 
 misleading view of the facts. Of all our experi- 
 ences none are more purely subjective than pleasure 
 and pain. Law, on the contrary, is an objective 
 standard, one independent of our feelings, and 
 apprehended by our intelligence. In pleasure and 
 pain there is the utmost possible indefiniteness. 
 What is very painful to one person is but slightly 
 so to another, and that which scarcely yields a 
 thrill of enjoyment to a man of a stolid constitution 
 may bring ecstasy to a more susceptible and sensi- 
 tive temperament. And the same individual is at 
 different times sensitive to feeling in very varying 
 degrees. 
 
 It is certain that in this earthly life pleasures 
 and pains are not apportioned in consonance with 
 the character and deserts of men. Yet all mankinc 
 are undergoing moral discipline, culture, probation, 
 The vicious are sometimes punished " in the flesh ' 
 for their vices, when those vices are violations o: 
 physical laws. The virtuous are sometimes per- 
 mitted to suffer even for their virtues, when thos< 
 virtues lead to conduct out of harmony witl 
 physical surroundings. We recognize intention! 
 purpose, in this arrangement; but only (so t(' 
 speak) in the very germ or bud. There is n( 
 completeness in the system ; there are indications , 
 
/ ^ OF -l-HK \ 
 
 ; : VBRSITT I 
 
 Utilitarianihm.o L^ .^\^y 37 
 
 but often little more tlian indications of tlie aims 
 
 of a Holy and Beneficent Governor. 
 
 Eeflecting minds have, in all ages, been led by The pro- 
 bability, 
 these considerations to cherish, the expectation of upon 
 
 * ^ grounds of 
 
 a life to come, and of future rewards and punish- ^^turTiifi"^ 
 raents. There is a moral perception which seems Son!*"^^* 
 to require that the wrongs of time should be 
 redressed in Eternity, that persecuted and calum- 
 niated goodness should be approved and recom- 
 pensed, that prosperous wickedness should be 
 overtaken by retribution, that the incomplete 
 discipline should be continued, that the results of 
 probation should be made manifest, that the 
 unfinished work of God should be brought to a 
 3onclusion harmonious with the Divine attributes, 
 and that the just government of the Almighty 
 Ruler should be vindicated in the experience of 
 sail mankind, and in the presence of a satisfied and 
 approving Universe. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Utilitarianism gives no Explanation of the 
 Moral Imperative. 
 
 I It is a crucial test to which we put the Utili- Moral 
 
 :arian system when we ask, How does that system, ^ fact for 
 
 explain the moral imperative? Is it compatible SorT' 
 
 .vith the existence, the sacredness of duty ? The S^oundto 
 loctrine which we are criticizing, is, that moral 
 
^S Utilitarianism. 
 
 good and evil are merely kinds of pleasure and 
 pain. Now, can it be maintained that we are 
 bound to do the thing which causes pleasure as we 
 are bound to do " the thing that right is ? " that 
 we are bound to refrain from all that causes suffer- 
 ing to ourselves or others, as we are bound to 
 shun wrong- doing and sin? If we do feel our- 
 selves morally obliged to do what involves pain to 
 ourselves or others, is our justification, our defence, 
 simply this, that we expect present suffering to 
 produce a larger measure of future joy ? 
 
 Utilitarianism nowhere more conspicuously fails 
 than in attempting to deal with duty. If there is 
 one factor in human nature more interesting and 
 admirable than another, it is our subjection to 
 moral obligation. The word "ought" is indeed 
 often used very loosely and inaccurately, but it 
 a wd often has a proper meaning, from which the secondary 
 figuratively and figurative uses of it are derived. It is quite 
 
 applied. ^ * 
 
 true that we say, I bought my watch from a good 
 maker, and gave a large price for it ; it ought to 
 keep good time ; or, My horse ought to do the 
 distance in an hour ; or. My sight being good, I 
 ought to see a vessel on the horizon as I look out 
 to sea. But these are simply adaptations of 
 language, recognizing the dependence of certain 
 movements or feelings upon the corresponding 
 function. The real and true meaning of " ought " 
 only comes out where voluntary conduct is in 
 
Utilitarianism. 39 
 
 question, where an alternative between different its real 
 
 meaning is 
 
 courses oi action opens up, and where the person connected 
 who is called upon to act is conscious of the power J^'J^'inan^ 
 of choosing one of these courses in preference to ^^^^^^^ 
 others. It is possible for a moral agent to speak 
 truthfully or deceitfully, to deal honestly with his 
 neighbour or to defraud him, to act like a churl or 
 with generosity, to read the Scriptures or a foul 
 French novel, to pray or to curse men and blas- 
 pheme God. But in every such case of moral 
 alternative, one mode of action is morally im- 
 perative as compared with the other. Whenever 
 we can say, This action is right, we can also say, 
 This action it ig the duty of a free and moral agent 
 to perform. 
 
 Utilitarians cannot, however, 'regard human 
 conduct in this light. Such independent obligation 
 is most distasteful to Bentham, who in his 
 Deontology says: 
 
 ** It is in fact very idle to talk about duties." " The talisman jj-^j.^, 
 
 of arrogance, indolence, and ignorance, is to be found in a single obligation la 
 
 word, an authoritative imposture . , . . It is the word ' ought, ' denied or 
 
 or 'ought not,* a circumstances may be .... If the use of explained 
 
 the word be admissible at all, it * ought ' to be banished from utuSarlans. 
 the vocabulary of morals." 
 
 A popular writer of our day, Professor Bain, 
 speaking of Morality, Duty, Obligation, or Eight, 
 says : 
 
 "I consider that the proper meaning or import of these 
 \ terms refers to the class of actions enforced by the sanction of 
 punishment." ^ 
 
 * The Emotions and the WUl, chap. xv. p. 264. 
 
40 Utilitarianism. 
 
 A man's duty is, then, that for neglecting which he 
 would be punished, either by actual suffering in- 
 flicted by law, or by public censure and social 
 penalty. According to this moralist, Conscience is 
 
 "that portion of our constitution which is moulded upon 
 external authority as its type." ^ 
 
 Dr. Bain If this be the case, then society, by means of 
 
 resolves the / , , Jf J 
 
 Sr into government or otherwise, inflicts punishment upon 
 fTunishment. ^^^ actions as interfere with the pleasures or 
 increase the pains of men ; and then association 
 being established in the mind between punishable 
 actions and punishment, men come to dread and 
 avoid suchi actions. Duty and Conscience thus 
 derive all their meaning from the social usage of 
 punishment. Morality is the offspring, at all 
 events in the first instance, of fear. The Con- 
 science is a miniature police court within the 
 breast, keeping order by threats of apprehension 
 and consequent " pains and penalties." Upon 
 this scheme of morals, duty has regard only to 
 wrong- doing. It is no man's duty to do more 
 than avoid such conduct as is punishable ; it is 
 meritorious to be benevolent, but it is not morally 
 obligatory. 
 Mr. J. s. "^Y^ J. S. Mill is no more successful in accounting 
 
 Mill regards '^ 
 
 CTeaturlS^ upou Utilitarian principles for the great fact of 
 Education. ^^^^| obligation. He thinks that there is " an in- 
 ternal sanction of duty,'' but that this exists only 
 
 T/ie Emotions and the Will, chap. xv. p. 2S5. 
 
utilitarianism, 41 
 
 for those whose moral feelings have been trained 
 to take pleasure in whatever promotes the general 
 good. It is his hope that a regard for the happi- 
 ness of others may by careful education acquire 
 the force of a religion. For those persons in 
 whose mind no such association has been estab- 
 lished, Mr. Mill does not seem to have any special 
 sanction provided. 
 
 Thus we come back to the question : 
 
 How does the contemplation and calculation of om?^^'*'^^ 
 pleasure and pain bring into the mind the concep- mSby 
 tion corresponding to the word " ought " ? Duty, to ILounr 
 moral obligation, is an idea which cannot be re- obligation. 
 solved into the dread of punishment. When a 
 man says, " This I ought to do, however I may 
 be regarded or treated in consequence by my 
 fellow-men ; " he is saying something quite dif- 
 ferent from "This it is for my interest to do; 
 if I neglect to do it; I shall be punished by the 
 powers that be." The two principles of action 
 must not, and cannot, be confounded. Is there no 
 difference between the principle which actuates a 
 craven slave, and that by which the hero or the 
 saint is inspired to suffer and to do ? 
 
 The fact is, that, in pleasure and in pain, there Pleasure 
 
 * . . IT > and Pain ava 
 
 is nothing morally authoritative. They are both Jj^rii^^^ 
 great realities of experience, which no man can ^^^^^^^y* 
 overlook in making and in carrying out his plans 
 in life. But we do not feel that when these 
 
42 
 
 Utilitarmnism. 
 
 Duty and 
 Conscience 
 are sacred. 
 
 elements alone are present, there is of necessity 
 the element of moral obligation. I ought to do 
 what a just authority commands ; but I cannot 
 say, I ought to do what will deliver me from 
 suffering, what will bring me delight. It is some- 
 thing quite different from interest, whether of one's 
 self or of others, which accounts for the sacred 
 imperative of duty. 
 
 Yet Duty and Conscience are realities, and among 
 the most precious realities of human existence. In 
 recent times their importance has been effectively 
 exhibited by Kant, who has rendered no greater 
 service to the cause of sound and religious philo- 
 sophy than by his repudiation of all merely 
 empirical explanation of our moral nature, his 
 exaltation of the proper dignity of the moral agent, 
 his insistance upon the sacredness of the moral 
 law, the so-called "categorical imperative." A 
 system like Utilitarianism has, at this point, to 
 encounter all that is most vigorous and ennobling 
 in contemporary philosophy, both on the Continent 
 and in Britain. 
 
 They are 
 upheld as 
 sacred by 
 the greatest 
 Moralists. 
 
 VII. 
 
 Christian Utilitarianism. 
 
 Some sincerely religious readers may object to 
 the foregoing criticism that it is unfair to represent 
 Utilitarianism and Christianity as opposed to 
 
Utilitarianism. 43 
 
 each other. They may contend for the possibility There is a 
 
 . 1 P 1 Christian 
 
 of combining the two, the philosophy of the xJtiutanan- 
 Universal Hedonists and the religion of the New geSn'as 
 Testament. They may remind us that the happmess 
 Creator does really desire the happiness of His re'yiiSS 
 creatures, and especially of those rational beings happiness 
 
 *- _ ^ ^ as its motiye 
 
 whom He has created with capacities for pleasure P^^er. 
 so vast and varied. They may add that the 
 Scriptures frequently depict the happiness attend- 
 ing a pious life as an inducement to embrace the 
 true religion, and they may urge that the Saviour 
 Himself invites the sinful and unhappy to His 
 own gracious person, with the assurance that His 
 yoke is easy and His burden light, and that He 
 recommends His service by the glorious prospect 
 of participation in the victorious Captain's blissful 
 throne. 
 
 There is prevalent, among many professed g^?f.^*^^^ . 
 Christians, a view of the Divine Government je^resents 
 which may be called " Christian Utilitarianism.'* itfef aimto 
 
 -r, , p T 1 'J render man. 
 
 It IS not uncommon lor religious persons to write happy, and 
 and to speak as though the one great end sought chief aim to 
 by the Divine Buler were the enjoyment of His ^^^^^^0!^ 
 creatures. It is urged that benevolence is one SJeSenJ^*^ 
 of the most glorious attributes of the Divine 
 nature, that, being infinitely benevolent, God 
 must desire to see all His creatures happy, that 
 revealed religion has the happiness of men for its 
 one great end, and that, sooner or later, pain and 
 
44 
 
 Utilitarianism. 
 
 But God 
 is more 
 concerned 
 for men's 
 goodness 
 than for 
 their 
 enjoyment. 
 
 sorrow must be banished from the universe, and 
 the reign of perfect, unbroken, and eternal 
 happiness must be established. Paley has even 
 defined Virtue, as " the doing good to mankind, 
 in obedience to the will of God, and /or the sake of 
 everlasting happiness'* He teaches that the will of 
 God is indeed the rule, but that everlasting happi- 
 ness is the motive to virtuous conduct. 
 
 Such a doctrine as this is no doubt very- 
 different from the doctrine which leaves out of 
 sight the existence and the government of a divine 
 Sovereign. But it is a doctrine very much at 
 variance with the stern facts of existence, and 
 with the character of the Christian Bevelation. 
 Whatever we may think of God's benevolence, 
 the existence of sin and the prevalence of a vast 
 amount of wretchedness are undeniable. There 
 is every reason to believe that the Euler of all is 
 less concerned for the enjoyment than for the 
 moral improvement of His intelligent creatures. 
 The Christian religion first of all deals with sin, 
 and deals with unhappiness only in subordination 
 to the higher problem of human life. The re- 
 demption of the Lord Jesus Christ is a redemption 
 from the bondage and the curse of sin. The work 
 of the Holy Spirit is a work of regeneration and 
 of sanctification. That those who embrace the 
 Gospel, who live a life of fellowship with God 
 as His reconciled and obedient children, are 
 
Utilitarianism. 45 
 
 introduced into a state of progressive happiness, Christianity 
 
 ^ promises 
 
 is indeed true ; and this is an arrangement of ^^l^^^ 
 Grod's government, for which we cannot be Kings. 
 sufficiently grateful. The promise is graciously 
 given: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and 
 His righteousness, and all other things shall be 
 added unto you/' Still, the enjoyment which the 
 Christian now finds in the reception of the truth, 
 and in communion with God, varies to some 
 extent with temperament and with circumstances, 
 whilst this variety does not affect the individual's 
 real relationship to his God and Saviour. Happi- True, 
 ness is a merciful and precious addition to the depicts 
 
 ^ * ^ ^ happiness 
 
 privileges of the Christian ; it is not the essence ^^jj^"'^^^"^^^, 
 of his religious experience, nor is it the highest gooJf^^*"'^ 
 gift of God. Even when we think of the future 
 state, of the abode and the occupations of the 
 glorified, is it not the case that the first and most 
 welcome thoughts of heaven are of the perfect 
 conformity there attained to the holy will of our 
 Father, and the freedom and devotion with which 
 God's servants shall there serve Him day and 
 night in His temple ? The fellowship with Christ 
 shall be perfect, and the society of the blessed 
 shall be intimate. All this will be productive 
 of complete, incomparable happiness. But it is 
 not happiness that will make heaven ; it is heaven 
 that will make happiness. 
 
40 
 
 Utilitarianism, 
 
 l\itting 
 aside 
 Utili- 
 tarianism, 
 is there no 
 bettor and 
 truer stan- 
 dard of 
 Riirlit and 
 Duty? 
 
 Tlowto 
 discover 
 rectitude. 
 
 Our ovra. 
 mental 
 and moral 
 constitution* 
 
 YIII. 
 
 The Alternative, if Utilitarianism be 
 Rejected. 
 
 But if the Utilitarian standard of morality be 
 rejected, what shall be accepted in its place ? It 
 is sometimes said that Utilitarians put forward a 
 criterion of Right and Duty, at all events intelli- 
 gible, but that alternative criteria are vague and 
 indefinable. Every one, we are told, can under- 
 stand what happiness is, and those who, by culti- 
 vation, are able to enjoy pleasures of a higher 
 order, can classify the pleasurable experiences of 
 which human nature is susceptible, and so can 
 construct an intelligible rule of human conduct. 
 But if this theory of duty be rejected, we are 
 challenged to say what shall be substituted for it 
 The demand is reasonable. 
 
 In our judgment the standard of right is dis- 
 coverable, and may be apprehended with growing 
 completeness by those who will regard three im- 
 portant considerations. 
 
 1. To understand what is the true and authorita- 
 tive principle of morality, it is necessary to examine 
 our own constitution, the powers with which we 
 are endowed, the development of which those powers 
 are by exercise capable, and the perfection of our 
 
Utilitarianism. 
 
 nature whicli we may thus attain. Professor 
 Calderwood has well said : 
 
 "If a general conception can be formed of the end or final 
 object of our being, it must be by reference to the higher or 
 governing powers of our nature ; and as these are intellectual or 
 rational, the end of our being is not pleasure, but the full and 
 harmonious use of all our powers for the accomplishment of 
 their own natural ends."^ 
 
 The same truth has been thus expressed by a 
 philosophical writer of a different school from 
 Professor Calderwood, the late Professor T. H. 
 Green, of Oxford. He says: 
 
 * * The real value of the virtue rises with the more full and 
 clear conception of the end to which it is directed : as a cha- 
 racter, not a good fortune ; as a fulfilment of human capabilities 
 from within, not an accession of good things from without ; as 
 a function, not a possession,"* 
 
 And again: 
 
 *' Our rheory has been that the development of morality is 
 founded on the action in man of an idea of true or absolute 
 good, consisting in the full realization of the capabilities of the 
 human bouI."^ 
 
 2. It is not a complete view of the foundation of Themst 
 ethics to confine our attention to the development order with 
 
 1 . . which we 
 
 of our own powers. We are but units m a vast are related. 
 whole, members of a glorious and mystic body. 
 In the universe of being, every conscious individual 
 has his allotted place, and his allotted function. 
 Corresponding to the capacities and faculties within 
 
 ^ Handhodlc of Moral PhilosopJiy, p. 1S3. 
 * Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 265. ^ m^^ p, 308, 
 
48 Utilitarianism, 
 
 are the relations with, which we are encompassed, 
 the heings in federal relation with ourselves. There 
 is a moral cosmos, a universal order, from which 
 we cannot escape, and in which we may bear a 
 serviceable and not ignoble part. 
 TiiP -Dmno 3. It is of ten and instlv said that a law implies a 
 
 Lawgiver o v l 
 
 ?d-n wh^se J^w-giver. The Utilitarian theory is not indeed 
 KghteoSs! inconsistent with Theism, but it is a theory which 
 ^"^ may consistently be held, and is held, by those 
 
 who do not believe in God. It is the favourite 
 theorj" of those who regard evolution as the great 
 formative principle of the universe, who consider 
 intelligence to be a development from sensation, 
 and moral distinctions and moral faculties to be a 
 further development from the same elements, along 
 the same line. It is especially the theory of those 
 to whom susceptibility to pleasure and pain is suffi- 
 cient to account for all that moral life which con- 
 stitutes the chief prerogative of humanity. As it 
 represents obligation as persistent instinct or impulse, 
 and responsibility as liability to punishment by 
 human governors, or at all events by human society. 
 this theory is naturally acceptable to those who 
 maintain that what they call "the hypothesis of 
 God " is unnecessary and superfluous. 
 Man's as- That man admires and aspires after moral ex- 
 
 pirations ^ ^ ^ 
 
 *aTSd- cellence which has never been in his experience 
 
 God^s""^^ realized, may be taken as a suggestion of a nature 
 
 purer, nobler than his own, either nearer to abso- 
 
Utilitarianism. 49 
 
 lute perfection, or actually possessing and mani- Andsub- 
 f esting it. His moral nature is, on the one hand, Goi's wiii. 
 so imperfect, and yet on the other hand has so 
 inextinguishable a yearniag for flawless and awful 
 goodness, that it has ever been deemed the truest 
 and mightiest witness to the Deity. Yery beauti- 
 fully has Professor Grote expressed this common- 
 place of the higher philosophy in these words : 
 
 **If we think of that which should be, and consider at the 
 same time that the mind and the will of God are according to 
 this, we are in point of fact trying to imagine what it is that 
 He thinks and wills. And I do not know that we can have a 
 better notion of morality than as the imagination on our part of 
 the thought and will of a better and superior Being. " ^ 
 
 The ne- 
 
 If it is difficult to srve any reasonable or even cessityofa 
 
 , Creator of 
 
 plausible account of the material universe apart ^^'^. piiysicai 
 
 ^ ^ universe, 
 
 from the existence and will of a Divine Creator and ^^^^f of the 
 Lord, whose reason and whose purpose are mani- SSTverse. 
 fest in the marvellous arrangements and harmony 
 of this majestic cosmos; it is in our apprehension 
 utterly impossible, apart from the same great fact, 
 to give any explanation of the far more wonderful 
 and interesting realm of moral life into which every 
 human being is introduced. Our E-eason presumes 
 a Divine Mind, in which all things are perfectly 
 comprehended, which we apprehend in their in- 
 completeness. Our freedom presumes a peculiar re- 
 lation to the Eternal "Will, and involves certain and 
 inevitable responsibility to the Omniscient Judge. 
 
 Professor Grote on Utilitarianism, 
 
50 
 
 Utilitarianism, 
 
 The Divine 
 Will is a 
 reality. 
 
 The Divine 
 
 Avill is not 
 to be re- 
 garded apart 
 from the 
 Di\'ine 
 lleason. 
 
 Those who identify the standard of righteousness 
 with the Divine Will are sometimes met with the 
 objection that such an identification tends to make 
 morality altogether arbitrary. If what God wills 
 is the right, then (it is urged) if God were to will 
 in the contrary direction, what we hold to be right 
 would become wrong, and what we hold to be 
 wrong would become right. How can that be an 
 independent standard of morality which is depen- 
 dent upon the will even of God ? 
 
 The answer to these diificulties is to be found in 
 the consideration that the Diving Will (if we may 
 use language so human) is according to the Divine 
 Eeason. The Will is simply the imperative, so to 
 speak, corresponding with the Reason, which is 
 indicative. Man's will is often capricious, is often 
 in contradiction to his highest conceptions and 
 convictions, is often according to his evil passions 
 or foolish fancies, and not according to his reason. 
 With the all-perfect Deity this is not the case. 
 Whilst the attributes of Wisdom, Justice, and 
 Benevolence prescribe the law of morality, the^ 
 Will of God publishes, sanctions, and enforces it 
 The revelation of the law in the human conscienc 
 and in the inspired volume is a revelation of the 
 Nature and Attributes of God, but it is a revelation 
 made by the Will of God, the practical mani- 
 festation of Himself as the Ruler and Judge of 
 His intelligent and responsible creatures. What- 
 
Utilitarianism. 51 
 
 soever rewards or punisliments obtain under the 
 Divine government are administered by the Infinite 
 Will of the Governor Himself. But they are 
 simply the expressions in judicial action of the 
 nature and perfections of the Eternal, who is just 
 and good beyond all degrees. 
 
 If, then, we are asked. What is there open to 
 us as an alternative theory, in case we are convinced 
 of the unsoundness of the Utilitarian doctrine? 
 the answer is plain. Conscience, the imperative 
 of Duty, within, has corresponding to it the 
 standard of Eight, the Moral Law. Where is this 
 to be discovered ? How is this to be determined ? 
 
 1. Eegard man's nature ; and the Moral Law, the ot^^^ 
 Ethical Standard, is to be found in the harmo- of moSiuty! 
 nious and perfect development and exercise of the 
 powers with which the Creator has endowed him, 
 
 2. Regard the Moral Universe of which man forms 
 a part ; and the Moral Law, the Ethical Standard, 
 is to be found in the Universal Order, the good, 
 i.e., the perfection, not of the individual agent, 
 merely, but of aU beings with whom he has rela- 
 tions, and whom his actions may affect. 3. Eegard 
 flie Supreme Lord, Euler, and Judge of the Moral 
 Universe ; and the Moral Law, the Ethical Stand- 
 ard, is to be found in the Divine nature and 
 attributes of Him who is infinitely good. 
 
52 
 
 Utilitarianism, 
 
 IX. 
 
 The general 
 acceptance 
 of Utili- 
 tarianism 
 would be 
 injurious 
 to public 
 morality. 
 
 It would 
 discredit 
 Cliristianiry, 
 
 Utilitarianism and Christianity Contrasted 
 IN THEIR Principles and Effects. 
 
 Although it is true that there are amongst 
 those who claim to be orthodox Christians, some 
 who have given their assent to the theory 
 known as Universalistic Hedonism, it is necessary 
 to expose the erroneous nature of this system, 
 because a theory is often held by those who are 
 not alive to all its proper and logical consequences. 
 The general acceptance and prevalence of Utili- 
 tarianism, moreover, would be most injurious to 
 the public morals. If men generally come to be- 
 lieve that whatever promotes pleasure is right, that 
 there is no test of rightness, except only a tendency 
 to increase enjoyment and to diminish suffering, 
 that Utility is to be enthroned as the sovereign 
 principle by which mankind are to be swayed; then 
 the general conception of human nature will be 
 degraded, for human nature will be considered as 
 constructed for no higher end than pleasure ; then 
 morality will suffer, for virtue will be despised, 
 except where it is seen to be a means to happi- 
 ness; and then Christianity will be discredited, 
 for a religion which exalts righteousness and holi- 
 
utilitarianism, 53 
 
 ness, and which endeavours to raise men above the 
 mere consideration of consequences, cannot but 
 appear as hostile to the scientific law and aim of 
 human life. Whilst our Saviour lays the greatest 
 stress upon the morality of the heart, and insists 
 upon the uprightness, the purity, the benevo- 
 lence of the thoughts and desires ; the Utilitarian 
 doctrine offers no effectual check to the evil 
 imaginations and longings, which are prone to 
 flourish unrestrained in the recesses of the soul. 
 There is danger lest those who deny the inde- 
 pendent authority of right should deem themselves 
 at liberty to indulge their covetousness and fleshly 
 appetites, when they can do so without fear of de- 
 tection, and without involving any manifest injury 
 to their fellow creatures. Religion bids men aim at 
 an ideal excellence, and reveals God as making this 
 life one of moral discipline and probation ; Utili- ^Jj\^*^j 
 tarianism bids men seek the general enjoyment, and i-^ Is^'^'^*^^ 
 either misrepresents God as supremely concerned for fjjo^ment ; 
 
 1 1 1 * T XT 1 1 Christianity 
 
 human pleasures, or else maligns Him as unable regards life 
 
 _ , as pro- 
 
 to secure an end which, nevertheless, upon the bationary 
 
 ^ ^ and dis- 
 
 whole He aims at. For these reasons we think cipunary. 
 it necessary to protest against doctrines which in 
 many respects harmonize with current feeling and 
 wishes, to show that however they accord with 
 imagination and sentiment, they have not the 
 support of reason or of facts. Utilitarianism is in 
 the view of those who look below the surfacq a 
 
64 Utilitarianism. 
 
 decidedly irreligious system of morals. It is not, 
 indeed, denied that upon it may be based rules of 
 conduct and legislative enactments which, may 
 secure a certain measure of individual and social 
 well-being. But it leaves out of sight, where it 
 does not actually negative, all that is of highest 
 interest in human life. It dispenses with our 
 spiritu al natur e, for it analyzes man's constitution 
 into his capacity for pleasure and pain, and bases 
 What mill- the rules of life upon that analysis. It dispenses 
 
 tarianism _ ^ ^ ^ '' ^ 
 
 ^spenses ^fth a future life, for it regards the present state 
 of society in connection with prospective develop- 
 ment upon earth, as a complete and sufficient 
 whole. It dispe nses with G od^jfor even if it tole- 
 rates in words the supposition that there is a 
 Supreme Euler and Magistrate who sanctions 
 beneficence of conduct ; it has really no place for 
 a Supreme Being, the Ideal of goodness, fellowship 
 with whom is spiritual life. In a word, it makes 
 
 It is favour- man *'of the earthj,_earthy." It favours such a 
 
 able to .^_, __._= 
 
 Secularism, yiew 01 the future of humau society as was 
 lately advocated by a distinguished English judge, 
 who holds that religion may disappear, that Chris- 
 tian self-denial and self-sacrifice may vanish, and 
 that life may still remain a very tolerable, indeed, 
 a very agreeable and comfortable thing.^ It 
 secularizes all that has hitherto been irradiated 
 
 * Vide Mr. Justice Stephen's article in the Nineteenth Century 
 for May, 1884. 
 
Utilitarianism, 
 
 with a halo of Divine glory. Such is the profession 
 of one of its champions : 
 
 "ISTow," says Mr. Herbert Spencer, "that moral injunctions 
 are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin, 
 the secularization of morals is becoming imperative." ^ 
 
 Against such principles we have an impregnahle 
 bulwark in Christian morality. The superiority of 
 Christianity over Utilitarianism is, upon an exam- 
 ination of the two systems, the two theories of 
 human life, perfectly incontestable. 
 
 1. The best feature in the theory considered in The 
 this Tract, is its unselfishness, its benevolence 
 
 UTJ- 
 
 selfishncsg 
 of Utili- 
 tarianism ia 
 
 This is cordially acknowledged. But this feature f "o'SrSTe 
 
 New 
 
 is not original, it is borrowed from the New Testa- Testament 
 ment, from the life of Christ Himself, from the 
 teaching of His inspired Apostles. It is Jesus of 
 Nazareth to whom we owe the maxim, "Do unto 
 others as ye would that they should do unto you," 
 from whom we have received the great law of the 
 redeemed society, the new commandment, "Love 
 one another." It is He who, by His teaching and 
 by His example, has shown us the beauty of self- 
 denial. The world had not to wait for Comte to 
 teach the lesson, '' Live for others ; " it is a lesson 
 which has been familiar for more than eighteen 
 centuries in the Church of Christ. It was an 
 Apostle of our Lord who bade us "bear one 
 another's burdens," and * look every man upon the 
 things of others." 
 
 1 Data of EthicSf p. 4. 
 
56 
 
 Utilitarianism. 
 
 The su- 
 periority of 
 tli(i aim of 
 Clii istiaiiity, 
 which seeks 
 not the en- 
 joyment, 
 but the im- 
 provement 
 and moral 
 and 
 
 spiiitual 
 welfare of 
 men. 
 
 2. When we ask, what services are we to render 
 our fellow- men, how is our good- will to express 
 itself ? the answer of the Christian to this inquiry- 
 sets his religion in a light far brighter and holier 
 than that which the Utilitarian reply sheds upon 
 his system. The latter professes a desire to pro- 
 mote the enjoyments of his fellow-creatures ; this 
 is his highest aim, for if he espouses the cause of 
 Liberty, of Order, of Yirtue, it is only because 
 he holds Liberty, Order, and Yirtue to be conducive 
 to human happiness. The Christian, on the other 
 hand, seeks the glory of God in the moral and 
 spiritual welfare of the race. All measures 
 devised for human improvement are in his view 
 inadequate, which do not go to the root of the 
 evil. Believing that the Gospel is the Divine 
 remedy for sin and its fearful consequences, he 
 seeks to bring the Gospel home to the sinner's 
 heart, with a view to his salvation. His aim is, 
 by the use of Divinely appointed means, and 
 in dependence upon Divine Agency, to bring 
 about the spiritual renewal of those whom he 
 desires to benefit. To him, the restoration of men 
 to the Divine image and favour is a far loftier aim 
 than the mere increase of their gratifications ; and 
 this is an estimate which a just mind will approve. 
 
 3. Whilst Utilitarians judge men by their out- 
 ward actions, and commend such conduct as tends 
 to promote pleasure, Christians are bound by the 
 
Utilitarianism. 57 
 
 teacliing of their Divine Master to lay stress upon 
 
 the thoughts and intents of the heart. The stand- :jj'w>t . 
 
 ^, , , , . Utilitarian- 
 
 ard of Utility is independent of spiritual excellence; j^^^^^^^^ 
 according to it, that course of action is deserving S-Stiamty 
 of approval which tends to the general pleasure. inneVepSiS 
 The standard of Christian morality has reference, nek 
 not to acts merely, but to the dispositions, purposes, 
 and habits of the soul ; it requires sincerity, up- 
 rightness, purity of heart, as indispensable to 
 acceptance with Him who judgeth not as man 
 judgeth. If man have a spiritual nature, and if 
 action is valuable as expressive of spiritual prin- 
 ciples, then it is indisputable that Christianity, 
 which places man's spiritual state and experience 
 foremost in dignity and importance, takes a juster 
 view of humanity than is taken by the Utilitarian 
 philosophy. 
 
 4. "When the motive to action is taken into The 
 
 , . . . superior ox- 
 
 consideration, our estimate of the comparative and ceiience of 
 
 ^ ^ Christianity. 
 
 indeed of the absolute merit of the Eeligion of 
 Christ becomes still more apparent. Some He- 
 donist philosophers maintain that we seek to 
 benefit others only for the sake of the pleasure 
 such conduct brings to ourselves; others main- 
 tain that natural sympathy is a sufficient motive. 
 The first of these principles of action must 
 constantly fail to secure benevolent conduct ; it 
 operates only when the pleasure exceeds thj 
 sacrifice involved. The second is a naturi 
 
 UNIVERSITT 
 
58 
 
 Utilitarianism. 
 
 The motive 
 upon which 
 Christianity 
 relies, viz. 
 love and 
 gratitude 
 towards a 
 Redeeming 
 God. 
 
 Failure of 
 Hedonistic 
 effort. 
 
 powerful motive, but is not competent to vanquish 
 human selfishness. How conspicuously superior to 
 other considerations are those which Christianity 
 brings to bear upon those who yield themselves to 
 its sacred influences ! The love of God the Father 
 is a motive to the soul that recognizes and feels it, 
 sufficient to awaken love to " the brethren whom 
 we have seen." " If God so loved us, we ought 
 also to love one another." " The love of Christ 
 constraineth us." The Cross has ever been the 
 most powerful corrective to human selfishness, the 
 most powerful incentive to human philanthropy. 
 From the Cross an inspiration proceeds which is 
 sufficient to sustain the Christian labourer in his 
 service, to nerve the Christian soldier for his 
 warfare. He who seeks the good of his fellow- 
 men can come under no power so invincible as 
 that which is supplied by the love and sacrifice of 
 the Eedeemer, who "bare our sins in His own 
 body on the tree." For this power reaches aTid 
 sways the inmost heart of the believer. 
 
 5. Let it be borne in mind that those who on 
 the Hedonistic system seek the happiness of their 
 fellow-men, often fail in their endeavours ; for 
 happiness is not a commodity that can be trans- 
 ferred from one to another. JSTeither can they be 
 assured of attaining happiness for themselves. On 
 the other hand, the Christian, seeking a higher 
 aim than pleasure, will not be left unrecompensed. 
 
Utilitarianism. 59 
 
 If the Universe is the work of a riffliteous and success of 
 
 Christian 
 
 benevolent Grod, who has the highest moral ends effort 
 before Him in the government of the conscious 
 and voluntary natures He has created, it is reason- 
 able to believe that ultimately He will confer 
 happiness upon those who are obedient and sub- 
 missive to His will. The Christian cannot seek The 
 
 Chnstian 
 
 enjoyment, either for himself or for others, as the acceptauc"^^ 
 highest aim of his action. Fellowship with God, ewriasting 
 likeness to God in moral attributes: this is his 
 highest conception of well-being. Yet, finally and 
 in eternity, a character in harmony with Divine 
 rectitude and purity cannot but be appointed to 
 experience the truest happiness, whatever may bo 
 the calamities and sorrows of the earthly life. 
 There is accordingly the glorious prospect before 
 the Christian of realizing for himself, and for those 
 whose welfare he is the means of promoting, the 
 inexhaustible meaning of the exclamation of the 
 Psalmist, " In Thy presence is fulness of joy ; ii^ 
 Thy right hand there are pleasures for evermore " ! 
 
 ^> 
 
 \ PRESENT Day Tracts, No. 40. H^- 
 
AUGUSTE COMTE 
 
 AND THE 
 
 ''RELIGION OF HUMANITY." 
 
 BY THE 
 
 EEV. J. HADFORD THOMSOjST, M.A., 
 
 AVTHOU OF 
 
 "Witness of Man's IIorat, NATunE to Chhisttanity ;'* "Modern Pessimism 
 
 "Utilitarianism," etc., eto. 
 
 THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY: 
 
 56 PATERNOSTER ROW, AND 65 ST. PAUL'S CHURCHYARD, 
 LONDON. 
 
^tgnmcxii at ttue Tract* 
 
 The process is described by which Comte, the author 
 of the " Positive Philosophy,'' which limits human knowledge 
 to the results of observation and experiment, came to be 
 the founder of the "Religion of Humanity." His aim is 
 ackrwwledged to have been the illumination of the intellect 
 by the heart. The Comtists are shown to elevate mankind, 
 and especially illustrious benefactors of the race, and ^ 
 woman, as the emotional and spiritual sex, into the object 
 of worship and veneration. The Positivist Church and 
 its organization are described, and the moral, political, and 
 social views of Comte's followers are stated. 
 
 The Tract then proves that the Religion of Humanity is 
 both atheistic and idolatrous, that human beings are not 
 worthy objects of supreme reverence and adoration, and 
 that true prayer is not a possible exercise on the part ot 
 those who disbelieve in a Being almighty and benevolent. 
 Positivism is shown to be lacking in moral authority over 
 human conduct. The unreality of the Positivist immor- 
 tality is exhibited. 
 
 The Religion of Humanity is then in several particulars 
 contrasted with the Religion of Christ, with the result of 
 showing the essential superiority of the latter in every 
 respect, 
 
AUGUSTE COMTE, 
 
 AND 
 
 '^THE RELIGION OF HUMANITY." 
 
 I. 
 
 The Author and Origin of the Religion 
 OF Humanity. 
 
 UGUSTE CoMTE, who was bom in 1798, 
 and who died in 1857, was a man who 
 made his mark upon the intellectual 
 history of this century. His reputation ^J"* ^^ \ 
 and influence have not been limited to his native exercised 
 country France but have, in the course of a lice^bofh" 
 generation, spread through the civilised world. He and eise- 
 founded a school of philosophy ; but his power has 
 been felt far beyond the limits of his school. His 
 spirit has penetrated many students and thinkers 
 who are not adherents of the system known by 
 his name. Comto has been called by an admirer 
 " the Bacon of the nineteenth century ; '* we may 
 dismiss such an estimate of his rank as ex- 
 aggerated, and may yet admit that he has made 
 for himself a place among the intellectual and 
 social leaders of our time. It is further claimed 
 for him that he has invented a new religion. 
 
Augusts Comte, and 
 
 His attain- 
 ments were 
 great; his 
 passion for 
 classification 
 was exces- 
 sive; his 
 ambition 
 was vast. 
 
 In his youth and early manhood, Comte was a 
 most diligent and enthusiastic reader, and under 
 the influence especially of Saint Simon and do 
 Maistre, the Utopian Socialists of the day, an ardent 
 student of all social questions. His attainments 
 in mathematics, his extensive acquaintance with 
 European history, his knowledge of the physical 
 sciences, in the stage of development in which they 
 existed in his early days, are all admitted and re- 
 cognised. His sympathies were less with the de- 
 structive tendency, which originated with Yoltaire 
 and Uousseau, than with what he deemed the con- 
 structive forces, represented by Diderot, Hume, 
 and Condorcet. He regarded Bichat and Gall as 
 his precursors in science. Possessing unbounded 
 self-confidence, and a passion even a genius 
 for classification, Comte made it his ambitious 
 aim, by means of his teaching and his writings, to 
 reconstitute science and philosophy, to revolutionize 
 education, and thus to regenerate humanity. 
 
 Positivism is the name given by its author to 
 the vast body of doctrine presented to the world by 
 this professed prophet and priest of the nineteenth 
 century. By the term " positive " Comte intended 
 to designate such knowledge as is based upon 
 actual observation and experiment, the accepted 
 methods of modern physical science. Nothing 
 else is, in his view, true knowledge ; philosophy, 
 as hitherto understood, and of course theologv of 
 
 The 
 
 " positive '* 
 philosophy 
 would limit 
 knowledge 
 to what can 
 be acquired 
 by observa^ 
 tion and 
 experiment. 
 
Tke Religion of Humanity'^ 
 
 every kmd, are dismissed, as outgrown and aban- 
 doned by this age, steeped as it is in tbe modern 
 scientific spirit. Comte's writings were encyclopaedic ; ^pj,^^"!' 
 bis system was professedly comprebensive of all inTerpSdJ 
 buman knowledge. His two great works, Positive ten? wiS^" 
 
 , . 1 . all meta- 
 
 Philosophy and Positive Polity^ were designed to physics 
 include all tbe sciences of nature and of man, and theology. 
 the classification of tbese sciences was represented 
 as being tbe true and indeed tbe only philosophy. 
 
 Much of what Comte wrote has no longer any 
 special value or interest. But in two directions, J?g*J^^g 
 one speculative and tbe other practical, bis influence fXence 
 survives to the present day. He advanced a stuisumvcs. 
 startling theory of human development, and he 
 propounded a religion and established a church. 
 The first of these must be briefly explained, as 
 very closely connected with the second. 
 
 The intellectual growth of mankind is represented 
 by Comte as passing through three successive 
 stages or epochs. The first of these is the theo- His doctnne 
 
 A ^ _ of the three! 
 
 logical stage of knowledge, in which the facts of intfiTectuai^ 
 nature are explained by the supposed presence and of maukiud! 
 action of supernatural beings. Men are supposed 
 to begin their religious development with fetichism, 
 to proceed to the higher position of polytheism, 
 and thence to advance to Monotheism, which is 
 deemed the summit of this first movement. The 
 second is the meta'physical stage, in which all 
 unseen personal agencies are discarded, and 
 
Augusts Comte, and 
 
 According to 
 Comic, -the 
 " ]iositive" 
 etajre is to 
 supersede 
 the theo- 
 logical and 
 the meta- 
 physical. 
 
 principles, laws, abstractions wliicli are the creation 
 of the mind J are represented as accounting for 
 natural phenomena. The third is the positive 
 stage, which has now at length been reached by 
 the most enlightened of mankind. These have 
 outgrown the intellectual illusions of childhood 
 and youth, and are content to take phenomena as 
 they find them, to classify them in co- existences 
 and sequences, and to renounce as vain and useless 
 all search for causes, whether personal or meta- 
 physical. 
 
 Such a doctrine as this certainly appears to 
 forbid scientific men to retain religion of any kind, 
 in fact to preclude the possibility of religion except 
 in the case of the ignorant and unreasoning. 
 Through the greater part of his life, Comte seems 
 to have regarded science as completely satisfying the 
 wants of his nature, and accordingly to have utterly 
 ignored all religious beliefs and practices. How, it 
 may well be asked, can the so-called " positive " 
 stage of human development admit of a Deity, of 
 prayer, of thanksgiving, of a priesthood and sacra- 
 ments, of immortality ? The answer to this question 
 must be sought in Comte's own personal experience, 
 in circumstances occurring in his life, in the history 
 of his heart. The process by which he came to 
 feel the need of religion for himself, and so to 
 found a religion in his judgment adapted to a 
 scientific age, is well worthy of careful attention. 
 
 Until he 
 approached 
 middle age, 
 Comte 
 altogether 
 ignored and 
 repudiated 
 all religion. 
 
" The Religion of Humanity," 
 
 It was by feminine influence that Comte was led 
 to crown the '* Positive " philosophy by the " Posi- 
 tive " religion, usually designated, to distinguish it 
 from Theism, "the Eeligion of Humanity." Comte's 
 marriage was not a happy one ; and after many 
 years of wedded life, the savant was separated, on 
 account of incompatibility of temper, from the wife 
 who had borne with him in his petulance, and watch- 
 ed over him during a period of mental derangement. 
 After this separation he made the acquaintance of His intimacy 
 
 ^ . ^ with Clotilda 
 
 Madame Clo tilde de Vaux a youna: woman of ^^ ^^^^ 
 
 ' o was the 
 
 thirty, and seventeen years his junior who came ^^'^^^^'^l ^^ 
 to exercise an extraordinary influence over his Ss^vflw^ 
 character, and indirectly over his teaching. The necessitica 
 object of his admiration was, like himself, unhappy moral 
 in marriage, and was separated from her husband, ^^^ ^^<- 
 who was at this time a convict undergoing punish- 
 ment. Her qualities of understanding and of heart 
 called forth the devotion of the Positivist prophet, 
 opened a fresh fountain of feeling in his nature, 
 and led him to take a different view of human life. 
 He wrote of his " St. Clotilde " in terms of extra- 
 vagant eulogy, as 
 
 "the incomparable angel appointed in the course of human 
 destiny to transmit to me the results of the gradual evolution 
 of our moral nature." 
 
 The friendship lasted but a year ; Madame de 
 Vaux died in 1846, but bequeathed to her admirer 
 an influence which lasted all the remainder of his 
 
Auguste Comte, and 
 
 life, and whicli affected all his subsequent specula- 
 timcom\e ^i^ns. From this period may be dated what has 
 omotiinli*^ ^ccn tcrmcd the new birth of Comte's moral nature. 
 impoTtanr^ Up to tliis point knowlcdgB had been everything 
 
 than the -i > 
 
 intellectual, to him ; honceiorward he confessed the supremacy 
 of the affections and the claims of what he held to 
 be religion. In the dedication to Clotilde's memory, 
 of his great work on Positive Polity ^ Comte records 
 that it was her influence that had taught him the 
 preponderance of universal love. 
 
 ** After frankly devoting the first half of my life to the 
 development of the heart by the intellect, I saw its second half 
 consecrated by the illumination of the intellect by the heart, so 
 necessary to give the true character to great social truths." 
 
 Thus Positivism was transformed from a very 
 secular doctrine into one in which everything was 
 subordinated to emotion, morality, worship, and 
 
 on'comte'f roHgion. The change was variously regarded. 
 
 Tschism in Many of Comte's followers refused to accompany 
 
 the ranks r>( i ji 
 
 of Comte's him UDOU this new departure, ouch was the case 
 
 followers. * ^ ... 
 
 with his most distinguished French disciple, M. 
 
 ^e'fuled to Littre ; whilst his English admirer and friend, 
 
 in"hJnew Mr. J. S. Mill, criticised the master's aberration 
 
 epar ure. ^.^^ extrcmo scvority, and went so far as to say : 
 
 ' M. Comte gradually acquired a real hatred for scientific and 
 all intellectual pursuits, and was bent on retaining no more of 
 them than was strictly indispensable." 
 
 On the other hand, the thorough-going scholars 
 in the Positivist school regard the emotional and 
 moral stage of Comte's life with reverence and 
 
" The Religion of Humanity. 
 
 liratitude. An Englisli representative of what may others 
 
 ..... ' admired and 
 
 be called Ecclesiastical Positivism speaks thus accepted 
 
 * Lis later 
 
 warmly of the high-priest of the new religion ; aXp^t&|' 
 
 his new 
 * It should become clear to us that the philosophical and '^^^eion. 
 political thinker had merged in the saint, that the life of thought 
 was so fruitful of good because it was a life of prayer, that if he 
 preached sacrifice to others, no man ever lived who imposed it 
 more completely on himself ; that if he preached humanity to 
 others, he had been the first to give her all, to consecrate every 
 faculty and power to her service ; that if he made love his 
 watchword, it was because he was the most loving of men."^ 
 
 Comte's own view of the relation between the 
 two sections of his life is apparent from his remark 
 with reference to Madame de Vaux : 
 
 " Through her I have at length become for humanity, in the 
 strictest sense, a two-fold organ. . . My career had been that 
 of Aristotle I should have wanted energy for that of St. Paul, 
 but for her. I had extracted sound philosophy from real 
 science; I was enabled by her to found on the basis of that 
 philosophy the universal religion. "^ 
 
 II. 
 
 The Positivist View of Religion. 
 CoMTE and his followers disbelieve in the super- The 
 natural ; to their minds faith in an unseen Creator SeUeve m 
 and Ruler of the universe appears unscientific, ' 
 and unworthy of enlightened cultivators of physical 
 science, of " Positive " knowledge. On the other 
 hand, the master, and those of the scholars who 
 
 ' Cougreve, The Annual Address, Jan. 1, ICSl. 
 2 Catechism^ Preface, p. 10. 
 
10 Auguste Comte, and 
 
 follow him in tlic later development of his teaching, 
 have always and earnestly repudiated secularismj 
 and have claimed to be truly religious, only with 
 a kind of religiousness becoming, as they think, to 
 men living in a scientific age, and having no sym- 
 cut those pathy with superstition ! The Positivist reliojion 
 
 who a<rree *. ^ j. <-> 
 
 hi*hisiS?r boasts itself as "the concurrence of feeling with 
 
 fnaintS'^"* roasou iu the regulation of our action." Comte 
 
 of Religion ^ himsolf taught that religion has two functions : viz., 
 
 to iuiiuouce to order the life of the individual, and to combine 
 
 men's indi- 
 
 sociifi&e*^ men into a social unity. It must, as an intellectual 
 power, satisfy the mind with truth, the object of 
 belief; and it must, as a moral power, satisfy the 
 heart with appropriate emotion. 
 
 Th'is, however, is morality rather than religion. 
 
 Comte saw that men need not only a law of con- 
 
 comte duct, but an object of reverence. He accordingly 
 
 that he sought to replace the sentiments and motives 
 
 reconciled 
 
 ^^^ths^ evoked by Christianity by raising Humanity into 
 
 tJtin^g^^^' tb^ supreme place in human regard. He was 
 
 foTood^as rigtt in recognizing the superiority of man over 
 
 objec?of'^^ matter, of human virtue above physical law. But 
 
 rcvcrGiiCG 
 
 and worship, he was wroug in exalting man into the place of 
 God. However, the Comtists believe that religion 
 is possible upon their basis of the supremacy of 
 humanity. Positivism, one of them tells us, 
 
 " will be religion, inasmuch as it will infuse a grandeur and a 
 unity into human toil, knowledge, and interests, by filling them 
 with all the light of duty, and the warmth of a social aflFection. 
 In every pait it will be a human religion, a perfectly piactical 
 
*' The Religion of Humanity,** .1 1 
 
 and mundane religion, grounded in thought, and issuing in act j 
 beginning on earth, and ending in man." ^ 
 
 The English school of Positivists lay the greatest J^j^^^^g 
 stress upon the religious aspect of their system, posftiSsts 
 and persuade themselves that all the good results accord with 
 vhich Christianity has brought to past ages may 
 be secured by a religion more in harmony, as they 
 bold, with the spirit of our own times. Thus Mr, 
 Frederic Harrison urges : 
 
 "All th^ eternal and essential institutions of religion are not 
 )nly open to Positivism, but are profoundly developed and em- 
 jraced by it. It is familiar too with that sense of individual 
 veakness and yearning for consolation, that spirit of humilia- 
 ion before Providence, and contrition in the consciousness of 
 juilt, that peace within in communing with an abiding sweetness 
 md goodness without, that unquenchable assurance of triumph 
 n final good all of v.'hich are the old and just privileges of the 
 )urest Christianity."* 
 
 The reader may well be curious to know what 
 ihere is in the Positivist religion to justify such 
 issertions and such expectations as are contained 
 n the writings of Comte and his followers. Of "^e know 
 
 ^ what Chris- 
 
 I Christianity we know that it professes to reveal a ^o^and^Jas 
 |jod of righteousness and of mercy, a God loving mankind, 
 ind pitying mankind, and able to save and bless 
 hose sinful beings who turn to Him in penitence 
 md in faith ; that it professes to reveal a Divine 
 kviour, and a Divine Helper, unseen but ever 
 )resent ; that it brings new motives, new powers, 
 
 "^ Congreve, New I'ear's Address, for 1880. 
 Contemporary Review, November, 1875. 
 
12 Augusie Comte, and 
 
 new hopes to men ; that it professes to reveal a future 
 state with prospects of retribution and of recom- 
 pense. Such a religion must have, and actually 
 Sy^ask^ ^^^ ^^^ exercises, a vast spiritual power. What 
 '^^eiiglon has Comtism to ofPer to the world, that it ventures 
 ity" rival" to vie with the faith of Christ ? So far as can 
 
 the Religion i i n i rv 
 
 of Christ, be gathered from its documents, it oners us a body 
 a*Ml)mi*^^^ of scientific doctrine, the lessons and examples of 
 Force? human history, a scheme of worship, with the 
 
 apparatus of priesthood, liturgy, sacraments, the 
 outward and visible sign of human federation, anc 
 a system of government of the most fantastica 
 order. Religion is to centre in Humanity. Tc 
 quote the words of the founder of this religion : 
 
 *' Under the permanent inspiration of Universal Love, th< 
 business of doctrine, worship, and discipline, is to study, U 
 honour, and to serve the great Being, the crown of al 
 human existence."^ 
 
 Ill 
 
 The Positivist God. 
 
 All religion assumes the existence and the rul 
 
 of a higher Being, worthy of worship and service 
 
 Positivism Comte proposed that reverence, praise and d( 
 
 humanity, yotiou should be rendered, not to a Deity abov 
 
 humanity, the Creator and the Governor of 
 
 men, but to humanity, the collective human rac 
 
 and especially to the great men of the past. Pos 
 
 ^ Positive Polity, vol. ii., p. G6. 
 
'* The Religion of Huvianity." IH 
 
 ivism means the sovereignty of the dead over the it proposes 
 
 the person- 
 
 ivinff. Comte personified Humanity. mcation of 
 
 *-' * ' numanity as 
 
 the Deity 
 " We condense the whole of Our positive conceptions in the whom men 
 
 -ne single idea of an immense and eternal Being, Humanity, ??"J^ 
 
 : lestined by sociological laws to constant development under the 
 
 I ireponderating influence of biological and cosmological ne- 
 
 lessities."^ 
 
 Towards Humanity, who is for us the only true great 
 iJeing, we, the conscious elements of whom she is composed, 
 hall henceforth direct every aspect of our life, individual or 
 ollective. Our thoughts will be devoted to the knowledge of 
 lumanity, our affections to her love, our actions to her service. " * 
 
 But we are not to understand hy the Humanity ^^it in con- 
 
 ' "^ structing 
 
 ve are summoned to worship, all mankind, " good, ^o^nJe^cS 
 )ad, and indifferent," but only such as have sought wthies'^s^ 
 he common good. The " mere digesting machines " aUd con- ^^ 
 
 joins only 
 
 nay, it is suggested, he replaced hy the nobler select and 
 imonsr the brutes ! The God, or Goddess, whom presentatives 
 
 o ' ' of our race. 
 
 uen should worship, is in a measure their own 
 ireation ; Comte reminds men of the duty of pre- 
 erving, developing, improving, and perfecting their 
 Deity. But we are assured that the object of 
 vorship is no abstraction, but the actud assem- 
 )lage of those who have led a noble and useful 
 ife. 
 
 It was, however, perceived hy the founder of ^?J^,^" 
 he Positivist religion that " Humanity " is to men ^^dSy^ 
 ;enerally somewhat vague, that they need to adore Jafrto^*^ 
 vhat is concrete, living, and personal. Thus 
 
 ^ l^he Catechism, of Positive Religion, p. 63. 
 * Positive Polity, vol. i., p. 201. 
 
J4 
 
 Angiiste Comte, and 
 
 Hence 
 Comte pro- 
 poses that 
 woman, as 
 the emotion- 
 al sex, 
 should be 
 the object 
 of adoration 
 and prayer. 
 
 Mother, 
 wife, and 
 daughter 
 are to be 
 venerated 
 as types 
 of moral 
 excellence. 
 
 Comte was led to the proposal that woman should 
 be the object of ordinary and private worship. 
 The " affective sex " (he held) embodies, in its 
 best representatives, what is most worthy of re- 
 ligious reverence. 
 
 ** Prayer would be of little value unless the mind could clearly 
 define its object. The worship of won:an satisfies this condition, 
 and may thus be of greater efficacy than the worship of God. " * 
 
 The worship of the Virgin Mary, so prevalent 
 throughout the so-called Catholic world, was re- 
 garded by this ingenious idolater, as a happy intro- 
 duction to the ciiltus of that graceful personification 
 of humanity which we are called upon to admire 
 in womankind. The mother speaks of the past, 
 suggests obedience, and requires veneration. The 
 wife speaks of the present, suggests union, and calls 
 for attachment. The daughter is of the future, sh( 
 needs protection, and is regarded with benevolence 
 Such a group of female relatives is commended a; 
 constituting collectively a suitable object of dailj 
 adoration. Women, however, are expected t( 
 worship the mother, the husband, and the son. I 
 must not be supposed that this teaching was a men 
 eccentricity of Comte, occasioned by his ad 
 miration for his St. Clotilde. Mr. Congreve, J 
 leader of English Positivism, presents the cas 
 very clearly: 
 
 *'What is the most universal constituent of this composii 
 spirituality ? The answer is clear. It is in woman that we fin 
 
 1 Positive Polity, vol. I., p. 209, 
 
*'The Religion of Humanity." 15 
 
 it ; and therefore it is that, as the most universal and the 
 most powerful of all modifying agents, woman is in our religion 
 the representative of humanity. " ^ 
 
 It may appear to the uninitiated that there is Tn his 
 
 ' '' worship of 
 
 some confusion involved in the proposal to conjoin ^o^j^'te^g'^.^ 
 the worship of the Supreme Being, i.e., the ideal Z.Slt" 
 Humanity, with that of an individual woman, d^soipies S 
 Such a helief does not vanish when we consider 
 Comte's account of his own habitual worship of 
 Clotilde. He anticipated the " extension to others 
 of his own personal worship of the angel from 
 whom he derived its chief suggestions." He thus 
 described the combination at which he arrived : 
 
 **She [i.e., Clotilde] is for all time incorporated into the true 
 Supreme Being, of whom her tender image is allowed to be for 
 me the best representative. In each of my three daily prayers 
 I adore both together. " ^ 
 
 It would be interesting to know whether any 
 habitual votaries of Clotilde de Yaux are to be 
 found in the select circle of our English Positivists. 
 
 lY. 
 
 The Worship of Humanity. 
 
 The worship presented by the religious man The 
 
 to his deity is twofold. He brings his offering, a which 
 
 . Comte 
 
 sacrifice, a hymn of praise, or an act of homage or J^jjf "^ ^^^ 
 
 obedience ; and, whilst acknowledging favours re- ^ mcdita- 
 
 ceived, he prays for spiritual or temporal good. 
 
 ^ Il'uman Catholicism, p. 18. ^ Catechism, Preface, p. 88. 
 
 tion and 
 aspiration. 
 
IG 
 
 Auguste Oonite. and 
 
 Now Comte enjoins prayer, or rather meditation 
 and aspiration, under the designations, " com- 
 memoration " and "effusion." Erroneous as is 
 his conception of the object of worship, his account 
 of fellowship with the Unseen is not without 
 dignity and beauty. 
 
 The 
 
 Religion of 
 Humanity 
 prescribes 
 both private 
 and public 
 devotion. 
 
 Stated 
 seasons of 
 worship are 
 appointed. 
 
 "Prayer in its purest form offers the best type of life, and 
 conversely life in its noblest aspect consists in one long prayer 
 The humblest home in Positivism should contain, better even 
 than under Polytheism, a sort of private chapel, in which the 
 worship of the true guardian angels would daily remind each 
 Positivist of the need of adoring the finest personifications of 
 humanity. " ^ 
 
 Private prayer is enjoined upon the disciple of 
 Comte. He devotes 
 
 " the first hour of each day to place the whole day under the 
 protection of the best representatives of humanity."^ 
 
 He offers a shorter prayer at mid- day, and again 
 at night as he sinks into slumber. The recom- 
 mendation with regard to family prayer reminds 
 us of the immemorial practice of the Chinese : 
 
 "The father of the family invokes, as household gods, the 
 chief ancestors of the family." * 
 
 Private prayer should be observed daily, weekly, 
 and yearly ; public prayer weekly, monthly, and 
 yearly. Whilst worship is to be offered only to the 
 "great being," Humanity, it is contemplated that 
 the Positivist temples shall contain a visible re- 
 presentation of the unseen object of adoration. 
 ^ jfosiUu<i Fulity, vol. n., p. 68. ^ m^^ ^^i^ iv., p. 103- 
 * Jbid. vol. IV., p. 107. 
 
" The Religion of Hutnamty." 17 
 
 " la i)ainting or in sculpture equally, the symbol of our 
 Divinity will always be a woman of the age of thirty, with her 
 son in her arms. The pre-eminence, religiously considered, of 
 the affective sex, ought to be the principal feature in our em- 
 blematic representation, whilst the active sex must remain 
 under her holy guardianship."^ 
 
 If it is asked whether it is possible for Positivists 
 to worship their human god in the methods con- 
 secrated by the usage of devout generations, the 
 material for an answer to this question may be ^^^^^4^ 
 found in the prayers used by the priest of the gy^^he'"''^^ 
 Positivist community in London, which are prefixed pjsltivists 
 to the annual addresses delivered upon New Year's iished. 
 Day, the festival of Humanity, and regularly pub- 
 lished. These prayers are addressed to 
 
 "the Great Power, acknowledged as the liighest, Humanity, 
 whose children and servants we are." ^ 
 
 The petitions are, for the most part, petitions for a 
 better knowledge of Humanity, with a view to 
 warmer love and truer service, and that life may 
 be strengthened and ennobled by sympathy and by 
 mutual aid. Among the blessings ardently sought of^sup^^fi?' 
 are union, unity, and continuity; but there is a necrSarify 
 lack of definiteness in the language, arising from indefinite, 
 the fact that the worshippers have no clear appre- 
 hension of the moral and religious qualities which 
 alone can make these blessings precious and 
 desirable. It is observable that the expressions 
 of the Positivist prayers are largely borrowed from 
 
 Catechism^ p. 142. ^ yj^^g ^y^^ Years' Addresses, passim. 
 
 
1^ Auguste Gomte, and 
 
 the Christian Scriptures. The Positivists have 
 their benediction, viz. : 
 
 The ** The faith of Humanity, the hope of Humanity, the love of 
 
 liuma^dty' Humanity, bring you comfort, and teach you sympathy, give you 
 sanctions peace in yourselves and peace with others, now and for ever. 
 
 the use of Arnfm " 
 
 lienedictions '^i'^^^- 
 and 
 
 Collects. There is an Advent collect, which represents 
 
 Comte as the Messiah ; the opening clauses shall 
 be quoted to give the reader an insight into the 
 evident desire of the Positivists to link their religion 
 on, in thought and phrase, to the religion they 
 hope to supersede : 
 
 " Thou power Supreme, who hast hitherto guided Thy chil- 
 dren under other names, but in this generation hast come to Thy 
 own in Thy own proper pei-son, revealed for all ages to come by 
 Thy servant, Auguste Comte," etc. 
 
 Christian In the same spirit, Thomas a Kempis' devo- 
 
 manuals oi r ' r 
 
 aSIpteTtr ^ional manual "Of the Imitation of Christ," is 
 the use of approved by the Positivists as edifying reading ; 
 Catholics.'* in fact, Comte himself used it daily in his re- 
 ligious exercises ; but that it may be adapted to 
 the use of " Human Catholics,'* it is directed that 
 "Humanity " be everywhere substituted for '' God," 
 and *' the social type " for the personal type of 
 Jesus! "What is left, when the Father and the 
 Saviour of man are eliminated from this famous 
 book of Christian devotion, may readily be im- 
 agined. 
 
 In the adoration and prayer offered to Humanity 
 by her votaries, one thing is very obvious Whilst 
 
" The Religion of Humanity. " 19 
 
 the petitions of Christian worshippers are presented 
 to a Being justly and confidently believed to 
 comprehend and to sympathise with the wants of 
 the petitioners, and to possess the power and dis- 
 position to grant the favours sought, no Positivist i* ia ^n- 
 can for a moment suppose that the dead and j^p?ay^t?*^ 
 vanished persons who constitute the humanity of in'^the^ew 
 past ages, can possibly be conscious of the desires worshippers, 
 professedly poured into their ears, or can possibly longer 
 do anything in response to prayer, to fulfil the JJ^^^^J^ 
 supplications of their worshippers. sciousness. 
 
 V. 
 
 The Church of Humanity. 
 
 It was Comte's aim to found a society com- comte 
 
 aimed at 
 
 posed of all who should acknowledge himself as jjjj^j^^j^^n 
 
 the prophet of the new and crowning dispensation, church%ut 
 
 and who should accordingly regard Humanity as Stwn*^^ 
 
 the object of supreme reverence and affection, those em- 
 bodied in 
 He perceived the miofhty hold which Eoman Boman 
 
 Catholicism had for centuries exercised over the 
 mind and life of Europe, and he attributed this 
 power to the adaptation of this mediaeval system 
 to the emotional and the social nature of man. 
 He accordingly set himself to copy the methods 
 and the very details of Romanism, and to institute 
 a church upon the broader basis of Hiunan Gatho- 
 lickm. There was this diifereuce between the two 
 
 usage. 
 
20 Auguste Comte^ and 
 
 systems: Roman Catholicism carried the super- 
 natural into every region of human life, whilst 
 Positivism sought to exercise religious influence 
 by the use of means purely natural and human. 
 
 Thus the Church of Humanity came into ex- 
 istence. The founder of the Church drew up its 
 calendar, a very remarkable document which 
 bears witness alike to the extent of Comte's 
 knowledge, his love of system, and his width of 
 The sympathy. Each of the thirteen lunar months of 
 
 Positivist . 
 
 Calendar the year is sacred to the memory of a great leader 
 
 celebrates ' jo 
 
 Ind TerSs ^^ humauity in some department of thought or of 
 mustoous activity. Thus the first month is known by the 
 name of Moses, and every one of the twenty- eight 
 days in the month is commemorative of some 
 distinguished man associated with the early re- 
 ligions of the race. The seventh days the four 
 Sabbaths of the month are connected with the 
 names of Numa, Buddha, Confucius and Mahomet 
 chiefs in religious belief and in church organisa- 
 tion. The second month is consecrated to Homei 
 and the ancient poets ; the third to Aristotle anc 
 the ancient philosophers; and so on with the rest 
 The thirteenth month is known by the name o: 
 the physiologist, Bichat, and its days are al 
 connected with the memory of men eminent 
 modern science. The complementary day is th 
 " Festival of all the dead," and the additional da; 
 in leap-year is the " Festival of holy women " 
 
** The Religion of Humanity,'' 21 
 
 Comte also published a system of Sociolatry, There are 
 
 comprising eighty-one annual festivals, upon which J^f ^J^J^j^^''^'* 
 
 the worship of Humanity should be celebrated. |aiSt8'^**^' 
 
 These were intended to replace the " holy days " ^^^^' 
 and "saints' days," which form so important a 
 part of the observances prescribed by Rome. 
 
 In this system it must be evident to the reader The 
 
 /-HI* Religion of 
 
 that man is everywhere ; whilst God is nowhere. Humanity 
 
 '' exalts man 
 
 Indeed, the religion of Humanity has been well andbanishes 
 described as " Catholicism without God." 
 
 Positivism was intended by its founder to have positivism 
 its priesthood, supported at first by the free con- priesthood, 
 tributions of believers, and when the faith shall 
 be generally adopted, by grants from the public 
 treasury Aspirants are to be admitted to the 
 priestly office at the age of twenty- eight, vicars afc 
 thirty-five, and priests proper at forty-two. Mar- TJie 
 riage is required of those in the second stage : ^M^^*; 
 
 of this 
 " for the priestly oflSce cannot be duly performed unless the man religion. 
 
 be constantly under the infljience of woman." 
 
 The business of priests is to teach the sciences, 
 and to preach upon the duties of private and 
 [public life. The supreme head of the body is the 
 'high priest, who is to be invested with absolute 
 power .^ In his love of organisation, Comte went 
 so far as to fix even the number and the stipends 
 of the Positivist clergy. 
 
 * Comte was succeeded in the Pontifical oflGice by M. Lafitto, 
 the recognized head of orthodox Positivism. 
 
22 Auguste Gomte, and 
 
 It has its J^fine sacraments were instituted : presentation, 
 
 sacraments , . . , . . 
 
 initiation, admission, destination, marriage, ma- 
 turity, retirement, transformation, and incorpora- 
 The tion. In the case of women, the fourth, sixth and 
 
 character of 
 
 these " sat^ soveuth sacramcuts are dispensed with. The 
 
 raments." ^ 
 
 reader cannot fail to ohserve that, whilst the 
 Christian sacraments are revelations of Divine 
 purposes, and symbols of Divine acts, the Positivist 
 institutions in question are all ordinances based 
 merely upon human life, especially upon events 
 occurring in its several stages, 
 rhe organi- It may be asked. Has any attempt been made 
 
 sationofthe "^ f J r 
 
 ^chm-ch of to realise these schemes ? In Paris, the metropolis 
 
 toheadl of the Eeligion of Humanity, the institutions 
 
 auarters. founded by Comte are maintained: there is a 
 
 Positivist society, and high priest, there is 
 
 public worship and commemoration, there are 
 
 authorised publications advocating the Comtist 
 
 doctrines. 
 
 The position The Positivists of Loudou, who accept the later 
 
 of this ^ . 
 
 a^siSand. P^^^^ ^^ Comto's teaching, are organised into a 
 religious sect, numerically indeed small, but 
 comprising men of learning, ability, character, 
 and influence. They hold religious service every 
 Sunday morning, and social meetings on five 
 Sunday evenings in the course of the year. The 
 London members of the " Church of Humanity " 
 observe the appointed festivals, make contributions 
 
 in England. 
 
" The Religion of Humanity.'* 23 
 
 towards their sacerdotal fund, their school fund, 
 their printing fund, and in their proceedings act in 
 some measure in accordance with the ordinary 
 usages of other English congregations. 
 
 In addition to two congregations in the metro- ^^^^^^ o, 
 polis, the religious Positivists of this country have S"^e?cS 
 
 , i- < p 1 2. T counts but 
 
 regular meetings m a lew or our large towns, in few aducr- 
 1876 they acknowledged that, outside of France, 
 they had no one in communion with them on the 
 Continent of Europe, with the exception of one 
 person in Sweden ! In the same year it was men- 
 tioned that one Oriental an Indian was in 
 fellowship with the hody. They do not, however, 
 seem discouraged by the slow progress they mako 
 as an organization, but rather look hopefully to 
 the diffusion of their principles among those who 
 do not join their assemblies. 
 
 This slow progress in a state of society which Their rata 
 
 ^ o 'of increafo 
 
 might be supposed to be peculiarly suited to the ^J^lbhe'^ 
 development of this humanitarian faith is certainly SmlS)sciiro 
 significant and suggestive, especially when com- seek 
 pared with the rapid advance of various forms of 
 Christian congregational life. Several obscure 
 sects of English Christians, even with all the 
 disadvantages of poverty, social insignificance, and 
 an illiterate ministry, have been seen so to grow 
 that, within a few years of their establishment, 
 they have come to number hundreds of congrega- 
 tions and tens of thousands of adherents. Tho 
 
24 
 
 Aiiguste Comte, and 
 
 *' Eeligion of Humanity," on the other hand, has so 
 little attraction for those who are supposed to be 
 yearning for such satisfaction as it professes to 
 offer, that, notwithstanding all the advantages 
 \vhich intellect, learning, and social position confer 
 upon its leading representatives, it can with 
 difficulty gather and keep together in the metro- 
 polis two small congregations ! The adhesion of 
 individuals is chronicled as matter for rejoicing; 
 and it is recorded with seriousness as a reason for 
 congratulation and as an omen of prosperity, that 
 in a certain provincial congregation progress has 
 been so striking and so encouraging that a har- 
 monium has actually been introduced with the 
 laudable design of aiding the public devotions of 
 the faithful ! 
 
 The 
 
 dilBcxilty Of 
 keoyiing 
 together 
 tlie two 
 Positive con- 
 gregations 
 in London. 
 
 Comte had 
 definite 
 political 
 plans. 
 
 VI. 
 
 The Practical Side op the Eeligion of 
 Humanity. 
 
 Comte, though an ardent theorist, was not con- 
 tent to propound a so-called science of Sociology, 
 a science which aims at reducing all the facts re- 
 lating to human societies and their actions to great 
 generalisations and laws. He believed himself to be 
 legislating for what, in his own grandiose way, he 
 termed *' the Eepublic of the West," by which he 
 meant the nations of 7estern Europe, with their off- 
 spring in America and the Colonies. He imagined 
 
" The Religion of Humanity.^* 25 
 
 that the power of the Religion of Humanity would He aimed 
 
 m ' '11 -11 ^* recon- 
 
 prove sufficient to induce the nations to resolve them- structinp: 
 
 ^ ^ society in 
 
 selves into small communities, each including from ^auSn?*'''^'^ 
 one to three millions of inhabitants, to give up 
 ^nationality," and to accept as the basis of their 
 true unity the sway of the Positive faith. The 
 new religion was to remould all political institu- 
 tions. Comte had great hope that the proletariate, 
 i.e.y the working classes, would hail his doctrine 
 with enthusiasm. He intended that there should 
 be an industrial patriciate having charge of the 
 proletariate. These capitalists and masters were 
 to include bankers, merchants, manufacturers, and 
 agriculturists. A council af bankers was to rule 
 all society ; with the advice of the "Western priest- 
 hood, acting under the direction of the high priest 
 of Humanity, this council was to fix the rate of 
 wages, and to administer the social and industrial 
 business of the civilised world. 
 Whilst the Positivists in our country claim to be, Jhe English 
 
 '' ' Positivists 
 
 as a body, entirely dissevered from party politics, tolcaven'^ 
 they professedly make it their aim to leaven national SJSr ^^*^ 
 life with moral principle, and to influence national ^"""^ " 
 action in favour of justice and peace. Accepting 
 the Christian doctrine of the universal brotherhood 
 of men, they are often to be found advocating the 
 Christian polity of mutual forbearance and good- 
 will. 
 
 Comte himself was a very decided opponent of 
 
26 
 
 duguste Comte, and 
 
 Comtc'a con- 
 servatism. 
 
 The influ- 
 ence of 
 Positivism 
 over English 
 thinkers and 
 writers. 
 
 those revolutionary forces which have during the 
 last century played so mighty a part in the political 
 life of his native country. His tendencies were 
 mainly Conservative. He even hailed the accession 
 to Imperial power of Napoleon III. He addressed 
 the Czar of Russia, Nicholas I., in language of 
 extravagant eulogy. It was his opposition to 
 democracy, his subserviency to autocrats, that as 
 much, perhaps, as his development of the religious 
 stage of his doctrine, alienated from him some of 
 his most admiring friends, especially his celebrated 
 disciple, M. Littr^. In his aversion to democracy 
 Comte has not been followed by all his disciples. 
 As a rule, the Positivists have cared more for the 
 lofty ends of justice and peace, than for the special 
 political means by which these ends may be 
 sought and perhaps attained. 
 
 Positivism has exercised a powerful influence 
 over our contemporary English literature. We do 
 not refer merely to the scientific, anti-philosophical, 
 and anti-theolugical bias which such writers as the 
 late Mr. Gr. H. Lewes received from the study of 
 Comte's works, but also to the quasi-religious ideas 
 which were imbibed from the same source by the 
 late "George Eliot," and which are advocated 
 with so much persistency and fervour by Mr. 
 Frederic Harrison. 
 
 The stories, poems, and essays of " George Eliot " 
 bear more than mere traces of Positivism ; the 
 
" The Religion of Humanity.^* 27 
 
 authoress herself described her longest poem as 
 " steeped " in this doctrine. That devotion to the George 
 welfare of others, which Comte denominated ^^If^ 
 " altruism," was ardently adopted and commended STncuil 
 by this writer, who seems to have substituted this S Lr ^ 
 form of benevolence for one more distinctively 
 Christian. She was also possessed with the Comtean 
 belief regarding the reign of the dead over the 
 living. But she was utterly opposed to the Chris- 
 tian doctrine of God, and had no faith in Revelation. 
 In her life occurs the following remarkable utter- 
 ance : 
 
 ' * My books have for their main bearing a conclusion without The main 
 which 1 could not have cared to write any representation of ^^^T^^i"' 
 human life, namely, that the fellowship between man and man, 
 which has been the principle of development, social and moral, 
 is not dependent on conceptions of what is not man ; and that 
 the idea of God, so far as it has been a high spiritual influence, 
 is the idea of a goodness entirely human, i.e., an exaltation of 
 the human." ^ 
 
 "We do not hesitate to say that just here, where 
 this popular authoress placed her moral strength, 
 just here lay her moral weakness. She was well 
 aware of the immense power for good residing in 
 Christian faith when sincere and active. But the The 
 
 impression 
 
 general tendency of her works is to suggest the J^J*^^^? ^^ 
 possibility of a pure, self-denying, bright, and bene- 
 ficent life, altogether apart from the motives and 
 the hopes of the Christian Revelation, altogether 
 
 ^ George Eliot'' s Life, Letter to Lady Ponsonby. Vol. ill.. 
 P- 245. ^ , 
 
 V*' OK THB 
 
 UNIVERSITT 
 
28 
 
 Auguste Comte. and 
 
 Her better 
 characters 
 unnatural 
 because the 
 motives 
 thatwould 
 account for 
 their actions 
 are ignored. 
 
 apart from belief in a Divine Euler, and from ex- 
 pectation of retribution and of conscious develop- 
 ment in a future state. Some of the better 
 characters she describes strike the reader as un- 
 natural, because the principles and motives which 
 would fairly account for their actions, are ignored. 
 A painful sense of defect mars the satisfaction of 
 even the admiring reader ; his mind seems to ache 
 for truths withheld, for prospects darkened, for 
 spiritual motives expunged by the destructive 
 power of unbelief from the probationary and dis- 
 ciplinary life of man. 
 
 If Revela- 
 tion be 
 rejected 
 what sub- 
 stitute do 
 unbelievers 
 offer for the 
 satisfaction 
 and guid- 
 ance of 
 mankind ? 
 
 VTI. 
 
 Positivism, though an advance upon some 
 
 OTHER FORMS OF UnBELIEF, IS VIRTUALLY 
 
 Atheistic. 
 
 What, let us now ask, is offered by those 
 eminent and able men, upon the Continent of 
 Europe and in our own country, who reject reve- 
 lation, and with revelation all that is supernatural 
 in Christianity, what is offered as the substitute? 
 There are indeed some unbelievers who consider 
 that no substitute is necessary or desirable, that 
 man has no need of religion, that this life and its 
 pursuits, interests, and pleasures are all-sufficient. 
 But thorough-going Secularism (as this doctrine is 
 termed) finds adherents chiefly among those of a 
 
" The Religion of Humanity.'^ 29 
 
 lower intellectual and moral type. By men of secularism 
 historical knowledge and philosophical insight it is thequc>stion, 
 generally admitted that man^s higher nature can on/f^f^rthe 
 only be developed, that his higher aspirations can inSecu^^^ 
 only be satisfied, when he accepts the declarations m^rliiy? 
 and gives himself up to the influence of religion. 
 But the question is, Where shall the basis, the 
 scope, the motive of religion be found, if God be 
 denied, if revelation be pronounced impossible, if 
 the supernatural element in the Bible be deemed 
 incredible, if a future life be dismissed as an un- 
 founded and unverifiable dream ? 
 
 Two answers are ffiven to this question. The Butieamed 
 
 ^ ^ and able 
 
 answer given by Strauss in Germany, and by the s^thr^^^ 
 author of Natural Religion in this country, is this : the^fXre, 
 that the universe itself, as studied and represented ence fo/" 
 
 1 rp 1 p T Of natural law 
 
 by science, anords scope lor our religious feelings ; and for 
 that to admire nature, its vastness, regularity, 'g^c^g^s^m' 
 and beauty, is sufficient for a religious being ; that 
 the highest and purest emotions are thus evoked, 
 and that human life is thus saved from Secularism. 
 Further, as man is, in the view of these specula- 
 tors, part of the universe, the productions of human 
 art and the exhibitions of human virtue, are to be 
 taken into account in estimating the power of so- 
 called Cosmic religion. 
 
 But there is another answer, that namely with 
 which this tract is concerned. The Comtists differ 
 not only from the Secularists, who think that no 
 
30 
 
 Auguste Comtek and 
 
 The 
 
 Positivists, 
 deeming 
 this an in- 
 sufficient 
 foundation 
 for religion, 
 propose that 
 the Human 
 shall be 
 deified. 
 
 religion is necessary, but further, from the Cosmists, 
 who think that the admiration of the universe is 
 the all-sufficient religion for man. In the view of 
 the Positivists there is something better than the 
 facts and processes which can be formulated in 
 mathematical and physical laws. Man is superior 
 to unconscious, to irrational nature. And since the 
 Comtists believe that God is only the name for an 
 abstraction, formed by projecting our own mental and 
 moral character and attributes into the imaginary 
 realm of the supernatural, they ask us to renounce 
 what they regard as superstition, and to rest satis- 
 lied with what is undoubtedly real, the race to 
 which we belong and the characteristics which, as 
 human beings, we share. 
 
 We readily admit that it is a higher exercise 
 of the soul to admire and to adore such human 
 qualities as justice, love, and pity, than to admire 
 and adore the revolutions of the planets, or the 
 symmetries and correspondences observable in the 
 various forms of life. But, after all said in favour 
 of the Positivist religion, it remains undisputed 
 that it is not Theism, That there is a Power 
 superior in might and duration even to Humanity 
 the Comtists do not deny.^ But Oomte himself 
 regarded the constitution of the universe as faulty ; 
 it often aroused his indignation, it never awakened 
 
 * Comte indeed recognized what has an apparent corre- 
 epondence to the Christian Trinity, in the three great powers, 
 Space, the Earth, and Humanity. 
 
 The 
 
 Religion of 
 Humanity- 
 is an 
 advance 
 upon 
 
 Secularism 
 and upon 
 Cosraism. 
 
 But it falls 
 Bhort of 
 Theism. 
 
" Tioe Religion of Humanity*' 31 
 
 his reverence. He traced no moral purpose in 
 nature ; and therefore we cannot he surprised that 
 for him man was higher, more deserving of esteem 
 and veneration than any power, knowable or un- 
 knowable, to which Humanity owes its origin and 
 also the circumstances by which, upon this planet, 
 the race of men has been encompassed. 
 
 In the view of the Christian, Positivism is As denying 
 
 a living 
 
 atheism and idolatry; atheism, because denying ^jJ^^J^g^-^,^^ 
 the existence and rule of a living and personal, an 
 almighty and righteous, a moral and supreme 
 Euler ; idolatry, because substituting for the Object as wor- 
 of worship whom Christians apprehend by faith, j^stSrl?^ 
 either an abstraction of the understanding, or else i^ls^S^'^' 
 concrete, actual, and finite beings coming within 
 the range of perception. Whilst, then, we can sym- 
 pathize with the indignant and eloq[uent protests 
 which the representatives of Positivism now and 
 again utter when Secularism and Agnosticism out- 
 rage by their cynical negations the best feelings of 
 mankind, we cannot be misled by our sentiments 
 into the admission that the E-eligion of Humanity 
 is properly entitled to the name of a religion, 
 since, if it is not without a cultus, it is without a 
 revelation, without a law, without a gospel, without 
 a God. 
 
 In exalting the human race to the highest posi- 
 tion of honour and of reverence, the Positivists 
 virtually affirm that no intelligence or virtue higher 
 
32 
 
 Auf/uste Comte, and 
 
 Positivists 
 confine their 
 regard and 
 reverence to 
 finite and 
 imperfect 
 beings. 
 
 We cannot 
 consent to 
 render to 
 man what 
 is due to 
 God alone. 
 
 than the human can be known to us. They do 
 not indeed pretend that man is the only rational 
 and moral being in the universe. Professing to 
 concern themselves only with what comes within 
 the range of observation, they are content to re- 
 cognise the existence of the human race and the 
 manifestation in its best representatives of qualities 
 higher than are discernible elsewhere. They refuse 
 to consider the question whether the phenomena 
 of the physical universe and the existence of con- 
 scious beings, involve or suggest a superhuman 
 Power. Regarding this as a question which our 
 intellect is unable to answer, they urge that, of 
 what we really know, the human qualities in- 
 tellectual and moral are most deserving of that 
 admiration which is the nearest approach to 
 worship allowed by their system. 
 
 Now this proceeding cannot be witnessed with- 
 out deep grief, without strenuous protest. It is 
 not in our nature to shut our eyes to the evidences 
 of a superior a supreme Power presiding over the 
 world, and revealing and exercising the attributes 
 of reason, righteousness, and benevolence attri- 
 butes which properly and necessarily belong to a 
 Person, a Divine Person. It is admitted that man 
 is not supreme, that he is no explanation of his 
 own existence, or of the existence of the material 
 universe. Yet we are urged to concentrate our 
 veneration and devotion upon man. This is a 
 
" The Religion of Humanity ^ 33 
 
 demand with which our reason will not suffer us 
 to comply. We cannot but look higher than to 
 our fellow-creatures. We cannot but ask whether 
 there is not sufficient evidence of the existence of 
 a Creator, with glorious moral attributes. Wo 
 cannot but withhold from the manifold imper- 
 fections of man the homage we are ready to yield 
 to the infinite perfections of God. 
 
 Comte's hostility to every form of religion which comte was 
 acknowledges a Divine Ruler of the world, is de- oJ^'-KeSiT 
 cided and undisguised. The servants of humanity, thei^m"^ 
 in claiming as their due the general direction of forms, 
 this world 
 
 " exclude, once for all, from political supremacy, all the different 
 servants of God Catholic, Protestant, or Deist aa being at 
 once behindhand and a cause of disturbance." ^ 
 
 Monotheism, which in the East assumes the form 
 of Mohammedanism, and in the West that of 
 Christianity, forms mutually hostile and irrecon- 
 cilable,^-must, in Comte's judgment, abandon its 
 pretensions, and must submit to be fused and 
 superseded by the religion of the future, the 
 religion of Positivism, of Humanity. 
 
 It has been maintained, by Strauss and by 
 many of his English disciples, that we may reject 
 Christianity and yet may retain religion. But 
 facts do not favour this contention. Those who 
 repudiate the Religion of the New Testament 
 may in doing so resolve that they will substitute 
 
 1 Catechism, Preface, p. 1. 
 
34 
 
 Auguste Comte, and 
 
 The impos- 
 sibility of 
 rejecting 
 Christianity 
 and yet 
 retaining a 
 Religion. 
 
 To abandon 
 
 Christianity 
 for Positiv- 
 ism is to 
 fall into 
 Atheism. 
 
 for it some other religion, more rational and credi- 
 ble as they think, but still a religion. But ex- 
 perience shows how slender a hold such a resolu- 
 tion has upon the mind of the infidel. That Au- 
 gusta Comte was sincere in his profession, that for 
 him religion was of supreme importance, we do not 
 question. But what are the facts with regard to 
 his followers ? It is well known that many who 
 regard the founder of Positivism as one of the 
 greatest of philosophers have no sympathy with 
 his religious views, but regard them as signs o: 
 his utter dotage ! They see no consistency between 
 the Positivism which teaches that exact science is 
 man's only intellectual possession, and the position 
 to which, in his later days, Comte exalted the 
 emotions of man, the precepts of morality, and the 
 mysterious observances of religion. Such was the 
 view taken by M. Littre in France and by Mr 
 G. H. Lewes in this country. The course o: 
 human events leads us to the conclusion, that, U 
 abandon Christianity for Positivism, is nothinc 
 else than to abandon Theism for Atheism. 
 
 YITT. 
 
 Humanity is neither an Intelligible Nor. 
 Worthy Object o Worship. 
 
 Whilst Christianity sets before us a Deitj 
 whose moral attributes, and especially whos 
 
" The Religion of HuTnanity,** 'So 
 
 moral perfections, are so superior to our own, 
 
 ihat it is obviously iust that, if He exist, He ThewowhiT> 
 
 , , of humanity 
 
 Ishould receive our adoration and liomas:e, Comte is virtually 
 
 o tne worsmp 
 
 land his followers have nothing higher to offer us, ' ^"* 
 as the object of our worship, than is to be found 
 in our own human nature and qualities. Eeligious 
 isentiment is to be directed towards men and women, 
 rwith ordinary human characteristics. This amounts 
 feto nothing very different from the worship of 
 ourselves ! 
 
 Let us try to understand what is that Humanity S^ .x_ 
 
 ' '' Hmnanity 
 
 which the Comtists propose as the Deity of the cJmtist?* 
 future and more enlightened generations of hi^tho^"* 
 iworshippers. When we make an attempt at God\as no 
 
 . . existence 
 
 idefiniteness, we find ourselves very much at a save as a 
 
 ' conception 
 
 loss to know what we are to revere, to what ^i^y^ 
 we are to offer our prayers. Strictly speaking, 
 ihumanity is an abstraction, a notion under which 
 Iwe gather together those qualities which distinguish 
 ttnen from brutes. "No doubt we shall be told to 
 Ibring together just those attributes which com- 
 
 nand our respect or win our love. Still, after all, 
 
 t is an abstraction, with no existence outside 
 our own thoughts. And how can we worship an 
 
 bstraction ? How can we trust, love, and serve 
 pin abstraction? Upon considering the Comtist 
 
 ieity, Dr. Mark Pattison came to the conclusion 
 
 that by humanity we can only understand 
 
 "A mere word, an abstract term, the pure creation of the 
 
 minds. 
 
36 
 
 Auguste Comte, and 
 
 logical faculty, of which we know that it never was or can be 
 a real entity." ^ 
 
 Others than Cliristiaii advocates have rejected 
 Tv^ith contempt or ridicule the proposal to set up 
 Humanity as a God. Professor Huxley, satirizing 
 the ecclesiastical pretensions of the founder of the 
 Positivist religion, says : 
 
 The utter 
 unrealitjr of 
 the " being '"' 
 thus offered 
 as a 
 
 eubstitute 
 for the 
 living God. 
 
 Probably 
 the Positiv. 
 ists worship 
 individual 
 human 
 beings, 
 dead or 
 living. 
 
 " Great was my perplexity, not to say disappointment, as T 
 followed the progress of this mighty son of earth, in his work of 
 reconstruction. Undoubtedly Dleu [God] disappeared, but the 
 Nouveau Grand-etre Supreme [the new, the Sxipreme great 
 Being] , a gigantic fetich, turned out brand-new by M. Comte'a 
 own hands, reigned in his stead." ^ 
 
 Similarly, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, 
 comparing Mr. Herbert Spencer's Agnosticism 
 with Mr. Frederic Harrison's Positivist Eeligion, 
 has said with point and with impartial severity : 
 
 "Humanity with a capital H is neither better nor worse 
 fitted to be a god, than the unknowable with a capital U."^ 
 
 In fact, it is necessary, in order that Humanity 
 may have some plausibility as an object of 
 worship, to personify the idea. When the French 
 atheists deified the " Eeason," which they designed 
 to replace the Christian God, they personified the 
 attribute Eeason, representing it in the person of 
 a woman, whose character and reputation were 
 not such as to inspire the respect of the virtuous. 
 And the Comtists, there can be no doubt, instead 
 
 ^ Co'itemporary Revieio, March, 1876. ^ Lai/ Sermons, p. 148. 
 ' Nineteenth Ccntwi/^ June, 1884. 
 
" The Religion of Humanity'* 37 
 
 of adoring the abstraction Humanity, actually 
 picture to themselves certain historical personages 
 who command their admiration, and make, now 
 this, now that, hero, saint, or sage, the object of 
 their veneration. 
 
 Apart from such personification it does not itseema 
 
 scarcely 
 
 seem consistent with reason and common-sense to possible to 
 
 worsnip an 
 
 worship Humanity. As well might we attempt to abstraction. 
 revere and love Mr. Matthew Arnold's " stream 
 of tendency, not ourselves, which makes for 
 righteousness." When Mr. Harrison afiirms that 
 "the sum of human effort in thought and act 
 forms a current of power," we admit the justice of 
 the statement, and the felicity of the figure. But 
 when he proceeds to describe Humanity as " a 
 composite human power," and, in his endeavour to 
 be more definite, as " a being, an organism with 
 every quality of organic life,"^ we resent the 
 transition from agreeable rhetoric to misty and 
 misleading philosophy. Much of the language 
 which the preacher of Positivism employs might 
 indeed justly be applied to that Being who made 
 man in His own image. Thus he speaks of 
 
 "the ever present sense of a superior power controlling our 
 lives, itself endowed with sympathies kindred to our own." 
 
 He adds: 
 
 ' ' The entire system of Positive belief points to the existence 
 of r. single dominant power, whose real and incontestable 
 
 ^ Contemporary Review, December, 1875. 
 
38 Auguste Gomte, and 
 
 attributes appeal directly to the afifections, in no less measure 
 than they appeal directly to the intellect." 
 
 "^fedT^ is Such language as this would be most appropriate 
 which^^^"^ from a Theist believing in a living, conscious, 
 appropriate persoual Euler and Father of men. But it is 
 to ffir mere inflated rhetoric in the mouth of a thinker 
 meaningless who believes in no conscious and personal Power 
 
 if applied to . . 
 
 Humanity, superior to what is human, and who regards the 
 dead of former generations as the sovereigns who 
 rule our spirits and deserve our adoration. 
 
 Sober reason cannot but acknowledge that the 
 bulk of our fellow-creatures, living and dead, are 
 very partially deserving of our admiration, and 
 have no claim upon that religious veneration, 
 which is appropriately rendered to a Being with 
 
 Men, moral perfections. Human virtues have existed 
 
 generally ^ 
 
 ^ave^^' in all states of society, but in how few characters 
 JSy'^quiii. have these virtues been impressively preponderant ! 
 
 fied admira- xtt l l { ^ i 
 
 tion : and We owe to our aucestors and predecessors much 
 
 few llSLVQ 
 
 deserved of ffood influence ; but alas ! not a little of evil. 
 
 ordinary '-' 
 
 reverence. Beverence and gratitude may justly be felt towards 
 some whose example has been found elevating and 
 inspiring. But, on the other hand, there have 
 been those of whose influence over ourselves wo 
 can think only with regret, even it may be with 
 loathing and with shame. 
 
 If a selection is to be made of certain individuals 
 who shall typify the true Humanity, who is to 
 make such a selection, and upon what principle ? 
 
^'The Religion of Suvianity." 39 
 
 Are we to worship the soldier or the saint, the is a 
 
 ^ ^ ^ selection of 
 
 emperor or the martyr, the missionary, the sage, Jeroe^'' and 
 or the poet? The type of character to this day '^0^;^ 
 admired hy the multitude is often far from being ^^^^^^ 
 such as would be approved by the intellectual, or the 
 religious. Comte was aware of the difficulty in 
 attempting to define the duly adorable Humanity : 
 he was not successful in overcoming the difficulty, J^j^o'^^haii 
 The " Calendar " is indeed a marvellous work, but Srectioni 
 it is noticeable that among its 500 names there 
 do not occur any of those which are connected 
 with the uprising of the enlightened intellect, the 
 quickened heart of mankind against mediaeval 
 superstition. In vain do we look for such names comte 
 
 ^ unfairly 
 
 as Wyclif, Savonarola, John Huss, Luther, Mel- JJ^^^^JJ^^ 
 ancthon, Calvin, Zwingle, Knox, Latimer. That mln'jfofthe 
 such names are " conspicuous by their absence," is purett,' 
 what we should expect, knowing Comte's prejudices useful oi 
 against Protestantism. Whoever shall select the 
 typical names will of necessity set before us only 
 a partial representation of humanity. Whether 
 the choice be arbitrary or rational, whether it be 
 according to personal preference or to general 
 conscience, the result cannot be other than un- 
 satisfactory. The author of Positivism endeavoured 
 to be at once comprehensive and eclectic. 
 
 * Humanity is not composed of all individuals or groups of 
 men, past, present, and future, taken indiscriminately. The 
 new great Being is formed by the co-operation only of such 
 existences as are of a kindred nature with itself ; excluding such 
 
40 
 
 Auguste Comte, and 
 
 as have proved only a burden to the human race. It is on this 
 ground that we regard Humanity as composed essentially of 
 the dead." I 
 
 Either the 
 worshipper 
 or tlic 
 priest must 
 by selection 
 virtually 
 determine 
 nnd create 
 the object 
 of worship. 
 
 The 
 
 Comtist, 
 like the 
 Papal 
 Calendar, 
 distracts the 
 mind by the 
 multiplicity 
 of the saints 
 whose claims 
 it presents. 
 
 It is then admitted that Humanity as a whole, 
 is not a suitable object of reverence and worship. 
 The unworthy members of the race the vast 
 majority must be put aside, and the choicest 
 spirits, the few elect and precious, must be set 
 apart and placed within the shrine for adoration. 
 Now, upon what principle, by what faculty, by 
 whose authority, shall that part of humanity be 
 selected, to whom worship shall be offered? Comte 
 himself acknowledged that no arbitrary principle 
 is to be admitted, that the worthless and useless 
 must be deliberately eliminated, and that the gold 
 of humanity, liberated from the dross, must be 
 praised and honoured as God. This is as much as 
 to determine that either the worshipper or the 
 priest must make his God, and must do this in the 
 exercise of his own discrimination and judgment. 
 
 A practical difficulty in the so-called "Religion of 
 Humanity," arises from the multitude of objects 
 proposed for worship. The Comtist calendar is 
 crowded with names, names of men illustrious 
 in every field of research and achievement. The 
 aim of its author was to present a kind of synopsis 
 of humanity, and in this he may be credited with 
 having partially succeeded. The prototype of this 
 
 Positive Polity y vol. i., p. 333. 
 
" The Religion of Humanity** 41 
 
 calendar is evidently the ecclesiastical calendar 
 comprising the saints who have heen canonized, 
 in the course of successive centuries, by the 
 Church of Eome. Let this diversity be com- 1f\^^^^ 
 pared with the unity of the object of worship cSian 
 revealed in the Scriptures of the Old and New ^hiSd 
 Testaments. The Papal and the Positivist SthiV^^ 
 
 , diversity, 
 
 worship are alike distracting to the mmd ; 
 all that can be said in their favour is this: 
 that every character is sure to find something con- 
 genial in the multiplicity which is thus approved 
 by worldly wisdom. Inconsistent and opposite 
 qualities are alike honoured. On the other hand, 
 the Bible exhibits One only and supreme object of 
 veneration in the Divine Creator, moral Grovernor, 
 and Redeemer, in whom no moral imperfection is 
 to be found, and who combines in Himself all 
 moral excellence. The worship of the living God 
 brings into one focus all the spiritual aspirations 
 of man, and leaves no room for aught to be added. 
 The immediate object of human worship is 
 represented by Comte as being woman, especially 
 in the person of mother, wife, and daughter. But 
 worship must be of that which is above the J^^^^S-' 
 worshipper. What guarantee is there that the i^'^nora^^* 
 worship of woman will be, in all or in most cases, object of 
 
 1 p 1 n T religious 
 
 the worship of the superior ? It is not every man worship. 
 who can look up to his feminine relatives as models 
 of human excellence, far less as incarnations of 
 
42 Aiiguste Gomte^ and 
 
 reason* 
 
 Divine glory. It is not every woman whose 
 worship will elevate her worshippers. Probably 
 there may be in the world more very bad men than 
 very bad women. But it is questionable whether 
 the highest and finest models of moral excellence 
 are to be found in the female sex. The worshipper 
 of woman will, to a sensible man of experience, 
 appear to be worshipping the creation of his own 
 imagination, coloured by the soft delusive light of 
 sentiment. 
 wsS^"i3 ^^ ^^ mainly to the religion of our Lord Christ 
 SntimJn!* that womau owes her elevation to her proper and 
 thllot ^ Divinely appointed position in human society. 
 The contrast between the regard in which women 
 were held, and are still held, in unchristian com- 
 munities, and the regard in which they are held 
 where the Eedeem.er of our humanity bears rule, 
 is striking indeed. But reasonable persons will 
 not be blind to that tendency to sentimentalism, 
 which is observable in religious society generally, 
 and which is referable to a deep-seated principle 
 in human nature. The worship of the Yirgin 
 Mary, so long and so extensively practised in 
 Itoman Catholic communities, however it may 
 have been originally suggested by heathen usages, 
 owes its popularity mainly to the power of senti- 
 mentality ; and the Positivist doctrine concerning 
 the worship of women, though traceable to Comte's 
 personal temperament and experience, lays hold 
 
" The Religion of Humanity" 43 
 
 upon a tendency of human nature which will not 
 be, and ought not to be eradicated, but which 
 certainly needs to be governed and controlled. It The moral 
 
 ^ ^ exccllenco 
 
 is not derogatory to women to say that, notwith- f^Sfcenda 
 standing all their excellences and all their charms, human^*^^* 
 they are but human ; and that, because they are both^mascu- 
 human, they are *' compassed with infirmity,'* and feminine, 
 are unsuitable as objects of supreme admiration 
 and unqualified praise. The just object of religious 
 veneration and service is a Being who combines 
 in His character, and who transcends, the ex- 
 cellences which are deemed distinctively masculine 
 and those which are deemed distinctively feminine. 
 The inferiority of the worship of woman to tho 
 worship of God, is apparent to every one who 
 believes that all human virtue is but the glimmer- 
 ing emanation from the goodness which is un- 
 created, eternal, and Divine. 
 
 IX. 
 
 The Inconsistency of Positivism with True 
 Prayer. 
 
 Nothing is more obviously inadmissible than comtists 
 
 offer prayer 
 
 the Comtist teaching upon prayer. The founder ^^^^^^ 
 of the " Religion of Humanity," and those of his ^^* 
 followers who sympathize with the religious part 
 of his teaching, lay the greatest stress upon the 
 duty of devotion, and encourage direct addresses 
 
44 Auguste Coonte, and 
 
 to the *' Great Being," i.e., to the human race as a 
 whole. That this Deity is unconscious, is incapable 
 of hearing the cry of suppliants, is neither pleased 
 with honour rendered nor able to confer favours 
 Such implored: this is unquestionable. We contend 
 
 prayer is * 
 
 for^it^does ^^^^ prayer to such a Deity is irrational and 
 beforo'those moaniugless. Better no prayer at all than that 
 
 to whom itp p I'll 1 L ^ 1^ 
 
 is addressed. lorm 01 prayer which alone can be presented to 
 "Humanity;'* for the prayerless may be convinced 
 of sin, whilst those who fancy that they pray when 
 they invoke a shadow, an abstraction, a name, are 
 certainly deluding and deceiving themselves. 
 other hand, The prayer which is enjoined and exemplified 
 the Creator in Holy Writ is of a very different kind from any 
 
 and Saviour 
 
 of mankind rccommended by the Comtists. Christian prayer 
 
 i>< just and ^ r J 
 
 elevating. jg offered to a Being personal, conscious, able by 
 His very nature, disposed by His moral attributes, 
 and pledged by His faithfulness, to enter into with 
 sympathy, and to consider with wise kindness, the 
 desires and requests of His people. That in saying 
 thus much concerning God, we are making use of 
 language based upon human experience, and adapted 
 to human comprehension, we admit ; but the lan- 
 guage, though imperfect, is not unwarranted or 
 misleading. Man is declared by the inspired 
 apostle to be "the image and glory of God." 
 Prayer is then offered by spiritual natures to that 
 eternal and blessed Being who has made men 
 capable of knowing, trusting, loving, and serving 
 
 I 
 
" The Religion of Hurru-inity, 45 
 
 Him. The Positivist theory forbids our attempting 
 to conceive an almighty Author of our individual 
 existence, an almighty Sovereign of our race ; and 
 enjoins upon us the adoration of those who at the 
 best are the " image," and the imperfect image, 
 of the Infinitely Excellent. It seems to us, as 
 Christians, more reasonable to believe that God 
 " is, and that He is a rewarder of them that seek 
 after Him." We have faith in One who, whilst Gratitude 
 
 and rever- 
 
 "one generation passeth away, and another genera- ^^J^-^^'^ 
 tion cometh," abides unchanged and unchangeable, S'^our''^ *^"^ 
 who includes in His own person in glorious per- ^^^-^^ 
 fection those moral attributes which awaken our 
 admiration, even when dimly reflected in the 
 character of His creatures and subjects. As unbounded 
 the Source of wisdom and goodness this Being may and affSou 
 reasonably be invoked and entreated in prayer. gSi our 
 But with regard to the memorable and illustrious 
 dead, we cannot but perceive that what good it 
 was in their power to do they have already done ; 
 they have said all that it was given them to utter 
 of inspiration and of counsel ; they have left their 
 example and their influence behind, as a precious 
 legacy to their successors. Commemorate their 
 virtues we may and will; implore their aid we 
 cannot; the one is the dictate of gratitude, the 
 other would be the proof of infatuation. In fact 
 the prayer of the Positivist is simply an uncon- 
 scious witness to the heart's deep need, and an 
 
46 
 
 Augiiste Comte, and 
 
 inarticulate acknowledgment of the heart's yet 
 deeper despair. Pray we must; but to whom 
 shall he pray, for whom no God in His all-wise 
 but inscrutable counsel sways the destinies of the 
 nations, and in tenderness as mysterious watches 
 over the child's uncertain steps ? There remains 
 for him nothing but the invocation of human pity 
 and human helpfulness. Alas ! for those who are 
 doomed to experience how vain is the help of man, 
 and who yet know not that God is " nigh unto all 
 them that call upon Him, to all that call upon 
 Him in truth." ^ 
 
 It is often urged by Positivists that the prayers 
 of Christians are selfish, whilst their own devotions 
 do not aim at securing personal advantages, but 
 take the form of communion with and of aspira- 
 tion towards the highest good. Now we contend 
 that meditation upon moral excellence is more real 
 and helpful in the case of those who believe in 
 that excellence as eternally distinguishing the 
 Being who is interested in and who presides over 
 human affairs, and who is Himself concerned that 
 His rational creatures should themselves partake 
 and exhibit it. "Whatever reflex advantages prayer 
 to Humanity secures to the Positivist worshipper, 
 are certainly enjoyed by the Christian. And the 
 Christian reaps in his own heart and life the 
 benefits of answered prayer. It is a great mistake 
 
 Sad is the 
 case of 
 those who 
 must pray, 
 but wliu are 
 ignorant of 
 the true 
 and proper 
 object of 
 prayer. 
 
 It is 
 
 objected by 
 Tositivists 
 that the 
 prayers of 
 Christians 
 are selfish. 
 
 1 i'ealm cxlv. 18, 
 
" The Religion of Humanity.** 47 
 
 to suppose that to ask for, and to use means for 
 obtaining blessings for ourselves, is the exercise of 
 a selfish spirit. Selfishness is the habit of seeking Prayer for 
 ffood for ourselves without regard for others, at shipper's 
 
 . . , 0^^ spiiit- 
 
 the expense of others, and with a view rather to "ii i^- 
 
 A ' provement 
 
 our own enjoyment than with a view to the pro- ig"noT^^^^^* 
 motion of the welfare of mankind and the glory of ^^^^^^* 
 God. If the Christian's prayer is selfish, then in the 
 view of the enlightened and spiritual, it ceases in 
 so far to be prayer at all. The essence of prayer 
 is submission to the Divine Will, that Will which 
 is the expression of righteousness, holiness, and 
 benevolence. That God's kingdom may in some The 
 
 Christian is 
 
 measure come through our agency, that God s bound to 
 
 *-" o ./ ' seek, above 
 
 glory may in some measure be promoted by our ^i}^^^i^y' 
 life, this is the supreme and constant desire and Go^and 
 hope of the Christian, and it is this that he em- ^^^**^* 
 bodies in his daily supplications. That the dross 
 of human earthliness mingles with the fine gold of 
 devotion, we all know from sad experience; but 
 this however the Comtist may be offended by the 
 explanation is because there is in our prayers 
 too much of man, and not enough of God. 
 
48 
 
 Augusts Comte, and 
 
 Religion 
 should not 
 only i-evL-al 
 truth, but 
 enjoin law, 
 and exercise 
 authority. 
 
 What shall 
 be the 
 rule of 
 social life? 
 
 The 
 
 Christian 
 
 and the 
 
 Comtist 
 
 answers 
 
 to this 
 
 question. 
 
 X. 
 
 The Moral Authority of the Religion of 
 Humanity is insufficient to guide and 
 govern the llfe of individuals and 
 Communities. 
 
 By common consent, religion, that it may de- 
 serve acceptance, must offer to men, not only a 
 system of doctrines to be believed, but a law to be 
 obeyed, with motives and sanctions sufficient, in 
 some measure, to ensure the obedience enjoined. 
 It is not an ornament to be worn, but a force to 
 be obeyed. Mankind needs a religion that will 
 "work," that will deal with a wilful, rebellious 
 nature, with a life abounding in temptation, with 
 a society prone to inflame passion and to enervate 
 virtue. Religion, if it is to prove suitable for man, 
 as man is, must come to him as to a sinner, must 
 bring a remedy for man's moral disorder, succour 
 for man's moral weakness, control for man's moral 
 waywardness. It must not only reveal truth ; it 
 must impose and enforce law. 
 
 In Comte's view, the Christian rule of social 
 life, Love your neighbour as yourself, is a rule which 
 distinctly sanctions egoism ; and in the love of 
 God the ground of the rule he finds a direct 
 stimulus to egoism. He proposes instead, the 
 formula, Live for others ; but he qualifies this by 
 
" The Religion of Humanity.'' 49 
 
 permitting men to gratify their personal instincts, 
 with the view of fitting themselves to be better 
 servants of humanity.^ 
 
 The word " altruism " has been adopted into our The 
 
 , , "Religion 
 
 language from the French tonarue, which owes it ?/ Human- 
 
 " o o ' ity ' en] 01113 
 
 to the inventive genius of Comte.^ It is opposed " Altruism." 
 to " egoism," and signifies the principle according 
 to which a man lives, not for his own pleasure or 
 good, but for the pleasure or good of others. 
 
 Comte considered that he was the inaugurator 
 of a new social era, a new social life. If there 
 was one practical precept more frequently reiterated 
 by him than another, it was that embodied in the 
 above formula, "Live for others." The motto The 
 
 Comtean 
 
 which the disciples have adopted from their master, ^^*^- 
 ^ and which they prefix to their publications, is, 
 
 * ** Love as our princijile, Order as our basis, Progress as our end" 
 
 The true interpretation of altruism includes 
 If not merely a regard for our fellow-men, but a 
 distinct ignoring of our Creator. It would be 
 easy to show that a community in which every nSfessity of 
 member of society should lose all thought and rrudcnco 
 renounce all care of himself, would become utterly benevolence. 
 disorganized. Comte was very well aware of this ; 
 he knew that it is by the due combination of 
 prudence with benevolence that human well-being 
 
 ^ Catechism, p. 313. 
 - The word should have been " alienism," biit "altruism " is 
 now established by its adoption by Mr. Herbert Spencer and 
 other well-known writers. 
 
50 
 
 Augusts Comte, and 
 
 is secured. His vanity led him to exalt his own 
 moral axioms ahove those accepted in Christendom. 
 Yet an impartial student of religion and of morals 
 cannot but regard the Christian law as superior 
 to that of Comte. ** Thou shalt love the Lord thy 
 God ivith all thy hearty . . . and thy neighbour as 
 thy self y^^ is a wise and practical principle of human 
 conduct ; it presumes as natural and right a regard 
 to our own interest, but directs us to make this 
 regard the measure of our interest in our fellow- 
 
 The 
 
 stipcriority 
 of the 
 Christian 
 over the 
 Comtist 
 law. 
 
 The 
 
 superiority 
 of the 
 Christian 
 motive. 
 
 men. Eighteen centuries before Comte's day, 
 Christ had inculcated the duty of unselfishness 
 and benevolence. But whilst Comtism relies only 
 upon the feeling of human community and sym- 
 pathy as the motive power to compliance with its 
 law, Christianity derives the love of man from the 
 love of God, and supplies in the revelation of 
 Divine compassion and mercy the spiritual impulse 
 which is mighty to prompt man to benevolence. 
 And experience has shown that there is no motive 
 so efficacious to secure the prevalence of mutual 
 love and helpfulness, as that arising from the pity of 
 the heavenly Father and the sacrifice of the Divine 
 Redeemer. He who is led by the faith he holds to 
 cherish love to God feels the force of the admonition 
 that, loving God, he shall love his brother also. 
 
 With regard to the other clauses of the Positivist 
 motto, it may be said that their unsatisfactory cha 
 racter is apparent at first sight, and that it is wonder 
 
" The Religion of humanity.*' 51 
 
 ful how thoughtful men should accept them and glory- 
 in them. " Order as our hasis, Progress as our end.*' 
 Comte distrusted all political revolution, and was The 
 
 Comtist 
 
 reactionary m his approval of strong government, motto criti- 
 His veneration for authority was such as to verge 
 upon the admiration of absolutism. The basis of 
 " order " was for him something very different 
 from the mutual respect which men should cherish 
 for one another's rights. And how can "pro- 
 gress " be regarded as the " end " ? The language 
 contradicts itself ; for progress should be towards 
 an end. Progress towards a good end is a desira- "Progress" 
 
 . ^ ^ is no proper 
 
 ble thing; the all -important question, which Comte "end-" 
 
 does not answer, is this, In what direction, towards 
 
 what goal, is progress to be made? There is 
 
 progress towards anarchy and atheism ; and there 
 
 is progress towards peace, freedom, righteousness, 
 
 and piety. If the first be deemed retrogression 
 
 rather than progress, this should be stated, and the 
 
 true end should be defined. There is none of this ThequeRtion 
 
 is : to what 
 
 vagueness in the prospect which is opened up, in the ^^*^gceif ^ 
 path which is prescribed, by the Christian revela- p^ogSs! 
 tion. The end there represented as worthy of all 
 human effort and sacrifice, is not mere progress, it 
 is the reign of God, i.e., the prevalence of justice 
 and benevolence among men, based upon faith in a 
 perfect spiritual Euler and Saviour, and intro- 
 ductory to the future and heavenly glory, to the 
 city and the kingdom of God Himself. 
 
52 
 
 Augusts Gomte, and 
 
 Tho aimo- 
 nitions of 
 Positivism 
 are for the 
 most part 
 truisms, and 
 in no 
 sense 
 peculiar 
 to the 
 system. 
 
 "With these 
 should be 
 contrasted 
 the deeply- 
 founded 
 laws of the 
 Christian 
 Kevelation. 
 
 The divine 
 and 
 
 practical 
 power of 
 Christianity. 
 
 The mottoes which have been so much vaunted 
 by Positivists, e.g.. Live for others ! Live openly ! 
 Let the strong devote themselves to the weak, and 
 let the weak venerate the strong ! The man must 
 support the woman ! etc., are very good as far as 
 they go. But they are no revelations of Comtism. 
 They are ethical truisms, and, what is of more 
 importance, such precepts do not meet the necessi- 
 ties of human life. The world is not governed by 
 mottoes. Christianity propounds a law, as the 
 expression alike of the reason and the righteous 
 will of the Author and Ruler of the universe. 
 Christianity reveals a future life, and thus adds to 
 the range and the solemnity of the moral outlook 
 of mankind. Christianity makes known the interest 
 of the Supreme Lord and Father of men in their 
 spiritual state. His displeasure with sin. His desire 
 to pardon, to purify, to bless. Christianity brings 
 to bear upon the heart and conscience of human 
 beings the mighty motive of love, enforced by 
 gratitude and by hope; so that this motive be- 
 comes the spring of a new moral life, of a cheerful 
 and enthusiastic obedience, Christianity reveals 
 an all-perfect example, the example of Christ, and 
 at the same time supplies needed power, the power 
 of the Holy Spirit. In all this we have some- 
 thing very different from mottoes; we have 
 principles whose efficient power is proved by 
 ample experience. Positivism has no resources to 
 
" The JReligion of Humanity." 63 
 
 compare with these, no resources adequate to the a super- 
 
 . " , . natural basis 
 
 necessities of the case. The witness of Sir J. F. necessarj' 
 
 for religion 
 
 Stephen, himself unfriendly to Christianity and yf^fed^n" 
 apparently to all religion, may he accepted to the ^^"'^^'^"'^y- 
 principle, supported by human experience, that 
 the only religion which will work "must be 
 founded upon a supernatural basis believed to 
 be true."i 
 
 XI. 
 
 "Subjective" Immortality is a poor Substi- 
 tute FOR THE Personal Immortality 
 
 REVEALED BY CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 The Positivist teaching with regard to im- cpmte8 
 mortality is, when compared with the teaching of immortality 
 the Lord Jesus and His apostles, very defective pon/j^ts 
 and unsatisfying. Whatever there is in it sound Knucnc" 
 and good is equally the property of the Christian, 
 who is the possessor at the same time of a glorious 
 hope to which the Positivist is a stranger. Comte 
 held that, inasmuch as the social existence of man 
 consists in the continuous succession of the genera- 
 tions, the living are of necessity always under the 
 government of the dead ; conscious existence 
 ceases at death, and each true servant of humanity, 
 upon quitting this life, " exists only in the heart 
 and intellect of others." 
 
 * Nineteenth Century, June, 1SS4. 
 
 after death. 
 
 
54 
 
 Aiigiiste Covite, and 
 
 Comte gives 
 no hope of 
 conscious 
 and happy 
 existence 
 after this 
 life. 
 
 " This is the noble immortality, necessarily disconnected with 
 the body, which Positivism allows the human soul. It preserves 
 this valuable term soul to stand for the whole of our in- 
 tellectual and moral functions, without involving any allusion 
 to some supposed entity answering to the name." ^ 
 
 Death dissipates man's bodily structure into its 
 component elements ; and, since the soul, according 
 to Positivism, is but the function of organised 
 matter, it ceases to be when the organism ceases to 
 live. But the Comtist comforts himself with the 
 assurance that a useful, devoted, and unselfish 
 life cannot be without influence upon the future of 
 that race which to him is the one object of supreme 
 interest and affection. The doctrine offers no 
 prospect of a life after death, to animate the self- 
 denying toiler with the vision of fruit not to be 
 reaped on earth, to cheer the sufferer with the 
 anticipation of relief and of repose. But it offers 
 compensation for this loss in the assurance that 
 every generation that does its work faithfully con- 
 fers priceless benefits upon the generations which 
 follow. Thus the individual may be said, when he 
 has lost his personal existence, to live afresh in the 
 higher and happier life of those who come after 
 him, and who inherit the fruit of his work and 
 sacrifice. A man, we are told, will prove himself 
 more noble and less selfish, in cheerfully renounc- 
 ing all thought, all desire, of personal, conscious 
 immortality, when he has the conviction that his 
 
 * Catccliism, p. 77. 
 
 He 
 
 represents 
 it as a 
 high and 
 uneelfish 
 aim to live 
 for the 
 benefit of 
 posterity. 
 
" The Religion of Humanity J* 55 
 
 best purposes will be realised, and his best en- 
 deavours rewarded, in the purer and richer life of 
 his successors. 
 
 " The old objective immortality," said Comte, "could never 
 clear itself of the egoistic, or selfish, character." ^ 
 
 Let, then, this view of immortality be compared 
 with the prospect revealed in the Scriptures, and 
 cherished by every Christian. 
 
 There is nothing peculiar to Positivism in the The prospect 
 
 of leaving 
 
 belief that a good man's work endures after he good 
 
 o influence 
 
 himself has gone ; that in this sense he lives on in Jommon^to 
 the life of those who succeed him. This kind of ^^hS^'""" 
 immortality if it may be so called is the 
 property of Comtist and of Christian alike ; and it 
 is very strange that it should be claimed by the 
 former as his special revelation and possession. 
 The consolation of contributing to the future well- work^aMdes 
 being of humanity, is a just and worthy and real wo^rklr 
 
 goes to his 
 
 consolation to him who toils and suffers and waits, rest. 
 who seeks the good of his fellow-men, and often 
 seeks it in weariness and amidst many discourage- 
 ments and disappointments. The future of human- 
 ity is, however, a very different thing to the 
 Christian and to the Positivist. To the former, 
 mankind appears to occupy this earth for a period, 
 as a tribe of sojourners or pilgrims seeking, and 
 not in vain, a better country elsewhere. To the 
 latter, mankind appears to have this earth as 
 
 1 Caiechism, Preface, p. 33. 
 
Augusts Comtej and 
 
 Positivism 
 contemplate* 
 the extinc- 
 tion of the 
 human race, 
 hody and 
 aoul, and the 
 consequent 
 annihilation 
 of every 
 good man's 
 work. 
 
 Christianity 
 opens up a 
 boundless 
 prospect of 
 results as 
 the harvest 
 of toU. 
 
 its possession and its one and only home. The 
 thoughtful man, however, will not forget that the 
 race is no more immortal than the individual. He 
 who believes in a future life may reasonably expect 
 a golden and imperishable harvest in eternity. 
 There is no limit, no end, to the beneficial results 
 of a virtuous and self-denying course on earth. 
 The new heaven and the new earth shall be 
 the scene, and eternity shall afford the un- 
 limited opportunity, of progress and of blessed- 
 ness. But to the Positivist no such prospect 
 opens up ; to him the future has no such re- 
 compense, no such compensation in store. What 
 then has he to look forward to ? The develop- 
 ment of earthly society, the prevalence among men 
 of peace and amity, of plenty, of culture, of order. 
 But the Positivist, as a man of science, knows that 
 this planet will cease to be the dwelling-place of 
 man, that our race will perish from off the earth. 
 And this means /or him the blankness of annihila- 
 tion. To his apprehension, all shall in the future 
 be as if knowledge and virtue and self-denial had 
 never been ! 
 
 The Christian has another advantage over the 
 Positivist. Assured that his victorious Redeemer 
 has " abolished death, and has brought life and 
 immortality to light by the Gospel," he has no 
 gloomy expectation of extinction, but a bright 
 hope of personal life in closer commupion with the 
 
" The Religion of Humanity*^ 57 
 
 ever-living God. This prospect he prizes as he in 
 prizes the present hie not lor an unworthy and Christianity 
 
 ^ ^ *' assures us 
 
 merely selfish reason, not as the prospect of ^^^^' ^ 
 pleasure made perpetual; but because there is gf^fS"* 
 
 11 ^ 1 ^ J* L p expectation, 
 
 thus opened up to him a luture oi unceasing personal and 
 devotion to the service of Him who is the highest immortality, 
 and the best, and who has the first claim upon 
 the love, the praise, the consecrated and loyal 
 devotion of His people. The Master lives, and 
 therefore the servant, the disciple, shall live also. 
 The relation gives dignity and blessedness to the 
 prospect of personal immortality- And with the 
 evidence upon which this prospect rests, the 
 Christian is abundantly and most reasonably 
 satisfied. 
 
 XII. 
 
 The Religion of Humanity, and the Religion 
 OF Christ. 
 
 If these rival claimants to man's spiritual comte's 
 
 misrepvescn- 
 
 loyalty are to be compared, the comparison must !j*^ji^on 
 not bo between Positivism and such Christianity ^ ^^"*^' 
 as Comte's wayward and prejudiced fancy con- 
 structed for the purpose of demolishing it. The 
 appeal of Christ's followers and friends is to 
 Christ's Word. It is necessary to refer to some 
 of Comte's misconceptions and misrepresentations 
 of our religion, for they have been too generally 
 
58 
 
 August e ComtCy and 
 
 accepted by those who know little at first hand of 
 the Inspired Yolume. 
 
 Comte's enmity towards Christianity was in- 
 spired, partly by a dislike to its fundamental 
 revelation of a superhuman Being, the Euler of 
 the universe, and partly by a misunderstanding of 
 the character of our religion. He objected to it, 
 because in his view it represented 
 
 Comte 
 regarded 
 Christianity 
 as only 
 concerned 
 with the 
 unseen ; 
 nrhercas the 
 Incarnate 
 Son of God 
 makes the 
 invisible 
 visible. 
 
 He 
 
 looked on 
 
 Christianity 
 
 as opposed 
 
 to 
 
 benevolence; 
 
 whereas 
 
 sin is a 
 
 departure 
 
 from the 
 
 ideal nature 
 
 which 
 
 comprises 
 
 love. 
 
 He thought 
 that 
 
 Scripture 
 treated 
 labour as 
 in itself 
 a curse ; 
 whereas 
 it is sin 
 which 
 renders 
 labour 
 a penalty. 
 
 "perfection as consisting in an entire concentration upon 
 heavenly objects ; '"' 
 
 an objection which overlooks the great Christian 
 doctrine of the Incarnation, a doctrine which makes 
 it possible for us to realize, and so to admire and 
 revere, the moral attributes of the Supreme as 
 manifested under the conditions of a human 
 character and a human life. He condemned 
 
 **a morality -which proclaims that the benevolent sentiments 
 are foreign to our nature ; " 
 
 whereas the truth is that the Scriptures represent 
 malice and hatred as forms of sin, and sin as a 
 departure from the proper and Divinely constituted 
 nature of man. He complained that Christianity 
 
 "so little understands the dignity of labour as to refer its 
 origin to a Divine curse ; " 
 
 which is in contradiction to the Biblical statement 
 that the Creator placed unfallen Adam in the 
 garden " to dress it and to keep it," and that his 
 sin was the occasion not of labour in itself being 
 cursed, but of labour in the new conditions that 
 
" The Religion of Humanity.'* 59 
 
 arose partaking of the penalties attaching to man's 
 disobedience. He describes our religion 
 
 " as putting forward woman as the source of all evil ; " 
 
 igard 
 woman as 
 the source 
 of all evil. 
 
 womau. 
 
 whereas the narrative in Genesis renresents the Eeveiation 
 
 . , , ^ . . , does not 
 
 man as equally guilty with the woman m violating ^cg 
 Divine law, whilst no book in the world has done 
 so much as the Bible to elevate the position of ^^n^^j/d^'' 
 woman, and to strengthen her moral influence bSgumy,* 
 amongst mankind. Comte held that Christians christiaiiity 
 
 has done 
 much to 
 " pursue no good, however trifling, but from the hope of an ^^^^1% 
 infinite reward, or from the fear of an eternal punishment," 
 thus "proving their heart to be as degraded as their in- 
 tellect. " 
 
 In this misrepresentation the master has been Hope 
 commonly followed by his disciples. Yet both aJenSf 
 Old and New Testament rely upon the love, the motives to 
 
 , ... - Christian 
 
 gratitude, the spiritual sympathy, cherished to- ^^ith and 
 
 ^ ./ i V ' obedience. 
 
 wards the God and Saviour of mankind by those '^ratitude 
 
 who accept the message of Divine authority and fenf * 
 
 mercy, as the most powerful motives to well-doing. thJ aiT ^^^ 
 
 A regard to personal welfare and happiness, power of 
 
 -^ . , , rr the Christian 
 
 though not the highest principle of obedience, is ^^*'- 
 yet a lawful and proper principle, and it is not the 
 fault of true religion that many of its expositors 
 have lost sight of the purest and best motives, and 
 have laid an undue stress upon those which have 
 right only to a subordinate place. No system of 
 morality, intended for men as they are, can al- 
 
60 
 
 Align ste Comte, and 
 
 The 
 
 defects and 
 errors 
 involved 
 in the 
 principles 
 of the 
 Positivist 
 system. 
 
 together dispense witli the consideration of the 
 consequences of actions. But the more Christians 
 are penetrated with the distinctively Christian spirit, 
 the less will they act aright from motives of hope 
 and of fear, the more will they be actuated by 
 the impulses of duty, of loyalty, and of love. 
 
 Positivism cannot clearly distinguish between 
 the worshipper and the Deity, for both alike are 
 human. The object of adoration does not actually 
 exist ; it has had a partial existence in the past, it 
 is to have a completer existence in the future. 
 Meanwhile the devotee is to assist in the growth, 
 the construction of his god. 
 
 Positivism discerns in man no truly spiritual 
 nature. The phenomenal only can be known, and 
 the phenomenal has no lasting existence. All 
 that is human is physical, mortal, perishable. 
 
 Positivism recognizes no law independent of 
 human origin, no eternal, unchangeable govern- 
 ment and authority, superior to the generations 
 of mankind which come and which pass away. 
 Humanity is making a law as it is making a God ; 
 and that which is made is inferior to its maker. 
 
 Positivism knows nothing of sin; for it re- 
 cognises in man no Divine image which has 
 been defaced, it admits of no Divine standard from 
 which man has deflected, it knows no Divine 
 authority which has been defied. Upon vice and 
 crime, indeed, it looks with detestation, as injurious 
 
 I 
 
represents 
 both God 
 and man ; 
 it abolishes 
 
 " The Religion of Humanity, " 01 
 
 to the happiness of the individual and to the peace 
 and order of society. But sin it is from its very 
 position and principles unable to comprehend; for 
 sin is against God, and the " Eeligion of Humanity '* 
 ignores and denies God. If man owes no allegiance 
 to a Supreme Power, he cannot rebel. 
 
 Positivism is ignorant of redemption ; for if 
 there is no sin, there can be no need and no 
 possibility of salvation. On the assumption that 
 God is not, the mercy, the pity, the love, which 
 Christians believe have provided a Saviour, ^vanish 
 and become mere fancies and illusions. For the i* "- 
 Positivist there can be no such thing as Divine 
 forgiveness, as restoration to Divine favour, as par- SiSlaw: 
 ticipation in Divine life. human sin; 
 
 it deprives 
 
 Depriving mankind of the Redeemer and of the " of the 
 blessed fruits of His redemption, the system now if^eakens 
 under discussion leaves the world poor, desolate, toV?tST' 
 
 1 . , . 1 1 , it limits out 
 
 and hopeless indeed ! prospects to 
 
 -r-k PIT T 'IT *^^ present 
 
 Positivism unfolds no reason, no substantial and '^^^ 
 sufficient motive for a virtuous life. There is no 
 Divine purpose, and no imperishable aim to be 
 sought and secured by self-denial and beneficence. 
 The alternative in human conduct is simply between 
 the temporary happiness of one person and that of 
 another, and it is not clear why the agent should 
 prefer another's happiness to his own. 
 
 Positivism restricts our regards within the horizon 
 of earth and of time, i.e.y such a period as com- 
 
62 
 
 Auguste Comte, and 
 
 prises man's tenancy of this perishable planet. 
 Beyond, it offers no prospect for either the in- 
 dividual or the race ; no scope for future recom- 
 pense, retribution, or development. 
 
 Does Christianity take a less noble view than 
 Positivism of human nature, as created by God, 
 and as re-created in Christ by the Spirit of God ? 
 On the contrary, the Scriptures assure us that 
 " God created man in His own image!' and "made 
 him hut Utile lower than God" ^ that " there is a 
 spirit in man, and the breath of the Almighty 
 giveth them understanding." Christianity confers 
 upon our nature the highest honour, for its central 
 truth is that the eternal Word became " the Son of 
 Man,'' that He might redeem and save the nature 
 which He deigned to share. 
 
 Does Christianity come short of Positivism in its 
 view of the highest law of righteousness, the highest 
 possibilities of moral character, the highest motives 
 to self-denial, to true service? On the contrary, 
 the Bible reveals to us in God the attributes whose 
 harmonious action constitutes moral goodness, and 
 the Being who, as the Almighty and Eternal Ruler, 
 secures the final triumph of the cause of righteous- 
 ness. And the Bible reveals to us in Christ the 
 Divine Saviour, whose cross is the condemnation 
 of sin and the salvation of the sinner, whose love 
 
 lu every 
 respect the 
 lloligion of 
 Christ has 
 advantage 
 over the 
 so-called 
 religion of 
 Humanity. 
 
 In its view 
 of human 
 nature. 
 
 In its view 
 of morality, 
 and of 
 man's 
 moral and 
 spiritual 
 necessities. 
 
 In its 
 
 proAision of 
 ealvation. 
 
 ^ llevised Versiou. 
 
 J 
 
I 
 
 anti(?ipation 
 f 
 
 " The Religion of Humanity.** G3 
 
 is the principle, and whose Spirit is the power of 
 the new and higher life of humanity. 
 
 Does Christianity take a less inspiring and in its 
 satisfying view than Positivism of the prospects of \\^^^^^^ ^ 
 humanity? On the contrary, it bids us look for- eirou^^ 
 ward to the time when it shall be said, "The 
 kingdom of the world is become the kingdom of 
 our Lord and of His Christ, and He shall reign 
 for ever and ever." The " Religion of Humanity ** 
 may promise the virtuous and the wise a name in 
 the Comtist calendar, a niche in the Positivist 
 temple ; but Christianity permits us to believe of 
 the sainted and the glorified that " they are equal 
 unto the angels, and are sons of God," and en- 
 courages the devout and faithful to breathe to 
 Heaven the aspiration, " I shall be satisfied when 
 I awake with Thy likeness." The brightest hope The limitod 
 of the Positivist is in the spread of civilisation. Positivism. 
 the reign of order, and the prevalence of peace on 
 earth. In this hope the Christian joins. But the 
 time shall come when the earth and the heavens 
 shall be rolled up as a mantle, and shall be changed 
 as a garment. With that time, in the gloomy 
 apprehension of the Positivist, shall perish and 
 pass away, together with this material dwelling- 
 place, those natures that make it their brief, their 
 only home ; and man, with all his works and all his 
 knowledge, and all his virtues, shall be swept into 
 eternal oblivion. But with that time, according to 
 
Gl 
 
 Tlie Religion of Humanity. 
 
 The Ricrious the stiong and well-founded hope of the Christian, 
 
 revelation 
 which. 
 
 Christianity 
 give? of the 
 everlasting 
 destiny of 
 the saved. 
 
 shall appear *^ the new heavens and the new earth, 
 wherein dwelleth righteousness;" and then shall 
 he fulfilled the prayer offered for His people hy 
 Jlim who is the Head of the new and immortal 
 humanity, " Father. I will that where I am they 
 also may he with Me, that they may hehold My 
 glory which Thou hs st given Me ; for Thou 
 lovedst Me hefore the foundation of the world/' 
 
 -*>>! Present Day Tracts, No 47. \- 
 
THE 
 
 ETHICS OF EVOLUTION 
 
 EXAMINED. 
 
 BY THE 
 
 EEV. JAMES IVERACH, M.A., 
 
 AUTTIOR OF 
 
 'Is God Kxo'wacle?" "The Philosophy of iln. Herbert Spencer Examined." 
 
 THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY: 
 
 56 PATERNOSTER ROW, AND 65 ST. PAUL'S CHURCHYARD, 
 LONDON. 
 
<^rgitmcnt of the ^vut 
 
 Mr. Herbert Spencer taken as the exponent of the 
 Ethics of Evolution. His statement of the question. The 
 new aspect given to Ethics by Evolution. Criticism of Mr. 
 Spencer's account of the genesis of moral intuition. It 
 fails to account for the influence of education, and for the 
 inheritance of mankind embodied in literature. Man is a 
 being possessed of freedom, and any view of morality must 
 have regard to this fact. Mr. Spencer's use of words of 
 different moral import as if they were synonymous. Bene- 
 ficial, good, pleasurable, are identified by him, as also are 
 detrimental, bad, painful. Fallacy involved in this pro- 
 cedure. Impossibility of deducing laws of conduct from 
 laws of life and conditions of existence. Criteria of moral 
 conduct. Evolved conduct may be good or evil. Indus- 
 trialism affords no criterion of the morality of conduct. 
 Moral obligation. Veracity as the test whereby we may 
 try the validity of the hypothesis of the Ethics of Evolution. 
 Impossibility of accounting for the binding obligation to 
 be truthful on any UtiUtarian hypothesis. Mr. Spencer's 
 prophecy that "the element in the moral consciousness 
 I which is expressed by the word obligation will disappear." 
 'Criticism of it. Mr. Spencer's distinction between absolute 
 and relative Ethics misleading. Failure of Evolutionary 
 Ethics to afi"ord guidance to man. Christ's life and teach- 
 ing the sure guide of man to real moral conduct. Christian 
 Ethics the only scientific Ethics. 
 
THE 
 
 ETHICS OF EVOLUTION EXAMINED. 
 
 [he latest outgrowtlL of the theory of ^^^ 
 
 Evolution is found in the Ethics it has stSSent 
 
 sought to formulate. Many writers are genesis of 
 
 in the field, but by common consent the intuitions 
 
 greatest of them is Mr. Herbert Spencer. His 
 
 writings are most referred to, his name has most 
 
 authority among Evolutionists, and we shall limit 
 
 ourselves to his writings. 
 
 We begin by quoting from him a statement 
 
 which sets forth in few words the method by which 
 
 evolution cceks to explain morality. "We make 
 
 this quotation, as it is well to have at the outset 
 
 a definite view of the matter with which we have 
 
 to deal. 
 
 "To make my position fully understood, it seems needful to 
 add that, corresponding to the fundamental propositions of a 
 developed moral science, there have been and still are, developing 
 in the race, certain fundamental moral intuitions; and that, 
 though these moral intuitions are the results of accumulated 
 experiences of UtiJity, gradually organised and inherited, they 
 have come to be quite independent of conscious experience. 
 Just in the same way that I believe the intuition of space to 
 have arisen from organised and consolidated experiences of all 
 antecedent individuals, who bequeathed to him their slowly- 
 developed nervous organizations, just as I believe that this 
 intuition, requiring only to be made definite by personal cxperi- 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 that man 
 has now an 
 intuitive 
 knowledge 
 of truth. 
 
 ence, has practically become a form of thought, apparently quite 
 independent of experience ; so do I believe that the experiences 
 of utility, organized and consolidated through all past genera- 
 tions of the human race, have been producing corresponding 
 nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and 
 f.ccujnulation, have become in us certi^in faculties of moral 
 intuition, certain emotions corresponding to right and wrong 
 conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experi- 
 ences of utility. I also hold that just as the space-intuition 
 responds to the exact demonstrations of Geometry, and has its 
 rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them ; so will 
 moral intuitions respond to the demonstrations of moral science, 
 and will have their rough conclusions interpreted and verified 
 by them." ^ 
 
 We take note of the concession here made by 
 Mr, Spencer, because it marks the end of a long 
 controversy, if from another point of view it marks 
 the beginning of a new one. We have it here 
 admitted that man has an intuition of truth, truth 
 which is recognised as true as soon as it is under- 
 stood. What origin soever the intuition may have 
 had, it is conceded that now and hero for the 
 individual there are truths of intuition, both mathe- 
 matical and moral. This is a distinct gain, and an 
 advance on the old assertion that worlds may exist 
 where two and two might make five. Still, we 
 must not make too much of the admission, for it 
 is often the habit of Mr. Spencer to take away 
 with the one hand what he concedes with the other. 
 The old controversy was whether custom and 
 association could account for, and explain the 
 intuitions of the mind. The old answer was Yes, 
 
 The old 
 controversy. 
 
 1 Data of Elides, p. 123, 
 
The Ethics of EvolvMon Examined, 
 
 and students of the history of philosophy will 
 readily recall to mind the various attempts to show 
 that the laws of association could account for ex- 
 perience. To the same question Mr. Spencer and The truth 
 
 ... intuilivcly 
 
 Mr. Lewes, and evolutionists in ereneral, answer '^"^'^.^ . 
 
 ' o ' o prion 
 
 both "No and Yes. They answer that if you have individual 
 
 regard only to the individual, then it is conceded p^sta-iori 
 
 that he has forms of thought and faculties of moral according * 
 
 intuition which have no apparent basis in individual spcnccr. 
 
 experience, and are apparently quite independent 
 
 of it. But they answer that if you have regard to 
 
 the race, if you widen the meaning of custom and 
 
 association, to embrace the Avhole history of life, 
 
 then these can account for all the beliefs of man, 
 
 both those which are fundamental and also those 
 
 which are less fundamental. Truths which are now 
 
 forms of thought, truths which are a ^oriori to tho 
 
 individual, are a posteriori to the race. 
 
 The concession made to intuition is thus more Tho con- 
 cession mora 
 
 apparent than real. An intuition is only custom JJ|^"r"jj 
 made inveterate. It is only an association of facts 
 or ideas which, from frequent repetitions, has be- 
 come inseparable. Obviously the former contro- 
 versy has been begun anew, and the issues aro 
 greater than before. Hume's position was that 
 all knowledge is the outgrowth of sensation ; the 
 position of Spencer is different only in the fact 
 that lie demands a longer time for sensations to 
 cluster themselves together, and to elevate thcni- 
 
T^ie Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 selves into faculties of intuition. It will be well 
 to inquire into the possibility of this transformation. 
 
 "I also hold," says Mr. Spencer, in the passage already quoted, 
 ** that as the space-intuition responds to the exact demonstra- 
 tions of geometry, and has its rough conclusions interpreted 
 r,nd verified by them." 
 
 The spact- 
 intuition 
 fundamen- 
 tal, and 
 without its 
 constant uso 
 peomctry 
 cannot 
 proceed. 
 
 The sense 
 in which 
 the 
 
 conclusions 
 of the space- 
 intuition 
 have to be 
 verified by 
 tlie exact 
 demonstra- 
 tions of 
 gecuietry. 
 
 "VYhat precise meaning is attacbed by Mr. Spencer 
 to these words it is difficult to say. It is certain, 
 however, that the procedure of geometry is the 
 exact opposite of what he describes. In every 
 geometrical demonstration appeal is made to, and 
 the verification is supplied by the space-intuition, 
 whose " rough conclusions " he thinks require veri- 
 fication. This is an illustration of a confusion of 
 thought which constantly recurs in the writings 
 of Mr. Spencer. It appears most frequently as an 
 inability to distinguish between things that differ. 
 Nothing is more common with him than to accumu- 
 late as proof of a certain proposition a number of 
 particulars which have no common principle, and 
 have no common bearing on the point the truth 
 of which has to be established. In the case 
 before us there is a sense in which the rough con- 
 clusions of the space-intuition have to be verified 
 by the exact demonstrations of geometry. These, 
 however, refer only to actual matters, such as the 
 shape, size, distance, and other quantitative rela- 
 tions of the different objects which are within our 
 view. But even the determination of these pre- 
 suppose the space-intuition geometry is supposed 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined, 
 
 to verify. The space-intuition which emerges as 
 the consummation at the end of a process, is of 
 such an indispensable nature, that without it the 
 process could not have begun. Geometricians 
 assume the space-intuition, they work from it, 
 ihey appeal to it at every stage of their demon- 
 strations, and this intuition has such authority, Authorita- 
 that a singular act of perception, presentative or of intuitivo 
 representative, is sufficient to establish the validity 
 of the truth thus intuitively seen, as a universal 
 truth, true everywhere and always. In this sphere 
 one presentation is equal to a thousand ; our con- 
 viction of the validity of intuitive truth, at the 
 very first presentation of it to our minds, is so 
 strong that increased experience does not make it 
 stronger. The space-intuition has no need of veri- 
 fication, it verifies itself, and it is the touchstone 
 of the truth of geometrical demonstration. 
 
 Experience is possible because we have intuitions, Expericnco 
 
 ossiblc 
 
 ecause 
 
 iutuitions. 
 
 and every experience, however slight, presupposes because of 
 the intuition, which, by the theory of Mr. Spencer, 
 emerges as the result of the experience. It is re- 
 markable also, that the procedure of Mr. Spencer Mr. 
 himself corresponds exactly with the usual proce- system of 
 
 ' ^ ^ *^ * _ philosophy 
 
 dure of geometricians. The first chapter of his Jtuitfons'^ 
 Fsychology is entitled "A Datum "Wanted," and the 
 second is called '* The Universal Postulate," which 
 is thus expressed, " a belief which is proved by 
 the inconceivableness of its negation to invariably 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 Attempt of 
 
 Mr. 
 
 Spencer to 
 
 trace the 
 enesis of 
 tuitions. 
 
 
 exist is true.'* It is curious to find that the 
 universal postulate is an intuition ; on it he bases 
 all his reasoning, and he regards his reasoning as 
 gaining in cogency in proportion as he can make 
 direct and immediate use of the postulate. With- 
 out the postulate he cannot move a step, or draw 
 an inference. Grant him the datum, and he can 
 move onwards to complete the great structure of 
 his philosophy. Eef use to grant him the validity 
 of his datum, or the sufficiency of his postulate, and 
 he is powerless. In the case of Mr. Spencer, too, 
 the experience philosophy is based on intuition. 
 
 No doubt he proceeds immediately to show how 
 the universal postulate has been obtained, and we 
 have from his pen a number of chapters of special 
 analysis, of general synthesis, and special synthesis, 
 in which he endeavours to describe the genesis of 
 special intuitions, as well as the genesis of that 
 intuition which he describes as the universal postu- 
 late. But for that genesis the universal postulate 
 is needed even at the starting-point, and it is needed 
 at every stage of the process. "We ask again how 
 we can conceive of a universal postulate which is 
 needed at every stage, and yet is itself the product 
 of the process which it governs aU along? If it 
 can be shown that the simplest experience is im- 
 possible if we do not possess these ideas beforehand, 
 then the argument that intuition is the product of 
 experience falls to the ground. Reduce experience 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 to its simplest elements, yet whenever there emerges 
 
 a state of consciousness, there are already present 
 
 those intuitions which form at once the basis and 
 
 the test of valid experience. It is unnecessary to 
 
 dwell further on this point, on which so much has 
 
 been written since the time of Kant. We pass on 
 
 to our proper subject, and we propose to examine ll^^ncer's 
 
 Mr. Spencer's account of the genesis of moral ^hfgSJes/s 
 
 , ., . of moral 
 
 intuition. intuition. 
 
 It is well to have clearly before our minds the 
 fundamental assumption made by Mr. Spencer. 
 It is 
 
 *' that the experiences of utility, organised and consolidated 
 through all past generations of tlie human race, have been pro- 
 ducing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued 
 transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain facul- 
 ties of moral intuition, certain emotions responding to right and 
 wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual 
 experiences of utility." 
 
 Concentrating our attention on the central part of ^o^J^L 
 this statement, we look steadfastly at what is in- becTme''''"^ 
 volved in it. Put nakedly it stands thus, "nervous of moral 
 
 . ni' 1* intuition. 
 
 modifications have become faculties oi moral in- 
 
 tuition.'' Mr. Spencer has certainly the courage 
 of his convictions, and in this startling proposition 
 has placed boldly before his readers what is implied 
 in his system. The sentence passes at a bound 
 from the outer world of matter to the inmost centre 
 of self-conscious life and thought, and in a bold 
 synthesis identifies the two. In the sentence is 
 gathered up the result of all the work of Mr. 
 
10 
 
 Tlie Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 The tlicory 
 fails whcu 
 brought 
 face to face 
 with patent 
 facts. 
 
 Spencer. Here a nervous organisation, which, has 
 somehow arisen, grown, accumulated to itself in- 
 crements and modifications ; there in the end facul- 
 ties of moral intuition. We might have forgotten, 
 in the long process of perusing the voluminous 
 works of Mr. Spencer, the identity of nervous 
 modification with faculties of moral intuition, had 
 he not in kindness placed them side hy side. The 
 identification of the two sets us to examine the 
 process by which they are identified. 
 
 The theory receives a fatal shock as soon as it 
 is brought face to face with facts which are 
 apparent to every one. I have received from my 
 ancestors a nervous organisation, modified and 
 enriched by all the experience through which they 
 have passed. They have bequeathed to me this 
 inheritance, and my nervous organisation is such 
 as to have born with it faculties of moral intuition. 
 Compared with the immense period during which 
 this nervous organism has been used, the time 
 during which I can use it is very brief indeed, and 
 the modifications which can be made in it by me 
 must be very slight in comparison. Yet, on tho 
 contrary, the fact stands thus, recognised as con- 
 spicuously by Mr. Spencer as by any other writer 
 on education, that the modifications introduced into 
 character by education, in the comprehensive sense 
 of that word, are infinitely more important than 
 those we have received by inheritance. At all 
 
 It fails to 
 account fcr 
 the crowth 
 ol character 
 ill a maa's 
 lifetime by 
 CVOluliOB. 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined, 1 1 
 
 events, it will be admitted by all that education, 
 tbo training of the family, the discipline of tbe 
 school, and tlie influence of social life, are elements 
 in the formation of character whose importance 
 cannot be over-rated. Where are the nervous 
 modifications to correspond with these changes in 
 the human character produced by education ? They 
 are not to be found. 
 
 Nor do nervous modifications represent all that it fails to 
 I have received from the past, any more than they the 
 
 "^ ^ *' inheritance 
 
 can represent all I receive from day to day in the f^^^'^i 
 present. If they did, I should be Hmited to that if aJrapTA 
 share in the universal inheritance which my im- nervous 
 mediate ancestors have been able to acquire and to tioas. 
 bequeath to me. What they were, that I would 
 be, with only an infinitesimal change in some direc- 
 tion. Nervous modification is a costly and a slow 
 process too costly and slow to fit me for my life- 
 work. Humanity is thrifty, and has found out a 
 more excellent way. It has found out other and 
 less expensive ways of registering its higher ex- 
 periences. Literature, art, science, the recorded 
 thoughts, feelings, and deeds of mankind are not 
 limited by the nervous organisations which each 
 generation has bequeathed to its successors. And F^^fj^^Jjf^^ 
 to-day my inheritance includes the achievement of includes. 
 inspired writers like Moses and Isaiah, the thoughts 
 of philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, the songs 
 of poets like Homer, Dante, and Shakespeare. In 
 
12 
 
 The Ethics of Evolution Examined, 
 
 a word, all that has been done by humanity has 
 become mine, whether my ancestors have had or 
 had not that particular nervous modification which 
 might be held to correspond to the BejmbUc of 
 Plato, or the Principia of Newton. The first 
 objection therefore to be taken to Mr. Spencer's 
 view is, that it can neither account for the influence 
 of education, nor for the inheritance of the past. 
 
 It implies also that for every great thought, or 
 lofty imagination, or holy feeling, there is a cor- 
 responding nervous modification. From the nature 
 of the case no proof of this can be given, nor can 
 there be any proof of the other assumption, that 
 nervous modifications have preceded or aocompanied 
 mental and moral development in the past. This 
 has been put so well by Dr. Martineau, that vro 
 venture to borrow the statement of it : 
 
 There is no 
 proof that 
 nervous 
 modifica- 
 tions accom- 
 pany mental 
 and moral 
 develop- 
 ment. 
 
 No exact 
 correspon- 
 dence 
 
 bti-ween the 
 moral and 
 the 
 physical. 
 
 "The fact is, that the evolution theory rests mainly upon 
 the evidence of organisms; and when they have been duly 
 disposed in the probable order of their development, their 
 animating instincts and functional actions are obliged, it is 
 supposed, to follow suite ; and it is therefore taken for granted 
 rather than shown, that by a parallel internal history, tho most 
 rudimentary animal tendencies have transmuted themselves 
 into the attributes of a moral and spiritual nature. But tho 
 essential difierence between the two cases must not be overlooked. 
 The crust of the earth preserves in its strata the memorials of 
 living structure, in an order which cannot be mistaken, enabling 
 us to associate the types that co-exist, and to arrange those 
 which are successive ; and, in spite of tho missing links of the 
 series, to observe the traces of a clear ascent, the higher forms 
 making their first appearance after the ruder. The archeeology 
 of nature is in this respect perfectly analogous to that of history ; 
 and supplies a chain of relative dates with as much certainty as 
 
77^6 Ethics of Evolution Examined, 13 
 
 the coins disinterred at different dates, and of graduated work- 
 manship from the ruins of a buried empire. But just as, in this 
 case, the image and superscription report to you only the place 
 and time of the Caesar they represent, but tell you nothing of 
 his character and will ; so in the other, the fossil organ is silent 
 about the passion that stirred it, the instinct that directed it, 
 the precise range and kind of consciousness which belonged to 
 its possessor. In other words you have, and can have, no record 
 of psychological relations, in correspondence with the hierarchy 
 of forms ; for you cannot get into the consciousness of other 
 creatures ; and if, in order to find room for educing the moral 
 affections from what is unmoral, you begin with our praehuman 
 progenitors, and take their private biography in hand, and 
 catch their first inklings of what is going to be conscience, you 
 are simply fitting a picture to your own preconception. To a 
 certain extent there is, no doubt, a definite and known relation 
 between structure and function in animals, enabling you from 
 the presence of the one to know the other. The wing, the 
 fin, the legs, reveal the element and the habit of a creature's 
 life ; the jaw, the teeth, the condyles for the connected muscles, 
 disclose his food-appetite, and his modes both of pursuit and 
 of self-defence. But long before we reach the problem which 
 engages us we come to the end of this line of inference. . 
 There are no bones or muscles or feathers appropriated to the conscicnco 
 
 exclusive use of self-love ; no additional eye or limb set apart ^5*^ ^^^ 
 
 ' ... . ^01 our 
 
 for the service of benevolence ; no judicial wig adhering to the higher 
 
 head that owns a conscience ; so that, in this field, i.e., through any tlvsical 
 
 the whole scene of the moral phenomena, no help can be had organ. 
 
 from the zoological record. Nothing can be more chimerical 
 
 than prse -historical psychology."^ 
 
 It is confessedly difficult to set forth all that is 
 implied in the notion of heredity, or to assign 
 limits to what may or may not be transmitted to 
 us from our ancestors. At the same time, it is 
 not difficult to see that the equation between nervous 
 modifications and faculties of moral intuition which 
 Mr. Spencer endeavours to establish cannot hold 
 1 Types of Ethical Theory, vol. ii., pp. 340, 3X 
 
14 
 
 The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 Pleasure is 
 evanescent, 
 and its 
 results are 
 limited to 
 the nervous 
 organism. 
 
 All nervous 
 
 changes are 
 
 accounted 
 
 for and 
 
 expressed in 
 
 physical 
 
 terms 
 
 in Mr. 
 
 Spencer's 
 
 system. 
 
 true. The experiences of utility whicli are spoken 
 of, are experiences of pleasure, and it is not ex- 
 plained how pleasurable experiences can be organised 
 or consolidated. lor a pleasurable feeling is an 
 evanescent state ; it was, and is not. In the moment 
 of fruition it ceases to be, and the effect of pleasure 
 on the nervous system is to produce a change in 
 its structure. The utmost result of pleasure in 
 relation to the nervous system is to produce a 
 momentary change or modification, more or less 
 great. And what is transmitted is the nervous 
 organisation thus modified. It is a gratuitous 
 assumption, that along with the changed nervous 
 system thus transmitted, there are transmitted also 
 the feelings and experiences which originally gave 
 rise to, and accompanied these changes of structure. 
 But nervous structure remains nervous structure 
 from first to last, and how great soever may have 
 been their modifications, and however numerous 
 the generations through which they have been 
 transmitted, they are in the end nervous modifica- 
 tions and nothing more. The nervous system, 
 hoAvever, plays a large part in the system of Mr. 
 Spencer. Modifications in its structure are by him 
 held to account for all the modifications of mind. 
 He has not shown how this is possible as a matter 
 of philosophy, nor has he been able to show that 
 it is a matter of fact. He has shown, on the con- 
 trary, that changes in the nervous organism are 
 
Tlie Etiiics of Evolution Examined. 15 
 
 physical changes to be accotinted for and explained 
 by physical causes alone, and may be described in 
 physical terms alone, without reference to any such 
 thins: as feeling or consciousness. For feeling is. Feeling, 
 
 " *^ , . according to 
 
 on his theory, something gratuitous, something in- ^^p^^wn-'^''' 
 
 explicably added to the physical changes of the gratuitous. 
 
 nervous structure. And yet Mr. Spencer holds 
 
 the correlation to be so close, that he can afford to 
 
 make the physical changes of the nervous system a 
 
 register of the growth of spirit, and an explanation 
 
 of the highest attainments of spirit. Consciousness kis con- 
 
 *^ ^ ceptionof 
 
 for him begins with a nervous shock, and every in- ^^^^^^^^^^ 
 crease of faculty is accompanied by or caused by a 
 more complicated shock until the faculty of moral in- 
 tention emerges as the result of this series of nervous 
 shocks. One would naturally have supposed that 
 this had been made out of a series of demonstrations 
 founded on the examination of nervous structures 
 in the various stages of their development. At one 
 stage a nervous system ought to be shown us at the 
 very time when consciousness began, and that added 
 modification ought to be pointed out which caused 
 consciousness to be. Other modifications, corres- 
 ponding to the growth of experience, and to separate 
 faculties, memory, hope, imagination, reason, v.ntil at 
 last moral intuition stands forth with its appropriato 
 nervous modification. Mr. Spencer's theory assumes atj.. 
 that a series of correlations can thus be made out, theory an 
 
 assumption 
 
 It remains an assumption, and nothing more, and nothing 
 
IG The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 Jtr. A consequence of tliis assumption is tliat Mr. 
 
 Bponcor's . i i i 
 
 view of Spencer is constrained to look on man as an aggre- 
 gate of feelings, wHcli feelings are again dependent 
 utterly on the nervous organism. As Lange has 
 pointed out, it remains true that if all the conse- 
 quences of Darwinism are granted, the conscious 
 life of man remains still a problem which requires 
 special treatment. With Mr. Spencer, however, 
 the problem of ethics is sought to be solved by re- 
 ference to methods which have been found adequate 
 in lower spheres of life. He is constrained to 
 reject the conception of freedom, and to treat it as 
 an illusion. The illusion arises from the belief 
 
 *' that at each moment the ego present as such in consciousness 
 is something more than the aggregate of feelings and ideas 
 which then exist." 
 
 We have always criticised the pyschological bearings 
 His incon- and implications of this statement.^ We now look 
 61. ency ^^ _.^ ^ ^^^ bearing on the problem of ethics. All 
 mankind have fallen into the strange illusion of 
 supposing themselves to be something more than 
 their " feelings and ideas." Even Mr. Spencer is 
 no exception to the rule ; at all events, he is in the 
 constant habit of using language which is meaning- 
 less, unless he is something more than the aggregate | 
 of ideas and emotions existent for the time. 
 Supposing, however, that the ego is this aggregate 
 
 1 Present Day Tract. No. 29 : Th& Philosophy of Mr. HcrOcrt 
 
 ^' "I 3j}cncer Emmined, pp, 13-28. 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 17 
 
 and nothing more, how does the further illusion of 
 freedom arise ? We get, it seems, into the habit 
 of speaking of ourselves as if we were something 
 separate from the group of psychical states which 
 constitute the action, and we fall into the error 
 of supposing that it was not the impulse alone 
 which determined the action. Causality does not, supposition 
 
 .of unrelateJ 
 
 it appears, belong to the ego, but to a particular feelings a3 
 
 causes. 
 
 feeling, idea, or impulse. How a consciousness of 
 self can have arisen at all on Mr. Spencer's terms 
 is not evident. How a consciousness of the freedom 
 of self could have arisen is even more mysterious. 
 For if the connection between feelings and actions 
 be what Mr. Spencer describes it, then the in- 
 ference for the consciousness to draw is, that the 
 will is necessitated. The puzzle is hopeless. How 
 came this ego to have its place in consciousness ? 
 How could a bundle of conscious states impose 
 on the " aggregate," that it was something apart 
 from the aggregate, and could cause changes in 
 it ? Well, if this be an explanation of the illusion 
 of freedom, the explanation is more mysterious 
 than the fact. 
 
 If a desirable state of f eeKng be the aim of con- Mr. 
 duct, as Mr. Spencer affirms, then it maybe remarked affirmatioa 
 
 , '' as to the 
 
 that when it is so, I look forward to that state as f;^^i^ 
 mine. I look forward, and see myself in the state 
 in which I desire to be ; and if my action is deter- 
 mined by it, this follows, not from an impulse which 
 c 
 
 conduct. 
 
18 
 
 The Ethics of Evolution Examined, 
 
 An aim is 
 intelligible 
 only when 
 viewed in 
 relation 
 to the 
 conception 
 of self. 
 
 Mr. 
 
 Spencer's 
 statement 
 of the 
 problem 
 of moral 
 sdeuce. 
 
 singly and alone produces its own consequence, but 
 from the impulse as ruled by tlie conception of 
 self. The self is conceived as now existent, as per- 
 sistent through changes of state, and as existent in 
 the desirable state of feeling which it foresaw and 
 strove after. Mr. Spencer assumes this as true, 
 though in terms he denies it. He cannot get rid 
 of the conception of self. For it is through this 
 conception that every pleasure has the possibility 
 of becoming a personal good. Pleasure is not the 
 end, but the satisfaction of self by means of the 
 pleasure. The consciousness of self originated the 
 act, persists through the act, and the series of 
 results set in motion by the act, and bears with it 
 the knowledge that the act and its consequences 
 are due to him, and he is responsible for them. A 
 mere abstract state of desirable feeling, without 
 relation to the self which accompanies and consti- 
 tutes it in reference to an object, is one of the 
 wonderful things which meet us in the philosophy 
 of Mr. Spencer. 
 
 The problem of ethics becomes very complicated 
 indeed in the assumption, that an aggregate of 
 feelings and ideas can attain to moraUty. But 
 Mr. Spencer contrives to get on, and the first step 
 he takes is to change the nature of the problem. 
 
 *' The view for which I contend is, that morality properly bo 
 called-^the science of right conduct has for its object to 
 determine how and why certain modes of conduct are detri- 
 mental, and certain other modes beneficial. These good and 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 19 
 
 bad results cannot be accidental, but must be necessary con- 
 sequences of the constitution of things, and I conceive it to be 
 the business of moral science to deduce, from the laws of life 
 and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily 
 tend to produce happiness, and what kind to produce un- 
 happiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognised 
 as laws of conduct, and are to be conformed to irrespective of 
 a direct estimation of happiness and misery." Data of HtJucs, 
 p. 57.1 
 
 "Waiving altogetlier the difficulties whicli Mr. isthero 
 Spencer's doctrine of the effo raises against his ance for * 
 
 ^ . . conduct 
 
 statement of the business of moral science, we shall ?^ t^^^^o 
 
 ' terms! 
 
 look at the statement in itself. Suppose we come 
 to the Data of Ethics for guidance as to the rules 
 of conduct. What is right conduct? And the 
 answer we receive is, that we ought to find out 
 how and why certain modes of conduct are detri- 
 mental, and certain other modes are beneficial. 
 Such information, supposing it possible to obtain 
 it, would not be without its use. It pre-supposes, impossiwi- 
 however, that we have made a tabulated account makinp; a 
 
 tabulated 
 
 of the results of conduct; and have been able to account 
 
 ' . of the 
 
 set them down as beneficial or the reverse. In coSt^' 
 addition, it pre-supposes that we have advanced 
 so far as to have got a satisfactory theory of hoio 
 and why these results have their respective charac- 
 
 1 It would be an instructive exercise to substitute for the 
 language used by Mr. Spencer, the language he uses when 
 speaking of the ego. It would run in something like the 
 following fashion : " The view for which the aggregate of 
 feelings and ideas which now exists, and is called Mr, Spencer, 
 contends." We have tried to do it, but the result is too gro- 
 tescjue to pursue it any further. 
 
20 
 
 The Ethics of Evohition Examined. 
 
 Identifica- 
 tion of the 
 beneficial, 
 tlie good, 
 and the 
 pleasure- 
 able; also 
 of the de- 
 trimental, 
 the bad, and 
 the T)ainful 
 by Mr. 
 Spencer. 
 
 teristics. Our knowledge of the laws of life and 
 the conditions of existence is supposed to be suffi- 
 ciently extensive and exact to warrant us in drawing 
 inferences worthy to be accepted as a guide to right 
 living. All this is a preliminary to real moral 
 guidance. For it is to be observed that when wo 
 have accomplished this heavy task, we have not 
 yet arrived at a distinction which involves anything 
 moral: we have only reached what is described as 
 what is beneficial and detrimental. How are we 
 to cross the boundary, and recsh the region where 
 moral distinctions obtain ? Mr, Spencer does not 
 seem to suspect the existence of a boundary. In 
 the next sentence he quietly substitutes the words 
 "good" and "evil" for beneficial and detrimental. 
 We are aware that to him they are identical. All 
 the same, however, he is by no means unwilling to 
 receive the help to his argument which the moral 
 meaning of the new words brings to it. Translating 
 the new words back into their Spencerian equi- 
 valents, it is obvious that his argument makes no 
 advance. We have still another substitution of 
 terms to notice in this characteristic paragraph. 
 Good and evil are again dropt out, and we have 
 instead " the kinds of action which necessarily tend 
 to produce happiness or unhappiness." Beneficial, 
 good, pleasurable, detrimental, bad, painful, are 
 interchanged, as if synonymous. l^To doubt they 
 are so in the new ethics of Mi\ Spencer. They 
 
 Ethics 
 not a 
 
 system 
 which sets 
 forth our 
 pleasures 
 and advan* 
 tagcs. 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined, 21 
 
 aro not so, however, in the ordinary use of language, 
 nor in the moral consciousness of man. The ethics 
 of Mr. Spencer can at the best be a system which 
 sets forth our pleasures and advantages. It does 
 not touch the margin of the higher region which 
 answers to the call of duty, and feels the binding 
 obligation of righteousness, truth, and goodness. 
 
 It is not to the purpose here to enter on a dis- 
 cussion of Utilitarianism in any of the forms it 
 has lately assumed. Guidance by pleasures and Does evo- 
 
 1 lution help 
 
 pains has been abundantly shown by many writers, Hedonism? 
 from different points of view, to be inapplicable to 
 human beings. What we purpose to show here is, 
 that the theory of evolution has not obviated the 
 objections brought against Hedonism ; and it has 
 brought fresh difficulties of its own. "We may be 
 permitted here to refer to the able and thorough 
 discussion of this subject by Mr. Sorley.^ He has 
 pointed out that the development of life does not 
 always tend to increase pleasure, and the laws of Develop- ^^ 
 its development cannot be safely adopted as maxims life does 
 for the attainment of pleasure. He has shown S^Juli 
 also that it is impossible for us to say 
 
 " what kinds of actions necessarily tend to produce happiness, 
 and what kinds to produce unhappiness." 
 
 He has shown, by a lengthened argument, in which 
 
 1 Mtlitcs of Natuv'-ilmit by \V. H, Sorley. Messrs. Blackwood 
 & Soaa, Edinburgh, 
 
9 A 
 
 The Ethics of Evolution Examined, 
 
 we Lave been able to find no flaw, tliat pleasure 
 may 
 
 "arise from any, or almost any, course of conduct which the 
 conditions of existence admit of. The evolutionist, therefore, 
 can liave no surer idea of greatest pleasure even although this 
 may not be a very sure one than that it will follow in the 
 train of the greatest or most varied activity which harmonizes 
 with the laws of life."^ 
 
 Biological 
 
 deduction 
 
 of laws of 
 
 conduct 
 
 void 
 
 through un- 
 
 certaiuty. 
 
 Moral 
 phenomc'iia 
 igiKjrcd or 
 misinter- 
 preted. 
 
 It is obvious, therefore, that Mr. Spencer's pro- 
 posed deduction of rules of conduct from the laws 
 of life and the conditions of existence, even were 
 it possible, is void through uncertainty. It would 
 be as reasonable to deduce the theory of chemical 
 equivalents from the laws of pure being. What 
 is needed is special inquiry into, and a recognition 
 of, the peculiar phenomena of. the moral world, and 
 Ethics has to account for and explain the pheno- 
 mena of that world, and not to substitute for it 
 another set of phenomena altogether. 
 
 Our contention is, that Mr. Spencer has ignored 
 in some instances the phenomena of the moral 
 world, and has misinterpreted them in others, and 
 generally has failed to recognise the peculiarity 
 of the question. He has sought to apply for 
 the explanation of moral phenomena a hypothesis 
 framed for the explanation of physical or biological 
 phenomena, and it is no wonder that he has failed 
 in consequence. He is aware of the difference 
 between the two, and now and then brings us to 
 1 Ethics of Naturalism^ pp. 201-2, 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined, 
 
 23 
 
 the chasm which, intervenes between the ono and 
 the other. Here is one of the many descriptions 
 he gives of the " struggle for existence " : 
 
 "The multitudinous creatures of all kinds which fill the 
 earth, cannot live apart from one another are interfered with 
 by one another. In large measure the adjustments of laws to 
 ends which we have been considering, are components of that 
 * struggle for existence,* carried on, too, between members of The 
 the same species, and between members of a different species ; 
 and, very generally, a successful adjustment made by one 
 creature involves an unsuccessful adjustment made by another 
 creature, either of the same kind, or of a different kind. 
 That the carnivore may live, herbivore animals must die; 
 and that its young may be reared, the young of w^eakcr 
 crea-tures must be orphaned. Maintenance of the hawk and 
 its brood involves the deaths of many small birds; and 
 that small birds may multiply their progeny must be fed 
 with innumerable sacrificed worms and larvae. Competition 
 among members of the same species has allied, though less 
 conspicuous, results. The stronger often carries off by force the 
 prey which the weaker has caught. Monopolising certain hunting Selfishness 
 
 struggle for 
 existence. 
 
 grounds, the more ferocious drive others of their kind into t^^ univer* 
 
 less favourable places. With plant-eating animals, too, the * > 
 
 like holds ; the better food is secured by the more vigorous 
 
 animals, while the less vigorous and worse fed succumb either 
 
 directly from innutrition or indirectly from resulting inability 
 
 to escape enemies. That is to say, among creatures whose lives 
 
 are carried on antagonistically, each of the two kinds of conduct 
 
 must remain imperfectly evolved. Even in such few kinds of 
 
 them as have little to fear from enemies or competiijors, as lions 
 
 or tigers, there is still inevitable failure in the adjustments of 
 
 acts to ends towards the close of life. Death by starvation 
 
 from inability to catch prey, shows a falling short of conduct 
 
 from its ideal. This imperfectly-evolved conduct introduces 
 
 us by association to conduct that is perfectly evolved."* 
 
 **The spider kills the fly. The wiser sphins 
 Stings the poor spider in the centre iicrvd 
 
 ^ Daia of Ethics, 17, 18. 
 
24 
 
 The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 Victory 
 to the 
 Btroug. 
 
 Survival of 
 the fittest. 
 
 Which paralyses only ; lays her eggs, 
 
 And buries with them with a loving care 
 
 The spider, powerless but still alive, 
 
 To warm them unto life, and afterward 
 
 To serve as food among the little ones. 
 
 This is the lesson Nature has to teach, 
 
 'Woe to the conquered, victory to the strong.' 
 
 And so, through all the ages, step by step 
 
 The stronger and the craftiest replaced 
 
 The weaker, and increased and multiplied. 
 
 And in the end the outcome of the strife 
 
 Was man, who had dominion over all, 
 
 And preyed on all things, and the stronger man 
 
 Trampled his weaker brother under foot." ^ 
 
 It is not necessary to add anything to tlie de- 
 scriptions of the law of life given in the foregoing 
 extract. Vae metis is the law of life in the organic 
 ^orld, and biological work since Darwin wrote the 
 Origin of Species^ has been in the direction of setting 
 forth additional illustrations and proof of the law 
 ** the survival of the fittest.'' Assuming for the 
 sake of argument that this law is proven, the pro- 
 blem set to the theory of evolution is to deduce 
 morality, as we know it in human life, from these 
 biological conditions. It is a formidable task. 
 Mr. Spencer is aware of the difficulty, and in the 
 foregoing extract says 
 
 " This imperfectly evolved conduct introduces us by associa- 
 tion to conduct that is perfectly evolved." 
 
 His self-appointed task, as described by himself is : 
 
 ** to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence 
 what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce hapi)iness, and 
 what kinds tend to produce unhappiness. " 
 
 Can 
 
 morality be 
 deduced 
 from the 
 struggle for 
 existence ? 
 
 ^ A Modern Ideal, by S. R. Lysaught, p 53. 
 
>?^e 
 
 The Ethics of Evolution Examhi^^, 
 
 TT 
 
 And when the time comes for this logical deduc- 
 tion, we must he content with "association/' The Transition 
 
 to morality 
 
 transition from the conduct of animals to the con- "\V5' ^t ^ 
 
 duction, but 
 
 duct of man can only he made hy association. Now ation?'^^^^^' 
 association is of various kinds, and one kind is 
 "contrast" or "antithesis," which is the kind 
 used hy Mr. Spencer. He speaks very severely of 
 those moralists who do not recognise causation in 
 the full sense of the word, and do not use it in 
 tvhe construction of their ethical system. 
 
 " So long as only some relation between cause and effect in 
 conduct is recognised, and not the relation, a completely scientific 
 form of knowledge has not been reached." 
 
 We venture to ask what treatment would Mr. Failure 
 Spencer give to a moralist who, having promised spencer to 
 his readers to recoornise causation in the full sense morality 
 
 *-' from laws 
 
 of the word, and rigorously use it in the deduction * ^^- 
 of rules of conduct from laws of life and conditions 
 of existence, when the most serious step in the 
 deduction came to he taken, introduced his readers 
 to the new field only hy ** association " ? Surely 
 we have reason to say to Mr. Spencer **de tef alula 
 narratur.'* 
 
 Nor does he mend the matter when he asks, 
 referring to the same difficulty 
 
 ** Is fc replied that the more intense pains and pleasures Mr. 
 which have immediate reference to bodily needs, guide us chaUeiv^o. 
 rightly ; while the weaker pains and pleasures, not immediately 
 connected with the maintenance of life, guide us wrongly ? 
 Then the implication is that the system of guidance by 
 
26 
 
 The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 pleasures and pains, -which has answered with all creatures 
 below the human, fails with the human. Or rather, the ad- 
 mission being that, with mankind, it succeeds so far as fulfil- 
 ment of certain imperative wants goes, it fails in respect of 
 wants which are not imperative. Those who think this are 
 required, in the first place, to show how the line is to be drawn 
 between the two ; and then to show us why the system which 
 succeeds in the lower will fail in the higher." ^ 
 
 Ans'wcr 
 thereto, 
 
 1. Science 
 has to 
 recognise 
 the special 
 character 
 ot each 
 iepartment. 
 
 "What is 
 ample in 
 lower 
 
 regions will 
 not serve 
 in higher. 
 
 The answer to this is twofold. In the first place, 
 we say that whenever science passes from a simpler 
 to a more complex subject, it has to recognise 
 new conditions of work, and to accept new princi- 
 ples of explanation. Mr. Spencer has had to 
 submit himself to this inevitable necessity, though 
 he has striven with all his might to avoid it, and 
 has sought to disguise the nature of his procedure. 
 He does not deduce chemical factors from the laws 
 of physics. He assumes them. If he has to con- 
 fine himself to the definite chemical factors present 
 in the primordial nebulae, he is brought to a stand 
 at the beginning of life. He is compelled to alter 
 his method at every stage of the process, and to 
 recognise new elements and new laws, and to 
 assume new principles. Genesis, heredity, repro- 
 duction, are not explained but assumed. So also 
 when he passes from what is below the human to 
 the human, he is constrained to assume the charac- 
 teristics of human nature, a faculty of moral in- 
 tuition, and so on. It is consistent with the 
 universal method of science that it recognises its, 
 1 pp. 84, 85. 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined, 27 
 
 limitations, and adapts itself to the peculiarities of 
 each field of inquiry. A sufficient answer to Mr. 
 Spencer's challenge is found when we say that the 
 system of guidance which succeeds in the lower 
 mr.st fail in the higher, precisely because it is 
 higher. 
 
 In the second place our answer is, that Mr. 2. -nr. 
 Spencer has himself undertaken the task he has imshimscii 
 
 shown in. 
 
 unposed on others, and has succeeded in showing ^^"g^^^j^^^^ 
 that the system of guidance by pleasures and pains ^"efsu"^ ^'' 
 has failed in the human sphere. He admits the doesSr 
 failure, and, strange to say, the admission is on the 
 very page in which he sets forth the challenge : 
 
 " Guidance by proximate pleasures and pains fails through- ^>^ 
 
 out a wide range of cases." 
 
 'No doubt he goes on to explain the causes of 
 
 failure, and to predict a time when the failure 
 
 shall cease to be. We shall look at this prophecy 
 
 a little further on. Meanwhile we lay stress on 
 
 the admission. "We place side by side two state- ^tatej^entj 
 
 ments of Mr. Spencer. One is that spencer. 
 
 " the deductions of moral science are to be recognised as laws of 
 conduct ; and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct 
 estimation of happinesss or misery." 
 
 The second is 
 
 *If the purpose of ethical inquiry is to establish rules of 
 right living ; and if the rules of right living are those of which 
 the total results, individual and general, direct and indirect, 
 are more conducive to human happiness, then ,it is absurd to 
 ignore the immediate results, and to recognize only the remote 
 results." (p. 95.) 
 
28 
 
 The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 I pain, or, as Mr. Spencer euphemistically puts 
 it, "disagreeable modes of consciousness," accom- 
 pany acts that are really beneficial, 
 
 "that objection does not tell against guidance of pleasures and 
 pains, since it merely implies that special and proximate 
 pleasures and pains must be disregarded out of consideration 
 for more remote and diffused pleasures and pains." 
 
 At one time we are told that proximate pleasures 
 and pains must be disregarded, and at another time 
 we are told that it is absurd to disregard them. 
 How are we to reconcile the two ? "We leave them 
 in their naked simplicity, with the remark that the 
 contradiction is a proof that guidance by pleasures 
 and pains fails with the human being, though it 
 may have succeeded in lower spheres of life. 
 
 Mr. Spencer's answer to himself is not yet com- 
 plete. He has granted in express terms that 
 guidance by pleasures and pains fails with man ; 
 in addition, he has demonstrated, in his criticism 
 of Bentham and Mill, that 
 
 ^ "not general happiness becomes the ethical standard by which 
 legislative action is to be guided, but universal justice" (p. 224.) 
 
 And also that in relation to private action 
 
 " the principle is true only in so far as it embodies a disguised 
 justice. " 
 
 His chapter on " Trial and Compromise " is one 
 of the most powerful in the book, and in it he has 
 clearly shown the inadequacy of guidance by plea- 
 sures and 2)ains. Happiness cannot be taken as 
 an end either for public action or for private action. 
 
 Happiness 
 is no end 
 for either 
 public or 
 private 
 action. 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 29 
 
 In his statement of the problem of ethics he has, 
 Ihowever, said that the 
 
 ' " ultimate moral aim is a desirable state of feeling called by 
 whatever name gratification, enjoyment, happiness, pleasure 
 i somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an in- 
 expungable element of the conception. It is as much a 
 necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form 
 of intellectual intuitions." 
 
 A necessary form of intuition, which is at times , 
 unnecessary, is surely a curious conception. For, ^^^^J^p^^ 
 according to the statement, happiness gives place iap!inc2^ 
 ito justice as a guide to action, on the ground that SnTuct? 
 sit is a more intelligible end, and also because 
 happiness as an end is indefinite. This is another 
 illustration of the failure of guidance by pleasures 
 iand pains, whether proximate or remote. If 
 justice has become the guide to action, then we 
 may perhaps be inclined to ask. Is the conception 
 of justice so perfectly plain and intelligible as Mr. 
 'Spencer supposes it to be? Nor can the answer 
 he easily given. "We recall to mind the opening Je^|jfS 
 chapter of Plato's RepuhliCj and the discussion in it JusticT'tS* 
 on the nature of justice ; and the discussion by has^to*bo 
 !Mr. Sidgwick in the Methods of Ethics^ and we are 
 not sure if the substitution of justice for happiness 
 can be readily accepted. We are sure, however, 
 that in either case the result is subversive of Mr. 
 ' Spencer's system ; for it raises the question of the 
 relation of justice to happiness, a question which 
 admits of no answer from the standpoint of evolu- 
 tion. 
 
30 
 
 The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 Further 
 statement 
 by Mr. 
 Spencer of 
 guidance by 
 pleasures 
 and pains. 
 
 Mr. 
 
 Spencer's 
 ] lediction 
 that guid- 
 ance by 
 pk'asures 
 and pains 
 will 
 
 succeed in 
 the future. 
 
 We feel constrained to quote a passage in whicli 
 the failure of Mr. Spencer's argument is recognised 
 in express terms by Mr. Spencer himself : 
 
 *' Were pleasures all of one kind, differing only in degree ; were 
 pains all of one kind, differing only in degree ; and could pleasures 
 be measured against pains with definite results, the problems 
 of conduct would be greatly simplified. Were the pleasures 
 serving as incentives and deterrents, simultaneously present to 
 consciousness with like vividness, or were they all immediately 
 impending, or were they all equi-distant in time ; the pro- 
 blems would be further simplified. And they would be still 
 further simplified if the pleasures and pains were exclusively 
 those of the actor. But both the desirable and the undesirable 
 feelings are of various kinds, making quantitative comparisons 
 difl&cult ; some are present and some are future, increasing the 
 difi&culty of quantitative comparison ; some are entailed on self 
 and some on others, again increasing the difficulty. So that the 
 guidance yielded by the primary principle reached is of little 
 service unless supplemented by the guidance of secondary 
 principles." ^ 
 
 Could we have a more complete acknowledgment 
 of the fact that guidance by pleasures and pains 
 fails with the human being ? How shall we obtain 
 the secondary principles of guidance? and what 
 is their validity? If they are derived from the 
 primary principle, they share its uncertainty. If 
 they are independent of it, then it fails ; in either 
 case the result is fatal to the theory of Mr. Spencer. 
 
 Guidance by pleasures and pains having thus 
 been shown to fail, Mr. Spencer finds a refuge in 
 the prediction that eventually it wiU succeed. When 
 life is complete, and the organism is fully adjusted 
 to the environment, and the happy time is come 
 
 1 Data of Etldcs, pp. 150-1. 
 
prediction 
 must fail 
 for lack 
 of time. 
 
 The Ethics of Evolution Examined, 31 
 
 when every action of man demanded by social 
 conditions shall give him pleasure, then the conflict 
 will cease, the disparity will disappear. With 
 great solemnity he says 
 
 " Not he Avho believes that adaptation will increase is absurd, 
 but he who doubts that it will increase is absurd." 
 
 Well, we are in the unhappy condition of those 
 whose belief is here characterised as absurd. 
 Taking into account only those forces which, ac- 
 cording to Mr. Spencer, have guided the evolution 
 ^of life, we see no escape from pessimism. If we JJJS 
 look forward across the years, we come to a physical 
 condition of things which must necessarily, ac- 
 .cording to the teaching of science, produce a change 
 in human life. The process from the first germ of 
 .life to the highest possible life has been long, and 
 the conflict has been great. Then must come a 
 time when this process will reach its culminating 
 point, and the history of life must then be a period 
 of decline and fall, until when the sun has grown 
 cold, and the earth has grown unfit for life, the 
 end is desolation and annihilation. 
 
 "We need not, however, 2:0 so far into the future it must 
 to free ourselves from the nightmare of Mr. ^^^J^^hat 
 Spencer's prophecy. All that is needful for this conSis 
 purpose is to point out that his assumption is un- Lriiy 
 
 . . 1 J moral 
 
 true. The assumption is that evolved conduct is conduct, 
 moral conduct. Evolved conduct may be good or 
 may be evil. Evil does not become good by be- 
 
32 The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 coming definite and coherent, nor does good lose 
 its character by becoming indefinite and incoherent 
 The appliances of civilization may be used for evil, 
 and an evil man may place himself in most definite 
 relations to the resources of civilization. Nihilists 
 and dynamiters have been most definite in their 
 use of explosives, most definite in the aim they 
 have in view, and their conduct is quite coherent. 
 They use the telegraph and the railway, the dyna- 
 mite is a most definite chemical substance, and the 
 clockwork is accurately timed, so as to release a 
 trigger at a definite moment to cause a definite 
 explosion, to accomplish a particular end. 
 
 The tests of definiteness, coherence, and hetero- 
 geneity afford no criterion of moral conduct. The 
 formula of evolution may be as readily ascribed to 
 Evil may the development of evil conduct as of good. Evil 
 
 consist with 
 
 the law of may be traced from an indefinite, incoherent homo- 
 
 cvolution. -^ ' 
 
 geneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and all 
 the marks of evolution may be applied to it. We 
 may trace crime from rudimentary beginnings, to 
 the most complex conspiracy ever formed, and the 
 history of the process would be in exact correspond- 
 ence with the requirements of evolved conduct, as 
 described by Mr. Spencer. JN'or is the matter 
 mended by the proposed substitution of Industrial- 
 ism for the military and feudal spirit which formerly 
 dominated the lives of men. Industrialism has 
 been formulated in political economy, and political 
 
TliG Ethics oj Evolution Examined, 
 
 economy is non-moral, at all events before tlio 
 recent revolt against its non-moral character, against 
 wliicli Mr. Spencer so strenuously protests, political 
 economy made self-interest its ruling power. It 
 is well known that the Danvinian law of the Tho law of 
 struojQ-le for existence is simply an extension of for 
 
 ^^ , , ^ *^ . . . existence is 
 
 Malthusianism, and the doctrine of political ^J" ^.^^Jl^^ j' 
 economy, in some forms of it, is simply self-interest ^^'^^^^ 
 reduced to system. How are we to evolve a new 
 morality out of selfishness ? or recognise in Indus- 
 trialism the new evolving force, which is to teach 
 us to love our enemies, to do good to them that 
 hate us, when Industiialism is based on self-interest, 
 and teaches us to buy in the cheapest and sell in 
 the dearest market ? We are aware of the hopes 
 which were burning brightly in the human heart 
 some forty years ago. We have read the speeches 
 of Cobden, the pages of Buckle, and the universal 
 song raised to the praise and glory of Industrialism industrial, 
 at the time of the Exhibition of 1851. Since then 
 many things have happened. But Mr. Spencer 
 seems never to have outgrown the impression then 
 made on him, nor to have recognised that the in- ?^^^gtyj.^i 
 dustrial tendency has need of a moral motive, which nJids'a^ 
 it cannot of itself supply. The transactions of the moUvc. 
 Stock Exchange, the phenomena of Strikes, the 
 various forms of Socialism, and other things of the 
 same order, show that Industrialism has no chann 
 of its own, whereby it may produce good and 
 

 The Etliics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 Moral 
 obligation 
 must be 
 accounted 
 for. 
 
 remove evil. It may give increased facilities for 
 good ; it may also afford a new soil for the pro- 
 duction of evil. At all events, it affords no criterion 
 of what is moral. 
 
 Any attempt to account for morality must have 
 regard to the essential feature of it. We are con- 
 scious of an obligation on our part to submit our- 
 selves to the law which we conceive as binding 
 upon us, and the problem set to Evolution is to 
 show how the binding force of the rules of experi- 
 ence could have arisen, and how the deductions of 
 the ethics of evolution can have authority. Let us 
 test the attempt by a special instance. We take 
 veracity as our example, and we propose to examine 
 whether it is possible to account for the universal 
 obligation to truthfulness on the evolutionary 
 hypothesis. If morality can be deduced from the 
 laws of life and the conditions of existence, we 
 have a right to expect that the biological conditions 
 which have caused success in the lower sphere, 
 should also hav .? scope in the higher. We find, 
 however, that with all creatures up to man, a 
 premium is put on deception. It is the weapon 
 which the weak use against the strong, the only 
 effective means which they have. Any work on;| 
 natural history will afford illustration of the truth 
 of the statement that deception is universal, and 
 has the moral stamp of success, that is, according 
 to Utilitarianism, upon it. The flatfish which 
 
 Proposed 
 deduction of 
 morality 
 from laws 
 of life and 
 conditions of 
 exi.^tence 
 tested in the 
 particular 
 instance of 
 veracity. 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 85 
 
 escapes the jaws of the dogfish is the one which 
 can imitate most closely the colour of the sandbank pre?? 
 on which it lies. The deception, being found to wr *^^ 
 bring its advantage with it, has become an organised Ufe. 
 utility, and has been transmitted to its descendants. 
 We need not multiply instances which will readily 
 occur to every one. Imitation, mimicry, deception, 
 prevail everywhere in the animal kingdom, from 
 the least to the highest, from the insect to the 
 mother bird, which moves as if her wings were 
 broken, to entice the pursuer from her nest. 
 
 This process of deception has the sanction of Deception 
 success. It has been advantageous. Those who with 
 
 success 
 
 have been best at it, have escaped the danger before 
 which their less skilful relatives went down, and 
 organised deception becomes the fit rule of conduct 
 for all who have survived. It is curious to think 
 that out of this biological laAV of life there should 
 have been evolved the supreme authority of truth- 
 fulness, and its full obligation by man. 
 
 It becomes more curious when we pass to the Truthful- 
 world of human life. It cannot be shown on the brshollir 
 hypothesis of evolution that the habit of truthful- adran- 
 
 , , tageou9 
 
 ness is beneficial, pleasurable, or advantageous. 
 The utilitarian sanction for truthfulness is neither 
 powerful nor universal. Few laws enforce it, nor 
 is the social reprobation attaching to untruthfulness 
 very severe. There are circumstances which to 
 many sccni to justify lying. "All is fair in lovo 
 
36 The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 and war." To deceive an enemy has been held 
 to be blameless, even laudable. We take the 
 followhig passage from Ruskin 
 
 The view of " Truth, that only virtue of which there are no degrees, but 
 Mr. Euskiii. ^j^eaks and rents continually ; that pillar of the earth but a 
 cloudy pillar ; that golden and narrow line, which the very 
 powers and virtues which lean upon it bend, which policy and 
 prudence conceal, which kindness and courtesy modify, which 
 courage overshadows with his shield, imagination covers with 
 her wings, and charity dims with her tears. How difficult 
 must the maintenance of that authority be, which, while it has 
 to restrain the hostility of all the woret principles of man, has 
 also to restrain the disorders of his best, which is continually 
 assaulted by the one and betrayed by the other, and which 
 regards with the same severity the lightest and the boldest 
 violations of its law 1 There are some faults slight in the sight 
 of love ; some errors slight in the estimate of wisdom ; but 
 truth forgives no insult, and endures no stain. 
 
 " "We do not enough consider this ; nor enough dread the 
 slight and continual occasions of offence against her. We are 
 too much in the habit of looking at falsehood in its darkest 
 cssociations, and through the colour of its worst purposes. 
 That indignation we profess to feel at deceit absolute, is indeed 
 only at deceit malicious. We resent calumny, hypocrisy, and 
 treachery, because they harm us, not because they are untrue. 
 Take the detraction and the mischief from the untruth, and 
 we are little offended by it ; turn it into praise and we may be 
 pleased with it, and yet it is not the calumny nor treachery 
 that does the largest sum of mischief in the world ; they are 
 continually crushed, and are felt only in being crushed. But 
 it is the glistening and softly-spoken lie ; the amiable fallacy ; 
 the patriotic lie of the historian, the provident lie of the 
 politician, the zealous lie of the pai'tizan, the merciful lie of the 
 friend, and the careless lie of each man to himself, that casts 
 the black shadow over humanity, through which we thank any 
 man who pierces, as we thank those who dig a well in the 
 desert. Happy that the thirst for truth still remains with us, 
 even when we have wilfully left the fountains of it." ^ 
 
 ^ Seven Lamps of Arcldtecture, chap, ii., sect, i 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 37 
 
 "We are prepared to stake tlie whole question of if the 
 the evolution of morality in this one point. How ot truthfui- 
 
 * ness prevails 
 
 can the felt obli":ation to be truthful be shown to ^^ f''}^^'' 
 
 *-' and tne 
 
 be an organized and transmitted utility, when the of ^mdfy 
 advantage of veracity cannot be shown. On the ufe^cSnot 
 contrary, if we limit our view to the present life, then 
 
 . . . the obliga- 
 
 the practice of veracity can be proven to be dis- ?%f^, 
 advantageous. The practice of this virtue has dcdSced'^ 
 many difficulties to contend with. There are many ex^rience. 
 instances in which it has brought death to the wit- 
 ness for truth, and ruin to his friends. Many 
 moralists and theologians have held a lie to be justi- 
 fiable to elude an enemy or prevent a crime. May 
 we tell a lie in the service of duty ? Basil says I^o, 
 and Chrysostom says Yes. Augustine is of opinion 
 that if the whole human race could be saved by 
 one lie, one must rather let it perish. And Jacobi 
 affirms 
 
 " I will lie like Desdemona, I will lie and deceive like Pyladea 
 who took the place of Orestes." 
 
 "We quote these for the sake of shelving that the 
 utility of truthfulness is by no means obvious ; and 
 there can be no such experience of the pleasure, 
 advantage, or benefit of veracity as to account for 
 the fact that men value truth for its own sake, 
 and feel constrained to practice it, regardless of 
 consequences. 
 
 So strongly is this felt by Utilitarians of all 
 shades, that they have given up the attempt to 
 
88 TJie Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 derive veracity from an experience of its utility, 
 utmtarian or to find its sanction in utility. Their way is to 
 
 mode of 
 
 evading the dcuv the binding oblisration of truthfulness. They 
 
 difficulty. ; _ too J 
 
 are inclined to hold that the law of truth is neither 
 universal nor supreme. Whether Ave are or are not 
 to be truthful depends on time, and place, and 
 circumstances. If veracity is an absolute and in- 
 dependent duty, and not a special application of 
 some higher principle or principles, then it is con- 
 ceded by all that experiences of utility can neither 
 account for it, nor explain the sanction of it. This 
 
 Testimony has been so well put by Mr. Hussell Wallace that 
 
 Busseii we quote the passage : 
 
 "A number of prisoners, taken during the Santal insurrec- 
 tion, were allowed to go free on parole to work at a certain 
 spot for wages. After some time cholera attacked them, and 
 they were obliged to leave, but every one of them returned and 
 gave up his earnings to the guard. Two hundred savages with 
 money in their girdles, walked thirty miles back to prison 
 rather than break their v\'ord. My own experience with savages 
 lias furnished me with similar, although less severely tested, 
 instances ; and we cannot avoid asking, how is it, that in these 
 few cases * experiences of utility ' have left such an over- 
 powering impression, while in so many others they have left 
 none ? The experiences of savage men, as regards the utility 
 of truth, must, in the long run, be pretty nearly equal. How 
 is it, that, in some cases, the result is a sanctity which over- 
 rides all considerations of personal advantage, while in others 
 there is hardly a rudiment of such a feeling ? 
 
 "The intuitional theory, which I am now advocating, explains 
 this by the supposition that there is a feeling a sense of right 
 and wrong in our nature, antecedent to, and independent of 
 experiences of utility. When free-play is allowed to the re- 
 lations between man and man, this feehng attaches itself to 
 those acts of universal utility or self-sacrifice which are the 
 
The Ethics of Evolution ExawAned. 39 
 
 products of our affectijus and sympathies, and which we term 
 moral ; while it may be, and often is, perverted, to give the 
 same sanction to acts of narrow and conventional utility, which 
 are really immoral as when the Hindoo will tell a lie, but will 
 sooner starve than eat unclean food ; and looks upon the 
 marriage of adult females as gross immorality. 
 
 " It is difficult to conceive that such an intense and mystical 
 feeling of riglit and wrong (so intense as to overcome all ideas of 
 personal advantage or utility), could have developed out of 
 accumulated ancestral experiences of utility ; and still more 
 difficult to understand, how feelings developed by one set of 
 utilities, could be transferred to acts of which the utility was 
 partial, imaginary, or altogether absent. But if a moral sense is 
 an essential part of our nature, it is easy to see that its sanction 
 may often be given to acts which are useless or immoral ; just 
 as the natural appetite for drink is perverted by the drunkard 
 into the means of his destruction."^ 
 
 As far as regards the obligation to truthfulness, no basis 
 we can find no basis for it in biological conditions, in uSS^d' 
 
 Biology gives its sanction to concealment and de- 
 ception. Nor is it more hopeful to seek a sanction 
 for it in the experience of man, that truth is advan- 
 tageous. But yet the fact stands before us, plain 
 and palpable, that the truth has claims on us which 
 we feel bound to acknowledge. We ought to bo 
 truthful. "Whence this oughtness? and this re- 
 cognition of universal obligation ? The universality 
 and supremacy of moral law cannot be explained. 
 All that Mr. Spencer will recognize is the obligation 
 to use the means if we are to get to the end ; a 
 substitute which can never be mistaken for the 
 original feeling of " oughtness." 
 
 The surprising thing, however, is that Mr. 
 
 ^ On Natural Sclectiony pp, 353-5. 
 
 conditions. 
 
40 The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 Spencer can speak of " Ethics '* at all. No ethics 
 arc inconceivable in which will does not stand foi 
 something. But acccording to the teaching oi 
 Mr. Spencer, will is an illusion. With him there 
 is no self, there are only states of consciousness, 
 which are again the result of molecular and 
 chemical changes in the physical organism. 
 Ethics can, The physical changes always produce the cor- 
 
 f*" the T 1 T 
 
 theory of rospoudmo: phenomena of memory, volition, 
 
 evolution. ^^ or ^ ... 
 
 brandf of"^' fcoling. Thought is as mechanical as digestion ; 
 which' deals conduct is as purposeless as gravitation; and the 
 natural*' fccling of obligation is a useless and unnecessary 
 conduct. accompaniment of the molecular changes of the 
 organism. Can we command conduct categorically 
 irrespective of and without regard to consequences? 
 Can we say to men, Thou shalt not, thou shalt, or 
 must we say it is worth your while to do this and 
 avoid that? But if conduct depends entirely on 
 the physical constitution and environment of a man, 
 why should anything be said to him one way or 
 the other ? We here touch again on the failure 
 of evolutionary ethics, which cannot account for the 
 idea of obligation. If, however, the doctrine of 
 Evolution could be successfully ajiplied to ethics, 
 the science of ethics would cease to deal with what 
 ought to be, and confine itself strictly to what is. 
 Ethics would become the branch of science which 
 deals with the natural history of conduct. 
 
 This is really wliat ethics have become in the 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 41 
 
 hands of Mr. Spencer. Mr. Spencer does not 
 care about a feeling or idea of moral obligation. 
 Believing as he does that freedom is an illusion, 
 what has he to do with the necessity of self- 
 control in action? In ordinary belief, a man 
 controls himself because he is free, is responsible 
 because free, feels above all the shame of penitence 
 and the agonies of remorse, because he knows 
 he could have acted differently if he had exerted 
 his free volition. But with Mr. Spencer, a man Mr. 
 
 , . , . , Spencer's 
 
 IS at the most a conscious and social animal; a affinnation Ly 
 
 * that the *^ 
 
 thing made up of atoms and molecules. What obTfgatlon 
 duty has he to recognise, except the promptings *^*^^^^^"^ 
 of nature? What is right but the duty of 
 attaining to the fitness which will survive ? As 
 to the feeling of obligation it is simply the ex- 
 pression of a consciousness of mal- adaptation to 
 the environment. So Mr. Spencer says in express 
 terms : 
 
 " This remark implies the tacit conckision, which will be to 
 most very startling, that the sense of duty or moral obligation is 
 transitory, and will diminish as fast as moraiization increases. 
 Startling though it is, this conclusion can be satisfactorily 
 defended. Evidently, with complete adaptation to the social 
 state, that element in the moral consciousness which is expressed 
 by the word obligation will disappear. The higher action re- 
 quired for the harmonious carrying on of life will be as much 
 matters of course as those lower actions which the simpler 
 desires prompt. In their proper times and places and propor- 
 tions, the moral sentiments will guide men just as spontaneously 
 and adequately as do the sensations."^ 
 
 ^ .Data of Ethics, p. 127--8, 
 
43 
 
 The Ethics of Evoluiion Examined. 
 
 Views cf 
 Bentham 
 and Mill. 
 
 Mr. 
 
 Spencer's 
 inadequate 
 conception 
 of conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 How much wiser than Bentham and Mill is 
 Mr. Spencer! Bentham thought he could do 
 without the word "ought," carried on a fierce 
 polemic against it, and the fact which it expressed, 
 and the consequence was that his system made 
 shipwreck on it. Mr. Spencer knows that "ought" 
 represents a fact of moral consciousness. He is 
 umvilling to lose the advantage of using it. It is 
 living and active, here and now. But he may get 
 rid of it quite as effectually hy a prophecy. And 
 until the time of the fulfilment of prophecy he may 
 lise the word and the fact for the strengthening of 
 his system. Stuart Mill, in his innocen3e, thought 
 he could account for intuitions by the experience 
 of the individual. Mr. Spencer cannot get on 
 without intuitions ; he will use them when 
 necessaiy, but by and by he hopes he can do 
 without them. 
 
 This amazing fertility of resource cannot, how- 
 ever, be granted to him. We readily grant to him 
 that if obhgation has no other meaning than that 
 which he formally ascribes to it, then it wHl 
 disappear. To him 
 
 ** the essential trait in the moral consciousness is the control of 
 some feeling or feelings, by some other feeling or feelings." 
 (p. 113). 
 
 The phenomena of moral consciousness are thus a 
 conflict of feelings, out of which conflict emerges a 
 resultant which, being the stronger, takes the lead, 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined, 43 
 
 and incites to action. The statement is at once in- iiis 
 
 statement 
 
 adequate and misleading, one loclmQr does not misleading 
 
 ^ *-' "^ as well as 
 
 control another. When we come to the region where inadequate, 
 control can be rightly spoken of, we have passed 
 beyond feeling ; we are in the region of comparison, 
 of judgment. Feelings and desires are known to us 
 and felt by us, but they do not act in the pure and 
 simple manner described by Mr. Spencer. They are 
 elements in the comparison of motives, and are 
 taken up by the moral judgment in order to the 
 determination of conduct. 
 
 Here we have ao:ain come across that fatal ""^'^ 
 
 O marked m- 
 
 defect in the system of Mr. Spencer, which ^^^"^^i'^teucy 
 vitiates all his reasoning. We mean his habit 
 of viewing feelings as if they were something 
 apart, and could take their own course as if they 
 were so many detached substances. His habitual 
 disregard of the self-conscious subject is sur- 
 prising ; more specially when we also consider how 
 with the same breath he uses language which is 
 meaningless, unless the activity of the subject is 
 presupposed. At one moment he speaks of the 
 control of one feeling by another, and the next 
 moment speaks of the 
 
 " conscious relinquishment of immediate and special good, to 
 j^ain distant and general good" as *' a cardinal trait of the self- 
 restraint called moral" (p. 114). 
 
 Is this conscious relinquishment a feeling? we 
 trow not. The moral consciousness is something 
 
44> 
 
 The Ethics of EvolvMon Examined, 
 
 "WTiat is 
 involved in 
 moral con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 The word 
 
 "right" 
 
 translated 
 
 into its 
 
 Spencerian 
 
 equivalent. 
 
 more than feelings in unison or in conflict. At 
 the very least it involves the power of looking 
 before and after, the power of making comparison, 
 and of determination of conduct in relation to a 
 foreseen course of action. 
 
 This way of representing the moral consciousness 
 has, however, enabled Mr. Spencer to speak of 
 obligation as a vanishing quantity. He has a 
 vision of the time when the control of one feeling 
 by another will be perfect, and the pain of conflict 
 will have ceased, and a man will do 
 
 " the right thing with a simple feeling of satisfaction in doing 
 it; and will be, indeed, impatient if anything prevents him 
 from having the satisfaction of doing it." 
 
 He will cease to have any thought of 7nusty he 
 will have no coercive feeling of ought \ the sense 
 of obligation will have retreated into the back- 
 ground of the mind. We shall not inquire too 
 curiously into the meaning of the antithesis between 
 the "right" thing and the simple feeling of 
 satisfaction in doing it. It would be too cruel to 
 translate the word " right '^ into its Spencerian 
 equivalent, and read the sentence thus : 
 
 "He does the ' pleasurable ' thing with a simple feeling of 
 satisfaction in doing it." 
 
 It would make the sentence meaningless, but that 
 is the usual fate which inevitably waits on all 
 schemes of Hedonistic ethics. But the point we 
 insist on is this, that the sense of obligation never 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 45 
 
 vanishes, even when the doing of duty becomes obligation 
 easy and habitual. There are various reasons whj^ 
 this sense of obligation should continue. One 
 reason is that the ideal of human conduct is con- 
 tinually gro"\ving, and seeks a higher statement and t^^^human 
 embodiment of itself, as knowledge widens. An- cSnuuiiy 
 other reason is that the demands of moral law are andraf' 
 always such as to transcend the utmost range of the infinite 
 
 nature of 
 
 human fulfilment; and Mr. Spencer's dream is moiauaw 
 
 ' ^ and its re- 
 
 possible even as a dream, only because he has ^^irementa. 
 
 lowered both the ideal of human conduct and the 
 
 requirements of moral law. Still further; the 
 
 conception of moral obli^ration set forth by Mr. Mr. 
 
 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' Spencer's 
 
 Spencer is radically defective. The idea of ^^^7^^117 
 authoritativeness, which is one element in the ^<^^<^^*^^* 
 abstract consciousness of duty, has arisen from 
 the fact 
 
 " that accumulated experiences have produced the consciousness 
 that guidance by feelings which refer to remote and general 
 results, is usually more conducive to welfare than guidance by 
 feeliugs to be immediately gratified." 
 
 But why this should generate the authority implied 
 in the sense of obligation is not apparent. To have 
 regard to remote and general results does not imply 
 morality. One may restrain himself from grati- 
 fying immediate feelings in order to gratify them 
 more effectively in the future. Nay, he may 
 sacrifice them for the moment, and yet all the time 
 in the present and in the future may transgress 
 
 TTr^'T^ 
 
4G 
 
 Tke Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 Moral 
 cocrciveness 
 not to be 
 derived 
 from fear 
 of punish- 
 ment. 
 
 every rule of morality. A burglar may scorii de- 
 lights, and live laborious days, may spend money 
 in buying tlie implements of his craft, in order that 
 at a fit time he may safely rob a bank or a house. 
 In so doing would he manifest " a cardinal trait of 
 the restraint called moral"? 
 
 The element of cocrciveness is derived by ^Ir. 
 Spencer from the fear of punishment, and these 
 two elements of authoritativeness and cocrciveness 
 are the main elements, according to Mr. Spencer, 
 in the consciousness of duty. The fear of punish- 
 ment is the permanent motive of the savage. If 
 we ask how this becomes the felt coercive element 
 of duty, we are led by Mr. Spencer to undertake a 
 long journey. At the outset we ask, Why does the 
 savage refrain from scalping his enemy ? and the 
 answer is, Because he is afraid of the anger of the 
 chief. This restraint arising from the "extrinsic" 
 effects of an action, is not yet moral. The moral 
 restraint arises when we refrain from slaying an 
 enemy because of the intrinsic effects of the action. 
 These intrinsic effects are of the following kind : 
 
 " the infliction of death-agony on the victim, the destruction of 
 all his possibilities of happiness, the entailed sufferings to his 
 belongings. " 
 
 The ground of restraint in the case of the savage 
 is the fear of future pain to himself : with the 
 evolutionist it is concern for the pleasures an( 
 pains of others. How is the transition made 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 47 
 
 Mr. Spencer's account of the transition can explani 
 only those deterrents which he neglects as non- 
 moral. The restraint which makes a man prudent 
 from fear of the gallows, has no mode of trans- 
 forming itself into the disinterested restraint which 
 guides its actions hy regard to the well-being of 
 other people. 
 
 Along this line we shall never reach the grand 
 conception of duty or of virtue, as we find it em- 
 bodied in human life, and expressed in human 
 Htcrature. A writer who can resolve the authori- 
 tativeness of duty into a calculation of future 
 pleasure, and its coerciveness into a dread of con- 
 sequences, has left out of sight a large sphere of 
 human sentiment, and the greater part of morality. 
 He Avho can look at the sense of obligation as 
 something that must fade away, has not yet seen 
 that the distinguishing clement of duty is not Duty not 
 restraint but constraint. Its main purpose is to tut 
 
 ^ ^ ^ constraint, 
 
 prescribe what kind of life we ought to live, what 
 work to do, what end to accomj)lish ; not merely 
 to say Thou shalt not, but Thou shalt. Even if 
 we were to reach the time and state when it would 
 be no longer necessary to say Thou shalt not, the 
 sense of obligation would remain, and would make 
 itself felt so long as there was a further progress 
 to be made, a higher ideal to reach, and a further 
 end to be accomplished. Neither by the attempt 
 to resolve it into its elements, nor by the prediction 
 
48 The MJiics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 that it Avill fade away, has Mr. Spencer succeeded 
 in getting rid of the sense of moral obligation. 
 
 Limited use We shall look for a little at Ih\ Spencer's 
 
 6f law of ^ ^ ^ 
 
 SS^'^"^ attempt to find a basis for ethics, and at his ex- 
 position of the nse of the principle of " causality '* 
 in ethics. All systems of ethics, save his OAvn, are, 
 he finds, distinguished by the absence of the use of 
 the principle of causation, or by an inadequate use 
 of it. We suppose that ethical writers would admit 
 the charge and justify it. They believe that to 
 treat the human world as no more than a chain of 
 efficient causality, is at the outset to make ethics 
 impossible. Ethics is possible, if we can rise to a 
 point of view wliich goes beyond mere sequence, 
 and can reasonably hope to reach a teleological 
 interpretation of the facts of human life. A king- 
 dom of means and ends is something altogether 
 different from a kingdom of causes and effects, and 
 the attempt to make conscious life subject to mere 
 physical causation must necessarily fail. 
 Mr. Following out his attempt to apply causation to 
 
 attempt to moral life, he seeks to find a basis for morals in 
 
 find a basis 
 
 for morality the physical ordor. So far as the four chapters 
 oS.^"^ which set forth the physical view, the biological 
 view, the psychological view, and the sociological 
 view are concerned, we have to say of them that 
 what is true in them is common-place, and what is 
 new in them is not true. The truth in them is 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined, 49 
 
 the common-place that man has a body, that he is 
 a living creature, that he has an emotional and 
 rational nature, and that he is a social being ; but 
 the attempt to find a basis for morality in these His attempt 
 
 , , a failure. 
 
 respective orders of being must be frankly set down 
 as failure. Our waning space warns us to be brief, 
 and we shall compress what we have still to say. 
 The main stress of his argument is laid on the 
 fact that 
 
 **the connexion between acts and effects is independent of any 
 alleged theological or political authority." 
 
 Quite so in many cases, but not so in others. His 
 illustrations are, if we tie the main artery we stop 
 most of the blood going to a limb, if we bleed a 
 man, if a man has cancer of the oesophagus, if we 
 forcibly prevent a man from eating, if we pay him 
 for his work in bad coin, in all these cases, and 
 in others mentioned by Mr. Spencer, the man is of non- 
 
 ' r ' moral and 
 
 disabled, and "^^^l 
 
 **the mischief results, apart from any divine command or 
 political enactment, or moral intuition," 
 
 Again we say quite so. But when we come to the 
 passing of moral judgment on any of these physical 
 processes and results, we must discriminate, and 
 must recognise an element not contained in the 
 physical order. The tying of an artery has always 
 the result of causing disablement to a limb. But 
 why was the artery tied ? If it is done for a 
 beneficent end, then the act is not condemned, 
 
 E 
 
 agenta. 
 
60 
 
 The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 The physical result caused by a cancer may be in 
 no wise different from the result caused by a robber, 
 who deprives a man of food. But we must go 
 beyond the physical order in order to find a ground 
 for the reprobation we pass on the conduct of the 
 robber. Physical causation cannot account for the 
 facts of the moral consciousness, nor does duty, 
 responsibility, and remorse find a fitting place in 
 the physical order. We must have regard to the 
 motives and the intentions of the agent before wc 
 approve or condemn his action. 
 
 The mistake made by Mr. Spencer consists in 
 not seeing that the ground of moral judgment lies 
 elsewhere than in the causal connection of the 
 events to which it refers. The life of a man is 
 destroyed by a bullet, and the momentum of a 
 bullet was caused by the explosive power of gun- 
 powder, confined within the narrow space of a gun 
 barrel. The gunpowder is of such a nature as to 
 explode when a percussion cap is struck, and we 
 may trace the links of causation further back to 
 the nature of the atoms, and their chemical com- 
 bination, and to the nature of guns, and so on. 
 But to trace the links of causation in the physical 
 order does not enable us to recognise something 
 which entered into the midst of them, and was the 
 real factor in the case. The touch of the mur- 
 derous finger on the trigger is the cause of the 
 murder, and then we are lifted up to the recogni- 
 
 GroTinds of 
 moral 
 judgment 
 not to be 
 found in 
 the chain 
 of physical 
 causes and 
 effects. 
 
The Ethics oj Evolution Examined. 51 
 
 tion of causes of another kind. We are in the Facts of a 
 
 A ,. 1 J i* A i moral order 
 
 region oi motive and mtention, among facts of a ^^^^\ 
 moral order, which demand another kind of treat- treatments. 
 ment. 
 
 We have already dealt with the contribution 
 which, in the hands of Mr. Spencer, Biology makes 
 to Ethics. All we shall now say is this, that the 
 command of biology is based on the assumptions 
 that guidance by present pleasures and pains has 
 succeeded. We are told that 
 
 "the vital functions accept no apologies on the ground that 
 neglect of them was unavoidable, or that the reason for neglect 
 was noble. The direct and indirect sufferings caused by non- 
 conforming to the laws of life are the same whatever induces the 
 non-conformity." 
 
 So we must have regard to the immediate results. 
 But the whole question turns, not on the sufferings, 
 but on the purpose and aim which induced the 
 non-conformity. The laws of life as furnished by ^^f p?'^* 
 biology may come into conflict with the laws of psychology? 
 the higher life of man, and when they do so, it 
 becomes the duty of a man to incur the sufferings 
 caused by a disregard to the laws of biological life. 
 The point, however, on which we now insist is, 
 that the command of biology is to be guided by 
 immediate results, and the teaching of psychology, 
 as interpreted by Mr. Spencer is 
 
 * the subjection of immediate sensations to the idea of eensa- 
 tiona to come.* 
 
52 
 
 The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 Are we to 
 
 be biological 
 or psycho- 
 logical in 
 oxir Etliics ? 
 
 and the recognition that feelings 
 
 **have authorities proportioned to the degrees in which they 
 are removed by their complexity and their ideality from simple 
 sensations and appotites." 
 
 Are we, then, to be biological in our ethics or 
 psychological ? Under which king shall we serve? 
 Are we to accept the teaching of biology, and seek 
 those things which are immediately present, and 
 think it to be absurd to recognise only the remote 
 results of conduct ? or are we to disregard biology, 
 and insist on the superior wisdom of psychology ? 
 If we do so, what becomes of our proposed deduc- 
 tion of morality from the laws of life and conditions 
 of existence, and what are we to do in the mean- 
 
 Thc socio- 
 logical 
 view. 
 
 time, while the need presses on us, to obtain a 
 scientific guide to conduct ? Shall we wait until 
 biology and psychology have been reconciled to 
 one another, and are agreed to speak with one 
 voice, and recommend one principle of conduct? 
 The vacuum must bo filled, but the sciences Mr. 
 Spencer calls in to help to fill it have disagreed, 
 and their dispute is likely to issue in the widening 
 of the vacuum. Meanwhile we shall content 
 ourselves for a little longer with the old Ethics 
 and their sanctions. 
 
 There remains the sociological view, wh*')h 
 perhaps may help to reconcile the discordant 
 utterances of biology and psychology. 
 
 **From the sociological point of view, ethics become nothing 
 else than a definite account of the forms of conduct that are 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined, 53 
 
 fitted to the associated state, in sucli wise that the lives of each 
 and all may be the greatest possible, alike in length and 
 breadth" (p. 133). 
 
 It is to be remembered, however, tliat on the 
 same principle 
 
 "there is a supposable formula for the activities of each 
 species, which, could it be drawn out, would constitute a system 
 of morality for that species." 
 
 If we follow the ascending scale, we have a series Ascending 
 of systems of morality, corresponding to the position systems oX 
 a species occupies in the ladder of evolution. If 
 we foUow man from his pre-social stage to man in 
 his social stage, we have at the new position to 
 include an added factor in the formula. This 
 addition affords a contrast to all systems of morality 
 supposed to be applicable to lower species. It 
 might have been supposed that we should find a 
 striking likeness between all systems of morality. 
 But we find, instead, a decided contrast. Man is Man aione 
 
 has "a 
 
 the only species which has "a formula for complete f^^^^ jj^^^ 
 life." It is very strange that this should be the ^*" 
 case, seeing that the formula is only the outcome 
 of adaptation to the environment, physical, bio- 
 logical, social. For other animals are also social ; 
 at all events 
 
 * there are inferior species which display considerable degrees of 
 cociality." 
 
 Why, then, should the morality applicable to them 
 be so different from the morality of man ? Is not 
 
54 
 
 The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 tlie additional factor of sucli a kind as to necessi- 
 tate a view of morality altogether new ? In which 
 case, we ask again, what has hecome of the pro- 
 posed attempt to deduce morality from the laws of 
 life and conditions of existence? 
 
 The ultimate end, even on the sociological view, 
 is the individual happiness. In order, however, 
 the more effectively to attain that end. 
 
 Inade- 
 quacy and 
 failure 
 of the 
 eociolugical 
 view. 
 
 Personal 
 
 pleasure 
 still the 
 ultimate 
 end : im- 
 possible to 
 deduce 
 morality 
 trom this. 
 
 " the life of the social organism, must, as an end, rank aboye 
 the lives of its unity." 
 
 We cheerfully admit that the welfare of society as 
 a whole ought to be put in the foreground, but we 
 see no reason for the admission on the ground set 
 forth by Mr. Spencer. If my duties to the social 
 organism have, as their ultimate ground, the aim 
 to secure for myself the gTeatest amount of pleasure 
 and the least of pain, what means are there to con- 
 strain me to my duty when the two ends conflict ? 
 
 " Living together arose because, on the average, it proved 
 more advantageous to each than living apart." 
 
 Let us suppose one to reason in the following 
 fashion, what answer would Mr. Spencer find. I 
 conceive it to my advantage to live apart. I find 
 that others keep the sunshine from me, and my 
 only request to my fellow-men is that made by 
 Diogenes to Alexander. There is no answer to 
 this position on any Utilitarian hypothesis. It is 
 no answer to the difficulty to say that the good 
 time is coming when 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 55 
 
 'the relations, at present familiar to us, will be inverted ; and, 
 instead of each maintaining his own claims, others will maintain 
 his claims for him." 
 
 And this brings us again to Mr. Spencer's favourite 
 method of escape from difficulty a method which 
 cannot be allowed to any moralist. "We are moral 
 now. We have a consciousness of right and wrong. 
 We feci moral obligation, and it is a mere evasion 
 of the question to say that there will come a time 
 when we shall be so moral as to have no conscious- 
 ness of right and wrong, and so have any feeling 
 of moral obligation. 
 
 It is not to be denied that in these chapters on irrSevant 
 the physical, the biological, the psychological, and of the 
 
 .. . t' argument 
 
 sociological views of morality there are many wise g^ed by Mr 
 observations on nature, man, and society ; nor do 
 we affirm that they are unprofitable reading. On 
 the contrary, there is much in them which deserves 
 the deepest consideration of all men. Our conten- 
 tion is that the observations made and the views 
 promulgated are irrelevant to the thesis propounded 
 by Mr. Spencer. He has set himself to explain 
 morality, and to devise rules of conduct for man as 
 he now is. He has substituted for morality some- 
 thing which is non-moral, and the rules of conduct 
 are not for man as he is, but for an ideal man in 
 a state of society which is non-existent. His Data 
 of Ethics is another Utopia, 
 
 This brings us to the last point wc shall consider 
 
56 
 
 The Ethics of EvolvMon Examined. 
 
 Absolute 
 and relative 
 ethics. 
 
 Illustration 
 from the 
 l>rogress of 
 mechanics. 
 
 at tlie present time. We mean the distinction 
 drawn by Mr. Spencer between absolute and relative 
 ethics. At the outset we may say that it is by no 
 means clear how, on Mr. Spencer's view, such a 
 distinction is possible, nor how absolute ethics may 
 precede relative ethics, except on the supposition 
 that the end is impUed in the process. When Mr. 
 Spencer says 
 
 *' that ascertainment of the actual truths has been made possible 
 only by pre-ascertainment of certain ideal truths " (p. 220), 
 
 he raises the question of how the human mind can 
 know the ideal before the actual. On the hypo- 
 thesis of evolution this is clearly impossible; for 
 it pre-supposes that the evolution is simply the 
 realisation of a prior idea involved at the beginning, 
 to be evolved at the end of the series of changes. 
 From our point of view we have no objection to 
 such a concej)tion, but it is fatal to the theory of 
 Mr. Spencer. 
 
 He seeks to make his meaning plain by the pro- 
 gress of mechanics, from its empirical to its rational 
 form. We may accept his account of the genesis 
 of abstract mechanics, and need not criticize it too 
 curiously : 
 
 **By easy and rude experiences there were inductively 
 reached, vague but practically true notions respecting the over- 
 balancing of bodies, the motions of missiles, the actions of 
 levers." 
 
 This may be accepted as, so far, a true account of 
 the matter. But the formulated, ideal mechanics 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined, 57 
 
 must be of a kind which, will truly interpret the 
 first rude experiences of the race, and not contra- 
 dict them. They must be consistent with universal 
 experience. In our ideal mechanics we may assume 
 a lever which is absolutely rigid, a fulcrum without 
 breadth, and the weight of the body to be moved 
 to be collected at a certain point. Abstract me- 
 chanics does assume this, knowing all the while 
 that as a matter of fact, we have no such levers or 
 fulcrums in nature. Still the demonstrations are 
 true as far as they go. But even abstract mechanics 
 cannot dispense with space, and time, and body, ^Sgy^ 
 and it assumes those intuitions which are universal meSnics 
 and necessary to the human mind. It cannot move 
 a step without them. The intuitions of space and 
 number are drawn on at every step. The inference 
 drawn by Mr. Spencer is, therefore, by no means 
 plain that in a similar fashion 
 
 "by easy and rude experiences there were inductively reached, 
 vague but partially true notions respecting the effects of man's 
 behaviour on themselves, on one another, and on society' 
 (p. 220). 
 
 And the reason is because the cases are not parallel. Jo^p^'Siei. 
 Ly this we mean that in the hands of Mr. Spencer 
 what corresponds in ethics to absolute mechanics 
 is in contradiction to the moral intuitions of the 
 human race. If he could set forth an abstract 
 mechanics, the conclusions of which would show 
 that the intuitions of space and time would dis- 
 appear, he would accomplish what he has professed 
 
58 The Ethics of Evolution Examined, 
 
 to demonstrate in ethics, when he predicts a time 
 when the sense of obHgation will disappear. Again 
 we say, that we do not deny a distinction between 
 absolute and relative ethics, we say that Mr. 
 Spencer has no right to make the distinction. If 
 he had been able to show how the sense of obliga- 
 tion and the power of discerning right from wrong 
 were present and operative at every stage of the 
 process, as the intuitions of space and time are 
 present and operative at every stage in the evolution 
 of abstract mechanics, he would have done some- 
 thing bearing on the proof of his thesis. Instead 
 we have a categorical denial of the moral intuitions, 
 and a prophecy of their disappearance. 
 Mr. Spencer In his zeal for absolute ethics he is quite pre- 
 that there is pared to assort that relative ethics can afford no 
 
 no guidance 
 
 iVhirl^^^^^ guidance to man. He affirms that 
 
 *' throughout a considerable parj; of conduct, no guiding 
 principle, no method of estimation, enables us to say whether a 
 proposed course is even relatively right ; as causing, proximately 
 and remotely, specially and generally, the greatest surplus of 
 good over evil" (p. 268). 
 
 Let the reader translate this into the language 
 of mechanics, and see how the parallel between 
 mechanics and ethics again fails. His illustrations 
 of the uncertainty of knowing right from wrong, 
 all turn on the difficulty of calculating contingen- 
 cies. One case is that of a tenant farmer, whose 
 political principles prompt him to vote in opposition 
 to his landlord. The way in which Mr. Spencer 
 
 etliics. 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 59 
 
 balances the pros and cons would be amusing, if it 
 were not so sad 
 
 ' We have to recognise the fact that in countless such cases no 
 one can decide by which of the alternative cases the least 
 wrong is likely to be done" (p. 267). 
 
 Here is in truth, no moral guidance, and this is 
 demonstrated by the only morality which can result 
 from the balancings of pleasures and pains. Ordi- 
 nary men, who believe in God and in moral law, 
 would at once say that the tenant farmer ought to 
 follow his principles, and leave the issues to God. 
 
 Nor does absolute ethics afford guidance to man. No guidance 
 
 in absolute 
 
 Before its rules can come into action there must ethics. 
 come a time when right action may be done with- 
 out leaving a trace of pain anywhere or to any 
 person. 
 
 *'The philosophical moralist treats," we are told by Mr. The philo- 
 Spencer, "solely of the straight man. He determines the moralist 
 properties of the straight man, describes how the straight man *|"*;*^^ ^^ 
 comports himself ; shows in what relationship he stands to other man. 
 straight men ; shows how a community of straight men is con- 
 stituted. Any deviation from strict rectitude he is compelled 
 wholly to ignore. It cannot be admitted into his premisses 
 without vitiating all his conclusions. A problem in which a 
 croolcd man forms one of the elements is insoluble by him" 
 (p. 271-2). 
 
 But, according to the analogy to mechanics, we 
 can only get the straight man by abstraction from 
 the crooked man; and, still adhering to the analogy, 
 every concrete mechanical problem can be solved 
 approximately by the methods of mechanics. Why 
 
GO 
 
 The Elhics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 The categor- 
 ical impera- 
 tive not an 
 abstract 
 truth, but 
 a universal 
 command. 
 
 We have a 
 real guide 
 to conduct. 
 
 should not the problem of practical morality he solved 
 after the same fashion ? We have been arguing 
 here on the supposition that Mr. Spencer's analogy 
 between mechanics and ethics holds good. But to 
 us the analogy is very misleading. The contrast 
 between absolute and relative ethics by no means 
 corresponds to the contrast between abstract and 
 concrete. To say so would be to mistake the ethical 
 problem altogether. The categorical imperative is 
 the expression, not of any general and abstract 
 truth, but of an absolute and universal command, 
 which claims to rule the inward life and outward 
 action of man by governing all his desires, inten- 
 tions, and aims. It is an absolute command, a 
 law of inherent and unconditional obligation, which 
 sets aside all considerations of prudence, personal 
 affection, and general utility, and asserts its OAvn 
 supreme authority over all other precepts and in- 
 junctions whatsoever. A good will is an end in 
 itself; and a good will, grounded on reverence for 
 moral law, is good in itself and for itself alone, 
 irrespective of any outward consequences, irrespec- 
 tive also of anything useful, or pleasant, or desir- 
 able, irrespective of fitness for any higher end, for 
 this is the highest end. 
 
 If this be so, then we have a real guide to con- 
 duct. We are not constraiued with Mr. Spencer 
 to say that we cannot tell what duty is, and are 
 not shut up to choose the least wrong. If we 
 
The Ethics of Evolution Examined. tjl 
 
 3C0gnise that right has not been built up out of 
 leasurable experiences, but has a majesty and a 
 ;v inction in itself, then the absolute claim it has on 
 s may be recognised and acted on, whatsoever the 
 jonsequenccs may be. 
 
 We submit, then, that Mr. Spencer has failed to ^^.^^ ^^ 
 ccount for the facts of our moral consciousness, Sepre^ert 
 nd that his system confessedly supplies no guidance morai^'con- 
 moral conduct. We need not consider further and fails 
 
 (to afford 
 ris conception of the straight man in a straight guidance to 
 ocicty. At present Mr. Spencer is conscious of 
 m unfriendly environment. He has, by various 
 terations, to force alien conceptions on reluctant 
 ninds. He does not expect that " his conclusions 
 ,vill meet with any general acceptance," nor do we. 
 But his own experience of a great mission and calling 
 m the world ought to have made him reflect on the 
 3onclusions he has reached. Taking for the moment 
 the estimate he has formed of his system of philo- 
 sophy, looking at the persistency with which he 
 has forced his conceptions on reluctant minds, and 
 having regard to the anxiety he manifests to pro- 
 vide a scientific basis for morality, we might have 
 expected from him a larger and a more generous 
 estimate of the value of the work of individual 
 man for man. He has steadfastly held his own, 
 and has sought to benefit man for of the noble- 
 ness of his purpose there can be no doubt. Why, 
 then, should he not recognise in man what he finds 
 
62 The Ethics of Evolution Examined* 
 
 in so largo a scale in himself? Why not take 
 account of the force of example as a moral mctive, 
 and of love to man as the great elevating force 
 over human life ? If the existence of Mr. Spencer 
 and his work has boon possible in an unfriendly 
 environment, why should we not go further, and 
 say, in opposition to his teaching, that the existence 
 of a perfect man and an imperfect society is quite 
 possible ? No doubt he says categorically that 
 
 **the co-existence of a perfect man and an imperfect society is 
 impossible." 
 
 Ethics J5ut we recall to mind Plato's description of the 
 
 aemand a ^ 
 
 Sample. j^^t man. We quote from Jowett's Introduction 
 to the Repuhlic : 
 
 *'And now let us frame an ideal of the just and unjust. 
 Imagine the unjust man to be master of his craft, seldom 
 making mistakes and easily correcting them, having gifts of. 
 money, speech, strength, the greatest villain bearing the highest 
 character ; and at his side let us place the just in hia nobleness 
 and simplicity, being not seeming, without name or reward, 
 clotlied in his justice only, the best of men who is thought to 
 be the worst, and let him die as he has lived. I might add 
 (but I would rather put the rest into the mouth of the 
 panygerists of injustice they will tell you) that the just man 
 will be scourged, racked, bound, will have his eyes put out, 
 and will at last be crucified, and all this because he ought to 
 have preferred seeming to being." ^ 
 
 ^piauThfs ^^^^^ picture which passed before the glowing ima- 
 hi^to?ai gination of Plato, has had an historical fulfilment. 
 And while the memories of Gethsemane linger in the 
 mind, Mr. Spencer will find it vain to tell man that 
 
 1 Jowett's PlatOf vol. iii., p. 21. 
 
 fulfilment. 
 
The Ethics of Euolution Examined, 
 
 *' conduct which has any concomitant of pain in any painful 
 consequence is partially wrong." 
 
 We find the criterion of riglit and wrong elsewliere, a perfect 
 
 , man in the 
 
 and we also find that by the confession of all, a midst of an 
 
 ^ ' imperfect 
 
 perfect Man did once appear in an imperfect society, 8<^^^*y- 
 and gave Himself to the work of redeeming men 
 from sin and misery, of showing them what human 
 life ought to be, and may become ; and of making a 
 new world in which a perfect society may safely, 
 gladly dwell. He showed man a more excellent 
 way, not the old way of self-assertion, or of the 
 rule of strength, or of having regard to pleasure, 
 but the new way of returning good for evil, of 
 bearing the cross, and of knowing the blessedness 
 of sorrow. Christ's moral teaching stands in chnst'a 
 
 teaching a 
 
 perfect contrast to the teaching of Mr. Spencer, J"^^^^ 
 different in origin, in method, in results, and in ^p^"^^'^'*' 
 sanction, and we have the testimony of John Stuart 
 Mill to the fact that no higher standard of living 
 is conceivable than to live so that Christ shall 
 approve your life. Those who have this as motive 
 and reward, are not conscious of the vacuum which 
 Mr. Spencer is so anxious to fill. 
 
 In the life and work and teaching of Christ, we Christ 
 
 '^ interprets 
 
 learn the true interpretation of the fact of our o"^ moral 
 moral life. From Him we learn the real meaning 
 of moral obligation, of our powerlessness to fulfil 
 it, ?nd of the pain, anguish and remorse, which we 
 foel because we cannot do the things which we 
 
G4 The Ethics of Evolution Examined, 
 
 would. How shall wo become wliat we feel we 
 ought to be ? We need to be placed in right re- 
 blcmne lations to the supreme moral law, wo need a 
 TughtTo be. strength beyond our own to lift us to the level of a 
 holy life, and through Christ and by union with 
 Him we obtain what we need. "Why should we be 
 afraid to say, that from Christ we have received 
 the true ideal of moral life, as from Christ we 
 receive the strength to live up to it ? He has 
 atoned for our sins, He has deepened and cleansed 
 all the moral convictions, He has embodied the 
 highest ideal of a perfect moral life, and He has 
 poured into human life a tide of living strength, 
 which is making this world a world of righteous- 
 ness, purity, and peace. We make no rash 
 prophecy, we are simply stating a fact of human 
 experience which may bo ascertained by ordinary 
 historical inquiry, when we say that, whoso has 
 the life and teaching of Christ, has enough for 
 life and guidance. He has a motive for living, an 
 aim for life, strength by the Holy Spirit to bear 
 and do, and hope to crown and reward his efforts. 
 The moral life inspired by Christ, and guided by 
 Him, has also the surest scientific truth; and it 
 will become more apparent as time rolls on, and 
 Christian experience widens, that Christian Ethics are the 
 only true scientific Ethics. 
 
 -i>^PRESENT Day Tracts, No, 48^-^ 
 
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 1 Christianity and Miracies at tiie Present 
 
 Day. By the Rev. Principal CAirns, 
 
 D.D., LL.D. 
 
 2 The Historical Evidence of ttie Resur- 
 
 rection of Jesus Christ /rom the Dead. 
 By Rev. C. A. Row, m.a. 
 
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 Hanity. By Rev. Principal Cairns. 
 
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 By W. G. Blaikih, d.d., ll.d. 
 
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 By Prebendary Row, m.a. 
 
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 ModemExplanations of It. By the Rev. 
 Principal Cairns, d.d., lud. 
 
 VOLUME 
 
 13 kge and Origin of Man Geologically 
 
 Considered. By S. R. Pattison, 
 Esq., F.G.S., and Dr. Friedrich Pfaff. 
 
 14 Rise and Decline of Islam. By Sir 
 
 William Muir, k.c.s.l, d.c.l. 
 
 15 Mosaic Authorship and Credibility of 
 
 the Pentateuch. By Dean of Cuiicrbury . 
 
 V0LUM3 a contains : 
 
 7 Christianity and Secularism Compared 
 
 in their Injluettce and Effects. By W. 
 G. Blaikie, d.d. 
 
 8 Agnosticism: a Doctrine of Despair. 
 
 By the Rev. Noah Porter, d.d. 
 
 9 The Antiquity of Man Historically Con- 
 
 sidered. By Rev. Canon Rawlinson, 
 
 M.A. 
 
 10 The Witness of Palestine to the ^ibh. 
 
 By W. G. Blaikie, d.d. 
 
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 Beliefs. By Canon Rawlinson, m.a. 
 
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 to Christianity. By the Rev. J. Radford 
 Thomson, m.a. 
 
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 16 Authenticity of the Four Gospels. 
 
 Rev. Henry Wage, b.d., d.d. 
 
 17 Modern Materialism. By the late 
 
 Rev. W. F. Wilkinson, m.a. 
 
 18 Christianity and Confucianism Com- 
 
 pared in their Teaching of the Whole 
 Dttty of Man. Uy JambS Leggb, LL.D. 
 
 By 
 
PRESENT DAY TRACTS, 
 
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 19 Christianity: as History, Doctrine, 
 
 and Life. By Rev. Noah Porter, d.d. 
 
 20 Ihe Religious Teachings of the Sub- 
 
 lifm and Beautiful in Nature. By Rev. 
 Canon Rawlinson, m.a. 
 
 21 Ernest Renan and His Criticism of 
 
 Christ. By Rev. W. G. Elmslib, m.A. 
 
 22 Unity of the Character of the Christ 
 
 of the Gospels, a proof of its Historical 
 Reality. By Rev. Prebendary Row, m.a 
 
 23 The Vitality of the Bible. By Rev. 
 
 W. G. BlAIKIE, D.D., LL.D. 
 
 24 Evidential Conclusions from the 
 
 Four Greater Epistles of St. Paul. By 
 the Dean of Chester. 
 
 VOIiUMS 5 contains: 
 
 25 The Zend-Avesta and the Religion 
 
 oftheParsxs. By J. Murray Mitchell, 
 
 M.A., LL.D. 
 
 26 The k uthorship of the Fourth Gospel. 
 
 By F. GoDKT, D.D., Neufchatel. 
 
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 ment from Prophecy. By the Rev. 
 Principal Cairns, d.d., ll.d. 
 
 28 Origin of the Hebrew Religion. By 
 
 Eustace R. Conder, m.a., d.d. 
 
 29 The Philosophy of Mr. Herbert 
 
 spencer Examined. By the Rev. J ames 
 Iverach, m.a. 
 
 30 fdan not a Machine, but a Respon- 
 
 sible Free Agent. By the Rev. Pre- 
 bendary Row, M.A. 
 
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 31 The Adaptation of the Bible to the 
 
 Needs and Nature of Man. By the 
 Rev. W. G. Blaikie, d.d., ll.d. 
 
 32 The Witness of Ancient Monuments 
 
 to the Old Testament Scriptures. By 
 A. H. SAvce, m.a.. Oxford. 
 
 33 The Hindu Religion. By J. M. 
 
 Mitchell, m.a., ll.d. 
 
 34 Modern Pessimism. By the Rev. J. 
 
 Radford Thomson, m.a. 
 
 35 The Divinity of our Lord In Relation 
 
 to His IVotk oj Atonement. By Rev. 
 William Arthur. 
 
 36 The Lord's Supper an Abiding Wit- 
 
 ness to the Death of Christ. By Sir 
 W. MuiR, K.C.S.I., etc. 
 
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 VOIjITMIj 7 contains: 
 
 37 The Christ of the Gospels. A Re- 
 
 ligious study. By Dr. Henri Meyer. 
 
 38 F^fdlnand Christian Baur, and his 
 
 M ktory of the Origin of Christianity 
 and the New Testament Writittt^s. By 
 Rev. A. B. Bruce, d.d. 
 
 39 Man, Physiologically Considered- 
 
 By A. Macalister, m.a., m.d., f.r.s- 
 Professor of Anatomy, Cambridge. 
 
 40 utilitarianism : An Illogical and 
 
 Irreligious Theory of Morals. By Rev. 
 J. Radford Thomson, m.a. 
 
 41 Historical Illustrations of the New 
 
 Testament Scriptures. By the Rev. G. 
 F. Maclear, d.d. 
 
 42 Points of Contact between Revelation 
 
 and Natural Science. By Sir J. Wil- 
 liam DAWbON, LL.U., H.K.B. 
 
 VOLUME 8 contains: 
 
 43 The Claim of Christ on the Conscience. 
 
 By Rev. William Stevenson, m.a. 
 
 44 The Doctrine of the Atonement 
 
 Historically and ScripturcUly Ex-- 
 amined. By Rev. J. Stoughton, d.d. 
 
 45 The Resurrection of Jesus Christ In 
 
 its Historical, Doctrinal, Moral, and 
 Spiritual Aspects. By the Rev. R, 
 McCheyne Edgar, m.a. 
 
 46 Buddhism: A Comparison and a 
 
 Contrast between Buddhism, and Chris- 
 tianity. By the Rev. Henry Robert 
 Reynolds, d.d. 
 
 47 Auguste Comte and the "Religion 
 
 of Humanity." By the Rev. J. Rad- 
 ford Thomson, m.a. 
 
 48 The Ethics of Evolution Examined. 
 
 By Rev. J. Ivkkach, m.a. 
 
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 49 /s the Evolution of Christianity from 
 
 Mere Natural Sources Credible ? By 
 the Rev. John Cairns, d.d. 
 
 50 The Day of Rest in Relation to the 
 
 World that now is and that which is to 
 come. By Sir J. Wm. Dawson, f.r.s. 
 
 51 Christianity and Ancient Paganism 
 
 By J. Mur.RAY Mitchell, m.a., ll.d. 
 
 52 Christ and Creation: a Two-sided 
 
 Quest. By Rev. W. S. Lewis, m.a. 
 
 53 The Present Conflict with Unbelief . 
 
 A Survey and a Forecast. By Rev. J. 
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 54 The Evidential Value of the Obser- 
 
 vance of the Lord's Day. By the Rev. 
 G. F. Maclear, d.d. 
 
 VOLUME 10 contains: 
 
 55 The Authenticity of the Four Prin- 
 
 cipal Epistles of St. Paul. By Rev. 
 
 F. GODET, D.D. 
 
 56 Moral Difficulties of the Old Testa- 
 
 ment Scriptures. By Rev. Eustace 
 
 R. CONDER, D.U. 
 
 57 Unity of Faith. A Proof of the 
 
 Divine Origin aiid Preservation cf 
 Christianity. By the Rev. John 
 
 StOUGHTON, D.D. 
 
 58 The Family: Its Scriptural Ideal 
 
 and its Modem Assailants. By Prof. 
 W. G. Blaikie, d.d., ll.d. 
 
 59 Socialism and Christianity. By the 
 
 Rev. M. Kaufmann, m.a.. Author of 
 " Socialism : its Nature, its Dangers, 
 audits Remedies considered^' etc. 
 
 60 The Age and Trustworthiness of the 
 
 Old Testament Scriptures. By R, 
 B. Girdlestone, m.a. 
 
 VOLUME 11 contains: 
 61 Argument for Christianity from the 
 
 Experience of Christians. By the Rev. 
 Principal Cairns, d.d. 
 
 62 Egoism, Altruism, and Christian 
 
 Jtudaimonism. By Rev. M. Kauf- 
 mann, M.A. 
 
 6.'? The Two Geologies : a Contrast and 
 
 a Comparison. Bv Rev. W. S. Lewis, 
 
 M.A. 
 
 64 The Psalms compared with the 
 
 Hymns of Different Religions an Evi- 
 dence of Inspiration. By Rev. Dr 
 Blaikie. 
 
 65 The Origin of life and Consciousness. 
 
 By Rev. Chas. ChApman, m.a., ll.d. 
 
 6Q The Influence of the Christian Re- 
 ligion in History. By T. E. Slater, 
 London Missionary Society. 
 
 VOLUME 12 contains: 
 
 67 Testimonies of Great Men to the 
 
 Bible and Christianity. By John 
 Murdoch, ll.d. 
 
 68 Theology an Inductive and a Pro- 
 
 gressive Science. By Rev. Joseph 
 Angus, m.a , d.d. 
 
 69 Modern Scepticism compared with 
 
 Christian Faith. By Rev. M. Kauk 
 
 MANN, m.a. 
 
 70 The Problem of Human Suffering in 
 
 the Light of Christianity. By Rev. 
 T. Stekling Berry, d.d. 
 
 71 The 'Psalms of David ' and Modern 
 
 Criticism. By Rev. Samuel G. 
 Green, d.d. 
 
 72 Christ's Doctrine of Prayer. By 
 
 Rev. R. McCheyne Edgar, m.a.. 
 
 D.D. 
 
PRESS NOTICES 
 
 OF THE 
 
 MOST RECENT NUMBERS OF THE " PRESENT DAY TRACTS.' 
 
 No. 72. Christ's Doctrine of Prayer. By the Rev. R. McCheyn 
 Edgar, M.A., D.D. 4d. 
 
 'I The great feature of Dr. Edgar's little work is the admirable metho 
 which he has adopted. . . . The whole argument is thoughtful an 
 suggestive." Record. 
 
 "The book is done so well, the argument is so cogent, and the style s 
 clear, that it can hardly fail to be one of the most useful of the series." 
 
 Cornwall Gazette. 
 
 * Ckrisfs Doctrine of Prayer is a fine contribution to the study of th 
 weighty topic. Written with a view to meet and refute the cultured scepticisi 
 of. the day, it is necessarily argumentative and philosophical. . , . W 
 cordially commend its study." Word and Work. 
 
 No. 73. Life and Immortality brought to Light by Christ. By tJ 
 Rev. W. Wright, D.D. 4d. 
 
 "A most able and comprehensive little treatise, clear and lucid in i 
 reasoning upon the question of the resurrection. Every doubter should ha^ 
 a copy placed in his hands." Baptist. 
 
 ** Succinct and pointed, this essay illustrates doctrine by history, and sf 
 forth in brief the sure warrant of the Christian faith. This little book 
 sixty-four pages is calculated to do much more effective service agair 
 agnosticism and other forms of unbelief than are many more pretentious a: 
 bulky works. It is instructive and evidential in substance, plain and u 
 technical in style, and eminently loyal to Holy Writ." Christian. 
 
 "Dr. Wright's Tract is a worthy addition to the Present Day Tracts. I 
 account of the admissions, of modern science, as represented by its m( 
 authoritative expounders, and of the ideas regarding the future prevalent 
 the ancient heathen world is clear and valuable." Presbyterian. 
 
 No. 74. Heredity and Personal Responsibility. By the Rev. : 
 Kaufmann, M.A. 4d. 
 
 "The Tract is both valuable and timely." London Quarterly Review. 
 
 ** Mr. Kaufmann does not appear for the first time in this very useful s.'iv 
 practical series, and his present effort is true to the character of his previc- 
 work. That he knows the literature of his subject goes without saying. , 
 The pamphlet is distinctly helpful." Record. 
 
 "One of the ablest and most notable of an able and notable series 
 tracts. . . . Mr. Kaufmann has compressed into the very narrow sp; 
 at his disposal a lucid and closely-reasoned case, and he supports 
 argument by a critical examination of the works of Darwin, Weismai 
 Herbert Spencer, Martineau, Zola, and other writers." Birmingham Gazei 
 
 " It is an able essay, and the aim is thus summarised by the auth( 
 'Granted heredity, responsibility is not destroyed, because in the inter 
 forces which regulate a man's life there is enough to counteract inb( 
 tendencies, and the grace of God is sufficient to conquer them.'" Christiai 
 
 London : The Religious Tract Society, 56 Paternostj^EURow, 
 
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