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ARE WE READY? 
 

ARE WE READY^ 
 
 BY HOWARD D. WHEELER 
 
 WITH A LETTEB 
 
 BY 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL LEONARD WOOD 
 
 BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
 
 HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 
 
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 1916 
 
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 COPYRIGHT, I915, BY HOWARD D. WHEELER 
 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 
 Published February iqij 
 
 • • • • > • 
 
TO THE 
 DAUGHTER OF A SOLDIER— MY WIFE 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
 
 I wish to express my gratitude to the editor of Har- 
 per's Weekly for permission to reprint in this volume 
 certain papers which appeared in that publication dur- 
 ing December, 1914, and January, 1915. 
 
 I am also indebted to Mr. Oliver Herford and to 
 Mr. Boardman Robinson for the right to use drawings 
 owned by them. 
 
 H. D. W. 
 
 New York, January 7, 1915. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 A Letter sdii 
 
 I. Gold and Iron 1 
 
 II. An Attack on New York 11 
 
 III. A Bottled Navy 37 
 
 IV. The Hole in our Pocket 55 
 
 V. Our Citizen Fighters 83 
 
 VI. The Battle op the Connecticut . . . 108 
 
 VII. Hell on Wheels 126 
 
 VIII. The Great American Bugaboo . . . 148 
 
 IX. The Extra Tire in War 175 
 
 X. Well? 195 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Majoe-General Leonard Wood . . . Frontispiece 
 
 Twentieth United States Infantry in Ma- 
 neuvers AT Fort Bliss, Texas 4 
 
 Madison Square, New York, after an 
 
 Aerial Raid 14 
 
 From a Drawing by Oliver Herford. 
 
 Signal Corps Man 20 
 
 Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, 1911- 
 1913 28 
 
 Big Guns at Fort Wadsworth, Staten 
 Island, New York 34 
 
 George Von L. Meyer, Secretary of the 
 Navy, 1909-1913 46 
 
 Our Thousand-Dollar Soldier 60 
 
 Fort Cook, Nebraska: An Army Post con- 
 structed and maintained at Maximum Cost 68 
 
 Fort Sheridan, Illinois: A National Extrav- 
 agance 72 
 
 Militia in Sham Battle 84 
 
 A Mess Table of the New York National 
 Guard, Montauk Point, Long Island . . 90 
 
 Militia in Battle Practice 98 
 
 xi 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Militia Officers in Consultation during 
 
 Field Practice 10£ 
 
 Prussian Citizen Soldiery of 1870 . . . .118 
 From a Painting by Edouard Detaiile. 
 
 The Terror of the Germans: The Famous 
 French Artillery in Action 132 
 
 Mountain Battery of the United States 
 Army 136 
 
 Comparative Strength of the Nations in 
 Field Artillery 137 
 
 An American Field Artillery Battery in 
 Action 140 
 
 A French Field Artillery Battery . . . .144 
 
 Swiss and German Soldiers at the Frontier 158 
 
 College Students learning the Fine Points 
 OF Trench-Digging 170 
 
 A Student Soldiers' Mess 170 
 
 We have 16 Trained Men as Listed Re- 
 servists 180 
 
 Skirmish Drill at the Burlington Camp . . 196 
 
 Open-Order Practice at Burlington, Ver- 
 mont 196 
 
 The Students' Camp at Ludington . ... 212 
 
 Students in the Trenches at Gettysburg . 212 
 
 President Wilson delivering an Address in 
 Front of Independence Hall, Philadelphia, 
 July 4, 1914 222 
 
A LETTER 
 
 Governor's Island, N.Y., 
 January 8th, 1915. 
 
 My dear Mr. Wheeler: — 
 
 I have read with much interest your articles 
 in Harper's Weekly, written evidently for the 
 purpose of bringing to the attention of the 
 American people the necessity of adequate pre- 
 paredness for defense, and I am very glad to 
 learn that you are to publish a book on the 
 same general lines with a view to bringing our 
 needs in this particular to the attention of the 
 American public. It is a subject, in my opin- 
 ion, deserving of serious and careful attention 
 on the part of the people. I do not mean to 
 indicate that we should have such a degree of 
 preparedness, or that we should prepare in such 
 a spirit as to justify the charge of militarism, 
 but only to such an extent and in such a man- 
 ner as to secure that rational and reasonable 
 degree of preparedness which will render us 
 able promptly and eflfectively to defend our- 
 
 xiii 
 
A LETTER 
 
 selves, our interests, and our institutions 
 against aggression. 
 
 I have stated plainly in oflScial reports, 
 which are public documents and open to your 
 inspection and use, my views and recommend- 
 ations in the way of preparedness, the necessity 
 of preparation in time of peace, and the impos- 
 sibihty of making preparation after war has 
 once commenced, at least without such delay 
 as would result in great and unnecessary 
 losses. 
 
 While entertaining the highest opinion of the 
 soldierly qualities of the American, it can be 
 stated that those who know what war is real- 
 ize that to send the youth of this country, 
 untrained and unprepared, into war means a 
 needless and wanton waste of life. It means 
 more, — it means that the lessons of history 
 have not been taken to heart. 
 
 Even in the early days of the Republic, when 
 our territorial possessions were limited to a 
 relatively small portion of this continent, when 
 transportation overseas was slow and danger- 
 ous, and wars came slowly, when our possible 
 
 xiv 
 
A LETTER 
 
 enemies were unprepared to strike promptly 
 and om* people were still to a large extent used 
 to the rifle and accustomed to take care of 
 themselves in camp and forest, even then our 
 early Presidents saw clearly the danger inci- 
 dent to unpreparedness and urged upon Con- 
 gress in message after message reasonable 
 measures of preparation. 
 
 Washington, in his first annual address, 
 stated: — 
 
 To be prepared for war is one of the most effec- 
 tual means of preserving peace. A free people 
 ought not only to be armed but disciplined, to 
 which end a uniform and well-digested plan is re- 
 quisite. 
 
 Again: — 
 
 The safety of the United States, under Divine 
 protection, ought to rest on the basis of systematic 
 and solid arrangements, exposed as little as pos- 
 sible to the hazards of fortuitous circumstances. 
 
 President Adams said : — 
 
 But in demonstrating by our conduct that we do 
 not fear war in the necessary protection of our rights 
 and honor, we should give no room for any fear 
 
 XV 
 
A LETTER 
 
 that we abandon the desire of peace. An efficient 
 preparation for war can alone insure peace. 
 
 Thomas JeflFerson, in his fifth annual mes- 
 sage, advocated: — 
 
 The organization of three hundred thousand 
 able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and 
 twenty-six for offense or defense, at any time or 
 any place where they may be wanted. 
 
 In a letter to Monroe he advocated compul- 
 sory military service in the following words: — 
 
 We must train and classify the whole of our male 
 citizens . . . and make military instruction a part 
 of collegiate education. 
 
 And again: — 
 
 If war be forced upon us in spite of our long and 
 vain appeals to the justice of nations, rapid and 
 vigorous movement at the outset will go far toward 
 securing us in its course and issue and throwing its 
 burdens on those who render necessary the resort 
 from reason to force. 
 
 The principles laid down in these messages 
 are just as sound to-day as they were when 
 uttered, and they are even more pertinent in 
 all which relates to a reasonable degree of pre- 
 
 xvi 
 
A LETTER 
 
 paredness, for wars now come much more 
 quickly. 
 
 That a rational degree of preparedness is not 
 inconsistent with American institutions and 
 ideals is clearly indicated in the last message of 
 President Wilson, in which he states : — 
 
 It will be right enough, right American policy, 
 based on our accustomed principles and practices, 
 to provide a system by which every citizen who will 
 volunteer for the training may be made familiar 
 with the use of modern arms, the rudiments of 
 drill and maneuver, and the maintenance and sani- 
 tation of camps. 
 
 We should encourage such training and make it 
 a means of discipline which our young men will 
 learn to value. It is right that we should provide 
 it not only, but that we should make it as attractive 
 as possible, and so induce our young men to under- 
 go it at such times as they can command a little 
 freedom and can seek the physical development 
 they need, for health's sake, if for nothing more. 
 
 I know that your purpose in writing these 
 articles and in amplifying them in book form is 
 to concentrate the attention of our people upon 
 that side of national life and responsibility 
 which we hear little of. I mean reasonable 
 
 xvii 
 
A LETTER 
 
 preparation for defense to an extent consistent 
 with our ideals and institutions. While we do 
 not want militarism it seems to me most desir- 
 able that we should secure that degree of mili- 
 tary preparedness which is found in Switzer- 
 land and is now being Established in Australia, 
 and that we can study with advantage the 
 methods employed in these countries. In doing 
 this we shall better American citizenship and 
 manhood in that such training will result in the 
 physical improvement of our youth, a higher 
 regard for the rights of others, and a fuller 
 appreciation of each man's duty to the State. 
 Very sincerely, 
 
 Leonard Wood. 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
AEE WE EEADY? 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 GOLD AND mON 
 He was a clean-limbed, clean-minded, clean- 
 
 blooded young American. By virtue of two 
 very hard fists, one very active brain, and 
 average American pluck, he had pounded his 
 way to the top of his own particular pile. 
 When I saw him last, he was slouched deject- 
 edly on a narrow wooden bench in a little coop 
 in the corner of a prize-ring enclosure in San 
 Francisco — a much-battered youth, absently 
 pressing the back of a swollen, bandaged hand 
 against badly puflfed lips. The usual bevy of 
 fight experts were grouped around him, eye- 
 ing him critically, pumping questions at him. 
 Finally they prodded him into speech. This is 
 what he said : "Aw, I never got started. He 's a 
 mark. I '11 knock his head oflf the next time I 
 get him in a ring with me." Up to now, there 
 
 1 
 
'^ "ARE WE READY? 
 
 has been no ''next time." The mauHng the lad 
 received shoved him from the top of the heap 
 to the ranks of the "second-raters." He never 
 got back. "Under-training, over-confidence, 
 and carelessness" was the verdict of the "ex- 
 perts." He had the "class," they agreed, but 
 the other lad "beat him to the punch." 
 
 All of which may or may not have anything 
 whatever to do with the question of whether 
 the United States of America is prepared for 
 war with a first-class foreign power. It all 
 depends on the way you look at it, or whether 
 you bother yourself to look at it at all. 
 
 Since the present conflict in Europe demon- 
 strated the terrific possibilities of international 
 disputes and exposed the horrible perfection of 
 modern scientific warfare, there is not one of 
 us, it is probably safe to say, who has not had 
 his moments of speculation, more or less vague, 
 as to whether, just in case . . . 
 
 Our military experts for years, particularly 
 since our trouble with Spain, when some rather 
 startling difficulties presented themselves, in 
 the way of putting where they were needed 
 
 2 
 
GOLD AND IRON 
 
 men and guns (and the things to put into men 
 and guns), have been hammering and hammer- 
 ing on their arguments that we are not pre- 
 pared for trouble, and that there is peril in our 
 unpreparedness. Largely because these men 
 are experts, perhaps, and therefore to the lay- 
 mind over-zealous and over-fearful, they have 
 not been able to plant in the general run of us 
 any very serious doubts as to our security here 
 at home. We are a very young, a very busy, 
 and a very confident people. 
 
 Whether or not our confidence and our sense 
 of security are justified, it is a fact that investi- 
 gation will immediately reveal facts previously 
 not guessed at or at any rate not fully grasped. 
 I set this fact down because it was only re- 
 cently that I completed just such an investi- 
 gation. It was undertaken for the purpose of 
 placing before the non-professional, unexpert 
 American the facts of our preparedness for war, 
 as found by a writer who approached his task 
 with no preconceived notions or theories of 
 war save the universal American sentiment 
 against militarism, and a conviction that mod- 
 
 S 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 ern warfare will, some day, be looked upon as 
 a wasteful and ridiculous means of expressing 
 patriotism and advancing national hardihood, 
 just as to-day we regard burning witches as a 
 wasteful and ridiculous means of expressing 
 faith and advancing religion. 
 
 If 200,000 fighting men of any first-class hos- 
 tile power should be landed on our Pacific 
 Coast to-night, we should have no course save 
 regretfully to hand over to a foreign nation the 
 rich empire west of the Rockies, with its cities, 
 its harbors, and the wealth of its valleys and 
 mountains. 
 
 If war were to be declared against us to-day, 
 with portions of our regular army in the Philip- 
 pines, Hawaii, Panama, and elsewhere, we could 
 throw not more than 50,000 men into Une of 
 battle. With the utmost energy on the part 
 of our officers, running our military machinery 
 at top speed, it would take us at least six weeks 
 to increase this force to 150,000 men. 
 
 A successful defense of our long coast line, in 
 case of an attempted hostile invasion, would 
 
 4 
 
GOLD AND IRON 
 
 require at least 300,000 men backed by a 
 trained field army of not less than half a million 
 men. We are wholly unprepared to assemble 
 any such defensive force. 
 
 Sudden invasion at this time would mean 
 the certain loss of our coast cities, to be re- 
 gained only at an enormous cost of lives and 
 treasure. 
 
 Of the very limited estimate of 1300 field 
 guns for our army, we have only between 700 
 and 800 built. If all our guns were put into 
 action at once, there is not enough ammunition 
 in the country for an engagement lasting a 
 single day. 
 
 These are all facts, agreed upon by the 
 ablest military minds of the nation. There are 
 many more just as interesting. 
 
 Are they important .^^ 
 
 Is a trained force of 50,000 men within our 
 borders ample at this time? 
 
 Is an invasion of the United States possible 
 or feasible? 
 
 Could a foreign nation profit by it? If so, 
 how? 
 
 5 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 On the premise that we can be forced into a 
 war with a powerful, perfectly equipped, and 
 thoroughly prepared foe and confronted with 
 the immediate necessity of repelling an inva- 
 sion, what then? 
 
 Can we provide an adequate defensive force, 
 ready for action on short notice? 
 
 If not immediately, is it possible to provide 
 against such an emergency in the future with- 
 out adopting some sort of system of miUtarism, 
 hateful to us, contrary to our best traditions? 
 If so, how? 
 
 It all sounds a good deal like an examination 
 paper. Well, perhaps it is. Perhaps the Ameri- 
 can people will find it worth while at this time 
 to work out the answers. 
 
 The "first punch" is considered to be as 
 important in the military art as it is in the 
 manual of the prize ring. This, probably, was 
 never more clearly shown than at the opening 
 of the present war in Europe. That Wilhelm's 
 first "straight right" was blocked, then coun- 
 tered, was due to no lack of preparation, train- 
 
 6 
 
GOLD AND IRON 
 
 ing, or agility on his part, but to the fact that 
 the other fellow, if not wholly prepared, was 
 suflSciently alert to be able to block, to weather 
 the first furious assault, and to wait for an 
 opening for a heavy counter. 
 
 The initial advantage of war is always with 
 the aggressor. 
 
 Major-General Leonard Wood, former Chief 
 
 of Staff of our army, in a recent interview I had 
 
 with him, illustrated this point this way: — 
 
 If an acquaintance has fully decided that it is 
 necessary and advisable that he give you a thor- 
 ough beating, he alone knows most of the vital 
 details that go into what is coming your way. First 
 of all, he knows of his decision. You do not. He 
 knows precisely where he is going to hit you, when 
 and how he will deliver the attack. You know 
 none of this. What is more, he is not going to wait 
 until you have begun to take boxing lessons. If you 
 know that his attitude is not altogether friendly, 
 you are lucky; and the best you can do is to keep 
 your eyes open, your courage up, and your wind 
 good. 
 
 Whether this great military man's illustra- 
 tion applies to the position of the United States 
 among the nations of the world is of course de- 
 
 7 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 batable. Whether we are Hkely to become the 
 object of the sinister designs of a foreign power 
 is a subject which we have entrusted to the 
 gentlemen and ladies whom we hire to keep 
 their ears to the ground — our secret service 
 and oiu- diplomatic corps. This much, how- 
 ever, may be said: — 
 
 Since the close of the Civil War, when there 
 were in the United States about 1,500,000 men 
 under arms, to the present, when we have a 
 mobile army of about 32,000 men ready, as a 
 nation we have been steadily advancing our 
 international position. Commercially, indus- 
 trially, and politically we have been constantly 
 becoming more important. Our responsibili- 
 ties at home and abroad have increased in the 
 ratio of our influence. Growing prosperity and 
 power is a breeder of jealousies in nations as in 
 men. Back of the European war is the latest 
 demonstration of this. 
 
 Generally speaking, we are taking it for 
 granted that because we do not want war we 
 shall not have war. We argue: War is barba- 
 rous and futile. We are enlightened. Therefore 
 
GOLD AND IRON 
 
 we shall not have war. The world's market is 
 an open market. If increased productiveness 
 and enterprise mean broader competition, we 
 will compete. We will not fight. 
 
 Generally speaking, we are taking it for 
 granted that we do, and shall continue to, con- 
 trol the Pacific. 
 
 Generally speaking, we are taking it for 
 granted that we shall continue successfully to 
 uphold the Monroe Doctrine, regardless. 
 
 Generally speaking, a nation emerging as con- 
 queror from the present struggle in Europe, it- 
 self based upon several things taken for granted, 
 would look upon itself, and not without reason, 
 as fully justified in taking over the work of 
 development and culture in more or less unde- 
 veloped regions — South America, for example. 
 
 "In the support of the Monroe Doctrine," a 
 very able observer of international affairs said 
 to me recently, **we must bear in mind that 
 our stand has had the tacit support of Great 
 Britain. Great Britain at present and for some 
 years past has had a rather superior navy. We 
 cannot see from where we sit how far the Euro- 
 
 9 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 pean frog is going to jump. We can form no 
 accurate picture of what Great Britain and her 
 navy, or any other nation and its navy, not to 
 mention armies and purses, are going to look 
 like when this war is over." 
 
 The statement, with its inference, is no 
 doubt open to debate. There is no reason for 
 presenting here an argument for or against. 
 
 As a broad proposition, however, may it not 
 be said that there is at least a possibihty that 
 while we, chock-full of confidence, happy, 
 healthy, and prosperous, go blithely whistling 
 up and down the highways of the world, some 
 other fellow, not quite so care-free and a little 
 less opposed to a brawl, may be watching us 
 with the cold eye of speculation? 
 
 Maybe there is a modern application of the 
 hint that Solon dropped to Croesus: "If an- 
 other king comes who has better iron than you, 
 he will be master of all this gold." 
 
 Over in Europe we are getting daily proof of 
 the fact that it is one thing to thumb one's nose 
 at one's neighbor and quite another thing to 
 watch one's eye. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK 
 
 Suppose: — 
 
 Portland, Me., March 12 — A destroyer ar- 
 riving here with one of its funnels shot away, 
 and half its crew dead or wounded, reports that 
 in a terrific engagement on the east and west 
 Unes of trade, south of Newfoundland and oflf 
 the Banks, the American main battle fleet has 
 been partially destroyed by a superior squad- 
 ron of the enemy. The surviving vessels are 
 apparently seeking refuge in Boston and New 
 York harbors, and Narragansett Bay. 
 
 Washington, March 12 — (Bulletin.) In a 
 statement issued by the Government Press 
 Bureau, the defeat of our main battle fleet is 
 officially confirmed. The loss in ships and 
 men is not given. 
 
 Bar Harbor, March 14 — A dispatch boat 
 reports the presence of several war vessels, 
 thought to be the enemy's scout cruisers, oflf 
 
 11 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 the Massachusetts coast. A neutral steamship 
 reports that the eneniy's fleet has reassembled 
 in large numbers. 
 
 Boston, March 14 — A scout cruiser, arriv- 
 ing here at midnight, reported having picked 
 up a code wireless from the flagship of the 
 enemy's fleet, carrying the information that 
 the American fleet had been beaten and scat- 
 tered, and instructing the movement of trans- 
 ports toward the Atlantic Coast. 
 
 Austin, Texas, March 14 — The Governor 
 has refused to transmit the President's call for 
 militia. Rumors of impending raids by Mexi- 
 can irregulars are active along the border. 
 
 Washington, March 15 — Semi-official re- 
 ports, from New England coast cities, only par- 
 tially confirmed, indicate the approach of a 
 large fleet of transports, under heavy convoy. 
 
 New York, March 16 — The official news of 
 the defeat of our main battle fleet in an engage- 
 ment off the Newfoundland Banks, followed by 
 the arrival to-day of several of our smaller war- 
 ships which crept into port, all badly crippled 
 and carrying hundreds of dead and wounded, 
 
 12 
 
r 
 
 AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK 
 
 has brought conditions here to the verge of 
 panic. Frightful stories told by survivors, 
 many of whom are in a state of hysteria, 
 published in early editions of the evening 
 papers, all indicate a disaster appalling in its 
 extent. 
 
 Rumors that a bombardment from the sea is 
 imminent persist. Because of the seemingly 
 hopeless confusion, mobilization of the militia 
 is proceeding slowly in spite of the utmost 
 elBforts of the military authorities. 
 
 Martial law has been declared. The Mayor 
 has issued a proclamation advising banks and 
 business houses to remove funds and valuables 
 to Albany. Fear of bomb-dropping raids by 
 aeroplanes launched from hostile warships has 
 intensified the terror. Street illumination has 
 been prohibited. New York will be in darkness 
 to-night. Whole blocks of shops are closed and 
 deserted. Looters have been ordered shot at 
 sight. 
 
 The Croton water supply is unprotected. 
 The city officials have asked the Government 
 for regular troops. 
 
 13 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 The tendency of civilians to rush frantically 
 to arms without organization, trained oflScers, 
 or adequate equipment is increasing confusion 
 and adding to the difficulty of preparing for a 
 land defense. Motor vehicles are being com- 
 mandeered for the transport of troops, equip- 
 ment, and supplies. Station platforms are Ut- 
 tered with baggage which cannot be moved. 
 Every train leaving the city is choked with 
 refugees. Two women have been killed in a 
 crush at the Grand Central Station. 
 
 Boston, March 16 — A hundred or more per- 
 sons, mostly women and children, were injured 
 to-day, in a riot at the South Station. An un- 
 official report, published here, that Boston may 
 expect a bombardment within the next forty- 
 eight hours, has thrown the city into a panic. 
 Thousands are leaving by rail, every descrip- 
 tion of vehicle, and on foot. 
 
 New York, March 16 — The commander of 
 an armored cruiser, who brought his crippled 
 vessel into port last night, is quoted in an even- 
 ing paper as saying : *' The nature of the engage- 
 ment, in which the enemy was successful in his 
 
 14> 
 
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 -iji 
 
 
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 MADISON SQUARE, NEW YORK, AFTER AX AERIAL RAID 
 From a Drawing by Oliver Herford 
 
AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK 
 
 first purpose, to destroy and scatter our fleet, 
 makes anything but the most general estimate 
 of our losses impossible. That the disaster is 
 complete there can be no doubt. The Ameri- 
 can fleet fought with the most desperate cour- 
 age. We have lost our most powerful vessels. 
 Our defeat can be attributed to our inferiority 
 in number of ships, in speed, in number of 
 heavy guns, to lack of battle practice, and to 
 shortage of men. We were hopelessly out- 
 weighed at long-range fighting." 
 
 Washington, March 16 — Official Washing- 
 ton is stunned at the extent of our naval disas- 
 ter as indicated in the fragmentary details con- 
 firmed up to this time. The ofiicial statement 
 of our losses is not expected for several days. 
 A comparison of reports makes it evident that 
 a third of our fighting ships have been de- 
 stroyed and that the rest have been so badly 
 crippled that they cannot go into action until 
 they are overhauled. 
 
 New York, March 16 — The central oflSce of 
 a press association reports that every important 
 center on the Atlantic seaboard, from Galves- 
 
 15 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 ton to Portland, is frantically appealing to the 
 Government for troops. 
 
 Boston, March 16 — The hostile fleet has 
 been picked up by a dispatch boat 150 miles oflf 
 Cape Cod, headed west and steaming slowly. 
 It could not be determined whether the fleet is 
 making for Boston or New York. It is the evi- 
 dent purpose of the commander to conceal his 
 objective until the troops reported to be ap- 
 proaching under convoy shall arrive. 
 
 Panama, March 16 — The Governor Gen- 
 eral has reported to Washington that steamers 
 arriving at Colon have sighted hostile cruisers 
 in the Caribbean. He has forwarded an urgent 
 request that troops in the Canal Zone be in- 
 creased and that an adequate ammunition sup- 
 ply be estabUshed at once. Preparations for 
 the defense of the Canal are inadequate. 
 
 Washington, March 17 — Reports from va- 
 rious States indicate that the President's call 
 for 500,000 volunteers has met with instant 
 response. The greatest difficulty is being ex- 
 perienced in the effort to assemble, organize, 
 and equip the recruits. It has developed that 
 
 16 
 
AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK 
 
 there are practically no officers available for 
 organizing and training. The total lack of even 
 a partially trained reserve for fiUing out the 
 essential branches of an effective field force 
 presents the gravest problems. There is an 
 alarming shortage of cavalry, signal, engineer- 
 ing, hospital, and field artillery equipment. 
 The total available supply is hardly adequate 
 for the regular army and more or less complete 
 militia organizations. Reports made public 
 indicate that both the regular army and the 
 militia are lacking in organization and equip- 
 ment. All the available coast artillery reserves 
 have been sent to the fortifications along the 
 Atlantic Coast. This will supply about half 
 the men needed at the gims. 
 
 New York, March 17 — The mobilization of 
 the regular army in the Albany district is com- 
 plete. With the troops from the Mexican bor- 
 der, withdrawn in spite of vigorous protests by 
 Texas authorities and by several border cities, 
 a force of 20,000, organized as a full division, is 
 concentrated in the military camps. One divi- 
 sion of cavalry is en route. 
 
 17 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 San Francisco, March 17 — A mass meeting 
 was held here to-night to protest against the 
 mihtia leaving California. The presence of 
 what are believed to be hostile warships off the 
 southern California coast is persistently ru- 
 mored. The coast artillery has been brought to 
 its full war strength. The artillery reserves 
 have been brought in. 
 
 Washington, March 18 — It is the consensus 
 of opinion of army and navy heads that the 
 enemy intends to strike in the region between 
 Washington and Boston. A high army officer, 
 whose name is withheld, is quoted as express- 
 ing the belief that New York, because it is one 
 of the most vulnerable of our large cities and 
 would be most efiFective as a base of operations, 
 and because, as the center of our arteries of 
 commerce, its fall would have a paralyzing 
 effect on the nation, has been selected for the 
 initial attack. 
 
 Washington, March 18 — In spite of vigorous 
 efforts to muster every available man during 
 the two weeks that have elapsed since the 
 President's call for militia, the figures made 
 
 18 
 
AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK 
 
 public to-day are startlingly low. Reports from 
 every State are in, and indicate that the militia 
 cannot be mobilized at more than forty per 
 cent of its war strength. At the present rate 
 of mobilization, and with several States re- 
 fusing to allow militia to leave, it is estimated 
 that at least six weeks must elapse before a 
 force of 150,000 men can be concentrated for 
 defense. Unless men who have had service in 
 foreign armies come to our assistance, this 
 force will remain untrained. The shortage of 
 field artillery, cavalry, equipment, and trains 
 is almost incredible. The greatest shortage is 
 in field artillery, by far the most important 
 auxiliary in infantry operations. This arm of 
 the service has not sufficient ammunition at 
 hand for more than a brief action. It has de- 
 veloped that New York has the only complete 
 divisional organization. The total shortage, 
 should the concentration of our available mili- 
 tia be accomplished, is estimated as follows: 
 80 batteries of field artillery; 70 troops of cav- 
 alry; 17 companies of engineers; 26 field hospi- 
 tals; 30 ambulance companies; 12 ammunition 
 
 19 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 trains; 12 supply trains; 12 pack trains. For 
 the most part the mihtia is suppUed with a 
 3-inch Kght field gun only. 
 
 Washington, March 18 — All the Atlantic 
 States, as well as Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, 
 California, Oregon, and Washington, have 
 flatly refused to allow their mihtia to leave. 
 The President's military advisers are reported 
 to be urging him to order the concentration of 
 mihtia over the heads of those governors who 
 are refusing to transmit his call. It is admitted 
 that should such an order be resisted, it could 
 be enforced only through process of law. The 
 commanding officers of the North and South 
 Atlantic districts are greatly exercised over the 
 lack of coast-guard troops to protect the de- 
 tached harbors, fire-control stations, and mili- 
 tary works. 
 
 Harrisburg, March 18 — The Governor has 
 agreed to send the Pennsylvania militia to the 
 Albany region. The militia is practically with- 
 out field artillery and other equipment neces- 
 sary to field service. 
 
 Springfield, March 18 — The Massachusetts 
 20 
 
*'. J 
 
r 
 
 ^^"L Tviili-f-io 
 
 AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK 
 
 militia has finally been ordered to Albany. It 
 is poorly equipped. Its transportation is im- 
 provised, every description of vehicle having 
 been pressed into its ammunition and supply 
 trains. It is, necessarily, proceeding slowly. 
 
 1^ Washington, March 18 — (Bulletin.) The 
 President has ordered the militia of every 
 State to mobilize in the Albany district. 
 
 L New York, March 21 — An American scout 
 
 ' cruiser, arriving here, reports having sighted a 
 large fleet of transports approaching the east- 
 ern entrance to Long Island Sound. 
 
 H Washington, March 21 — (Bulletin.) Under 
 cover of a night fog, the coast artillery force 
 on Fisher's Island was overpowered and the 
 big guns rendered useless in a raid last night by 
 a strong landing force of the enemy, according 
 to an official statement issued by the Press 
 Bureau to-day. A smaller force, with field 
 guns brought from the warships, landed on the 
 eastern side of Watch Hill, drove off the de- 
 fenders of Fort Mansfield, and destroyed the 
 mechanism of the guns, according to the same 
 official report. 
 
 21 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 New London, March 21 — (Bulletin.) A large 
 number of troop ships under heavy convoy are 
 entering Long Island Sound from the east. 
 Troops are evidently about to be landed on 
 the Connecticut shore east of here. Advance 
 bodies of the hostile forces are momentarily 
 expected. The city is rapidly becoming de- 
 serted. Terror-stricken inhabitants are leaving 
 by hundreds. 
 
 Washington, March 21 — The following oflS- 
 cial statement has been issued by the War De- 
 partment: "Troops in large force are being 
 landed from the enemy's transports at a point 
 east of New London. Advices from the vicin- 
 ity of the invaded area are that United States 
 regulars with a small force of militia offered a 
 short resistance. They were driven back by the 
 guns of the warships. With the hostile troops 
 are being landed field artillery, several heavy 
 guns, apparently of the siege type, and large 
 quantities of supplies and ammunition. An 
 aerial squadron has apparently been landed in 
 Fort Pond Bay near Montauk Point, where the 
 work of assembling aeroplanes is reported to 
 
 22 
 
AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK 
 
 be under way. Infantry and field artillery have 
 also been landed at this point, according to the 
 same report, indicating that the enemy plans a 
 movement through Long Island. Telegraphic 
 communication with New London has been 
 severed. Reports froir. Waterford, Montville, 
 and Chesterfield indicate that large bodies of 
 troops are being pushed forward rapidly. The 
 New York, New Haven & Hartford lines have 
 been seized. It is evidently the enemy's inten- 
 tion to advance as rapidly as possible in order 
 to hold the bridges toward New York. A 
 strong detachment hasten sent out in the 
 direction of Boston wittithe apparent object of 
 interrupting railroad communication toward 
 Boston." 
 
 Philadelphia, March 23 — It is reported from 
 the Delaware Capes that a large fleet, appar- 
 ently composed of transports, cruisers, and 
 battleships, is headed for the Chesapeake. By 
 order of the Governor, the movement of the 
 Pennsylvania militia has been suspended. 
 
 New York, March 23 — The delay in the ad- 
 vance of the Pennsylvania militia, caused by 
 
 23 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 the rumor of a war fleet making for the Chesa- 
 peake, has caused the greatest embarrassment 
 in the preparations for the defense of New 
 York. The fleet reported in yesterday's dis- 
 patch is now known to consist of Hght cruisers 
 and colHers. No hostile move toward the 
 Chesapeake is apparently under way, accord- 
 ing to the latest advices from Washington. 
 
 Washington, March 23 — A Press Bureau 
 statement contains the opinion of naval and 
 military authorities that the enemy will not 
 risk his ships against coast defense guns and 
 there is no immediate prospect of a bombard- 
 ment of New York from the sea. They believe 
 that he intends moving through Connecticut 
 to cut off Boston and to attack New York from 
 the rear of its fortifications. This move will 
 render the coast defenses powerless. The big 
 coast guns cannot be trained inland and cover 
 the harbor entrances only. They are practi- 
 cally unprotected against a land attack. If 
 the surmised movement through Long Island 
 is correct, it means that the defenses at Willet's 
 Point and Fort Hamilton will soon be in the 
 
 24 
 
AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK 
 
 hands of the enemy. This would put Fort 
 Slocum out of action and open up the eastern 
 entrance to New York Harbor to small ships. 
 The approach of additional troop transports is 
 reported. 
 
 Boston, March 23 — Several hostile ships 
 have fired long-range shots at Fort Revere, 
 according to a dispatch from Gloucester. The 
 Governor has requested that the Massachusetts 
 militia be returned for the defense of Boston. 
 
 Washington, March 23 — The President has 
 refused to allow the Massachusetts militia to 
 return to Boston. Apparently he and his mili- 
 tary advisers are convinced that the shots 
 fired at Revere were intended to create panic 
 and to weaken the defensive strength of our 
 troops. 
 
 New York, March 24 — An aerial scout, who 
 succeeded in reconnoitering over the Sound, 
 reports the enemy's strength in the neighbor- 
 hood of 150,000 men, with large quantities of 
 field artillery, perfectly equipped supply, am- 
 munition, and hospital trains, and several bat- 
 teries of the heavy siege type. The force at 
 
 25 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 Montauk Point, as nearly as can be estimated, 
 is about a division of all arms. He observed 
 several aeroplanes aloft apparently trying to 
 locate American troops. He reports the main 
 body of the hostile infantry pressing forward 
 toward Saybrook. 
 
 Our forces are known to be advancing rap- 
 idly, and it is believed that a desperate at- 
 tempt will be made to check the enemy's ad- 
 vance at the Connecticut River. It is believed 
 that the closing days of the month will see 
 the first battle of the war being fought along 
 the river between Hartford and Saybrook. 
 Our total strength consists of one division of 
 regulars, a cavalry brigade, one division of New 
 York militia, and an incomplete division of 
 Ohio and Wisconsin militia. Small arms have 
 been secured from the arsenal on Governor's 
 Island and Frankf ord Arsenal at Philadelphia 
 sufficient for 10,000 volunteers. Without or- 
 ganization or sufficient officers, these recruits 
 have been rushed to the support of the little 
 army advancing toward Saybrook. 
 
 Washington, March 27 — The following offi- 
 
AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK 
 
 cial statement was issued by the Press Bureau 
 at noon to-day : — 
 
 The enemy has forced a crossing of the Con- 
 necticut River at both Saybrook and Middle- 
 town. Our troops are being forced northward, 
 and before further resistance will be possible, 
 they will have to join with the New England 
 militia. The hostile invading force numbers 
 in the neighborhood of 150,000 men, with 
 an overwhelming superiority in artillery and 
 equipment. Transports with heavy reinforce- 
 ments are reported to be approaching. The 
 New York municipal authorities have been 
 notified that a successful defense of that city 
 seems impossible. 
 
 All of this is pure speculation, to be sure. 
 
 Nevertheless, the speculation has a basis in 
 facts which cannot be disputed. I have shown 
 the manuscript of this chapter to several mili- 
 tary experts and all agreed that under the con- 
 ditions which I have imagined, with the city's 
 fate hanging on a bare 50,000 men, and an 
 unorganized, unoflScered, and poorly equipped 
 
 27 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 force of volunteers, capture would be inevit- 
 able. They agreed that defense by citizens, 
 under modern methods of warfare, would be 
 hopeless, and pointed to the German opera- 
 tions in Belgium as proof of this. They agreed 
 that a tremendous indemnity would doubt- 
 less be demanded, some placing it as high as 
 $1,000,000,000, others still higher. None of 
 them suggested that there was absurdity in the 
 speculative treatment of the facts of our pre- 
 paredness, and they were of one mind that if 
 the events imagined should occur, the nation 
 would face the immediate necessity of decid- 
 ing whether it would pay an enormous mone- 
 tary price for peace or whether it would enter 
 into a long war to retake all that might be lost 
 before hundreds of thousands of men and oflGi- 
 cers could be armed, trained, equipped, and 
 put into the field. 
 
 Among the men with whom I discussed this 
 chapter was Henry L. Stimson, former Secre- 
 tary of War. After a close study of the manu- 
 script Mr. Stimson permitted me to quote him 
 as follows: — 
 
 28 
 

 HENRY L. STIMSON 
 Secretary of War, 1911-1913 
 
AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK 
 
 I have read "An Attack on New York." There 
 is nothing said in it which is outside the bounds of 
 modern military possibility. The facts with refer- 
 ence to our possible defensive force are accurately 
 stated and the speculative treatment of them is 
 logical. 
 
 The facts of our niilitary preparedness, as 
 they apply to the possibility of an attack on the 
 Atlantic Coast, have an even more alarming 
 bearing on any speculation touching the safety 
 of our Pacific Slope. 
 
 Our General StaflP and our War College have 
 taken problem after problem, worked each one 
 forward, backward, and sideways, conjured up 
 every conceivable proposition touching attack 
 and means of defense. In each case, eventually, 
 the solution has been the same. 
 
 We cannot defend the Pacific Slope against a 
 trained hostile force as small as 100,000 men. 
 
 It matters very little at what point the 
 empire west of the Rockies might be invaded. 
 In the opinion of mihtary experts who have 
 worked on the problems of the military de- 
 fense of that portion of our territory, a sue- 
 
 29 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 cessful invasion might have as its first object 
 the region of San Francisco Bay, of Puget 
 Sound, or of Los Angeles. 
 
 There are many points on the Pacific Coast 
 entirely outside the fire zone of the big harbor 
 guns, where landing troops could be easily, 
 quickly, and safely accomplished. 
 
 It is probable that a foe would select the 
 San Francisco region for the initial point of 
 invasion, although there is Uttle or nothing 
 upon which to base a theory that a hostile 
 power would not land its fighting men at two 
 or even three points at once. 
 
 With a portion of our fleet destroyed and 
 the rest "bottled," transports could approach 
 and land troops, guns, ammunition, and equip- 
 ment at points either north or south of the 
 city of San Francisco, — at HaK Moon Bay, 
 on the peninsula, for example, — or north of 
 San Francisco at some point on the Marin 
 County shore line. Small bays and inlets 
 furnish many accessible points. 
 
 We could, and no doubt would, throw for- 
 ward all our available line of defense across the 
 
 30 
 
r 
 
 AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK 
 
 peninsula, if the attack came from the south, 
 and north of the city of San Francisco, if troops 
 should be landed in that region. 
 
 If the necessity came to-night for such a hne 
 or for both Unes of defense, this is approximately 
 what we should have at hand to go into it: — ■ 
 
 Three thousand regular troops in California. 
 ' We should have three regiments of infantry 
 at the Presidio of San Francisco, and one regi- 
 ment of cavalry at Monterey. All the coast 
 artillery troops would be needed at the guns. 
 The only other mobile troops available along 
 the whole long shore hne would be two regi- 
 ments of infantry — one at Portland, Oregon, 
 the other at Seattle, Washington. The total 
 of the regular mobile forces on the whole 
 Pacific Coast would be six regiments at peace 
 strength, or about 4500 men. 
 ^ About 3500 men, indifferently trained, in 
 the organized militia, short of field guns, with- 
 out the necessary ammunition, supply, and 
 hospital trains, and lacking in other necessi- 
 ties of actual field service, would make up our 
 militia strength. The mihtia forces, estimated 
 
 SI 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 from recent inspection figures, would be ap- 
 proximately as follows: — 
 
 Quartermaster Corps 
 
 Subsistence Department 
 
 Medical Department 
 
 Corps of Engineers 
 
 Ordnance . 
 
 Signal Corps . 
 
 Chaplains 
 
 Cavalry . 
 
 Field Artillery 
 
 Infantry . 
 
 Coast Artillery Corps' 
 
 2 oflficers, no men 
 
 1 officer, no men 
 
 20 officers, 90 men 
 
 2 officers, no men 
 
 2 officers, no men 
 
 4 officers, 69 men 
 
 3 
 
 10 officers, 170 men 
 
 15 officers, 300 men 
 
 140 officers, 2000 men 
 
 . 30 officers, 600 men 
 
 Our militia force, therefore, though well 
 supplied for religious ministration, would have 
 not more than 3500 men in its organization, 
 and this number would include many non- 
 combatants, both officers and men. Without 
 doubt, militia from the region of Los Angeles 
 and San Diego, as well as militia from the 
 States of Oregon and Washington, would not 
 be sent to the region of San Francisco because 
 of the necessity of local defense. 
 
 An attack from the north by a strong force 
 of trained men would, without question, result 
 in the almost immediate capture of the north 
 batteries of San Francisco Bay. 
 
 ^ Which cannot be counted in the mobile force. 
 32 
 
AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK 
 
 The power of a so-called coast-defense bat- 
 tery is in exact ratio to the range of its heaviest 
 gun within the radius of that gun's fire. 
 
 It is right there that we have been so 
 bUthely fooling ourselves, ever since some 
 one called harbor-defense guns "coast-defense 
 guns." 
 
 Without men defending them, the great guns 
 mounted along our coast line are powerless 
 against an attack by land. Big rifles, and 
 heavy mortars, if big enough, heavy enough, 
 and well handled, can prevent hostile entrance 
 of our harbors. 
 
 f Little rifles, small guns, and many men, all 
 of them well handled, the men well trained, are 
 necessary to protect our coast hne against 
 invasion. 
 
 • When we speak of having a regular army of 
 about 5000 officers and 88,000 men, we have 
 to consider that approximately 19,000 of these 
 officers and men belong to the coast artillery, 
 and that other thousands are stationed outside 
 the territorial borders of the United States, 
 leaving an actual mobile army within the 
 
 I 
 
 33 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 United States of not more than 1500 officers and 
 80,000 men. The men who handle the big guns 
 at the harbor entrances cannot be counted 
 among those upon whom we can count to take 
 part in an effort to repel an attack by land. 
 The coast fortifications are local organizations, 
 and are designed wholly to protect the more 
 important of our seaports from direct naval 
 attacks and raids, to guarantee against the 
 landing of hostile troops at certain definite 
 places, to safeguard our naval bases, in the 
 absence of our own warships, to prevent the 
 use of individual harbors and other landing- 
 places as points which could be used for naval 
 operations against us, and to secure places of 
 safety for our war-vessels. 
 
 The total stretch of our coast line is enor- 
 mous, and the portions of it covered by the guns 
 in our harbor defenses are very limited in com- 
 parison with the unprotected intervals that lie 
 between them. 
 
 Should we lose control of the sea, as has been 
 assumed, it would be possible for a hostile 
 power to commence an invasion by the simple 
 
 34 
 
BIG GUNS AT FORT WADSWORTH, STATEN ISLAND, N.Y. 
 
AN ATTACK ON NEW YORK' 
 
 expedient of landing troops in one of these 
 unprotected intervals, within easy striking 
 distance of some important city. Should at- 
 tack come from a nation having tens of thou- 
 sands of reservists already within our borders, 
 as part of our population, our fleet and our 
 harbor defenses would be powerless to help us. 
 Ultimate defense, therefore, can be accom- 
 plished only by having a suflScient mobile army 
 equipped and trained to fight efficiently in any 
 theater of war which an enemy may select. 
 The complete defense of our coast Hne depends 
 upon the combined efforts of our coast artillery 
 and our mobile forces. 
 
 This fundamental difference between the 
 coast artillery and the mobile portions of the 
 army has not yet been recognized by our legis- 
 lators, though the point has been hammered 
 at constantly for years by our military men. 
 Eventually, if we are to have a really efficient 
 regular army organization, the mobile forces 
 must be free to move on instant notice, and 
 should not be tied down by peace administra- 
 tion in any particular locality. Our present 
 
 35 
 
ARE WE READY ? 
 
 army post system is a direct violation in many 
 instances of this principle. When the violation 
 lies in the fact that, as in some instances, one 
 commanding ojSScer is in charge of both mobile 
 and stationary troops, such a system of admin- 
 istration would, without doubt, break down in 
 time of war. 
 
 It is the opinion of men who have given 
 years of careful study to the subject that, for 
 the defense of our Atlantic Coast alone in time 
 of threatened invasion, we should require at 
 least 300,000 trained men of all arms, organ- 
 ized into complete divisions. The question 
 that army officers, cabinet officers, and mem- 
 bers of our national legislature are asking is: — 
 
 "How can we get them.^^" 
 
^^^B CHAPTER m 
 
 ^^^IP A BOTTLED NAVY 
 
 1^ If our fleet is unbeatable, there is little sense 
 1 or reason in speculation as to our readiness to 
 repel invasion, or excuse for a volume such as 
 this. No foreign enemy, imless able to strike 
 directly from or through the territory north or 
 south of us, would venture to attack us by land 
 until he had destroyed our war power on the 
 sea. In regarding the question of our military 
 preparedness, therefore, if we ignore the pos- 
 sibility of direct attack by land, two assump- 
 tions are possible : — 
 
 We can assume that our fleet cannot be 
 beaten. Or we can assume that it can. 
 
 Unintelligent patriotism immediately jumps 
 to the first premise and proclaims that military 
 strength is unimportant, and that any agita- 
 tion looking toward increasing our land forces 
 is jingoism. 
 
 Intelligent patriotism, the kind that is to be 
 37 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 found in our ablest soldiers and in many of our 
 leading statesmen, holds to the second assump- 
 tion, and insists that the safety of the nation 
 demands that it be prepared both by land and 
 sea. That is not to say that intelligent patriot- 
 ism admits that our sea fighters can be con- 
 quered, but that it is willing to assume, in seek- 
 ing to find what absolute safety demands, that 
 our fleet can be rendered powerless to defend 
 our shores. 
 
 This second assumption was the basis of the 
 speculation in the preceding chapter. It is 
 at the bottom of the contention that it will 
 be profitable for the American people to con- 
 sider the facts of our military preparedness. 
 Whether or not this is warranted can be estab- 
 lished only in actual warfare. In a discussion 
 of our military strength, there is little space for 
 an exhaustive analysis of our naval strength. 
 
 There are, however, certain general grounds, 
 which it may be well to indicate at this point, 
 for assuming that a naval defeat is possible. 
 
 Size alone cannot always be counted upon to 
 win battles, as the schoolboy bully has often 
 
 38 
 
A BOTTLED NAVY 
 
 discovered to his amazement and chagrin. So 
 long as the issues of modern warfare are de- 
 cided by explosives and projectiles, battles will 
 be won and lost by superiority of fire. Larger 
 numbers and bigger guns, greater weight and 
 superior agility, all are distinct advantages; 
 but the ultimate test lies in how the gxms are 
 handled, how well trained are the men behind 
 them, and whether the agility is converted into 
 fighting efficiency. 
 
 It is not our poHcy to excel all nations in 
 greater numbers — of men, ships, or guns. We 
 do make an effort, however, to keep ahead of 
 all nations in the size of our guns. If under this 
 policy we are able, under any circumstances, 
 to maintain superiority of fire, both in volume 
 and accuracy, we are justified in assuming that 
 our navy is unconquerable. There are very 
 definite grounds for seriously questioning such 
 ability. 
 
 Throughout our history, the general trend 
 of our naval policy has been weak. It has been 
 "off again, on again, back again, Finnegan," 
 with us. 
 
 80 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 We started the ''little navy" policy im- 
 mediately after the Revolution. Contrary to 
 the advice of Washington, our navy was abol- 
 ished and for eight years we had none. It was 
 not until the outrageous decree of the Direc- 
 tory of France in 1796, followed by the cap- 
 ture of American vessels bound to and from 
 English ports, that the necessity of fighting 
 ships was driven home to us, and we established 
 a sea power which forced peace. After the 
 Constellation defeated the French frigate In- 
 surgente, and strife on the sea was stopped, we 
 went back again to our "Httle navy" policy. 
 We soon found ourselves paying tribute to the 
 pirates of Algiers. Once more we provided 
 ourselves with warships and eventually the 
 piracy was put down. 
 
 England's interference in 1807 with com- 
 merce between the United States and conti- 
 nental Europe should have warned us of the 
 folly of our weak naval policy. Jefferson, with- 
 out a navy, and with a distaste for war, per- 
 suaded Congress to pass the Embargo Act as 
 a substitute for a navy. One historian has said 
 
 40 
 
} 
 
 A BOTTLED NAVY 
 
 that "the cost of this experiment emptied the 
 treasury, bankrupted the mercantile and agri- 
 cultural classes, and ground the poor beyond 
 endurance." 
 
 By 1811, it was plain as the nose on om- face 
 that we were rapidly moving, totally unpre- 
 pared, toward war. When war was declared in 
 1812, we had six frigates and eight sloops, 
 against the hundreds of ships in England's 
 navy. We had three years of the War of 1812. 
 We called out over 500,000 men and burdened 
 ourselves with a large pension list. A himdred 
 years after the war, there were still over two 
 hundred widows on the pension roll of 1812. 
 A strong naval policy at that time, if not actu- 
 ally preventing the war, would very probably 
 have Umited its duration to a few weeks or 
 months. 
 
 It is interesting to consider the pension fig- 
 ures in connection with the argument of the 
 **httle navy" men that we cannot stand the 
 expense of a larger navy. Up to 1914, the cost 
 of pensions, due to the Civil War, had been 
 about $4,000,000,000. The pension appro- 
 
 41 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 priation for 1913 was in the neighborhood of 
 $185,000,000. This is about $50,000,000 more 
 than was appropriated in the same year for 
 the navy. Since we began to be the United 
 States of America, we have paid $1,250,000,- 
 000 more for pensions than we have paid out 
 for our navy. How much of this enormous sum 
 a strong naval poHcy would have saved us can 
 only be guessed at. 
 
 No one seriously questions the assertion, 
 frequently made, that had the Northern States 
 in 1861 been possessed of an adequate navy, 
 there would not have been four years of cruel 
 and costly conflict. With a navy of adequate 
 proportions, the Norfolk Navy Yard would 
 have been seized, the Mississippi would have 
 been blockaded, and the export of cotton and 
 the importation of war material from other 
 nations would have been prevented. The ex- 
 ploits of the Alabama and other vessels which 
 were built in English ports would have been 
 impossible. 
 
 If Russia in 1905 had been able to assemble 
 a suflGiciently strong fleet at Port Arthur, Japan 
 
 42 
 
A BOTTLED NAVY 
 
 would not have dared to send transports to 
 j China and to land troops. Turkey's naval 
 weakness, in the recent war with Italy, opened 
 the way for the Italian Navy to seize TripoU 
 without being punished. Turkey was unable 
 to prevent Italy's command of the Mediter- 
 ranean. 
 
 To-day, England with a navy of superior 
 strength, has been able to completely paralyze 
 Germany's over-sea trade, which last year 
 amounted to close to $4,000,000,000. Eng- 
 land's navy is one of the great elements which 
 experts are taking into consideration as a factor 
 that will weigh heavily in bringing hostilities 
 in Europe to an end. 
 
 It should be remembered, however, that, 
 with all her sea power, England, without the 
 aUied armies, was and is powerless to pre- 
 vent Germany from overrunning Belgium and 
 France, or any other territory open to direct 
 attack by land. England's weakness is Hke 
 the weakness of the professional bowler — 
 abnormal development. If her strong arm 
 should be broken, she would be out of the 
 
 43 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 running. In a game requiring the service of the 
 weaker arm, she is outclassed by her rivals. 
 That real war strength must include mihtary 
 as well as naval power is true of any nation. 
 We are no exception. 
 
 The oflScial figures of 1914 show that the 
 navy of the United States ranks third among 
 the powers of the world, with France and Japan 
 fourth and fifth. If our naval programme is 
 carried out, the United States Navy soon will 
 have dropped to fourth place, if, in actual 
 fighting strength, it is not already there. These 
 same figures give the French Navy 2406 offi- 
 cers and the Japanese Navy 3230 officers, with 
 the United States a bad fifth, with 1918 offi- 
 cers. They show that in enlisted men we rank 
 ahead of Japan by 2500 men and behind 
 France by 10,000 men. Japan has 96 enlisted 
 men per 1000 tonnage, compared with 69 men 
 for the same tonnage in the American Navy. 
 In ten years, Japan increased her naval expend- 
 itures eleven-fold, while the expenditures of 
 the United States, on its navy, ; only doubled 
 within the fifteen years ending with 1914. The 
 
 44 
 
A BOTTLED NAVY 
 
 German expenditures tripled within the same 
 period. 
 
 Josephus Daniels, as Secretary of the Navy, 
 gave voice to the principle that " we are not 
 building against anybody." He expressed the 
 belief that the war in Europe is going to ex- 
 haust the resources of the countries engaged, 
 and that there "is less hkelihood of our hav- 
 ing any trouble at any time in the future with 
 those nations than there was before." This 
 view concerns a point over which there is the 
 widest divergence of opinion. It involves purely 
 the question of size and weight. 
 
 George von L. Meyer, Mr. Daniels's prede- 
 cessor as Secretary of the Navy, takes an op- 
 posite view. His opinion is this: — 
 
 Better no navy whatever than a navy that is 
 insufficient to our needs, and which only deceives 
 the ignorant and inexperienced public as to its 
 safety from attack or circumstances which would 
 result in a paralyzing foreign commerce. 
 
 It is impossible and unnecessary for this coun- 
 try to have a large standing army in competition 
 with those across the seas. But it is possible and 
 necessary for us to have a navy that is superior 
 
 45 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 to that of any country, with the exception of 
 England. 
 
 To bring that about we must have a definite and 
 continuous building programme of four battleships 
 a year until we have secured an ultimate battle- 
 ship strength of forty-eight ships of the line, with 
 the necessary auxiliaries. 
 
 We also need a merchant marine as an adjunct 
 to the navy, which in times of peace will carry the 
 mails and our products to the foreign markets of 
 the world. 
 
 England's merchant marine has been of incal- 
 culable value to her in the present crisis, and, while 
 with us, the transportation of troops by water 
 would probably be limited, it would require a large 
 fleet of merchant steamers, of which this country 
 is very deficient, to transport, in case of war, merely 
 the necessary quantities of coal, oil, naval supplies, 
 and ammunition. 
 
 We should insist on a strong navy. Battleships 
 are cheaper than battles. The sea is a highway for 
 a strong navy — a closed path to a weak one. In- 
 vasion of a country cannot be effected in the face 
 of a superior fleet. The fleet is the navy. In war 
 nothing fails like failure. 
 
 A powerful navy is the cheapest insurance. 
 
 laval 
 
 The factors that go into any nation's nava 
 strength are ships, men, guns, ammunition, 
 
 46 
 
 rf 
 
GEORGE VON L. MEYER 
 Secretary of the Navy, 1909-1913 
 
A BOTTLED NAVY 
 
 and administration. If we insist that our naval 
 programme, as it relates to the nmnber, size, 
 and armament of the ships which we maintain, 
 is sufficient to guarantee our security, we have 
 left the important elements of men, ammuni- 
 tion, and administration. That we are short 
 of both men and officers to man our war- 
 vessels is generally admitted. Our shortage of 
 blue- jackets is about 15,000, and we are to- 
 tally without reserve strength to replace losses 
 in battle, to man our second-Une ships, or to 
 supply the necessary men for manning the 
 new ships which our naval programme calls 
 for. 
 
 That we are short of ammunition is another 
 defect in our navy, which can be easily reme- 
 died. We have but one torpedo, for example, 
 for each tube in our navy. We could not give 
 a foe "the other barrel" if he were looking 
 right into the muzzle of our gun. We need not 
 only enough ammunition for a protracted en- 
 gagement, but a sufficient quantity in reserve 
 to insure us against shortage during any rea- 
 sonable period of naval conflict. It is a most 
 
 47 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 disconcerting thing to have the hammer of 
 your gun go down on an empty chamber. 
 
 Quick mobihzation, in time of war or threat- 
 ened war, is as important at sea as on land. 
 The persistent and continuous refusal of Con- 
 gress to abolish our numerous and unnecessary 
 navy yards is in line with the costly and useless 
 maintenance of our scattered army posts. It 
 is the opinion of naval experts that highest 
 efficiency demands that we have not more than 
 three naval bases on the Atlantic, and three 
 on the Pacific Coast. On the Atlantic Coast, 
 it is advocated that our war- vessels should be 
 concentrated at Hampton Roads, Narragan- 
 sett, and Guantanamo, and that the Pacific 
 naval bases should be Puget Sound, San Fran- 
 cisco, and Hawaii. 
 
 Given sufficient ships, sufficient guns, and 
 sufficient ammunition, and means of quick 
 mobilization, the administration of our fight- 
 ing craft, and the men aboard them, remains 
 as the great element involving efficiency. 
 
 Under our law, our Secretary of the Navy 
 is not permitted to have a staff. He can, how- 
 
 48 
 
 1 
 
A BOTTLED NAVY 
 
 ever, if he desires, surround himself with aides 
 who have had actual experience as sea fighters, 
 
 Former Secretary Meyer was inchned to- 
 ward administration through cooperation with 
 advisers. Secretary Daniels showed an inclina- 
 tion toward greater concentration of adminis- 
 tration in the Secretary of the Navy himself. 
 It was Secretary Meyer who detailed oflScers to 
 investigate and to keep him informed on the 
 four essential divisions of naval affairs; opera- 
 tions, personnel, material, and inspection. 
 
 Under Meyer, the work on the problems in- 
 volved in operations was performed by the 
 best strategists in the navy. Those entrusted 
 with keeping the Secretary informed on mat- 
 ters of personnel were kept at work on ques- 
 tions concerning the supply of officers and 
 men, and the selection of men to perform the 
 varied duties that go into the making up of a 
 fleet. Such matters as the type of ships needed, 
 and the various engineering problems that go 
 into the building of a warship, were turned over 
 to the aide entrusted with questions of mate- 
 rial. The Secretary of the Navy was kept fully 
 
 49 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 informed of the condition of ships in service 
 and ships building through the aide in charge 
 of inspection. 
 
 Secretary Daniels, in large measure, aban- 
 doned this system, as well as the custom of 
 having five instead of four battleships in a 
 division, with one constantly in dry dock for 
 altering and repair. A naval division contains 
 four battleships. The object of so dividing the 
 fleet that there would be five was to provide 
 a system whereby the battleships in each divi- 
 sion might at all times be in the best possible 
 condition. Something of a luxury, on the face 
 of it, perhaps. So is an extra pair of trousers. 
 But any tailor will testify to the better appear- 
 ance, longer life, and all-round greater service- 
 ability of a suit with an "extra." 
 
 A college football team would not be con- 
 ceded the remotest chance of success if it went 
 into a game without having had team and sig- 
 nal practice. Although fleet practice is con- 
 ceded to be an essential of efficient naval force, 
 for some reason we seem to have taken a posi- 
 tion that our fleet is an exception. We have 
 
 50 
 

 A BOTTLED NAVY 
 
 not had our warships out for extensive prac- 
 tice for three years. At the time of this writ- 
 ing, a period of such training is in contempla- 
 tion ; but if our fleet were called out to-day to 
 repel a naval attack, there is not the question 
 of a doubt that there would be a costly if not 
 a disastrous lack of teamwork. The "puUing'* 
 of "bones" can work as much havoc on the sea 
 as on the gridiron or diamond. 
 
 Battle maneuvers on paper and in textbooks 
 are all well enough in their way, but they are 
 not enough to place a fleet on an even footing 
 with an enemy of equal strength, well trained 
 in the actual handhng of his warships. 
 
 We pride oiu'selves on the marksmanship 
 of our gunners, but we are apt to overlook the 
 fact that our high scores have been made under 
 the most favorable conditions, — in calm seas, 
 and without the strain that comes in battle. 
 The recent naval battle off the coast of Chili 
 was a clear demonstration of the value of the 
 German system of holding fleet and target 
 practice in rough seas and imder the most un- 
 favorable conditions. 
 
 51 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 The American people may ultimately decide 
 how large our fleet is to be. For the present 
 the immediate necessities are : — 
 
 Suflicient men to handle the ships and guns 
 which we now have; 
 
 Sufficient men and officers to take the place 
 of those lost in war and to man the ships now 
 building; 
 
 Sufficient ammunition to supply our guns 
 and enough in reserve to supply new ships 
 and to meet the demands of naval warfare; 
 
 Supply ships, such as coUiers, oil ships, and 
 ammunition carriers, to meet the demands of 
 our present fleet in war; 
 
 Equipment for aerial scouting; 
 
 Battle practice, sufficient to bring our sea- 
 fighting machinery to maximum efficiency; 
 
 A good general staff. 
 
 It may be that we have an unbeatable navy. 
 Whether we have or not, only a war with a 
 first-class power will demonstrate. There 
 surely is sufficient ground in a time of peace, 
 such as this, however, to set us to wondering 
 whether it is possible that the sea defense of 
 
 52 
 
A BOTTLED NAVY 
 
 our country might be partially destroyed or 
 bottled up in our harbors, to an extent which 
 would enable an enemy to land troops on our 
 shores and throw the burden of defense upon 
 our military organizations. 
 
 Many of us are falling into the error of as- 
 suming that sea defense means stringing our 
 ^ warships along our coast Hue to prevent an 
 enemy from nosing into our harbors, shelUng 
 our cities, or landing troops at unfortified 
 points, and are losing sight of the fact that a 
 war fleet to be most eflfective must strike an 
 enemy in waters vital to him, outside the trade 
 routes of its own nation, leaving the folks at 
 home free to continue trade with their neigh- 
 bors. 
 
 As a nation, we are assuming that the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine is an established policy, that the 
 national interest demands that we shall con- 
 trol the Pacific just as England now controls 
 the Atlantic, and that we shall be able to 
 prevent an enemy from landing troops on our 
 shores. We are exhibiting a tendency to over- j 
 look the fact that the Monroe Doctrine is just' 
 
 53 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 as strong as our fleet; that our power to enforce 
 international agreements is as great as the 
 weight of our guns; that our grip on the Pacific 
 is as strong as the ships we can float on that 
 ocean in case of necessity; and that whether we 
 are "building against" any other nation or not, 
 an enemy can land troops on our shores unless 
 we have ships, guns, and men, sufficient in 
 number and training to meet any emergency. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE HOLE IN OUR POCKET 
 
 I THINK the worst regular beating I ever got 
 in my life was the result of the misappUcation 
 of a thoroughly sound miUtary pohcy. 
 
 In the small town of my youth there was a 
 very healthy and an exceedingly active bimch 
 of young Americans. We gloried in the label of 
 "The Hillside Avenue Gang." In the same 
 town there was a **dude." He was our pet 
 aversion, partly because we had a natural an- 
 tipathy for the genus, and partly because he 
 had related to our parents, with unnecessary 
 detail, many things, including an assorted col- 
 lection of words and phrases over which, so far 
 as outsiders were concerned, we exercised the 
 strictest censorship. 
 
 Came a time of thirst for revenge; came long 
 conferences of the whole as a strategy board; 
 an advance force, to hold the "dude's" atten- 
 tion — then an assault en masse. That was 
 
 5& 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 it — a strategy as old as Napoleon, and a lot 
 older. 
 
 Largely because I had established a repu- 
 tation as a middling straight shot, partly be- 
 cause my armament was to be a carefully se- 
 lected assortment of rather sickly and very 
 squashy oranges, and partly because of a 
 varied experience in matters such as that in 
 hand, I was honored by being singled out for 
 the advance force. I dislike to put the mark of 
 approval on my military achievements; but I 
 will say that I discharged in a highly efficient 
 manner the duties laid upon me. My courage 
 never faltered, my strategy ran like clockwork, 
 and my range-jBnding was perfect. The open- 
 ing shots, considered so vital to our cause, 
 went home. 
 
 But my support expected too much of me. 
 Instead of taking advantage of the temporary 
 confusion of the enemy, the main force hesi- 
 tated, backed and filled, pulled this way and 
 that, refused to heed the commands of the 
 officers, until I had been overborne by superior 
 speed, weight, and endurance (that "dude" 
 
 56 
 
r 
 
 THE HOLE IN OUR POCKET 
 
 was no slouch) , and the whole plan was spoiled, 
 with the enemy in full possession of the field, 
 before the gang had made up its mind on any 
 definite fine of action. The great battle had to 
 be left for another day. 
 
 Now all of this has a real bearing on a very 
 serious fact — that a courageous and efficient 
 regular army of less than 90,000 men, no mat- 
 ter how well armed, how well trained, how 
 courageous, or how physically fit, is a mighty 
 slim protection for this country. 
 
 The traditional military poUcy of the United 
 States contemplates a small regular army as a 
 nucleus in time of peace for a great army of 
 citizen soldiers as the ultimate force in time of 
 war. 
 
 This policy, based upon a theory declared by 
 economists, statesmen, and military experts to 
 be sound, both economically and politically, 
 really dates back to the days following the 
 Revolution. The foundation of our existing 
 army was laid in the Act of September 29, 
 1789, which recognized an "estabhshment for 
 the troops in the service of the United States" 
 
 57 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 and required all oflSeers and men in such an 
 establishment to take the oath of allegiance. 
 
 The first general organization of the army 
 under the Constitution took place under the 
 Act of April 30, 1790, which fixed the strength 
 of non-commissioned oflScers and privates at 
 1216, enlisted for a term of three years. 
 
 The Miami expedition painfully demon- 
 strated the ineflBciency of so small an estab- 
 lishment, and on March 3, 1791, another regi- 
 ment was added with a strength of 912 men. 
 St. Clair's defeat was followed in 1792 by an 
 act which provided for three additional regi- 
 ments of infantry and for filling the battalion 
 of artillery and the two existing regiments of 
 infantry then in service to the legal maximum. 
 
 There is not space here to trace the growth 
 of this little force into the present organization 
 of the regular army. Through the record of 
 our military legislation, however, there runs 
 distinctly the policy of restricting the regular 
 force of the United States to the smallest pro- 
 portions consistent with efficiency and the 
 national safety. Through all the records runs 
 
 58 
 
THE HOLE IN OUR POCKET 
 
 also that assumption that in time of war the 
 small peace establishment shall be nothing 
 more than the nucleus for great forces of citizen 
 soldiery. 
 
 How nearly we come to satisfactory appli- 
 cation of our traditional policy in the matter of 
 combination of professional fighting men and 
 citizen soldiers will be taken up in succeeding 
 chapters. 
 
 It would appear to a man up a tree that, if 
 the nation should suddenly be confronted by 
 war, and should depend for its safety upon a 
 trained military nucleus intended to expand 
 into a great defensive force, that nucleus is a 
 very important thing. 
 
 Whether such a view is or is not correct, it is 
 a fact that every year we spend in the neigh- 
 borhood of ninety million dollars for less than 
 ninety thousand men and oflScers in our regular 
 army. 
 
 Ninety million dollars for ninety thousand 
 soldiers is more — per head — than any other 
 nation in the world pays for its army — from 
 two to five times more. (You can figure the 
 
 59 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 average cost of a United States regular, officer 
 and private, anywhere from eight hundred to 
 two thousand dollars a year, according to what 
 you put in or take out of the War Department 
 figures. If, for example, you charge the cost of 
 building the Panama Canal and the River and 
 Harbor Pork Barrel, the cost tag on your sol- 
 dier will be away over a thousand dollars. But 
 if you figure only what goes into his actual 
 fighting ability, the average will be close to a 
 thousand.) 
 
 To be sure, the difference between the cost 
 of our soldier and the cost of the soldier of other 
 first-class nations can be charged largely, 
 though not by any means wholly, to higher 
 pay, higher cost of food, clothing, and other 
 necessities that go into the soldier's mainten- 
 ance, and the higher cost of his transportation. 
 
 But even if the average cost of our soldier 
 were not greater than that of the soldier of 
 other great powers, there is still the fact that 
 against the ninety thousand trained nien of our 
 regular army which we could immediately put 
 into the field in time of war, including the 
 
 60 
 
 J 
 
R 
 
 Copyright, i'ndericootl &■ Vmienrood 
 
 OUR THOUSAND-DOLLAR SOLDIER 
 
THE HOLE IN OUR POCKET 
 
 thirty or forty thousand regulars we could 
 promptly assemble on the continent, Germany, 
 at the beginning of the present war, had four 
 milUon trained men ready, and France nearly 
 that many. 
 
 As a business proposition, unless we admit 
 that we are colossal spendthrifts, the conclu- 
 sion has to be either that our theories of the 
 home defense — or their apphcation — are all 
 wrong, or that there are prodigious leaks 
 somewhere. 
 
 The truth of it is that our theories are all 
 right; that our application of them is all wrong; 
 and that, for a nation with a reputation for 
 hard-headed business sense, there are the most 
 astonishing leaks. 
 
 The problem of the organization of our regu- 
 lar army has both a dynamic and a political 
 aspect. It has been said that battles may be 
 won and lost in the dome of the Capitol as well 
 as on the field of battle. The military man may 
 be at fault in proposing measures for adequate 
 defense that would be intolerable to the Ameri- 
 can citizen, while the political expert may pro- 
 
 61 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 pose systems and schemes of organization 
 which may be ridiculously impracticable and 
 ineffective. 
 
 The ultimate test, of course, is the capa- 
 city of the armed body to exert a superior mil- 
 itary force in time to meet successfully any 
 hostile pressure that is brought to bear against 
 it. 
 
 The numerical strength of our standing 
 army is fixed at 100,000 men and oflBcers. 
 
 On June 30, 1914, according to the report of 
 the Secretary of War, its actual strength was 
 4701 officers, and 87,781 men, including 3809 
 men in the Quartermaster Corps, and 4055 
 men in the Hospital Corps. These figures rep- 
 resent the peace footing of the United States 
 Army. In time of war, an infantry company 
 now having 65 men, should have 150 men; a 
 cavalry troop, which now has 71 men, should 
 have 100 men; an artillery battery, with a pres- 
 ent strength of 133 men, should have 190 men. 
 No provision in the way of reserve strength 
 has been provided for filling out our army from 
 its peace to its war propositions. These forces 
 
I 
 
 THE HOLE IN OUR POCKET 
 
 are, and so long as our responsibilities outside 
 the continental limits of the United States 
 continue, must be divided into two parts: 
 troops on service beyond the territorial hmits, 
 and troops on service within the territorial 
 limits. At present it is necessary for us to main- 
 tain forces in the Philippines, Panama, Oahu, 
 Alaska, Guantanamo, and Porto Rico. 
 
 Increasing responsibilities outside the conti- 
 nental limits have necessitated distribution of 
 our mobile forces approximately in the follow- 
 ing manner: — 
 
 In the Philippines, 3f regiments infantry, 2 regi- 
 ments cavalry, 1 regiment field artillery, 2 com- 
 panies engineers, 11 companies coast artillery 
 (aggregate strength 9572). In the Hawaiian Is- 
 lands, 3 regiments infantry, 1 regiment cavalry, 1 
 regiment field artillery, 1 company engineers, 8 
 companies coast artillery (aggregate strength, 
 8195). In the Canal Zone, 1 regiment infantry, 3 
 companies coast artillery (aggregate strength, 
 2179). In China, 2 battalions infantry (aggregate 
 strength, 849). In Alaska, 1 regiment infantry, 
 (aggregate strength, 862). In Porto Rico, a 2-bat- 
 talion regiment infantry (strength, 707). In United 
 States, 17 regiments infantry, 11^1 regiments 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 cavalry, 3j regiments field artillery, 2 battalions 
 engineers, 148 companies coast artillery (aggregate 
 strength, 68,669). Troops en route and officers at 
 other foreign stations, 1449. 
 
 And that is not all. In the near future it is 
 going to be necessary to take from the United 
 States and put in the Philippines 1950 men of 
 the coast artillery; in the Hawaiian Islands, 
 6380 men, including infantry, field artillery, 
 and coast artillery; and along the Panama 
 Canal, 4774 men, including infantry, cavalry, 
 field artillery, engineers, and coast artillery. 
 When the necessary distributions are made, 
 we shall have left within the continental hmits 
 of the United States, 12,610 coast artillery 
 troops, and 28,692 mobile troops. This whole 
 force is a little more than twice the size of 
 the police force of the City of New York. 
 
 All of those groups stationed in foreign pos- 
 sessions, depend upon communication by sea 
 with the central government. In time of war, 
 therefore, they would have to be self-support- 
 ing until the navy should have secured com- 
 mand of the sea. Until naval supremacy should 
 
 64 
 
Hf THE HOLE IN OUR POCKET 
 
 be decided, there would be no opportunity for 
 their expansion. 
 
 The contrary is the case with the troops 
 within the territorial limits of the United 
 States. Theoretically, our troops at home, 
 while being maintained on a plan to insure high- 
 est eflSciency together with maximum mobility, 
 should have the backing of a condition which 
 would make certain speedy and orderly expan- 
 sion from the body of the citizenship into what- 
 ever force an emergency might demand. 
 
 Our regular army, while serving as a na- 
 tional poHce force, for administration and for 
 instruction and training of citizen forces, should 
 be able, in time of sudden need, to do for 
 the nation what the Belgian army did for the 
 Allies — to serve as the line of immediate 
 defense, the stopgap to provide the few vital 
 days of assembling a great defensive force of 
 citizens. 
 
 With ninety milhon dollars to spend, it would 
 seem that we should be able to provide our- 
 selves with a regular army which would be the 
 last word in efficiency. Yet if the need came 
 
 65 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 to-night, as has been shown, we could put into 
 the field a mobile force of a scant 32,000 men, 
 indifferently equipped in artillery and with a 
 supply of artillery ammunition hardly suJ05- 
 cient for a day's engagement. 
 
 Behind this condition are wholly avoidable 
 eflBciency wastes and money wastes. The 
 necessity of distributing troops in widely sep- 
 arated places and at great distances, the con- 
 sequent cost of transportation of men, equip- 
 ment, and supplies, with the added necessity, 
 because of climatic conditions, of frequent 
 changes of troops — all are highly expensive, 
 and operate against quick mobilization. There 
 is no doubt that there is a greater or less degree 
 of waste in the routine of handling the admin- 
 istration and distribution of our regular forces; 
 but since measures of economy and efficiency 
 in these matters do not threaten to deprive 
 any budding or blossomed statesman of his 
 seat in Senate or House, constant progress is 
 being made toward putting technical detail 
 upon a thoroughly economic basis. 
 
 The big leak is the army post. 
 66 
 
THE HOLE IN OUR P0CEI:T 
 
 The army-post graft is first cousin to the 
 navy-yard graft. 
 
 Genuinely patriotic American voters are 
 really the grafters. Their representatives in 
 Congress are the instruments. 
 
 The army post has become a big leak, ri- 
 diculously apparent and wholly avoidable, by 
 reason of the desire of poUticians in Congress 
 to please a very limited portion of the folks 
 who put them there, and to lend color to their 
 ** district loyalty" campaign utterances at 
 what time they desire to be put there again. 
 
 Once we had big Indian troubles — people 
 being terrorized, and scalped, and killed, and 
 tortured in a lot of places. Now a murder by 
 some whiskey-crazed redskin gets a "scare- 
 head" in our metropoUtan dailies. 
 
 Once we estabUshed many rough garrisons 
 whose chief function was to protect white peo- 
 ple from Indians. Now we have many elabo- 
 rate army posts whose chief function is to make 
 the green grass grow all around. They represent 
 a great investment, on which no interest accrues ; 
 and they are very expensive to maintain. 
 
 67 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 Back in 1911, along toward the close of the 
 year, a Secretary of War, in his report to the 
 President, made this statement: — 
 
 The mobile army is distributed among forty- 
 nine posts in twenty-four States and Territories. 
 Nearly all of these posts have been located in their 
 present situations for reasons which are now totally 
 obsolete or which were from the beginning purely 
 local. . . . Comparatively few of them are in posi- 
 tions suited to meet the strategic needs of national 
 action or defense. . . . The posts have universally 
 been constructed upon a plan which involves a maxi- 
 mum initial cost of construction and a maximum 
 cost of maintenance both in money and men. 
 
 Now this Secretary of War — it was Henry 
 L. Stimson — chanced to be a Republican. So, 
 in accordance with our time-honored political 
 traditions, a Democratic House started after 
 him, passing a resolution demanding to know 
 what he meant, if, by chance, he meant any- 
 thing. 
 
 Some observers of the period will tell you 
 that that House resolution was intended to 
 scare the Secretary of War away from the 
 army posts. However that may be, it is no 
 
 68 
 
THE HOLE IN OUR POCKET 
 
 secret that he was besieged by Senators and 
 Congressmen, who, in their great wisdom and 
 long experience in such matters, m-ged him 
 against the folly of a reply, begging that if he 
 were really bent on making a chump of him- 
 self, he would refrain from dragging in posts 
 in their particular neck of the woods. It is 
 no secret, either, that he told them all: "You 
 have asked for facts; now you are going to get 
 facts" — or words to that effect. 
 
 It is tradition that if you wish to hide any- 
 thing from the American people, the best place 
 to put it is in an official report. It is too bad; 
 for the official accounts of what followed are 
 most interesting. 
 
 To the demand that he give "the names of 
 all army posts which have been located in their 
 present situations for reasons which are now 
 totally obsolete," Stimson replied by calling 
 the roll. He named Fort Apache, Arizona; 
 Boise Barracks, Idaho; Fort Clark, Texas; 
 Fort D. A. Russell, Wyoming; Fort Douglas, 
 Utah; Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Fort Leaven- 
 worth, Kansas; Fort Mackenzie, Wyoming; 
 
 69 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 Fort Meade, South Dakota; Fort Missoula, 
 
 Montana; Fort Robinson, Nebraska; Fort 
 
 Riley, Kansas; Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Fort Snell- 
 
 ing, Minnesota. 
 
 When the Secretary of War came to the 
 
 straight congressional demand that he declare 
 
 the intentions of the War Department as to 
 
 legislation it would urge, he came back with 
 
 straight talk. He said — what to-day military 
 
 experts agree in — that 
 
 K the mobile army is to be efficient its distribu- 
 tion must meet the following requirements : — 
 
 1. It must be favorable for the tactical training 
 of the three arms combined (infantry, cavalry, and 
 field artillery). m 
 
 2. It must be favorable for the rapid concentra- 
 tion of the army upon our northern or southern 
 frontier, or upon our eastern or western seaboard. 
 
 3. It must favor the best use of the army as a 
 model for the general military training of the Na- 
 tional Guard. 
 
 4. It must favor the use of the Regular Army as 
 a nucleus for the war organization of the National 
 Guard and such volunteer forces as Congress may 
 authorize to meet any possible military emergency. 
 
 5. The distribution must favor economical ad- 
 ministration with the view of developing the maxi- 
 
 70 
 
 m 
 
THE HOLE IN OUR POCKET 
 
 mum return for the money appropriated for mili- 
 tary purposes. 
 
 6. The distribution must permit a peace organ- 
 ization which will also be effective in war; that is, 
 an organization which will permit a prompt expan- 
 sion in time of war by means of a system of reserve. 
 
 The conditions back of the recommendations 
 made in 1911 have not materially changed. 
 The fact that close to $6,000,000 could be saved 
 the American people annually by the compara- 
 tively simple process of the concentration and 
 redistribution of regular troops is still a fact. 
 
 Yet only four minor posts of the forty-nine 
 have been abandoned. The United States 
 Army, what of it is not in the Philippines, 
 Panama, Oahu, Alaska, Guantanamo, and 
 Porto Rico, is still scattered in little groups 
 averaging not more than six hundred men each 
 and without a possibility of getting together 
 frequently for effective tactical training. 
 
 Take Fort D. A. Russell, Wyoming, as an 
 example. It cost about $5,000,000 to build 
 Fort D. A. Russell. The soldiers stationed there 
 are, for the most part, recruited in New York; 
 
 71 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 they are fed from the Mississippi Valley, clothed 
 from New York, and when they are discharged, 
 they are returned to New York at our expense. 
 We think we are a mighty business-like nation. 
 Yet a nice little padded coop would likely be 
 recommended for any one of us who would 
 build a costly factory at Steubenville, Ohio, 
 and persist in a poUcy of frequently paying 
 transportation to and from New York of la- 
 borers to run it on a plan that would mean 
 maximum expense and minimum profit. 
 
 The reasons for the army-post waste are the 
 same as they have been for twenty years : Army 
 leaders grown old under the scattered post sys- 
 tem; the tradition that a post commander to 
 get favorable mention must maintain the 
 "beautiful park" idea, with its extensive roads, 
 walks, gardens, lawns, and independent and 
 costly systems of lighting, water, and sewage; 
 the argument that abandonment would mean 
 throwing away immense sums already in- 
 vested; and finally, the influence of affected 
 communities, exerted through members of 
 Congress and backed by pleas ranging from 
 
 72 
 
 d 
 

THE HOLE IN OUR POCKET 
 
 "There are forty thousand Indians near this 
 point" to "The people of this community are 
 peaceful, law-abiding, hospitable and patriotic"; 
 and the plaint of the legislator himself that 
 "We would find it diflScult to square ourselves 
 with our constituency if our promises are not 
 made good." The character and magnitude of 
 the protest that goes up whenever an army 
 post is threatened can be found by anyone 
 who will go through the records. 
 
 So, year after year, Congressmen and Sena- 
 tors have heard from home. They have played 
 politics and we have our useless and wasteful 
 posts. 
 
 There has been much muck-raking of mem- 
 bers of Congress over army-post expenditures, 
 much heated protest against log-rolling in the 
 interest of individual communities. Yet the 
 further one gets into the army-post records, 
 the clearer it becomes that if muck-raking of 
 Senators and Congressmen is to be undertaken 
 it will be necessary to muck-rake a very large 
 majority of both houses. 
 
 73 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 And right there is a great national weakness. 
 
 They all do it. 
 
 Once in a while you come upon some one 
 who did n't do it; and a few pages on you find 
 that he did n't last long. 
 
 When the man whom we send to represent 
 us in Congress is called upon to decide ques- 
 tions in connection with an inland waterway 
 or a harbor, he puts the consideration of his 
 local constituency first; when tariff questions 
 arise and are to be legislated upon, he hears 
 from back home and acts accordingly; when 
 the abandonment of an obsolete, useless, and 
 wasteful army post is advocated, he hears from 
 the comparatively small local community 
 affected, and fights it. He wants to stay in 
 Congress and needs votes to keep him there. 
 
 It is n't his fault. It is our fault. Rather it 
 is the fault of our system. So long as in casting 
 our vote we place our home town, our home 
 county, or our home State above the interest 
 of the nation, and cling to the tradition that 
 our executive officers have no business in the 
 halls of Congress, we are not going to be justi- 
 
 74 
 
THE HOLE IN OUR POCKET 
 
 fied in holding our representatives to account if 
 they continue to throw away our money. 
 
 A candidate for the national legislature in a 
 district where the vote is close cannot declare 
 that he places the welfare of the nation above 
 the interests of his district and win the place. 
 We voters have proven it time and again. 
 Kent, of California, to be sure, is one notable 
 exception now in Congress. PoUtically he is a 
 freak. He holds his place not by reason of but 
 in spite of his patriotic utterances. 
 
 It would be a fine thing if we could bring our- 
 selves to send to Congress men who would be 
 free to exercise a real executive abiUty, free to 
 consider the interest of the nation first. 
 
 The millennium is going to be a fine thing, 
 too. Just now, human nature stands in the 
 way of both. We can't change that by writing 
 pieces for the paper. But we can, if we want, 
 give our representatives in Congress a chance 
 to hear the views of experts who have no local 
 obligations and whose whole service is in the 
 interest of the nation. 
 
 The proposition that our executives and our 
 75 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 legislators have no business to sit down and 
 deliberate together has become almost a reli- 
 gion with us, since it was propounded by Mon- 
 tesquieu back in 1730. There is no place here 
 for an argument as to whether this is as it 
 should be. It is a fact, though, that this idea 
 has been abandoned by Great Britain and by 
 France and that it has no place in the Govern- 
 ment of Switzerland. 
 
 By statute, or by the simpler process of reso- 
 lution, we can, if we want, give the President 
 the right to appear on the floor of either house 
 and to say what he thinks should be said with- 
 out exposing himself to gibes and the accusa- 
 tion that he is making a "grand-stand play." 
 By the same process we can give the same 
 opportunity to each member of the Cabinet. 
 
 If we want to, we can go even further than 
 this. We can give the President the right to 
 introduce bills; to prepare and introduce a 
 budget containing estimates of the expenses 
 of the Government for a coming year; and we 
 can give Cabinet members the right to defend 
 on the floor of either house the portions of 
 
 76 
 
THE HOLE IN OUR POCKET 
 
 the President's budget involving their depart- 
 ments. 
 
 We could, of course, even go further, and 
 prohibit the addition of items to the Executive 
 budget without the concurrence of the Presi- 
 dent and Congress. 
 
 Whether we will want to do all this, or any 
 part of it, or none of it, we cannot dodge the 
 fact that we are wasting milUons on our army. 
 
 To stop this waste and to secure maximum 
 efficiency, military experts agree that the first 
 step should be legislation that would concen- 
 trate the army in eight large posts of approxi- 
 mately equal size and located where transpor- 
 tation and supply would be most economic. 
 
 The following grouping of detachments of 
 all arms is being advocated by our ablest miU- 
 tary men: — 
 
 Two or three groups covering the Atlantic 
 seaboard on the line between the St. Lawrence 
 and Atlanta. 
 
 Two, possibly three, groups covering the 
 Pacific seaboard, on the Une between Puget 
 Sound and Los Angeles. 
 
 77 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 Two groups between the Great Lakes and 
 the Rio Grande, which would serve as first 
 reserve and which would supply central organ- 
 izations around which could be built organiza- 
 tions of the National Guard, and, in time of 
 war, volunteer forces in the interior of the 
 continent. 
 
 It is estimated that by this means alone a 
 total yearly saving of more than $5,500,000 
 would be accomplished. That very large sums 
 are now invested in the scattered posts is true. 
 The real estate occupied by these posts is valu- 
 able. It is the judgment, however, of men who 
 have spent years on our military problems that 
 it should be possible to refund this investment 
 and largely to finance the redistribution of the 
 army from moneys made available through the 
 sale of government property which is no longer 
 needed for military purposes. These men argue 
 that there is no reason why the United States 
 Government should not adopt the policy of the 
 wise business man who tears down an anti- 
 quated building, representing a considerable 
 original investment, in order to make room for 
 
 78 
 
L 
 
 THE HOLE IN OUR POCKET 
 
 a much more economical and profitable 
 structure. 
 
 There is becoming more and more evident a 
 growing conviction that we should have some- 
 thing more than our regular army and our 
 incomplete militia organizations. It is being 
 asserted with increasing frequency that we 
 should have a citizen force wholly adequate to 
 protect the nation in any emergency, and that 
 we can have such a force without giving ground 
 an inch on our traditions and our institutions. 
 
 It is not so much that the application of our 
 military theories has been all wrong, as stated 
 in a previous paragraph, as it is that there has 
 been scarcely any application at all. 
 
 It has been shown that in a time of desperate 
 necessity we could, perhaps within six weeks, 
 put into the field a force of not more than 
 150,000 men made up, for the most part, of 
 regulars and groups of militia organized with- 
 out uniformity, incompletely trained, short of 
 artillery, and practically without the necessary 
 auxiHary arms of the service. That pitifully 
 small force would represent about all that we 
 
 79 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 have done toward applying the pohcy laid 
 down in the days of the Revolution. We 
 should have no officers for training new levies, 
 and no means for organizing and handling the 
 citizens who might enlist. 
 
 The time necessary for the training of volun- 
 teer forces depends upon whether or not there 
 are trained instructors available. With trained 
 officers at hand, and with the necessary sup- 
 plies, implements, and equipment in reserve, 
 bodies of raw recruits could probably be trans- 
 formed into efficient fighting groups within six 
 months. 
 
 But in a situation, such as we have to-day, 
 where all officers available would be hardly 
 sufficient for the regular army and the militia 
 organization, and where the leaders and the 
 men comprising volunteer forces would have to 
 stumble toward efficiency through the desper- 
 ate and costly school of experience in actual 
 battle, months, even years, and thousands of 
 lives needlessly wasted, would be the expendi- 
 ture required to transform the inexperienced 
 soldiers into efficient, defensive units. 
 
 80 
 
. 
 
 THE HOLE IN OUR POCKET 
 
 Probably there was never a greater demon- 
 stration of this than during the Civil War. 
 Between 1861 and 1865, two extemporized 
 armies gradually developed while in conflict. 
 
 In 1861 both officers and men were unready 
 for the tasks demanded of them. There was 
 lack of cohesion between the units making up 
 regiments and armies, and lack of cooperation 
 between officers. At Bull Run, one force was 
 disorganized by defeat, the other by victory, 
 and it was not until 1863 that the armies could 
 be regarded as complete and effective mili- 
 tary organizations. Had one or the other of 
 the armies been made up of men previously 
 trained, it is the opinion of those who have 
 given close study to that war that it would 
 have been speedily ended. 
 
 The private cannot become a good private 
 until his captain is a good captain. The captain 
 cannot become a good captain until his colo- 
 nel is a good colonel. And so it goes. Training 
 of officers and men in actual conflict, without 
 any preliminary training whatever, must be 
 appalUngly wasteful in both money and men. 
 
 81 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 Under present conditions of warfare, it is 
 hardly to be imagined that any first-class na- 
 tion would attack us by land with anything 
 but trained forces. Yet we have devised no 
 means of fiUing out our professional organiza- 
 tion to large proportions in time of need. 
 
 The big hole in the pocket where we carry 
 our army funds, of course, is the lack of any 
 regular system of reserve. The professional 
 soldier, the fighter who enters the army for a 
 living, is the most expensive unit of defense a 
 nation can have. The citizen soldier, who is 
 called to the colors only in time of war, or for 
 short periods of training, is the cheapest. A 
 reasonable combination of the professional and 
 the citizen soldier, in accordance with the es- 
 tabUshed military policy of the United States, 
 would give us, for our ninety millions, a defen- 
 sive strength that would compare not imfavor- 
 ably with that of any first-class nation. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 OUR CITIZEN FIGHTERS 
 
 One of the peculiarities of the eflfect here at 
 home of the upheaval in Europe during the 
 early months of the war was a rapidly devel- 
 oped belief in some quarters that matters per- 
 taining to our own miUtary fitness should not 
 be discussed in polite society. We were warned 
 time and again that to talk frankly among 
 ourselves on this subject is an international 
 indehcacy, and may not only shock some 
 other higher up among the nations, but will 
 also weaken our position as the world's great 
 example of peace, purity, piety, and prosperity, 
 when the day arrives when we shall venture to 
 take those awful, barbarous foreign cut-throat 
 nations by the hands, or hind legs, and lead 
 them, or drag them, into ways of righteousness. 
 
 No doubt, those of us who have subscribed 
 to this sort of propaganda, should we discover 
 that that horrible, common brawl between 
 
 83 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 that low-down man and his wife next door all 
 came about because the old man found a cock- 
 roach in his soup, would immediately throw all 
 our own bug exterminators, our soup tureens, 
 and ladles into the garbage can, for fear that 
 their presence in our possession might interfere 
 with our showing our quarreling neighbors how 
 silly it is to start a fight over cockroaches and 
 soup. 
 
 It used to be believed that to say "limb" 
 when "leg" was meant kept boys and girls from 
 being led into wickedness. As our notions have 
 broadened, we have come more and more to 
 call things by their right names. Right now, 
 we are the spectators of a frightful war, be- 
 tween highly cultured peoples. To pull the 
 long "better-than-thou" face of purity and 
 piety is rank hypocrisy, and every Tom, Dick, 
 and Harry of us knows it. There is no "limb" 
 about it. It is plain "leg." 
 
 We are notorious in our national tendency to 
 go up and down the world with a very discern- 
 ible chip on our shoulder. We do not hesitate, 
 or at least we have not hesitated in the past, 
 
 84 
 
■n^ 
 
 >^ 
 
I 
 
 OUR CITIZEN FIGHTERS 
 
 to meddle in the aflfairs of other nations, — of 
 Russia, or China, or Japan, — and we get 
 "sassy" as can be the instant there is the faint- 
 est suggestion that an outsider might, in the 
 remotest possibiUty, resent our interference 
 or tread on our pet poUtical, commercial, or 
 industrial corns. 
 
 We are a healthy and very courageous sort 
 of folk, mighty willing to fight if we have to. 
 Yet some of us insist, even when people are 
 fighting to the death all around us, and it has 
 been frightfully demonstrated that war can no 
 longer be regarded only as a thing of the bar- 
 barous past, that it is harmful and indelicate 
 to inquire what, if anything, we tote in our 
 national hip pocket. 
 
 One of our blossoming statesmen, boaster 
 of a greater stock of "clarion tones" than of 
 information, is quoted as having dismissed the 
 whole subject of our preparedness to defend 
 ourselves in the following "ringing words": 
 "Back of our splendid regular army is our 
 miUtia; and back of our militia is the sturdy, 
 glorious manhood of the nation." 
 
 85 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 The facts leave no room for doubt that 
 somebody should have led the gentleman ten- 
 derly away and explained to him that the regu- 
 lar army really is not splendid; and that even 
 if it were, the militia should not be back of it; 
 and have advised him to read George Wash- 
 ington on the subject of the value of sturdy, 
 untrained citizens in time of war. 
 
 In the opinion of every mihtary expert who 
 has made public his views on the subject from 
 the time of Washington to the present, the 
 militia should not be thought of as being back 
 of the regular army, but one with the regular 
 army. The fact that we have not carried out 
 the fundamental principle of our military pol- 
 icy, that of bringing the professional and the 
 citizen soldiery into uniformity of organiza- 
 tion, equipment, and training, is one of our 
 two great mihtary weaknesses. The other one 
 is our total lack of reserve strength, a subject 
 which will be taken up further on. The lack 
 of uniformity between the militia and the regu- 
 lar army can be charged almost entirely to a 
 failure to build up an efficient cooperation be- 
 
 86 
 
 4 
 
OUR CITIZEN FIGHTERS 
 
 tween the individual States and the Federal 
 Government. No doubt this failure is due en- 
 tirely to thoughtlessness and an incomplete re- 
 alization of the peril that Hes in this shpshod 
 method of applying the principles of our mili- 
 tary theories. 
 
 Washington sounded a warning against just 
 such a condition at the close of the Revolution. 
 Back of what he said were years of bitter expe- 
 rience. In taking leave of the Governors of the 
 States before resigning his commission, writ- 
 ing with the experience of a soldier and with 
 the foresight of the real statesman, he said 
 this: — 
 
 There are four things, which I humbly conceive, 
 are essential to the well-being, I may even venture 
 to say, to the existence of the United States, as an 
 independent power. 
 
 First. An indissoluble imion of the States under 
 one federal head; 
 
 Second. A sacred regard to public justice; 
 
 Third. The adoption of a proper peace establish- 
 ment; and 
 
 Fourth. The prevalence of that pacific and 
 friendly disposition among the people of the United 
 
 87 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 States, which will induce them to forget their local 
 prejudices and policies; to make those mutual con- 
 cessions which are requisite to the general pros- 
 perity; and in some instances, to sacrifice their 
 individual advantages to the interest of the com- 
 munity. . . . 
 
 It is necessary to say but a few words on the 
 third topic which was proposed, and which regards 
 particularly the defense of the Republic; as there 
 can be little doubt that Congress will recommend 
 a proper peace establishment for the United States, 
 in which a due attention will be paid to the impor- 
 tance of placing the militia of the Union upon a 
 regular and respectable footing. If this should be 
 the case, I would beg leave to urge the great advan- 
 tage of it in the strongest terms. The militia of 
 this country must be considered as the palladium 
 of our security, and the first effectual resort in case 
 of hostility. It is essential, therefore, that the same 
 system should pervade the whole; that the forma- 
 tion and discipline of the militia of the continent 
 should be absolutely uniform, and that the same 
 species of arms, accouterments, and military appa- 
 ratus should be introduced in every part of the 
 United States. No one, who has not learned it 
 from experience, can conceive the difficulty, ex- 
 pense, and confusion, which result from a contrary 
 system, or the vague arrangements which have 
 hitherto prevailed. 
 
 88 
 

 OUR CITIZEN FIGHTERS 
 
 Notwithstanding Washington's warning and 
 similar ones by military men ever since his 
 time, although the machinery for securing uni- 
 formity in the organization of our military 
 forces has been provided, the militia organiza- 
 tions, except in rare instances, are designed 
 primarily for the immediate needs of the in- 
 dividual States, and very Uttle thought is given 
 to bringing them to a point where they would 
 be really eflScient if called upon to act in the 
 defense of the nation. 
 
 Twelve years have elapsed since the passage 
 of the miUtia law, and in some instances the 
 important provisions of that law, especially re- 
 lating to raising the standard of eflSciency and 
 to providing well-rounded organization, are not 
 nearer to being complied with to-day than 
 they were when the law was passed. The act 
 requiring conformity in organization between 
 the regular army and the militia was passed in 
 1903 and permitted five years for the carrying- 
 out of its provisions. At the end of that time 
 the period was further extended to January 21, 
 1910. 
 
 89 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 In his report for the year 1913, General A. L. 
 Mills, Chief of the Division of Militia AflFairs, 
 discussing this point said this: — 
 
 Properly balanced divisions are so vital to the 
 successful use of troops, that until the present de- 
 ficiency in auxiliary arms is removed it constitutes 
 a grave peril. This fact cannot be realized by the 
 organized militia itself at present, or an insistent 
 demand from that body would result. There is but 
 one obstacle that at present stands in the way of 
 obtaining the desired result, and that is the indif- 
 ference of the organized militia itself to the sub- 
 ject. Since the members of this body are engaged 
 during the day in making a living, and devote only 
 a certain number of evenings a week to the military 
 profession, and since there is so much ground for 
 them to cover in performing their routine military 
 duties, naturally the work immediately in hand 
 fully occupies their available time, and large ques- 
 tions, such as the one now under consideration, are 
 in general left in each State to the organized mili- 
 tia officer who is practically continuously engaged 
 in military work. I refer to the adjutant-general. 
 This man in most States devotes his entire time to 
 the organized militia; he is the governor's military 
 adviser and he largely shapes military legislation 
 in the State. It may be said, therefore, that in a 
 great measure the safety of the United States de- 
 
 90 
 
L 
 
 OUR CITIZEN FIGHTERS 
 
 I 
 
 pends upon having balanced divisions and that the 
 securing of these balanced divisions depends upon 
 the forty-eight adjutants-general. This is a fact 
 seldom realized. There is no doubt in my mind 
 that were these gentlemen to fully appreciate the 
 great responsibility that is upon them, and were 
 they to lay the situation before the members of the 
 organized militia in their respective States, frankly 
 and earnestly, entering in a whole-souled way into 
 the work, the present difficulties would disappear, 
 and in a short time we should emerge from the seri- 
 ous danger that now threatens us. 
 
 The peace establishment which Washington 
 urged, we have secured, and having secured 
 it and brought it to a state where it is moder- 
 ately well equipped and thoroughly well trained, 
 through sheer thoughtlessness we have been un- 
 fair enough to place upon it the greater portion 
 of the military responsibility of the nation. 
 
 The regular army is the national military 
 hired man. At present among its most impor- 
 tant duties are: — 
 
 m To supply peace garrisons for foreign posses- 
 
 ■ sions of the United States; 
 
 B To supply peace garrisons for fortified har- 
 
 I bors, and naval bases; 
 
 i " 
 
 I 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 To prevent naval raids which under mod- 
 ern methods of warfare may precede a declara- 
 tion of war, and which may determine the ini- 
 tiative by giving the enemy a convenient base 
 for invading operations; 
 
 To supply a mobile reserve prepared to rein- 
 force foreign garrisons in case of insurrection 
 and disorder; 
 
 To furnish forces suflScient for the occupa- 
 tion of foreign territory where treaty rights or 
 established national policies are threatened; 
 
 To be able to cooperate with the navy in the 
 formation of joint expeditions to protect the 
 foreign interests of the United States and its 
 citizens; 
 
 To be ready to mobilize on instant notice 
 and to strike quickly and successfully at the 
 outbreak of war, before an army of citizen sol- 
 diers can be concentrated; 
 
 To maintain itself as an experimental model 
 for the volunteer army, to demonstrate the 
 application of military practices, and to serve 
 as a means of educating and training and organ- 
 izing citizen forces. It must be a school of mili- 
 
 92 
 
 4 
 
OUR CITIZEN FIGHTERS 
 
 ry theory and practice, not only for the de- 
 velopment of soldiers, but for the development 
 of officers who will be capable of assuming im- 
 portant duties in war; 
 
 To unify a military doctrine and policy 
 which must permeate the entire national army 
 if it is to succeed in war ; 
 HI To prepare an advance for equipment, trans- 
 portation, and supply of a great citizen army 
 in time of war; 
 
 To act for the peace and safety of any com- 
 munity within the borders which may require 
 its services. 
 
 It may be that it is high time for us to de- 
 cide whether it is safe, so far as we ourselves 
 are concerned, and whether it is fair to our mili- 
 tary hired man, to place upon him, in addition 
 to keeping our home in order, and taking his 
 part in preventing our neighbors from be- 
 coming too presuming, practically the whole 
 responsibility of defending the home against 
 other fighting men, perhaps twenty or thirty 
 times his size. If we decide that there is peril 
 as well as injustice in our present handling of 
 
 93 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 our military resources, the way out is most 
 simple: — 
 
 First: By legislation we can remedy the 
 defects in the nucleus about which we can 
 build an adequate defensive strength. 
 
 Next: We can coordinate the miUtia and the 
 professional organization. 
 
 Finally: We can utilize our tremendous but 
 undeveloped miHtary resources in men and 
 material. 
 
 The means by which the regular army organ- 
 ization may be perfected have been described 
 in a previous chapter. 
 
 What should we do with the militia? 
 
 If it is to form a part of a peace army which 
 in time of war is to be eflScient, what must be 
 required of it? 
 
 The infantry makes up the bulk of an army. 
 Infantry is made up of men whose means of 
 transportation is their own feet, and who carry 
 with them their own weapons, ammunition, 
 shelter, and food. On the march or in battle, 
 the infantry bears the heaviest burdens, and 
 
 94 
 
OUR CITIZEN FIGHTERS 
 
 stains the heaviest losses. MiUtary genius in 
 our country organizes the infantry into bri- 
 gades of three regiments each, commanded by 
 a brigadier-general. Three battahons make 
 up each regiment. The regiment is commanded 
 by a colonel. Each battaUon consists of four 
 companies, each commanded by a captain and 
 two heutenants. In each regiment there is a 
 band, a machine-gun platoon with two auto- 
 matic guns, and a few mounted scouts. 
 
 The fighting arm of first importance asso- 
 ciated with the infantry is the field artillery. 
 The largest field artillery unit which we have is 
 the regiment, commanded by a colonel. The 
 regiment consists of two battahons. The bat- 
 talion is made up of three batteries of four 
 guns, each in command of a captain and four 
 lieutenants. The artillery is of various kinds, 
 according to the work for which it is designed. 
 We have horse artillery, which may accom- 
 pany the cavalry, for example, and mounted 
 artillery with guns of a type that may be dis- 
 mounted and carried on pack mules. Next to 
 the field artillery in importance as a fighting 
 
 95 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 arm comes the cavalry. In the cavalry the 
 three subdivisions of the regiment are known 
 as squadrons and instead of companies there 
 are troops. As other auxiliary arms are the 
 engineers, the signal corps, the medical depart- 
 ment, including ambulance companies and 
 field hospitals, and the quartermaster corps for 
 the furnishing of transportation, rations, and 
 shelter, and which has charge of the payment 
 of troops. 
 
 The branch of the army not included in the 
 mobile forces is the coast artillery intended for 
 operating the great guns which command the 
 entrances to important harbors. 
 
 The smallest military imit which contains 
 all arms of the service, and all branches of the 
 staff is the division. The division, therefore, is 
 the smallest unit capable of independent ac- 
 tion. A complete infantry division should com- 
 prise: — 
 
 Headquarters, 27 men; three brigades of 
 infantry, 17,244 men; one regiment of cavalry, 
 1308 men; one brigade of light artillery, 2391 
 men; one pioneer battaUon of engineers, 514 
 
 96 
 
 i 
 
 J 
 
i 
 
 OUR CITIZEN FIGHTERS 
 
 men; one field battalion of signal troops, 176 
 men; commander of trains, military police, etc., 
 15 men; one ammunition train, 216 men; one 
 supply train, 194 men; one sanitary train, 570 
 men; one engineer train, 10 men. The ag- 
 gregate, 22,665 men, is made up as follows 
 Combatant officers, 620; medical officers, 94 
 chaplains, 12; combatant enlisted men, 20,673 
 enUsted men, hospital corps, 826 ; enhsted men, 
 quartermaster corps, 421; civiUans, 9; veteri- 
 narians, 10. 
 
 These figures are based on long experience of 
 all the nations of the world, and although the 
 units in the armies of diflferent nations vary in 
 size, and are called by difiFerent names, the 
 proportions approximate very closely. 
 
 A study of the experience of nations in mod- 
 em warfare, in an examination of the condi- 
 tions of our militia, led the Army War College 
 and the Divisions of MiUtary Affairs very 
 recently to establish twelve divisions of organ- 
 ized miUtia. This was a step in advance. But 
 an examination of the condition of the militia 
 shows a great variation in the proportions of 
 
 97 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 the various arms of the service. No two are 
 aUke, and not one is wholly complete. With 
 the exception of the sixth division (New York), 
 where rapid progress is being made, there is 
 not a complete division of miUtia within sight. 
 The mihtia divisions have been established as 
 follows: — 
 
 Fifth Division — Headquarters, Boston; 
 Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massa- 
 chusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut. 
 
 Sixth Division — Headquarters, Albany; 
 New York. 
 
 Seventh Division — Headquarters, Harris- 
 burg; Pennsylvania. 
 
 Eighth Division — Headquarters, Washing- 
 ton; New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, Vir- 
 ginia, West Virginia. 
 
 Ninth Division — Headquarters, Atlanta; 
 North CaroUna, South Carohna, Georgia, 
 Florida. 
 
 Tenth Division — Headquarters, Nashville; 
 Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi. 
 
 Eleventh Division — Headquarters, Colum- 
 bus; Ohio, Michigan. 
 
 98 
 
 11 
 
OUR CITIZEN FIGHTERS 
 
 Twelfth Division — Headquarters, Chicago; 
 Illinois, Indiana. 
 
 Thirteenth Division — Headquarters, St. 
 Paul; Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North 
 Dakota, South Dakota. 
 
 Fourteenth Division — Headquarters, Kan- 
 sas City; Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, Wyom- 
 ing, Colorado. 
 
 Fifteenth Division — Headquarters, San 
 Antonio; New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, 
 Louisiana, Arizona. 
 
 Sixteenth Division — Headquarters, San 
 Francisco; California, Oregon, Washington, 
 Idaho, Montana, Utah, Nevada. 
 
 In each one of these divisions, with the pos- 
 sible exception of the sixth and fifteenth, there 
 is an excess of infantry and a deficiency in the 
 arms upon which infantry depends for main- 
 tenance and operation in war. Recent figures 
 show that the various divisions fall short of 
 what eflSciency would demand in action ap- 
 proximately as follows: — 
 
 99 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 j 
 
 31 
 
 1^ 
 
 Is 
 
 d 
 
 1 
 
 s 
 
 S.2 
 
 11 
 
 a 8 
 < 
 
 ill 
 
 < 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 6 
 
 7 
 8 
 9 
 10 
 11 
 12 
 13 
 14 
 15 
 16 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 9 
 
 10 
 10 
 
 7 
 6 
 
 8 
 
 7 
 7 
 7 
 
 3 
 3 
 4 
 9 
 6 
 
 12 
 6 
 3 
 
 11 
 8 
 5 
 7 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 3 
 3 
 3 
 
 2 
 8 
 2 
 2 
 3 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 2 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 4 
 2 
 3 
 1 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 2 
 3 
 2 
 
 2 
 1 
 4 
 4 
 3 
 3 
 
 3 
 4 
 3 
 4 
 2 
 
 
 w 
 
 
 Total 
 
 87 
 
 77 
 
 25 
 
 8 
 
 26 
 
 33 
 
 12 
 
 12 
 
 12 
 
 This condition, to some extent, at least, is 
 due to misinterpretation by the organized mili- 
 tia itseK of the terms of our miUtia law. Under 
 the amended Militia Act, the President has the 
 power to fix the minimum strength of enlisted 
 men in each company, battery, troop, etc. 
 Misunderstanding, or misinterpretation, or 
 both, seems to have centered around the mean- 
 ing of the term "minimum number." The 
 original intention was that the minimum 
 strength of any unit should be sufficient to 
 provide men in large enough numbers to be 
 trained as a unit, and a sufficient number of 
 
 100 
 
 J 
 
IP OUR CITIZEN FIGHPriiRS ^ 
 
 units to make possible a nucleus so organized 
 as to be capable of expansion to adequate war 
 strength without losing in efficiency. 
 
 In other words, the intention of the act was 
 to supply enough men to make possible the 
 application of the general theory of the na- 
 tional defense, so far as concerned the mihtia. 
 During the years following the passage of the 
 act, however, its terms have been interpreted, 
 apparently, to mean that the minimum num- 
 ber is the smallest strength that units must 
 have in order to be taken into the Federal serv- 
 ice. There has come about, therefore, the ex- 
 istence of units so absurdly small as to make 
 it impossible to carry out what our miUtary 
 men had in mind in their efforts to fix a 
 standard of minimum strength. The latest 
 complete figures available show that out of 
 approximately 1600 companies of infantry, 
 1030 are below minimum strength. The aver- 
 age strength of the field artillery is about two 
 thirds of what the law requires. In no other 
 
 IB arm of the service is the average up to the 
 
 ll required standard. 
 
 ■ 
 
^^ ;l :mie we ready? 
 
 In recent years, very definite eflForts have 
 been made to standardize the system of train- 
 ing for the organized mihtia, but the shortage 
 of officers in the regular army has made it im- 
 possible to supply anywhere near the number 
 necessary for instructing and training of troops 
 outside the regular organization. Lack of facil- 
 ities for both indoor and outdoor training has 
 also been a serious obstacle. 
 
 As a result, recruits are admitted to militia 
 organizations as trained soldiers fit for duty 
 in the regular army who have had no actual 
 field experience and the most casual indoor 
 miUtary training. Among my acquaintances is 
 a man who has been admitted in this manner 
 into what is known as a crack regiment of mili- 
 tia. He has had eight periods of marching in 
 an armory, during which time, to use his own 
 words, he has learned "which end of the gun 
 the bullet comes out of, and what is the differ- 
 ence between 'right' and 'left dress.' " 
 
 The militiaman each year receives twenty- 
 four hour-and-a-half drills in the armory and 
 a period of training in the field — if the legis- 
 
 102 
 
MILITIA OFFICEUS IN CONSULTATION DURING FIELD PRACTICE 
 
I 
 
 OUR CITIZEN FIGHTERS 
 
 ature of his State does not refuse to appropri- 
 ate the necessary money for the field practice. 
 
 Statistics recently collected show that of a 
 total of 1971 naihtia organizations reported on, 
 480 had drill halls not adequate for indoor 
 instruction; 162 had armories used for other 
 than mihtary purposes, which interfered with 
 mihtary training; 188 which did not aflford the 
 United States property the proper protection; 
 470 which were not equipped with means of 
 indoor rifle practice; 182 which had neither 
 equipment nor room for indoor gallery prac- 
 tice; and 628 whose location, construction, and 
 equipment were not such as to encourage en- 
 listment or reenhstment. 
 
 It can be shown that one fourth of our or- 
 ganized militia cannot be properly instructed 
 in drill, and cannot receive the necessary in- 
 struction in target practice. 
 
 Not only is the organized militia deficient 
 in the necessities for proper training, but it is 
 not adequately suppUed with uniforms and 
 equipment, either in quantity or in kind, suffi- 
 cient for its needs, should all, or a large part 
 
 103 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 of it, be called into the service of the United 
 States. A very noticeable tendency is shown 
 in many States to provide only the supphes 
 needed by the troops for the short period of 
 the annual field exercises. Many States equip 
 their troops, apparently, for state purposes 
 only. Yet the Federal Government spends 
 about $4,000,000 a year to help bring the mili- 
 tia to reasonable efficiency as a war organi- 
 zation. The militia's deficiency in the most 
 important auxiliary arms of the service, field 
 artillery and cavalry, is due to the fact that 
 these arms are the most expensive to main- 
 tain, and least likely to be found necessary in 
 handling local situations. Federal expenditures 
 have not yet given States generally a broader 
 view of the functions of their militia organiza- 
 tions nor secured means of rapid, orderly, and 
 eflfective mobilization. 
 
 The condition that carries with it the great- 
 est peril is the total lack of any means of filling 
 out the militia organizations, already contain- 
 ing many untrained men, with men who have 
 had even preliminary miUtary instruction. 
 
 104 
 
OUR CITIZEN FIGHTERS 
 
 There is a vast difference between paper 
 strength and actual miUtary strength. On 
 paper, the strength of our organized militia is 
 8323 officers, and 119,087 men, or approxi- 
 mately 127,300 men and officers. 
 
 The actual strength of the militia, officers 
 and men, can be placed at approximately 64,- 
 000 men and officers, but it is not conceivable 
 that even this number could be assembled in a 
 time of urgent need, and it is a fact that almost 
 every organization contains a considerable 
 number of men who have not received suffi- 
 cient or proper training to fit them to be 
 capable soldiers. In time of sudden war, what 
 is now beheved to be the actual strength of 
 our mihtia would undoubtedly be reduced by 
 the inabihty, physical or otherwise, of mem- 
 bers of the organizations to serve with the 
 colors. 
 
 What is to be done about it? 
 
 The adjutant-generals and other military 
 officers of our States, the mihtary men in our 
 regular army, and many of our leading states- 
 men have given the closest study to the prob- 
 
 105 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 lem, and they are approaching the general 
 agreement approximating the following: — 
 
 That in time of peace, each State should be 
 considered as a territorial militia department 
 with the Governor the commander-in-chief of 
 the department; 
 
 That oflScers on the staff of the Governor, 
 not members of the line or of the staff corps of 
 the organized militia, should not be considered 
 as part of the organization under the law; 
 
 That there should be sufficient officers and 
 administrative corps to carry on proper mili- 
 tary administration in time of peace, and to 
 provide sufficient officers for the state organ- 
 ization both in time of peace and war; 
 
 That the organization of the militia should 
 be made to conform with the divisional organ- 
 ization of the regular army; 
 
 That if the number of companies in a com- 
 plete militia regiment falls, at any time, below 
 twelve, exclusive of the machine-gun company, 
 the deficiency should be replaced within six 
 months, or the regiment considered as perma- 
 nently abandoned, its members either being 
 
 106 
 
OUR CITIZEN FIGHTERS 
 
 assigned to other organizations or mustered 
 out. 
 
 We opened this chapter by subscribing to 
 the contention that it is worth while to call 
 things by their right names. There is no dis- 
 puting the fact that, with few exceptions, the 
 state organizations of our mihtia are poorly 
 filled, indifferently trained, partially, and in 
 some cases wholly, lacking in personnel and 
 equipment necessary to a well-balanced fight- 
 ing force which can be counted upon to give a 
 satisfactory account of itself in battle. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 THE BATTLE OF THE CONNECTICUT 
 
 An army across the Connecticut River, driv- 
 ing our handful of defenders northward, was as 
 far as the speculation was carried in our imag- 
 inary attack on New York. 
 
 Suppose it is carried a bit further. 
 
 Suppose the following as fragmentary press 
 accounts of a struggle at the Connecticut to 
 check a hostile advance on New York: — 
 
 With the Army, March 28 — Although the 
 presence of small advance detachments of the 
 enemy was reported by our scouts toward 
 evening, apparently the main body of the en- 
 emy's forces had not yet come up, and, owing 
 to our lack of aeroplanes for scouting, it was 
 decided to throw a squadron of cavalry across 
 the river. 
 
 It was only when the troops were pouring 
 across in fancied security that two batteries of 
 the enemy's guns, cleverly posted and screened, 
 
 108 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE CONNECTICUT 
 
 opened their concentrated fire on the crowded 
 bridge. 
 
 Before the blast of shrapnel and machine- 
 gun projectiles, scores of our men were swept 
 into the river. The challenge of the enemy's 
 guns was taken up by our artillery, and a 
 spirited duel continued for an hour, under 
 cover of which our cavalry retreated and re- 
 formed. The enemy's batteries finally became 
 silent, but on account of our lack of aeroplanes 
 it was impossible to determine whether the 
 hostile guns had been put out of action by our 
 fire or had changed their position. Because of 
 an appalling shortage, orders have been issued 
 to save every possible round of ammunition. 
 
 In the trenches, March 29 — Before dawn it 
 became apparent that the enemy was to at- 
 tempt the crossing. Several night advances by 
 small detachments were made. But our scouts 
 were alert and our guns had the range. During 
 the night, apparently, the enemy brought up 
 additional and heavier artillery. 
 
 These guns were set to work at an early hour 
 this morning, when the prospect began to 
 
 109 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 change. Several of our batteries were soon 
 moved backward. Though suffering heavy 
 loss, at last the enemy managed to get a bri- 
 gade of infantry and a battery of artillery 
 across the river and into position. Under the 
 protection of a heavy bombardment of our posi- 
 tion, two more batteries were got over and were 
 planted at the bridge-head. With three hos- 
 tile batteries and a brigade of infantry over 
 the water, a retirement to our secondary en- 
 trenched position was ordered. 
 
 Hardly had the movement been completed 
 when the overwhelming superiority of the 
 enemy's field artillery became apparent. A 
 terrific fire was poured into our lines from a 
 distance fully four miles away. Our lighter 
 artillery was powerless against the heavy guns. 
 
 The enemy is now centering his rain of steel 
 upon oiu* entrenchments. For three hours our 
 brave young fellows have stood the terrific 
 ordeal, unable to fire a shot in return. Any 
 man raising his head above the fire-swept earth 
 ramparts is certain of death. Lying flat on 
 their bellies, all our men can do is to pray for a 
 
 110 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE CONNECTICUT 
 
 respite and a chance to charge the ever-increas- 
 ing forces on our side of the river and to silence 
 their guns. The enemy for the most part is 
 using shrapnel. Hastily entrenched as we are, 
 our forces are suflFering terribly. 
 
 Hostile aeroplanes, like great hawks, are 
 soaring continually over our Unes. It is impos- 
 sible to conceal our batteries, no matter how 
 frequently they are moved. Our inferiority in 
 aircraft and the impossibiUty of locating hostile 
 batteries is maddening. While the hostile gun- 
 ners find the range quickly and exactly, we 
 waste round after round of precious ammuni- 
 tion in attempting to search out the enemy's 
 positions. 
 
 Ignoring our guns, the hostile artillerymen, 
 relying on concealment for immunity, are con- 
 centrating all their efforts to enfilade our 
 trenches. With an apparent prodigality of 
 ammunition they continue to pour bouquet 
 after bouquet of high explosives or combined 
 shrapnel and high explosive shells into our 
 works. 
 
 With the Army, March 29 — Toward mid- 
 111 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 afternoon our artillery fire noticeably slack- 
 ened. The enemy continued to pour a wither- 
 ing fire of ever-increasing volume and intensity 
 over our trenches. The enemy's plan was to 
 keep our artillery busy and to hold our forces 
 in the trenches while the crossing of the river 
 was accomplished. On our side of the river, the 
 artillery was thrown well forward in screened 
 positions. Only once during the soul-racking 
 day was there a charge. It came during a lull 
 in the artillery duel when a regiment of militia, 
 lying in advanced trenches, cut to pieces under 
 the merciless hail from a battery of quick-firers, 
 cracked under the strain and sprang into the 
 open. Careless of the quick-firers masked be- 
 hind the enemy's advance posts, they charged 
 with the bayonet. A stream of lead was poured 
 into them before they had covered half the dis- 
 tance to the river. Only a handful regained the 
 trenches. It was here that the enemy showed 
 immense superiority in mitrailleuses, which 
 gave them marvelous mobility and a very 
 deadly advantage. These quick-firers were 
 masked with great skill, and were worked with 
 
 112 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE CONNECTICUT 
 
 the very apparent object of drawing an infan- 
 try attack. It was with the greatest difficulty 
 that our officers were able to prevent impetu- 
 ous and disastrous advances from our trenches. 
 
 Your correspondent has talked to a wounded 
 lieutenant brought to the rear at the beginning 
 of the engagement. 
 
 "We are helpless against those guns across 
 the river," he said. "It was heartbreaking to 
 see the boys dropping from the shrapnel, with- 
 out a chance to get back at the beggars. It 
 made me sick, even in the excitement of it all. 
 The enemy's quick-firers were marvelous. I 
 am bound to say they had it pretty much their 
 own way. If we only had aeroplanes to match 
 theirs! They are constantly saiUng over our 
 positions. Then it always happens the same 
 way. Those aeroplanes are really wonderful in 
 the way they search out the positions of our 
 guns. We always know that within halt an 
 hour of observation by aeroplane, shells will 
 begin to fall above gunners, unless they have 
 altered their position. 
 
 "The shell fire is terrifying. I confess to you 
 113 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 that there were times when my nerves were 
 absolutely gone. One hears the zip-zip of bul- 
 lets, the boom of the large guns, the ste4ang of 
 the hghter artillery; and in all this infernal 
 experience of noise and stench, the screams, at 
 times, of dying horses and men joined with the 
 fury of gun-fire and rising shrill above it, no 
 man may boast of his courage. There were 
 moments when I was a coward with all of them. 
 It cannot last much longer. We must either 
 attack or fall back." 
 
 The first day of fighting proves conclusively 
 that the enemy intends making it a battle of 
 guns against men. If our Hnes are forced to 
 retire, it is clearly the enemy's intention to 
 advance to our position with as little loss of 
 men as possible. It is evident that the hostile 
 forces are supplied with abundant ammunition 
 for an extended campaign. Our men have not 
 enough at hand for another day's action. 
 
 With the Army, March 29 (midnight) — Our 
 forces are retreating toward the North, fighting 
 a stubborn rear-guard action. They have failed 
 to hold the invaders at the Connecticut. 
 
 114 
 
r 
 
 k 
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE CONNECTICUT 
 
 Washington, March 30 — A War Depart- 
 ment statement, admitting defeat at the Con- 
 necticut River and the hopelessness of fm-ther 
 attempting to defend New York, contains the 
 following report concerning yesterday's fight- 
 ing: — 
 
 "By nightfall it became apparent that if 
 complete annihilation was to be avoided, a 
 retirement must be attempted, and an order 
 was given to commence it at 8.30 o'clock. The 
 movement was covered with the most devoted 
 intrepidity and determination by the artillery, 
 which has suffered heavily, and the fine work 
 of the cavalry assisted materially in a most 
 diflBcult and dangerous operation. 
 
 "Our initial force has been cut off from re- 
 treat toward New York, and its only avenue is 
 north. It must join with the New England 
 militia before there will be hope of successfully 
 making another stand." 
 
 Now the only speculation in all of the fore- 
 going is in its application. The description of 
 the fighting is taken, almost word for word, 
 
 115 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 from official and well-authenticated news ac- 
 counts of the struggle in Europe in the battle 
 of the Marne, practically the only alteration 
 being the substitution of the words "Ameri- 
 can," "our/' or "enemy," for "German," 
 "EngHsh," "French," or "Allies." 
 
 It is admitted, of course, that portions of 
 actual narration, which particularly dealt with 
 incidents where there was a marked superiority 
 of artillery strength on one side or the other, 
 have been selected. 
 
 Is such a selection and such an apphcation 
 warranted in a discussion of our miUtary 
 strength, — a discussion based on a premise 
 that a first-class nation would consider it possi- 
 ble and profitable to attack us by land ? 
 
 A part of the answer is in history; a part of 
 it is in what is going on in Europe every day; a 
 part of it is in the facts of our own power of 
 defense. 
 
 "Battles are won by superiority of fire." 
 
 When a military expert takes a long breath, 
 pauses for complete silence and for concen- 
 trated attention, and divulges this one great 
 
 116 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE CONNECTICUT 
 
 secret of success in armed strife on sea or land, 
 there is not one of us in ten thousand, prob- 
 ably, who is inclined to rear up and dispute 
 him. 
 
 Even the man who has never laid finger to 
 trigger has a sneaking notion that since battles 
 hang on the ability to kill or maim, and since 
 killing in war, for the most part, is done by the 
 burning of powder in various quantities and 
 various ways, the side who can set oflf its pow- 
 der to the greatest advantage is the side that is 
 going to win. 
 
 Eye, reach, and hitting power may be set 
 down as a fairly accurate dynamic analysis of 
 this matter of superiority of fire. "Volume, 
 accuracy, and range of fire" is another and 
 more technical way of putting it. 
 
 Strategy, bayonet action, cavalry charges, 
 all the tricks, deceptions, and heroic incidents 
 of a campaign, go into this matter of burning 
 powder. For it is true, of course, that all battles 
 are not won by actual superiority of fire. Many 
 of them are won by the power of one side or 
 another to exert, instantly, at some point in 
 
 117 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 the struggle, an overwhelming superiority of 
 fire. 
 
 Something like forty-five years ago, a Ger- 
 man fighting force captured the French Em- 
 peror, Napoleon III, Marshal MacMahon, and 
 all of the French regular army except what had 
 been bottled up at Metz, and other forts on 
 the frontier. 
 
 All this happened by reason of the fact that 
 the Germans had worked themselves into a 
 position where they could, if they wanted to, 
 pour a. fire into the French ranks that would 
 mean slaughter and practical annihilation. In 
 securing this advantage, the artillery had been 
 the most powerful factor. The German artil- 
 lery had been rushed to the front, supported 
 by a very small escort of cavalry and infantry, 
 and by being at the right place at the right 
 time had been able to exert a fire which drove 
 the French back in their efforts to escape 
 to the East. Rapidly other German forces 
 pressed in. German batteries secured hills bor- 
 dering the valley of the Meuse in sufficient 
 strength to repulse every attempt of the French 
 
 118 
 
 m 
 

 
 S3 S 
 
 a. 
 
 A - 
 
 Lj fa 
 
TOE BATTLE OF THE CONNECTICUT 
 
 army to break through. The long-range shell- 
 ing of the forces massed in Sedan was so mur- 
 derous in its effect that to escape the slaughter 
 the French were forced to an unconditional 
 surrender. 
 
 It was in 1870 that the tremendous impor- 
 tance of the field gun in modern warfare began 
 to be demonstrated. Up to that time artillery 
 had been looked upon as an awkward and cum- 
 bersome weapon. It had been the custom to 
 place the artillery well in the rear of marching 
 columns and to protect it with large bodies of 
 infantry and cavalry. This whole theory was 
 upset by the Germans in the Franco-Prussian 
 War. They risked surprise and capture of 
 artillery for the advantage of exerting a power- 
 ful artillery fire before the enemy could bring 
 his field guns from the rear to the front. 
 H In the present struggle in Europe, in every 
 individual battle, the artillery is in action from 
 the very start, and the advantage to one side 
 or the other is almost always determined by 
 the outcome of preliminary artillery duels. 
 
 kThe musket has not gone out. The rifle is 
 I 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 simply a refined musket. It has its part; but in 
 modern warfare the man with the rifle comes 
 in only after the field gun has done its work, or 
 when the field gun is doing its work effectively 
 — at least, as well as the field gun of the other 
 fellow. 
 
 The rifle and the bayonet are the deciding 
 factors in many a sharp struggle in Europe, 
 but, in the official accounts, before the infan- 
 try attack, we almost invariably read of the 
 artillery duel. 
 
 The charge may come at a period when the 
 duel is a draw, when a change of position is in 
 progress, or when the batteries of one side have 
 established a superiority. 
 
 At other times the man with the gun lies in 
 the shelter of the trench facing death with 
 every shrapnel shell that screeches its way 
 from the enemy's lines, waiting, day by day, 
 sometimes praying, for action that will break 
 the terrific monotony. 
 
 One of the most interesting, illuminating, 
 and pathetic documents touching this phase 
 of modern warfare is contained in the letters of 
 
 120 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE CONNECTICUT 
 
 Norman Leslie, a captain of the British Rifle 
 Brigade, who was killed in action near Lille, on 
 October 18, 1914. Only a few days before the 
 action in which he lost his life. Captain Leslie 
 wrote this to a member of his family: — 
 
 September 23 — I write this in the midst of a 
 furious battle, but as our part is to sit still in our 
 trenches for the time, I am enabled to do so. Our 
 artillery are about seven or eight thousand yards 
 from German main position. Night before last we 
 marched, crossed a certain river and climbed up to 
 the heights on the other side, where we relieved a 
 certain regt. They had been in these trenches for 
 seven days and had lost Heaven knows what; the 
 2 co'ys whose lines I relieved having alone 120 
 casualties, i.e., 25 per cent! Well, we got the busi- 
 ness of relieving them done by about 2 a.m., and 
 the minute dawn broke their snipers (German) 
 started at us. It was light about 5 a.m., and we had 
 a little time to look around and examine our posi- 
 tion. The trenches are at the top of a line of hills 
 with the valley and river in rear of us; they are 
 most irregular, and just consist of little zig-zag lines 
 on the highest part of the sky line. The German 
 main position is only 1200 yards off, and very 
 powerful; they have got earth trenches and infan- 
 try about 300 yards from us. 
 
 I've now got to 7 a.m. yesterday, the 22nd. About 
 121 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 7.30 hell broke loose above us and shrapnel fairly 
 tore around us; we lay low in our trenches with 
 only one sentry looking out for their infantry. I Ve 
 got about 120 men under me in a series of hollow 
 ventrants, so I can only see the 50 men in my par- 
 ticular hollow, but I walk round on a path just 
 below these little hillocks which connects them all. 
 About 8.30 a man ran from A round to me and 
 said he'd got about 7 men badly hit in their 
 trenches, so I dashed round with him and found a 
 proper charnel house — all shrapnel wounds, one 
 arm hanging by a shred, another pierced through 
 the lungs, another neck, back and thigh, 2 broken 
 legs. ... I got a corporal and we pulled them out 
 and down to the path where we had got another 
 
 little pit dug. It was d d ticklish work. I was 
 
 trying to tie up one fellow's leg when crash came 
 another shrapnel and wiped out another man 20 
 yards off. At the end of the job I was drenched 
 with their blood, the unpleasant part being that 
 we have no water to drink at present, far less to 
 wash with. I returned to my little pit and, working 
 hard, made it moderately bomb-proof by about 
 1.00. About 2.00 the German artillery died down 
 and we were n't worried again till the evening — 
 their snipers don't worry us at all. The cruel thing 
 for the wounded was that they had to lie there all 
 yesterday; we had not doctor or stretcher bearers, 
 and even if they had been there they could n't have 
 
 122 
 
^ 
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE CONNECTICUT 
 
 gone down, as it's fair death moving from the 
 trenches to the river by day. About 7 p.m. it got 
 dark and we sent them off, but one was dead, and 
 the lung fellow died on the way down. 
 
 Well, I've got to about 9 p.m. yesterday, and I 
 retired after my bully dinner to my crevice in the 
 ground and was instantly woke by star shell, 2 of 
 which pitched 10 and 15 yards away; and they 
 were of course followed by a roar of rifle fire and 
 artillery as well. You know what they do: they 
 look like a rocket, and bursting diffuse a pale light 
 around them — quite harmless in themselves, but 
 excellent in lighting up our position to the German 
 fire. 
 
 They started up again with their old shrapnel 
 about 9 A.M. — it's pretty to watch. First comes a 
 Taube aeroplane miles high above us, circles round 
 and drops out sort of smoky balls just over us to 
 give his gunner friends the range — then about five 
 minutes afterwards, bang come the shells. How- 
 ever, we suffered but little this morning, as our gun- 
 ners came up about a mile behind us and helped 
 by one of our aeroplanes fairly bombarded the 
 German batteries. We've sat here quite comfort- 
 ably all day between the rival batteries watching 
 the shells burst on both sides. The aeroplanes cross 
 continually, but don't molest each other, and, of 
 course, fire clean out of range of our infantry fire. 
 They certainly are the masters of the situation, 
 
 123 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 these fliers — though they do no damage them- 
 selves, yet they give all information and are ap- 
 parently quite immune themselves. It is a curious 
 position being between the rival batteries. We 
 hear them sizzling straight over us all the time. 
 
 The shrapnel bursting emit white smoke, and the 
 high explosives a black smoke. The Germans have 
 got two of their big batteries working over us. 
 They don't cause nearly as much loss of life as 
 shrapnel, unless they hit a column of men or house. 
 But anything hit is blown to bits. Very little re- 
 mains of a house, far less of a man. Well, I must 
 stop now and try and sleep a little before the night 
 bombardment. The coming of day is a real joy 
 to us. Night is bloody and we fear an attack the 
 whole time. The general plan — which I 'm allowed 
 to state by the Censor as it's already in your 
 papers, and this letter won't reach you for ages — 
 is that we sit tight till the French outflank them, 
 then a general advance till we bump up into an- 
 other of these positions. 
 
 October 6 — Herewith a typical night. 5 :45 p.m. 
 All stand to arms during the dusk till night has 
 fallen, the Germans being rather fond of attacking 
 at that hour. (Attack on the guards, etc.) 
 
 The men sleep in the trenches with double sentry 
 posts every 15 yards or so. I lie in the open just 
 behind them ready to go to any part of my line 
 that gets engaged. About 8.00 I rise with a start, 
 
 124 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE CONNECTICUT 
 
 and see a star rocket coming from the German 
 trench, and pitching right beside me — during its 
 flight it illumines everything round it with a pale 
 yellow light — every one instinctively holds their 
 breath, and those standing up lie down, for that 
 which follows comes quickly ! A rattle of musketry 
 and machine guns! I get up and walk round the 
 sentries, then lie down again — suddenly crash 
 comes the German shrapnel and for about 5 min- 
 utes the peaceful night resounds with shell fire. 
 Silence again, and I try and sleep for a few minutes 
 — then a watery gurgling sound over my head, for 
 all the world like the lap of water against a boat, 
 and it*s our own shells passing over our heads to 
 burst on the German trenches or artillery. This 
 continues on and off throughout the night, relieved 
 occasionally by the swish of a sentry's bullet either 
 from our or their trench. 
 
 How far does all this touch America and our 
 chance of successfully resisting a land attack.^ 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 HELL ON WHEELS 
 
 Two great elements go into the matter of 
 "superiority of fire," or, if you like, of "eye, 
 reach, and hitting power." 
 
 One is the element that goes off. The other 
 is the element that sets it oflf. Guns in war are 
 of no use without men. The obverse is no less a 
 fact. It must be remembered that the rifle is a 
 gun just as much, though not just as big, as the 
 heavy howitzer. 
 
 We speak of our "war" strength and our 
 "peace" strength. Our peace strength is made 
 up of the men we maintain under arms. Our 
 war strength includes these, and, in addition, 
 the men who would be under arms if war should 
 come our way. While on paper the peace 
 strength of our regular army is about 90,000 
 men and officers of all arms, and of our organ- 
 ized militia 127,000 men and officers of varie- 
 gated arms, — mostly infantry, — the strength 
 
 126 
 
■^^ HELL ON WHEELS 
 
 ^Fo? both organizations combined, the force 
 which we could instantly throw into battle Une 
 on the Atlantic Coast is about 50,000 men, 
 while the mobile force we could assemble 
 within our borders within thirty days is about 
 90,000 men. That is about our peace strength, 
 and it may be said that it is our actual immedi- 
 ate war strength. 
 
 Within six weeks, of course, we might pos- 
 sibly increase our force with men who have 
 had some military training, to something near 
 150,000 men. That may be considered as our 
 semi-war strength. 
 
 Experts, including the chief men of our 
 General Staff and several of our Secretaries of 
 War, have estimated that for a successful de- 
 fense of our continental territory against hos- 
 tile aggression by any first-class nation of the 
 world, we should have ready at the outbreak 
 of the war a well-balanced force of not less than 
 500,000 men, with at least 300,000 more to be 
 raised at once. We should without the shadow 
 of a doubt get them — ultimately — even if war 
 should come to-night. Yet if history teaches 
 
 127 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 anything, we should get most of them by con- 
 scription. They would be poorly trained, if 
 trained at all. The greater the time required 
 to collect them, the more we should have to 
 collect. Untrained men desert faster, are cap- 
 tured of tener, and are killed oflF more rapidly 
 than trained men. But we should get them. 
 Sooner or later we should have the men. 
 
 Men, millions of them, are already manufac- 
 tured. Iron and copper, millions of tons of it, 
 are in the ground. In war, the men, ultimately, 
 would be trained to shoot; minerals, ultimately, 
 would be converted into things to shoot with. 
 But the cost in life, money, and time, during 
 the process of converting military resources 
 into military strength during actual warfare, 
 has always been, and must always be, fright- 
 ful. Our actual immediate strength in the one 
 great element, men, is shown elsewhere in these 
 pages. 
 
 If we should find it necessary to put half a 
 million men in the field, and if, through ne- 
 cessity, we should find the way to do it, how 
 should we arm them.'* 
 
 1^ 
 
i 
 
 HELL ON WHEELS 
 
 Rifles? Probably. We have finished, or 
 nearly finished, about 700,000 rifles, with some- 
 thing over 200,000,000 rounds of ammunition. 
 Counting out coast artillery, an army of 500,- 
 000 men would have about 420,000 infantry 
 and cavalry. Our field service regulations, 
 based on the experience of all nations in war, 
 call for 1340 rounds of ammunition behind each 
 rifle and 1080 rounds behind each saber. If 
 1200 rounds be taken as a safe average, we 
 should need a small-arms ammunition supply 
 of about 504,000,000 rounds; and if we were to 
 have an adequate supply for the rifles we have 
 finished or nearly finished, as against the 200,- 
 000,000 rounds we now have, we should have 
 about 840,000,000 rounds. It is to be remem- 
 bered, however, that small-arms ammunition 
 can be manufactured quickly and in large 
 quantities. It is not in this shortage that the 
 greatest danger lies. 
 
 Should we be forced into a war prepared as 
 we are to-day, after we should have herded 
 our men, put rifles in their hands, buckled car- 
 tridge belts around them, and sent them into 
 
 129 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 battle, thousands of them, without question, 
 would be slaughtered before they could dis- 
 charge an effective bullet from their rifles. 
 
 The reason for this would be our weakness 
 in the matter of the fi.eld gun. 
 
 There are two weapons which modern war- 
 fare has developed for use in fire action. These 
 are the magazine rifle and the field gun. The 
 rifle is considered to be most effective at 800 
 yards, although the modern weapon can be 
 used effectively at a range of 1200 yards, and 
 even beyond that. For rifle fire to become 
 a factor, and an important factor, in mod- 
 ern warfare, therefore, the infantry must be 
 thrown very close to the enemy's line. Now, 
 the range of the modern field gun is measured 
 in miles, and in every battle of recent times 
 the infantry has gone into the zone of artillery 
 fire long before reaching the range where any 
 purpose would be served through the use of the 
 rifle. The field artillery is designed not only to 
 cover an infantry advance, but to support an 
 infantry attack throughout an action. The 
 artillery may be directed toward an enemy's 
 
 130 
 
I 
 
 HELL ON WHEELS 
 
 own field batteries in order to create confusion, 
 to suppress or neutralize opposing artillery 
 fire, to force frequent changes in the location 
 of hostile batteries, or it may be used directly 
 on the infantry of the opposing force. No 
 matter where it is turned, its purpose is to 
 shatter an attack or to support one. When 
 under cover of supporting field guns, infantry 
 forces gain ground, that ground can only be held 
 by the maintained activity of the field guns. 
 
 Through the variety of the work which it 
 has been called upon to do, field artillery has 
 practically classified itself. Common to mod- 
 ern warfare, there are now batteries used for 
 supporting infantry advances; batteries used 
 to neutralize an enemy's field artillery fire; 
 batteries whose function is to break down 
 obstacles, earth- works or men, which may be 
 in the way of advancing infantry. The ac- 
 counts of engagements in all our modern wars 
 show with steadily increasing clearness how 
 absolutely indispensable in successful military 
 operations is the field gun and back of it the 
 trained artilleryman. 
 
 131 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 Only as this is being written, a copy of a 
 New York evening paper has been laid on my 
 desk. The following are the headlines and the 
 first few paragraphs of its daily story of the 
 War in Europe: — 
 
 KAISER BEATEN IN BATTLES TO EXTEND 
 HOLD NORTH OF AISNE 
 
 FRENCH TWICE DEFEAT ATTACKS 
 
 German Charges near Vic, Twelve Miles west of Soissana 
 broken up by Fire of Field Batteries 
 
 Hill in Argonne valiantly defended against Invaders 
 
 Teuton Artillery outmatched in Long-Range Engagement 
 at Perthes — Le Pretre Forest cleared of Enemy 
 
 Paris, Monday — Germany's aggressive maneu- 
 vers in the Soissons-Aisne district appear to have 
 been completely halted by the splendidly con- 
 ducted defense of the French, not only on the south 
 bank of the Aisne, but westward of Soissons, where 
 the French maintain a strong hold on the north 
 side of the stream. 
 
 Deterred from attacking east of Soissons by the 
 fire of French field batteries, the Germans have 
 attempted twice to break down the defensive of 
 the French at a point northeast of Vic-sur-Aisne 
 
 132 
 
HELL ON WHEELS 
 
 about twelve miles north of Soissons. Both 
 these attacks were defeated by the French, who 
 maintained their positions intact. 
 
 Near Perthes-les-Hurlus, between Rheims and 
 the Argonne, the French artillery has overcome 
 that of the Germans in a violent duel. 
 
 French artillery forces defending " Hill 263," near 
 Bourseuilles, in the Argonne district, have repulsed 
 a determined attack by the Germans and have held 
 all their trenches. 
 
 The Kaiser's troops have been driven from sev- 
 CTal field forts in the foothills of the Vosges Moun- 
 tains, notably in the Forest of Le Pretre. 
 
 From the sea to the Oise there was yesterday a 
 T/iolent storm, particularly in Belgium. The day 
 saw artillery fighting at certain points. 
 
 In the region of Perthes there was very eflScient 
 marksmanship on the part of our artillery on the 
 positions of the enemy. 
 
 The Chief of our Ordnance Department re- 
 ^fcently estimated that to build enough field 
 guns for an army of 70,000 would require at 
 least a year. 
 
 Are we ready .^ How would we match up 
 with any possible foe in this single matter of 
 '*hell on wheels," — the modern field gun? 
 
 K)se it should transpire that we were 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 confronted suddenly with just such a problem 
 as the situation we have imagined to exist at 
 the Connecticut River. Suppose that instead 
 of this handful of 50,000 men, we should be 
 able to throw forward as a battle line a force 
 of 500,000 men; and suppose that the enemy, 
 instead of outnumbering us, should be only 
 equal to our own force numerically, but should 
 be equipped with field guns and ammunition in 
 accordance with the most advanced theories 
 and practice of modern warfare, — what then 
 would be our chance of immediate success ? 
 
 Our General Staff has set the proportion of 
 field guns which we should have at 3.16 guns 
 for every thousand infantry and cavalry. That 
 is a lower proportion than exists in actual op- 
 eration in the army of any other first-class na- 
 tion in the world. There are instances where 
 European armies average five guns for every 
 thousand infantry and cavalry. The present 
 war in Europe indicates that the percentage 
 in the future will be much higher. 
 
 Our General Staff has classified field artil- 
 lery as follows : — 
 
 134 
 
I 
 
 HELL ON WHEELS 
 
 "Horse," "light," "mountain," and 
 "heavy." 
 
 Horse batteries are armed with the 3-inch 
 gun. 
 
 Light batteries are armed with the 3-inch 
 gun or the 3.8-inch howitzer. 
 
 Heavy batteries are armed with the 4.7- 
 inch howitzer, the 4.7-inch gun, or the 6-inch 
 howitzer. 
 
 The 4.7-inch howitzer, drawn by eight 
 horses, has very considerable mobihty, and is 
 really intermediate between the Hght and 
 heavy calibers. 
 
 Horse batteries are assigned for service with 
 the cavalry. 
 
 Light or mountain batteries and 4.7-inch 
 howitzer batteries are assigned for service with 
 infantry divisions. 
 
 Heavy batteries (4.7-inch gun and 6-inch 
 howitzer) are assigned as army artillery. 
 
 On the basis of 3.16 guns for every thousand 
 of infantry and cavalry, the General Staff and 
 the War College have made the very modest 
 recommendation that provision be immedi- 
 
 135 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 ately made for the manufacture of 1300 field 
 guns. What we have built or approaching 
 completion is not over 800 guns. What we 
 have actually built is about 650 guns. 
 
 In his report for the year 1911, Henry L. 
 Stimson, then Secretary of War, said this: 
 
 Attention has-been repeatedly called to the very 
 unprepared condition of the army with respect to 
 reserve supplies of field artillery guns, carriages, 
 and ammunition. We are less adequately supplied 
 with field artillery material than with any other 
 class of fighting equipment. There is not enough 
 field artillery ammunition for the guns we now 
 have for a single engagement such as were frequent 
 in the Manchurian War. The manufacture of this 
 class of material involves processes requiring much 
 time and which there is no possible way to hasten . It 
 follows, of course, that provision must be made for 
 such material long in advance of its probable use. 
 At the present rate of appropriations it is estimated 
 that it would take more than fifty years to secure 
 a reasonable supply of the field artillery guns, car- 
 riages, and ammunition that would be necessary in 
 the event of a war. I invite particular attention to 
 the following views of the Chief of Staff upon this 
 subject: "The existing want of field artillery guns, 
 carriages, and ammunition constitutes a grave 
 
 136 
 
 n 
 
i 
 
ENGLAND 
 
 V.S. 
 
 COMPARATIVE STRENGTH IN FIELD ARTILLERY 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 menace to the public safety in case of war. Ordin- 
 ary prudence would seem to dictate that the appro- 
 priations, especially for those field artillery guns, 
 carriages, and ammunition, should be very greatly 
 increased. Once a state of war exists with a first- 
 class power there will be no opportunity to buy the 
 material abroad or time to manufacture it at home, 
 even if all available plants in this country were run- 
 ning at the maximum capacity, without such delay 
 as would be fatal to our hopes of success. This 
 shortage of field artillery material is the most seri- 
 ous feature of the present military situation, and 
 one which should be immediately corrected. It 
 constitutes a source of grave danger." 
 
 The Chief of Stafif to whom Mr. Stimson 
 referred was Major-General Leonard Wood. 
 Although Wood, Stimson, and other of our 
 military men and statesmen have continued to 
 lay stress on the peril that lies in our lack of 
 field guns and equipment, and although some 
 progress has been made toward securing the 
 most modern weapons of this character, the 
 greatest shortage in the auxiliary arms of our 
 defensive force is still in the field artillery. 
 
 Mr. Stimson's statement regarding our am- 
 munition supply is approximately as accurate 
 
 138 
 
I 
 
 HELL ON WHEELS 
 
 to-day as it was at the time that it was printed. 
 It is abundantly substantiated by figures 
 which have been secured in connection with 
 recent wars. A statistician in the French 
 Army recently estimated that, during an en- 
 gagement in France, a battery of the famous 
 75-milUmeter (3-inch) guns averaged 600 rounds 
 of ammunition per day for each gun. This 
 figure is very high for a daily average. Some 
 experts fix 350 rounds as a minimum which 
 should be with the gun. It is conservative to 
 say that there should be 1850 rounds with the 
 gun, in the train and at the base. 
 
 We have ready in this country not much 
 more than 300,000 rounds of field-gun am- 
 munition. If all the field guns which our esti- 
 mates call for were built and put into action 
 at once, which is conceivable, and if all were 
 of the same type, so that the anununition could 
 be interchanged and concentrated at the points 
 where it might be most necessary, we should have 
 in the whole country not more than suflBcient 
 ammunition for a single day's engagement. 
 
 If, in a desperate situation, such as we have 
 139 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 imagined, our enemy should be equipped ac- 
 cording to the most advanced theories of field- 
 gun artillery fire, he would have probably five 
 field guns for every thousand of his infantry 
 and cavalry. If we should have in the field the 
 smallest force (420,000 rifles and sabers) with 
 which, in the opinion of our General Staff, we 
 could successfully engage in a defensive war, we 
 should have about 1.6 guns for every thousand 
 of our infantry and cavalry. An enemy would 
 not venture to attack us without a fully ade- 
 quate supply of ammunition and equipment, 
 while we should have about 450 rounds for 
 each gun as our total ammunition supply — 
 about one fourth of the amount considered 
 necessary. The volume of fire which an en- 
 emy could exert, both by reason of the greater 
 number of his guns and the fact that he could 
 afford to waste ammunition in searching out 
 our positions, would be overwhelming. It is 
 the opinion of military experts that our in- 
 fantry would be wholly unable to advance in 
 the face of a fire so much more deadly than 
 anything we could exert. 
 
 140 
 

 IT 
 
 A n 
 
 ^ 
 
 'I 
 
 I 
 

 HELL ON \MIEELS 
 
 Although there is a shortage of field guns 
 even in our regular army, the greatest and 
 most alarming shortage is in the militia. For 
 years it has been intended that the militia 
 should be equipped ultimately on the same 
 basis as the regular army; yet our citizen force 
 has only the 3-inch light gun, and this in num- 
 bers wholly out of proportion to the infantry. 
 The total shortage in the militia is about 80 
 batteries, or 320 guns. Only one division of the 
 organized militia, the Sixth of New York, has 
 its full quota of field guns. The latest complete 
 figures available show the shortage in other 
 divisions to be as follows: — 
 
 The Fifth has one half its quota; the Seventh, 
 one sixth; the Eighth, one half; the Ninth, one 
 fourth; the Tenth, one sixth; the Eleventh, five 
 twelfths ; the Twelfth, one half; the Thirteenth, 
 one third; the Fourteenth, five twelfths; the 
 Fifteenth, five twelfths; and the Sixteenth, 
 one third. 
 
 The cause for such a condition is easily 
 found, and it will not be removed until some 
 means can be devised for securing a greater 
 
 141 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 degree of cooperation in military matters be- 
 tween the individual States and the Federal 
 Government. Field artillery is a very expen- 
 sive arm of the service both to estabhsh and to 
 maintain, and it is an arm which would rarely 
 be called upon to take part in solving any prob- 
 lem which might arise within the borders of 
 an individual State. The obUgation of a 
 State to maintain its field artillery at top effi- 
 ciency is purely a moral one, and since the 
 Federal Government would be outside its 
 rights in insisting that the necessary propor- 
 tion of federal funds, supphed for mihtia pur- 
 poses, be devoted to field artillery, it must be 
 left to the States to decide whether or not their 
 individual militia organizations are to be re- 
 garded as purely local military forces, or as 
 parts, also, of the Army of the United States. 
 Brigadier-General A. L. Mills, as Chief of the 
 Division of Militia Affairs, in pointing out the 
 dangers of this shortage of field guns in the mili- 
 tia in his annual report for 1913, said this: — 
 
 It is sufficient to state here that if the present 
 so-called divisions are ever pitted against equal 
 
 142 
 
 ■ 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 HELL ON WHEELS 
 
 forces, adequately provided with field artillery (and 
 all foreign nations are so provided), we are fore- 
 doomed to defeat. Other factors being equal, to 
 place the so-called divisions of the Organized Mili- 
 tia in such an action will cause such a disaster in 
 morale, time, and actual loss of life as will draw on 
 the heads of the responsible authorities maledic- 
 tions from one end of the land to the other. The 
 preventive is to now, in time of peace, either create 
 the necessary field artillery units, or convert the 
 relative excess of infantry into this arm. 
 
 The cause for the shortage of field guns in 
 the organized militia is also back of the militia's 
 inadequate cavalry equipment. At the last 
 inspection, the militia was short 64 troops of 
 cavalry. The cavalry, like the artillery, is an 
 expensive arm to maintain. The militiaman is 
 paid only during the time that he serves, but 
 horses must be maintained constantly. In re- 
 1 cent years there has grown up the erroneous 
 impression that the days of cavalry are passing. 
 Nothing is further from the truth. Cavalry 
 is still indispensable. It is frequently used in 
 both attack and defense, as well as in certain 
 forms of scout duty. 
 
 143 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 In a description of an angle of the fighting 
 in the now famous battle of the Maine, for 
 example, a well-authenticated press dispatch 
 from Paris contained this; — 
 
 A terrific cannonade at once opened upon the 
 wood, which took fire, and, as a brisk wind was 
 blowing, the flames soon turned the forest into an 
 inferno. The Germans rushed out in great disorder, 
 and the British, who were waiting, fell upon them 
 hip and thigh. The men fought with terrible fury. 
 The German commander concentrated all his ener- 
 gies upon saving the guns, but the British cavalry 
 swept down upon the German horsemen that were 
 trying to escort the guns to a place of safety. They 
 went through them like an avalanche. 
 
 Once again it was clearly demonstrated that the 
 cavalry arm is still one of the most effective that an 
 army can possess when used at the proper moment 
 and in the right way. Cavalry may be useless 
 against men intrenched in kopjes, but in the open 
 field it is, as effective as in the days of the first 
 Napoleon. 
 
 Not only did the cavalry prevent the German 
 guns from escaping, but, by lightning-like delivery 
 of charges, it prevented the gunners from taking 
 up positions from which to work havoc on the Brit- 
 ish infantry. 
 
 The British guns were busy all the time, and thet , 
 
 144 
 
HELL ON WHEELS 
 
 accuracy of their firing soon made every fresh posi- 
 tion taken up by the Germans untenable. 
 
 The British infantry went into the fray with ter- 
 rible relish and zest. The men got over the ground 
 at a great, swinging pace, and when they closed up 
 for bayonets they were literally on the run and 
 nothing could stop them. They went through the 
 Germans like fire through flax. All the French 
 gallopers are loud in their praises of the British in 
 this battle. 
 
 Stand after stand was made by the Germans in 
 the hope of stemming the tide of disaster until sup- 
 port should arrive, but the British knew the value 
 of time as well as the Germans, and pushed the 
 attack home so hotly that, according to the latest 
 verbal reports, the Germans lost heavily in dead 
 and wounded, while a large amount of artillery, 
 great and small, big guns and rapid-firers, fell 
 into British hands. 
 
 In time of war, we could count on not more 
 than 9000 regular cavalry, and 6000 cavalry of 
 the Organized Militia, poorly instructed and 
 poorly mounted. We should be short at least 
 30,000 of what we should need for a well-bal- 
 anced army of 500,000 men of all arms (in- 
 cluding 40,000 coast artillery) , and should have 
 no reserve whatever. 
 
 145 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 The aeroplane is the eye of the artillery. The 
 war in Europe, the first great struggle in which 
 it has been applied, has demonstrated every 
 day the tremendous aid rendered by an aero- 
 plane in matters of strategy, in securing infor- 
 mation regarding an enemy's movements and 
 in assisting gunners in finding the range. 
 
 The United States ranks fourteenth in the 
 nations of the world in what it pays for mili- 
 tary aviation. Germany leads, with France, 
 Russia, Italy, Austria, England, Belgium, and 
 Japan, following in order. Greece, Bulgaria, 
 ChiU, Spain, and Brazil have all spent more 
 than the United States for this most important 
 arm of the service. 
 
 "Superiority of fire" does not mean alone a 
 greater number of guns and a greater number 
 of projectiles sent in the general direction of 
 an enemy. Accuracy is as important as vol- 
 ume. The side which first finds the range 
 has the initial advantage in modern battles. 
 Rapidity in range-finding has depended almost 
 wholly on the successful activity of aerial 
 scouts. 
 
 146 
 
HELL ON WHEELS 
 
 We need not only the material and personnel 
 and reserve for adequate field artillery. We 
 must have, also, if we are to make sure that 
 artillery fire is to be most effective, auxiliary 
 arms in adequate proportion. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE GREAT AMERICAN BUGABOO 
 
 "Militarism" is the scare- word thrown into 
 almost every serious discussion of our abiUty 
 to defend ourselves. Whether or not it is some- 
 thing really to be afraid of, so far as Amer- 
 icans and American institutions and traditions 
 are concerned, it is a most interesting thing 
 when hauled out into the light and examined. 
 
 The problem of home defense has been 
 faced since the primitive family squatted 
 around in a circle and figured ways and means 
 to thwart the hostile intentions of old Stone 
 Hatchet and his gang, over across the river, 
 and spent spare moments in fashioning newer 
 and deadlier skull-crushing implements. 
 
 In some ways, especially in the science of 
 killing, we have gone a long road since then; 
 but we have not got away from the family 
 idea, and we have only elaborated on the fam- 
 ily council. We have learned to deal with each 
 
 148 
 
THE GREAT AMERICAN BUGABOO 
 
 other by means of words and scraps of paper. 
 We have fought and loved, made peace and 
 broken it, made promises and defiled them, 
 gone cahoots, for a spell, with this family or 
 that — all to protect or to enlarge the power 
 of om* own particular family, and with never a 
 serious attempt to work out a scheme for one 
 big, world-wide family. 
 
 Some families have said that the head of the 
 house is boss; others have said the family is 
 boss. So we have Prussia ; so w^e have the United 
 States of America — each sure that the other 
 is wrong. Yet the American would not laugh 
 at the idea of the Kaiser's "Ich und Gott" 
 were he a Prussian; and the Prussian would not 
 sneer at our little army and our bungling way 
 of doing things military w^ere he an American. 
 
 It cannot be expected that a family strictly 
 brought up on the lines of a military autocracy, 
 and one which has brought itself up on the 
 broadest theories of democracy, can have many 
 notions in common as to the ways and means 
 of defending the home, save the great essen- 
 tial — to be willing, and ready, to fight. 
 
 149 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 Recent events across the Atlantic would 
 seem to indicate that the German family, on 
 instant notice, was both. Certain facts and fig- 
 ures set down in the course of previous chap- 
 ters seem to suggest that the American peo- 
 ple, though willing, are not at all ready. 
 
 The first is no proof that the Prussian idea 
 is right any more than the second is proof that 
 the American idea is wrong. 
 
 There is one fact which the average American 
 finds it difficult to swallow. It is this: Funda- 
 damentally, the German military idea is more 
 democratic than ours. The application of the 
 idea, of course, is diametrically opposed to 
 the principles of democracy. Yet the German 
 fighting force is directly from the citizenship. 
 Democracy has swung away from the profes- 
 sional soldier of a hundred and fifty years ago. 
 The British, ourselves — and China — of the 
 world's great nations, are the only ones in 
 whose military systems there is a survival of 
 the days of Frederick the Great. With the 
 abhorrence of anything approaching military 
 rule, bred in the bone of the Anglo-Saxon, we 
 
 150 
 
THE GREAT AMERICAN BUGABOO 
 
 have taken elaborate means of insuring the sub- 
 ordination of the miUtary to the civil authority. 
 
 Modern economists very generally agree 
 that the danger of the professional soldier to 
 a democracy, not so safe-guarded, is his eager- 
 ness to practice his profession — his hanker- 
 ing to try out new tools placed in his hands. 
 Yet, go to the soldier of long experience, and 
 he will tell you how silly this notion is. He will 
 insist that the experienced soldier dreads war, 
 because he knows what war is; just as a sur- 
 geon dreads to be operated upon, because he 
 knows the danger and suffering that an opera- 
 tion entails. 
 
 Be that as it may, the fact is that, no matter 
 how much we have subordinated him, we still 
 have the professional soldier, and that in the 
 Prussian system the professional soldier, the 
 man who carries the gun, has been discarded 
 for the citizen fighter. It is true, of course, that 
 most of the officers, particularly the higher offi- 
 cers and the general staff, are all professionals, 
 making a study of war their Hfe-work. 
 
 Militarism is not a thing. It is not a form of 
 151 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 government. It is not even a system, wholly. 
 It is a state of mind. That is a fact that we 
 Americans find it difficult to get hold of. In 
 Germany, militarism is superimposed on a 
 democratic theory of national defense, evolved 
 by Prussia after Napoleon, through sheer 
 necessity. The armies that Prussia poured into 
 the field in 1813 were no longer professional but 
 citizen forces, poorly trained and organized, 
 but fired with patriotism and enthusiasm. 
 After the war, the Prussian rulers sagaciously 
 made permanent the system found to be so 
 effective. That system, though modified and 
 enlarged upon, was substantially the same as 
 that now in force. The victories of 1866 and 
 1870 thoroughly popularized it. The military 
 alliance in 1866 between Prussia and all the 
 other German States, with the union in 1871 
 of all the armies, opened the way for model- 
 ing the whole German military force after the 
 Prussian pattern. The system of a citizen 
 army, once laughed at by the French as a 
 "sort of militia," is essentially the marvelous 
 war machine of to-day. 
 
 152 
 
THE GREAT AMERICAN BUGABOO 
 
 The militarism so abhorrent to us is not this 
 machine, not the German system of govern- 
 ment, not compulsory military service, nor yet 
 wholly the Prussian influence personified in the 
 Kaiser and his advisers. No doubt all these 
 elements go into it, but the militarism of Ger- 
 many is the state of mind of the German people. 
 
 Such an impartial observer as R. M. Berry, 
 in his ''Germany of the Germans," has this to 
 say of this German state of mind : — 
 
 That the army is the people can perhaps be 
 asserted of Germany more than of any other na- 
 tion. Every citizen considers service in the na- 
 tional defensive forces as a natural duty. He thinks 
 it unworthy of any nation that its men should need 
 to have attractions offered them in order to induce 
 them to take their proper share in the defense of 
 their country. Patriotism is a cult among the Ger- 
 mans. The German youth, as a general rule, looks 
 forward with pleasure to the day when he is to don 
 the uniform, and if, for some physical reason, he 
 should be rejected, he feels that he has not. quite 
 proved his manliness. . . . The soldier is held up 
 to him as the pattern which he should follow. . . . 
 "For the people, but not by the people," is the 
 motto that has been adopted by the Empire ever 
 since Bismarck's effort to limit the spread of Social- 
 
 153 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 ism by introducing State-enforced thrift. . . . The 
 masses of the people in Germany are always treated 
 by the official classes as minors requiring guardian- 
 ship with many restrictions. Since this method has 
 been in vogue for so long a time, the Germans, al- 
 most to a man, expect all ameliorations of their 
 condition, political as well as economical, to be 
 proposed by the administrative authorities. They 
 would not dream of initiating anything of the kind 
 themselves. . . . The officer occupies a privileged 
 position, which is inviolable by the civil authori- 
 ties. He takes precedence everywhere. . . . There 
 is in some quarters a very strong argument urged 
 against this system of paternal government, — 
 that it destroys individuality and takes away the 
 personal will of the people. They become so used 
 to obeying orders that they cannot think for them- 
 selves in politics. Spontaneity is not requisite for 
 them. The Government sees to all things : the peo- 
 ple only need to do what they are told. . . . One 
 of the most striking features of German life is 
 that the people have so little understanding of the 
 way in which they are governed. In other things 
 the German can recite long lists of data without 
 the slightest hesitation, but in politics he replies 
 with a blank look when questioned. It has never 
 impressed him as necessary that he should compre- 
 hend politics. He is governed — as a rule well; that 
 is sufficient for him. 
 
 154 
 
THE GREAT AMERICAN BUGABOO 
 
 How much of this is due to Prussian influ- 
 ence, how much to the personahty of the Kai- 
 ser, how much to the leaders in the Prussian 
 mihtary cult, how much to the long compul- 
 sory military service, and how much is due to 
 the racial temper of the German, writers disa- 
 gree. That the Kaiser's "There is but one mas- 
 ter in the coimtry — myself. I will tolerate no 
 other"; and "It is the soldier and the army, 
 not majorities and parliamentary decisions 
 that have forged the unity of the German 
 Empire. It is on the army that my confi- 
 dence rests"; and "The army and its sov- 
 ereign head are the only guarantees of the 
 safety of the empire and the peace of the 
 world," are accepted seriously, cannot be ques- 
 tioned. To me it is inconceivable that, no 
 matter what extreme measures might be 
 taken to increase our preparedness against 
 attack, militarism in any form, as we under- 
 stand the militarism of Prussia, could gain a 
 foothold in our nation. 
 
 But before we get around to talking about 
 om-selves: — 
 
 155 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 Over across the way from the Kaiser and 
 his family, there is a family that is boss of itself 
 and thoroughly well able to take care of itself. 
 
 There is a world of difference between "the 
 army is the people" and "the people are the 
 army." There is just that much difference be- 
 tween Germany and Switzerland; between the 
 Prussian system and the Swiss system; be- 
 tween Prussian miUtarism and Swiss democ- 
 racy. 
 
 Yet, at bottom, the German idea and the 
 Swiss idea are identical. The armies of both 
 come directly from the citizenship. The diflFer- 
 ence is in the manner in which the citizenship 
 has allowed the idea to be applied. 
 
 Switzerland, certainly the most democratic 
 nation in Europe, held by some writers to be 
 the world's model state since the adoption of 
 the constitution of 1874, has no standing army. 
 Its only permanent military officers are mili- 
 tary trainers, selected by and under the super- 
 vision of the general government. 
 
 With a population of about 4,000,000 at an 
 expenditure of less than $8,000,000 annually, 
 
 156 
 
THE GREAT AMERICAN BUGABOO 
 
 the Swiss Confederation can, in an hour of 
 need, muster a fighting force of 500,000 men, 
 trained and perfectly equipped. 
 
 With a population of over 90,000,000, it 
 costs the Republic of the United States in the 
 neighborhood of $90,000,000 to maintain a 
 professional military organization which, in 
 emergency could throw a bare 30,000 men, 
 incompletely equipped, into line of battle. 
 Where the money goes and what we get for it 
 we have already seen. The subject is intricate. 
 
 To trace the Swiss eight millions into a first- 
 class defensive force of half a million is exceed- 
 ingly simple. The money goes for training, 
 clothing, and equipment, and pay of soldiers 
 and officers while they are with the colors. It 
 is not wasted in politics because it is next to 
 impossible to play poUtics with the Swiss mili- 
 tary system. 
 
 Every male citizen of Switzerland, who is 
 able, receives miUtary training for certain 
 short periods between the ages of seventeen 
 and thirty-two. Every two years, for the first 
 ten years, — that is, five times in all, — he 
 
 157 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 answers a call to the colors. His period of 
 training is never more than ninety days for any 
 one year and that only in the first year. If an 
 artillery recruit, his training covers seventy- 
 five days; if in the cavalry, ninety days; and if 
 in the infantry, sixty days. The period with 
 the colors shortens as he grows older. During 
 his third, fifth, seventh, and ninth years, this 
 period of training is from twelve to fifteen days. 
 He is paid only during the time he is with the 
 colors. More than that, so far as is possible, his 
 military training is made to follow the fines of 
 his occupation. If he is a baker, he finds his 
 place in the commissary; if he is an electrician, 
 he can enter the engineers or the signal corps. 
 The Swiss soldier has as good a chance of be- 
 coming an oflScer as any of his fellows. Offi- 
 cers are drawn from the ranks according to 
 seniority. The appointing power rests with the 
 Government. 
 
 "Compulsory service!" 
 
 Those are the other scare-words, the team- 
 mates of "militarism." 
 
 The Swiss miUtary training is the law of the 
 158 
 
fe 
 
 THE GREAT AMERICAN BUGABOO 
 
 land, certainly, even if it has become so by 
 ^1 vote of all the people. Its relation to democ- 
 racy depends to some extent on whether you 
 argue that a person can be compelled to do 
 what he wants to do. 
 ^m The Swiss youth, from his earliest school 
 ^ days, is taught that the army is for defense 
 only. Patriotism is interwoven in his develop- 
 ment. He discerns no line between civic duty 
 and military duty. He learns to look upon 
 each as essential to real citizenship. By the 
 time he leaves school he is not a raw recruit. 
 He has already had some miUtary training. 
 He is ready and eager to join the colors and to 
 complete his education. Certainly he does not 
 regard as undemocratic or unreasonable the 
 requirement that he must know how to fight in 
 order that he may take an intelligent part in 
 the defense of his country, any more than we 
 consider undemocratic and unreasonable the 
 requirement that we must know how to read in 
 order that we may take an intelligent part in 
 the political affairs of our country. 
 ^^^ AustraUa is another country which has been 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 working out a system of defense that has 
 attracted the attention of the world's great 
 powers. Within a very few years the mihtary 
 theory there has developed along lines which 
 have converted a hired police force into a 
 powerful organization of citizen soldiery. 
 
 The responsibility for the defense of Aus- 
 traha prior to 1870 rested on British troops 
 which were quartered in the largest cities. 
 The chief function of these troops was that of 
 a convict guard. In any emergency where war 
 threatened, the only measures of defense which 
 could be taken, except those which would be 
 afforded by the professional soldiers, depended 
 upon the organization of volunteers. , 
 
 It was in 1870 that all British troops were 
 withdrawn from Australia. It was then that 
 small bodies of permanent forces were formed, 
 and it was the intention to build around these 
 small detachments an organization of citizen 
 fighters. The first experiment, in 1883 to 1884, 
 was a partially paid volunteer militia. | 
 
 A system of military instruction in schools 
 for boys was established at this time. This 
 
 160 
 
I^n 
 
 THE GREAT AMERICAN BUGABOO 
 
 system of cadets was purely of a volunteer 
 nature, and did not offer the means of military 
 training to boys who could not, or for any rea- 
 son did not, attend these schools. It was ten 
 years before the system was so altered and 
 extended that opportunity was given for the 
 training of boys who were qualified to take a 
 part in the defense of the country, but who did 
 not attend school. 
 
 The system was found to be unsatisfactory 
 to so marked a degree that in 1909 compulsory 
 military training became the law. This law 
 became operative on June 30, 1911, when the 
 volunteer system of military training came to 
 an end and compulsory training began. 
 
 The military and naval forces were divided 
 to permanent and citizen organizations; the 
 one bound for a definite term of service, the 
 other not so bound. Until 1911 the permanent 
 forces were designated as the militia and were 
 paid, and the remaining citizen soldiers were 
 classed as volunteers, not ordinarily paid for 
 their service, but provided with a reserve 
 which included members of rifle clubs and men 
 
 161 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 who had seen active service at some other 
 time. 
 
 Up to the time that the compulsory training 
 law became operative, enlistment was volun- 
 tary in time of peace. Between the ages of 
 eighteen and sixty years, all male citizens were 
 declared to be members of the army and liable 
 to service, in time of war, within the territorial 
 limits of Australia only. The departure from 
 the old theory was a most radical one. The 
 Act of 1909 was the direct outcome of a popu- 
 lar belief that the defense of Australia under 
 the volunteer system was wholly insufficient. 
 
 The important section of the new law reads 
 
 as follows : — 
 
 All male inhabitants of Australia (excepting 
 those who are exempted by this Act), who have 
 resided therein for six months and are British sub- 
 jects, shall be liable to be trained as follows: (a) 
 from 12 to 14 years of age in the junior cadets; 
 
 (b) from 14 to 18 years of age in the senior cadets; 
 
 (c) from 18 to 26 years of age in the citizen forces; 
 provided that, except in time of imminent danger 
 or war, the last year of service in the citizen forces 
 shall be limited to one registration or one muster 
 parade. 
 
 162 
 
THE GREAT AMERICAN BUGABOO 
 
 At about the age when the average American 
 youth is tormenting his neighbors with "bean- 
 shooters" and making the hfe of the family cat 
 almost unendurable with the inevitable air- 
 gun, the Australian youth is beginning to get 
 the beginnings of a training that will even- 
 tually turn him out as a trained unit of his 
 country's defense. 
 
 On July 1 of his twelfth year, every Aus- 
 tralian boy who has been found to be physi- 
 cally, morally, and mentally fit, becomes a 
 junior cadet. The Government gives him a hat, 
 a shirt, breeches, puttees, and shoes. He re- 
 ceives ninety hours of military training each 
 year for two years, when he graduates into the 
 ranks of the senior cadets. For four years he is 
 put through a course of drilling, marching, dis- 
 ciplining, the handUng of arms, physical train- 
 ing, guard duty, and elementary tactics. Each 
 year he receives a minimum of four four-hour 
 drills, twelve two-hour drills, and twenty -four 
 one-hour drills. Upon entering the senior ca- 
 dets, he becomes the proud possessor of a 
 cadet rifle and belt. If, as a marksman, he 
 
 163 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 can meet certain stipulated requirements, he 
 is allowed to handle a man's-size gun and to 
 take part in target practice with the service 
 rifle. 
 
 Military experts, comparing the rifle fire of 
 the soldiers of the European nations involved 
 in the present war, invariably comment on the 
 marked superiority of the British over the 
 German riflemen. They agree that this supe- 
 riority is due to the fact that the Enghshman 
 finds his target before he pulls the trigger. Be- 
 fore the missile leaves its chamber Tommy 
 Atkins is pretty sure on the one thing that the 
 German has the vaguest notion about — where 
 death in a steel jacket is going to. Likewise, 
 those theories once propounded by profound 
 students of things military, that rifle fire and 
 other forms of close-range killing would play 
 a very small part in modern warfare, have 
 been exploded by what is happening every day 
 in Europe. 
 
 The British passion for expert marksman- 
 ship is reflected in the Australian military sys- 
 tem. Not only does the senior cadet have the 
 
 164 
 
Ij THE GREAT AMERICAN BUGABOO 
 
 opportunity of reaching his ambition of shoot- 
 ing with a real war gun, but he knows that 
 when he is nineteen years old he is to become 
 a full-fledged member of the citizen force of 
 his country. 
 
 At that time he receives, in addition to his 
 previous equipment, two woolen shirts, two 
 pairs of breeches, an overcoat, a hat, a sleeping- 
 cap, two pairs of leggings, two pairs of shoes, 
 a kit pack, service rifle, and bayonet. 
 
 As a citizen soldier, he must each year re- 
 ceive not less than the equivalent of sixteen 
 whole days' training, eight of which must be 
 in camps of continuous training. 
 
 From the time of his junior cadetship, the 
 natural tendencies of the youth are observed, 
 and to a great extent he is allowed to follow his 
 bent in fitting himself for a part in the coun- 
 try's defense. By the time he is past his junior 
 and senior cadetships, what arm of the service 
 he is best fitted for is usually very apparent. 
 
 I From the time that he is graduated from the 
 ranks of the senior cadets until he is twenty- 
 five years old, he receives infantry and cavalry 
 I 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 drill or staflF corps training. To attend one 
 muster parade is all that is required of him in 
 his twenty-sixth year, when he is discharged 
 from "active service." Not until he is sixty 
 years of age, however, does he cease to be sub- 
 ject to a call to the colors in time of war. To 
 win a discharge in his twenty-sixth year he 
 must be able to show twelve annual certificates 
 of proficiency, which have been issued by a 
 board of officers by whom he is examined at 
 the end of every year of his training. If in any 
 year he fails to pass the efficiency board of 
 examiners, he must repeat that year of train- 
 ing. 
 
 The citizen soldier of Australia receives pro- 
 motion based entirely upon merit. 
 
 Under the Defense Act, the following classes 
 of exemptions exist: persons physically, men- 
 tally, or morally unfit, members and officers of 
 Parliament, judges, police, prison employees, 
 ministers of religion, lighthouse keepers, and 
 physicians and nurses of public hospitals. The 
 Governor-General may by proclamation vary 
 or extend these exemptions or he may exempt 
 
 166 
 
THE GREAT AMERICAN BUGABOO 
 
 specified areas. Persons whose religion or be- 
 lief prohibits them from bearing arms may 
 be exempted from service in the combatant 
 branches, but are liable for service in the sup- 
 ply departments, and in every case the burden 
 of proof rests upon the person claiming exemp- 
 tion. 
 
 If a parent or guardian fails or refuses to 
 register a son or ward who is of the proper age 
 for service, or if any employer, of the type in- 
 clined to subordinate the national interest to 
 his greed for money, interferes in any way with 
 the military service of his employees, he is sub- 
 ject to a heavy fine. Employers are not re- 
 quired to pay employees during the time they 
 are on military duty. 
 
 Now the Australian Army is the manhood 
 of the country — trained for military defense. 
 
 The Swiss Army, though the systems diflFer 
 in certain details, is the same. 
 
 The United States Army is an organiza- 
 tion of a few thousand professional soldiers, 
 backed by the manhood of the country, un- 
 trained. 
 
 167 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 American manhood is in no way inferior to 
 Swiss or Australian manhood. 
 
 American patriotism is in no way inferior to 
 Swiss or Austrahan patriotism. 
 
 We pride ourselves, with reason, on our in- 
 dependent spirit and the courage to back it. 
 Spirit and courage are about all we have in a 
 military way. Are they sufficient for any situ- 
 ation we may find ourselves in ? 
 
 Our theory of defense, laid down by Wash- 
 ington, and changed very little since then, is 
 generally considered to be both sound and ade- 
 quate. That theory contemplates a small pro- 
 fessional army as a nucleus combined with the 
 organized militia as a first line of defense, and 
 the whole backed by the citizenship. Admin- 
 istration after administration has pointed out 
 our failure to apply this theory and the perils 
 that lurk in our negligence. Taft, Roosevelt, 
 and Wilson, Root, Stimson, and Garrison, as 
 well as the chief men of our military establish- 
 ment, have all at intervals had something to 
 say on this subject. 
 
 Woodrow Wilson, in his message to Con- 
 168 
 
» 
 
 THE GREAT AMERICAN BUGABOO 
 
 gress, during the closing days of 1914, said 
 this: — 
 
 We must depend in every time of national peril, 
 in the future as in the past, not upon a standing 
 army, nor yet upon a reserve army, but upon a cit- 
 izenry trained and accustomed to arms. It will be 
 right enough — right American policy, based upon 
 our accustomed principles and practices — to pro- 
 vide a system by which every citizen who will vol- 
 unteer for the training may be made familiar with 
 the use of modern arms, the rudiments of drill and 
 maneuver, and the maintenance and sanitation 
 of camps. We should encourage such training and 
 make it a means of discipline which our young men 
 will learn to value. It is right that we should pro- 
 vide it not only, but that we should make it as 
 attractive as possible, and so induce our young 
 men to undergo it at such times as they can com- 
 mand a little freedom and can seek the physical 
 development they need, for mere health's sake, if 
 for nothing more. Every means by which such 
 things can be stimulated is legitimate, and such a 
 method smacks of true American ideas. It is right, 
 too, that the National Guard of the States should 
 be developed and strengthened by every means 
 which is not inconsistent with our obligations to 
 our own people or with the established policy of 
 our Government. And this, also, not because the 
 
 169 
 
ARE WE READY ? 
 
 time or occasion specially calls for such measures, 
 but because it should be our constant policy to make 
 these provisions for our national peace and safety. 
 More than this carries with it a reversal of the 
 whole history and character of our policy. More 
 than this, proposed at this time, permit me to say, 
 would mean merely that we had lost our self-pos- 
 session, that we had been thrown off our balance 
 by a war with which we have nothing to do, whose 
 causes cannot touch us, whose very existence affords 
 us opportunities of friendship and disinterested 
 service which should make us ashamed of any 
 thought of hostility or fearful preparation for 
 trouble. 
 
 In his Annual Report of 1914, Lindley M. 
 Garrison, as Secretary of War, had the follow- 
 ing comment to make on this point: — . 
 
 It would be premature to attempt now to draw 
 the ultimate lessons from the war in Europe. It is 
 an imperative duty, however, to heed so much of 
 what it brings home to us as is incontrovertible 
 and not to be changed by any event, leaving for 
 later and more detailed and comprehensive consid- 
 eration what its later developments and final con- 
 clusions may indicate. 
 
 For orderly treatment certain preliminary con- 
 siderations may be usefully adverted to. It is, of 
 course, not necessary to dwell on the blessings of 
 
 170 
 
 d 
 

 COLLEGE STUDENTS LEARNING THE FINE POINTS OF 
 TRENCH-DIGGING 
 
 * V 4 ^ 
 
 A STUDENT SOLDIERS' MESS 
 

 THE GREAT AMERICAN BUGABOO 
 
 I peace and the horrors of war. Every one desires 
 peace, just as every one desires health, content- 
 ment, affection, sufficient means for comfortable 
 
 |l existence, and other similarly beneficent things. 
 But peace and the other states of being just men- 
 tioned are not always or even often solely within 
 one's own control. Those who are thoughtful and 
 have courage face the facts of life, take lessons from 
 experience, and strive by wise conduct to attain 
 the desirable things, and by prevision and precau- 
 tion to protect and defend them when obtained. It 
 may truthfully be said that eternal vigilance is the 
 price which must be paid in order to obtain the de- 
 sirable things of life and to defend them. 
 
 I In collective affairs the interests of the group 
 are confided to the Government, and it thereupon 
 is charged with the duty to preserve and defend 
 these things. The Government must exercise for 
 the Nation the precautionary, defensive, and pre- 
 servative measures necessary to that end. All gov- 
 ernments must therefore have force — physical 
 force — i.e., military force — for these purposes. 
 The question for each nation when this matter is 
 under consideration, is. How much force should it 
 have and of what should that force consist? 
 
 We already have our nucleus for defense — 
 a very expensive one — well trained, well oflS- 
 cered, and moderately well equipped. For a 
 
 171 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 nucleus it is pretty well scattered. Washing- 
 ton, of course, could not foresee that we should 
 have to maintain fighting men at such distances 
 as the Philippines, Hawaii, and Panama. 
 
 Back of this nucleus, in accordance with the 
 original idea, we have the militia, each state 
 organization adequate for local needs, no 
 doubt, but woefully lacking as a first line of 
 national defense — its theoretical function. 
 Our militia as a whole is so incompletely organ- 
 ized and so inadequately equipped that it would 
 be next to powerless if pitted against a well- 
 prepared foe under modern methods of warfare* 
 
 As a nation, we have a lot of family pride. 
 We are warlike, but not mihtary. We are quick 
 to resent insult and very confident of our abil- 
 ity to maintain our position. With unlimited 
 miUtary resources there is no doubt that we 
 are abundantly able to take care of ourselves. 
 But we are apt to forget that war has developed 
 from a glacier to an avalanche; that modern 
 international blows are struck unexpectedly 
 and with lightning quickness; and that in a 
 time of desperate and sudden necessity, unde- 
 
 172 
 
THE GREAT AMERICAN BUGABOO 
 
 veloped resources of men and materials would 
 be as useless as would be an undeveloped gold 
 mine in Alaska in a Wall Street panic. 
 
 Our family has men, money, and materials 
 more than sufficient for any military need. 
 But we lack group and individual team work. 
 No one has yet devised a successful scheme 
 for securing effective military cooperation be- 
 tween the States and the Federal Government. 
 Jasper and Henry and Brother Hiram are all 
 tied up in their local troubles. They are fight- 
 ers, every last one of them, but they have n't 
 had time nor a desire to spend the money nec- 
 essary to prepare themselves for trouble that 
 might involve everybody. Such an emergency 
 has appeared to us all to be the very remotest 
 possibility. Satisfied with our natural strength, 
 we have had but the vaguest concern as to 
 what shape we should be in if we should be 
 brought suddenly to face the necessity of 
 getting together for the defense of all. 
 
 There is a growing conviction that this is 
 not wisdom and that it is not fair to the httle 
 body of men whom we hire to protect us. 
 
 173 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 This conviction, for a long time, has been 
 crystallizing, in some quarters, into a deter- 
 mination to find a way out. Some of our states- 
 men and miUtary men, notably former Secre- 
 tary of War Henry L. Stimson, and former 
 Chief of Staff Leonard Wood, have been grap- 
 pling with the problem. The Swiss idea and 
 the military theories of other nations have 
 been given the closest study. 
 
 A start has already been made; a beginning 
 of a system of genuine and adequate citizen 
 defense which already has received the endorse- 
 ment of President Wilson, Secretary of War 
 Garrison, President Hibben of Princeton, 
 President Lowell of Harvard, President Had- 
 ley of Yale, and other men of equal standing. 
 
 And not one of them suggests the peril of 
 militarism! 
 
■F Thos 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 THE EXTRA TIRE IN WAR 
 
 Those gentlemen who have been telHng us 
 that the United States is the only first-class 
 nation in the world which has no military 
 reserve must have a care lest they be put down 
 as jingos, attempting to create hysteria by 
 inflammable and inaccurate utterances. 
 
 We have a reserve. It consists of 16 men. 
 At least, it did up to November 15, 1914. Some 
 of it may have departed this life by the time 
 these pages reach the press; but the chances 
 are that it is safe and accurate to say that our 
 reserve to-day is about what it was in the mid- 
 dle of November, 1914. 
 
 We have a reserve law, too. Under its pro- 
 visions a man intending to enlist in the regular 
 army has the privilege at the time of his enlist- 
 ment of expressing a wish that he be discharged 
 on furlough when he has served his term, and 
 HI be held subject to recall to the colors at any 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 time his services may be needed. In twenty- 
 four months this law produced the 16 reserv- 
 ists. 
 
 And there we are. 
 
 The law is a joke — just as much of a joke as 
 the "American Landsturm." If by any chance 
 war should be brought our way by any first- 
 class nation on earth, the joke would instantly 
 become a tragedy; and it is the purpose of this 
 volume to serve in its small way in presenting 
 facts and figures that may assist the Ameri- 
 can people in reaching some conclusion as to 
 whether our small regular army and our incom- 
 plete and poorly organized militia are sufficient 
 military protection for this country. 
 
 The territory of continental United States 
 is about 3,027,000 square miles, with a popu- 
 lation of about 99,000,000. There are 590,800 
 square miles in Alaska and a population of 
 about 65,000. We have spent $400,000,000 as 
 an investment in the Panama Canal. In 
 Hawaii, the population of 192,000 is contained 
 within 6500 square miles. The area of Porto 
 Rico is about 3600 square miles, with a popu- 
 
 176 
 
THE EXTRA TIRE IN WAR 
 
 lation of 1,118,000. In the Philippine Islands, 
 with 127,800 square miles, there is a population 
 of 7,640,000. 
 
 Our miUtary responsibilities over this scat- 
 tered area are both heavy and complicated. 
 The distribution of our regular army of less 
 than 90,000 men has been described in detail 
 in a previous chapter. 
 
 The most superficial study of our standing 
 military forces and the duties which devolve 
 upon them, reveals immediately the utter folly 
 of contending that our available miUtary forces 
 could cope successfully with even as small an 
 army as 200,000 trained men of any first-class 
 power. In his Report for 1914, Lindley M. 
 Garrison, as Secretary of War, compared our 
 peace and war strength with those of other 
 nations, as shown on the following page. 
 
 Mr. Garrison's figures for the United States 
 are generous. They include the Philippine 
 scouts and the organized militia. As has been 
 previously pointed out, there is a vast difference 
 between paper strength and actual strength. 
 It is the opinion of those who have given the 
 
 177 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 
 Area 
 
 
 (square miles) 
 
 Germany 
 
 208,830 
 
 France 
 
 207,054 
 
 Russia 
 
 8,647,657 
 
 Great Britain 
 
 
 and colonies 
 
 11,467,294 
 
 Italy 
 
 110,550 
 
 Austria-Hun- 
 
 
 gary 
 
 261,035 
 
 Japan 
 
 147.655 
 
 Turkey 
 
 1,186,874 
 
 Spain 
 
 194,783 
 
 Switzerland. . . 
 
 15,976 
 
 Sweden 
 
 172,876 
 
 Belgium 
 
 11,373 
 
 United States. 
 
 3,026,789 
 
 Population 
 
 Peace 
 strength 
 
 64,903,423 
 
 620,000 
 
 38,961,945 
 
 560,000 
 
 160,095.200 
 
 1,200,000 
 
 396,294,752 
 
 254,500 
 
 32,475,253 
 
 275,000 
 
 49,418,596 
 
 360,000 
 
 53,875,390 
 
 230,000 
 
 35,764,876 
 
 420,000 
 
 19,503,008 
 
 115,000 
 
 3,741,971 
 
 140,000 
 
 5,476,441 
 
 75,000 
 
 7,074,910 
 
 42,000 
 
 98,781,324 
 
 97,760 
 
 Total 
 
 trained war 
 
 strength 
 
 4,000,000 
 3,000,000 
 4,500,000 
 
 800,000 
 1,200,000 
 
 2,000,000 
 
 1,200,000 
 
 1,200,000 
 
 300,000 
 
 275,000 
 
 400,000 
 
 180,000 
 
 1225.170 
 
 * Including Philippine scouts and Organized Militia. 
 
 closest study to this subject that the actual 
 and immediate war strength of our regular 
 army and militia combined, including combat- 
 ants and non-combatants and troops in for- 
 eign service, is not more than 140,000 men; and 
 that the total armed force which we could 
 assemble on instant notice at any one point 
 within the continental limits of the United 
 States, a force which could be looked to for 
 immediate resistance of invasion, is not more 
 than 50,000 men, including regular troops and 
 miUtia. The whole outfit could be put into the 
 
 178 
 
THE EXTRA TIRE IN WAR 
 
 Yale Bowl, and there would be room left for a 
 good-sized crowd of admiring sisters. 
 
 Mr. Garrison's figures for Switzerland, on 
 the other hand, are most conservative. Swit- 
 zerland really has no standing army. Its per- 
 manent establishment consists of a general 
 staff and a small number of recruiting, supply, 
 and instructor oflScers. With a population of 
 4,000,000, Switzerland, in 1912, had a mili- 
 tary force of 490,340 men, fully organized and 
 equipped, well trained and disciplined, and 
 instantly available. Incidentally, the military 
 expense of the Government for that year was 
 $8,299,941, or $16.77 per man. Our regular 
 soldier costs us about $1000 each year. Mr. 
 Garrison's figures for England, France, and 
 Russia were low. The peace armies of these 
 countries were greatly augmented subsequent 
 to his report. 
 
 Back of our hired regular force, and back of 
 our militia, we have 16 trained men as Usted 
 reservists ! 
 
 Back of the whole is the citizenship — a 
 179 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 citizenship second to none in the world in 
 hardihood, courage, intelhgence, and patriot- 
 ism. That this citizenship, in any conflict 
 
 Boardman Robinson, del, 
 WE HAVE 16 TRAINED MEN AS LISTED RESERVISTS 
 
 with any power on earth, would ultimately 
 triumph, we none of us question. 
 
 What do we want to pay in life, property, 
 and treasure, for ultimate triumph ? About 
 that question centers the whole military prob- 
 lem of the United States. There are two pos- 
 sible answers to it : — 
 
 180 
 
THE EXTRA TIRE IN WAR 
 
 Either we can continue to ignore the prin- 
 ciples of our mihtary poHcy; 
 
 Or we can devise means whereby our whole 
 citizenship will have opportunity to re- 
 ceive military training. 
 
 In other words: — 
 
 We shall have a reserve; 
 
 Or we shall not have a reserve. 
 
 Or still another way: — 
 
 We shall continue to throw the whole burden 
 of first defense on a handful of professional 
 hired soldiers; 
 
 Or we shall undertake to fit ourselves intel- 
 Ugently to back our hired men in time of 
 national peril. 
 
 It all means that: — 
 
 We shajl continue to invite trouble by our 
 unpreparedness for it; 
 
 Or we shall discourage foreign trouble- 
 seekers by being ready for any military 
 emergency. 
 
 Those of us who spend our week-ends in 
 automobiles would feel a certain sense of dis- 
 grace if our neighbors should catch us start- 
 
 181 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 ing out without our extra tire. Some of us are 
 inclined to surround ourselves with an atmos- 
 phere of disgusting prosperity by packing 
 along two extras; and if we head away on a 
 particularly long, rough, dangerous, or impor- 
 tant trip, a few of us carry a whole extra set. 
 
 What is more, we take pains in providing 
 tires that fit our rims. Think of it! We make 
 sure that tires and rims match. Why, we even 
 insist that the threads of our extra spark plugs 
 shall match up with the threads that are to 
 receive them; and that extra parts shall be 
 especially designed for our particular machine. 
 Yet nobody ever accuses us of letting these 
 precautions for safety, convenience, and com- 
 fort interfere with our commercial, profes- 
 sional, or domestic duties and activities. It 
 is most remarkable. 
 
 Now I am not ready to admit that this di- 
 gression is far-fetched. 
 
 Our army is a machine — a most expensive 
 one. A nation keeps a military machine on 
 hand for use in emergency. Its efficiency as a 
 
 182 
 
THE EXTRA TIRE IN WAR 
 
 nation's economic possession depends upon 
 the fighting power it can develop and maintain 
 in conjBict. 
 
 As soon as a mihtary machine is used in 
 actual warfare, it immediately becomes sub- 
 ject to heavy losses. Wear and tear begins. 
 Parts are broken, destroyed, lost through sick- 
 ness or desertion, or stolen. 
 
 Not all the losses are directly due to vio* 
 lence. Some come through disease, some 
 through the hard going — the hardships of a 
 
 I campaign. In its marches to Sedan the Prus- 
 sian Guard lost 5000 men. The Guard had to 
 arrive at a given place on time, and the neces- 
 sary speed of marching was more destructive 
 than battle. The members of that Guard were 
 trained soldiers. Raw, soft troops would never 
 have arrived at all, in all probability. 
 
 We spend large amounts of money to main- 
 tain military forces through long periods of 
 ■I peace which we count upon to meet a com- 
 paratively brief emergency in war. It would 
 appear to be sound economics as well as ordi- 
 ^ nary horse sense that the war eflSciency of our 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 machine should be commensurate with the 
 money we spend on it in time of peace. 
 
 It is not — by any means. 
 
 In spite of the fact that we know that our 
 fighting machine will, in war, immediately de- 
 teriorate unless we provide for replacing loss 
 and destruction of its parts, both trivial and 
 vital, we have, throughout our military history, 
 persisted in ignoring the peril that is involved 
 in our neglect to apply the sound and funda- 
 mental principles of our established military 
 poHcy. 
 
 It has been proved by cold figures and broad 
 averages that in modern warfare any given 
 unit loses near to fifty per cent of its initial 
 strength during the first six months of a con- 
 flict. If the parts making up this loss are not 
 replaced with other identical parts, the fight- 
 ing machine loses at least haK its power. If 
 the lost and destroyed parts are replaced by 
 inferior and ill-fitting ones, the initial eflFec- 
 tiveness of the machine is destroyed in the 
 ratio of the rapidity with which the new parts 
 can be remodeled and adjusted. 
 
 184 
 

 THE EXTRA TIRE IN WAR 
 
 Remodeling and readjusting mean careful 
 training. Training can be accomplished eco- 
 nomically in time of peace or at a frightful cost 
 during the progress of actual war. 
 
 The United States is the only great nation 
 of the world that chooses the latter course. In 
 all the wars in our history, the units first sent 
 into the field have shrunk; and as they dwin- 
 dled, new bodies, untrained, and under un- 
 trained oflBcers, have been organized, and 
 sent into the line of battle. The results from 
 ■|lhe Revolution down have been a demonstra- 
 tion that continued and persistent fighting is 
 impossible under such a system. With almost 
 every battle followed by exhaustion, disorgan- 
 ization, and a period of inactivity, our wars 
 have dragged out their weary course, taking a 
 toll of life and treasure out of all proportion to 
 the sacrifice that would be necessary under a 
 system of military preparedness. 
 Ht Our military peace organization is the auto- 
 ^"mobile stripped down to the motor, chassis, 
 and driving gears. Not only should there be 
 at hand the necessary spare parts, but there 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 should be accessible the means for building it 
 up completely without confusion at a mo- 
 ment's notice. 
 
 The army was never intended to be more 
 than the peace skeleton for an adequate war 
 force. Our forebears went on the assumption 
 that we would supply ourselves with the means 
 of expansion. That we have not done so can 
 be charged to the negligence of our legislators, 
 not to those in charge of our military affairs. 
 An adequate reserve of trained men would 
 mean that, at the present time and in the future, 
 our standing forces should be kept at the ab- 
 solute minimum consistent with the military 
 obligations devolving upon us in time of peace, 
 and our security in the face of a threatened 
 invasion. 
 
 Suppose that an invasion actually threat- 
 ened. Suppose that, in the opinion of our miU- 
 tary experts, an army of 100,000 men were 
 necessary successfully to repel an attack by 
 land. Not only should we have to put these 
 100,000 trained men into the field, but we 
 should have to maintain a force of that size 
 
 186 
 
THE EXTRA TIRE IN WAR 
 
 I 
 
 H throughout a campaign. We should have to 
 H avoid, first of all, a lowering of the efficiency of 
 the initial force through the absorption of raw 
 recruits to replace the first losses. We should 
 assume, with good ground, that during the first 
 six months of fighting, we should lose about 
 fifty per cent of our initial fighting fine. If the 
 training of recruits were begun at once, some 
 of the new men would be ready to go to the 
 front before the expiration of the six months. 
 Perhaps we might be able so to train 25,000 
 raw recruits. In order, therefore, to maintain 
 100,000 men at top efficiency during six months 
 of war, our fighting force would have to have 
 an initial strength of 125,000 trained men. 
 
 All this is based on the assumption of our 
 military organization being without trained 
 
 ■ reserves. With the average cost of each soldier 
 $1000, this force would cost us $125,000,000 
 per year. 
 
 ■ Suppose that, under these same circum- 
 stances, we had at hand a trained reserve of 
 50,000 men. Our professional military estab- 
 _ lishment, then, could be limited to 75,000 men, 
 
 L 
 
 n 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 and it has been estimated that the cost per 
 year for maintaining such a force at top effi- 
 ciency would not be more than $75,000,000. 
 The war effectiveness of such a peace organi- 
 zation would be as high as the larger standing 
 army. 
 
 We can't seem to get it out of our national 
 head that the "Indian Days" are past. In 
 those days the longer we held a man in the serv- 
 ice, the better he became acquainted with the 
 ways of the redskin and the more efficient as 
 an Indian fighter he was. To-day we need men 
 ready for any emergency — sound in body 
 and trained for modern warfare. Yet we persist 
 in looking upon our army as a police force. 
 The longer a policeman deals with crooks and 
 criminals, the more efficient he is in locating 
 criminals and suppressing crime. Only in ac- 
 tual warfare is this true of the soldier. In time 
 of peace he can only study military science and 
 keep his body in trim to apply what he has 
 learned. Our police-force system of enlistment, 
 as a matter of pure business, is ridiculous. We 
 take a man into the army, train him, and pay 
 
 188 
 
THE EXTRA TIRE IN WAR 
 
 him the most at the time that he is least effi- 
 cient — when he is on the down grade. And we 
 have very few of him, at that. 
 
 Suppose we took him for a very short period 
 of enhstment, and at the end of it returned him 
 to civil life, thereafter calling him to the colors 
 only for a few days' brushing up each year, and 
 in time of war. He would cost not more than 
 $100 a year. The regular soldier costs about 
 $1000. For what we pay for each regular, we 
 could have ten reservists. And the reservist 
 would be in all respects the equal of the regular 
 as a unit of defense. 
 
 The regular army was designed originally 
 to be, among other things, a training school. 
 It has proved its efficiency in this respect, but 
 year after year we have continued the poUcy 
 of educating and training our citizens who 
 have enlisted in the regular army, and then of 
 returning them to private life w^ithout provid- 
 ing any means of assuring ourselves of their 
 further services if ever required. 
 
 We shall, of course, always need a regular 
 force sufficient for garrison duty at home and 
 
 189 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 abroad. But if we ever decide to substitute, 
 for minimum defensive strength at maximum 
 cost, maximum strength at minimum cost, we 
 are going to find the trained reserve the easy 
 and democratic way out. 
 
 The time that must be consumed in making 
 an efficient soldier out of a raw recruit in the 
 regular army training-school is a matter con- 
 cerning which there is a rather wide diver- 
 gence of opinion. Averaging the views of mili- 
 tary men of long experience, it can be safely 
 said that the regular army can turn out a sol- 
 dier in twelve months. From my talks with 
 leading military men, I am inclined to the be- 
 lief that a recruit of average intelligence and 
 good habits can be made an effective fighting 
 unit within six months. It is a fact that has 
 been established that any young man of good 
 health and average mental equipment can be 
 fitted for military service within that time. 
 Under a system of intensive training, the ex- 
 periment has been successfully tried in other 
 countries. 
 
 What is more, there is no good reason why 
 190 
 
the militia organizations, as well as the regular 
 army, should not be useful as military training- 
 schools. 
 
 ■L Should Congress suddenly decide, after long 
 years of inactivity, that it is in the interest 
 of the nation to put something beside high- 
 sounding utterances complimentary to the 
 manhood of the nation behind our hired sol- 
 diers and our militiamen, and should it enact 
 legislation under which a reserve strength could 
 
 Hi be built up, we should still be without the one 
 great essential for turning recruits into trained 
 soldiers. We have hardly enough officers for 
 our present regular army, and not nearly 
 enough efficient officers to bring our militia to 
 the degree of organization and effectiveness 
 which it should have. Theoretically, we should 
 have sufficient officers in the regular army to 
 assist in the training of the mihtia, and if we 
 should decide that it would be good business 
 for us, in addition, to have a reserve, we should 
 have absolutely no officers available to handle 
 the detail of organizing, training, and admin- 
 istering the reserve, not to mention the fact 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 that if the regular army should be expanded 
 with reserve troops, we should not have any- 
 where near enough leaders to handle the larger 
 force in time of war. 
 
 "If we were called upon to mobilize to meet 
 a first-class power," said General Leonard 
 Wood, recently, "we should require immedi- 
 ately several thousand officers. Where are we 
 to get them? This is a matter of vital impor- 
 tance and one which should be attended to at 
 once, and not left to the rush, hurry, and con- 
 fusion preceding the war." 
 
 A possible answer to General Wood's ques- 
 tion will be given further on. 
 
 Should we find a way to supply ourselves 
 with a reserve of men and of officers suffi- 
 cient to bring the regular army and the militia 
 to war strength in absolute uniformity of or- 
 ganization, the final problem would be the es- 
 tablishment of a reserve of war material. Our 
 military forces, particularly the militia, are not 
 only without the equipment that would be 
 essential to any successful campaign, but we 
 have taken no means whatever of supplying 
 
 192 
 
n 
 
 i( 
 
 THE EXTRA TIRE IN WAR 
 
 anything like a reserve supply of weapons, par- 
 ticularly field guns, ammunition, supplies, hos- 
 pital trains, and the equipment necessary to 
 eflScient operation of other auxiliary arms of 
 the service. 
 
 There are two vital aspects of this situation : 
 The first is the safety of the nation; and the 
 second is the unfairness, which in time of war 
 I will amount to criminal negligence on our part, 
 in putting such a burden of responsibihty as 
 now exists upon men who have voluntarily 
 stepped forward as willing to train themselves 
 for the defense of the nation. 
 
 President Taft emphasized the fact that a 
 large body of men does not necessarily consti- 
 tute an army, and that a volunteer enUsted 
 to-day, or a militiaman enrolled to-morrow, 
 I cannot be expected, no matter what his desire 
 may be, to be an effective fighting unit at once. 
 
 What has been accomplished in our military 
 history by the soldiers who have made up our 
 forces under the shpshod system which has 
 
 Bued since the Revolution, is the highest 
 e to the spirit and valor of the individual 
 
 t 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 American soldier, whether regular or militia- 
 man. 
 
 Our unfairness toward the man who volun- 
 tarily assumes his share of the burden of the 
 national defense was emphasized by General 
 Richard Henry Lee, commander of the famous 
 Partisan Legion. Years after the Revolution, 
 Lee said this: "A government is the murderer 
 of its citizens which sends them to the field 
 uninformed and untaught, where they are 
 to meet men of the same age and strength, 
 mechanized by education and discipline for 
 battle." 
 
 m 
 
CHAPTER X 
 WELL? 
 
 What are we going to do about it? 
 
 Probably, either we are going to assume that 
 there is no need to do anything about it, or we 
 are going to take the position that, because 
 there is peril in our present state of military 
 preparedness, there is necessity for deciding 
 upon some means of increasing our miUtary 
 strength. 
 
 Some of us hold very firmly to the belief that 
 our system in its present application is suflS- 
 cient for any possible emergency which we 
 might face, and point to the successful and glo- 
 rious outcome of every armed struggle in which 
 we have been engaged. 
 I Others of us are inclined to the belief that 
 those very conflicts furnish the strongest proof 
 of the unnecessary disasters and needless sacri- 
 fices that go with military unreadiness. 
 
 Assuming that a first-class nation might de- 
 195 
 
 » 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 cide that it would be profitable and advisable 
 to attack us by land, would an immediately 
 available force of 50,000 trained men, plus our 
 patriotism, be adequate for our defense? Evi- 
 dently such a force, particularly if ill-equipped, 
 poorly organized, and not supplied with suffi- 
 cient field artillery and ammunition, would be 
 no match against trained troops, perfectly 
 equipped. The element, then, upon which we 
 would rely to give us superiority and ultimate 
 success, would be our patriotism. 
 
 It was an inspiring picture which William 
 J. Bryan, as Secretary of State, is quoted as 
 having painted — *'The President knows that 
 if this country needed a milhon men and needed 
 them in a day, the call could go out at sunrise, 
 and the sun would go down on a million men 
 under arms." But it is a picture without his- 
 torical background. Mr. Bryan, no doubt, in 
 common with the great majority of people 
 unexpert in things military, has had neither 
 the time nor the inclination to study the re- 
 quirements of military science. Among those 
 of us whose information is of the most general 
 
 196 
 
OPEX-ORDER PRACTICE AT BURLINGTON, VERMONT 
 
WELL ? 
 
 character, nothing is more common than mis- 
 taking mihtary resources for military strength. 
 This misconception is particularly characteris- 
 tic of the American people. Our histories give 
 us the record of our triumphs in the Revolution, 
 in the War of 1812, and succeeding conflicts; 
 and since nearly all of these wars were, for the 
 most part, begun by forces of militia and vol- 
 unteers, we have very naturally formed the 
 conviction that, since our system has been ulti- 
 mately successful, there is little pressing need 
 for altering it. 
 
 We are apt to forget that, in relating the 
 events of our wars, our historians have for the 
 most part limited themselves to describing the 
 battles that have been fought, without laying 
 much stress upon the delays and unnecessary 
 disasters which accompanied them; nor has it 
 been pointed out to us that in nearly every in- 
 stance our wars have been so protracted that 
 
 I the national resources have been well-nigh 
 
 I exhausted. 
 
 I An understanding of the enormous life and 
 
 I treasure loss which has attended our refusal to 
 
 i^^ 197 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 carry out the principles of our military policy 
 would surely lead to prompt remedy of the 
 most dangerous of our present weaknesses. 
 
 Argue as we may, we cannot evade the fact 
 that all our wars have been prolonged for lack 
 of preparation, and that often the news of 
 humiliating defeat instead of victory has 
 plunged the people into mourning. 
 
 Patriotism cannot be relied upon to produce 
 at once very large forces of volunteers. It is 
 not pleasant to reflect that, out of every five 
 men who went into the Union forces during 
 the Civil War, one was a deserter; that early 
 in the second year of the war (August 4, 1862) 
 President Lincoln had to resort to the draft, 
 and that before the struggle had continued two 
 years Congress was compelled to adopt gen- 
 eral conscription; that the only real land vic- 
 tory we won in the War of 1812 was after the 
 war was over; that a French navy and army 
 played a powerful role at Yorktown; that 
 Washington himself, in November, 1775, after 
 most heroic efforts to assemble an army of 
 
 20,000 men around Boston, wrote this : — 
 
 198 
 
WELL ? 
 
 The trouble I have in the arrangement of the 
 Army is really inconceivable. Many of the officers 
 sent in their names to serve in expectation of pro- 
 motion; others stood aloof to see what advantage 
 they could make for themselves, while a number, 
 who had declined, have again sent in their names to 
 serve. So great has the confusion arising from these 
 and many other perplexing circumstances been that 
 I found it absolutely impossible to fix this very in- 
 teresting business exactly on the plan resolved on 
 in the conference, though I have kept up to the 
 spirit of it as near as the nature and necessity of the 
 case would permit. 
 
 The difficulty with the soldiers is as great, in- 
 deed, more so, if possible, than with the officers. 
 They will not enlist until they know their colonel, 
 lieutenant-colonel, major, and captain, so that it 
 was necessary to fix the officers the first thing, 
 which is, at last, in some manner done, and I have 
 given out enlisting orders. . . . 
 
 There must be some other stimulus, besides love of 
 their country, to make men fond of the service. . . . 
 [ The number enlisted since my last is 2540 men. 
 I am sorry to be necessitated to mention to you 
 the egregious want of public spirit which reigns 
 here. Instead of pressing to be engaged in the cause 
 of their country, which I vainly flattered myself 
 would be the case, I find we are likely to be deserted 
 in a most critical time. Those that have enlisted 
 
 199 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 must have a furlough, which I have been obliged 
 to grant to fifty at a time, from each regiment. 
 The Connecticut troops, upon whom I reckoned, 
 are as backward, indeed, if possible, more so than 
 the people of this colony. Our situation is truly 
 alarming, and of this General Howe is well apprised, 
 it being the common topic of conversation when 
 the people left Boston last Friday. No doubt when 
 he is reinforced he will avail himself of the informa- 
 tion. . . . Such a dearth of public spirit and such 
 want of virtue, such stock- jobbing and fertility in 
 all the low arts to obtain advantages of one kind 
 or another in this great change of military arrange- 
 ment I never saw before, and pray God's mercy that 
 I may never be witness to again. What will be the 
 end of these maneuvers is beyond my scan. I trem- 
 ble at the prospect. We have been till this time 
 enlisting about 3500 men. To engage these I have 
 been obliged to allow furloughs as far as fifty men 
 to a regiment, and the officers, I am persuaded, 
 indulge as many more. The Connecticut troops 
 will not be prevailed upon to stay longer than their 
 term, saving those who have enlisted for the next 
 campaign, and are mostly on furlough; such mer- 
 cenary spirit pervades the whole that I should not 
 be at all surprised at any disaster that may happen. 
 In short, after the last of this month our lines will 
 be so weakened that the minute men and militia 
 must be called in for their defense, and these being 
 
 200 
 
WELL? 
 
 under no kind of government themselves will de- 
 li stroy the little subordination I have been laboring 
 to establish, and run me into one evil while I am 
 endeavoring to avoid another; but the less must be 
 chosen. . . . 
 li Our enlistment goes on slowly. By the returns 
 » last Monday, only 5917 men are engaged for the 
 ensuing campaign, and yet we are told that we shall 
 get the number wanted, as they are only playing 
 off to see what advantages are to be made, and 
 whether a bounty cannot be extorted, either from 
 the public at large or individuals, in case of a 
 draft. 
 
 » 
 
 I Similar instances of the disappointing results 
 of reliance upon volunteer enlistments can be 
 found almost without number in the full rec- 
 ords of our military operations. While these 
 facts may not be pleasant to contemplate, per- 
 haps it is high time that we faced them. In 
 the opinion of able military men and states- 
 men, these instances do not indicate any lack 
 of patriotism, but do demonstrate that a sys- 
 tem which depends wholly upon patriotism to 
 produce armed forces in time of necessity is 
 
 M| imperfect. 
 
 HK All our history gives a complete demonstra- 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 tion of the fact that our great weaknesses have 
 been the persistent use of raw troops; the lack 
 of an expansive organization; and voluntary 
 enlistments with large bounties. Where men, 
 enlisted for a period of three months, as at 
 Bladensburg, are thrown against veteran 
 troops, no matter what the ultimate result of 
 a campaign may be, needless sacrifice and pro- 
 longed fighting is inevitable. Military men 
 agree that the excellence of the troops shown 
 at the close of the Civil War was due, not to 
 the fact that they were volunteers, but to the 
 fact that their long term of service enabled 
 them to become expert soldiers with discipline 
 and a knowledge of military science to back 
 their courage. Every battlefield of the Civil 
 War after 1861 gave proof of the valor of the 
 trained American soldier, but it must be re- 
 membered that, in producing such soldiers, 
 nearly every family in the land was in mourn- 
 ing, and the nation was all but overwhelmed 
 with a debt with which we are still bur- 
 dened. 
 
 A people forget easily. Already we are ceas- 
 202 
 
WELL? 
 
 Hf ing to dwell on the costly sacrifices of the Civil 
 War; and yet, unless we take some means of 
 profiting by past experience, and devise some 
 system of national military preparedness, we 
 shall continue a condition that would, if war 
 should come, involve the nation in the same 
 difficulties, and expose the country to the same 
 terrible sacrifices as in the past. 
 
 HI Probably no man in the history of our na- 
 tion was better qualified to speak as an au- 
 thority on the question of national defense 
 than was Washington. Through all his writ- 
 ing runs the plea for trained citizens and uni- 
 formity of organization. At the time that W^ash- 
 ington wrote, the line between the mihtia and 
 the volunteer forces of the country was an in- 
 definite one. 
 
 ■i It has been in comparatively recent years 
 that we have drawn a clear-cut distinction be- 
 tween unorganized volunteers and organized 
 volunteers. The peril of being unprepared to 
 put trained citizens into the field on short 
 notice has been sounded by military men and 
 statesmen from the time of Washington down. 
 
 flt 203 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 Elihu Root, in 1904, declared: — 
 
 One . . . field of great importance remains to be 
 covered by legislation: the establishment of an 
 adequate system for raising, training, and officer- 
 ing the volunteer forces of the future. It is of first 
 importance, that the distinction between volun- 
 teers and militia shall be observed. 
 
 Our Secretaries of War and our army ofll- 
 cers, in administration after administration, 
 have pounded away on the same point. 
 
 In recent years we have created machinery 
 which could give us not only an efficient regu- 
 lar army, but an adequate and uniform divi- 
 sional organization of well-equipped and well- 
 trained militia. 
 
 We have shown a disinclination to use the 
 machinery. Yet none of us would question the 
 fact that a nation's success in war depends 
 upon the organization and application of its 
 military resources. Military resources are men, 
 material, and money. 
 
 The organization of these three depends on 
 the wisdom of the statesmen. The military 
 men can only advise. Our Constitution gives 
 
 204 
 

 WELL? 
 
 Congress the power to raise and support armies. 
 A Congress thoroughly informed on mihtary 
 matters, and awake to the perils that follow in 
 the wake of negUgenee, would mean a miUtary 
 system wholly adequate for any emergency. 
 No matter what the skill, efficiency, and cour- 
 age of the individual soldier may be, the re- 
 sponsibility of defeat or victory in a war Ues as 
 heavy on the civil as on the military authority. 
 HI American battles have not been wholly won 
 or lost in the field. A close scrutiny reveals 
 that they may be lost in the Cabinet room, in 
 the dome of the Capitol, or in the private office 
 of the Secretary of War. Wherever the ulti- 
 mate responsibiUty may he, it is the young 
 men of the country who die, and it is the 
 whole people of the country who suflFer. Legis- 
 lative negligence is an ofiFense against the cit- 
 izenship of the country, and there can be no 
 doubt that in the event of disaster, due wholly 
 ^m to the failure of Congress to enact laws that 
 ^ would have insured national safety, the Ameri- 
 
 Bople would call their representatives in 
 5SS by their right names. 
 205 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 The broad purposes of our military policy 
 have not changed since the time of Washing- 
 ton. Our standing army and our military or- 
 ganizations were, and are intended to be, merely 
 the skeleton in time of peace for a great defen- 
 sive force in time of war. 
 
 The skeleton, as has been shown in previous 
 chapters, is not in the very best of shape. In 
 fact, certain parts of it are missing. But the 
 defects, if certain simple legislation can be 
 enacted, and if military cooperation between 
 the States and the Federal Government can 
 be secured, can be easily remedied. 
 
 It is the total lack of any means of putting 
 the meat on the skeleton that is declared by 
 many military experts to be the great and seri- 
 ous weakness. 
 
 In an athletic club to which I once belonged, 
 we had a crack wrestler. We called him 
 "Fatty" because he was so thin. He knew 
 every hold and trick of the game, and for a 
 long time he took on anybody, big, little, or 
 middle-sized, who cared to try conclusions 
 with him — always with the same result, a 
 
 206 
 
WELL? 
 
 ^H scientific twist of some sort or other that sent 
 
 ^^ the ambitious antagonist to the mat. He 
 finally came to a heavy-weight who had meat 
 and science combined. Our crack wrestler, 
 within a few seconds, discovered that he had 
 
 |l a sprained back. He never wrestled again. 
 He couldn't. 
 
 Hf ! The proposition that the good little man can- 
 not successfully match strength and skill with 
 the good big man is as old as the Olympiads. 
 Military men with whom I have talked insist 
 that the proposition applies exactly to the 
 question of the chances of a good little miU- 
 tary force against a good big miUtary force. 
 The great problem which they have set them- 
 selves to solve is not that of the size or the 
 organization of the regular army, nor yet that 
 of bringing our militia organizations to a 
 greater degree of uniformity and eflBciency, 
 though both of these go into it. It is the ques- 
 tion of creating, back of the regular army and 
 back of the organized militia, an adequate re- 
 serve of trained men. 
 
 Both the army and the militia are at present 
 207 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 at less than half of their war strength, and no 
 means of filling out the organizations in time 
 of war has been provided. 
 
 It is because of this condition that our army 
 experts and some of our ablest statesmen are 
 urging that our negUgence has placed us in a 
 position of peril. 
 
 Should war suddenly come our way, there 
 is no reason to believe that our situation would 
 be, in its fundamental aspects, much different 
 from the one which Washington faced in 1775. 
 In the light of the facts and figures which an 
 investigation into the present state of our 
 military preparedness reveals, the following 
 portion of a letter written by Washington on 
 January 4, 1776, to Joseph Reed, is most 
 interesting: — 
 
 Search the volumes of history through, and I 
 much question whether a case similar to ours is to 
 be found, namely, to maintain a post against the 
 flower of the British troops for six months together, 
 without powder, and then to have one army dis- 
 banded and another to be raised within the same 
 distance of a reinforced enemy. It is too much to 
 attempt. What may be the final issue of the last 
 
 208 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 WELL? 
 
 maneuver, time only can unfold. I wish this month 
 was well over our heads. The same desire of retir- 
 ing into a chimney corner seized the troops of New 
 Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, so 
 soon as their time expired, as had wrought upon 
 those of Connecticut, notwithstanding many of 
 them made a tender of their services to continue 
 till the lines could be sufficiently strengthened. 
 We are now left with a good deal less than half- 
 raised regiments and about 5000 militia, who only 
 stand engaged to the middle of this month, when, 
 according to custom, they will depart, let the neces- 
 sity of their stay be ever so urgent. Thus for more 
 than two months past I have scarcely emerged 
 from one difficulty before I have been plunged into 
 another. 
 
 The confusion that would inevitably mark 
 I an attempt to assemble a force to repel a land 
 attack, and the hopelessness of sending our 
 j available forces, with their inadequate equip- 
 ment and organization, against 150,000 trained 
 troops, have been previously shown. If, as 
 our military men assert, there is no extrava- 
 gance in the speculation contained in those 
 chapters, as to the possible results of our 
 present state of preparedness, and if it is as- 
 
 209 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 sumed that there is a possibiHty of our being 
 attacked by land, what is there that we can do 
 that will not turn the United States into what 
 President Wilson calls "an armed camp" and 
 will in no way interfere with the economic 
 activity and freedom of the individual? 
 
 For years, our General Staff and our War 
 College, our Presidents, our Secretaries of War, 
 and our leading active and retired army oJE- 
 cers have been working on this question. 
 What has been worked out combines the crea- 
 tion of a trained reserve strength through 
 enlistment in the regular army, with an oppor- 
 tunity for the private citizen to receive mili- 
 tary training. 
 
 Should we decide upon a reserve, it should 
 not only be large enough to fill up the regular 
 army and the militia, but it should be suffi- 
 ciently in excess of this to make up the wast- 
 age for the first three months of a war: that 
 is, besides being large enough to bring the 
 army and the militia to war strength, the re- 
 serve should be at least fifteen per cent of the 
 combined war strength of both organizations. 
 
 210 
 
I 
 
 WELL? 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 
 It should also be large enough to provide new 
 organizations. 
 
 We can, if we want to, accomplish this by 
 legislation. We can so change our enlistment 
 laws that the recruit, when enUsting, will know 
 that after he has served with the colors for a 
 short period of training, sufficient to make 
 him proficient as a soldier, he will, for a num- 
 
 (ber of years, perhaps eight or ten, be subject 
 to call to the colors in time of war and pos- 
 sibly each year for a few days of additional 
 training. 
 
 Back of the regular army, back of the mili- 
 tia, and back of the reserve, should we enact 
 legislation which would create the reserve, 
 H would still be the great citizen body. Our 
 military policy from the beginning has consid- 
 ered this body as the real defensive strength 
 ■| of the nation. If that body should be trained, 
 as it is trained in Switzerland and Australia, 
 we should have an immediate military strength 
 second to none in the world, and a security that 
 
 k would be the greatest safeguard against war. 
 In Switzerland, the training of citizens is 
 I 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 based absolutely on the idea that the nation 
 shall never go to war save for defense, and the 
 closest observers of the Swiss Government and 
 the Swiss people agree that the military train- 
 ing of the citizens, even though that training 
 is compulsory, has not in any way operated 
 against the advanced democratic standards of 
 that nation or against the liberty and freedom 
 of its individual citizens. 
 
 The proponents of a system of military 
 training for our citizens do not advocate the 
 compulsory training which is a part of the 
 Swiss system. They do urge, however, the ad- 
 visability of opening the way for training to 
 any citizen who desires it. A most important 
 move in this direction is already well under 
 way. 
 
 During the summer of 1913, two experi- 
 mental military camps for the instruction of 
 students of educational institutions were es- 
 tablished and were highly successful. Since 
 then two more have been opened. The object 
 of these camps is to give the young men of the 
 country an opportunity for a short course in 
 
THK STUDENTS' CAMP AT LUDIXGTOX 
 
 STIDKNTS IN IllK TKKNCIIKS AT (JETTYSBURG 
 
WELL? 
 
 ^M military training should their sense of patriotic 
 service prompt them to fit themselves for a 
 part in the defense of the nation. It is the 
 policy of these camps to make the training of 
 the most intensive character. It is now sug- 
 gested that the whole period of training should 
 
 If be divided into three periods of not more than 
 two months each, these months to fall during 
 the school and college vacation time, as well 
 as during the usual business vacation. This 
 training, undertaken in time of peace, would 
 be at least six times as long as the time that 
 would be available for training of volunteers 
 if we were suddenly confronted with war. 
 
 II It is urged that besides the benefit that 
 I would come to the students through the broad- 
 I ening influence of intimate association with 
 the students of other institutions, the oppor- 
 tunity for athletic contests as well as the ac- 
 quired habits of discipline, obedience, and 
 II self-control, the nation would profit through a 
 I greater fostering of the patriotic spirit and a 
 f wider spread, among the whole citizenship of 
 the country, of a more thorough knowledge of 
 
 213 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 military history, military policy, and military 
 needs. 
 
 These camps, it is contended, will have an 
 exceptional value as a military asset, since they 
 are instrumental in instructing a class of highly 
 intelligent and well-educated men who, in 
 time of national emergency, would be espe- 
 cially well fitted to undertake the duties of 
 officers. 
 
 Under the order of the Secretary of War, 
 these camps are open to students between the 
 ages of eighteen and thirty, in universities, 
 colleges, and the graduating classes of high 
 schools, and other schools rated as such. Ap- 
 plicants for admission to a student's military 
 instruction camp must be citizens of the United 
 States or men who have declared their inten- 
 tion of becoming citizens. It is required that 
 they must be of good moral character, physi- 
 cally sound, and of good scholastic standing. 
 Each season's training in the camp consumes 
 five weeks. The students are required to at- 
 tend during the full period. At the present 
 time the students are required to pay their own 
 
 214 
 
WELL? 
 
 traveling expenses to and from the camp. For 
 this reason camp sites have been selected in 
 as central locations as possible. The military 
 authorities furnish food for $3.50 a week for 
 each student, or $17.50 for each year's period 
 of training. 
 
 The students of the camps are also required 
 to supply themselves with a uniform, consist- 
 ing of two suits of cotton, olive drab, one extra 
 pair of breeches, one campaign hat, one pair 
 of leggings, and two oUve drab shirts. A dis- 
 tinctive hat cord is worn to distinguish the 
 student's uniform from the uniform of the 
 regular army. The cost for clothing is from 
 $5 to $10 for each student. The Government 
 furnishes, without cost, cots, blankets, tents, 
 cooking outfits, a complete infantry equip- 
 ment, including rifles, bayonets, cartridge belts, 
 canteens, shelter tents, tent poles and pins, 
 haversacks, pack carriers, mess kits, and other 
 property of the quartermaster and ordnance 
 
 I departments, all of which are turned in at the 
 end of the period of training. The necessary 
 instructors and the personnel for the organiza- 
 I 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 tion and maintenance of camp wagon trans- 
 ports, medical care and sanitation, and all 
 other means of protecting the health and in- 
 suring the comfort of the students, which 
 under the law can be furnished by the War 
 Department, are provided. 
 
 Such troops of the regular army as can be 
 spared, for purposes of demonstration and 
 assisting in the instruction of the students, 
 attend the camps for field maneuvers, exer- 
 cises, and other forms of military training. 
 
 The course of instruction, as outlined by 
 the War Department, is along the following 
 lines: — 
 
 The theoretical principles of tactics, includ- 
 ing advance and rear guards, patrols, outposts, 
 and combat, are studied and explained in a 
 series of informal talks, tactical walks, and war 
 games conducted by selected competent offi- 
 cers. 
 
 The practical application of the above is 
 carried out in the field by the students them- 
 selves, and also in conjunction with the regular 
 troops, blank ammunition being used. 
 
 ^16 
 
WELL? 
 
 Military map-making and road-sketching 
 are explained and opportunities for practical 
 work in that subject offered to those who de- 
 sire it. 
 
 The proper handling and use of the rifle is 
 taught and experience given by means of gal- 
 lery (or subcaliber) practice, and by actual fir- 
 ing with the service rifle and ammunition on 
 the target range. To those students making 
 the necessary qualifications over the prescribed 
 course, the National Rifle Association of Amer- 
 ica offers its prescribed marksmanship badges 
 and a trophy, to be competed for by teams rep- 
 resenting the different educational institutions. 
 
 Physical drill, marching, camping, tent- 
 pitching, making and breaking camp, loading 
 and unloading wagons, camp expedients, field 
 cooking, camp sanitation, first aid to the in- 
 jured, personal hygiene, and the care of troops 
 in the field are taught by practice. 
 
 Informal talks by selected officers are given 
 on the following subjects: Use and duties of 
 the different arms and branches of the serv- 
 ice (infantry, field artillery, cavalry, engineers, 
 
 217 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 signal troops, and the medical corps) ; field forti- 
 fication, including the laying-out, construction, 
 and use of trenches; military bridge-building; 
 use of explosives; demolitions; the installa- 
 tion and operation of field lines of electrical 
 information and the use of buzzers, field tele- 
 phones, and radio-telegraphic apparatus; sig- 
 nal flags, heliographs, and acetylene lanterns, 
 and other apparatus used by signal corps or- 
 ganizations in the field; the tactical organiza- 
 tion of the military forces of the United States, 
 the reasons therefor, and comparison with that 
 of foreign armies; the supply (food and mate- 
 rial) of an army and the problems connected 
 therewith; the psychology of war; the military 
 history of our country — not the illuminated 
 school-book versions of our victories merely, 
 but the true versions, as taken from the official 
 records, of our failures and defeats, as well as 
 our successes and victories, with reasons for 
 them; our military policy, past and present, the 
 necessity for some sound, definite military pol- 
 icy; and the present scheme of organization 
 of the land forces of the United States as pre- 
 
 218 
 
WELL? 
 
 pared by the General Staff of the Army and 
 recommended by the War Department to Con- 
 gress. 
 
 The schedule of instruction includes a prac- 
 tice march of several days' duration, in which, 
 as nearly as possible, there are actual cam- 
 paign conditions of march, bivouac, and com- 
 bat such as the assumed situation would exact 
 in war. 
 
 To each student who successfully completes 
 the prescribed course of instruction, a certifi- 
 cate is issued and his name kept on file in the 
 War Department, with such remarks as to his 
 degree of efficiency and recommendations as to 
 his fitness for future command as may be made 
 by the officers in charge. 
 
 A correct understanding of the principles 
 involved being considered of more importance, 
 in the short time available for instruction, than 
 the exercise itself, only that degree of precision 
 in close order drill necessary to insure disci- 
 pline is insisted upon. Extended order drill and 
 field exercises are considered most important. 
 Work is confined, as far as practicable, to the 
 
 219 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 morning, leaving the afternoons and evenings, 
 with due regard to proper supervision, at the 
 disposal of the student for rest, athletic sports, 
 and recreation, or for such other work or in- 
 struction as he may desire and which can be 
 given. 
 
 All companies commanded by a selected reg- 
 ular army officer, or officers, are aided by sub- 
 altern officers and non-commissioned officers 
 selected from among the students themselves. 
 
 The discipline exacted is strict and just. 
 Students are on a cadet status; that is, they 
 are treated with the courtesy due prospective 
 officers, but subject to all rules and regulations 
 of the camp and to disciplinary measures for 
 infractions. 
 
 The greatest care has been exercised by the 
 General Staff in the selection of camp-sites, in 
 order that they shall fulfill not only the military 
 requirements of a good camp, with suitable 
 grounds for maneuver purposes, but that they 
 shall be located in a healthful, cool, and pleas- 
 ant climate and in a region in each section 
 offering advantages desirable from the summer- 
 
 220 
 

 WELL? 
 
 If 
 
 outing standpoint, such as being on a lake, the 
 seashore, or in the mountains. 
 
 The idea of the students' camp has gained 
 ground with surprising rapidity. Not only has it 
 become intensely popular with students them- 
 selves, but many parents have written letters 
 congratulating the army authorities upon the 
 benefits derived by their sons from the camps 
 which have already been operated. Already 
 one organization has sprung up, which is called 
 the "Association of the National Reserve 
 Corps of the United States." H. S. Drinker, 
 President of Lehigh University, is president 
 of the organization, and the following heads of 
 representative colleges throughout the country 
 act as its advisory committee: John G. Hibben, 
 President of Princeton University; A. Law- 
 rence Lowell, President of Harvard University; 
 Arthur Twining Hadley, President of Yale Uni- 
 versity; John H. Finley, President of the Uni- 
 versity of the State of New York; H. B. Hutch- 
 ins, President of the University of Michigan; 
 George H. Denny, President of the University 
 H[ of Alabama; E. W. Nichols, Superintendent, 
 
ARE WE READY ? 
 
 Virginia Military Institute; Benjamin Ide 
 Wheeler, President of the University of Cali- 
 fornia. 
 
 At the close of the first period of instruc- 
 tion in 1913, this committee issued the follow- 
 ing statement which has a peculiar interest as 
 bearing upon recent objections to the military 
 training of citizens, based on the ground that 
 such preparation tends toward militarism : — 
 
 After careful inquiry regarding the organization 
 and management of the camps of instruction for 
 college students, established by the Secretary of 
 War in the summer of 1913, we take pleasure in 
 certifying to their excellence. 
 
 The military instruction was thorough. The dis- 
 cipline was strict; but the work was so well arranged 
 that it caused enjoyment rather than hardship. 
 The food, sanitation, and medical care were good, 
 and the lessons received by the students in these 
 matters were scarcely less valuable than the mili- 
 tary instruction itself. 
 
 We commend these camps to the attention of 
 college authorities as a most important adjunct to 
 the educational system of the United States, fur- 
 nishing the student a healthful and profitable sum- 
 mer course at moderate expense. 
 
 222 
 
 I 
 
•RESIDKXT WILSON DELIVERING AN ADDRESS IN FRONT OF 
 INDKPKNDENCE HALL. PHILADELPHIA, JULY 4. 1914 
 
I» 
 
 WELL? 
 
 Woodrow Wilson, in a statement issued 
 September 22, 1913, as President, took this 
 view of instruction camps : — 
 
 I am very much interested in the successful work- 
 ing-out of the idea of these college camps. I believe 
 the students attending will derive not only a great 
 deal of physical benefit from the healthful, open- 
 air life, but also that they will benefit from the dis- 
 cipline, habits of regularity, and the knowledge of 
 personal and camp sanitation which the experience 
 in camp will give them. 
 
 At about the same time the following en- 
 dorsement came from William H. Taft: — 
 
 For young men who have a taste for outdoor life 
 and military training, — and, indeed, for " rough- 
 ing it," — I can conceive of no better opportunity 
 for them to gratify this taste than to accept the in- 
 vitation of the War Department. They can be sure 
 it will be no boys' play if they go into it, but it will 
 not only give them substantial knowledge of the 
 principles of military science, but an opportunity 
 for physical development and muscular training, 
 and a regular life that will contribute greatly to 
 their health and strength. On the other hand, the 
 knowledge that they will acquire will be a very good 
 foundation for their becoming members of state 
 
 223 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 militia in their homes after graduation, and will 
 fit them to come to the rescue of the country in an 
 emergency whenever that may arise. 
 
 I commend the plan to the earnest consideration 
 of all who have the tastes I have indicated, and 
 urge that they consult the agent of the War De- 
 partment who is coming here, in order to learn just 
 exactly what their duties and what their responsi- 
 bilities will be. 
 
 The suggestion has come from General Wood, 
 who is a college man and knows college men, and is 
 most sympathetic with college men who love out- 
 door life and have an inclination to do a little sol- 
 diering. 
 
 Lindley M. Garrison, as Secretary of War, 
 also has expressed his approval of the conduct 
 of military camps and the ideas back of them. 
 
 It is advocated that, with his training in the 
 instruction camps completed, the trained man 
 should be held for a period of six years as a re- 
 servist, with the understanding that he will not 
 be called to the colors except for defense and 
 for a yearly period of instruction not to exceed 
 eight days. As each student in the military 
 camp completed his instruction, he could be 
 assigned to some reserve organization. 
 
 2U 
 
WELL ? 
 
 F 
 
 V With a steadily increasing number of trained 
 " citizens would go the immediate necessity of 
 finding officers. All regular officers are needed 
 with the regular establishment and the militia 
 is short of officers. Outside of these two organ- 
 izations we have the following source of supply: 
 A very limited number of graduates of the 
 
 better class of military schools; 
 A certain number of former non-commis- 
 sioned officers of the regular army, who 
 have the necessary qualifications de- 
 manded of the lower grades of volunteer 
 officers; 
 A very small list of men, who have qualified 
 through examination for appointment as 
 officers of volunteer organizations; 
 A certain number of men who have passed 
 through the Students' Instruction Camps 
 recently established. 
 All these sources combined could produce a 
 number of available men for officers which 
 would be insignificant in comparison with the 
 requirements. Those who are forwarding the 
 plan advocate that military instruction in all 
 
 225 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 schools where regular officers are instructors 
 be standardized; that each year, from the 
 graduates of these schools, from 500 to 1000 
 men be appointed as provisional second lieu- 
 tenants in the various arms of the service, in- 
 fantry, cavalry, field and coast artillery, serv- 
 ing for one year in this capacity, and receiving 
 the full pay and allowances of a second lieu- 
 tenant in the regular army. 
 
 It is argued that this system would supply 
 a well-trained reserve officer who would have, 
 in addition to his military training at school or 
 college, a full year's service in the regular army . 
 The marked success of the experimental schools 
 has led to the encouragement of plans for a 
 very great extension of the system, and it is 
 expected that important details, such as fixing 
 the course of instruction and securing govern- 
 ment aid in the way of uniforms, rations, and 
 transportation, will be speedily worked out. 
 
 Here, then, is what we can do about it, 
 whether or not we decide that it is worth while 
 to do anything about it : — 
 
 S26 
 
WELL? 
 
 We can supply the necessary equipment for 
 all arms of the service in both regular army 
 and militia; 
 We can provide an adequate reserve of guns, 
 ammunition, and other necessary imple- 
 ments and supplies; 
 We can abolish useless and costly army posts 
 and concentrate our regular forces into large 
 and uniform groups in strategic locations; 
 We can bring our militia and regular army 
 
 into uniformity of organization; 
 We can give our citizens a chance to receive 
 
 military instruction; 
 We can build up a strong reserve. 
 We can do all this without altering in the 
 slightest the position of the military in its sub- 
 ordination to the civil authority. 
 
 And if we want to be doubly secure against 
 an attempt of any man or set of men to turn the 
 United States of America into another Prussia, 
 we can make it the law, since the people foot 
 the bills and do the fighting, that offensive war 
 shall not be declared except by direct vote of 
 all the people. 
 
 227 
 
ARE WE READY? 
 
 That is national referendum. It would 
 quickly and definitely solve su«h problems as 
 the question of intervention in Mexico, and 
 would be most troublesome to gentlemen who 
 would fill their pockets by driving the nation 
 to a season of killing and of being killed. 
 
 THE END 
 
CAMBRIDGE . MASSACHUSETTS 
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THE DIPLOMACY OF 
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