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BY THE EDITOR.
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[Published this day.
/A' I'llEl'ARATION.
GOETHE, . . . By A. Hayward, Q.C. [In April.
CERVANTES, . . By the Editor.
MONTAIGNE, . . By the Rev. W. Lucas Collins, Isl.k.
RABELAIS, . . By Walter Besant, M.A.
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. EDIXBURGII AND LONDON.
Caiitnet ^tittiou*
THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.
THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA
ITS ORIGIN, AND AN ACCOINT OF ITS PKOURESS
DOWN TO THE DEATH OF LORD RAGl.AN.
A. W. KING LAKE.
SIXTH EDIT I OX.
VOL. I.
WILLIAM r.LAC'KWOOl) AND SONS,
KDINliriJClI ,\M) I.ONDOX.
MDCCCLXWII.
DK
V. \
THE YEAE 1853 AND THE YEAR 1876.
A PREFACE TO THE PRESENT EDITION.
' Guarantee,' ' august master,' ' good faith,' ' bis
'Majesty's well-known magnanimity' 'the Pruth,'
' the Danube,' ' the Balkan ; ' ' Bulgaria, high-road
to Constantinople,' the air once more is so charged
with the language of Czarinas and Czars, and the
names of their neighbours' landmarks, that ^judging
only from the unstudied sounds one might fancy
the strange fitful drama which I long ago traced in
these pages to be now again acting before us.
And indeed, though along with sharp contrasts,
there is many a point of real likeness between the
story of 185o and the one we now see going on.
Amongst the ibremost of the causes which help to
l)ring about this recurrence, there must be reckoned
that crusading spirit of the north which, though stir-
ring tlie heart of the millions much more dee])ly than
the mind of their rulers, is nevertheless very steadfast.
654056
vi THE YEAE 1853 AND THE YEAR 1876.
The Russians are a warm-hearted, enthusiastic people
with an element of poetry in them, which derives
perhaps, from the memory of subjection undergone
in old times, and the days of the Tartar yoke; for,
if Shelley speaks truly
' Most wretched men
Are cradled into poetry by wrong,
They learn in sorrow what they teach in song.'
With but little in their own condition of life that
can well provoke envy, the peasants love to believe
that there are others more ill-fated than themselves,
to whom they owe pity and help, love to think that
the conscript they see torn away from his village is
going going off in close custody to be the liberator
of syn-orthodox brethren oppressed by Mahometan
tyrants ; and being curiously prone to ' fraternity,'
they can be honestly, and beyond measure vehement
in favour of an idealised cause which demands their
active sympathy That the voice of the nation when
eagerly expressing these feelings is commonly genuine
and spontaneous, there seems no reason to doubt.
Far from having been inspired by the rulers, an
outburst of "the fraternising enthusiasm, which tends
towards State quarrels and war, is often unwelcome
at first in the precincts of the Government offices ;
but it brings, nevertheless, a new force which Policy
may afterwards guide, and pervert to worldly uses.
This volume shows how a war in the midst of
what seemed trading times owed its origin to a
A PREFACE TO THE PRESENT EDITION. VU
gentle, poetic impulsion to love, fond, worshipping
love of the Holy Shrines in Palestine ; and now, as it
happens, sheer chance for indeed I sought no such
knowledge makes me able to say that it is sentiment
romantic, wild sentiment which has once more
been throwing the spark. When Servia in the month
of July invaded her Suzerain's dominions, the new
leverage of Kussian Democracy had already so acted
upon Opinion, that the Czar, although not at that time
under anything like hard compulsion, was still so far
moved as to be induced to let some of his people
go out and take part in the rising a rising against
the Government of a State with which he professed
to be at peace ; but this armed emigration at lirst was
upon a small scale, and the Servian cause stood in
peril of suffering a not distant collapse, when the
incident I am going to mention began to exert its
strange sway over the course of events.
The young Colonel Nicholai Kirtieff was a noble,
whose birth and possessions connected him with the
districts affected by Moscow's fiery aspirations ; and
being by nature a man of an entliusiastic disposition,
with a romantic example before him in the life of
his father, he had accustomed himself to the idea of
self-sacrifice. Upon the outbreak of rriace Milan's
insurrection, he went off to Servia with the design
of acting simply under the banner of the Red Cross,
and had already entered upon his humane task, wlieu
he found himself called upon by General Tchcrnaiolt
to accept the conimaud of what we may call a briga.le
Viii THE YEAK 1853 AND THE YEAK 1876.
a force of some five thousand infantry, consisting
of volunteers and militiamen, supported, it seems, by
five guns ; and before long, he not only had to take
his brigade into action, but to use it as the means of
assailing an entrenched position at Eokowitz. Young
Kir^eff very well understood that the irregular force
entrusted to him was far from being one that could
be commanded in the hour of battle by taking a look
with a field-glass and uttering a few words to an
aide-de-camp ; so he determined to carry forward his
men by the simple and primitive expedient of person-
ally advancing in front of them. He was a man of
great stature, with extraordinary beauty of features ;
and, whether owing to the midsummer heat, or from
any wild, martyr -like, or dare - devil impulse, he
chose, as he had done from the first, to be clothed
altogether in white. Whilst advancing in front of
his troops against the Turkish battery he was struck
first by a shot passing through his left arm, then
presently by another one which struck him in the
neck, and then again by yet another one which shat-
tered his right hand and forced him to drop his sword ;
but, despite all these wounds, he was still continuing
his resolute advance, when a fourth shot passed
through his lungs, and brought him, at length, to the
ground, yet did not prevent him from uttering al-
though with great effort the cry of ' Forward ! Vov-
' ward ! ' A fifth shot, however, fired low, passed
through the fallen chief's heart and quenched his gal-
lant spirit. The brigade he had commanded fell
A PREFACE TO THE PRESENT EDITION. IX
back, and his body vainly asked for soon afterwards
by General Tchernaieff remained in the hands of the
Turks.
These are the bare facts upon which a huge super-
structure was speedily raised. It may be that the
grandeur of the young colonel's form and stature,
and the sight of the blood, showing vividly on
his white attire, added something extraneous and
weird to the sentiment which might well be inspired
by witnessing his personal heroism ; and few people,
understanding ' Young Muscovy,' will be slow to be-
lieve that designing men, enchanted with the bright
opportunity, took good care to seize and use it by
putting in motion all the democratic and ecclesiastical
machinery they had at their command. But, be that
as it may, the actual result was that accounts of the
incident accounts growing every day more and more
marvellous flew so swiftly from city to city, from
village to village, that before seven days had passed,
the smouldering lire of Russian enthusiasm leapt
up into a dangerous flame. Under countless green
domes, big and small, priests fiercely chanting tlie
' licquiem ' for a young hero's soul, and setting
forth the glory of dying in defence of ' syn-ortlio-
'dox' bretliren, drew wavlike responses from men
who whilst still in catliodral or cliurch cried
aloud that they, too, would go wliere the young
Kireeff had gone ; and so many of them liastenetl to
keep their word, that before long a flood of volunteers
from many parts of Russia was pouring fast into
X THE YEAK 1853 AND THE YEAR 1876.
Belgrade. To sustain the once kindled enthusiasm
apt means M'ere taken. The simple photograph, re-
presenting the young Kireeff's noble features, soon
expanded to large-sized portraits ; and Fable then
springing forward in the path of Truth, but transcend-
ing it with the swiftness of our modern appliances,
there was constituted, in a strangely short time, one of
those stirring legends which used to be the growth
of long years a legend half-warlike, half-supersti-
tious, which exalted its really tall hero to the dimen-
sions of a giant, and showed him piling up heca-
tombs by a mighty slaughter of Turks.*
The mine the charged mine of enthusiasm ujoon
which this kindling spark fell was the same in
many respects that we saw giving warlike impulsion
to the Eussia of 1853 ; but to the enthusiasm of a
sensitive Church for the cause of its syn-orthodox
brethren to the passion of a northern and predatory
State for conquest in sunny climes to that kind of
religious fervour which mainly yearned after masses
under the dome of St Sophia to that longing for a
guardian-angelship M'hich, however fraternal osten-
sibly, might perhaps carry with it the priceless key
Tlie able correspondents of our English newspapers lately acting
in Servia took care to mention the exploit and death of Colonel
Kireeff with more or less of detail, and the information they fur-
nished is for the most part consistent with the scrutinised accounts
on which I found the above narrative ; but it was only, of course,
from the interior of Russia that a knowledge of the eifect there pro-
duced by the incident could be directly obtained. The corps in wlncli
the Colonel formerly served was that of the Cavalry of the Guards,
but he had quitted the army long before the beginning of this year.
A PKEFACE TO THE PRESENT EDITION. xi
of the Straits, there now was added the wrath the
just wrath at the thought of Bulgaria which Eussia
shared with our people ; whilst moreover, this time,
there blazed up the fierce hatred of race against
race, incited by Pansclavonic agitation, and withal
the eager, joyous desire of a newly usurping demo-
cracy to use the monarch's prerogative of determining
between peace or war.
It may be that by greater firmness the Czar could
have withstood the whole weight of this national im-
pulsion, and that even with the firmness he had, he
perhaps might have resisted the pressure if Fortune
had smiled on his efforts ; but this was not destined
to be. Having endeavoured to let the enthusiasm of
his people waste itself by acquiescing in their desire
to volunteer for Servia, he soon came to learn that
the men he had thus suffered to join in insurrection
against the Sultan were so strongly supported by
the sympathy of their brethren at home, that he not
only could not disown them, but was brought into
the curious predicament of having to watch over their
safety, as though they were troops in his service ; so
that when the Turks overthrew them on the heights
of Djunis, he found himself in the hapless condition
of one who without having gone to war has some-
how lost a battle. He was taken, it seems, by sur-
prise, and whether losing or not his composure, he at
all events astonished his own able ambassador at Con-
stantinople by ordering him to send in an ultimatum
without the assent of the other Powers ; and proceed-
xii THE YEAE 1853 AND THE YEAR 1876.
ing then almost immediately to separate himself (con-
tingently) from the rest of Europe, began preparing
for war.
Thus the phantom of the young Kireeff with the
blood on his snowy-white clothijig, gave an impulse
which was scarce less romantic and proved even
perhaps more powerful than the sentiment for the
Holy Shrines ; but the very words I have used to
establish the parallel disclose one broad, palpable dif-
ference between the Russia of 1853 and the Eussia
we now have before us. There, within recent years,
whether destined to be lasting or not, there has
occurred a displacement of political force, involving
apparently nothing less than the decomposition of the
ancient Czardom, the dispersion of what was once the
Czar's power of choosing between peace and war
amongst turbulent, warlike committees, the submis-
sion of Alexander II. to the Pansclavistic fraternity,
and the consequent accession of Eussia to the cause of
a half-hearted Democracy, which, though patient of
despotic power at home, is nevertheless so careful in
its attention to the business of others as to be indus-
triously aggressive abroad, asserting and exercising
the ' sacred right of insurrection ' in a foreign state
ostensibly treated as 'friendly;' nay, able, moreover,
when beaten, to turn back upon the once puissant
monarch at home, and compel him with all the public
resources to come and fight out its battle. Between
such a condition of things and the Czardom as it stood
in 1853, the contrast of course seems abrupt. People
A PREFACE TO THE PEESENT EDITION. Xlll
find in this volume the mighty autocrat Nicholas wield-
ing absolutely in his own almost worshipped person the
whole strength of his vast dominions ; and then turn-
ing from the book to their newspapers, they learn that
the Russian Emperor of this day is supposed to love
peace and order supposed to love honour and the
observance of good faith between nation and nation,
yet apparently loves all this in vain, because his
power falls short, and the cattle are now driving the
herdsman.* Yet even whilst still in the act of observ-
ing the immense change thus wrought, one can discern
after all a close likeness between the volitional forces
which acted upon the Russia of 1853 and those which
govern her now. These pages abundantly show that,
although the strong will of Nicholas (if only he could
definitively know it) was absolute law in all Russia, his
own mind was the theatre of a breathless strife, being
rudely drawn to and fro by the conflicting desires
which alternately had the mastery over him ; and that
yet, in every one of his varying nay, opposite moods,
he was thoroughly, tliorouglily Russian, being some-
times indeed a Russian statesman, sometimes a Russian
fanatic, sometimes a Russian encroacher with a wild,
* A ver}- al)]c and interesting account of the ]iolitical Kussia of
tlie present day was given to the world on tlie 26th of last October,
by Prince W. ^Icstchersky. The Prince assures his readers that
Russia is now a Democracy with 'liberty, e([uality, and fraternity'
all complete ; but it is loyal, he says, and religious, and not there-
i'ore deserving to be confounded with the Democracy of the French
licvolution. He plainly agrees that it is a Democrac}' not applying
its energies to Home politics, but attending on grounds of frater-
nity to foreign alfairs.
Xiv THE YEAR 1853 AND THE YEAR 1876.
shallow, gypsy-like cunning, but always, always Rus-
sian, and always therefore impersonating some more
or less weighty component of Eussian opinion. Thus
the conflict then distracting one man was an epitome
of what we now see extended over Eussia at large :
for, exactly as, the present Emperor Alexander made
head for some time with noble courage and dignity
against the perturbing forces arrayed against him by
the Pansclavonic societies, and all the other well-
whetted instruments of an aggressive democracy, so
also in the brain of the Czar Nicholas until at last he
succumbed to his more violent impulses, and de-
scended to meet his fate there went on an analogous
conflict between his own clashing desires between
impulsions that would make him on one day a prudent,
austere, righteous monarch ; on the next, a lialf-
fanatic, half-covetous aggressor in arms for the glory
of his Church, and intent to win some of the land
dividing him from the gates of Constantinople.
' Young Muscovy ' flatters herself tliat the power
she has wrested from her monarch will remain in her
'prentice hands ; but one hardly knows how to believe
that a Democracy which shrinks from Home politics
can have any very strong roots, and indeed it seems
likely that, as soon as there comes back a period of
either real peace, or real war, the Czar will regain iiis
ascendant ; for in a period of European tranquillity
(unless, indeed, they take heart, and begin to look
after their own liberties instead of watching over
their neighbours') the agitators of the Pansclavonic
A PREFACE TO THE PRESENT EDITION. XV
fraternity will have no field of action before them ;
and on the other hand, if a campaign shall have once
been begun in great earnest, there is some danger of
their being invited to express the enthusiasm they
feel by the eloquence of their money contributions,
but in other respects to stand down, and retire from
public life. For the moment, however, ' young Mus-
' covy ' has a real, though precarious existence, and
must not be left out of account in negotiating with
the Czar's representative.
I have striven to make it plain that the impulse
which has been stirring the Eussian people was for
the most part a genuine, honest enthusiasm ; but
already we know that this zeal, though expressing
itself at first in mere personal, volunteered enterprises,
was glad, when defeated, to look back to St Petersburg
and invoke the aid of the State. In obedience to that
appeal, weighty armies are now fast assembling on the
frontiers of the Turkish dominions, and it would be
rash to make sure that, however disinterested originally,
a State making these huge exertions will long remain
purely angelic. Tlie young Kirceff could die for a
shadowy, perhaps lialf-formed idea, but in tlie camp of
200,000 men, and in tlie Cabinet which has brought
them together, coarser objects, if deemed within reach,
nuist needs be tempting the choice.
A. W. K.
December 20, 167G.
ADVEETISEMENT TO THE SIXTH EDITION.
So long as this History was a subject of active contro-
versy, I kept its language unchanged, throwing always
into separate, though appended, ' notes,' those correc-
tions and additions which I thought fit to make upon
the issue of each new edition ; but the safeguard thus
adopted and maintained during a period of nearly
fourteen years can at last be dispensed with, and
accordingly the text of the narrative has been now
fur the first time revised.
The 14th chapter, however, concerns the actions and
the character of a sovereign who, although at the
height of his power when I published my words in
18G3, was destined to meet dire reverses, and is now
no more. Under these conditions, I have judged it
right to let the chapter reappear without the change
of one word. A. W. K.
Paxmher 20, 1S7G.
THE SOURCES OF THE NARRATIVE.
Before I had determined to write any account of the
war, there were grounds from whicli many inferred
that a task of this kind would be mine ; and I may
say that, from the hour of their hmding on the
enemy's coast, close down to the present time, men,
acting under this conviction, have been giving me a
good deal of their knowledge.
In 185G Lady liagian placed in my hands the whole
mass of the papers which Lord liaglan had with him
at the time of his death. Having done this, she made
it her request that I would cause to be published a
letter which her husband addressed to her a few days
before his death.* All else she left to me. Time
passed, and no history founded upon these papers was
given to the world. Time still passed away ; and it
chanced to me to hear that people who longed for the
dispersion of what they believed to be falsehoods, were
striving to impart to Lady IJaglan the not unnatural
* I need hardly say tliat this h'lter will appear in its proper pLace.
XX THE SOURCES OF THE NARRATIVE.
impatience which all this delay had provoked. But
with a singleness of purpose and a strength of will
which remind one of the great soldier who was her
father's brother, she answered that, the papers having
once been placed under my control, she would not
disturb me with expressions of impatience, nor suffer
any one else to do so with her assent. I cannot be too
grateful to her for her generous and resolute trustful-
ness. If these volumes are late the whole blame rests
with me. If they are reaching the light too soon the
fault is still mine.
Knowing Lord Eaglan's habits of business, knowing
his tendency to connect all public transactions with
the labours of the desk, and finding in no part of the
correspondence the least semblance of anything like a
chasm, I am led to believe that, of almost everything
concerning the business of the war which was known
to Lord Eaglan himself, there lies in the papers before
me a clear and faithful record.
In this mass of papers there are, not only all the
Military Eeports which were from time to time ad-
dressed to the Commander of the English army by
the generals and other officers serving under him (in-
cluding their holograph narratives of the part they
had been taking in the battles), but also Lord Eaglan's
official and private correspondence with sovereigns
and their ambassadors ; with ministers, generals, and
admirals ; with the French, with the Turks, with the
Sardinians ; with public men, and official function-
aries of all sorts and conditions ; with adventurers ;
THE SOUKCES OF THE NARRATIVE. xxi
with men propounding wild schemes ; with dear and
faithful friends * Circumstances had previously made
me acquainted with a good deal of the more important
information thus laid before me ; but there is a com-
pleteness in this body of authentic repords which en-
ables me to tread with more confidence than would
have been right or possible if I had had a less perfect
survey of the knowledge which belonged to Head-
quarters. And so methodical was Lord Eaglan, and
so well was he served by Colonel Steele, his military
secretary, that all this mass of authentic matter lies
ranged in perfect order. The strategic plans of the
much-contriving Emperor still carrying the odour of
the havaunahs which aid the ingenuity of the Tuileries
are ranged with all due care, and can be got at in
a few moments ; but, not less carefully ranged, and
equally easy to find, is the rival scheme of the en-
thusiastic nosologist who advised that the Eussians
should be destroyed by the action of malaria, and the
elaborate proposal of the English general who sub-
mitted a plan for taking Sebastopol with bows and
arrows. Here and there, the neatness of the arranging
hand is in strange contrast with the fiery contents of
the papers arranged; for, along with reports and re-
turns, and things precise, the most hun-iid scrawl of
the commander who writes to his chief under stress of
* I have never looked at it since lS5d, but it struck me then, tliut
tlie letter which Jlr Sidney Herbert addressed to Lord Raglan in the
winter of the first campaign was the very ideal of what, in such cir-
cumstances, might be written by an English statesman who dearly
loved his friend, but who loved his country yet more.
XXii THE SOUKCES OF THE NARRATIVE.
deep emotion, lies flat, and hushed, and docketed. It
would seem as though no paper addressed to the Eng-
lish Headquarters was ever destroyed or mislaid.
With respect to my right to make public any of the
papers entrusted to me, I have this, and this only, to
say : circumstances have enabled me to know who
ought to be consulted before any State Paper or pri-
vate letter hitherto kept secret is sent abroad into
the world; and, having this knowledge, I have done
what I judge to be right.
The papers entrusted to me by Lady Eaglan con-
tain a part only of the knowledge which, without
any energy on my part, I was destined to have cast
upon me ; for when it became known that the papers
of the English Headquarters were in my hands, and
that I was really engaged in the task which rumour
had prematurely assigned to me, information of the
highest value was poured in upon me from many
quarters. Nor was this all. Great as was the quan-
tity of information thus actually imparted to me, I
found that the information which lay at my command
was yet more abundant ; for I do not recollect that to
any one man in this country I have ever expressed
any wish for the information which he might be able
to give me, without receiving at once what I believe
to be a full and honest disclosure of all he could tell
on the subject. This facility embarrassed me ; for 1
never could find that there was any limit to my power
of getting at what was known in this country. I
rarely asked a question without eliciting something
THE SOURCES OF THE NARRATIVE. xxiii
which added, more or less, to my labour, and tended
to cause delay.
And now I have that to state which will not sur-
prise my own countrymen, but which still, in the eyes
of the foreigner, will seem to be passing strange. Foi
some years, our statesmen, our admirals, and our
generals, have known that the whole correspondence
of the English Headquarters was in my hands ; and
very many of them have from time to time conversed
and corresponded with me on the business of the war.
Yet I declare I do not remember that any one of these
public men has ever said to me that there was any-
thing which, for the honour of our arms, or for the
credit of the nation, it would be well to keep con-
cealed. Every man has taken it for granted that
what is best for the repute of England is, the truth.
I have received a most courteous, clear, and abun-
dant answer to every inquiry which I have ventured
to address to any French commander ; and, indeed,
the willingness to communicate with me from that
quarter was so strong, that an officer of great experi-
ence, and highly gifted with all the qualities which
make an accomplished soldier, was despatched to this
country with instructions to impart ample statements
to me respecting some of the operations of the French
army. I seize upon this occasion of acknowledging
the advantage I derived from the admirably lucid
statements which were furnislied to me by this highly-
instructed officer; and I know that those friends of
mine to whom I had the honour of presenting liini,
xxiv THE SOUECES OF THE NAKKATIVE.
will join with me in expressing the gratification which
we all derived from his society.
I thought it right to apprise the authorities of the
French War Department, that, if they desired it, the
journals of their divisions, and any other unpublished
papers in their War Office which they might be
pleased to show, would be looked over by a gifted
friend of mine, now a member of the House of Com-
mons, who had kindly offered to undertake this task
for me. The French authorities did not avail them-
selves of my offer ; but any obscurity which might
otherwise have resulted from this concealment has
been effectually dispersed by the information I after-
wards obtained from Eussian sources.
Of all the materials on which I found my account
of the battle of the Alma, hardly any have been more
valuable to me than the narratives of the three Divi-
sional Generals who there held command under Prince
MentschikofF. The gifted young Eussian officer who
obtained for me these deeply interesting narratives,
and who kindly translated them from their Eussian
originals, has not only conferred upon me an import-
ant favour, but has also done that which will uplift the
repute of the far-famed Eussian infantry, by helping
to show to Europe the true character of the conflict
which it sustained on the banks of the Alma.
My knowledge respecting the battles of Balaclava
and Inkermau, and the subsequent fights before Sebas-
topol, is still incomplete ; and I shall welcome any
information respecting these conflicts which men may
THE SOURCES OF THE NAERATIVE. xxv
be pleased to entrust to me.* From the Eussians,
especially, I hope that I may receive communications
of this kind. Their defence of Sebastopol ranges high
in the annals of warfare ; and I imagine that the more
the truth is known, the more it will redound to the
honour of the Eussian arms.
I do not in general appeal for proof to my personal
observation, but I have departed from this abstinence
in two or three instances where it seemed to me that
I might prevent a waste of controversial energy by
saying at once that the thing told had been seen or
heard by myself.
With regard to the portion of tlie work which is
founded upon unpublished documents and private in-
formation, I had intended at one time not to give the
documents nor the names of my informants, nor the
words they have written or spoken, but to indicate
the nature of the statements on which I rely ; as, for
instance, to say in notes at the foot of a page, ' The
' Eaglan Papers,' ' Letter from an oflicor engaged,'
' Oral statement made to me by one who was present,'
and the like. But, upon reflection, I judged that I
could not venture to do this. When a published
authority is referred to, any want of correspondence
between the assertion and the proof can be detected
by a reader who takes the trouble to ascend to the
originals ; but I do not like to assort tliat a document
* This sentence was published in 186."., and lonj^ before tlie appear-
ance of my 4th and 5tli volumes. It is only to information touchin<;
the period between ' Inkerman ' and the close of June 185.^, that
the above invitation would now ap]>ly.
XXVI THE SOUECES OF THE NARRATIVE.
or a personal narrative withheld (for the present) from
this wholesome scrutiny is the designated yet hidden
foundation of a statement which I make freely, in my
own way, and in my own language. So, although
when I found my statements upon a Parliamentary
Paper or a published book, I commonly give my au-
thority ; yet so far as concerns that part of the work
which is based upon unpublished writings or private
information and this applies to an important part of
the first, and to nearly the whole of the second volume
I in general make no reference to the grounds on
which I rely. Hereafter it may be otherwise ; but,
for the present, this portion of the book must rest
upon what, after all, is the chief basis of our historical
knowledge must rest upon the statement of one who
had good means of knowing the truth. In the mean-
while, I shall keep and leave ready the clue by which,
in some later time, and without further aid from me,
my statements may be traced to their sources.
For a period of now several years my knowledge of
what I undertake to narrate has been growing more
and more complete. Par from gathering assuriince at
the sight of the progress thus made, I am rather led
to infer that approaches which continued so long
might continue perhaps still longer; and it is not
without a kind of reluctance that I pass from the
tranquil state of one who is absorbing the truth, to
that of one making it public. But the time has now
come. A. W. K.
1st January 1SG3.
CONTENTS.
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853 BETWEEN THE CZAR
AND THE SULTAN.
CHAPTER I.
'1,
The Crimea, 1850-51, ....
Ground for tracing the causes of the war,
EuTo])e in 1850, and down to 2d December 18;"
Standing armies, .....
I'eisonal government, ....
In France, . . .
In Russia, .....
In Austria, .....
In Prussia, .....
Aihiinistration of foreign affairs under the Sultan, .
TLe mixed system of English Government as bearin
conduct of foreign affairs, .....
Pjwcr of Russia, .......
Turkey,
on the
PAGE
2
5
6
6
6
10
10
10
10
11
11
14
15
CIIAPTEK ir.
The Usage which tends to protect the weak against the strong, 2'2
Instance of a wrong to wliii'h the Usage did nut apply, . . 24
Instance in which the Usage was ap]ili(alile and was disobeyed, 24
Instances in which the Usage was faithfully obeyed, . . 2."i
I'.y Austria, 26
By Russia, ......... 26
By England, 27
XXVlll
CONTENTS.
Chapter II. continued.
The practical working of the Usage,
Aspect of Europe in reference to the Turkish Empire,
Policy of Austria, ....
Of Prussia, ....
Of France, ....
Of England, ....
Of the lesser States of Europe,
29
33
33
34
34
36
39
CHAPTER III.
Holy shrines, .....
Contest for the possession of the shrines.
Patronage of Foreign Powers,
Comparison between the claims of Russia and
Measures taken by the French President,
By the Russian Envoy, .
Embarrassment of the Porte, .
Mutual concessions, ....
The actual subject of dispute, .
Increased violence of the French Government,
Afif Bey's Mission, ....
Delivery of the key and the star, .
Indignation of Russia, ....
Advance of Russian forces,
France,
40
43
43
44
46
48
48
48
49
50
50
53
54
CHAPTER IV.
Natural ambition of Russia, .
Its irresolute nature,
Tiie Emperor Nicholas, .
His policy from 1829 to 1853,
CHAPTER V.
Troubles in Montenegro, .......
Count Leiningen's mission, .......
Tlie Czar's plan of sending another mission to tlie Porte at thi
same time, ..........
Plans of tile Emperor Nicholas, ......
CONTENTS.
XXIX
CHAPTEE VI.
Position of Austria in regard to Turkey at the beginning of
1853, 79
Of Prussia, 80
Of France, 80
Of England, 83
Seeming state of opinion in England, 83
Sir Hamilton Seymour, 89
His conversation with the Emperor, ..... 90
Ileception of the Czar's overtures by the English Government, 96
Kesult of Count Leiningon's mission, ..... 97
Its effect upon the plans of tlie Czar, ..... 97
He abandons the idea of ''ointr to war, . . ... 98
CIIAriER VII.
The pain of inaction, ....
The Czar's new scheme of action, .
His choice of an ambassador, .
Prince Mentschikofi", ....
Mentschikoff at Constantinople,
Panic in the Divan, ....
Colonel Kose, .....
The Czar seemingly tranquillised, .
The French fleet snddcnly ordered to Salaniis,
The Czar's concealments,
MentschikofTs demands.
99
101
102
102
104
lO.'')
106
107
107
108
109
CIIAPTKIl VIII.
Foreign 'influence,' . . . . . . . .111
Crounds for foreign interference in Turkey, . . . .lit
llivalry between Nicliolas and Sir Stratford Canning, . . IIS
Sir Stratford Canning, . . . . . . . .ITS
Lord Stratford instructed to return 1o Constantindple, . . 123
His instructions, ......... 12-1
CIIAPTEli IX.
Lord Stratford's return, 12S
His plan of resistance to Mentseliikciffs demands, . . . 131
Conuuencement of the struggle between Prince Mentscliikolf
and Lord Stratford, 132
XXX
CONTENTS.
CHAPTEE X.
State of the dispute respecting tlie Holy Places,
Lord Stratford's measures for settling it,
He settles it, .
Terms on which it was settled,
139
142
145
145
CHAPTER XL
Peaceful aspect of the negotiation, .
Angi'y despatches from St Petersburg,
Cause of the change,
Inferred tenor of the fresh despatches,
Mentschikoff's demand for a protectorate of the Greek Church
in Turkey,
Effect which would he produced bj' conceding it.
The negotiations which followed the demand, .
Puige of the Czar on finding himself encountered by Lord Strat-
ford,
Its effect upon the negotiation,
Mentschikoff's difficult}', ....
He is baffled by Lord Stratford,
He presses his demand in a new form,
Counsels of Lord Stratford, ....
His communications with Prince Mentschikoff,
His advice to the Turkish ministers,
His audience of the Sultan, ....
The disclosure which he liad reserved for the Sultan's ear,
Turkish answer to Mentschikoff's demand,
Mentschikoff's angr}' reply, ....
His private audience of the Sultan,
This causes a change of ilinistry at Constantinople
But fails to shake the Sultan,
Mentschikoff violently presses his demands, .
The Great Council determine to resist, .
Offers made by the Porte under the advice of Lord Stratford,
Mentschikoff replies by declaring his mission at an end,
The representatives of the four Powers assemblet
Stratford,
Policy involved in this step, ....
Unanimity of the four representatives, .
Their measures, ......
CONTENTS.
XXXI
Chapter XL continued.
Kussia's ultimatum,
Its rejection, ........
Final threats of Prince Mentscliikoff,
His dej)arture, .
Effect of the mission upon the credit of Nicholas, .
I'osition in which Lord Stratford's skill had placed the I
Engagements contracted by England,
Obligations contracted by the act of giving advice, .
England, in concert with France, becomes engaged to defen
the Sultan's dominions, .....
The process by wliich England became bound,
Slowness of the English Parliament,
Powers entrusted to Lord Stratford,
orte.
176
177
178
178
179
18-2
184
186
186
187
187
189
CHAPTER XII.
I.'age of the Czar, - .
Tlie Danubian Principalities, .....
Tlie Czar's scheme for occupying tlieui, .
Efforts to effect an accommodation,
Defective representation of France, Austria, and Prussia,
Court of St Petersburg, .....
The Czar's reliance upon the acquiescence of England,
Orders for the occupation of tlie Principalities,
The Pruth passed, .......
Russian manifesto, ......
tlourse taken by the Sultan, .....
Religious character of tlie threatened war,
!\t the
191
193
194
19;-;
196
199
204
20.'.
2i.5
2(h;
207
CILVrTEIl XIII.
Effect of the Czar's threat u]>on European Powers,
Upon Austria, .....
Upon Prussia, .....
Ellect produced by the actual invasion of llic Prim
In Austria, ......
In France and England, . . .
In Prussia, ....
Attitude of Europe generally,
palit
203
208
209
210
210
211
211
211
xxxu
CONTENTS.
Chapter XIII. continued.
Concord of the four Powers 212
Their means of repression, ....... 212
Their joint measures, . .212
Importance of maintaining close concert between the four
Powers, 213
CHAPTER XIV.
I.
State of the French Republic in November 1851,
Prince Lotris Bonaparte,
II.
III.
His overtures to the gentlemen of France at the time when he
was President,
Is rebuffed, and falls into other hands, .
Motives which pressed him forward.
He declares for universal suffrage, .
His solemn declarations of loj'alty to the Eepublic,
Morny, ........
Fleury,
Fleury searches in Algeria and finds St Arnaud,
St Arnaud is suborned and made Minister of War,
Maupas, .......
He is suborned and made Prefect of Police, .
Persigny, .......
Contrivance for paralysing the National Guard,
The army, .......
Its indignation at M. Baze's proposal.
Selection of regiments and of officers for the army of Paris,
!Magnan, .......
Meeting of twentj'- generals at Magnan's house.
The army encouraged in its hatred of the people,
IV.
Assembly at the Elysee on Monday evening, .
Vieyra's errand, ......
Midnight,
215
217
234
235
235
236
237
238
239
241
242
242
243
243
244
245
246
246
246
248
248
249
249
249
CONTENTS
XXXlll
Chapter XIV. continued.
Packet entrusted to Beville, .
Transaction at the State printing-office,
The Proclamations there printed, .
Morny appointed Minister, .
Hesitation at tlie Elysee,
Fleury, .....
3 a.m.,
Order from the Minister of "War,
Arrangements for the intended arrests,
Disposition of the troops,
Arrest of generals and statesmen, .
Morny at the Home Office,
250
250
251
252
252
2.r2
253
253
253
254
254
255
Newspa])crs seized and stopped,
The Assembly meets : but is dispersed by troops,
The President's ride, .....
Seclusion and gloom of Priifco Louis Napoleon,
Another meeting of the Assembly,
Its decrees, .......
Troops ascend the stairs, but hesitate to use fore
Written orders from Magnan to clear the hall.
The Assembly refuses, yielding only to force,
Is made captive by the troops, and marched to the (>uai
d'Orsay,
And there imprisoned in the barrack,
The members of the Asseml>ly carried off to ditfei
in felons' vans, . .....
The ([uality of the men imprisoned,
Quality of the men who imprisoned them,
Sitting of the Supreme Court,
The judges forcibly driven from the bench,
'ut prison
25(j
256
25(5
258
259
259
259
2tJ0
2tn
'2t)l
2iJ2
2<!3
2t)4
205
265
VI.
Want of means for defending the laws by furee,
The Committee of Kesistanee,
Attempted rising in the Faubmirg St .\iitciinc.
The barricade of the Rue St ^ilarguerite.
Panieades in Central Paris, ....
265
2(;s
2IJ.S
269
270
XXXIV CONTENTS.
Chapter XIV. continued.
vir.
state of Paris at two o'clock on the 4th of December, . . 271
Attitude of the troops, 271
Hesitation of Magnan, ........ 272
Its probable grounds, 272
Apparent terror of the plotters on account of their continued
isolation, 27.3
Stratagem of forming the 'Consultative Commission,' . . 27.3
Magnan at length resolves to act, ...... 275
VIII.
The advanced post of the insurgents, ..... 276
State of the Boulevard at three o'clock, ..... 276
The massacre of the Boulevard, 278
IX.
Slaughter in Central Paris, 287
Slaughter of prisoners, 289
X.
Mode of dealing with some of the prisoners at the Prefecture, 290
XI.
Graduations by which slayers of vanquished men may be dis-
tinguished, . . 291
Slaughter ranging under all those categories, .... 293
Alleged employment of troops as executioners, . . . 294
XII.
Uncertainty as to the number of people killed, . . . 299
Total loss of the army in killed, 300
XIII.
Effect of the massacre upon the people of Paris, . . . 300
Upon their habit of ridiculing Louis Napoleon, . . . 302
XIV.
The fate of the provinces, ....... 303
CONTENTS. XXXV
Chaptek XIV. continued.
XV.
Itlotives for the ferocity of the measures taken by tlie Executive, 305
General dread of the Socialists, 306
The use made of tliis by the plotters of the Elysee, . . 306
They pretend to be enga<;ed in a war against Socialism, . . 307
Support thus obtained, ........ 307
XVI.
Commissaries sent into the provinces, ..... 308
The Church, 308
XVII.
France dismanncd, 310
Twenty-six thousand five hundred men transported, . .212
XVIII.
The Plebiscite, 314
Causes rendering free election impossible, .... 314
The election under martial law, . . . . . .316
Violent measures taken for coercing the election, . . .316
Contrivance for coercing the election by the vote of the army, 318
France succumbed, . . . . . . . .319
Prince Louis sole lawgiver of France, ..... 319
The laws he gave her, 319
XIX.
Importance of the massacre on the Boulevard, . . . 320
In([uiry into its cause, ........ 320
Tiie passion of terror, ........ 321
State of Prince Louis Bonaparte during the period of daiigur, . 322
Of Jerome Biuapartc, ........ 326
Of his son, 326
liodily state of Maupas, ........ 327
Anxiety of the jihittcrs and of ^lagiiau, and the generals under
him, 32S
Effect of anxious suspense upon French troops, . . . 328
Surmised cause of the massacre, .... . 330
XX.
Gratitude due to Fleury, 332
The use the Elysee made of France, ..... .S.33
XXXVl CONTENTS.
Chapter XIV. continued.
XXI.
The oath which the President had taken, .... 333
His added promise as ' a man of honour,' .... 333
The Te Deum, 334
XXII.
The President becomes Emperor of the French, . . . 335.
XXIII.
The inaction of great numbers of Frenchmen at the time wlien
their country was falling, . ...... 336
Its cause, 336
XXIV.
The gentlemen of France standing aloof from the Government, 337
Dangers threatening the new Emperor and his associates, . 338
Motives governing the foreign policy of France, . . . 338
CHAPTER XY.
Immediate effect of the Coup d'Etat upon the trantpiillity of
Europe, . 3-lii
The turbulent policy it engendered, ..... 340
Eaising up by coercion of the Sultan a quarrel between Turkey
and Russia, 311
And then seeking a combative alliance with England, . . 341
Personal feelings of the new Emperor, ..... 34-2
The French Emperor's scheme for superseding the concord of
the four Powers by drawing England into a sejiarate al-
liance with himself, ........ 343
The nature of the understanding of ]\Iidsummer 1853 between
France and England, ........ 348
Annoimcement of it to Parliament, ..... 333
Failure of Parliament to understand the real import of the dis-
closure, ,........- 354
The Queen's Speech, Augu.st 1853, 354
This marks where the roads to peace and to war branched off, 355
CONTENTS. XXXVn
CHAPTEE XVI.
Count Nesselrode, 356
State of the Czar after knowing that tlie fleets of France and
England were ordered to the mouth of the Dardanelles, . 357
His complaints to Europe, ....... 358
Their refutation, ......... 358
The Vienna Conference, ........ 359
The danger of being entangled in a separate understanding
with France, 36(
The French Emperor's ambiguous ways of action, . . . 3(J0
Hi.s diplomacy seems pacific, . 3(Jl
Yet he engages England in naval movements tending to pro-
voke war, .......... 3<^2
The Bosphonis and the Dardanelles, . . . .3(12
The Sultan's ancient right to control them, .... 363
Folic}- of lUissia in regard to the Straits, .... 364
The rights of the Sultan and the five Towers under the Treaty
of 1841 361
How these rights were aflccted by the Czar's seizure of the Prin-
cipalities, .......... 364
Powerful means of coercing the Czar, ..... 3()5
Importance of refraining from a premature use of the power, . 365
The naval movements in which the French Emperor engages
England, ;'.65
Means well fitted for enforcing a just peace were so used as to
provoke war, ......... 368
ClIAPTEll XA'II.
Lord Stratford's scheme of pacification, ..... 36!
The ' Vienna Note,' 370
Agreed to by the four Powers and act'epted by Rus.-ia, . . 371
The French Em[>eror does nothing to thwart the sui-eess of the
Note ' 371
Pord Stratford had not been consulted, ..... 372
The 'Vienna Note' in tlu' hands of Lord Stratfonl, . . 374
Tlie Turki.sh Government determines to reject it unless altered, 376
The Turks at variance with the rest of Kurope, but stand finn, 376
And are unexpectedly proved to be right in their iuterpreta-
ticm of the Noti>, . . . . . .377
What their ilispute with Pussia still was, .... 377
XXXVlll CONTENTS.
Chapter XVII. continued.
The Porte declares war, ......
Warlike spirit, .......
In Russia this had been forestalled,
AVarlike ardour of the people in the Ottoman Enquire,
]\Ioderation of the Turkish Government,
Its effect on the mind of the Czar, ....
The Czar's proclamation, .....
378
378
378
378
379
380
380
A P r E N D I X.
Xote I. Rpsjiecting the attitude of Austria towards Eussia
in 1828-9, 383
"Note If. Papers showing; the difference which led to the rup-
ture of Prince Mentschikoff's negotiation, . . 386
Note III. The ' Vienna Is^ote,' with the proposed Turkish
modifications, showing the points of the difference,
which was followed by war between Russia and
Turkey, 390
Note IV. Correspondence between Sir Arthur Gordon and
Lord Russell, 392
Kote V. Respecting the day on which the Czar and the Sul-
tan began to be in a state of war, . . .411
Advertisements to the previous Editions, . . . .413
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
TEE CZAR AND THE SULTAN.
CHAPTER I.
WiiEX this century had half run its course, and cri.U'.
even during some few montlis afterwards, the \
peninsuha which divides tiie Euxine from the Sea
of Azoff was an almost forgotten land, lying out
of the chief paths of merchants and travellers, and
far away from all the capital cities of Christendom,
liarely went thither any one from Paris, or Vienna,
or IVrliu : to reach it from London was a harder
task than to cross the Atlantic ; and a man of
otTice receiving in this distant province his orders
despatched from St Petershurg, was tlu; servant
of masters who governcid him from a distance of
a thousand miles.
Along the course of the little rivers which
seamed the ground, there were villages and narrow
belts of tilled land, with gardens, antl fruitful
VOL. I. A
2 OKIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, vineyards ; but for the most part tliis neglected
' Crim Tartary was a wilderness of steppe or of
i85*o-M*^' mountain-range mucli clothed towards the west
with tall stiff grasses, and the steins of a fragrant
herb like southernwood. The bulk of the people
were of Tartar descent, but no longer what they
had been in the days when nations trembled at
the coming of the Golden Horde ; and although
they yet held to the Moslem faith, their religion
had lost its warlike fire. Blessed with a dispen-
sation from military service, and far away from
the accustomed battle-fields of Europe and Asia,
they lived in quiet, knowing little of war except
what tradition could faintly carry down from old
times in low monotonous chants. In their hus-
bandry they were more governed by the habits of
their ancestors than by the nature of the land
which had once fed the people of Athens, for
they neglected tillage and clung to pastoral life.
AVatching flocks and herds, they used to remain
on the knolls very still for long hours together ;
and when they moved, they strode over the hills
in their slow-flowing robes with something of
the forlorn majesty of peasants descended from
warriors. They wished for no change, and they
excused their content in their simple way by say-
inof that for three generations their race had lived
happy under the Czars.*
* The villagers of Eskel (on the Katcha) declared this to me
on the 23d of September 1854, and the date gives value to the
acknowledgment, for these villagers had been witnessing the
<xin fusion and seeming ruin of the Czar's army.
BETWEEN THE CZAE AND THE SULTAN. 3
But afterwards, and for reasons unknown to the chap.
sheplierds, the chief Powers of the earth began to '
break in upon these peaceful scenes. Prance,
England, and Turkey were the invaders, and these
at a later day were reinforced by Sardinia. With
the whole might which she could put forth in a
province far removed from her military centre,
Russia stood her ground. The strife lasted a year
and a half, and for twelve months it raged.
And with tliis invasion there came something
more than what men saw upon the battle-fields of
the contending armies. In one of the Allied States,
the people being free of speech and having power
over the judgment of their rulers, were able to
take upon themselves a great share of the business
of the war. It was in vain that tlie whole breadth
of Europe divided this people from the field of
strife. By means unknown before, they gained
iitful and vivid glimpses of the battle and the
siege, of the sufferings of the camj) and bivouac,
and the last dismal scenes of the hospital tent ;
and being thus armed from day to day with fresh
knowledge, and feeling conscious of a warlike
strengtli exceeding by a thousandfold tlie strength
expressed by the mere numbers of tlieir army, tliey
thronged in, and made their voice heard, and be-
came partnkers of the counsels of State. The
scene of the confiict was mainly their clioice.
They enforced the invasion. They watched it
hour by hour. Through good and evil days they
sustained it, and when by the yielding of their
adversary the strife was brought to an end, they
4 OKIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, seemed to pine for more fighting. Yet they had
witnessed checkered scenes. They counted their
army on the mainland. They watched it over the
sea. They saw it land. They followed its march.
They saw it in action. They tasted of the joy of
victory. Then came the time when they had to
bear to see their army dying upon a bleak hill
from cold and want. In their anguish this people
strove to know their general. They had seen him
in the hour of battle, and their hearts had bounded
with pride. They saw him now commanding a
small force of wan, feeble, dying men, yet holding
a strong enemy at bay, and comporting himself as
though he were the chief of a strong, besieging
army. They hardly knew at the time that for
forty days the fate of two armies and the lasting
fame and relative strength of great nations were
hanging upon the quality of one man's mind.
Tormented with grief and anger for the cruel
sufferings of their countrymen, they turned upon
the Chief with questioning looks, and seeing him
always holding his ground and always composed,
they strove to break in upon the mystery of his
calm. But there, their power fell short. Except
by withstanding the enemy, he made them no
sign; and when he was reinforced and clothed
once more with power, he still seemed the same
to them. At length they saw him die. Thence-
forth they had to look upon the void which was
left by his death. They grew more patient. They
did not become less resolute. What they hoped
and what they feared in all these trials, what they
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 5
thought, what they felt, what they saw, what they c n a p.
heard, nay, even what they were planning against "
the enemy, they uttered aloud in the face of the
world ; and thence it happened that one of the
chief features of the struggle was the demeanour
of a free and impetuous people in time of war.
Again, the invasion of the Crimea so tried the
strength, so measured the enduring power of the
nations engaged, that, when the conflict was over,
their relative stations in Europe were changed, and
they had to be classed afresh.
Moreover, the strife yielded lessons in war and
policy which are now of great worth.
But this war was deadly. " The grave of the Ground for
tracing tlis
hundred thousand" which Eussia keeps holy on causes of
^ *' the war.
the Severnaya contains, after all, but a fraction of
the soldiers, sailors, workmen, and peasants whom
she alone brought to the sacrifice;* and if the
aggregate of her losses were discovered and added
to those of France, England, Turkey, and Sardinia,
there would be seen to have resulted altogether
an appalling destruction of life. The war con-
sumed treasure unsparingly, but also swallowed
up in huge quantities that yet more precious rural
* "The grave of the hundred thousand " on the north side of
Sebastopol contains a less number of dead than its jjoetic appel-
lation imports contains, I believe, 80,000 but it is not there
that the bulk of the victims repose. They died on the lines of
march. The losses sustained by Russia were mainly occasioned
by the effort of marching great distances in the interior of her
vast territories. Tlie Czar did not merely press on his people
by forcing the march of soldiers, but by wringing from a hap-
less peasantry the means of moving his Divisions with their war
encumbrances over immense tracts of country.
6 OEIGIX OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, wealth to which human beincrs unnumbered were
. trusting for life or welfare ; and again, it so
shattered the framework of the European system,
that thenceforth for many a year the safety of
nations became more than ever dependent upon
their armed strength. Upon the whole, there is
ground for saying that the causes of a havoc which
went to such proportions should be traced and
remembered,
Europe in Eor tliirty-five years there had been peace
1850, and ^ mi
down to 2d bctwcen the s;reat Powers of Europe. The out-
Dec. 1851. '^ ^
breaks of 1848 had been put down. The wars
which they kindled had been kept within bounds,
and had soon been brought to an end. Kings,
emperors, and statesmen declared their love of
standing pcaco. But always whilst they spoke, they went
on levying men. Eussia, Germany, and Prance
were laden with standing armies.
Personal This was ouc root of danger. There was another.
government. .
Between a sovereign who governs for himself, and
one who reigns through a council of statesmen,
there are points of difference which make it more
likely that war will result from the will of the one
man than from the blended judgments of several
chosen advisers. In these days the exigencies of
an army are vast and devouring. Also, modern
society, growing more and more vulnerable by
reason of the very beauty and complexity of its
arrangements, is made to tremble by the mere
rumour of an appeal to arms ; and, upon tlie
whole, the evils inflicted by war are so cruel, and
the benetit which a Power may hope to derive
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 7
from a scheme of aggression is commonly so chap.
obscure, so remote, and so uncertain, that when the '
world is in a state of equilibrium and repose, it is
generally very hard to see how it can be really for
the interest of any one State to go and do a wrong
clearly tending to provoke a rupture. Here, then,
there is something like a security for the main-
taining of peace. But the security rests upon the
supposition that a State will faithfully pursue its
own welfare, and therefore it ceases to hold good
in a country where the government happens to be
in such hands that the interests of the nation at
large fail to coincide with the interests of its ruler.
This history will not dissemble it will broadly
lay open the truth that a people no less than a
prince may be under the sway of a warlike passion,
and may wring obedience to its fierce command
from the gentlest ministers of state ; but upon the
whole, the interests, the passions, and foibles which
lead to war are more likely to be found in one man
than in the band of public servants which is called
a ministry. A ministry, indeed, will share in any
sentiments of just national anger, and may even
entertain a great scheme of state ambition, but it
can scarcely be under the sway of fanaticism, or
vanity, or petulance, or bodily fear ; for though
any one member of the Government may have
some of these defects, the dangers they might well
enough cause, if he alone were the ruler, are likely
to be neutralised in council. Then, again, a man
rightly called a minister of state is not a mere
favourite of his sovereign, but the actual trans-
8 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, actor of public business. He is in close inter-
course with those labourers of high worth and
ability who in all great States compose the per-
manent staff of the public office ; and in this way,
even though he be newly come to affairs, he is
brought into acquaintance with the great traditions
of the State, and comes to know and feel what the
interests of his country are. Above all, a ministry
really charged with affairs will be free from the
personal and family motives which deflect the
state policy of a prince who is his own minister,
and will refuse to merge the interests of their
country in the mere hopes and fears of one man.
On the otlier hand, a monarch governing for
himself, and without responsible ministers, must
always be under a set of motives which are laid
upon him by his personal station as well as by his
care for the people. Such a prince is either a
hereditary sovereign or he is a man who has won
the crown with his own hand. In the first case,
the contingency of his turning out to be a man
really qualified for the actual governance of an
empire is almost, though not quite, excluded by
the bare law of chances ; and, on the other hand,
it may be expected that the prince who has made
his own way to the throne will not be wanting in
such qualities of mind as fit a man for business of
state. In some respects, perhaps, he will be abler
than a council. He will be more daring, more
resolute, more secret ; but these are qualities con-
ducive to war, and not to peace. Moreover, a
prince who has won for himself a sovereignty
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 9
claimed by others will almost always he under the chap.
pressure of motives very foreign to the real inter- L
ests of the State. He knows that by many he is
regarded as a mere usurper, and that his home
enemies are carefully seeking the moment when
they may depose him, and throw him into prison,
and ill-use him, and take his life. He commands
great armies, and has a crowd of hired courtiers at
his side ; but he knows that if his skill and his
fortune should both chance to fail him in the same
hour, he would become a prisoner or a corpse. He
hears, from behind, the stealthy foot of the assassin ;
and before him he sees the dismal gates of a jail,
and the slow, hateful forms of death by the hand
of the law. Of course he must and he will use
all the powers of the State as a defence against
these dangers, and if it chance to seem likely as
in such circumstances it often does that war may
give him safety or respite, then to war he will
surely go ; and although he knows that this rough
expedient is one M'hich must be hurtful to the
State, he will hardly be kept back by such a
thought, for, being, as it were, a drowning man
who sees a plank within his reach, he is forced by
the law of nature to clutch it ; and his country is
then drawn into war, not because her interests
require it, nor even because her interests are mis-
taken by her ruler, but because she has suffered
herself to fall into the hands of a prince whose
road to welfare is distinct from her own.*
* No verbal or other change has been made in the above par-
agraph since the day when it was first published in 1863.
10
OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
I.
Personal
i;overnnient
in France.
In Austria.
The change suddenly undergone by France in
the winter of 1851 must be shown by-and-by, and
its effect upon the peace of Europe will be found
to correspond but too closely with what we have
last been saying ; but the period now spoken of
is one some months anterior to the night of the
2d December, and it was not yet possible in
France, any more than in England, that a war
should be all at once undertaken by the Executive
Government without the approval of Parliament
and of the nation at large. Still, the President
Louis Napoleon could even then do acts which
tended to breed up causes of quarrel between
European States ; and we shall see him exerting
his power.
The power of All the Russias was centred in
the Emperor, and it chanced that the qualities of
Nicholas were of such a kind as to enable him to
give a literal truth to the theory that he, and he
alone, was the State.
In Austria the disasters of 1848 had broken the
custom of government, and placed a kind of dic-
tatorship in the hands of the youthful Emperor.
And although before the summer of 1853 the
traditions of the State had regained a great deal of
their force, still for a time the recovery was not so
plainly evidenced as to compel an unwilling man
to see it ; and the notion that the great empire of
the Danube had merged in the mere wishes of
Francis Joseph lingered always in the mind of the
Czar, and drew him on into danger.
Even in Prussia, though the country seemed to
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 11
enjoy a constitutional form of government, the chat
policy of the State was always liable to be de- "
ranged by the tremulous hand of the King ; and
the anticipation of finding weakness in this
quarter was one of the causes which led the Czar
to defy the judgment of Europe.
In the Ottoman dominions Abdul Mediid was Adminis-
tration of
accustomed to leave the administration of foreign forei^^n af-
fairs under
affairs to responsible ministers ; and it will be t-i^e suitan.
seen that this wholesome method of reigning gave
the Turkish Government a great advantage over
the diplomacy of other Continental States.
Speaking loosely, observers mifdit say that the riie mixed
i- O J > O J systPm of
conduct of public business in England was a task Kngiisi.
government
entrusted to ministers enioyinff the confidence of '' '"-^i'-i"!,'
* -^ " on tiie Con-
Parliament ; but the rule, if rule we may call it, '''"t of
was subject to one huge exception, and besides, iiii";iiis-
to several qualifying conditions which clogged the
authority wielded by some of our State Depart-
ments.* Amongst the Departments thus sub-
jected to Itoyal interference the Foreign Office
was one : and there, besides maintaining^ a ri^ht
to see important despatches, the Crown was ac-
customed to insist that it must have an o])por-
tunity of either consenting or refusing consent to
every resolve of great moment. The Crown, it is
true, understood that, unless at the cost of liavijig
to change the Administration, and to change it
under perilous conditions, no refusal to adopt a
* The 'huge exception' was of eour.st" tlie TIor.se Guards.
Those habitually subjected to Koval iiitcrtVreiice were the
Foreign Ollico and the Deiuirtnient of Woods and Works.
12 ORIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP, measure definitively approved by the Cabinet
^" could be persistently maintained ; but supposing
the Eoyal objections to be sound or even plausible,
there was always of course a probability that they
might be supported by some of our public men ;
and upon the whole it may be said that, even al-
though exerted no further, the power of the Crown
to enforce a deliberate reconsideration of every
great question arising was of itself a weighty pre-
rogative. This prerogative through the Prince
Consort was diligently asserted and exercised
during those very years the first years of this
half- century which were pregnant with the
question of peace or war for Europe, and it would
seem that the conditions were exactly those under
which princely warnings, if wise and well suited
to English methods of action, might have been
advantageously addressed to a ' drifting ' minis-
try. The Consort seems to have imagined that
his ceaseless endeavours to understand, to check
and control the torrent of public business which
rushed in those days through the Foreign Ofiice,
were labours of no small moment ; * and it there-
fore may be fairly conjectured that a renewed sur-
vey of his political life will show him perceiving
each error of the Government, protesting against
* No one, I think, can read Mr Theodore Martin's work
without seeing that the Prince had that impression on his
mind. "With respect to what I have called the ' torrent ' of
business passing through the Foreign Office, I may cite the
statement made in Mr Martin's second volume i.e., that in
1848 the number of despatches there arriving or thence seut
out was about 28,000.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 13
every false step, and, in short, bringing down to chap.
the superintendence of our foreign affairs some '
of that all -enlightening wisdom which he and
his friend Baron Stockmar were accustomed to
ascribe to each other; but no disclosures to that
effect have been hitherto made ; * and accord-
ingly, in the pages which follow, I shall have to
show our ministers from time to time straying
aside from what was the right, prudent course
without yet being able to say that any one of
those deviations was pointed out at the time by
the Crown or the Eoyal Consort.
On the other hand, I decline to maintain tliat
the interference of the Prince in our foreign
affairs brought England into the war. Many
reasoners, it is true, have believed that the hos-
tility of the Crown to Lord Palmerston in the
middle part of this century forged links in the
chain of causation which brought about the quar-
rel with Paissia ; but discarding on the whole that
conclusion, because overstrained and far-fetched,
I have no ground left me for saying that the inter-
position of the Sovereign or the Prince in foreign
affairs, either helped to bring on the war, or con-
tributed any means for averting it.-f* Whether
* The Prince's iiu'inoraiidum of the 21st of Octolicr had no
practical significance. It was more than four months too hite.
+ The Prince, as we know, was honestly desirous for tlie
maintenance of an lionourable peace, and comhining tliat fact
with the circumstances stated in the text, it hccomos clear tliat
the question of his Royal Ilij^hness's ajititudo for the super-
vision of our forei<;n atfairs must depend upon disclosures not
hitherto made upon disclosures showing what steps he took
when each of the ministerial ' deviations ' was in progress.
14 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. England went right or went wrong in the course
' we shall have to trace, she was guided at each,
step by ministers whom the House of Commons
approved.
Power of It was believed that the Emperor Nicholas
numbered almost a million of men under arms ;
and of these a main part were brave, steady,
obedient soldiers. Gathering from time to time
great bodies of troops upon his western frontier,
he caused the minds of men in the neighbouring
States to be weighed down with a sense of his
strength. Moreover, he was served by a diplom-
acy of the busy sort, always labouring to make
the world hear of Eussia and to acknowledge her
might ; and being united by family ties with
some of the reigning Houses of Germany, he
was able to have it believed that his favour
might be of use to the courtiers and even
sometimes to the statesmen of Central Europe.
Down to the giving of trinkets and ribbons, he
was not forgetful. His power was great ; and
when the troubles of 1848 broke out, the broad
foundation of his authority was more than ever
manifested ; for, surrounded by sixty millions of
subjects whose loyalty was hardly sliort of wor-
ship, he seemed to stand free and aloof from tlie
panic which was overturning the thrones of the
Western Continent, and to look down upon the
Feeling this, I shall aid Mr Theodore Martin in his endeavour
to sustain the political reputation of H.R.H. by specially call-
ing attention in foot-notes to the several periods of crisis when
a little good, opportune warning might have had an unspeak-
able value.
BETWEEN THE CZAE AND THE SULTAN. 15
terrors of his fellow -sovereigns, not deigning to chap.
yield his cold patronage to the cause of law and "
order. In the West, he said, and even in Central
Europe, the storm might rage as it liked, but he
warned and commanded that the waves should
not so much as cast their spray upon the frontiers
of ' Holy Eussia ; ' * and when Hungary rose, he
ordered his columns to pass the border, and forced
the insurgent army to lay down its arms. Then,
proudly abstaining from conditions and recom-
pense, he yielded up tlie kingdom to his Ally.
That day Russia seemed to touch the pinnacle
of her greatness ; for men were forced to acknow-
ledge that her power was vast, and that it was
wielded in a spirit of austere virtue, ranging high
above common ambition.
But towards the South, Russia was the neigh- Turkey.
hour of Turkey. The descendants of the Ottoman
invaders still remained quartered in Roumelia and
the adjoining provinces. Tliey were a race living
apart from the Christians who mainly peopled
the land ; for the original scheme of the IVToslem
invasions still kept its mark upon the country.
"When the Ottoman warriors were conquering a
province, they used to follow the injunction of the
Prophet, and call upon sucli of tlio nations as re-
jected the Koran to choose between 'the tribute'
and the sword ; but the destiny implied by the
first brancli of the alternative was very different
from that of a people whose country is conquered
by European invaders. Instead of being made
* See the Manifesto issued bv the Czar in 1848
16 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, subject to all the laws of their conquerors, the
, people of the Christian Churches were suffered to
live apart, governing themselves in their own way,
furnishing no recruits to the army, and having
few legal relations with the State, except as payers
of tribute.
In cities, the people of the Christian Churches
and of the Synagogue generally had their respec-
tive districts, apart from the Moslem quarter.
They were not safe from lawless acts of tyranny ;
and there were usages which reminded them that
they were a conquered people ; but they were
never interfered with, as the citizens of European
States are, for the mere sake of method or uni-
formity. They were free in the exercise of their
religion ; and most of the customs under which
they lived were so completely their own, and so
many of the laws which they obeyed were laws
administered by themselves, that they might almost
be said to form tributary republics in the midst of
a military empire. Indeed, this distinct existence
was so fully recognised as a result of Mahometan
conquest that the Turkish Government was ac-
customed to give the title of a 'Nation' to the
members of any Christian Church or Synagogue
established within the Ottoman realm.
The subjects, or 'Eayahs,' as they are called,
thus held under ^Mussulman sway, numbered per-
haps fifteen millions ; and although the Mussul-
mans of the whole Empire might be computed at
twenty-one millions, the great bulk of these were
scattered over remote provinces in Asia and
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 17
Africa. There were hardly more than two million chap.
Turks in Europe. These dominant Ottomans were ^'
in an earlier stage of civilisation than most of the
Christian States ; and it had happened that their
Government, in straining to overtake and imitate
the more cultivated nations, had broken down
much of the strength which belongs to a warlike
and simple people. Besides, amongst the Turks
who clustered around the seat of government, a
large proportion were men so spoilt by their con-
tact with the metropolis of the Lower Empire,
that, whilst the State suffered from the ignorance
and simplicity of the governing race, it was suffer-
ing also in an opposite way under the evils which
are bred by corruption.
Yet, notwithstanding the canker of Byzantian
vice, and although they knew that they were lia-
ble to be baffled by the methods of high organi-
sation and ingenious contrivance now brought to
bear upon the structure of armies, the Ottoman
people still upheld the warlike spirit which be-
longs to their race and to their faith. It is true
that Eussia, seizing a moment when the Sultan
was without an ally,* and almost without an
* The accustomed policy of England had first been deranged
by a sentiment in favour of Greece a sentiment culminating at
Navarino and was afterwards in no small measure governed
by the personal feelings and strong wayward convictions of a
Minister. He who became the head of the Government iu 1828
was the foremost man then living in the world, and it could
not but be that his vast ascendancy would curtail the power
and alleviate the responsibility of every other member of the
Cabinet. The Czar's Declaration of War was in April 1828,
and at that time Lord Dudley and Ward was the Foreign
VOL. I. B
18 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, army,* had invaded Bulgaria in 1828, and, passing
the Balkan in the following year, had brought the
campaign to an issue which seemed like a triumph.
Yet men versed in the affairs of Eastern Europe
always knew that the treaty of Adrianople had
not been won by the real strength of the invaders,
but rather by a daring stratagem in the nature
of a surprise, and by a skilful feat in diplomacy.
Experience showed that the Turks could generally
hold their ground with obstinacy, when the con-
ditions of a fight were of such a kind that a man's
bravery could make up for the want of prepara-
tion and discipline. In truth they were a devoted
soldiery, and fired with so high a spirit that, wdaen
brought into the right frame of mind, they could
look upon the thought of death in action with a
steadfast, lusty joy. They were temperate, endur-
ing, and obedient to a degree unknown in other
armies. They brought their wants within a very
narrow compass ; and, without much visible effort
of commissariat skill or of transport power, they
were generally found to be provided with bread
and cartridges, and even with means of shelter.
Their arms were always bright. Their faith
tended to make them improvident; but a wise
Secretary, Lord Aberdeen not succeeding to the ofEce until the
30th of May. It was not till the 8th of June that the Russians
were over the Danube, and they were in the middle of July
when, issuing from the desolate peninsula of the Dobrudja,
they first touched the frontiers of what is commonly understood
to be the province of ' Bulgaria. '
* The Sultan had destroyed the Janissaries, and was be-
ginning the formation of an army upon the European plan.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 19
instinct taught them that if there was one thing chap.
which ought not to be left to fate or to the pre- '
cepts of a deceased prophet, it was the Artillery.
Their guns were well served. The Empire was
wanting in the classes from which a large body of
good officers and of able statesmen could be taken,
and therefore, with all their bravery, the Turks
were liable to be brought to the verge of ruin by
panic in the field, or by panic in the Divan ; but
where the men are of so warlike a quality as the
Turks, the want of able officers can be remedied
to an almost incredible degree by the presence
of a foreigner ; and, indeed, the Osmanlee is so
strangely cheered and supported by the mere sight
of an Englishman, that aid rendered upon the
spur of the moment by five or six of our country-
men has more than once changed despair into
victory, and governed the course of events. Help
of that sort, whatever our Government might do,
was not again likely to be wanting to the Turks in
a defensive war. Moreover, the vast and desolate
tracts of country wliich lie between the Pruth and
the Bosphorus cannot easily be crossed by an
army requiring large supplies, especially if it should
be deprived of the sea communication. It is true
that neither the warlike qualities of the Ottoman
people nor the physical difficulties of the invasion
were well understood in Europe, and it was com-
monly believed that Turkey, if left unsupported,
would lie completely at the mercy of the Czar.
This, however, was an error. Except in the
possible event of their being overwhelmed by
20 OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, some panic, the Turks were not liable to be
^' speedily crushed by an army forcing the line of
the Danube and advancing through the passes
of the Balkan.
But also, the conquest of European Turkey was
obstructed by the very splendour of the prize. To
have the dominion of the summer kiosks, and the
steep shady gardens looking down on the straits
between Europe and Asia, is to have a command
which carries with it nothing less than an Empire :
and since the strength of every nation is relative,
and is liable to be turned to nought by the aggran-
disement of another Power, it was plain that no
one among the nations of Europe could be seen
going in quest of dominion on the Bosphorus
without awakening alarm and resistance on the
part of the other great Powers. Certainly the
Turks trusted much in Heaven; but being also
highly skilled in so much of the diplomatic art as
was needed for them in this temporal world, they
knew how to keep alive the watchfulness of every
Power which was resolved to exclude its rivals
from the shores of the Bosphorus. Moreover,
those descendants of the Ottoman conquerors still
remained gifted with the almost inscrutable quali-
ties which enable a chosen race to hold dominion
over a people more numerous and more clever
than their masters. There were a few English
statesmen and several English travellers who had
come to understand this ; but the generality of
men in the Christian countries found it hard to
make out that a people could be wise without
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 21
being keenly intelligent, and could see little chap
strength in a civilisation much earlier and more "
rude than their own.
So in the common judgment of the world it had
long seemed natural that, as a result of the decay
which was thought to have come upon the Otto-
man Empire, its European provinces should revert
to Christendom. By many the conquest of them
was thought to be an easy task: for the Turks
were few and simple, and in peace-time very
listless and improvident ; and the bulk of the
people held under their sway in Europe were
Christians, who bore hatred against their Ottoman
masters. And to Eussia these same provinces
seemed to be of a worth beyond all kind of
measurement, for they lay towards the warm
South, and, commanding the Bosphorus and the
Dardanelles, gave access to and fro between the
Euxine and the Mediterranean. The Power which
seemed to be abounding in might was divided
from the land of temptation by a mere stream of
water. No treaty stood in the way.* Was there
in the polity of Europe any principle, custom, or
law which could shelter the weak from the strong,
and forbid the lord of eight hundred thousand
soldiers from crossing the Truth or the Danube ?
* The preambles of the Treaties of 1840 and 1841 recognised
the expediency of maintaining the Sultan's dominion, bnt there
was nothing in the articles of either of those treaties which en-
gaged the contracting parties to defend the empire from foreign
invasion.
22 OEIGIN OF THE WAK OF 1853
CHAPTER II.
CHAP. The supreme Law or Usage which forms the safe-
The Usage
guard of Europe is not in a state so perfect and
which tends Symmetrical that the elucidation of it will bring
to protect r I I ^ I 1 J
the weak any ease or comiort to a mmd accustomed to
strong. crave for well-defined rules of conduct. It is a
rough and wild-grown system, and its observance
can only be enforced by opinion, and by the be-
lief that it truly coincides with the interests of
every Power which is called upon to obey it ; but
practically, it has been made to achieve a fair
portion of that security which sanguine men
might hope to see resulting from the adoption of
an international code. Perhaps under a system
ideally formed for the safety of nations and for
the peace of the world, a wrong done to one State
would be instantly treated as a wrong done to all.
But in the actual state of the world there is no
such bond between nations. It is true that the
law of nations does not stint the right of execut-
ing justice, and that any power may either remon-
strate against a wrong done to another State great
or small, or may endeavour, if so it chooses, to
prevent or redress the wrong b}^ force of arms;
BETWEEN THE CZAE AND THE SULTAN. 23
but the duties of States in this respect are very chap.
far from being coextensive with their rights. In '
Europe, all States except the five great Powers are
exempt from the duty of watching over the general
safety;* and even a State which is one of the five
great Powers is not practically under an obligation
to sustain the cause of justice unless its perception
of the wrong is reinforced by a sense of its own
interests. Moreover, no State, unless it be com-
bating for its very life, can be expected to engage
in a war without a fair prospect of success. But
when the three circumstances are present when
a wrong is being done against any State great or
small, when that wrong in its present or ulterior
consequences happens to be injurious to one of
the five great Powers, and, finally, when the great
Power so injured is competent to wage war with
fair hopes then Europe is accustomed to expect
that the great Power which is sustaining the hurt
will be enlivened by the smart of the wound, and
for its own sake, as well as for the public weal,
will be ready to come forward in arms, or to labour
for the formation of such leagues as may be
needed for upholding the cause of justice. If a
Power fails in this duty to itself and to Europe,
it suddenly becomes lowered in the opinion of
mankind ; and happily there is no historic lesson
more true than that which teaches all rulers that a
moral degradation of this sort is speedily followed
by disasters of such a kind as to be capable of
* The above was published before, iu 1 SG3, Italy Lad acceded
to the "live."
24
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
II.
Instance of
a wrong to
whicli the
Usage did
not apply.
Instance in
which the
Usage was
applicable
and was
disobeyed.
being expressed in aritlimetic, and of being in
that way made clear to even the narrowest under-
standing. The principle on which the safeguard
rests will not be acknowledged by all, but those
who will disown it can be designated beforehand.
There are many who cannot make out how society
can justly be harsh upon a man for being tame
under insult or injury ; and the same class of
moralists will encounter a like difficulty in their
endeavour to understand the cogency and the
worth of this Usage.
Perhaps the limit to which the Usage is subject
may be best shown by first giving an example of
circumstances in which it fails to take practical
effect. When the Eepublic of Cracow was abol-
ished by an arrangement concerted between Eus-
sia and Austria, a clear wrong was done, and
France and England protested against it ; but it
could hardly be said that their interests were
grievously affected by the change, and therefore
it was not the opinion of Europe that the West-
ern Powers had been guilty of a great dereliction
of duty because on this account they declined to
go to war.
But as an example of circumstances in which
tame acquiescence would be clearly a breach of
the great Usage and a defection from the cause of
nations, one may cite the conduct of Prussia in
1805 ; for when the First Napoleon suddenly came
to a rupture with Austria, and broke up from his
camp at Boulogne and poured his armies into
Germany, advancing upon Ulm and finally upon
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 25
Vienna itself, all men saw that it was not only chap
for the interest of Europe at large, but also for the "
interest of Pinissia herself, that she should come
forward to prevent the catastrophe. She hung
back and stood still whilst Austria succumbed ;
but acting thus, Prussia incurred the ill opinion
of Europe ; and the ruin which follows degrada-
tion did not at all lag, for in the very next year
Bonaparte was issuing his decrees from Berlin, and
the Prussians were yielding up their provinces and
their strong places to France, and handing over their
stores of gold and silver, and of food and clothing,
to cruel French intendants, and French soldiery
were quartered upon them at their hearths. A
brave and warlike people had been brought down
into this abyss because their rulers had shrunk
from taking up arms in obedience to the great
Usage ; and Europe set it down and remembered
that Prussia's dereliction of duty in 1805 was fol-
lowed by shame and ruin in the autumn of 1806.
But if the wars of 1805 and 1806 supplied a instancs h
signal instance of this khid of defection and of its usage w.-fs
speedy chastisement, they also furnished examples obeyed. "
of loyal obedience to the great Usage. From the
ru])turc of the peace of Amiens to tlie summer of
1805. Bonaparte was at peace with the Continent
and at war with this country. During tliat in-
terval of more than two years he bent his whole
energy, and devoted the vast resources at his
command, to the one object of invading and
crushing England. It was against the interest
of Europe that England should be ruined, but more
26 OEIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP, especially it was for the interest of Austria that
' this disaster should be averted, because the great
By Austria, gj^pipg of the Dauube is so situate that its inter-
ests are more closely identical with the interests
of England than with those of any other Power.
Moreover, the indignation of Austria was whetted
by seeing Bonaparte crowning himself at JNlilan
and seizing Genoa. Therefore when Pitt turned
to the Court of Vienna, he did not turn in vain.
Supported by Eussia and Sweden, Austria came
forward in arms, and though she was for the
time broken down by the disaster of Ulm, and the
defeat of the Russian array at Austerlitz, her old
ally was safe : nothing more was heard in those
days of the invasion of England; and the islanders,
relieved from the duty of mere literal self-defence,
were set free to enter upon a larger scheme of
action.* Thenceforth they defended England by
toiling for the deliverance of Europe. The coa-
lition of 1805 was shattered, but already it had
helped to secure the precious life of tlie nation
which was destined to be the first to carry war
into the territory of the disturber.
By Russia, Again, in the same year it was perilous to Cen-
tral Europe that Bonaparte should be having do-
minion in Germany ; but also it was against the
interest of Eussia that this should be, and the de-
* Of course it was the destruction of the French and Spanish
fleets at Trafalgar which prevented Bonaparte from resuming
the idea of invading England, but that which caused him to
abandon the enterprise which he had been jilanning for two
years was the coalition. He broke up from the camp at Bou-
logne several weeks before the battle of Trafalgar.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 27
fection of Prussia threw upon the Czar the burthen chap.
II
of having to be foremost in the defence of Austria. '
Therefore, in 1805, the Emperor Alexander came
forward with his army to the rescue, and in the
following year he refused to stand idle when
Prussia was the victim, and again moved forward
his armies ; and although he was worsted at
Austerlitz in striving to defend Austria, and
although, after heroic struggles in defence of
Prussia, he at last was vanquished at Friedland
and was obliged to make peace, still his faithful
and valorous efforts gained him so much of the
respect of Europe, and even of his victorious adver-
sary, that, beaten as he was, he was able to go to
Tilsit and to negotiate with the great Conqueror of
the day upon a footing which resembled equality.
It has fallen to the lot of England also to have By Engianu.
some share of the honour which Europe bestows
upon resolute defenders of right ; for when Bona-
parte wished to make himself master of Spain and
Portugal, it was the interest of England to prevent
this result if she could, and to endeavour to thwart
and humble the French Emperor in the midst of
his triumphs : but it was also for the interest of
Europe that Enghind should be able to do this.
Nay, so crusliing had been the disasters sulVered
by the Continental States, that tlie glorious duty
of standhig foremost and alone in defence of the
liberties of mankind was cast for a time upon
England. The tiisk might well seem a bard one,
for all that the islanders could do wa.s to send out
in ships scanty bodies of troops, in order that the
28 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, men, when they landed, mi^ht encounter the
' armies of the hitherto victorious Emperor. But
England did not shrink from the undertaking.
For more than six years she carried on the struggle,
and during some three years of that time she stood
alone against Napoleon, for he had put down all
the other nations which had sought to resist him,
and during that evil time it seemed that the van-
quished people of the Continent had no hope left
except when they were telling one another in
whispers that England remained mistress of the
seas, and in the Peninsula was still fighting hard.
Times grew better, and although Bonaparte still
held the language of a great potentate, he had so
mismanaged the resources of the heroic and war-
like country which he ruled, that an English army
with its Portuguese auxiliaries was able to invade
and hold its territory; and whilst he still pre-
tended to the Germans that he was a proud and
powerful sovereign, Wellington unmasked the
whole imposture of the ' French Empire ' by estab-
lishing his army and his foxhounds in the south
of France, and quietly hunting the country in the
livery of the Salisbury Hunt.* The effort had
begun when Sir Arthur Wellesley landed upon the
coast of Portugal in the year 1808, and it ended
in 1814 In the spring of that last year, men
* Larpent's ' Private Journal at Head-Quarters,' 2(i edition,
vol. ii. p. 105. Wellington establislied himself in France in
November 1813. He sent back into the Peninsula his whole
Spanish army because it plundered. The invasion of France
by the Continental Powers took place in the beginning of the
f jUowing year.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 29
of several nations were gathered together at the chap.
English headquarters in Toulouse ; and it was put ^^"
into the heart of a man whose name is unknown
but who spoke in the French tongue, to confer the
loftiest title that ever was truthfully given to man.
In a moment his words were seized as though they
were words from on High, and the whole assembly
with one voice saluted Wellington ' the Liberator
of Europe.'* The loyal soldier shrank from the
sound of a title not taken exact from the Gazette, -}*
but the voice which had spoken was nothing less
than the voice of grateful nations. If the fame of
England had grown to this proportion, it was be-
cause she had faithfully obeyed the great Usage,
and had come to be the main prop of the rights of
others by firmly defending her own.
The obligation imposed upon a great State by The ],iac-
this Usage is not a heavy yoke, for after all it does in^^f the
no more than impel a Sovereign, by fresh motives ^''*''*'
and by larger sanctions, to be watchful in the pro-
tection of his own interests. It quickens his sense
of honour. It warns him that if he tamely stands
witnessing a wrong which it is his interest and
his duty to redress, he will not escape with the
reckoning which awaits him in his own dis-
honoured country, but that he will also be held
guilty of a great European defection, and that his
delinquency will be punished by the reproach of
nations, by tlieir scorn and mistrust, and at last,
* Larpent's 'Private Journal,' vol. ii. p. 267.
j- Mr Larpcnt (who was present) says that Wellington 'bowed
confused,' and abruptly put an end to the scene.
30 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, perhaps, by their desertion of him in his hour of
' trial. But, on the other hand, the Usage assures
a Prince that if he will but be firm in coming for-
ward to redress a public wrong which chances to
be collaterally hurtful to his own State, his cause
will be singularly ennobled and strengthened by
the acknowledgment of the principle that, al-
though he is fighting for his own people, he is
fighting also for every nation in the world which
is interested in putting down the wrong-doer.
Of course neither this nor any other human law
or usage can have any real worth except in pro-
portion to the respect and obedience with which
it is regarded ; but since the Usage exacts nothing
from any State except what is really for its own
good as well as for the general weal, it is very
much obeyed, and is always respected in Europe.
Indeed, a virtual compliance with the Usage is
much more general than it might seem to be at
first sight, for the known or foreseen determina-
tion of a great State to resist the perpetration of
a wrong is constantly tending with great force to
the maintenance of peace, and peace being much
less remarkable than war, the very success with
which the principle works prevents it from being
conspicuous. And, certainly, when the Usage is
faithfully obeyed, it commonly proves a strong
safeguard ; for, the interests of the various nations
of Europe being much intertwined, a wrong done
to any lesser State is likely to be in some way
hurtful or dishonouring to one or other of the
great Powers ; and if the great Power which is
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 31
thus aggrieved takes fire, as it ought to do, and chap.
determines to resist or avenge the aggression, it ^ '
is generally able to embroil other States ; and the
result is that the Prince who is the wrong-doer
finds himself involved in a war which having
a tendency to become greater and greater can
hardly be otherwise than formidable to him. It
is the apprehension of this result which is the
main safeguard of peace. Any prince who might
be inclined to do a wrong to another State casts
his eyes abroad to see the condition of the great
Powers. If he observes that they are all in a
sound state, and headed by firm, able rulers,
who are equal, if need be, to the duty of taking
up arms, he knows that his contemplated outrage
would produce a war of which he cannot foresee
the scope or limit, and, unless he be a madman
or a desperado desiring war for war's sake, he
will be inclined to hold back. On the other
hand, if he sees that any great nation which
ought to be foremost to resist him is in a state of
exceptional weakness, or imder the governance of
unworthy or incapable rulers, or is distracted by
some whim or sentiment interfering with her
accustomed policy, then, perhaps, he allows him-
self to entertain a hope that she may not have the
spirit or the wisdom to perform her duty. That
is the hope, and it may be said in these days it is
the one only hope, which would drive a sane prince
to become the disturber of Europe. To frustrate
this hope in other words, to keep alive the dread
of a just and avenging war should be the care
32 OKIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, of every statesman who would faithfully labour
' to preserve the peace of Europe. It is a poor use
of time to urge a king or an emperor to restrain
his ambition and his covetousness, for these are
passions eternal, always to be looked for, and
always to be combated. For such a prince the
only good bridle is the fear of war. Of course it
is right enough to appeal to this wholesome fear
under the courteous title of 'deference to opinion,'
though in truth it is not for the ambitious dis-
turber, but rather for those Princes who are show-
ing signs of weakness and failing spirit, that the dis-
cipline of opinion is really needed. Happily this
discipline is not often wanting, for the feelings of
nations in regard to the toleration of a wrong
coincide with the general weal ; and if men cannot
always shame a prince from being guilty of an
ignominious defection, they at least take care that
the fruit of his delinquency shall be bitter. Europe
is severe and slow of forgiveness towards any
great Power which, by shrinking from the defence
of its own rights, has suffered a harm to be done
to another State.
It will be seen by-and-by that, in defiance of
the opinion of Europe, and without any colour
of right, a great Power invaded the territory of
a weaker neighbour; but any one who keeps in
mind the principle of the great Usage will have
the means of seeing what resources Europe had
for repressing this act of violence, and will hold a
clue for finding out the quarter to which men had
a right to look for the commencement of resistance.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 33
The Power most exposed to harm from Eussiau chap.
encroachments upon European Turkey was Aus-
tria ; for it was plain that, if her great neighbour European
of the North were to extend his empire in the to^the"''^
direction of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia, and EmpC^e.
so come winding round her South-Eastern fron-
tier, she would be brought into grievous danger ; PoUcy of
1 n T 1 Austria.
and her motives for watchfulness in this quarter
were quickened by a knowledge of the disturbing
elements which existed in the border provinces,
where the people were drawn towards Eussia by
the tics of religion and race, and even of language.
If the prospect of the Czar's carrying his dominion
to the shores of the Bosphorus was galling and
offensive to the other Powers of Europe, the evil
which such a change was calculated to bring upon
Austria seemed hardly short of ruin. JMoreover
Austria, in her character as a representative of
(merman interests, was charged to see that the
Lower Danube, ordained by Nature to be the
main outlet for the products of Central Europe,
should not hopelessly fall under the control of
the Northern Power. Thus upon Austria, before
all other Powers, there attached the care of guard-
ing against encroachments on the European pro-
vinces of the Sultan ; and the cogency of this duty
towards herself, towards Germany, and towards
Europe, Austria had always acknowledged. "When
Turkey was invaded in 1828, Prince ]\Ietternich
was the one statesman in Europe who strove to
form a league for the defence of the Sultan ; * and
* See Note No. I. in the Appeinli.\.
VOL. L O
34
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
II.
Of Prussia.
Of France.
it will be seen that, although the events of 1849
had tended to embarrass the free action of the
Emperor Francis Joseph, the last war against the
Sultan disclosed no change in Austrian policy.
Over the councils of Prussia at this time the
Court of St Petersburg had a dangerous ascend-
ancy ; but by his actual station as a leading
member of the Confederation, and by his hopes of
attaining to a still higher authority in Germany,
the King was forced into accord with Austria
upon all questions which touched the freedom of
the Lower Danube, and it was certain that he
would do all that he safely could to discourage
schemes for the disturbance of the Ottoman
Empire. Still he lived in awe of the Emperor
Nicholas, and it was hard to say beforehand what
course he would take if he should be called upon
to choose between defection and war.
Among the very foremost of the great Powers
stood France ; and she was well entitled, if her
rulers should so think fit, to use her strength
against any potentate threatening to alter the
great territorial arrangements of Europe ; and
especially it was her right to withstand any
changes which she might regard as menacing to
her power in the Mediterranean. But French
statesmen have generally thought that, as the
Mediterranean after all is only a part of the
ocean, a new maritime Power in the Levant might
be rather a convenient ally against England than
a dangerous rival to France ; and, upon the whole,
it was difficult to make out, either from the nature
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 35
of things or from the general course of her policy, chap.
that France had any deep interest in the integrity ! .
of the Sultan's dominions. At all events, her
interest was not of so cogent a sort as to oblige
her to stand more forward than any of the other
great Powers, or to bear, in any greater proportion
than they might do, the charge of keeping the
Ottoman Empire untouched. Indeed, it was hard
at that time to infer from the past acts of France
that she had any settled policy upon the Eastern
Question. She had clung with some steadiness
to the idea of establishing French influence in
Syria ; and from time to time during the last half-
century she had been inclined to entangle herself
in Egypt ; but upon the question whether the
elements constituting the Ottoman Empire should
be kept together, she had generally seemed to be
undecided ; for, although she took part in the
conservative arrangements of 1841, her conduct in
the previous year, and at several other times of
crisis, had disclosed no great reluctance on her
part to see the empire dismembered. Upon the
supposition, however, that she intended to pursue
the policy which she afterwards avowed, and to
concur in the endeavour to maintain the Sultan's
dominions, her duty towards lierself and to Europe
required that she should herself refrain from dis-
turbing the quiet of the East, and that, in the
event of any wrongful aggression by Ifussia upon
the dominions of the Sultan, she should loyally
range herself with such of tlie four great Powers
as might be willing: to check the encroachment
36 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, "by their authority, or, in last resort, by force of
" arms ; but it was not at all incumbent upon
France to place herself in the van ; and it was not
consistent with the welfare of her people that she
should take upon herself a share of the European
burthen disproportionate to her interest in the
state of Eastern Europe. Nor was there at this
time any reason to imagine that the country could
be brought into strife, or engaged in warlike
enterprises, without sufficient cause ; for the in-
stitutions of France had not then shrivelled up
into a system which subordinated the vast inter-
ests of the State to the mere safety and welfare of
its ruler. The legislative power and the control
of the supplies were in the hands of an Assembly
freely elected ; and both in the Chamber and in
print men enjoyed the right of free speech. Also
the executive power rested lawfully in the hands
of ministers responsible to Parliament ; and there-
fore, although the President, as will be seen, could
do acts leading to mischief and danger, he could
not bring Prance to a rupture with a foreign State
unless war were really demanded by the interests
or by the honour, or at least by the passions, of the
country. And the people being peacefully in-
clined, and the interests and the honour of the
country being carefully respected by all foreign
States, Erance was not at that time a source of
disturbance to Europe.
Of England. JSTcxt to Austria, England was of all the great
Powers the one most accustomed to insist upon
the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. It
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 37
might be a complex task to prove that the rule chap.
of the English in Hindostan is connected with 1_
the stability of the Sultan's dominions in a far-
distant region of the world; but whether the
theory of this curious inter-dependence be sound
or merely fanciful, it is certain that the conquest
of the shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardan-
elles by one of the great Continental Powers
would straiten the range of England's authority
in the world, and, even if it did not do her harm
of a positive kind, would relatively lessen her
strength. The effect, too, of liussia's becoming a
Mediterranean Power could not be so clearly fore-
seen and computed as not to be a fitting subject
of care to English statesmen. The people at large
were not accustomed to turn their minds in this
direction ; but the ' Eastern Question,' as it was
called, had become consecrated by its descent
through a great lineage of Statesmen ; and the
traditions of the Foreign Office were reinforced
by English travellers : for these men, going to
Eastern countries in early life, and becoming
charmed with their glimpse of the grand, simple,
violent world that they had read of in their Bibles,
used soon to grow interested in the diplomatic
strife always going on at Constantinople ; and
then coming home, they brought back with their
chibouques and their scymitars a zeal for the cause
of Turkey which did not fail to fmd utterance in
Parliament. In process of time the accunmlated
counsels of these travellers, coming in aid of dip-
lomatists and statesmen, put straight the deflec-
38 ORIGIN OP THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, tion which had been caused by romantic sym-
' pathy with the Greek insurgents ; and it may be
said that after the year 1833 the Eastern policy
of England was brought back into its ancient
channel.
Abroad, no one doubted that the maintenance of
the Sultan's authority at Constantinople was of
high concern to England ; and indeed the bearing
of the Eastern question upon English interests
seemed even more clear and obvious to foreigners
than to the bulk of our countrymen at home. At
this time Lord John Eussell was the Prime Min-
ister ; and the Secretary of State for Foreign A^-
fairs was Lord Palmerston. It is true that during
the last Eussian invasion of Turkey in 1828, Lord
Palmerston, then out of office, had taken part with
Eussia ; but from the period of the Treaty of Un-
kiar Skelessi in 1833 he had not swerved from
the traditions of the Foreign Office ; and, upon the
whole, there was no fair ground for believing that
under his counsels, and under the sanction of our
then Prime Minister, the acquiescent policy of
1829 would again be followed by England.* It
is true that strange doctrines were afloat ; but
after 1833 the Government had not forgotten
that England was one of the great Powers of
Europe, and had never confessed, by any un-
* Lord Aberdeen was Foreign Secretary in 1829 ; but consider-
ing the vast authority of the then Prime Minister (Wellington),
it would perhaps be more just to ascribe the 'acquiescent'
policy of that period to the great Duke himself than to any
other minister. And the policy, although for the time ' ac-
quiescent,' was not un watchful.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 39
pardonable inaction, that this height and standing chap.
in the world gave their country mere rank and
celebrity without corresponding duties. Upon
the whole, there was not at this time any sound
reason for doubting that England would pursue
her accustomed policy with due resolution. Thus
Europe was in repose ; for, in general, when the
world believes that England will be firm, there
is peace ; it is the hope of her proving weak or
irresolute which tends to breed war.
Of the lesser States of Europe there were some or the lesser
' . states of
which, in the event of a war, might lean towards Europe.
Russia, and more which would lean against her :
and the divided opinion of the minor Courts of
Germany might be reckoned upon by the Czar as
tending to hamper the action of tlie leading States ;
but, upon the whole, the interests of the lesser
Powers of Europe, and the means of action at
their command, were not of such a kind as to
exert much weight in retarding or accelerating
Kussian schemes of encroachment upon Turkey.
This was the quiet aspect of Europe in relation
1<) the Eastern question, when an ancient quarrel
between the monks of the Greek and the Latin
Churclies in Palestine began to extend to laymen
and politicians, and even at last to endanger the
peace of the world.
40 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAPTER III.
CHAP. The mystery of holy shrines lies deep in human
'- nature. For, however the more spiritual minds
shrines. may be able to rise and soar, the common man
during his mortal career is tethered to the globe
that is his appointed dwelling-place ; and the
more his affections are pure and holy, the more
they seem to blend with the outward and visible
world. Poets, bringing the gifts of mind to bear
upon human feelings, have surrounded the image
of love with myriads of their dazzling fancies ; but
it has been said that in every country, when a
peasant speaks of his deep love, he always says
the same thing. He always utters the dear name,
and then only says that he ' worships the ground
' she treads.' It seems that where she who holds
the spell of his life once touched the earth where
the hills and the wooded glen and the pebbly
banks of the stream have in them the enchanting
quality that they were seen by him and by her
when they were together there always his mem-
ory will cling ; and it is in vain that space inter-
A^enes, for imagination, transcendent and strong of
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 41
fliglit, can waft him from lands far away till he chap.
liglits upon the very path by the river's bank '
which was blessed by her gracious step. Nay,
distnnce will inflame his fancy ; for if he be cut
off from the sacred ground by the breadth of the
ocean, or by vast, endless, desolate tracts, he comes
to know that deep in his bosom there lies a secret
desire to journey and journey far, that he may
touch with fond lips some mere ledge of rock
where once he saw her foot resting. It seems that
the impulse does not spring from any designed
culture of sentiment, but from an honest earthly
passion vouchsafed to the unlettered and the
simple-hearted, and giving them strength to pass
the mystic border which lies between love and
worship. For men strongly moved by the Chris-
tian faith it was natural to yearn after the scenes
of the Gospel narrative. In old times this feeling
had strength to impel the chivalry of Europe to
imdertake the conquest of a barren and distant
land ; and although in later days the aggregate
faith of the nations grew chill, and Christendom
no longer claimed witli the sword, still there were
always many who were willing to brave toil and
danger for tlie sake of attaining to the actual and
visible Sion. These venturesome men came to be
called Pelerins or Pilgrims. At first, as it would
seem, they were impelled by deep feeling acting
upon bold and resolute natures. Holding close lo
the faith that the Son of God, being also in mys-
tic sense the great God Himself, had for our sakcs
and for our salvation become a babe, growing
42 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, up to be an anxious and suffering man, and
III
' submitting to be cruelly tortured and killed
by the hands of His own creatures, they longed
to touch and to kiss the spots which were be-
lieved to be the silent witnesses of His life upon
earth, and of His cross and passion. And since
also these men were of the Churches which sanc-
tioned the adoration of the Virgin, they were
taught, alike by their conception of duty and by
nature's low whispering voice, to touch and to kiss
the holy ground where Mary, pure and young, w^as
ordained to become the link between God and the
race of fallen man. And because the rocky land
abounded in recesses and caves yielding shelter
against sun and rain, it was possible for the
Churches to declare, and very easy for trustful
men to believe, that a hollow in a rock at Beth-
lehem was the Manger which held the infant Ee-
deemer, and that a Grotto at Nazareth was the
very home of the blessed Virgin.
Priests fastened upon this sentiment, and al-
though in its beginning their design was not sor-
did, they found themselves driven by the course
of events to convert the alluring mystery of the
Holy Places into a source of revenue. The ]\Ia-
hometan invaders had become by conquest the
lords of the ground ; but since their o\vn creed
laid great stress upon the virtue of pilgrimage to
holy shrines, they willingly entered into the feel-
ing of the Christians who came to kneel in Pales-
tine. Moreover, they respected the self-denial of
monks ; and it was found that, even in turbulent
BETWEEN THE CZAE AND THE SULTAN. 43
times, a convent in Palestine surrounded by a good chap.
wall, and headed by a clever Superior, could gen- "^"
erally hold its own. It was to establishments of
this kind that the pilgrim looked for aid and hos-
pitality, and in order to keep them up, the priests
imagined the plan of causing the votary to pay
according to his means at every shrine which he
embraced. Upon the understanding that he ful-
filled that condition he was led to believe that he
won for himself unspeakable privileges in the
world to come ; and thenceforth a pilgrimage to
the holy shrines ceased to be an expression of en-
thusiastic sentiment, and became a common act
of devotion.
But since it happened that, because of the man- contest
ner in which the toll was levied, every one of the poMession
Holy Places was a distinct source of revenue, the shnnes.
prerogative of the Turks as owners of the ground
was necessarily brought into play, and it rested
with them to determine which of the rival Churches
should have the control and usufruct of every holy
shrine. Here, then, was a subject of lasting strife.
So long as the Ottoman Empire was in its full
strength, the authorities at Constantinople were
governed in their decision by the common appli-
ances of intrigue, and most chiefly, no doubt, by
gold ; but when the power of the Sultans so waned
as to make it needful for them to contract engage-
ments with Christian sovereigns, the monks of one
or other of the Churches found means to get their
suit upheld by foreign intervention. In 1740, r.itron.u'fi
France obtained from the Sultan a grant which Powers.''
44
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
III.
Comparison
between
the claims
of Russia
and France.
had the force of a treaty, and its Articles, or
' Capitulations,' as they were sometimes called,
purported to confirm and enlarge all the then ex-
isting privileges of the Latin Church in Palestine.
But this success was not closely pursued, for in
the course of the succeeding hundred years, the
Greeks, keenly supported by Eussia, obtained from
the Turkish Government several firmans which
granted them advantages in derogation of the
treaty with France ; and until the middle of this
century France acquiesced.
In the contest now about to be raised between
France and Eussia, it would be wrong to suppose
that, so far as concerned strength of motive and
sincerity of purpose, there was any approach to an
equality between the contending Governments.
In the Greek Church the rite of pilgrimage is held
to be of such deep import, that if a family can
command the means of journeying to Palestine,
even from the far-distant provinces of Eussia, they
can scarcely remain in the sensation of being truly
devout without undertaking the holy enterprise ;
and to this end the fruits of parsimony and labour,
enduring through all the best years of manhood,
are joyfully devoted. The compassing of vast
distances with the narrow means at the command
of a peasant is not achieved without suffering so
great as to destroy many lives. This danger does
not deter the brave pious people of the North.
As the reward of their sacrifices, their priests,
speaking boldly in the name of Heaven, promise
them ineffable blessings. The advantages held
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 45
out are not understood to be dependent upon the chap.
volition and motive of the pilgrim, for they hold '
good, as baptism does, for children of tender years.
Of course every man who thus came from afar to
the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was the repre-
sentative of many more who would do the like if
they could. When the Emperor of Eussia sought
to gain or to keep for his Church the holy shrines
of Palestine, he spoke on behalf of fifty millions of
brave, pious, devoted subjects, of whom thousands
for the sake of the cause would joyfully risk their
lives. From the serf in his hut even up to the
Great Czar himself, the faith professed was the
faith really glowing in the heart, and violently
swaying the will. It was the part of wise states-
men to treat with much deference an honest and
pious desire which was rooted thus deep in the
bosom of the Russian people.
On the other hand, the Latin Church seems not
to have inculcated pilgrimage so earnestly as its
Eastern rival. Whilst the Greek pilgrim -ships
poured out upon the landing-place of Jaffa the
nmltitudes of those who had survived the misery
and the trials of the journey, the closest likeness
of a pilgrim which the Latin Church could sup-
ply was often a mere Erench tourist, with a jour-
nal and a theory, and a plan of writing a book.
It is true that the Erench Eoreign Oflice liad
from time to time followed up those claims to
protect the Latin Church in the East which had
arisen in the times when the mistresses of 'the
' most Christian kings ' were pious ; but it was
46
OEIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP.
III.
Measures
taken by
the French
President.
understood that by the course of her studies in the
eighteenth century, Trance had obtained a tight
control over her religious feelings. Whenever she
put forward a claim in her character as 'the eldest
' daughter of the Church/ men treated her demand
as political, and dealt with it accordingly ; but as
to the religious pretension on which it was based,
Europe always met that with a smile. Yet it will
presently be seen that a claim which tried the
gravity of diplomatists might be used as a puissant
engine of mischief.
There was repose in the empire of the Sultan,
and even the rival Churches of Jerusalem were
suffering each other to rest, when the French
President, in cold blood, and under no new motive
for action, took up the forgotten cause of the Latin
Church of Jerusalem, and began to apply it as a
wedge for sundering the peace of the world.
The French Ambassador at Constantinople was
instructed to demand that the grants to the Latin
Church which were contained in the treaty of
1740 should be strictly executed ; * and, since the
firmans granted during the last century to the
Greek Church were inconsistent with the capitula-
tions of 1740, and had long been in actual opera-
tion, the effect of this demand on the part of the
French President was to force the Sultan to dis-
turb the existing state of repose, to annul the
privileges which (with the acquiescence of France)
the Greek Church had long been enjoying, to drive
*June 1850. 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 2. Note to ith
Edition.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 47
into frenzy the priesthood of the Greek Church, chap.
and to rouse to indignation the Sovereign of the '
great military empire of the North, with all those
millions of pious and devoted men who, so far as
regarded this question, were heart and soul with
their Czar. * The Ambassador of France,' said our
Foreign Secretary,* ' was the first to disturb the
' status quo in which the matter rested. Not that
' the disputes of the Latin and Greek Churches
' were not very active, but that without some po-
' litical action on the part of France, those quar-
' rels would never have troubled the relations of
' friendly Powers. If report is to be believed, the
* French Ambassador was the first to speak of
' having recourse to force, and to threaten the in-
' tervention of a French fleet to enforce the demands
' of his country. We should deeply regret any
' dispute that might lead to conflict between two
' of the great Powers of Europe ; but when we
' reflect that the quarrel is for exclusive privileges
' in a spot near which the heavenly host proclaimed
' peace on earth and goodwill towards men when
' we see rival Churches contending for mastery in
' the very place where Christ died for mankind
' the thought of such a spectacle is melancholy
' indeed. . . . Both parties ought to refrain
' from putting armies and fleets in motion for the
' purpose of making the tomb of Christ a cause of
' quarrel among Christians.'
Lord John Russell. See his desjiatch of the 28th of
January 1853. 'Eastern Papers,' ^lart i. pp. 07, 68. Note
to Uh Edition.
48
ORIGIX OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
III.
By the
Russian
Envoy.
Embarrass-
ment of the
Porte.
Mutual
concessions.
Still, in a narrow and technical point of view,
the claim of France might be upheld, because it
was based upon a treaty between France and the
Porte which could not be legally abrogated without
the consent of the French Government ; and tlie
concessions to the Greek Church, though obtained
at the instance of Eussia, had not been put into
the form of treaty engagements, and could always
be revoked at the pleasure of the Sultan. Accord-
ingly M. de Lavalette continued to press for the
strict fulfilment of the treaty; aud being guided,
as it would seem, by violent instructions, and be-
ing also zealous and unskilled, he soon carried his
urgency to the extremity of using offensive threats,
and began to speak of what should be done by
the French fleet. The Eussian Envoy, better
versed in affairs, used wiser but hardly less cogent
Avords, requiring that the firmans should re-
main in force ; and since no ingenuity could
reconcile the engagements of the treaty with
the grants contained in the firmans, the Porte,
though having no interest of its own in the
question, was tortured and alarmed by the con-
tending negotiators. It seemed almost impossible
to satisfy France without affronting the Emperor
Nicholas.
The French, however, did not persist in claim-
ing up to the very letter of the treaty of 1740,
whilst on the other hand there were some of the
powers of exclusion granted by the firmans which
the Greeks could be persuaded to forego ; and
thus the subject remaining in dispute was nar-
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 49
rowed down until it seemed almost too slender for c h a p.
the apprehension of laymen. '
Stated in bare terms, the question was whether, The actual
subject of
for the purpose of passing through the building disimte.
into their Grotto, the Latin monks should have the
key of the chief door of the Church of Bethlehem,
and also one of the keys of each of the two doors
of the sacred Manger,* and whether they should
be at liberty to place in the sanctuary of the Na-
tivity a silver star adorned with the arms of France.
The Latins also claimed a privilege of worshipping
once a-year at the shrine of the blessed Mary in
the Church of Gethsemane, and they went on to
assert their right to have a cupboard and a lamp
in the tomb ' of the Virgin ; ' but in this last pre-
tension they were not well supported by France ; f
and, virtually, it was their claim to have a key of
the great door of the Church of Bethlehem, instead
of being put off with a key of the lesser door, which
long remained insoluble, and had to be decided by
the advance of armies I and the threatening move-
ment of fleets.
Diplomacy, somewhat startled at the nature of
the question committed to its charge, but repress-
ing the coarse emotion of surprise, ' ventured,' as
it is said, ' to inquire whether in this case a key
' meant an instrument for opening a door, only
' not to be employed in closing that door against
' Christians of otlier sects, or whether it was sim-
* 'Eastern Tapers,' part, i. p. 84. + Il'iil. p. 48.
:J: See Count Nesselrode's Despatches, ibid. p. Gl.
VOL. I. D
50
OEIGIN OF THE WAK OF 1853
CHAP.
III.
Increased
violence of
the French
Govern-
ment.
Afif Bey's
Mission.
' ply a key an emblem ; ' * but Diplomacy an-
swered that the key was really a key a key for
opening a door; and its evil quality was not
that it kept the Greeks out, but that it let the
Latins come in.
M. de Lavalette's demand was so urgently, so
violently pressed, that the Porte at length gave
way, and acknowledged the validity of the Latin
claims in a formal note : f but the paper had not
been signed more than a few days when the Rus-
sian Minister, making hot remonstrance, caused
the Porte to issue a firman, | ratifying all the
existing privileges of the Greeks, and virtually
revoking the acknowledgment just given to the
Latins. Thereupon, as was natural, the French
Government became indignant, and to escape its
anger the Porte promised to evade the public read-
ing of the firman at Jerusalem ; but the Russian
Minister not relaxing his zeal, the Turkish Gov-
ernment secretly promised him that the Pasha
of Jerusalem should be instructed to try to avoid
giving up the key to the Latin monks.
Then again, under further pressure by France,
the Porte engaged to evade this last evasion, and
at length the duty of affecting to carry out the
conflicting engagements thus made by the Porte
was entrusted to Afif Bey. This calm Mahometan
went to Jerusalem, and strove to temporise as well
* See Count Nesselrode's Despatches, ibid. p. 79.
t Note of the 9th February 1852.
t The firman of the mi-fevrier 1852.
Col. Kose to Lord Malmesbury. 'Eastern Papers,' part i.
p. 46.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 51
as he could betwixt the angry Churches. His chap,
great difficulty was to avert the rage which the _
Greeks would be likely to feel when they came to
know that the firman was not to be read ; and the
nature of his little stratagem showed that, although
he was a benighted Moslem, he had some insight
into the great ruling principle of ecclesiastical
questions. His plan was to inflict a bitter disap-
pointment upon the Latins in the presence of the
Greek priesthood, for he imagined that in their
delight at witnessing the mortification of their
rivals, the Greeks might be made to overlook the
great question of the public reading of the firman.
So, as soon as the ceremonial visits had been ex-
changed, Afif Bey, with a suite of the local Effendis,
met the three Patriarchs, Greek, Latin, and Ar-
menian, in the Church of the Resurrection, just
in front of the Holy Sepulchre itself, and under
the great dome, and tliere he 'made an oration
'upon the desire of His Majesty tlie Sultan to
'gratify all classes of his subjects;' and when jM.
P>asily and the Greek Patriarch and the Eussian
Archimandrite were becoming impatient for tlie
public reading of the firman which was to give to
their Church the whole of the Christian sanc-
tuaries of Jerusalem, the Bey invited all the dis-
putants to meet him in the Church of the Virgin
near Gethsemane. There he read an order of the
Sultan for permitting the Latins to celebrate a
mass once a-year ; but then, to the great joy of
the Greeks, and to the horror of their rivals, he
went on to read words commanding that the altar
52 OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, and its ornaments should remain undisturbed.
' ' No sooner/ says the official account, ' were these
' words uttered, than the Latins, who had come to
' receive their triumph over the Orientals, broke
' out into loud exclamations of the impossibility of
' celebrating mass upon a schismatic slab of mar-
' ble, with a covering of silk and gold instead of
' plain linen, among schismatic vases, and before
' a crucifix which has the feet separated instead of
' one nailed over the other.' Under cover of the
storm thus raised, Afif Bey perhaps thought for
a moment that he had secured his escape, and for
a while he seems to have actually disentangled
himself from the Churches, and to have succeeded
in gaining his quarters.
But when the delight of witnessing the discom-
fiture of the Latins had in some degree subsided,
the Greeks perceived that, after all, the main
promise had been evaded. The firman had not
been read. M. Basily, the Eussian Consul-Gen-
eral, called on Afif Bey, and required that the
reading of the firman should take place. At first
the Bey affected not to know what firman was
meant, but afterwards he said he had no copy of
it ; and at length, being then at the end of his
stratagems, he acknowledged that he had no in-
structions to read it. Thereupon M. Basily sent
off Prince Gagarin to Jaffa to convey these tidings
to Constantinople in any Arab vessel that could
be found ; and then, hurrying to the Pasha of
Jerusalem, he demanded to have a special council
assembled, with himself and the Greek Patriarch
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 53
in attendance, in order that Eussia and the Ortho- chap.
dox Church might know once for all whether the '
firman had been sent or not ; but when the meet-
ing was gathered, Hafiz Pasha only 'made a
' smooth speech on the well-known benevolence
' of His Majesty towards all classes of his sub-
' jects, and that was all that could be said.' * So
the Greeks, though they had been soothed for
a moment by the discomfiture of their Latin ad-
versaries in the Church of the Virgin, could not
any longer fail to see that their rivals were in the
ascendant ; and it soon turned out that the pro-
mise to evade the delivery of the keys was not to
be faithfully kept.
The pressure of France was applied with in- Delivery of
^ , . -^ the key and
creasing force, and it produced its effect. In the "'e star.
month of December 1852, the silver star was
brought with much pomp from the coast. Some
of the Moslem Effendis went down to Jaffa to
escort it, and others rode out a good way on the
road that they might bring it into Jerusalem
with triumph ; and on Wednesday the 2 2d of
the same month, the Latin Patriarch, with joy
and with a great ceremony, replaced the glitter-
ing star in the sanctuary of Bethlehem ; and at
the same time the key of the great door of the
church, together with the keys of the sacred
manger, was handed over to the Latiiis.-f-
Consul Fin to Earl of Malmesbury, Oct. 27, 1852. 'Cor-
' rcspondence,' part i. p. 44.
t Consul Fin to Earl of Malmesbury, Dec. 28, 1852 ; but
see Mr i'isaui's note, p. 106.
ludigiiatiou
of Russia.
54 OKIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. For the Czar and for the devout people of All
III
' the Eussias it was hard to bear this blow. ' To
' the indignation/ Count Nesselrode writes, ' of
' the whole people following the Greek ritual, the
' key of the Church of Bethlehem has been made
' over to the Latins, so as publicly to demon-
' strate their religious supremacy in the East.
' The mischief then is done, M. le Baron, and
' there is no longer any question of preventing
' it. It is now necessary to remedy it. The im-
' munities of the Orthodox religion which have
' been injured, the promise which the Sultan had
' solemnly given to the Emperor, and which has
' been violated, call for an act of reparation. It
' is to obtain this that we must labour. If we
' took for our example the imperious and violent
' proceedings which have brought France to this
' result if, like her, we were indifferent to the
' dignity of the Porte, to the consequences which
' an heroic remedy may have on a constitution
' already so shattered as that of the Ottoman
' Empire our course would be already marked
' out for us, and we should not have long to re-
' fleet upon it. Menace and a resort to force
' would be our immediate means. The cannon
has been called the last argument of kings, the
' French Government has made it its first. It is
' the argument with which, at the outset, it de-
' clared its intention to commence its proceedings
' at Tripoli as well as at Constantinople. Not-
* withstanding our legitimate causes of complaint,
and at the risk of waiting some time lou<,^er for
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 55
' redress, we shall take a less summary course, chap.
' ... It may happen that France, perceiving ^;_
' any hesitation on the part of the Porte, may
' again have recourse to menace, and press upon
' it so as to prevent it from listening to our just
' demands. . . . The Emperor has therefore
' considered it necessary to adopt in the outset
' some precautionary measures in order to support
' our negotiations, to neutralise the effect of M.
' Lavalette's threats, and to guard himself in any
' contingency which may occur against a Govern-
' ment accustomed to act by surprises.' *
Nor were these empty words. The same Advance of
authentic page-f- which tells of this triumph of forces.
Church over Church goes on to show how the
Czar was preparing for vengeance. ' Orders,' says
Sir Hamilton Seymour, ' have been despatched to
' the 5tli corps d'arm(5e to advance to the frontiers
' of the Danubian provinces without waiting for
' their reserves ; and the 4th corps, under the
' command of General Count Dannenberg, and
' now stationed in Volhynia, will be ordered to
' hold itself in readiness to march if necessary.
' General Luder's corps d'armee, accordingly,
' bcin<,' now 48,000 stronfj will receive a rein-
' forcement of 24,000 men soon after its arrival
' at its destination ; and supposing tlie 4tli corps
' to follow, the whole force will anidunt at least,
' according to official returns, to 144,000 men.'
* Count Ne.sselrode to Baron Brunuow, 11th January 1853.
Ibid. p. 61.
+ P. 56, ' Eastern Paper.s,' part i.
56 OPvIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP. Is it true that for this cause great armies were
^' gathering, and that for the sake of the key and
the silver star the peace of the nations was brought
into danger ? Had the world grown young once
more?
The strife of the Churches was no fable, but
after all, though near and distinct, it was only the
lesser truth. A crowd of monks with base fore-
heads stood quarrelling for a key at the sunny
gates of a church in Palestine, but beyond and
above, towering high in the misty North, men
saw the ambition of the Czars.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 57
CHAPTER IV.
Men dwelling amidst the snows of Kussia are chaj'
driven by very nature to grow covetous when '__
they hear of the happier lands where all tlie year
round there are roses and long sunny days. And
since this people have a seabord and ports on
the Euxine, they are forced by an everlasting
policy to desire the command of the straits which
lead through the heart of an empire into the midst
of that world of wliicli men kindle thoughts when
they speak of the ^gean and of Greece, and the
Ionian shores, and of Palestine and Egypt, and
of Italy, and of France, and of Spain and the
land of the Moors, and of the Atlantic beyond,
and the path of ships on the ocean. Gifted with
the knowledge and the skill which are means of
excellence in the diplomatic art, and excluded by
their institutions from taking any but an official
part in the home Government, the Eussian nobles
had long been accustomed to bend their minds to
foreign policy ; and the State, favouring this in-
clination, used to multiply the labours of its dip-
lomatic service. Almost every gifted and accom-
Natural
ambitiou oi
Russia.
58 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
c H A P.. plished Eussian who might be travelling in foreign
' countries used to receive instructions of some kind
from his Government, and was enabled to believe
that, either by collecting information or in some
still more important way, he was performing a
duty towards the State. Men thus entrusted
became eager partakers of a policy rather more
enterprising than the policy avowed by their
Government, and the result was that the natural
ambition of the country was always being nur-
tured and subserved by a great Aristocracy.
But, moreover, the ambition of the Statesmen
and the Nobles was reinforced hy the pious desire
of the humbler classes. Some fifty millions of
men in Eussia held one creed ; and they held it,
too, with the earnestness of which Western Europe
used to have experience in earlier times. In her
wars Eussia had always been engaged against na-
tions which were not of her faith ; and twice at
least in the very agony of her national life, and
when all other hope was gone, she had been
rescued by the warlike zeal of her priesthood.
By these causes love of country and devotion to
the Church had become so closely welded into
one engrossing sentiment, that good Muscovites
could not sever the one idea from the other ; *
and although they were by nature a kind and
good-humoured race of men, they were fierce in
the matter of their religion. They had heard of
* I owe my perception of the causes which rendered the
Russian Church so intensely national to Arthur Stanley's most
interesting work upon the Greek Church.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAX. 59
infidels who had torn down the crosses from the c u a p.
Churches of Christ, and possessed themselves of L_
the great city, the capital of the Orthodox Church ;
and, as far as they could judge, it would be a
work of piety, with the permission of the Czar
their father, to slaughter and extirpate the Turks.
But this was not all. They knew that in the
Turkish dominions there were ten or fourteen
millions of men holding exactly the same faith as
themselves, who were kept down in thraldom by
the Moslems, and they had heard tales of the
sufferings of these their brethren which seemed to
call for vengeance. The very indulgence with
which the Turks had allowed these Christians to
have a distinct corporate existence in the Empire
gave weight to their prayers ; for, instead of being
only a disorganised multitude of sufferers, they
seemed to be, as it were, a suppliant nation, ever
kneeling before the great Czar, and imploring him
to deliver them from their captivity. It was not
possible for the liussian people to conceive any
enterprise more worthy of their nation and their
Church than to raise high the banner of the Cross,
drive the infidel Turks out of Europe, and cause
the broad provinces in which their Christian
brethren lived and suffered to be blended with
'Holy Kussia.' It is true that the ^Muscovite
peasants were not an enterprising race of men,
and it might be hard ])erhaps to find a vilhiger
who, if he could have his choice, would ratlier be
a soldier of the Cross than remain at home in his
hut; but the people knew that, whether there
60 OEIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP, were peace or whether there were war, the exi-
^^- gency of their Czar's military system would al-
ways go on consuming their youth ; and since
this engine of a vast standing army was destined
to be kept up and to be fed with their flesh and
blood, they desired in their simple hearts that it
should be used for a purpose which they believed
to be holy and righteous. To a cause having all
these sanctions the voice of prophecy could not
be wanting. Seers foretold the destruction of the
Turks by the men of the yellow hair.
Yet, vast as it was in its aggregate force, the
heart's desire of a whole nation would have been
vague and dim of sight if it had not some famed
city for its goal, or some outward and visible
figure or sign to which the multitude could point
as the symbol of its great intent. The people
were not without their goal nor without their
symbol, for the city whither they tended was the
imperial city of Constantine, once mistress of the
world, and the Cross that the Emperor had seen
in the heavens was still the sign in which the
Church said they must conquer. For such as
were the politic few there was the Golden Horn,
with its command of the Bosphorus and the Dar-
danelles, and all its fair promise of wealth and
empire. In the horizon of the pious multitude
there rose the dome of St Sophia. Ambition was
sanctified by Eeligion. The most pious might-
righteously desire that the devotion of their mili-
tant Church should be aided by the wisdom of
the serpent, and the most worldly-minded states-
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 61
man could look with approval upon the scheme of chap.
a lucrative crusade. The Emperor Alexander the '
First, when he declared that for the time he was
trying to withstand the ambition of his people,
acknowledged that he was 'the only Eussian
' who resisted the views of his subjects upon
' Turkey.'*
The Czar was the head of the Church. It was
not without raising scruples in the minds of the
pious that his predecessors had been able to at-
tain ecclesiastical autliority ; but this shadow of
doubt upon the title of the lay Pontiff made it all
the more needful for him to take care that his
zeal should be above reproach. It is true that
the great body of the Muscovite people were sim-
ple and docile, not partaking in cares of Govern-
}nent, and that, even among the most powerful
Nobles, there were none who would be un^villing
to leave the choice of time and of measures to
the chief of the State ;-|- but still the religious
mind of the vast empire would have been dan-
gerously sliocked if the priests had been forced
t(i know that the Czar failed to share the pious
desire of liis people ; and the minds of men ac-
customed to bend their thoughts to the aggran-
disement of the nation would be overclouded and
chilled if they saw that the Emperor was growing
forgetful of their favourite cause.
But the prospect of what would follow upon
* Quoted by Sir II. Soymour, 'Eastern Papers,' part v. ]>. 11.
+ This now, in 1876, umlcr the Emperor Alexander, can no
lon;rer be said.
62 OKIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, the realisation of tliis scheme of ambition was
' dim. The sovereignty of European Turkey could
scarcely be added to the possessions of the Czar
without tending to dislocate the system of his
empire ; for plainly it would be difficult to sway
the vast Northern territories of All the Eussias
by orders sent from the Bosphorus, and yet, by
force of its mere place in the world, Constanti-
nople seemed destined to be the capital of a great
State. Therefore, in the event of its falling into
the hands of the Eomanoffs, it may be thought
more likely that the imperial city would draw
dominion to itself, and so become the metropolis
of some new assemblage of territories, than that
it would sink into the condition of a provincial
seaport. The statesmen of St Petersburg have
always understood the deep import of the change
which the throne of Constantine would bring with
it; and it may be imagined that considerations
founded on this aspect of the enticing conquest
have mingled with those suggested by the physi-
cal difficulties of invasion, the obstinate valour of
the Turks, and the hostility of the great Powers
of Europe. Still, the prize was so unspeakably
alluring to an aristocracy fired with national
ambition, and to a people glowing with piety,
that apparently it was necessary for the Czar to
seem as though he were always doing sometliing
for furthering a scheme of conquest thus endeared
to the nation. He was liable to be deemed a fail-
ing champion of the faith when he was not labour-
ing to restore the insulted Cross to the Church of
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 63
CoDstantine ; he was chilling the healthy zeal of c H a p.
his ablest servants if he lived idle days making '
no approach to the Bosphorus.
Upon the whole, it resulted from the various itsirresoiuta
^ _ nature.
motives tending to govern the policy of the State
that the ambition of the Eussian emperors in the
direction of Constantinople was generally alive
and watchful, and sometimes active, but was
always irresolute. The first Napoleon said, in the
early years of this century,* that the Czars were
always threatening Constantinople and never
taking it; and what he said then had already
been true for a long time, and his words con-
tinued to be a true description of the Eussian
policy for half a century afterwards. Evidently
it answered the purpose of the Czars to have it
thought amongst their own people that they were
steadily advancing towards the conquest, but they
always suffered their reasons for delay to prevail.
They had two minds upon the question. They
were willing, but they were also unwilling, and
this clashing of motives caused them to falter.
At home they naturally tried to make their am-
bition apparent abroad, as miglit be expected,
they were more careful to display the inclinations
forced upon them by prudence ; ])ut it would
seem that this double face was not simply a
deceptive contrivance, but resulted from imper-
fect volition. The project against Constantinople
was a scheme of conquest continually to be de-
layed, but never discarded ; and happen what
* 'La Russie a trop menacd Constantiiuijile sans le prendre.'
64 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, might, it was never to "be endured that the pros-
' pect of Eussia's attaining some day to the Bos-
phorus should be shut out by the ambition of any
other Power.
Of course it followed that a great State am-
bition of this watchful but irresolute kind would
be stimulated to an increased activity by the dis-
appearance of any of the chief obstacles lying
in the way of the enterprise ; and especially
this would be the case whenever the course of
affairs seemed to be unfavourable to an alliance
against Eussia between the other great Powers
of Europe.
The The Emperor Nicholas held an absolute sway
Nicholas, ovcr his Empire, and his power was not moderated
by the salutary resistance of ministers who had
strength enough to decline to take part in acts
which they disapproved. The old restraints
which used sometimes to fetter the power of the
Eussian monarchs had fallen away, and nothing
had yet come in their stead. Holding the bound-
less authority of an Oriental Potentate, the Czar
was armed besides with all the power which is
supplied by high organisation and the clever ap-
pliances of modern times. What he chose to do
he actually did. He might be sitting alone and
reading a despatch, and if it happened that its
contents made him angry, he could touch a bell
and kindle a war without hearing counsel from
any living man. In the room where he laboured
he could hear overhead the clicking of machinery,
and he liked the sound of the restless magnets, for
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 65
thev were giving instant effect to his will in chap.
b
regions far away. He was of a stern, unrelenting
nature. He displayed, when he came to be tried,
a sameness of ideas and of language and a want of
resource which indicated poverty of intellect; but
this dearth within was masked by the brilliancy
of the qualities which adorned the surface ; and
he was so capable of business, and had such, a
vast activity, that he was able to arrogate to him-
self an immense share of the actual governance of
his subjects. Indeed, by striving to extend his
management beyond the proper compass of a
single mind he disturbed the march of business,
and so far superseded the responsibility of his ser-
vants that he ended by lessening to a perilous ex-
tent the number of gifted men who in former
times had taken part in the counsels of the State.
Still, this widely-ranging activity kept alive the
awe with which his subjects watched to see where
next he would strike ; and made the nation feel
that, along with his vast stature and his command-
ing presence, he carried the actual power of the
State. He had been merciless towards the I'olish
nation; but whilst this sternness made him an
object of hatred to millions of discomlitetl men,
and to other millions of men who felt for them
in their sorrows, it tended, perhaps, at the time to
increase his ascendancy, by making him an object
of dread, and it trebled the delight of being with
him in his gentle mood. AVhen he was friendly,
or chose to seem so, there was a glow and frank-
ness in his manner which had an irresistible
VOL. L E
IV.
66 ORIGIX OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, charm. He had discarded in some measure his
IV.
' predecessor's system of governing Eussia through
the aid of foreigners, and took a pride in his own
people, and understood their worth. In the great
empire of the North religion is closely blended
with the national sentiment, and in this compos-
ite shape it had a strong hold upon the Czar. It
did not much govern him in his daily life, and his
way of joining in the service of the Church seemed
to disclose something like impatience and disdain,
but no one doubted that faith was deeply rooted
in his mind. He had the air of a man raised
above the level of common worshippers, who ima-
gined that he was appointed to serve the cause
of his Church by great imperial achievements, and
not by humble feats of morality and devotion. It
will be seen but too plainly that the Emperor
Nicholas could be guilty of saying one thing and
doing another ; and it may be supposed, therefore,
that at once and in plain terms he ought to be
charged with duplicity ; yet there are circum-
stances which make one falter in coming to such
a conclusion. He had reigned, and had person-
ally governed, for some seven-and-twenty years ;
and although during that period he had done
much to raise bitter hatred, the most sagacious
statesmen in Europe placed faith in his personal
honour. It is certain that he had the love of
truth. When he sought to speak of what he
deemed fair and honourable, he travelled into our
language for the word which spoke his meaning,
and claimed to have the same standard of upright-
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 67
ness as an English ' gentleman.' * It is known chap.
also that his ideal of human grandeur was the L ,
character of the Duke of Wellington. No man
could have made that choice without having truth
in him.
It would seem, however, that beneath the vir-
tues which for more than a quarter of a century
had enabled the Czar to stand before Europe as a
man of honour and truth, there lurked a set of
opposite qualities ; and that when he reached the
period of life which has often been found a trying
one to men of the Eonianoff family, a deterioration
began to take place which shook the ascendant of
his better nature. After the beginning of 1853
there were strange alternations in his conduct.
At one time he seemed to be so frank and straight-
forward that the most wary statesman could not
and would not believe him to be intending deceit.
Then, and even within a few hours, he would steal
off and be false. But the vice which he disclosed
in those weak intervals was not the profound de-
ceit of statecraft, but rather the odd purposeless
cunning of a gypsy or a savage, who shows by
some sudden and harmless sign of his wild blood
that, even after years of conibrmity to Europi-an
ways, he has not been completely reclaimed. For
the present, however, tlie Emperor Nicholas must
be looked upon not merely as he was, but as he
* Sometimes when declaring his reliance upon the honour of
our public men he woulil with great energy extend his open
hand, and vow that with our people he never wanted more
than what in somewhat composite language he called the
' parole de gentlemaTi.'
68 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, seemed to be : and what he seemed to be in the
IV .
' beginning of 1853 was a firm, righteous man, too
brave and too proud to be capable of descending
to falsehood.
Nicholas had a violent will ; but of course when
he underwent the change which robbed him of his
singleness of mind, his resolves, notwithstanding
their native force, could not fail to lose their
momentum. He was a man too military to be
warlike ; and was not only without the qualities
for wielding an army in the field, but was mis-
taken also as to the way in which the best sol-
diers are made. Eussia, under his sway, was so op-
pressively drilled that much of the fire and spirit
of enterprise which are needed for war M'as crushed
out by military training No man, however,
could toil with more zeal than he did in that
branch of industry which seeks to give uniformity
and mechanic action to bodies of men. He was
an unwearied inspector of troops. He kept close
at hand great numbers of small wooden images
clothed in various uniforms, and one of the rooms
in his favourite palace was filled with these mili-
tary dolls.
The Emperor Nicholas had not been long upon
the throne, when he showed that he was a par-
taker of the ambition of his people ; for in 1828
he had begun an invasion of Turkey, and was
present with his army in some of the labours of
the campaign : but his experience was of a pain-
ful kind. The mechanical organisation in which
l>e delighted broke down under stress of real war
BETWEEN THE CZ.VE A2>'D THE SULTAX. 69
carried on upon an extended line of operations, chap,
In the country of the Danube his soldiery per- '__
ished fast from sickness and want ; and although
he had so well chosen his time that the Sultan
was without an ally, and (having but lately put to
death his own army) was in an ill condition for
war, still he encountered so much of obstinate and
troublesome resistance from the Turks, and was
so ill able to cope with it, that at the instance, as
is said, of his own Generals, he retired from the
scene of conflict, and went back to St Petersburg
with the galling knowledge that he was without the
gifts which make an able commander in the field.
lie could not but see, too, that the military repu-
tation of Russia was brought into great peril ; and,
although in the following year he was rescued
from the dangerous straits into which he had run,
by the brilliant audacity of Diebitsch, by the skill
of his diplomacy, and above all by indulgent for-
tune, still he was so chastened by the anxiety of
the time, and by the narrowness of his escape from
a great humiliation, that he ceased to entertain
any hope or intention of dismembering Turkey,
except in the event of there occurring a chain of
circumstances which should enable him to act
with the concurrence of other great Powers.
But the Emperor knew that the pride of his
people would be deeply wounded if any great
changes should take place in tlie Ottoman Empire
without bringing gain to Russia and accelerating
her march to Constantinople ; and therefore he
believed that, until he was prepared to take a
70 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, part in dismembering the Empire, it was his
' interest to preserve it intact. For more than
twenty years his actions as well as his declared
intentions were in accordance with this view ;
and it would be wrong to believe that the policy
thus shown forth to the world was only a mask.
Just as the love of killing game generates a sincere
wish to preserve it, so the very fact that the Czar
looked upon Turkey as eventual booty, made him
anxious to protect it from every other kind of
danger. In 1833 the Emperor Nicholas saved the
Sultan and his dynasty from destruction; and
although he accompanied this measure with an
act offensive to the other maritime Powers,* his
conduct towards Turkey was loyal. In 1840 he
again acted faithfully towards the Sultan, and
joined with England and the two chief Powers
of Germany in preventing the disruption of the
Ottoman Empire.
In 1844 the Czar came to England, and anxiously
strove to find out whether there were any of our
foremost statesmen who had grown weary of a
conservative policy in Turkey. He talked confi-
dentially with the Duke of Wellington and Lord
Aberdeen, and also, no doubt, with Sir Eobert
Peel ; but evidently meeting with no encourage-
ment, he covered his retreat by giving in his adhe-
sion to England's accustomed policy, and to do this
with the better effect, he left in our Foreign Office a
solemn declaration not only of his own policy, but
likewise, strange to say, of the policy of Austria ;
* The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 71
and all this he blended in a somewhat curious chap.
IV
manner with words which might be read as im- \
porting that his views had obtained the sanction
of the English Government. It would seem that
our Government agreed, as they naturally would, to
that part of the Czar's memorandum which was
applicable to the existing state of things, and
which, in fact, echoed the known opinion of Eng-
land ; and they also assented to the obvious pro-
position that the event of a breakiug-up of the
Ottoman Empire would make it important for the
great Powers to come to an understanding amongst
themselves ; but it must be certain that the Duke
of Wellington, Sir Eobert Peel, and Lord Aber-
deen refrained, as it is the custom of our states-
men to do, from all hypothetical engagements.
' Russia and England,' said this memorandum,
' are mutually penetrated with the conviction that
' it is for their common interest that the Ottoman
' Porte should maintain itself in the state of inde-
' pendence and of territorial possession which at
' present constitutes that Empire. Being agreed
' on this principle, Russia and England have an
' equal interest in uniting their efforts in order to
' keep up the existence of the Ottoman Empire,
' and to avert all the dangers which can place in
* jeopardy its safety. With this object, the essen-
' tial point is to suffer the Porte to live in repose,
' without needlessly disturbing it by diplomatic
' bickerings, and without interfering, without ab-
' solute necessity, in its internal alTairs.' Then,
after showing that the tendency of the Turki^sh
72 OKIGIX OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP. Government to evade treaties and ill-use its
IV
. '. Christian subjects ought to be checked rather by
the combined and friendly remonstrance of all the
Powers than by the separate action of one, the
memorandum proceeded : ' If all the great Powers
' frankly adopt this line of conduct, they will have
' a well-founded expectation of preserving the ex-
' istence of Turkey. However, they must not
' conceal from themselves how many elements of
' dissolution that Empire contains within itself.
' Unforeseen circumstances may hasten its fall.
' ... In the uncertainty which hovers over the
' future, a single fundamental idea seems to admit
' of a really practical application : it is, that the
' danger w^hich may result from a catastrophe in
' Turkey will be much diminished if, in the event
* of its occurring?, Eussia and Enjifland have come
' to an understanding as to the course to be taken
' by them in common. That understanding will
' be the more beneficial, inasmuch as it will have
' the full assent of Austria. Between her and
' Eussia there exists already an entire accord.'
His policy Upou the wholc, it would seem that from the
from 182y n 4 i
to 1853. peace of Adrianople down to the beginning of 1853
the state of the Czar's mind upon the Eastern
Question was this : He was always ready to come
forward as an eager and almost ferocious defender
of his Church, and he deemed this motive to be
one of such cogency that views resting on mere
policy and prudence were always in danger of
being overborne by it ; but in the absence of
events tending to bring this fiery principle into
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 73
action, he was really unwilling to face the troubles chap.
which would arise from the dismemberment of '
Turkey, unless he could know beforehand that
England would act with him. If he could have
obtained any anterior assurance to that effect, he
would have tried perhaps to accelerate the dis-
ruption of the Sultan's Empire ; but as England
always declined to found any engagements upon
the hypothesis of a catastrophe which she wished
to prevent, the Emperor had probably accustomed
himself to believe that Providence did not design
to allot to him the momentous labour of governing
the fall of the Ottoman Empire. He therefore
chose the other alternative, and not only spoke
but really did much for the preservation of an
Empire vvhicli he was not yet ready to destroy.
Still, whenever any subject of irritation occurred,
the attractive force of the opposite policy was
more or less felt; for it is not every man who,
having to choose between two lines of action, can
resolve to hold to the one and frankly discard the
other. In general, the principle governing such a
conflict is found to be analogous to the law which
determines the composition of mechanic forces,
and tlie mental struggle docs not result in a clear
adoption of either of the alternatives, but in a
mean betwixt tlie two. It was thus with the
Emperor Nicholas whenever it liappcned tliat he
was irritated by questions connected with the
action of tlie Turkish Government. At such times
his conduct, swayed in one direction by the notion
of dismembering the Empire, and in the other
74 OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
c H A P. direction by the policy of maintaining it, resulted
^ in an endeavour to establish what the English
Ambassador called ' a predominant influence over
' the counsels of the Porte, tending in the inter-
' est of absolute power to exclude all other influ-
' ences, and to secure the means, if not of hast-
' ening the downfall of the Empire, at least of
' obstructing its improvement, and settling its
' future destinies to the profit of Eussia, whenever
' a propitious juncture should arrive.' *
* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 237.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAX. 76
CHAPTER V.
It happened that at a time* when the Emperor chap.
of Russia was wrought to anger hy the triumph '
of the Latin over the Greek Church, there were Monteue-ra
troubles in one of the provinces bordering upon
the Austrian territory, and Omar Pasha, at the
head of a Turkish force, was operating against
the Christians in Montenegro. The continuance
of this strife on her frontier was no doubt alarm-
ing and vexatious to Austria ; but with the
P^mperor Nicholas the tidings of a conflict going
on between a Moslem soldiery and a Christian
people of the Greek faith could not fail to kindle
his religious zeal, and cause him to thirst for
vengeance against the enemies of his Church. Of
course the existence of this feeling on the part of
the Czar was well understood at Vienna, and it was
probably in order to anticipate his wishes, and
to remove his motives for interference, that the
Austrian Cabinet determined to address a peremp-
tory summons to the Porte, calling upnu the Sul-
The winter of 18,'2-3.
76 OKIGIN OF THE WAK OF 1853
CHAP, tan to withdraw his forces immediately from
^' Montenegro. The Czar secretly but studiously
represented that upon this and every other matter
touching his policy in Turkey he was in close
accord with Austria.* This, however, the Austrian
Government denies. Truthful men declare that
the Czar was not even informed beforehand of the
demand which Austria had resolved to press upon
the Porte. It is certain, however, that the Czar
determined to act as though he were in close con-
count _ cert with Austria. Count Leiningen was to be
mission. the bearer of the Austriau summous ; and simul-
taneously with the Count's departure from Vienna,
the Emperor Nicholas resolved to despatch to
the Porte an Ambassador Extraordinary, who was
The Czar's to declarc that a refusal to withdraw Omar Pasha's
plan of send-
ing another forces from Montenegro would be regarded by the
mission to o j
the Porte Czar as a ground of war between him and the
at the same
time. Sultan ; and the Ambassador was also to be
charged with the duty of obtaining redress for the
change which had been made in the allotment of
the Holy Sites to the contending Churches. It
may seem strange that the Czar should propose
to found a declaration of war upon a grievance
which was put forward by tlie Cabinet of
Vienna, and not by himself; but he was al-
ways eager to stand forward as the protector of
Christians of his own Church who had taken up
arms against their Moslem rulers ; and when, as
now, his conservative policy was disturbed by
* ' Eastern Papers,' part v., in several places.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 77
anger and religious zeal, his ulterior views upon chap.
the Eastern Question became too vague, and also, '.
no doubt, too alarming, to admit of their being
made the subject of a treaty engagement with
Austria.
Apparently, then, the plan of the Emperor riansof
Nicholas was this : he would make the rejection McUoias
of Count Leiningen's demand a ground of war
against the Porte, and then, acting under the
blended motives furnished by the assigned cause
of war and by his own separate grievance, he
woiild avenge the wrong done to his Church by
forcing the Sultan to submit to a foreign protec-
torate over all his provinces lying north of the
Balkan. This, however, was only one view of the
contemplated war. It might be applicable, if the
occupation of the tributary provinces should evoke
no element of trouble except the sheer resistance
of tlie enemy ; but the Czar, who did not well
vinderstand the Turkish Empire, was firmly con-
vinced at this time that the approach of war
would be followed by a rising of the Sultan's
Christian subjects. On the other hand, he feared,
and with better reason, that if the angry ^Nfoshnus
sliould deem the Sultan remiss or faint-hcurted
in the defence of his territory, they might rise
against their Government and fall upon the
Christian rayahs, whom they would regard as
the abettors of the invasion. He could not
fail to perceive that in the jn-ogvess of the con-
templated operations he might be forced by
78 OftlGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, events to give a vast extension to his views
' against the Sultan ; and that, even against his
will, and without being prepared for the crisis,
he might find himself called upon to deal with
the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in the midst
of confusion and massacre.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 79
CHAPTER VI.
Now, therefore, it became needful for the Emperor c ha p.
KichoLas to endeavour to divine the temper in '
which the other great Powers of Europe would be
inclined to regard his intended pressure upon the
Sultan, and the eventual catastrophe which, even
if he should wish it, he might soon be unable to
avert. It was of deep moment to him to know
what help or acquiescence he might reckon upon,
and what hostility he might have to encounter, if
he should be called upon to take part in regulating
the collapse of the Turkish Empire, and control-
ling the arrangements which were to follow.
He looked around. The policy of one of the Position of
n n -r> Austria in
great States of Europe was bent out ot its true regard to
. - . , Turkey at
course, and in others tliere were signs of weak thei.egin-
purpose. The power most deeply interested in
preventing the dismemberment of European Tur-
key had already determined to press upon the
Sultan an unjust and offensive demand ; and
although the statesmen of Vienna might have re-
solved in their own minds to stop slinrt at some
prescribed stage of the contemplated hostilities, it
80 OKIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
c H A P. was plain that Austria, when once engaged in war
' against the Sultan, would lose the standing-ground
of a Power which undertakes to resist change, and
would become so entangled by the mere progress
of events, that it might be difficult for her to ex-
tricate herself and revert to a conservative policy.
Indeed, the Emperor Nicholas might fairly expect
that Austria, having committed the original mis-
take of disturbing the peace, would afterwards
strive to cling to his friendship in the hope of
being able to moderate his course of action, and
avert or mitigate the downfall of the Turkish
Empire.
Of Prussia. With rcspect to Prussia, the Emperor Nicholas
was free from anxiety. As long as the measures
against the Sultan were carried on in alliance with
Austria, the States of Germany had little ground
for fearing that the interest which they had in the
freedom of the Lower Danube would be forgotten ;
and, this object being secured, or regarded as secure,
Prussia had less interest in the fate of the Ottoman
Empire than any of the other great Powers. There
being, therefore, no reason of State obliging him
to take a contrary course, it was to be expected
that the King of Prussia would continue to live
under the ascendancy which his Imperial brother-
in-law had long been accustomed to maintain.
Of France. Erauce, having great military and naval forces,
and a Mediterranean seabord, was well entitled to
frame for herself any honest system of policy which
she might deem to be the best guide for her con-
duct in Eastern affairs ; but her power to have
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 81
and assert any policy really her own could no chap.
longer be said to exist ; for, by this time, as we ^ "
shall by-and-by see more particularly, she had
fallen under the mere control of the Second
Bonaparte ; and in order to divine what France
would do, it was necessary to make out what
scheme of action her ruler would deem to be most
conducive to his comfort and safety. Even the
supposition that he would copy the First Napoleon
gave no sufficing clue for saying what his East-
ern policy ought to be, or what it was, or what it
was likely to be in any future week. France, as
wielded by a Bonaparte, had been known to the
Sultan sometimes as a friendly Power, sometimes
as a Power pretending to be friendly to him, but
secretly bargaining with Russia for the dismem-
berment of his empire ; * sometimes as a mere
predatory State seizing his provinces in time of
peace and without the pretence of a quarrel, -f* and
sometimes even as a rival Mahometan Power
I'or it is known that the First Bonaparte did not
scruple to call himself in Egypt a true Mussul-
man; J and although he now and then claimed
to bo ' the eldest son of the Catholic Church/ he
first introduced himself in the Levant as a soldier
of a nation which had 'renounced the ^Messiah.'
Upon the whole, there seemed to be no reason
why the new French Emperor should l)e unwilling
* At Tilsit.
t f.g., Bonaparte's predatory invasion of I'-^'vpt in time of
]>eacc.
+ A falsified copy of the manifesto was sent to France. The
one really issued represented Bonaparte as a ilahoiin'tan.
VOL. L F
82 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, to join with Eussia in trying to bring about the
' dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, and to
arrange the distribution of the spoil ; for the great
extension which France had given of late to her
navy, rendered views of this kind less chimerical
than they were at the time of the secret Articles
of Tilsit.* But, on the other hand, it was the
French Government which had provoked the
religious excitement under which Nicholas was
labouring ; and, although it is believed that when
his troubles increased upon him, the Czar after-
wards made overtures to France, it would seem
that in the beginning of 1853 he was too angry
and too scornful towards the French Emperor to
be able to harbour the thought of making him
his ally. Of the danger lest France should sud-
denly adopt a conservative policy, and undertake
to resist his arrangements in the East of Europe,
the Emperor Nicholas made light, for he had
resolved at this time not to place himself in con-
flict with England ; and the operations of any
Western Power in Turkey being dependent upon
sea-communications, he did not think it to be
within the wide compass of possible events that
France, single-handed and without the alliance of
her maritime neighbour, would or could obstruct
him in the Levant. ' He cared,' he said, ' very
* There is ground, I understand, for believing, though I do
not myself know the fact, that Louis Napoleon made early
overtures to the Czar for what one may call a predatory alli-
ance, and that the rebuff then inflicted upon him by Nicho-
las preceded his determination to seek a close alliance with
England.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 83
' little what line the French mi^ht think proper chap.
' to take in Eastern affairs ; and he had apprised ___!
' the Sultan that if his assistance were required
* for resisting the menaces of the French, it was
' entirely at the service of the Sultan.'* ' AVhen
' we (Eussia and England) are agreed, I am quite
' without anxiety as to the West of Europe : it is
' immaterial what the others may think or do.'-f*
There remained, then, only England, and upon or England.
the whole it had come to this : that the Emperor s^tTof"
Nicholas would feel able to meet the emergency there""
occasioned by the downfall of the Sultan, and
might perhaps be inclined to do a little towards
bringing about the catastrophe, if beforehand he
could come to an understanding with the English
Government as to the way in which Europe should
deal with the fragments of the Turkish Empire.
But he had learned, as he said, that an alliance
with England must depend upon the feeling of the
country at large, J and this he strove hard to
understand.
England had long been an enigma to the politi-
cal students of the Continent, but after the sum-
mer of 1851 they began to imagine that they
really at last understood her. They thought tliat
she was falling from her place among nations ;
and indeed there were signs which might well
lead a shallow observer to fancy that her ancient
spirit was failing her. An army is but the limb
(F a nation, and it is no more given to a people to
* ' Eastern Papers,' part v. p. 10. t Ibid., p. 1.
i Ibiii., i)art iii.
84 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, combine the possession of military strength with
' an unmeasured devotion to the arts of peace, than
it is for a man to be feeble and helpless in the
general condition of his body, and yet to have at
his command a strong right arm for the conveni-
ence of self-defence. The strength of the right
arm is as the strength of the man : the prowess of
an army is as the valour and warlike spirit of the
nation which gives it her flesh and blood. Eng-
land, having suffered herself to grow forgetful of
this truth, seemed, in the eyes of foreigners, to be
declining. It was not the reduction of the military
and establishments which was the really evil sign:
for to say nothing of ancient times the Swiss
in Europe, and some of the States of the North
American continent, have shown the world that
a people which almost dispenses with a standing
army may yet be among the most resolute and
warlike of nations ; but there was in England a
general decrying of arms. Well-meaning men
harangued and lectured in this spirit. What they
sincerely desired was a continuance of peace ; but
instead of taking the thought and acquiring the
knowledge which might have qualified them to
warn their fellow-countrymen against steps tend-
ing to a needless war, they squandered their in-
dignation upon the deceased authors of former
wars, and used language of such preposterous
breadth that what they said w^as as applicable to
one war as to another. At length they generated
a sect called the ' Peace Party,' which denounced
war in strong indiscriminate terms.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 85
Moreover, at this time extravagant veneration c ii a p
was avowed for mechanical contrivances, and the L_
very words which grateful nations had wrought
from out of their hearts in praise of tried chiefs
and heroes were plundered, as it were, from the
warlike professions, and given to those who for
their own gain could make the best goods. It
was no longer enough to say that an honest
tradesman was a valuable member of society, or
that a man who contrived a good machine was
ingenious. More was expected from those who
had the utterance of the public feeliug ; and it
was announced that 'glory' and 'lionour' nay,
to prevent all mistake, 'true honour' and 'true
' glory ' were due to him who could produce the
best articles of trade. At length, in the summer
of 1851, it was made to appear to foreigners that
this singular faith had demanded and obtained
an outward sign of its acceptance, and a solemn
recognition by Church and State. The foreigners
were mistaken. The truth is that the English, in
their exuberant strength and their carelessness
about tlie strict import of words, are accustomed
to indulge a certain extravagance in their demon-
strations of public feeling ; and this is the more
bewildering to foreign minds because it goes
along with practical moderation and wisdom.
What the English really meant was to give
people an opportunity of seeing the new inven-
tions and comparing all kinds of patterns, but,
above all, to have a new kind of show, and bring
about an immense gathering of people. Perhaps,
86 ORIGIN OF THE WAK OF 1853
CHAP, too, in the secret hearts of many, who were weary
' of tame life, there lurked a hope of animating
tumults. This was all the English really meant.
But the political philosophers of the Continent
'^ were resolved to impute to the islanders a more
profound intent. They saw in the festival a
solemn renouncing of all such dominion as rests
upon force. England, they thought, was closing
her great career by a whimsical act of abdication ;
and it must be acknowledged that there was
enough to confound men accustomed to lay stress
upon symbols. Eor the glory of mechanic Arts,
and in token of their conquest over nature, a
cathedral of glass climbed high over the stately
elms of Knightsbridge, enclosing them, as it were,
in a casket the work of men's hands, and it was
not thought wrong nor impious to give the work
the sanction of a religious ceremony. It was by
the Archbishop of Canterbury that the money-
changers were brought back into the temple.
Few protested. One man, indeed, aboimding in
Scripture, and inflamed with the sight of the glass
Babel ascending to the skies, stood up and de-
nounced the work, and foretold 'wars ' and 'judg-
' ments.' * But he was a prophet speaking to the
^v^ong generation, and no one heeded him. In-
deed, it seemed likely that the soundness of his
mind would be questioned ; and if he went on to
foretell that within three years England would be
engaged in a bloody war springing out of a dis-
pute about a key and a silver star, he was probably
* This I witnessed.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 87
adjudged to be mad, for the whole country at the chap.
time felt sure of its peaceful temper. Certainly ^'
it was a hard task for the sagacity of a foreigner
to pierce through these outward signs, and see
that, notwithstanding them all, the old familiar
' Eastern Question ' might be so used as to make
it rekindle the warlike ardour of England. Even
for Englishmen, until lonjT after the befrinning of
1853, it was difficult to foresee how the country
would be willing to act in regard to the defence
of Turkey ; and the representatives of foreign
Powers accredited to St James's might be excused
if they assured their Courts that England was
deep in pursuits which would hinder her from all
due assertion of her will as a great European Power.
Thus foreigners came to believe that the Eng-
lish nature was changed, and that for the future
the country would always be tame in Europe ;
and it chanced that, in the beginning of the year
1853, they were strengthened in their faith by
observing the structure of the ]\Iinistry then
recently formed ; for Lord Palmerston, wliose
name had become associated with the idea of a
resolute and watchful policy, was banished to the
Home Office, and the I'rime Minister was Lord
Aberdeen, the same statesman who had lield the
seals of tlie Foreign Oflice in former years, when
Austria was vainly entreating England to join
with her in defending the Sultan. The Emperor
Nicholas lieard the tidings of Lord Aberdeen's
elevation to the premiership witli a deliglit wliich
he did not suppress. Yet this very event, as will
88 OlilGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, be seen, was a main link in the chain of causes
L_ which was destined to draw the Czar into war,
and bring him in misery to the grave.
But if there was a phantasy in vogue which
seemed likely to make England acquiesce in
transactions adverse to her accustomed policy in
the East, there were other counsels afloat which,
although they were based on very different views,
seemed to tend in the same direction, for some of
our countrymen were beginning to perceive that
the restoration of a Bonapartist Empire in France
would bring back with it the traditions and the
predatory schemes of the First Napoleon. These
advisers were unwilling that the elements of the
great alliance, which, thirty-eight years before,
had delivered Europe from its thraldom, should
now be cast asunder for the mere sake of giving
a better effect to the policy which the Foreign
Office was accustomed to follow upon the Eastern
Question. And in truth this same Eastern policy,
though held by almost all responsible statesmen,
was not so universally received in England as to
go altogether unchallenged. The notion of Eng-
land's standing still and suffering the Turks to be
driven from Europe was not deemed so preposter-
ous as to be unworthy of being put forward by
men commanding great means of persuasion; and
before the new year was far advanced, the Em-
peror Nicholas had means of knowing that the old
English policy of averting the dismemberment of
Turkey would be gravely questioned, and brought
in an effective way to the test of printed discus-
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 89
sion.* Upon the whole, therefore, it seemed to chap
the Czar that now, if ever, England might be '-.-
willing to acquiesce in his encroachments upon
Turkey, and even perhaps to abet him in schemes
for the actual dismemberment of the Empire.
The Minister who represented the Queen at the sir
Eussian Court was Sir Hamilton Seymour. It is sJymoui-.
said that before there was a prospect of his being
accredited at St Petersburg, he had conceived a
high admiration of the qualities of the Emperor
Nicholas, and that this circumstance, becoming
known to the Czar, tended at first to make tlie
English IVIinister more than commonly welcome
at the Imperial Court. Sir Hamilton was not so
constituted as to be liable to the kind of awe
which other diplomatists too often felt in the
majestic presence of the Emperor; but his de-
spatches show that he was much interested, and,
so to speak, amused by the conversation of a prince
who wielded with his own very hand the power
of All the Russias. Moreover, Sir Hamilton had
the quickness and tlie presence of mind whicli
enable a man to seize the true bearing and import
of a sentence just uttered, and to meet it at the
instant with tlie fe^\' and appropriate words which
convey the needful answer, and provoke a still
further disclosure.
On the night of the 9th of January IS^''.^, the
English ^Minister was at a party gatlicred in the
palace of the Grand Duchess Helen, wlicn the
* See the 'articles' in that ilirectitui whicli the 'Times'
published in the early months of 1Sj3.
90
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
VI.
His conver-
sation with
the Em-
peror.
Emperor Nicholas approached him, and drew him
into conversation.
'You know my feelings,' the Emperor said,
' with regard to England, What I have told you
' before I say again: it was intended that the two
' countries should be upon terms of close amity;
' and I feel sure that this will continue to be the
' case. ... I repeat that it is very essential that
' the two Governments that is, that the English
' Government and I, and I and the English Gov-
' ernment should be on the best terms; and the
' necessity was never greater than at present. I
' beg you to convey these words to Lord John Kus-
* sell. When we are agreed, I am quite without
' anxiety as to the West of Europe ; it is immate-
* rial what the others may think or do. As to Tur-
' key, that is another question ; that country is in a
' critical state, and may give us all a great deal of
* trouble. And now I will take my leave of you.'
The Emperor then shook hands with Sir Hamil-
ton Seymour, and believed that he had closed the
conversation; but the skilled diplomatist saw and
grasped his opportunity ; and whilst his hand
was still held by the Emperor, Sir Hamilton Sey-
mour said, ' Sir, with your gracious permission, I
' would desire to take a great liberty.' Certainly,'
His Majesty replied ; 'what is it? let me hear.'
Sir Hamilton said, ' I should be particularly glad
' that your Majesty should add a few words which
' may tend to calm the anxiety with respect to
' the affairs of Turkey which passing events are
' so calculated to excite on the part of Her
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 9]
' Majesty's Government. Perhaps you will be chap.
' pleased to charge me with some additional assur- ^^-
' auces of this kind.'
The Emperor's words and manner, although still
very kind, showed that he had no intention of
speaking to Sir Hamilton of the demonstration
which he was about to make in the South. He
said, however, at first with a little hesitation, but,
as he proceeded, in an open and unhesitating man-
ner : ' The affairs of Turkey are in a very disor-
' ganised condition ; the country itself seems to
' be falling to pieces : the fall will be a great mis-
' fortune, and it is very important that England
' and Russia should come to a perfectly good un-
' derstanding upon these affairs, and that neither
' should take any decisive step of which the other
' is not apprised.' The Envoy answered that this
was certainly his view of the way in which Turk-
ish questions should be treated ; but the Emperor
tlien said, as if proceeding with his remark, ' Stay
' we have on our hands a sick man a very sick
' man ; it will be, I tell you frankly, a great mis-
' fortune if one of these days he sliould slip away
' from us, especially before all necessary arrange-
' ments were made. But, however, this is not the
' time to speak to you on that matter.'
On the 2 2d of January another interview took
place between the Emperor and the English En-
voy. 'I found llis Majesty,' writes Sir Hamilton
Seymour, 'alone ; he received me with givat kind-
' ness, saying that I had ajtjK'ared desirous to
' speak to him upon Eastern ail'uir.s ; that on his
92 OKIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. ' side there was no indisposition to do so, but that
' ' he must begin at a remote period. You know,
' His Majesty said, the dreams and plans in which
' the Empress Catherine was in the habit of in-
* dulging ; these were handed down to our time ;
' but while I inherited immense territorial pos-
' sessions, I did not inherit those visions those
' intentions, if you like to call them so. On the
' contrary, my country is so vast, so happily cir-
' cumstanced in every way, that it would be un-
' reasonable in me to desire more territory or
' more power than I possess ; on the contrary, I am
' the first to tell you that our great, perhaps our
' only danger is that which would arise from an
' extension given to an Empire already too large.
' Close to us lies Turkey, and in our present
' condition nothing better for our interests can be
' desired. The times have gone by when we had
' anything to fear from the fanatical spirit or the
' military enterprise of the Turks ; and yet the
' country is strong enough, or has hitherto been
' strong enough, to preserve its independence, and
' to insure respectful treatment from other coun-
' tries.
' Well, in that Empire there are several millions
' of Christians whose interests T am called upon to
' watch over, while the right of doing so is secured
' to me by treaty. I may truly say that I make a
' moderate and sparing use of my right, and I will
' freely confess that it is one which is attended
' with obligations occasionally very inconvenient ;
' but I cannot recede from the discharge of a dis-
BETWEEN THE CZAR AXD THE SULTAN. 93
' tinct duty. Our religion as established in this chap.
' country, came to us from the East, and there are .
' feelings as well as obligations which never must
' be lost sight of.
' Now Turkey, in the condition which I have
' described, has by degrees fallen into such a state
' of decrepitude that, as I told you the other night,
' eager as we all are for the prolonged existence of
' the man (and that I am as desirous as you can
' be for the continuance of his life, 1 beg you to be-
' lieve), he may suddenly die upon our hands : we
' cannot resuscitate what is dead. If the Turkish
' Empire falls, it falls to rise no more ; and I put
' it to you, therefore, whether it is not better to be
' provided beforehand for a contingency, than to
' incur the chaos, confusion, and the certainty of
* an European war, all of which must attend the
' catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly, and
' before some ulterior system has been sketched.
' This is the point to which I am desirous you
' should call the attention of your Government.'
Sir Hamilton Seymour adverted to the objec-
tion which the English Government habitually felt
to the plan of taking engagements upon possible
eventualities, and said that disinclination might
be expected in England to the idea of disposing,
by anticipation, of the succession of an old friend
and ally. ' The rule is a good one,' the Emperor
replied ' good at all times, especially in times of
' uncertainty and change like the present ; still it
' is of the greatest importance that we should un-
' derstand one another, and not allow events to
94 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. ' take us by surprise. Now I desire to speak to
' ' you as a friend and as a " gentleman : " if Eng-
' land and I arrive at an understanding in this
' matter, as regards the rest it matters little to me ;
' it is indifferent to me what others do or think.
' Frankly, then, I tell you plainly that if England
' thinks of establishing herself one of these days
' at Constantinople, I will not allow it. I do not
' attribute this intention to you, but it is better
' on these occasions to speak plainly. For my
' part, I am equally disposed to take the engage-
' ment not to establish myself there as proprie-
' tor that is to say, for as occupier I do not say :
' it might happen that circumstances, if no pre-
' vious provision were made, if everything should
' be left to chance, might place me in the position
' of occupying Constantinople.'
On the 20th of February the Emperor came up
to Sir Hamilton Seymour at a party given by the
Grand Duchess Hereditary, and in the most gra-
cious manner took him apart, saying he desired
to speak to him. ' If your Government,' said the
Emperor, ' has been led to believe that Turkey
' retains any elements of existence, your Govern-
' ment must have received incorrect information.
' I repeat to you that the sick man is dying, and
' we can never allow such an event to take us by
' surprise. We must come to some understanding.'
Then Sir Hamilton Seymour felt himself able
to infer that the Czar had settled in his own mind
that the hour for bringing about the dissolution of
the Ottoman Empire must be at hand.
BETWEEN THE CZAE AND THE SULTAN. 95
The next day the Emperor again sent for Sir chap.
Hamilton Seymour, and after combating the de-
termination of the English Government to persist
in regarding Turkey as a Power which might, and
which probably would, remain as she was, he at
length spoke out his long-reserved words of temp-
tation. He thought, he said, that in the event of
the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, it might
be less difficult to arrive at a satisfactory terri-
torial arrangement than was commonly believed,
and then he proceeded : ' The Principalities are, in
' fact, an independent State under my protection :
* this might so continue. Servia might receive the
' same form of government. So again with Bul-
' garia : there seems to be no reason why this pro-
' vince should not form an independent State. As
' to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to
' England of that territory. I can then only say,
' that if, in the event of a distribution of the Otto-
' man succession upon the fall of the Empire, you
' should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no
' objection to offer. I would say tlie same thing
' of Candia : that island might suit you, and I do
' not know why it should not become an English
possession.'
' As I did not wish,' writes Sir Hamiltou Sey-
mour, 'that tlie Emperor sliould imagine that an
' English public servant was caught by this sort
' of overture, I simply answered that I had always
' understood that the English views upon Egypt
' did not go beyond the point of securing a safe
' and ready conmiunication between British India
VI.
96 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. ' and the mother country. Well, said the Ern-
L__- ' peror, induce your Government to write again
' upon these subjects to write more fully, and to
' do so without hesitation. I have conj&dence in
' the English Government. It is not an engage-
' ment, a convention, which I ask of them ; it is a
* free interchange of ideas, and, in case of need,
' the word of a " gentleman ; " that is enough be-
' tween us.' *
Reception of In auswcr to thcso overtures, the Government
overtures by of the Quecn disclaimed all notion of aiming at
the English . .
Govern- the possBSsion of either Constantinople or any
other of the Sultan's possessions, and accepted the
assurances to the like effect which were given by
the Czar. It combated the opinion that the ex-
tinction of the Ottoman Empire was near at
hand, and deprecated the discussions based on
that supposition as tending directly to produce
the very result against which they were meant to
provide. Finally, our Government, with abund-
ance of courtesy, but in terms very stringent and
clear, peremptorily refused to enter into any kind
of secret engagement with Kussia for the settle-
ment of the Eastern Question.
These communications of January and February
1853 were carried on between the Emperor of
Ptussia and the English Government upon the
understanding that they were to be held strictly
secret ; and for more than a year this concealment
was maintained. It will be for a later page to
show the ground on which the engagement for
* ' Eastern Papers,' part v.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 97
secrecy was broken, and the effect which the dis- chap.
closure wrought upon the opinion of Europe, and '_ _
upon the feelings of the people in England.
The Czar was baffled by the failure of his some-
what shallow plan for playing the tempter with
the English Government ; and an event which
occurred at the same time still further conduced
to the abandonment of his half- formed designs
against the Sultan.
When Nicholas came to the singular resolution
of declaring war against the Sultan in the event
of his rejecting Austria's demand respecting Mon-
tenegro, he imagined, perhaps, that his counsels
were kept strictly secret ; but it seems probable
that a knowledge or suspicion of the truth may
have reached the Turkish Government, and helped
to govern its decision. What we know is, that Result or
^ . ' Count
the demand made by Austria was carried bv i.tiuingcn'
^ _ "^ luissiou.
Count Leiningen to Constantinople, and that,
liaving been put forward in terms offensively
peremptory, it was suddenly acceded to by the
sagacious advisers of the Sultan.
This last continfrcncy seems to have been unfore- its I'fr.'ct
seen by tlie Emperor Nicholas. At first, the tidings piims "f
... . . thoCair.
kindled in his mind strong feelings of joy, for
he looked upon the deliverance of Montenegro as
a triumph of his Church over the jMoslem. But
he soon perceived that this sudden attainment of
the object to be sought would disconcert his plans.
He found himself all at once deprived of the basis
on which his scheme of action had rested ; and
except in respect of the question of the key and
VOL. I. G
98 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, the silver star, there was nothing that he had to
charge against the Sultan. On the other hand, he
had failed in his endeavour to win over England
to his views. He therefore relapsed into the use
of the conservative language which he had been
accustomed to apply to the treatment of the
Eastern Question ; professed his willingness to
labour with England to prolong the existence of
the Turkish Empire ; and even went so far as to
join with our Government in declaring that the
way to achieve this result was to abstain 'from
' harassing the Porte by imperious demands, put
' forward in a manner humiliating to its indepeu-
He aban- ' dcuce and its dignity.' * He abandoned the in-
dons the i.- ^-j. i i-ii-
idea of go- teution 01 gomg to war, and even deprived him-
self of the means of taking such a step with
effect ; for immediately upon hearing the result of
Count Leiningen's mission, he stopped the pur-
chase of horses required for enabling him to take
the field.
"* ' Efiritern Papers, ' part v. p. 25.
ing to war.
BETWEEN THE CZAE AND THE SULTAN. 99
CPIAPTER VIL
But when a man's mind has once been thrown chap.
VII
forward towards action, it gains so great a mo- ^_
mentum that the ceasing of the motive which
first disturbed liis repose does not instantly bring
him to a stand. The Czar had found himself The i.ain oi
suddenly deprived of his ground of war against
the Porte by the embarrassing success of Count
Leiuingen's mission, and in the same week he
was robbed of his last hope of the alliance which
he most desired by the failure of his overtures to
England. He gave up the idea of going to war,
and policy connnanded that for a while he should
rest ; but already he had so acted that rest was
j)ain to him. lie could not but be tortured with
the thought that the furtive words which he had
uttered to Sir Hamilton Seymour on the 21st of
February were known to the Queen of England
and to several of her foremost statesmen. i\Iore-
over, in a thousand forms, the bitter fruits of the
delivery of the key and the star of Jjcthlehem, and
the tidings of the triumph which the Latins had
gained over his Church, and of the agony which
100 OKIGIX OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, this discomfiture had inflicted upon pious zealots,
' were coming home upon him, and from time to
time in a fitful way were tormenting him, and
then giving him a little rest, and then once more
rekindling his fury. So he began to turn this
way and that, in order that by turmoil he might
smother the past, win back the self-respect which
he had lost, and gain some counter- victory for his
Church, He had already gathered heavy bodies
of troops in the south of his empire ; he had a
powerful fleet in the Euxine ; the Bosphorus was
nigh. The Turks, trusting mainly to heavenly
power, were ill prepared. No French or English
fleets were in the Levant. Above all, that shady
garden at Therapia, commanding the entrance of
the Euxine, and seeming to be the fit dwelling-
place for a statesman who watched against inva-
sion from the North, was no longer paced by the
English Ambassador. The great Eltchi was away.
Many thought it was possible for the Czar to
seize the imperial city, and treat with the anger
of Europe from the Seraglio Point.
But Nicholas, though he was capable of ventur-
ing a little way into wrong paths, and w^as often
blinded to the difference between right and wrong
by a sense of religious duty, was far from being a
lawless prince. His conscience, w^arped by Faith,
would easily reconcile him to an act of violence
against a Mahometan Power ; but he never ques-
tioned that the fate of Turkey was a matter of
concern to other Christian States as well as to his
own : and he did not at this time intend to take
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 101
auy steps which England would regard as an out- chap.
rage. The plan which he resorted to as a means L_
of giving vent to his anger, and satisfying that i"''? ^.'^-"'^
DO r> ' JO ni'w sclieine
tendency to action which had been engendered ^'f"'-'^'""-
by his preparations against the Sultan, was to go
on with the scheme of sending an Extraordinary
Embassy to Constantinople, to make up for the
sudden loss of the Montenegro grievance by lay-
ing an increased stress upon the question of the
Holy Places, and to force the Sultan to settle the
dispute upon terms which, without wounding the
Latins more than could be helped, should still do
justice to the Greek Church. Any attempt at
resistance which the Porte might make, by alleg-
ing the counter-pressure of Erance, was to be met
by at once engaging that the Emperor of Russia
with all his forces should defend the Sultan's ter-
ritory against every attack by a Western Power ;
and well knowing that j^rotective aid of such a
kind was a burthen and not a gift, the Emperor
seems to have directed that this alliance should
lje_ not merely offered, but pressed.
P>ut the secret purpose of the mission was to
make the past defaults of the Turkish Govern-
ment in regard to the Holy Places of Palestine
a groiuid for extorting a treaty engagenu'ut by
wliich the Greek Clmrch throughout all Turkey
would be brought under the protection of Pussia.
It seemed to the Czar that his half-com})leted
l)reparations for war would give to his demands
exactly that kind of support which their offensive
character required; for the position of tlie truops
102
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
VII.
His choice
of an Am-
Prince
Mentschi-
koff.
gathered in Bessarabia, and the activity of the last
few months in Sebastopol, would not fail to make
the Turks see that force was at hand. The arma-
ments in readiness were more than enough for
the occupation of the Darmbian Principalities ;
and as soon as they should become swollen by the
unfailing aid of rumours, they might easily grow
to be thought a sufficing force for some great en-
terprise against Constantinople.
For some time, the Emperor Nicholas hesitated
in the choice of the person to whom this extra-
ordinary mission should be entrusted. He hesi-
tated between Count Orloff and Prince Mentschi-
koff. He did not hesitate because he was doubt-
ing which of the two men would be the fittest
instrument of his policy, but rather because he
had not determined what his policy should be.
Count Orloff was a wise and moderate man, nmch
associated with the Czar, and accustomed to speak
to him with becoming freedom. To make choice
of this trusty friend was to avoid any such out-
rage as would lead to the isolation of liussia. To
choose Prince Mentschikoff was to choose a man
whose feelings and prejudices might cause him to
embitter the Czar's dispute with the Porte, and
who, to say the least, could have no pretension to
moderate the zeal of his master. It was for this
very reason, perhaps, that he was preferred. In
an evil hour Nicholas brought his doubts to an
end, and made choice of Prince Mentschikoff.
Mentschikoff was a Prince of the sort which
Court almanacs describe as ' Serene.' He was a
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 103
General, a High Admiral, the Governor of a great chap.
VII
province, and, in short, so far as concerns official '__^
and titular rank was one of the chief of the Czar's
subjects; but Eussia has not disclosed the grounds
on which it was thought fit to entrust to him
first the peace, and then the military renown of
his country ; for when liussians are asked about
the qualities of mind which caused a man to be
chosen for a momentous embassy, and for the
command of an army defending his country from
invasion, they only say that the Prince was
famous for the strange and quaint sallies of his
wit. However, he was of the school of those who
desired to govern the affairs of the State upon
principles violently Eussian, and without the aid
and counsel of foreigners. It was understood
that he held the Turks in contempt ; and it was
said also that he entertained a strong dislike of
the English. He had not been schooled in diplo-
macy, but he was to be entrusted with the power
of using a threatening tone, and was to be sup-
ported by a fieet held in readiness, and by bodies
of troops impending upon the Turkish frontiers.
Tlie Emperor Nicholas seems to have thought
that harsh words and a display of force might be
made to supply want of skill.
Great latitude was given to Prince ^Mcntschikoff
in regard to the means by wliich he was to attain
the objects of his mission ; but it is certain that
the general tenor of his instructions contravened
with singular exactness the honourable and gen-
erous language in which the Emperor Nicholas
104 OKIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP, loved to mark out the duty of the great Powers
of Europe towards Turkey. In the last Secret
Memorandum solemnly placed in the hands of our
Envoy at St Petersburg as a record of the Em-
peror's determination, Nicholas, as we have seen,
had laid it down that it was the duty of great
Powers not to 'harass the Porte by imperious
' demands put forward in a manner humiliating
' to its independence and dignity;' and yet these
very words, which so well point out what the Czar
said ought not to be done, are a close description
of that which he ordered his Ambassador to do.
Mentsciii- The approach of Prince Mentschikoff to Con-
stantinople, stantinople was heralded by the arrival of Staff
officers, who were charged to prepare the way,
and cause men to feel the import of the com-
ing embassy. For many days rumour was busy.
When for some time men's minds had been kept
on the rack, it became known that the expected
vessel of war was nearing the gates of the Bos-
phorus ; and at length, surrounded with pomp, and
supported by the silent menace of fleets equipped,
and battalions marching on the Danube, Prince
Mentschikoff entered the palace of the Eussian
Embassy. The next day another war- steamer
came down, bringing the Vice- Admiral Korniloff,
the commander of the Black Sea fleet, and the
Chief of the Staff of the land forces under General
Eudiger, with several other officers. All this war-
like following went to show that the Ambassador
had the control of the military and naval forces
which were hovering upon the Turkish Empire.
Divan.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 105
There, moreover, came tidinfrs that General Dan- chap.
VII.
nenberg, then commanding the cavalry of the 5th
corps d'arm^e, had pushed his advance-guard close
up to the frontiers of Moldavia ; that funds had
been transmitted to merchants in Moldavia and
Wallachia for the purchase of rations ; and finally,
that the fleet at Sebastopol was getting ready to
sail at the shortest notice.
In the midst of the alarm engendered by these
demonstrations, Prince Mentschikoff began the du-
ties of his mission ; and he so acted as to make
men see that he was charged to coerce, and not to
persuade. With his whole Embassy he went to the Pan
Grand Vizier's apartment at the Porte, but refused
to obey the custom which imperatively required
that he should wait upon Fuad EfTendi, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs. With him, as it was under-
stood, tlie Ambassador declined to hold intercourse.
Fuad EfTendi, the immediate object of the affront,
was the ablest member of the Government. He
instantly resigned his office. The Sultan accept-
ed his resignation. There was a panic. It was
understood that Prince Mentschikoff was ffoing to
demand terms deeply humiliating and injurious
to the Sultan, and that a refusal to give way
would be followed by an instant attack. The
Grand Vizier believed that the mission, far from
being of a conciliatory character, as pretended,
was meant, on tlie contrary, 'to win some import-
' ant riglit from Turkey, which would destroy her
' independence,' and that the Czar's object was *to
' trample under foot the rights of the Porte and
106 OEIGIX OF THE WAK OF 1853
CHAP. ' the independence of the Sovereign.' * In short,
' the Divan was so taken by surprise, and so over-
whelmed by alarm, as to be in danger of going
to ruin by the path of concession for the sake of
averting a sudden blow. But there remained one
hope the English fleet was at Malta ; and the
Colonel Grand Vizier went to Colonel Eose, who was then
in charge of our affairs at the Porte, and entreated
that he would request our Admiral at ]\Ialta to
come up to Vourla, in order to give the Turkish
Government the support of an approaching fleet.
Colonel Eose, being a firm, able man, with strength
to bear a sudden load of responsibility, was not
afraid to go beyond the range of common duty.
He consented to do as he was asked; and although
he was disavowed by the Government at home,
and although his appeal to the English Admiral
was rejected, it is not the less certain that his
mere consent to call up the fleet allayed the panic
which was endangering at that moment the very
life of the Ottoman Empire. Happily there was
not a complete perfect communication by tele-
graph between London and Constantinople ; and
long before the disavowal reached the Bosphorus
the Turkish statesmen had recovered their usual
calm. On the other hand, the Eussian Govern-
ment was much soothed by the intelligence that
the English Cabinet had declined to approve
Colonel Eose's request to the Admiral; and it
might be said with truth that both the Act of the
Queen's Eepresentative and the disavowal of it by
* ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 88.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 107
his Government at home were of advantage to the chap.
public service.* L_
It would seem that in the middle of the month The czar
seemingly
of March the anjier of the Emperor Nicholas had tranquu-
o ^ lised.
grown cool. He had always felt the difficulty
of basing a war upon the question of the Holy
Places alone, and the language of his Government
at this time was moderate and pacific. -j- But un-
happily there were distinct centres of action in
Paris, in London, in St Petersburg, and in Con-
stantinople, and it was constantly happening that
when the fire seemed to Ije got down in three out
of the four ca])itals, it would spring up with fresh
strength in the fourth. Thus, at a moment when
the panic of the Divan had entirely ceased, and
when the Court of St Petersburg, already inclining
towards moderation, was about to be further paci-
fied by the welcome tidings which informed it of
the disavowal of Colonel Pose by the Home Gov-
ernment, the Emperor of the French sudderdy
determined to send a naval force into the Levant,
and notwithstanding the opposition of our Govern-
ment, the French fleet was ordered to Salamis. Tiie Kn-ncii
ihis was done witliout sound reason, lor the panic a.Miiy order-
ed t(i SiUa-
which had induced Colonel Rose to appeal to the '"is.
English Admiral at ^Nlalta had long ago ceased.
The step gave deep umbrage to Russia.
* Colonel Rose was the officer who afterwanls Lecaiiie illus-
trious for his career of victory in India, hut at that later time
he was known to his grateful country as Sir Hugh llosc. Uv
is now Lord Strathnairn.
+ Lord Cowley's account of Count Ncssclrodc's Dcsjiatch of
the 15th March. ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. DO.
108 OIIIGIX OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. When the Emperor Nicholas learned that the
VII
L_ advance of the French fleet had been disapproved
by England, his anger was followed by gladness,
and the relations between the Governments of St
Petersburg and London then seemed to be upon
so friendly a footing as to exclude the fear of
a disagreement. Count ISTesselrode assured Sir
The Czar's Hamilton Seymour that Eussia was alle^infr no
conceal- . ''. , ^ -i i ^
ments. grievance against the Turkish Government except
in regard to the question of the Holy Places ; and
even this one remaining subject of complaint he
began to treat as a slighter matter than it had
hitherto appeared to be. It is hard to have to
believe that all this good-humour of the Court of
St Petersburg was simulated ; and yet the assur-
ances of Count Nesselrode distinctly went to ex-
clude the belief that Eussia could ever do that
which she was actually doing. Yielding, it would
seem, to an instinct of wild cunning, the Czar
failed to understand that the chance of carrying a
point at Constantinople by a diplomatic surprise
could never be of such worth as to deserve to be
set against his old reputation for truthfulness.
If he thought at all, he would see that the differ-
ence between what he was saying and what he
was doing would be laid bare in three weeks.
Yet he gave way to the strange impulse which
forced him to go and try to steal a trophy for his
Church. He concealed from the French as well
as from our Government all knowledge of his
intention to endeavour to extort from the Sultan
an engagement giving to Eussia the protectorate
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 109
of the Greek Church in Turkey. The Cabinets chap.
of the Western Powers were suffered to gather '__
the first tidings of this scheme from their Con-
stantinople despatches, and the trust which the
English Government had hitherto placed in the
honour and good faith of the Emperor Nicholas
was suddenly and for ever destroyed.
Meanwhile Prince Mentschikoff brought for- Mentschi-
ward the claims of the Greek Church in regard to urunds.*^
the Holy Places, but he seemed disposed to be
moderate in his demands respecting the shrines,
if the Turkish Government should show any will-
ingness to give way to him in regard to the other
and more important object which he was to
endeavour to compass. Striving to take advan-
tage of the alarm created by his Embassy, he pro-
posed to wring from the Porte a treaty engage-
ment, conceding to the Emperor of Russia a pro-
tectorate over the Greek Church in Turkey. At
first he spoke darkly, intimating that he had
some great demand to press upon the Sultan, but
not yet choosing to say what the demand might
be. Then he began to say to the Turkish Minis-
ters that if they would appease the anger of tlie
Czar, and deliver their State from danger, it would
be well for them at once to turn away from
France and England, trust themselves wlioUy to
the generosity of the Emperor of Pussia, and begin
by giving a solemn assurance that they would
withhold from the representatives of the Western
Powers all knowledge of tlie negotiation which
they were required to undertake. ' We are aware,'
110 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, said the Grand Vizier, 'that the obiect of his
VII . .
; ' (Prince Mentschikoffs) mission is to make a
' secret treaty of alliance with us. He has not
' demanded it officially, but he has told some
' persons in his confidence, who (he knows) are in
' communication with us, that we do wrong to
' rely on the English and French Governments,
' for experience should at length have proved to
' us that we have lost much and gained nothing
' by following their policy and advice. By this
' language he seeks to gain their support, and to
* insure their concurrence in the work of the
' secret treaty which he is seeking to conclude.
' His policy is most confused. At one time he
' would attract us to Russia by mildness, spreading
' abroad a report that the intentions of his Govern-
' ment are pacific. At another time he seeks to
' gain us over by pointing out the disadvantages
* and inutility of our reliance upon England and
* France, and how M^rong we are in following the
' advice of those two Powers, to whom we ought
' not to be attached, especially if we consider that
' the nature of their Constitution differs from that
* of ours, which, on the contrary, resembles that
' of Eussia and Austria. Prince IMentschikoff
' had a conference with Eifaat Pasha two days
' ago. He told him that before communicating
' to the Sublime Porte the nature of his mission
' and the demands of his Government, and before
' giving any explanation, he required from Eifaat
' Pasha the formal promise of the Porte, that it
' would not communicate to the representative
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. Ill
' either of England or of France anything what- chap.
' ever as to what he demanded or proposed ; that '__
' it was his wish that it should be treated with
' the greatest secrecy, otherwise he would not
' enter upon the subject.' *
The Grand Vizier declared that the Turkish
Government had at once refused to withhold from
the Western Powers a knowledge of the impending
negotiation, but it seems likely that some alarmed
member of the Turkish Government may have
been led to give the required promise of secrecy,
for before the end of jSIarch Prince jMentschikoff
vouchsafed to disclose the offers and the demands
of his Sovereign. lie verbally expressed the
Emperor's wish to enter into a secret treaty with
Turkey, putting a fleet and 400,000 men at her
disposal if she ever needed aid against any
AVestern Power. As ' the equivalent for this
' proffered aid,' said the Grand Vizier, ' Pussia
' further secretly demanded an addition to the
' treaty of Kainardji, whereby tlie Greek Church
' should be placed entirely under Pussian protec-
' tion without reference to Turkey. Pi'ince Ment-
' schikoff had stated that the greatest secrecy
' must be maintained relative to this proposition ;
' and that, should Turkey allow it to be made
' known to England, he and bis mission would
' instantly quit Constantinople.' f
Tliis kind of pressure upon the Turkish Gov-
ernment was perhaps well fitted for the days of
alarm which immediately followed Prince Ment-
' Eivstem Papers,' part i. p. 111. + Ibid. p. 112.
112 OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, scliikoff's arrival at Constantinople ; but an extor-
L_ tion attempted at the end of March was divided
by a very safe interval from the 6th of the month
when Colonel Eose, by requesting the English
Admiral to come into the Levant, had been able
to stop the panic. Eifaat Pasha, the Minister
who had succeeded to Fuad Effendi in the De-
partment of Foreign Affairs, was firm. ' I am not
' a child/ said he in his message to Colonel Eose ;
' I am an old Minister, very well acquainted with
' the treaties which unite the Sublime Porte with
' the friendly Powers ; and I understand, God be
' praised ! too well the importance of our good re-
' lations with England and Prance, the full weight
' of the obligation to maintain treaties, the whole
' extent of the evil which would result to my
' Government if it departs from or infringes them,
' to hesitate a single instant to inform their respec-
' tive representatives of every demand or proposal
' which Eussia might be desirous of enforcing
' upon us, and which might not be in accordance
' with the rights recorded in those treaties.' *
Finding himself thus encountered, and being
unskilled in negotiation, Prince Mentschikoff had
already begun to draw to himself the support of
an army. The English Vice -Consul at Galatz
reported that preparations had been made in
Bessarabia for the passage of 120,000 men, and
that battalions were marching to the south from
all directions. Though the time of mere panic was
past, there was ' anxiety and alarm ' in the Divan.-f"
* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. Hi. f Ibid. p. 124.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 113
But Prince Mentscliikoff was destined soon to chap.
learn that there was a power in the world which ^^^-
could exert more governance over Turkish states-
men than the march of the Czar's battalions.
Before the week was past he had to undergo the
sensation of encountering a formidable mind.
VOL. 1.
114 OEIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAPTER VIII.
CHAP. When a great country is induced, by virtue or by
policy, to refrain from using her physical strengtli
'influence.' against a Sovereign of a weaker State, she often
solaces herself for this painful effort of modera-
tion by showing her neighbour the error of his
ways and giving him constant advice ; and if it
happen that two or more great Powers are thus
engaged in tendering their rival counsels to the
same State, they will be prone to struggle with
one another for the ascendancy, and to do this
with a zeal scarcely intelligible to men who have
never seen that kind of strife. The prize con-
tended for is commonly known by the name of
' influence ; ' and although this moral sovereignty
over foreign States may be a privilege of small
intrinsic worth, the Princes and Statesmen who
have once begun combating for the prize, and
even the merchants and the travellers who have
happened to be on the spot, and to witness with
, , any attention the animating incidents of the
Grounds for '' " _ _
foreign in- conflict, havc generally had their zeal kindled.
terference ' " '
in Turkey. Nqw the Ottoman polity is of such a nature as
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAX. 115
almost to court this kind of interference. The chap.
practice of suffering the Christian Churches to . 1_
live and thrive separate and apart without being
subjected to any attempt at amalgamation, has
given to these communities so many of the privi-
leges of distinct national existence that they long
to make their independence still more complete,
and to do this, not by attempting to lay their
timid hands upon the government, but rather by
becoming more and more separate, and at last
dropping off from the Empire. Therefore, instead
of harbouring schemes for rising in arms against
the Sultan, they have accustomed themselves to
seek to form ties of a political and religious kind
with foreign States, and to appeal to them for
protection against their Ottoman rulers. Here,
then, of course, a gaping cleft was open to receive
the wedge which diplomatists call a ' Protectorate.'
Russia claimed a moral right to protect the ten or
fourteen millions of Turkish subjects who con-
stituted the Greek Church, and she availed her-
self of some loose words which had crept into
the old treaty of Kainardji as a ground for main-
taining that this moral claim was converted into
a distinct right by treaty engagement. Austria,
armed with treaties, was empowered to })rotect
the Eoman Catholic worship, but France had
always been accustomed to busy herself in watch-
ing over that portion of the Latin Church whicli
was connected witli Palestine and Syria. It is
true that the Armenian, the Coptic, and the Black
Churches were without any recognised foreign
116 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, patron, and flourished quite as well as their
'__ protected brethren ; hut the numbers composing
these Churches were scanty in comparison with
the worshippers following the Greek ritual ; and
it may be said that the bulk of the Christian
population of Turkey had contracted the habit of
looking abroad for support.
Again, the Turkish Government was always so
sensible of the distinctness of the ' nations ' held
under its sway, and of the hardship of keeping
Christians under the close subjection of the Mos-
lem system, that even in the times when the Sul-
tans were in the pride of their strength they
generously allowed humble foreigners, though
living in Turkey, to have the protection of their
country's flag, and to enjoy immunities which
(except in the case of Sovereigns and their ambas-
sies) the Governments of Christian countries have
never been accustomed to give to any of their
foreign guests. These privileges had been grant-
ed to the principal States of Europe by treaty
engagements which went by the name of 'capitu-
' lations ;' and they were so extensive that, except
in regard to one or two specified descriptions of
crime and outrage, a foreigner in Turkey who was
a native of any of the States to whom these capit-
ulations had been granted, was exempt from the
laws of the country in which he dwelt. And these
privileges were not even confined to foreigners, for
Ambassadors at the Porte claimed and exercised
a right of withdrawing a Turkish subject from the
laws of his country by taking him into their ser-
BETWEEN THE CZAE AND THE SULTAN. 117
vice, or even by a mere written grant of protection ; chat
and the streets of Pera and Galata -were filled witli '
Orientals of various races who had contrived to
be turned into 'Eussians/ or 'Frenchmen,' or
' Englishmen.' Thus it resulted that not only the
great communities forming Churches or ' nations,'
but also a great number of individuals, often clever,
stirring, and unscrvipulous men, were always la-
bouring to attract the interference of some great
Power, furnishing it with ready grounds of dis-
pute, and stimulating its desire for preponderance.
P)Ut there was a broad difference between the pro-
tectorate of Piussia and that of the other States of
Europe ; for wliilst the Eoman Catholic State?
could only reckon a few hundred thousand of
clients, and whilst tlie Protestant subjects of the
Porte were too few to form a body in the State,
the number of Greek Christians who looked to
Russia for protection amounted to from ten to
fourteen millions. This fact save OTeat strenfjth
and substance to the pretensions of Russia, but,
on the otlier hand, it made her interference in a
high degree dangerous; for it was clear tliat if
the guardianship of so vast a number of tlie Ra-
yahs or Turkish subjects were to be suffered to
lapse into tlie hands of a foreign Sovereign, the
empire of tlic Sultans would pass away. All the
great Powers of Europe were accustonu>d to press
upon the Sultan the duty of confoi'riiig upon his
people, and especially upon his Chi-istiaii sultjects,
1be blessing of good and equal government; but
Russia ur<ied these demands with the not unnat-
118
OKIGIX OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP,
VIII.
Rivalry
between
Nicholas
and Sir
Stratford
Canninpr.
Sir
Stratford
Canning.
ural desire to prepare for herself a firm standing-
ground in ttie midst of her neighbour's territory ;
whilst Austria and England, being interested in
averting the dismemberment of the Sultan's do-
minions, gave their counsel with a real view to
make the Sultan do what they deemed to be for
his own good.
For ascendancy on this the favourite arena of
diplomacy two men had long contended. They
were altogether unequal in station, and yet were
not ill matched. The first of the combatants was
the Emperor Mcholas ; the other was Sir Strat-
ford Canning. This kinsman of Mr Canning the
Minister had been bred from early life to the ca-
reer of diplomacy, and whilst he was so young
that he could still perhaps think in smooth Eton
Alcaics more easily than in the diction of ' High
' Contracting Parties,' it was given him to nego-
tiate a treaty which helped to bring ruin upon the
enemy of his country.* How to negotiate with a
perfected skill never degenerating into craft, how to
form such a scheme of policy that his country might
be brought to adopt it without swerving, and how to
pursue this always, promoting it steadily abroad,
and gradually forcing the Home Government to
go all lengths in its support, this he knew ; and
he was, moreover, so gifted by nature, that whether
men studied his despatches, or whether they
* The Treaty of Bucharest in 1812. By enabling the Czar to
withdraw from the South the forces commanded by Tchitcha-
goff, this treaty did much to convert the discomfiture of Napo-
leon's ' Grand Army' into absohite ruin.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULT.USr. 119
listened to his spoken words, or whether they chap.
were only bystanders caught and fascinated by the
grace of his presence, they could scarcely help think-
ing that if the English nation was to be maintain-
ed in peace or drawn into war by the will of a
single mortal, there was no man who looked so
worthy to fix its destiny as Sir Stratford Canning.
He had faults which made him an imperfect
Christian, for his temper was fierce, and his asser-
tion of self was so closely involved in his conflicts
that he followed up his opinions with his feelings,
and with the whole strength of his imperious na-
ture. But his fierce temper, being always under
control when purposes of State so required, was far
from being an infirmity, and was rather a weapon
of exceeding sharpness, for it was so wielded by
him as to have more tendency to cause dread and
surrender than to generate resistance. Then, too,
every judgment which he pronounced was en-
folded in words so complete as to exclude the idea
that it could ever be varied, and to convey, there-
fore, the idea of duration. As though yielding to
fate itself, the Turkish mind used to bend and fall
down before him.
But the counsels which Sir Stratford Canning
had been accustomed to tender to the Sultan's
Ministers, liowcver wholesome they miglit be, were
often very irksome to hear, and very dillicult to
adopt. Indeed it might be questioned whether
his Turkish policy could be made to consist with
the principle on which the Ottoman system was
based. He sought to make the Ottoman rule
120 OEIGIN OF THE WAK OF 1853
CHAP, seem tolerable to CLiristendom by getting rid of
' the differences which separated the Christian sub-
jects of the Porte from their Mahometan fellow-
subjects, and placing the tributaries on a footing
with their masters. But the theory of Mahometan
government rests upon the maintenance of a clear
separation from the unbelievers ; and to propose
to a Mussulman of any piety that the Commander
of the Faithful should obliterate the distinction
between Mahometans and Christians, would be
proposing to obliterate the distinction between
virtue and vice. The notion would seem to be
not merely wrong and wicked, but a contradiction
in terms. A virtuous Osmanlee would feel that,
if he were to consent to this levelling of the bar-
riers between good and evil, he would lose the
whole merit and comfort of being a Turk. Per-
haps the opposite policy namely, that of widen-
ing the separation of the Christians, and giving
them (under a tenure less precarious than the
present one) the character of tributary municipal-
ities would be more consonant with the scheme
of a Mussulman Empire, and therefore more sus-
ceptible of complete execution. But whether tlie
reforms thus counselled were possible or not, it
was hard to resist the imperious Ambassador to
his face. If what he directed was inconsistent
with the nature of things, then possibly the na-
ture of things would be changed by the decree of
Heaven, for there was no hope that the great
Eltchi would relax his will. In the meantime;
however, and by the blessing of God, the actual
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 121
execution of the Ambassador's painful mandates chap.
might perhaps be suffered to encounter a little L
delay. So thought, so temporised, the wise tran-
quil statesmen at the Porte.
Of course, this kind of ascendancy was often
very galling to the Sultan's advisers. They knew
that the English Ambassador was counselling
them for the good of their country ; but they felt
that he humbled them by making his dictation
too plainly apparent, and they wei-e often very
conscious that the motive whicli made them suc-
cumb to him was dread. Yet, if the Ambassador
was unrelenting and even harsh in the exercise of
his dominion over tlie Turks, he was faithful to
guard them against enemies from abroad. He chas-
tened them himself, but he was dangerous to any
other man who came seeking to hurt his children.
Now it happened tliat this was exactly the kind
of ascendancy over the Turks for Avliich the Em-
peror Nicholas had long been craving. Some men
imagine that the Emperor's designs in regard to
Turkey were steadily governed by sheer desire for
his neighbour's land ; and they are not without
specious materials for forming such an opinion :
but perhaps a full knowledge of the truth would
justify the belief that, from the Peace of Adrian-
ople in 1829 down to the time of his death, the
Czar would have preferred the ascendancy which
Sir Stratford Canning enjoyed at Constantinople
to any scheme of conquest. And, what is more,
if Nicholas had succeeded in gaining this ascend-
ancy, he would have been inclined to use it as a
122 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, means of enforcing counsels somewhat similar to
^^^' those which were pressed upon the Sultan by the
English Ambassador; for though his first care
would have been always for his own Church, it
would have suited his pride and his policy to
extend his protection to all the Christian subjects
of the Porte. But just as similarity of doctrine
often embitters the differences between contend-
ing sects, so the very resemblance betw^een his
and Sir Stratford Canning's views with regard to
the Christian subjects of the Porte made it the
more intolerable to him to see that he, the power-
ful neighbour of Turkey, who was able to hover
over her frontiers and her shores with great armies
and fleets, could never make an effort to force his
counsels on the Porte without finding himself
baffled or forestalled by the stronger mind.
Even in his very early life it had been the fate
of Sir Stratford Canning to have to resist and
thwart the Eussian Government ; and during a great
part of the years of his embassy at Constantinople
he had been more or less in a posture of resistance
to the Emperor Nicholas. Moreover, the feeling
with which the Emperor carried on this long-
standing conflict was quickened by personal ani-
mosity, and by a knowledge that diplomacy was
watching the strife with interest and amusement ;
for he had once gone the length of declining to
receive Sir Stratford Canning as the English
Ambassador at St Petersburg, and had thus
marked him out before Europe as his recognised
antagonist. The struggle had lasted for a long
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 123
time, and with varying success ; for many a Turk- chap.
ish ministry owed its frail existence and its un- L.
timely end to the chances of the combat going on
between the Czar and the English Ambassador.
Tlie Turks could not help knowing that the coun-
sels of the Ambassador were for their own good,
and they had reason to surmise that the advice of
the Emperor might spring from opposite motives ;
but there are times when the smooth speech and
the wily promises of a poHtical foe are more wel-
come than the painful lectures of an honest
friend ; and again, though it w^as hard to bear up
with mere words against the personal ascendant
of the Ambassador, the Emperor had the power of
throwing the sw^ord into the scale at any moment.
The strife, therefore, had not been altogether un-
equal ; but, upon tlie whole, Sir Stratford Canning
liad kept the upper hand, and the Czar had been
forced to endure the agony of beiug what liis
representative called 'secondary,' so long as Sir
Stratford Canning was in the palace of tlie Eng-
lish Embassy.
For some eight or nine months Sir Stratford i.nni
Canning had been absent from Constantinople
St nit ford
instructed
but now, at a time when Europe had fastened its con.staiui-'
eyes upon the Czar, and was watching to see how
the Ambassador of All the Russias would impose
his master's will upon Turkey, the Emperor Xicho-
las was obliged to hear that his eternal foe, travel-
ling by the ominous route of Paris and Vienna,
was slowly returning to his Embassy at the
Torte.
uoiilo.
124 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. It was on the 25tli of February 1853 that Sir
^^^^' Stratford Canning, now Lord Stratford de Eed-
Hisinstruc- cliffe,* was instructed to return to his former
post. The measure was not without significance.
liead by foreigners, it imported that England
clung to her ancient policy, and was proceeding
to maintain it ; and although the instructions
addressed to Lord Stratford disclosed no know-
ledge of the spirit in which Prince Mentschikoff
was about to conduct his Embassy, or of the kind
of proposals which he was about to press upon
the Porte, they indicated that the Cabinet was
alarmed for the fate of Turkey.
The despatch which supplied Lord Stratford
with his instructions, announced to him that, in
the then critical period of the fate of the Ottoman
Empire, he was to return to his Embassy at Con-
stantinople for a special purpose. Then, after
recording once more the fact that the duty of
maintaining the integrity and independence of the
Ottoman Empire was a principle solemnly declared
and acknowledged by all the great Powers of
Europe, the despatch informed Lord Stratford that
it was his mission to counsel prudence to the
Porte, and forbearance to those Powers who were
urging compliance with their demands. In Paris
he was to remind the French Government that
the interests of France and England in the East
were identical, and was to explain the fatal em-
barrassment to which the Sultan might be exposed
* Sir Stratford Canning was created Viscount Stratford de
KedclifTe in 1852.
BETWEEN THE CZAE AND THE SULTAN. 125
if unduly pressed by France upon a question of c H a p.
such vital importance to the Power from which 1_
Turkey had most to apprehend. At Vienna he
was to give and elicit fresh declarations of the
conservative views entertained by the two Govern-
ments. Then, proceeding to Constantinople, the
Ambassador was to inform the Sultan that his
Embassy was to be regarded as a mark of Her
Majesty's friendly feelings towards His Highness,
but also as indicating the opinion which Her
]\Iajesty entertained of the gravity of the circum-
stances in which there was reason to fear the
Ottoman Empire was placed. In regard to any
part which he might be able to take in conduc-
ing to a settlement of the question of the Holy
Places, the discretion of the Ambassador was left
unfettered. The Ambassador was directed to
warn the Porte that the Ottoman Empire was in
' a position of peculiar danger. The accumulated
' grievances of foreign nations,' continued Lord
Clarendon, * which the Porte is unable or unwill-
' ing to redress, the maladministration of its own
' affairs, and the increasing weakness of executive
' power in Turkey, have caused the allies of the
' Porte latterly to assume a tone alike novel and
' alarming, and which, if persevered in, may lead
' to a general revolt among the Christian subjects
' of the Porte, and prove fatal to the iudcpend-
' ence and integrity of the Euipire a catastrophe
' that would be deeply deplored by Her INIajes-
' ty's Government, but which it is their duty to
' represent to the Porte is considered probable and
126 ORIGIX OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP. ' impending by some of the great European Powers.
L_ ' Your Excellency will explain to the Sultan that
* it is with the object of pointing out these dangers,
' and with the hope of averting them, that Her
* Majesty's Government have now directed you to
' proceed to Constantinople. You will endeavour
' to convince the Sultan and his Ministers that
' the crisis is one which requires the utmost
' prudence on their part, and confidence in the
' sincerity and soundness of the advice they will
' receive from you, to resolve it favourably for their
* future peace and independence.' Then (and
probably at the suggestion of Lord Stratford him-
self) the Ambassador was to press upon the Porte
the adoption of the reforms which his intimate
knowledge of the affairs of Turkey enabled him to
recommend ; and next, plainly disclosing the effect
already produced upon the mind of the Govern-
ment by the challenge to which our accustomed
policy in the East had just been subjected by the
press, the despatch went on : ' Nor Avill you dis-
' guise from the Sultan and his Ministers that
' perseverance in his present course must end in
' alienating the sympathies of the British nation,
* and making it impossible for Her Majesty's
' Government to shelter them from the impending
* danger, or to overlook the exigencies of Christen-
' dom, exposed to the natural consequences of
' their unwise policy and reckless maladminis-
* tration.' Finally, the Ambassador was told that,
in the event of imminent danger to the existence
of the Turkish Government, he was to despatch
BETWEEN THE CZAR AXD THE SULTAX. 127
a messeufjer at once to Malta, requestiiif? the chap.
. . VIII
Admiral to hold himself in readiness ; but Lord L.
Stratford was not to direct him to approach the
Dardanelles without positive instructions from the
Government at home.
Thus, so far as concerned the power of turning
for aid to physical force, the Ambassador went
out poorly armed ; but he was destined to have
an opportunity of showing that a slender authority
in the hands of a skilled diplomatist may be more
formidable than the absolute control of great
armaments entrusted to a less able statesman.
Lord Stratford was licensed to do no more than
send a message to an Admiral, advising him to be
ready to go to sea ; and, slight as this power was,
he never exhausted it; yet, as will be seen, he
so wielded the instruction wliich entrusted it to
him as to be able to establish a great calm in the
Divan at a moment when Prince IMentschikoff
was violently pressing upon its fears, wnth a fleet
awaiting his ordei-s, and an army of 140,000 men.
128 ORIGIN OF THE "WAR OF 1853
CHAPTER IX.
CHAP. On the morning of the 5th of April 1853, the
Sultan and all his Ministers learned that a vessel
Stratford's of War was coming up the Propontis, and they
knew who it was that was on board. Long before
noon the voyage and the turmoil of the reception
were over, and, except that a corvette under the
English flag lay at anchor in the Golden Horn,
there was no seeming change in the outward
world.* Yet all was changed. Lord Stratford
de Eedcliffe had entered once more the palace of
the English Embassy. The event spread a sense
of safety, but also a sense of awe.-f It seemed
to bring with it confusion to the enemies of Tur-
key, but austere reproof for past errors at home,
and punishment where punishment was due, and
* The corvette which brought the great Eltchi was the Furj',
commanded by Captain Tatham.
+ Since the original publication of this work, Captain Tatham
has been so good as to communicate with me, and to confirm in
decisive terms my above account of the awe inspired by Lord
Stratford's return as ' most accurate.' The Captain was present
at the first audience, and he assures me that the spectacle af-
forded by the manner and bearing of the great Ambassador and
the evident awe of the Sultan is one he will ' never forget.'
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 129
an enforcement of hard toils and painful sacrifices chap.
of many kinds, and a long farewell to repose. It '
was the angry return of a king whose realm had
been suffered to fall into danger. Before a day
was over, the Grand Vizier and the Eeis Effendi
had begun to speak, and to tell a part of what
they knew to the English Ambassador. They
did not yet venture to tell all. Things which
they had told to Colonel Rose they did not yet
dare to tell to the great Eltchi. They did not,
perhaps, mean to conceal from him, but they
shrank from the terror of seeing his anger when
he came to know of Prince Mentschikofl's de-
mands for a Protectorate . of the Greek Church.
If they were to confess that they had borne to
hear such a proposal, the Eltchi might think that
they had dared to listen to it. Lord Stratford,
observing their fear, imagined that it was Prince
MentschikofF who had disturbed their equanimity.
' This combination,' said he, ' of alarm, seeking
' for advice, and of reluctance to entrust me frank-
' ly with the whole case, is attributable to the
' threatening language of Prince jMentschikoff,
' and to the character of his proposals.' But
' his view of the cause of this tendency towards
suppression is displaced by observing th<} frank-
ness of the disclosures which the Turkish Min-
isters had long before made to Colonel Pose : *
the truth is that Lord Stratford was unconscious
of exercising the ascendancy which he did, and,
imagining that men gave way to him because he
* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 107 ft ""'q.
VOL. L I
130 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, was in the right, he never came to understand
^^' the awe which he inspired. However, by de-
grees the Turkish Ministers went so far as to
tell him that ' since the arrival of Prince Ments-
' chikoff, the language held by the Eussian Em-
' bassy to them had been a mixture of angry
' complaints and friendly assurances, accompanied
' with positive requisitions as to the Holy Places
' in Palestine, indications of some ulterior views,
' and a general tone of insistence bordering at
' times on intimidation.' * They declared that as
to what the ulterior views were, ' there was still
' some uncertainty in the language of Prince
' Mentschikoff. In the beginning he had sound-
' ed the sentiments of the Porte as to a defensive
' alliance Avith Eussia, but, receiving no encour-
' agement, had desisted from the overture. His
' intentions were now rather directed to a remod-
' elling of the Greek Patriarchate of Constantino-
' pie to a more clear and comprehensive definition
' of Ptussian right under treaty to protect the Greek
' and Armenian subjects of the Porte in religious
' matters, and to the conclusion of a formal agree-
' ment comprising those points.' Then eager to
place themselves under Lord Stratford's guidance,
but still shrinking from a disclosure of the ^vhole
truth, the Turkish Ministers entreated the Ambas-
sador to tell them how to meet the demands which,
although they only spoke of them hypothetically,
had been already made by Prince Mentschikoff.
Lord Stratford instantly saw that he must
* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 125.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 131
cause the question of the Holy Places to be kept c ii a p.
clear of all the other subjects of discussion which
Prince Mentschikoff might be intending to raise, ^stsun"e^
for it was plain that the vacillation of the Porte korsT'*'''
in regard to the sanctuaries (though it had sprung '"*"'^^-
from a desire to avoid giving offence to either of
two great Powers) had given Eussia fair grounds
of complaint on that subject ; but the Czar had
nothing else to complain of, and it was clear, there-
fore, that if the one grievance which really existed
could be settled, every hostile step which Eussia
might afterwards take would place her more and
more in the wrong. ' Endeavour,' said Lord Strat-
ford, in charging the Turkish Ministers, * to keep
' the affair of the Holy Places separate from the
' ulterior proposals (whatever they may be) of
' Eussia. The course which you appear to have
' taken under the former head was probably the
' best, and I am glad to find that there is a fair
' prospect of its success. Whenever Prince Ments-
' chikoff comes forward with further propositions,
' you are at perfect liberty to decline entering into
' negotiation without a full statement of their
' nature, extent, and reasons. Should they be
' found on examination to carry with them that
' degree of iniluence over the Christian subjects of
' the Porte in favour of a foreign Power which
' might eventually prove dangerous or seriously
' inconvenient to the exercise of the Sultan's
' legitimate authority, His IMajesty's Ministers
' cannot be doing wrong in declining them,' *
'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 125.
132 OKIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. But then, added the Ambassador and his words
TX
' portended some counsels hard to follow this
' will not prevent the removal by direct sovereign
' authority of any existing abuse.' *
Gradually the Turkish Ministers told more, and
on the 9th of April Lord Stratford knew that
Eussia was demanding a treaty engagement, giv-
ing her the protectorate of the Greek Church in
Turkey ; and being now in communication with
Prince Mentschikoff, he succeeded, as he believed,
in penetrating the real object which Eussia had
in view. ' That object,' he said, 'was to reinstate
' the Eussian influence in Turkey on an exclusive
' basis, and in a commanding and stringent form.'
In other words, Prince Mentschikoff, with horse
and foot and artillery and the whole Sebastopol
fleet at his back, was come to depose the man
whom they called in St Petersburg ' the English
' Sultan.' On the other hand, Lord Stratford was
not willing to be deposed. The struggle began.
commencft- The scverancc of the question of the Holy
struggle be- Placcs from the ulterior demands of the Czar was
tweenPrince t , j i nr-.i -, ^ -,
Mentschi- not au obiect to be pursued ior the sake oi order
koffand '' , t r\ i
Lord strat- and conveuience only. On the contrary, it bade
fair to govern the result of the diplomatic conflict;
for the Montenegro question having disappeared,
and Eussia having committed herself to the avowal
that she had no complaints against the Sultan
except in regard to the Holy Places, a settlement
of that solitary grievance would leave the ulterior
demands so baseless that any attempt to enforce
* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 125.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 133
them by arms would be a naked outrage upon the chap
opinion of Europe. If Prince Mentschikoff had __ll_
been a man accustomed to negotiate, he would
have taken care to preserve the question of the
Holy Places, and keep it blended with the ulterior
demand until he saw his way to a successful
issue ; for he was in the position of having to
found two demands upon one grievance, and it
was clear, therefore, that he would be stranded if
he allowed his one grievance to be disposed of
without having good reason for knowing that his
further demand would be granted ; but he was
vain and confident, and perhaps his sagacity was
blunted by the thought that he was able to
threaten an appeal to force. Moreover, Prince
Mentschikoff was in the hands of a practised
adversary.
Lord Stratford, knowing the full import of the
decision towards which he was leading his oppo-
nent, did not fail to deal with him tenderly ; and
for several days the Prince had the satisfaction
of imagining that the imperious and overbearing
Englishman of whom they were always talking
at St Petersburg was become very gentle in his
presence. The two Ambassadors, without being
yet in negotiation, began to talk with one another
of the matters which were bringing the peace of
the world into danger. They spoke of tlie Holy
Places. Ear from seeming to be hard or scornful
in regard to that matter. Lord Stratford was full
of deference to a cause which, whether it were
founded on error or on trutli, was still the honest
134 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, heart's desire of fifty millions of pious men. He
' showed by his language that if by chance he
should be called upon to use his good offices in
this matter, or to mediate between Eussia and
France, he would form his judgment with grav-
ity and with care. Where he could do so with
justice, he admitted the fairness of the Eussian
claims.
Prince Mentschikoff's tone became 'consider-
* ably softened.'* Then the Ambassadors ven-
tured upon the subject still more pregnant with
danger, for Lord Stratford now disclosed his
knowledge of Prince Mentschikoff's 'ulterior
' propositions relative to the protectorate of the
' whole Greek Church and the priesthood in
' Turkey, and his conviction that they would
' meet with serious opposition from the Porte,
' and be regarded with little favour by Powers
' even the most friendly to Eussia.' -j* Prince
Mentschikoff tried to 'attenuate the extent and
* effect ' I of his demands ; and, on the other
hand. Lord Stratford 'drew a clear line of dis-
' tinction between the confirmation of special
' points already stipulated by treaty, and an ex-
' tension of influence having the virtual force of
' a protectorate, to be exercised exclusively by a
' single foreign Power, over the most important
' and numerous class of the Sultan's tributary
' subjects ; '| but by a common consent the two
Ambassadors 'avoided entering into a discussion
* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 134.
t Ibid. p. 151. t Ibid. p. 139.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 135
' which might have proved irritating upon this chai
' question.' * Prince Mentschikoff, however, com- ^^'
mitted the diplomatic error of intimating 'that,
' notwithstanding the great importance attached
' to it by his Government, there was no danger
' of any hostile aggression as the result of its
' failure, but at most an estrangement between
* the two Courts, and perhaps, though it was not so
' said, an interruption of diplomatic relations.'*
That in these circumstances, and until he had
succeeded in separating the question of the Holy
Places, it was right for the English Ambassador
to deal very temperately with the ulterior de-
mauds of the Czar, no diplomatist would doubt ;
and Lord Stratford acknowledges "f" that he care-
fully refrained from discussing the subject in a
way tending to irritate, but the Eussians imagine
that he did more than abstain. They say that,
having been supplied with a copy of Prince
Mentschikoff's draft of the convention embodying
his demands in respect to the Greek Church and
Clergy, Lord Stratford struck out as inadmissible
the clauses relating to the Greek Patriarch's
tenure of office, and sending back the draft with
that and with no other alteration, induced the
Turkish Ministers (and through them induced
the Russian Embassy) to suppose that he en-
tertained no objection to the proposed conven-
tion except tliat which he had indicated by his
erasure ; and that Prince jNIentscliikoff, being in
this belief, and being prepared to give way upon
'Eiistern Papers,' i>an i. p. 139. + IbiJ. p. 134.
136 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, the question of the Greek Patriarch, had a right
' to expect Lord Stratford's acquiescence in that
dangerous part of the Czar's demand which sought
to establish a Protectorate over the Greek Church
in Turkey. Nothing is more likely than that,
in the process of endeavouring to penetrate Lord
Stratford's intentions through the medium of the
Turkish Ministers, Prince Mentschikoff may have
received a wrong impression, and it is very
likely that Lord Stratford in reading the draft
may have at once struck out clauses which he
regarded as totally inadmissible, reserving for
separate discussion and for oral explanation the
consideration of an ambiguous clause which,
dangerous as it was, might easily be so altered as
to become entirely harmless ; but it is certain
that there was never a moment in which Lord
Stratford was willing or even would have endured
that any Protectorate over the Greek Church in
Turkey should be ceded to Ptussia ; * and no
one versed in the spirit of English diplomacy,
or having a just conception of Lord Stratford's
nature, will be able to accept the belief that the
Queen's Ambassador intended to overreach his
antagonist by any misleading contrivance.
But whatever may have been the clue which
led him into the wrong path, Prince Mentschikoff
failed to see the danger in which he would place
the success of his negotiation if he consented to let
the question of the Holy Places be treated sej)ar-
* See Lord Stratford's Despatches, 'Eastern Papers,' part i.
p. 127 et seq. to 151.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 137
ately ; and the angry despatches which now came chap.
in from St Petersburg* did not tend to divert L_
him from his error. On the contrary, they tended
to place him in hostility with France more dis-
tinctly than before ; and since the question of the
Holy Places was the one in which Prance and
Russia were face to face, the Czar's Ambassador
was not perhaps unwilling to enter upon a course
which would place him for the time in distinct
antagonism with Prance, and with Prance alone.
He agreed to allow the question of the Holy
Places to be treated first and apart from his other
demands.
It must be acknowledged that, so far as con-
cerned the question of the Holy Places, the de-
mands made by Russia were moderate. Notwith-
standing all the heat of his sectarian zeal, the
Emperor Nicholas had seen that to endeavour to
enforce a withdrawal of the privileges which had
been granted with public solemnity to the Latin
Church would be to outrage Catholic Europe ; and
it may be believed, too, that his religious feel-
ing made him unwilling to exclude the people
of other creeds from those Holy Sites whicli,
according to the teaching of his own Church, it
was good for Christians to embrace. But if the
demands of the Piussian Emperor in regard to the
Holy Places were fair and moderate, he was re-
solved to be peremptory in enforcing them. And
it seemed to him that in this matter he could not
fail to have the ascendant, for his forces were near
13tli April.
138 OKIGIN" OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, at hand. Also he had good right to suppose that
TV
France would be isolated, for it was not to be
believed that England or any other Power would
take a part or even acknowledge the slightest inter-
est in a question between two sorts of monks.
On the other hand, the violent language of M.
de Lavalette, his threats, the persistence of the
French Government, and the advance of the
Toulon fleet to the Bay of Salamis, all these
signs seemed to exclude the expectation that the
French Government would easily give way. Here
was an error. Zealous himself, the Eussian Am-
bassador imagined a zeal in the Government and
the Church to which he was opposing himself,
and fancied that he saw in the French Ambas-
sador's * resistance a proof of the encroaching
' spirit of that Church which proclaims itself
' universal, and looked for its real cause in the
' unceasing desire of the same Church to extend
' the sphere of its action.' * He failed to see that
his French antagonist might suddenly smile and
throw off the cause of the Latin Church, and so
rob the Czar of the signal triumph on which he
was reckoning, by the process of mere concession.
But whilst, to the common judgment of men who
watched this haughty Embassy, it seemed that
the Czar, in all the pride of strength and firm
purpose, was descending on his prey, he was ful-
filling the utmost hope of the patient enemy in the
West, who had long pursued him with a stealthy
joy, and was now keenly marking him down.
* ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 139.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 139
CHAPTER X.
Meantime the course of events affectinfif the chap.
X
question of the Holy Places had shifted the
grounds of dispute ; for the solemn act performed dlgpute"'/
at Bethlehem in the foregoing December had con- uoiy^ plices".
verted the claims of the Latins into established
privileges ; and the Emperor Nicholas, notwith-
standing his religious excitement, had still enough
wisdom to see that, although he might have been
able to prevent this result by a violent use of his
power at an earlier period, he could not now un-
do what was done. Without outraging Catholic
Europe, and even, it may be believed, his own
sense of religious propriety, he could not now
wrench the key of the Bethlehem Church from tlie
hands of the Latin monks, nor tear down the
silver star from the Holy Stable of the Nativit}'.
Therefore all that Prince Mentschikoff demanded
in regard to the key and the star was a declara-
tion by the Turkish Government that the delivery
of the key implied no ownership over the princi-
pal altar of the Church ; that no cliange should be
made in the system of the religious ceremonies or
140 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, the hours of service ; that the guardianship of the
' Great Gate should always be entrusted to a Greek
priest ; and, finally, that the silver star should he
deemed to he a gift coming from the mere gener-
osity of the Sultan, and conferring no sort of new
rights.* In regard to the shrine of the Blessed
Virgin at Gethsemane, Prince Mentschikoff re-
quired that the Greeks should have precedence at
her tomb. He also insisted that the gardens of
the Church of Bethlehem should remain in the
joint guardianship of the Greeks and the Latins ;
and in demanding that some buildings which over-
looked the terraces of the Church of the Holy
Sepulchre should be pulle'd down, he required that
the site of these buildings should never become
the property of any ' nation/ but be walled off and
kept apart as neutral ground. This last demand
is curious. The Eussian Government felt that
even at Jerusalem it would be well to set apart
one small shred of ground, and keep it free from
the strife of the Churches.
But the last of Prince Mentschikoff s demands
in regard to the Holy Places was the one most
hard to solve. It has been said that in comparing
the ways of men in the East with the ways of
men in the "West, there are found many subjects
on which their views are not merely different but
opposite. One of these is the business of repair-
ing churches. Whilst the English Churchmen
were contending that they ought not to be laden
with the whole burthen of keeping their sacred
* ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 129.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 141
buildings in repair, the Christians in Palestine chap.
were willing to set the world in flames for the '
sake of maintaining their rival claims to the
lionour of repairing clmrches. The cupola of the
Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem was
out of order. The Greeks, supported by Eussia,
claimed the right to repair it. The Latins denied
their right. The dispute raged. Then, as usual, the
wise and decorous Turk stepped in between the
combatants, and said he would repair the Church
himself. This did not content the Greeks, and
Prince Llentschikoff now demanded that the an-
cient rights of the Greeks to repair the great
Cupola and Church at Jerusalem should be re-
cognised and confirmed ; and although he did not
reject the Sultan's offer to supply the means for the
repairs, he insisted that the work should be under
the control of the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem.*
Some of these demands were resisted by France ;
and although M. de Lavalette had been long since
recalled, ]\I. de la Cour, who succeeded him,
seemed inclined to be somewhat persistent, es-
pecially in regard to the question of the Cupola
iind the question of precedence at the Tomb of
the Blessed Virgin.
It seems probable, however, that although 'M.
de la Cour may have been sufficiently supplied
with instructions touching the immediate question
in hand, he had not perceived so clearly as his
English colleague the dawn of the new French
policy. From the communications of his own
* ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 129.
142 OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. Government before he crossed the Channel, from
' his sojourn at Paris, and from the tenor of the
despatches from England, Lord Stratford had
gathered means of inferring that Trance no longer
intended to keep herself apart from England by
persisting in her pressure upon the Sultan ; and,
supposing that she had made up her mind to
enter upon this new policy. Lord Stratford might
well entertain a hope that the question whether
a Greek priest should be allowed to control the
repair of a Cupola at Jerusalem, or whether the
doorkeeper of a Church should be a Greek or a
Latin, would not be fought with undue obstinacy
by the quick-witted countrymen of Voltaire. He
spoke with M. de la Cour, and found that he was
prepared for concession, if matters could be so
arranged as to satisfy what Lord Stratford, in his
haughty and almost zoological way, liked to call
' French feelings of honour.' *
Lordstrat- By mcans of his communications with the
sures for Turks, tlic English Amxbassador easily ascertained
settling it.
the points on which Prince Mentschikoff might
be expected to be inexorable. These were : the
repair of the Cupola, the question of precedence
at the Tomb of the Virgin, and the question about
the Greek doorkeeper in the Church of Bethle-
hem. Furnished with this clue. Lord Stratford
saw M. de la Cour, and dissuaded him from com-
mitting himself to a determined resistance on any
of these three questions. He also gave his French
colleague to understand that, in his opinion, the
* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 134.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND TUE SULTAN. 143
Greek pretension upon these three points stood chap.
on strong ground, and urged him to bear in mind '
the great European interests at stake, the declared
moderation of the French Government, and the
triumph already achieved by France in regard to
the key and the silver star. And then Lord
Stratford gave M. de la Cour a pleasing glimpse
of the discomfiture into which their Russian col-
league would be thrown if only the question of
the Holy Places could be settled.* The French
Ambassador soon began to enter into the spirit of
these counsels.
On the other hand, Prince Mentschikoff was
also willing to dispose of this question of the
Holy Places ; for he had now seen enough to be
aware that he would not encounter sufficient re-
sistance upon this matter to give him either a
signal triumph or a tenable ground of rupture, and
the angry despatches which he was receiving from
St Petersburg made him impatient to press for-
ward his ulterior demand. The two contending
negotiators being thus disposed, it was soon foimd
that the hindrances which prevented their coming
to terms were very slender. But it often hap-
pens that the stress which a common man lays
upon any subject of dispute is proportioned to the
energy ^v]lich he has spent in dealing witli it,
rather than to the real magnitude of the ([uestion
itself; and when Prince jNIentschikoff and jNI. de
la Cour seemed to be approaching to a settlement,
they allowed their minds to become once again so
* ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. loS.
144 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, much heated by the strenuous discussions of small
- matters that ' the difficulty of settling the ques-
' tion of the Holy Places threatened to increase.
' The French and Eussian Ambassadors insisted
' on their respective pretensions, while the Porte
' inclined but hesitated to assume the responsi-
' bility of deciding between them.'* Then, at
last, the hour was ripe for the intervention of
Lord Stratford de Eedcliffe. ' I thought,' said he,
' it was time for me to adopt a more prominent
' part in reconciling the adverse parties.'
He was more than equal to the task. Being by
nature so grave and stately as to be able to re-
frain from a smile without effort and even without
design, he prevented the vain and presumptuous
Russian from seeing the minuteness and inanity of
the things which he was gaining by his violent
attempt at diplomacy. For the Greek Patriarch
to be authorised to watch the mending of a dilapi-
dated roof for the Greek votaries to have the
first hour of the day at a tomb and, finally, for
the doorkeeper of a church to be always a Greek,
though without any right of keeping out his
opponents, these things might be trifles, but
awarded to All the Russias through the stately
mediation of the English Ambassador, they
seemed to gain in size and majesty ; and for the
moment, perhaps, the sensations of the Prince
were nearly the same as though he were receiving
the surrender of a province or the engagements of
a great alliance. On the other hand, Lord Strat-
* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 157.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN, 145
ford was unfailing in his deference to the motives chap.
X
of action which he had classed under the head of '
' French feelings of honour; ' and if M. de la Cour
was set on fire by the thought that at the Tomb
of the Virgin, or anywhere else, the Greek priests
were to perform their daily worship before the
hour appointed for the services of the Church
which looked to France for support. Lord Strat-
ford was there to explain, in his grand quiet way,
that the priority proposed to be given to the Greeks
was a priority resulting from the habit of early
prayer which obtained in Oriental Churches, and
not from their claim to have precedence over the
species of monk which was protected by French-
men. At length he addressed the two Ambassa-
dors ; he solemnly expressed his hope that they
would come to an adjustment. His words brought
calm. In obedience, as it were, to the order of
Nature, the lesser minds gave way to the greater,
and the contention between the Churches for the
shrines of Palestine was closed. The manner in iic settles it
which the Sultan should guarantee this apportion-
ment of the shrines was still left open, but in all
other respects, the question of the Holy riaces
was settled.*
According to the terms of the arrangement thus Tmnson
'-' wliich it wns
effected, the key of tlie Church of Bethlehem and settled,
the silver star placed in tlie Grotto of tlie Nativ-
ity were to remain wliere they were, but were to
confer no new riglit on the Latins ; and tlie door-
keeper of the Cliurch was to be a Greek priest as
* April 22, 1853. ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 157.
VOL. I. K
146 ORIGIN OF THE "WAR OP 1853
CHAP, before, but was to have no ri^ht to obstruct other
nations in their right to enter the building. The
question of precedence at the Tomb of the Blessed
Virgin was ingeniously eluded by the device be-
fore spoken of; for the priority given to the Greeks
was treated as though it resulted from a conveni-
ent arrangement of hours rather than from any
intent to grant precedence ; and it was according-
ly arranged that the Greeks should worship in the
Church every morning immediately after sunrise,
and then the Armenians, and then the Latins,
each nation having an hour and a half for the
purpose. Perhaps it was in order to hinder the
out-going worshippers from coming into conflict
with those who were about to begin their devo-
tions that the gentle Armenians were thus inter-
posed between the two angry Churches. The
gardens of the Convent of Bethlehem were to re-
main as before, under the joint care of the Greeks
and Latins. With regard to the Cupola of the
Church of the Holy Sepulchre, it was arranged
that it should be repaired by the Sultan in such a
way as not to alter its form ; and if, in the course
of the building, any deviation from this engage-
ment should appear to be threatened, the Greek
Patriarch of Jerusalem was to be authorised to
remonstrate, with a view to guard against innova-
tion. The buildings overlooking the terraces of
the Church of the Holy Sepulchre were to have
their windows walled up, but were not to be de-
molished, and therefore no effect could be given to
the Eussian plan of setting apart a neutral ground
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 147
to be kept free from the dominion of both the con- chap.
X
tending Churches. All these arrangements were .
to be embodied in firmans addressed by the Sultan
to the Turkish authorities at Jerusalem.*
Thus, after having tasked the patience of Euro-
pean diplomacy for a period of nearly three years,
the business of apportioning the holy shrines of
Palestine between the Churches of the East and
of the West was brought at last to a close. The
question was perhaps growing ripe for settlement
when Lord Stratford reached Constantinople ; but
whether it was so or not, he closed it in seventeen
days. For the part which he had taken in help-
ing to achieve this result he received the thanks
of the Turkish Government and of the Eussian
and French Ambassadors. The Divan might well
be grateful to him, and he deserved, too, the
thanks of his French colleague ; for, having more
insight into the new policy of the French Govern-
ment than M. de la Cour, he was able to place
him in the path which turned out to be the right
one. But when I^rd Stratford received the
thanks of Prince Mentschikoff, he felt perliaps
that the gravity which had served him well in
these transactions was a gift which was still of
some use.
(
Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 24S. The question of tlie Holy
Places was finally settled on the 22d of April.
148
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAPTER XL
CHAP.
XI.
Peaceful
aspect of
the nego-
tiation.
Angry de-
spatches
from St
Petersburg.
Whilst the question of the Holy Places was ap-
proaching its solution, Prince Mentschikoff went on
with his demand for the protectorate of the Greek
Church in Turkey ; but the character of his mis-
sion was fitfully changed from time to time by the
tenor of his instructions from home. On the 12th
of April, the peaceful views which had prevailed
at St Petersburg some weeks before were still
governing the Russian Embassy at Constantinople ;
and Lord Stratford was able to report that the
altered tone and demeanour of Prince Mentschi-
koff corresponded with the conciliatory assurances
which Count Nesselrode had been giving in the
previous month to Sir Hamilton Seymour. But
on the following day all was changed. Fresh
despatches came in from St Petersburg. They
breathed anger and violent impatience, and of this
anger and of this impatience the causes were
visible. It was the measure adopted in Paris,
several weeks before, which had rekindled the
dying embers of the quarrel at St Petersburg, and
the torch was now brought to Constantinople.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 149
It has been seen that, without reason, and with- chap.
XT
out communication with the English Ministers * '
(though it professed to be acting in unison with change!^ *''^
them), the French Government had ordered the
Toulon fleet to approach the scene of controversy
by advancing to Salamis ; and it was whilst the
indignation roused by this movement was still
fresh in the mind of the Emperor Nicholas that
the despatches had been framed. Moreover, at
the time of sending of the despatches, the Czar
knew that by the day they reached the shores of
the Bosphorus, the man of whom he never could
think with temper or calmness would already be
at Constantinople, and he of course understood
that, in the way of diplomatic strife, his Lord
High Admiral the Serene Prince Governor of
Finland was unfit for an encounter with Lord
Stratford. He seems, therefore, to have determined
to extricate his Ambassador from the unequal
conflict by putting an end to what there was of a
diplomatic character in the mission, and urging
him into a course of sheer violence, which would
supersede the finer labours of negotiation.
From the change which the despatches wrought
in Prince Mentschikoff's course of action, from the
steps which he afterwards took, and from the
known bent and temper of the Czar's mind, it
may be inferred that the instructions now received
by the Eussian Ambassador were somewhat to
this effect: 'The French fleet has been ordered tuo7ofthe
' to Salamis. The Emperor is justly indignant. si.atcLes.
* ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 93.
150
OKIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XI.
You must bring your mission to a close forth-
with. Be peremptory both with the French and
the Turks. If the French Ambassador is ob-
stinate enough upon the question of the Holy
Places to give you a tenable ground on which
you can stand out, then hasten at once to a
rupture upon that business without further dis-
cussion about our ulterior demands. But if the
French Ambassador throws no sufficing diffi-
culties in the way of the settlement of the ques-
tion of the Holy Places, then press your demand
for the protectorate of the Greek Church. Press
it peremptorily. In carrying out these instruc-
tions, you have full discretion so far as concerns
all forms and details, but in regard to time the
Emperor grants you no latitude. You must force
your mission to a close. By the time you receive
this despatch Stratford Canning will be at Con-
stantinople. He has ever thwarted His Majesty
the Emperor. The inscrutable will of Providence
has bestowed upon him great gifts of mind
which he has used for no other purpose than to
baffle and humiliate the Emperor, and keep down
the Orthodox Church. In negotiation, or in
contest for influence over the Turks, he would
overcome you and crush you, but his instructions
do not authorise him to be more than a mere
peaceful negotiator. You, on the contrary, are
supported by force. He can only persuade ; you
can threaten. Strike terror. jNIake the Divan
feel the weight of our preparations in Bessarabia
and at Sebastopol. Dannenberg's horsemen are
BETWEEN THE CZAE AND THE SULTAN. 151
'close upon the Pruth. When the Emperor re- chap.
XT
' members the position of the 4th and the 5th '
' corps d'arm(^e, and the forwardness of his naval
' preparations, he conceives he has a right to ex-
' pect that you should instantly be able to take
' the ascendant over a man who, with all his
' hellish ability, is after all nothing more than the
' representative of a country absorbed in the pur-
' suit of gain. The Emperor cannot and will not
' endure that his Eepresentative, supported by the
' forces of the Empire, should remain secondary
' to the English Ambassador, Again the Emperor
' commands me to say you must strike terror.
' Use a fierce insulting tone. If the Turks remain
' calm, it will be because Stratford Canning sup-
' ports them. Therefore demand private audiences
' of the Sultan, and press upon his fears. If your
' last demands, whatever they may be, are reject-
' ed, quit Constantinople immediately with your
' whole suit, and carry away with you the whole
' staff of our Legation.'
On the day after receiving his despatches. Prince Mcntschi-
Mentschikoff had a long interview with Pifaat mandfora
T 1 1 1 n 1 1 rrotectorato
1 asha, and strove to wrench irom him the assent df the Greek
of the Turkish Government to the terms already Turkey,
submitted to the Porte as the project for a secret
treaty. And although it happened that in the
course of the negotiations on this subject Piussia
submitted to accept many changes in the form or
the wording of the engagement wliich she required,
it may be said with accuracy that, from the first
to the last, she always required the Porte to give
152 OEIGIN OF THE WAK OF 1853
CHAP, her an instrument which should have the force
v r
' of a treaty engagement, and confer upon her the
wo^lbe^'"^ right to insist that the Greek Church and Clergy
Snced^g^t i^ Turkey should continue in the enjoyment of all
their existing privileges. It was clear, therefore,
that if the Sultan should be induced to set his
seal to any instrument of this kind, he would be
chargeable with a breach of treaty engagements
whenever a Greek bishop could satisfy a Eussian
Emperor that there was some privilege formerly
enjoyed by him or his Church which had been
varied or withdrawn. It was plain that for the
Sultan to yield thus much would be to make the
Czar a partaker of his sovereignty. This seemed
clear to men of all nations except the Russians
themselves; but especially it seemed clear to those
who happened to know something of the structure
of the Ottoman Empire. The indolence or the
wise instinct of the Mussulman rulers had given
to the Christian * nations ' living within the Sul-
tan's dominions many of the blessings which we
cherish under the name of 'self-government;' and
since the Greek Christians had exercised these
privileges by deputing their bishops and their
priests to administer the authority conceded to the
' nation,' it followed that the spiritual dominion of
the priesthood had become blended with a great
share of temporal power. So many of the duties
of prefects, of magistrates, of assessors, of collec-
tors, and of police were discharged by bishops,
priests, and deacons, that a protectorate of these
ecclesiastics might be so used by a powerful for-
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 153
eign Prince, as to carry with it a virtual sover- chap.
eignty over ten or fourteen millions of laymen. '
All this had been seen by Lord Stratford and ihenegotia-
by the Turkish Ministers ; and when Prince Ment- fouowed the
schikoff pressed the treaty upon Pdfaat Pasha he
was startled, as it would seem, by the calmness
and the full knowledge which he encountered.
' The treaty,' said Kifaat Pasha, ' would be giving
' to Kussia an exclusive protectorate over the
' whole Greek population, their clergy, and their
' Churches.'*
The Prince, it would seem, now began to know
tliat he had to do with the English Ambassador,
for he made the alteration before adverted to in
the draft of his treaty, and on the 20th of April
read it in its amended shape to Lord Stratford,
and assured him that it was only an explana-
tory guarantee of existing treaties, giving to the
co-religionists of Ptussia what Austria already
possessed with regard to hers. Lord Stratford on
that day had approached to within forty-eight
hours of the settlement of the question of the Holy
Places, wliich he deemed it so vital to acl)ieve ;
and it may be easily imagined that, in the remarks
which he might make upon hearing the draft read,
he would abstain with great care from irritating
discussion, and would not utter a word more than
was necessary for the purpose of fairly indicating
that his postponement of discussion on the sub-
ject of the ulterior demands was not to be mis-
taken for acquiescence ; but all that for that pur-
* * Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 153.
154 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, pose was needed he fairly said, for he observed
XT
' to Prince Mentschikoff ' that the Sultan's promise
' to protect his Christian subjects in the free
' exercise of their religion differed extremely from
' a right conferred on any foreign Power to enforce
' that protection, and also that the same degree of
' interference might be dangerous to the Porte,
' when exercised by so powerful an empire as
' Eussia on behalf of ten millions of Greeks, and
' innocent in the case of Austria, whose influence,
' derivable from religious sympathy, was confined
' to a small number of Catholics, including her
' own subjects.'* These remarks were surely not
ambiguous; but it seems probable that Prince
Mentschikoff, misled by his previous impression
as to what Lord Stratford really objected to, may
have imagined that the proposed convention in its
altered form would not be violently disapproved by
the English Ambassador. At all events, he seems
to have instructed his Government to that effect.
On the 19th of April the Eussian Ambassador
addressed his remonstrances and his demands to
the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs in the
form of a diplomatic Note. In the first sentence
of this singular document Prince Mentschikoff
tells the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he must
have ' seen the duplicity of his predecessor.' In
the next he tells him he must be ' convinced of
' the extent to which the respect due to the
' Emperor had been disregarded, and how great
' v.^as his magnanimity in offering to the Porte the
* ' Eastern Papers, ' part i. p. 156,
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 155
' means of escaping from the embarrassments chap.
' occasioned to it by the bad faith of its Minis- ^
' ters ; ' and then, after more objurgation in the
same strain, and after dealing in a peremptory
way with the question of the Holy Places, the
Note goes on to declare that ' in consequence of
' the hostile tendencies manifested for some years
' past in whatever related to Eussia, she required
' in behalf of the religious communities of the
' Orthodox Church an explanatory and positive
' act of guarantee.' Then the Note requested that
the Ottoman Cabinet would ' be pleased in its
* wisdom to weigh the serious nature of the offence
' which it had committed, and compare it with
' the moderation of the demands made for repar-
' ation and guarantee, which a consideration of
' legitimate defence might have put forward at
* greater length and in more peremptory terms.'
Finally the Note stated that * the reply of the
' Minister for Foreign Affairs would indicate to the
' Ambassador the idterior duties which he would
' have to discharge ; ' and intimated that those
duties would be 'consistent with the dignity of
' the Government which he represented, and of
' the religion professed by his Sovereign.'*
It might have been politic for Prince ^lentschi-
koff to send such a note as this in tlie midst of
the paTiic which followed his lauding in tlie early
days of March, but it was vain to send it now.
The Turks had returned to their old allegiance.
They could take their rest, for they knew that
* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. LoS.
156 OKIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP. Lord Stratford watched. Him they feared, him
' they trusted, him they obeyed. It was in vain
now that the Prince sought to crush the will of
the Sultan and of his Ministers. Whether he
threatened, or whether he tried to cajole; whether
he sent his dragoman with angry messages to the
Porte, or whether he went thither in person;
whether he urged the members of the Government
in private interviews, or whether he obtained
audience of the Sultan, he always encountered
the same firmness, the same courteous deference,
and, above all, that same terrible moderation
which, day by day and hour by hour, was putting
him more and more in the wrong. The voice which
spoke to him might be the voice of the Grand Vizier,
or the voice of the Eeis Effendi, or the voice of the
Sultan himself; but the mind which he was really
encountering was always the mind of one man.
Par from quailing under the threatening tone of
the ISTote, the Turkish Government now deter-
mined to enter into no convention with Eussia,
and to reject Prince Mentschikoff's proposals re-
specting the protection of the Greek Church in
Turkey. The Grand Vizier and the Eeis Effendi
calmly consulted Lord Stratford as to the manner
in which they should give effect to the decision of
the Cabinet, and Lord Stratford, now placed at
ease by the settlement of the question of the Holy
Places, contentedly prepared to encounter the
next expected moves of Prince INIentschikoff.*
* 24th April. 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 160. The settle-
ment of the question of the Holy Places was on the 22d.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 157
In strife for ascendancy like that which was chap.
now going on between the Czar and Lord Strat-
ford, the pain of undergoing defeat is of such a cza?o*^[flnd-
kind that the pangs of the sufferer accumulate ; encountered
and far from being assuaged by time, they are s[ratfo'ni.
every day less easy to bear than they were the
day before. By the pomp and the declared sig-
nificance of Prince Mentschikoff's mission, the
Emperor Nicholas had drawn upon himself the
eyes of Europe, and the presence of the religious
ingredient had brought him under the gaze of
many millions of his own subjects who were not
commonly observers of the business of the State.
And he who, in transactions thus watched by
men, was preparing for him cruel discomfiture
he who kept him on the rack, and regulated his
torments with cold unrelenting precision was
the old familiar enemy whom he had once refused
to receive as the English Ambassador at St Peters-
burg. People who knew the springs of action in
the Eussian capital used to say at that time tliat
the whole * Eastern Question,' as it was called, lay
enclosed in one name lay enclosed in tlie name
of Lord Stratford. They acknowledged tliat tlie
Emperor Nicholas could not bear the stress of our
Aml)assador's autliority with the Porto.
And, in trutli, tlic Czar's jjower of endurance
was drawing to a close. He wavered and wavered
again and again. He was versed in business of
State, and it would seem that wlieii liis mind was
turned to things temporal he truly meant to bo
politic and just. But in his more religious mo-
158 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, ments lie was furious. Even for Kicliolas the
' ^^' Czar it was all but impossible to endure the Am-
bassador's political ascendancy ; but the bare
thought of Lord Stratford's protecting Christian-
ity in Turkey was more than could be borne by
Nicholas the Pontiff. Men not jesting approached
him with stories that the Ambassador had deter-
mined to bring over the Sultan to the Church of
England. His brain was not strong enough to be
safe against rumours like that. He almost came
to feel that the Englishman, who seemed to be en-
dued with strange powers of compulsion always
used for the support of Moslem dominion and for
curbing the Orthodox Eusso-Greek Church, was
a being in his nature Satanic, and that resistance
to him was as much a duty (and was a duty as
thickly beset with practical difficulties) as resist-
ance to the great enemy of mankind. Maddened
at last by this singular kind of torment, the Czar
broke loose from the restraints of policy, and was
even so void of counsel that, having determined
to do violence to the Sultan, he did not take the
common care of giving to his action any semblance
of consistency with public law.
Us effect The despatches framed under the orders of a
monarch in this condition of mind reached Prince
Mentschikoff in the beginning of jNIay. Breath-
ing fresh anger and enjoining haste, they fiercely
drove him on. They urged him to an almost in-
stantaneous rupture, without giving him a stand-
ing-ground for his quarrel. Yet at this time the
condition of things was of such a kind that a good
upon the
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 159
cause, nay even a specious grievance, would have chap.
XT
helped Prince Mentschikoff better than the ad- '
vance of the 4th and 5th corps, or the patrolling
of Dannenberg's cavalry.
In truth, what now befell the Russian Ambas- Mentsrhi-
sador was this : lie found himself placed under cuity
the compulsion of violent instructions at a time
when all ground for just resentment was wanting.
He could obey his orders, and force on a rupture ;
but he could no longer do this upon grounds
which Europe would regard as having a semblance
of fairness. AVhen he had despatched his Note of
the 19t]i of April, the question of the Holy Places
was still unsettled, and he was then able to blend
that grievance with other matters, and make it
serve as a basis for his ulterior demands ; but
now that that question was disposed of, his stand-
ing-ground failed him, for he alleged against the
Sultan no infraction of a treaty, and the only
grievance of which he had had to complain had
been redressed on the 22d of April ; and yet,
passing straight from this smooth condition of
things, he had to call upon the Sultan to sign a
treaty which he disapproved, and to make his re-
fusal to do so a ground for the immediate rupture
of diplomatic relations.
The natural hoi)c of a diplomatist placed in a jjo is i.^fflid
stress of this sort would have lain in the chance Stratford.
that the Government upon which he was pressing
might be guilty of some imprudence, and it may
be inferred that the Note of the 19th had been
framed with a view of provoking the Turkish
160 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. Ministers into a burst of anger. But every hope
' of this kind had been baffled. Turks were fan-
atical, Turks were fierce, Turks were quick to
avenge, and, above all, Turks were liable to panic ;
but some spell had come upon the race. The
spell had come upon the Sultan, it had come upon
the Turkish Ministers, it had come upon the
Great Council, it had come even upon the larger
mass of the warlike people who bring their feel-
ings to bear upon the policy of their Sultan. At
every step of his negotiation Prince Mentschikoff
encountered an adversary always courteous, al-
ways moderate, but cold, steadfast, wary, and
seeming as though he looked to the day when
perhaps he might wreak cruel vengeance. Who
this was the Prince now knew ; and he perhaps
began to understand the nature of the torment
inflicted upon his imperial Master by the bare
utterance of the one hated name. Prince Ments-
chikoff found himself powerless as a negotiator,
and it was clear that, unless he could descend to
the rude expedient of an ultimatum or a threat, he
was a man annulled. Indeed, without some act
of violence he could hardly deliver himself from
ridicule.
He presses Therefore, on the 5th of ]\Iay, Prince Mentschi-
in\new koff" forwardcd to the Minister for Foreign Affairs
the draft of a Sened or Convention, purporting to
be made between the Sultan and the Emperor of
Russia. This proposed Sened confirmed, with the
force of a treaty engagement, the arrangements
respecting the Holy Places which had been made
form.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN, 161
ill favour of the Greek Church, and it also intro- chap.
XT
duced and applied to the rival Churches a pro- '
vision similar in its wording to that which often
appears in commercial treaties, and goes by the
name of ' the most favoured nation clause.' But
the noxious feature of the Convention was de-
tected in the Article which purported to secure
for ever to the Orthodox Church and its Clergy
all the rights and immunities which they had
already enjoyed, and those of which they were
possessed from ancient times.* Here, under a
new form, was the old endeavour to obtain for
liussia a protectorate of the Greek Church in
Turkey.
This draft of a Convention was annexed to a
JSTote, in which Prince MentschikofF pressed its
immediate adoption, and urged the Sublime Porte,
' laying aside all hesitation and all mistrust, by
' which,' he declared, ' the dignity and the gener-
' ous sentiments of his august Master would be
' aggrieved,' f to delay its decision no longer. In
conclusion, Prince Mentschikoff suffered himself
to request that the ^linister for Poreign Affairs
would be good enough to let him have his answer
by the following Tuesday, and to add that he
could not 'consider any longer delay in any other
' light than as a want of respect towards his
Government, which would impose upon him the
' most painful duty.'f
Upon receiving this hostile communication, the counsels of
Minister for Foreign Affairs appealed to Lord ford. "
* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 167. t IbiJ. p. 165.
VOL. I. L
162 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. Stratford for counsel. He advised the Turkish
^' Government to be still deferential, still courteous,
still willing to go to the very edge of what might
be safely conceded, but to stand firm,
ffiscom- At this time Lord Stratford received a visit
with Prince from Prince Mentschikoff, and ascertained from
koff. him that he did not mean to recede from his
demands. The Prince declared that he had run
out the whole line of his moderation, and could
go no further, and that his Government would no
longer submit to the state of inferiority in which
he said Eussia was held with reference to the co-
religionists of the Emperor Nicholas.
A few days later Lord Stratford addressed a
letter to Prince Mentschikoff, in which, with all
the diplomatic courtesy of which he was master,
he strove to convey to the Prince some idea of
the way in which he was derogating from that
justice and moderation towards foreign sovereigns
which had hitherto marked the reign of the
Emperor Nicholas. The answer of Prince Ments-
chikoff announced that it was impossible for him
to agree in the views pressed upon him by Lord
Stratford, and (after a little more of the wasteful
verbiage in which Eussia used to assert that her
exaction was good and wholesome for Turkey)
the Prince claimed a right to freedom of action.
He said that he was not conscious of having failed
in the loyal assurances given by his Government
to the Cabinet of the Queen, declared that he had
been perfectly sincere in his communications with
Lord Stratford, and owned that he had expected a
BETWEEN THE CZAE AND THE SULTAN. 163
frank co-operation on his part. But when he had chap.
written these common things the truth broke out. '
' The Emperor's legation,' said he, ' cannot stay
' at Constantinople under the circumstances in
' which it has been placed. It cannot submit
* to the secondary position to which it might be
' wished to reduce it.' *
Lord Stratford, it would seem, had now little
hope of being able to bring about an accommoda-
tion, and henceforth his great object was to take
care that the Porte should stand firm, but should
so act that, in the opinion of England and of
Europe, the Sultan should seem justified in
exposing himself to the hazard of a rupture with
Eussia.
Late at night Lord Stratford saw the Grand msndvi.-e
Vizier at his country-house, and the Minister for ilirki^sii
Foreign Affairs and the Seraskier were present. "
During the day there had been a little failing of
heart, and when the Turkish Ministers were in
the presence of M. de la Cour, they had seemed
' disposed to shrink from encountering the conse-
' quences of Prince Mentschikoff s retiring in dis-
' pleasure ;'7 but either they had dissembled their
fears in the ])resence of the English Ambassador,
or else, whilst Lord Stratford was in the same
room with them, their fear of other Powers was
suspended. They were unanimous in regarding
the Convention as inadmissible. Lord Strat lord's
determination was that the demand of Prince
Mentschikoff should be resisted ; but that at the
* ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 217. + Iliid. p. 177.
164 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, same time there should be shown so much oi
^^" courtesy and of forbearance, and so great a will-
inffness to so to the utmost limit of safe conces-
sion, and to improve the condition of the Christian
subjects of the Porte, that the Turks should appear
before Europe in a character almost angelic. ' I
' advised them,' said he, ' to open a door for
' negotiation in the note to be prepared, and to
' withhold no concession compatible with the real
' welfare and independence of the Empire. I
' could not in conscience urge them to accept the
' Eussian demands as now presented to them, but
' I reminded them of the guarantee required by
' Prince Mentschikoff, and strongly recommended
' that, if the guarantee he required was inadmis-
' sible, a substitute for it should be found in a
' frank and comprehensive exercise of the Sultan's
' authority in the promulgation of a firman, secur-
' ing both the spiritual and temporal privileges
' of all the Porte's tributary subjects, and, by way
' of further security, communicated officially to
' the five great Powers of Christendom.'* To all
these counsels the Turkish Ministers listened with
assenting mind.
But it was now late in the night, and the Am-
bassador rose. Perhaps the hour and the Ambas-
sador's movement to depart cast a shadow of
anxiety upon the minds of the Turkish Ministers.
Perhaps the ripple of the waters (for the con-
ference was in a house on the edge of the Bos-
phorus) called to mind the thought of the English
* ' Eastern Papers,' part i. 177.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 165
flag. At all events, the Grand Vizier, in that chap.
moment of weakness, suffered himself to cast a '
thought after the arm of the flesh, and to ask
whether the Porte might expect the eventual ap-
proach of the English squadron in the Mediter-
ranean. Lord Stratford rebuked him. ' I replied,'
said he, 'that I considered the position in its
' present stage to be one of a moral character,
' and consequently that its difiiculties or hazards,
' whatever they might be, should be rather met
' by acts of a similar description than by demou-
' stratious calculated to increase alarm and pro-
' voke resentment.'
It was a new and a strange task for this Grand
Vizier of a warlike Tartar nation to be called
upon to defend a threatened empire by ' acts of a
' moral character ; ' but after all his reliance was
upon the man. It might be hard for him to
understand how the mere advantage of being in
tlie right could be used against tlie Sebastopol
licet, or the army that was hovering upon the
P]'uth ; but if he looked upon the close, angry,
resolute lips of the Ambassador, and the grand
dverhanging of his brow, he saw that which more
than all else in the world takes hold of the Ori-
ental mind, for he saw strength held in reserve.
And this faith was of such a kind, that, far from
being weakened, it would gather new force from
Lord Stratford's refusal to speak of material help.
The Turkish Ministry determined to reject Prince
MentschikofFs pro})osals, and to do this in the
way advised by the English Ambassador. All this
166 OEIGIX OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, while Lord Stratford was unconscious of exercis-
" ing any ascendancy over his fellow-creatures, and
it seemed to him that the Turks were determining
this momentous question by means of their un-
biassed judgments*
Prince Mentschikoff was soon made aware of
the refusal with which his demand was to be met,
and, finding that all his communications with the
Turkish Ministers gave him nothing but the faith-
ful echo of the counsels addressed to them by
Lord Stratford, he seems to have imagined the
plan of overstepping the Turkish Ministers, and
endeavouring to wring an assent to his demands
from the Sultan himself. It seems probable that
Lord Stratford had been apprised of this intention,
and was willing to defeat it, for on the 9th he
sought a private audience of the Sultan : he
sought it, of course, through the legitimate chan-
nel. The Minister for Foreign Affairs went with
Lord Stratford to the Sultan's apartment, and then
Hisaufiience Withdrew. The Ambassador spoke gravely to the
of the Sultan. n -, -, r o j
Sultan of the danger with which his Empire was
threatened, and then of the grounds for confidence.
He was happy, he said, to find that His Majesty's
servants, both Ministers and Council, were not
less inclined to gratify the Eussian Ambassador
with all that could be safely conceded to him,
than determined to withhold their consent from
every requisition calculated to inflict a serious
injury on the independence and dignity of their
Sovereign. ' I had waited,' said Lord Stratford,
* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 213.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AKD THE SULTAN. 167
to know their own unbiassed impressions re-
specting the kind of guarantee demanded by
Prince Mentschikoff, and I could not do other-
wise than approve the decision which they ap-
pear to have adopted with unanimity. My own
impression is, that if your Majesty should sanc-
tion that decision, the Ambassador will probably
break off his relations with the Porte and go
away, together perhaps with his whole embassy :
nor is it quite impossible even that a temporary
occupation, however unjust, of the Danubian
Principalities by Russia may take place ; but I
feel certain that neither a declaration of war,
nor any other act of open hostility, is to be
apprehended for the present, as the Emperor
Nicholas cannot resort to such extremities on
account of the pending differences without con-
tradicting his most solemn assurances, and ex-
posing himself to the indignant censure of all
Europe. I conceive that, under such circum-
stances, the true position to be maintained by
the Porte is one of moral resistance to such de-
mands as are really inadmissible on just and
essential grounds, and that the principle should
even be applied under protest to the occupation
of tlie Principalities, not in weakness or despair,
but in reliance on a good cause, and on the
sympathy of friendly and independent Govern-
ments. A firm adherence to this line of con-
duct as long as it is possible to maintain it
with honour will, in my judgment, offer the
best chances of ultimate success with the least
CHAP,
XI.
168 ORIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP, 'practicable degree of provocation, and prevent
'. ' disturbance of commercial interests. This
' language,' writes Lord Stratford, ' appeared to
' interest the Sultan deeply, and also to coincide
' with His Majesty's existing opinions. He said
' that he was well aware of the dangers to which
' I had alluded ; that he was perfectly jjrepared,
' in the exercise of his own free will, to confirm
' and to render effective the protection promised
' to all classes of his tributary subjects in matters
' of religious worship, including the immunities
' and privileges granted to their respective clergy.
' He showed me the last communications in writ-
' ing which had passed between his Ministers and
' the Eussian Embassy ; he thanked me for hav-
' ing helped to bring the question of the Holy
' Places to an arrangement ; he professed his re-
' liance on the friendly support of Great Britain.'
Thediscio- But now Lord Stratford apprised the Sultan
sure which * -'
he had re- that he had a communication to make to him
served for
the siiitan's which he had hitherto withheld from his Minis-
tar.
ters, reserving it for the private ear of His ^la-
jesty. The pale Sultan listened.
Then the Ambassador announced that, in the
event of imminent danger, he was instructed to
request the Commander of Her Majesty's forces
in the Mediterranean to hold his squadron in
readiness.*
This order was of itself a slight thing, and it
conferred but a narrow and stinted authority ;
but, imparted to the Sultan in private audience
* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 213.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 169
by Lord Stratford de Eedcliffe, it came with more chap.
weight than the promise of armed support from ^^"
the lips of a common Statesman. Long withheld
from the Turkish Ministers, and now disclosed to
them through their Sovereign, it confirmed them
in the faith that whatever a man might know of
the great Eltchi's power, there was always more
to be known. And when a man once comes to
be thus thought of by Orientals, he is more their
master than one who seeks to overpower their
minds by making coarse pretences of strength.
On the 10th the Secretary for Foreign Affairs Turkish
sent his answer to Prince Mentschikoff's demand. Mentschi-
The letter was full of courtesy and deference maud.
towards Russia : it declared it to be the firm
intention of the Porte to maintain unimpaired
the rights of all the tributary subjects of the Em-
pire, and it expressed a willingness to negotiate
with Eussia concerning a church and an hospital
at Jerusalem, and also as to the privileges which
should be conceded to Eussian subjects, monks
and pilgrims ; but the Note objected to entertain
that portion of the Eussian demands which went
to give Eussia a protectorate of the Greek Churcli
in Turkey.*
On tlie following day Prince Mentschikoff sent Montseiii-
an angry reply to this Note, declining to accept gry rei.iy.
it as an answer to his demand. He stated that
he was instructed to negotiate for an engagement
guaranteeing the privileges of the Greek Church
as a mark of respect to the religious convictions
* May 10. 'Eastern Papers,' part i. ]k IV6.
170
OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XI.
His i)rivate
audience of
the Sultau.
This causes
a change of
Ministry at
Constanti-
no] lie;
of the Emperor; and if the principles which
formed the basis of this proposed mark of respect
were to be rejected, and if the Porte, by a system-
atic opposition, was to persist in closing the very
approaches to an intimate and direct understand-
ing, then the Prince declared with pain that he
must consider his mission at an end, must break
off relations with the Cabinet of the Sultan, and
throw upon the responsibility of his Ministers all
the consequences which might ensue. The Prince
ended his Note by requiring that it should be an-
swered within three days.*
On the second day after sending this Note,
Prince Mentschikoff was to have an interview with
the Grand Vizier at half-past one o'clock ; but
before that hour came the Prince took a step
which had the effect of breaking up the JNIinistry.
Without the concurrence, and apparently without
the previous knowledge, of the Ministers, he found
means to obtain a private audience of the Sultan
at ten o'clock in the morning. The Sultan did
wrongly when he submitted to receive a foreign
Ambassador without the advice or knowledge of
his Ministers, and the Grand Vizier had the spirit
to resent the course thus taken by his Sovereign ;
for upon being sent for by the Sultan immediately
after the audience, he requested permission to stay
at home, and at the same time gave up his seals
of office. The new Ministry, however, was formed
of men who, as members of the Great Council,
had declared opinions adverse to the extreme de-
* May 11. ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 197.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 171
mauds of Eussia.* Eeshid Pasha became the chap.
XI
Secretary of State for Foreign Afiairs ; and this '
was not an appointment which disclosed any in-
tention on the part of the Sultan to disengage
himself from the counsels of the English Am-
bassador.
If the Sultan had erred in granting an audience
without the assent of his Ministers, he had carried
his weakness no further. It soon transpired that but fails to
^ shake the
Prince Mentschikoff had failed to wring from the suitan.
Sultan any dangerous words. It seems that when
the Prince came to press his demands upon the
imperial ear, he found the monarch reposing in
tlie calmness of mind which had been given him
by the English Ambassador five days before, and
in a few moments he had the mortification of
hearing that for all answer to his demands he was
referred to the Minister of State."|- In the judg-
ment of Prince Mentschikoff, to be thus answered
was to be remitted back to Lord Stratford. It
was hard to bear.
Prince jNIentschikoff began his intercourse with Mts<hi-
, T-i n 1 kdir violiiit-
tne new foreign Secretary by insisting uj)on an ly i.nss,s
immediate reply to his Note of the 11th of j\Iay.
Eeshid Pasha asked for the delay of a few days,
on the ground of the change of Ministry. This
reasonable demand was met at first by a refusal,
but afterwards by a Note which seems to have
been rendered incoherent by the difficulty in
which Prince ^Mentschikoff was placed ; for, on
the one hand, a request for a delay of a few da}'S,
* 'Eastern Papers,' juirt i. p. IPi. t Ibid. p. ll'j
172
OEIGIX OF THE WAK OF 1853
CHAP.
XI.
TJie Great
Council de-
termine to
resist.
founded upon a change of Ministry, was a request
too fair to be refused with decency ; and on the
other hand, the violent orders which had just
come in from St Petersburg enjoined the Prince
to close the unequal strife with Lord Stratford,
and to enforce instant compliance, or at once
break off and depart. The Note began by an-
nouncing that Eeshid Pasha's communication
imposed upon the Piussian Ambassador the duty
of breaking off from the then present time his
official relations with the Sublime Porte ; but it
added that the Ambassador would suspend the
last demand, which was to determine the attitude
which Piussia would thenceforth assume towards
Turkey. The Xote further declared that a con-
tinuance of hesitation on the part of the Ottoman
Government would be regarded as an indication
of reserve and distrust offensive to the Eussian
Government, and that the departure of the Rus-
sian Ambassador, and also of the Imperial Le-
gation, would be the inevitable and immediate
consequence.
By the voices of forty-two against three, the
Great Council of the Porte determined to adhere
to the decision already taken ; and on the 18th,
Eeshid Pasha called upon Prince Meutschikoff,
and orally imparted to him the extreme length to
which the Turkish Government was willing to go
in the way of concession. The honour of the
Porte required, he said, that the exclusively spirit-
ual privileges granted under the Sultan's prede-
cessors, and confirmed by His Majesty, should
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 173
remain in full force; and he declared that the chap.
XT
equitable system pursued by the Porte towards '
its subjects demanded that the Greek Clergy
should be on as good a footing as other Christian offers made
bv tli6 Porttj
subjects of the Sultan. He added that a firman under the
. . 1 1 advice of
was to issue proclaiming this determination on Lordstrat-
the part of the Sultan. In regard to the shrine at
Jerusalem, Eeshid Pasha was willing to engage
that there should be no change without communi-
cating with the Piussian and French Governments.
Eeshid Pasha also consented that a church and
hospital for the Russians should be built at Jeru-
salem ; and in regard to all these last matters
connected with the Holy Land, the Porte, he said,
was willing to solemnise its promise by a formal
convention. These overtures were made in exact
accordance with a Paper of advice which Lord
Stratford had placed in the hands of Rcshid Pasha
five days before.* Virtually Eeshid Pasha offered
Prince Mentschikoff everything which Russia had
demanded except the protectorate of the Greek
Church in Turkey ."f That he refused.
Instantly, and without waiting for the written
statement of the pro^iosals orally conveyed to him
by Eeshid Pasha, Prince Mentschikoff determined
to break off the negotiation. On the same day he
addressed to tlie Porte an official Note, whicli pur- Ments.iii-
ported to be truly his last. In this he declared i.y dodarinK
that, by rejecting with distrust the wishes ot tlie atanoud
Emperor in fiivour of the Orthodox Groco-Eussian
* ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. T.^o.
t Ibid. p. 205, and see p. '252.
174
OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XI.
The repre-
sentatives
of the four
Powers
assembled
by Lord
Stratford.
Policy in-
volved in
this step.
religion, the Sublime Porte had failed in what was
due to an august and ancient ally. The refusal,
he said, was a fresh injury. He declared his
mission at an end ; and after asserting that the
Imperial Court could not, without prejudice to
its dignity and without exposing itself to fresh
insults, continue to maintain a mission at Con-
stantinople, he announced that he should not only
quit Constantinople himself, but should take with
him the whole Staff of the Imperial Legation,
except the Director of the Commercial Depart-
ment. The Prince added, that the refusal of a
guarantee for the Orthodox Greco-Russian religion
obliged the Imperial Government to seek in its
own power that security which the Porte declined
to give by way of treaty engagement ; and he
added that any infringement of the existing state
of the Eastern Church would be regarded as an
act of hostility to Eussia*
Prince Mentschikoff's departure did not imme-
diately follow the despatch of this Note, and on
the morning of the 19th Lord Stratford took a step
of great moment to the tranquillity of Europe, for
it laid the seed of a wholesome i)olicy which,
until it was ruined, as will be seen hereafter, by
the evil designs of some, and by the weakness of
other men, promised fair to enforce justice and to
maintain truth without bringing upon the world
the calamity of a war. Instead of putting him-
self in communication with one only of the other
great Powers, and so preparing a road to hostili-
* May 18. ' Eastern Papers,' p. 206.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 175
ties, the English Ambassador assembled the rep- chap.
resentatives of Austria, Trance, and Prussia. It "
then appeared that there was no essential differ- o^^t^j^J^jy^
ence of opinion between the representatives of the tfver*^"**'
four great Powers. None of them questioned the
soundness of the Porte's views in resisting the
extreme demands of Eussia ; all acknowledged the
spirit of conciliation displayed by the Sultan's
Ministers ; all were agreed in desiring to prevent
the rupture; all desired that the Emperor Nicholas
should be enabled to recede without discredit from
the wrong path which he had taken, and were
willing to cover his retreat by every device which
was consistent with the honour and welfare of
other States. This union of opinion, followed
close by concerted action, was surely a right
example of the way in which it was becoming for
Europe to regard an approach to injustice by one
of the great Powers. It was arranged that the Their
_ ^ _ measures.
Austrian Envoy should call upon Prince jMentschi-
koff, should apprise liim of the sorrow with which
the representatives of the four Powers contem-
plated tbe rupture of his relations with the Porte ;
should express tlie lively gratification wliich a
friendly solution, if that were still possible, would
afford them ; and, iinally, should ascertain wliether
tlie Prince would receive through a ])rivat(.' clian-
nel the Porte's intended Note, and give it a calm
consideration.* This appeal from the representa-
tives of the four great Powers produced no effect
on the mind of Prince Mentschikon'.f and Lord
* ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 205. t lltid. \\ 219.
176 OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. Stratford scarcely expected that it would do so;
but it commenced, or rather it marked and strength-
ened, that expression of grave disapproval on the
part of the four Powers, which was the true and
the safe corrective of an outrage threatened by
one.
After his official relations with the Porte had
come to a close, Prince Llentschikoff received and
rejected the Turkish Note,* which embodied the
concessions already described to him orally by
Eeshid Pasha ; but on the evening of the 20th
of May the Prince determined to make a conces-
sion in point of form, and to be content to have
the engagement which he was demanding from
the Porte in the form of a diplomatic Xote, in-
stead of a Treaty or Convention. In furtherance
Russia's of tliis view, thougli his official capacity had
ceased, he caused to be delivered to Eeshid Pasha
the draft of a iSTote to be giveu by the Porte.
This draft purported to involve the Porte in
engagements exactly the same as those which
it had refused to contract, and to give to Eussia
(by means of a Xote instead of a Convention) the
protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey.-j-
Eeshid Pasha immediately sent the Note to Lord
Statford for communication to the three other rep-
resentatives of the four Powers, with a request
that they would give an opinion as to the most
* This Note, being the last offer made by the Turkish Gov-
ernment to Prince MentschikofF, is printed in the Ajipendix.
+ ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 220. As this Draft was
Prince Mentschikoff's real ultimatum, it is printed in the
Appendix.
ultimatum.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 177
advisable mode of proceeding. Early the next chap.
morning, Lord Stratford ascertained that, in the '
opinion of Eeshid Pasha, the altered form of the
Eussian demands left them as objectionable as
ever.* The Eussians imagined that Eeshid Pasha
was wilhng to give way to them, and that he even
entreated Lord Stratford to let him yield, but that
the English Ambassador was inexorable. There
was no truth in this notion.-|- Lord Stratford's
counsels had cut so deep into the mind of the
Turkish Minister that he was well able to follow
them without wanting guidance from hour to hour.
The English Ambassador assembled the represen-
tatives of the tliree Powers, and found that they
unanimously agreed with him ' in adopting an
' opinion essentially identical with that of the
' Turkish Ministers/ 1 They all signed a memo-
randum declaring that * upon a question which so
' closely touched the freedom of action and the
' sovereignty of Ilis Majesty the Sultan, His High-
' ncss Eeshid Pasha was the best judge of the
' course which it was fitting to take, and that they
did not consider themselves authorised to pro-
' nounce an opinion.'
Prince Mentschikoff had caused it to be under- its i ejection.
stood that this his last demand was only to be
accepted by being accepted in full. It was re-
jected; and on the 21st of May the Prince was
preparing to depart, when he heard tliat tlic Porte
* ' P];i,stiTn Papers,' ji.irt i. pp. 219, 220.
+ It is clearly disproved. Iliid. ]>p. ^?,Q-^.
t Ibid. p. 220. Ibid. p. 222.
VOL. I. M
178 OKIGIN OF THE WAK OF 1853
CHAP, intended to issue and proclaim a guarantee for the
^ exercise of the spiritual rights possessed by the
Greek Church in Turkey. It was hard for Eussia
to endure the resistance which she had en-
countered, but it was more difficult still to hear,
with any semblance of calmness, that the Porte,
of its own free will, was doing a main part of that
which the Emperor Nicholas had urged it to
do. This was not tolerable. To Eussian ears the
least utterance about ' the free will of the Porte '
instantly conveyed the idea that all was to be
ordered and governed at the will and pleasure of
the English Ambassador. The thought that the
protectorate of the Greek Church was not only
refused to the Czar, but was now passing quietly
into the hands of Lord Stratford, was so madden-
ing, that Prince Mentschikoff, forgetting or tran-
scending the fact that he had formally announced
Finaithreats the rupturc of his relations with the Porte, now
Mentschi- Suffered himself to address a solemn Note to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which (basing
himself upon a theory that the mention of the
spiritual might be deemed to derogate from the
temporal rights of the Church) he announced that
any act having the effect which this theory attri-
buted to the proposed guarantee, would be regarded
His depar- as ' hostllc to Eussia and her religion.' * Having
despatched these last words of threat, he at length
went on board and departed. On the same day
the arms of Eussia were taken down from the
palace of the Imperial Embassy.
'Eastern Papers,' part i. ji. 253.
tore.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 179
Thus ended the ill-omened mission of Prince chap.
Mentschikoff. It had lasted eleven weeks. In . ^[
that compass of time the Emperor Nicholas de- F;'''"'^'=<'.r
^ ^ the mission
stroyed the whole repute which he had earned "Pf^l^f
by wielding the power of Eussia for more than a ^^'ciioias.
quarter of a century with justice and moderation
towards foreign States.* But, moreover, in these
same fatal days the Emperor Nicholas did much
to bring his good faith into question. The tenor
of his previous life makes it right to insist that
any imputation upon his personal honour shall
be tested with scrupulous care ; but it is hard to
escape the conviction that, during several weeks
in the spring of the year, he was giving to the
English Government a series of assurances which
misrepresented the instructions given by him to
Prince ISIentschikoff during that same period.
Thus, almost at the very hour when Count Nessel-
rode was assuring Sir Hamilton Seymour that
' the adjustment of the difficulties respecting the
' Holy Places would settle all matters in dispute
' between Ptussia and the Porte,' f Prince Ments-
chikolf was striving to wring from the Porte a
secret treaty, depriving the Sultan of his control
over tlie Patriarcliate of Constantinople, and ced-
ing to Eussia a virtual protectorate of the Greek
Church in Turkey, and was enjoining tlie Turkish
Ministers to keep this negotiation concealed from
* Computed from the Peace of Adriaiioplc in 18'2(>. The
reign of Nicliolas commenced in 1825.
+ 'Eastern Papers,' parti, p. 102. The slight qualification
with wliich Count Nesselrodo accompanied the assurance,
truded to strengthen it by giving it greater precision.
180 OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, the 'ill-disposed powers,' for so he called England
and France ; * and again, in the very week in
which the Czar was joining with the English
Government in a form more than usually solemn
in denouncing the practice of ' harassing the Porte
' by overbearing demands, put forward in a man-
' ner humiliating to its independence and its
' dignity,' j* he was shaping the angry despatch
which caused Prince Mentschikoff to insult the
Porte by his peremptory Note of the 5th of May.
But notwithstanding all this variance between
what the Czar said and what he did, it must be
acknowledged that it would be hard to explain his
words and his course of action by imputing to him
a vulgar and rational duplicity ; for it was plain
that the secrecy at which he aimed would be
terminated by the success of the negotiation ; and
supposing him to have been in possession of his
reason, and to have been acting on grounds tem-
poral, he could not have imagined that, for the
sake of extorting a new promise from the Sultan,
and giving a little more semblance of legality to
pretensions which he already maintained to be
valid, it was politic for him to forfeit that reputa-
tion for honour, which was a main element of his
greatness and his strength. The dreams of terri-
torial aggrandisement which he imparted to Sir
Hamilton Seymour in January and February had
* 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 108.
+ Memorandum by the Emperor Nicholas confidentially
delivered to Sir Hamilton Seymour, and dated tlie 15th April
1853. Ibid, part v. p. 25.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 181
all dissolved before the middle of March, and it chap.
is vain to say that after that time his actions were '
governed by any rational plan of conquest. Policy
required that for encroachments against Turkey
he should choose a time when Europe, engaged in
some other strife, might be likely to acquiesce ;
far from doing this, the Czar chose a time when
the four Powers had nothing else to do than to
watch and restrain the aggression of Eussia.
Again, policy required that pressure upon the
Sultan of a hostile kind should be justified by
narratives of the cruel treatment of the Christians
by their Turkish masters ; yet if any such causes
existed for the anger of Christendom, the Emperor
Nicholas never took the pains to make them known
to Euroj)e. From first to last his loose charges
against the Turks for maltreatment of their
Christian subjects were not only left without
])roof, but were even unsupported by anything like
statements of fact.
Still the Czar was not labouring under any
general derangement of mind. The truth seems
to be that zeal for his Church had made greater
inroads upon his moral and intellectual nature
than was commonly known, and that when he
was imdcr the stress of religious or rather of
ecclesiastic feelings he ceased to be politic, and
even perhaps ceased to be honest. It was at such
times that there came upon him that tendency to
act in a spirit of barbaric cunning which was
really inconsistent with the general tenor of his
life. Put if it happened that whilst his mind was
182
OEIGIN OF THE WAK OF 1853
CHAP.
XI.
Position in
which Lord
Stratford's
skill had
placed the
Porte.
already uuder one of these spiritual visitations, it
was further inflamed by any tidings which roused
his old antagonism to Sir Stratford Canning, then
instantly it was wrought into such a state that
one must be content to mark its fitful and violent
impact upon human affairs without undertaking
to deduce the result from any symmetrical scheme
of action.
But, whatever the cause, the fall was great.
The polity of the Russian State was of such a
kind that, when the character of its monarch stood
high he exalted the empire, and when he descended,
he drew the empire along with him. In the be-
ginning of March the Emperor Nicholas almost
oppressed the continent of Europe with the weight
of his vast power, conjoined with moderation and
a spirit of austere justice towards foreign States.
Before the end of May he stood before the world
shorn bare of all this moral strength, and having
nothing left to him except what might be reck-
oned and set down upon paper by an inspector of
troops or a surveyor of ships. In less than three
months the station of Eussia amongst the Powers
of Europe underwent a great change.
The English Ambassador remained upon the
field of the conflict. Between the time of his
return to Constantinople and the departure of
Prince Mentschikoff there had passed forty-five
days. In this period Lord Stratford had brought
to a settlement the question of the Holy Places,
had baffled all the efforts of the Emperor Nicholas
to work an inroad upon the sovereign rights of
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 183
the Sultan, and had enforced upon the Turks a chap.
. XI
firmness so indomitable, and a moderation so "
unwearied, that from the hour of his arrival at
Constantinople they resisted every claim which
was fraught with real danger but always resisted
with courtesy and yielded to every demand,
however unjust in principle, if it seemed that they
could yield with honour and with safety. Know-
ing that, if he left room for doubt whether Eussia
or tlie Porte were in the riglit, the controversy
would run a danger of being decided in favour of
the stronger, he provided, with a keen foresight,
and at the cost of having to put a hard restraint
upon his anger, and even upon his sense of justice,
tliat the concessions offered by the Turks should
reach beyond their just liability; nay, should reach
so far beyond it as to leave a broad margin be-
tween, and make it difficult even for any one who
inclined towards the strong to deny that Eussia was
committing an outrage upon a weaker State, and
was therefore offending against Europe. In truth,
he placed the Moslem before the world in an atti-
tude of Christian forbearance sustained by unfail-
ing courage ; and in proportion as men loved
justice and were led by the gentle precepts of the
Gospel, they inclined to the IMahometan Prince,
who seemed to represent their princi})lcs, and
began to think how best they could help him to
make a stand against the ferocious Christianity of
the Czar. In England especially this sentiment
was kindled, and already it was beginning to gain
a hold over the policy of the State. Less than
184 ORIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
GHAP. three months before, the dismemberment of the
XI
' Turkish Empire had been thought a fair subject
to bring into question, and now the firmness and
the strange moderation with which the Turks
stood, resisting the demands of their assailant,
was drawing the English people, day by day, into
a steadfast alliance with the Sultan.
But if Lord Stratford had succeeded in gaining
over to his cause the general opinion of Europe,
or rather in adapting the policy of the Divan to
what he knew would be approved by the people
of the West, he did not neglect to use such means
as he had for moving the Governments of the four
Powers ; and the concerted action to which he
had succeeded in bringing them on the 21st of
May was a beginning of the peaceful coercion
with which it was fitting that Europe should
withstand the encroachments of a wrong-doer.
Engage- But this was not all that was effected by the
ments con- ,. i . . n ^ -r '
tractedby diplomatic transactions of the sprino-. It cannot
England. ^ r a
be concealed that, without the solemnity of a
treaty nay, without the knowledge of Parliament.
and perhaps without the knowledge of her Prime
Minister England, in the course of a few weeks,
had slided into all tiie responsibility of a defensive
alliance with the Sultan against the Emperor of
Eussia. It may seem strange that this could
be ; but the truth is, that the general scope of
a lengthened official correspondence is not to be
gathered by merely learning at intervals the
import of each despatch. Taken singly, almost
every despatch composed by a skilled diplomatist
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 185
will be likely to seem wise and moderate, and chap
deserving of a complete approval ; but if a states-
man goes on approving and approving one by one
a long series of papers of this sort, without rousing
himself to the effort of taking a broader view of
the transactions which he has separately examined,
he may find himself entangled in a course of action
which he never intended to adopt. Perhaps this
view tends to explain the reasons which caused a
Minister whose love of peace was passionate and
almost fanatical to become gradually and imper-
ceptibly responsible for a policy leading towards
war.* Lord Aberdeen did not formally renounce
his neutral policy of 1828, and lie did not at this
time advise the Queen to conclude any treaty for
the defence of Turkey, nor ask the judgment of
Parliament upon the expediency of taking such a
course ; but day after day, and week after week,
the Cabinet-boxes came and went, and came and
* This niny also explain liow it was that, so far as is known,
the ceaseless efforts of the Prince Consort to exert an influence
upon our foreign policy were without advantageous results. He
never, as he complained with great naivete, could find any
question 'intact'; and if he had been an English statesman
accustomed to apprehend the way in which an English policy
grows up to maturity, he would not have dreamed of heing able
to do .so. In order that the suggestions of a Palace adviser
should have effect upon the swift course of business in our
Foreign Office, it was, of course, indispen.sable that they should
be opportune; and that condition apparently the Prince Con-
.sort did not fulfil. His Memorandum of the 21st of October
1853, if submitted to Ministers at all, should have been sub-
mitted to them at the latest on the 31st of the previous May,
and before the messenger started who carried the despatch of
that date.
186
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XI.
Obligations
contracted
by the act
of giving
advice.
England, in
concert with
France, be-
comes en-
gaged to
defend the
Sultan's do-
minions.
went again, and every day lie passed his anxious
and inevitable hour and a half at the Foreign
Office ; and at length it became apparent that the
Government of which he was the chief had so
acted that it could not with honour* recede
from the duty of defending the home provinces
of the Sultan against an unprovoked attack by
Eussia. The advice of a strong Power is highly
valued, but it is valued for reasons which should
make men chary of giving it. It is not com-
monly valued for the sake of its mere wisdom,
but partly because it is more or less a disclosure
of policy, and still more because it tends to draw
the advising State into a line of action corre-
sponding with its counsels. England, by the
voice of her Ambassador (approved from time
to time by the Home Government !-), had been
advising a weak Power to resist a strong one.
Counsels of such a kind could not but have a
grave import.
The French Emperor had been more careful to
keep himself free from engagements with the
Porte ; but he had long ago resolved to seize the
welcome occasion of acting in concert with Eng-
land. And England now became bound. With-
in three days from Prince Mentschikoft's departure
France and England were beginning to concert
resistance to Eussia;:]: on the 26th of May the
* ' Even if the Governments of France and England were
'not in honour bound to protect the Sultan,' &c. Lord
Clarendon to Lord Cowley. 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 321.
t 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 183.
J 24th May. Ibid. p. 182.
BETWEEN THE CZAE AKD THE SULTAN. 187
Sultan's refusal of the Eussian ultimatum was chap.
XT
warmly applauded by the English Government, '
and before the end of the month the Foreign
Secretary instructed the English Ambassador that
it was 'indispensable to take measures for the
' protection of the Sultan, and to aid His Highness
' in repelling any attack that might be made upon
' his territory ; ' and that ' the use of force was to
' be resorted to as a last and unavoidable resource
' for the protection of Turkey against an unpro-
' voked attack, and in defence of her independence,
' which England,' as Lord Clarendon declared,
' was bound to maintain.' *
Lord Clarendon at the same time addressed a
despatch to St Petersburg, setting forth with pain-
ful clearness the difference between the words and
the acts of the Czar, and indignantly requiring to
know what was the object which Russia had 'in
' view, and in what manner, and to what extent,
' the dominions of the Sultan and the tranquillity
' of Europe were threatened.' -f*
It was not by any one decisive act or promise, The i.rocrss
but by the tenor of expressions scattered through EMKi.m'i'hr-
a long series of Despatclies, and by words used
from time to time in conversations, tluit iMiglaiul
had taken upon liersclf the burthen of del'onding slowness of
the Sultan against the Czar. Parliament was paduamcut
sitting when this momentous engagenu'nt was
being contracted, and it may be thouglit that
there was room for questioning whetlier England
in concert witli France alone, and witluint first
* ' Eastern Papers,' \y.\vt i. p. 197. + H'i'l. p. 200.
188 OllIGIX OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, doincr her utmost to obtain the concurrence of the
XI
' other powers, should good-humouredly take upon
herself a duty which was rather European than
English, and which tended to involve her in war.
There were eloquent members of the Legislature
who would have been willing to deprecate such a
policy, and to moderate and confine its action ;
but apparently they did not understand how Eng-
land was becoming entangled until about nine
months afterwards, and, either from want of know-
ledge or want of promptitude, they lost the occa-
sion for aiding the Crown with their counsels.
Indeed, from first to last, the backwardness of the
English Parliament in seizing upon the changeful
phases of the diplomatic strife was one of the
main causes of the impending evil, and this was
only one of the occasions on which it failed in the
duty of opportune utterance. When the Despatch
of the 31st of May was once on the road to Con-
stantinople, England stood bound, and all that
might be afterwards said about it would be criti-
cism rather than counsel.*
So ended one phase of the ancient strife be-
tween the Emperor Nicholas and Lord Stratford
de Eedcliffe. Prince ]\Ientscliikoff, landing at
Odessa, hastened to despatch to his master the
best account he could give of the causes of his
discomfiture, and of the evil skill of that Anti-
christ, in stately English form, whom Heaven was
* For the purpose indicated ante, p. 14, I invite Mr Theo-
dore Martin's attention to this period viz., the month of May
1853, and in particular to tlie despatch of the 31st.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 189
permitting for a while to triumph over the Czar c h a p.
and his Church. ^^-
Lord Stratford reaped the fruit of his toil and Powers
of the long-endured pain of encountering violence to Lord '
with moderation. All his acts were approved by ' '
the Government, and, so far as they were known
and understood, by the bulk of his countrymen at
home. And now when he paced the shady gar-
dens, where often he had put upon his anger a
difficult restraint, he could look with calm joy to
the headland where the Straits opened out into
the Euxine, for he knew that the Governments of
the Western Powers, supporting his every word,
and even overstepping his more sober policy, were
coming forward to stand between Eussia and her
prey. The fleet at jNIalta was to be moved when
and whither he chose ; and, even to the length of
war, the Admiral was ordered to obey any requi-
sitions made to him by the Ambassador.* A few
days later the Governments of Paris and London,
fearing the consequence of delay, ordered the
fleets to move up at once to the neighbourhood of
the Dardanelles. -f- The power to choose between
peace and war went from out of the Courts of
Paris and London, and passed to Constantinople.
Lord Stratford was wortliy of this trust ; U)Y being
tirm, and supplied with full knowledge, and hav-
ing power by his own mere ascendancy to enforce
moderation upon the Turks, and to forbid panic,
and even to keep down tumult, he was able to be
very chary in the display of force, and to be more
' Eastern TapiTs,' part i. p. 199. + Pp. 210, 225.
190 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, frugal than the Government at home in using or
'- engaging the power of the English Queen. He
remained on the ground. Still, as before, he kept
down the home dangers which threatened the
Ottoman State. Still, as before, he obliged the
Turks to deserve the goodwill of Europe ; but
now, besides, with the arm of the flesh, and no
longer with the mere fencing of words, he was
there to defend their capital from the gathered
rage of the Czar. In truth, at this time he bore
much of the weight of empire. Entrusted with
the chief prerogative of kings, and living all his
time at Therapia, close over the gates of the Bos-
phorus, he seemed to stand guard against the
North, and to answer for the safety of his charge.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 191
CHAPTER XII.
The mere sensation of beinc^ at strife with the Eng- chap.
lish Ambassador at Constantinople, had kindled '
in the bosom of tlie Emperor Nicholas a rage so ci'f,". ""^ """
fierce as to drive him beyond the bounds of
policy -, but when he came to know the details
of the struggle, and to see how, at every step, his
Ambassador had been encountered and, finally,
when he heard (for that was the maddening
thought) that, by counsels always obeyed. Lord
Stratford was calmly exercising a protectorate of
all the Churches in Turkey, including the very
Church of him tlie Czar, him the Father, him the
Pontiff of Eastern Christendom he was wrought
into siicli a condition of mind that his fury broke
away from the restraint of even the very pride
which begot it. Pride counselled the calm use of
force, an order to the Admiral at Sebastopol, the
silent march of battalions. ])Ut the Czar had so
lost the control of his anger, that everywliere, and
to all who would look upon tlie sight, he showed
the wounds infiicted upon him by his hated
adversary. * He addressed,' said Lord Clarendon.
192 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, 'to the different Courts of Europe, unmeasured
XII
' ' complaints of Lord Stratford. To him, and to
' him alone, he attributed the failure of Prince
' Mentschikoff's mission.'* 'An. incurable mis-
' trust, a vehement activity,' said Count Nessel-
rode, -j- ' had characterised the whole of Lord
' Stratford's conduct during the latter part of the
' negotiation,'
Even in formal despatches the Czar caused his
Minister to speak as though there were absolutely
no government at Constantinople except the mere
will of Lord Stratford. ' The English Ambassador,'
Count Nesselrode said, 'persisted in refusing us
' any kind of guarantee ; ' f and then the Count
went on to picture the Turkish Ministers as
prostrate before the English Ambassador, and
vainly entreating him to let them yield to Russia.
'Reshid Pasha,' said he, 'struck with the dan-
* gers which the departure of our Legation might
' entail upon the Porte, earnestly conjured the
' British Ambassador not to oppose the accept-
' ance of the Note drawn up by Prince Ments-
' chikoflf ; but Lord Eedcliffe prevented its accept-
' ance by declaring that the Note was equivalent
' to a treaty, and was inadmissible.* -f- This last
story, it has been seen, was the work of mere
fiction ; J but in the Czar Nicholas, as well as in
Prince Mentschikoff, there were remains of the
Oriental nature which made him ready to believe
in the boundless power of a mortal, and he seems
* ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 268. + Ibid. p. 24.^.
t This is proved very clearly. Ibid, p. 336 ct seq.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 193
to have received without question the fables with chap.
which the Eastern mind was portraying the se- ' '
vere, the implacable Eltchi. It was vain to
show a monarch, thus wrought to anger, that the
difference between him and the terrible Ambassa-
dor lay simply in the fact that the one was in the
wrong and the other in the right. The thought
of this only made the discomfiture more bitter.
In the eyes of the Czar, Lord Stratford's way of
keeping himself eternally in the right and eternal-
ly moderate was the mere contrivance, the mere
inverted Jesuitism, of a man resolved to do good
in order that evil might come resolved to be
forbearing and just for the sake of doing a harm
to the Church. It was plain that, to assuage the
torment which the Czar was enduring, the remedy
was action : yet, strange to say, this disturber of
Europe, who seemed to pass his life in preparing
soldiery, was not at all ready for a war even
against the Sultan alone. His preparations had
been stopped in tlie beginning of March, and the
movements which his troops had been making
in Bessarabia were movements in the nature of
throats. He wished to do some signal act of
violence witliout plunging into war.
Tlie disposition of the Eussian forces on the Ti.cDaim-
banks of tlie Truth had long been breeding paiities.
rumours that the Emperor Nicholas meditated an
occupation of tlie Principalities called "Wallachia
and ^loldavia. These provinces formed a part of
tiic Ottoman dominions in Europe ; but they
were held by the Sultan under arrangements
VOL. I. N
194 OEIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP, which modified their subjection to the Porte and
' gave them the character of tributary States.
Each of them was governed by a prince called
a Hospodar, who received his investiture at Con-
stantinople ; but the Sultan was precluded by
treaty from almost all interference with the in-
ternal government of the provinces, and was even
debarred the right of sending any soldiery into
their territories. Eussia, on the other hand, had
acquired over these provinces a species of pro-
tectorate ; and, in the event of their being dis-
turbed by internal anarchy, she had power to
aid in repressing the disorder by military occupa-
tion. This contingency had not occurred in either
of the provinces ; but the anomalous form of their
The Czar's political cxisteuce caused the Emperor Nicholas
sclicniG for
occupying to imagine that, by occupying them with a military
force, and professing to hold them as a pledge, he
could find for himself a middle course betwixt
peace and war ; and the thought was welcome to
him, because, being angry and irresolute, he had
been painfully driven to and fro, and was glad to
compound with his passion.
On the 31st of May Count Nesselrode addressed
a letter to Eeshid Pasha, urging the Porte to ac-
cept without variation the draft of the Note sub-
mitted to it by Prince Mentschikoff", and announc-
ing that, if the Porte should fail to do this within
a period of eight days, the Russian army, after a
few weeks, would cross the frontier, in order to
obtain ' by force, but without war,' that which tlie
Porte should decline to give up of its own accord.
them.
^^
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 195
It was afterwards explained that this plan of re- chap.
sorting to violence without war was to be carried 1_
into effect by occupying the Danubian Principali-
ties, and holding them as a security for the
Sultan's compliance.
But, in the second week of June, the Despatch
which brought to the Sultan a virtual alliance
with England was already at Constantinople, and
the English fleet was coming up from Malta to
the mouth of the Dardanelles under orders to
obey the word of the English Ambassador. Be
fore the moment came for despatching an answer
to Count Nesselrode's summons, both the French
and the English fleets were at anchor close out-
side the Straits, in waters called Besica Bay.
Thus supported, the Porte at once refused to give
Russia the Note demanded ; but, under Lord
Stratford's counsel, it did this in terms of defer-
ential courtesy, and in a way which left open a
door to future negotiation.
In all the capitals of the five great Powers, as Ktroits to
well as at Constantinople, great efforts were made a.<om'imv
to bring about an accommodation, and it is certain
that at intervals, if not continually, the Emperor
Nicholas souglit the means of retreating without
ridicule from tlie ground on which his violence
liad placed him. It might seem tliat tliis was a
condition of things in wliich diplomacy ouglit to
have been able to act with effect; but it is hard
for any one acquainted with the Despatches 1o
say tliat tlie Statesmen entrusted with the duty
of labouring for this end were wanting in energy
196 OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, or in skill. It was the Czar's ancient hatred of
XTT
- Sir Stratford Canning which defied the healing
art. What Nicholas wanted was to be able to
force upon the Porte some measure which was
keenly disapproved by Lord Stratford ; and if it
could have been shown that the English Ambas-
sador had led the Turks into an untenable ground,
there would have been an opportunity of giving
the Czar this gratification : but Lord Stratford's
moderation had been so firmly maintained, his
sight had been always so clear and just, and his
advice had gone so close to the edge of what
could safely be conceded by the Turks, that
(without doing a gross wrong to the Sultan) it
was hardly possible to contrive any way of giving
the Czar a semblance of triumph over the English
Ambassador.
Defective Erom this time and thenceforth down to the
tfon^of^'^' final rupture between Eussia and the Western
Austria, and Powcrs, there was a cause of evil at work which
thTcou'rt of was every day tending to draw the Czar on into
burg. danger. Austria, Prussia, and Erance were unfitly
represented at St Petersburg. In order to under-
stand the nature of this evil, it must be remem-
bered that in the reign of Nicholas the society of
the Eussian capital was what in the last century
used to go by the name of a ' Court.' It was a
mere group of men and women gathered always
around one centre, bending always their eyes on
one man, and striving to divine his will. More-
over, the worshippers were always watching to
see who was in favour and who was in disgrace ;
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 197
and whoever was seen to be in favour with the chap.
Czar was brought into favour with all ; and who- L_
ever was believed to have incurred the Czar's dis-
pleasure, was immediately forced to perceive that
he had become displeasing to the rest of his
fellow-creatures. Strange to say, the members of
the diplomatic body were not exempt from these
vicissitudes : if a foreign envoy felt obliged to
offer resistance to the imperial will, his life was
made cold and gloomy to him ; and, on the other
hand, he was sure to be well caressed if he chose
to cringe to the Czar. At a critical time, and in
the presence of a ' society ' which thus called upon
even a stranger to fall down, and join in Czar-
worship, it was of great moment that foreign
States should be represented at St Petersburg by
men of high spirit, by men with some strength of
will, and, above all, completely acquainted with
the real purposes and desires of their respective
governments ; but, unfortunately for the peace of
Europe, these conditions were wanting, for M.
Castelbajac, representing France, and Colonel
liochow, representing Prussia, were both of them
a good deal too courtier-like for the exigency of a
time wliicli required that their demeanour at the
Court of the raging Nicholas should be grave at
the least, if not stern ; and although it is true
that Count Mensdorf, the representative of Aus-
tria, was an honest soldier too higli-couraged to
lie capable of shrinking from what lie undcn'stood
to be his duty, he was not a man so well versed
in tlie task of a diplomatist as to have a large
198 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, conception of its implied obligations ; and besides,
' ' it would seem, he had not been kept well imbued
with the policy which his Government was pur-
suing.* Thus it happened that at a time when
four of the Great Powers were all apparently
labouring* to restrain the Czar by the course they
took at Constantinople, no less than in their own
capitals, there were three of them whicli failed to
maintain a corresponding front at St Petersburg.
Sir Hamilton Seymour alone held language
corresponding with the disapproval which the
acts of the Czar were exciting in Central Europe,
as well as in France and England. He alone re-
presented at St Petersburg the judgment of the
four Powers. From the moment when the occu-
pation of the Principalities was first threatened,
he always treated it as an act perilous to the
tranquillity of Europe, and always declined to
give any measure of the extent to which it was
likely to affect the relations between Eussia and
England. In using this wholesome language he
was left without support from any of his
colleagues.
Of course, in a literal way, the representatives
of Austria, Prussia, and France obeyed their
* It was long the custom of Austria to leave her Ambassa-
dors ill furnished with knowledge of material facts, and some-
times also in darkness respecting the policy of the Government.
Perhaps the interference of the Sovereign in the business of tlie
Foreign Office at Vienna was the cause of this apparent neglect.
If a Minister could not send an important despatch without
taking the pleasure of the Emperor, the correspondence of the
Department would be only too likelj' to fall into a defective,
slovenly state.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 199
orders, and remonstrated when they were directed chap.
VTT
to do so ; but the Czar was so prone to believe
what he wished to be true, that diplomatists who
were forced to make painful communications to
his Government could easily do a great deal to
blunt the edge of their instructions. So, although
in the real Europe Nicholas had become isolated,
yet in Europe, as represented at St Petersburg,
the true order of things was reversed. There, it
was Sir Hamilton Seymour who stood alone.
More than this, it was believed at St Petersburg
that the delinquency of M. Castelbajac often went
beyond mere inaction, and that when the Czar
was pained and discouraged by the reserve or the
warning language of the Queen's representative,
he used to turn for solace to the complaisant
Frenchman standing always in readiness to assure
him that Sir Hamilton Seymour's grave tone was
the sheer whim of an obstinate Englishman.
The Emperor Nicholas had laid down for him- The czar-,-
self a rule which was always to guide his conduct upon the
T Ti /"v 1 1 aiquics-
upon the Eastern Question; and it seems to be c.nceof
, . . . , EnglaiiiL
certain that at this time, even in his most angry
moments, he intended to cling to his resolve.
What he had determined was, that no temptation
should draw him into hostile conflict with Eng-
land. He did not know that already he was
breaking away from England, and rapidly going
adrift. Persisting in the belief that the op])osition
which he had been encountering at Constantinople
was the work of the English Ambassador, and of
him alone, or at worst of the Foreign Office, he
200 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, refused to accept the conviction that he was
XII . .
' falling out with the English people, or even with
the English Government. It was in vain that
Lord Clarendon, in words as clear as day, disclosed
the anger and the growing determination of the
Cabinet. It was in vain that, by grave words and
by pregnant reserve. Sir Hamilton Seymour strove
to warn the Czar of the danger which he was bring-
ing upon his relations with England. The Czar
imagined that he knew better. 'My dear Sir
' Hamilton,' Count Nesselrode seemed to say, ' you
' have lived away from your country so long, that,
' forgive me, you do not know its condition and
' temper. AVe do. "We have studied it. Your
' Foreign Office speaks as if we did not know that
* England has her ' weak point. My dear Sir
' Hamilton, we have mastered the whole subject of
' the " School of Manchester." Certainly it cost us
' some trouble, but we have now made out the dif-
' ference between a " Meeting " on a Sunday morn-
' ing, and a " Meeting " on a Monday night.
' Nothing escapes us. "We comprehend the Society
' of Friends. Pardon me, Sir Hamilton, for saying
' so, but your country is notoriously engaged in
' commerce. With that we shall not interfere.'
In truth, the Czar's theory was, that the foreign
policy of the English Government was dictated
by the people, and that the people loved money,
and for the sake of money loved peace. In other
words, he thought that the English nation had
undergone what historians term ' corruption.' As
far as he could make out, the vast expanse of
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 201
men and women which presented itself to his chap.
imagination under the name of ' the people ' was L_
the same sort of thing as the crowd which went
to hear a fierce speech against princes, and states-
men, and parliaments, and armies, and navies, and
taxes. He also thought that the cheers which
this crowd uttered at the end of sentences de-
nouncing war, were proof of a settled determination
to prevent any Government from ever again
breaking the peace without stringent reasons. A
deeper knowledge would have taught him that
what the crowd applauded was not the mere
doctrine, but the pure racy strenuous English, and
the animating ferocity of the speaker: for, in
speeches of this kind, praises of peace were always
blended with rough attacks upon public men ;
and therefore, to a shallow observer, the hearers
might seem to be lifting up their voices for peace
and goodwill among men, when in reality they
were only acknowledging the pleasantness of the
sensation which is produced by hearing good
invective. A prince of the Eussian Emperor's
breed might have known that, even if it be given
in ])raise or in joy, the ' hurrah ' of a northern
people lias in it a sound of conflict. What it
negatives and forbids is peace and rest. His
battalions were destined to hear it some day, to
know its import, and to blend it long afterwards
with recollections of mist and slaughter, and the
breaking strength of Paissia. But to the mind of
the Cznr at this time, the cheering which greeted
the thin phantom of the 'Peace Tarty' imported
202 OKIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, a determination of the English people to abdicate
XIT
'__ their place in Europe ; and in proportion as this
belief fixed its hold upon his mind, the tranquillity
of the world was brought into danger.
Another unhappy circumstance tended to keep
the Czar in his fatal error. Lord Aberdeen was
the Prime Minister. He was a pure and upright
statesman, and it can be said that the more closely
he was known the more he was honoured ; for his
friends always saw in him higher qualities than
he was able to disclose to the general world by
writing, or by speech, or by action. It was his
lot to do much towards bringing upon his country
a great calamity. He drew down war by suffering
himself to have an undue horror of it. With good
and truly peaceful intentions, he was every day
breaking down one of the surest of the safeguards
which protected the peace of Europe. This he
did by the dangerous language which he suffered
himself to hold almost down to the time of Baron
Brunnow's departure from London. If judges
were to declare their horror of justice, and make
it appear that they would be likely to shrink from
the duty of passing sentence on one of their erring
fellow-creatures, they would invite the world to
pillage and murder ; but they would be commit-
ting a fault less grave than that of which Lord
Aberdeen was guilty. He was chief of tlie Govern-
ment, entrusted with the forces of the State. To
be chary of the use of means so puissant for good
and for evil is one of the most solemn charges
that can be cast upon man ; but for a ruler to
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 203
give out that the sword of the State will be in his chap.
XII
hands a thing loathed and cast aside, is to be L_
guilty of a dereliction of duty fraught with instant
danger. To all who would listen, Lord Aberdeen
used to say that he abhorred the very thought of
war ; and that he was sure it would not and
could not occur. He caused men to believe that,
except for weighty and solemn cause, no war
would be undertaken with his concurrence. Re-
lying on a Prime Minister's words, the Emperor
Nicholas felt certain that Lord Aberdeen would
not carry England into a war for the sake of a
difference between the wording of a Note demanded
by Prince Mentschikoff and the wording of a Note
proposed by the Turks. It is true that P)aron
Brunnow had the sagacity to understand that
imprudent and timid language, though coming
from the lips of a Prime Minister, would not
necessarily be binding upon the high-spirited
people of England ; and he, no doubt, warned his
master accordingly, even at the time when he was
conveying to him Lord Aberdeen's words of
peace ; * but it was so deliglitful to the Czar to
remain under the impression produced by the
language of the Englisli Prime IMinistcr, and,
moreover, this language was so closely in harmony
with the apparent feelings of the active little crowd
which he had mistaken for 'the Enulish people,'
that he could not or would not forego his illusion.
It is believed that the errors of Lord Aberdeen
did not end here. In a conversation between
* Tlio Baron inforined me that this was tlie case.
204
OEIGIX OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. Lord Clarendon and Baron Brunnow, our Foreign
__^ Secretary, they say, spoke a plain, firm sentence,
disclosing the dangers which the occupation of
the Principalities would bring upon the relations
between Eussia and England. The wholesome
words were flying to St Petersburg. They would
have destroyed the Czar's illusion, and they there-
fore bade fair to preserve the peace of Europe ;
but when Lord Aberdeen came to know what had
been uttered, he insisted, they say, and insisted
with effect, that Baron Brunnow should be re-
quested to consider Lord Clarendon's words as
unspoken. Of course, after a fatal revocation like
this, it would be hard indeed to convince the Czar
that his encroachment was provoking the grave
resistance of England.
The Emperor Nicholas was alone, in his accus-
tomed writing-room in the Palace of Czarskoe
Selo, when he came to the resolve which followed
upon the discomfiture of Prince Mentschikoff. He
took no counsel. He rang a bell. Presently an
officer of his Staff stood before him. To him he
gave his orders for the occupation of the Princi-
palities. Afterwards he told Count Orloff what
he had done. Count Orloff became grave, and
said, 'This is war.' The Czar was surprised to
hear that the Count took so gloomy a view. He
was sure that no country would stir against him
without the concurrence of England, and he was
certain that, because of her Peace Party, her trad-
ers, and her Prime Minister, it was impossible for
England to move.
Orders for
the occupa'
tion of the
Principali-
ties.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 205
It was thus that by rashness and want of mo- chap.
deration men truly attached to the cause of peace
were encouraging the wrong-doer, and rapidly
bringing upon Europe the calamity which they
most abhorred.
On the 2d July the Emperor Nicholas caused The Prutii
his forces to pass the Pruth, and laid hold of the
two Principalities. On the followin<:f day a man- Russian
,.,,, ^ Mauifesto.
ifesto was read in the churches of All the Ptussias.*
' It is known/ said the Czar, ' to all our faithful
' subjects that the defence of the Orthodox reli-
' gion was from time immemorial the vow of our
' glorious forefathers. From the time that it
' pleased Providence to entrust to us our heredi-
' tary throne, the defence of these holy obligations
' inseparable from it was the constant object of
' our solicitude and care ; and these, based on the
' glorious treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by other
' solemn treaties, were ever directed to ensure the
' inviolability of the Orthodox Church. But to
' our great grief, recently, in despite of our efforts
' to defend the inviolability of the rights and pri-
' vileges of our Orthodox Church, various arbitrary
' acts of the Porte have infringed these rights, and
' threaten at last tlie complete overthrow of the
' long-perpetuated order so dear to Orthodoxy.
' Having exhausted all persuasion, we have found
' it needful to advance our armies into tlie Dan-
' vibian Principalities, in order to show the Otto-
' man Porte to what its obstinacy may lead. But
' even now we have not the intention to commence
* ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 357.
206 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. ' war. By the occupation of the Principalitie.s
' ' we desire to have such a security as will ensure
' us the restoration of our rights. It is not con-
' quest that we seek; Russia needs it not; we
' seek satisfaction for a just right so clearly in-
' fringed. We are ready even now to arrest the
' movement of our armies, if the Ottoman Porte
' will bind itself solemnly to observe the inviola-
' l)ility of the Orthodox Church. But if blindness
' and obstinacy decide for the contrary, then, call-
' ing God to our aid, we shall leave the decision
' of the struggle to Him, and, in full confidence
' in His omnij^otent right hand, we shall march
' forward for the Orthodox Church.' *
Course Bv declaring that his military occupation of
taken by " . J r
the Sultan, thcsc proviuccs was not an act of war, the Em-
peror Nicholas did not escape from any part of
the responsibility naturally attaching to the in-
vasion of a neighbour's territory ; and yet, by
making this announcement, he committed the
error of enabling the Porte to choose its own time
for the final rupture. The Sultan was advised by
Lord Stratford, and afterwards by the Home
Governments of the Western Powers, that al-
though he was entitled, if he chose, to look upon
the seizure of the tributary provinces as a clear
invasion of his territory, he was not obliged to
treat it as an act which placed him at war, and
that for the moment it was wise for him to hold
back. Upon this counsel the Sultan acted ; and
in truth the latitude which it gave him was high-
* ' Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 323.
BETWEEN THE CZAE AND THE SULTAN. 207
ly convenient, because he was ill-prepared for an chap.
immediate encounter. Tlierefore, without yet go- ^^^'
ing to a rupture, the Turkish Government exerted
itself to make ready for war. In States religiously RfUgious
constituted, the preparation for war is begun by th'rtiireat-
preaching it ; and now in Europe, in Asia, and in ^'"^ ^^'
Africa, wherever there were Turkish dominions,
the Moslems were called to arms by a truculent
course of sermons. In the churches of Eussia
there was a like appeal to the piety of the mul-
titude. Of course the members of the two dis-
puting Governments were much under the in-
lluence of temporal motives ; but by the people of
both Empires the war now believed to be impend-
ing was regarded as a war for Eeligion.
208
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAPTER XIII.
CHAP.
XIII.
Effect of
the Czar's
threat upon
European
Powers.
Its effect
upon Aus-
tria.
The Czar had no sooner uttered his threat to
occupy the Principalities, than he found himself
met by the unanimous disapproval of the other
great Powers of Europe. 'Nov was this a barren
expression of opinion. From the time of the
accomplishment of Count Leiningen's mission,
Austria had never ceased to declare her adhesion
to her accustomed policy ; and the moment that
she saw herself endangered by the Czar's deter-
mination to send troops into "Wallachia and
Moldavia, she became, as it was her interest and
her duty to be, a resolute opponent of Russia.
And her resistance was of more value than that
of any other Power, because she was so placed in
reference to the Principalities that, at any moment
and without any very hard effort, she could make
her will the law. Of course the Czar might
resent the interference of Austria and declare
war as^ainst her; but in such a case he would
necessarily place the scene of hostilities upon
another part of her frontier. It was not possible
for him with common piTidence to wind round
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 209
the frontier of the Austrian Empire, and attempt chap.
to keep troops in Wallachia, if he were liable to 1-
attack from Transylvania and the Banat.
Clearly, then, it rested with Austria to prevent or
redress tlie threatened outrage. Her resolution was
never doubtful. Before the end of May Count
Buol represented at St Petersburg the danger
of the proceedings adopted by Prince jNIentschi-
koff ; * and on the 17th of June he declared that
he considered himself as 'entirely united' with
England in her policy towards the Turkish Empire,
that he regarded ' the maintenance of its inde-
' pendence and integrity as of the most essential
' importance to the best interests of Austria,' and
that lie would employ all the 'means in his
' power to eflect that object.' He promised that
he would take no engagement with Eussia not to
oppose her ' with arms ; ' and he added that ' should
' he be called upon to carry out an armed inter-
' vention on the frontiers, it would be in support of
' the authority and independence of the Sultan.' i*
The opinion of Prussia was scarcely less decided. ui>on
On the 30tli of JMay Lord Bloomfield was able to
report that the impression made upon the Govern-
ment of licrlin by the last reports from Turkey
was ' most unfavourable to tlie Pussian Govern-
' ment ; ' and Baron jManteuffel declared that
Prince IMentschikolf had gone far beyond every-
thing that the Prussian Government liad been
given to expect, and he could hardly believe but
* ' East.ru Papurs,' part i. p. 2'24. t Ibid. p. 291.
VOL. 1.
210
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XIII.
Effect pro-
duced by
the actual
invasion of
the Princi-
palities.
that the Prince would be disavowed.* Three
days later the Prussian Government conveyed this
impression to the Court of St Petersburg ;-f- and
on the 7th Lord Clarendon expressed his satisfac-
tion at the views taken and the course of the
policy indicated both by the Court of Berlin and
the Court of Vienna. J
This was the effect produced by the threat
contained in Count Nesselrode's summons ; but
when the invasion of the Principalities took place,
and came to be known in Europe, it quickly
appeared that the uneasiness excited by the
actual occurrence of the event was more than
proportioned to that which sprang from the
mere expectation of it. In Austria the uneasiness
of the Government was so great that it dissolved
the close relations of friendship lately subsisting
between the Courts of Petersburg and Vienna ;
and within three days from the time when Russia
crossed the Pruth, Count Buol, abandoning the
notion of ' acting singly,' which had been enter-
tained some days before, began to lay the founda-
tions of a league well fitted to repress the Czar's
encroachment without plunging Europe in war.
' The entry of the Ptussiau troops into the Princi-
' palities,' wrote Lord Westmoreland to the Eng-
lish Secretary of State, ' is looked upon with the
' greatest possible regret : and I am requested by
' Count Buol to state tliis to your Lordship, as
' also to announce to you his intention immediate-
* ' Eastern Papers,' pait i. p. 223. t Ihid. p. 227.
.t Ibid. p. 230. Ibid. p. 320.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 211
' ly to convey this feeling to the Eussian Cabinet, chap.
XIII
* together with the expression of the disappoint- L_
' ment he has felt at the sudden adoption of this
* measure while there still existed the hope of an
* arrangement at Constantinople. Count Buol
' expressed his entire satisfaction with the lan-
' guage your Lordship had held to Count Col-
' loredo, agreeing as he does with the policy you
' recommend, and with the necessity which would
' arise, in case the invasion of the Principalities
' took place, of concerting measures among the
' Powers parties to the treaties of 1841, with the
' view of obtaining from the Russian Cabinet the
' most distinct declarations as to the objects of
' that movement, and the term which would be
' fixed for its duration.' *
On the other hand, the Governments of France in France
and England, with less cause for anxiety about iami.'
countries so remote as the provinces of the Lower
Danube, were angrily impatient of the Czar's
intrusion.
I'ru.ssia, hitherto supposed to be hardly capable in I'mssia.
of diU'eriiig with the Emperor Nicholas, did not
fear to exi)ress her disapproval in decisive terms ;
and the Cabinet of Berlin instructed llie King'.s
Envoy at Constantinople to ' unite cordially' a\ ith
the representatives of Austria, France, and I"ng-
land.-f
Iii short, the attitude of Europe towards the .vttitn.ic
1 1 1 "' '''"""1''-'
luissian Emperor -was exactly tliat which a lover gmrraiiy.
of peace and of order miglit desire to witness ;
* EiibterD Paijers,' part i. ji. 350. t Und. ]\ 3i'j
212
OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, for the wrong-doer was left without an ally in the
'__ world, and was resisted by the four great Powers,
tiefour^ with the assent of the other States of Europe.
Powers. j^ ^^g^g plain, moreover, that this resistance would
not evaporate in mere remonstrance or protest ;
for if Austria was the country most endangered
by the seizure of the Principalities, she was also
the power which could most easily extirpate the
Tiieir means evll, bccausc, whcnevcr she chose, she could fall
of repres- ;
sion. upon the flank and rear of the Russian invaders
by issuing through the passes of the Eastern
Carpathian range, or the frontier which touched
the Banat. Moreover, France and England, by
bringing their fleets into the Levant, by causing
them to approach the Dardanelles, by passing the
Straits, by anchoring in the Golden Horn, by
ascending the Bosphorus, by cruising in the
Euxine, and, finally, by interdicting the Piussian
flag from its waters, could always inflict a gradu-
ated torture upon the Czar, and (even without
going to the extremity of war) could make it
impossible that the indignation of Euro^^e should
remain unheeded.
The concord of the States opposing the Czar's
encroachment was already so well perfected that,
on the very day* when the Piussian advance-
guard crossed the Pruth, the representatives of
the four Powers assembled in Conference, deter-
mined to address to Russia a collective Xote
pressing the Czar to put his claims against Tur-
key in conformity with the sovereign rights of
*2d July 1853,
Their joint
measures.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN, 213
the Sultan. Here was the very principle for chap.
which France and England had been contending ;
and it was obvious that if this concerted action onn?dnta?n-
of tlie four Powers should last, it would ensure colc^irt be-
peace : for, in the first place, any resistance to fouTpowers.
their united will would be hopeless ; and, on the
other hand, a Prince whose spirit rebelled against
the idea of yielding to States which he looked
upon as adversaries, might gracefully give way to
the award of assembled Europe. In short, the
four Powers could coerce without making v;ar;
and the business of a statesman who sought to
maintain the peace and good order of Europe was
to keep them united, taking care that no mere
shades of difference should part them, and that
nothing short of a violent and irreconcilable
change on the part of one or more of the Powers
should dissolve a confederacy which promised to
ensure the continuance of peace and a speedy
enforcement of justice.
How came it to happen that in the midst of
all this harmony there supervened a policy wliich
discarded the principle of a peaceful coercion
applied by the whole of the remonstrant Powers,
and raised up in its stead a threatening alliance
wliich was powerful enough to wage a bloody and
successful war, but was without that more whole-
some measure of strength which can enforce jus-
tice without inflicting humiliation, and without
resort to arms? How came it to happen that
within six days from the date of the collective
Note, and without the intervening occurrence of
214 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, any new event, the concert of the four Powers
^^^^" was suddenly superseded and paralysed by the
announcement of a separate understanding between
two of them ?
It was not for reasons of State that by one of
the high contracting parties this evil course was
designed ; and in order to see how it came to be
possible that the vast interests of Europe should
be set aside in favour of mere personal objects,
it will presently be necessary to contract the field
of vision, and, going back to the winter of 1851,
to glance at the operations of a small knot of
middle-aged men who were pushing their fortunes
in Paris.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 215
CHAPTER XIV*
In the be"innin(T of the winter of 1851 France chap.
XIV
was still a republic ; but the Constitution of 1848 L_
had struck no root. There was a feeling that the IreMh^Re*
country had been surprised and coerced into the nJ,v"^85i.
act of declaring itself a republic, and that a mon-
archical system of government was the only one
adapted for France. The sense of instability
which sprang from this belief was connected with
an agonising dread of insurrections like those
which, forty months before, had filled the streets
of Paris with scenes of bloodshed. Moreover, to
those who M'atchcd and feared, it seemed that the
shadow on the dial was moving on w'ith a terrible
steadiness to the hour when a return to anarchy
was, as it were, pre-ordained by law ; for the con-
stitution required that a new president sliould be
chosen in the spring of the following year, and
the Frencli, being by nature of a keen and anxious
* Not a word of this chapter lias been chaiigod since the diy
of its original publication in January 1863, when the French
Emperor was at the height of his power.
216 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, temperament, cannot endure that lasting pressure
L_ upon the nerves which is inflicted by a long-im-
pending danger. Their impulse under such trials
is to rush forward, or to nin back, and what they
are least inclined to do is to stand still and be
calm, or make a steady move to the front.
In general, France thought it best that, notwith-
standing the Rule of the Constitution, which stood
in the way, the then President should be quietly
re-elected ; and a large majority of the Assembly,
faithfully representing this opinion, had come to
a vote which sought to give it effect ; but their
desire was baffled by an unwise provision of the
Republican Charter, which had laid it down that
no constitutional change should take place with-
out the sanction of three-fourths of the Assembly.
By this clumsy bar the action of the state system
was hampered, and many whose minds generally
inclined them to respect legality were forced to
acknowledge that the Constitution wanted a
wrench. Still, the republic had long been free
from serious outbreak. The law was obeyed ; and
indeed the determination to maintain order at all
sacrifices was so strong that, even upon somewhat
slight foundation, the President had been entrusted
with power to place under martial law any
districts in which disturbances seemed likely to
occur. The struggles which went on in the
Chamber, though they were unsightly in the eyes
of military men and of those who love the decis-
iveness and consistency of despotism, were rather
signs of healthy political action than of danger to
XIV.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 217
the State. It is not true, as was afterwards pre- chap.
tended, that the Executive was wickedly or per-
versely thwarted either by the votes of the As-
sembly, or by the speeches of its members ; still
less is it true that the representative body was
engaged in hatching plots against the President ;
and although the army, remembering the humili-
ations of 1848, was in ill-humour with the people,
and was willing upon any fit occasion to act
against them, there w^as no general officer of any
repute who would consent to fire a shot without
what French Commanders deemed to be the one
lawful warrant for action an order from the
Minister of War.
11.
But the President of the republic was Prince Prince Louis
Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the statutory
heir of the first French Emperor.* The election
which made him the chief of the State had been
conducted with perfect fairness ; and since it
happened that in former years he had twice en-
gaged in enterprises which aimed at the throne
of France, he liad good right to infer that the
millions of citizens who elected him into the
presidency were willing to use his ambition as a
means of restoring to France a monarchical form of
government.
But if he had been open in disclosing the
ambition which was almost cast iipou him by the
* i.e., by the Senatus-Coii.sulte of 1S04.
218 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, circumstances of his birth, he had been as success-
XIV
!_ ful as the first Brutus in passing for a man of
a poor intellect. Both in France and in England,
at that time, men in general imagined him to be
dull. When he talked, the flow of his ideas was
sluggish : his features were opaque ; and after
years of dreary studies, the writings evolved by
his thoughtful, long-pondering mind had not shed
much light on the world. Even the strange
ventures in which he had engaged had failed to
win towards him the interest which commonly
attaches to enterprise. People in London who
were fond of having gatherings of celebrated
characters never used to present him to their
friends as a serious pretender to a throne, but
rather as though he were a balloon-man, who had
twice had a fall from the skies, and was still in
some measure alive. Yet the more men knew him
in England, the more they liked him. He entered
into English pursuits, and rode fairly to hounds.
He was friendly, social, good-humoured, and will-
ing enough to talk freely about his views upon the
throne of France. The sayings he uttered about
his ' destiny ' were addressed (apparently as a
matter of policy) to casual acquaintance ; but to
his intimate friends he used the language of a
calculating and practical aspirant to Empire.
The opinion which men had formed of his
ability in the period of exile was not much altered
by his return to France : for in the Assembly his
apparent want of mental power caused the Avorld
to regard him as harmless, and in the chair of the
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 219
President he commonly seemed to be torpid. But chap.
there were always a few who believed in his
capacity ; and observant men had latterly re-
marked that from time to time there appeared a
State Paper understood to be the work of the
President, which teemed with thought, and which
showed that the writer, standing solitary and
apart from the gregarious nation of which he was
the chief, was able to contemplate it as something
external to himself His long, endless study of
the mind of the First Napoleon had caused him to
adopt and imitate the Emperor's habit of looking
down upon the French people, and treating the
miglity nation as a substance to be studied and
controlled by a foreign brain. Indeed, during the
periods of his imprisonment and of liis exile, the
rehitions between him and the France of his
studies were very like the relations between an
anatomist and a corpse. He lectured upon it ; he
dissected its fibres ; he explained its functions ;
he showed how beautifully Nature, in her infinite
wisdom, had adapted it to the service of the l)ona-
partes ; and liow, without the fostering care of
those same Bonapartcs, the creature was doomed
to degenerate, and to perisli out of the world.
If his intellect was of a poorer quality than
men supposed it to be at the time of the Anglo-
French alliance, it was much above the low gauge
whicli people used to assign to it in the earlier
])eriod which began in 1830 and ended at the
close of IS.jl. That which had so long veiled his
cleverness from the knowle(Kn^ of niankiud, was
220 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, the repulsive nature of the science at which he
XIV
L_ laboured. Many men before him had suffered
themselves to bring craft into politics ; many
more, toiling in humbler grades, had applied their
cunning skill to the conflicts which engage courts
of law ; but no living man perhaps, except Prince
Louis Bonaparte, had passed the hours of a studi-
ous youth, and the prime of a thoughtful man-
hood, in contriving how to apply stratagem to the
science of jurisprudence. It was not, perhaps,
from natural baseness that his mind took this
bent. The inclination to sit and sit planning for
the attainment of some object of desire this,
indeed, was in his nature ; but the inclination to
labour at the task of making law an engine of
deceit this did not come perforce with his blood.
Yet it came with his parentage. It is true, he
might have determined to reject the indication
given him by the accident of his birth, and to re-
main a private citizen ; but when once he resolved
to become a pretender to the imperial throne, he
of course had to try and see how it was possible
how it was possible in the midst of this century
that the coarse Bonaparte yoke of 1804 could
be made to sit kindly upon the neck of France ;
and Trance being a European nation, and the yoke
being in substance a yoke such as Tartars make for
Chinese, it followed that the accommodating of the
one to the other was only to be effected by guile.
Therefore, by the sheer exigencies of his in-
heritance rather than by inborn wickedness,
Prince Louis was driven to be a contriver ; and
BETWEEN THE CZAE AND THE SULTAN. 221
to expect him to be loyal to France without giving chap.
up his pretensions altogether, would be as incon- ^^ ' _
sistent as to say that the heir of the first Perkin
might undertake to revive the fleeting glories of the
house of Warbeck, and yet refrain from imposture.
For years, the Prince pursued his strange call-
ing, and by the time his studies were over, he
had become highly skilled. Long before the
moment had come for bringing his crooked science
into use, he had learnt how to frame a Constitu-
tion which should seem to enact one thing and
really enact another. He knew how to put the
word 'jury' in laws which robbed men of their
freedom ; he could set the snare which he called
* universal suffrage ; ' he knew how to strangle a
nation in the night-time with a thing he called a
' Plebiscite.'
The lawyer-like ingenuity which had thus been
evoked for purposes of jurisprudence could, of
course, be applied to the composition of State
Papers and to political writings of all kinds ; and
the older Prince Louis grew, the more this odd
accomplishment of his was used to subserve his
infirmities. It was his nature to remain long in
suspense, not merely between similar, but even
between opposite plans of action. This weakness
grew upon him with his years; and, his conscience
being used to stand neuter in these mental con-
flicts, he never could end his doubt by seeing that
one course was honest and the otlu^r not ; so, in
order to be able to linger safely in his suspense,
he had to be always making resting-places upon
222 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, which for a time he mi^ht be able to stand un-
XIV
. decided. Just as the indolent man becomes clever
in framing excuses for his delays, so Prince Louis,
because he was so often hesitating between the
right and the left, became highly skilled in con-
triving not merely ambiguous phrases, but
ambiguous schemes of action.
Partly from habits acquired in the secret socie-
ties of the Italian Carbonari, partly from long
years passed in prison, and partly, too, as he once
said, from his intercourse with the calm, self-
possessed men of the English turf, he had derived
the power of keeping long silence; but he was
not by nature a reserved nor a secret man. To-
wards foreigners, and especially towards the Eng-
lish, he was generally frank. He was reserved
and wary with the French, but this was upon the
principle which makes a sportsman reserved and
wary with deer and partridges and trout. No
doubt, he was capable of dissembling, and con-
tinuing to dissemble through long periods of time;
but it would seem that his faculty of keeping his
intentions secret was very much aided by the fact
that his judgment was often in real suspense, and
that he had therefore no secret to tell. His love
of masks and disguises sprang more, perhaps, from
the odd vanity and the theatric mania whicli will
be presently spoken of, than from a base love of
deceit ; for it is certain that the mystery in which
he loved to wrap himself up was often contrived
with a view to a melodramatic surprise.
It is believed that men do him wrong who speak
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 223
of Ilim as void of all idea of truth. He under- chap,
stood truth, and in conversation he habitually _1 1_
preferred it to falsehood ; but his truthfulness
(though not perhaps contrived for such an end)
sometimes became a means of deception; because,
after generating confidence, it \vould suddenly
break down under the pressure of a strong motive.
He could maintain friendly relations with a man,
and speak frankly and truthfully to him for seven
years, and then suddenly deceive him. Of course
men finding themselves ensnared by what had
appeared to be honesty in his character, were
naturally inclined to believe that every semblance
of a good quality was a mask ; but it is more con-
sistent with the principles of human nature to
believe that a truthfulness continuing for seven
years was a genuine remnant of virtue, than that
it was a mere preparation for falsehood. His
doubting and undecided nature was a help to con-
cealment ; for men got so wearied by following
the oscillations of his mind that their suspicions
in time went to rest ; and then, perhaps, when he
saw that they were quite tired of predicting that
ho would do a thing, he gently stole out and did it.
He had boldness of the kind which is ja'oduced
by rellection rather than that which is the result
of temperament. In order to cope with the ex-
traordinary ]ierils into which he now and then
thrust himself, and to cope with them decorously,
there was wanted a fiery quality which nature
had refused to the great bulk of mankind as well
as to him. lUit it was only in emergencies of a
224 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, really trying sort, and involving instant physical
L_ danger, that his boldness fell short. He had all
the courage which would have enabled him in a
private station of life to pass through the
common trials of the world with honour un-
questioned ; but he had besides, now and then, a
factitious kind of audacity produced by long
dreamy meditation ; and when he had wrought
himself into this state, he was apt to expose his
firmness to trials beyond his strength. The truth
is, that his imagination had so great a sway over
him as to make him love the idea of enterprises,
but it had not strength enough to give him a
foreknowledge of what his sensations would be in
the hour of trial. So he was most venturesome
in his schemes for action ; and yet, when at last
he stood face to face with the very danger which
he had long been courting, he was liable to be
scared by it, as though it were something new and
strange.
He loved to contrive and brood over plots, and
he had a great skill in making the preparatory
arrangements for bringing his schemes to ripe-
ness ; but his labours in this direction had a
tendency to bring him into scenes for which by
nature he was ill-fitted, because, like most of the
common herd of men, he was unable to command
the presence of mind and the flush of animal
spirits which are needed for the critical moments
of a daring adventure. In short he was a
thoughtful literary man, deliberately tasking him-
self to venture into a desperate path, and going
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 225
great lengths in that direction : but liable to find chap.
XIV
himself balked in the moment of trial by the L
sudden and chilling return of his good sense.
He was not by nature bloodthirsty nor cruel,
and besides that in small matters he had kind
and generous instincts, he was really so willing
to act fairly until the motive for foul play was
strong, that for months and months together he
was able to live amongst English sporting men
without incurring disgrace ; and if he was not so
constituted nor so disciplined as to be able to re-
frain from any object of eager desire merely upon
the theory that what he sought to do was wicked,
there is ground for inferring that liis perception
uf the difference between riglit and wrong had
been dimmed (as it naturally would be) by the
habit of seeking an ideal of manly worth in a
personage like the First Bonaparte. It would
seem that (as a study, or out of curiosity, if not
with a notion of being guided by it) he nmst have
accustomed himself to hear sometimes what con-
science had to say ; for it is certain that, with a
pen in his hand and with sufficient time for pre-
paration, he could imitate very neatly the scrupu-
lous language of a man of honour.*
What he always longed for was to be able to
seize and draw upon himself the wondering atten-
See i?itcr alia lii.s adlross to tlic Electors, 29tli Nov. 1848 ;
his speech, read after taking the oath, 20th Dec. 1848 ; speech
at Ham, 22d July 1849 ; ditto, at Tours, Ist Aug. 1849 ; mes-
sage to the Chambers, 3d Dec. 1849; ditto, 12th Nov. 1850.
It will be seen (see post) that, according to niy view, these
declarations may have bcec composed at a time when he was
VOL. L P
226 OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, tion of mankind; and the accident of his birth
. L- having marked out for him the throne of the First
Kapoleon as an object upon which he might fasten
a hope, his craving for conspicuousness, though it
had its true root in vanity, soon came to resemble
ambition ; but the mental isolation in which
he was kept by the nature of his aims and his
studies, the seeming poverty of his intellect, his
blank wooden looks, and above all, perhaps, the
supposed remoteness of his chances of success
these sources of discouragement, contrasting with
the grandeur of the object at which he aimed,
caused his pretension to be looked upon as some-
thing merely comic and odd. Linked with this his
passionate desire to attain to a height from which
he might see the world gazing up at him, there was
a strong and almost eccentric fondness for the
artifices by which the framer of a melodrama, the
stage-manager, and the stage-hero, combined to
produce their effects ; and so, by the blended force
of a passion and a fancy, he was impelled to be
contriving scenic effects and surprises in which
he himself was always to be the hero. This bent
was so strong and dominant as to be not a mere
taste for theatric arrano-ements, but rather what
men call a propensity. Standing alone, it would
have done no more, perhaps, than govern the
character of his amusements ; but since his birth
really shrinking from treason ; but if, as others suppose, they
were intended to hoodwink the country, it must be owned that
they counterfeited the sentiments of an honest man with extra-
ordinary skill.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 227
had made liim a pretender to the throne of France, chap.
his desire to imitate and reproduce the Empire ^^^'
supplied a point of contact between his theatric
mania and what one may call his rational ambi-
tion ; and the result was, tliat so long as he was
in exile, he was always filled with a desire to
mimic Napoleon's return from Elba, and to do
this in his own person and upon the stage of the
actual world.
In some of its features his attempt at Strasburg
in 1836 was a graver business than is commonly
supposed. At that time he was twenty-eight
years old. He had gained over Vaudrey, the
officer commanding a regiment of artillery which
formed part of the garrison. Early in the morn-
ing of Sunday the 30tli of October tlie movement
began. By declaring tliat a revolution had broken
out in Paris, and that the King had been deposed,
Vaudrey persuaded his gunners to recognise the
Prince as Napoleon II. Vaudrey then caused
detachments to march to the houses of the Prefect
and of General Voirol, the General commanding
tlie garrison, and made them both prisoners, plac-
ing sentries at tlieir doors. All this he achieved
witliout alarming any of the other regiments.
Sup])osing tliat tliere really existed among the
troops a deep attachment to the name and fam-
ily of Ponaparte, little more seemed nei'ded fur
winning over the whole garrison than that the
heir of the great Emperor should have the personal
qualities requisite for the success of the enterpris(\
Prince Louis was brought into tlu; presence of the
228 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, captive General, and tried to gain him over, but
, L_ was repulsed. Afterwards the Prince, surrounded
with men personating an Imperial Staff, was con-
ducted to the barrack of the 46th Eegiment ; and
the men, taken entirely by surprise, were told
that the person now introduced to them was their
Emperor. What they saw was a young man with
the bearing and countenance of a weaver a
weaver oppressed by long hours of monotonous
indoor work, which makes the body stoop and
keeps the eyes downcast ; but all the while and
yet it was broad daylight this young man, from
hat to boot, was standing dressed up in the his-
toric costume of the man of Austerlitz and
Marengo. It seems that this painful exhibition
began to undo the success which Vaudrey had
achieved ; but strange things had happened in
Paris before ; and the soldiery could not with
certainty know that the young man might not be
what they were told he was Napoleon II., the
new-made Emperor of the Erench. Their per-
plexity gave the Prince an opportunity of trying
whether the sentiment for the Bonapartes were
really existing or not, and if it were, whether he
was the man to kindle it.
But by-and-by Taiandier, the Colonel of the
regiment, having been at length apprised of what
was going on, came into the yard. He instantly
ordered the gates to be closed, and then fierce,
angry, and scornful went straight up to the spot
where the proposed Emperor and his ' Imperial
Staff' were standing. Of course this apparition
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 229
the apparition of the indignant Colonel whose chap.
barrack had been invaded was exactly what was L
to be expected, exactly what was to be combated;
but yet, as though it were something monstrous
and undreamt of, it came upon the Prince with a
crushing power. To him, a literary man, standing
in a barrack-yard in the dress of the great con-
queror, an angry Colonel, with authentic warrant
to command, was something real, and therefore,
it seems, dreadful In a moment Prince Louis
succumbed to him. Some thought that, after
what had been done that morning, the Prince
owed it to the unfortunate Vaudrey (whom he had
seduced into the plot) to take care not to let the
enterprise collapse without testing his fortune to
the utmost by a strenuous, not to say desperate
resistance ; but this view did not prevail One
of the ornaments which the Prince wore was a
sword ; yet, without striking a blow, he suffered
himself to be publicly stripped of his grand cordon
of the Legion of Honour and all his other decora-
tions.* According to one account, the angry
Colonel inflicted this dishonour with his own
hands, and not only pulled the grand cordon from
the Prince's bosom, but tore off his epaulettes, and
trampled both epaulettes and grand cordon under
foot. When he had been thus stripped the I'rince
* Despatch of General Voirol, 'Moniteur,' 2(1 Nov. After
stating the arrival of Lt.-Col. TalanJier in the h.arrack-yard,
the despatch says, ' Dans une minute L. N. Bonaparte et les
' miserables qui avaient pris parti ]inur lui ont ete arretds, et
' Ifs decorations dont ils etaieut revfitus out dtd arrachdes par
' les snldats du -IGme.'
230 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, was locked up. The decorated followers, who had
_I L- been impersonating the Imperial Staff, underwent
the same fate as their chief. Before judging the
Prince for his conduct during these moments, it
would be fair to assume that the Colonel having
once been suffered to enter the yard, and to exert
the ascendancy of his superior firmness, the
danger of attempting resistance to him would
have been great would have been greater than
any which the common herd of men are at all
inclined to encounter. Besides, the mere fact
that the Prince had wilfully brought himself into
such a predicament shows that, although it might
fail him in very trying moments, he had extra-
ordinary daring of a particular kind. It would be
unjust to say flatly that a man so willing as he
was to make approaches to dangers was timid ; it
would be fairer to say that his characteristic was a
faltering boldness. He could not alter his nature,
and his nature was to be venturesome before-
hand, but to be so violently awakened and shocked
by the actual contact of danger as to be left
without the spirit, and seemingly without the
wish or the motives, for going on any farther
with the part of a desperado. The truth is, tliat
the sources of his boldness were his vanity and
his theatric bent ; and these passions, though they
had power to bring him to the verge of danger,
were not robust enough to hold good against man's
natural shrinking from the risk of being killed
being killed within the next minute. Conscious
that in point of hat and coat and boots he was
betwt:en the czar and the sultan. 231
the same as the Emperor Napoleon, he imagined chap.
that the great revoir of 1815 between the men and '
the man of a hundred fights could be acted over
again between modern French troops and him-
self ; but it is plain that this belief had resulted
from the undue mastery which he had allowed for
a time to his ruling propensity, and not from any
actual overthrow of the reason ; for, when checked,
he did not, like a madman or a dare-devil, try to
carry his venture through ; nor did he even, in-
deed, hold on long enough to try, and try fairly,
whether the Bonapartist sentiment to wliich he
wished to appeal were really existent or not : on
the contrary, the moment he encountered the
shock of the real world he stopped dead ; and
becoming suddenly quiet, harmless, and obedient,
surrendered himself (as he always has done) to the
first firm man who touched him. The change
was like that seeming miracle which is wrought
when a hysteric girl, who seems to be carried
headlong by strange hallucinations, and to be
clothed with the terrible power of madness, is
suddenly cured and silenced by a rebuke and a
sharp angiy threat. Accepting a small sum of
money* from the Sovenngn whom he had been
trying to dethrone, Prince Louis was ship])('d off to
America by the good-natured King of the French.
But if he was wantiiig in the qualily wliicli en-
ables a man to go well through willi a venture,
bis ruling propensity had strength enough to
make him try the same thing over and over again.
* 000.
232 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. His want of the personal qualifications for enter-
L_ prises of this sort being now known in the French
Army, and, ridicule having fastened upon his
name, he could not afterwards seduce into his
schemes any officers of higher rank than a lieu-
tenant. Yet he did not desist. Before long he
was planning another 'return from Elba,' but
this time with new dresses and decorations. So
long as he was preparing counterfeit flags and
counterfeit generals and counterfeit soldiers,* and
teaching a forlorn London bird to play the part
of an omen and guide the destiny of Trance, he
was perfectly at home in that kind of statesman-
ship ; and the framing of the plebiscites and pro-
clamations, which formed a large part of his cargo,
was a business of which he %vas master ; but if
his arrangements should take effect then what he
had to look for was, that at an early hour on a sum-
mer morning he would find himself in a barrack-
yard at Boulogne surrounded by a band of armed
followers, and supported by one of the officers of
the garrison whom he had previously gained over ;
but also having to do with a number of soldiery, of
whom some would be for him and some inclining
against him, and others confused and perplexed.
Now, this was exactly what happened to him :
his arrangements had been so skilful, and fortune
had so far lured him on, that whither he meant to
* The dresses were made to counterfeit the uniform of the
42d, one of the rer;iments quartered at Boulogne ; and buttons
having on them the number of the regiment were forged for the
purpose at Birmingham.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 233
"0, there he was at last, standing in the very cir- chap.
XT V
cumstances which he had brought about with long '___
design aforethought. But then his nature failed
him. Becoming agitated, and losing his presence
of mind,* he could not govern the result of the
struggle by the resources of his intellect; and
being also without the fire and the joyfulness
which come to warlike men in moments of crisis
and of danger, he was ill qualified to kindle the
hearts of the bewildered soldiery. So, when at
last a firm, angry officer f forced his way into the
barrack-yard, he conquered the Prince almost in-
stantly by the strength of a more resolute nature,
and turned him out into the street with all his
fifty armed followers, with his flag and his eagle, %
and his counterfeit headquarters Staff, as though
he were dealing with a mere troop of strolling
players. Yet only a few weeks afterwards this
same Prince Louis Napoleon was able to show, by
his demeanour before the Chamber of Peers, that
where the occasion gave him leisure for thought,
and for the exercise of mental control, he knew
how to comport himself with dignity, and with a
generous care for the safety and welfare of his
followers.
* Tliis is Ids own explanation of his state given before the
Chamber of Peers. The flutter lie was in caused him, as he ex-
plained, to let his pistol go off without intending it, and to hit
a soldier who was not taking part against him. 'Moniteur'
for 1340, p. 2031-2034.
+ Captain Col-Puygellier.
X The eagle here spoken of is the wuoden one.
^ ' Moniteur,' uhi ante.
234 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
III.
CHAP. It was natural that a man thus constituted
'__ should be much inclined to linger in the early-
stages of a plot ; but since it chanced that by his
birth and by his ambition Prince Louis Napoleon
was put forward before the world as a pretender
to the throne of France, he had always had around
him a few keen adventurers who were willing to
partake his fortunes ; and if there were times
when his personal wishes would have inclined
him to choose repose or indefinite delay, he was
too considerate in his feelings towards his little
knot of followers to be capable of forgetting their
needs,
ffisover- In 1851, motives of this kind, joined with feel-
gentiemen ings of disappointment and of personal humilia-
of France .
at the time tiou, wcrc driving the President forward. He had
when he was . ^ ^ ^ . , ,<
President, aiways Wished to bring about a change m tlie
Constitution, but originally he had hoped to be
able to do this with the aid and approval of some
at least of the statesmen and eminent generals of
the country ; and the fact of his desiring such
concurrence in his plans seems to show that he
did not at first intend to trample upon Trance by
subjecting her to a sheer Asiatic despotism, but
rather to found such a monarchy as might have
the support of men of station and character. But
besides that few people believed him to be so
able a man as he really was, there attached to him
at this period a good deal of ridicule. So, although
there were numbers in France who would have
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 235
been heartily glad to see the Eepublic crushed by c n a p.
some able dictator, there were hardly any public _1 1_
men who believed that in the President of the
Eepublic they would find the man they wanted.
Therefore his overtures to the gentlemen of
Prance were always rejected. Every statesman to
whom he applied refused to entertain his pro-
posals. Every general whom he urged always
said that for whatever he did he must have ' an
' order from the Minister of War.'
The President bein<:ij thus rebuffed, his plan of isrebnfTed,
1 . I P . ' , and falls
clianii'inji the form oi frovernment with the assent luto other
^ . " hands.
of some of the leading statesmen and generals of
the country degenerated into schemes of a very
different kind ; and at length he fell into the Motives
hands of persons of the quality of Persigny, ^Nforny, press.'.!
and rieury. With these men he plotted ; and, ward,
strangely enough, it happened that the character
and the pressing wants of his associates gave
strength and purpose to designs which, without
this stimulus, might have long remained mere
dreams. The President was easy and generous in
the use of money, and he gave his followers all he
could ; but the checks created by the constitution
of the Eepublic were so effective, that beyond the
narrow limit allowed by law he was without any
command of the State resources. In tlu'ir invet-
erate love of strong government, the E(>])ublicans
had placed within reach of the Chief of the State
ample means for overthrowing their whole struc-
ture, and yet they allowed him to remain subject
to the same kind of anxiety, and to be driven to
236 OEIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP, the same kind of expedients, as an embarrassed
1_ tradesman. This was the President's actual plight ;
and if he looked to the future as designed for him
by the Constitution, he could see nothing but the
prospect of having to step down on a day already
tixed, and descend from a conspicuous station into
poverty and darkness. He would have been con-
tent, perhaps, to get what he needed by fair means.
In the beginning of the year he had tried hard to
induce the Chambers to increase the funds placed
at his disposal. He failed. From that moment
it was to be expected that, even if he himself
should still wish to keep his hands from the purse
of France, his associates, becoming more and more
impatient, and more and more practical in their
views, would soon press their chief into action.
He declares The President had been a promoter of the law
of the 31st of May restricting the franchise, but
he now became the champion of universal suf-
frage. To minds versed in politics tliis change
might have sufficed to disclose the nature of the
schemes upon which the Chief of the State was
brooding ; but from first to last, words tending to
allay suspicion had been used with great industry
and skill. From the moment of his coming before
the public in February 1848, the Prince laid hold
of almost every occasion he could find for vowing
again and again that he harboured no schemes
against the Constitution. The speech which he
addressed to the Assembly in 1850 * may be taken
as one instance out of numbers of these solemn
* 13th November.
BETWEEN THE CZAE AND THE SULTAN. 237
and volunteered declarations.* * He considered,' chap.
he said, 'as great criminals, those who by per- ^^^'
' sonal ambition compromised the small amount declarations
' of stability secured by the Constitution ; . . . ll |i,^e"Re-
* that if the Constitution contained defects and ^'^'''^'^'
' dangers, the Assembly was competent to expose
' them to the eyes of the country ; but that he
' alone, bound by his oath, restrained himself
' within the strict limits traced by that act.' He
declared that ' the first duty of authorities was to
* inspire the people with respect for tlie law by
' never deviating from it themselves ; and that
* his anxiety was not, he assured the Assembly
' to know who would govern France in 1852, but
' to employ the time at his disposal, so that the
' transition, whatever it miglit be, should be
' effected without agitation or disturbance ; for,'
said he, ' the noblest object, and the most worthy
' of an exalted mind, is not to seek when in power
' how to perpetuate it, but to labour inseparably
* to fortify, for the benefit of all, those principles
' of autliority and morality which defy the pas-
' sions of mankind and the instability of laws.'
It was thus that, in language well contrived
for winning belief, he repudiated as wicked and
preposterous the notion of his being the man
who would or could act against the Constitution ;
and, supposing that when he voluntarily made
these declarations he had resolved to do what
he afterwards did, he would have been guilty of
deceit more than commonly black ; but perhaps
* See :in enumeration of a lew of these given ante.
238 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, an appreciation of the room which he had in
XTV
' his mind for double and conflicting views, and
a knowledge of his hesitating nature, and of the
pressing wants of the associates by whom he was
surrounded, may justify the more friendly view of
those who imagine that, when he made all these
solemn declarations, he was really shrinking from
treason. Certainly, his words were just such
as may have pictured the real thoughts of a
goaded man at times when he had determined to
make a stand against hungry and resolute follow-
ers who were keenly driving him forward.
It was natural that, in looking at the operation
which changed the Eepublic into an Empire, the
attention of the observer should be concentrated
upon the person, who, already the Chief of the
State, was about to attain to the throne ; and
there seems to be no doubt that what may be
called the literary part of the transaction was
performed by the President in person. He was
the lawyer of the confederacy. He no doubt
wrote the Proclamations, the Plebiscites, and the
Constitutions, and all suchlike things ; but it
seems that the propelling power which brought
the plot to bear was mainly supplied by Count
de ]\Iorny, and by a resolute Major named
Eleury.
Morny. M. Momy was a man of great daring, and
gifted with more than common powers of fascina-
tion. He had been a member of the Chamber of
Deputies in the time of the monarchy ; but he
was rather known to the world as a speculator
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 239
than as a politician. He was a buyer and seller chap.
of those fractional and volatile interests in trading L.
adventures which go by the name of ' shares ; ' and
since it has chanced that the nature of some of his
transactions has been brought to light by the
public tribunals, it is probable that the kind of
repute in which he is held may be owing in part
to those disclosures.* He knew how to found
a * company/ and he now undertook to estab-
lish institutions which were destined to be more
lucrative to him than any of his former adventures.
M. Morny was a practical man. If Prince Louis
Napoleon was going to be content with a vision-
ary life, thinking fondly of the hour when grateful
Prance would come of her own accord and salute
liim Emperor, ]M. Morny was not the sort of
person who would consent to stand loitering with
him in the hungry land of dreams.
It seems, however, that the man who was the Fifury.
most able to make the President act, to drive
him deep into his own plot, and fiercely carry him
through it, was JNIajor Fleury. Fleury was young,
but his life had been checkered. lie was the son
of a Paris tradesman, from whom at an early age
he had inherited a pleasant sum of money. He
plunged into the enjoyments of Paris with so much
ardour that that phase of his career was soon cut
short ; but whilst his father's friends were no
* The trials here refcrrod to are tlie iicti'Hi f^r lihcl against
M. Cabrol, Trihunal of the Seine, Janiiiiry -1 ami .TuTie 30,
1853 ; and the suit instituted hy the shan hoKhrs of the ' Con-
' stitutionnel ' against Veron, ^liros, and ilorny.
240 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, doubt lamenting ten times a-day that the boy had
' ' eaten his fortune/ young Fleury was at the foot
of a ladder which was destined to give him a con-
trol over the fate of a mighty nation. He enlisted
in the army as a common soldier ; but the ofiicers
of his corps were so well pleased with the young
man, and so admired the high spirit with which
he met his change of fortune, that their goodwill
soon caused him to be raised from the ranks. It
was perhaps his knowledge about horses which
first caused him to be attached to the Staff of the
President.
From his temperament and his experience of
life it resulted that Meury cared a great deal for
money, or the things which money can buy, and
was not at all disposed to stand still and go with-
out it. He was daring and resolute, and his
daring was of the kind which holds good in the
moment of danger. If Prince Louis Bonaparte
was bold and ingenious in designing, Pleury was
the man to execute. The one was skilful in pre-
paring the mine and laying the train ; the other
was the man standing by with a lighted match,
and determined to touch the fuse. The support
of such a comrade as Pleury in the barrack-yard
at Strasburg or at Boulogne might have brought
many lives into danger, but it would have pre-
vented the enterprise from coming to a ridiculous
end. In truth, the nature of the one man was the
complement of the nature of the other ; and be-
tween them they had a set of qualities so puissant
for dealing a sudden blow, that, working together,
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 241
and with all the appliances of the Executive chap.
Government at their command, they were a pair ^^^-
who might well be able to make a strange dream
come true. It would seem that from the moment
when rieury became a partaker of momentous
secrets, the President ceased to be free. At all
events, he would have found it costly to attempt
to stand still.
The language held by the generals wlio declared pieury
that they would act under the authority of the in Algeria
Minister of War, and not without it, suggested the st Amalid
contrivance which was resorted to. Fleury deter-
mined to find a military man capable of com-
mand, capable of secrecy, and capable of a great
venture. The person chosen was to be properly
sounded, and, if he seemed willing, was to be ad-
mitted into the plot. He was then to be made
Minister of War, in order tliat through him the
whole of the land-forces should be at the disposal
of the plotters. Fleury went to Algeria to find
the instrument required ; and he so well performed
liis task that he hit upon a general officer who
was christened, it seems, Jacques Arnaud Le
Koy,* but was known at this time as Achille St
Arnaud. Of some of the adventures of this per-
son it will be right to speak hereafter. There
was nothing in his past life, nor in his then plight,
which made it at all dangerous for Fleury to ap-
* Giving in a formal way its list of the new Ministry of the
27th of Octoher, the ' Annuaire,' an authority favourable to the
Elysde, has these wonls : ' A la guerre, Jacques Arnaud le Roy
' de St Arnaud,' p. 352. iVo^c to iih EdUion, 18G3.
VOL. L Q
242 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP P^'03'Cli ^li^ with tlie words of a sulDorner. He
XIV. readily entered into the plot. From the moment
stArnaud that Prince Louis Bonaparte and his associ-
andmade ates had entrusted their secret to the man of
War. rieury's selection, it was perhaps hardly possible
for them to flinch ; for the exigencies of St Ar-
naud, formerly Le Eoy, were not likely to be on
so modest a scale as to consist with the financial
arrangements of a Eepublic governed by law : and
tlie discontent of a person of his quality, with a
secret like that in his charge, would plainly bring
the rest of the brethren into danger. He was
made Minister of "War. This was on the 27th of
October.
At the same time M. Maupas, or De jNIaupas,
was brought into the Ministry. In the previous
July this person had been Prefect of the Depart-
ment of the Upper Garonne. Of him, his friends
say that he had property, and that he had never
been used to obtain money dishonestly. His zeal
had led him to desire that thirty-two persons, in-
cluding three members of the Council-General,
should be seized and thrown into prison, on a
charge of conspiring against tlie Government.
The legal authorities of the department refused to
suffer this, because they said there was no ground
for the charge. Then this ]\Iaupas, or De Maupas,
proposed that the want of all ground for accusing
the men should be supplied by a stratagem, and
with that view he deliberately offered to ar-
range that incriminating papers and arms and
grenades should be secretly placed in the houses
Maupas.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AXD THE SULTAN, 243
of the men wliom he wanted to have accused, chap
Naturally, the legal authorities of the department _J L
were horror-struck by the proposal, and they de-
nounced the Prefect to the Keeper of the Seals.
Maupas was ordered to Paris.* From the indig-
nant and scornful presence of M. Faucher he
came away sobbing, and people who knew the
truth supposed him to be for ever disgraced and
ruined ; but he went and told his sorrows to the
President. The President of course instantly saw
that tlie man could be suborned. He admitted ueis
Jum into tlie plot, and on the 2/th oi October ap- aiuimade
pointed him Prefect of Police. PoUce.
Persigny, properly Fialin, was in the plot. lie rorsigny.
was descended, on one side, of an ancient family,
and, disliking Ids father's name, he seems to have
called himself for many years after the name of
his maternal grandfather. -f* He began life as a
non-commissioned officer. As he himself said, |
his instinct was ' to serve ; ' and at first, he served
the Legitimists, but chance brought him into con-
tact with Louis Ponaparte, and he very soon be-
came the attached friend of the Prince, and liis
partner in all his plans and adventures. If Morny
was merely taking up the Bonaparte cause as one
* Sl'c the ' r>iiiirtin Fraiirais', p. 08 rt srq. This jmlilication
appoared undtT auspices wliich make it a sale aiitlmriiy. It is
to be re;;;retle(l that its statcincuts extend to (uily a portion
of tlie events conneeted with tlie 2d of Deeeinlier.
+ This, I think, was the ueeount wlii'li lie ,i,'ave n]ioii his
t vial in 1840. lie was tried hy the description of Fialin rf;.'
rersij^ny.
; ijeiore the Chaniher of Peers, ISIO.
244 OKIGm OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, of many other money speculations, Persigny could
L_ truly say that he had made it for years his profes-
sion, and had even tried as well as he could to
raise it4o the dignity of a real political principle.
But the part entrusted to Persigny on this occa-
sion, though possibly an important one, was not
of a conspicuous sort. It is said that, the firm-
ness of the Prince Louis Bonaparte being distrusted
by his comrades, Persigny, who was of a sanguine,
hopeful nature, was to remain constantly at the
Elys^e in order to receive the tidings which would
be coming in during the period of danger, and
prevent them from reaching the President in such
a way as to shake him and cause despondency.
At all events, it would seem that the hand of
Persigny was not the hand employed to execute
the measures of the Elys^e ; and to this circum-
stance he owes it that he will not always have to
stand in the same sentences with JVIorny, and
Pleury, and Maupas, and St Arnaud, formerly Le
Eoy.
Contrivance It was ueccssary to take measures for paralys-
lysing the ing the National Guard ; but the force was under
Guard.' the commaud of General Perrot, a man whose hon-
esty could not be tampered with. To dismiss
him suddenly would be to excite suspicion. The
following expedient was adopted : The President
appointed as Chief of the Staff of the National
Guard a person named Vieyra. The past life and
the then repute of this person were of such a kind,
that General Perrot, it seems, conceived himself
insulted by the nomination, and instantly resigned.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 245
That was what the brethren of the Elys(^e wanted, chap.
On Sunday the 30th, General Lawastine was ap- '
pointed to the command. He was a man who
had fought in the great wars, but, now in his
grey hairs, he was not too proud to accept the
part designed for him. His function was not to
lead the force of which he took the command, but
to prevent it from acting. It was unnecessary
to admit either Lawa^stine or Vieyra to a complete
knowledge of the plot, because all that they were
to do was to frustrate the assembly of the National
Guard by withholding all orders and preventing the
drums from beating to arms.
Of course the engine on which the brethren of The army,
the Elysde rested their main hopes was the army ;
and it was known that tlie remembrance of
humiliating conflicts in the streets of Paris had
long been embittering the temper in which the
troops regarded the people of the capital. IMore-
ovcr, it happened that at this time the Legislative
Assembly had been agitated by a discussion which
inflamed tlie troops with fresh anger against
civilians in general, but more especially against the
Parisians, against the representatives of the people,
and against statesmen and politicians of all kinds.
A portion of the Chambers, foreseeing that the
army might be used against the freedom of the
Legislative P>()dy, had desired that the Assembly
should avail itself of a provision in the Consti-
tution which empowered it, not only to have an
armed force for its protection, but to have tluit
force under the order of its own nominee. This
246
OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XIV.
Its indig-
nation at
M. Baze's
proposal.
Selection of
regiments
and of olti-
cers for the
Ariuv of
Paris.
was a scheme which shocked the mind of the
army. In France, of late years, the Minister of
War had always been a soldier, and an order from
him (though it was in reality the order of a
member of the civil Government) was habitually
regarded by military men as the order of a gen-
eral having supreme command. A proposal to
change this system by giving to the Assembly a
direct control over a portion of the land-forces
could be easily represented to the soldiery as a
plan for withdrawing the French army from the
control of its generals and placing it under
the command of men whom the soldiers called
'lawyers.' Seen in this light, the project so
exasperated the feelings of the troops, that if it
had been carried, they would probably have been
stirred up at once to effect by force a violent
change of the Constitution. The measure was
rejected ; but anger is not always appeased by the
removal of the kindling motive ; and the soreness
created by the mere agitation of the question had
been so well kept up by the means employed for
the purpose, that the garrison of Paris now came
to look upon the people with a well-defined feel-
ing of spite.
Care had been taken to bring into Paris and its
neighbourhood the regiments most likely to serve
the purpose of the Elysee, and to give the com-
mand to generals who might be expected to act
without scruples. The forces in Paris and its
neighbourhood were under the orders of General
Magnan. At the time of Louis Napoleon's descent
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 247
upon the coast near Boulogne, Magnan had had chap.
the misfortune to be singled out by the Prince as L
a person to whom it was fitting to offer a bribe
of 4000. He had also had the misfortune to be
detected in continuing his intercourse with the
oiliccr who had thought it safe to come with a
proposal like that into the presence of a French
general. Magnan did not conceal his willingness
to go all lengths, and the brethren, it appears,
wished to bring him completely into the plot ; *
but his panegyrist (not seeing, perhaps, the full
import of his disclosure) causes it to be known
that the General, though ready to act against
Paris and against the Assembly, declined to risk
Ids safety by avowedly joining in the plot. 'He
' expressly requested,' says Granier de Cassagnac,
' not to be apprised until the moment for taking
' the necessary dispositions and mounting on
' horseback.' "j* In other words, though he was
willing to use the forces under his command in
destroying the Constitution, and in effecting such
slaugliter as miglit be needed for the purpose, he
refused to dispense with the screen afforded by an
order from the ^linister of War. In the event of
the enterprise failing he would be able to sfiy,
I refused to participate in any plot. The duty
of a soldier is obedience. Here is the order
wliich I received from General St Ariiaud. I
* Tliis is inferrcil from what follows.
t (iraTiier de C:issaf,mac, 'Histoirc (li> la Clmtc dii i;<ii Lmis-
' rhiliupe, do la K(<pu1ili.iuc de 184'', rt du R(5talilissenu'nt de
' I'Enipire,' vol. ii. ]>. 40').
248
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XIV.
Meeting
of twenty
generals at
Magnan's
house.
The Army
encouraged
in its hatred
ofthe people.
* did no more than obey my commanding
' officer/
On the 27th of November, however, this Magnan
assembled twenty generals whom he had under
his command, and gave them to understand that
they might soon be called upon to act against
Paris and against the Constitution.* They prom-
ised a zealous and thoroughgoing obedience ; and
although every one of them, from Magnan down-
wards, was to have the pleasing shelter of an
order from his superior officer, they all seemed to
have imagined that their determination was of the
sort which mankind call heroic ; for their pane-
gyrist relates with pride that when Magnan and
his twenty generals were entering into this league
and covenant against the people of Paris, they
solemnly embraced one another.-j-
Prom time to time the common soldiery were
gratified with presents of food and wine, as well
as with an abundance of flattering words ; and
their exasperation against the civilians was so
well kept alive, that men used to African warfare
were brought into the humour for calling the
Parisians ' Bedouins.' There was massacre in the
* Granier de Cassagnac, p. 392. There, the 26th is the day
of the month which the historian mentions, but he f,dves Thurs-
day (which fell on the 27th) as the day of tlie week when the
meeting took place. Note to Ath Edition, 1863.
t 'All the generals embraced each other, and from that
' moment it might be said with certainty that France was going
' to come out of the abyss.' Ibid. p. 392. The names of tlie
twenty-one generals will be found ibid. p. 393. Xotc to ith
Edition, 1863.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 249
very sound. The army of Paris was in the tern- chap.
per required.
It was necessary for the plotters to have the
concurrence of M. St Georges, the Director of
the State printing-office. M. St Georges was
suborned. Then all was ready.
IV.
On the Monday night between the 1st and the Assembly at
2d of December the President had his usual as- on Momhiy
sembly at the Elys^e. Ministers who were loyally
ignorant of what was going on were mingled with
those who were in the plot. Vieyra was present.
He was spoken to by the President, and he under- vieyras
crrflind,
took that the National Guard should not beat to
arms that night. He went away, and it is said
that he fulfilled his humble task by causing the
drums to be mutilated. At the usual hour the
assembly began to disperse, and by eleven o'clock
there were only three guests who remained. These
were Morny (who had previously taken care to Midnight.
show himself at one of the theatres), Maupas, and
St Arnaud, formerly Le lioy. There was, besides,
an orderly officer of the President, called Colonel
Beville, who was initiated in the secret. Persigny,
it seems, was not ])resent. Morny, jNIaupas, and
St Arnaud went with the President into his
cabinet ; Colonel Beville followed them.* Moc-
quard, the private secretary of the President, was
* Granier de Cassagnac, vol. ii. p. 399. ' Annuaire ' for
IS.*)!, pp. 364, 365.
250
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XIV.
Packet en-
trusted to
Beville.
Ti-ansaction
at tlie State
jirinting-
oflice.
ill the secret, but it does not appear that he was
in the room at this time. Fleury too, it seems,
was away ; he was probably on an errand which
tended to put an end to the hesitation of his more
elderly comrades, and drive them to make the
venture. They were to strike the blow that night.
They deliberated, but in the absence of Fleury
their council was incomplete, because at the very
moment when perhaps their doubts and fears were
inclining them still to hold back, Fleury, impet-
uous and resolute, might be taking a step which
must needs push them forward. By-and-by they
were apprised that an order which had been given
for the movement of a battalion of gendarmerie
had duly taken effect without exciting remark.
It is probable that the execution of this delicate
movement was the very business which Fleury
had gone to witness with his own eyes, and that
it was he who brought the intelligence of its
complete success to the Elysee. Perhaps also he
showed that, after the step which had just been
taken, it would be dangerous to stop short; for
the plotters now passed into action. The Presi-
dent entrusted a packet of manuscripts to Colonel
Beville, and despatched him to the State printing-
office.
It was in the streets which surround this build-
ing that the battalion of gendarmerie had been
collected. When Paris was hushed in sleep, the
battalion came quietly out, and folded round the
State printing-office. From that moment until
their work was done the printers were all close
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 251
captives, for no one of them was suffered to go c n A p.
XIV
out. For some time they were kept waiting. At L_
printed.
length Colonel Beville came from the Elysee with
his packet of manuscripts. These papers were
tlie proclamations required for the early morning,
and M. St Georges, the Director, gave orders to
put them into type. It is said that there was
something like resistance ; but in the end, if not
at first, the printers obeyed. Each compositor
stood whilst he worked between two policemen,
and the manuscript being cut into many pieces,
no one could make out the sense of what he was
printing.* By these proclamations the President The Pm-
asserted that the Assembly was a hotbed of plots ; tiu'-e' '""*
declared it dissolved ; pronounced for universal
suffrage ; proposed a new constitution ; vowed
anew that his duty was to maintain the liepublic ;"|*
and placed Paris and the twelve surrounding
departments under martial law.;]; In one of the
proclamations he appealed to the army, and strove
to whet its enmity against civilians by reminding
it of the defeats inflicted upon the troops in 1830
and 1848.
The President wrote letters dismissing the niem-
* ^Inidiiit, ' IJuvdlution i\Iilit;iire,' p. 92.
t 'My duty is to bailie thoir perrulioiis ]irojo(3t.s, to mninimn
' Ulc Jii'piLhlic, and to savo the country,' &c. ' Aiumain',' Ap]'.
]). 60. iVote to 4th Eilition, 1863. J ll>id.
The proclamation to the army contaimni this passat,'e : ' In
' 18311, a.s in 1848, they treated you as coniincred iiuii. After
' havin<f sivarned your heroic disinterestedness, they dis(huned
to consult your sympathies and your ^vishes, and yet you ar-'
' the CUtfl, of the nation. To-day, in this sdlnnn moment, I
desire that the army maj- make its voit'C lieard.' Granier de
252
OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XIV.
Morny
appointed
Jlioister.
Hesitation
at the
Elvs6e.
Fleury.
bers of the Government who were not in the plot ;
but he did not cause these letters to be delivered
until the following morning. He also signed a
paper appointing Morny to the Home Office.
The night was advancing. Some important
steps had been taken, but still, though highly
dangerous, it was not absolutely impossible for
the plotters to stop short. They could tear up the
letters which purported to dismiss the Ministers ;
and although they could not hope to prevent the
disclosures which the printers would make as soon
as they were released from captivity, it was not
too late to keep back the words, and even the gen-
eral tenor, of the Proclamations. But the next
steps were of such a kind as to be irrevocable.
It is said that at this part of the night the spirit
of some of the brethren was cast down, and that
there was one of them who shrank from farther
action ; but Fleury, they say, got into a room
alone with the man who wanted to hang back,
and then, locking the door and drawing a pistol,
stood and threatened his agitated friend with
instant death if he still refused to go on.*
Cassagnac, vol. ii. p. 404. A copy of the proclamation will
also be found in the ' Annuaire' for 1851. This last publica-
tion (which must be distinguished from the 'Annuaire des
* Deux Mondes') gives an account of the events of December,
written in a spirit favourable to the Elysee ; but the Appendix
contains a full collection of official documents. Note to 4th
Edition, 1863.
* I have thought it right to introduce this account under a
form indicating that it is based on mere rumour, but I enter-
tain no doubt that the incident has been declared to be true
by one of the two persons who stood face to face in that room.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 253
What is certain is, that, whether in hope or chap.
XIV
whether in fear, the plotters went on with their
midnight task. The order from the Minister of fj^^f^ f^.^,,,
War was probably signed by half-past two in the ofVir"'^**'
morning, for at three it was in the hands of
Magnan,*
At the same hour Maupas (assigning for pretext An-ange-
1 T'lcp- n \ 1 ments for
the expected arrival ot foreign refugees) caused a tiie intended
number of Commissaries to be summoned in all
haste to the Prefecture of Police. At half-past
three in the morning these men were in attend-
ance ; Maupas received each of them separately,
and gave to each distinct instructions. It was
then that for the first time the main secret of the
confederates passed into the hands of a number
of subordinate agents. During some hours of
that night every one of those humble Commissar-
ies had the destinies of Prance in his hands ; for
lie might either obey the Minister, and so place
liis country in the power of the Elysde ; or he
might obey the law, denounce the plot, and bring
its contrivers to trial. jMaupas gave orders for
the seizure at the same minute of the foremost
Clenerals of France, and several of her leading
Statesmen.-f- Parties of the police, each under
the orders of a Commissary, were to be at the
doors of the persons to be arrested some time
beforehand, but the seizures were not to take
place until a quarter past six.
At six o'clock a brigade of infantry, under
* Granier de Cassagnac, vol. ii. p. 4^5. ' Annuaire,' p. 364.
+ Granier dc Cassagnac, vol. ii. p. 401.
254 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. Forey, occupied the Quai d'Orsay ; auotlier bri-
gade, under Dulac, occupied the garden of the
ofthetroops Tuileries ; another brigade, under Cotte, occupied
the Place de la Concorde ; and another brigade of
infantry under Canrobert, with a whole division
of cavalry under Korte, and another brigade of
cavalry under Eeybell, was j)osted in the neigh-
bourhood of the Elys^e.* It would seem that
the main objects aimed at b}^ those who thus
placed the troops were not at this moment to
overawe the whole of Paris, but rather to sup-
port the operations of Maupas, and to provide for
the safety of the brethren at the Ely see by keep-
ing them close under the shield of the army as
long as they remained in Paris, and, if such a step
should become necessary, by securing and cover-
ing their flight.
Almost at the same time Maupas's orders were
carefully obeyed ; for at the appointed minute,
and whilst it was still dark, the designated houses
Arrest of were entered. The most famous generals of
Statesmen. France were seized. General Changarnier, Gen-
eral Bedeau, General Lamoriciere, General Ca-
vaignac, and General Leflo were taken from their
beds, and carried away through the sleeping city
and thrown into prison.-f- In the same minute
the like was done with some of the chief members
and officers of the Assembly, and, amongst otliers.
with Thiers, Miot, liaze, Colonel Charras, Roger
du Xord, and several of the democratic leaders.
* Granier de Cassagnac, vol. ii. pp. 407, 408.
+ Ibid. p. 401.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 255
Some men, believed to be the chiefs of secret chap.
societies, were also seized.* The general object
of these night-arrests was that, when morning-
broke, the army should be without generals in-
clined to observe the law, that the Assembly
should be without the machinery for convoking
it, and that all the political parties in the State
should be paralysed by the disappearance of their
chiefs. The number of men thus seized in the
dark was seventy-eight. Eighteen of these were
members of the Assembly. 7
Whilst it was still dark, jNIorny, escorted by Momyat
a body of infantry, took possession of the Home omce.
Oflice, and prepared to touch the springs of that
wondrous machinery by wliich a clerk can dic-
tate to a nation. Ah'eady lie began to tell forty
thousand communes of tlie oiithusiasm with which
the sleeping city had received the announcement
of measures not hitherto disclosed. :]:
When tlie light of the morning dawned, peojdo
saw the rroclamations on the walls, and slowl\
came to luiar tliat numbers of the foremost men
of France liad been seized in the niglit-tinie, nnd
that every General to whom the iViciuls of law
and order could look fur heli) was lying in one or
* Oranior de Cassapnao, vol. ii. p. 401. + IMil.
X 'The Assembly,' lie wrdte, 'has Imcii di-solvcd amid tlie
'applause of tlic wliole population of Taris. ' Circular to t)ie
rrefctts. JN'ote to 4th Edition, lSC>o.
256
ORIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP.
XIV.
Newspapers
seized and
stopped.
The Assem-
bly meets :
but is dis-
persed by
troops.
The Presi-
dent's ride.
other of the prisons. The newspapers, to which a
man might run in order to know, and know truly,
what others thought and intended, were all seized
and stopped.*
The gates of the Assembly were closed and
guarded, but the Deputies, who began to flock
thither, found means to enter by passing through
one of the official residences which formed part
of the building. -|- They had assembled in the
Chamber in large numbers, and some of them
having caught Dupin, their reluctant President,
were forcing him to come and take the chair, when
a body of infantry burst in and drove them out,
striking some of them with the butt-ends of their
muskets.^ Almost at the same time a number
of Deputies who had gathered about the side-
entrance of the Assembly were roughly handled
and dispersed by a body of light infantry. Twelve
Deputies were seized by the soldiers and carried
off prisoners.
In the course of the morning the President, ac-
companied by his uncle, Jerome Bonaparte, and
Count Plahault, || and attended by many general
oflficers and a numerous staff, rode through some
* ' Annuaire,' p. 344.
+ La V^rit^ 'Reciieil d'Actes Officiels,' p. 4.
J The names of nine of these are given in the 'Recueil,'
p. 64 ; and besides these, the seizure of MM. Daru and
De Blois is stated. Ibid. pp. 6, 7. Note to Ath Edition,
1863.
La Vdrit^, * Recueil d'Actes OfEciels,' p. 4.
II I imagine that, before the night of the 1st of December,
Count Flahault had some knowledge of what was going to be
done.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 257
of the streets of Paris.* It would seem that his chap.
theatric bent had led Prince Louis to expect from 1_
this ride a kind of triumph, upon which his
fortunes would hinge ; and certainly the unpopu-
larity of the Assembly, and the suddenness and
perfection of the blow which he had struck in the
night, gave him fair grounds for his hope ; but
he was hardly aware of the light in which his
personal pretensions were regarded by the keen
laughing people of Paris. The moment when
they would cease to use laughter against him was
very near, but it had not yet come. ]\Ioreover,
lie did not bring himself to incur the risk which
was necessary for obtaining an acclaim of the
people, for he clung to the streets and the quays
which were close under the dominion of the
troops. Upon the whole, the reception he met
with seems to have been neither friendly nor
violently liostile, but chilling, and in a quiet way
scornful.
It seems that after meeting this check his
spirit suffered collapse. Once again, though not
so hopelessly as at Strasburg and Poulogne, he had
encountered the shock of the real world. And
again, as before, the shock felled him. Xor was it
strange that he should be abashed and despond-
ing: obeying his old propensity, he had prepared
and appointed fcjr the Austerlitz day a great
scenic greeting between liimself on the one hand,
* Floury rode in front of tlie cortdgc, WiivinL; his sword and
tryini; to get the people in the streets to chpeT. Xote to ith
Edition, 1863.
V(H.. I. R
ORIGIN OF THE "WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XIV.
Seelnsion
and gloom
of Prince
Louis
Najxileon.
and on the other a mighty nation. When, leav-
ing the room where all this had been contrived
and rehearsed, he came out into the free air, and
rode through street after street, it became every
minute more certain that Paris was too busy, too
grave, too scornful, to think of hailing him Em-
peror ; nay, strange to say, the people, being
fastidious or careless, or imperfectly aware of
what had been done, refused to give him even
that wondering attention which seemed to be in-
sured to him by the transactions of the foregoing
night ; and yet, there they were the proffered
Csesar and his long-prepared group of Captains
sitting published on the backs of real horses, with
appropriate swords and dresses. Perhaps what a
man in this plight might the most hate would be
the sun the cold December sun. Prince Louis
rode home, and went in out of sight.
Thenceforth, for the most part, he remained
close shut up in the Elysee. There, in an inner
room, still decked in red trousers, but with his
back to the daylight, they say he sat bent over a
fireplace for hours and hours together, resting his
elbows on his knees, and burying his face in his
hands.
What is better known is, that in general, dur-
ing this period of danger, tidings were not suffered
to go to him straight. It seems that, either in
obedience to his own dismal instinct, or else be-
cause his associates had determined to prevent
him from ruining them by his gloom, he was
kept sheltered from immediate contact with alarm-
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 259
ing messengers. It was thought more wholesome chap.
XIV
for him to hear what Persigny or the resolute !_
Fleury might think it safe to tell him, than to see
with his own eyes an aide-de-camp fresh come
from St Arnaud or Magnan, or a commissary full
fraught with the sensations which were shaking
the health of Maupas.
Driven from their Chamber, the Deputies as- Another
sembled at the Mayoralty of the 10th arrondisse- the Asscm-
ment.* There, upon the motion of the illustrious
Berryer, they resolved that the act of Louis Bona-
parte was a forfeiture of the Presidency, and they
directed the judges of the Supreme Court to meet its decrees.
and proceed to the judgment of the President and
his accomplices, -f* These resolutions had just
been voted, when a battalion of the Chasseurs Tmop? ns-
de Vincennes entered the courtyard of the Mayor- stairs, but
. liesitate to
alty, and began to ascend the stairs. One of the use force
Vice-Presidents of the Assembly :J: went out and
summoned the soldiers to stop, and leave the
Chamber free. The officer appealed to felt the
hatefuluess or the danger of the duty entrusted
to him, and, declaring that he was only an in-
' Recueil d'Actes Oliiciels,' p. GO. la that and in pp. 01-3,
the names of the 220 deputies are given. Xutc to AUt KiUtlon,
1803.
t Ibid. pp. 37, 4r>. The report of the proceedings of the
Assembly is from the shorthand-writer's notes. See ibid. p.
35. iVo/c to ilh Edition, 1863.
X Namely, M. Vitet. Tlironf,'h all tho.so last moments of the
stnitrj^le between law and force, iM. Vitet's demeanour was ad-
mirable for its firmness and dignity. Of this 1 am assured by
one of the most eminent of the many statesmen who were there
present. ^..Vyfe to ilh Edition, ]863.
260
ORIGIN or THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP.
XIV.
Written
orders from
Magnan to
clear the
halL
strument, he said lie would refer for guidance to
his chief.*
Presently afterwards several battalions of the
line under the command of General Forey came
up and surrounded the Mayoralty. The Chasseurs
de Vincennes were ordered to load. By-and-by
two Commissaries of Police came to the door, and,
announcing that they had orders to clear the hall,
entreated the Assembly to yield. The Assembly
refused. A third Commissary came, using more
imperative language, but he also seems to have
shrunk back when he was made to see the law-
lessness of the act which he was attempting, -f-
At length an aide-de-camp of General ]\Iagnan
came with a written order directing the of&cer in
command of the battalion to clear the hall, to do
this if necessary by force, and to carry off to the
prison of Mazas any Deputies offering resist-
ance.^: By his way of framing tliis order, ]\Iagnan
showed how he crouched under his favourite
shelter, for in it he declared that he acted 'in
' consequence of the orders of the Minister of
' War.' The number of Deputies present at
* La V^rit^ ' Recueil d'Actes Officiels,' p. 52.
t Ibid. pp. 53-6.
t It was in the second of the two written orders produced
that the prison of ilazas was designated. It is given ibid. p.
57. Note to ith Edition, 1863.
The order rendered into English M-as in these words :
' Commandant ! In consequence of the orders of the Minister of
' War, cause to be immediately occupied the Mayoralty of the
' 10th arrondissement, and cause to be arrested, if necessary,
' such of tlie representatives as shall not instantly obey the
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 261
this moment was two hundred and twenty. Tlie chap.
XIV
whole Assembly declared that they resisted, and '
would yield to nothing short of force.* In the TheAssem-
-m--r> DA 111 ^'^'^ refuses,
absence of Dupin, M. Benoist dAzy had been yieidingoniy
^ ^ to force :
presiding over the Assembly, and both he and
one of the Vice - Presidents were now collared
by officers of police and led out. -f- The whole is made
Assembly followed, and, enfolded between files tiie troops
and marched
of soldiery, was marched through the streets. totheQuai
-" d'Orsav.
General Forey rode by the side of the column. 4:
The captive Assembly passed through the Eue de
Grenelle, the Paie St Guillaume, the Eue Neuve
de rUuiversite, the Paie de Beauue, and finally
into the Quai d'Orsay. The spectacle of France
thus marched prisoner through the streets seems
to have pained the people who saw it, but the
pain was that of men who, witnessing by chance
some disagreeable outrage, feel sorry that some
one else does not prevent it, and then pass on.
The members of the Assembly, trusting too much
to mere law and right, had neglected or failed to
provide that there should be a great concourse of
people in the neighbourhood of the hall where
they met. Those who saw this ending of free
institutions were casual bystanders, and were
gathered, it seems, in no great numbers. There
' order to disperse. (Sijjiied) The Gcncral-iii-Chiof ]SrM!;iiaii.'
Ibid. p. 57. Xote to 4fh Edition, 1^(S'i.
* La VCritd, ' Recncil d'Aetes Ofliciels,' p. GO.
t Iliid. p. 60. M. Benoist d'Azy was one of the Vice-Prrsi-
dents, and the other Vice-President collared by the soldiery
was ]\I. Vitet. Note to ith Edition.
t Ibid. p. 11. Ibid. p. 60.
262 OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, was 110 storm of indignation. In an evil hour the
Eepublicans had made it a law that the repre-
sentatives of the people should be paid for their
services. This provision, as was natural, had
brought the Assembly into discredit, for it de-
stroyed the ennobling sentiment with which a free
people is accustomed to regard its Parliament.
The Paris workman, brave and warlike, but shrewd
and somewhat envious, compared the amount of
his day's earning with the wages of the Deputies,
and it did not seem to him that the right cause to
stand up for was the cause of men who were hired
to be patriots at the rate of twenty-five francs a-
day. Still, by his mere taste, and his high sense
of the difference between what is becoming and
what is ignoble, he was inclined to feel hurt by
the sight of what he witnessed. In this doubtful
temper the Paris workman stood watching, and
saw his country slide down from out of the rank
And there of froc Statcs. The gates of the D'Orsay barrack
in the bar- wcrc opcucd, and the Assembly was marched into
the court. Then the gates closed upon them.*
It was now only two o'clock in the afternoon ;-f-
but darkness was wanted to hide the thing which
was next to be done, and the members of the
Assembly were kept prisoners all the day in the
barrack. At half-past four, three Deputies who
had been absent came to the barrack and caused
* La V^rit^, ' Recueil d'Actes Officiels,' p. 60.
+ Ibid. p. 12 ; but the procds-verbal makes it rather later
viz., twenty minutes past three o'clock. Ibid. p. 60. Note to
ith Edition, 1863.
rack
BETWEEN THE CZAli AND THE SULTAN. 263
themselves to be made prisoners with the two chap.
hundred and twenty already there ; and at half- L_
past eight in the evening the twelve Deputies who
liad been seized by the troops at the house of the
Assembly were brought to the barrack, so that the
number of Deputies there imprisoned was now
raised to two hundred and thirty-five.*
At a quarter before ten o'clock at night a large xiie mem-
number of the windowless vans which are used Aissembiy
o 1 ni'1 1 1-iji can ii'd off
tor the transport ot leions were brought into the to .liiierent
court of the barrack, and into these the two hun- t. inns' vans
dred and thirty-five members of the Assembly
were tlirust.-f* They were carried off, some to
the Fort of ]\Iount Valerian, some to the fortress
of Vincennes, and some to the prison of Mazas.
Before the dawn of the 3d of December all the
eminent members of the Assembly, and all the
foremost generals of France, were lying in prison ;
for now (besides General Changarnier, and General
Bedeau, General Lamorici^re, General Cavaignac,
and General Leflo, and besides Tliiers, and Colonel
Charras, and Roger du Nord, and ]\riot, and Baze,
and the others who had been seized tlie night
before, and were still held fast in the jails) tliere
were in prison two liundred and thirty-five of the
* Arcordiiij^ to tlio 'l^ecnril' tlic number was 2:''2, La V(5ritc',
' Renioil d'Artt'S Ollicii'ls,' p. 64. Tlie (liireii'iico is oocasioTied
liy including, or not including, M. Dam, and M. dc IJlois, and
one other. Xo(e to 4th Edition, 1863.
t Not all in one batch, but in three. The last batrh was so
large a one, that tlie prison-vans had to be reinforced by some
omnibuses ; and some few of the Dejuities were left behind for
a time in the barrack. Ibid. y. ITi.- .Vo^c to 4th Edition,
1 863.
264
ORIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP.
XIV.
representatives of the people, including, amongst
others of wide renown, Berryer, Odillon Barrot,
ofthTmelf Barthelemy St Hilaire, Gustave de Beaumont,
imprisoned, gg^oist d'Azj, * the Duc de Broglie, Admiral
Cecile, Cliambolle, De Corcelles, Dufaure, Duver-
gier de Hauranne, De Falloux, General Lauriston,
Oscar Lafayette, Lanjuinais, Lasteyrie, the Duc de
Luines, the Duc de Montebello, General Eadoult-
Lafosse, General Oudinot, De Eemusat, and the
wise and gifted De Tocqueville. Amongst the
men imprisoned there were twelve statesmen who
had been Cabinet Ministers, and nine of these
had been chosen by the President himself "f
Quality of Thcsc werc the sort of men who were within
whoimpris- the walls of the prisons. Those who threw them
oned them. . . _ . _ . _^
into prison were rrince Louis Bonaparte, Morny,
Maupas, and St Arnaud formerly Le Boy, all
acting with the advice and consent of Bialin de
Persigny, and under the propulsion of Fleury. It
is true that the army was aidingj but it has been
seen that Magnan, who commanded it, had taken
care to screen himself under the orders of the
Minister of War ; and in the event of his being
brought to trial he would, no doubt, labour to
show that in doing as he did, and in effecting
* One of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. Amongst
the Deputies thrown into prison there was also M. Vitet,
another of the Vice-Presidents. Note to Uh Edition, 1863.
t The facts mentioned in the above paragraph are not, I
believe, controverted in any important point. A full account
of what passed will be found in the well-known letter of ]\I. de
Tocqueville (now printed in the collection of his letters), and in
the 'E-ecueil' above quoted, pp. 13, 14, GO et seq. Note to i(h
Edition, 1863.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN, 265
the midnight seizure and imprisonment of his chap.
XTV
country's greatest commanders, he was an iustru- '_
ment, and not a contriver.
By the laws of the Eepublic, the duty of taking sitting of
n r-n i /"< ^'' Supreme
cognisance of offences against tlie Constitution court.
was cast upon the Supreme Court. The Court
was sitting, when an armed force entered the hall,
and the judges were driven from the bench,* but The judges
foreiblv
not until they had made a ludicial order for the driven "from
^ _ '' . thebencli.
impeachment of the President. Before the judges
were thrust down they adjourned the Court to
a day ' to be named hereafter,' and they had the
spirit to order a notice of the impeachment to be
served upon the President at tlie Elysee.*|" If the
process-server encountered Colonel Fleury at the
I'^lysee, he would soon lind that Fleury was not
the man who would suffer his gloomy master to
be depressed by the sight of a man with an ugly
summons from a Court of Law.
VI.
The ancient courage of the Parisians had accus- want of
, 1 ii i ji ii 1 (^ means for
tomed them to the thouglit ot encountering wrong dwvn.img
by an armed resistance ; but there were many force.
causes which rendered it unwi.se for them at that
moment to ai)peal to force. Tlie events of 1848,
* Tho ' Anmmiro ' say.s triuiiiplmntly that twn Coiniiii.ssarics
of Police 'iiiterniiitcd tliis frf.sli Mttciiipt at 1i<,m1 rcsi-stanci;,
I>. 273. Note to 4th Edition, 1803.
t It seems that in his mission to tlie El\ see tho proces.s-
scrvcr was accomjiaiiied hy the President of the Court. Ibid.
' Bulletin Fraiivai.s,' p. 27. Note to Ath Edition, 1S(J3.
266 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, and the doctrines of the sect called Socialists, had
XIV.
_^ filled men's minds with terror. People who had
known what it was to be for months and months
together in actual fear for their lives and for their
goods, were brought down into a condition of
mind which made them willing to side with any
executive government however lawless, against
any kind of insurrection however righteous.
Moreover, the feeling of contempt with which the
President had been regarded by many was not
immediately changed by the events of the 2d of
December. It was effectually changed, as will be
seen, by the carnage of the 4th ; but before the
afternoon of that day, the very extravagance of
the outrage which had been perpetrated so re-
minded men of the invasion of Strasburg and the
grotesque descent upon Boulogne, that, during the
fifty-four hours which followed upon the dawn of
the 2d, the indignation of the public was weakened
by its sense of the ridiculous. The contemptuous
cry of ' Soulouque ! ' indicated that Paris was
comparing Louis Napoleon to the negro Emperor
who had travestied the achievements of the First
Bonaparte ; and there were many to whom it
seemed that his mimicry of the 18th Brumaire
belonged to exactly the same class of enterprises
as his mimicry of the return from Elba. Plain-
ly the difference was, that this time, instead of
having only a few dresses and counterfeit flags,
he commanded the resources of the most power-
ful executive government in the world ; but still
there was a somewhat widespread belief that the
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 267
President was tumbling as fast as was necessary, chap.
and would soon be defeated and punished. Be- L
sides, by the contrivance already described, the
plotters had paralysed the National Guard. IMore-
over, it would seem that the great body of the
working men did not conceive themselves to be
hurt by what had been done. Universal suffrage,
and the immediate privilege of choosing a dictator
for France, were offerings well fitted to win over
many honest though credulous labourers, and the
baser sort, whose vice is envy, were gratified by
what had been done ; for they loved to see the
kind of inversion which was implied in the fact
that men like Lamoriciere, and Bedeau, and
Cavaignac, like De Luines, like De Tocqueville,
and the Due de Broglie, could be shut up in a
jail or thrown into a felon's van by persons like
Morny, and INIaupas, and St Arnaud formerly
Le lioy. Thus there was no sufficing material
for the immediate formation of insurgent forces
in Paris. The rich and the middle classes were
indignant, but they had a horror of insurrection ;
and the poor had less dread of insurrection, but
then they were not indignant. It is known,
moreover, that for the moment there was no fight-
ing power in Paris. Paris has generally abounded
in warlike and daring men, who love fighting for
iighting's sake ; but, for the time, this ])ortion of
the French community had been cruslu'd by the
result of the great street-battle of Juni; 1848, and
the seizures and banishments which followed the
defeat of the insurtreuts. The men of the barri-
268 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, cades had been stripped of tlieir arms, deprived
XIV
' of their leaders, and so thinned in numbers as
to be unequal to any serious conflict, and their
helplessness was completed by the sudden dis-
appearance of the street captains and the chiefs
of secret societies, who had been seized in the
night between the 1st and 2d of December.
The Com- Still there was a remnant of the old insurrec-
mittee of . i i .ii .
Resistance, tiouary lorccs, which was willing to try the ex-
periment of throwing up a few barricades, and
there was, besides, a small number of men who
were impelled in the same direction by motives of
a different and almost opposite kind. These last
were men too brave, too proud, too faithful in
their love of riglit and freedom, to be capable of
acquiescing for even a week in the transactions of
the December night. The foremost of these was
the illustrious Victor Hugo. He and some of the
other members of the Assembly who had escaped
seizure, formed themselves into a Committee of
Eesistance, with a view to assert by arms the
supremacy of the law. This step they took on
the 2d of December.
Attempted Scvcral members of the Assembly went into
Fauboiirg the Faubourg St Antoine, and strove to raise the
people. These Deputies were Schoelcher, Baudin,
Aubry, Duval, Chaix, Malardier, and De Flotte,
and they were vigorously supported by Cournet,
whose residence became their headquarters, and
by Xavier Durrieu, Kesler, Ruin, Lemaitre, Wa-
bripon, Le Jeune, and other men connected with
the democratic press. More, it would seem, by
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 269
their personal energy than by the aid of the chap.
people, these men threw up a slight barricade at L_
the corner of the Rue St Marguerite. Against JidcS'e
this there marched a battalion of the 19th Regi- guerue.^''""
ment ; and then there occurred a scene which may
make one smile for a moment, and may then al-
most force one to admire the touching pedantry
of brave men, who imagined that, without policy
or warlike means, they could be strong with the
mere strength of the law. Laying aside their fire-
arms, and throwing across their shoulders scarfs
which marked them as Eepresentatives of the
People, the Deputies ranged themselves in front
of the barricade, and one of them, Charles Baudin,
held ready in his hand the book of the Constitu-
tion. When the head of the column was within
a few yards of the barricade, it was halted. For
some moments there was silence. Law and Force
had met. On the one side was the Code demo-
cratic, which France liad declared to be perpetual ;
on the other a battalion of the line. Charles Bau-
din, pointing to his book, began to show what he
hekl to be the clear duty of the battalion ; but the
whole basis of his argument was an assumption
that tlie \a\v ought to be obeyed ; and it seems
that the officer in command refused to concetle
what logicians call the 'major premiss,' for, in-
stead of accepting its necessary consequence, he
gave an impatient sign. Suddenly llie muskets
of the front-rank men came ddwn, came up, came
level ; and in another instant tliuir fire pelted
straight into the group of the scarfed Deputies.
270 ORIGIN OF THE WAK OF 1853
CHAP. Baudin fell dead, his head being shattered by more
XIV
L_ than one ball. One other was killed by the vol-
ley ; several more were wounded. The book of
the Constitution had fallen to the ground, and the
defenders of the law recurred to their firearms.
They shot the officer who had caused the death of
their comrade and questioned their major premiss.
There was a fight of the Homeric sort for the body
of Charles Baudin. The battalion won it. Four
soldiers carried it off.* Plainly this attempted
insurrection in the Faubourg St Antoine was
without the support of the multitude. It died
out.
Barricades The Committee of Resistance now caused bar-
in central .
Paris. ricades to be thrown up m that mass of streets
between the Hotel de Ville and the Boulevard,
which is the accustomed centre of an insurrection
in Paris ; but they were not strong enough to oc-
cupy the houses, and therefore the troops passed
through the streets without danger, and easily
took every barricade which they encountered.
When the troops retired, the barricades again
sprang up, but only to be again taken. This state
of things continued during part of the 3d of De-
cember; but afterwards the efforts of the troops
were relaxed, and, during the night and the whole
forenoon of the next day, the formation of barri-
cades in the centre of Paris was allowed to go on
without encountering serious interruption.-f-
* Xavier Durrieu, pp. 23, 24.
t JMagnan's Despatch, given in the ' ^Mouiteur.''
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULT.VN. 271
VIL
At two o'clock in the afternoon of the 4th, the chap
condition of Paris was this : The mass of streets _J '_
which lies between the Boulevard and the neigh- ^^^\l ll
two o'clock
on the 4tli
of Dec.
bourhood of the Hotel de Ville was barricaded,
and held without combating by the insurgents ;
but the rest of the city was free from grave dis-
turbance. The army was impending. It was
nearly forty-eight thousand strong,* and coiu-
prised a force of all arms, including cavalry, in-
fantry, artillery, engineers, and gendarmes. Large
bodies of infantry were so posted that brigades Attitude of
advancing from all the quarters of the compass
could simultaneously converge upon the barricaded
district. Besides that, by the means already
shown, the troops had been wrought into a feeling
of hatred against the people of l*aris, they had
clearly been made to understand that they were to
allow no consideration for bystanders to interfere
with their fire, that they were to give no quarter,
and that they were to put to death not only the
combatants whom they might see in arms against
them, but those also who, without having been
seen in the act, might nevertheless be deemed to
liave taken part against them. AVhou it is re-
membered that the duty the judicial duty of
bringing pciople within tliis last category was cast
upon raging soldiers, it will be clear that the army
* 47,028. Manduif, tabular state facility paj;r 302. Xo/e (o
ith Edition, 1SG;5.
272 OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
c HAP. of Paris was brought into the streets with instruu-
XTV
L_ tions well fitted to bring about the events which
marked the afternoon of the 4th of December.*
For reasons which then remained unknown, the
troops were abstaining from action, and there was
a good distance between the^heads of the columns
and the outposts of the insurgents.
Hesitation It is plain that, either because of his own
' agnan. j^gg^^^^^^Q^^ qj, bccause of the hesitation of the
President or M. St Arnaud, the General in com-
mand of the army was hanging back ; i* and in
truth, though the mere physical task which he
Us probable had to perform was a slight one, Magnan could
gioun s. ^^^ 1^^^ g^^ ^j^^^^ politically, he had got into
danger. The mechanical arrangements of the
night of the 2d of December had met with a
success which was wondrously complete; but
in other respects the enterprise of the Elysian
brethren seemed to be failing, for no one of mark
and character had come forward to abet the Presi-
dent. There were many lovers of order and tran-
* My knowledge as to what the troops were made to under-
stand is derived from a source higlily favourable to the Elysee.
+ Magnan, in his Despatch, accounts for his delay in words
which tend to justify the conclusion of those who believe that
the opportunity of inflicting slaughter on the people of Paris
was deliberately sought for and prepared ; but I am not in-
clined to believe that for such an object a French General
would throw away the first seven hours of a short December
day, and therefore, so far as concerns his motives, I reject
Magnan's statement. I consider that the disclosures made
before the Chamber of Peers, in 1840, give me a right to use
my own judgment in determining the weight which is due to
this person's assertions.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 273
quillity who wished the President to succeed in chap.
overthrowing the Constitution, or giving it the L_
needful wrench ; but they had assumed tliat he
would not engage in any enterprise of this sort
without the support of some, at least, of the states-
men who were the known champions of the cause
of order. Those whose views had lain in this direc-
tion were shocked out of their hopes when, on the Apparent
terror of tin
2d of December, they came to find that all the I'louers on
'' aefount of
honoured defenders of the cause of order had been ttieir con-
tinued iso-
thrown into prison, and that the persons wlio were '^t'""-
sheltering the President by their concurrence and
their moral sanction were jNIorny and Maupas or
De jNIaupas, and St Arnaud formerly Le Poy.
The list of the ^Ministry, which was published on
the following day, contained no name held in
honour; and the plotters of the Elysee, terrified,
as it seems, at the state of isolation in which
they were placed, resorted to a curious stratagem.
They formed wliat thev called a 'Consultative Com- stratagem o
forming the
' mission, and promukfated a decree which pur- 'consuita-
. ^ ' 'live Com-
ported to appoint as members of the body, not ' mission/
only most of the plotters themselves, and others
whose services they could command, but also
some eighty otlier men who were eminent for
their cliaracter and station.* In so far as it rep-
resented these eighty men to be members of the
Commission, the decree was a counterfeit. One
after another, tlie men with the honoured names
repudiated tlie notion that they liad consented
to go and 'consult' with Louis iJonaparte, and
* ' Aniiiiairi',' Ajipeudix, ]ii>. (33-G.").
VOL. I. S
274 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. Morny, and Fleury, and Maupas, and St Arnaud
XIV.
formerly Le Eoy. * The Elys^e derived great
advantage from this stratagem, because for many
precious hours, and even days, it kept the country
from knowing what was the number and what
was the quality of the persons who were really
abetting the President ; but Magnan of course
knew the trath, and when he found, on the morn-
ing of the 4th of December, that even the com-
plete success of all the arrangements of the fore-
going Tuesday had not been hitherto puissant
enough to bring to the Elys^e the support of men
of weight and character, he had grounds for the
alarm which seems to have been the cause of his
inaction.
Tor, regarded in connection with the state of
isolation in which the plotters still remained, the
insurrection, feeble as it was, became a source oi
grave danger to the General in command of the
troops. It would have been no new thing to have
to act against insurgents in vindication of the law,
and under the orders of what had been com-
Several of their letters to this effect appeared from time to
time in the English journals ; but M. Leon Faucher (who had
been a few weeks before a member of the Cabinet) addressed his
indignant protest straight to the President :
'Monsieur le President, It is with a painful surprise
' that I see my name figuring amongst those of the members oi
' a Consultative Commission which you liave just been institut-
' ing. I did not think I had given you any right to offer me
' this insult [de me /aire cette injure]. The services I have
' rendered to you in the belief that they were services rendered
' to the country, entitled me perhaps to expect from you a very
' different treatment. At all events my character deserved
' more respect' 'Recueil,' p. 24. Note to ith Edition, 1863.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 275
moiily called a ' Governmeut ; ' but this time the chap.
law was on the side of the insurgents, and the ^^'^'
knot of men who had got the control of the offices
of the State were not so circumstanced in point of
repute as to be able to make up for the want of
legal authority by the weiglit of their personal
character. Therefore it was natural for Magnan,
notwithstanding his cherished order from the
Minister of War, to think a good deal of what
might happen to him, if perchance, at the very
moment when he was taking upon his hands the
blood of the Parisians, the plot of which he was
the instrument should after all break down for
want of support from men known and honoured
as statesmen.
But at length perhaps it was effectually ex- M.i<rnaiiat
U'D^tli re-
plained to ]\Iagnan that he must stand or fall sok.s to
with those to whom he was now committed, and
that, although he thought to keep himself under
the shelter of the ' order of the Minister of War,'
the testimony of any one out of the twenty
Generals who met him on the 27th of November
would suffice to bring him into nearly the same
plight as any of the avowed plotters. A judicious
application of this kind of torture would make
it unnecessary for Colonel Fleury to show even
the hilt of his pistol. At all events, Magnan now
at last consented to act against the insurrection.
He had thrown away the whole of the morning
and the better part of the afternoon, and this on
a short December day ; but at two o'clock the
troops were ordered to advance, and by three all
276
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, the heads of columns which were convergmg
upon the insurrection from different points were
almost close to the several barricades upon which
they had marched.
The ad-
vanced post
of the in-
surgents.
State of the
Boulevard
at three
o'clock.
VIII.
The advanced post of the insurgents, at its
north-western extremity, was covered by a small
barricade, which crossed the Boulevard at a point
close to the Gymnase Theatre. Some twenty
men, with weapons and a drum taken in part
from the ' property room 'of the theatre, were be-
hind this rampart ; and a small flag, which the
insurgents had chanced to find, was planted on
the top of the barricade.*
Facing this little barricade, at a distance of
about a hundred and fifty yards, was the head of
the vast column of troops which now occupied
the whole of the western Boulevard, and a couple
of field-pieces stood pointed towards the barricade.
In the neutral space between the barricade and the
head of the column the shops and almost all the win-
dows were closed, but numbers of spectators, in-
cluding many women, crowded the foot-pavement.
These gazers were obviously incurring the risk of
receiving stray shots. But westward of the point
occupied by the head of the column the state of
* The great barricade in this district was the one which
crossed the Boulevard diagonallj^, near the Porte St Denis.
It is not noticed in the text, because the object here is, not to
describe in detail the preparations of the insurgents, but merely
to show the state of the Boulevard at the point where their
advanced post faced the troops.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 277
the Boulevards was different. From that point chap.
XIV
home to the Madeleine the whole carriage-way . __!_
was occupied by troops ; the infantry was drawn
up in subdivisions at quarter distance. Along
this part of the gay and glittering Boulevard the
windows, the balconies, and the foot-pavements
were crowded with men and women who were
gazing at the military display. These gazers had
no reason for supposing that they incurred any
danger, for they could see no one with whom the
army would have to contend. It is tnie that
notices had been placed upon the walls, recom-
mending people not to encumber the streets, and
warning them that they would be liable to be dis-
persed by the troops without being summoned ;
but of course those who had chanced to see this
announcement naturally imagined that it was a
menace addressed to riotous crowds which might
be pressing upon the troops in a hostile way.
Not one man could have read it as a sentence of
sudden death against peaceful spectators.
At three o'clock one of the field-pieces ranged
in front of the column was fired at the little bar-
ricade near the Gymnase. The shot went high
over the mark. The troops at the head of the
column sent a few musket-shots in the direction
of the barricade, and there M'as a slight attempt
at reply, but no one on either side was wounded ;
and the engagement, if so it could be called, was
so languid and harmless that even the gazers wlio
stood on the foot-pavement, between the troops
and the barricade, were not deterred from remain-
278 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, ino- where thev were; and with regard to the
XIV. . > o
_ spectators farther west, there was nothing that
tended to cause them alarm, for they could see no
one who .was in antagonism with the troops. So
along the whole Boulevard, from the Madeleine
to near the Eue du Sentier, the foot-pavements,
the windows, and the balconies still remained
crowded with men and women and children, and
from near the Eue du Sentier to the little barri-
cade at the Gymnase, spectators still lined the foot-
pavement ; but in that last part of the Boulevard
the windows were closed.*
The mas- Accordlug to souic, a shot was fired from a
Boufevard.'^ wiudow or a housc-top near the Eue du Sentier.
This is denied by others, and one witness declares
that the first shot came from a soldier near the
centre of one of the battalions, who fired straight
up into the air ; but what followed was this : the
troops at the head of the column faced about to
the south and opened fire. Some of the soldiery
fired point-blank into the mass of spectators who
stood gazing upon them from the foot-pavement,
and the rest of the troops fired up at the gay
crowded windows and balconies.t The officers in
general did not order the firing, but seemingly they
were agitated in the same way as the men of the
rank and file, for such of them as could be seen
from a balcony at the corner of the Eue Mont-
* "What I say as to the state of the Boulevard at this time is
taken from many concurrent authorities, but Captain Jesse's
statement (see post) is the most clear and satisfactory so far as
concerns what he saw.
t Captain Jesse, ubi pnst.
BETWEEN THE CZAli AND THE SULTAN. 279
niaitre appeared to acquiesce in all that the sol- chap,
diery did.* .Ji^Zl
The impulse which had thus come upon the
soldiery near the head of the column was a motive
akin to panic, for it was carried by swift conta-
gion from man to man till it ran westward from
the Boulevard Bonne Nouvelle into the Boulevard
Poissoni^re, and gained the Boulevard Mont-
martre, and ran swiftly through its whole length,
and entered the Boulevard des Italiens. Thus by
a movement in the nature of that which tacticians
describe as ' conversion,' a column of some sixteen
thousand men facing eastward towards St Denis
was suddenly formed, as it were, into an order of
battle fronting southward, and busily firing into
the crowd which lined the foot - pavement, and
upon the men, women, and children who stood
at the balconies and windows on that side of the
Boulevard. t What made the fire at tlie houses
the more deadly was that, even after it had be-
gun at the eastern part of the Boulevard Mont-
niartre, people standing at the balconies and
windows further west could not see or believe
that the troops were really firing in at the win-
dows with ball-cartridge, and tliey remained in
the front rooms, and even continued standing at
the windows, until a volley came crasliing in.
At one of the windows there stood a young
Kussian noble with his sister at lii.s ,-;ide. Sud-
denly they received the hre of the soldiery, and
lioth of them were wounded with niusket-shot<.
* Captain Jo.sse, nhi post. t Il>id.
280 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. An English surgeon, who had been gazing from
L_ another window in the same house, had the for-
tune to stand unscathed ; and when he began to
give his care to the wounded brother and sister,
he was so touched, he says, by their forgetfulness
of self, and the love they seemed to bear the one
for the other, that more than ever before in all
his life he prized his power of warding off death.
Of the people on the foot-pavement who were
not struck down at first, some rushed and strove
to find a shelter, or even a half-shelter, at any
spot within reach. Others tried to crawl away on
their hands and knees ; for they hoped that per-
haps the balls might fly over them. The impulse
to shoot people had been sudden, but was not
momentary. The soldiers loaded and reloaded
with a strange industry, and made haste to kill
and kill, as though their lives depended upon the
quantity of the slaughter they could get through
in some given period of time.
When there was no longer a crowd to fire into,
the soldiers would aim carefully at any single
fugitive who was trying to effect his escape ; and
if a man tried to save himself by coming close up
to the troops and asking for mercy, the soldiers
would force or persuade tlie suppliant to keep off
and hasten away, and then, if they could, they
killed him running. This slaughter of unarmed
men and women was continued for a quarter of
an hour or twenty minutes. It chanced that
amongst the persons standing at the balconies
near the corner of the Kue Montmartre there was
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 281
an English officer ; and because of the position in chap
which he stood, the professional knowledge which L
guided his observation, the composure with which
he was able to see and to describe, and the more
than common responsibility which attaches upon
a military narrator, it is probable that his testi-
mony will be always appealed to by historians
who shall seek to give a truthful account of the
founding of the Second French Empire.
At the moment when the firing began, this
officer was looking upon the military display with
his wife at his side, and was so placed that if he
looked eastward he would carry his eye along the
Boulevard for a distance of about 800 yards, and
see as far as the head of the column ; and if he
looked westward he could see to the point where
the ]')Oulevard jNIontmartre runs into the Boulevard
des Italiens. This is what he writes : ' 1 went to
' the balcony at which my wife was standing, and
' remained there watching the troops. The whole
' I)Oulevard, as far as the eye could reach, was
'crowded with them, principally infantry in
' subdivisions at quarter distance, and here and
' there a batch of twelve-pounders and howitzers,
' some of which occupied tlie rising ground of the
' Bt)ulevard Poissonicre. The officers were smok-
' ing their cigars. The windows were crowded
' with people, princi])ally women, ti'udesmen, ser-
' vants, and children, or, like ourselves, the occu-
' pants of apartments. Suddenly, as I was in-
' tently looking with my glass at the trooi)s in the
' distance eastward, a few musket-shots were lircui
282
OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
' at the head of the column, which consisted ol'
' about 3000 men. In a few moments it spread ;
' and, after hanging a little, came down the Boule-
' vard in a waving sheet of flame. So regular,
' however, was the fire that at first 1 thought it
' was a fni de joie for some barricade taken in
' advance, or to signal their position to some other
' division ; and it was not till it came within fifty
' yards of me that I recognised the sharp ringing
' report of ball-cartridge ; but even then I could
' scarcely believe the evidence of my ears, for, as
' to my eyes, I could not discover any enemy to
' fire at ; and I continued looking at the men
' until the company below me were actually rais-
' ing their firelocks, and one vagabond sharper
' than the rest a mere lad without whisker or
' moustache had covered me. In an instant I
* dashed my wife, who had just stepped back,
' against the pier between the windows, when a
' shot struck the ceiling immediately over our
' heads, and covered us with dust and broken
' plaster. In a second after, I placed her upon
' the floor ; and in another, a volley came against
' the whole front of the house, the balcony, and
' windows ; one shot broke the mirror over the
' chimney-piece, another the shade of the clock ;
' every pane of glass but one was smashed ; the
' curtains and window-frames cut; the room, in
* short, was riddled. Tlie iron balcony, though
* rather low, was a great protection ; still fireballs
' entered the room, and in the pause for reloading
' I drew my wife to the door, and took refuge in
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 283
the back-rooms of the house. The rattle of chap.
musketry was incessant for more than a quarter '^^^'
of an hour after this ; and in a very few minvites
the guns were unlimbered and pointed at the
" Magasin " of M. Salkindrouze, five houses on
our right. What the object or meaning of all
this might be was a perfect enigma to every
individual in the house, Erench or foreigners.
Some thought the troops had turned round and
joined the Eeds ; others suggested that they
must have been fired upon somewhere, though
they certainly had not from our house or any
other on tlie boulevard !Montmartre, or we must
have seen it from the balcony. . . . This
wanton fusilade must have been the result of a
panic, lest the windows should have been lined
with concealed enemies, and they wanted to
secure their skins by the first fire, or else it was
a sanguinary impulse. . . . The men, as ]
liave already stated, fired volley upon volley for
more than a quarter of an hour without any
return ; they shot down many of the imhappy
individuals wlio remained on tlic Boulevard and
could not obtain an entrance into any Jiouse ;
some persons wore killed close to our door.' *
The like of what was calmly seen by tliis Eng-
lish officer, f was seen with frenzied horror by
thousands of French men and women.
* r.ctter from Captain Jesse, first jiriutcd in tlie ' Times."
loth Deconilier 18.51, and given also in the, ' Annnal Register.'
+ Another English oflieer, who was in that jiart of tlie Boule-
vards wliidi is at the corner of the Kne de Oramniont, writes
tome thus: ' Having Lccn in Paris during the amp d'ttaf, a.m\
284 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. If the officers in general abstained from order-
_J ing the slaughter, Colonel Eochefort did not fol-
low their example. He was an officer in the Lan-
cers, and he had already done execution with his
horsemen amongst the chairs and the idlers in
the neighbourhood of Tortoni's ; but afterwards
imagining a shot to have been fired from a part
of the Boulevard occupied by infantry, he put
himself at the head of a detachment, which made
a charge upon the crowd ; and the military his-
torian of these events relates with triumph that
about thirty corpses, almost all of them in the
clothes of gentlemen, were the trophies of this
exploit.* Along a distance of a thousand yards,
goinfj eastward from the Eue Eichelieu, the dead
DO '
bodies were strewed upon the foot-pavement of
the Boulevard, but in several spots they lay in
heaps. Some of the people mortally struck would
be able to stagger blindly for a pace or two until
they were tripped up by a corpse, and this, perhaps,
is why a large proportion of the bodies lay heaped
one on the other. Before one shop - front they
' having been a spectator and nearl\' a victim when tlie French
' troops fired against harmless people on the Boulevards, and
' having been standing, until forced to leave it, on the balcony
' of my club at the corner of the Rue de Grammont which club
' was struck thirty-seven times, six balls entering the drawing-
' room I can vouch for the correctness of your description of
' it.' Letter dated 9th March 18(^3. Note to ith Edition, 1863.
* This was in the Boulevard Poissoniere. Mauduit, ]ip.
217, 218. Mauduit speaks of these thirty killed as armed men,
but it is well proved that there were no armed men in the
Boulevard Poissoniere, and I have therefore no difficulty in
rejecting that part of his statement.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 285
counted thirty - three corpses. By the peaceful chap,
little nook or court which is called the Cite . L_
Bergere they counted thirty-seven. The slayers
were many thousands of armed soldiery : the
slain were of a number that never will bo reck-
oned ; but amongst all these slayers and all these
slain there was not one combatant. There was
no fight, no riot, no fray, no quarrel, no dispute.*
What happened was a slaughter of unarmed men,
and women, and children. Where they lay, the
dead bore witness. Corpses lying apart struck
deeper into people's memory than the dead who
were lying in heaps. Some were haunted with
the look of an old man with silver hair, whose
only weapon was the umbrella which lay at his
side. Some shuddered because of seeing the gay
idler of the Boulevard sitting dead against the
wall of a house, and scarce parted from the cigar
which lay on the ground near his hand. Some
carried in their minds the sight of a printer's boy
leaning back against a shop-front, because, though
the lad was killed, the proof-sheets which he was
carrying had remained in his hands, and were
red with his blood, and were fluttering in the
wind.-f" The military historian of these achieve-
* I speak here of the Boulevard from the Rue du Seiitier to
the western extremity of the Boulevard Montinartre.
t For accounts of tlie state of the Boulevard after the
massacre, see the written statements of eyewitnesses sui)plied
to Victor Hugo, and printed in his narrative. It will he seen
that I do not adopt M. Victor Hugo's conclusions ; hut there
is no reason for questioning the authenticity or the truth of tiie
statements which he h;is collected.
286 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, ments permitted himself to speak with a kind of
XIV
_ joy of the number of women who suffered. After
accusing the gentler sex of the crime of shelter-
ing men from the fire of the troops, the Colonel
writes it down that 'many an Amazon of the
' Boulevard has paid dearly for her imprudent
' collusion with that new sort of barricade ; ' and
then he goes on to express a hope that women will
profit by the example and derive from it 'a lesson
' for the future.' * One woman who fell and died
clasping her child, was suffered to keep her hold
in death as in life, for the child too was killed.
Words which long had been used for making
figures of speech, recovered their ancient use,
being wanted again in the world for the picturing
of things real and physical. Musket-shots do not
shed much blood in proportion to tlie slaughter
which they work ; but still in so many places the
foot-pavement was wet and red, that, except by
care, no one could pass along it without gather-
ing blood. Eound each of the trees in the Boule-
vards a little space of earth is left unj^aved in
order to give room for the expansion of the trunk.
The blood, collecting in pools upon the asphalt,
drained down at last into these hollows, and
there becoming coagulated, it remained for more
than a day, and was observed by many. * Their
* blood,' says the English officer before quoted,
' their blood lay in the hollows round the trees
* the next morning when we passed at twelve
' o'clock.' ' The Boulevards and the adjacent
* Mauduit, p. 278.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 287
' streets,' he goes on to say, * were at some points chap
' a perfect shambles/ Incredible as it may seem, _1 '_
artillery was brought to bear upon some of the
houses in the Boulevard. On its north side the
houses were so battered that the foot-pavement
beneath them was laden with plaster and such
ruins as field-guns can bring down.
The soldiers broke into many houses and
hunted the inmates from floor to floor, and caught
them at last and slaughtered them. These things,
no doubt, they did under a notion that shots had
been fired from the house which they entered ; but
it is certain that in almost all these instances,
if not in every one of them, the impression was
false. One or two soldiers would be seen rushing
furiously at some particular door, and this sight
leading their comrades to imagine that a shot had
been fired from the windows above, was enough
to bring into the accused house a whole band of
slaughterers. The Sallandrouze carpet warehouse
was thus entered. Fourteen helpless people
shrank for safety behind some piles of carpets.
The soldiers killed them crouchinff.
IX.
Whilst these things were being done upon the siauKiit.r
Boulevard, four brigades were converging upon rans.
the streets where resistance, though of a rash and
feeble kind, had been really attempted. One after
another the barricades were battered by artillery,
and then carried without a serious struggle ; but
XIV.
88 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, things had been so ordered that, although there
should be little or no fighting, there might still
be slaughter, for the converging movement of the
troops prevented escape, and forced the people
sooner or later into a street barred by troops on
either side, and then, whether they were comba-
tants or other fugitives, they were shot down. It
was the success of this contrivance for penning
in the fugitive crowds, whicli enabled Magnan to
declare, without qualifying his words, that those
who defended the barricades in the quartier Beau-
bourg were put to death ;* and the same ground
justified the Government in announcing that of
the men who defended the barricade of the Porte
St Martin, the troops had not spared one-i* Some
of the people thus killed were men combating or
flying, but many more were defenceless prisoners
in the hands of the soldiery who shot them.
Whatever may have been the cause of the
slaughter of the unoffending spectators on the
Boulevard,:}: it is certain that the shooting of the
prisoners taken at the barricades was brought
about by causing the troops to understand that
they were to give no quarter. Over and over again,
no doubt, the soldiers, listenim:^ to the dictates of
humanity, gave quarter to vanquished combatants ;
but their clemency was looked upon as a fault,
* See his Despatch dated, I think, the 9th December
' Moniteur. '
+ The ' Patrie, ' one of tiie official organs of the President,
December 6.
% See the discussion on this subject towards the close of the
chapter.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 289
and the fault was repaired by shooting the chap.
prisoners they had taken. Sometimes, as was
natural, a house was opened to the fugitives, but prisoner."'
this shelter did not long hold good. For instance,
when the barricade near the Port St Denis was
taken, a hundred men were caught behind it, and
all these were shot ; but their blood was not
reckoned to be enough ; for, by going into the
houses where there were supposed to be fugitives,
the soldiers got hold of thirty more men, and
these also they killed.* The way in which the
soldiery dealt with the inmates of houses sus-
pected of containing fugitives, can be gathered
by observing what passed in one little street.
After describing the capture of a barricade in
the Eue Montorgueil, the military historian of
these events says that searches were immediately
ordered to be made in the public-houses. 'A hun-
' dred prisoners,' he says, ' were made in them, the
' most of whom had their hands still black Avith
' gunpowder an evident proof of their participa-
' tion in the contest. How, then, was it possible
' not to execute, with regard to a good many of
* tliem, the terrible prescriptions of the state of
* siege ?'t
X.
This killing was done under orders so strin-
gent, and yet, in some instances, with so much of
* An ofEoer eiir^aged in tlio operation niaile this statement
not as a confession of sins, but as a narrati\ e of e.xploits.
t Maiuluit, p. 248.
VOL. L T
ture.
290 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, deliberation, that many of the poor fellows put
1_ to death were allowed to dispose of their little
treasures before they died. Thus, one man, when
told that he must die, entreated the officer in
command to be allowed to send to his mother the
fifteen francs which he carried in his pocket.
The officer, consenting, took down the address of
the man's mother, received from him the fifteen
francs, and then killed him. Many times over
the like of this was done.
Mode of Great numbers of prisoners were brought into
some of the the Prefecture of Police, but it appears to have
prisoners at i i
thePrefec- been thought inconvenient to allow the sound of
the discharge of musketry to be heard coming
from the precincts of the building. For that
reason, as it would seem, another mode of quiet-
ing men was adopted. It is hard to have to
believe such things, but according to the state-
ment of a former member of the Legislative
Assembly, who declares that he saw them with
his own eyes, each of the prisoners destined to
undergo this fate was driven, with his hands tied
behind him, into one (jf the courts of the Pre-
fecture, and then one of Maupas's police-officers
came and knocked him on the head with a loaded
club, and felled him felled him in the way that
is used by a man when he has to slaughter a
bullock.*
* M. Xavier Durrieu, formerly a member not of the
' Legislative,' as stated in the text, but of the Constituent
Assembly, is one of those who states that he was an eyewitness
of these deeds, having seen them from the window of his cell
He says, ' Souvent quand la porte gtait refcrmee les sergens de
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 291
XL
Troops are sometimes obliged to kill insurgents chap.
in actual fight, and unarmed people standing in L_
the line of fire often share the fate of the com- by^which^ ^
batants ; what that is the whole world under- vantmish^f
vanquished
stands. But also an officer has sometimes caused be^distm-
people to be put to death, not because they were ^"'^ "^ '
fighting against him, nor even because they were
hindering the actual operations of the troops, but
because he has imagined that under some prob-
able chang-^ of circumstance their continued
presence might become a source of inconvenience
or danger, and he has therefore thought it right
to have them shot down by way of precaution ;
but generally sucli an act as this has been pre-
ceded by the most earnest entreaties to disperse,
and by repeated warnings. This may be called
a precautionary slaughter of bystanders, who are
foolhardy or perverse, or wilfully obstructive to
the troops. Again, it has happened that a slaugh-
ter of this last-mentioned sort has occurred, but
without liaving been preceded by any sucli re-
quest or warning as would give the j)eople time
' ville se jotaifiit couime des ti^n\-s sur Ir.s piisoniiiLTs attaclx^s
' It's mains diTriurt^ le dos. lis le.s as.-<(iiniiiaieiit h coup de
' Passe-tCto. lis les lai.-saicnt rillant sur la iiicrru oh jdusifurs
' d'entre eux out cx])ire. ... 11 en est ainsi ni jilus ni
' moins : nous Tavons vu des fenCtn-s de nos etllules qui .s'ouv-
' raieut sur la cour. ' Lc Coup d'Ehi>, par Xavier Durrieu,
aucieii liepresentant du I'cuple, jip. 39, A^K Suie to Uh Edi-
tion. 1863.
292 OKIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, to disperse. This is a wilful and malignant
L_ slaughter of bystanders ; but still it is a slaughter
of bystanders whose presence might become in-
convenient to the troops, and therefore, perhaps,
it is not simply wanton. Again, it has happened
(as we have but too well seen) that soldiers not
engaged in combat, and exposed to no real danger,
have suddenly fired into the midst of crowds
of men and women who neither opposed nor
obstructed them. This is 'wanton massacre.'
Again, it has sometimes happened, even in
modern times, that when men defeated in fight
have thrown down their arms and surrendered
themselves, asking for mercy, the soldiery to
whom they appealed have refused their prayers,
and have instantly killed them. This is called
' giving no quarter.' Again, it has happened that
defeated combatants, having thrown down their
arms and surrendered at discretion, and not hav-
ing been immediately killed, have succeeded in
constituting themselves the prisoners of the van-
quishing soldiery, but presently afterwards (as,
for instance, within the time needed for taking
the pleasure of an officer on horseback at only a
few yards' distance) they have been put to death.
This is called ' killing prisoners.' Again, defeated
combatants, who have succeeded in constituting
themselves prisoners, have been allowed to remain
alive for a considerable time, and have afterwards
been put to death by their captors, with circum-
stances 'indicating deliberation. This is called
' killing prisoners in cold blood.' Again, soldiers
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 293
after a fight in a city have rushed into houses chap.
where they believed that there were people who 1_
helped or favoured their adversaries, and, yield-
ing to their fury, have put to death men and
women whom they had never seen in combat
against them. This is massacre of non-com-
batants, but it is massacre committed by men
still hot from the fight. Again, it has happened
that soldiery, seizing unarmed people whom they
believed to be favourers of their adversaries, have
nevertheless checked their fury, and, instead of
killing them, liave made them prisoners ; but
afterwards upon the arrival of orders from men
more cruel than the angry soldiery, these people
have been put to death. This is called an ' exe-
' cution of non-combatants in cold blood.'
Here, then, are acts of slaughter of no less than slaughter
nine kinds, and of nine kinds so distinct that umieraii
they do not merely differ m their accidents, but ^^ries.
are divided, the one from the other, by strong
moral gradations. It is certain that deeds rang-
ing under all these nine categories were done in
Paris on the 4th of December 1851, and it is
not less certain tliat, although tliey were not all
of them specifically ordered, they were, every one
of them, caused by the brethren of the Ely-
see. Moreover, it must be remembered that this
slaughtering of prisoners was the slaughtering of
men against wliom it was only to be charged that
tliey were in arms not to viohite, but to de-
fend the laws of their country.
But there is yet another use to whicli, if itM'crc
294 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
not for the honest pride of its officers and men, it
would be possible for an army to be put. In the
course of an insurrection in such a city as Paris,
numbers of prisoners might be seized either by
the immense police force which would probably
be hard at its work, or by troops who might
shrink from the hatefulness of refusing quarter to
men without arms in their hands ; and the pris-
oners thus taken, being consigned to the ordinary
jails, would be in the custody of the civil power.
The Government, regretting that many of the
prisoners should have been taken alive, might
perhaps desire to put them to death, but might
be of opinion that it would be impolitic to kill
them by the hand of the civil power. In this
strait, if it were not for the obstacle likely to be
interposed by the honour and just pride of a war-
like profession, platoons of foot-soldiers might be
used not to defend not to attack not to fight,
but to relieve the civilians from one of the duties
which they are accustomed to deem most vile, b}'
performing for them the office of the executioner ;
and these platoons might even be ordered to help
the Government to hide the deed by doing their
work in the dead hours of the night.
Is it true that, with the sanction of the Home
Office and of the Prefecture of Police, and under
the orders of Prince Louis Bonaparte, St Arnaud,
Magnan, Morny, and Maupas, a midnight work
of this last kind was done by the army of Paris ?
To men not living in the French capital, it
BETWEEN Tim CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 295
seems that there is a want of complete certainty chap.
about the fate of a great many out of those throngs '^^^-
of prisoners who were brought into the jails and
other places of detention on the 4th and 5th of
December. The people of Paris think otherwise.
They seem to have no doubt. The grounds of
their belief are partly of this sort : A family,
anxious to know what had become of one of their
relatives who was missing, appealed for help to a
man in so high a station of life that they deemed
him powerful enough to be able to question offi-
cial personages, and his is the testimony which
records what passed. In order, if possible, to
tind a clue to the fate of the lost man, he made
the acquaintance of one of the functionaries who
held the office of a 'Judge-Substitute.' The mo-
ment the subject of inquiry was touched, the
' Judge-Substitute ' began to boil with anger at
the mere thought of what he had witnessed, but
it seems that liis indignation was not altogether
unconnected with offended pride, and the agony
of having had his jurisdiction invaded. He said
that he had been ordered to go to some of the jails
and examine the prisoners, with a view to deter-
mine whether they sliould be detained or set free ;
and that, whilst he was engaged in this duty, a
party of non-commissioned officers and soldiers
came into the room and rudely announced that
they themselves had orders to dispose of tliose
prisoners whose fingers were black. Then without
regard to tlie protesting of the ' Judge-Substitute,'
296 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, they examined the hands of the prisoners whom
XIV
'__ he had before him, adjudged that the fingers of
many of them were black, and at once carried off
all those whom they so condemned, with a view
(as the 'Judge-Substitute' understood) to shoot
them, or have them shot. That they were so
shot the ' Judge-Substitute ' was certain, but it is
plain that he had no personal knowledge of what
was done to the prisoners after they were carried
off by the soldiers. Again, during the night of
the 4th and the night of the 5th, people listening
in one of the undisturbed quarters of Paris would
suddenly hear the volley of a single platoon a
sound not heard, they say, at such hours either
before or since. The sound of this occasional
platoon-firing was heard coming chiefly, it seems,
from the Champ de Mars, but also from other
spots, and, in particular, from the gardens of the
Luxembourg, and from the esplanade of the Inva-
lides. People listening within hearing of this
last spot declared, they say, that the sound of
the platoon -fire was followed by shrieks and
moans ; and that once, in the midst of the other
cries, they caught some piteous words, close fol-
lowed by a scream, and sounding as though they
were the words of a lad imperfectly shot and
dying hard.
Partly upon grounds of this sort, but more per-
haps by the teaching of universal fame, Paris
came to believe and, rightly or wrongly, Paris
still believes that during the night of the 4th,
and again during the night of the 5th, prisoners
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 297
were shot in batches and thrown into pits.* On chap.
the other hand, the adherents of the French Em- ^^"^ '
peror deny that the troops did duty as execution-
ers. Therefore the value of an Imperialist denial,
with all such weight as may be thought to belong
to it, is set against the imperfect proof on which
Paris founds her belief ; but men must remember
why it is that any obscurity can hang upon a
question like this. The question whether, on the
night of a given Thursday and a given Friday,
whole batches of men living in Paris were taken
out and shot by platoons in such places as the
Champ de ISIars or the Luxembourg gardens
this is a question which, from its very nature,
could not have remained in doubt for forty-eight
hours, unless Paris at the time had lost her free-
dom of speech and her freedom of printing ; and
even now, after a lapse of years, if freedom were
restored to France, the question would be quickly
and righteously determined. Now it happens
that those who took away from Paris her freedom
of speech and her freedom of printing are the very
persons of whom it is said that during two Decem-
ber nights they caused their fellow-countrymen to
be shot by platoons and in batches. So it comes to
* I now have the name of a man a man widely known, and
fomiinf:; part of Louis Napoleon's military entoura[ic who en-
tered the Union Cluh of Paris in a state of joyous excitement,
saying with exultation that he had just been 'assisting' at the
shooting of 165 insurgents in the Charnj) de Mars. It is right
to say that some time afterwards, when the fashion of thus
l)oasti!ig had a little declined, the m;iii said he might have
' un pen exagen5.' Note tu 5th Kdition.
298 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, this, that those who are charged have made away
'__ with the means by which the truth might be best
established. In this stress, Justice is not so dull
and helpless as to submit to be baffled. Wisely
deviating in such a case from her common path,
she listens for a moment to incomplete testimony
against the concealer, and then, by requiring that
he who hid away the truth shall restore it to light,
or abide the consequence of his default, she shifts
the duty of giving strict proof from the accuser
to the accused. Because Prince Louis and his
associates closed up the accustomed approaches
to truth, therefore it is cast upon them either
to remain under the charge which Paris brings
against them, or else to labour and show, as best
they may, that they did not cause batches of
French citizens to be shot by platoons of infantry
in the night of the 4th and tlie night of the 5tli
of December.*
* I find that what I, in my caution, thns speak of as a ' ques-
' tion,' has been recorded as a proved fact by a gentleman who
was in Paris at the time of the coup d'^at, who was gifted more
than most men with the power of seeking for truth in an im-
partial spirit, and who enjoyed great opportunities of informing
himself concerning the events which had been passing in the
French capital. His narrative asserts, in plain unqualified
terms, that ' hundreds ' were ' put to death in the courtyards
' of the barracks, or in the subterraneous passages of the
' Tuileries.' Still, the writer did not see the prisoners shot
with his own eyes, and I persist in my inclination to treat it as
a ' question,' whether these alleged executions did or did not
take place in the nights of the 4t]i and 5th of December. Xote
to ith Edition.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 299
XII.
The whole number of people killed by the chap.
troops during the forty hours which followed upon '__
the commencement of the massacre in the Boule- ^3"^ ufe"^^
vards, will never be known. The burying of the p"op^" "^
bodies was done for the most part at night. In '""*'^-
searching for a proximate notion of the extent
of the carnage, it is not safe to rely even upon
the acknowledgments of the officers engaged in
the work, for during some time they were under
an impression that it was favourable to a man's
advancement to be supposed to be much steeped
in what was done. The colonel of one of the
regiments engaged in this slaughter spoke whilst
the business was fresh in his mind. It would
be unsafe to accept his statement as accurate
or even as substantially true ; but as it is cer-
tain that the man had taken part in the trans-
actions of which he spoke, and that he really
wished to gain credence for the words which he
uttered, his testimony has a kind of value as rep-
resenting (to say the least of it) his idea of what
could be put forward as a credible statement V)y
one who had the means of knowing the truth.
What he declared was that his regiment alone had
killed two thousand four hundred men. Suppos-
ing that his statement was anything like an ap-
proach to the truth, and that his corps was at all
rivalled by others, a very high numlier would be
300 ORIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP, wanted for recording the whole quantity of the
'__ slaughter*
Total loss of In the army which did these things, the whole
the army in *^
killed. number of killed was twenty-five.'f'
XIII.
Effect of Of all men dwelling in cities the people of Paris
themassacre , ,.. ^ -, , ,^
upon the are perhaps the most warnke. Less almost than
people of ,
Paris any other Europeans are they accustomed to over-
value the lives of themselves and their fellow-
citizens. With them the joy of the fight has power
to overcome fear and grief, and they had been used
to great street-battles ; but they had not been
used of late to witness the slaughter of people
unarmed and helpless. At the sight of what was
done on that 4th of December the great city was
struck down as though by a plague. A keen-
eyed Englishman, who chanced to come upon
some of the people retreating from these scenes of
slaughter, declared that their countenances were
of a strange livid hue which he had never before
seen. This was because he had never before seen
the faces of men coming straight from the witness-
ing of a massacre. They say that the shock of
being within sight and hearing the shrieks broke
down the nervous strength of many a brave though
* The number of regiments operating against Paris was be-
tween thirty and forty, and of these about twenty belonged to
the divisions which were actively employed in the work.
+ Including all ofScers and soldiers killed from the 3d to the
Cth of December. The official return, 'Moniteur,' p. 3062.
BETWEEN THE CZAJl AND THE SULTAN. 301
tender man, and caused him to burst into sobs as chap.
XT V
though he were a little child. 1_
Before the morning of the 5th the armed insur-
rection had ceased. From the first, it had been
feeble. On the other hand, the moral resistance
which was opposed to the acts of the President
and his associates had been growing in strength :
and when the massacre began on the afternoon
of the 4th of December, the power of this moral
resistance was in the highest degree formidable.
Yet it came to pass that, by reason of the strange
prostration of mind which was wrought by tlie
massacre, tlie armed insurrection dragged down
with it in its fall the whole policy of those who
conceived that by the mere force of opinion and
ridicule they would be enabled to send the plot-
ters to Vincennes. The Cause of those who in-
tended to rely upon this scheme of moral resist-
ance was in no way mixed up with the attempts
of the men of tlie barricades, but still it was a
Cause wiiich depended upon the high spirit of
the people ; and it had happened that this spirit
perplexed and baffled on the 2d of December
by a stratagem and a night attack was now
crushed out by sheer horror.
For her beauty, for her grandeur, for lier liis-
toric fame, for lier warlike deeds, for lier power to
lead the will of a mighty nation, and to crown or
discrown its monarchs, no city on earth is worthy
to be the rival of Paris. Yet, because of the palsy
that came upon her after the slaughter on the
Boulevard, this Paris this beauteous, heroic Paris
302
OKTGIN OF THE WAK OF 1853
CHAP.
XIV.
Upon their
habit of
ridiculing
Louis
Napoleon.
this queen of great renown, was delivered bound
into the hands of Prince Louis Bonaparte, and
Morny, and Maupas or De Maupas, and St Ar-
naud formerly Le Eoy. And the benefit which
Prince Louis derived from the massacre was not
transitory. It is a maxim of French politics that,
happen what may, a man seeking to be a ruler of
Prance must not be ridiculous. Prom 1836 until
1848 Prince Louis had never ceased to be obscure
except by bringing upon himself the laughter of
the world ; and his election into the chair of the
Presidency had only served to bring upon him a
more constant outpouring of the scorn and sar-
casm which Paris knows how to bestow.* Even
the suddenness and perfect success of the blow
struck in the night between the 1st and the 2d of
December had failed to make Paris think of him
with gravity. But it was otherwise after three
o'clock on the 4th of December ; and it happened
that the most strenuous adversaries of this oddly-
fated Prince were those who, in one respect, best
served his cause ; for the more they strove to
show that he, and he alone, of his own design and
malice had planned and ordered the massacre,7
the more completely they relieved him from the
disqualification which had hitherto made it im-
possible for him to become the supreme ruler of
* A glance at the ' Charivari ' for '49, '50, and the first eleven
months of '51, would verify this statement. The stopping of
the ' Charivari ' was one of the very first exertions of absolute
power which followed the night of the 2d of December.
t It will be seen (see post) that I question the truth of this
charge against him.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 303
France. Before the night closed in on the 4th of chap.
December, he was sheltered safe fron
the ghastly heaps on the Boulevard.
December, he was sheltered safe from ridicule by ;
XIV.
The fate of the provinces resembled the fate of xim fate
the capital. Whilst it was still dark on the morn- vmces.
ing of the 2d, Morny, stealing into the Home
Office, had entrusted his orders for instant and
enthusiastic support to the zeal of every prefect,
and had ordered that every mayor, every juge
de paix, and every other public functionary who
failed to give in his instant and written adhesion
to the acts of the President sliould be dismissed *
Tn France the engine of State is so constructed as
to give to the Home Office an almost irresistible
power over the provinces, and the means which
the Office had of coercing France were reinforced
by an appeal to men's fears of anarchy, and their
dread of the sect called 'Socialists/ Forty thou-
sand communes were suddenly told that they
nmst make swift choice between Socialism and
anarchy and rapine on the one hand, and on the
other a virtuous dictator and lawgiver, recom-
* ' You will iiiimi'iliately dismiss the jiii^fs dv paii, the
' mayors, and the other fuiictiuiinries, wliose conciuTeiice may
' not be assured, and appoint other men in their stead. To
' this end, you will call upon all the jmblic functionaries to
' give you in writing their adhesion to the great measure which
' the Government has just adopted.' Morny's Circular to the
Prefects. 'Annuaire,' Appendix, p. 67. Xote (o 4lh Edition,
1863.
304 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, mended and warranted by the authority of Mon-
____ sieur de Morny. The gifted Montalembert him-
self was so effectually caught in this springe that
he publicly represented the dilemma as giving no
choice except between Louis Bonaparte and ' the
' ruin of France.' In the provinces, as in Paris,
there were men whose love of right was stronger
than their fears of the Executive Government, and
stronger than their dread of the Socialists ; but
the Departments, being kept in utter darkness by
the arrangements of the Home Office, were slower
than Paris in finding out that the blow of the 2d
of December had been struck by a small knot of
associates without the concurrence of statesmen
who were the friends of law and order; and it
would seem that, although the proclamations
were received at first with stupor and perplexity,
they soon engendered a hope that the President
(acting, as the country people imagined him to
be, with the support of many eminent statesmen)
might eff'ect a wholesome change in the Constitu-
tion, and restore to Prance some of the tranquil-
lity and freedom which she had enjoyed under
the Government of her last King. There were
risings; but every Department which seemed
likely to move was put under martial law. Then
followed slaughter, banishment, imprisonment,
sequestration ; and all this at the mere pleasure
of generals raging with a cruel hatred of the
people, and glowing with the glow of that motive
so hateful because so sordid which in central-
ised States men call 'zeal.' Of these generals
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 305
there were some who, in their fury, went beyond chap.
all the bounds of what could be dictated by any- '__
thing like policy, even though of the most fero-
cious kind. In the department of the Allier, for
instance, it was decreed, not only that all who
were ' known ' to have taken up arms against the
Government should be tried by Court-Martial, but
that 'those whose Socialist opinions were noto-
' rious ' should be transported by the mere order
of the Administration, and have tlieir property
sequestered. The bare mental act of holding a
given opinion was thus put into the category of
black crimes ; and either the prisoner was to have
no trial at all, or else he was to be tried, as it
were, by the hangman. This decree was issued
by a man called General Eyuard, and was at
once adopted and promulgated by the Executive
Government.*
XV.
The violence with which the brethren of the Motives for
Elysee were raging, took its origin, no doubt, f u.*e"nen'
from their terror ; but now that they were able by tiie Exe-
to draw breath, another motive began to govern
them, and to drive them along the same road:
for by this time, they were able to give to their
actions a colour which tended to bring them the
support and goodwill of whole multitudes wliole
multitudes distracted with fear of tlie democrats,
and only longing for safety. For more than three
years people had lived in dread of the ' Socialists;'
'Mouitc'ur,' '2Sth Duo.
VOL. I U
306 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, and thoufli the sect, taken alone, was never so
XIV. . .
' formidable as to justify the alarm of a firm man,
dreTdonhe stiU it was more or less allied with the fierce
species of democrat which men called ' Eed,' and,
the institutions of the Eepublic being new and
weak, it was right for the nation to stand on its
guard against anarchy ; though many have judged
that the defenders of order, being upheld by the
voice of the millions no less than by the forces
of intellect and of property, might have kept
their watch without fear. But whether the thing
from which people ran flying was a danger or
only a phantom, the terror it spread brought
numbers down into a state which was hardly
other than abject. Of course, people thus un-
manned would look up piteously to the Executive
Government as their natural protectors, and would
be willing to offer their freedom in exchange for
The use a little morc safety. So now, if not before, the
thts by the company of the Elysee saw the gain which would
tiie Eiy^see. accrue to them if they could have it believed that
their enterprise was a M^ar against Socialism.
After the subjugation of Paris, the scanty gath-
erings of people who took up arms against the
Government were composed, no doubt, partly of
Socialists, but partly also of men who had no
motive for rising, except that they were of too
high a spirit to be able to stand idle and see the
law trampled down. But the brotherhood of the
Elysee was master sole master of the power to
speak in print ; and by exaggerating the disturb-
ances going on in some parts of France, as well
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 307
as by fastening upon all who stood up against chap.
them the name of the hated sect, they caused it _J ^
to be believed by thousands, and perhaps by J^l^H^'ll
millions, that they were engaged in a valorous '-vl^r'^gjlii'ist^
and desperate struggle against Socialism. In ^'j*^'''''^'"-
proportion as this pretence came to be believed, support
it brought hosts oi people to the support oi the taiued.
Executive Government ; and there is reason to
VjcKeve that, even among those of the upper
classes who seemed to be standing proudly aloof
from the Elysee, there were many who secretly
rejoiced to be delivered from their fear of the
Democrats at the price of having to see France
handled for a time by persons like ]Morny and
Maupas.
The truth is, that in the success of this specula-
tion of the Elysee many thought they saw how to
escape from the vexations of democracy in a safe
and indolent way. When an Arab decides that
the burnous, whicli is his garment by day and by
night, has become unduly populous, he lays it
upon an ant-hill in order that the one kind of
insect may be chased away by the oth(jr ; and, as
soon as this has been done, lie easily brushes off
the conquering genus with the struke of a whij)
or a pipe-stick. In a lazy mood wrll-born men
thought to do this with France; and tlu' lirst })art
of the process was successful onougli, lor all the
I'cd sort were killed or crushed or liunledaway;
but when that was done it began to a})pear that
those whose hungry energies had been made use
of to do tliL' work Were altouether unwilling to be
308
OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XIV.
brushed off. They clung. Even now, after the
lapse of years, they cling and feed.*
Commis-
saries sent
into the
provinces.
XVI.
The army in the provinces closely imitated the
ferocity of the army of Paris ; but it was to be
apprehended that soldiery, however fierce, might
deal only with the surface of discontent, and
not strike deep enough into the heart of the
country. They might kill people in streets and
roads and fields ; they might even send their
musket-balls through windows into the houses,
and shoot whole batches of prisoners ; but they
could not so well search out the indignant friends
of law and order in their inner homes. Therefore
Morny sent into the provinces men of dire repute,
and armed them with terrible powers. These
persons were called Commissaries. In every spot
so visited the people shuddered ; for they knew
by their experience of 1848 that a man thus set
over them by the terrible Home Office might be a
ruffian well known to the police for his crimes as
well as for his services, and that from a potentate
of that quality it might cost them dear to buy
their safety.
Tiie Church. There have been times when the all but dying
spark of a nation's life has been kept alive by the
priests of her faith ; and when this has happened,
there has sprung up so deep a love between people
and Church that the lapse of ages has not had
* Written in September 1861.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 309
strength to put the two asunder.* In Prance, it chap,
is true, the Church no longer wielded the authority L
which had belonged to her of old ; but besides
that the virtues of her humble and labouring
priesthood had gained for her more means of
guiding men's minds than Europe was accustomed
to believe, she was a cohering and organised body.
Therefore, at a moment when the whole temporal
powers of the State had been seized by a small
knot of men slyly acting in concert, and when the
Parliamentary and judicial authority which might
restrain their violence had been all at once over-
thrown, the Church of France, surviving in the
midst of ruined institutions, became suddenly in-
vested with a great power to do good or to do evil.
She might stand between the armed man and his
victim ; she might turn away wrath ; she might
make conditions for prostrate Prance. Or, taking
a yet loftier stand, she might resolve to choose
and choose sternly between right and wrong.
She chose.
The priestliood of Prance were, upon the whole,
a zealous, unworldly, devoted body of men ; but
already the Church which they served had been
gained over to the President by the arrangements
which led to the siege and occupation of Pome.
Therefore, although tlie priests perceived that
Maupas, coming privily in the night-time, had
seized tlie generals and the statesmen of Prance,
and had shut up tlie Parliament, and driven the
* See Arlliur Stanley's admirable account of the relations
between Ku.ssia and her Church.
310 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, judges from the judgment-seat, still it seemed to
!_ them that, because of Eome, they ought to side
with Maupas. So far as concerned her political
action in this time of trial, they suffered the
Church of France to degenerate into a mere sub-
department of the Home Office. In the rural
districts, when the time for the Plebiscite came,
they fastened tickets marked 'Yes' upon their
people, and drove them in flocks to the poll.
XVII.
Every institution in the country being thus
suborned or enslaved or shattered, the bretliren of
the Elys(^e resolved to follow up their victory over
France Fraucc. In the sense which will presently appear
they resolved to disman her. It had resulted,
from the political state of France during several
years, that great numbers of the most stirring men
in the country had belonged to clubs, which the
law called ' secret societies.' A net thrown over
this class would gather into its folds whole myriads
of honest men ; and indeed it has been computed
that the number of jDersons then alive who at one
time or other had belonged to some kind of 'secret
' society,' amounted to no less than two millions.
If French citizens at some period of their lives
had belonged to societies forbidden by statute, it
was enough (and, after a lapse of time, much more
than enough) that the penalties of the law which
they had disobeyed should be enforced against
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULT.VN. 311
them. But it was not this, nor the like of this, chap.
that was done. ^^'
Prince Louis Bonaparte and Morny, with the
advice and consent of Maupas, issued a retro-
operative decree, by which all these hundreds of
tliousands of Frenchmen were made liable to be
instantly seized, and transported either to the
penal settlements in Africa, or to the torrid swamps
of Cayenne.* The decree was as comprehensive
as a law would be in England if it enacted that
every man who had ever attended a political
meeting might be now suddenly transported ; but
it was a hundred times less merciful ; for, in
general, to be banished to Cayenne was to be
put to a slow, cruel, horrible death. ]\Iorny and
Maupas pressed and pressed the execution of this
* Decree of 8th December, inserted in the ' Moniteur ' of the
9th. It is also in the ' Annuaire,' pp. 75, 76. The transporta-
tion was to be to a penal colony iu Algeria or Cayenne, and was
to be for a period of five years at the least, and ten years at the
most (Articles 1 and 2). The order for transportation was to be
an act of administration. In other words, everybody whom the
police authorities chose to designate as having belonged to a
secret society was made liable to be transported without trial.
This decree was superscribed Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. I
observe that, within forty-eight liours from the time when they
thus got France down viz., on the 10th of December the
brethren of tlie ElysGu began their 'concessions' to railways
and other companies. Thenceforth, as miglit be expected,
' concessions ' went on at a merry rate. See wliole lists of them
in the Appendices to the 'Annuaire.' Those who know how
viust have been the sums expended by our public companies in
obtaining 'Private Acts of Parliament,' may form some idea of
the importance of the patronage iu tliis direction which the
brethren got into their hands. Xofr, to -ith KiHtlon, 1SG3.
312 OKIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, almost incredible decree with a ferocity which
'__ must have sprung in the first instance from terror,
and was afterwards kept alive for the sake of that
hideous sort of popularity which was to be gained
by calling men Socialists, and then fiercely hunt-
ing them down. None will ever know the num-
ber of men who at this period were either killed
or imprisoned in France, or sent to die in Africa
or Cayenne ; but the panegyrist of Louis Bona-
parte and his fellow-plotters acknowledges that
26,500 men the uumber of people who were seized and trans-
ported within the few weeks which followed the
2d of December, amounted to the enormous num-
ber of twenty-six thousand five hundred.*
France perhaps could have borne the loss of
many tens of thousands of ordinary soldiers and
workmen without being visibly weakened ; but
no nation in the world no, not even France her-
self is so abounding in the men who will dare
something for honour and liberty, as to be able
to bear to lose in one month between twenty and
thirty thousand men, seized from out of her most
stirring and most courageous citizens. It could
not be but that what remained of France when
she had thus been stricken should for years seem
to languish and to be of a poor spirit. This is why
I have chosen to say that France w^as dismanned.
But, besides the men killed and the men trans-
* Granier de Cassagnac, vol. ii. p. 438. To meet the cost of
these wholesale transportations, an extraordinary credit was
opened on the 28th of January. It is only the title of the
decree, and not the snm fixed, which is given in the 'Annuaire,'
Appendix, p. 95. Note to ith Edition, 1863.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 313
ported, there were some thousands of rrenchmen chap.
who were made to undergo sufferings too horrible 1_
to be here told. I speak of those who were
enclosed in the casemates of the fortresses and
huddled down between the decks of the Canada
and the Duguesclin. These liapless beings were,
for the most part, men attached to the cause of
the Eepublic. It would seem that of the two
thousand men whose sufferings are the most
known, a great part were men whose lives had
been engaged in literary pursuits ; for amongst
them there were authors of some repute, editors
of newspapers, and political writers of many
grades, besides lawyers, physicians, and others
whose labours in the field of politics had been
mainly labours of tlie intellectual sort. The tor-
ments inflicted upon these men lasted from two
to three months. It was not till the second week
in Marcli tliat a great many of them came out in-
to the light and the pure air of heaven. Because
of what they had suffered they were hideous and
terrible to look upon. The hospitals received
many. It is right that the works which testif}-
of these things should be indicated as authorities
on which the narrator founds bis passing words.*
But unless a man be under some special motive
for learning the detailed trutli, it would be well
for him to close his eyes against those horrible
pages ; for if once he looks and reads, the recol-
* ' Le Coup d'Etat,' par Xa^^c^ Durricii, aiicien Ecpresent-
ant du Peuple. ' Histoire de la Terrcur Boaapartiste,' par
Hippolyte Magen.
314
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XIV.
lection of the things he reads of may haunt him
and weigh upon his spirit till he longs and longs
in vain to recover his ignorance of what, even in
this his own time, has been done to living men.*
The
Plebiscite.
Causes
rendering
free elec-
tion im-
possible.
XVIII.
At length the time came for the operation of
what was called the Plebiscite. The arrangements
of the plotters had been of such a kind as to allow
France no hope of escape from anarchy and utter
chaos, except by submitting herself to the dictator-
ship of Louis Bonaparte ; for although the Presi-
dent in his Proclamation had declared that if the
country did not like his Presidency they might
choose some other in his place, no such alternative
* I have not ventiii'ed to speak of the numbers of these hap-
less sufferers further than to use the phrase, ' the two tliousand
' men whose sufferings are the best known ; ' but the highly
qualified writer referred to in the foot-note, p. 298, conceived
himself warranted in venturing upon the following words :
' All that is known is, that about three thousand two hundred
' have since disappeared from Paris ; they may have been killed
' in the Boulevards, and thrown into the large pits in which
' those who fell on that day were promiscuously interred ; they
' may have been among the hundreds who wei'e put to death in
' the courtyards of the barracks, or in the subterraneous pas-
' sages of the Tuileries ; they may be in the casemates of Fort
' Bicetre, or in the bagnes of Rochefort, or they may be at sea
' on their way to Cayenne We have already
' stated that the number of persons undergoing or sentenced by
' these cruelties is believed to exceed ten thousand. A hun-
' dred thousand more are supposed to be in the vaults and ctwe-
' mates which the French dignify with tlie name of prisons,
' often piled, crammed, and wedged together so closely that
' they can scarcely change thei'- positions. ' ' Edinburgh Ee-
' view,' vol. xcv. }). 319. Note to Uh Edition.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 315
was really offered. The choice given to the elec- chap
XIV
tors did not even purport to be anything but '_
a choice between Louis Bonaparte and nothing.
According to the wording of the Plebiscite, a vote
given for any candidate other than Louis Bona-
parte would have been null. An elector was only
permitted to vote 'Yes/ or vote 'No;' and it
seems plain that the prospect of anarchy involved
in the negative vote would alone have operated as
a sufficing menace. Therefore, even if the collec-
tion of the suffrages had been carried on with
perfect fairness, the mere stress of the question
proposed would have made it impossible that
there should be a free election : the same central
power which, nearly four years before, had com-
pelled tlie terrified nation to pretend tliat it loved
a republic, would have now forced the same help-
less people to kneel, and say they chose for their
one only lawgiver the man recommended to them
by Monsieur de ^Nlorny.
Having the army and the whole executive
power in their hands, and having preordained the
question to be put to the people, the brethren
of the Elysee, it would seem, might have saftdy
allowed the proceeding to go to its sure conclu-
sion without further coercing the vote ; and if
they had done thus, they Avould have given a
colour to the assertion that the result of the Ple-
biscite was a national ratification of their act.
I5ut, remembering what they had done, and hav-
ing blood on their hands, tlu'V did not venture
upon a free election. What they did was this :
tion.
316 ORIGIN OF THE WAE OF 1853
CHAP, they placed thirty-two departments under martial
1 . law ; and since they wanted nothing more than
a sheet of paper and a pen and ink in order to
place every other department in the same pre-
The election dicament, it can be said without straining a word,
under mar- , , n n i ii p-r-i
tiaiiaw. that potentially, or actually, the whole ot Jb ranee
was under martial law.
Violent Therefore men voted under the sword. But
taken for martial law is only one of the circumstances which
coercing
the eiec- constitutc the difference between an honest elec-
tion and a Plebiscite of the Bonaparte sort. Of
course, for all effective action on the part of mul-
titudes, some degree of concert is needful ; and on
the side of the plotters, using as they did the
resistless engine of the executive government, the
concert was perfect. To the adversaries of the
Elysee all effective means of concerted action were
forbidden by ]\Iorny and IMaupas. Xot only
could they have no semblance of a public meet-
ing, but they could not even venture upon the
slightest approach to those lesser gatherings which
are needed for men who want to act together. Of
course, in these days, the chief engine for giving
concerted and rational action to bodies of men is
the Press. But, except for the uses of the Elysde,
there was no Press. All journals hostile to the
plot were silenced. Not a word could be printed
which was unfavourable to Monsieur Morny's
candidate for the dictatorship. Even the printing
and distributing of negative voting-tickets was
made penal ; and during the ceremony which was
called an ' election,' several persons were actually
BETWEEN THE CZAR AXD THE SULTAN. 317
arrested, and charged with the offence of distri- chap.
buting negative voting - tickets, or persuading "' '
others to vote against the President. It was soon
made clear that, so far as concerned his means of
taking a real part in the election, every adversary
of the Elys^e was as helpless as a man deaf and
dumb.
In one department it was decreed that any one
spreading reports or suggesting fears tending to
disquiet the people, should be instantly arrested
and brought before a court-martial.* In another,
every society, and indeed every kind of meeting,
however few the persons composing it might be,
was in terms prohibited ; f and it was announced
that any man disobeying the order would be
deemed to be a member of a secret society within
the meaning of the terrible decree of the 8th of
December, and liable to transportation. + In the
same department it was decreed, that every one
hawking or distributing printed tickets, or even
manuscripts, unless authorised by the mayor or
the juge de paix, should be prosecuted ; and tlie
same prefect, in almost mad rage against freedom,
proclaimed tliat any one who was caught in an
endeavour to ' propagate an opinion ' should be
deemed guilty of exciting to civil war and instant-
ly liandcnl over to the judicial authority. In
another department the sub-prefect announced
* Arrotd du Genenil d'Aliilionsp, Coininandant I'dtat de si6ge
dans le DepartpniPiit dii Cher, Article 4.
t ArrCtd du Prifet do la Haute Garonne, Articles 1, '2, 3.
.;; Ibid., Article .3. Ibid., Article -t.
318 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, that any one who threw a doubt on the loyalty
i_J_ of the acts of the Government should be arrested*
These are samples of the means wdiich generals
and prefects and sub-prefects adopted for insuring
the result ; but it is hardly to be believed that all
this base zeal was really needed, because from the
very first, the brethren of the Elys6e had taken a
step which, even if it had stood alone, would have
been more than enough to coerce the vote. They
fixed for the 20th and 21st of December the elec-
tion to which civilians were invited; but long
before this, the army had been ordered to vote
(and to vote openly without ballot), within forty-
eight hours from the receipt of a despatch of the
3d of December. -f- So all the land-forces of
Contrivance Francc had voted, as it were, by beat of drum,
for coercing ^ loi- -tit
the election aud the Tcsult of their voting had been made
by the vote .
of the army, kuowu to tlic wholc couutiy, loug bcfore the time
fixed for the civilians to proceed to election.
France, therefore, if she were to dare to vote
against the President, would be placing herself
in instant and open conflict with the declared will
of her own army, and this at a time when, to the
extent already stated, she was under martial law.
Surprised, perplexed, affrighted, and all un-
* Arrete du Sous-pr6fet de Valenciennes.
+ ' Anmtaire,' Appendix, p. 67. M. St Amand's circular to
the generals of Division ordered that tlie vote of the soldiers be
taken within forty-eight hours, and also said, ' The President
' reckons on the support of the nation and of the armj^; aud, so
' far as concerns your Division, on the cnerg}' of j'our attitude,
' the prompt and severe repression of the slightest attempt at
' disturbance.' Ibid. Note to 4th Edition, 18C3.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 319
armed and helpless, France %vas called upon chap.
either to strive to levy a war of despair against L_^
the rnighty engine of the French executive govern- fuc"uuibed
ment, and the vast army which stood over her, or
else to succumb at once to Louis Bonaj)arte and
Morny and Maupas and INIonsieur Le Roy St
Aruaud. She succumbed. The brethren of the
Elys^e had asked the country to say ' Yes ' or
'No:' should Louis Bonaparte alone build a new
Constitution for the governance of tlie mighty
nation ? and when, in the way already told, they
had obtained the ' Yes ' from herds and flocks of
men whom they ventured to number at nearly
eight millions,* it was made known to Paris that
the person who had long been the favourite sub-
ject of lier jests was now become sole lawgiver for Priiu-e Loms
soIiUawgivtr
her and for France. In tlie making of such laM's ofFmiKe.
as he intended to give the country. Prince Louis
was highly skilled, for he knew how to enfold the
creation of a sheer Oriental autocracy in a nomen-
clature taken from the polity of Free European
States. With the advice and consent of jNIorny,
and no doubt with the full approval of all the
rest of tlie i)lotters, he virtually made it the law ti.c iiws i..-
tliat he should command, and that France should
pay him tribute and obey."|*
* 7,439, 21G, aj,Miii,st t;-<0,737 noes. ' Aiiiniaire,' Appendix,
p. 95. Note to Atk Eilition.
+ The free way in whit'li tlie purse of Fraine was laid open
by the success of^the amp cVitat may he in some measure
pathen'<l from the lonj^ eatalofjuc of deereo dpenint,' supplemen-
tary and extraordinary credits, which is gi\iii in the Ajijieii-
dix to tlio ' Annuaire,' pp. t'5 <t seq. .\s was mentioned in a
320 OEIGIX OF THE WAR OF 1853
XIX.
CHAP. It has been seen that the success of the plot of
XIV.
the 2d of December resulted from the massacre
oftiemas-^ wliich took placc in the Boulevard on the follow-
Bouievard.^ ing Thursday; and since this strange event be-
came the foundation of a momentous change in
Inquiry into the politv of France, and even in the destinies of
its cause. . .
Europe, it is right for men to know, if they can,
how and why it came to pass. At three o'clock
on the afternoon of the 4th of December, the
ultimate success of the plot had seemed to become
almost hopeless by reason of the isolation to which
Prince Louis and his associates were reduced.
But at that hour the massacre began, and before
the bodies were cleared away, the brethren of the
Elys^e had Paris and Prance at their mercy. It
was natural that wronged and angry men, seeing
this cause and this effect, should be capable of
believing that the massacre was wilfully planned
as a means of achieving the result which it
actually produced. Just as the Cambridge theo-
logian maintained that he who looked upon a
watch must needs believe in a watchmaker, so
men who had seen the massacre were led to infer
a demon. They saw that the massacre brought
wealth and blessings to the Elys^e, and they
thought it a safe induction to say that the man
former note [ante, p. 311), the 'concessions' to railway and
other companies began so early as the 10th of December. See
the Appendix to the ' Annuaire.' Xote to 4:th Edition, 1863.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 321
who gathered the harvest as though it were his chap.
own iimst have sown the seed in due season. '__
Yet, so far as one knows, this argument from de-
sign is not very well reinforced by external proof ;
and perliaps it is more consistent with the princi-
ples of human nature to believe that the slaughter
of the Boulevard resulted from the mixed causes
which are known to have been in operation, than
from a cold design on the part of the President
to have a quantity of peaceful men and women
killed in order tliat the mere horror of the sight
might crush the spirit of Paris. "Without resort-
ing to this dreadful solution, the causes of the
massacre may be reached by fair conjecture.
The army, as we have seen, was burning wdth
hatred of tlie civilians, and its ferocity had been
carefully whetted by the President and by St
Arnaud. This feeling, apart from other motives
of action, would not have induced the brave
soldiery of France to fire point-blank into crowds
of defenceless men and women ; but a i)assion
more cogent than auger was working in the
bosoms of tlie men at the Elysee and the Generals
in connnand, and from them it descended to the
troops.
According to its nature, and tlie circumstances tiic passion
in which it is ])laced, a creature struck l)y ter-
ror may either lie trembling in a state of abject
prostration, or else may be convulsed with hysteric
energy; and when terror seizes upon man or beast
in this last way, it is the liercest and most blind
of all ])assions. The Prench unite the delicate,
VOL. r. X
322 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, nervous organisation of the south with much of
'__ the energy of the north ; and they are keenly
susceptible of the terror that makes a man kill
people, and the terror that makes him lie down
and beg. On that 4th of December, Paris was
visited with terror in either form. The army
raged and the people crouched ; but army and
people alike were governed by terror. It is very
true that in the Boulevard there were no physical
dangers which could have struck the troops with
this truculent sort of panic ; for even if it is
believed that two or three shots were fired from
a window or a house-top, an occurrence of that
kind, in a quarter which was plainly prepared for
sight-seeing and not for strife, was too trivial of
itself to be capable of disturbing prime troops.
But the President and his associates, though they
had succeeded in all their mechanical arrange-
ments, had failed to obtain the support of men of
character and eminence. Por that reason they
were obviously in peril ; and if ]\Iorny and Pleury
still remained in good heart, there is no reason
for doubting that on the 4th of December the
sensations of the President, of the two other
Bonapartes, of Maupas, of St Arnaud, and of
Magnan, corresponded with the alarming circum-
stances in which they were placed.
stete of The state of the President seems to have been
Bonaparte vcry like wliat it had been in former times at
period of Strasburg and at Boulogne, and what it was years
" afterwards at Magenta and Solferino. He did
not on any of these five occasions so give way
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 323
to fear as to prove that he had less self-control chap.
in moments of danger than the common run of _J '__
peaceful citizens ; but on all of them he showed
that, though he had clioseu to set himself heroic
tasks, his temperament was ill-fitted for the hour
of battle and for the crisis of an adventure. For,
besides that (in common with the bulk of man-
kind) he was without resource and presence of
mind when he imagined that danger was really
quite close upon him, his complexion aud the
dismal looks he wore in times of trial were always
against him. From some defect perhaps in the
structure of the heart or the arterial system, his
skin, wlien he was in a state of alarm, was liable
to be suffused with a greenish hue. This dis-
coloration might be a sign of high moral courage,
because it would tend to show that the spirit was
warring with the flesh ; but still it docs not
indicate that condition of body and soul which
belongs to a true king of men in the hour of
danger, and enables him to give heart and im-
pulsion to those around him. It is obvious, too,
that an appearance of this sort would be dam])ing
to the ardour of the bystanders. Several incidents
show tliat between the 2d and the 4lh of December
the President was irresolute and keenly alive to
liis danger. The long-pondered i>lan of election
which he liad promulgated on the 'Jd of December
lie withdrew the next day, in obedience to the
supposed desire of the I'arisian multitude, lie
took care to have always close to his side the
immense force of cavalrv, to \\hieh he looked as
324 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, the means of protecting his flight; and it seems
-^^^- that, during a great portion of the critical interval,
the carriages and horses required for his escape
were kept ready for instant use in the stable-yard
of the Elysee. Moreover, it was at this time that
he suffered himself to resort to the almost desperate
resource of counterfeiting the names of men repre-
sented as belonging to the Consultative Commis-
sion. But perhaps his condition of mind may be
best inferred from the posture in which history
catches him whilst he nestled under the wing of
the army.
When a peaceful citizen is in grievous peril,
and depending for his life upon the whim of sol-
diers, his instinct is to take all his gold and go
and offer it to the armed men, and tell them he
loves and admires them. What, in such stress,
the endangered citizen would be impelled by his
nature to do, is exactly what Louis Bonaparte did.
The transaction could not be concealed, and the
imperial historian seems to have thought that,
upon the whole, the best course was to give it an
air of classic grandeur by describing the soldiers
as the ' conquerors ' of a rugged Greek word, and
by calling a French coin an 'obolus."" 'There
' remained,' said he, 'to the President, out of all
' liis personal fortune, out of all his patrimony,
' a sum of fifty thousand francs. He knew that
' in certain memorable circumstances the troops
' had faltered in the presence of insurrection,
' more from bein^? famished than from bein"
' defeated ; so he took all that remained to him,
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 325
'even to his last crown-piece, and charged Col- chap.
XIV
' onel Fleuiy to go to the soldiers, conqnerors ;_
' of demagogy, and distribute to them, brigade by
' brigade, and man by man, this his last obolus.' *
The President had said, in one of his addresses to
tlie army of Paris, that he would not bid them
advance, but would himself go the foremost and
ask tliem to follow him. If it was becoming to
address empty play-actor's words of that sort to
real soldiers, it certainly was not the duty of the
President to act upon them ; for there could not
well be any sucli engagement in the streets of
Paris as woukl make it right for a literary man
(though he was also the chief of the State) to go
and affect to put himself at the head of an army
inured to war ; but still there was a contrast
between what was said and what was done, which
makes a man smile as he passes. The President
had vowed he would lead tlie soldiers against tlu"
foe, and instead, he sent them all his money.
There is no reason to suppose that the change of
plan was at all displeasing to the troops ; and
this bribing of tlie armed men is only adverted
to here as a moans of getting at the real stati; of
the President's mind, and thereby tracing up to
its cause Ihe massacre of the 4(h of iH'ceniber.
Another clue, heading the same way, is to be
found in the D(M',re(>. by which the rresident en-
acted that combats with insurgents at home
should count for the honour and ]>rofit (tf the
troops in the same way as though they were
* Craiiicr dc Cassai^Miac, vol. ii. p. l.Sl.
326 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, fought against a foreign enemy.* It is true that
1_ this decree was not issued until the massacre of
the 4th was over, but of course the temper in
. which a man encounters danger is to be gathered
in part from his demeanour immediately after the
worst moment of trial ; and when it is found that
the chief of a proud and mighty nation was capable
of putting his hand to a paper of this sort on the
5th of December, some idea may be formed of
what his sensations were on the noon of the day
before, when the agony of being in fear had not
as yet been succeeded by the indecorous excite-
ment of escape.
Of Jerome Whilst Priucc Louis Bonaparte was hugging
Bonaparte. ^ oo o
the knees of the soldiers, his uncle Jerome Bona-
parte fell into so painful a condition as to be
unable to maintain his self-control, and he suffered
himself to publish a letter in which he not only
disclosed his alarm, but even showed that he was
preparing to separate himself from his nephew ;
for he made it appear (as he could do, perhaps,
with strict truth) that although he had got into
danger by showing himself in public with the
President on the 2d of December, he was innocent
of the plot, and a stranger to the counsels of the
ofhi.^son. Elysee.f His son (now called Prince Napoleon)
* Decree of the 5tli, inserted in the ' IMoniteur ' of the 7th
Deceinher : ' LorS(;['une troupe orgauisee aura coutrihudc par
' ties combats 5, r6tablir I'ordre sur un point quelcoiique du ter-
' ritoire, ce service sera compt(5 connne service de campagne.'
Article 1, ' Annuaire,' Appendix, p. 70. Note to 4ih Edition.
+ The letter will he found in the ' Annual Register.' It seems
to have been sent at 10 o'clock at night on the 4th of December
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 327
was really, they say, a strong disapprover of tlie chap.
President's acts, and it was natural that he should L_.
be most unwilling to be put to death or otherwise
ill-treated upon the theory that he was the cousin
and therefore the accomplice of Louis, for of that
theory he wholly and utterly denied the truth.
Any man, however firm, might well resolve that,
happen what might to him, he would struggle
hard to avoid being executed by mistake ; and it
seems unfair to cast blame on Prince Napoleon
for trying to disconnect his personal destiny from
that of the eiulangered men at the Elysee, whose
counsels he had not shared. Still, the sense of
being cast loose by the other Ijonapartes, could
not but be discouraging to Prince Louis, and to
those who had thrown in their lot with him.
Maupas, or I)e ^Liupas, was a man of a fine, Bo.iiiy state
ot M;iuiias.
large, robust frame, and with florid healthy looks ;
but it sometimes happens that a spacious and
strong-looking body of that sort is not so safe a
tabenuicle as it seems for man's troubled spirit.
It is said that tlie bodily strengtli of INTaupas
collapsed in the hour of danger, and tliat, at a
critical ])art of the time between tlie night of tlu^
2d of December and the massacre of the 4th,
he had the misfortune to fall ill.
hut the writer eviilcntly iliil not know tliat tlif insurrection at
tliat time 'was so near its end as it ically was, and liis letter
may therefore he taken as a fair indication of tlie state of his
niiud in the earlier ])art of the day. The advice and the mild
reuionstranee contained in the letter niii,'ht have heen ;,'iven in
private liy a man who had not lost his calm, but the fact of
ullowin'r .such a letter to he iiuhlic disidoses Jerome's motives.
328 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. Finally, it must be repeated that on that 4tli
L_ of December the army of Paris was kept in a
state of inaction during all the precious hours
which elapsed between the earliest dawn of the
morning and two o'clock in the afternoon.
Anxiety of Thesc are signs that the brethren of the Elysee
the plotters, "l
and of Mag- were aghast at what they had done, and aghast
nan and the ^ ' . .
generals at wliat they had to do. And it is obvious that
under him.
Magnan and the twenty Generals who had em-
braced one another on the 27th of November,
were now more involved in the danger of the plot
than at first they might have expected to be ; for
the isolation in which the President was left for
want of men of character and station who would
consent to come and stand round him, must liave
made all these Generals feel that even the sove-
reign warrant of ' an order from the jMinister ol"
' War ' was a covering which had become very
thin.
Effect of Xow by nature the French people are used to
anxious siis- <i i
i)enseupon go lu flocks I and in their army there is not that
French . .
troops. social difference between the officers and the
common soldiers which is the best contrivance
hitherto discovered for intercepting the spread of
a panic or any other bewildering impulse. AVith
their troops, any impulse, whether of daring or
fear, will ofteii dart like lightning from man
to man, and quickly involve the whole mass.
Generally, perhaps, a panic in an army ascends
from the ranks. On this day, the panic, it seems,
went downwards. For six hours the army had
been kept waiting and waiting under arms within
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 329
a few hundred yards of the barricades which it chap.
was to attack. The order to advance did not _ ' ;_
come. Somewhere, there was hesitation, and the
Generals could not but know that even a little
hesitation at such a time was both a sign and a
cause of danger ; but when they saw it continuing
through all the morning hours of a short Decem-
ber day, they could hardly have failed to appre-
hend that the plot of the Elysee was collapsing
for want of support, and they could not but know
tliat, if this dread were well founded, their fate
was likely to be a hard one.
The temperament of Frenchmen is better fitted
for the hour of combat than for the endurance of
this sort of protracted tension ; and the anxiety
of men of their race, when they are much per-
turbed and kept in long suspense, will easily
degenerate into that kind of alarm which is apt
to become ferocious. This was the kind of stress
to which the trooi)s were put on that 4th of
December ; and in the case of jMagnan and the
(,lenerals under him, the pangs of having to wait
ujton the brink of action for more than two-thirds
of a (lay were sharpened by a sense of political
danger; for they i'elt that if, after all, the schcnu!
of the Elysee sliould fail, their meeting of \\\o.
27th mi^iit cause them to bo brought to ti'ial.
Any one knowing what those twenty-on.e (ien-
eruls had on their minds, and being also some-
what used to the l-'rench army, will almost be
able to hear the grinding of the teeth and tlie
rumblinif of the curses which mark the armed
330 OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
c I] A P. Frenclimaii when he rages because he is anxious.
'__ Even without the utterance of any words, the
countenances of men thus disturbed would be
swiftly read in a body of French troops ; and
though the soldiery and the inferior officers would
not be able to make out very well what it was
that was troubling the minds of the Generals, the
sense of not knowing all would only make them
the more susceptible of infection. On the other
hand, it is certain that the instructions given to
the troops prescribed the ruthless slaughtering of
all who resisted or obstructed them ; and although
it is of course true that these directions would
not compel or sanction the slaughter of peaceful
crowds not at all obstructing the troops, still they
would so act upon the minds of the soldiery that
any passion which might chance to seize them
would be likely to take a fierce shape.
Surmised Upou the wliolc, then, it would seem that the
massacre. natural and well-grounded alarm which beset the
President and some of his associates was turned
to anxiety of the raging sort when it came upon
the military commanders, and that from them it
ran down, till at last it seized upon the troops
with so maddening a power as to cause them to
face round without word of command, and open
fire upon a crowd of gazing men and women.
If this solution were accepted, it would destroy
the theory which ascribes to Prince Louis Bona-
parte the malign design of contriving a slaughter
on the Boulevard as a means of striking terror,
BETWEEN THE CZAE AND THE SULTAX. 331
and so cnishincj resistance; but it would still chap.
. XIV
remain true that, although it was not specifically '
(-lesi^aied and ordered, the massacre was brought
a1)0ut by him, and by ^lorny, Alaupas, and St
Arnaud, all acting with the concurrence and
under the encouragement of Fleury and Persigny.
By them the deeds of the 2d of December were
contrived and done; by them, and in order to
the support of those same deeds, the army was
brought into the streets ; by their industry the
minds of the soldiery were whetted for the
slaugliter of the Parisians ; and, finally, by their
hesitation, or the hesitation of jNIagnan their in-
strument, tlio army, when it was almost face to
face with the barricades, was still kept standing
and expectant, until its Generals, catching and
transmitting in an altered form the terror which
had come u})on them from the Elysee, brought
tlie troops into that state of truculent jiauic which
was tlie innnediate cause of the shiughter. It
must also be renunnbered that the doubt which
I have tried to solve extends only to the cause
which Itrought al)out the massacre of the ]icaceful
crowds on tin; r>oul(>vard ; for it remains unques-
tioned that the killing of the ])visoners taken in
the bari'icadcd quarter was the result of design,
and WHS enforced liv stringent orders. Moreover,
the persons who had the l)lood u])on tlieir hands
were the persons who got tlie booty. St Arnaud
is no more;; but Louis Xapoleou lionajiarte,
^loiny, Fleury, T^Iaupas, Magnan, and Persigny
332 OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. all these are yet alive, and in their possession
the puhlic tr*
antly found.'*
XT V
'__ the puhlic treasures of France may still he ahund-
XX.
It is known that the most practised gamesters
grow weary sometimes of their long efforts to
pry into the future wdiich chance is preparing for
them, and that in the midst of their anxiety and
doubt they are now and then glad to accept guid-
ance from the blind, confident guess of some one
who is younger and less jaded tlian themselves ;
and when a hot-headed lad insists that he can
govern fortune, wdien he 'calls the main,' as
though it were a word of command, and shakes
the dice-box with a lusty arm, the pale doubting
elders will sometimes follow the lead of youth's
high animal spirits ; and if they do this and win,
their hearts are warm to the lad whose fire and
wilfulness compelled them to run the venture.
Gratitude Whether it be true, as is said, that in the hour
Fiemy. of trial any of the brethren of the Elysee were
urged for-ward by Colonel Fieury's threats, or
whether, abstaining from actual violence, he was
able to drive them on by the sheer ascendancy of
a more ardent and resolute nature, it is certain
that he well earned their gratitude, if by any
means, gentle or rough, he forced them to keep
their stake on the table. For they won. They
won France. They used her hard ; they took her
* I may be fillowed to remind the reader tliat tlie above was
published in 1S6;>. Xote to 6th Edition.
XIV
The list' the
Elysfie made
of Fraiiei'.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND TUE SULTAN. 333
freedom ; they laid open lier purse, and were ricli chap.
with her wealth. They went and sat in the seats
of Kings and Statesmen, and handled the mighty
nation as they willed in the face of Europe.
Those who hated freedom, and those also who
bore ill - will towards the French people, made
merry with what they saw.
XXI.
These are the things whicli Charles Louis
X'apolcon Bonaparte did. AYhat he had sworn
to do was set forth in the oatli whicli he took on
the 20th of December 1848. On tliat day he
stood before the National Assembly, and, lifting
liis right arm towards heaven, thus swore : ' In The oatii
' the presence of God, and before the French Prosidt-nt
111 -vT 11 IT I ''-"^ taken
' people represented by the National Assembly, i
' swear to remain faithful to the democratic lic-
' public one and indivisible, and to fulfil all tlie
' duties wliich the Constitution imposes u})on mc'
What he had pledged his honour to do was set
forth in the promise, which of his own i'rcc will
he addressed to the Asseml)Iy. heading from a
])aper which he had prepared, he uttered these
words: 'The votes of the nation, and the oath iiisaa.hd
which i iiave just taken, command my luture a -111:111 nf
1 r "1 J 1 I -11 / ii-i 'honour.'
' conduct. JNly duty is clear ; 1 will iuUil it as a
' man of honour. I shall regard as enemies of
' the country all those wlio (nuieavour to change
' by illogiil means that which all France has
' established.'
334 ORIGIN or THE AVAR OF 1853
CHAP. In Europe at that time there were many men,
XIV "
_J L_ and several millions of women, who truly believed
that the landmarks which divided good from evil
to"-
were in charge of priests, and that what Eeli-
TheTe giou blesscd must needs be right. Now on the
thirtieth day computed from the night of the 2d
of December, the rays of twelve thousand lamps
pierced the thick wintry fog that clogged the
morning air, and shed their difficult lio-ht throui-h
the nave of the historic pile which stands mark-
ing the lapse of ages and the strange checkered
destiny of France. There waiting, there were the
bishops, priests, and deacons of the Eoman branch
of the Church of Jesus Christ. These bishops,
priests, and deacons stood thus expecting, because
they claimed to be able to conduct the relations
between man and his Creator ; and the swearer
of the oath of the 20th of December had deigned
to apprise them that again, with their good leave,
he w^as coming into ' the presence of God.' And
he came. Where tlie kings of France had knelt,
there was now the persistent manager of the
company that had played at Strasburg and Bou-
logne, and with him it may well be believed,
there were Morny rejoicing in his gains, and
Magnan soaring high above sums of four thou-
sand pounds, and Maupas no longer in danger, and
St Arnaud formerly Le Eoy, and Fialin, more
often called ' Persigny,' and Fleury the propeller
of all, more eager, perhaps, to go and be swift to
spend his winnings, than to sit in a cathedral and
think how the fire of his temperament had given
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 335
him a strange power over the fate of a nation, chap.
When the Church perceived that the swearer of _1 L_
the oath and all his associates were ready, she be-
gan her service. Having robes whereon all down
the back there was embroidered the figure of a
cross, and being, it would seem, without fear, the
bishops and priests went up to the high altar,
and scattered rich incense, and knelt and rose,
and knelt and rose again. Then, in the hearing
of thousands, there pealed through the aisles that
liymn of praise which purports to waft into heaven
the thanksgivings of a whole people for some new
and signal mercy vouchsafed to them by Almighty
(xod. It was because of what had been done to
France within the last thirty days that the Hosan-
nas arose in Xotre Dame. ^Moreover, the priests
lifted their voices, and cried aloud, chanting and
saying to the Most High, 'iJomine, salvum fac
' Ludovicum Napoleonem.' O Lord! save Louis
Napoleon.
What is good, and what is evil ? and who is he
that deserves the prayers of a nation ? If any
man, being scrupulous and devout, was moved
by the events of December to ask these questions
of his Church, he was answered that day in the
Cathedral of (Jur Lady of Paris.
xxn.
In the next December, tlic form of the state xiioPnsi-
system was accommodated to the reality, and tlie r,,mc.s i;m-
President of the Republic became wliat men call irLmh.
336 ORIGIN OF THE WAK OF 1853
c H A P. a ' French Emperor.' Tlie style that Prince Louis
L_ tliought fit to take was this : ' Napoleon the
' Third, by the Grace of God, and by the will uf
' the people, Emperor of the French.'
XXIII.
Tiie inaction Of course, whcn any one thinks of the events
of great . .
iiumiiersof of December 1851, the stress of his attention is
Frenchmen
at the time apt to be broii^lit to bear upon those who were
when their ^ ^
country was actors, and upon those who, desiring to act, were
falhng. -^ _ . .
only hindered from doing so by falling into the
pits which the trappers had dug for them ; but
no one will fail to see that one of the main phe-
nomena of the time was the wilful acquiescence
of great numbers of men. It may seem strange
that during a time of danger the sin of inaction
should be found in a once free and always brave
people. The cause of this was the hatred which
itsoause men had of democracy. A sheer democracy, it
would seem, is so unfriendly to personal liberty,
and therefore so vexing or alarming, not only to
its avowed political enemies, but to those also
who in general are accustomed to stand aloof from
public affairs, that it must needs close its frail
existence as soon as there comes home a General
renowned in arms who chooses to make himself
King. This was always laid down as a guiding
principle by those who professed to be able to
draw lessons from history; but even they used
to think that, until some sort of hero could be
found, democratic institutions might last. France
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 337
showed maukind that the mere want of such a chap.
XIV.
hero as will answer the purpose is a want which L_
can be compensated by a little ingenuity. She
taught the world that when a mighty nation is
under a democracy, and is threatened with doc-
trines which challenge the ownership and enjoy-
ment of property, any knot of men who can get
trusted with a momentary hold of the engine of
State (and somebody must be so trusted), may
take one of their number who never made a cam-
paign except with counterfeit soldiers, and never
fired a shot except when he fired by mistake, and
may make him a dictator, a lawgiver, and an
absolute monarch, with the acquiescence, if not
with the approval, of a vast proportion of tlie
people. Moreover, France proved that the tran-
sition is not of necessity a slow one ; and that,
when the perils of a high centralisation and a
great standing army are added to the perils of
a sheer democracy, then freedom, although it be
hedged round and guarded by all the contrivances
which clever, thoughtful, and honest Eepublicans
tan devise, may be stolen and made away with in
one dark winter night, as though it were a purse
or a trinket.
XXIV.
Although France lost her freedom, it would be Tho genti,.
an error to imatrnie that u])on the rums ol the France
'^ ' standing
commonwealth tliere was fuuiuled a monarchv j'loorfrom
'' theGover:
lik(! that, for instance, wliicli governs the jieople "*'"'
of liussia. In empires of that kind the Sovereign
VOL. L Y
338
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XIV.
Dangers
threatening
the new
Emperor
and his
associates.
Motives
governing
the foreign
policy of
France.
commands the services of all his subjects. In
France, for the most part, the gentlemen of the
country resolved to stand aloof from the Govern-
ment, and not only declined to vouchsafe their
society to the new occupant of the Tuileries, but
even looked cold upon any stray person of their
own station who suffered himself to be tempted
thither by money. They were determined to
abide their time, and in the meanwhile to do
nothing which would make it inconsistent for
them, as soon as it suited their policy, to take an
opportunity of laying cruel hands on the new
Emperor and his associates. It was obvious that,
because of the instinct which makes creatures
cling to life, a monarch thus kept always standing
on the very edge of a horrible fate, but still having
for the time in his hands the engine of the State,
would be driven by the very law of his being to
make use of the forces of the nation as means of
safety for himself and his comrades ; and that to
that one end, not only the operations of the Home
Government, but even the foreign policy of the
country, would be steadily aimed. And so it
ha^jpened. After the 2d December in the year
1851, the foreign policy of France was used for
a prop to prop the tlirone which IMorny and liis
friends had built up.
Therefore, although I have dwelt awhile upon
a singular passage in the domestic history of
France, I have not digressed. The origin of the
war with Eussia could not be traced without
showing what was the foreign policy of France at
BETWEEN THE CZAR A^T) THE SULTAN. 339
the time when the mischief was done; and since chap.
it happened that the foreign policy of France was _^ l_
new to the workl, and was governed in all things
by the personal exigencies of those who wielded
it, no one could receive a true impression of its
aim and purpose without first gathering some idea
of the events by which the destinies of Europe
were connected with the hopes and fears of Prince
Louis and ]Morny and Fleury, of jMagnan and
Persigny and INIaupas and ]\Ionsieur Le Koy St
Arnaud.
340
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAPTER XV.
CHAP.
XV.
Immediate
eflect of the
coup d'fitat
upon the
tranquillity
of Europe.
The turbu-
lent policy
it engen-
dered.
Almost instantly the change which was wrouglit
by these French transactions began to act upon
Europe. The associates of the Elysee well under-
stood that if they had been able to trample upon
France and her laws, their success had been made
possible by the dread which the French people
had of a return to tumult ; and it was clear that,
until they could do something more than merely
head the police of the country, their new power
would be hardly more stable than the passing
terrors on which it rested. "What they had to do
was to distract France from thinking of her shame
at home by sending her attention abroad. For
their very lives' sake they had to make haste, and
to pile up events which might stand between
them and the past, and shelter them from the
peril to which they were brought whenever men's
thoughts were turned to the night of the 2d of
December, and the Thursday, the day of blood.
There could be no hesitating about this. Ambi-
tion had nothing to do with it. It was matter of
life and death. If Prince Louis and Morny and
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 341
Fleury, if Maupas, St Arnaud, and Magnan were to c h a p.
continue quartered upon Trance instead of being ' '
thrown into prison and brought to trial, it was
indispensable that Europe should be disturbed.
Without delay the needful steps were taken.
It must have been within a week or two after
the completion of the arrangements consequent
on the night of the 2d of December, that the
despatches went from Paris which caused M. de
Lavalette to wring from the Porte the Note of the
9th of February,* and forced the Sultan into en- Raising up
gageraents unfair and offensive to Eussia. The o{ue%nilan
French President steadily continued this plan of bXTeii
driving the Porte into a quarrel with the Czar, uussla:'^"
imtil at length he succeeded in bringing about
the event -{- which was followed by the advance of
the Eussian armies ; but the moment the Czar
was wrought up into a state of anger which suf-
ficed to make him a disturber of Europe, Prince
Louis, now Emperor of the French, sagaciously
perceived that it might be possible for him to
take violent means of appeasing the very troubles
which he himself had just raised ; and to do this
by suddenly declaring for a conservative policy in
Turkey, and offering to put himself in concert
with one of the great settled States of Europe.
England, he knew, had always clung to a con- ana tiicn
sorvative policy in the East. France, he also comi'iuve
knew% of late years, had generally done the re- England.'
* lSr)2. See ante.
t Tlie delivery of the key and the st:ir to the Latin monks
at l^ethlehem in Dcceniher ]S;V2. See Count Xcsselrode's de-
spatch of tlio 14tli of January 1S'>^, anb', pp. 5i, 5.5.
342 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, verse, but then France was utterly in his power;
; and it seemed to him that, by offering to thrust
France into an English policy, he might purchase
for himself an alliance with the Queen, and win
for his new throne a sanction of more lasting
worth than Morny's well-warranted return of his
eight millions of approving Frenchmen. Above
all, if he could be united with England, he might
be able to enter upon that conspicuous action in
Europe which was needful for his safety at home,
and might do this without bringing upon himself
any war of a dangerous kind.
Personal Auothcr motive of a narrower sort was urging
o'fthe'new him in the same direction. Hating freedom, hat-
ing the French people, and delighting in an inci-
dent which he looked upon as reducing the theory
of Representative Government to the absurdum,
Nicholas had approved and enjoyed the treatment
inflicted upon France by throwing her into the
felon's van and sending her to jail ; but he had
objected to the notion of the Second Xapoleon
being called ' the Third ; ' * and, in a spirit still
* It is said, I know not -with what truth, that the style of
the new Emperor was the result of a clerical error. In the
course of its preparations for constituting the Empire, the
Home Office wished the country to take up a word which
should be intermediate between ' President ' and ' Emperor ; '
so the minister determined to order that France should sud-
denly burst into a cry of ' Vive Xapoleon ! ' and he wrote,
the}' say, the following order, ' Que le mot d'ordre soit Vive
' Xapoleon ! ! ! ' The clerk, they say, mistook the three notes
of admiration for Roman numerals ; and in a few hours the
forty thousand communes of France had cried out so obediently
for ' Napoleon III.,' that the Government was obliged to adopt
the clerk's blunder.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 343
more pedantic, he had refused to address the chap.
French sovereign in the accustomed form. He '__
would call him his 'good friend/ but no earthly
power should make him add the word 'brother.'
The taunting society of Petersburg amused itself
with the amputated phrase, and loved to call the
ruler of France their 'good friend.' The new
P^mperor chafed at this, for his vanity was hurt;
but he abided his time.
At length, nay so early as the 28th of January The Frencii
1853, the French Emperor perceived that his sehtmefor
measures had effectually roused the Czar's hos- the concord
. of tlie four
tihty to the Sultan, and he instantly proposed to Powers by
drtiwing
England that the two Powers should act together Kngiand
in extinguishing the flames which he himself had spparate
alliance
iust kindled, and should endeavour to come to withhim-
. . . self.
a joint understanding, with a view to resist the
ambition of Pussia. Knowing beforehand what
the policy of England was, he all at once adopted
it, and proposed it to our Government in the very
terms always used by English statesmen. He
took, as it were, an ' old copy ' of the first English
Speech from the Throne which came to his hand,
and, following its words, declared that the first
object should be to 'preserve the integrity of the
' Ottoman Empire.' * From that moment until the
summer of 1855, and perhaps even down to a still
later period, he did not once swerve from the
great sclieme of forming and maintaining an offen-
sive alliance with England against the Czar, and
to that object he subordinated all other considera-
* 'Eastern Papers,' ]>ait i. ]>. 08.
344 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, tions. He had at that time the rare gift of being
XV
. ;__ able to keep himself alive to the proportionate
value of political objects. He knew how to give
up the less for the sake of attaining and keeping
the greater. Governed by this principle, he
gradually began to draw closer and closer towards
England ; and when the angry Czar imagined that
he was advancing in the cause of his Church
against a resolute champion of the Latins, his
wily adversary was smiling perhaps with Lord
Cowley about the ' key ' and the ' cupola,' and
preparing to form an alliance on strictly temporal
grounds.
It would have been well for Europe if the exi-
gencies of the persons then wielding the destinies
of France would have permitted the State to rest
content with that honest share of duty which fell
to the lot of each of the four Powers when the
intended occupation of the Principalities was an-
nounced. Neither the interest nor the honour of
France required that in the Eastern Question she
should stand more forward than any other of the
remonstrant States ; but the personal interest of
the new Emperor and his December friends did
not at all coincide with tlie interest of France ;
for what he and his associates wanted, and what
in truth they really needed, was to thrust France
into a conflict which might be either diplomatic
or warlike, but which was at all events to be of a
conspicuous sort, tending to ward off the peril of
home politics, and give to the fabric of the 2d of
December something like station and celebrity in
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 345
Europe. In order to achieve this, it clearly would chap.
not suffice for France to be merely one of a con- l.,J_
ference of four great Powers quietly and temper-
ately engaged in repressing the encroachment of
the Czar, Her part in such a business could not
possibly be so prominent nor so animating as to
draw away the attention of the French from the
persons who had got into their palaces and their
offices of State. On the other hand, a close,
separate, and significant alliance with England,
and with England alone, to the exclusion of the
rest of the four Powers, would not only bring
about the conflict which was needed for the safety
and comfort of tlie Tuileries, but M'ould seem in
the eyes of the mistaken world to give the sanc-
tion of the Queen's pure name to the acts of the
December night and the Thursday the day of
blood. Tlie unspeakable value of this moral
shelter to persons in the condition of tlie new
French Monarch, and St Arnaud, jMorny, and
Maupas, can never be imderstood except by those
wlio look back and remember liow exalted tlie
moral station of England was, in tlie period which
(dapsed between the 10th of xVpril 1S48 and the
time when she suffered lierself to become en-
tangled in engagements with the French Emperor,
It would hiive l)eon right enough Ihat France
and England, as the two great maritime Powers,
should have come to an understanding with each
other in r(\^ard to the disposition ol" tluMr fleets;
liut even if they had been concerting for only that
limited purpose, it would have been right that the
346 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, general tenor and object of their naval arrange-
" ments should have received the antecedent ap-
proval of the two other Powers with whom they
were in cordial agreement. The English Govern-
ment, however, not only consented to engage in
naval movements which affected nay, actually
governed the question of peace or war, but fell
into the error of concerting these movements with
France alone, and doing this not because of any
difference which had arisen between the four
Powers, but simply because France and England
were provided with ships ; so that in truth the
AVestern Powers, merely because they w^ere pos-
sessed of the implement which enabled them to
put a pressure upon the Czar, resolved to act as
though they were the only judges of the question
whether the pressure should be applied or not;
and this at a time when, as Lord Clarendon de-
clared in Parliament, the four Powers were ' all
' acting cordially together.' Of course, this wanton
segregation tended to supersede or dissolve the
concord which bound the four Powers, and, as a
sure consequence, to endanger yet more than ever
the cause of peace. Some strange blindness pre-
vented Lord Aberdeen from seeing the path he
trod, or rather prevented him from seeing it with
a clearness conducive to action. But what tlie
French Emperor wanted was even more than this,
and what he wanted was done. It is true that
neither admiration nor moral disapproval of the
conduct of princes ought to have any exceeding
sway over our relations with foreign States ; and
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 347
if we had had the misfortune to find that the chap.
Emperor of the French was the only potentate in '_
Europe whose policy was in accord with our own,
it might have been right that closer relations of
alliance with France (however humiliating they
might seem in the eyes of the moralist) should
have followed our separation from the other States
of Europe. But no such separation had occurred.
What the French Emperor ventured to attempt,
and what he actually succeeded in achieving, was
to draw England into a distinct and separate
alliance with himself, not at a time when she was
isolated, but at a moment when slie was in close
accord with the rest of the four Powers.
Towards the close of the Parliamentary session
of 1853, the determination on the part of Austria
to rid the Principalities of their Eussian invaders
was growing in intensity. Prussia also was firm ;
and in principle the concord of the four Powers
was so exact, that it extended, as was afterwards
seen, not only to the terms on which the dif-
ference between Eussia and Turkey should be
settled, but to the ulterior arrangements which
might be pressed upon Eussia at the conclusion
of the war which she was provoking. ' Tiie four
' great Powers,' said Lord Aberdeen on the 12th
of August, 'are now acting in concert.'* 'In
' all these transactions,' saitl Lord Clarendon, 7
' Austria, England, Prussia, and France are all
' acting cordially together, in order to check de-
' signs which they consider inconsistent with the
* 129 Hunsanl. p. 1650. + Ibid p. 1423.
348 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. ' balance of power and with those territorial
'^^^ ' limits which have been established by various
' treaties.'
The nature Yct it cannot be doubted that in the midst of
standing of this perfect concord of the four Powers, the Eng-
isssbetween lish Govcmment was induced to enter into a
France and . .,
England. Separate understanding with the Emperor oi the
French.* This was the fatal transaction which
substituted a cruel war for the peaceful but irre-
sistible pressure which was exerted by the four
Powers. The purport of this arrangement still
lurks in private notes, and in recollections of
private interviews ; but it can be seen that (for
reasons never yet explained) Prance and England
were engaging to move in advance of the other
Powers. The four Powers, being all of one mind,
were still to remain in concert so far as concerned
the discussion and adjudication of the questions
pending between Eussia and Turkey ; but France
and England were to volunteer to enforce their
judgment. The four Powers were to be judges,
and two of them namely, France and England
were to be the executioners. What made this
arrangement the more preposterous was, that the
outrage of which Europe complained was the
occupation of two provinces which abutted upon
the Austrian dominions. Of all the great Powers,
Austria was the chief sufferer. Austria was upon
the spot. Austria was the one Power which in-
stantly and in a summary way could force the
Czar to quit his hold ; and yet the charge of
* Hansard, pp. 1424, 1768, 1826.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN, 349
undertaking a duty which pressed upon her more chap,
than upon any other State in Europe, was vol- ^
untarily taken upon themselves by two States
whose dominions were vastly distant from the
scene of the evil deed. It was much as though the
forces of the United States and of Brazil were to
come across the Atlantic to defend Antwerp from
the Trench, whilst the English looked on and
thanked their enterprising friends for relieving
them of their duty.
There was not, perhaps, more than one of the
members of the English Cabinet who desired the
formation of this singular alliance on grounds
like those which moved the Erench Emperor ;
and it is believed that Lord Aberdeen and several
other members of the Government were much
governed by a shallow theory which had prevailed
for some years amongst public men. The theory
was, that close union between France and En<f-
land was a security for the peace of Europe.
' Sure I am,' said one confident man who eclioed
the crude thought of many 'sure I am, that if
' the advisers of the Crown in this country act
' in cordial concert with the Government of the
' Emperor of the Erench, and if the forces of the
' two countries in the ^Mediterranean are to act in
' concert, then it will be almost impossible that
' any war can disturb the peace of Europe.' But
of course, to men of more statesmanlike views,
the main temptation was the j)rospect of seeing
France dragged into the policy which England
had always entertained upon the Eastern Question.
350 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. Perhaps it will be thought that the practice of
' hiding away momentous engagements between
States in the folds of private notes may now and
then justify an endeavour to infer the nature of
an agreement secretly made between two Govern-
ments from the tenor of their subsequent actions,
and from a knowledge of surrounding facts. If
this licence were to be granted, and if also it were
to be assumed that the English as well as the
French Government was negotiating with open
eyes, it might perhaps be laid dowm that the com-
pact of Midsummer 1853 was virtually of this
sort : ' The Emperor of the French shall set aside
' the old views of the French Foreign Office, and
' shall oblige France with all her forces to uphold
' the Eastern policy of England. In considera-
' tion of this sacrifice of French interests by the
' French Emperor, England promises to give her
' moral sanction (in the way hereinafter pre-
' scribed) to the arrangements of December 1851,
' and to take the following means for strengthen-
' ino- the throne and endeavourinoj to establish
' the dynasty of the Emperor of the French : 1st,
' England shall give up the system of peaceful
' coercion which is involved in the concerted
' action of the four Powers, and shall adopt, in
' lieu of it, a separate understanding with France,
' of such a kind as to place the two Powers con-
' spicuously in advance of the others, and in a
' state of more immediate antagonism to Pussia
' with a prospect of eventual war. 2d, Even
' before any treaty of alliance is agreed upon, the
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 351
' Queen of England shall declare before all Europe chap.
' that the Emperor of the Ereuch is united with '
' Her Majesty in her endeavours to allay the
' troubles now threatening Europe with war ; and
' it shall not be competent to the English Govern-
' ment to weaken the effect of this announcement
' by advising Her Majesty to include any other
' Sovereigns in the same statement. If Her
' Majesty should continue to be closely in accord
' with the rest of the four Powers, she may be
' advised to speak of them in general terms as
' her allies, but they are not to be named. 3d,
' If hostilities should become necessary, the two
' Governments will determine upon the measures
' to be adopted in common ; and in that case also
' it is distinctly understood tliat the Englisli
' Government will advise the Queen not to shrink
' from the gratification of receiving the Emperor
' of the French as her guest. It is, of course, to
' be understood (^7 xa sans dire) that the reception
' of His Majesty at the English Court is to be in
' uU respects the same as would be the reception
' of any other great Sovereign in alliance willi
' the Queen. ^Whenever occasion re(|uires it, the
' other actors in the operations of December 1851
' shall be received and treated by the English
' autliorities witli the lionours due to tlie trusted
' servants of a friendly Power, and without objec-
' tions founded on the transactions of December,
' or any of the circumstances of their ]iast lives.'
These are only imaginary worils, but tliey show
what the French Emperor was seeking to achieve,
352 OEIGIN OF THE WAK OF 1853
CHAP, and they represent but too faithfully what the
" English Government did.
Every State is entitled to regard a foreign
nation as represented by its Government. The
principle is a sound one ; but it must be owned
that by this alliance the theory was pushed to an
ugly conclusion. What happened was the like of
this : There came to us five men heavily laden
with treasure, but looking hurried and anxious.
They wanted to speak to us. Upon inquiring
who they were, and comparing their answers with
our other means of knowing the truth, we found
that two of them bore names resulting in the
usual way from marriages and baptisms,* and
that the other three had been going by names
which they had chosen for the sake of euphony.
They said that suddenly they had become so
struck with the soundness of our old-fashioned
opinions, that they asked nothing better than to
be suffered to devote the immense resources which
they could command to the attainment of the
object which we had always desired. All they
wanted, in return, was that, in pursuing our own
object side by side with them, we would promise
not to suffer ourselves to be clogged by our old
scruples against breaches of the peace ; that we
would admit them to our intimacy, allowing our-
selves to be much seen with them in public ; and
that, in order to make our favour the more signal,
we would consent to turn aside a little from our
old friends : that was all. With regard to the
* These two were Prince Louis Bonaparte and Maupas.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 353
question of how they had come by their treasure, chap.
and all the vast resources they offered us, their
story was that they had all these things with the
express consent of the former owner. There was
something about them which made us fear that,
if we repulsed them, they would carry their trea-
sures to the very man who, at that moment, was
giving us trouble. In truth, it seemed that, either
from us or from somebody else, they must and
they would have shelter. Upon their hands there
was a good deal of blood. We shrank a little,
but we were tempted much. AVe yielded : we
struck the bargain. What we did was not unlaw
ful, for those with whom we treated had for the
time a real hold upon the people in whose great
name they professed to come ; and by the custom
of nations we were entitled to say that we would
know nothing of any France except the France
that was brought to us by these five persons to
be disposed of for the purposes of our ' Eastern
' Question ;' but when we had done this thing, we
liad no right to believe that to Europe at large,
still less to the gentlemen of France, the fair
name of England would seem as it seemed before.
But whatever were the terms of the understand- Announce
ing between the two Governments, the result of it Parliament.
was that the English Cabinet, disregarding the
policy which only six days before had united it
in a concerted action with the Powers represented
at the Conference, now announced, through the
lips of Lord Pahuerston,* ' that England and
* Sth July 1853, in the House of Commons.
VOL. L Z
354 OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP. * France were agreed, that they continued to
' follow the same policy, and that they had the
' most perfect confidence in each other,' These
Failure of words wcrc cnough to show any one nsed to
Parliament p. ^, .__,.-
to under- torcign affairs that England was advancing with
stand the .
real import France into an adventurous policy, and then
ofthedis- ^ "^ ^ .
closure. (though cvcu then they were dangerously late)
Members of Parliament might have stood forward
with some hope of being able to check their
country in her smooth descent from peace to
war. They lost the occasion; it did not recur.*
The Queen's At the closc of the scssiou, the Queen's Speech
August'i853, announced to Europe ' that the Emperor of the
' French had united with Her Majesty in earnest
' endeavours to reconcile differences, the contin-
' nance of which might involve Europe in war ;
' and she declared that, acting in concert with
' her Allies, and relying on the exertions of the
' Conference then assembled at Vienna, Her
' Majesty had good reason to hope that an hon-
' Durable arrangement would speedily be accom-
' plished.' -f-
It would seem, at first sight, that this language
had been occasioned by some accidental displace-
ment of words ; and that it could not have been
intended for the Queen of England to say that she
* For the purpose indicated ante, p. 14, I invite the atten-
tion of Mr Theodore Martin to this period. What were the
* minutes ' ^v^itten and what the steps taken by the Prince Con-
sort at that cardinal time ?
+ 129 Hansard, p. 1826. Here again, when the policy of the
Cabinet was to be indicated in so formal a document as the
Queen's Speech, I invite the attention of 3Ir Theodore Martin.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 355
was acting iu concert with her Allies assembled chap.
at Vienna, and to declare, in another limb of the '__
same sentence, that she was 'united' with one
of them. Unhappily, the error w^as not an error
of words. The Speech accurately described the
strange policy which our Government had adopt-
ed ; for it was strictly true that, in the midst of
a perfect concord between the four great Powers,
the English Cabinet had been drawn into a
separate union wdth France, and into an union
of such a kind as to require the distinguishing
phrase which disclosed the new league to Europe.
This Speech from the Throne may be regarded xins marks
as marking the point where the roads of policy roads to
branched off. By the one road, England, movinrj to war
1 1 o 1 p -n. brauched
in company with the rest of the four Powers, off-
might insure a peaceful repression of the outrage
which was disturbing Europe ; by the other, she
might also enforce the right, but, joined with the
French Emperor, and parted from the rest of the
four Powers, she would reach it by passing through
war. The Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen desired peace,
and not war ; but seeing dimly, they took the
adventurous path. They so little knew whither
they were going that they made no preparation
for war.*
* See Lord A1)erdeoii's evidence before the Selia,sto])ol Com-
mittee.
356 OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAPTER XVI.
CHAP. The difference between a servant and a Minister
XVI
L_ of State lies in this : that the servant obeys the
Nes^eirode Orders given him, without troubling himself con-
cerning the question whether his master is right
or wrong ; whilst a Minister of State declines to be
the instrument for giving effect to measures which
he deems to be hurtful to his country. The
Chancellor of the Eussian Empire was sagacious
and politic ; and his experience in the business of
the State, and in the councils of Europe, went
back to the great days when Nesselrode and
Hardenberg, and Metternich and Wellington, set
their seals to the same charter. That the Czar
was wrong in these transactions against Turkey
no man in Europe knew better than Count Nes-
selrode ; and at first he had the courage to speak
to his master so frankly that Nicholas, when he
had heard a remark which tended to wisdom and
moderation, would cry out, 'That is what the
' Chancellor is perpetually telling me ! ' But,
unhappily for the Czar and for his empire, the
^Minister did not enjoy so commanding a station
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 357
as to be able to put restraint upon his Sovereign, chap.
nor even perhaps to offer him counsel in his angry 1_
mood. He could advise with Nicholas the Czar ;
but there were reasons which made his counsels
unwelcome to a heated defender of the Greek
faith. He was a member of the Church of Eng-
land, and the maddening rumours of the day made
out that into the jaws of this very Church of
England Lord Stratford was dragging the Sultan
and all his Moslem subjects. Then, too, Count
Nesselrode was worldly ; but, after all, the quality
most certain to make him irksome to a Prince in
a high state of religious or ecclesiastic excitement
was his good sense. It was dangerous for a wise,
able sinner like him to go near holy Nicholas the
Pontiff, the Head of God's Orthodox Church upon
earth, when he was hearing the voices from Hea-
ven, when he was raging against the enemies of
the Faith, and struggling to enforce his will upon
mankind by utterances of the hated name of
Canning,* and interjections, and gnashing of teeth.
Far from being able to make a stand against this
consuming fury, Nesselrode did not even decline
to be the instrument for disclosing to all the world
his master's condition of mind.
When the Czar knew that the fleets of the state of ti.e
Western Powers were coming up into the Levant, knowing
and that the sword of England was now in the fleets of
iiPTinr-ii Franite and
lianas oi Lord btrattord, he was thrown into so Engiund
were ordered
herce a state, that his notions of wliat was true to the mouth
1 , ^ ^ 1 -1 1 1 o'^ the Dar-
ancl wliat was not true of what was plausible, and daneiies.
* The Czar used to call Lord Stratford ' Lord Caiininfr.'
358
OEIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
xvr.
His com-
plaints to
Europe.
Their
refutation.
what was ascertainably false of what was a cause,
and what was an effect of what happened first, and
what happened last, nay, almost, it would seem,
his notions of what was the Bosphorus and what was
the Hellespont,* became as a heap of ruins. He
was in the condition imagined by the Psalmist,
when he prayed the Lord that his enemy might
be ' confounded.' Count Nesselrode was forced to
gather up his master's shivered thoughts, and, put-
ting them as well as he could into the language of
diplomacy, to address to all the Courts of Europe
a wild remonstrance against the measures of the
Western Powers. The approach of their fleets to
an anchorage in the iEgean outside the Straits of
the Dardanelles was treated in this despatch as
though it were little less than a seizure of Con-
stantinople ; and it was represented that this was
an act of violence which had entitled and com-
pelled the Czar, in his own defence, to occupy the
Principalities. 7 Lord Clarendon seized this weak
pretence and easily laid it bare ; for he showed
that Nicholas, in his anger, was transposing events,
and that the Czar's resolve to cross the Pruth was
anterior to the occurrence which he now declared
to have been the motive of his action. Then, in
language worthy of England, our Foreign Secretary
went on to vindicate her right to send her fleets
whither she chose, so long as they were on the
high seas, or on the coasts of a Sovereign legiti-
* See the sentence of the above text beginning 'The ap-
' proach.'
t 'Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 3i2.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 359
mately assenting to their presence. Nearly at the chap.
same time the writer of the French Foreiffn Office !_
despatches pursued the Czar through Europe with
his bright, cutting, pitiless logic*
Of course, the vivacity of France and England
tended to place Austria at her ease, and to make
her more backward than she would otherwise have
been in sending troops into the Banat ; and, more-
over, the separate action of the Western Powers
was well calculated, as will be seen by-and-by, to
undo the good which might be effected by the
Conference of the four Powers at Vienna. The xiie Vienna
Conference, however, did not remit its labour.
The mediating character which belonged to it in
its original constitution was gradually changed,
until at length it represented what was nothing
less than a confederacy of the four Powers against
Russia. It is true that it was a confederacy which
sought to exhaust persuasion, and to use to the
utmost the moral pressure of assembled Europe
before it resorted to arms ; and it is true also that
it was willing to make the Czar's retreat from his
false moves as easy and as free from shame as the
nature of his late errors would allow : but these
were views held by the English Cabinet as well as
by the Conference ; and it is certain that, if our
Covernment had seen clear, and had been free
from separate engagements, it would have stood
fast upon the ground occupied by the four Powers,
* These despatches hear the signature of JI. Drouyn de Lhuys,
but it was commonly believed at the time that tliey were written
by a man on the permanent staff of tlie French Foreign Office.
360
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XVI.
The danger
of being
entangled
in a separate
understand-
ing with
France.
The French
Emperor's
ambiguous
ways of
action
and would have refused to be drawn into measures
which were destined to be continually undoing
the pacific work of the diplomatists assembled at
Vienna.
But partnership with the midnight associates of
the 2d of December was a heavy yoke. With all
his heart and soul Lord Aberdeen desired the
tranquillity of Europe; but he had suffered his
Cabinet to enter into close friendly engagements
with one to whom the tranquillity of Europe por-
tended jail, and ill-usage, and death. The French
Emperor had consented to engage France in an
English policy ; and he thought he had a right to
insist that England should pay the price, and help
to give him the means of such signal action in
Europe as might drive away men's thoughts from
the hour when the Parliament of France had been
thrown into the felons' van.
The object at which the French Emperor was
aiming stands clear enough to the sight ; but at
this time the scheme of action by which he sought
to attain his ends was ambiguous. In general,
men are prone to find out consistency in the acts
of rulers, and to imagine that numberless acts,
appearing to have different aspects, are the result
of one steady design; but those who love truth
better than symmetry will be able to believe that
much of the conduct of the French Emperor was
rather the effect of clashing purposes than of
duplicity. There are philosophers who imagine
that the human mind (corresponding in that re-
spect with the brain) has a dual action, and that
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 361
the singleness of purpose observed in a decided chap.
man is the result of a close accord between the L_
two engines of thought, and not of actual unity.
Certainly it would appear that the Emperor Louis
Napoleon, more than most other men, was accus-
tomed to linger in doubt between two conflicting
plans, and to delay his final adoption of the one,
and his final rejection of the other, for as long a
time as possible, in order to find out what might
be best to be ultimately done by carrying on ex-
periments for many months together with two
rival schemes of action.
But whether this double method of action was
the result of idiosyncrasy or of a profound policy,
it was but too well fittted for the object of draw-
ing England into a war. The aim of the French
Emperor was to keep his understanding with
England in full force, and yet to give the alliance
a warlike direction. If he were to adopt a policy
frankly warlike, he would repel Lord Aberdeen
and endanger the alliance. If he were to be
frankly pacific, there would be a danger of his
restoring to Europe that tranquillity which could
not fail to bring him and his December friends
into jeopardy. In this strait he did not exactly
take a middle course. By splitting his means of
action he managed to take two courses at the
same time. There are people who can write at
the same time with both hands. Politically,
Louis Napoleon had this accomplishment. With uisdipio.
his left hand he seemed to strive after peace ; iMrihr:'
with his right he tried to stir up a war. The Ian-
362
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XVI.
yet he en-
gages Eng-
land in naval
movemeats
tending to
provoke
The Bos-
phorus and
tlie Darda-
nelles.
guage of his diplomacy was pacific, and yet at
the very same time he contrived that the naval
forces of France and England should be used as
the means of provoking a war. The part which
he took in the negotiations going on at Vienna,
and in the other capitals of the great Powers, was
temperate, just, and moderate ; and it is probable
that the Despatches which indicated this spirit long
continued to mislead Lord Aberdeen, and to keep
him under the impression that an Anglo-French
alliance was really an engine of peace ; but it
will be seen that, as soon as the French Emperor
had drawn England into an understanding with
him, he was enabled to engage her in a series of
dangerous naval movements, which he contrived
to keep going on simultaneously with the efforts
of the negotiators, so as always to be defeating
their labours.
In order to appreciate the exceeding force of
the lever which was used for this purpose, a man
ought to have in his mind the political geography
of south-eastern Europe, and the configuration of
the seas which flow with a ceaseless current into
the waters of the ^gean.
The Euxine is connected with the Mediter-
ranean by the Straits of the Bosphorus, the Sea of
Marmora, and the Straits of the Dardanelles.
The Bosphorus is a current of the sea, seventeen
miles in length, and in some places hardly more
than half a mile broad, but so deep, even home to
the shores on either side, that a ship of war can
almost, as it were, find shade under the gardens
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 363
of the European shore can almost mix her spars chap.
with the cypresses which darken the coast of ^
Asia. At its southern extremity the Bosphorus
minjiles with the waters of the great inlet or
harbour which still often goes by the name of the
Golden Horn ; and at length, after passing be-
tween Constantinople and its beautiful suburb of
Scutari, the straits open out into the land-locked
basin now known as the sea of Marmora, which
used to be called the Propontis. At the foot of
this inland sea the water is again contracted into
a deep channel, no more, in one place, than three-
quarters of a mile in breadth, and is not set free
till, after a course of some forty miles, it reaches
the neighbourhood of the Troad, and spreads
abroad into tlie iEgean. These last are the fam-
ous straits between Europe and Asia which used
to be called the Hellespont, and are now the Dar-
danelles. Tlie Bosphorus and the Dardanelles
are both so narrow that, even in the early times
of artillery, they could be commanded by guns on
either side, and it followed that these waters had
not tlie character of 'hifrh seas.' And since the TiicSuitan's
^ ancient
land upon either side belonrjed to the Ottoman ngi'ttocon-
^ o trol them.
Empire, the Sultans always claimed and always
enjoyed a right to keep out foreign ships of war,
from both the straits. Now on the Black Sea
Russia had as much seabord as Turkey, and
nevertheless, like every other Bower, she was shut
out from all right to send her armed navy into
the ^Mediterranean through the Bosphorus and the
Dardanelles. There being no other outlet, her
364
OEIGIX OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XVI.
Policy of
Russia in
regard to
the straits.
The rights of
the Sultan
and the five
Powers
under the
treaty of
1841.
How these
rights were
affected by
the Czar's
seizure of
the Princi-
palities.
Black Sea fleet was pent up in an inland basin.
Painful as this duress must needs be to a haughty
State having a powerful fleet in the Euxine, it
would seem that Eussia has been more willing to
submit to the restriction than to see the war-flag
of other States in the Dardanelles or the Bos-
phorus. The presence of a force greater than her
own, or even rivalling it, did not comport with
the kind of ascendancy which she was always
seeking to establish at Constantinople and on the
seabord of the Euxine. Eussia, therefore, had
been a willing party to the treaty of 1841. By
this treaty the five great Powers acknowledged
the right of the Sultan to exclude armed navies
from both the straits ; and, on the other hand,
the Sultan engaged that in time of peace he would
always exercise this right of exclusion. More-
over, the five Powers promised that they would
all respect this engagement by the Sultan. The
result, therefore, was that, whether with or without
the consent of the Sultan no foreign squadron, at
a time when the Sultan was at peace, could law-
fully appear in either of the straits.* But when
the Emperor Nicholas forcibly occupied the Prin-
cipalities, it was clear that this act was a just
cause of war whenever the Sultan might think
fit so to treat it; and there was fair ground for
saying that, even before a declaration of war, the
invasion of the Sultan's dominions was such a vio-
lation of the state of peace contemplated by the
* There were exceptions in favour of vessels having on board
the Representatives of foreign States.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 365
treaty, that the Sultan was morally released from chap.
his engagement, and might be justified in asking ^^'^'
his allies to send their fleets up through the
straits. On the other hand, the appearance of
foreign navies in the Dardanelles was regarded
as so destructive to Kussian ascendancy, that the
bare prospect of it used to fill Kussian statesmen
with dismay; and the Emperor Nicholas held
the idea in such horror that the mere approach
of the French and English fleets to the Levant
wrought him, as we have seen, to a state of mind
which was only too faithfully portrayed by his
Chancellor's Circular.
It is plain, therefore, that the power of advis- Powerful
ing the Sultan to call up the French and Eng- coercing
lish fleets was an engine of immense force in the
hands of the Western Powers ; but it is also cer-
tain that this was a power which would put a
much harder stress upon Eussia whilst it was
kept suspended over her, than it was likely to do
when it came to be physically used. To subject importance
Nicholas to the fear of having to see foreign war- fromapre-
. . mature use
Hags m the straits, was to apply a pressure well ofuicrower.
fitted for coercing him ; but actually to exert tlie
power was to break its spell, and to change the
Czar's wholesome dread into a frenzy of anger
hardly consistent with liopes of peace.
The French Emperor had no sooner engaged xhcnavai
the Englisli Government in a separate understand- in which
. . , . the French
ing, tlian he began to insist upon the necessity of Emiieror
using the naval power of France and England in England.
the way which he proposed a way bitterly offen-
366 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, sive to Kussia. Having at length succeeded in
forcing this measure upon England, he, after a
while, pressed upon her another movement of the
fleet still more hostile than the first, and again he
succeeded in bringing the English Government to
yield to him. Again, and still once again, he did
the like, always in the end bringing England to
adopt his hostile measures ; and he never desisted
from this course of action until, at last, it had
effected a virtual rupture between the Czar and
the Western Powers.
Not yet as part of this narrative, but by way of
anticipation, and in order to gather into one page
the grounds of the statement just made, the fol-
lowing instances are given of the way in which
the English Government was, from time to time,
driven to join with the French Emperor in mak-
ing a quarrelsome use of the two fleets : On the
13th of July 1853, the French Emperor, through
his Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared to the
English Government that if the occupation of the
Principalities continued, the French fleet could
not longer remain at Besica Bay. On the 19th of
August he declared it to be absolutely necessary
that the combined fleets should enter the Darda-
nelles, and he pressed the English Government to
adopt a resolution to this effect. On the 21st of
September he insisted that the English Govern-
ment, at the same moment as the French, should
immediately order up the combined squadrons to
Constantinople. On the 15th of December he
pressed the English Government to agree that the
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 367
Allied fleets should enter the Euxine, take pos- chap.
XVT
session of it, and interdict the passage of every L_
Eussian vessel. It will be seen that, with more
or less reluctance and after more or less delay,
these demands were always acceded to by Eng-
land : and the course thus taken by the maritime
Powers was fatal to the pending negotiations ; for,
besides that in the way already shown the Czar's
wholesome fears were converted into bursts of
rage, the Turks at the same time were deriving a
dangerous encouragement from the sight of the
French and English war-flags ; and the result was,
that the negotiators, with all their skill and all
their patience, were never able to frame a N'ote
in the exact words which would allay the anger
of Nicholas, without encountering a steadfast re-
sistance on the part of the Sultan*
Some men will believe that a long series of
acts, all having a tendency in the same direction,
and ending at length in war, were deliberately
planned by the French Emperor as a means of
bringing about the result which they effected, and
that the temperate and sometimes conciliatory
negotiations which were carried on during the
same period were a mask to the real intent. It
is perhaps more likely to be true that the French
Emperor was all this time hesitating, and keeping
his judgment in suspense. "What he needed, for
his very life's sake, was to become so conspicuous,
whetlier as a disturber or as a pacificator of other
* Hero again, for tlie imrpnse indicated code, ]>. 14, I invite
the attention of Mr Tlieodore ilartin.
368 _ ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, nations, that Freuchmen might be brought to look
XVT
'__ at what he was doing to others instead of what he
had done to them ; and if he could have reached
to this by seeming to take a great ascendant
in the diplomacy of Europe, it is possible that,
for a while at least, he might have been content
Means weu to Spare the world from graver troubles ; but
enforcing a whether he acted from design or under the
were^sTuscd impulsc of Varying and conflicting wishes, it is
voke war. certain that that command of naval power, which
was an engine of excellent strength for enforcing
the restoration of tranquillity, was so used by his
orders and under his persuasion, as to become the
means of provoking a war.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 369
CHAPTER XVII.
Lord Stratford, it would seem, -was unconscious c ii a p.
XVII.
of his power over the mind of Nicholas, and did ..
not understand that it rested with him to deter- stnuford-s
mine whether the Czar should be politic or raging, iladncation.
lie did not know that, as long as he was at
Therapia, every deed, every word of the Divan
was regarded as coming from the English Ambas-
sador ; and that the bare thought of the Greek
Church in Turkey being under the protection of
' Canning,' was the very one which would at any
moment change the Czar from an able man of
business to an almost irresponsible being. Tak-
ing the complaints of Paissia according to their
avowed meaning, the English Ambassador faith-
fully strove to remove every trace of the founda-
tion on wliich they rested ; and having caused
the Porte to issue firmans perpetuating all the
accustomed privileges of tlie Greek Church, he
proposed that copies of these iirmans should be
sent to the Court of 8t Petersburg, together with
a courteous Xote from the I'orte to Count Xessel-
rode, distinctly assuring the Chancellor that the
VOL. L 2 A
370 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, firmans confirmed the privileges of the Greek
XVII .
' Church in perpetuity, and virtually, therefore, en-
gaging that the grants should never be revoked.*
This was doing exactly what Eussia ostensibly
required ; but it was also doing exactly that which
the Czar most abhorred, for to his mind it in-
dicated nothing less than that the Greek Churcli
was passing under the gracious protection of Lord
Stratford. The polished courtesy of the Note
imparting this concession only made it the more
hateful, by showing on its face whence it came.
However, Lord Stratford obtained for his plan the
full approval of his French, Austrian, and Prussian
colleagues, as well as of the Porte ; and the Note,
signed by Eeshid Pasha, and enclosing copies of
the new firmans, was despatched to Vienna, with
a view to its being thence transmitted to St
Petersburg. The packet which held these papers
contained the very ingredients which were best
fitted for disturbing the reason of the Czar. It
happened, however, that at Vienna there were
men who knew something of the psychological
part of the Eastern Question, and they took upon
themselves to arrest the maddening Note in its
transit.
And now the representatives of the four Powers,
conferring in the Austrian capital, succeeded in
framing a document which soon became known
to Europe under the name of the ' Vienna Note.'
Tiie 'Vienna This paper, framed originally in Paris, was per-
fected and finally approved by all the four Powers
* 20th July 1853. 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 15.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 371
conferring at Vienna. It was a draft of a Note chap.
understood to be brought forward by Austria ^^"'
in her mediating capacity, and proposed to be (^^^^^^^0^
addressed by the Porte to the Eussian Govern- Po^^er^, and
ment. The parties to the Conference believed
that the engagements purporting to be made by
the Note on tlie part of the Sultan might satisfy
the Czar without endangering the true interests
of Turkey. Indeed, the Austrian Government,
somewhat forgetting its duty as a faithful medi-
ator, had used means of ascertaining that the
Note would be acceptable to Eussia,* but with-
out taking a like step in favour of the other
disputant. Copies of the Note thus framed were accpptea
sent for approval to St Petersburg and to Con- ^
stantinople, and the acceptance of the arrange-
ment was pressed upon the Governments of the
two disputing States with all the moral weight
which the four great Powers could give to their
unanimous award.
And here it ought to be marked that at this The Frmcii
moment the French Emperor did nothing to (u'esnouiing
thwart the restoration of tranquillity. He per- tiie success
haps believed that if a Note which had origi-
nated in Paris were to become the basis of a
settlement, he might found on this circumstance
a claim to the glory of having pacified Europe,
and in that wholesome way might achieve the
sort of c(uispicuousness which he loved and
needed. Perhaps he was ciily obeying that
(loublcness of mind which made liim always
* ' Eastern rapors,' part ii. p. '27.
372 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, prone to do acts clashing one with another.
L_ But whatever may have been the cause which
led him for a moment to intermit his policy, it
is just to acknowledge that he seems to have been
faithfully willing to give effect to the means of
pacification which were proffered by the ' Vienna
' Note.' It soon became known that the Note
was agreed to by the Emperor Nicholas. j\Ien
believed that all was settled. It was true that
the courier who was expected to be the bearer of
the assent of the Porte had not yet come in from
Constantinople, but it was assumed that the
representatives of the four Powers had taken the
precaution of possessing themselves of the real
views of the Turkish Government ; and, besides,
it was thought impossible that the Sultan should
undertake to remain in antagonism to Eussia, if
the support which he had hitherto received from
the four great Powers were to be transferred from
him to the Czar.
Those who dwell far away from great cities can
hardly, perhaps, believe that the touching signs of
simplicity which they observe in rural life may be
easily found now and then in the councils of
Lord strat- asscmblcd Europc. The Governments of all the
ford liad not _-, . , .
i.'oncon- four Powers, and their representatives assembled
at Vienna, fondly imagined that they could settle
the dispute and restore tranquillity to Europe
without consulting Lord Stratford de Eedcliffe.
They framed and despatched the Note without
learning what his opinion of it was, and it is
probable that a knowledge of this singular
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 373
omission may have conduced to make the Czar chap,
accept the award of the mediating Powers, by J '_
tempting him with the delight of seeing Lord
Stratford overruled. But, on the other hand,
the one man who was judge of what ought or
ought not to be conceded by the Turks was Lord
Stratford ; and it is plain that any statesmen who
forgot him in their reckoning must have been
imperfect in their notion of political dynamics.
It would be wrong to suppose that a sound judg-
ment by the four Powers would be liable to bo
(jverturned by Lord Stratford from any mere feel-
ing of neglect. He was too proud, as well as too
lionest, to be capable of such a littleness. What
was to be a])prehended was, that until it was
ratified by the English Ambassador at the Porte,
the decision of a number of men in Vienna and
Paris and London and Berlin might turn out to
be really erroneous, or might seem to be so in the
eyes of one who was profoundly versed in the sub-
ject; and no man had a right to make sure that,
even at the instance of all Europe, this strong-
willed Englishman would consent to use his vast
personal ascendancy as a means of forcing upon the
Turks a surrender which he held to be dangerous.
Early in August the Vienna Note reached Con-
stantinople ; and the Turkisli Government soon
detected in it not only a misrecitul of history, but
words of a dangerous sort, conveying or seeming
to convey to Paissia, under a new form, that very
protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey whicli
had brought about the rupture of tlic negotiation
374 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, conducted by Prince MentscliikoflP. The four
_: ;_ Powers, however, had determined to press the
acceptance of the arrangement upon the Porte ;
and on the 12th it became known at Constanti-
nople that the Note had been accepted by the
The 'Vienna Empcror Nicholas. On the same day the English
the hands of Ambassador received instructions from London,
ford. ' which informed him that the English Govern-
ment ' adhered to the Vienna Note, and considered
' that it fully guarded the principle which had
' been contended for, and might therefore with
' perfect safety be signed by the Porte ; ' and Lord
Clarendon went on to express a hope that the
Ambassador would have 'found no difficulty in
' procuring the assent of the Turkish Govern-
' ment to a project which the allies of the Sul-
' tan unanimously concurred in recommending
' for his adoption.' *
It cannot be doubted that Lord Stratford's
opinion as to the effect of the Vienna Note was
opposed to that of his Government,-)- but it was
his duty to obey. He obeyed. He ' scrupulously
' abstained from expressing any private opinion
' of his on the Note whilst it was under consid-
' oration at the Porte,' and he conveyed to the
Turkish Government the desire of Europe. ' I
' called the attention of Eeshid Pasha,' said he,
' to the strong and earnest manner in which the
' Vienna Note was recommended to the accept-
' ance of the Porte, not only by Her Majesty's
' Government, but also by the Cabinets of Austria,
* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 27. t Ibid. pp. 72, 82.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 375
' France, and Prussia. I reminded him of the chap
XVII
' intelligence which had been received from St '_
' Petersburg, purporting that the Emperor of
' Eussia had signified his readiness to accept the
' same Note. I urged the importance of his
' engaging the Porte to come to a decision with
' the least possible delay. I repeatedly urged
' the importance of an immediate decision, and
' the danger of declining or only accepting with
' amendments, what the four friendly Powers so
' earnestly recommended, and what the Cabinet
' of St Petersburg had accepted in its actual
' state.' *
These were dutiful words. But it is not to be
believed that, even if he strove to do so, Lord
Stratford could hide his real thoughts from the
Turkish IVIinisters. There was that in his very
presence which disclosed his volition ; for if the
thin disciplined lips moved in obedience to con-
stituted authorities, men who knew how to read
the meaning of his brow, and the light which
kindled beneath, would gather that the Am-
bassador's thought concerning the Home Gov-
ernments of the five great Powers of Europe
was little else than an angry ' ([uos ego ! ' The
sagacious Turks would look more to these great
signs than to the tenor of formal advice sent out
from London, and if they saw that Lord Stratford
was in his heart against the opinion of Europe,
they would easily resolve to follow his known de-
sire, and to disobey his mere words. The result
* ' Eastern PapiTS,' part ii. \k 69.
376
OlilGIN OF THE WAK OF 1853
CHAP.
XVII.
The Turkish
Government
determines
to reject it
unless al-
tered.
The Turks
at variance
with the
rest of
Europe :
but stand
firm.
was that, without any signs of painful doubt, the
Turkish Government determined to stand firm.
They quietly introduced into the draft the modi-
fications which they deemed to be necessary for
extracting its dangerous quality, and resolved that,
unless these changes were admitted, they would
altogether reject the Xote. They were supported
by the unanimous decision of the Great Council.
It might seem that, with Lord Stratford and
the Turkish Government on one side, and all the
rest of Europe, including England herself, on the
other, the preponderance would be soon deter-
mined; and Lord Clarendon remonstrated against
the obstinacy of the Turks in terms which ap-
proached to a disapproval of all that had lately
been done at Constantinople ; * but Europe was in
the wrong, and Lord Stratford and the Turks were
in the right ; and happily for the world, a strong
man and a good cause make a formidable con-
junction. Lord Stratford did not fail to show his
Government that the objections of the Turks to
the proposed Xote were well founded ; and Europe
was compelled to remember that the Eussian de-
mand still had in it tlie original vice of wrongfully
seeking to extort a treaty in time of peace.
On the 19th of August the Porte declined to
accept the Vienna Note, without introducing into
it the required alterations.-^ These alterations
* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 91.
+ Ibid. p. 80. A copy of the 'Vienna Note,' and of the al-
terations insisted upon by the Turks, is given in the Appendix,
in order to show the exact difference of words which brought
about the final rupture between Russia and the Porte.
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 377
were rejected by Eussia ; and for a moment Eu- chap.
rope was threatened with the mortification of see- ^ '
ing that the question of peace or war was to
depend upon a mere verbal criticism and a
criticism, too, in which the English Government
at first supposed that the Turks were wrong.* It
happened, however, that in the course of the
discussion, Count Nesselrode argued against the
alterations proposed at Constantinople, in Ian- And are un-
guage which avowed that the meaning and intent piovea to
^ ^ . . . . . . be right in
of Kussia coincided with that very interpretation their inter-
'' ^ ]iretation of
which had been fastened upon the ISTote by the tiieNoie.
sagacity of the Turks ; and the Governments of
tlie four Powers being then obliged to acknow-
ledge that they were wrong, and that Lord Strat-
ford and the Turks weve right, the question whicli
brought about the final rupture between Eussia and
the Porte was virtually the same as that which
had caused the departure of Prince Mentschikoff what their
. , . -, diapnte with
from Constantinople. What Eussia still required, iiussia stiu
and what the Porte still refused to grant, was the
Protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey, i*
At length, witli the advice of a Great Council
attended by a hundred and seventy-two of the
fciremost men of the Empire, the Porte determined
* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 91.
+ I am liappily able to say that the hstters wliicli have re-
cently passed between Sir Arthur Gordon and Lord Eussell do
not suggest to mo any modification of the statements contained
in this cha])ter ; but the correspondence is, I tliink, so inter-
esting, that I venture to add it (see Note iv.) in the Aii])endi.x.
Sir Arthur Gordon was the son and deejdy trusted ])rivate sccre-
tar}' of Lord Aberdeen, and ]irobab]y knows more of wliat his
father knew than any other living man.
378
ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP.
XVII,
Tlie Porte
declares
war.
Warlike
spirit of the
belligerents.
In Bussia
this had
been fore-
stalled.
Warlike
ardour of
the people
in the Otto-
man Empire.
upon war. A declaration was issued, which made
the further continuance of peace dependent upon
the evacuation of the Principalities ; and the lius-
sian General there commanding was summoned
to withdraw his troops from the invaded provinces
within fifteen days. He did not comply with the
demand; and on the 23d of October 1853 the
Sultan was placed in a state of war with the
Emperor of Russia.*
But meanwhile the preachers of the Orthodox
Church and the preachers of Islam had not been
idle. In Eussia, the piety and the spirit of the
people had been forestalied by the consuming evil
of a vast standing army, and crushed down by
police and by drill. The Government had already
taken so much by sheer compulsion, that the
people, however brave and pious, had little more
that it was willing to offer up in sacrifice. It
was not thus in the Ottoman Empire. Through
the vast and scattered dominions of the Sultan,
the holy war had not been preached in vain.
There, religion and love of country and warlike
ardour were blent into one ennobling sentiment,
which was strong enough, as was soon shown, to
make men arise of their own free will and endure
long toil and cruel hardships that they might attain
to some battle-field or siege and there face death
with joy. And under the counsels and ascend-
* There was an idea that Russia and Turkey passed into a
state of war on the ith of October, but, as above stated, the 23d
was the day. See in the Appendix a note showing this viz.,
Note V.
BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 379
ancy of Lord Stratford this ardour was so well chap.
guided that it was kept from breaking out in vain ^ '
tumult or outrage, and was brought to bear in all
its might upon the defence of the State. 'A
spirit of self-devotion/ wrote the Ambassador,
unaccompanied with fanatical demonstrations,
and showing itself among the highest function-
aries of the State, bids fair to give an extra-
ordinary impulse to any military enterprise
which may be undertaken against Eussia by the
Turkish Government. The corps of Ulema are
preparing to advance a considerable sum in sup-
port of the war. The Grand Vizier, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, and other leading members
of the Administration, have resigned a large pro-
portion of their horses for the service of the
artillery, Eeinforcements continue to be directed
towards the Danube and the Georgian frontier.
If hostilities commence, they will be prosecuted
in a manner to leave, on one side or on the
other, deep and durable traces of a truly national
struggle.' *
But if the Turkish Empire was still the Cali])h- Modoraiion
...... .,, , 1 11-1 ofllu'Tuik-
ate, and it religion still gave tlie watchword which i^b covem-
brought many races of men to crowd to the same
standard, yet the Porte, chastened by the adver-
sity of the latter century, and disciplined by the
English Ambassador, had become so wise and
politic that it governed the beating heart of the
nation, and suffered no fanatic words to go out
into Christendom. The duty of the ^Moslem, now
* ' Eastern Paiiers," part ii. p. 167.
380 ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1853
CHAP, called to arms for his Faith, was preached with a
XVTT
fervour sufficing for all military purposes ; but
the Proclamation which announced that the Sul-
tan was at war abstained from all fierce theology.
Eeiterating the poignant truths which placed the
Porte in the right and the Czar in the wrong, it
kept to that tone of moderation which had hitherto
marked all the State Papers of the Turkish Gov-
its effect on ernmeut. But this very moderation seemed al-
t}ie mmd of
tiie Czar. ways to kindle fresh rage in the mind of the Em-
peror Nicholas, and to fetch out his religious zeal.
The reason perhaps was, that in all wisdom and
all moderation evinced by the Divan he persisted
The Czar's in sccing the evil hand of Lord Stratford. In his
Proclama-
tion. Proclamation he ascended to ecstatic heights :
' By the grace of God, We, Kicholas L, Emperor
' and Autocrat of All the Paissia.s, make known :
' By our Manifesto of the 14th of June, we ac-
' quainted our well-beloved and faithful subjects
' with the motives which have compelled us to
' demand of the Ottoman Porte inviolable guaran-
' tees in favour of tlie sacred rights of the Ortho-
' dox Church. . . , Eussia is challenged to
' the fight ; nothing, therefore, further remains for
' her but, in confident reliance upon God, to have
' recourse to arms, in order to compel the Ottoman
' Government to respect treaties, and obtain from
' it reparation for the offences by which it has
' responded to our most moderate demands, and
' to our legitimate solicitude for the defence
' of the Orthodox faith in the East, which is
' equally professed by the Russian people. We
BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. 381
'are firmly convinced that our faithful subjects chap.
' will join the fervent prayers which we address to '
' the ^lost Kigh, that His hand may be pleased to
* bless our arms in the holy and just cause which
' lias ever found ardent defenders in our pious
' ancestors. " In Thee, Lord, have I trusted ; let
' " me not be confounded for ever ! " ' *
* ' Eastern Papers,' part ii. ]>. 228.
APPENDIX.
NOTE I.
IvESrECTING THE ATTITUDE OF AUSTRIA TOWARDS
EussiA IN 1828-9.
I'uiNCE jSrETTERNicii's eiideavour to form a league for this
inirpo.se has been questioned ; and there can be no doubt
that the Duke of AVellington, and with liim Lord Aberdeen,
thought poorly of all that IMetternich could or would do ;
but the Russian Government a Government served at that
time with an extraordinary abundance of diplomatic skill
and energy acquired wliat it deemed to bo a certainty on
this subject. After suggesting the possibility of a triple
alliance between Ilussia, Prussia, and France, Count Pdzzo
di P>()rgo, on the 28th of November 1828, writes thus to
(yount iS'^esselrode :
' Lorsquo je trace de telles coinbinaisons, M. Le Comte,
' c'est avec le d^sir qu'elles ne puissent jamais devenir
' necessaires : il a fallu la conduite inconeevable du Prince
' Metternich pour etre forc6 a chcrcher dans de si grands
' (diangeinens les moyens de di'joucr cette liguc gendrale
' (pi'il travaille ;\ former contre la Pussic, et a conti>nir les
' coups directs qu'il voudraii lui porter.' Portfolio, vol. i.
p. 4G9.
384 APPENDIX.
For further proofs of the fact that Russia understood
Austria to be bitterly hostile and to be endeavouring to
form a league against her, see passages from the same de-
spatch appearing in vol. i. of the Portfolio, at the following
pages :
343, 358, 359, 362-3, 409, 410, 412, 413, 414, 416,
417, 419, 420, 421, 426, 429, 430, 433, 441, 446, 447,
450, 451, 452 eA seq., 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461,
462, 464, 466, 467, 469, 473, 474, 476. The Duke of
Wellington had evidently been urged by Metternich to-
wards the adoption of strong measures, but profoundly dis-
trusting the courage of Metternich, he yielded but little
attention to warlike counsels coming from that quarter.
On the 7th of I^Tovember the Duke thus wrote to Lord
Aberdeen : ' In truth, Metternich is as much at a loss as
' we to know what to do. He was very angry icith us for
' not seizing the ajyparent op2)ortumty afforded by the block-
' ade to declare against Russia, because that Avould have
' been a commencement of resistance which, at all events,
' would have saved the Turks, and would have enabled him
' to do what he calls " prendre une position ; " that is to
' say, either to support us or to oppose us, or what is more
' probable, do nothing but talk. But, as I said before, he
' no more knows what to do under existing circumstances
' than we do.'
The Russian Government, though it knew, as it con-
ceived, that Prince Metternich was in earnest, adroitly re-
solved to allow the Duke of "Wellington and Lord Aberdeen
to remain under the false impression (for so they regarded
it) which the Duke's low estimate of Metternich had pro-
duced. After saying that he had communicated to Count
Pozzo di Borgo Metternich's denial, M. de Tatischeff, the
Russian ambassador at A-^ienna, thus writes to his Govern-
ment on the 5th of February 1829 :
' J'ai recu de notre ambassadeur a Paris par un courier
APPENDIX. 385
' Fran^ais des notions si d^taill^es et si positives sur la
' nianiere dont ce projet a it6 communiqu(^ au Gouveme-
' ment Fran^ais, que j'aurais pu en d^montrer I'existence
' au Prince de ^letternich lui-meme, si conformement a la
' dcpeche reservee de V. Ex. du 14 Janvier dernier, je n'avais
' cru plus opportune de ne pas prolonger a nos discussions
' sur un fait qui appartient desorniais au domaine de
' I'histoirc'
Then after stating an interview with Metternich, in
which he caused him to see that his scheme had been dis-
covered (Count Trautmandorff seems to have been the
agent), and after saying that the Prince appeared much
' decontenance ' at the position in which he was placed by
being convicted, ]\r. TatischefF continues :
'Jo n'ai pas fait confidence a mes collegues du resultat
' de nos explications ; et je n'ai contredit Lord Coicley
' lorsque ces jours-ci il ??iV< annonce que Lord Aberdeen Jui
' nvait ecrit une depcche pour lui parler des intentions qu'on
' avait pn'''f''''s '^ I'Aufriche comvie demiee de tout fonde-
' 7uent.' Portfolio, vol. ii. p. G9 et scq. Note to bth
Edition.
VOL. I. o n
386 APPENDIX.
NOTE II.
Papers Showing the Difference which Led to the
EuPTURE OF Prince Mextschikoff's I^egotiation.
Draft of Note proposed hy Prince Mentscldkoff to he
addressed to him hy the Porte*
La Sublime Porte, apres I'examen le plus attentif et le
plus s^rieux des demandes qui ferment Tobjet de la mission
extraordinaire confiee k I'Ambassadeur de Eussie, Prince
MentscbikofF, et aprfes avoir soumis le resultat de cet ex-
amen a Sa Majesty le Sultan, se fait un devoir empresse de
notifier par la pr^sente k son Altesse I'Ambassadeur la de-
cision Imp^riale emanee a ce sujet par un Trade supreme
en date du (date Musulmane et Cbretienne).
Sa Majesty voulant donner a son auguste alli6 et ami
I'Empereur de Eussie un nouveau t^moignage de son
amiti^ la plus sincere, et de son d^sir intime de consolider
les anciennes relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite en-
tente qui existent entre les deux Etats, pla9ant en meme
temps une entiere confiance dans les intentions constam-
ment bienveillantes de Sa Majesty Imp^riale pour le main-
tien de I'integrite et de I'independance de I'Empire Otto-
man, a daign^ appr^cier et prendre en serieuse consideration
les representations franches et cordiales dont I'Ambassadeur
de Eussie s'est rendu I'organe en faveur du culte Ortho-
doxe Greco-Eusse profess6 par son auguste alli^ ainsi que
par la majorite de leurs sujets respectifs.
Le Soussign^ a re9U en consequence I'ordre de donner
par la pr^sente note I'assurance la plus solennelle au
Gouvernement de Eussie, que repr&ente aupr^s de Sa Ma-
jeste le Sultan son Altesse le Prince Mentscbikoff, sur la
* This was the last demand made by the Prince.
APPENDIX. 387
sollicitude invariable et les sentiments gendreux et tole-
rans qui animent Sa Majestd le Sultan pour la s^curit^
et la prosp6rit6 dans ses (^tats du clerg6, des (^glises, et des
ctablissements religieux du culte Chretien d'Orient.
Afin de rendre ces assurances plus explicites, preciser
d'une mani^ro formelle les objets principaux de cette haute
sollicitude, corroborer par des dclaircissenients supplemen-
taires que ndcessite la marcbe du temps, le sens des Articles
qui dans les Trait^s ant^rieurs conclus entre les deux Puis-
sances ont trait aux questions religieuses, et pr(5venir enfin
a jamais toute nuance de malentendu et de dcsaccord a se
sujet entre les deux Gouvernements, le Soussigne est autoris6
par sa Majest6 le Sultan a faire les declarations suivantes :
1. Le culte Ortliodoxe d'Orient, son clergd, ses eglises,
et ses possessions, aiusi que ses dtablissements religieux,
jouiront dans I'avenir sans aucune atteinte, sous I'egide de
Sa Majest6 le Sultan, des privildjges et immunites qui leur
sont assures ah antiquo, ou qui leur ont 6t6 accordes a difler-
entes reprises par la favour Imperial, et dans un principe
de liaute (^quit^ participeront aux avantagcs accordfe aux
autres rites Chretiens, ainsi qu'aux Legations Etrangeres
accreditees pros la Sublime Porte par Convention ou dis-
position particidiere.
2. Sa ]\Iajeste le Sultan ayant jugo n^cessaire et (jquit-
able de corroborer et d'exjiliquer son firman souverain re-
vetu du hattihoumayoum le 15 do la lune de Rebiul-Akhir
12G8 (10 Puvrier 1852), jiar son iirman souverain du
et d'ordonner en sua par un autre firman en
date du la reparation do la coupole du Tem])le du
Saint Sepulcre, ces deux firmans seront textuellement exe-
cutes et iidelement observes, pour maiutenir a jamais le
t<tatus quo acluel des sanctuaires ])ossedes jiar les Grecs ex-
clusivement ou en commun avec d'aulres cultes.
II est eutendu que cette jiromesse s'etend ogalement au
maiutien de tous les droits et immunites dont jouissent (Oi
388 APPENDIX.
antiquo I'Eglise Orthodoxe et son clerge tant dans la ville
de Jerusalem qu'au-dehors, sans aucun prejudice ponr les
autres communautes Chretiennes.
3. Pour le cas oil la Cour Imperiale de Eussie en ferait
la demande, il sera assigne une localite convenable dans la
ville de Jerusalem ou dans les environs pour la construc-
tion d'une eglise consacree a la celebration du service divin
par les ecclesiastiques Eusses, et d'un hospice pour les
pelerins indigents ou nialades, lesquelles fondations seront
sous la surveillance speciale du Consulat-General de Eussie
en Syrie et en Palestine.
4. On donnera les firmans et les ordres necessaires a qui
de droit et aux Patriarches Grecs pour I'execution de ces
decisions souveraines, et on s'entendra ulterieurement sur
la regularisation des points de detail qui n'auront pas
trouve place tant dans les firmans concernant les lieux
saints de Jerusalem que dans la pr^sente notification.
Le Soussigne, &c.
Reshid Pasha to Prince Mentschikoff*
(Translation.)
This statement made by Prince Mentschikoff, in his
written and verbal communications, concerning the doubts
and "want of confidence entertained by the Porte with re-
gard to His Majesty the Emperor's good intentions, has
been seen with great regret. His Majesty the Sultan has
perfect faith and confidence in His ]\Iajesty the Emperor,
and highly appreciates the great qualities and spirit of
justice which animate his august ally and neighbour, and
it is a great honour for me to proclaim that it has always
been His Majesty the Sultan's desire to consolidate and
* This was the last ofFer made by the Porte to Prince Mentschikoff.
APPENDIX. 389
strengthen the friendly relations happily subsisting between
the two countries.
AVith reference to the religious privileges of the Greek
Churches and clergy, the honour of the Porte requires that
the exclusively spiritual privileges granted under the
Sultan's i^rodecessors, and confirmed by his Majesty, should
be now and henceforward preserved unimpaired and in
force ; and the equitable system pursued by the Porte to-
wards its subjects demands that any spiritual privilege
whatever granted henceforward to one class of Christian
subjects should not be refused to the Greek clergy. It
would be a cause of much regret tliat tlie fixed intentions
of llis Majesty the Sultan in this respect should be called
into question.
Nevertheless, the Imperial firman now granted to the
Greek Patriarchate, confirming the religious privileges, is
considered to afford a new proof of his Imperial Majesty's
benevolent sentiments in this respect, and the general pro-
mulgation thereof must afford every security, and remove
for ever from His Imperial jMajesty's mind all doubts for
the future respecting the religion wliich he professes, and
it is with pleasure that I perform the duty of making this
declaration.
In order that tliere should be no alteration respecting the
Shrines at Jerusalem, it is formally promised that, for
security in the future thereon, the Sublime Porto Avill t;\ke
no step concerning them without the knowledge of the
French and Kussian Governments. An official note has
been addressed to the French Embassy also to this purpose.
The Sultan consents that a church and hospital should
be built at Jerusalem (for the Kussians) ; and the Porte is
ready and disposed to conclude a Sened, both on this sub-
ject and concerning the special privileges of the Pussian
monks at that place.
390 APPENDIX.
NOTE III.
The 'Vienna ISTote,' with the Proposed Turkish
Modifications, Showing the Points of the Dif-
ference, WHICH WAS followed BY WaR BETWEEN
EussiA AND Turkey.
Copy of the Vienna Projet de Note, as modified by
the Sublime Porte.
[The Turkish modifications are shown by printing in italics the wortls
which the Porte rejected, and placing the words which it proposal to
substitute in the foot-note.]
Sa Majest(^ le Sultan n'ayant rieii de plus a coeur que do
r^tablir entre elle et Sa Majesty I'Empereur de Eussie les
relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont ete
malheureusement alt^ree par do recentes et penibles com-
plications, a pris soigneusement k tacher de rechercher les
moyens d'effacer les traces de ce differend.
Un irade supreme en date dii lui ayant fait
connaitre la decision Imperiale, la Sublime Porte se fclicite
de pouvoir la communiquer ci son Excellence jM. le Comte
de Nesselrode.
Si k touts ^poque les Empereurs de Eussie ont tdmoignes
leur active sollicitude pour le maintien des immunites et
privilhges de VEglise Orthodoxe Grecque dans V Empire Otto-
man, les Sultans ne se sent jamais refuses a les consacrer*
de nouveau par des actes solennels qui attestaient de leur
ancienne et constante bienveillance a I'egard de leurs sujets
Chretiens.
* Le culte et I'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque, les Sultans n'ont jamais
cesse de veiller au maintien des immunitds et privileges qu'ils ont spoii-
tauenient accords h diverscs reprises \x ce cultc et l\. cette Eglise dans
r Empire Ottoman, et de les consacrer.
APPENDIX. 391
Sa Majesty le Sultan Abdul-Medjid, aujourd'hui regnant,
animd des memes dispositions et voulant donner k Sa Ma-
jeste I'Empereur de Eussie un t^moignage personnel de son
amitie la plus sincere, n'a 6cout^ que sa confiance infinie
dans les qualit(^s (^rainentes de son auguste ami et aUie, et
a daign6 prendre en serieuse consideration les representa-
tions dont son Altesse le Prince de Mentscliikoff s'est rendu
Torgane auprfes de la Sublime Porte.
Le Soussign^ a re5u en consequence I'ordre de declarer
par la prdsente que le Gouvernement de Sa Majest6 le
Sultan restera fidele a la leftre et a V esprit des stijmlatwns
des Traites de Kainardji et d'AndrinojjIe, relatives a la j^ro-
tection du culte Chretien* etque Sa Majesty regarde comme
etant de son honneur de faire observer a tout jamais, et
de preserver de toute atteinte, soit pr^sentement, soit dans
I'avenir, la jouissance des privileges spirituels qui ont ete
accord^s par les augustes aieux de Sa Majestd k I'Eglise
Orthodoxe de I'Orient, qui sont maintenus et confirrnds par
elle ; et, en outre, h, faire participer dans un esprit de baute
equite le rit Grec aux avantages concedes aux autres rits
Chretiens par Convention ou disjjosition j^articuliere.f
Au reste, conimo le firman Imperial qui vient d'etre
donne au patriarcat et au clerg^ Grec, et qui contient les
confirmations do leurs privileges spirituels, devra etre re-
garde comme uue nouvelle preuve de ses nobles sentiments,
ct comme, en outre, la proclamation de ce firman, qui donne
toute securite, devra faire disparaitre toute crainte t\ regard
du rit qui est la religion do Sa !Majeste I'Empereur do
Russie ; je suis bcureux d'etre cliarge du devoir de faire
la presentc notification.
* Aux stipulations du Traite do Kainardji confirm^ par celui d'Andri-
nople, relatives k la protection par la Sublime Porte de la religion Cbr^-
tienne, et il est en outre cliargd do faire connaitre.
+ Octroyes, ou <[ui seraient octroyi5.s, aux autres comniunautes Clire-
tienues, sujettos Ottonianes.
392 APPENDIX.
NOTE IV.
Correspondence between Sir Arthur Gordon
AND Lord Russell.*
The Hon. Sir Arthur Gordon, K.C.M.G.,
to Eael Russell, K. G.
Ascot Wood, February 1875:
My dear Lord Eussell, Like every one else, I have
read your late publication with interest and with pleasure.
It contains, however, a statement Avhich has caused me
much surprise.
The statement to which I refer is one with reference
to the conduct of the negotiations which preceded the
Crimean Avar. It is to be found at page 271, and is as
follows :
' The Austrian Government had framed a IS^ote of con-
' ciliation, which the Emperor of Russia had accepted
' as a settlement of all dijHiculties. I proposed to Lord
' Clarendon that the Turkish Government should be told
' that if they would accept this Note totidem verbis we
' could arrange a peace between Turkey and Russia ; but
' that if Turkey altered the Note, we could befriend her no
' further. Lord Aberdeen, although he saw very clearly
' that by this means peace would be insured, declined to
' use his authority to enforce the condition. Had I been
' Prime Minister at the time, I should have insisted on the
' acceptance of the Austrian Note.'
What you might have done had you been Prime Minister
in 1853 can be known, of course, by none excej^t yourself ;
Ijut I have no hesitation Avhatever in saying that your
* Keprinted by Macmillan & Co. (-witli permission) from the ' Times '
of March 1, 1875.
APPENDIX. 393
present impression that you then desired to press the
Turks to accept the Vienna Note, and that liOrd Aberdeen
declined to adopt your advice to that effect is not in
accordance with my understanding of wliat actually took
place. It is, I hope, unnecessary for me to add that of
course it is the accuracy of your recollection only, and not
the sincerity of the present impression upon your mind,
which I venture to call in question.
I need hardly remind you that the Note prepared at
Vienna, and which was held by all the Four Powers to be
one which the Porte might safely sign, and the Emperor
of llussia might honourably accept, was forwarded from
Vienna simultaneously to St Petersburg and to Constan-
tinople ; that the Emperor Nicholas at once declared his
willingness to accept it ; but that the Porte refused to
sign it unless certain modifications were previously intro-
duced ; and that the Emperor of liussia was recommended
by the Four Powers to consent to the introduction of these
modifications, but declined to accept any alteration made
by the Turks in a document which had been originally
prepared by all the great Powers of Europe, and already
accepted by himself.
The question then arose whether the Porte should be
pressed to sign the original Note, under a guarantee of the
great Powers as to the interpretation to be given to it ; and
my recollection is very clear that both Lord Aberdeen and
Lord Clarendon wished to adopt this course, but tliat it
met with strenuous opposition from yourself, and that your
objections were indeed so strong as to lead you to declare
that, should the plan bo persevered in, you would leave
the Cabinet. In fact, I believed that a dissolution of
the Government on tliis ground was only averted by the
publication of the Emperor of Pussia's reasons for refusing
to accept the modifications of the Porte reasons whicli,
showing as they did that he understood the Note in thu
394 APPENDIX.
same sense as the Turks, rendered it impossible to press
further for its signature in a different sense from that in
which it was read both by the Power by which it was to
be sent and the Power by which it was to be received.
There are probably few persons now living who have a
fuller knowledge or a clearer recollection than myself of all
that passed during the long and complicated negotiations
which preceded the Crimean war. My knowledge of all
that passed, both abroad and at home, was ample ; for not
only was I in possession of the most unreserved confidence
of my father (whose private secretary I then was), but both
Sir James Graham and Lord Clarendon, as well as Mr
Gladstone, were in the habit of conversing with me with
entire freedom on the course of public affairs. My recol-
lection of that period is vivid and distinct. Though my
subsequent life has not been inactive, nor I hope altogether
a useless one, my acceptance of colonial employment has
necessarily removed me from any part in transactions of
similar magnitude; nor have I, like yourself and most of the
other actors in those negotiations, been ever since engaged
in great affairs, the increasing pressure of which, as well as
the crowd of important events which have filled the last
twenty years, must necessarily have more or less weakened
the impressions of this bygone time in so far as concerns
matters of detail.
But it is not upon the strength of my own recollection,
however vivid, or on that of my knowledge, however
complete T may believe it to be, that I should have ventured
to question the accuracy of any statement made by you,
were it not that the ample documentary evidence in my
possession completely confirms the correctness of my im-
pressions.
It is no doubt the case that in the first instance you, in
con:mon with the rest of the Cabinet, desired that the
Vienna Note should be pressed upon the acceptanco of the
APPENDIX. 395
Porte. But with respect to this there was no difference of
opinion or of action. On the 29th of July Lord Aberdeen
wrote to Lord Clarendon in the following terms :
* I take for granted that you agree with Lord John in
' not giving to Stratford any option as to the acceptance by
' Turkey of our conditions ; and that you adopt his pro-
' posed declaration. I think it quite necessary that this
' should he clearly understood by Stratford and the Turks.'
Accordingly Lord Clarendon, on the 3d of August,
informed Lord Stratford tliat the Turks 'must' sign the
N'ote ; and when, a fortnight later, under the apprehension
that difficnlties might be made at Constantinople, you
wrote that you thought 'the positive orders given to
' Stratford must produce their effect ; if not, they must be
' repeated and enforced,' Lord Aberdeen observed (August
20) that he * adhered to every syllable ' of your letter. So
far the agreement was perfect ; but when, a few days
afterwards, it was known that the Turks (as it had been
anticipated they would do) had suggested modifications in
the !N'ote, and it became a practical question whether the
acceptance of it in the terms agreed to at Vienna should be
insisted on, you expressed the utmost reluctance to adopt
that course. On the 26th of August Lord Aberdeen wrote
to inform you of the arrival of intelligence that the Turks
desired to introduce alterations into the I^ote. lie ex-
presses a doubt whether the Emperor of Eussia will consent
to them, and says :
' It is just possible that he may yield, and perhaps it may
' be right to make the attempt. Sliould it fail, we are bound
' to make the Turks agree to the terms we have prescribed
or to let them take their own course.'
In this sentiment, however, you did not concur, for you
reply, writing from Eoseneath, on the 30th :
' Hitherto we have shown great forbearance to Eussia.
' It now becomes us to show a similar indulfjenco towards
396 APPENDIX.
* Turkey when she becomes in her turn wilful and wrong-
' headed.'
On the 4th of September Lord Aberdeen recorded his
conviction that ' should the Emperor reject the modiiica-
' tions, the Conference at Vienna must then endeavour to
* make such a joint proposition at Constantinople as ^yill
' induce the Turks to accept the Xote in its original form'
a clear indication of his own views and wishes.
On the 12th of September the news arrived that the
Emperor Kicholas had refused to accept the Turkish
modifications, and at a meeting between Lord Aberdeen,
Lord Clarendon, and Lord Palmerston on the 15th, it was
agreed to urge the Vienna Conference to recommend the
Porte to sign the unmodified Austrian Kote, the Powers
giving to the Porte at the same time an assurance that it
Avas understood by them in a similar sense to that which
it would have more clearly borne had the modifications
been inserted in its text.
The proposal was at once despatched by telegraph to
Vienna. On hearing this you wrote from Eoseneath, on
the 19 th, to Lord Aberdeen :
' The only hope I have is that Turkey may instantly re-
' ject such a j^roposal ; but even that will not wipe away
' the shame of having made it. . . . It is unAvise and
' unfair to propose again a Kote which his [the Sultan's]
' Ministers have declared they can none of them sign. All
' this makes me very uneasy, and if the Austrians agree to
' Clarendon's terms, and forward them to Constantinople,
' I do not see how I can remain a member of your Govern-
' ment.'
You expressed yourself in even stronger terms to Lord
Clarendon ; and in writing again, two or three days later,
to Lord Aberdeen, in amplification of the preceding letter,
you say :
' I had in view the iSJ'ote of Eeschid Pasha, as published
APPENDIX. 397
' in the "Times," in which he says, " Certains paragraphes
' " superflus et incompatibles avec le droit sacr6 du gouver-
' " nement de sa Majeste le Snltan y ayant 6te introduits,
' " la Sublime Porte," &c. ; and again, *' Pas un serviteur de
' " I'auguste famille Imperiale Ottomane n'oserait ni ne serait
' " capable de mettre par 6crit des paroles qui tendraient,"
' &c. I thought and think that if after these declarations
' made public in the face of Europe the Sultan's Minister
' had signed the Vienna Note, he would have signed a totally
' different document from the Note as presented to him ;
' although the words were the same. I could not, there-
' fore, approve of the step you took, though Palmerston
' may have approved, and even suggested it,'
Nevertheless, I believe, from the tenor of my father's
correspondence with Sir James Graham, that even at the
risk of breaking up the Government this plan would have
been pursued, had it not been that, as I have before ob-
served, and as is explained by Lord Aberdeen in a letter
to you of the 22d of September :
'When the Emperor gave his reasons for rejecting the
' modifications, we found that he interpreted the Note in
' a manner quite diff'erent from ourselves, and in a great
' degree justified the objections of the Turks. We could
' not, therefore, honestly continue to give an interpretation
' to the Note, and ask tlio Turks again to sign it, when we
' knew that the interpretation of tlie Emperor was entirely
' diff"erent. The project, in consequence of this, fell to the
* ground. ... I am not at all certain if something of the
' sort might not hereafter be revived with advantage.'
Your rejoinder was : ' If tlic project of having the Note
of Vienna signed by the Sultan's Ministers is ever revived,
as you seem to think likely, I hope I shall hear of it before
it is finally agreed to.'
The reference in your recent volume to an 'Austrian"
Note and its acceptance by the Emperor of Eussia (which
398 APPENDIX.
can only be said of the original Vienna Note) is precise
and unmistakable ; but I have carefully gone through
all the records of the period to see whether any of the
other projects of accommodation, at various times proposed,
received from you any decided support. The only other
ISTote which there was ever any question of urging upon
the Porte's acceptance was one framed towards the middle
of October, by the English and French Governments, and
which it was believed would also be adopted at Vienna.
This JS'ote was very carefully written, and Lord Aberdeen
was extremely anxious that it should be strongly pressed
upon the Porte proposing that the declaration of the
Four Powers, to be made on its presentation, should con-
clude thus :
' It [the Note] has been framed with an anxious regard
' for the interests of the Porte. The objections formerly
' urged against portions of the Vienna Note have been
* considered and effectually removed, and there is nothing
' which can in any degree affect the independence or dignity
* of the Sultan, The Foiu- Powers trust that the Porte will
' duly appreciate their endeavours, and will adopt tliis Note
* as now proposed. Should this unfortunately not be the
' case, they feel it to be their duty to declare that they
' cannot permit themselves, in consequence of unfounded
' objections, or by the declaration of war which they have
' already condemned, to be drawn into the adoption of a
' policy inconsistent with the peace of Europe as well as
' Avith the true interests of Turkey itself. On the other
' hand, the conciliatory spirit evinced by an acceptance of
' the Note, as now proposed, could not fail to secure for the
' Porte, in case of necessity, a more decided support from
' the Four Powers.'
This addition Lord Clarendon pronounced to be ' neces-
' sary,' while 'Mr Gladstone Avrote that he was ' one of those
' who, like Graham, think it indispensable.' The reason
APPENDIX. 399
why Lord Aberdeen did not, however, insist on its adoption
is thus stated by him in writing to Mr Gladstone (October
20):
* Reasonable as it was, I have not thought it prudent to
* adhere to it. I found that Palmerston and Lord John
' were both determined to resist it to the utmost extremity ;
' and I had to consider how far I should be justified in
' creating a breach on such grounds ; for the practical
' question at issue would have been, whether we should
' impose on the Turks the necessity of making no alteration
* whatever in a N"ote which was to be signed by them and
' delivered in their name. To tliose Avho did not know all
' that had passed, such a condition would have appeared
' harsh and unjust ; and I felt that it could not properly be
' made the ground of such an irreconcilable difference in the
' Cabinet.'
Lord Clarendon wrote to you that the declaration was
abandoned, and you replied, October 22: 'Your note has
' given me great satisfaction. I understand from it that a
' power of modification is to be left to Reschid Pasha.*
Both at the time, and ever after, until his death. Lord
Aberdeen's impression certainly was that the views taken by
you of the differences between the Porte and Russia made
it impossible for you conscientiously to support him in
his efforts for peace ; and that had it been otherwise, war
might have been avoided. I find that, just previously to
its commencement (Feb. 28, 1854), he expressed this
feeling to you in the following terms. After stating his
entire concurrence with you on the Reform question, ho
says :
' I wish that I could feel as much at ease on the subject
' of the unhappy war in which we are about to be engaged.
' The abstract justice of the cause, altliough indisputable, is
' but a poor consolation for the int'vital)le calamities of all
' war, or for a decision which T am not without fear may
400 APPENDIX.
' prove to have been impolitic and unwise. My conscience
' upbraids me the more, because, seeing, as I did from the
' first, all that was to be apprehended, it is possible that,
' by a little more energy and vigour, not, indeed, on the
' Danube, but in Downing Street, it might have been
' prevented.'
Your reply (^Nlarch 3) was this :
' The only course which would have prevented wai
' would have been to have counselled acquiescence to the
' Turks. But that was a course to which
',...,...., and . . . . , and I would
' not have consented ; so that you would only have broken
* up your Government, if you had insisted upon it.'
There is certainly no hint here that Avar could have been
avoided had a plan of accommodation recommended by
yourself been adopted by Lord Aberdeen.
My letter is already a long one ; but, as I am writing, I
may as well remark upon another sentence in your recent
publication which may, I think, be misapprehended, and
which to ordinary readers may seem to bear a meaning
which I am certain it was not your intention to convey.
Those who are not, like yourself, aware that Lord Aber-
deen was at all times as eagerly anxious to quit office as
any other man ever was to obtain it, may, I think, imagine
that by your perfectly truthful statement that ' Lord Aber-
' deen told you that after being Prime Minister for a short
' time he meant to make way for you, but somehow the
' moment never came for executing his intentions,' it is in-
tended to imply that Lord Aberdeen, once established in
power, was reluctant to relinquish it, and slow to carry out
the wish he had expressed.
You probably saw at the time the letter written by my
father at the end of 1856 to the Duke of Bedford, in an-
swer to some inquiries made by the Duke upon this sub-
ject ; but it convej's so clear and complete a statement of
APPENDIX.
401
the case that I cannot, I think, do better than copy its
principal sentences :
* From my correspondence with Lord John and personal
' communication in 1852, he must have had no doubt of
' my reluctance to be at the head of the Government and
' of my desire to see him in that position instead of my-
' self, as being in my opinion infinitely better qualified to
' take it. When I found, from the admitted state of public
' opinion at the time and the unwillingness of my own
' friends to listen to any such arrangement, that his appoint-
' ment was impossible, I formed a resolution in my OAvn
' mind that I would take an opportunity, in the event of
' my being placed at the head, of retiring in his favour
' whenever circumstances should permit, and as soon as I
' could do so without breaking up the Government ; for
' this I did not think it would be fair either to tlie Queen
* or to my colleagues to do. I cannot recollect having
' specifically declared this intention to Lord John himself
' before the formation of the Government ; but I think
' that I must have done so to others ; and I have little
' doubt that from the iirst he must have looked to such a
' contingency. At all events I kept it constantly in view
' myself; and in the summer of 1853, when, by the acce])t-
' ance of the Vienna Note, it appeared that tlie difference
' between Russia and Turkey was entirely settled, I thouglit
* the time had come when something might be attempted.
' At that time I had a conversation with Lord John
' in which I very clearly explained to him my views and
' intentions. On submitting the matter to ray friends I
' found that Graham, although unwillingly, acquiesced, and
* I believe he informed Lord John himself to that efi'ect.
' ^ly other friends would not entertain the proposal ; and I
' was compelled to delay any further proceeding, in the
' hope that during the Eecess and before the next Session
of Parliament T miglit by persuasion change their views.
VOL. I. 2 C
402 APPENDIX.
' The members of the Cabinet separated for the summer,
' and the time was not very favourable for personal com-
' munications. Most unfortunately, the Eastern negotia-
' tions "were renewed ; and, as they became more and more
' complicated, we found ourselves, before the meeting of
' Parliament, on the very eve of war. I recollect having
* an explanation with Lord John at the time, and telling
' him that it was impossible for me at such a moment to
' think of running away. In this opinion I thought he
' appeared entirely to acquiesce. After the war had fairly
' commenced I do not think that the subject was ever prac-
' tically discussed between us. . . .
' You say that Lord John thinks he committed an error
' in leaving the Government in the way he did. It is
' certain that a different course might more probably have
* led to the result at which we both wished to arrive.
* Had he supported us against Roebuck's motion, or en-
' abled us in some mode to meet it with success, this might
' have been the case. Clarendon and I had already spoken
' about the possibility of Lord John going to Vienna to
' negotiate on the "Four Points ; " and if I had remained
' at the head of the Government, I can have little doubt
' that peace would have been made. Had the peace been
' confirmed, I might then have irresistibly pressed my pro-
' posed retirement in his favour ; or if the peace had been
' censured, the Government would at least have fallen in a
' cause of which I should have felt proud to the end of my
' days. Instead of this euthanasia, however, I was igno-
' miniously overthrown in consequence of Lord John's
' decision.
'Although I do not deny that I may have felt some
* reason to complain, this step was much more warmly
' resented by my friends than by myself; for in truth it
' made little or no change in my feelings towards Lord
' John. Knowing what he did, it seemed to me not \\n-
APPENDIX. 403
' natural that he might think me too slow and undecided
' in giving effect to my intentions, for I "will not do him
' the injustice of supposing that he ever for a moment
' doubted my sincerity. It is possible, too, that although
' I am convinced that he entered into the Government from
' the most generous and high - minded motives, he may
' have found himself in a somewhat false position, and that
' he may have miscalculated his powers of enduring this
' position with equanimity for any length of time.
' But however this step may have been regarded by my
' friends at the moment, I trust that, seeing how little I
' liave felt it myself, and looking to subsequent events, all
' asperity of feeling is now entirely at an end.
' It gives me the greatest satisfaction to be informed by
' you of the good opinion and friendly feelings of Lord
' John. I can truly say that my conscience tells me that
' I liave done my best to deserve them. I know that he
' has sometimes complained of my want of confidence in
' him, but for this there never was any real foundation.
' Any appearance of the kind was entirely the effect of
' accident, and never of intention. I may, perhaps, my-
' self have thought Lord Jolni over-sensitive, or sometimes
' rash or impracticable. Lut these are trifles. We parted
' with expressions of mutual regard, Avhich on my side
' were perfectly sincere, as I have no doubt they were on
' his. These expressions I am happy in having tlie oppor-
' tunity to renew ; as well as, witli my admiration of his
' great powers and noble impulses, to assure you that I
' shall always feel a warm interest in his rejiutation and
' honour.'
And in another letter (January 11, 1857) to the Duke,
he says :
* I now return the letter from Clarendon, wliich you had
' the goodness to send me, and which I have read witli
' pleasure. I think it takes very much the same view of
404 APPENDIX.
' the matter as I had already stated to you ; and it seems
' to me that you have obtained all the information of
' which the subject is susceptible. It is perfectly true that
' in my daily intercourse with Clarendon he became fully
' aware of all my views, wishes, and intentions ; and that
' he had my entire confidence.
' It is right, however, you should know that, although
' these wishes were strongly entertained and unequivocally
* expressed, they were not the result of any engagement or
' obligation on my part ; but that the whole proceeding
' was perfectly spontaneous and free. It must also be re-
' collected that I always explicitly declared that any steps
' to be taken by me having in view the substitution of
' Lord John as the head of the Government, must have
' the assent of the Cabinet; that I would not agree to
' break up the Administration for this object. !N^ow I am
' bound to say that I met with as much reluctance to en-
' tertain the project from some other members of the
' Cabinet as from those who were more especially con-
' sidered my own friends.
' At all events the war put an end for the time to any
' further practical measures being taken on the subject.
' Situated as we then were, I could only look forward to
' the return of peace as the moment when the attempt to
' carry my wishes into effect might successfully be renewed.
' I did not regard this as a distant prospect ; for, as I
' had most reluctantly entered into the war, I was deter-
' mined, if I remained at the head of the Government,
' that the first reasonable terms of peace within our reach
' should be accepted ; and in this respect I am happy to
' believe that I did not materially differ from Lord John.'
The Duke's reply is :
' You tell me although your wishes were strongly enter-
' tained and unequivocally expressed, they Avere not the
* result of any engagement or obligation on your part, and
APPENDIX. 405
' that the whole proceeding was perfectly spontaneous and
' free. That is precisely my own understanding of the
' case.'
I am sorry to have troubled you at so great a length, hut
jny father's reputation is naturally very dear to me, and I
should much regret that any part of his career should he
exposed to misconstruction through the words of one whose
lightest sayings carry so much Aveight as yours. His name
may not he, like yours, a household word throughout the
country. His fame may not, like yours, he a cherished
possession of which all Englishmen are jealous. Known
comparatively to few, his calm sagacity and his impartial
justice may prohahly never he fully appreciated. But on
that very account I am all the more anxious that his mo-
tives and conduct should not so he represented to the pub-
lic as to be needlessly misunderstood.
Sir James Graham, shortly before his death, thus wrote
to me :
' I do not remember the exact terms used by mo in a
' former letter with regard to cases which might require
' your interposition, and the use of materials even of re-
' cent date, if your father's character and conduct were
' unjustly attacked by any writer or speaker worthy of
' Tiotico. I consider you the accredited guardian of his
' fair fame, and you are armed with weajjons for its defence.
' Let me illustrate my meaning.'
And he goes on to give cases Avhich would ' require in-
' terveiitiou and tlie pul)lication of documents of recent
' date ; and such are the subjects of pressing interests to
' which I referred.' Among these cases, the share of Lord
Aberdeen in the transactions relating to the war, and
the relations existing between him and yourself, are
not omitted.
I hope, therefore, you Avill hold mo excused for thus
])ointing out a misapj^rehension which it appears to mc lias
406 APPENDIX.
crept into your raiud, and an expression wliicli may, I
think, possibly be misconstrued. I am, &c.,
Arthur Gordon
Earl Russell to Sir Arthur Gordox.
Pembroke Lodge, February 1876'.
My dear Sir Arthur, I find that in the sixth chap-
ter, as printed, in my volume of ' Eecollections,' I had
fallen into several errors, through lapse of memory. But
what is worse than this, I have committed an injustice
towards Lord Aberdeen, which I am anxious, as far as
possible, to repair.
I will now endeavour, by the help of the letters which I
have received from you, to trace the course of events which
immediately preceded the breaking out of the war between
Russia on the one side, and Great Britain and France on
the other.
In 1853 the Government of Austria framed a Xote of
conciliation, which was despatched to St Petersburg, to
Constantinople, to London, and to Paris, as a step to the
settlement of all difficulties. Hence arose several questions
of great moment. I will take them in the following order:
First, the reception of the Austrian Note in London ;
next, the reception of the Note at Constantinople.
"What I proposed to Lord Clarendon was, that we should
give no option to Turkey with regard to the acceptance of
the Austrian Note ; that we should propose that Turkey
should assent to the literal acceptance of the Austrian
Note ; and that we should at the same time warn her that
if she did not choose to accept the Austrian Note, both in
words and substance, we could no longer aid her in her
contest with Eussia.
I give a copy of a letter of mine to Lord Clarendon re-
ferring to this proposal :
APPENDIX. 407
Pembroke Lodge, Aiu/. 20, 1853.
' In case I miss you to-day, I will say all I have to say
' on this small bit of paper.
' I think the positive orders given to Stratford must
' produce their effect ; if not, they must he repeated and
' enforced. The Turks must he told that if they will not
' make this moderate concession, which is, after all, scarcely
' more than their own last !N"ote, they must be prepared to
' see the Principalities occupied all the winter, for we can-
' not abet them in their obstinacy.
' On the other hand, the Emperor of Eussia must not
' be permitted to go beyond his present positions. He has
' no case for the invasion of Turkey. If he crosses the
' Danube, our fleet must go to the Bosphorus ; but if he
' remains quiet, holding his material guarantee, he will
' have, before the spring, the diplomatic security he asks.
' The only danger is that the war party in Turkey may
' bring on a war by some imprudence an attack on out-
' posts, or the like. In that case Eussia can hardly be
' kept in leash, and we must take fresh counsel with our
' other three allies,'
Lord Aberdeen had before this time expressed his con-
currence with my proposed declaration. On the 29th of
July he wrote in the following terms to Lord Clarendon :
' I take for granted that you agree with Lord John in
' not giving to Stratford any option as to the acceptance
' by Turkey of our conditions, and tliat you adopt his pro-
posed declaration. I think it (juite necessary that this
' should be clearly understood by Stratford and the Turks.'
Lord Aberdeen observed (August 20) that he ' adhered
' to every syllable ' of my letter namely, the one which I
have just quoted.
"We must now pass to Constantinople. "When tlie Aus-
trian Note arrived there, the Turkish ^Minister understood
408 APPENDIX.
the 'Note as trenching upon the independence of Turkey,
and as establishing a Eussian Protectorate over the Clirist-
ian subjects of the Sultan.
On the 26th of August, Lord Aberdeen wrote to inform
me that the Turks desired to introduce alterations into the
ISTote, and expresses a doubt whether the Emperor of Eussia
will consent to them. He advised that, if the attempt to
do so should fail, ' we are bound to make the Turks agree
' to the terms we have prescribed, or to let them take their
' own course.'
In my reply, dated from Eoseneath on the 30th of
August, I say : ' Hitherto we have shown great forbearance
' to Eussia ; it now becomes us to show a similar indul-
' gence to Turkey, when she becomes in her turn wilful
' and wrong-headed.'
Up to this time Lord Aberdeen had agreed with me, and
I had agreed with Lord Aberdeen ; but from this time I
found it impossible to agree to the course proposed by Lord
Aberdeen, and which Lord Aberdeen himself gives up in a
letter to me of the 22d of September :
* "When the Emperor gave his reasons for rejecting these
' modifications, we found that he interpreted the ISTote in
' a manner quite different from ourselves, and in a great
' degree justified the objections of the Turks. We could
' not, therefore, honestly continue to give an interpretation
' to the ISTote and ask the Turks again to sign it, when Ave
' knew that the interpretation of the Emperor was entirely
' different. The project, in consequence of this, fell to the
' ground. ... I am not at all certain if something of
' the sort might not hereafter be received with advantage.'
The attempt to revise the Austrian !N"ote, or to frame
any declaration which might preserve peace without in any
degree affecting the independence or dignity of the Sultan,
entirely failed. One proposal was approved by three
members of the Cabinet. Lord Aberdeen gives his rea-
APPENDIX. 409
sons for not adhering to it in a letter of the 20th of
October :
* Eeasonable as it was, I have not thought it prudent to
' adhere to it. I found that Palmerston and Lord John
' were both determined to resist it to the utmost extremity,
' and I had to consider how far I should be justified in
' creating a breach on such grounds ; for the practical
' question at issue would have been, whether we should
' impose on the Turks the necessity of making no altera-
' tion whatever in a Xote which was to be signed by them
' and delivered in their name. To those who did not know
' all that had passed, sucli a condition would liave ap2)eared
' harsh and unjust, and I felt that it could not properly be
' made the ground of an irreconcilable difference in the
' Cabinet.'
Thus tlie failure of the attempts to avoid a war between
Great Britain and France on the one side, and Russia on
the other, did not arise from any reluctance of Lord Aber-
deen to insist on the signature of the Austrian Xote by
Turkey, but was owing to an irreconcilable difference be-
tween Lord Palmerston and me on tlie one side, and Lord
xVberdeen and various members of the Cabinet on tlie other.
Tlie Emperor of Kussia was at this time in a state of frenzy,
and would not have been content with anything less tlian
the total destruction of the independence and dignity of
the Sublime Porte.
Some of the friends of Lord Aberdeen seem to have
thought that a sentence in my book was intended to imply
that Lord Aberdeen, once established iu power, was reluc-
tant to relinquish it and slow to carry out tlio wish he had
expressed. Such was never my meaning or my opinion.
I believed, as I believe now, and as I was taught by Sir
James Graham to think, that Lord Aberdeen was unwilling
to retain office as Prime Minister, but that lie was sur-
rounded and beset by colleagues and adherents who couL.l
410 APPENDIX.
not bear that he should give way to me, and thereby favour
views of a more decided character than those of which he
himself was the patron. I believe no man has entered
public life in my time more pure in his personal views, and
more free from grasping ambition or selfish considerations.
I am much grieved that anything I have written should
have been liable to an interpretation injurious to Lord
Aberdeen. I remain yours truly, Russell.
Sir Arthur Gordon to Earl Eussell.
Ascot Wood, February 27.
My dear Lord Eussell, I have been much gratified
by your letter, and you must permit me to express my very
hearty thanks to you for the promptness and fulness with
which you have responded to my appeal ; as well as for the
intention you have intimated to me of correcting in a
future edition of your ' Recollections ' those passages which
are liable to misconstruction.
It is, however, in truth, no more than I expected, for I
felt certain that, when once your attention had been called
to the subject, you would be the first to desire the removal
of all inaccuracy or ambiguity from your pages.
I do not clearly understand with respect to what subject
those 'more decided views' were held which you consider
to have been distasteful to those by whom, in your opinion,
Lord Aberdeen was ' beset.' Xot Reform ; for on that
subject you and Lord Aberdeen were in entire agreement,
Not the War ; for, as has been pointed out, the sugges-
tion tliat he should resign in your favour was made to his
colleagues by Lord Aberdeen at a moment when all danger
of war was supposed to have been averted by the accept-
ance of the Vienna Note.
I must also observe, that although I have 7iamed but
three members of the Cabinet as approving of the suggested
APPENDIX. 411
declaration of October 1853, it would be erroneous to con-
clude from that fact tbat it was approved by those three
members of the Cabinet only.
I cannot conclude without again thanking you for the
kindness and courtesy you have shown me throughout our
communications on this subject. I remain yours very
sincerely, Arthur H. Gordon.
P.S. To those not well acquainted with the history of
the Vienna Note, I think your reference to its origin may
convey the erroneous impression that it was the work of
the Government of Austria alone, and transmitted simul-
taneously by that Government to the different Courts
named ; instead of being, as in fact it was, the joint com-
position of the Governments of England, France, Austria,
and Prussia, subsequently submitted by the Vienna Con-
ference to the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan for ac-
ceptance or rejection.
NOT E V.
Kespkcting the Day on which the Czar and the
Sultan began to be in a State of War.
Some imagined that the state of war began on the 4th of
October the date of the Declaration; but that is a mistake.
It was Lord Stratford who devised the plan of a contingent
declaration of war ('Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 198); and
he, of all men living, would be the least likely to be wrong
as to the time when the state of war began. Eeporting to
the Home Government the effect of the decision of the
Great Council as conveyed to him by Reshid Pasha, Lord
Stratford writes, that ' Omar Pasha will be instructed to
412 APPENDIX.
' resummon Prince Gortscliakoff by letter to evacuate the
' Principalities within fifteen days from the receipt of his
' letter ; that the Princess refusal will he considered as tan-
' tamount to a declaration of war on the part of Russia ;
' that hostilities will be declared thereiqoon by the Porte ;
' that all persons now here in the employment of Russia
' will then be requested to withdraw ; and, finally, that all
' merchant vessels under Russian colours M'ill also be re-
' quired to leave the port of Constantinople.' ('Eastern
' Papers,' part ii. p. 151.) After the 4th of October, and at
a time when the state of war was erroneously supposed to
have begun, the Turkish Government was sending to Prince
Gortschakoif the summons devised by Lord Stratford a
summons which the Sublime Porte described as ' the last
' expression of its pacific sentiments.' (Ibid. }). 154.) The
mistake Avas sustained by a notion that the postponement
of hostilities applied only to ' hostilities on the Danube ; '
but Lord Stratford's despatch of the 21st of October shows
that not only on the Danube, but on the Asiatic frontiers
the attack was to be ' immediately after the e^-piration of
' the fifteen days.' (Ibid. p. 198.) At one time, the Turk-
ish Ministers set up a theory that, as Prince Gortschakoff's
answer (dated the 10th of October) was virtually a refusal,
the term offered by the summons was brought to a close on
that day the 10th (ibid. p. 198) ; but the very fact that
they Avere discussing with Lord Stratford this question
about the state of war beginning on the 10th, shows con-
clusively that neither they nor Lord Stratford had any
notion of its having begun on the 4th of October.
APPENDIX. 413
ADVERTISEMENTS TO PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
ADYERTISE:\rENT TO SECOND EDITIOX.
A FEW notes liave been added to this edition, but not a
word of the text lias been chan^red.
ADVERTISEMEXT TO THIRD EDITIOX.
The reason \vliicli made it a duty to withhold some portions
of the Despatch (jf the 29th of June has ceased to operate,
and the Despatch is now given entire.
Some notes have been added, and some passages con-
taiiu'il in the second volume have been moved ini to other
parts of the same chapter;* but not a word has l)een
withdrawn from the text, and not a word has ])ecu added
to it.
tSincc the publicati(~)n of the first edition, T have been
engaged in a great deal of discussion with luilitarv men on
the subject of transactions in which they bore a jiart. This
iliscussion has been laborious; but tlie result of it is satis-
* Tlir cxint extrnt to wliii'Ii tills has Ivcii iloiic is shown in tlir
Direction, )>. xlviii. .V. />'. Tlio I'orcu'oinLT jiart of tliis footnote was
attaclnil to the " advert isenient " .as orii,'innlly published, and re-
ferred, of course, to a pa^e iu the tliird edition.
414 APPENDIX.
factory ; for it entitles me to believe that none of tlie
officers I speak of are now at variance with me upon any
grave matters of fact ; and yet (as will be seen, I think,
from the purport and from the scantiness of the very few
notes now appended) I have been able to stand fast to the
tenor of the narrative as given in the first and second
editions. It was in the nature of things than an honest
comparison of the impressions of several eyewitnesses
should throw more and more light upon the matters to
which it related ; but the farther and more minute facts
thus brought to my knowledge have not proved to be of
such a kind as to contravene the narrative. On the con-
trary, their tendency has been to elucidate its meaning,
and to strengthen its outlines. So, by merely inserting a
few foot-notes, I have been able to give to the public the
fruit of the discussion which has been going on, and to do
this, as I have already said, Avithout resorting to the plan
of withdrawing any words from the text.
ADVERTISEMENT TO FOURTH EDITION.
Ix this edition many notes have been added ; and there is
a sentence in the second volume which has been moved
forward to a page further on. The spelling of the names
of several English officers, and of one foreigner, has been
corrected. Not a word has been withdrawn from the text,
and not a word has been added to it.
Of the notes, there are some few which correct or
qualify the words of the text. Eor a book which chances
to be a subject of controversy, this way of setting right
all mistakes is, I think, the fairest and best. Far from
hiding the mended spot, it makes the newly-found truth
more conspicuous than it would have been if it had been
APPENDIX. 415
allowed to glide quietly into the text. For example : In
one of the lists of wounded officers, I or my printers
chanced to leave out the name of Colonel Smith. Upon
the omission becoming known to me, I attached to the
passage a mark of reference, which seizes the eye of the
reader and carries him to the foot of the page, where
instantly he sees it stated that Colonel Smith Avas one of
the wounded. In this way the omitted fact is presented
to the reader more effectually than it would have been if
the word * Smith ' had been blended with the text, stand-
ing there with thirteen other names.
Eut also, by this method, I acknoAvledge and publicly
record against myself every single inaccuracy, however
minute and trivial, Avhich had struck me as requiring
correction Avhen last I went through the book. "Whether
I could have been so venturesome as to do thus, if the
emendations required had been many and important, I will
not undertake to say. As it is, I am enabled to take this
method of courting any criticism which may be founded
upon my confessions of error.
The plan, therefore, is a fair one ; but it is also, I think,
very needful to adopt it, and I Avill say why.
Tlio book is undergoing discussion ; and in order that
the conflict it raises may be honestly Avaged, it seems right
to take care that the subject of dispute shall not be a
shifting thing a thing shifting this way and tliat under
stress of public scrutiny.
Again, there is a charge noA\^ ponding. Eightly or
Avrongly, the accusers say that in public journals in
journals still sold under honourable titles the Avriters
are noAV and then suffered to misstate the tenor of books ;
and it seems that the printed accounts Avhich have been
given of this Avork are put forAA'ard as some of the instances
in Avhich misdescription has occurred. I have not myself
taken the pains Avhich would Avarrant mo in declaring a
416 APPENDIX.
resemblance, or a want of resemblance, between the book
and its likenesses ; but knowing that the charge has been
brought, I see it to be right that all those who are called
upon to judge the question should have before their eyes
the very text of a book which is the subject of the alleged
misdescriptions the very text with all its sins and wicked-
nesses, not having one single word added, nor one single
word withdrawn
But, besides his reasons for the course he is taking, a
man may have his motive ; and I acknowledge that, with
me, a chief motive for declining to alter the text is this :
I wish to keep a check upon those who might like to be
able to say that I had materially altered the book. If any-
body shall try to say such a thing in defiance of the plan
I have adopted, he will find himself painfully tethered ;
for, the words of the text standing fast, he will be unable
to range beyond the circle of those little matters matters
chiefly minute, and of detail which are dealt with in a
few corrective foot-notes. Either he must say what is not
true under circumstances which make his exposure a simple
task, or else he will have to browse upon such scant herb-
age as is aflForded by notes of this sort : ' Xo [not a squa-
' dron] ; only one troop.' * oSTo [not sixty-six years old] ;
' only sixty-four.' ' Here the words " Laurence and " should
' be inserted.' 'Instead of "a wing," read ''the whole."'
The first of the commentators who found himself checked
in this way was thrown into so angry a state, that when I
stood observing his struggles, I was glad to think of the
prudence which had led me to keep him tied up.
I said just now that some of the writings which pur-
ported to give the tenor of these volumes had been put
forward as instances of unfaithful description. I have not
enabled myself to assist this inquiry by comparing the
accounts of things contained in the book with the book
itself; and it is not desirable for me to do so, because an
APPENDIX. 417
author can hardly expect to be looked upon as a good judge
of what is, or is not, an honest abridgment or statement of
his words ; but I may be allowed to adduce two curious
instances of the errors into which men may be led by look-
ing to the accounts which have been given of a book instead
of to the book itself.
On the 15th of February, a stranger, who had been pre-
sent at the battle of the Alma, addressed to me a letter
from a distant foreign station, which began thus : ' Sir,
' It has not been yet my good fortune to see a copy of your
' recent . . . work, the "Invasion of the Crimea," but a
' critique upon it in the ' (here the Avriter of the letter
gives the name of his newspaper) 'of the 27th of January
' last, purporting to give an outline of some parts of the
' narrative, contains an assertion, made Avith reference to a
' description of the battle of the Alma viz., that under
* the fire sustained by Lord Kuglan's Headquarter Staff,
' " not a man of it received a scratch," which I take to
' be incorrect.'
The writer proceeds to state, with admu-able clearness,
the circumstances which enabled him to speak as an eye-
witness of Avhat went on with the Headquarter Staflf, and
tlien says : ' I presume to detail these particulars, in order
' to show, sir, that having tlius, like yourself, taken jiart
' in, and been an eyewitness of, the movements of the
' Staff on the memorable day referred to, I may venture to
' point out how far the statement as to the Staff havmg
* come out of it scathless seems to be inaccurate ; ' and the
writer then })ruceeds to prove to me, with great clearness
and perspicuity, that on the two spots of ground wliich he
rightly and carefully describes, two officers of the Head-
quarter Staff Avere wounded.
Supposing tliat his newspaper was guiding him faith-
fully, well indeed might this critic remonstrate with me
for the inaccuracy of which he had been led to suppose me
VOL. I. 2D
418 APPENDIX.
guilty, because the Staff, so far from coming off scathless,
had been more than decimated. "VYlien my correspondent
at that foreign station shall see the book itself, he will
know that I disclose this fully, giving the names of the
two wounded officers ; and, indeed, it would have been
strange if I had omitted to do so, for Leslie and "Weare,
the two Staff officers wounded, were both of them struck
down on the part of the field where I was, and one of them
fell within a few paces of me.
Thus, then, it appears that even a careful and accurate
man who has to put up with his newspaper's account of a
book, at a time when he remains debarred from access to
the book itself, is so misled by this method of seeking for
the real purport of a volume that he thinks it his duty to
address the author with a view to correct a gross error a
gross error not existing in the book itself, but appearing to
do so in the mind of one who receives his account of it
from a newspaper.
On the 18th of March last, another letter was written,
which I doubt not to be also an instance of the effect pro-
duced upon a mind of fair intelligence by accounts purport-
ing to give the tenor of a book. When Captain Mends
thought it his duty to address his letter to the newspaper
about the buoy, he introduced the subject by writing, and
suffering to be printed and published, the following words :
' As I have been referred to by many as to the truth of
' Mr Kinglake's statement in his "Invasion of the Crimea,"
' " that the landing of our army at Old Fort was materially
' '' delayed by the wilful displacement of a buoy by the
' " French," I feel called upon in justice,' &c. l^ow Cap-
tain Mends not only made that statement, but suffered it
to be printed in the newspaper with inverted commas, ex-
actly as given above. "Well, those words are not in the
book. Kot only is there no such passage in the book
not only is there no assertion that ' material delay was oc-
APPENDIX. 419
' casioned by the wilful displacement of the buoy by the
' French ' but the book actually makes light of the delay,
saying that there was ' much less delay, and much less con-
fusion, than might have been expected ; ' and, far from un-
dertaking to assert that the displacement of the buoy was
wilful, it goes out of its way to suggest that one of the
hypotheses which would account for the displacement was
' sheer mistake.' I cannot doubt that Captain Mends in-
tended to quote accurately ; and I account for his mistake
by supposing that, instead of copying from the book itself
he must have been induced to give what purported to be a
quotation, by taking his words from one of those printed
representations of the contents of the book which, were cur-
rent at tlie time when he wrote his letter to the news-
paper.
I repeat that I have done notliing towards that collation
of passages which is necessary for determining whether any
given account of the tenor of the book is an account given
in good faith ; but it struck me that the above two in-
stances of men who trusted to printed versions of the con-
tents of the book, instead of to the book itself, might possibly
help the inquiry, and could hardly fail to serve as whole-
some examples.
In the general controversy which the book has engen-
dered I am not taking part ; but having in my hands large
means of proof and disproof, I ought, of course, to aid to-
wards the attainment of right conclusions upon disputed
matters of fact ; and it is only with that view that I am
now going to speak not of the nature and spirit, but
of the mere abundance of the scrutiny which the book lias
undergone.
The book treated of such subjects, and of a time so little
removed from the present, that there were great numbers
of public men ministers, diplomatists, and military and
naval officers who were not only likely to have strong
420 APPENDIX.
motives for narrowly scrutinising the accuracy of the nar-
rative, but were able to speak upon some or one of the
subjects it touches with the authority of partakers or eye-
witnesses. Thence, as was to be expected, there were ad-
dressed to me a quantity of communications, some personal,
and some by letter. In these communications, the speakers
and writers pointed out what they deemed to be errors or
omissions. In almost every instance they made their re-
presentations with great precision, and with a strikingly
rigid adherence to the subject-matter.*
But, besides the authoritative criticism of those numbers
of men who had been actors in the scenes described, there
was the criticism of the periodical press. This was applied
to the book, both at home and abroad ; and so diligently,
that already the w^orks of the commentators must be many
times greater in bulk than the original book. Of the pub-
lications which yielded these floods of comment, there were
some whose conductors trusted mainly to public sources for
the information on which they rested, but there were other
conductors of reviews and newspapers who placed them-
selves under the guidance of some public man some min-
ister, some soldier, some sailor who had been what is
called "an actor in the 'scene.'" The criticism resulting
from this last method Avas of a composite sort, for it more
or less covertly uttered the notions of some public man
whose reputation was at stake, but expressed them in the
name of the journal through whom he addressed the public.
* I include in this category of communications from individuals
some few wliicli also appeared in print ; as, for instance, one about
the age of Sir George Brown, and the way he carried his plumes
another about the exact rank with which Colonel Codrington went
out and one or two more of a less important kind; but I do so
rightly, because these communications had reached me hefore the
time when they got published. I also include in this category the
communication from Colonel Norcott, because, though his letter ap-
peared in a newspaper, it was a letter addressed to me.
APPENDIX. 421
From causes to which I need not advert, the commentaries
were delivered, not only with great animation and zeal, but
with a persistency not often applied to the criticism of one
mere book. Dihgence of the most varied kinds was brought
to bear ; for since the book involved politics as well as his-
tory, it fairly enough became the subject not merely of
reviews, but also of what they call 'articles;' and seeing
that it touched things abroad, correspondents employed by
the conductors of newspapers in foreign capitals were en-
couraged or suffered to remit their daily toil of gathering
' news,' and take part for a time with their colleagues at
home in finding something to say about tliis book. Finally,
it was made to appear, that if an officer would submit to
the condition of writing to a newspaper, and would begin
his letter with a criticism upon the book of a kind approved
by the managers, he might append to his comments a nar-
rative of his own achievements, with the certainty that
his own account of his own deeds would be read in one day
by thousands and thousands of people.
It may be imagined that the immense body, both of
authoritative and anonymous criticism, thus brought to
bear upon one book, could hardly fail to show that mis-
takes had crept in hero and there ; but if any reader shall
take the pains to separate from the bulk of the notes every
sentence which puts right an error, he will be able to judge
and say whether the corrections are many and important,
or whether tliey are scanty and slight.
re that as it may, I must state that, with the exceptions
which I shall presently enumerate, I owe all these correc-
tions to the pu])lic men and olliccrs who have done me the
honour to communicate with me either personally or by
letter.
For reasons of larger scope than tliose Avhich only apply
to the questioned worth of a book, the public, I imagine,
lias an interest in knowing what impression has been made
422 APPENDIX.
upon these volumes by the exertions of the periodical press.
Certainly my own reading of the criticisms brought to bear
on the book has been not only very imperfect, but has been
conducted without method ; and although I have taken
other means besides my own scanty reading for learning
what statements of mine upon matters of fact have been
disputed in respectable publications, I cannot be sure, nor
even indeed imagine, that I have dealt with every contra-
diction upon matters of fact which has been taken in print
to my statements. All I can say is, that when last I went
through these volumes I did not knowingly pass by any
error ; and it must be remembered that there is this safeguard
namely, that every public writer whose challenge upon a
matter of fact I may have failed to notice, will not only be
able to exclaim against me for my neglect of his strictures,
but will even be likely to do so, because it is according to
nature that any critic who may have taken pains to give to
a book this kind of antagonistic assistance should be loth
to see his industry wasted.
!N'ow, then, to speak of the corrections upon matters of
fact which I owe to the periodical press. In writing a
book of this kind, one naturally glances at many things
which are not in strictness the subject of the History.
Thus, before I came to the time when their actions brought
them strictly within the range of this narrative, I glanced
at the antecedent career of several public men, and in re-
ferring to those ' tidings from the Danube,' which I spoke
of as stirring the public mind in England, I suffered myself
to linger awhile on the ground whence the tidings had
come. Well, in the course of those retrospective glances,
I treated Lord Stratford's antecedent absence from Constan-
tinople as lasting full double the number of months that
it really did ; I said that, in 1836, St Arnaud entered for
the third time into 'the military profession,' when I ought
rather to have said that he entered for the third time
APPENDIX. 423
' upon the career of an officer serving with troops ; ' I
spoke of Lieutenant Glyn and his seamen as coming up
from the sea with some gunboats, whereas I ought to have
said that the gunboats they used at Giurgevo were lying
in the river beforehand ; and, finally, I spoke of General
Airey as returning from Canada to England upon the
death of his uncle, whereas I ought to have said that
he came back some months before. These four mistakes
were pointed out, the first three of them by respectable
English journals, and the fourth by an American news-
paper. So far as concerns my retrospective glances at
things not falling within the strict limits of the History,
these are, I think, all the corrections which I owe to the
zeal of the press.
Well, but what impression has public criticism made
upon the rest of the book ? "What (properly) historical
errors have owed their correction to the vigilance of the
periodical press ?
They are as follows : ' Garan ' should be ' Gagarin ; '
Captain ' Schane * should be Captain ' Schaw ; ' ' Lux-
' more ' should be ' Luxmoore ; ' ' Bisset ' should be
' Bissett ; ' ' Woolcombe ' should be * Wollocombe ; '
' ^Montagu ' should be ' Montague.' *
For these corrections I am indebted to the conductors
of au eminent English newspaper. t
* The, press also sugf^ested four perfectly just corrections in regard
to the following matters : The rank with which Colonel Codrington
went out ; the wrongly-spelt name of ' Stacey ; ' the omission of
Colonel Smith from the list of wounded ; the misspelling which gave
' Wardlow ' instead of ' Wardlaw ; ' and the error about Sir George
Brown's exact age, and the way he carried his plumes ; but these
corrections had been previously supplied to me by means of private
communication, and it is for that reason that I do not place them in
the above enumeration of the corrections which I owe to the periodi-
cal press.
t The misspelling of the name of ' Garan * for ' Gagarin ' was
424 APPENDIX.
I -will repeat that there may, and there must be, numbers
of printed challenges upon questions of fact with which I
have not become acquainted ; and there may be others
which I have heard of and forgotten ; but the above, I
believe, are the only corrections supplied by the periodical
press which I have hitherto seen fit to adopt.
What then did I do with all the rest of those charges of
error in matter of fact which were brought against me by
the press? "Well, I looked through the book, and where
I observed a statement which I knew at the time to have
been denied, I did this : By a note at the foot of the page
where a challenged assertion occurred, I supplied a sufficing
portion of the proofs by which I supported my statement.
Of the soundness and cogency of the proofs thus produced,
it will be for the public to judge. They are all, or nearly
all, documentary.
But, besides the unnumbered strangers and friends who
have addressed to me private communications on the con-
tents of the book, and besides the whole host of those who
speak to the public through the medium of the periodical
press, there is one persistent scrutiniser who (so far as
concerns all questions of dry fact) has hitherto proved
more formidable than all. He alone nas succeeded in
proving that, here and there, there is a mistake slight
enough perhaps in itself, but occurring in a place where,
to point to it, is to fix upon the part of the narrative in
which it appears, a small, yet ugly blemish. For some
years this caviller took an interest in the progress of the
book, and it is believed that he still wishes well to it ; but
in his determination to insist upon strict accuracy without
the least regard for the flow of the narrative, he is steadfast
pointed out by the correspondent of the newspaper acting at Con-
stantinople. The other misspellings of names were indicated in one
of the many reviews of the hook which appeared in the same jour-
naL
APPENDIX. 425
and pitiless, "What makes his scrutiny so formidable is,
that without the least merit on his part he has chanced
to become possessed nay, is every day becoming more
and more possessed of the knowledge, the constantly
accruing knowledge, which enables him to find fault Avith
effect. This persistent, implacable critic is no other than
the author himself.
Of the Avay in Avhich I break in and find fault with the
book wherever truth bids me do so, I can best speak by
giving a single example. Guided by Sir Colin Campbell's
narrative of the operations of his brigade at the Alma, I
narrated the advance of the 79th Highlanders against the
flank of a Russian column then marching across its front,
and catching animation from that strangely kindling
power with which Lord Clyde used to speak of these
scenes I said that the 79th 'sprang at the flank' of the
Russian column. I never knew of anybody except myself
who ever found fault with the accuracy of the sentence.
But it happened that, long after the publication of the
book, and for a purpose having nothing to do with the
movement in question. Lord Clyde, one day, brought me a
paper, written by an officer of the 79th, and containing
more minute details of the advance of the regiment than
liad previously come to my knowledge. From these
(lotails I gathered that, although the 79th had advanced
exactly in the direction I described, and against the flank
of the Russian battalions then marching across its front, it
had advanced more deliberately than T had supposed. I
no sooner read this than I felt that my expression, ' sprang
at the flank,' indicated a greater swiftness of attack than
was consistent with the liare truth, and therefore ncede<l
to be qualified. Lord Clyde did not agree with me ; he
thought the expression sufllciently accurate, and depre-
cated the notion of my qualifying the words ; but T was
steadfast in my determination to show wliat T myself
426 APPENDIX.
judged to be the very truth, and therefore it is that, by a
qualifying note, I wilfully mar and deface the sentence to
which I appended it. This is only one example of the
rigour with which the book is treated by its author.
And here I may say that, in order to substantiate dis-
puted statements, I have not been always obliged to reopen
the stores of information on which I founded my assertions.
In many, and I think in most instances, I was saved the
need of going back to papers long out of my sight, by the
firm love of justice which brought men who had observed
that I was wrongly contradicted to come forward of their
own accord and lay before me the private letters and jour-
nals of eyewitnesses in support of the statements I had
made. Of the written documents on which I based the
narrative, I can say that, for the most part, I have hitherto
kept them in reserve.
Until after the publication of the book, I think I Avas as
much inclined as the generality of men to be doubtful of
the possibility of getting very close to historical truth; and
I knew, of course, that the occurrences of a battle-field are
especially hard to seize ; but I must acknowledge that the
supply of fresh confirming proof by which I now find my-
self supported, has done something towards lessening any
tendency I had towards this kind of historical scepticism.
"When the first edition of the book was published, I had
never seen the private journal and letters of Colonel Hood,
the ofiicer who commanded the Grenadier Guards at the
Alma, nor the clear and straightforward narrative of Sir
Charles Eussell, of the same regiment. I was without that
letter of Colonel Percy of the same regiment, to which (as
will be gathered from the notes) I attach great worth. I
had never seen that journal of Colonel Annesley of the
Fusilier Guards, which tells me the story so naturally and
so well, that to glance through the written words is more
like listening than reading. I had never seen the rough,
APPENDIX. 427
lifelike letters of Colonel Yea, nor the short telling letter
of Colonel Aldworth. Yet when all this authentic testi-
mony of eyewitnesses is laid before me, I find it confirm-
ing what I had asserted in print some months before. See-
ing this, I cannot but think that even in the battle-field
there is truth, after all, to be found.
If I might be suffered to press this view for a moment
more by giving a chosen instance of the way in which it
applies to my own narrative, I would venture to speak of
one only amongst those several pieces of testimony by which
I now support my account of the operations of the Grena-
dier Guards at the Alma. I support what I say of the
battalion by giving extracts from the journal and private
letters of its honoured chief, Colonel Hood. These extracts
correspond so closely with the tenor of the narrative, that
the reader would be likely to say, ' That journal and
' those letters were evidently the authority on which the
' author based his account of the operations of the Grona-
' dier Guards.' It is, however, a fact, that I never saw the
journal, nor the letters, and never knew anything of their
tenor, until after the publication of the first and second
editions of this book. It was then that Mrs Grosvenor
Hood (the widow of him whose achievement on the banks
of the Alma had won so largo a share of my attention) re-
solved to give mo fresh means of substantiating the narra-
tive, by placing in my hands the treasured words which
were written to her from the banks of the Alma.*
* This she did with the full approval of Lord Hood, the present
head of the family. I may here say (though I thiuk I have eleaily
explained it in the foot-note), that the order with respect to which
Colonel Hood wrote, ' Thank God I disobeyed ! ' was not an order
given by the Divisional General H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge.
Colonel Hood had been directed by General Bentinck to conform to
any movements on his left, and it was only by being applied to the
event which afterwards happened viz., the temporary retreat of the
Fusilier Guards that General Bentinck's order became in effect an
order directing Colonel Hood to retreat.
428 APPENDIX.
IS'ow, wlieii it is seen that I make a series of statements
of statements planted thick with particulars in regard
to the operations of a given battalion at the Alma, and that,
after the publication there comes to light a private record
written on the field of the battle by the officer -who com-
manded the battalion a record confirming almost sentence
by sentence the account I give in my narrative, it is
plainly a sound deduction to say, that the coincidence be-
tween the two accounts must result from the accuracy of
both. But I venture to think that an inference of wider
scope than that may fairly be drawn ; for surely in the
mind of anybody who shall be seeking after truth with the
aid of accustomed principles, the appearance of new and
confirmatory proofs of this sort will not only establish the
particular assertion to which he finds them appended, but
will even tend to strengthen his trust in other parts of the
book.
ADVERTISEMENT TO PUBLICATION COMPRISING
THE FIFTH EDITION
OF Volumes I. and II., and the Third Edition
OF Volumes III. and IV.
The text still remains unaltered.
A. W. K.
1874.
PRINTKB BY WILLIAM BLArKWOOD AND SONS
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A Family Tour romid the Coasts of Spain and
Portugal during the Winter of 1860-61. Post 8vo, 5s.
Rev. JOHN EAGLES, A.M., Oxon.
Essays. Originally published in ' Blackwood's
Magazine.' Post 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Contents : Church Music, and other Parochials. Medical attendance, and
other Parochials. A few Hours at Hampton Court. Grandfathers and
Grandchildren. Sitting for a Portrait. Are there not Great Boasters
among us ? Temperance and Teetotal Societies. Thackeray's Lectures :
Swift. The Crystal Palace. Civilisation : the Census. The Beggar's
Legacy.
The Sketcher. Originally published in ' Black-
wood's Magazine.' 8vo, 10s. 6d.
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that ought to be found in the studio of every Englisli landscape-painter.
. . . More instructive and suggestive readintrs for young artists, especially
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WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. 13
GEORGE ELIOT.
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The Mill on the Floss. With Illustrations.
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Scenes of Clerical Life. With Illustrations.
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Silas Marner. With Illustrations. 2S. 6d.,
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Felix Holt. With Illustrations. 33". 6d., cloth.
Middlemarch : A Sttidy of English Provincial
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Daniel Deronda. Complete in 4 vols. C7^own
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tion at the basis of the poem, and the finish and power with which it is worked
out and adorned." ^Spectator.
Wise, Witty, a7id Tender Sayings, in Prose and
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Edition, 6s.
" But undoubtedly George Eliot is the only woman of our time whose writ-
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A Booh of Common Order : Being Forms of
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14 LIST OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY
ALEXANDER CHARLES EWALD, F.S.A.
The Crown and its Advisers : Or, Queen, Minis-
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"A commendable attempt to explain in simple and popular language the
machinery of the English Government." PaZi Mall Gazette.
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The Late PROFESSOR FERRIER.
Philosophical Works. New Edition. Edited
by Sir Alex. Grant, Bart., D.C.L., and Professor Lushington. 3 vols,
crown 8vo, 34s. 6d.
Institutes of Metaphysic. Third Edition, los. 6d.
Lectures on the Early Greek Philosophy. Second
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Early Greek Philosophy. 2 vols., 24s.
Field- Map, Lothians Hunt; with List of the
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nearest Railway Stations. Bound in leather, 5s.
The Late GEORGE FINLAY, LL.D., Athens.
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717. A Historical View of the Condition of the Greek Nation from its
Conquest by the Romans imtil the Extinction of the Roman Power in
the East. Second Edition, 16s.
History of the Byzantine Empire. a.d. 716
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History of the Greek Revolution. 2 vols. Zvo,
1, 4s.
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The history of Greece is but half told without it." London Guardian.
"His work is therefore learned and profound. It throws a flood of light
upon an important though obscure portion of Grecian history. ... In
the essential requisites of fidelity, accuracy, and learning, Mr Finlay bears a
favourable comparison with any historical writer of our day." North Ameri-
can Review,
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. 16
CHARLES STUART FORBES,
Commander, E.N.
The Campaign of Garibaldi in the Two Sicilies :
A Personal Narrative. Post 8vo, with Portraits, 12s.
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baldians just published by M. Dumas." Examiner.
PROFESSOR FLINT.
The Philosophy of History in Eitrope. Vol. /.,
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8vo, 15s.
HUGH FRASER.
Handy Book of Ornamental Cofiifers, and of
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and containing Useful Hints for their successful Cultivation. Crown
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A Dictionary of the Gaelic Langtiage. Coni-
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prefixed a Compendium of Gaelic Grammar. Compiled and publislied
under the directiou of the Highland Society of Scotland. 2 vols, quarto,
cloth, 5, 5s.
JOHN GALT.
Annals of t lie Parish.
The Provost.
Sir Andrczu JVylic.
The Entail, or the Laird of Grippy.
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16 LIST OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE CHURCH OF
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The Great Problem: Can it be Solved?
In 8vo, lOs. 6d.
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minds." English Churchman.
" We sincerely recommend the book, which, if it does not contain anything
strikingly original, at least sums up with force and clearness the main con-
siderations which almost compel a belief in the substantial truth of Christ's
mission and teaching." Spectator.
The Subaltern. Originally published in ' Black-
wood's Magazine.' Library Edition. Revised and Corrected, with a
New Preface. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.
"The volume, though as interesting as any novel, is in all respects the
actual record of its author's own experience, and it is in fact the day-to-day
Journal of a young officer who embarked at Dover with his battalion in 1813,
joined Lord Wellington's army a few days before the storming of San Sebas-
tian, just as the French, under Soult, were being driven back through the
Pyrenees on to their own soil, and had his share of tlie fighting on the
Bidassoa. . . . We must not omit to notice tlie new preface which gives
an additional interest to tlie present issue of 'The Subaltern,' and wliich
recounts the present-day aspect of the tract of country where were fought the
last battles of the PeninsuJ.ar War." The Times.
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AXD SOKS. 17
GOETHE.
Faust. Translated into English Verse by
Theodore Martin. Second Edition, post 8vo, 6.s. Cheap Edition,
fcap., 3s. 6d.
" The Lest translation of ' Faust' in verse we have yet had in England."
Spectator.
" Mr Theodore Martin's translation is unqnestionablj' the best in the lan-
guage, and will give to English readers a fair idea of the greatest of modern
poems." Press.
Poems and Ballads of Goethe. Translated by
Professor Aytoun and Theodore Martin. Second Edition, fcap. 8vo, 6s.
" There is no doubt that these are the best translations of Goethe's marvel-
lously-cut gems which have yet been published." The Times.
COLONEL E. B. HAMLEY, C.B.,
Commandant of the Staff College.
The Operations of War Explained a7id Illustrated.
Third Edition, 4to, witli numerous Illustrations, 30s.
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Times.
" On all matters relating to the practice of the profession, it forms the most
perfect book of reference that has been published.' United Service Magazine.
The Sto7y of the Ca?npaign of Sebastopol. Writ-
ten in the Camp. With Illustrations drawn in Cami) by tlie Author.
8vo, 21s.
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it ])aying the gallant author too higli a compliment to class this maslerjiiece
of military history with tlie most jirecions of those classic records which have
been bequeathed to us by the great writers of antiquity who took part in the
wars they have described." The Press.
Wellingtons Career ; A Military and Political
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its wide, kindly sympathies and delicate fancy, will lielp it on." Sjhctiitor.
18 LIST OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY
GENERAL SIR HOPE GRANT.
Incidents in the China War of i860. Compiled
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By Henry KnoUys, Captain Royal Artillery ; Author of ' From Sedan to
Saarbruck,' and Editor of Sir Hope Grant's ' Incidents in the Sepoy
War.' Crown 8vo, with Maps^ 12s.
Incidents in the Sepoy War ^1857-58. Compiled
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E. A. Crown 8vo, with Map and Plans, 12s.
PHILIP GILBERT HAMERTON,
Author of ' A Painter's Camp,' &c.-
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shire Life. New Edition, crown 8vo, 6s.
SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., D.C.L.
Lectures on Metaphysics. Edited by the Rev. H.
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Professor of Logic and Khetoric, Glasgow. Fifth Edition. 2 vols. 8vo,
24s.
Lectiires on Logic. Edited by Professors Mansel
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Discussions oji Philosophy and Literature, Edtt-
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Memoir of Sir William Hamilton, Dart. By
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" Professor Veitch has succeeded in blending the domestic with the intel-
lectual life of Sir W. Hamilton in one graphic picture, as biographers rarely
do succeed." Saturday Review.
CAPTAIN THOMAS HAMILTON.
Ann.als of the Peiiinsular Campaigns. A New
Edition, Edited by P. Hardman, 8vo, 16s. Atlas of Maps to illustrate
the Campaigns, 12s.
Men and Manners in A ineiHca. Second Edition.
With Portrait of the Author. Fcap., 7s. 6d.
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. 19
The Handy Horse-Book : or, Practical Instrtic-
tion.s in Riding, Driving, and the General Care and Management of
Horses. By "Magenta." A New Edition, with 6 Engravings, 4s. 6d.
"As cavalry officer, hunting horseman, coach-proprietor, whip, and steeple-
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"He propounds no theories, but embodies in simple untechnical language
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The Treatment of our Domesticated Dogs. By
the Same. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d.
Rev. J. B. HARBORD, M.A.,
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A Glossary of Navigation. Cotttaining the Defni-
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Defjiitions and Diagrams in Astronomy and
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Short Sermons for Hospitals and Sick Seamen.
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LADY FLORA HASTINGS.
Poems. Edited by Her Sister, the late Mar
chionesa of Bute. Second Edition, with a Portrait. Fcap., 7s. 6d.
The Right Rev. DR GEORGE HAY,
Bishop of Edinburgh.
Works. Edited under the Supervision of the
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TJic Sincere Christian Instructed in the Faith of
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20 LIST OP BOOKS PUBLISHED BY
MRS HEMANS.
The Poems of Felicia Hemans. Complete in One
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The following Works of Mrs Hemans are sold separately, bound in cloth,
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Records of Woman.
Forest Sanctuary.
Songs of the Affections.
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Tales and Historic Scenes.
Moral and Religious Poems.
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The Rev. S. REYNOLDS HOLE.
A Book about Roses : Hozv to Groii:; and Show
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The Field.
"A very captivating book, containing a great deal of valuable information
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Journal of Horticulture.
HOMER.
The Odyssey. Tra?islated into English Verse in
the Spenserian Stanza. By Philip Stanhope Worsley. Third Edition,
2 vols, fcap., 12s.
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He has placed in the hands of English readers a poem which deserves to out-
live the present generation." Edinburgh Review.
" We assign it, without liesitation, the first place among existing English
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The Iliad. Translated by P. S. Worsley and Pro-
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WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. 21
JOHN HOSACK,
Barrister-at-Law.
Mary Queen of Scots and her Accusers. Con-
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" Whatever surmises may be formed about Mary's knowledge or assent,
there can now be no doubt that the murder was contrived, not by Mary, but
by her accusers." Scotsman.
" He has confuted those who, by brilliant \vriting and a judicious selection
of evidence, paint the Queen of Scots as an incarnate fiend, and who are dra-
matic poets rather than historians." The Times.
" Mr Hosack's elaborate and painstaking defence is the most important
hitherto produced. " Spectator.
INDEX GEOGRAPHICUS.
Being a List, Alphabetically Ai^rajigcd, of the
Principal Places on the Globe, with the Countries and Subdivisions of
the Countries in which they are situated, and their Latitudes and Longi-
tudes. Applicable to all Modem Atlases and Maps. In 1 vol. Imperial
8vo, pp. 676, 21s.
PROFESSOR JOHNSTON.
The Chemistiy of Comino7i Life. A New Edition.
Edited by G. H. Lewes, Author of ' Sea-side Studies,' kc. With 113
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Elemetits of Agricultural Chemistry and Geology.
The Tenth Edition, Revised and brought down to date. By Charles A.
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Catechism of Agricultural Chemistry. Seventy -
FiKTii Tnous.\ND. Edited by Professor Voelcker. With Engravings.
Is.
A. W. KINGLAKE, Esq.
History of the Invasion of the Crijnea.
A Nkw Edition is in course of publication, in crown Svo, 6s. ; of which
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22 LIST OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY
JOHN KNOX.
John Knoxs Liturgy: The Book of Common
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Handsomely printed, in imitation of the large editions of Andro Hart, on
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LEONCE DE LAVEKGNE.
The Rural Economy of England, Scotland, and
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The Late PRINCIPAL LEE.
Lectures on the History of the Church of Scotland,
FROM THE Reformation to the Revolution Settlement. With
Notes and Appendices from the Author's Papers. Edited by the Rev.
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GEORGE HENRY LEWES.
The Physiology of Common Life. Illustrated
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Contents : Hunger and Thirst Food and Drink Digestion and Indi-
gestion The Structure and Uses of the Blood The Circulation Res-
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Feeling and Thinking The Mind and the Brain Our Senses and
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Parents Life and Death.
MAJOR LOGKHART.
Fair to See : A Novel. New Edition in i vol.
post 8vo, 6s.
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book than at first you fancied. . . . The scenes on the moors, in the
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WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. 23
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Speeches Spoken and Unspoken. With a Memoir
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The Rev. THOMAS M'CRIE, D.D.
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Life of John Knox. Containing Illustrations of
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24 LIST OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY
CHARLES M'INTOSH.
The Book of the Garden. In two lai'ge vols.
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LORD MACKENZIE.
Sittdies in Ro7nan Law, with Comparative Views
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present edition are of three kinds. First, there is the addition of very
numerous references to the original authorities of antiquity, in addition to
the indirect method of referring to modern text-writers, mainly French and
German, upon the different branches of the Corpus Juris. This is wholly
good, and constitutes a distinct addition to the vahie of the book. Secondly,
there is a large contribution of additional notes by the present editor, tilling
in to some extent the details of the original sketch. They are most numerous
in that part of the work which deals with the law of civil procedure abrancli
of Roman law upon the complex nature of which modern research and dis-
covery have thrown much light." Pall Mall Gazette.
Rev. ALEXANDER MACK AY, LL.D., F.R.G.S.
Mamtal of Modern Geography ; Mathematical,
Physical, and Political; on a new plan, embracing a complete de-
velopment of the River Systems of the Globe. Sixth Thousand, revised
and brought down to the present time. Crown 8vo, pp. 688. 7s. 6d.
This volume the result of many years' unremitting application is speci-
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Civil Service, and proficients ''iL. geography generally.
LADY JOHN MANNERS.
Gems of German Poetry. Translated by Lady
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WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. 25
FREDERICK MARSHALL.
Frc7ich Home Life. By " an English Looker-o7t,
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Contents : Servants. Children. Furniture. Food. Manners. Lan-
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ture, vivid contrast, and firm hold on general causes, as we have here."
British Quarterly Review.
International Vanities. Originally published in
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"The general public would hardly be led to anticipate from the title
selected the amount of entertainment and quaint infonnation that is pre-
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