^Mu; tiait S.\NivHYA ISWAKA ESQ, MMENTARi' OF GAUDAPADA; -\KATED B\ AN ORK,IAAL OX' BY THE SANKHYA KlRIKl BY ISWARA KRISHNA; TRANSLATED FROM THE SANSCRIT BY HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE, ESQ. ALSO THE BIIA'SHYA, OR, COMMENTARY OF GAUDAPADA ; TRANSLATED, AND ILLUSTRATED BY AN ORIGINAL COMMENT, BY HORACE HAYMAN WILSON, M.A.F.R.S. PUBLISHED BY MR. TOOKAKAM TATYA, BOMBAY. 1887, BOMBAY: PRINTED AT THE SCP.OMIA-PRAKASII PRE&S. SANKHYA KARIKA OR THE inquiry is into the means of precluding the three sorts of pain ; for pain is embarrassment : nor is the inquiry superfluous because obvious means of allevia- tion exist, for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished. 2005594" ( 2 ) ITRFI ftrcft %i% i ?g r 5-- i wramrTOFT fj- ( 3 ) frfrt^ * BHASHYA. ^ Salutation to that KAPILA by whom the Sankhya philosophy was compassionately imparted, to serve as a boat for the purpose of crossing the ocean of ignorance in which the world was immersed. I will declare compendiously the doctrine, for the benefit of students ; a short easy work, resting on authority, and establish- ing certain results. Three sorts of pain.' The explanation of this Aryd stanza is as follows : The divine KAPILA, the son of BRAHMA indeed : as it is said, " SANAKA, SANANDANA, and SANATANA the third ; ASURI, KAPILA, BORHU, and PANCHASIKHA : these seven sons of Brahma were termed great sages." Together with KAPILA were born Virtue, Knowledge, Dispassion, and Power: for he being born, and observing the world plunged in profound dark- ness by the succeeding series of worldly revolutions, was filled with compassion ; and to his kinsman, the Brahman ASURI, he communicated a knowledge of the TWENTY-FIVE PRINCIPLES ; from which knowledge the destruction of pain proceeds. As it is said ; " He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever " order of life he may have entered, and whether he wear " braided hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven, he is liberated " (from existence) : of this there is no doubt." The inquiry is in consequence of the embarrassment of the three sorts of pain. In this place the three sorts of pain are, 1. (ddhydtmika) natural and inseparable ; 2. (adlnbltauiika} natural and extrinsic ; and 3. (ddhidaicikfi) non-natural or superhuman. The first is of two kinds, corporeal and mental ( 4 ) corporeal is flux, fever, or the like, arising from disorder of the wind, bile, or phlegm : mental is privation of what is liked, approximation of what is disliked. Extrinsic but natural pain is fourfold, according to the aggregation or elementary matter whence it originates; that is, it is produced by any created beings ; whether viviparous, oviparous, generated by heat and moisture, or springing from the soil ; or in short, by men, beasts, tame or wild birds, reptiles, gnats, musquitoes, lice, bugs, fish, alligators, sharks, trees, stones, &c. The third kind of pain may be called superhuman, daivika meaning either divine or atmospheric : in the latter case it means pain which proceeds from cold, heat, wind, rain, thunderbolts, and the like. Where then, or into what, is inquiry, in consequence of the embarrassment of three kinds of pain, to be made ? Into the means of precluding them. This is the inquiry. Nor is the inquiry superfluous. That is ; if this inquiry be (regarded as) superfluous, the means of precluding the three sorts of pain being obvious (seen) ; as for example ; the internal means of alleviating the two inseparable kinds of pain are obvious, through the application of medical science, as by pungent, bitter, and astringent decoctions, or through the removal of those objects that are disliked, and accession of those that are liked ; so the obvious obstruction of pain from natural causes is protection and the like ; and these means being obvious, any (farther) inquiry is superfluous : if you think in this manner, it is not so ; for absolute, certain, final, permanent, obstruction (of pain) is not (to be effected) by obvious means. Therefore inquiry is to be made by the wise elsewhere, or into means of prevention which are absolute and final. COMMENT. The first verse of the Kdrikd proposes the subject of the work, and not only of that, but of the system to which it belongs, and of every philosophical system studied by the ( 5 ) Hindus ; the common end of which is, ascertainment of the means by which perpetual exemption from the metempsychosis, or from the necessity of repeated births, may be attained : for life is uniformly regarded by the Hindus as a condition of pain and suffering, as a state of bondage and evil; escape from which finally and for ever is a consummation devoutly to be wished. The liberation thus proposed as the object of rational exis- tence cannot be attained as long as man is subject to the ordinary infirmities of his nature, and the accidents of his condition : and the primary object of philosophical inquiry therefore is, the means by which the imperfections flesh is heir to may be obviated or removed. As preparatory then to their right determination, it is first shewn in the text what means are not conducive to this end ; such, namely, as obvious but temporary expedients, whether physical or moral. Of this introductory stanza Professor Lassen, in the first number of his Gymnosophista, containing the translation of the S&rikA, has given aversion differing in some respects from Mr. Colebrooke's. He thus renders it : " E tergeminorum dolorum impetu oritur desiderium cognoscendse rationis, qua ii depellantur. Quod cognoscendi desiderium licet in visibilibus rebus infructuose versetur, non est (infructuosum) propter absentiam absoluti, et omni sevo superstitis remedii." In the first member of this sentence, the translation of dbliighdta by ' impetus' is irreconcilable with the context. The sense required by the doctrine laid down is ' impediment, embarrassment, the prevention of liberation by worldly cares and sufferings.' So the same word abhighdtaJca is immediately used to mean l preventing, removing,' ' depellens." Professor Lassen's text, it is true, reads apaghdtaka, but this is not the reading followed by Mr. Colebrooke, nor that of the citation of the text given in the Sankhya Bhashya or Sdnkhya Kaiimndi ; it is that of the S. Tatwa Kaumudi and S. Chandrikdpnd although in itself unobjectionable, yet is not a necessary nor preferable ( 6 ) variation. At any rate there can be no question that the word abhigh&ta may be used in the sense of ' depellere,' and that sense therefore equally attaches to it in the prior, member of the hemistich. So in the Bhdshya of GAURAPADA we have ddh'ibkautikasya rdfok&dina abhighdtah ; ' The prevention of extrinsic pain -is by protection and the like.' It would not be possible here to render abhighdta by 'impetus.' By VACHAS- PATI the term alhigfidta is defined 'the confinement of the sentient faculty (explained to mean here ' life'), through the impediment opposed by threefold distress abiding in spirit.'* / / NARAYANA interprets it more concisely asahya sambandha,^ 1 intolerable restraint.' ' Embarrassment' therefore sufficiently well expresses the purport of these definitions, or the obstruc- tions offered by worldly sufferings to the spirit anxious to be free. This variation, however, is of no great consequence : the more important difference is in the second portion of the stanza ; and as Professor Lassen has deviated advisedly from Mr. Colebrooke, it is necessary to examine the passage more in detail. The following are his reasons for the version he has made : " Hsec posterioris versus (dnshte etc.) interpretatio, sicuti scholiastarurn suffragiis probatur, a grammatica postulatur. Quod ideo moneo, he leviter rationem, a Colebrookio, V. summo, in hoc versa enarrando initam deseruisse censear. Is enim : ' nor is the inquiry superfluous, because obvious means of alleviation exist : for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished.' Sed vereover, ne vir summus constructionem particulse diet sententiam claudentis et a uegatione exceptae male intellexerit. De qua re dixi ad Hitop. prooem. d. 28, Ex interpret. Colebrook construendum esset : driskte sc. safi (i. e. yadyapi drishtam vidyate) set (jijnaaa) ( 7 ) dp&rthd na ekdnt abhdvdt* Sed ut omittam, par-ticulaa chet nullum omnino relinqui locum in seutentia, na inop- portune versus loco collocatum esse, non potes quin concedas. Male omnino se habet tota seritentia et claudicat Equidem construe : drishte sd (jijndsd) apdrthd (bhavati) diet (tathapl) na (apdrthd bhavati) ekantd afe/tdt'dt.t Prorsus similiter dicitur ndbhdvdt infr. v. 8. Ablativiuii igitur ekdntyatyantoh ab/idvdt, non ad drishte refero cum Colebrookio, sed ad nega- tionem quse cum supplementis suis apodosin constituit. Nam quse post chennd sequuntur verba, ad apodosin pertinere sem- per observavi. Quam grammatica postulare videtur, patitur prasterea loci tenor enarrationem, imo melior evadit sententia. Ad drishte enim relatis istis verbis, id tantum dicitur, rerum visibilium cognitione non attingi posse philosophic finem, liberationem absolutam et perpetuam a doloribus ; mea posita enarratione non id tantum docetur, sed additur etiam hoc : finern istum posse attingi, licet alio cognitionis genere. Tres omnino positiones altero hemistichii versu continentur : phi- losophise (id enim valet gigndsd, L e. cognitionis desiderium) finem esse emancipationem a doloribus certam et omne tempus transgredientem ; deinde ad eum non perveniri ea via quse primum initur, quia obvia quasi sit, i. e. remediorum a sensi- bilibus rebus petitorum ope ; denique ea rernedia cognoscendi desideriurn posse expleri. Sed aliter atque Colebrookius hasce sententias inter se conjungit noster, et per couditionein effert, quod ille per negatiouem enuritiat." In this view of the meaning of the verse, there is a refine- ment that does not belong to it, and which is not Indian : arguments are often elliptically and obscurely stated in Sanscrit dialectics, but one position at a time is usually sufficient for even Brahmanical subtlety. The only position here advanced : " ?% afa ( ssift 12 fasj^ ) m ( fairrerr ) t ) ( 8 ) is, that the cure of worldly evil is not to be effected by such remedies as are of obvious and ordinary application, as they can only afford temporary relief. Death itself is no exemption from calamity, if it involves the obligation of being born again. The version proposed by Professor Lassen rests upon his notion of the grammatical force of the expression chenna or chdt, ' if,' na, ' not :' the former he would refer to the prior member of the sentence, the latter to the subsequent expressions. But this division of the compound is not that which is most usual in argumentative writings. The phrase is an elliptical negation of a preceding assertion, diet referring to what has been said, implying, ' if you assert or belive this ;' and na meeting it with a ncgatur, ' it is not so :' then follows the reason or argument of the denial. Thus in the Ifuktdrali : ' But why should not Darkness be called a tenth thing, for it is apprehended by perception ? If this be said, it is not so (iti chen-na) \ for it is the consequence of the non-existence of absolute light, and it would be illogical to enumerate it amongst things.'* So in the Ny&ya Sutra Vritti : ' If by a disturbance in the assembly there be no subsequent speech, and through the want of a reply there be defeat ; if this be urged, it is not so (iti chen-na), because there has been no opportunity for an answer.'t Again in the Sankhya Pravachana Shdshya. Sutra : ' If it be said that Prakriti is the cause of bondage, it is not so, from its dependent state.'} Comment : ' But bondage may be occasioned by Prakriti. If this be asserted, it is not so. Why ? Because in the relation of bondage, Prakriti is dependent upon conjunction, as will be ( 9 ) explained in the following precept.'* Also in the Veddntct Sara Vivriti : ' If in consequence of such texts of the Ve"das as " let sacrifice be performed as long as life endures" their performance is indispensable, and constant and occasional rites must be celebrated by those engaged in the attainment of true knowledge ; and if, on the other hand, the attainment of true knowledge is distinct from the observance of ceremonies ; then a double duty is incumbent on those wishing to eschew the world. If this be asserted, it is not so (iti chen*na), from the compatibility of severalty with union, as in the case of articles of khayra or other wood :'f that is, where there are several obligations, that which is most essential may be select- ed from the rest. In the same work we have an analogous form used affirmatively ; as, ' But how by the efficacy of knowledge, after the dissipation of ignorance, in fegard to the object (of philosophy), can the true nature of the essentially happy (being) be attained ? for as he is eternally existent, knowledge is not necessary to establish his existence. If this be asserted, it is true (iti chei; satyani). Brahme, one essentially with felicity, is admitted to be eternal, but in a state of ignorance he is not obtained ; like a piece of gold which is forgotten (and sought for), whilst it is hanging round the neck.'^ Here it would be impossible to refer sati/dm to the succeeding member of the sentence, as the apodosis being separated from it, not only by the sense, but by the particle api. Passages of this description might be indefinitely isuf mr srrnfft ^frwsijifljr arar'rt rcrjfa i *rrr multiplied, but these are sufficient to shew that the con- struction in the sense adopted by Mr. Colebrooke is common and correct. Accordingly his version is uniformly supported scholiastarum tuffragiia. Thus in the Sankya Bhdshya, as we have seen, the passage is explained, drishte sd apdrtha chet evam manyase na tkdnta, &c. ; 'If by reason of there being obvious remedies, you think indeed the inquiry superfluous, no (it is not so), from their not being absolute and permanent.' So in the Sankya Tatica Kaumudi, after stating the objection at length, the com- mentator adds, nirdkaroti, na iti ; ' (the author) refutes it (by saying), no, not so :' kutah, ' why' ? ekdntatyantatah ab/tdvdt* The Sankhm Chandrikd is to the same effect, or still more ex- plicit : ' There being obvious means, the inquiry is superfluous, the conclusion being otherwise attained : if (this be urged) such is the meaning (of the text), (the author) contradicts it ; no, it is not so.f This commentator giving the very reading, drishte sati, which Professor Lassen argues Mr. Colebrooke's version would erroneously require. The remaining scholiast, RAMA KRISHNA, adopts the comment of the Chandrikd word for word, and consequently the commentators are unanimous in support of the translation of Mr. Colebrooke. With respect to the passages referred to by Professor Lassen as establishing the connection of tne negative with the latter member of the sentence, instead of its being absolute, it will be seen at once that they are not at all analogous to the passage in our text. They are declaratory, not argumentative ; and the terms following the negative particle are the parts or circumstances of the negative, not the reasons on which it is grounded. Thus in the Hitopadesa : ' What will not be, will sr nrsusr wfr 3?wrfa5r*?frftT ( 11 ) not be; if it will be, it will not be otherwise.'* So in v. 8. of the Rarikd,: 'The non-apprehension of nature is from its subtlety, not from its nonentity t.' In neither of these is there any reference to a foregone position which mast be admitted or denied, nor is the negative followed by the reasons for denial, as is the case in our text. These considerations are more than sufficient to vindicate, what it was scarcely perhaps necessary to have asserted, Mr Colebrooke's accuracy ; and they are now also somewhat super- fluous, as I have been given to understand that Professor Lassen acknowledges the correctness of his interpretation. The commentary of GAURAPADA distinctly shews that nothing more is intended by the text, than the unprofitableness of recourse to visible or worldly expedients for the relief or removal of worldly pain. In subjoining therefore the gloss of VACHESPATI MISRA, with a translation, it is intended rather to illustrate the doctrines of the text, and the mode of their development by native scholiasts, than further to vindicate the correctness of the translation. ' \ But verily the object of the science may not need inquiry, 1. if there be no pain in the world; 2. if there be no desire to ( 12 ) avoid it ; 3. if there be no means of extirpating it. The im- possibility of extirpating it is twofold ; either from the eternity of pain, or from ignorance of the means of alleviation : or, though it be possible to extirpate pain, yet that knowledge which philosophy treats of may not be the means of its re- moval ; or again, there may be some other and more ready means. In the text, however, it is not said that pain does not exist, nor that there is no wish to avoid it. From the embar- rassment of the three kinds of pain. A triad of pain, three kinds: they are the culhyatmlka, 'Natural;' ddhibhavtika 1 extrinsic ;' and ddhidaivika, ' superhuman.' The first is of two kinds, bodily and mental : bodily is caused by disorder of the humours, wind, bile, and phlegm ; mental is occasioned by desire, wrath, covetousuess, fear, envy, grief, and want of dis- crimination, These various kinds of pain are called insepar- able, from their admitting of internal remedies. The pain that requires external remedies is also twofold, ddhibhautika and dd/tidaii'ika, The first has for its cause, man, beasts, deer, birds, reptiles, and inanimate things ; the second arises from the evil influence of the planets, or possession by impure spirits (Yakshas, Rdkshasa*, i^indyakas &c.). These kinds of pain depending upon the vicissitudes arising from the quality of foulness, are to be experienced by every individual, and cannot, be prevented. Through the obstruction occasioned by the three kinds of pain abiding in spirit, arises embarrassment, or : n ^rrqr^ ^(j i ^qxr: i cT%rR: ^^ ^ cT^^qplfr^ ffft X \ ( 13 ) confinement of the sentient faculty. The capability of know- ing the impediment occasioned by such pain, is considered the cause of the desire to avoid it ; for though pain may not be prevented, yet it is possible to overcome it, as will be subse- quently explained. Pain then being generated, inquiry is to be made into the means of its removal Tad ctpagk&takt : tail refers here to the three kinds of pain, tad having the relation dependent upon its being used as subordinate (relative) term*. The means (hetu) of removing These are to be derived from philosophy, not from any other source : this is the position (of the text). To this a doubt is objected ; As there are obrious means, the inquiry is superfluous ; if so . The sense is this : Be it admitted that there are three kinds of pain ; that t he rational being wishes to escape from them ; that escape is practicable ; and that means attainable through philosophy are adequate to their extirpation ; still any investigation by those who look into the subject is needless ; for there do exist obvious (visible) means oi extirpation, which are easily attainable, whilst the knowledge of philosophical principles is difficult of attainment, and to be acquired only by long study, and tradi- tional tuition through many generations. Therefore, according to the popular saying, " Why should a man who may find honey in the arkka flower, go for it to the mountain ?" so what wise man will give himself unnecessary trouble, when he has attained the object of his wishes. Hundreds of remedies for u m-fl %w. i farr^fifa ( 14 ) bodily affections are indicated by eminent physicians. The pleasures of sense, women, wine, luxuries, unguents, dress, ornaments, are the easy means of obviating mental distress. So in regard to extrinsic pain, easy means of obviating it exist in the skill acquired by acquaintance with moral and political science, and by residing in safe and healthy places, and the like ; whilst the employment of gems and charms readily counteracts the evils induced by superhuman agency. This is the objection. (The author) refutes it ; it is not HO. "Why ? From these means not being absolute or final. Ekanta means the certainty of the cessation of pain ; atyanid, the non- recurrence of pain that has ceased. (In obvious means of relief there is) the non-existence of both these properties ; the affix tasi, which may be substituted for all inflexions, being here put for the sixth case dual ; as it is said ; " From not observing the (invariable) cessation of pain of various kinds, in conse- quence of the employment of ceremonies, drugs, women, moral and political studies, charms, and the like, their want of certain operation (is predicated) ; so is their temporary influence, from observing the recurrence of pain that had been suppressed. Although available, therefore, the obvious means of putting a stop to pain are neither absolute nor final, and consequently this inquiry (into other means) is not superfluous." This is the purport (of the text).' The Sdnkhya Chandrika and S. Kaumudi are both to the same effect, and it is unnecessary to cite them. The original Sutras of KAPILA, as collected in the S. Pravachana, and commented on by VIJGNYA'NA BHIKSHU, confirm the view taken by the scholiasts. vz wr *fa ^TRW! fairrafa u ( 15 ) Sutra ; < The final cessation of the three kinds of pain is the filial object of soul.*' Comment : ' The final cessation of these three kinds of pain, the total cessation of universal pain, whether gross or subtle (present or to come), is the final, supreme object of soul f Stitra : ' The accomplishment of that cessation is not from obvious means, from the evident recurrence (of pain) after suppression.^ 1 Comment : ' The accomplishment of the final cessation of pain is not (to be effected) by worldly means, as wealth, and the like. Whence is this ? Because that pain of which the cessation is procured by wealth and the like is seen to occur again, when that wealth and the rest are exhausted.' ii. THE revealed mode is like the temporal one, ineffec- tual, for it is impure ; and it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others. A method different from both is preferable, consisting in a dis- criminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul. t S*t ftrfa*T?;:^RT ( 16 ) r H ( 17 ) BHASHYA. Although the inquiry is to be directed to other than to obvi- ous remedies, yet it is not to be directed to such as are deri* vable from revelation, as means of removing the three kinds of pain. Anusravati, ' what man successively hears ;' anusra- vika, ' that which is thence produced, revealed mode ;' that is, established by the Vedas : as it is said ; " "We drank the juice of the acid asclepias ; we became immortal ; we attained efful- gence ; we know divine things. What harm can a foe inflict on us ? How can decay affect an immortal ?" (This text of the Veda refers to) a discussion amongst Indra and other gods, as to how they became immortal. In explanation it was said, " we were drinkers of soma juice, and thence became immortal," that is, gods : further, " We ascended to, or attained effulgence, or heaven ; we knew divine, celestial, things. Hence then, assuredly, what can an enemy do to us ? What decay can affect an immortal?" dhurtti meaning 'decay' or 'injury:' ' What can it do to an immortal being '? It is also said in the Vedas, that final recompense is obtained by animal sacrifice : " He who offers the ashwamedha conquers all worlds, overcomes death, and expiates all sin, even the a murder of a Brahraan." As, therefore, final and absolute con- sequence is prescribed in the Vedas, inquiry (elsewhere) should be superfluous ; but this is not the case. The text says, the revealed mode is like the temporal one drishtavat ; ' like, same as the temporal,' drishtena tulya. What is that revealed mode, and whence is it (ineffectual) ? It is impure, defective in sdme respects, and excessive in others. It is impure from (enjoining) animal sacrifices ; as, " according to the ritual of the ashivamedha, six hundred horses, minus three, are offered at midday." For though that is virtue which is enjoined by the Vedas and laws, yet, from its miscellaneous character, it may be affected by impurity. It is also said ; " Many thousands of Indras- and other gods have passed away in successive ages, overcome by time ; for time is hard to overcome." Hence therefore, as even Indra and the gods perish, the revealed mode involves defective cessation of pain. Excess is also one of its properties, and pain is produced by observing the superior ad- vantages of others. Here, therefore, by excess, atisaya is under- stood the unequal distribution of temporal rewards, as the consequence of sacrifice ; the object of the ritual of the Vedas being in fact in all cases temporal good. Therefore the reveal- ed mode is like the temporal one. What then is the preferable mode ? If this be asked, it is replied, One different from both. A mode different from both the temporal and revealed is preferable, being free from impurity, excess, or deficiency. How is this ? It is explained (in the text : It consists in a discrimi- native knowledge &c. Here, by perceptible principles, are in- tended Mnhat and the rest, or Intellect, Egotism, the five subtile rudiments, the eleven organs (of perception and action), and the five gross elements. The imperceptible one is Pradhana (the chief or great one). The thinking soul, Purusha (the incorporeal). These twentyfive principles are intended by the (three) terms vyakta, avyakta, and/wet. In discriminative knowledge of these consists the preferable mode ; and he who knows them knows the twenty-five principles (he has perfect knowledge). The difference between the perceptible, and imperceptible, thinking principles, is next explained. Having taught that worldly means of overcoming worldly evil are ineffectual, it is next asserted that devotional remedies, such as the rites enjoined by the VMas, are equally unavail- ing ; and knowledge of the three parts or divisions of existence material and spiritual, is the only mode by which exemption from the infirmities of corporeal being can be attained, The Vedas are inefficient, from their inhumanity in pre- scribing the shedding of blood : the rewards which they propose are also but temporary, as the gods themselves are finite beings, perishing in each periodical revolution. The immortality spok- en of in the Ve"das is merely a jlong duration, or until a dissolution of the existent forms of things*. The Vedas also cause, instead of curing pain, as the blessings they promise to one man over another are sources of envy and misery to those who do not possess them. Such is the sense given by GTAURA- PADA to dtisaya, and the Sankhya Tatwa Kaumudi understands it also to imply the unequal apportionment of rewards by the Ve'das themselves : ' The jyotishtoma and other rites secure simply heaven ; the vajapeya and others confer the sovereignty of hea- ven : this is being possessed of the property of excess (in- equality)^' In like manner, the original aphorism of KAPILA affirms of these two modes, the temporal and revealed, that there ' is no difference between them,':J: and that ' escape from pain is not the consequence of the latter/|| because ' recurrence is neverthe- { 20 ) less the result of that immunity which is attainable by acts (of devotion),' * as ' the consequences of acts are not eternal. '-f- Here however a dilemma occurs, for the Veda also says, ' There is no return (regeneration) of one who has attained the sphere of Brahma by acts (of devotion).'^ This is explained away by a Sutra of Kapila, which declares that the Veda limits the non-regeneration of one who has attained the region of Brahma to him who, when there, acquires discriminative wisdom. This discriminative wisdom is the accurate discrimination of those principles into which all that exists is distributed by the Sdnkhya philosophy. Vyakta, ' that which is perceived, sensible, discrete ;' Avyakta, ' that which is unperceived, indiscrete ;' and Jna, ' that which knows, or discriminates :' the first is matter in its perceptible modifications ; the second is crude, unmodified matter ; and the third is soul. The object of the S&nkhya Karika is to define and explain these three things, the correct knowledge of which is of itself release from worldly bondage, and exemption from exposure to human ills, by the final sepa- ration of soul from body. 900$ R$fa: W. III. NATURE, the root (of all), is no production. Seven principles, the Great or intellectual one, &c., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor pro- ductive. t ( 21 ) i t SH f [% *{ffrf: t BHASHYA. (the root) prakriti (nature) is pradhdna (chief), from its being the root of the seven principles which are productions ( 22 ) and productive ; such nature is the root. No production. It is not produced from another : on that account nature (prakriti) is no product of any other thing. Seven principles. ~Mahat and the rest ; from its being the great (mahat). ele- ment ; this is Intellect (Buddhi) . Intellect and the rest- The seven principles are, 1. Intellect ; 2. Egotism ; 3 7. The five subtile rudiments. These seven are productions and pro- ductive : in this manner ; Intellect is produced from the chief one (nature). That again produces Egotism, whence it is productive (prakriti). Egotism, as derived from intellect, is a production ; but as it gives origin to the five subtile rudiments, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of sound is derived from Egotism, and is therefore a production ; but as causing the pro- duction of ether, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of touch, as generated from Egotism, is a production ; as giving origin to air, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of smell is derived from Egotism, and is therefore a production ; it gives origin to earth, and is therefore productive. The subtile rudi- ment of form is a production from Egotism ; as generating light, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of flavour, as derived from Egotism, is a production ; it is productive, as giving origin to water. In this manner the Great principle and the rest are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions ; that is, the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, with mind, making the eleventh, and the five elements : these form a class of sixteen which are productions, the term vikdra being the same as vikriti. Soul is neither a production nor productive. These (principels) being thus classed, it is next to be considered by what and how many kinds of proof, and by what proof severally applied, the demonstration of these three (classes of) principles, the perceptible, the imperceptible, and the thinking soul, can be effected. For in this world a probable thing is established by proof, in the same mode as (a quantity of) grain by a prastha (a certain measure), and the like, or sandal and other things by weight, Ou this account what proof is, is next to be defined. In this Stanza the three principal categories of the Sankhya system are briefly defined, chiefly with regard to their relative characters. Existent things, according to one classification, are said to be fourfold : 1 prakriti ; 2. vikriti ; 3. prakriti-vikriti ; and anubhaya rupa neither prakriti nor vikriti. Prakriti, according to its ordinary use, and its etymological sense, means that which is primary, that which precedes what is made ; from pra, pros and kri, ' to make.' This, however, is further distinguished in the text into the mula prakriti ; the prakriti which is the root and substance of all things except soul, matter or nature ; and secondary, special, or relative prakriti, or every production that in its turn becomes primary to some other derived from it. By prakriti may therefore be undefstood the matter of which every substance primarily or secondarily is composed, and from which it proceeds, the primary, or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it, ' productive' principle of some secondary substance or production. This subsequent product is termed vikriti, from the same root> kri, ' to make,' with vi, implying ' variation,' prefixed. Vikriti does not mean a product, or thing brought primarily into exis- tence, but merely a modification of a state of being, a ne\V development or form of something previously extant. We might therefore consider it as best rendered by the term ' development,' but there is no objection to the equivalent in 1 the text, or ' product.' In this wayj then, the different sub- stances of the universe are respectively nature, or matter, and form. Crude or radical matter is without form. Intellect is its first form, and Intellect is the matter of Egotism. Egotism is a form of Intellect and the matter 1 of which the senses and the rudimental elements are formed ; the senses are forms of Egotism. The gross elements are forms of the rudimental elements. We are not to extend the materiality of the grosser elements to the forms of visible things, for visible things are compounds, not ( 24 ) simple developments of a simple base. Soul comes under the fourth class ; it is neither matter nor form^ production nor productive. More particular definitions of each category sub- sequently occur. II $11 IV. PERCEPTION, inference, and right affirmation, are ad- mitted to be threefold proof; for they (are by all acknowledged, and) comprise every mode of demon- stration. It is from proof that belief of that which is to be proven results. ( 25 ) Rr^rftr ii JFF^TF ^^ i^ftw i ^rg* ?rfif- : J^FF: ( 26 ) f% BHiSHYA. Perception ; as, the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue, the nose, are the five organs of sense ; and their five objects are respectively, sound, feel, form, flavour, and odour : the ear apprehends sound ; the skin, feel ; the eye, form ; the tongue taste ; the nose, smell. This proof is called, (that which is) seen {or perception). That object which is not ascertainable either by its being present, or by reference, is to be apprehended from right affirmation ; such as, INDRA, the king of the gods ; the northern Kurus ; the nymphs of heaven ; and the like. That which is not ascertainable by perception or inference, is derived from apt (or sufficient) authority. It is also said ; " They call scripture, right affirmation ; right, as free from error. Let not one exempt from fault affirm a falsehood with- out adequate reason. He who in his appointed office is free from partiality or enmity, and is ever respected by persons of 'the same character, such a man is to be regarded as apt (fit or -worthy) " In these three are comprised all kinds of proof. JAIMINI describes six sorts of proof. Which of those then are not proofs 1 They are, presumption (arthdpatti), proportion (sambhava), privation (abhdva) comprehension (pratibhd), oral communication (aitihya), and comparison (upamdna) . Thus " Presumption" is twofold, 4 seen' and ' heard.' ' Seen ' is where in one case the existence of spirit is admitted, and it is presumed that it exists in another. ' Heard ^ DEVADATTA does not eat by day, and yet grows fat : it is presumed then that he eats by night. "Proportion;" By the term one prastha, four kuravas are equally designated. " Privation " is fourfold; prior, mutual, constant, and total. 'Prior;' as DEVADATTA in childhood, youth, &c. ' Mutual ;' as, Water jar in cloth. ' Constant ;' as, The horns of an ass ; the son of a barren woman ; the flowers of ^the jsky. v Total ' priva- ( 27 ) tion, or destruction ; as when cloth is burnt, or as from contemplating withered grain, want of rain is ascertain- ed. In this manner privation is manifold. " Comprehen- sion ;" as, The part of the country that lies between the Vindhya mountains on the north and Sahya mountains on the south, extending to the sea, is pleasant. By. this sentence it is intended to express that there are many agreeable circumstances comprehended in that country, the name of the site indicating its several products. "Oral communication ;" as, When people report there is a fiend in the fig-tree. " Com- parison ;" The Gavaya is like a cow ; a lake is like a sea. These are the six kinds of proof ; but. they are comprised in the three; for presumption is included in inference ; and proportion, privation, comprehension, oral communication, and comparison, are comprehended in right affirmation. There- fore from the expressions (in the text), they comprise every mode of demonstration, and are admitted to be threefold proof, . it is said, that by these three kinds of proof, proof is esta- blished. Belief of that which is to be proven results from proof. The things to be proven, are, Nature, Intellect, Egotism, the five subtile rudiments, the eleven organs, the five gross elements, and Soul. These five and twenty principles are classed as the perceptible, the imperceptible, and the percipient ; and some are verifiable by perception, some by inference, and some by authority ; which is the threefold proof. The definition of each kind (of proof) is next, given, COMMENT. The work pauses in its enumeration of the physical and metaphysical principles of the system, to define its dialectical portion, or the proofs which may be urged in support of its principles. The doctrine that there are but three kinds of proof, is said to be supported by a text of the Ve'da? : ' Soul is either to be perceived, to be learned from authority, or to be inferred from ( 28 ) reasoning*.' It is opposed to the tenets of the Naiyuyikat and Mimdnsakas, the former of whom describe four kinds, and the latter six kinds of proof. The proofs of the logicians are, pratyakshaj ' perception ;' anumdna,l ' inference ;' upamdna ||, ' comparison ; ' and s'abda , ' verbal authority.' Of these, comparison and verbal authority are included by the Sdnk.hyas under right affirmation ; the term dpta 1F mean- ing ' fit, right,' and being applied either to the Vedas** , or to inspired teachers ff, as subsequently explained. The Mlmdnsakas do recognise six kinds of proof ; but GAURAPADA has either stated them incorrectly, or refers to a system differ- ent from that now found in the best authorities of this school. KUMARILA BHATTA alludes to the sixfold proof of an older scholiast or Vrittikdra, but those six proofs are, as Mr. Cole- brooke states, perception, inference, comparison, presumption, authority, and privation ; and the author of the Sdstra dipikd excludes expressly sambhava, pratibhd and aitihya from the character of proofs. With regard to the terms specified, it may be doubted if exact equivalents can be devised. Arthd- patti is literally, ' attainment of meaning ;' conjecture or pre- sumption, ' inference ;' from which it differs only in the absence of the predicate or. sign from which the subject is inferred. The illustrations of the commentator do not very clearly explain the purport of the two kinds of this proof, ' seen' and ' heard.' In the S'dstra dipikd the first is exem- plified by the sentence, " DEVADATTA is alive, but not in his house ; it is presumed therefore that he is abroad." ' Heard,' s'ruta, is referred to the Ve'das, and applies to the interpretation of receipts by the spirit as well as the letter, as in a direction to offer any particular article, it may be presumed, that should that not be procurable, something similar may be substituted. 3TTH I. ""* WTflf I ft ( 29 ) VACHASPATI also considers arthdpatti to be comprised in infer- ence, as well as sambhava, ' identity' or ' proportion.' Privation, he argues is only a modification of perception ; and aitihya, or ' report,' is no proof at all, the person with whom it origi- nates being undetermined. Pratibhd he does not mention. The concluding expressions of GAURAPADA, Pratij&nvdsa sanjndnam, are of questionable import, and there is possibly some error in the copy. The ' objects of proof,' prameya, are, according to the Sankhy&, all the principles of existence. Siddhi, ' accomplishment, determination,' in the last hemistich, is explained by pratlti, ' trust, belief.' V. PERCEPTION is ascertainment pf particular objects. Inference, which is of three sorts, premises an argu- ment, and (deduces) that which is argued by it. Bight affirmation is true revelation. ( so ) BHASHYA. Dr-ishta ' seen,' or pratyaksha, ' perception,' is application or exertion of the senses in regard to their several objects, as of the ear, and the rest, to sound, &c. Inference is of three kinds, subsequent, antecedent, analogous. Inference antecedent is that which has been, previously deduced ; as rain is inferred from the rising of a cloud, because formerly rain had been the consequence. Subsequent ; as, having found a drop of water taken from the sea to be salt, the saltness of the rest also is inferred. Analogous ; as, having observed their change of place, it is concluded that the moon and stars are locomotive, like CHAITRA : that is, having seen a person named CHAITRA trans- fer his position from one place to another, and thence known that he was locomotive, it is inferred that the moon and stars also have motion (because it is seen that they change their places). So observing one mango tree in blossom, it is inferred that other mango trees also are in flower. This is inference from analogy. Again ; premises an argument, and (deduces) that which it argued by it. That inference. Premises a prior argument that is, the thing which has a predicate, is inferred from the predicate, as, a mendicant (is known) by his staff; or it premises the subject of the argument, when the predicate is ( 31 ) deduced from that of which it is predicated as, having seen a mendicant, you say, this is his triple staff. Right affirmation is true revelation. Apia means dchdryas, ' holy teachers,' as Brahmd and the rest, tfruti means Ve'das,' 'Teachers and Ve'das' is the import of that compound, and that which is declared by them is true revelation. In this manner threefold proof has been described. It is next explained by what sort of proof ascertainment is to be effected, and of what objects. COMMENT. The three kinds of proof, perception, inference, and right affirmation, are here more particularly explained. The first is defined, ' what severally relates to, or is engaged in, an object of sense*. Adhyavasaya is explained by VACHASPATI, ' Knowledge, which is the exercise of the intellectual faculty^. NARAYANA explains it, ' That by which certainty is obtained^.' The organs do not of themselves apprehend objects, but are merely the instruments by which they are approximated to the intellect : ' neither does intellect apprehend them (rationally), being, as derived from (prakriti) matter, incapable of sense ; but the unconscious impressions or modifications of intellect, derived through the senses, are communicated to soul, which, reflecting them whilst they are present in the intellect, appears by that reflection actually effected by wisdom, pleasure, and the like . fW sfa ( 32 ) The explanation given by GAURAPADA of the three kinds of inference is not exactly conformable to the definitions of the logicians, although the same technical terms are employed. Thus in the Ny&ya S&tra Vritti, in the comment on the Sutra of Gautama,* we have the following : ' Threefold infe- rence. Prior, that is, cause ; characterized by, or having, that (cause) ; as inference of rain from the gathering of clouds. Posterior, effect ; characterized by it, as inference of rain from the swelling of a river. Analogous (or generic); characterized as distinct from both effect and cause, as the inference of any thing being a substance from its being earthy-}-.' Here then we have inference a priori, or of effect from cause ; inference a posteriori, or of cause from effect ; and inference from analogy, or community of sensible properties : for sdmdnyato drishtam is ' that which is recognised from generic properties^ its own specific properties being unnoticed}:.' The Sdnkhya Chandrikd gives a similar, or logical, explanation of the three kinds of inference. The definition of inference in general is the subject of the first member of the second hemistich. The expressions linga and Ungi\\ are analogous to 'predicate and subject,' or the mark, sign, or accident by which any thing is characterized and the thing having such characteristic mark and sign. Thus linga is explained by logicians by the term vy&pyd , IF and lingi by vydpakd **; as in the proposition, There is fire, because there is smoke, the latter is the linga, vy dpi/a, ' major or predicate ;' and fire the lingi or tydpaka, the ' minor or subject,' or thing of which the presence is denoted by its characteristic. *mr ** ( 33 ) Inference, then, is a conclusion derived from previous determination of predicate and subject ; or it is knowledge of the points of argument depending on the relation between subject and predicate ; that is, Unless it were previously known that smoke indicated fire, the presence of the latter could not be inferred from the appearance of the former*.' This is what the logicians term paramersha, 'observation or experience.' Apta^, according to GAURAPADA, means dchdrya ; and dpta sruti\ implies ' holy teachers and holy writ.' NARAYAXA expounds it in a similar manner]!, and adds, that dpta means Iswara, or ' god,' according to the theistical Sdnkhya. VACHASPATI explains the terms similarly, though more obscurely. Apia is equivalent with him to prdpta, * obtained,' and yiikta, ' proper, right ;' and dpta sruti is ' both that which is right and traditional, holy know- ledgelf ;' for sruti is defined to be ' knowledge of the purport of texts derived from holy writ ; which knowledge is of itself proof, as obtained from the Vedas, which are not of human origin, and fit to exempt from all fear of error**.' The first term, vdkya is explained to signify, the Ve'da is the teacher of religionf-f- ;' and the expression vdkydrtha is equivalent to dharma, ' religion or virtue.' Religion is heard by it ; as, " Let one desirous of heaven perform the jyotishtoma sacrifice :" such is a text (of scripture) + .' The texts of the Vedas and of other inspired works are authority, as having been handed down through successive births by the same teachers as JAIGISKAVYA t arm i n i ft szfrfaslfo ( 34 ) says, ' By me living repeatedly in ten different great creations*/ So ' the Veda was remembered by KAPILA from a former state of being-f.' The Mhndnsakas distinguish between dpta vdkya and veda vdkya : the former is human, the latter inspired, authority. n ^ u VI. SENSIBLE objects become known by perception; but it is by inference (or reasoning) that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is obtained : and a truth which is neither to be directly perceived, nor to be inferred from reasoning, is deduced from revelation. fef 1 tr T ftrf^;: < 35 ) BHASHYA. #?/ inference from analogy ; of things beyond the senses the ascertainment of existing things which transcend the senses. Nature and soul are not objects of sense, and are to be known only by reasoning from analogy. For as the predicates Mahat and the rest have the three qualities, so must that of which they are effects, the chief one (nature), have the three quali- ties ; and as that which is irrational appears as if it was rational, it must have a guide and superintendent, which is soul. That which is perceptible is known by perception ; but that which is imperceptible, and which is not to be inferred from analogy, must be learnt from revelation, as, INDRA, the king of the gods ; the northern Kurus ; the nymphs of heaven : these depend upon sacred authority. Here some one objects, Nature or soul is not apprehended, and what is not apprehended in this world does not exist ; therefore these two are not, any more than a second head, or a third arm. In reply it is stated, that there are eight causes which prevent the apprehension of existing things. COMMENT. In this verse, according to the translation followed, the application of the three kinds of proof to three different objects is described : according to a different version, only one class of objects is referred to, those which transcend the senses, and; of which a knowledge is attainable only by inference from, analogy, or revelation. The Sdnkhya Tativa Kaumudi concurs with, the S&nkhyz Bhdshya in understanding the terms of the text,, s&mdnyafa ( 36 ) drishtdt*, to refer to anumdndtf, intending ' inference from analogy}:.' A similar explanation occurs in the Sdnkhya Pravachana JBhdshya : ' Thence, from reasoning by analogy, the determination of both, of nature and soul, is effected.' It appears therefore that in this place the text does not refer either to perception or to inference in general, as evidence of perceptible things, but solely to inference from analogy, as proof of imperceptible objects. For inference a priori or a posteriori regards things not necessarily beyond the cognizance of the senses, like nature and soul, but those only which are not at the moment per- ceptible, as fire from smoke, rain from floods or clouds, and the like. It might be preferable, therefore, to render the verse somewhat differently from the text, or. * It is by reasoning froia analogy that belief in things beyond the senses is attained ; and imperceptible things, not thereby determined, are to be known only from revelation.' The version of Mr. Colebrooke in which he is followed by Professor Lassen.' (" ^Equalitatis intellectus est per perceptionem : rerum quae supra sensus sunt per demonstrationem vel hac non evictum, quod praeter sensus est, probatur revelatione"), rests apparently upon the authority of the Sdnkhya C'tandrikd and Sdnkhya Kaumudt Sdmdnyatas has the affix tasi in the sense of the sixth (posses- sive) case. The ascertainment of all objects appreciable by the senses, whether actually perceived or not, is by perception : there- fore knowledge of earth and the other elements is by sense ; but knowledge of things beyond the senses, as natnre and the rest, is from inference||.' u smr^m ifa ^sT^TrxTfa crn ( 37 ) When inference from analogy fails, then, according to all the authorities, the remaining proof, or revelation, must be had recourse to, agreeably to the Sutras ; ' Oral proof is fit instruc- tion,' and ' fit instruction is communication of the proofs by which the nature of both prakriti and purusha may ba discriminated.* VII. FROM various causes things may be imperceptible (or unperceived); excessive distance, (extreme) nearness, defect of the organs, inattention, minuteness, interpo- sition of objects, predominance of other matters, and intermixture with the like. fa f^jftorof i ( 38 ) cgr BHASHYA. Non-perception of things here existing may proceed from, their remoteness, as of Vishnu mitra, Maitra, and Chaitra, dwelling in different countries ; or their propinquity, as the eye does not see the collyrium applied to the eyelids ; from defect of the organs, as sound and form are undiscernible by the deaf and the blind ; from inattention, as a person whose thoughts are distracted does not apprehend what is said to him, however intelligibly ; from minuteness, as the small particles of frost, vapour, and smoke in the atmosphere are ob preceived ; from interposition > as thing is hidden by a wall ; from predominance of others, as the planets, asterism.s, and stars are invisible when their rays are overpowered by those of the sun ; from intermixture icith the like, as a bean in a heap of beans, a lotus amongst lotupes, a myrobalan amongst myrobalans, a pigeon in a flock of pigeons, cannot be perceived, being confounded in the midst of similar objects. In this way non-perception of actually existing things is eightfold. Be it granted, that whatever is to be ascertained (by any means) is ; by what cause is apprehension of nature and soul prevented, and how is it to be effected. COMMENT. Reasons are here assigned why things may not be perceived, although they actually exist. ( 39 ) The terms of the text, as illustrated by the comment, are easily understood : the particle cha, in connexion with the last, is considered to imply the existence of other impediments besides those enumerated, such as non-production, as of curds from milk*. But these circumstances, for the most part, account for the non-perception of perceptible things, and it is still to be considered why nature and soul, which are not amongst things ordinarily perceptible are not perceivedf. \\e\\ VIII. IT is owing to the subtilty (of nature), not to the non-existence of this original principle, that it is not apprehended by the senses, but inferred from its effects. Intellect and the rest of the derivative prin- ciples are effects; ( whence it is concluded as their cause) in some respects analogous, but in other dissimilar. ( 40 ) BKASHYA. From subtilty the non^perception of that nature. Nature is not apprehended (by the senses) on account of its subtilty, like the particles of smoke, vapour, and frost, which are in the atmosphere, although not perceived there. How then is it to be apprehended ? Its perception is from its effects. Having observed the effects, the cause is inferred. Nature is the cause, of which such is the eifect. Intellect, egotism, the five subtile rudiments, the eleven organs, the five gross elements, are its effects. That effect may be dissimilar from nature : ' nature,' prakriti ; ' the chief one/ pradh&na ; dissimilar from it : or it may be analogous^ of similar character ; as in the world a son may be like or unlike his father. Prom what cause this simi- larity or dissimilarity proceeds, we shall hereafter explain. Here a doubt arises, from the conflicting opinions of teachers, whether intellect and other effect be or be not already in nature. According to the Sankhya doctrine, the effects are in nature ; according to the Bauddhas and others, they are not ; for that which is, cannot cease to be ; and that which is not, can by no means be : this is a contradiction. Therefore it is said COMMENT. Nature is said to be imperceptible, from its subtilty : it taiust be therefore inferred from its effects. The effects are the products of nature, or intellect, egotism, and the rest ; some of which are of a similar, and some of a dissimilar character, as subsequently explained. Effect, according to the Sankhya system, necessarily implies c&use, as it could not exist without it*: but on this topic there are different opinions, thus particularized by VACHAS- PATI : ' 1. Some say, that that which is may proceed from that which is not. 2. Some say, that effect is not a separate- ly existent thing, but the revelation of an existent thing. 3. Some say, that that which is not may proceed from that which is. 4. The ancients assert, that that which is comes from that which is (or ens from ens). By the three first pro- positions the existence of nature would not be proved ; for. ' 1. The materiality of the cause of the world, of which the qualities goodness, foulness, and darkness are the natural properties, comprises sound and other changes of its natural condition, and is diversified by pleasure, pain, and insensibility ; but if that which is, is born from that which is not, how can that insubstantial cause which is not, comprehend pleasure, pain, form, sound, and the like ? for there cannot be identity of nature between what is and what is not. * 2. If sound, and other diversified existences, were but revolutions of one existent thing, yet that which is could not proceed from such a source, for the property of manifold existence cannot belong to that which is not twofold : the notion of that which is not manifold through its comprising manifold existence is an obvious error. ( 42 ) ' 3. The notion of the Kanabhaksbas, Akshacharanas, an d others, that that which is no't may proceed from that which is> excludes the comprehension of effect in cause, as that which is and that which is not cannot have community : consequently the existence of nature is not proved ; and in order to establish its existence, the existence of effect in it must first be determined*.' Of the doctrines here alluded to, the first is said to be that of some of the Buddhists, who deny the existence of prakriti, or any universal cause, or of any thing which they cannot verify by perception. The second is that of the Ve'dantis, who maintain that all that exists is but the vivarttas, literally the ' revolutions ' the emanations from, or manifestations of, one only universal spirit. It might be said that the Sankhya seems to teach a similar doctrine, in as far as it refers all that exists, exclusive of spirit, to one common source, and makes all else identical with prakriti. It differs however in this, that it regards the substances evolved from the radical prakriti as substantial existences, as effects or products of a cause which exists no longer except in its effects. The Ve'ddntis, on the other hand, maintain that it is cause which is eternal, and that effects are only its present operations. The popular form i 3?:$ irate \% anra fliJ.6.vov(ri T^S, dtTraj/Te? 01 Trepl 0u9, Phys. I. 4. v IX. EFFECT subsists (antecedently to the operation of cause) ; for what exists not, can by no operation of cause be brought into existence. Materials, too, are selected which are fit for the purpose : every thing is not by every means possible : what is capable, does that to which it is competent ; and like is produced from like. 3 ( 45 ) BHASHYA. From there being no instrumental cause of ivhat exists not non-existent, what is not there is no making what is not : therefore effect is. In this world there is no making of what is not ; as, the production of oil from sand : therefore the instrumental cause produces what is, from its having been formerly implanted. Hence perceptible principles, which are effects, exist in nature. Further, from selection of materials. Updddna is ' (material) cause,' from the selection of it : thus, in life, a man who desires a thing, selects that by which it may be produced ; as he who wishes for curds, takes milk, not water (for their material cause). Thence effect is. Again, every thing is not by every means possible. The universal possibility of every thing is not ; as of gold in silver, &c. or in grass, dust, or sand. Therefore, from the non- universality of every thing in every thing, effect is. Again, what is capable does that to which it is competent ; as, a potter is the capable agent ; the implements, the lump of clay, the wheel, rag, rope, water, &c. (are capable), by which he makes the jar, which is capable of being so made from earth. Thence effect is. Lastly, like is produced from like. Such as is the character of cause, in which effect exists, such also is the character of effect ; as, barley is produced from barley, rice from rice. If effect was not (did not pre-exist), then rice might grow from pease ; but it does aot, and therefore effect is. By these five arguments, then, it is proved that intellect and the other characteristics do (pre) exist in nature ; and therefore production is of that which is, and not of that \vhich i 1 ^ not. ( 46 ) COMMENT. Arguments are Ikere adduced to shew that the effects or products of nature are comprised in, and coexistent with, their cause or source ; consequently they are proofs of the existence of that primary cause or source. It is laid down as a general principle, that cause and effect are in all cases coexistent, or that effect exists anteriorly to its manifestation ; sat-kdryyam* in the text meaning ' existent effect prior to the exercise of (efficient) cause t ;' or, as the phrase also of the text asadakarandt + is explained, ' If effect prior to the exercise of (efficient) cause does not exist, its existence cannot by any means be effected |L' The expression sat-kdryyam, therefore, is to be understood throughout as meaning ' existent effect,' not the effect of that which exists : and the object of the stanza is to establish the existence of cause from its effects, and not of effects from the existence of cause, as Professor Lassen has explained it : " Quaenam sint rationes docetur quibus evincatur mentem ceteraque principia eftecta esse a TU> ovn" Mons. Pauthier (Traduction de la Sdnkhya Kdrikd, 105) is more correct in his view of the general purport of the verse ; " Ce qui n'existe pas ne peut arriver 4 1'etat d'effet ;" but he has mistaken the particulars the reasons why that which is not can never be, for the means which would be fruitlessly exercised for its production ; it is not that such existence cannot be effected " par la co-operation d'aucune cause mate'rielle," &c., but became an effect requires an adequate material cause, and the like. Not only has the meaning of this verse been misapprehended by its translators, but the doctrine which it conveys seems to have been somewhat misconceived by high authority. M. t ( 47 ) Cousin, referring to this passage, observes, " I/argumentation de Kapila est, dans Fhistoire de philosophic, 1'ante'cedent de celle d'^Enesidemc et Hume. Selon Kapila il n'y a pas de notion propre de cause, et ce que nous appelons une cause n'est qu'une cause apparente relativement a 1'effet qui la suit, mais c'est aussi un effect relativement a la cause qui la precede, laquelle est encore un effet par la meme raison, et toujours de meme, de maniere que tout est un enchainement necessaire d'effets sans cause veritable et inddpendente." M. Cousin then supports his view of the doctrine by selecting some of the arguments contained in the text ; as, " That which does not exist cannot be made to exist;" and, "Cause and effect are of the same nature :" and he adds, as a third, that " il ne faut pas s'occuper des causes, mais dcs effets, car 1'existence do 1'effet mesure 1'energie de la cause ^ done 1'effet dquivaut la cause." In this instance, however, he is scarcely justified by 'his authority, whose object is not to dispense with the con- sideration of cause altogether, but to prove its existence from that of its effects. Kapila, therefore, is far from asserting that " il n'y a pas de cause," although he may so far agreo with the philosophers referred to, in recognising no difference between material cause and material effects : for it must be remembered, that it is of material effects, of substances, that he is speaking. His doctrine is, in fact, that on which Brown enlarges in his lectures on power, cause, and effect that " the forms of a body are the body itself ; and that all the substances which exist in the universe are every thing which truly exists in the universe, to which nothing can be added which is not itself a new substance : that there can be nothing in the events of nature, therefore, but the antecedents and conse- quents which are present in them ; and that these accordingly, or nothing, are the very causes and effects which we are desir- ous of investigating." Lect. on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, p. 175. KAPILA, however, has not asserted a series of antecedents and consequents without beginning ; and whatever we may conceive of hia m^Ua-prakriti, his original and un- originated substance whence all substances proceed, it is a fixed point from which he starts, and the existence of which he deduces from its effects : the mutual and correlative existence of which, with their cause, ho endeavours to establish by arguments, which, as regarding a curious and not unin- teresting part of the Sankhya philosephy, it may be allowable to recapitulate a little more in detail. 1. Asadakarandt ; ' Because efficient or instrumental cause cannot make or produce that which is not.' Professor Lassen renders this, ' E nulla nonentis efficacitate, nonens nil efficit. Asat in this passage, however, is the object, not the agent ; and karana is employed technically to denote the efficient or operative cause, the energy of which would be exerted in vain unless applied to materials that existed : that which does not exist cannot be brought into existence by any agent. It would be useless to grind the sesamum for oil, unless the oil existed in it : the same force applied to sand or sugar-cane would not express oil. The appearance or manifestation of the oil is a proof that it was contained in the sesamum, and consequently is a proof of the existence of the source whence it is derived. This dogma, in its most comprehensive appli- cation, is of course the same with that of the Greeks, that nothing can come from nothing, and makes the creation of the universe dependent upon pre-existing materials. Here^ however, the application is limited and specific, and as Sir Graves Haughton, in his vindication of Mr. Colebrooke's ex- position of the Vedanta philosophy, has justly observed, it means no more than that things proceed from their respective sources, and from those sources alone ; or that certain sequents follow certain antecedents, and indicate consequently their existence. 2. Updddna yrahandt ; ' From taking an adequate material cause : a fit material cause must be selected for any given effect or product." There is no difference of opinion as to the purport of upddana; ' Such as the substance evolved, such i,s ( 43 ) that from which it is evolved :' or as illustrated by GAURAPADA. ' He who wishes to make curds will employ milk, not water :' but this being the case, the effects which we behold, or infer, must proceed from something similar to themselves, and consequently prove the existence of that substance. ' The relation between cause and effect is the generation of effect ; but there can be' no relation (between cause and) a non-existent effect, arid there- fore effect is*," and consequently so is cause. 3. ' From the unfitness of all causes for every effect ;' sarva sambkavdbkdvdt. There must be an identity of character be- tween the sequent and its antecedent, and the existence of one indicates that of the other : a jar is made with clay, cloth with yarn ; the latter material could not be used to fabricate a water- pot, nor clay to' weave a garment. If this was not the case, all things would be equally fit for all purposes/ . . . ex omnibus rebus Omne genus nasci possit. It is not, however, here intended to assert, that "idone'a causa non est ulla quam sad, TO ov," but that the effect must have a determinate existence in that cause, and can be the only effect which it can pfoduce ; as in the commentary on this expression in the Sankhya, Pmvacharta Bhdshya : ' If effect prior to pro- duction do not exist in cause, there would be no reason why cause should not produce one non-existent effect, and not anotherf.' 4. Sfaktasya sakydkdrandi ; ' From the execution of that which the agent is able to do.' Active or efficient causes can. do only that to which they are competent : the potter and his implements fabricate a water-jar, not a piece of cloth ; they are not competent to the latter, they are capable of the former. If effect did not pre-exist, if it were not inseparable from cause, ( 50 ) power, or the exertions of an agent, and the employment of means, might derive from any antecedent one consequence as well as another. 5. Kdranabhdvat ; ' From the nature of cause ;' that is, from its being of the same nature or character with effect, and consequently producing its like ; or, according to VACHASPATI, ' from the identity of cause with effect*:' 'Cloth is not differ- ent from the threads of which it is woven, for it is made up of them -f^.' Here, then, we have precisely the discovery of modern philosophy, " that the form of a body is only another name for the relative position of the parts that constitute it ; and that the forms of a body are nothing but the body itself:" (Brown's Lectures :) a discovery which, simple as it may appear to be, dissipated but recently the illusion of substan- tial forms,' which had prevailed for ages in Europe. It seems, however, to have been familiar to Hindu speculation from the remotest periods, as the commentator on the Sankhya Prava- chana, and the author of the Swnkhya 0/iandrika, cite the Ve'das in its confirmation : * Before production there is no difference between cause and effect J.' There is good reason, however, to think that the conclusion drawn from the doctrine by the Ve'das was very different from that of the Sankhyas, being the basis of Pantheism, and implying that before creation the great First Cause comprehended both cause and effect : the texts illustrating the dogma being such as, ' The existent TO ov verily was unevolved || This, the Existent, was oh pupil, before all things The Unborn was verily before all IT.' The Sankhyas, like some of the old Grecian philoso- phers, choose to understand by tad, idam, TO ov, TO eV, ' the 1 comprehensive, eternal, material cause.' I : srrfa ( 51- ) From the arguments thus adduced, then, it is concluded that effect is, sat k&ryam * ; that is, that it exists in, and is the same with, cause ; or, as GAURAPA'DA has it, mahat and the other characteristics of pradhdna are in pradhdna. Sat kdryam is therefore neither ' ponendura est, existens (sad) emphatice ita dictum TO OI>TW? 6i/, per se ens,' nor ' effectus existentis, ab , existente effectum, effectum .a TO> OVTI:' the question is, whe- ther effect exists or not before production ; and not whether it is produced ' a TU> OVTI an a TOJ M OVTI' It is the production or appearance, OF that which is or is not ; not the production of any thing BY that which is or is not ; agreeably to the Sutra of KAPILA : ' There is no production of that which is not, as of a man's honrf- The production of that which is not is impossi- ble, as would be that of a human hornj.' Agreeably to the same doctrine also is the reply made in the Sutras to the objection, that if effect exists already, existence is superfluously given to it ; ' It is absurd to produce what is already extaut||/ The answer is, ' It is not so ; for the actual occurrence or non-occur- rence of production depends upon manifestation :' that is, the present existence of an effect is not the production of any thing new, but the actual manifestation of a change of form of that which previously existed : something like the notions which Aristotle ascribes to ancient philosophers, that all things were together, and that their generation was merely a change of condition : ^Hv OJULOV TO TTOLVTO, KOI TO ytve7/rei/ aXXoiovcrOai : and it is curious enough to find the doctrine illustrated almost in the words of Hobbes : " Faciendum est quod faciunt statuarii, qui materiam exculpentes, supervacaneam imaginem non faciunt sed inveniunt ;" or as VlJNYANA BHIKSHU has it, ' The active exertion of the sculptor produces merely the manifestation of the image which was in the stonelT.' ( 52 ) Although however, as identical with cause, and regarded as proofs of its existence ; effects or products, in their separated or manifested condition regarded as forms only, possess proper- ties different from those of their source or cause : these differ- ences are detailed in the next stanza. X. A DISCRETE principle is causable, it is inconstant, unpervading, mutable, multitudinous, supporting, mer- gent, conjunct, governed. The undiscrete one is the reverse. i oq^ |jq^ || f% ^Fq^Rf ^Wr^ : ii f% TOR II f ll ^M TOR ( 54 ) BHASHYA. Discrete ; intellect and the other effects. Causable ; that of which there is cause ; the term hetu meaning ' cause,' as synony- mous with up&dana, kdrana and nimitta. Nature is the cause of a discrete principle ; therefore discrete principles, as far as the gross elements inclusive, have cause : thus, the principle intellect has cause by nature ; egotism by intellect ; the five rudiments and eleven organs by egotism ; ether by the rudiment of sound ; air by that of touch : light by that of form ; water by that of taste ; and earth by that of smell. In this way, to the gross elements inclusive ,a discrete principle has cause. Again, it is inconstant, because it is produced from another ; as a water- jar, which is produced from a lump of clay, is not constant. Again, it is unpervading, not going every where : a discrete principle is not like nature and soul, omnipresent. Again, it is mutable ; it is subject to the changes which the world undergoes : combined with the thirteen instruments, and incorporated in the subtile frame, it undergoes worldly vicissitudes, and hence is mutable. It is multitudinous ; it is intellect, egotism, the five rudiments, and eleven organs ; and the five gross elements are supported by the five rudiments. It is mergent ; subject to resolution ; for at the period of (general) dissolution, the five gross elements merge into the five rudiments ; they, with the eleven organs, into egotism ; egotism into intellect ; and intellect merges into nature. Conjunct ; conjoined, made up of parts, as sound, touch, taste, form, and smell. Governed ; not self-dependent; for intellect is dependent on nature, egotism on intellect, the rudiments and organs on egotism, and the gross elements on the rudiments. In this way the governed or subject discrete principle is explained: we now explain the undiscrete. The undiscrete one is the reverse. An undiscrete principle is the contrary in respect to the properties attributed to the discrete : that, is causable ; but there is nothing prior to nature whence follows its non-production, and therefore it is without ( 55 ) ' cause. A discrete principle is inconstant ; an undiscrete is eternal, as it is not produced. The primary elements are not produced from any where ; that is, nature. A discrete principle is unpervading ; nature is pervading, going every where. A discrete principle is mutable ; nature immutable, from the same ' omnipresence. Discrete principles are multitudinous ; nature is single, from its causality: "Nature is the one cause of the three ' worlds ;" thence nature is single. Discrete principles are depen- 1 dent ; the undiscrete one is independent^ from its not being an 1 effect : there is nothing beyond nature of which it can be the effect. A discrete principle is mergent ; the undiscrete immer- gent (indissoluble), being eternal : intellect and the rest, at the period of general dissolution, merge respectively into one another ; not so nature ; and that therefore is immergent (indissoluble). A discrete principle is conjunct (or compound, made up of parts) ; nature is uncoinpounded, for sound, touch, flavour, form, and odour, are not in (crude) nature. Discrete principles are governed ; the undiscrete is independent, it presides over itself. These are the properties in which discrete and undiscrete principles are dissimilar: those in which they are similar are next described. COMMENT. It was stated in the eighth stanza, that intellect and the other effects of nature were in some respects similar, and in others dissimilar, to their cause : the properties in which the dissimilarity consists are here enumerated. The generic term used for the effects or products of primae- val nature (vyakta*) means, in its etymological and commonly received senses, that which is evident or manifest, or that which is individual or specific ; from vi distributive particle, and anja, ' to make clear or distinct". The purport is there- fore sufficiently well expressed by the equivalent Mr. Colo- ( 5G ) broke has selected, 'discrete,' detached from its cause, and having a separate and distinct existence. Nature (or primary matter) is the reverse of this, or avyakta * ' undiscrete, unseparated, indistinct.' If natura were substituted for tellus these lines of Lucretius would illustrate the application of the terms in question : Multa modis multis multarum semina rerum Quod permixta gerit tellus discretaque tradit. Discrete or separated effect or principle (meaning by principle a tatwa, or category, according to the Saukhya classi- fication of the elements of existent things) is described by its properties, and they are the same which arc specified in the original Sutra. 1. Hetuinat^f, 'having cause, or origin;' hetu implying ' material, efficient, and occasional cause ;' 2. Anitya J, ' temporary ;' for whatever has cause has begin- ning, and whatever has a beginning must have an end. At the same time this is to be Understood of them in their actual or present form or condition : ' Of their own nature (or as one with their cause) they are eternal, but they are perish- able by their separate conditions j|.' So in the Sutras ' destruction ' is explained ' resolution into cause ' 3. Un- pervading 1F :' ' Every one of the effects of nature is not observable in every thing, they are dispersed as different modifications**.' Vydpti is the essential and inherent presence of one thing in another, as of heat in fire, oil in sesamum, &c. 4. Sakriycff -f, ' mutable,' or ' having action :' perhaps ' movable ' or ' migratory ' would perfectly express the senses for the phrase is explained to signify that the effects of nature migrate from one substance to another; 'Intellect and the rest leave one body in which they were combined, and enter into * fflqf^rm Jf sqrmm i ft the composition of another : this is their transition : the transi* tion of the gross elements earth and the rest, composing body> is well known *.' 5. ' Multitudinous :' many, aneka } being repeated in various objects and persons, as ' the faculties in different, individuals, and the elements in different forms +.' 6. Supported by, referable to, asrita ; as an effect may be considered to be upheld by its cause, or an individual referable to a species ; as trees form a wood. 7. * Mergent,' linga ||; that which merges into, or is lost or resolved into, its primary elements, as subsequently explained. Intellect and the rest are the lingas, signs, marks, or characteristic circumstances of nature : and when they lose their individuality, or discrete existence, they may be said to have been absorbed by, or to have fused or merged into, their original source. Although therefore, the application of linga as an attributive in this sense is technical, the import is not so widely different from that of the substantive as might at first be imagined. VACHASPATI, explaining the term, has, ' Linga, the characteristic of pra- dhdna, for these principles, bwddhi and the rest, are its charac- teristics, as will be hereafter explained If:' and the author of Sankhya Chandrika has, ' Linga is that which charac- terizes, or causes to be known ** ;' it is the anumapaka^, ' the basis of the inference:' ' For this effect (of nature) is the parent of inference that an undiscrete cause exists JJ.' (See also Com. on V. 5. p. 24.) According to these interpretations, ' predicative' or ' characteristic' would perhaps be a preferable equivalent ; but ' mergent' or 'dissoluble ' is conformable to the Sankhya Bhdshya. of non-causability, constancy, omnipresence, immutability, singleness, self-support^ substantiveness, entireness, and supremacy, soul and nature correspond. They differ, however, in other respects, and particularly in those in which nature and its effects assimilate, as enumerated in the succeeding stanza. in *u XI. A DISCRETE principle, as well as the chief (or un- discrete) one, has the three qualities i it is indiscritni- native, objective, common, irrational, prolific. Soul is in these respects, as in those, the reverse. ft W ^Tf ( 60 ) ff irfir i wnsrp afaprthr: yffftrft n ( 61 ) frsn fHRr BHASHYA. the three qualities : it is that of which goodness, foul- ness, and darkness, are the three properties. A discrete prin- ciple is indiscriminative ; discrimination does not belong to it : that is, it cannot distinguish which is a discrete prin- ciple and which are properties, or that this is an ox, that is a horse : such as the properties are, such is the principle ; such as is the principle such are the properties ; and the like. Objective ; a discrete principle is to be enjoyed (made use of), from its being an object to all men. Common ; from being the common possession of all, like a harlot. Irrational ; it does not comprehend pain, pleasure, or dulness. Prolific ; thus, egotism is the progeny of intellect ; the five rudiments and eleven organs of egotism ; and the five gross elements of the five rudiments. These properties, to prolific inclusive, are specified as those of a discrete principle ; and it is in them that the chief (or undiscrete) one is similar: " Such as is a discrete principle, such is the chief (or undiscrete) one." Therefore as a discrete principle has three qualities,, so has ( 62 ) the undiscrete, or that of which intellect and the rest, having the three qualities, are the effects : so in this world effect is of the like quality with cause, as black cloth is fabricated with black threads. A discrete principle is indiscriminative ; so is the chief one, it cannot discern that qualities are distinct frona nature, that qualities are one thing, and that nature is au- other ; therefore the chief one is iudiscriminative. A discrete principle is objective ; so is the chief one, from its being the object of all men. A discrete principle is common ; so is the chief one, being common to all things. A discrete principle is irrational ; so is the chief one, as it is not conscious of pain or pleasure, or dulness. Whence is this inferred ? From the- irrationality of its effects ; from an irrational lump of clay proceeds an irrational water-pot. Thus has (nature) the chief one been explained. Soul is in these respects, as in those, the reverse : this is now explained. Reverse of both the discrete and undiscrete principles. Soul is the reverse of both, thus : Discrete and undiscrete have (the three) qualities ; soul is devoid of qualities : they are indis- criminative ; soul has discrimination : they are objects, (of sense or fruition) ; soul is not an object (of sense or fruition) : they are common ; soul is specific : they are irrational ; soul is ra- tional ; for inasmuch as it comprehends, or perfectly knows, pleasure, pain, and dulness it is rational : they are prolific ; soul is unprolific ; nothing is produced from soul. On these grounds soul is said to be the reverse of both the discrete and undiscrete principles. It is also said, as in those, referring to the preceding verse ; for as the chief (or undiscrete) principle is there said to be without cause, &c. such is the soul. It is there stated that a discrete principle is causable, inconstant, and the like ; and that the undiscrete one is the reverse ; that is, it has no cause, &c., so soul is without cause, being no production. A discrete principle is inconstant; the undiscrete one is constant; so is soul; and it is immutable also, from its omnipresence. A discrete principle is multitudinous ; the undiscrete is single ; so is soul. ( 63 ) A discrete principle is supported ; the undiscrete is unsup- ported ; so is soul. A discrete principle is mergent ; the un- discrete immergent (indissoluble) ; so is soul ; it is not in any way decomposed. A discrete principle is conjunct ; the un- discrete one uncombined ; so is sul ; for there are no (com- ponent) parts, such as sound, &c., in soul. Finally, discrete principles are governed ; the undiscrete one is independent ; so is soul, governing (or presiding over) itself. In this way the common properties of soul and nature were described in the preceding stanza ; whilst those in which they diifer, as- possession of the three qualities, and the like, are specified in this verse. Next follows more particular mention of these three qualities, with which both discrete principles and the undiscrete one are endowed. COMMENT. In this verse the properties common to crude nature and to its products are specified, continuing the reference to the eighth Terse, in which it was asserted, that in some respects the effects of nature itself were analogous. This being effected, the text proceeds to state that soul has not the properties which are common to nature and its products, but possesses those which are peculiar to the former ; agreeing therefore in some respects with crude nature, but dissimilar in every respect to its effects or products. The three qualities,* or satwa^", ' goodness,' rajas]., ' foulness,' and tamas}], 'darkness', which are familiar to all the systems of of Hindu speculation, are more particularly described in the next^verse ; soul, has them not. Pradhana, 'the chief one,' crude nature, and its products, have not discrimination, viveka, the faculty of discerning the real and essential differences of thing?, of ' distinguishing between matter and spirit, of knowing self. the exercise of which is the source of final liberation (from existence)?*. By the term 'objective**' is intended that which t *TC? i ** ( 64 ) may be used or enjoyed, such as the faculties of the mind and the organs of sense; or such as may be perceived by observation, vijndna* : such nature, or pradhdna, may also be considered as the origin of all things inferable by rea- son. Soul, on the contrary, is the observer or enjoyer, as after- wards explained. Achetana't ' irrational;' that which does not think or feel unconscious, non-sentient; as in the Meghaduta; "Those afflicted by desire seek relief both, from rational and irra- tional objects,!'' explained either ' living and lifeless' or * knowing and ignorant||' chetana^ being defined knowledge of right and wrong, or ' of what ought, and what ought not, to be done **.' The general position, that the properties of soul are the reverse of those of the products of nature, requires, however, some modification in one instance. A discrete principle is said to be multitudinous, many, aneka^; consequently soul should be single, eka +J; and it is so, according to the 8 f Bhdshya. On the other hand, the 8. Tatwa Kaumudi makes soul agree with discrete principles, in being multitudi- nous : The properties of non-causability, constancy, and the rest, are common to soul and nature ; multitudinousness is a property common to (soul and) an undiscrete principle||||.' The S. Chandrikd confirms the interpretation, ' The phrase tathd cha implies that (soul) is analogous to the undiscrete principle in non-causability and the rest, and analogous to discrete principles in manifold enumeration*^.' This is, in fact, the Saukhya doctrine, as subsequently laid down by the text, ver. 18, and is conformable to the Sutra of KAPILA ; ' Multitude t II ** nffiftw i tt ( 65 ) of souls is proved by variety of condition* :' that is, ' the virtuous are born again in heaven, the wicked are regenerated in hell ; the fool wanders in error, the wise man is set freef.' Either, therefore, GAURAPADA has made a mistake, or by his eka is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations ; or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it (R. A. S. Trans, vol I. p. 31), ' individual.' So in the Sutras it is said, ' that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the etherial element may be confined in a variety of ves- sels:}:.' This singleness of soul applies therefore to that par- ticular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage, and liberation ; for, as the commentator observes, ' one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body)]].' The singleness of soul therefore, as asserted by GAUHAPADA, is no doubt to be understood in. this sense. : n ^ I XII. THE qualities respectively consist in pleasure, pain, and dulness ; are adapted to manifestation, activity, and restraint ; mutually domineer ; rest on each other ; produce each other ; consort together ; and are reci- procally present. ( 66 ) sfti%: w$ /9 fikv ovcrias ?, TO?? Se iraQecn yueTa/3aAAoui\ta and veiKos, the ' love' and ' strife' of Empedocles as the principles of creation ; respectively the source of what is good or evil. The sense in which the several terms for the three gunas is employed is sufficiently clear from the explanation given of them in the text ; and the meaning of the equivalents which Mr. Colebrooke has assigned them must be understood ac- cording to the same interpretation. Prof. Lassen renders them essentia, impetus, and caligo ; which, similarly understood, are equally unobjectionable : but as the name of a ' quality t satwa, is not perhaps well rendered by ' essence,' or even by ' existence,' which is its literal purport, ' goodness,' denoting exemption from all imperfection, seems to be preferable. Impetus is rather the effect of rajas, than the quality ; and the term ' foulness,' derived from its etymology from ranf ( 72 ) ' to colour or stain/ will better comprehend its characteristic results. The quality bears a striking analogy to the perturbatio of the Stoics, and might be rendered by that word, or by ' passion,' in its generic acceptation. ' Darkness,' or caligo, expresses both the literal and technical signification of tamos. S5f SWT^FPregqSTOW ^ ^ *3T: I Korrswr OT: sRnwfcfr f r%: i i\ i XIII. GOODNESS is considered to be alleviating and en- lightening : foulness, urgent and versatile : darkness > heavy and enveloping. Like a larcp, they cooperate for a purpose (by union of contraries). r%: ( 73 ) BHASHYA. Goodness is alleviating, &c. When goodness predominates, the frame is light, the intellect is luminous, and the senses are acute. Foulness is urgent and versatile. What urges, urgent, exciting: as a bull, upon seeing another bull, exhibits vehement excitement; that is the effect of foulness. Foulness is also seen to be versatile ; that is, a person under its influence is capricious. Darkness is heavy and enveloping. Where darkness prevails, the members of the body are heavy, the senses obtuse, or inade- quate to the performance of their functions. But here it may be said, If these qualities are contraries to one another, what effect can they produce by their several purposes, and how therefore can it be said, they co-operate, like a lamp, for a (common purpose}. Like a lamp, their operation is for a (common) purpose : as a lamp, which is composed of the op- posites, a wick, oil, and flame, illuminates objects, so the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, although contrary to one another, effect a (common) purpose. This question involves another. It was said (in ver. 11) that a discrete principle, as well as the chief one, has the three qualities, and is indiscriminative, objective, and the like. Admitting this to be true of the chief one (or nature), how is it ascertained that intellect and the rest have also the three qualities, and are indiscriminative. and the like ? This is next explained. COMMENT. The description of the three qualities is continued in this verse. Goodness is alleviating ; laghit, ' light ;' it is matter, elastic and elevating, generating upward and lateral motion, as in the ascent of flame, and the currents of the air. It is the cause of active and perfect functionality also in the instruments of vita - 10 3ity* ; enlightening, prakdwkam, 'making manifest,' the objects of the senses. The term ish'tam, meaning ordinarily "wished, desired,' imports in the text merely drishtam, 'seen, regarded, considered' * by the 'Sankhya teachersf .' Foulness is urgent and versatile. The qualities of goodness and dark- ness are both inert and inoperative, even with regard to their own peculiar consequences; and it is only by the restless activity and stimulating agency of the quality of foulness that they are roused to action ; upash'tambhakam + being here ex- plained to signify ' stimulating, impelling,' udyotakani, pre'da- kam\\, contrary to its usual sense of ' opposing, hindering." It might be supposed to imply some relation to the primitive sht a lhi, ' stop, hinder, oppose, be stupid;' inasmuch as the idea appears to be that of action consequent upon obstruction, or inertia, ' reaction.' Thus, as illustrated in the /S'. Bhdshya, a bull displays excitement on beholding, or being opposed by, another. The -S. Tatwa Kaumudi has, ' The qualities good- ness, and darkness, on account of their own inertia, are in- operative, in regard to the exercise of their own effects, until excited by foulness. Having been roused from inactivity, they are made to put forth vigour and energy ; and therefore foul- ness is said to be uigentK.' The Chand,rikd is to the same effect : ' The meaning is this : From the production of combi- nation and activity by foulness, the definition of that quality is excitement and versatility**.' It is not necessary, however, to take into consideration the sense of the primitive stitabhi, for upitsli tambhaka is riot derived from that root, but from stambh'U/^, a Sautra root ; which therefore, although the meanings of sh'tabhi are usually also assigned to it, may take the import required by the text, of ' urging' or ' exciting.' * i 3H?i* srt i 8 fa i : I tf ( 75 ) The quality of darkness is ' heavy/ guru, causing sluggish- ness of body and dulness of mind. It is also varanaka, ' sur- rounding, enveloping,' so as to obstruct light, retard motion, &c. But these qualities, although contraries, co-operate for a. common purpose ; as the cotton, the oil, and the flame, al- though mutually destructive, combine in a lamp to give light. The common object of the qualities is the fulfilment of the. purpose of soul, as- is subsequently explained. n XIV. INDISCRIMINATIVENESS and the rest v of the properties- of a discrete principle) are proved by the influence of the three qualities, and the absence thereof in the reverse. The undiscrete principle, moreover, (as well as the influence of the three qualities,) is demonstrat- ed by effect possessing the properties of its cause (and by the absence of contrariety). qr. f% BHASHYA, That which is the property of indiscriminativeness and the rest is proved from the influence of the three qualities in mahat and the other discrete principles : but this is not proved in the imdiscrete ; therefore it is said, by the absence the reverse of it : the reverse of it ; the absence ; the non-existence of the reverse of that: thence the undiscrete principle is established; as, where there are threads, there is cloth ; the threads are not one thing, and the cloth another. Why so ? From the absence of the reverse (they are not contraries to each other). In this manner the discrete and undiscrete principles are established- The latter is remote, the former is near: but he who perceives discrete principles, perceives the undiscrete one also, as there is no contrariety between them. Hence also the undiscrete one is proved by effect possessing the properties of cause in this world : such as is the nature of the cause, such is that of the effect; thus from black threads black cloth is made. In the same manner, as the characteristics of intellect .and the rest .are their being iudiscriminative, objective, common, irrational, prolific, such as they are, such the undiscrete is proved essenti- ally to be. From the influence of the three qualities, indis. criminativeness and the rest are proved to be in discrete princi- ples ; and from there being no difference between them (and the nndiscrete), and from essential identity of the properties of cause and effect, the nndiscrete principle also is demon- strated. But it is replied, this cannot be true ; for in this world that which is not apprehended is not ; but the undiscrete one is, although not applicable. COMMENT. It was stated in ver. 8, that mtihat and the other effects of prakriti were in some respects like, and in others unlike, to their original. The circumstances in which they were dis- similar were specified in ver. 10, and those in which they agreed in ver. 11. In the latter stanza, the first of the con- current properties that was named was that of their possessing the three qualities ; and in verses 12 and 13 it was explained what was meant by the three qualities. In the present stanza it is asserted, that as the effects of prakriti have the three qualities, they must have, as a necessary consequence, the other properties, want of discrimination and the rest, enumerated in ver. 11 ; and that as they have them, their origin, or prakriti, must have them also, as there is no essential difference bet- ween the properties of cause and effect. The influence of goodness, foulness, and darkness, or the varied affections and conditions of all substances, is the obvious cause of perplexity, or want of discrimination, &c.; being, in fact, the same state or condition. Traigunya is the influence or any consequence of the three gunas. The next expression is variously interpreted. Mr. Colebrooke renders tad viparyaya abhavdt*, ' and from .the absence thereof in the reverse ;' that is, the absence of want 'Of discrimination, &c. in that subject which is the reverse of the ( 78 ) material products of nature, as, for instance, soul, is a negative- proof of their existence in the former. The properties of contraries are contrary. Soul and matter are contraries, and consequently their properties are mutually the reverse of each other: but one property of soul is freedom from the three qalities, whilst that of matter, or any material product of pra- kriti, is their possession ; consequently the former must be cap- able, of discrimination. The same may be said of the other properties of nut-hat and the rest. Thus VACHESPATI observes : ' It (the assertion) is first plainly affirmatively expressed in the natural order : it is then put negatively, or in the inverted rder ;from the absence thereof in the reverse ; from the ab- sence of the three qualities in soul, as the reverse of the pro- ducts of prakn'ti, in regard to want of discrimination and the like*.' The S. ChartdrikA has a similar explanation : ' The reverse of that want of discrimination ; where that is that is the reverse (of mahat, c.), or soul : for in soul there are not the three qualities ; or, where there is not want of discrimination there are not three qualities, as in soul*f*:' intimating, therefore, that tad, ' thereof,' may refer either to the three qualities traigunya, or to want of discrimination, &c. There is, however, another sense attached to the expression ' and the reverse is understood not to signify soul, or any thing- contrary to mahat and the rest, but to imply contrariety or in- compatibility in the properties of their origin, or prakriti : that is, indiscrimiuativeness and the rest are the properties of mahat &c. not only from their possessing the three qualities, but be- cause there is nothing contrary to indiscriminativeness, &c. in prakriti. This proposition is indicated by VACHESPATI, who. after explaining the passage as above, adds, * Or it may be understood as taking for its two subjects ryakta and aryakta i t ( 79 ) (discrete and tmdiscrefce matter), and by the inverted proposi- tion (or negatively) asserting that there is no reason (to the contrary) arising from one being exempt from the three quali- ties*.' The same is more explicitly stated by GAURAPADA. The absence of indiscriminativeness, he observes, as deduced from the influence of the three qualities, relates in the first in- stance to vyakta, 'discrete matter/ not to avyakta, or 'indiscrete:' but the same must apply to the latter also, because there is no property belonging to it which is incompatible with, or the re- verse, of, the properties of the vyakta> or ' discrete matter,' mahat, &c.; as in the case of the cloth and the threads of which it is woven, there is no incompatibility between them. The first portion of the stanza having shewn, then, either simply that discrete matter is possessed of indiscriminativeness, etc. or that both it and indiscrete matter are equally devoid of discrimination, proceeds to draw the conclusion that such an indiscrete cause must exist, endowed with properties similar to those of its indiscrete effects, because there is no difference of property between cause and effect ; agreeably to the Sutra, ' The three qualities, insensibility and the rest, belong to both (prakriti and its products)!;' and VACHESPATI observes, ' Effect is seen to be the same in its properties with cause. As the properties of the threads, &c. are identical with those of cloth and the like, so the attributes of pleasure, pain, and insensibi- lity, evidenced in the effects, which are distinguished as mahat and the rest, are proofs that similar conditions must belong to their cause: the existence of pradh&na or avyakta, as a cause, of which pleasure, pain, and insensibility are the conditions, is consequently established}.' s?j: i t ( 80 ) XV. SINCE specific objects are finite; since there is homo- geneousness ; since effects exist through energy ; since there is a parting (or issue) of effects from cause, and a reunion of the universe, t JTf^ ff f fir ^ \ f^mfr ftwft ^fT rT in fact^ total ab- straction from the world : this is the necessary consequence of being devoid of the three qualities^ which are essentially tha same with pleasure, pain, and dulness ; and from them, there- fore, soul is equally free. From the same cause, absence of qualities and insusceptibility of agreeable or disagreeable emo- tions, proceeds the next property of soul, that of being a bystander ; madkydstka, * neutral, indifferent, unconcerned ;' uddsina, ' neither rejoicing in pleasure, nor sorrowing in pain. Qualities, and particularly foulness, are indispensable to acti- vity ; and being without them, soul is consequently inert : the. same is considered to be also the necessary result of its being ' discriminative and unprolific, or unproductive^;' VIJNA'NA BHIKSHU restricts the term sdkshi^ ' witness/ to the sense of ' beholder,' distinguishing it from the other term, to which such a translation is more applicable, dfasJitri, as importing one who has the object near to, or before, his eyes ; the latter implies seeing in general : hence he says, * Soul witnesses or contemplates buddlii (intellect), and sees the other principles] |i* i J ( ioo ) XX. THEREFORE, by reason of union with it, insensible body seems sensible : and though the qualities be ac- tive, the stranger (soul) appears as the agent. Tir: tffa 3- PRTPTT BHASHYA. Here soul is said to be possessed of sensation ; and in connec- tion with it, intellect and the other predicates of nature assum- ing the appearance of sense seem sentient : as in life, a jar with cold water appears to be cold, with warm water seems to be warm ; so intellect and the rest, from union with it, with soul, seem sensible. But the qualities perform the active application, (of sense), not the soul : for although in common it is said, soul is the doer, the goer, yet soul is not the agent. How so 1 Though the qualities be active, (soul) the stranger appears as the agent. There being activity of the qualities, soul, which is indifferent, or inactive, appears as if it was the agent ; which it is not. Here is an illustration : as a man who is not a thief, being taken np along with thieves, is suspected to be a thief also ; so soul, being connected with three active qualities, is supposed, though inert, to be active also, In this manner the distinction of the perceptible, impercep- tible, and thinking principles (ver. 2. p. 13) has been explained ; from the discrimination of which liberation is obtained. It is next expounded why the union of the two (chief) principles, nature and soul, takes place, COMMENT. It is here taught that the sentient faculty resides in soul, and not, as it appears to do, in the products of nature ; and that activity resides in the qualities, not, as it appears to do, in soul. The term ch&and, from chit, ' to reflect/ means in general * reason, intelligence ;' but it is here applied to the possession or exercise of every faculty proper to a sentient and thinking being. It is the attribute of soul only, aa will be more dis- tinctly made clear when the functions of the senses, of con- sciousness, and intellect are explained, and they are shewn to be merely the vehicles or instruments through which ideas and notions are conveyed. They seem, however, to act. indepen- dently, but this is merely from their union with, or, more correctly, proximity to, soul ; samyoga being explained by the commentators to mean here merely sannidhdna, ' approxima- tion. In like manner, soul, which is contemplative, not active } mover, though itself unmoved, appears to be active through a similar contiguity. ' I am sentient ; wishing to do, I do : here a common origin or subject of action and reflection is appre- ( 102 ) hcndedV 8. Tatwa KaumucM. But this is an error, as the site or subject of action and reflection is distinctt. The term linf/a in the first line is explained to denote nuihat and the subtile products of pradhdna. Uddxina, ' indifferent,' is said also to mean ' inert J.' But it appears that there are passages in the Vedas and in the law-books which attribute agency to soul, and knowledge to biuldhi\\: and to meet this is supposed to be the purpose of the aphorism, ' Agency from affection, intelligence from propin- quity^' that is, ' The apparent agency of soul is from the affection (or operation) of biaddki ; the apparent intelligence of biiddhi (understanding) is from the proximity of soul ; neither is actual. Their mutual transfer of properties is like that of fire and iron in a heated bar, or of the sun and water, in the reflected rays of the former from the latterHV S. Prav. S. In like manner the Gha/ndrikd exemplifies the doctrine by reference to biiddhi, the organ of the understanding ; and furnishes also an example of the sense in which chetand, * intelligence/ is to be understood : ' Thence the effect (of pradhdna), the category buddhi, which is unintelligent, is as it were intelligent, (seems to be that which says) I know, be- comes as it were endowed with knowledge** :' that is, it is not the understanding, but soul, that knows. This, however, ap- plies equally to all the other products of nature, as far as to the subtile rudiments, whether individually considered, or ^rarfa v t I er ( 103 ) as composing subtile body*. They are all non-sentient, or irrational and inert. Their activity depends on combination with the qualities ; their sentient power on proximity to soul : and the conjoint presence of these two properties leads to the erroneous belief that soul is agent, as well as sentient. srarwr H XXI For the soul's contemplation of nature, and for its abstraction, the union of both takes place, as of the halt and blind. By that union a creation is framed. ( 104 ) i f% BHASHYA. The union of soul with nature is for its contemplation (of na- ture); that is, soul contemplates nature (in the state of) intellect and the other effects to the gross elements inclusive. For that object is the union of nature with soul ; and the same union, which is also for the abstraction (of the latter), is like the association of the halt and blind. As, a lame man and a blind man, deserted by their fellow-travellers, who in making their way with difficulty through a forest had been dispersed by robbers, happening to encounter each other, and entering into conversation so as to inspire mutual confidence, agreed to divide between them the duties of walking and of seeing ; accordingly the lame man was mounted on the blind man's shoulders, and was thus carried on his journey, whilst the blind man was enabled to pursue his route by the directions of his companion. In the same manner the faculty of seeing is in soul, not that of moving ; it is like the lame man : the faculty of moving, but not of seeing, is in nature ; which resembles, therefore, the blind man. Further, as a separation takes place between the lame man and the blind man, when their mutual object is accomplished, and they have reached their journey's end, so nature, having effected the liberation of soul, ceases to act ; and soul, having contemplated nature, obtains abstracted- ness ; and consequently, their respective purposes being effected, the connexion between them is dissolved. Again, By that, by that union, a creation is framed. As the birth of a child proceeds from the union of male and female, so the production of creation results from the connection of na- ture and soul. ( 105 ) The text next deecribef the particulars of all the product* of nature. COMMENT; The object of the union of soul arid nature, or the final libe- ration of the former by its knowledge of the latter, is here explained. ' Contemplation,' dar'sana, is considered to comprise ' frui- tion,' bhoga. As nature is devoid of sensibility and reflection, it can neithef enjoy nor observe ; and its existence would be therefore without an object, uriless there were some other one capable both of observation arid fruition*. This other one is soul. But, again, as pain is inseparable froni nature, so enjoy- ed soul desires, after a season, to be loosed froni the combina- tion ; and this detachnient, or the liberation of purified soul, necessarily requires sonde orie from" whicti to be liberated : that gome one is nature i consequently, for the fulfilment of their respective ends the fruiUo'ri of nature, and liberation of soul their mutual cooperation arid combination are essential. ' Ab- et raction,' kaivalyd, is explained by VACHESPATI, ' The cause of the attribution 1 of separation to purified soul, wiiich cannot be without previous union' with nature}.' But th'ese results cannot be attained without tHe evolution of the products of nature, and corisecjueritly they assum'e their several develop- ments, or, in other words, d creation is framed ; as it is only in the state of discrete principles that nature is to be co'titern- plated by soul, and it is only by the exact appreciation of the same, and of their' source, that sbiil ban detach itself front na- ture. For both purposes, therefore; the world must exist, as developed from its material cause. There are passages in the Ve"das, however, a"ttfib'iiiii!g crea- tion to soul , as, ' That was from it From this soul was ether 14 ( 106 ) produced.*' To this it is replied, that all that is herein in- tended is the attribution of the act of the inferior, or nature, to the superior soul : ' As in the world it is said that a king triumphs or is defeated, when it is not he, but his array, that suffers a defeat or achieves a victoryt.' S. Prav. Sara. : n n ^ H ^\ XXII, FROM nature issues the great one ; thence egotism : and from this the sixteenfold set : from five among the sixteen proceed five elements. ( 107 ) t ii *TTH r q-^trfi^mr^ \$ft\ft q BHASHYA, Nature (pratriti) is also termed ' the chief one* (pr(tdhdna\ ' the supreme' (brahmin), 'the undistinguished' (aryaktam), 'th* multi-comprehending' (bahudhdndka) and mdyd. Such are. its synouym.es. From that which is devoid of characteristic at- tributes, or from (crude) nature! the great one (nwhat) is pro- duced : this is also termed ' intellect' (buddhi) ; it is also called dswri, or 'demoniac;' mati, or 'understanding;' 'notoriety' (khydti), ' knowledge' (jndna), ' wisdom' (prdjna). From thence proceeds egotism, also called ' the origin of the ele- ments,' &c. (bhtitddi), ' the luminous, (taijasa}, ' the modified' (vaikrita), ' conscience' (abhimdna). From this the sixteen fold set. From this, from egotism, the class of sixteen is de- rived. This consists of the five subtile elements, or the arche- types of sound, touch, form, flavour, arid odour : the synonymes of tan-mdtra, arc all words denoting ' subtile' (sukshma) : also. ( 108 ) the eleven organs, the ear, the skin, the eye., the tongue, the nose, which are the five organs of perception ; the voice, the hand, the foot, and the organs of excretion and generation, which are the five organs of action; and, besides these, mind, making the eleventh, and being an organ of both action and sensation. These constitute the class of sixteen produced from egotism. From, Jive among the sixteen. From the five subtile elements proceed the five gross elements : as it is said, " From the archetype sound, ether is produced ; from touch, air ; from form, light (or fire) ; from flavour, water ; from odour, earth : and thus from these five rudiments the five gross elements proceed." As also it is said, " From discriminative knowledge of perceptible and imperceptible principles and the thinking soul (see ver. 2) liberation is obtained." Now therefore intel- lect and the rest, to the gross elements inclusive, forming twenty-three categories, have been specified (in the text) ; the xmdiscrete principle has beeiv described (see ver. 15, 16) ; and soul has been explained (ver. 18, 19) ; and these constitute the twenty-five tatwas (physical and metaphysical categories of the Sankhya system of philosophy). He who knows the universe to be composed of these principles called tatwas, from the abstract of tad, ' that,' implying the abstract existence of those principles as it is said, " He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever order of life he may have entered, and whether he wear braided hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven* he is liberated : of this there is no doubt." (See p. 1.) The twenty -five categories are, nature, soul, intellect, egotism, the five subtile (or rudimental) elements, the eleven organs of sensation and of action, and the five gross elements. It is stated in this stanza, from nature issues the great one. ^rVhat is meant by that great one is next defined. COMMENT- The categories of the Sankhya system have been before alluded to (ver. 3. p. 16), in explanation of their mutual re- lations, aud of the properties which they have in common, or ( 109 ) by which they are discriminated from one another ; but w have them here enumerated in the order of their production, as prefatory to a detailed description of them and of their func- tions contained in the following stanzas. The generic term for the twenty-five principles, tattwa, or as usually and with equal correctness written tatwa, is ex- plained by GAURAPADA to mean ' the abstract existence,' astitwa*, ova-la, essentia of tat+, THAT ; that thing, which is the object of philosophical investigation, or which has a real existence, and must be known. The more common etymology, tat, ' that,' and twam, ' thou 1 belongs to the Ve'danta system ; as in the Mahdvdkya, tat-twam asi, ' that (supreme soul) thou art,' implies the identity of universal and individualized spirit. We have in the scholia of GAURAPADA, on this stanza some synonymes of nature and the two first principles, the analysis of which elucidates the ideas entertained of them by the San- khyas. The succeeding stanzas will afford au opportunity of adverting to the terms used for intellect and egotism, and we may here confine the enquiry to the synonymes of nature, or matter. Prakriti, as has been previously, mentioned (p. 17), inti- mates, that which precedes, or is prior to, making ; that which, is not made from any thing else. It is also used relatively, to, signify that which is the source from which a product is deriv- ed ; so that mahat is the prakriti of ahankdra, &c. (see p. 18). Here, however, our business is with the primary source of all material products, and the term indicates merely that which preceded (pro) production (kriti) ; what that may have been is left wholly undefined or unimplied by the particular term. The same may be said of it agreeably to another etymology given in the Sdnkhya Sdra, where pra is interpreted by prak- rishta, ' principal, chief, best,' analogously to its other denomi- nation, pradh&na, 'the chief/ Pradhdna is derived from pra, ' principal,' and dhd, to ' hold :' ' that in which all genera- ( no ) fred effect is comprehended*.' The next synonyme, avyakta 'the unseparatecl, the undistinguished, the unperceived,' has been also previously noticed (p 41). as derived from anja, ' to make clear,' with vi, separative preposition, and the negative a prefixed : the term is of as frequent occurrence as either of the preceding, and is constantly used as a synonyme of prakriti in the Puranas and in ftjanu.. Brahme, which is to be carefully distinguished from Srahmd, the personified creative power, is ordinarily applied either to t-Ue Yecias or supreme spirit, and is an uncommon synonyrqe of prakriti ; but as derived from vriha, ' to inprease,' ;t implies the first principle of which the expansion becomes all perceptible objects. Bahudhdnaka is derived, like pradhdna from dhd, ' to hold ;' dhdnaka, ' the holder' qr comprehender' of bfthu, ' much,' of all things. Md- yd, in, \ts ordinary sense of ' illusion,' is applied to prakriti, not by the Sdnkhyas, for they maintain the reality of existing things, but by the Vedantis and Pauranikas, who regard crea- tion as a delusion or as a sp.ort of the creator : it is derived from the root md, ' to measure,' and may here perhaps imply either ' comprehension,' like pradhdna, or ' extension.' There is no explanation, of the term by any of tlie Scholiasts. VIJNANA BHIKSHU quotes the Yedas to shew that it is synony- mous with prakriti^. In. the Sdnkhha we have other syno- nymes ; as, sakti, ' power, Swapis; aja, 'the unborn, the un- produ,ced ;' tamos, darkness ;' and avidyd, ' igr\orancej.' Now what is to be considered as the sense of these words ? By what equivalent is prakriti to be best rendered ? Professor Lassen translates it procreatrix, but this seems to convey too much the idea of personality, and therefore, although very well agreeing with the original term as used, by the Pauraniks, where prakriti is commonly personified, yet it can scarcely be ( 111 ) considered as indicative of that which not only produces, bufc is the thing produced, being at once the origin and substance of all things. Mr. Colebrooke has rendered the term some- times by ' nature,' and sometimes by ' matter:' the former ex- presses both the parent and the progeny, and agrees in being also the constant subjects of prosopopeia. It is therefore, pre- ferable to perhaps any synonyme that the English languag e can offer. At the same time the correct equivalent is ' matter, materia, quasi inatter, ' the substance and source of material things ;' not, however, crude, visible, or divisible matter, but that first principle of the Pythagoreans and Platonists, and of Aristotle, which having neither parts, nor form, nor sense, nor quantity, nor any of the properties of body, was yet the one universal, incorporeal, invisible substance from which all bodies were derived. Ato $>; rtjv TOV yeyoi/oro? oparov KOI TTO.VTU>S aicrOriTOv /mr]Tfia /cat VTroSoxiv M^re yrjv fjujre ae/oa m^re irvp fj.rjT vSc?Te ocra e/c TOVTWV ftrfTe e wv raura ycyovev. aXX' avoparov ef<5o9 TI KOI a/u.opov Tray^e?. Timseus. See also the Physics, p. III. c. 6. That we are to understand this of the prakriti of the Sankhyas is evident from the mean- ing of its several appellations. It is also said by VUNANA BHIKSHU, that ' the world is merely modification of form, of which prakriti is the materiality*.' ' It is not individual or formal, but Universal material^.' S. Pr. Bhashya. Its invi- sibility is, as we have seen (ver. 8. p. 29), attributed, not to its non-existence, but to its subtilty (sauhshmya). Prakriti is also defined ' the equilibrium of the three qualities^ ;' and here it differs from, the subject matter of Aristotle in having quali- ties. These qualities however, whilst prakriti is yet unevolved, neutralize each other$ and are scarcely qualities as regards primary nature, because their loss of equilibrium, or their ac- tivity, is concurrent with the discontinuance of prakriti as separate from its products. So far, however, prakriti may t qftfsrei t + ( H2 ) b considered as different from the brute matter of the ancient physiologists, that it produces products of its own energy or power for a special cause, and is therefore more akin to the " plastic nature that acts, eveKa TOV, for the sake of something." In the Saukhya system, how- tever, such nature is not distinct from matter itself, whilst it Appears to be a different principle in the writings of the Greek philosophers, although not always very intelligibly described ; for, as Cudworth observes of Aristotle, " he nowhere 'declares of this nature of his, whether it be corporeal or in- corporeal, substantial or accidental." To conclude, we are to understand of the prakriti of the Sankhyas, primary, subtile, universal substance, undergoing modification through its own ehergy, arid for a special motive, by which it is manifest ai individual and formal substance, varied according to the pre- d'dminance of qualities, which are equipoised and inert in the parent, and unequal and active in the progeny. \\ XXIII. ASCERTAINMENT is intellect. Virtue, knowledge, dis- passion, and power are its faculties, partaking of good- ness. Those partaking of darkness are the reverse. ( 113 ) nrre JR r r 15 BHASHYA. The definition of intellect is ascertainment. Ascertaining (discerning, determining) is ascertainment : as in the seed the future germinating shoot is contained, so is determination (in intellect). This is a jar, this is cloth : that intellect which Avill so determine is so defined. This intellect has eight members, according to the twofold affection of goodness and darkness. The first kind, or intellect, partaking of goodness, is of four kinds, virtue, knowledge, di^passion, power. Virtue, comprises humanity, benevolence, and acts of restraint (yama) and of obligation (niyama). The former are said in the Pdtan- jala to be, restraint of cruelty, of falsehood, of dishonesty, of incontinence, and of avarice : the latter are the obligations of purification, contentment, religious austerity, sacred study, and worship of God. Knowledge has for its synonymes, manifesta- tion, certainty, light. It is of two kinds, external and internal. The former is (knowledge of) the Ve'das and their six subordi- nate branches, recitation, ritual, grammar, glossary, prosody, and astronomy ; also (of) the purdnas, and of logic, theology, and law. Internal knowledge is that of nature and soul, or (the discrimination that) this is nature, the equipoised condi- tion of goodness, foulness, and darkness : that is soul, perfect; devoid of qualities, pervading, and sentient. By external knowledge worldly distinction or admiration is acquired ; by internal knowledge, liberation. Lispassion is also of two kinds, external and internal. The former is the indifference of one who contemns sensible objects from observing their defects, or the trouble of acquiring and preserving them ; the incon- venience of attachment to them ; their liability to decay ; and the injustice they cause. The latter is the indifference of one who is desirous of liberation, and looks upon nature as if it was a piece of witchcraft or a dream. Power, is the abstract property of a superior (or divine) being : it is eightfold, (the capacity of) minuteness, magnitude, heaviness, lightness, reach, gratification of will, dominion, subjugation, and irresistible purpose. Atomic existence is meant by ' minuteness ;' so that a person becoming atomically subtile or minute may traverse the world : ' magnitude' is said of one who may make himself a giant : ' lightness' is having limbs like the fibres of the lotus stalk, or like cotton, so as to be able to stand upon the tops of the filaments of a flower : ' reach' is attainment of a desired object by going to the place where it is situated, wherever that may be :' gratification of will' is obtaining or effecting what- ever is desired : ' dominion' is governing the three worlds, as a king: 'subjugation' is having all things subject :' irresistible purpose' is compelling the site, rest, and motion of all things, from Brahma to a block, agreeably to the will of the person endowed with this faculty. These are the four properties of intellect which soul obtains when the qualities of foulness and darkness are overcome by that of goodness. But those partaking of darkness are the reverse. When intellect is influenced by the quality of darkness, then its four properties are the reverse of the above ; they are, vice, igno- rance, passion, and weakness. In this manner intellect having eight members, as it is affected by goodness or foulness, is produced from the undiscrete principle having the three qualities. Intellect has thus been explained. Egotism is next des- cribed. COMMENT- The first product of nature, or intellect, Is here described by its properties, ( H6 ) Intellect (buddhi) is adhyavasdya*. It is not easy to offer a satisfactory equivalent for this word, nor to understand pre- cisely what is meant by it. In the Amara Kosha it occurs as a synonyme of utsdka^, 'effort, strenuous and continued effort* perseverance ;' according to RA'MA'SRAMA, ' possessing gieat powerj.' He derives it from so antakarmmani\\, ' finishing, making end of/ with adhi, ' over,' and acalf, ' off ;' that is, en- tirely or absolutely ending or effecting ; as in the Hitopadesa : ' The precepts of knowledge confer not the least benefit on one who is afraid of exertion : of what use is a lamp to a blind man, though it be within his reach**.' In the Mitdkshara, uts6.hu is explained, ' Effort (or perseverance) in the performance of acts accomplishing the objects of manft.' In the Bhatti Kdvya we have the word used in the sense of ' wish, purpose, determination :' ' The bird said to the monkeys, You have not studied the law, if at such a season you wish (or resolve) to die#.' In a preceding passage (ver. 5) the phrase prati vishaya adhyavasdya\\\\, ' ascertainment of several objects, was given as the definition of drislita, ' perception ;' and the explanation of the Scholiast, buddhivytipdra jndnam, ' knowledge, which is the exercise of the intellectual faculty/ was cited (p. 23). The same commentator, VACHESPATI, here defines it, 'the specific function of intellect, not differing from intellect, itself; 7 or, to quote the passage at length, ' Ascertainment is intellect, from the identity of the act and the agent, as will be explained. #* : i tt ^^nq-^tfr^rs^sm: i JJ : i fzti zrerrnr ^sf^vq^I^w i ( H7 ) Every one who engages in any matter first observes, or con- siders ; he next reflects, it is I who am concerned in this ; and then determines, this is to be done by me ; thence he pro* ceeds to act : this is familiar to every one. Thence this as- certainment that such act is to be done is the determinatioH of intellect, which is as it were endowed with reason, from the proximity of the sentient principle. This is the specific func- tion of intellect, not differing from intellect itself; and the defi- nition of intellect is ascertainment, as that comprehends both its generic and specific distinctions*.' The explanation of the 8. Chandrikd, is to the same effect : Adhyavasdya is a sort of modified condition of intellect, as flame is of a lamp ; it is certainty in this form, such an act is to be done by me.*}*' The explanations, however, would rather seem to intimate intention, or volition, or, at least, the determination to act after reflection ; but the determination or conclusion that such an act should be done, does not necessarily signify that it shall be done : it is only the conclusion or ascertainment of its fitness. This function of the intellect, also, is not indispensably con- nected with the notion of will ; as in the example given by GAURAPADA ; where, in the simple conclusion after considera- tion, " this object is ajar; that, is a piece of cloth/' no wish, or will, is indicated ; no act follows. It is clear also that h0 considers adhyavasdya merely as the functions of intellect, in exercise : they are in intellect, and part of it, as the germ is in the seed, until brought into activity. Intellect is only an instrument ; that which, having received the ideas or images conveyed through the organs of sense, and the mind, constructs them into a conclusive idea, which it presents to soul. Its function in exercise, therefore, is ascertainment or certainty, as described in the $. Pravachana Bkdshya, which explains adhyavasdya, ' the synonyme, as well as buddhi, of great prin- ciple (mahat), and its specific function denominated ascer- tainment *.' The other synonymes of this principle are, buddhi, derived from biidh, ' to know,' ' knowing, intellect.' Mahat, ' great, the great principle ; ! ' The first and most important of the products of nature, and presiding over and pervading the wholef.' Asnri\: this is a very unusual and questionable denomination. It occurs only in the S. Bhashya, aud may be an error, perhaps for semus/ii, one of the synonymes of buddhi in the Amara kosha. It cannot be connected with asura, ' a demon,' as if the faculty were incompetent to convey divine knowledge ; for one of its properties, in connexion with the quality of goodness, is jnydna, ' true knowledge/ There is no good reason why it should be derived from ASURI, the pupil of KAPILA, unless allusion is made to some personification of intellect, as the bride of the sage. No explanation of the word is given in the Bhdshya, and I must confess my inability to suggest one en- titled to any confidence. Mati means ' understanding :' man- ydte anayd, that by which any thing is understood. Xhydti properly signifies ' fame but here means ' notoriety, notion, familiar knowledge ;' as in the Smriti, ' The great one it is, whence the familiar notions of the universe are always pro- f duced*.' Jnyana is usually the term for 'true or divine knowledge ;' knowledge of matter and spirit leading to libera- tion ; but it is here employed in its generic purport, ' that by which things are known.' The same may be said of prajnd, which is also commonly used in the sense of ' true wisdom/ but here implies merely, ' that by which knowledge is obtain- ed,' prajndyaU anay&, as RAMASRAMA expounds it. Several of these terms, in their technical, as well as literal application, bear an analogy to the vov$ of Aristotle, and the (fipovya-is of Plato. M. Cousin considers the category to be ' une sorte d'ame du monde.' It is, however, the instrument most proxi- mate to soul, by which the latter perceives, wills, and acts. Intellect is of two kinds, or has two sets of properties, as it is influenced or affected by the opposite qualities, goodness and darkness. The former are, 'virtue,' dkcnna; 'knowledge, jnyana ; ' dispassion,' vairagya ; and ' power,' ai&waryya. The latter are their negatives, ' vice,' adherma ; ' ignorance,' qjnyana^ ' passion,' avairagya ; and ' weakness,' anaiawaryya. These again comprehend specific varieties. Dkerma, 'virtue,' according to the S. JBhdskya, comprehends morality and religion. The S. Tatwa Kaumudi explains it, ' The cause of happiness and liberationt.' As the source of prosperity and happiness in life, it is the discharge of religious and moral obligations^ ; as the means of liberation, it is the observance of the eightfold yoga, or eight modes of contempla- tive devotionlj. Jnyana, or ' knowledge,' is defined by the same Scholiast to be, ' distinct notion of the difference between the three qualities and soul.' ' Dispassion/ vairdgya, is the extinction of rdqa, ' colour/ or passion, which like dyes of vari- ous hues tinctures the soul*!!.' ' Power/ aiswaryya, is the posses- ( 120 ) siott of superhuman faculties. It is always termed eightfold, even in the S. Bhashya, although nine varieties are there named : one of them, however, ' heaviness,' gariman t finds no place among the definitions given there, any more than in other authorities. It may be supposed to be included under the faculty of magnitude. The four first faculties, minuteness,' nnima ; ' lightness,' lagliima ; ' reach,' prdpti ; and ' magnitude,' mahima ; explain- ed and illustrated every where in the same way. According to VACHESPATI. the person endowed with the first can make his way into a solid rock; with the second, he may ascend to the solar sphere upon a sunbeam; or, as Moore has it, " may dance on a beam of the sun :" with the third, he can touch the moon with the tip of finger : and with the fourth, he may expand himself so as to occupy all space. The latter four faculties are less distinctly defined, and are sometimes confounded : the shades of difference are indeed so slight, that they may all be resolved into one, ' absolute power over matter.' ' Gratifica- tion of will,' prakamya, is generally defined by ichchliaiuibhi- yhuta*, unobstruction of wish ;' or. as explained by HEMACHAN- DRA, in his commentary on his own Lexicon, ' The wishes of a person possessing this faculty are unimpeded by the properties of material nature, such as form and the like ; so that he can swim, dive, or float in earth as readily as in waterf.' This is sometimes adduced in illustration of the meaning of the next faculty, but less accurately. That, is termed lusitd, which VACHESPATI defines, ' absolute subjugation of the elements and elementary beings}:.' The Chandrikd makes it ' independance on matter]!,' which is much the same as prakamya ; and A similar confusion occurs in RAMASRAMA'S commentary on AMARA, for he illustrates it by ' swimming or diving on dry land.' ' Subjugation of nature' is the usually accepted import s as HEMACHANDRA. * Thus as (with this faculty) any one deter- mines the elements shall be, so they remain*." The next faculty is dominion,' isita, According to VACHESPATI, it is 4 disposition at will of the production, arrangement, and ex- penditure of the elements and elementary beingsf.' NARA- YANA explains it, ' directing or impelling them at willj.' RAMAS- RAMA interprets it prabfiutva, ' dominion, sovereignty ; under which inanimate things obey command||.' The last faculty is termed yatrakdmdvasdyitd. In RAMASRAMA'S commentary he reads the word kdmdvasdy itd ; and the only variety he notices is that of the sibilant, which is sometimes, he observes, the dental, instead of the palatal letter^. According to the latter reading it is derived from si* " ' to sleep ;' to the former, from soff, ' to destroy :' in either, with ava prefixed, meaning, as RAMASRAMA explains it, ' he who tranquillizes or destroys (that is, accomplishes) his desires^.' The reading of GAURAPADA is, however, yatrakamdvasdyitd, as one compound ; and the common definition of the term is ' true (infalliable) purposej|||,' wherever exercised : ' Whatever the person having this faculty intends or proposes must be complied with by that which is the subject of his pur- pose ; the elements themselves must conform to his desigus. The Chandrikd has, ' Whatever the will proposes, that it obtamsHH.' HE'MACHANDRA, in his text, gives the word as iu the Bhdshya, yatrakdnidvasdyitwom ; and explains it, ' he who accomplishes his desires, to whatever they may be direct- 9 d*** :' and he illustrates it by saying that ' an arhat, or mi flrfr ( qm^frfr ) w^mrft crer^fas-fl i t i : i ftirr ^r^Trrr CT>TF i ## ^ i tt ^r i 16 Bauddha saint, 'can, by virtue of this faculty, convert poion into ambrosia, and administer it as nwaus of vitality*.' . \\ II R % II XXIV. CONSCIOUSNESS Is egotism. Thence proceeds a two- fold creation. The elevenfold set is one : the five elemental rudiments are the other. T BHASHYA. The elevenfold set: the eleven organs. The jive elemental rudiments : elementary matter of five kinds, or the rudiments, sound, touch, form, flavour, and odour. What sort of creation proceeds from that which is thus defined is next explained. COMMENT- The third category is here specified, and described as the source of the senses and their respective objects, The term here given as the syiiouyme and definition of ( 123 ) * egotism,* ahanlcdra-f , is abhimdnat, translated ' conscious^ ness/ The ordinary sense of both words is pride, and the technical import is ' the pride or conceit of individuality ;' 1 self-sufficiency f the notion that ' I do, I feel, I think, I am/ as explained by VACHESPATI : ' I alone preside and have power over all that is perceived and known, and all these objects of sense are for my use. There i& no other supreme except I ; I AM. This pride, from its exclusive (selfish) application, is egotism||/ The principle, therefore, is something more in Hindu metaphysics than mere consciousness, or conscience. It might be better expressed, perhaps, by ' le moi,' as it adds to the simple conception of individuality the notion of self- property, the concentration of all objects and interests and feelings in the individual. The other synonymes of this category express rather modifi- cations of it, as the next stanza intimates. Taijasa, ' the active* or ' the ardent/ from tejas*, ' light, splendour, ardour/ refers to- its animating or exciting influence on human actions, in con- nection with the quality of foulness. Bhtitddi-f, * primitive element/ and vaikrita^, l the modified,.' as explained in the Bhdshya on the next verse, regard its being, in connection, with darkness and goodness, the principle from which the organs and objects of sense proceed : for it must not be for- gotten, that this category of egotism or consciousness has a physical, not a metaphysical, character, according to the Sankhya philosophy, being the organ or instrument by which; the impression of individuality is conveyed to soul. It is ia this capacity that it may be considered the primary element, the parent of the rudiments of the elements, or the objects o sense, and of the organs by which they are perceived. It is, { raw: ( 124 ) in fact, the same with both these, as it is only by the applica- tion of our own senses to the objects of sense that we can become conscious of individual existence. ^ II XXV. FROM consciousness, affected by goodness, proceeds the good elevenfold set : from it, as a dark origin of being, come elementary particles : both issue from that principle affected by foulness. fr ( 125 BHASHYA. When goodness predominates in egotism over darkness and foulness, that egotism is of the pure kind ; the name of which, according to ancient teachers, was vaikrita, ' the modified.' From this modified egotism the class of eleven organs is pro- duced. The good set : perfect organs ; adequate to their func- tions : the set is thence called good. Again ; from it as a dark origin of beings, &c. When darkness predominates in egotism over goodness and foulness, that egotism is called dark, or, as it was named by the old masters, ' primitive element,' bktitddi. From it come elementary particles ; the fivefold set. The first element of the elements is darkness ; therefore it is usually called the dark : from that primitive element the fivefold rudi- mental set proceed. Both issue from that principle affected by foulness : that is, the egotism in which foulness predomi- nates over goodness and darkness takes the denomination taijasa, ' the active ;' and from that both proceed ; both the eleven organs and five rudiments. For the pure egotism, which is taikrita, ' the modified/ becoming so modified, produces the eleven organs : but to do this it takes active egotism for its assistant ; for pure (sdtwika) egotism is inert, and is only able to produce the organs when combined with the active. In like manner the dark egotism, or that which is called * primi- tive element,' is inert, and becomes active only in union with the active, when it produces the five rudiments. Therefore it ( 126 ) is said, both the organs of sense and their objects issue frona the modification of egotism affected by foulness. The good elevenfold set proceeds from modified egotism, or that which is affected by the quality of gooduess. They are next particularized. COMMENT. The products of egotism are here described as proceeding from three modifications of that principle, varied by the in- fluence of the three qualities. The terms used to designate the ' pure/ or sdtwikct priucipla; the ' dark/ or fdmasa ; and the ' foul,' or rdfasa ; e variety of egotism,' or vaikrita, bhtitddi, and taijasa ; have been explain- ed. According to our text, as understood by the Scholiasts, the eleven organs of sense issue from pure or modified egotism, and the five rudiments from elemental egotism - both being influenced by ardent or active egotism.' The commentator on the 8. Pravachana has a rather different explanation, in- terpreting ekadasaka, ' eleventh,' not ' elevenfold :' according to- him, this eleventh, which is mind, proceeds from the first kind of egotism ; the other ten from the second kind ; and the ele- ments from the third. " Sutra : The pure eleventh (organ) proceeds from modified egotism. Comment : Eleventh, is mind, which in the class of sixteen organs and rudiments is of the quality of goodness ; therefore it is born from egotism, affected by goodness, called vaikrita. This is the sense. Hence it follows, that from egotism, affected by foulness, proceed the other ten organs of sense ; and from egotism, affected by darkness, proceed the rudiments*." This interpretation he defends by the authority of the law-books and Purana&j. ( 127 ) and he gives a similar turn, although rather indistinctly expressed, to the text of the Karika. In the stanzas subse- quent to this, to ver. 37, the organs of sense are fully described, and in ver. 38 the text returns to the ele- ments. It is not necessary, therefore, to enter upon any explanation of them in this place. There is a remarkable ex- pression in the Bhdshya, which presents a notion familiar to all ancient cosmogonies. GAURAPADA says, ' the first of the elements was darkness*.' It is the first of the ' elements,' not the first of ' things ;' for it was preceded by unevolved nature and intellect, and it is itself a modified form of individuality. It therefore harmonizes perfectly well with the prevailing ideas in the ancient world, of the state of things anterior to ele- mentary or visible creation, when " chaos was, and night," and when Nullus adhuc nrunclo prsebebat lumina'Titan, Nee nova crescendo reparabat cornua Phoebe. In the influence of the quality of foulness, or passion, for the word rajas has both senses, may be suspected an affinity to the doctrine of an active principle, the moving mind, the eras, that set inert matter into motion, and produced created things. _ : IU \ II XXVI. INTELLECTUAL organs are, the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin : those of action are, the voice, hands, feet, the excretory organ, and that of generation. : J ( 128 ) BHASHYA. Reckoning from the eye to the organ of touch, the organs are called ' intellectual.' Touched by it, the organ of touch, which is the skin : thence the term for the skin which is used (in the text), ' that which touches,' sparsanaka. Intellectual organs are five, as they ascertain or know (severally) five ob- jects, or sound, touch, form, flavour, and smell. Those of ac- tion, <&c. They perform acts, whence they are called ' organs of action :' thus, the voice articulates ; the hands variously manipulate ; the feet effect motion ; the excretory organ, excre- tion ; and the sexual organ, generation. Thus are enumerated ten organs, five of intellect and five of action. The character and nature of the eleventh, or mind, is next described. COMMENT- The five instruments or means of perception and five of ac- tion, products of egotism, are enumerated in this stanza. The term ' organs' is correctly applicable to the material instruments by which perception is exercised ; but it is not to be understood of the gross corporeal bodies, the visible eye, ear, hand, &c., which arc parts of gross body. The word ' sen- ( 129 ) fees' would therefore be a less equivocal term, only that it does hot so distinctly convey the idea of an instrument which, though subtile, is substantial. The original word, indriya, is defined to mean whatever relates or belongs to indra, said to be a synonyme of soul, the senses being indicative, being marks or signs, of the presence of soul*: accordingly each is denomina- ted a linga (see p. 24), 'a characteristic feature or indication.'f n STT?R?W n R* n XXVII. (!N this set is) mind, which is both (an organ of sensation and of action). It ponders, and it is an or- gan as being cognate with the rest. They are numer- ous by specific modification of qualities, and so are external diversities* 17 * t ( 130 ) f qfrrnft BHASHYA. Here, as one of the class of organs, mind is said to be Among the organs of sensation it is one of sensation, and among those of action it is an organ of action also. As it performs the function of the organs of sensation and of those of action it belongs to;both. // ponders (or purposes) ; whence the term sankalpaka. It is also an organ as being cognate with the rest ; for such is the meaning of the word sadherrnya. The organs of sensation and action being (cognate or) produced, along with mind, from egotism affected by goodness, have this (property, of origin) in common with mind ; and from this com- mon property mind is an organ likewise. Thus eleven organs are produced from egotism affected by goodness. What, then, is the function (vritti) of mind ? Re- flection (nanhtlpa) is its function. Sound and the rest are the functions of the organs of sensation. Speech and the rest are the functions of the organs of action. Now are these various organs, apprehending various objects, so created by Iswara ? or are they self-generated ? since nature, intellect, and egotism, are devoid of sense ; and soul is devoid of action. Thence according to the Saukhya doctrine, a certain spontaneity is the cause (of the variety of the senses). Therefore it is addded. TJiey are numerous by specific modification of qualities, and so are external diversities : that is, the several objects of these eleven organs, or sound, touch, form, flavour, and odour, which are the objects of five; speech, manipulation, motion, excretion, and generation, the objects of other five; and reflexion, the object of mind; these all proceed from specific modification of qualities. From the variety (or special difference) of such modifications of the qualities the multifari- ousness of the organs proceeds, as well as the diversity of external objects : consequently this variety is not the work of Isiuara, nor of egotism, nor of intellect, nor of nature, nor of soul ; but from modification of the qualities, produced by spontaneity. It does not proceed designedly (it is not the re- sult of a will to act), because the qualities are non-sentient (unconscious or irrational). How then does it take place ? This, as will be afterwards explained, is in like manner as the secretion of milk is for the growth of the calf, so the proceed- ings of nature take place for the liberation of soul, without ( 132 ) foul's being cognizant of them ; so the unconscious qualities become modified by the existence of the eleven organs, and their varieties are thence derived. Hence the eye is placed in its elevated orbit for the purpose of looking up to heaven ; and in like manner the nose, the ear, the tongue are commodi- ously situated for the apprehension of their respective objects : the organs of action are also distributed conveniently for the discharge of their several duties of their own nature, through the modification of the qualities, not as their objects ; as it ia elsewhere said, " Qualities abide in qualities ; that which is the function of the qualities is their object." External diversi- ties, therefore, are to be regarded as made by the qualities : this is the meaning of the text. Of which nature is the cause. The several functions of the organs are next specified. COMMENT. After defining mind as an instrument both of sensation and of action, this verse explains how it is that there are various organs and objects of sense ; and it is said to depend in both cases upon specific modifications of the qualities of nature. Mind is an instrument both of sensation and of action. Its function is sankalpa, a word that more commonly means ' re- solve, purpose, expectation ; as in the Hitopadesa, ' the crow,' Lagliupatatiaka, says, ' All has been heard by me ; and this is my resolve, that we must be friends*.' And MENU : ' Desire is the root of expectation ; sacrifice is its product^:' or, as KTJLLUKA BHATTA explains it, ' Sankalpa is understanding to this effect, that by a certain ceremony a desired consequence is effected]:.' In both passages the notion of ' conclusion from Stir: ( 133 ) foregone premises' is conveyed, and that seems to be its mean- ing here. Thus VACHASPATI explains it : ' The mind carefully considers a substance perceived by an organ of sense, (and determines) this is simple, that is not so ; or discriminates them by their condition of predicate and predicable*.' Again, it is said, " First, knowledge or perception in simple (inconsiderate), like the knowledge of a child, a dumb man, or the like : it is produced by the mere thing ; but when, after this, the thing, as distinguished by its properties, by its genus, and the like, is recognised by the understanding, and intellect is in accor- dance with perception, that period (or interval) of determina- tion is the operation of the mind." Here, then, scmkalpa is the process of reflection, the consideration of the object of simple perception, so as to form a definite idea, which mind transmits, through individuality and intellect, to soul. In this way mind is an organ both of perception and action ; perceiving the ob- jects presented by the senses, and forming them into a positive idea. It is further identified with both classes of organs by originating from the same source, egotism affected by goodness ; and consequently it consists of the same materialf. The second portion of the stanza conveys a doctrine that is not very intelligible. The variety of the senses and of the ob- jects of the senses is said to arise spontaneously in them, from specific modification of the three qualities. VACHASPATI under- stands the allusion to external objects to be merely illustrative ; that is, the internal organs are diversified by modification of the qualities, in the same manner that external objects are varied by the same modification^:' and the translation follows this explanation. In the Bhashya a different reading in the original occurred, which would require the passage to be ren- dered, ' and from variety of external objects||:' thus ascribing ( 134 ) the diversity of the organs, not only to modification of the qualities, but to the diversity of external objects, which require suitable, and therefore various organs for their apprehension. The reading is, however, clearly incompatible with his argu- ment, although GAURAPADA is somewhat obscure ; but the variety is noticed and admitted by the author of the ('liriwlril-u*. The S. Pravdchdiia B/ias/tya considers the multif'ariousness spoken of in the Sutra, which conveys apparently a similar doctrine to that of the Kdrika, as restricted to mind : ' Multi- fariousness is from modification of qualities, as the variety of human condition (is from various association) : that is, as the very same individual assumes different characters, according to the influence of his associations ; becoming a lover with a mistress, a sage with sages, a different person with others ; so mind, from its connection .with the eye or any other organ, becomes identified with it, and consequently is diversified according to the function of sight and the rest of the organs with which it is severally associated^.' The association of mind with the organs is intimated by the Ve'das, as in the text, ' My mind was elsewhere, I did not hear.+' The very illustration used by Locke : " A man whose mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, takes no notice of im- pressions made by sounding bodies upon the organ of hearing : therefore it is evident that perception is only when the mind receives the impression," says the English philosopher ; and the Hindu infers, that ' the mind must cooperate with the organs of sense, even for perception, as they would otherwise be in- capable of performing their functions.)) i t inHffilftlftftWRr ( 135 ) The materiality of mind, considered as distinct from con- sciousness, intelligence, and soul, and as neither more nor less than an internal sense, a sensorium, is much less absurd than the same character of it when considered as part of, or identical with, soul, as was the doctrine of the Epicureans, whose des- cription of mind, as an organ merely, agrees well enough with the Hindu notion : Prim'um ; animum digo mentem quam sa?pe dicamua Esse hominis partem nihilo minus ac maims ac pes Atque oculei, partes animantes totius exstant. LUCRETIUS, III. 94. XXVIII. THE function of five, in respect to colour and the rest, is observation only. Speech, handling, treading, excretion, and generation are the functions of five (other organs). ft firtrotf: ftrs ( 136 ) BHA'SHYA. The term ' only' (matra) is to be understood in the sense of speciality, or the exclusion of what is not specified ; as in the sentence, " Alms only are received ;" that is, nothing else is received. Thus the eyes are observant of colour (form), not of flavour and the rest ; and so of the other senses. And in this way the function of the eye is colour (vision) ; of the tongue, taste ; of the nose, smell ; of the ear, sound (hear- ing) ; of the skin, touch : these are the functions of the intellec- tual organs. Speech and the rest (are the functions) of the five organs of action ; or, speech is the function of the voice (larynx, <&c.) ; handling of the hands ; treading, of the feet ; dejection of excrement separated from food, of the rectum ; and generation of offspring, of the sexual organs : ' function or ob- ject' being required for each term by the grammatical construc- tion of the sentence. The functions of intellect, egotism, and mind are next described. COMMENT. The text particularizes the functions of the organs of sense severally. The general term for the office of the sense is dlochana*, literally ' seeing, beholding, perceiving, observing.' According to ancient authorities it is said to comprise both the first un- deliberative, and the second deliberative knowledge ; or, in short, what is understood by ' perception*.' The commentator on the S. Pravachana, who gives this explanation, observes, however, that some consider deliberative perception to be the property of the mind only, whilst simple or uodeliberative per- \ t arref^T^ gpUPqrWteTRi r **v sron ftftwwrtl i if jrewr Jfwffsfrftfasfoftf i (137 ) fception is that of the external senses ; and this appears to be the doctrine of the Sankhyas : the senses receive simple im- pressions from without of their own nature ; whether those im- pressions are perceived, depends upon the cooperation of the internal sense, or mind. The term for ' function' is vritti, ex- plained by vyapard, ' active exercise or application ;' also by samarthyam, 'ability, adequacy;' and phala, 'fruit, result.' GAUKAPADA has vishayd, ' object ; and it may be said, that the function and object of a sense is the sanle thing, sight being both the function and the object of the eye. There is some difficulty in translating some of the terms satisfactorily, al- though there is none in understanding what is meant by them. ^Thus rtipa, ' form,' or, as rendered in the text, ' colour,' is the object and office of the eye ; it is therefore equivalent both to visible substance and sight. So of sabda, ' sound ;' it is both hearing and that which is heard. Spersa, ' touch,' is the faculty and the substance to which contact may be applied. In rasa, ' taste,' and gandha, ' smell,' we have the double equivalents^ as both words in English, as Well as in Sanscrit, express both the sense and the sensible property. In English^ ' voice' is a function ; but here, at least, v ach* is also the instrument of speech. In the other organs of action the function is more readily rendered ; but the difficulty in any case is only that of language, and the sense is sufficiently explicit. is ( 138 ) XXIX. OF the three (internal instruments) the functions are their respective characteristics : these are peculiar to each. The common function of the three instru- ments is breath and the rest of the five vital airs. I |f%; c* HfTFTT frT: 3pr^T : i f fa; i ( 139 ) BHA'SHYA. The natural properties, which are the several characteristics, are the respective characteristics (as previously defined). As- certainment is intellect (ver. 23) : that also is the function of intellect. Consciousness is egotism (ver. 24) : consciousness is both its characteristic and its function. Mind ponders (ver. 27) : such is its definition ; and reflection, therefore, is the function of mind. Of these three, intellect, egotism, and mind, their respective characteristics are their specific functions. The functions of the intellectual organs, as before explained, are also specific (the same is the case with the organs of action). But now their common function is described. The common function of the instruments. The function of the instruments in common is breath and the rest of the Jive vital airs ; the airs called prana.. apana, samana, udana, and vyana. These are the five airs which are the common function of all the organs of sense. The air, for instance, called prana is that which is perceptible in the mouth and nostrils, and its circulation is the common function of the thirteen kinds (of instruments) : that is, where there is breath, the organs acquire (are connected with) soul (they become living). Breath, like a bird in a cage, gives motion (vitality) to the whole. It is called prana 1 breath' or ' life,' from ' breathing.' From carrying downwards (apanayana), the air apana is so named ; the circulation of which, also, is the common function of the organs. Samana is so named from conducting equally (samanayanaj the food, &c- (through the frame). It is situated in the central part of the body, and its circulation is the common function of the in- struments. The air udana is denominated from ascending, or from drawing or guiding best (un-nayana). It is percep- tible in the space between the navel and the head, and the circulation that it has is the common function of the organs. ( 140 ) Lastly, the air by which internal division and diffusion through the whole body is effected is called vycma, from its pervading (vyapti) the body like the etherial element. The circulation of that, also, is the common function of the assemblage of the organs. In this manner these vital airs, as the common func-i tion of the instruments, are explained ; that is, the common function of the thirteen kinds (of organs). . COMMENT. Besides the peculiar functions of the three internal instru-* ments, mind, egotism, and intellect, which as the same with their definitions have already been specified, they have a com-, mon office in the evolution or circulation of the internal aerial humours which constitute vitality, The translation limits this community of function to the three internal instruments only, or to intellect, egotism, and mind ; and such is the interpretation of YACHASPATI MISRA : ' The five airs, or life, is the function of the three (internal) instruments, from being present where they are, and absent where they are not*." So the S. Pravachana Bh explains the Sutra Sdindnya karana vritti'f ; which is also the phrase of the Kdrikd, ' the function of the three internal instruments^. GAURAPADA, however, understands, vitality to be the common function of all the organs, external and internal ; or thirteen instruments, ten of the former, and three of the latter kind. The expression of the text aLo is general, and applicable either to all the organs, or to any of them, as variously understood. The two meanings are not irreconcilable, although, strictly speaking, the sense followed in the translation is most correct ; for although vitality is the common function of all the senses, yet it is essentially so of the internal senses only : it might f ftf: I J 3RT: ( 141 ) continue with the privation of any or all of the external senses^ but could not, as VACHESPATJ states, subsist without the inter- nal organs, as it depends upon their existence for its own. So also the S. Pravachana Bhdshya calls the vital airs not only the ' functions,' but ' modifications, of the internal instruments||.' These vital airs are not to be confounded with vdyu, or ' elemental air,' for the Ve'das are authority for their different origin : ' From him is born vital air, mind, and all the senses, heaven, wind, light, water, and the all-sustaining earth.' ' The attribution of aerial operation to modification of the internal instruments arises from their being susceptible of a sort of motion similar to that of air and from their being governed by the same deityll.' The vital airs are, in fact, the vital func- tions of breathing, circulation, and digestion. That these functions, resulting from organization, should be supposed to partake of the nature of aerial humours, originates very possibly from some misapprehension of the phenomena of breathing, flatulence, and arterial pulsation. The term used by GAURA- PADA to designate their action occurs syandana, ' moving, circulation,' in the copy ; but spandana, ' throbbing, pulsation,' were perhaps a preferable reading. The offices assigned to them are evidently connected with notions either of circulation or a pulse. Thus Prdna is breath, expiration and inspiration. Apdna is flatulence, crepitus, Samdna is eructation, supposed to be essential to digestion. Uddna is the pulsation of the arteries in the head, the neck, and temples ; and Vydna is the pulsation of the rest of the superficial arteries, and occasional puffiness of external parts, indicating air in the skin. The situations assigned to the five airs by the 8. Tatwa Kaumudi, are much less consistent and intelligible. Thus Prdna is there said to be the function of the tip of the nostrils, head, navel, ( 142 ) and great toes ; Apdna, of the back of the neck, the back, the feet, and the organs of excretion and generation ; Samdna, of the heart, the navel, and the joints ; Uddna, of the head, throat, palate, forehead, and root of the nose ; and Vydna, of the skin. With exception of the last, it is not easy to under- stand how such absurd situations should have been selected. The Bhdshya may be taken as the expression of the earlier notions, Rf5! II XXX. OF all four the functions are instantaneous, as well as gradual, in regard to sensible objects. The func- tion of the three (interior) is, in respect of an unseen one, preceded by that of the fourth. sft ( 143 ) f gr ?i BHASHYA. O/ a^ four the functions are instantaneous. The four are, intellect, egotism, and mind, in connection with any one of the organs of sense. Of these four the function is instantaneous in regard to perception, or in the ascertainment of perceptible objects. Intellect, egotism, mind, and the eye see form at once, in one instant, (coming instantly to the conclusion) that is a post. The &ame three, with the tongue, at once appreciate flavour; with the nose, odour : and so with the ear and skin. Again ; their functions are also gradual in regard to sensible objects. Of that aggregate of four the function is also (oc- casionally) gradual (progressive). Thus, a person going along a road sees an object at a distance, and is in doubt whether it be a post or a man : he then observes some characteristic marks upon it, or a bird perched there ; and doubt being thus dissipated by the reflection of the mind, the understanding discriminates that it is a post ; and thence egotism inter- poses, for the sake of certainty, as, verily (or, I am certain) it is a post. In this way the functions of intellect, egotism, mind, and eye are (successively) discharged. And as in the case of a visible object, so it is as to sound and the rest of the objects of perception. But in respect of an unseen one, the functions of the three are preceded by that of the fourth. Unseen implies time past, ( 144 ) or future : for instance, in respect to ' form,' the function of the eye has preceded that of intellect, egotism, arid mind, as has that of the skin in respect to touch ; of the nose in regard to smell ; of the ear in relation to sound ; and of the tongue in respect to taste. The functions of intellect, egotism, and mind are preceded in order by those of the senses in regard to time future or past ; whilst in regard to time present they may bef either instantaneous or gradual. Further COMMENT- The consentaneous or successive operation of the three in- ternal and any one ol the external organs in the formation of ideas is here described. The cooperation of the three internal organs and any organ of sense may be instantaneous (yugapat). like a flash of lightn- ing, or as at the sight of a tiger, when the recognition of him, knowledge of his ferocity, conclusion of personal peril, and determination to try to escape are the business of one and the same moment : or their operation may be gradual or succes- sive (kramauas), allowing leisure, for instance, for the eye to see, for the mind to consider, for egotism to apply, and for intellect to conclude. G-AURAPADA rather disarranges the order of succession, and places the function of egotism last, assigning to it the office of belief or conviction. YACHESPATI'S illu- stration is more regular : ' Thus, the ear hears the twang of a bowstring ; mind reflects that this must be for the flight of an arrow ; egotism says, It is aimed at me ; and intellect determines, I must run away*.' Whenever the object is un- seen, adrish'ta, not present, whether it be past or be to come, there must have been a prior perception of it ; that is, as the text is explained by the commentators, there must have been a prior perception of it by an organ of sense. The expression ftf the text, tat purvikd vritti, ' their prior function,' might be thought to refer to a prior notion gained by the conjoint opera- tion of the internal and external organs at some former period. This, however, would be recollection, the seat of which, as well as of judgment or inference, is in buddhi, or ' intellect,' alone ; as in the Pdtanjala Sutra, ' Proof, refutation, delibera- tion, sleep, memory ; these are said to be the functions of intellect*.' The prior operation, therefore, is merely percep- tion or observation by the external sense, alochanam (see ver. 28), conveying simple ideas to the mind. Taking, then, this prior simple idea acquired through an external organ, any fur- ther consideration of it is the gradual operation of the three internal instruments. Where the object is present; conviction may be either momentary or successive : the Sankhyas main- taining the possibility of consentaneous operation of the organs of sense and mind, egotism and intellectj in opposition to the doctrine of the Vaiseshikas, that the formation of ideas is in all cases a graduated process : "Where the object is absent, the idea must be formed by the internal organs so far in successive order that they must be consequent upon a former impression received by an external sense ; but as concerns themselves, their action may be either simultaneous or successive-}-. The illustration which occurs in the Bhdshya and other commen* taries, of the course of reasoning by which the nature of a distant object is determined, is something like that with which in the Philebus, the formation of opinion is elucidated, |frr 11 \\ <* \\ * JJT T^rTF 19 ( 146 ) XXXI. THE instruments perform their respective functions, incited by mutual invitation. The soul's purpose is the motive : an instrument is wrought by none. ff% i: BHASHYA. Swam is repeated, implying ' several order :' that is, intellect, egotism, mind, perform their respective functions, the incite- ment to which is mutual invitation. Akuta implies ' respect and alertness.' They do this for the accomplishment of the purpose of soul. Egotism and the rest effecting it through intellect : that is, intellect, knowing the wishes of egotism and the rest, proceeds to its own peculiar function. If it be asked, \vhy it does so 1 the answer is, the purpose of the soul is the motive. Soul's purpose is to be fulfilled : for this object the activity of the qualities occurs, and thence these instruments make manifest the object of the soul. How is it that (being devoid of intelligence) they act 1 They act of their own accord. An instrument can be wrought by none. The purpose of soul alone causes them to act : this is the meaning of the sentence : ( 147 ) an instrument is not made not roused to act by any human superior. It is next specified how many (instruments) intellect and the rest are. COMMENT- The circumstances that induce the internal and external organs to perform their respective functions are said to be mutual incitement, and spontaneous disposition to effect the objects of soul. The organs of sense are said to act by mutual invitation or incitement. Their cooperation in the discharge of their respec- tive functions is compared to that of different soldiers in an army, all engaged in a common assault, but of whom one agrees to take a spear, another a mace, another a bow. It is objected, that the organs being declared non-sentient, incapable of intelligence, cannot be supposed to feel, much less to know, any mutual design or wish, dkuta* or abhiprdya'f ; and the terms are explained to signify the insensible influence which the activity of one exerts upon that of another, if there be no impediment in the way ; a sort of sympathetic or consentane- ous action. ' Akuta here means incitement to activity ; that is, at the time when one organ is < in action, the activity of another, if no obstruction hinder itj.' ' With this view the several instruments are directed by a presiding power, which may be termed the adaptation of the mutual fitness of their natures!].' The motive for this sympathetic action is the pur- pose of soul, fruition or liberation ; which purpose they of their own accord, but unconsciously, operate to fulfil, in the same way as the unconscious breast spontaneously secretes milk for ( 148 ) the nourishment of the infant ; according to the Sutra, ' As the cow for the calf:' that is, as the milk of the cow of its own accord exudes for the use of the calf, and awaits not the effort of another, so the organs of their own accord perform their office for the sake of their master, soul*. S. Pravachana Bh. They must act of their own nature ; it is not in the power of any one to compel them to act. GAURAPADA'S expression is, ' Not by any sovereign manf :' perhaps some particle, such as vd, may have been omitted in the copy, making the sense, 1 Neither by a deity nor a mortal ;' or the phrase may imply, that they are not compelled to action even by soul, as a divi- iiity ; but fulfil soul's purposes through an innate property, undirected by any external agent. XXXII. INSTRUMENT is of thirteen sorts. It compasses, main- tains and manifests : what is to be done by it is ten- fold, to be compassed, to be maintained, to be manifested. : \ 1 ( 149 ) BHASHYA. Instrument. Intellect and the rest are three ; the intellec- tual organs are five ; the organs of action are five : all together thirteen. What this performs is next declared : it compasses, maintains, and manifests ; that is, the organs of action com- pass and maintain ; those of perception manifest. How many kinds of action there are is next specified. Its action, that which is to be done by it, is tenfold ; of ten kinds, as-hearing, touch, &c. by the instruments of perception ; speech and the rest by those of action : and thus by the former, manifestation, and by the latter, comprehension and support, are effected. COMMENT. The sense of the term karana, ' instrument' or ' organ,' is here explained, as a generic denomination for the external and internal organs. The instruments or organs are thirteen ; that is, three inter- nal, intellect, egotism, and mind ; and ten external, or the organs of sensation and action. Their respective functions as organs have been explained : their effects as instruments are classed under three heads, ' compassing.' dharana*; ' maintain- ing,' dhdranat ; and ' manifesting,' prakdsana^. The first which means, literally, ' taking, seizing,' and rendered in the text ' compassing,' signifies ' the application of an organ to the ( 150 ) object to which it is adapted*/ and is the especial function of the organs or instruments of action. ' Maintaining,' dkdrancii 'supporting, upholding,' is, according to the 8. Bkdskya, also the office of the instruments of action ; but the authors of the S. Tatwa Kaumudi and S. Chandrikd assign it to the three internal instruments, intellect, egotism, and mind, as being es- pecially the supporters of vitality. ' Buddhi, ahankdra, and mind uphold, through their function being designated as the production of the vital airs, &C.J-' The elder commentator could not, of course, admit this doctrine ; for we have seen (ver. 29) that, according to him, all the senses or instruments contri- bute to support the vital principle. All the Scholiasts agree in attributing ' manifestation, enlightening,' prakdsana, to the intellectual organs. The objects to be effected by the instru- ments are tenfold, reducible to the same three classes : speech, manipulation, walking, excretion, and generation are to be compassed, to be effected, dhdrya$, by the actual application of the several organs : sound, taste, touch, smell, form to be manifested, to be made sensible, prakdsya : and all of them, together with the vital airs, constituting in fact animal life, are to be dhdryya\\, upheld or maintained. STT? ^rem^cK 97*o II ^ II XXXIII. INTERNAL instruments are three ; external ten, to make known objects to those three. The external organs minister at time present : the internal do so at any time. * ? 3 &im swrf^w vnr^r-cT i J arrim: i il wb \ ( 151 ) *ri ^ TOT BHASHYA. Internal instruments. Intellect, egotism, and mind are three, from the difference between intellect and the others, External ten. The five organs of perception and five of action are the ten external instruments, and they are to make known objects for the fruition of intellect, egotism, and mind. Time present : that is, the ear hears a present sound, not one that is past, nor one that is to come : the eye Gees present form, not that which is past, nor that which is future : the skin touches present substance : the tongue tastes present flavour ; the nose ( 152 ) amells present odours, nor past nor future. It is the same with the organs of action : the voice articulates actual, not past nor future words : the hand takes hold of a present water-pot, not one that has been or is to be : the feet traverse a present, not a past nor a future walk : and the organs of excretion and generation perform present, not past nor future offices Exter- nal organs, therefore, minister at time present. The internal ones do so for any time. Intellect, egotism, and mind regard objects of any period : thus intellect forms an idea, not only of a present water-jar, but of one that has been or will be made : so egotism exercises consciousness of an object past, present, or future : and mind considers the past and future, as well as the present. Internal instrument is, therefore, for all times. It is next explained which of these instruments apprehends specific, and which unspecific objects. COMMENT. The difference between the functions of the external and internal organs, as concerns time, is here explained : the action of the former being confined to time present ; that of the latter comprehending also the past and the future* Internal instrument is so denominated from operating within the body* ; the external from being applied to exterior objects making them known to the internal organization. The term vishaya, ' object,' is also explained by bhogya, 'that which is to be enjoyed ;' and vydpara, ' exercise ;' and vishaydkLya, ' that which declares or makes objects known.' It is also defined as ' that which occasions the exercise of the functions of the three internal instrumental" .' External sensation is necessarily confined to present objects, but mind, conscious- ness, and intellect apprehend from present objects those which t favf ( 153 ) have past, or are to come ; as past rain from the swelling of a river ; and future rain, in the absence of any other prognostic, from the destruction of the eggs of the ants*. This last phrase alludes probably to the well known destruc- tion of various species of the ant tribe, which in the East takes place immediately before the setting in of the rainy season : they then take wing, and fly abroad in vast multi- tudes, of which few survive ; according to the Hindustani proverb, yf&jjj? v5* i5 3 ? &** 3* ^ ^ ^ When the ants are about to die, their wings come forth.' The expres- sion " ants' eggs," pigrflik&nda, is, however, rather question- able. It occurs in both copies of the S. Tatwa Kaumudi. xxxiv. AMONG these organs the five intellectual concern objects specific and unspecific. Speech concerns sound. The rest regard all five objects. , I 20 ( 154 ) q^rftwfar BHA'SHYA. The intellectual organs concern specific objects : they ap- prehend objects which have specific properties. The intellec- tual organs of men distinguish sound, touch, form, taste, smell, along with objects of indifference, pleasure and pain. The organs of the gods apprehend objects which have no specific distinctions. So, amongst the five organs of action, speech concerns sound. Speech, whether of gods or of men, articu- lates words, recites verses, and the like ; and this instrument is the same in both orders of beings. The rest all except speech ; the hand, the foot, and the organs of excretion and generation regard all five objects : that is, sound and the other four objects of perception belong to all the other organs ; for there may be sound, touch, form, taste, and smell in the hands ; the foot treads upon the earth, of which sound and the rest may be characteristics ; the excretory organ separates that in which the five objects abide ; and the generating organs produce the secretion which is equally characterised by the five organs of sense. COMMENT- Ano ther distinction is made in the functions of the external instruments, as they regard objects with or without specific characteristics. Objects are distinguished as having specific characters or effects, sai'ise'sha* , and as devoid of them, nirvis&kfffc and the t ( 155 ) instruments are discriminated according to their capability of conveying notions of either the organs of sense in mortals can apprehend only those objects which have specific charac- ters ; either sensible, as colour, form, taste, &c. ; or moral, as pleasant, painful, or indifferent. The faculties of the gods and of sages can apprehend objects without such characteristic properties, and which exercise no moral effect, producing neither pleasure, pain, nor indifference. The S. Tatwa Kau- mudi identifies ' specific' with ' gross corporeal' objects*, and ' unspecific' with ' subtile and redimental' objects! ; the latter of which are cognizable alone by the organs of holy men and deities*. This distinction applies to all the external organs, except the voice, which in men, saints, and gods can articulate sensible, specific, or corporeal words alone ; for it is the organ of the voice that is the origin of speech. Speech cannot, like sound, taste, &c., originate with any thing gross or subtile exterior to the speaker ; it must proceed from him, through the agency of a gross material instrument, and must therefore be gross or sensible itself. Gross corporeal mechanism cannot bo the source of a subtile product, and therefore with every order of beings speech must be specific. ' The rest,' se'shdn-i refer- ring to the organ of speech, implies the other organs of action, all of which may regard the five objects of perception ; that is, they may comprehend them all ; as ' from the combination (or capability) of sound, touch, colour, smell, taste, in objects like a water-jar and others, which may be compassed or taken hold of by the hand, &c.|j' 8. Tatwa KaumudL \ ?FR f RTF% ^T^TT^T II 3 H II : i t tf^fow : i J I arcHTTfR proceeds ether. These gross elements arc termed specific. They are the objects of the senses of men, and are sootkiwj, causing pleasure ; terrific, causing pain ; and stupifyingi causing insensibility ; as the ethereal element may give delight to one person coming forth at once from within a house, so the same may be the source of pain to one affected by cold, or heat, or wind, or rain ; and if he be going along a road leading through a foisst, in which he loses his way, it may then, from the perplexity of space, occasion stupefaction : so the air (or wind) is agreeable to a person oppressed by heat, disagreeable to one feeling cold ; and when tempestuous and loaded with clouds of sand and dust it is stupifyiug. The same may be said of fire and the rest. There are other specific varieties. ( 163 ) COMMENT. It was intimated in ver. 34, that objects wore both specific and unspecific ; and it is here explained, that by the former it meant tke various property which the same element possesses at different times, and under different circumstances, in regard to mortals ; and by the latter, the uniform and unvaried opera- tion of the subtile rudiments in respect to the gods. The precise nature of the rudimental elements is not very intelligible, according to their usual identification with what we are accustomed to consider as qualities, not substances, or sound, tangibility, form or colour, flavour,, and odour ; xabda, sparxu., 'I'/'ijxi, rasa, and yandka. It seems, however, that wo should regard the rudimental elements as the imperceptible subjects of these qualities, from which the grosser and visible elements, ether, air, light, water, and earth, originate. So VIJNAXA BHIKSHU calls them ' subtile substances, the elements which are the holders (sustainers or subjects) of the species of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell ; but in which, as a genus, the three species of pleasurable, painful, and indifferent do not occur : they are not varieties of the gross elements, but in each respectively the elementary property exclusively resides whence they are said to be rudiments. In those elements that elementary property resides alone (without being diversi- fied, as agreeable, &c,) ; and as there is nc distinction between a property and its subject, that which is a rudimental substance is called a rudiment, tan mdtra ; the existence of which as a cause is inferred from that of the gross element as an effect*.' Tan Vidti-a is a compound of tad, 'that,' and riidtm, 'alone;' im- plying, that in which its own peculiar property resides, without ?T 1. II. c. 6, or ether, fire, earth, water, and air. In- tellect. Syst. I. 07. That Empedocles was not of the atomic school is evident from Lucretius, who specifies him as one of those who greatly misunderstood the principles of things ; Principiis tamen in rernm fecere ruinas Et graviter inagnei magno ceciclere ibi casu. I. 741--2. It may be suspected that something like the Hindu notion that the senses, or their faculties, and the gross elements, par- qmsi^ra: i ( 105 ) take of a common nature, is expressed in the celebrated, though otherwise not very intelligible verses of the same philosopher : Fa/if/ /u.ev "yap yjuav oTriaTra/aev, vSari tT vfiwp A.i6epi <5 atOepa Slav, arup Trvpi -wvp aidrjXov : By the earthy element we perceive earth ; by the watery, water ; the air of heaven by the aerial element ; and devour- ing fire by the element of fire.' As opposed to the simple unvaried rudiments, the derivative gross elements, which are sensible to men and animals, are susceptible of three qualities ; they may hav 7 e specific or varied effects, may be diversified as species ; they are said, accord- ingly, to be soothing or agreeable*, terrific or disagreeablef, and stupifying, bewildering^ ; that is, they may be either of these, according to the different circumstances in which the influence of one or other of the three qualities predominates. When goodness prevails, whether it be in themselves or in the object affected, they are sdnta, ' tranquil or pleasant ;' when foulness they are yhom, ' frightful, disagreeable ;' and when darkness prevails, they are ' perplexing,' mtirha : as VACHES- PATI ; ' In the gross elements, ether and the rest, some, through the predominance of goodness, are soothing, pleasant, agree- able, light ; some, through the prevalence of foulness, are terri- fic, painful, restless ; whilst others, through the influence of darkness, are stupifying, depressing, heavy(|.' ^ \\ u u J JT ( 166 ) XXXIX, SUBTILE (bodies), and such as spring from father and mother, together with the great elements, are three sorts of specific objects. Among these, the subtile bodies are lasting ; such as issue from father and mother are perishable. ^rftt : qiwr* inp?TOnft*frft i ^Wftftwr ft^r ^: I ITR ft PRTF ? ( 167 ) BHASHYA, Subtile : the rudimental elements, that, when aggregated, form the rudimental or subtile body, characterised by intellect (mahat) and the rest, and which always exists, and undergoes successive states of being (transmigration) : those are subtile (bodies). Such .*- Subtile ; rudimental elements : these are lasting) constant ; by them body is commenced, and migrates, according to the im- perative influence of acts, through the forms of beasts, deer, birds, reptiles, or immovable substances ; or, in consequence of virtue, proceeds through the heaven of Indra, and other celes- tial abodes. So the subtile body migrates until knowledge is attained ; when that is attained, the sage, abandoning all body, acquires liberation ; these sorts of bodies, or subtile, therefore, are called lasting. Such as issue from father and mother are perishable. Having left that subtile body, the frame that proceeds from mother and father ceases, even here, at the time ( 1G8 ) that the breath departs ; the body born of parents ceases at the time of death, and merges into earth and the other gross elements. "What subtile body is, and how it migrates, is next described. COMMENT. Objects were distinguished in the preceding verse according as they were with or without specific or diversified effects : they are here classified according to their forms, their origin, aud duration. A question of some difficulty, however, arises here, as to the objects of the classification. Are they bodies in general ? or are they gross bodies only ? In the preceding stanza it was stated, that the subtile elements, the tan mdtras, were un- specific; whilst their effects, the gross elements, were 'specific,' vlse'ska. It is now stated, that there are three kinds of vi^eahas, ' sorts, species, specific differences ;' but it is not explicitly de- fined of ivhat these are varieties. Mr. Colebrook. following the principal commentators, renders it ' sorts of objects ;' that is, of bodies in general. Professor Lassen, carrying on the sense of 'vixe'sha, ' specific,' from the preceding stanza, considers the variety here spoken of to concern only gross or perceptible elementary bodies : " Distincta, elementa qua: distincta dictm- tur (ver. 38). Distinctorum triplex est divisio in subtilia, a parentibus progenita, crassa" (ver. 39). He admits that the commentators are against this interpretation, but concludes rather that they are in error, than that ISWAHA KRISHNA should have employed the word i-i.^lm in a double sense. The interpretation of Prof. Lassen is highly creditable to his critical acumen and judgment, aud is possibly correct al- though it is scarcely compatible with the notions of subtility and durability which the text ascribes to this branch of the triad. His view is not, as he supposes, wholly unsupported by the commentators ; for VIJXANA BIIIKSHU similarly ex- plains the stanza, us will presently be noticed, The passage ( 169 ) is one of some importance, as it regards apparently the history of the Saukhya doctrines respecting the nature of that subtile body which is the immediate vehicle of soul, as \ve shall have occasion to notice more particularly, when we come to verse 40. If the meaning of the text be as Prof. Lassen renders it, it furnishes reason to suppose that the author of the K&rikd, had introduced an innovation upon the original doctrine, as will be subsequently indicated. According to GAURAPA'DA and NA'RA'YANA, the sorts or species intimated in this verse are different from those des- cribed in the preceding ; the former calls them, as above, ' other varieties* ;' and the latter has, referring to ver. 38, ' So many are the specific varieties ; but these are not all, there are othersf .' VA'CHESPATI'S expression, ' A further species of species^, might be thought to refer to the gross elements ; but, from the explanation that follows, it is evident he does not intend to limit the specific differences to gross elementary bodies. Agreeably to the explanation, then, in which these writers concur, bodies in general are threefold, subtile, gene- rated, and elementary ; and consistently with this view they consider ' subtile,' sukslima, as equivalent to tan-mdtra, ' rudi- mental :' thus GAURAPA'DA has, ' Subtile is the aggregated rudimental elements, forming a rudimento-elemental subtile body)] :' so also YA'CHESPATI ; ' Subtile means subtile bodies ; subtile body is one specific object :' and the Ghandrikd ; Subtile are what are called rudimental bodies!!.' Consequently they also conceive the subtile objects spoken of in this verse to be something entirely different from the gross elementary visedMx, or ' species,' of the preceding verse ; not merely sub- species or varieties of the same : and it must be admitted that 22 ( 170 ) there is some inconsistency in the Kdrikd'a speaking of subtile bodies being a species of gross bodies; of the impwceptiblt being a variety of the perceptible. According to VIJNA'NA BHIKSHU, however, the text merely intends by ' subtile,' aiikshrnu, a modification of gross elementary body ; a corporeal frame, which is subtile only relatively, or which is more refined than the second kind of body specified in the text, that which is begotten : ' The nature of that body which is the support of rudimental body is explained in the Kdrikd, " subtile, gene- rated," &c. : here is meant, body aggregated of the five ele- ments, the (product or) effect of the rudimental elements' which is subtile relatively to generated body*.' The same notion is again intimated by expressions which will be subse- quently cited ; and there remains no doubt that this commen- tator understands by the sukdiriuf, of the text, ' a subtile variety of gross elementary body,' disti/nctorum dlstlnctio. The other commentators understand by it, ' rudimental bodies,' elementa indlstincta. Either interpretation is therefore al- lowable : the latter agrees best with the construction, of the original. In the second variety of bodies of course specific or sensible bodies only are intended ; bodies generated or begotten are made of the gross elements, agreeably to the Sutra, ' Body consists of the five elements! :' they are, however, in some degree distinguished here from the elements ; holding, accord- ing to GAUIIAPA'DA, a middle place between them, and rudi- mental bodies serving to combine them ; upachdyaka causing upachaya, ' proximate aggregation ;' the parts of the embryo being derived in the first instance from the parents, and their development being the result of the accession of the elements, for purposes which he describes. There is some incongruity, however, in this explanation, as it makes a distinction where there is no essential difference ; organized matter being, in fact, i t the same with elementary matter. The other commentator's, therefore, give a different explanation of the term ' great ele- ments,' restricting it to inorganic matter. Thus VA'CHESPATI observes, 'Subtile body is one variety of objects; generated bodies are a second ; and the great elements a third : water- jars and the like (inorganic bodies) are comprised in the clasi of the great elements*.' So also the Ghandrikd : ' Subtile bodies are those called rudimental ; generated, are gross bodies ; and the great elements are mountains, trees, and the likef.' In this threefold division of bodies, as explained by the Scholiasts on the Kdrikd, we have, in fact, but two distinc- tions, subtile and gross ; the latter being subdivided into organic and inorganic. The twofold distinction is that which is especially recognised in the Sutras : thus in the S. Prava- chana Bhdshya, the Sutra, ' Thence (the origin) of body},' is explained, ' from the twenty-three tativas (or categories) two kinds of bodies, subtile and gross, proceed]] :' and again, ' Gross body is for the most part generated (some bodies being inor- ganic), the other (subtile body) is not.' The chief object of the stanza is, however, to assert the different duration of these three kinds of bodies ; subtile are permanent : and here we have an argument in favour of the translation adopted ; for no form of gross body could be con- sidered as lasting : as composed of the elements, in however delicate a form, it must resolve into them at the time of death ; whilst the subtile bodies, consisting of the subtile ele- ments, endure either till liberationll, or until the great Pralaya.** Dissolvi quo qusuque supremo tempore possint. : I fairc $fa i t $ snr R*KtT: ^cnSTT^: I J |fcT If < 172 ) C\. u v H XL. (SUBTILE body), primaeval, unconfined, material, com- posed of intellect, with other subtile principles, mi- grates, else unenjoying ; invested with dispositions, mejrffent. ( 173 ) BHASHYA. Primeval ; whilst yet the universe is uncreated : in the first creation of nature, at that season subtile body is produced. Unconfined ; imcombined either in the state of animals, men, or gods ; and from its subtilty wholly unrestrained, or passing into rocks and the like without obstruction ; it migrates ; it goes. Permanent: until knowledge is attained it migrates. Composed of intellect, with other subtile prmci/ples ; having mahat and the rest : that is, intellect in the first place, with egotism and mind, to the five subtile rudiments, to the subtile principles, to the rudimental elements. It miy rates; it tra- verses the three worlds, as an ant the body of Siva. Unenjoy- iny ; without enjoyment : that subtile body becoming capable of enjoyment only in consequence of acquiring the property of action, through its aggregation by external generated body. Invested with dispositions, Dispositions, as virtue and the rest ; which we shall hereafter explain (see ver. 43). Invested with ; coloured or affected by. Subtile body is that which, at the period of universal dissolution, possessed of mahat, in- telligence, and the other subtile principles, merges into the chief one (or nature), and, exempted from further revolution, remains extant there until creation is renewed, being bound in the bondage of the stolidity of nature, and thereby incom- petent to the acts of migrating and the like. At the season of re-creation it again revolves, and is hence called linya, 'charac- teristic' or ' mergent,' or sukshma, ' subtile.' From what cause the thirteen instruments (intellect, egotism, and the eleven organs) revolve, as has been said, is next explained. COMMENT. The condition of subtile body, in regard to commeiice'me'ntj duration, and term, is here described. The commentators are agreed that the subtile body here spoken of is the linya, or the linya sarim, ' rudiment/ or ( 174 ) ' rudimental body ;* ordinarily, though perhaps not quite accu- rately, confounded : the linga consisting, as intimated in the last phrase of the Bkdskya, of thirteen component parts, in- tellect, egotism, and the organs of sense and action ; whilst the linga earira adds to these a bodily frame, made up of the five rudimental elements. In this form, however, they always coexist, and it is not necessary to consider them as distinct : thus the Sutra of KAPILA states, ' one linga of seventeen* ;' that is, according to the Scholiast, * in the beginning, at crea- tion : there is but one rudimental body at the period of creation, consisting of an aggregate of the eleven organs, five rudimental elements, and intellectf .' This was at first embodied in the person of HIRANYAGARBHA, or BRAHMA, and afterwards 'multi- plied individual!}', according to variety of actions^:.' In this enumeration egotism is omitted, being included, according to the commentator, in intellect. ' Unconfined,' asalda, means unobstructed, capable of passing into any bodies. The next epithet, niyata, translated ' material,' is explained by GrAUKA- PADA as above, by nitya, ' permanent, lasting ;' and VACHES- PATI attaches to it the same signification. ' It endures till the period of universal dissolution ji; and the 8. Pr. Bkdshya ob- serves, also, that it ceases, or is destroyed, only at the same eason : a property, of which it may be observed by the way, that it furnishes another reason for identifying the sulc8hma t or 'subtile body,' of the foregoing stanza with the linga, or * rudimental body,' of this verse. The ChandriJcd explains niyata differently, ' distinct in different persousV The com- position of subtile body is explicitly described by VACHESPATI : ' Subtile body is an assemblage of intellect, egotism, the eleven J ( 175 ) senses, and the five elements*.' He ascribes, however, to this a specific or ' diversified existence, from its endowment with senses, which are the sources of pleasure, pain, or indifferencet.' The commentators agree that subtile body is subject to enjoy- ment or suffering only through its connection with generated body ; understanding apparently thereby, not its abstract capability of either, but the actual condition in which it par- takes of them ; for it is repeatedly declared that the seat of enjoyment and suffering is buddhi, or ' intellect ;' through the presence of which as an ingredient in subtile body, it is im- mediately added, the latter is invested with ' dispositions/ bhdvas ; that is, with the properties of intellect enumerated in ver. 23, virtue, vice, knowledge, ignorance, &c. The term bhdva was rendered by Mr. Colebrooke in that place by ' senti- ments/ but in another (ver. 43) he expressed the same ' dis- positions,' which, as far as relates to the mental bhdvas, ap- pears to be a preferable equivalent. Of the consequences of these dispositions, reward in heaven, or punishment in hell, dead, decomposed animal body is no longer susceptible : ' In a dead body there can be no sense of pleasure or pain ; this all admit*.' In order, however, to be placed in circumstances leading to such enjoyment or suffering, generated body is necessary ; and therefore subtile body migrates, sansarati, goes from one body to another continually : hence the world is called sansdra, ' migration' or ' revolution.' ' Through the influence of intellect the whole of subtile body is affected by dispositions or conditions, in the same manner as a garment is perfumed from contact with a fragrant champa flower]).' S. Tdtiva Kaumudi. Subtile body is called llnga from its con- ( 17C ) sisting of those principles which are so termed, either from their indicating or characterising that nature from which thy proceed, or from their being ultimately resolvable into it. Thus the Cha/ndrikd has, ' Lingo,, from designating, apprising*:' GAURA- PADA, as above, ' It merges into nature at the season of dissolu- tion :' and VACHESPATI, ' Linya is so termed because it suffers resolution (lay a}, or from its characteristic indication of the source from which it proceedsf.' See also remarks on ver^ 10 p. 43, RRT sroi ii XLI. As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a stake, &c. so neither does subtile person subsist supportless, without specific (or un- specific) particles. fir^r ( 177 ) far BHASHYA. As a picture without the support of a wall or the like does not stand ; as the shadow does not stand without the stake (the gnomon of a dial) ; that is, without them does not exist. The term et cetera comprises (other illustrations) ; as, water cannot be without coldness, nor coldness without water ; fire without heat ; air without touch ; ether without extension ; earth without smell ; so by this illustration it is intimated that it, the rudiment (lingo), does not subsist without unspecific or rudimental particles. Here also specific elements are implied, or body composed of the five gross elements ; for without a body, having specific particles, where can the place of the lingo, be ; which, when it abandons one corporeal frame, takes refuge in another. SupportlesB ; devoid of support. Subtile (person) ; instrument of thirteen kinds : this is the meaning of the text. For what purpose (these subtile elements are embodied) is next described. COMMENT. In the preceding verse it was stated that subtile person migrated, or as soon as deprived of one body it took refuge in another. It is now explained why this must be ; and that it proceeds from the necessity of something to give to subtile principles asylum and support. The text accordingly states, that the ' rudiment.' the linya, cannot exist without such support; but with regard to the sup- port itself there is some difference of opinion, the passage being variously read and interpreted. GAURAPADA reads the expression, avi^haii' rind, ' without unspecific particles ;' by which he states that he means the ' rudimeutul particles,' the tan indtra*. He adds, that specific 23 ( 178 ) particles, gross elementary bodies, are also necessary ; using the terms avisesho. and viseska as they were before employed (ver. 38), to represent severally the rudiniental and gross elements. VACHESPATI and NARAYAXA read the phrase viseshair vin&, ' without specific particles ;' but they use the term ' specific' apparently in its general acceptation of ' species,' without re- ference to its technical employment in ver. 38 ; for they con- fine its purpose to that of ' subtile bodies.' ' Without specific particles ; without subtile bodies : that is the meaning*.' S. Tatwa Kaumudi. ' Without specific particles ; without very subtile bodies : the rudiment (linga), being unsupported, does not remain ; but being supported by subtile bodies it existst.' S. Chandrikd. So far therefore, although the reading be different, the interpretation appears to be the same. The linga, or ' rudiment' for it is to be observed, that it is this which is spoken of by both text and comment, and not the linga, sarira, 'rudiniental body' cannot subsist without a bodily frame. Whence that frame is derived, GAURAPADA makes sufficiently clear. The linga, or 'rudiment,' consists of but thirteen principles the unclothed faculties and senses : the rudiniental body, by which they are aggregated and de- fended, is a tan mdtrika body, composed of the rudiniental elements (p. 123). This again, for worldly existence, is enve- loped in a bodily frame of gross elementary composition. It may, however, be suspected that the authors of the S. Tatica Kaumudi and the Chandi'iLu have not attended to the distinction, and that they intend by their ' specific or subtile bodies' only one of the ' species/ or vine'skas, which may be intimated in ver. 38 ; a modification of the gross ele- ments enclosing, not the naked ' rudiment,' the lingu, but the 'rudiniental body,' the linga sarira. Such, at any rate, is the interpretation of VIJNANA BHIKSHU, who commenting on Prcraq ( 179 ) this stanza of the Kdrikd, explains ' specific particles, those which are called subtile amongst gross ; a species or variety of gross elements :' and he says, that ' the definition of subtile body which is given in the preceding stanza, " composed of intellect with other subtile elements" (p. 128), as compared with the expression of the present verse, proves that there is a distinction made between subtile body and the specific variety of the gross elements, which is also called subtile*.' The question then is not one merely of a difference of inter- pretation, but it is a difference of doctrine. According to GAUKAPADA'S explanation, which appears to be the original theory, living bodies consist of two parts, one of a subtile, and one of a gross nature ; the latter perishes or decomposes at death ; the former may live on through the existence of the world : the latter gives cover to the former, which is the imme- diate vehicle of soul, and accompanies it constantly, through successive perishable bodies, until soul's liberation, or until a period of universal dissolution restore its component parts to their primitive and common parent. To this body the term of lingo, sarira, ' rudimental body,' is properly applied ; it is also called dtivaJiika, that which is swifter than the wind in pass- ing from body to body ; and, as Mr. Colebrooke observes, " il seems to be a compromise between an immaterial soul and the difficulty which a gross understanding finds in grasping the comprehension of individual existence, unattached to matter." Tr. R. As. Soc. I. 32. But some of the expounders of the Sankhya doctrines have not thought even the rudimental body sufficiently material for the purpose of independent existence, when separated from gross body ; and a third corporeal frame has been devised for its support, to which the present verse of the Kdrikd and the ( 180 ) other passages which seem to allude to a subtile form of speci- fic or gross elementary matter relate, according to VIJXAXA BHIKSHU : * Having abandoned gross body, a support is neces- sary for the passage of rudimental body to other regions, and another species of body is established*.' This is more particu- larly explained in the same writer's commentary on a some- what obscure Sutra immediately preceding : " In the body, which is the receptacle of the receptacle of that (rudimental body) ; for the denomination of body is applied to one as it is to the other." That is, the receptacle or support of that rudi- ment, which will be described as composed of the five elements, is supported or contained in body constituted of the six organic ingredients (bones, blood, &c.) ; to which the name body is applied, from the same being applicable to the sense of the word udhish hdna (dehu, " body," being understood apparently in either case " containing" or " comprehending"). The cor- poreity of the vehicle or receptacle (adklshthdna) arises from its relation to the (aggregate) linga ; the corporeity of gross body, from its being the receptacle of vehicular body. This is the meaning of the text. We have therefore three (kinds of) body establishedf.' Quoting a passage which appears opposed to this, and to intimate, as GAURAPADA has done, a twofold dis- tinction only of bodies, the same writer observes, ' What is said in writings, upon the authority of the Ve'das, that there are but two (kinds of) bodies, arises from their identifying the rudimental and vehicular bodies as one, as they are mutually ( 181 ) permanent and subtile*.' This is no doubt correct ; but it is very unlikely that the elder writers admitted any form of the gross elements to be equally permanent and subtile as the ru- diments from which they proceeded. In the institutes of Mauu, for instance, although the doctrine there laid down is of a dif- ferent tenor from that of the Sankhya system, we have but two kinds of bodies, a subtle and substantial one, described; 'After death another body, composed of the five rudimental elements, is immediately produced, for wicked men, that may suffer the tortures of the infernal regions^.' Mcmu, XII 16. We have here, then, a body composed of the five rudimental elements. In the Bkagavad Glta it is intimated that soul retains the senses and mind in the intervals of migration : ' At the time that spirit obtains a body, and when it abandons one, it migrates, taking with it those senses, as the wind wafts along with it the perfume of the flowers^.' If VACHESPATI be correct in his interpretation of the word purusha, the Ve'da makes one kind of subtile body of the size of the thumb : " YAMA drew forth violently the subtile body, as big as the thumb." The specification of the size merely de- notes minuteness ; extraction of soul would be absurd ; and therefore by puruska must be meant " a subtile body," that which reposes in gross body||.' This, agreeably to the older doctrine, would be rudimental body ; according to later refine- ment, vehicular. It is the latter Avhich, as Mr. Colebrooke mentions (Tr. R. As. Soc. I. 33) in PATANJALI'S Yoga sastra, t fa i i i srfrt ^r 3ro7fa srcrfa r| 3 ( 182 ) is conceived to extend, like the flame of a lamp over its wick, to a small distance above the skull ; and which, according to M. Cousin, is " la fameuse pensee intracranienne, dont on a cru faire recemment uue decouverte merveilleuse." Hist, de la Philosophic, I, 195. The notion of some corporeal, however subtile envelopment of soul the eiSwXov, umbra, manes, simulacrum, spirit, or ghost giving to invisible and intangible soul some visible and tangible materiality, " such," as Good (Translation of Lucreti- us) observes, / means and consequences. Means (or antecedents) are virtue and the like : consequences are their results, such as their ascending to heaven and so forth, as we shall hereafter explain. Ky their rchrilon ; their connection. With the aid of natuft''* nifl/icnce ; of the influence of the chief one, nature. As a king in his own kingdom does what he wishes of his own authority, so by the application of the supreme authority of nature, ( 185 ) through the relation of means (or causes) and consequences, subtile body exhibits : that is, nature commands subtile body to assume different conditions, by taking different (gross) bodies. Subtile body is that which is aggregated of subtile atomic rudimental elements, and is possessed of thirteen in- struments (or faculties and senses). It assumes various con- ditions, by its birth, amongst gods, animals and men. How does (it exhibit) ? Like an actor, who when he enters upon the scene is a god, and when he makes his exit is again a mortal : or again, a buffoon. So the subtile body, through the relation of causes and consequences, haviug entered the womb, may become an elephant, a woman, or a man. It was said (ver. 40), " Subtile body migrates, invested with dispositions." What those dispositions are is now described. COMMENT. The circumstances on which transmigration depends are here said to be the purpose of soul, enforced by the authority of nature. Soul's purpose is either fruition or liberation ; and to accom- plish one or other of these, subtile body passes through various conditions, assuming different exterior forms, as an actor puts on different dresses to personate one while Rama, another while Yudkishtkira, or again, Vatsa*. The purpose of soul is enforced by the power, authority, or influence of nature*K Vibkut'VM; as illustrated by GAURAPADA, means ' kingly or supreme authority.' VACHESPATI understands it as ' univer- sality' rather, as in the text of the Purana : ' This wonderful vicissitude is from the universality of nature J ;' that is, from its invariable presence and consequent influence. But besides these motives, the purpose of soul and influence of nature, which may be regarded as the remote and proximate causes of 24 transmigration iu general, it is still necessary to have what may be regarded as a special, or exciting, or efficient cause 5 the reason of the particular migration ; the cause wherefore, in particular instances, subtile body should ascend from the exterior frame of a man to that of a god, or wherefore it should descend from the exterior frame of a man to that of a brute. This depends, then, upon the relation of certain occasional or instrumental means or causes, nimittas*, with their incidental consequences or effects, the nalmitlikas'f; as virtue and vice, which lead severally to reward and punishment after death ; that is, to regeneration in an exalted or degraded condition. Thus the Chandrikd explains the terms : ' Nimitta is virtue and the rest ; naimittika is the effect, having the nimilta for its cause, as gross bodies, &c. By the relation or connection of these two, subtile body, assuming the form of gods or other beings, performs its part*.' Professor Lassen has been needlessly perplexed by this verse, and has strangely rendered it as follows : " Corpusculum hocce propter genii causam effectuni, ludionis instar se habet ad has rnodo ad illas originari- as et derivatas conditiones pronum, post conjunctiouem pro- creatricis cum potestato sua." XLIII. ESSENTIAL dispositions are innate. Incidental, as virtue and the rest, are considered appurtenant to the J iHftm instrument. The uterine germ (flesh and blood) and the rest belong to the effect (that is, to the body). r *rrer: tfsnrn m JR J% Pfftrf fir- BHA'SHYA. Dispositions (bkavas, ' conditions') of being are considered to be threefold, innate, essential, and incidental. The first, or innate, are those four which in the first creation were cognate ( 188 ) with the divine sage KAPILA, or virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power. The essential are declared ; these were four sons of BRAHMA', SANAKA, SAXANDANA, SANA' TANA, and SANAT- KUMA'IIA ; and these four dispositions were produced with them, who were invested with bodies of sixteen years of age (or perpetually juvenile bodies), inconsequence of the relation of causes and effects (or in consequence of merit in a former existence) : therefore these dispositions are called essential. Incidental are those derived through the corporeal ' form of a holy teacher ; from which (in the first instance) knowledge is incidentally obtained by such as we are ; from knowledge comes dispassion ; from dispassion, virtue ; and from virtue, power. The form of a teacher is an incidental product (of nature), and therefore these dispositions are termed incidental: " Invested by which, subtile body migrates" (ver. 40). These four dispositions are of the quality of goodness ; those of dark- ness are their contraries : as above, " Virtue, &c. are its faculties partaking of goodness ; those partaking of darkness are the reverse" (ver. 23). Consequently there are eight dispositions, or virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, vice, ignorance, passion, weakness. Where do they abide ? They are considered ap- purtenant to the instrument. Intellect is an instrument, and to that they are appurtenant ; as in ver. 23, " Ascertainment is intellect ; virtue, knowledge," &c. Effect; body. The uterine germ and the rest belong to it ; those which are born of the mother, the yemi and the rest, or the bubble, the flesh, the muscle, and the rest, which are (generated), for the develop- ment of the infant, in the union of the blood and the seminal fluid. Thus the conditions of infancy, youth, and old age are produced ; the instrumental causes of which are food and beve- rage ; and therefore they are said to be attributes of the effect (or of the body), having, as the instrumental cause, the fruition of the sensual pleasures of eating and the like. It was said (ver. 42). " Through the relation of means and consequences :" this is next explained, ( 189 ) COMMENT. We have here an explanation of what is to be understood by the term dispositions, used in a former passage (ver. 40). The translation of bh&va* adopted by Mr. Colebrooke in this place is ' disposition :' in the passage referred to he had em- ployed, as above remarked, ' sentiment ;' but it was there changed, in order to preserve consistency. Neither word per- haps exactly expresses the purport of the original, nor is it easy to find one that will precisely correspond. In some res- pects ' condition,' mode, or state of being, conditio, as rendered by Professor Lassen, is preferable, as better comprehending the different circumstances to which bhdva- is applied ; although, as he has occasion subsequently to remark, it does not very well express all the senses in which bhdva occur. These cir- cumstances or conditions, according to the obvious meaning of the text, are of two kinds, or intellectual and corporeal. The first comprise virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, and their contraries ; the second, the different periods of life, or embryo, infancy, youth, and senility. They are also to be regarded as respectively cause and effect ; virtue, &c. being the efficient cause, or nimitta ; bodily condition the naimittika, or conse- quence ; as VA'CHESPATI explains the object of the stanza, ' which,' according to him, ' distinguishes incidental cause and consequence, the latter being the incidental conditions of body-f-.' But besides the division of conditions or dispositions into the two classes of intellectual and corporeal, they are also characterised according to their origin, as sdnsiddhika, prd- hrita, and vaikrita, rendered in the text ' innate, essential, and incidental.' Prof. Lassen translates them conditiones absolute*;, pendentes ab origine, pertinentes ad evoluta principled Both the two first are innate, and some further distinction is necessary. ' Superhuman' or ' transcendental' Avould perhaps best explain the first, as they are, according to the commenta- tor, peculiar, to saints and sages. According to GAURAPADA, they occur only in one instance as the cognate conditions of the divine KAPILA, the author of the Sankhya system. The second class, which may be rendered ' natural/ agreeably to his view, which is a little mystical, originated with the four holy and chaste sons of BRAHMA. The third class, those which are incidental or constructive, vaikrita, belong to mortals, as they are produced in them by instruction. VACHESPATI re- cognises but two distinctions, identifying, as in the translation, the innate (sdnsiddkika) with the essential (prdkrita) dis- positions, they being both swdbhdvika, inseparable, inherent/ not the production of tuition, and opposing to it the construc- tive or incidental (vaikritika)*. A similar account of their origin as in the Bhdshya is given, but under these two heads only : ' Thus in the beginning of creation the first sage, the venerable and great Muni KAPILA, appeared, spontaneously endowed with virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power. The incidental and unspontaneous dispositions were produced by the cultivation of the means (of producing them), as (the les- sons of) PRACHETASA and other great Rishis^.' These dis- positions or conditions are dependent upon the instrument, that is upon buddhi, or ' intellect,' of which they are faculties, as was explained in verse 23. The states or conditions of life depend upon the body, and are the immediate effects of gene- ration and nutriment, the more remote effects of virtue, vice, &c. vrr^r *9: || g 8 II XLIY. By virtue is ascent to a region above ; by vice, des- cent to a region below : by knowledge is deliverance ; by the reverse, bondage. *riRt i TOW 5^/ virtue ascent. Having made virtue the efficient cause, it leads upwards. By upwards eight degrees are intended, or the regions of Brahma, Prajapati, Soma, Indra, the Gan- dharbas, the Yakshas, the Rakshasas, and Pisachas : the subtile body goes thither. Or if vice be the efficient cause, it mi- grates into an animal, a deer, a bird, a reptile, a vegetable, or a mineral. Again ; l>y knowledge, deliverance : knowledge of the twenty -five principles ; by that efficient cause, deliverance, the subtile body ceases, and (soul is) called ' supreme spirit' ( 192 ) (paramdtmd). By the reverse, bondaye : ignorance is the efficient cause, and that (effect) bondage is natural (prdkrita), incidental (tttifefat&a), or personal (ddkshma), as will be ox- plained : " He who is bound by natural, incidental, or personal bondage is not loosed by any other (means than knowledge)." Next, other efficient causes are declared. : us XLV. BY dispassion is absorption into nature ; by foul passion, migration: by power, unimpediment ; by the reverse, the contrary. fir- ( 193 ) BHASHYA. If any one has dispassion without knowledge of principles then from such dispassion unpreceded by knowledge occurs absorption into nature, or when the individual dies he is re- solved into the eight primary elements, or nature, intellect, egotism, and the five rudiments ; but there is no liberation, and therefore he migrates anew. So also by foul passion ; as I sacrifice, I give gifts, in order to obtain in this world divine or human enjoyment ; from such foul passion proceeds worldly migration. By power, unhnpedlment. Where eightfold power, as minuteness, &c. is the efficient cause, the non-ob- struction is the effect. Such power is unimpeded in the sphere of Brahma, or in any other. By the reverse, the contrary. The contrary of uninipedimcnt is obstruction, which proceeds from want of power, every where obstructed. Thus sixteen efficient causes and effects have been enume- rated : what they comprehend (or amount to) is next described. COMMENT- In these two verses the efficient causes of the various con- ditions of subtile body and their effects, or its conditions, are detailed. These causes and effects are collectively sixteen, eight of each : the former are positive and negative, as diversified by the qualities of goodness and foulness (ver. 23); and the effects respectively correspond. They are accordingly. Came. Efftct. 1. Virtue. 2. Elevation in the scale of being. 3. Vice. 4. Degradation in the scale of being. . r >. Knowledge. 6. Liberation from existence. 7. Ignorance. 8. Bondage or transmigration. 9. Dispassion. 10. Dissolution of the subtile bodily form. 11. Passion. 12. Migration. 13. Power. 14. Unimpediment. 15. Feebleness. 16. Obstruction. ( 194 ) By ' virtue,' dherma, both religious and moral merit are in- tended. Ascent, going upward, is elevation to a more exalted station in another birth ; the term stkdna implying both place and degree. According to GAURAPADA, this ascent is eightfold, and the subtile frame may after death assume a new body amongst the various classes of spirits, Pisachas, Rakshasas, Yakshas, and Gandhcrbas ; or may attain a place in the heaven, of Indra ; of Soma ; or the moon ; of the Prajapatis, or progeni- tors of mankind ; or even in the region of Brahma. It is a curious, though perhaps an accidental coincidence, that the Syrians and Egyptians enumerated also, according to Plato (Epinomis), eight orders of heavenly beings : their places, how- ever, seem to be the planets exclusively. The author of the S. T. Kaumudi understands by ascent, or elevation, ascent to the six superterrestrial regions. Dyu, or Bkuvar loka, the at- mosphere ; Swer loka, the heaven of Indra; Afahar foka, Jana- loka, and Tapoloka, worlds of sages and saints ; and Satya loka, of Brahma. By degradation he understands descent to the subterrene regions, Pdtdla, Rasdtafa, &c. These notions are, however, not incompatible, as rewards and punishments in heaven and hell are put temporary, and subtile body must even afterwards assume terrestrial form, and undergo a series of migrations before escape from the bondage of existence can be finally accomplished. Bondayp is said by the commentators to be of three kinds, intending thereby three different errors or misconceptions of the character of soul and nature ; the prevalence of which pre- cludes all hope of final emancipation. ' These errors or bonds are, 1. Prdkritika ; the error or bondage of the materialists, who assert soul in nature (or matter) : 2. Vaikritika; the error of another class of materialists, who confound soul with any of the products of nature, as the elements, the senses, egotism or intellect: and, 3. Ddkshlna ; the error or bondage of those who, ignorant of the real character of soul, and blind- ed by the hop e of advantage, engage in moral and religion* ( 195 ) observances :' as VA'CHESPATI*. These errors confine the soul to its subtile material frame for various protracted periods ; as, for instance, in the case of those who identify soul with sense, for ten manwantaras, or above three thousand millions of years (3,084,480,000). By dispassion occurs 'absorption into nature/ prakriti layaf ; or, as the Kaumudi and Cltdndrikd express it, ' reso- lution into the chief one and the rest+.' GAURAPA'DA makes the meaning of the phrase sufficiently clear : according to him it signifies the resolution of even the subtile body into its constituent elements : but this is not in this case equivalent to liberation ; it is only the term of one series of migrations, soul being immediately reinvested with another person, and commencing a new career of migratory existence until know- ledge is attained. W: n IIHgfftWUiriFrfaf5Tt?ir: V^mi tflC ( 203 ) formerly described: that is, the subdirisions of obstruction*,, which is said to be of five species, are such as were fully de- tailed by former teachers, but are in the Sutra but briefly alluded to, for fear of prolixity*.' XLIX. DEPRAVITY of the eleven organs, together with in- juries of the intellect, are pronounced to be disability. The injuries of intellect are seventeen, by inversion) of acquiescence and perfectness. ( 204 ) BHASHYA. From defect of instruments there are twenty-eight kinds of disability ; this has been declared (ver. 47) : these are, depra- vity of the eleven organs, or deafness, blindness, paralysis, loss of taste, loss of smell, dumbness, mutilation, lameness, con- stipation, impotence, and insanity. Together with injuries of the intellect : as, together with these, there are twenty-eight kinds of disability, there are seventeen kinds of injuries of the intellect. By inversion of acquiescence and perfectness : that is, there are nine kinds of acquiesence, and eight of perfect - ness ; and with the circumstances that are the reverse of these (seventeen), the eleven above specified, compose the twenty- eight varieties of disability. The kinds of injury of the in- tellect which are the reverse of (the sorts of) acquiescence and perfectness will be understood from the detail of their varieties. The nine kinds of acquiescence are next explained. COMMENT- The various kinds of the second class of conditions or dis- ability are here enumerated. ' Disability/ asakti, or incapability of the intellect to dis- charge its peculiar functions*, is the necessary result of imper- fection of the senses, or of any of the organs of perception and of action. But besides these, which are sufficiently obvious, such as blindness, deafness, and any other organic defect, there are seventeen affections of the intellect itself equally injurious to its efficiency. These are described as the contraries of the conditions which constitute the classes acquiescence and per- fectness. Under the former head are enumerated, dissatisfac- tion as to notions of nature, means, time, and luck, and addic- tion to enjoyment of the five objects of sense, or the pleasures of sight, hearing, touching, &c. The contraries of perfectness ( 205 ) are, want of knowledge, whether derivable from reflection, from tuition, or from study, endurance of the three kinds of pain, privation of friendly intercourse, and absence of purity or of liberality. L. NINE sorts of acquiescence are propounded ; four internal, relating to nature, to means, to time, and to luck ; five external, relative, to abstinence from (en- joyment of) objects. I Iff ( 206 ) f f^: BHASHYA. Five internal sorts of acquiescence. Those which are in the individual are internal. They are said to relate to nature, to 'means, to time, and to luck. The first is, when a person under- stands what nature is, its being with or without qualities, and thence knows a principle (of existence) to be a product of nature ; but knows this only, and is satisfied : he does not obtain liberation: this is acquiescence in regard to nature. The second is, when a person, ignorant of the principles (of existence), depends upon external means, such as the triple staff, the water-pot, and other implements (used by ascetics) : liberation is not for him : this is acquiescence in regard to means. Acquiescence in regard to time is when a person satisfies him- self that liberation must occur in time, and that it is unne- cessary to study first principles : such a one does not obtain liberation. And in the same way acquiescence as relates to- luck is when a person is content to think that by good luck liberation will be attained. These are four kinds of acquie- scence. Five external, relative to abstinence from (enjoyment of objects). The external sorts of acquiescence are five ; from < 207 ) 'abstinence from enjoyment of (five) objects of sense ; that is when a person abstains from gratification through sound, touch, form, flavour, and smell ; such abstinence proceeding from observation of (the evils of) acquiring, preserving, waste, attachment (to sensual pleasures), and injuriousness. Acquir- ing is pain (or trouble), for the sake of increase, by the pastur- age of cattle, trade, acceptance of gifts, and servitude. There is pain in the preservation of what has been acquired ; and if they be enjoyed, they are wasted ; and waste, again, is vexa- tion. When attachment to sensual pleasures prevails, the organs have no repose : that is the fault of such attachment. Without detriment to created things there is no enjoyment <(of sensible objects) ; and this is the defect of injuriousness. From observing then the evil consequences of acquiring and the rest, abstinence from enjoyment of the five objects of sense is practised ; and these are the five sorts of external acquiescence. From the variety of these internal and external kinds proceed the nine serts of acquiescence. Their names are differently enumerated in other works, or ambhas, salilam, ogha, w*ishti) sutamas, pdram, sunetram, narikam, and anuttamdmbhasikam : and from the reverse of these kinds of acquiescence, constituting the varieties of disability, injuries of the intellect arise, named (according to the last mentioned nomenclature) anambhas, asalilam, and so on. From the contrariety of these, therefore, are inferred the injuries of the intellect. Perfectness is next described. COMMENT- The different kinds of acquiescence, apathy, or indifference, are specified in this verse. The kinds of acquiescence, content, or complacency, tushti, are of two descriptions ; internal or spiritual, ddhy&tmika, an d external or sensible, bahya. GAURAPADA explains the former ""being in self or spirit*.' VACHESPATI defines them, ' Those kinds of acquiescence are called internal which proceed from 'discrimination of self, as different from naturef.' According to VUNANA BHIKSHU, they are those principles or sentiments which preside over collected or composed soulj. Of the dif- ferent species, the first, or that which relates to nature, ac- knowledges it as the radical principle of all things, but expects that as every thing is but a modification of nature so nature will effect all that is necessary, even liberation, for example^ and the individual I remains passive and complete||. Another person, as the means of liberation, adopts a religious or mendicant order, or at least bears the emblems, as the staft, the water-pot, and the like : the term vividika, used in the Bhdshya is of doubtful import, and is perhaps an error. Others suppose that liberation must come in time, or at least by a long continued course of meditation. Other* imagine it may come by good luck ; and contenting themselves with these notions or practices, omit the only means of being freed from existence, discriminative meditation. The five external kinds of acquiescence are self-denial, or abstinence from the five objects of sensual gratification ; not from any philosophic appreciation of them, but from dread of the trouble and anxiety which attends the means of procuring and enjoy- ing worldly pleasures ; such as acquiring wealth, preserving it, spending it, incessant excitement and injury or cruelty to others. Besides the terms ordinarily significant of those divi- sions of acquiescence, the Scholiasts specify other words, the usual sense of which is quite different, and which may there- fore be regarded as the slang or mystical nomenclature of the ( 209 ) followers of the Yoga., There is some difference in the precise expressions, but they are of a similar purport in general. The first four, the synonymes of the internal modes of acquiescence are alike in all the authorities ; or ambhas*, ' water ;' saltta-]-, also ' water ;' of/ha+, l quantity ;' and vrisliti\\' ' rain.' GAURA- PADA then has for the five exterior modes, si<,ta,mas, ' great darkness ;' pdra*ti, ' shore ;' sun&ra**, * a beautiful eye ;' nd- rika^, ' feminine ;' and anuttamdmbhisika^l, ' unsurpassed water/ VACHESPATI makes them, p&ram, supdram\\\\, ' good shore ;' apdram, ' shoreless ;' amuttamambhas^ll , ' unsur- passed water ;' and uttam&mbhas*** , ' excellent water.' The Cliandrikd, has the same, except in the third place, where the term is jpdroparflftt, ' both shores ;' with which the S. Prav. Bh. agrees. No explanation of the words is any where given, nor is any reason assigned for their adoption. %: ^Sf*jftlftre: II H 3 II LI. REASONING, hearing, study, prevention of pain of three sorts, intercourse of friends, and purity (or gift) are perfections (or means thereof). The fore-inention- ed three are curbs of perfectness. 3 charati or dckarati, or ' effect,' kurute. The last word of the verse is differently read. n ^ u LXI. NOTHING, in my opinion, is more gentle than nature; once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the gaze of soul. ( 232 ) ff " BHA'SHYA. k There is nothing in the world more soft (gentle, timid) than nature, in my opinion : for which reason (nature's) opinion consults another's advantage. Wherefore nature says to her- self, " I have been beheld by that soul," and does not again present herself to the view of that soul ; that is, she disappears from the presence of soul. That indicates what the text means by yentle. It (the next ?) declares Iswara (God) to be the cause of the world : thus ; " Let this ignorant, brute, godless (soul), for its own pleasure or pain, go to heaven or hell, sent (thither) by Iswara" Others say, spontaneity is cause. "By what (or ( 233 ) whom) the swan is created white, the peacock of many colours ; :> that is, they arc so naturally (or spontaneously). Here, therefore, the Sankhya teachers have said, how can be- ings endowed with qualities proceed from Iwn-ra, who is de- void of qualities ? or how from soul, equally devoid of qualities ? Thererefore (the causality) of nature is rendered probable. Thus ; from white threads white cloth is fabricated ; from black threads black cloth : and in the same manner, from nature, endowed with the three qualities, the three worlds, endowed with the three qualities also, are produced. This is determined, Isvxt'iu is without qualities : the origin of the three worlds en- dowed with qualities, from him, would therefore be an incon- sistency. By this (same reason) soul also cannot be cause. According to some, time is cause : " Time is the five elements ; time destroys the world ; time watches, when all things sleep ; time is not to be surpassed." There are but three categories, the discrete principle, the undiscrcte principle, and soul ; and by one of them time must be comprehended. Time, then, is a discrete principle ; for nature, from its universal creative power, is the cause of them; spontaneity merges into it (nature) : and time, therefore, is not cause ; neither is spon- taneity. Nature alone, therefore, is cause ; and there is no cause of nature. She doe* not again expose kernel/ to the ). Such a subtile body is affected by virtue, vice, &c. Nature is bound, is loosed, and migrates. How is next described. COMMENT. The subjection of nature, not of soul, to the accidents of bondage, liberation, and migration is asserted in this verse. The doctrine here laid down seems at variance with what has preceded, and with the usual purport of the notions that attach the accidents of bondage and liberation to soul. Appa- rently, however, the difference is one of words only. Soul is incapable of action, consequently is not liable to change. It cannot be bound, as the consequence of acts which it does not perform ; and as it is never in bondage, it cannot be set free. The application of these terms to soul, therefore, is to be understood in a relative not in a positive sense ; and their positive signification is properly restricted to nature. It is nature that is bound, nature that is liberated, nature that undergoes change or migration. When nature attaches her- self to soul, when she separates from it, the converse is equally true, soul is attached to, or is separated from, nature ; and is consequently said to be bound, to be set free, to undergo change. But soul is passive in all these things ; it is nature that is active, that binds, loosens, or changes form. GAURA- PADAS explanation of these subtleties is not very clear, but such appears to be his understanding of the text. So also VACHESPATI : ' Soul is without qualities and exempt from vicissitude. How then can it be liberated < To soul, not liable to change, there could apply none of the circumstances termed bondage, arising from acts, sufferings, or consciousness : nor could worldly change or migration, another name for which is death, affect soul, incapable of action*.' The same commenta- am ( 238 ) tor adds, ' These circumstances, which are in truth the acts and conditions of nature, are ascribed to and affect soul as the superior, in the same manner that victory and defeat are attributed and relate to a king, although actually occurring to his geneials; for they are his servants, and the gain or loss is his, not theirs**' So NARAYANA explains the text : ' Binding is the confinement of nature, in the various forms of intellect, &c, ; and bondage and liberation are attributed to soul only through the contiguity of intellect, to which they belong, and not to soulf.' It is from ignorance only that bondage and liberation are ascribed to soul ; as by the Sutra*, as explained by the Scholiast, ' Binding and liberation, or endurance of, and exemption from pain, are not (conditions) of soul in reality or absolutely, but (are considered as such) from ignorance ; for the binding and liberation mentioned are (conditions) of nature^.' So also the Sutra, ' From actual pain suffered by nature proceed binding and liberation, and from its attachments ; that is, from its being affected by virtue and the rest, which are the causes of pain ; like an animal ; that is, as an animal may be bound or loosed, when entangled in a ropeV The distinction, after all, is little more than nominal, except as it is the necessary consequence of the inactivity attributed to the soul. R: I J q*roi$fr ( 239 ) Sift LXIII. BY seven modes nature binds herself by herself . by one, she releases (herself), for the soul's wish. BHA'SHYA. .Zty seye->i modes. These seveu have been specified, as virtue dispassion, power, vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness. These are the seven modes (or condtions) of nature by which she binds herself, of herself. And that same nature, having ascertained that soul's object is to be accomplished, liberates heself by one mode, or by knowledge. How is that knowledge produced '( COMMENT- Nature is bound by seven modes, and liberated by one. Nature binds herself by acts of whatever kind, especially by the faculties of intellect, enumerated above (ver. 23). She binds herself of her own accord. She frees herself by one mode, by the acquisition of philosophical knowledge. ' Nature ( 240 ) binds herself (in her own work), like a silkworm in its cocoon*.' tiutra. At man is here uniformly explained by swa, ' own self.' LXIV. So. through study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I AM, nor is auht mine, nor do I exist. BHA'SHYA. So, by the order explained, the xtn j>< -/nr/jdeii, knowledge of soul, or the discriminative know- ' ledge, this is nature, this is .soul, these are the rudiments, ( 241 ) senses and elements,' is acquired. Neither I am : I am not, JNot mine: not my body ; that, I am one (thing), body is an- other Nor do I exist: that is, exempt from egotism. This is conclusive, incontrovertible: free from doubt. Viparyaya means ' doubt/ with the negative prefixed, ' absence of doubt ; and visu/Hdha, ' pure;' pure .through absence of doubt. Single. There is no other (true knowledge). In this way the cause of liberation is produced, is manifested (individually). Know- ledge means knowledge of the twenty-five principles, or of soul. Knowledge being attained, what does soul ? COMMENT. The knowledge that is essential to liberation is here de- scribed. It is acquired through study of the twenty-five principles, tatwdbhdsya ; familiarity with them ; frequent recurrence to them : it is finite or conclusive, aparisesha; it leaves nothing to be learned : it is perfect, as being without doubt, avipar- yayavisudha : and single, the one the thing needful, ke'vala, What sort of knowledge is this ? or what is the result it teaches ? The absence of individuality ; the notion of the abstract existence of soul. Neither I am, nor is aught mine' nor do I exist : that is, there is no activity, nor property, nor individual agency. / am not precludes action only*. Indeed As, the root, together with bhu and kri, are said to signify action in generalf. Ndsmi therefore signifies, not ' I am not,' but ' I do not.' The & Tatwa Kaumudi then proceeds : ' Thus all acts whatever, whether external or internal, ascer- tainment, consciousness, reflection, perception, and all others* are denied as acts of soul : consequently, there being no active functions in soul, it follows that neither do I (as an individual agent) exist. Aham here denotes " agent ;" as, I know, I : terror- ( 242 ) sacrifice, I give, I enjoy or so on, implying uniformly the notion of an agent nor is aught mine : an agent implies mastership ; if there be no agent there can be no abstract mastership (or possession)*.' The same authority gives also a different reading of the first expression Twismi, explaining it nd asmi, * I am male ;' or purusha, ' unproductive of progeny,' of acts-}-. The S. Prav. Bh., commenting on this verse of the K&rikd, has, ' Neither I am, denies the agency of soul ; nor (is aught mine), denies its attachment (to any objects) ; nor do I exist, denies its appropriation (of faculties)*.' The Sutra is to the same effect : ' From relinquishment (consequent on) study of principles ; this is not, this is not|| :' that is, of all the objects proceeding from prakriti, not one is soul. The phraseology ia ascribed to the Ve'das, and a similar passage is thence cited : ' Hence comes the conclusion, it is not, it is not (soul), it is not (soul is not), from it : such is not so ; it is different, it is supreme, it is that very thing (that it is). It is not, it is not, (means) soul. Such is (the phrase), It is not,, &c. And the Chandrikd explains the terms similarly : ' / am not means I am not agent ; there I am distinct from the principle of intelligence. Not inline is pain : exemption from being the seat of pain and the rest is thence determined. Nor do I exist : by this, difference from egotism is ex- pressedlf.' RAMA KRISHNA repeats the words of the Chan- i a? =r *r f JTTH ( 243 ) drikd. By these expressions therefore, however quaint or questionable, we are not to understand negation of soul. This would be a direct contradiction to its specification as one of the categories of the system, one of the twenty-five essential and existent principles. It is merely intended as a negation of the soul's having any active participation, individual interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feel- ings. / am, / do, I suffer, mean that material nature, or some of her products, (substantially,) is, does, or suffers ; and not soul, which is unalterable and indifferent, susceptible of neither pleasure nor pain, and only reflecting them, as it were or seemingly sharing them, from the proximity of nature, by whom they are really experienced*: for soul, according to the Vedas, is absolutely existent, eternal, wise, true, free, unaffec- ted by passion, universalf. This verse, therefore, does not amount, as M. Cousin has supposed, to " le nihillisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme." LXV. POSSESSED of this (self-knowledge), soul contem- plates at leisure and at ease nature, (thereby) de- barred from prolific change, and consequently preclu- ded from those seven forms. ftf : i ( 244 ) fa BHASHYA. By that piare (absolute), single knowledge soul beholds na- ture, like a spectator, at leisure and composed ; as a spectator seated at a play beholds an actress. Composed : who stays (or is involved) in self ; or staying or abiding in one's own place. How is Prakriti ; debarred from prolific change ? Not pro- ducing intellect, egotism, and the other effects. Consequently precluded from, those seven forms: desisting from the seven* forms or modes by which she binds herself, or virtue, vice, and the rest, and which are no longer required for the use of soul, both whose objects (fruition and liberation) are effected. COMMENT- Soul, possessed of the knowledge described in the preceding stanza, or divested of all individuality, becomes indifferent to, and independent of, nature, which therefore ceases to act. Soul contemplates nature, like a spectator, prefcshaka, one who beholds a dancer or actress ; at leisure, avasthita, or with- out action, niskriya ; and at ease sustha. This is also read swastha, ' calm, collected in self* ;' or nirdkula, ' unagitated.' ( 245 ) Nature consequently has nothing more to do. The objects of soul, fruition and liberation, having been- effected by know- ledge, the other faculties of intellect are aeedless. LXVI. HE desists, because he has seen her ; she does so, because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation. : %- ( 246 ) BHA'SHYA. One present at a play, as a spectator, (ceases to behold :) so one, single, pure soul desists. One (nature), knowing I have been seen by him, stops, ceases. Nature is the one, chief cause of the three worlds ; there is no second. Although form have terminated, yet from specific difference there is, even in the cessation of (the cooperation of) nature and soul, union, as a generic characteristic. For, if there be not union, whence is creation ? There being union of these two ; that is, of nature and soul ; there being union from their universal diffusion yet there is no further occasion for the world ; from the ob- ject of creation being terminated. The necessity for nature is twofold ; apprehension of the difference between qualities and soul : when both these have been effected there is no further use for creation ; that is, of further creation (of future regene- ration) ; as in the case of a settlement of accounts between debtor and creditor, consequent on accepting what is given, when such a union is effected there is no further connection of object : so there is no further occasion for nature and soul. If upon soul's acquiring knowledge liberation takes place, why does not my liberation (immediately) occur ? To this it is observed. COMMENT. The final separation of soul from nature is here indicated, as no further purpose is answered by their continued union. The first part of its stanza repeats the illustrations given in preceding verses (61 and 65) : " Nature, having been fully seen or understood, ceases to act. Soul, having seen or under- stood, ceases to consider ;' becomes regardless, upekshaka. Consequently there can be no future reunion, HO future creation. For mere union of soul and nature is not the cause of the development of the latter, constituting worldly existence : the motive is, the fulfilment of the objects of soul. The activity of nature is the consequence of her subserviency ( 247 ) to soul's purposes ; and when they are accomplished, all motive for action, all inducement to repeat worldly creation, ceases. ' The two objects of soul, fruition and discrimination, are the excitements to the activity of nature ; if they do not exist, they do not stimulate nature* In the text the term motive implies that by which nature is excited in creation (to evolve the world) : which cannot be in the nonentity of the objects of soul*.' VACHESPATI. So also NARAYANA : ' In the (mere) union of these two there is no motive for the production of the worldt.' With the accomplishment, therefore, of the objects of soul, individual existence must cease for ever. : II ^1? LXVII. BY attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest become causeless, yet soul remains a while invest- ed with body, as the potter's wheel continues whirl- ing from the effect of the impulse previously given to it. ftgffi ( 248 ) BHASHYA. Though perfect knowledge, that is, knowledge of the twenty- five principles, be attained, yet, from the effect of previous impulse, the sage continues in a bodily condition. Ho\v ? Like the whirling of a wheel ; as a potter, having set his wheel whirling, puts on it a lump of clay, fabricates a vessel, and takes it off, and the wheel continuing to turn round. It does so from the effect of previous impulse. From the attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest have no influence upon one who is possessed of such knowledge. These seven kinds of bonds are consumed by perfect knowledge : as eods that have been scorched by fire are not able to germi- nate, so virtue and the rest are not able to fetter soul. These then, virtue and the rest, not being (in the case of the yogi, the causes (of continued bodily existence), body continues from the effects of previous impulse. Why is there not from knowledge destruction of present virtue and vice ? Although they may be present, yet they, perish the next moment) -and knowledge destroys all future acts, as well a.s those which -a man does in his present body by following instituted obsor- ( 249 ) vances. With the cessation of the impulse the body perishes, and then liberation occurs. What liberation, is next specified. COMMENT- A reason is assigned \vhy pure soul is not at once set free from body. This stanza may be considered partly as an illustration of the preceding, explaining the continued union of soul and body even after knowledge is attained. It is also a kind of apology for the human forms of KAPILA and other teachers of the Sankhya doctrines, who, although in possession of perfect knowledge, lived and died as men. The sage, or Yogi, is no longer susceptible of the accidents of virtue, vice, passion, dis- passion, and the rest, which are the proximate causes of bodily existence ; and his continuance in the bodily form arises from the effects of virtue. &c. lasting after the cause has ceased ; like the whirl of a wheel after the impulse that set it going has been withdrawn. ' As, when the potter's work is done, the wheel, in consequence of the impulse or momentum given to it, continues revolving, but stops when the period under such influence has expired ; so virtue and vice, incident to body ini- tiative and mature, constitute impulse*.' The effects of former acts of virtue and vice, then, cease when the impulse derived from them is worn out ; and the possession of knowledge pro- vents all future acts. GAURAPADA apparently suggests a difficulty with respect to acts done in the present body ; such as the observance of the Yoga, or performance of prescribed rites. These acts may be performed by a sage possessing per- fect knowledge, and should therefore produce certain conse- quences. They lead, however, to no results ; for as far as they * ( i>50 ) are themselves concerned, they are but of brief duration, perish- ing as soon as performed ; and .with regard to any future effects they are anticipated, prevented, or destroyed, by the possession of knowledge. Such seems to be the purport of the passage, but it is not very perspicuous. am srfrw? ^ftm&^ra; scwftfaf 3r LXVIII. WHEN separation of the informed soul from its cor- poreal frame at length takes place, and nature in re- spect of it cease, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished. BHASBYA. When bodfty separation is accomplished, by destruction of the effects of virtue, vice, and the rest. In respect of it. having accomplished its object, nature ceases : then absolute, certain final, unimpeded deliverance, liberation, consequent upon the condition of singleness. Soul obtains singleness (separation), which is both absolute and final. ( 251 ) COMMENT- This verse refers to the first stanza, and announces the accomplishment of what was there stated to be the object of inquiry, absolute and final liberation. When the consequences of acts cease, and body, both gross and subtile, dissolves, nature, in respect to individual soul, no longer exists ; and soul is one, single, free kevala, or ob- tains the condition called kaivalyam. This according to VA- CHESPATI and NARAYANA, means ' exemption from the three kinds of pain*.' GAURAPA'DA gives no definition of the term, except that it is the abstract of kemlcrf. What the condition of pure separated soul may be in its liberated state, the San- khya philosophy does not seern to hold it necessary to inquire. LXIX. THIS abstruse knowledge, adapted to the -liberation of soul, wherein the origin, duration, and termination of beings are considered, has been thoroughly ex- pounded by the mighty saint. ITR ( 252 ) BHA'SHYA. Soul's object is liberation : for that (purpose) this abstruse, secret, knoivlcdye (has been expounded) lj the miyldij saint, by the divine sage KAPILA. Wherein, in which knowledge, the origin, duration, and termination, the manifestation, continuance, and disappearance, of being*, of the products (or developments) of nature, are considered, are discussed. From which investigation perfect knowledge, which is the same as knowledge of the twenty-live principles, is produced. This is the Bhfahya of GAURAPADA on the Sankhya doctrines, propounded, for the sake of liberation from migra- tion, by the Muni KAPILA ; in which there are these seventy stanzas. COMMENT. This verse specifies by whom the doctrines of the text were originally taught. The commentary of GAURAPA'DA closes here in the only copy of the MSS. procurable; and consequently omits all notice of ISWAHA KRISHNA, to whom a subsequent stanza of the text attributes the Kdrikd. In the JlltdsJtya it is said that the work commented on is the Sankhya declared by KAPILA ; but that the Kdrikd is not the work of KAPILA, the other Scholiasts agree. It is also different from the Sutras of that teacher, as given in the Sdnkltya Pravachana, al- though it follows their purport, and sometimes uses the same or similar expressions. GAUKAPA'DA may therefore probably only mean to intimate that its substance is conformable to ( 253 ) the doctrines of the Sutras, not that it is the work of the Muni. These doctrines, he adds, are contained in seventy stanzas ; of which, however, our copy has but sixty-nine. The verses of the Kdrikd, as usually met with, are seventy-two ; but there also reference occurs to seventy verses, as compri- sing apparently the doctrinal and traditional part of the text, derived from older authorities. Either GAURAPA'DA thought it unnecessary to explain the concluding three verses of the Kdi'ikd, or there is some omission in the copy, or they do not belong to the work. The concluding verse is evidently in- accurate, the metre of the third line of the stanza being defective. The KAPILA to whom the Sankhya philosophy is attributed is variously described by different authorities. In a verse quoted by GAUHAPA'DA, in his comment upon the first stanza of the text, he is enumerated amongst the sons of BKAHMA. VIJNA'NA BHIKSHU asserts him to have been an incarnation of VISHNU*. He refers also to the opinion of a Vedanta writer, that KAPILA was an incarnation of AGNI, or ' lire,' upon the authority of the Smritit ; but denies their identity. There does not appear to be any good authority for the notion. Kapila is a synonyme of fire, as it is of a brown, dusky, or tawny colour ; and this may have given rise to the idea of AGNI and the sage being the same. The identification with VISHNU rests on better grounds. The popular belief of the Vaishnavas is, that there have been twenty-four Avatdrds of VISHNU, and KAPILA is one of them. The earliest authority for this specification is no doubt the Rdmdyana, in which VASUDEVA or VISHNU is said by BRAHMA to assume the form of KAPILA, to protect the earth against the violence of the sous of SAGARA, searching for the lost steed intend- # <\ t 3?fo: S ^fq^F !TR ( 254 ) ed for their father's a&twmedkot. ' * BRAHMA having heard the words of the gods, who were bewildered with the dread ot destruction, replied to them, and said, VASUDEVA is the Lord, he is Mddhava, of whom the whole earth is the cherished bride ; he, assuming the form of KAPILA, sustains continually the world.' So also the Mi'dtabluirata : 'Then spoke incensed, KAPILA, the best of sages ; that VASUDEVA, indeed, whom the holy Man is called KAPiLAf.' According to the Bhdgavat, he was the fifth incarnation of VISHNU : ' The fifth Avatdra was named KAPILA, the chief of saints, who revealed to ASURI the Sinkhya explanation of first principles which has been impaired by time:}:.' Book I. s. 12. The latter half of the third book describes him also as an A t'fttdr of VASUDEVA, but as the son of DEVAHUTJ, the daughter of SAYAMBHUVA Menu, married to the Pi-djapa.il KERDDAMA. PHV with Bhoja R;ij4s Commentary rued Introdui. containing the extracts .->rs ) iring o u the subject. Price including lv 2 tt 4. Englisi. translation >i the Bhagwat Gita, Ve". ed'Jon, rcrised and t-nlar^ed, by Mr. Cluirie.- \Vilkins w ,th t\vn leained introduc- tions by Professor Manila: N Luivef< ; unDA S A-.IHITA for a copy without bincHng Sanscrit Text in Browu HalJand ..48-, ,. in Silk IN THE PRESS. Rig Veda Sanhifca with Bhashya by dayanacharya. Be-fore Decem or, 1887 subscription iu advance In anv-ars Aft. r subscription in ... i'.' ok are highly recommended to begumer.- ; > . :ularly vuttea to help them 40 I