trA 
 
xiu- 
 
THE 
 
 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
THE 
 
 LIFE OF COOTT OAYOUR. 
 
 FROM THE FRENCH 
 
 M. OHAELES DE MAZADE_p^r^^/^ 
 
 CHAPMAN & HALL, 193, PICCADILLY. 
 
 1877. 
 
•i:>:^^ 
 
 5^& 
 
 ,-6 a^ 
 
 CHABLK8 DICKIK8 AVO KTIITS, 
 PALICI 
 
 CBTniL PALICB FBBM. 
 

 PEEFACE. 
 
 This book is composed of the public records of a memorable 
 histoiy, together with less known documents, which I 
 owe to treasured private communications and some per-, 
 sonal knowledge of the facts. It is devoted to a man 
 who will ever be ranked as one of the rarest of human 
 kind ; for in him there was the union of strength, suavity, 
 passion, suppleness, boldness, and prudence, and he 
 succeeded in all that he undertook. 
 
 It may be said with truth that Count Cavour was 
 among the most illustrious of the favourites of fortune 
 in our century. He was not one of those chance favourites 
 whom a happy accident, interest at court, or the winning 
 of popularity, launches to a fleeting renown ; but he was 
 of the few that, being privileged to deserve success by 
 the exercise of a consummate skill, leave their names 
 inscribed upon imperishable works. 
 
 His mission was fulfilled within the space often years — 
 less than the cycle of Tacitus. These ten years sufficed for 
 
vi PItEFAGE. 
 
 him to realise a dream of nationality tliat seemed beyond 
 realisation, and more particularly at the beginning of 
 his parliamentary life ; to raise up his country, and to 
 become himself the greatest of Italians, among the 
 foremost of the political men of all time, European in 
 influence, glory, and genius. 
 
 It would be writing with levity to say that he was 
 happy, even in his premature end, in escaping, as he did, 
 through an opportune and sudden death, the perplexities 
 of his task. If ever there was a man who needed not 
 to fear to live, and who knew how to precombine and 
 prearrange all for the attainment of a special object, and 
 then to assure his success by guarding himself against 
 the reverses of fortune and the risk of unforeseen events, 
 it waa he. Better than any other he knew the right 
 moment when to adventure and to stop, so as always to 
 remain master of the ciisis he brought to a head or 
 unwound so daringly, in which none but he was able to 
 preserve a perfect serenity of mind. 
 
 Those who knew him, who were mixed up with his 
 labours — and there is one among them, M. Nigra, 
 whose name friendship permits me to write beside that of 
 his first instructor in public affairs — have not forgotten 
 the ready resource, the simple ease, the correctness of 
 judgment in midst of the gravest situations and the 
 keenest contests, displayed by Cavour. He overcame 
 everything. He had arrived at that point when he no 
 longer feared to be unequal to the final trials ; he felt 
 
PREFACE, vii 
 
 sure of completing that which he had begun, and more ; 
 for since his death Italy has been sustained by his breath, 
 and whatever has been done, has only been the com- 
 pletion of projects left behind by him, and animating 
 his mind up to his last moments. 
 
 There is in the life of such a man a profound attrac- 
 tion for those who love the spectacle of a nature mar- 
 vellously gifted to grapple with events. It has, more- 
 over, at the present time, almost a direct and practical 
 interest ; for, apart from the lively remembrance I have 
 retained of Count Cavour, I must confess that one of my 
 objects, when I wrote this book in the Revue cles Deux 
 Mondes, arose from a desire to luring before those who 
 may stand in need of the example, this striking image of 
 a man who knew how to be a great Lil^eral as well as a 
 downright head of the Government. It is what I would 
 term the moral lesson of this work. If the aforesaid 
 moral is made sufficiently prominent, it may not perhaps 
 be inopportune at a time when, if care be not taken, 
 party spirit will disturb and confound everything, from 
 the simplest ideas of Liberalism to the most elementary 
 conditions of Government. , 
 
 The signal superiority of Count Cavour consists in 
 his having been a real Liberal, in the strongest and 
 fullest acceptation of the word. The liberty in which he 
 believed, both from instinct and reason, was to him no 
 empty formula, nor was it an engine of destruction, or an 
 implement of war against the Church or the State ; it 
 
viii PREFACE. 
 
 was a regular system of public guarantees, impartially 
 applied and patiently worked out, as free from subter- 
 fuge as from violence. In the working of institutions, 
 even in the boldest undertakings, lie carried a mind free 
 alike from revolutionary prejudice and timid scruples. 
 Confidence was a part of his nature, and, granting 
 whatsoever was due to liberty, he was still, and above all, 
 the man made to govern. Let me explain. 
 
 Premier of a parliamentary State, he was compelled 
 to secure to himself a majority ; he required it, for 
 he undei-stood that, to use his own expression, "there 
 is no governing on needles' points ; " but the majority 
 he needed was of his creating ; he knew how to direct 
 and guide it ; he did not abandon it to its own inex- 
 perience, its doubts and phantasies ; he thought for it, 
 and at the right moment ; he did not shrink from the 
 i-esponsibility of taking a desperate initiative. When he 
 debated within himself on the advisabihty of an alliance 
 with France and England in the Crimea ; when he ven- 
 tured to propose to his little Piedmont such works as 
 economical refonn, or the boring of a tunnel through 
 Mont Cenis, he proved that he had no intention of 
 allowing the reins of Government to slacken and grow 
 weak in his grasp. However deferential his attitude 
 before public opinion and the Chambers, he knew how to 
 outshoot and make a way for them. 
 
 I admit that he leaned upon a solid and popular 
 monarchy, and in this he gathered strength ; he was. 
 
PREFACE. ix 
 
 supported by a king who was a pattern of patriotic and 
 constitutional sovereignty ; he was assisted by fellow- 
 workers, such as La Marmora, in the reconstruction of an 
 army. But it was Cavour who obtained the money where- 
 with to do itj as well as the opportunities of making use 
 of it ; adding to the fecundity of his contrivances and 
 the certainty of his combinations an indomitable power 
 in willing and executing. Had he awaited the good 
 pleasure of parties in all his resolutions, he would have 
 waited long ; and on more than one occasion he ran 
 great risks, in concert with La Marmora, to carry out 
 military undertakings which have subsequently been the 
 saving of Piedmont in the hour of danger. He did not 
 hesitate to pledge himself, convinced that the affairs 
 of a nation were only placed in his hands for guidance 
 and judicious direction, even under a parliamentary 
 regime ; and thus he knew how to unite in the fullest 
 measure the spirit of government with the spirit of 
 Liberalism ; thus it was that he was more than an 
 eminent man in power, he was a living and working 
 policy, and, after having recast a little country, he 
 created a new nation. 
 
 Another name, that of one who may take rank as a 
 competitor in the ai*ena of political conflicts, naturally 
 rises to the mind at the present time. It is now diffi- 
 cult to speak of Count Cavour without being reminded 
 of the Prussian minister who has been enabled to per- 
 form in Germany what the Piedmontese minister 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 achieved in Italy. Events are interlinked ; men follow 
 but do not always resemble one another. I have no 
 desire to undervalue the German chancellor ; coming 
 from a Frenchman this would be childish and unworthy. 
 In Prince Bismarck we have good reason to see an enemy, 
 aud we do not combat him with idle disparagements. 
 All we can say is, that if Count Cavour and Prince 
 Bismarck appear to have a similar fortune, at least till 
 now, in analogous undeitakings, they differ in genius, 
 character, and mode of proceeding, as widely as Italy 
 differs from Germany. 
 
 Several private letters written by Prince Bismarck 
 in the course of his career have been published within 
 the last few years ; and they unveil a strangely com- 
 plex nature ; they reveal the whole man. A man 
 assuredly of powerful originality, impetuous, crabbed, 
 abrupt, and familiar ; of feudal stamp, a Teuton by 
 temperament and education ; mixing confidential com- 
 munications as to his capacities as a drinker, and the 
 effects of moonlight on the banks of the Rhine, with 
 visions of grandeur and power ; a Mephistophelean 
 politician and diplomatist, despising diplomatic and 
 parliamentaiy formulas ; impatient for action at all cost, 
 feii^o et igne, and defining himself with the aii- of a 
 ruffled giant, from a heap of violent contradictions, 
 in his disturbing and discomposed figure of conqueror. 
 
 That is not the portrait of Count Cavour, whom his 
 contemporaries knew and saw at his work. Dou1)tless, 
 
PREFACE. xi 
 
 Prince Bismarck is a great German. Count Cavour was 
 rather, and in the broad humane sense, a great man. 
 He, too, had strength of will and genius, but with 
 perfect cordiality and a very taking charm. Prince 
 Bismarck began by showing himself independent of his 
 parliament, and even in some degree ridiculing it ; he 
 provoked the conflict and defied " rebellious " majorities ; 
 and if he ended in overruling the Chambers, it was by 
 making his power and success a necessity to his country. 
 Count Cavour worked always with the aid of public 
 opinion and of parliament on his side. What he had 
 been aided by liberty in accomplishing, he leaned on 
 liberty to consolidate, with no despotic impatience, no 
 persecution of beliefs. 
 
 And, furthermore, if Prince Bismarck has been a 
 German Cavour, it cannot be said that Cavour was 
 ever an Italian Bismarck. The Piedmontese minister 
 copied no model ; he was the first on this field ; and 
 what makes his greatness is, that in an unprecedented 
 enterprise, even in success, he has left behind him 
 an example of forethought, judgment, and moderation 
 worthy to be studied universally where politics is still a 
 business. 
 
 Had Cavour been solely a great Italian, he would by 
 right have belonged to his fellow-countrymen ; and who 
 has better revived his image than my excellent friend 
 Massari, writing with tender fidelity and veneration his 
 volume of recollections, II conte di Cavour, Ricordi 
 
xii FREFAGE. 
 
 hiogmjici f ""' Such as he was, Cavour belongs not only 
 to Italy, but to the world ; and it has struck me that in 
 wTiting this great life, in showing how a man was able 
 to raise up a fallen nation by genius and policy, it would 
 be a work of ser\dce to the conquered, and not without a 
 lesson for the conquerors. 
 
 March 2, 1877. 
 
 * Count Cavour baa been the subject of mucli literary work, both in an«l out 
 of Italy. It ia my duty to mention, besidca the aubstantial literary study by 
 S. Massari, the attractive work by M. de la Rive : Le Comte de Cavour, ricitt 
 et aouvenirs, and a very interesting preface, with which S. Artom has headed 
 a collection of Cavour's principal speeches, translated into French. It is, how- 
 ever, only an abridgment of the large collection of Cavour's Speeches (12 vols.), 
 published by order of the Chamber of Deputies. I should also mention the 
 Historia doctimentata della diplomazia europea m Italia, by S. Nicomedo 
 Bianchi, now in the Record Office at Turin, as being instructive as to contem- 
 poraneous history. Many other works might be cited. 
 
COIfTENTS. 
 
 pAoa 
 mEFACE V— xii 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 The Youth op Cavour — Piedmont and Italy after the Defeat. 
 
 A Liberal Conservative — Origin and Antecedents of Cavour — His Family 
 — His Education and Military Life — A young Piedmontese Citoyen — • 
 Agricultor's Life at Leri — Journeys in Switzerland, in France, and 
 in England — Piedmont and Italy under Charles Albert — Cavour's first 
 Political Ideas — Events preliminary to 1848 — Cavour a Journalist — 
 The Constitutional Order of Things at Turin— First War in Lombardy 
 — Eevolutionary Agitations — Battle of Novara — Piedmont after the 
 Defeat — Communism at Genoa — D'Azeglio's Ministry and the Con- 
 elusion of Peace^The Standard and Liberal Institutions — The Begin- 
 ning of Ketribution — Cavour in Parliament and in the Ministry — 
 Piedmont and the 2nd of December — The Two Policies — ^The Cm- 
 nuhio — Political Development of Cavour 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 The Policy of Cavour — The First Act of the Kvtional 
 
 Drama. 
 
 Cavour President of the Council — The National and Liberalldeaf-Financial 
 Policy— Commercial Policy — Religious Policyl— Party Opposition — 
 Letter from Cavour on his Policy — Beginning of Operations — The 
 Eastern Question and the Crimean War of 1856 — Alliance with France 
 and England — The Piedmontese Corps in the Crimea — ^Peace, and its 
 
xiv CONTENTS. 
 
 PACK 
 
 Effects apon Piedmont — ^Victor Emmanuel in Prance — Cavoor at the 
 Congress of Paris— First Interviews with the Emperor — ^The Italian 
 Question as regards Europe — The Session of the 8th of April — 
 ^ Cavour's lUuaions^Piedmont and Italy after the Peace . .58 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 Parliamentary Eeion op Cavour — Preparation's for AVar. 
 
 A Panso after 1856 — New Situation of Piedmont — Moral Headship of 
 Cavour— Portrait of the Man— His Character —His Speeches— A Parlia- 
 mentary Beign — Watchword of the New Phase — Alere Jlammam ! — 
 Activity in Turin — The Fortifications of Alessandria — Maritime 
 Arsenal of Spezzia — Boring of the Mont Cenis — Piedmontese Policy 
 in Italy — Cavour and Daniel Manin — Piedmont before Europe — 
 Relations ■»rith Russia, with England, and with France — Crisis in 
 Piedmontese Policy — Elections of 1857 — The Crime of Orsini in 
 Paris — Effects in Turin — OflBcial and Secret Diplomacy — Speech of 
 Cavour on the Alliances — Private Communications of the Emperor 
 — Negotiations —Interview at Plombiftres — Secret Treaty — Scene on 
 the 1st of January, 1859, at the Tuilcries — Speech of King Victor 
 Emmanuel before Parliament — Prologue of the War . . . .111 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The War op 1859 — Cavour and the Peace op Villafranca. 
 
 Prologue of the War of Italian Independence — The Situation at the 
 Beginning of 1859 — Napoleon III. and Cavour — Marriage of Princess 
 Clotilde and Prince Napoleon — The Pamphlet "Napoleon III. and 
 Italy" — Position of Affairs — Diplomatic Phase — English Negotia- 
 tions — Diplomacy of the Emperor — Proposed Congress — Cavour 
 during the AVinter of 1859 — Italy in a Ferment — The Volunteers 
 at Turin — Preparations moral and military — Cavour and Diplomacy — 
 Trip to Paris — Two French Politicians — Napoleon III. and Count 
 Walewski — Mot of Cavonv to M. de Rothschild — The knotty Point — 
 Crisis in April — Dramatic Situation, Coup de Th^'itre — The Austrian 
 Ultimatum at Turin — War is declared — French Troops at Turin — 
 Military Operations — Napoleon III. and his Proclamations — March 
 of the Franco-Piodmontoso Army — Movements at Modena, Parma, 
 Florence, and Bologna — Cavour during the War — Solferino and 
 the Preliminaries of Villafranca — Cavour in the Camp — Sceue at 
 Desenzano — Victor Emmanuel — Despair and Retirement of Cavour — 
 Departure for Switzerland — Uncertainty after Villafi-anca- Mental 
 Condition of Cavour— Departure of the Emperor for Fmnce . . 168 
 
V 
 
 CONTENTS. XV 
 
 CHAPTER Y. 
 
 The Italian Crisis after Villafranca — Cavour and the 
 Cession op Savoy. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Speech of Napoleon III. at St. Cloud — Character and first Consequences of 
 the Peace of Villafranca — France and Austria — Piedmont and the New 
 Ministry — Italian Phase — The Annexation Movement in Central Italy 
 — Farina at Modena and at Bologna — Ricasoli at Florence — Portrait 
 of Eicasoli — The Military League of Central Italy — The Tuscan Envoys 
 in Paris — Official Policy of France —Personal Policy of the Emperor — 
 Contradictions of French Diplomacy — Negotiations with England — 
 The Emperor's Tactics to disengage himself — New Coup de Theatre — 
 Change in the French Ministry — M. Thouvenel takes the Place of 
 Coimt Walewski — The Pamphlet " The Pope and the Congress " — 
 Change of Ministry at Turin — Cavour recalled to Office — Negotiations 
 with Central Italy and with Paris — Preparations for the D^noHnient — 
 The Annexations — Cession of Savoy and Nice to France — Opinion in 
 Italy — Opinion in Europe — The External and Internal Situation — The 
 Treaty of March 24, 1860, before Parliament — Speech of Cavour on 
 Italian Policy and the French Alliance — Cavour at Pisa and at Florence 
 — Results of the Annexations and the Cession of Savoy — The Policy of 
 Action — Revolution in Sicily 211 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Cavour and the Unity of Italy — Rome and Kaples. 
 
 The Idea of Unity in the Mind of Cavour— Insurrection of Sicily and the 
 Expedition of Graribaldi — Attitude of Cavour at Turin — Relations with 
 Najilcs and with Rome — Negotiations with Europe — Cavour and the 
 Dictatorship of Garibaldi in Sicily — Matters touching his Policy — 
 Advance of the Insurrection in the South — The Revolution in Naples 
 — Projects of Garibaldi — Threats of an Attempt on Rome and on Venice 
 — Private Dissensions between Cavour and Garibaldi — Necessity for 
 a Resolution — The Chambery Mission — ^Words of Napoleon III. — In- 
 vasion of Umbria and the Marches — The Piedmontese Army in the 
 Kingdom of Naples — Assembly of the Chambers in Turin — The Policy 
 of Cavour before Parliament — Triumph of that Policy — Annexation of 
 Sicily and Naples — Programme of Cavour as to Venice and Rome- 
 Letters and Speeches — Rome the Capital — The Free Church in the 
 Free State — Views of Cavour concerning the Papacy .... 260 
 
xvi CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 The Final \''ictobt of a Policy — Death and Legacy of Cavour. 
 
 PAGS 
 
 Italian Unity and Europe — Austria and the Annexations — La Marmora's 
 Mission to Berlin — Last Negotiation with Napoleon III. — Unity at 
 Naples — Baron Ricasoli's Discourse and Interpellation — Cavour and 
 Garibaldi before Parliament — The Sitting of April 18, 1861 — A 
 Minister's last Victory — Sudden Illness of Cavour — His last Moments 
 — His Death — Fra Giacomo — Legacy of Cavonr — His Work and his 
 Policy — Conclusion , . . ^ 310 
 
LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 ;nKI7EESIT7l 
 
 THE YOUTH OF CAVOUR — PIEDMONT AND ITALY AFTER 
 -;^^,S . THE DEFEAT. 
 
 A Liberal Conservative — Origiu and Antecedents of Cavour — His Family — 
 His Education and Military Life — A young Piedmontese Citoyen — 
 Agricultor's Life at Leri — Journeys in Switzerland, in France, and in 
 England — Piedmont and Italy under Charles Albert — Cavour's first 
 political Ideas-p:Events preliminary to 1818 — Cavour a Journalist — The 
 constitutional Order of Things at Turin — First "War in Lombardy — 
 Revolutionary Agitations — Battle of Novara — Piedmont after the Defeat — 
 Communism at Genoa — D'Azeglio's Ministry and the Conclusion of Peace — 
 The Standard and Liberal Institutions — The Beginning of Retribution — 
 Cavour in Parliament and in the Ministry — Piedmont and the 2nd of 
 December — The Two Policies — The Connuhio — Political Development of 
 Cavour. 
 
 I. 
 
 One of the most extraordinary revolutions of the cen- 
 tury has made Italy a constituted nation, and has raised 
 her on a level with the Powers of the world. This can 
 hardly be called a resurrection ; Italy, seeing her as she 
 has emerged from contemporary events, in no way 
 resembles what she has ever been before ; the sky 
 illumining her, the seas into which she dips on every 
 
 B 
 
2 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 side, and the many traditions of those twenty brilliant 
 cities which are now joined together in national unity — 
 these are all that she has in common with the past. 
 Modern Italy is a new creation ; a work prepared by 
 history, no doubt, but one also which is the combined 
 result of policy, of circumstances, high daring, and pro- 
 found astuteness. 
 
 Now that this work is completed, we regard it as 
 natural and simple ; it has become so intimately allied 
 with the general order of things, that we can hardly 
 imagine the successive reactions and upheavings which 
 would be required to destroy it. Only five-and-twenty 
 years ago it seemed an impossibility, so many conditions 
 and events did it presuppose that could not even be 
 reasonably conceived as realisable. 
 
 To establish it as a reality, the agents have been 
 European revolutions, changes in the balance of power 
 and of national equilibrium, and wars unexpected, though 
 sagaciously planned ; these, together with diplomatic 
 dramas, the disappearance of local sovereignties, and a 
 complete transformation of that which struck the mind 
 as the most immovable of institutions — the temporal 
 power of the Pope. It needed, too, that there should 
 be at the foot of the Alps a small but disciplined and 
 devoted people, of exemplary courage, and at the head 
 of these people a prince made popular by his patriotic 
 sentiments, it may be by an ambition in his blood ; and 
 in the councils of this prince and this people, one of 
 those great ministers, who seem to have been created 
 for the most complicated as well as the most perilous of 
 enterprises. 
 
ITALY AND CAVOUB. 3 
 
 To enter upon a public career at so critical a period , 
 as 1848, and boldly to take in hand the affairs of his 
 country immediately after a national disaster, which 
 threatened to be for a long time irremediable ; and in 
 a condition of internal revolution full of uncertainty, to 
 go through all the difficulties of reorganisation amidst 
 the shiftings of European policy, without wavering or a 
 moment's deviation in making everything concur in one 
 aim ; to conspire openly for ten years — in the noblest of 
 causes it is true, but in one the triumph of which could 
 realise itself only at the cost of almost impossible 
 changes ; and to succeed in gathering to his side 
 alliances and sympathies, I might almost say the force 
 of facts ; then suddenly to disappear when the work 
 has reached a point where the past appears as a dream 
 — such was the destiny of Count Cavour. 
 
 What Italy would have been without him — ^what 
 she would still be — one can no longer conceive; it is 
 through him that she has become what she now is ; she 
 has become developed, disciplined, and concrete in de- / / 
 spite of all her divisions ; Italy has become a new power, 
 and she has found in that little Piedmont the frame- 
 work ready-made of a living nationality ; and this work 
 of energy, perseverance, suppleness, and profound com- 
 binations, is one of the most complete and instructive 
 lessons in the art of governing. 
 
 It teaches how a country, overwhelmed by defeat, 
 can be raised again, and how a parliamentary system 
 and established liberty may contribute to ctirry out a 
 national idea ; it shows us how this policy, patiently and 
 strenuously followed under a patriotic inspiration, can 
 
 B 2 
 
4 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOTJU. 
 
 frustrate those fatal concuiTcncies of reaction and revolu- 
 tion wliicli endanger the justest of causes. And, finally, 
 it demonstrates what a Liberal Conservative is, who 
 tempers his genius to identify himself with his country 
 1 and his time ; — supple in turning all to his puq^oses, 
 even his adversaries or the unforeseen, while concealing 
 the depth of his calculations under the most equable air ; 
 — knowing how to prepare and command events by the 
 power of a penetrating and unerring reason, and by a 
 constantly inventive boldness in the execution of new 
 and ever- enlarging designs. 
 
 One day, towards the autumn of 1850, on the eve 
 of entering for the first time into office as a simple 
 Minister of Commerce, journeying through the provinces 
 of Piedmont, Cavour stopped at Stresa, on the borders 
 of Lago IMaggiore, at the house of Rosmini the philo- 
 sopher, where he met Manzoni. These eminent men 
 convened on the future destiny of Italy from the top of 
 the villa Bolongaro, keeping their eyes fixed upon the 
 opposite shore, which was then, and seemed likely long 
 to remain, a part of the Austrian dominions. Manzoni, 
 in the simplicity of his soul, did not cease to hope * 
 Rosmini smiled sadly at this poet's dreams, but Cavour 
 rubbed his hands — it was even at that time a peculiar 
 habit with him — and repeated with persuasive liveliness : 
 *' We will do something." 
 
 The man who thus lightly disposed of the future was 
 still young and full of life, having lately tried his maiden 
 steel in the revolutionary turmoil of 1848 — one who 
 carried with him into the whirlwind of public affairs a 
 clear mind, great strength of will, the most liberal of 
 
PARENTAGE OF CAVOUR. 5 
 
 natures, and a disposition every way fitted for action. 
 He was not a revolutionist meditating the renewal of 
 conspiracies when he spoke of " doing something ; " he 
 was, on the contrary, the man of all men the most politic, 
 having in him at once the solidity of the old Piedmontese 
 race without any of its prejudices ; and he had, moreover, 
 the patriotic and liberal sap of the later generations, 
 without having ever been a conspirator. 
 
 His good fortune consisted in his coming at the right 
 moment, and being prepared by his birth and his educa- 
 tion, as well as by his temperament, to meet the chances 
 wdiich might befall him. He was born at Turin, on 
 August 1, 1810, in one of those periods when indeed 
 no one would have said or thought that he who had then 
 received breath would one day, for the benefit of princes 
 then discrowned or banished, revive that name of Italy, 
 Avith which the whimsical caprice of a glorious despot 
 embroidered a fiction of nationality. He was the second 
 son of the Marquis Michael Benso di Cavour, the last of 
 one of those ancient Piedmontese houses issuing from 
 the little republic of Chieri, called the Eepublic of the 
 Seven B's, because of seven families having lived there 
 which had all made their way in the world : the Bensi, 
 the Balbi, the Balbiani, the Biscaretti, the Buschctti, 
 the Bertoni, the Broglie, destined to figure in another 
 land.'"" By his paternal grandfather Camillo Cavour w^as 
 
 * I recall, as a further characteristic trait of those who love to follow out 
 the genealogies, that the first founder of the house appears to be a personage 
 of the name of Hubert, who comes from Saxony with Frederic Barbarossa. 
 This Hubert, on his return from a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, espouses, at 
 Chieri, the heiress of the Bensi, of whom he takes the name, and at the same 
 time he obtains several fiefs, amongst which is the estate of Santena, where 
 now the last descendant of the race reposes. The title of ilarquis of Cavour 
 
6 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 linked with Savoy and the amiable race of St. Francois 
 de Sales ; Geneva claimed him on his mother's side, a 
 de Sellon ; and he was drawn to France by many rela- 
 tions — by the two sisters of his mother, who were 
 married, one to the Due de Clermont-Tonnerre, a per- 
 sonage of distinction at the court of the Restoration, 
 the other to the Baron d'Auzers, a gentleman of 
 Auvergne, who, after having been a functionary of 
 the empire beyond the Alps, settled at Turin. 
 
 It was in this varied, though veiy united, social 
 centre, which often met either at Turin or at Geneva, 
 and in this wholesome and strengtliening atmosphere, 
 that Camillo Cavour was bred and born : as a child, 
 robust, enjoying his life, sparkling, and bringing liappi- 
 ness to all about him ; a young man of a most liberal 
 spirit, prompt and open, with a mind seizing and un- 
 derstanding ever}i:hing. 
 
 Cavour was among the youngest of a generation 
 that, after the Restoration of 1815, and when still op- 
 pressed by prolonged reactions, began, in the heavy 
 
 dates only from the last century ; it was given by King Charles Emmannel III., 
 in recompense for military services to Michael Antonio Benso, lord of Santena, 
 and lieutenant-general. The Castle of Cavour, situated on the summit of a 
 rock, in the province of Pignorol, is no more than a ruin since Catinat de- 
 stroyed it in 1691. One day Cavour was asked how it chanced that his armo- 
 rial bearings were headed by a German motto, " Gott will Rocht." «' It is 
 supposed," answered ho, " that my family originated in Saxony, and that a 
 pilgrim of my name came to Piedmont in 1080. Hence the shells that you seo 
 in my coat-of-arms, and the motto which ornaments them. Do you believe 
 this ? "— " No." «' Neither do I ; " and he burst into laughter. Cavour always 
 entertained the broadest and most liberal notions in all that pertains to titles, 
 external dignities, honorary distinctions, but without using any affectation, or 
 ever condescending to flatter base democratic instincts. He was naturally 
 familiar and simple ; with his good-humoured frankness he possessed also a 
 well-bred ease, and a sense of personal dignity, which it was well not to 
 offend. 
 
MILITARY LIFE. 7 
 
 darkness of absolutist reigns, to ripen for tlie ultimate 
 freedom of Italy. 
 
 In 1815, when the tragic warfare which swept away 
 the French Empire had made Piedmont independent, 
 he was only five years of age. At the age of ten he 
 was admitted to the Military Academy, the school of 
 the young nobility, and soon obtained the position of 
 page in the household of the Prince di Carignano — ^the 
 future Charles Albert — where at once the impetuous 
 vivacity of his natural temper burst out in revolt 
 against this gilded servitude. 
 
 At eighteen he was the most brilliant and amiable 
 of sub-lieutenants of engineers, leading a light-minded 
 soldier's life at Vintimille, Turin, and Genoa — especially 
 at Genoa, in which he found the freedom and the attrac- 
 tions of a city of business and pleasure. 
 
 In his twenty-second year he had already sent in his 
 resignation, after having undergone the disgrace of a 
 sort of exile at a small station in the Alps, for having 
 uttered a few risky words, which were merely a cry of 
 generous emotion and sympathy, hailing the French ^ 
 Eevolution of 1830. 
 
 Eeduced, for his sole pastime, to play at taroh with 
 the contractors for the building of the fort of Bard, his 
 place of exile, and menaced with being always suspected 
 at headquarters, he had resigned himself to be no more 
 than an " obscure citizen of Piedmont," as he termed 
 himself, a son of good family stopped on the threshold 
 of a brilliant career. But this " obscure citizen of Pied- 
 mont," this young man whom a breath of liberty come 
 from France had set quivering — this retired officer of 
 
8 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 twenty-two — was of the order of those who reach the 
 goal by all roads, and who do not allow themselves to 
 be discouraged, or even irritated, by a misunderstanding 
 or a disgrace. 
 
 Thus exiled from a soldier's life, on the morrow he 
 was brisk and resolute; he combined the study of 
 agricultural affairs with the enjoyment of the pleasures 
 of the world and a course of travel, taking with him into 
 this larger sphere an inexhaustible store of activity, 
 together with those precociously fixed ideas of liberty 
 and patriotism which gave rise to his utterance that 
 ** in his youthful dreams he already saw himself Prime 
 Minister of the Kingdom of Italy ; " which also made 
 him write to his aunt, Madame de Sellon, after the 
 " decisive step " of his resignation : " Do not imagine 
 that all I have suflfered — morally, be it understood — has 
 in any way abated my love for the views which I pre- 
 viously entertained. These ideas form a part of ray 
 existence. I shall profess, teach, and uphold them a.s 
 long as I have a breath of life." Already we see the 
 whole man in the resigning ofiicer of 1832, and in the 
 rebellious youth of the beginning of the reign — that of 
 Charles Albert — a reign destined to conclude with a 
 national explosion, but which for the moment remained 
 under the hand of Austria and the Jesuits. 
 
 II. 
 
 Three things contributed to the development and 
 expansion of this happy nature, while giving it the 
 impress of originality. It is evident that Cavour always 
 
FAMILY INFLUENCES. 9 
 
 felt the influence of the family life which had been his 
 first education. He gathered from it that which forms 
 the man and the character. He had become morally 
 developed i^i a centre where habits of afiection and com- 
 panionship tempered all differences in political and even 
 in religious views ; for if in Turin that society of the 
 Cavours, Auzers, Clermont-Tonnerres was profoundly 
 attached to traditions of supremacy, both religious and 
 monarchical, at Geneva, the Comte de Sellon, a Protestant 
 and a Liberal, kept faithful allegiance to all that was 
 lofty in the ideas of the eighteenth century, and of the 
 French Eevolution. 
 
 Divided between these family influences, Camillo 
 Cavour was able to reconcile them in his liberal nature. 
 With his uncle, M. de Sellon, he suffered himself to 
 succumb to the fascination of new ideas. With Baron 
 d'Auzers, an Absolutist by conviction, but a man of 
 good intelligence and of agreeable company, who liked 
 discussion even with young men, his mind was 
 sharpened. At that school of maternal grace, when with 
 Madame d'Auzers, who had the quick, lively, and 
 animated nature of her nephew, and with Madame de 
 Clermont-Tonnerre, a woman of extreme Eoyalist 
 notions, but of the most perfect charity, he had imbibed 
 a beautiful amenity and a love of tolerance, together 
 with an easy dignity, mixed perhaps with pride, wdiich 
 sometimes made itself felt through all his familiar 
 heartiness. 
 
 Let no one be deceived : with the most liberal 
 opinions on the rights and claims of birth, Cavour 
 was never a renegade aristocrat, denouncing the 
 
10 LIFU OF COUNT CAVOUE. 
 
 traditions of race or the spirit and customs of his 
 fiimily. At the highest elevation of his political fortune 
 he was and remained the same. In the " house of the 
 Cavours," which he did not cease to inhabit, even when 
 he was Minister, and which was the patrimonial mansion, 
 his eldest brother held the highest place ; and it chanced 
 only a short time before his death, that as one day he 
 was travelling by train a few miles from Turin, Cavour 
 looked out on the flying landscape, and said to a fellow- 
 traveller : " Do you see that spire half hidden among 
 the trees? it is the spire of the Church of Santena. 
 There is the hereditary chd,teau of my family ; it is 
 there that I wish to rest after my death ! " Thus, 
 before he disappeared, with the pride of a great name, 
 he mshed to give testimony to the surviving power of 
 those first impressions which had contributed to his 
 moral development when young. 
 
 Another perceptible influence in this supple and 
 vigorous organisation, was the almost exclusively scien- 
 tific education of the Military Academy. Indeed 
 Cavour had but little literary instruction. " In my 
 youth," he used to say, " I was never taught to write ; 
 I never had a professor of rhetoric, nor even of the 
 humanities." At times, during his active life, he has 
 indulged in a sort of coquettish ignorance, pretending 
 that he neither knew Latin nor Greek, and he main- 
 tained lightly that to him it *' was easier to make Itiily 
 than to make a sonnet." He had supplied that which 
 was wanting, by the determination or the cmiosity of a 
 mind which knew how to take an interest in ever}^thing, 
 even in a new novel ; and he boldly set to work to learn 
 English, in the history of Lord Mahon. 
 
STUDY OF MATHEMATICS. U 
 
 His intelligence was disciplined and shaped on the 
 mathematics, which he had successfully studied at the 
 Military Academy, under the able geometrician, Giovanni 
 Plana : " That is what builds a head and teaches you to 
 think. From the study of triangles and algebraic 
 propositions, I passed to thos& of men and things ; and 
 now I know how useful this study has been to me, by 
 what I am able to do with things and men." He 
 believed himself to owe to this primary teaching the 
 faculty " of keeping in his head a long series of theorems 
 and corollaries which always maintained their order of 
 battle." It is indubitable that the study of mathematics 
 developed in him a disposition to preciseness, clearness, 
 and exactitude ; it had given him an amazing aptitude 
 to play with figures and calculations. 
 
 It is possible that he threw a certain amount of 
 whim and some slight degree of affectation even into 
 this, as he did in his pretended literary ignorance. The 
 truth is, that the study of mathematics would not have 
 sufficed, if this spirit of his, which all things contributed 
 to strengthen, had not at the same time been impreg- 
 nated by influences powerful in quite other ways — by 
 experience, by his travels, by his manifold studies, and 
 by real practical life in all its forms. 
 
 III. 
 
 The life of the real world was one of the great 
 teachers of Cavour. Immediately upon his resignation 
 as officer of engineers, he did not hesitate an instant ; a 
 soldier one day, on the morrow he became a sort 
 of steward of the much -neglected family estates. 
 
12 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 Soldier and farmer, these, without his knowing it, 
 were the two most instructive of the schools of politics. 
 Agriculture had the advantage of being the only possible 
 occupation under a government that saw revolutionary 
 perils even in the pursuits of industry. Cavour gave 
 himself up to agricultural life, not in distaste, nor for 
 a pastime, but with the fire of an impatient activity ; 
 with the spirit and the resources of a nature not in- 
 clined, according to his own expression, to do things by 
 halves, taking an increasing interest in everything about 
 him. " I have embarked," he wrote to his friends in 
 Geneva, " in great speculations ; I have purchased a 
 large estate among the rice-fields. I think I have done 
 a very good stroke of business. All I am in want of is 
 the money to pay for it ; that settled, I shall make a 
 splendid profit by it. I cannot do things by halves. 
 Once embarked in business, I give myself up to it alto- 
 gether — for that matter, my situation compels me to it. 
 I am a younger son, which says a good deal in an aristo- 
 cratically-constituted country. I must carve myself a 
 way by the sweat of my brow." This large estate of 
 which he speaks is Leri, created and transformed l)y 
 Cavour in the middle of the Vercelli district — that Leri 
 where he so often went to seek twenty-four hours' rest 
 in the midst of the most absorbing affairs. 
 
 It was there, in this sujficiently monotonous district 
 of Vercelli, in a plain covered with rice-fields and bare 
 open meadows, that Camillo Cavour lived for yeai-s, 
 syndic of his village, and farmer ; himself directing all 
 the details of a vast system of cultivation, seeking aid in 
 the discoveries of science, introducing new measures and 
 
COUNTRY AND TOWN LIFE. 13 
 
 machines, thus converting a dilapidated estate into a 
 model property. It was his work, his conquest — a 
 prelude to many other conquests ; and in proportion as 
 success smiled on his intrepidity, he did not fear to 
 extend his operations. He had in him activity for 
 everything ; to make a clearing of a forest, as well as 
 to make a canal or a bank ; to cultivate beetroot, as well 
 as to establish a sugar manufactory, or a manufactory of 
 chemical productions. One day he undertook to furnish 
 eight hundred merino sheep for the Pasha of Egypt, 
 and he kept his engagement, although at first he was 
 rather put about to do so. 
 
 Assuredly this well-occupied and active life, in the 
 midst of which he could offer his friends the free and 
 joyous hospitality, not of a luxurious mansion, but of a 
 well-to-do farm, was fertile for Cavour. To this he 
 owed much of what made his peculiar originality, and 
 his weight in politics, his familiar experience of things 
 and men, his practical acquaintance with all special 
 interests, and his ability and judgment in the manage- 
 ment of the springs of a country's wealth. And mthal 
 he was the man of all others the least absorbed even 
 when the most occupied, and while appearing to be 
 entirely given up to his works of cultivation, he never 
 ceased to be one among the foremost in the gay life of 
 the world. 
 
 When he was not leading his country life he was at 
 Turin, enlivening with his inexhaustible verve the 
 salon of his aunt, the Duchess of Clermont-Tonnerre, 
 or delighting and instructing himself in the shrewd, 
 sensible, and liberal conversation of the Ambassador of 
 
14 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 France, M. de Barante, and of his secretary, M. de 
 Haussonville. When the air of Turin weighed on him, 
 he went to Geneva, where he found himself near his 
 uncle, in that cordial and intelligent society of tlie 
 La Kives, the Navilles, the Lullin de Chateauvieux, 
 amongst whom he passed evenings that he recalls, 
 launching epigrams on the afifairs of Europe, reconstruct- 
 ing false systems, recomposing bad ministries — in fine, 
 arranging everything for the very best. When he ceased 
 to feel at home at Geneva, he departed for Paris and 
 London, the two great theatres of the world. Twice, 
 in 1835 and in 1843, he visited France and England, as a 
 traveller who did not lose his time. 
 
 The institutions, the parliamentary struggles, the 
 development of national, agricultural, and industrial 
 forces in England interested him vividly ; everything — 
 politics and social life — attracted him in France. Wel- 
 comed for his name, his intelligence, and his cordiality 
 in the principal salons, he fell under their charm ; it is 
 possible that other seductions also carried him away. 
 Well, he was in the spring-tide of his youth, fond of 
 pleasure, priding himself little upon being a sage, and 
 bold at the green-table, as in everything he did ; in 
 good company not shrinking from a rubber at whist, at 
 twenty-five louis the trick. But these wild bursts of 
 youth did not prevent him from being an attentive 
 observer, with a taste for serious things, above all from 
 being impressionable to the fine and elevated charm of 
 Parisian life ; and he wrote pleasantly from London to 
 Madame de Circourt, with whom he was constantly in 
 correspondence : " England is a country of enormous 
 
VISITS TO FRANCE AND ENGLAND. 15 
 
 resources ; but what you look for in vain there is that 
 admirable union of science and intelligence, depth and 
 graciousness, of the inner and the outer, in perfection, 
 which is the charm of certain Parisian salons ; a charm 
 that we regret all through life when once we have tasted 
 it, and that is not to be found again when we have been 
 removed from this intellectual oasis ; " and, casting an 
 eye on his own country, he added : " Under certain 
 particulars the air of Piedmont is heavier than that of 
 London ; the sky is pure, but the moral horizon so 
 obscured by the clouds developed by an intensely com- 
 pressing system, that the mind there has still less 
 elasticity than in England." 
 
 In default of elasticity, England, without doubt, 
 possessed merits appreciated by Cavour, though he 
 nevertheless preserved a distinct preference for France. 
 " When you shall have shown me an English or a 
 German Due de Broglie, I shall begin to question my 
 opinion of the moral, intellectual, and political supe- 
 riority of France, an opinion that every day takes 
 deeper root in my judgment." These excursions, in 
 which a life of pleasure was mingled with much studious 
 observation, had undoubtedly a remarkable influence on 
 Camillo Cavour. They initiated him, while stiU young, 
 in the heart of European afi'airs, the complicated in- 
 terests of the world, and the various aspects of politics 
 in England and in France, in Belgium and in Switzer- 
 land. They gave him what I w^ould call the exterior 
 and diplomatic sense of things, as agriculture, practised 
 in a certain extension, gave him the sense of all the 
 positive interior realities. 
 
16 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 TV. 
 
 Such was, tlien, the life of "a young citizen of 
 Piedmont," wlio, throughout the changes of an active 
 and easy-going life, remained constantly a Liberal, 
 flourishing in the shade of absolute government. Cavour 
 was liberal, according to the ingenious phrase of M. de 
 la Rive, " as he was fair, alert, and brilliant — ^by birth." 
 
 From his early youtli he had the national and liberal 
 instinct which governed his soul to the very latest hour, 
 and he gives a vivid picture of the deception with which 
 the period of 1830 afilicted him : " How many hopes 
 deceived !" he writes; "what illusions laid bare ! what 
 a host of misfortunes have ftillen upon our country ! I 
 accuse no one ; it may be but the force of circumstances 
 which has so decided it ; but the foct is, that the revolu- 
 tion of July, after bidding us conceive the noblest hopes, 
 has replunged us into a state more deplorable than ever. 
 Ah 1 if France had known how to make the most of her 
 
 position ; if she had drawn the sword it might 
 
 have been that ! " Entirely disconnected from 
 
 the government, he did not withhold his railleries from 
 a rule resting on Jesuitism and police, that confounded 
 in its proscriptions the secret societies, the philosophy of 
 Rosmini, railways, and industry — a rule with wliich 
 Madame de Clermont-Tonnen-e was reduced to nego- 
 tiate, for a considerable period, that she might be per- 
 mitted, by the medium of the Ambassador of France, to 
 receive the Joiimal des Dehats. " Science and intelli- 
 gence," he said, " are deemed things infernal by those 
 
'^-^ OP THR ><^ 
 
 THE JESUITS. \ /y. 17 
 
 who have the goodness to govern us." 
 science, and his intellio-ence was as free as it was clear. 
 During these years of trial for Italy and for Piedmont, 
 between 1830 and 1846, he often, in his private conver- 
 sations, and in his correspondence with his closest 
 friends, stirred many a deep question that he seemed 
 but to brush in trifling ; his sharp and decisive stroke 
 was that of a man who saw far and distinctly, nothing 
 astonishing him. 
 
 One day, before the appearance of De Tocqueville's 
 book, in the course of a letter to one of his friends, he 
 described the march of new societies towards a democracy 
 of yet unshapen outlines ; he showed the material and 
 intellectual levelling beginning to operate between 
 classes ; the patrician more than half destroyed ; the 
 ancient oro:anisati6ns on the road to disinteg-ration, or to 
 transformation of some kind ; and, he added : " What 
 is there left now to take arms against these waves of the 
 masses ? Nothing that is solid ; nothing that has 
 strength. Is it a good ? is it an evil ? I hardly know^ 
 but it is, to my thinking, the inevitable future of hu- 
 manity. Let us prepare ourselves for it, or at least 
 prepare our descendants, whom it concerns more than 
 us." Is it a good ? is it an evil ? He saw the inevitable 
 circumstance, and he was of those who do not revolt 
 a.o:ainst evident facts, who believe that there is nothing- 
 better than to make what you can of them by directing 
 them. On another occasion, roused by the noise that 
 was going on in France about the Jesuits, then masters 
 of his little Piedmont, he wrote to a French lady : " If 
 one would learn to know the true nature of that order, 
 
 
 
 IP 
 
18 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 it is not where the Jesuits are struggling, and where 
 they hohl a precarious footing, that they should be 
 studied ; they are not to be appreciated fully as they 
 jire, except where, meeting no obstacle, they apply their 
 rules in a logical and consecutive manner. They have 
 learnt nothing, forgotten nothing ; their minds and their 
 methods are the same. Woe to the country, woe to the 
 class confiding its youth to their exclusive education ! 
 Unless it be owing to fortunate circumstances that 
 destroy in the man the lessons imparted to the child, 
 they will, within one century, make a race utterly de- 
 based. The opinion that I express here is shared by the 
 
 most distinguished members of our clergy The 
 
 Jesuits are not dangerous in France. In a country of 
 liberty, science, and enlightenment, they must always 
 be compelled to shape and transform themselves ; 
 neither in the pohtical nor in the intellectual w^orld can 
 they ever obtain a real and durable empire. I wish, in- 
 deed, that, in the interests of humanity, we could come 
 to an understanding with the Jesuits, and concede them, 
 in the countries from which they are excluded, three, 
 four, ten times the degree of liberty that they are willing 
 to grant in the countries where they dominate." Observe 
 this wish — even for the Jesuits ! 
 
 V. 
 
 Yes, assuredly, Cavour was a Liberal of the early 
 
 dawn, but he wiis always one in his own manner and 
 
 v/ in harmony with his own temperament. His was the 
 
 Liberalism of a jnstTjjtoisp.d ^jp^rcjudiced brain, with- 
 
HIS POSITION BETWEEN PARTIES. 19 
 
 •out fiinaticism as without sourness, with nothing 
 sickly or desponding in it ; and I fancy he must have 
 smiled somewhat when his friend Pietro di Santa-Eosa 
 addressed him in elegiacal verses : " Camillo, for us 
 to mourn together is henceforward the consolation of 
 our broken spirits." He for his part never wasted much 
 time in bewailino^ himself. If he had not too good an 
 opinion of the Government, he by no means assumed 
 the air of a victim, or of a systematic antagonist. If he 
 was not particularly fond of those whom in his fancy 
 French he called the reculeurs — backsliders — the ultras, 
 those who from hatred or dread of revolution had 
 retrograded to the length of one or many centuries, as 
 little did he esteem the " fanatics " — the idealists, who, 
 for a dream of their own, would push " Society into a 
 fearful chaos, from which it could not be raised save by 
 the agency of an absolute and brutal Imperialism." 
 
 He was neither of the one nor the other party ; he 
 had a natural aversion from excesses that are, more 
 often than not, a disguise of impotence ; and during 
 one of those conspiratorial crises and reactions through 
 which his country passed, he said : '' As to me, I 
 have lonof been undecided in the midst of these move- 
 ments in opposite directions. Common sense coun- 
 selled moderation ; an overweening desire to set our 
 reculeurs marching precipitated me into action. At 
 last, after numerous and violent agitations and waver- 
 ings, I finished by fixing myself, like the pendulum, 
 between the two. So let me tell you, I am an honest 
 middle-course man, desiring and hoping for social pro- 
 gress with all my might, but resolved not to purchase it at 
 
 c 2 
 
20 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 the cost of an universal overthrow My position 
 
 between the two, however, does not hinder me from 
 wishing for the emancipation of Italy, w^ith all possible 
 speed, from the barbarians oppressing her ; and in con- 
 sequence I foresee that a tolerably violent crisis is 
 inevitable. But I would have that crisis brought about 
 with all the discretion compatible w4th existing circum- 
 stances ; and besides this, I am more than persuaded that 
 the mad attempts made by the men of action do but 
 retard and render it more risky " 
 
 He was already, if you will, a Liberal cloaking the 
 man of government, or a Conservative who, in spite 
 of his profession of the *' middle-course," had nothing 
 in him of the doctrinaire ; did not take immobility for 
 the final word of wisdom, and who meant to make of the 
 principle of moderation a policy of initiation and action 
 realising what the revolutionist promises, and doing it 
 better. 
 
 There was another distinction in the Liberalism of 
 Cavour. Others have contributed to the movements 
 preceding Italian emancipation, and have made their 
 way into politics through literature or by philosophy. 
 Gioberti revived the sentiment of the supremacy of Italy. 
 Balbo, by a series of patient and ingenious deduc- 
 tions, saw in the past the nourishment of new hopes. 
 D'Azeglio wrote his romances and jjamphlets ^^'ith a 
 fine, sensible, and persuasive eloquence. Camillo Cavour 
 was neither a philosopher, an historian, nor a poet. His. 
 Liberalism was of a more practical kind, and I might 
 almost venture to say more modern in its direction. 
 A farmer and a man of the world, he endeavoured in 
 
m8 FIRST WRITINGS. ' 21 
 
 his fashion to rekindle the feeling of public interests. 
 He was always ready to seek a means to break through 
 the network of supervision. He was one of the founders 
 of the " Piedmontese Agrarian Society," whose statutes 
 he had revised, from which society sprang a multitude 
 of offshoots, where, under the pretext of agriculture, 
 the spirit of discussion spread and sharpened. In con- 
 junction with the Count of Salmour and others of 
 his friends, he naturalised in Piedmont the popular 
 institution of infant schools. Acting with the Marquis 
 Alfieri and Count Pralormo, who represented what might 
 be called the liberal side of the Government, he formed, 
 nt Turin, under the inoffensive name of "Whist 
 Society," a sort of club of the Piedmontese nobility ; a 
 reunion, where men were accustomed to meet and 
 exchange ideas. He felt the necessity of doing some- 
 thing ; of giving a distinct shape to an activity that was 
 beginning to disquiet the police ; and when, instigated 
 by his friends at Geneva, or excited by the wider 
 awakening of the minds beyond the Alps, he likewise 
 decided to take up a pen, what were the subjects he 
 selected ? They were questions of political economy, 
 ajxricultural labour, and finance. He treated of the 
 ^'oyages agronomiqiies of M. de Chateauvieux, or of the 
 state of Ireland ; of " model farms," or of '' communistic 
 doctrines ; " of " railways in Italy ; " or of "the influence 
 of the English commercial reforms." 
 
 All that was written in French, in an easy, pointed, 
 and simple manner, without any literary style, by an 
 observer manifestly schooled in economical problems, 
 and taken with the great reforms, of which he hailed the 
 
22 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 victorious realisation in England, already dreaming tliat 
 he might see them transported and applied in Italy. 
 
 Was he an economist ? He was one after his own 
 fashion, just as he was a farmer ; as a man who con- 
 stantly made use of whatsoever came in his way, with- 
 out subjecting himself to a theory or to a speciality ; 
 one for whom the science of the laws of production, and 
 the experience derived from agriculture, were useful and 
 necessary, but secondary elements towards the art of 
 governing. In these first pages of an amateur, writing 
 upon questions that were special to all appearance, the 
 politician burst forth spontaneously, so to speak, plan- 
 ning in a system of railways an instrument of national 
 transformation for Italy, or in his economical liberalism 
 the prelude of the liberalism of institutions. The man 
 revealed himself completely by his verdicts, his ideas', 
 and his preferences. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Unite all these features in him ; they compose, if I 
 mistake not, the characteristic physiognomy of one who 
 is not likely to be stopped in his road. This is Camillo 
 Cavour at the age of thirty-six, towards 1846 and 1847 ; 
 it is Cavour breathing life and energy, endowed with a 
 sort of contagious entrain, stjuandering his activity 
 without ever exhausting it, allying discretion witli 
 audacity, flexibility with decision, the traditionar}' and 
 Conservative sentiment with all modern instincts, an 
 Italian and a Liberal, without ever being a revolutionist 
 or a conspirator. Having a decided taste for France, 
 and at the same time formed in the EngUsh school^ 
 
HIS EULOGY OF PITT. 23 
 
 Cavour in some respects had a toucli of the nature of 
 Charles Fox. He had the ardent temperament of the 
 great AVhig leader — the power of mind, the charm of 
 manner, and the irony without bitterness. He had yet 
 more than Charles Fox — the instinct and the natural 
 stamp of the man born to govern, and in his dreams of 
 ambition he did not content himself with the part of 
 chief of the Opposition. His leanings and his admira- 
 tions were rather in the direction of those men who 
 knew how, in case of necessity, to sacrificeJbheij_£0£ti- 
 laritv for the sake of their countr y. " Yes, my friend," 
 Ee wrote excitedly, in 1^47, "Peel's reform has been the 
 safety of England. What would have come to pass if 
 they had allowed the too famous sliding-scale to stand ? 
 It is probable that England would have been left with- 
 out resource after the recent harvest, and then what 
 should we have seen ? England owes statues to Peel ; 
 some day he will have them." If he encountered in the 
 past, on the subject of Ireland, the figure of Pitt, he 
 kindled, and seemed to find in himself some of the 
 features under W'hich he painted the son of Lord 
 Chatham. "He had," says Cavour, "the lights of his 
 time ; he was no friend of despotism nor a champion of 
 intolerance. This vast and able mind loved pn >\7^pr ^ .? ^ ,- ], 
 ineaiiSy-J Bot no an end. He was not one of those men who 
 aim at recasting society from top to bottom, with loose 
 conceptions and humanitarian theories of profound and 
 frigid genius. Devoid of prejudices, he was animated 
 only by the love of his country and of glory. If he had 
 governed in a time of peace and tranquillity he would 
 have been a reformer in the manner of Peel and Canning, 
 
21 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUIt. 
 
 uniting his own peculiar boldness to the largeness of 
 view of the one, and the ubleness and the sagacity of the 
 other." 
 
 Pitt, Canning, Robert Peel — such were the men 
 whom Cavour loved to take for models, and it was thus 
 at the moment when the period of reforms opened for 
 Italy, and those agitations and illusions whereof the 
 accession of Pius IX. was the signal, that " the obscure 
 citizen of Piedmont" found himself, better than any 
 other, anned for public life. 
 
 On the first concessions made by Charles Albert at 
 the end of 1847, he flung himself resolutely into tiiis 
 new career, not in the character of one agitator more, 
 but as a counsellor, as a guide, by the aid of a journal, 
 The Risorgimiento, which he founded with his friends, 
 the moderate Liberals of Turin, Balbo, Massimo 
 d'Azeglio, . Carlo Boncompagni, Michelangelo Castclli. 
 The Risorgimiento represented the opinions of all those 
 who desire to maintain a good understanding between 
 princes and people ; whose effort it was to regulate 
 without enchaining the liberal and national movement 
 of Italy. Cavour was not precisely a journalist ; to him 
 journalism was only a new sphere of action, which, like 
 all that he did, was useful to him ; it compelled him to 
 fix his ideas ; and successively on two important occa- 
 sions, the journalist, the leader of moderate Liberalism, 
 had occasion to show that he did not shrink from reso- 
 lutions of the gravest importance. 
 
 One day, early in 1848, there had been troubles in 
 Genoa, that centre of keen passions. A deputation had 
 gone to Turin to demand from the king, Charles Albert, 
 
THE REVOLUTIONS OF FEBRUARY, 1848. 25 
 
 the expulsion of the Jesuits and the institution of ca 
 National Guard. The public mind was in a state of 
 excitement. The Liberal section at Turin was favour- 
 able to the Genoese deputation. Cavour instantly per- 
 ceived that they were on a wrong track, and that to 
 demand rigorous measures against the Jesuits was to run 
 the risk of wounding the religious sentiments of the 
 king ; that a National Guard could only provoke trouble 
 and sedition so long as a legal representation of the 
 whole country was wanting ; and he proposed to go 
 straight to the point, without confining himself to the 
 Genoese petition — to claim a Constitution. 
 
 While it was more daring, it was also more politic, 
 for this was a step to flatter the pride and secret ambi- 
 tion of the prince whom the Constitution would elect 
 the chief of Liberal Italy. It was in the very essence of 
 Cavour, and, curiously enough, those who most warmly 
 opposed him, those who refused to follow him, were men 
 of extreme Liberalism, men of the Democratic party, 
 Valerio and Sineo, who were suspicious of his leaning to 
 English institutions, and ironically called him "My Lord 
 Camillo." From that moment arose the question 
 between constitutional policy and revolutionary policy. 
 
 Shortly after this, everything had undergone a sin- 
 gular change ; there was no longer any question of the 
 Constitution wrested from the vacillations of Charles 
 Albert. The revolution of February 24 had just burst 
 forth, everywhere kindling incendiary fires, in Italy and 
 in Germany — at Vienna as well as at Berlin. Sicily 
 was already in a state of insurrection. After five days' 
 combat, Milan had expelled the Germans ; while, at the 
 
26 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB, 
 
 same moment, Venice was setting herself free. The 
 Austrian dominion, weakened in the heart of the empire 
 by the Viennese revolution, had barely a hold even in 
 its fortresses of the Adige. Amidst all these events, 
 Turin re-echoed with impassioned appeals : Cavour was 
 one of the first to utter the decisive word. " The 
 supreme moment has arrived for the Sardinian 
 monarchy," he wrote, on March 23, 1848 ; "the moment 
 of grave deliberations ; that which decides the fortune 
 of empires and the fate of nations. In the face of the 
 recent events in Lombardy and at Vienna, hesitation 
 
 and doubt are no longer tolerable We, men of 
 
 coolness, accustomed to follow the counsels of reason 
 rather than the passions of the heart, after carefully 
 weighing our words, should declare that only one course 
 is open to the nation, to the government, and to the 
 king — war! immediate war! .... Under existing 
 circumstances, the highest policy is that of bold 
 
 resolutions " 
 
 Thus Cavour struck at once to the centre of the Italian 
 movement, outstepping the boldest, and approaching — 
 without much of illusion, perhaps, but with no vain 
 subterfuges — that double question of constitutional 
 liberty and of national independence which suddenly 
 sprung up in the midst of the univei'sal outburst. 
 
 VIL 
 
 Ittdy was destined to stand for mournful evidence of 
 how a national revolution can in a few years be wrecked 
 for want of maturity and good management — how, on 
 
CONDITION OF EUROPE. . 27 
 
 the contrary, that same revolution could become suc- 
 cessful when patiently organised and skilfully conducted. 
 What was not known in March, 1848, the which has since 
 been a lesson to a whole generation, was that this sudden 
 crisis, perhaps an inevitable one, before which men like 
 Cavour thought it their duty not to draw back, was never- 
 theless the most perilous of trials. Circumstances seemed, 
 no doubt, at first to warrant audacity, and fortune seemed 
 to smile on Italy. Kadetzki's army, driven back from 
 Milan and from Lombardy, reduced to shut itself up in 
 Verona, in the midst of a circle of fire, and almost 
 deserted by Vienna, was, it might well be believed, a 
 last defence, quite inadequate to maintain the Austrian 
 dominion beyond the Alps. On the other hand, the 
 Piedmontese army, crossing the Ticino under the com- 
 mand of Charles Albert, could with a single spring reach 
 the lines of the Mincio and the Adige. For four months 
 it fought most valiantly, and a day came — that of the 
 taking of Peschiera and the victory at Goito — when the 
 cause of Italian independence seemed almost won. It 
 was, in reality, a grand undertaking badly begun, and 
 rendered complex by inexperience of every sort, as well 
 as by every passion and every illusion which could lead 
 it to a fatal termination. 
 
 The first of its dangers rested Mdth external cir- 
 cumstances. The war of 1848, which broke out thus 
 unexpectedly and with so little preparation, was inti- 
 mately connected with a wide-set revolutionary situation, 
 with an European convulsion. The result was that, up 
 to a certain point, everything beyond the Alps depended 
 upon what took place in Em-ope — upon the reactions 
 
28 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 which might, and which inevitably must, ensue. The 
 chances of succeeding, which at the commencement of 
 the campaign no doubt were real, diminished in pro- 
 portion as events unrolled themselves. 
 
 After the days of June France was fully occupied 
 with her own affairs. The intervention she had thought of, 
 when she gathered together an army of the Alps, dwindled 
 into an evasive and lingering mediation. England, an 
 ally in this mediation, was only anxious to have done 
 with agitations seeming to threaten the peace of Europe 
 established in 1815. Revolutionary^ Germany, far from 
 being fiivourable in parliament at Frankfort, openly 
 pointed to the fortresses of the Adigc as being the 
 outworks of her natural frontiers. Austria, shaken 
 for a moment, had time to look about her, and, 
 by the assistance of her generals at Prague and at 
 Vienna, to recover herself; and from the heart of the 
 empire the poets sent forth to Radetzki, to that ancient 
 warrior of Italy, the sympathetic war-cry,*' *' Austria is 
 in your camp !" In a few months everj^thing had 
 changed, in so much that, before the autumn of 1848, 
 Piedmont, flung back from the ^lincio to the Ticino, 
 reduced to undergo the humiliating armistice of 
 August 16, stood unsupported to face a strengthened 
 and victorious Austria, having nothing more to hope 
 from Europe, hesitating to recommence hostilities, wdth 
 
 Lines of Grillparzer's, very popular in Vienna at the time : 
 
 Gliickaaf, mcin Fcldherr, fiihre den Streich, 
 Nicht bios um des Buhmes Bcliimmer : 
 
 In deinem Lager is Oesterreich, 
 
 Wir andcrn sind einzclne Triimmer. — Tr. 
 
EFFECTS OF PARTY PASSIONS. 29 
 
 an army disorganised by defeat, and already powerless 
 to restrain the passions nrging it to renew the combat. 
 
 The violence of these passions, raging beneath the 
 surface in Italy, led straight to ruin. While the army 
 was gallantly fighting at Pastrengo, Goito, Curtatone, 
 and Vicenza, everything was conspiring against her. 
 The princes, on the one hand, full of misgivings and 
 alarm, refused their alliance ; the Pope, by the ency- 
 clical of April 29, disavowed the war of indepen- 
 dence ; and King Ferdinand of Naples was engaging, 
 on May 15, in a victorious battle of internal repression, 
 which ultimately drove Neapolitan policy to extreme 
 reactionary measures. 
 
 On the other hand, the political doctrinaires, the 
 abettors of sedition and * conspiracy, with Mazzini at 
 their head, were puffing the flame, adding to the diffi- 
 culties of war by their divisions, and the outbreak of all 
 the republican passions, unionist or federalist. These 
 were really Austria's most useful auxiliaries ; and the 
 reverses of the Piedmontese army became the signal for 
 an immense and disastrous anarchy, which extended far 
 and wide, manifesting itself successively — at Milan, in 
 scenes which imperilled the life of Charles Albert ; at 
 Kome, in the murder of Eossi, the flight of the Pope, 
 and the proclamation of Mazzini's republic ; at Florence, 
 in the flight of the Grand Duke, and the advent of a 
 noisy and confused demagog}^ 
 
 Although Piedmont Avas protected by solid tradi- 
 tions, by a national dynasty, and by the "statuto,"'"' or ^^ 
 royal decree, recently promulgated, it did not escape the 
 
 * Statuto fondamentale, the basis of a constitution, sworn to Charles Albert 
 February 8, 1818, and observed by him. 
 
30 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 universal contagion. The democratic party of the 
 Katazzis, the Vaterios, the Buffas, the Ravinas, the Brof- 
 ferias, although it did not carry a majority in the newly- 
 opened parliament, was powerful enough to perplex tlie 
 military and political action of the government, by its in- 
 coherent propositions and its declamations, aided by the 
 clubs and an intemperate and excited press. At Turin 
 that party was the representative or the accomplice of a 
 turbulent democracy, the ally of all the agitators of Italy, 
 and of all the partisans of war to the knife, of popular 
 insurrections, and the wildest of combinations. I am 
 but summing up the situation of 1848, in its principal 
 external and internal features. 
 
 VIII.. 
 
 In the midst of these disturbances, and in this feverish 
 and dramatic inauguration of public life in Piedmont, 
 Cavour fought in the front ranks, both as deputy from 
 Turin to parliament, and in his capacity of editor of Hie 
 Risorgimiento. 
 
 A constitutionalist and a patriot before the " statuto," 
 and before the war, he was during the stniggle the least 
 revolutionary of men, the most reasonable, and the most 
 liberal. Against those who feigned to bribe the union 
 of Lombardy and of Piedmont with the simulacrum of 
 a constituent assembly, he energetically upheld the 
 necessity for immediate amalgamation. To those who 
 proposed to establish a sliding-scale of taxation, he 
 replied with the experienced discernment of a financier, 
 a political economist, and a man of business. To those 
 who were ever talking of recommencing hostilities with 
 
BEVOLUTIONAltY MEANS. 31 
 
 ii disorganised army, reckoning on tlie help of France 
 and of England, lie exhibited the views of a politician 
 sagaciously weighing the affairs of Europe. In the 
 ]3resence of vain and turbulent hostilities he stood by the 
 Government. He did not fear the conflict. Without 
 immediately obtaining the success of an orator, he soon 
 became seasoned, making his way, and facing with an 
 imperturbable coolness the hissing of public assemblies 
 and the unpopularity of the streets, bearing lightly the 
 name of codino, much amused with the accusation 
 brought against him of his being an Anglomaniac. He 
 was a frank and simple moderate, eager for the fray ; of 
 a merciless common sense and irony towards those who 
 believed only in " revolutionary means " without taking 
 nature, reality, and experience into account. One day, 
 in November, 1848, he directly attacked this shibboleth 
 of the extreme party. 
 
 "What is it," said he, "which has always wrecked 
 the finest and justest of revolutions ? — The mania for 
 revolutionari/ means ; the men who have attempted 
 to emancipate themselves from ordinary laws ; . . . . 
 the French Constituent Assembly creating the as- 
 signats in contempt of nature and economic laws ; — 
 revolutionary means, productive of discredit and of 
 ruin ! The Convention attempting to smother in blood 
 the resistance to its ambitious project ; — revolutionary 
 means, producing the Directory, the Consulate, and the 
 Empire ; Napoleon bending all to his caprice, imagining 
 ' that one can with a like facility conquer at the Bridge 
 of Lodi and wipe out a law of nature ; ' — revolutionary 
 means, leading to Waterloo and St. Helena ! The sec- 
 
 l>^ 
 
32 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 tarians of June striving to impose the Democratic and 
 social republic 1)y fire and sword ; — revolutionary means, 
 producing the siege of Paris and reaction everywhere. 
 AVait but a little longer," he added, " and you will see 
 the last consequence of your revolutionary means — Louis 
 Napoleon on the Throne ! " 
 
 In truth he was of a just, liberal, and far-seeing 
 mind ; but neither Cavour, nor his friends in parliament, 
 nor of the press, could, placed as they were in the 
 centre of a circle of fire, improvise moderate views that 
 should yet have strength to prevail. Tlie movement 
 that was hurrying Italy away, and re-echoed through 
 Turin, swept off with it successively the first constitu- 
 tional ministry of Count Balbo, Count Casati's ministry 
 of national compromise, the armistioe ministry of Alfieri, 
 Revel, Pinelli, to fling itself into one of headlong 
 measures, revolutionary plots, and war at any price. 
 
 For a moment only, in the latter days of 1848, 
 Vincenzo Gioberti, a man raised to ix)wer through popu- 
 larity, seemed called to arrest events, or to stamp them 
 with a new character ; at least he tried to do so, and in 
 so doing he soon learnt to appreciate the energetic assist- 
 ance of Cavour, who had previously defended to the 
 utmost the ministry of Counts Revel and Pinelli against 
 him. 
 
 Gioberti felt the danger of a policy that was at once 
 coarsely revolutionar}" and rashly pledged to war. He 
 understood that without renouncing the idea of national 
 independence' it was possible to reach it by another road ; 
 and before precipitating herself upon the Austrians, 
 Piedmont had another part to play — that of bringing the 
 
GIOBEBTL 3a 
 
 Grand Duke home to Florence and the Pope to Eome ; 
 and everywhere re-establish a constitutional government, 
 — in a word, to direct the Italian movement. Piedmont 
 would thus deprive Austria of one excuse for intervening 
 in Peninsular affairs, at the same time conciliatino; and 
 strengthening the restored princes ; she would regain the 
 sympathy of Europe, now ready to forsake her, out- 
 wearied of so much excitement ; and when her work was 
 completed she would find herself in a better position 
 either to negotiate with the concourse of mediating 
 Powers, or again to take up arms. 
 
 Things were in readiness : England and France 
 approved of the plan ; General Alfonso La Marmora 
 was approaching with a Piedmontese division from 
 Tuscany. Unfortunately Gioberti, having come into 
 power with the perfervid heads of the period, such as 
 Eatazzi, BuiFa, Sineo, and Tecchio, had been guilty of 
 the error of dissolving the first Piedmontese parliament, 
 when it had hardly been established, and to suffer a new 
 and thoroughly Democratic chamber to be elected under 
 the auspices of his name. Gioberti still fancied himself 
 the master when he had ceased to be anything. At last 
 he was left alone with his project of intervention, for- 
 saken by a chamber to which ten elections had returned 
 him ; betrayed in his own cabinet by certain of his 
 colleagues, and vainly supported by Cavour, who had 
 now to defend him against his recent friends. 
 
 The defeat of Gioberti was the victory of the Demo- 
 cratic ministers opposed to intervention in Central Italy. 
 These, impatient to break with the armistice and all 
 negotiations, were for immediate war. Gioberti's defeat 
 
34 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 was the resumption of the old policy of extremes, with 
 an army still inefficiently reorganised, and irritated by 
 party insults ; with a king overwhelmed with bitterness. 
 Placed midway between intricate complications at home 
 and a new war of independence, Charles Albert 'pre- 
 ferred, to throw himself on the Austrian sword, heading 
 a country whose only cry w^as : "Let us make an end of 
 it ! " One year after first crossing the Ticino, and 
 the hopeful departure for the campaign in Lombardy, 
 Piedmont found herself again driven to the combat, to 
 play the highest of stakes. The policy of " revolution- 
 ary means," to use Cavour's own words, had been per- 
 mitted to see the light, to show its complete liollowness. 
 On March 23, 1489, it expired in the catastrophe of 
 Novara, where Charles Albert staked his crown with an 
 all but desperate heroism, and for a time the last chance 
 was wrecked for Piedmont and Italy. 
 
 IX. 
 
 Imagine this morrow of defeat prepared by a spirit 
 of i*ashness, and settled in a few hours. A vanquished 
 nation always seems to plunge into tlie ver}^ bottom of 
 the abyss. 
 
 The first consequence of the defeat of Novara was 
 the necessity for an armistice, which handed over a 
 portion of the country to foreign occupation. The 
 Austrians, encamped on the Sesia, with power to place a 
 garrison in Alessandria, held Piedmont between the two 
 threats of an absolute invasion or a treaty of peace, of 
 which they would not state the conditions. The 
 
THE RISING IN GENOA. 35 
 
 Piedmontese could no longer oppose any steady re- 
 sistance. No doubt tlie army had fouglit gallantly at 
 Mortara and at Novara, under the eyes of Charles 
 Albert — always in the hottest fire of battle. It had 
 lost some of its generals and many of its officers, fallen 
 before the enemy. It was not the less in a condition of 
 extreme demoralisation, composed as it was chiefly of 
 recruits, and convinced that it had been forced to pay 
 the price of blood for the madness of political agitators. 
 The officers found it impossible to keep together their 
 men, who broke, and scattered panic all about them. 
 
 At Turin opinions wavered between discouragement 
 and exasperation. The clubs were noisy with passionate 
 rhetoric, and naturally enough there arose a cry of 
 treason. In the chambers, Brofferio prepared a decree 
 of general insurrection, and the formation in the 
 assembly of a committee of public safety. Motions in 
 Parliament rapidly succeeded one another : one in- 
 geniously declaring the armistice to be " unconsti- 
 tutional," and the " statuto" in peril ; another threaten- 
 ing to indict the Government if it opened the gates 
 of Alessandria to the Austrians ; a third gravely prepared 
 an inquiry into the situation, and as to means for pur- 
 suing the war : all this as though the enemy were not at 
 hand, and ready to draw the sword of certain victory if 
 defied. 
 
 Matters at Turin were of small moment for the 
 nonce. At the first news of disaster, the populous and 
 fiery city of Genoa, the town of Mazziniism, caught the 
 contagion, "passing from agitation to insurrection, and 
 thence to a real revolution. Either the army had 
 
 D 2 
 
36 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 betrayed its chiefs, or it had been betrayed by them. 
 The " statute " had been violated. Turin was to be 
 handed over to the Austrians, and Genoa herself was to 
 be held as a hostage of war. It was wdth these reports, 
 pei-fidiously spread, that agitatore inflamed the public 
 mind, and gave the signal for civil war. 
 
 The gaiTison, chiefly composed of reserves weakly 
 commanded, was compelled to retire after a humiliating 
 suiTcnder to the rioters, who thus remained masters of 
 the town, the arms, artilleiy, forts, and defences of the 
 most important ^lace in the kingdom. The unrestrained 
 populace massacred a few unfortunates, among whom 
 were a major of carabineers and the military com- 
 mandant of the city ; the general and his family were 
 detained as hostages. The Genoese rabble, headed 
 by an old Emigre, the veteran Avezzana, constituted 
 itself an "association of public safety" — "the provi- 
 sional government of Liguria." It refused to recognise 
 the armistice, it separated itself from Piedmont, and it 
 humiliated the army by putting itself in opposition to 
 the regular authorities. In truth, what took place as 
 early as 1849 at Genoa, was an anticipatoiy sketch of 
 the Commune in Paris in 1871. 
 
 This furious rabble, anxious to take advantage of the 
 general disturbance, could not perceive that it was guilty 
 of the crime of national treason ; that in so doing it 
 could only add to the misery of the masses, draw on 
 Piedmont a still heavier invasion, and place the Govern- 
 ment in a situation still more difficult. The defeat at 
 Novara, the disorganised army, the threatened niin of 
 the country, agitations at Turin, civil war at Genoa, 
 
VICTOR EMMANUEL'S DIFFICULTIES. 37 
 
 uncertainty everywhere — this was what followed the 
 catastrophe. It was in these conditions that the young 
 prince, destined by his birth to w^ear the crown of the 
 exiled Charles Albert — ^Victor Emmanuel — re-entered 
 Turin in the last days of March, 1849, to find himself 
 so situated that everything depended on his first acts. 
 
 X. 
 
 There were two policies open to the new reign. At 
 this decisive moment of European reaction and national 
 confusion, Victor Emmanuel could lay aside the 
 " statuto," and the recently inaugurated liberal regime, 
 again possess himself of the blue flag of Savoy, and 
 recover the past by shutting himself up within his 
 frontiers, and no longer turning his attention beyond 
 the Ticino towards Italy. Had he done this he would 
 certainly have obtained an easier peace, and he would 
 in his perplexity have had the support of Austria. 
 External solicitations were not wanting — the most 
 powerful influences sought to incline him to this reso- 
 lution, which would perhaps have given him a certain 
 momentary security, — but it is true it would have 
 placed him in the modest condition of a subject of 
 Austria — another Duke of Modena, or a second Grand 
 Duke of Tuscany. Victor Emmanuel could also have 
 manfully resigned himself to his ill-fortune, and have 
 endured the ill results of war, without sacrificing the 
 *' statuto," or the tricoloured flag — the only two surviv- 
 ing representatives, the only two symbols of Piedmontese 
 independence, and of Italian hopes, that were left. 
 
38 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 Thus placed between divergent policies, tlie soldierly 
 and princely loy»alty of Victor Emmanuel did not hesi- 
 tate : he accepted the part of liberal and national king ; 
 and certainly the most significant testimony that he 
 could give of the frankness of his intentions was almost 
 immediately to elevate to the post of prime minister 
 him who might be termed the Knight of Italy, Massimo 
 d'Azeglio, still lame of a wound he had received at 
 Vicenza. 
 
 This was decisive of the fate of Italy ; this made of 
 that dark day of Novara not only an anniversary of 
 mourning for the bloody termination to the incon- 
 secutive attempts of 1848, but made it also the sombre 
 yet absolute starting-point of a new epoch. By the 
 preservation of the tricoloured Italian flag and the 
 maintenance of the " statuto " the future of Italy was 
 saved. " It is a long work to recommence," said 
 D'Azeglio, "but we will recommence it." And on the 
 other hand, Cavour wrote about the same time to 
 Salvagnoli : " As long as liberty exists in one comer 
 of the Peninsula we must not despaii* of the future. 
 As long as Piedmont can protect its institutions from 
 despotism and anarchy, there will be a means of working 
 successfully at the regeneration of the countiy." 
 
 It was with nothing more nor less than the 
 "statuto" that Massimo d'Azegho entered into oflfice 
 after Novara, calling to his assistance men as moderate 
 and patriotic as himself — Count Siccardi, Paleocapa, the 
 Venetian, the banker Nigra, and General Alfonso La 
 Marmora, who had lately pei*fonned a national service, 
 in suppressing, with equal judgment and promptitude, 
 
TERMS OF PEACE. 39 
 
 the factious Genoese. Indeed, the task was not an easy 
 one ; it had to triumph over the confusion and irritation 
 of parties, parliamentary blunders due to inexperience, 
 and all possible internal and external difficulties. 
 
 Peace was the chief necessity, and D'Azeglio, in 
 submitting to it and negotiating for it, set an example 
 of resigned patriotism and courageous abnegation. It 
 was evident that this peace must be a hard one ; it 
 carried Piedmont back to the treaties of 1815, inflict- 
 ing a war indemnity of seventy-five millions of francs 
 — a heavy weight on the budget of the country. After 
 all, it was not humiliating ; it was a necessity. It 
 will, however, scarcely be credited — parties played the 
 sad game of bargaining with that necessity, and refusing 
 their co-operation, at the risk of sacrificing everything. 
 On two occasions the Government saw itself reduced to 
 dissolve the House, and on the last of these two the 
 king himself was compelled to make a direct appeal to 
 the common sense of the country by the proclamation of 
 Moncalieri, which, under the cloak of a C02ip d'etat, was 
 nevertheless a deed of far-sighted Liberalism. " Do not 
 these gentlemen perceive," said D'Azeglio, sadly, " that 
 the Ministry has already enough to do in upholding the 
 Constitution — and that after us the Croats f " 
 
 This was not the only task. At the time when Pied- 
 mont stood for Constitutionalism, reaction carried the day 
 in all parts of Europe. Piedmontese liberty seemed an 
 anomaly and a danger, in the midst of the absolutist 
 restorations which were taking place in Italy, at Rome, 
 at Florence, and at Milan. Austria signalised Turin as 
 a last incendiary focus. The Emperor of Eussia declined 
 
40 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR 
 
 any intercourse with the new King of Sardinia. Even 
 in France the Conservative party, which had hitely rein- 
 stated the Pope at Kome, seemed to look upon this 
 transalpine constitutional regime, which had the strange 
 pretension of accomplishing refomis, both civil and 
 rehgious, as a troublesome and importunate brawler. 
 Piedmont encountered eveiywhere hostility or coldness, 
 so that what had to be done was virtually, day by day, 
 te wrest, as it were, from Austria, and from domestic 
 factions as well as foreign suspicions, that " statuto " in 
 which a well-inspu-ed prince and wise Liberals perceived 
 a means of reconstructing, with the aid of a constitu- 
 tional monarchy, what had been cast down by revolu- 
 tions and revolutionists. 
 
 XI. 
 
 Cavour was one of the most energetic supporters of 
 this renovating policy, and of D'Azeglio's ministr}-. At 
 the democmtic elections which had overthro\NTi Gioberti, 
 in Januaiy, 1849, he had been excluded from parliament 
 as a reactionaiy or codino ; the -extremists had defeated 
 him by bringing forward to oppose him an obscure 
 nonentity of the name of Pansoya — a Barodet of the 
 period — who only owed his celebrity of one day to that 
 strange adventure. At the elections which followed 
 after Novara, Cavour again found himself at the head of 
 the poll in his native town of Turin ; re-entering the 
 House never again to leave it ; and in this new position 
 he rapidly attained increasing authority, warranted and 
 confirmed by the clear-sighted decision he had not 
 
HIS SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT. 41 
 
 ceased to show for tlie space of a year ; by the pohtical 
 spirit that never left him ; and by a superiority that 
 made itself felt in matters of public and financial 
 economy. 
 
 He was the same frank and simple upholder of the 
 Constitution before the crisis as after it. He held in 
 antipathy and contempt the bragging of impotent 
 revolutionists ; and he defended and stood by the 
 Government, more especially in the critical times imme- 
 diately succeeding Novara, until the peace was definitely 
 settled, which was only in January, 1850. But let us 
 not deceive ourselves. Cavour, in the meantime, still 
 remained a bold and active Liberal, accepting the 
 "statuto" with all its conditions, guarantees, and con- 
 sequences. In upholding the Ministry, he often stimu- 
 lated and outstripped it ; he was becoming, by degrees, 
 the chief — the leader, if not, of the Conservative 
 majority, with which he kept pace — at least, of the 
 Liberal fraction of that majority. He was not the 
 man to pursue a Conservative policy as a partisan of 
 immobility and reaction ; nor was he slow in showing 
 that in him, the moderate and parliamentary man was 
 the statesman born for power and action. 
 
 Opportunities were not wanting : they were the 
 natural issue of that policy of day by day ; and, indeed, 
 of the constitutional system, which is perpetually bring- 
 ing parties into collision. 
 
 One of the simplest consequences of this system was 
 evidently the suppression of privileged jurisdictions and 
 ecclesiastical immunities in the administration of justice. 
 It was natural that the most religious and the most 
 
J 
 
 42 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUIi. 
 
 conservative of tlie men on the Eight, Count Balbo and 
 Count Kevel, friends of the Ministry, should not them- 
 selves hold the principle in doubt ; they only asked that 
 negotiations should be made first with the Pope. Un- 
 fortunately, such negotiations had been carried on for 
 two years in vain, and a longer delay would only 
 enervate the new institutions, and allow it to be sup- 
 posed that in a Liberal State there could be two laws, 
 two jurisdictions, and two powers. It is true there 
 were many other questions of civil reforms and eccle- 
 siastical organisations, issuing inftillibly from a consti- 
 tutional regivie. For the time being the Ministry did 
 not go so far; it modestly contented itself with pro- 
 posing the abolition of ecclesiastical privileges, of that 
 which was called the foro. 
 
 Such was the bill introduced by the minister of 
 justice. Count Siccardi — supported by all the sincere 
 Liberals ; contested dubiously by a portion of the minis- 
 terial Right ; and combated with fury by the members 
 of the reaction. 
 
 Cavour could not hesitate. He was of those who 
 had urged the Ministry to present the bill ; and when 
 the matter was discussed in March, 1850, he seized the 
 opportunity of claiming the civil rights of society in the 
 face of the privileges of the Church ; thus boldly to 
 resume a true constitutional policy. He combated 
 those who were always opposed to reforms — som^ j^es 
 on the score of troubled times, at others because they 
 were tranquil ; he called attention to English statesmen, 
 who knew how to turn the tide of revolution by the use 
 of opportune measures ; and he added : " When reforms 
 
, 1 
 
 EXAMPLE OF ENGLISH STATESMEN. 43 
 
 are efFected in good time, far from weakening autlio- 
 rity, they strengthen it, rendei^ing the revolutionary 
 spirit powerless. I would say, therefore, to statesmen : 
 Frankly follow the examples of the Duke of AVellington, 
 Earl Grey, and Sir Robert Peel .... follow broadly 
 the road of reforms, without fear of their being | \ 
 inopportune. Do not think that it will weaken the \ 
 cause of the constitutional throne, for it will on the 
 contrary strengthen it, and will strike such deep roots 
 into our soil that, should revolution spring up around 
 us, not only will it have power to dominate revolution, 
 but it will yatlier about it all the live forces of Italy, and (/ 
 conduct the nation to the destinies aivaiting her " 
 
 This speech, one of the first in which Cavour 
 revealed his innermost thought, manifestly outstepped 
 the limits of a special question, and in determining the 
 success of the law in parliament, in the public mind 
 it left a profound impression as the revelation of a 
 policy, and of the man created to conduct it. 
 
 Another opportunity soon presented itself. This 
 time it was not one of those delicate questions which 
 stir every passion, but of the cruelly-embarrassed con- 
 dition of Piedmontese finance — a deficit of six millions 
 per annum. Cavour, as we have said, stood by the 
 Government, brushing aside puerile charges and 
 chimerical schemes ; but in defending the Government, 
 he caused it to feel the prick of the spur. He in turn 
 reviewed the economical position, like a man who was 
 master of the facts ; touching upon them with clearness 
 and confident boldness ; and at the end of the list he con- 
 cluded l)y saying nearly in these words : " Be careful ; 
 
44 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 if in the next session the Ministry does not bring forward 
 a financial scheme by which to restore the balance, with 
 a reforaied custom-house tariff, and the system of tax- 
 ation which the country needs, I shall deeply regret it : we 
 
 shall, my friends and I, be compelled to abandon it 
 
 Although the condition of our country is serious, it 
 is by no means desperate ; we only need a little strength 
 of will and courage to make it accede to the necessaiy 
 
 taxation Let us hear no more of party agitations ; 
 
 the union between the king and the nation is sufficiently 
 
 close and well established, there is nothing to fear from 
 
 V extreme, revolutionary, or reactionary parties. I do not 
 
 fear the spread of either one or the other Proceed, 
 
 therefore ; banish alarms ; you will have the support of 
 parliament and of the country, even in the most dis- 
 tressing portion of our task — the re-establishment of the 
 balance of expenditure and income." 
 
 In this universal ability, firmness of mind in matters 
 politic, and prompt activity, we discern the man and the 
 minister eager to restore lost time, ripe for the work. 
 So clearly was this felt, that when the minister of 
 commerce, Santa-Kosa, died unexpectedly, in October, 
 1850, the name of Cavour instantly suggested itself. 
 Everything concuiTcd in pointing out Cavour as his fit 
 successor, at a time when circumstances were full of 
 anguish. The unfortunate Santa-Rosa having taken part 
 in the introduction as well as the vote of the law of the 
 foro, yet nevertheless profoundly religious, wa^, by 
 order of the Archbishop of Turin, Mgr. Fransoni, hai^hly 
 refused the last sacraments of the Church. A painful 
 scene took place round this death-bed, of a man begging 
 
A EOYAL PREDICTION. 45 
 
 for the prayers of tlie priest, while he stoutly refused to 
 utter a recantation which he considered would dishonour 
 his name. 
 
 At Turin public opinion was deeply moved, and not 
 unnaturally turned towards him who had been the 
 intimate friend of Santa-Kosa, and who more than any 
 other had lent his aid to the success of the law of the 
 foro. D'Azeglio himself desired no better than to have 
 the support of so able and vigorous an athlete, and when 
 he went to propose him to Victor Emmanuel, the king, 
 without showing any more surprise than the rest, replied 
 shrewdly : "I will accept him ; but wait a little, and he 
 will rob you of all your portfolios." As to these con- 
 ditions, Cavour had made none, neither as regarded men 
 nor things. He knew that a minister has what power he 
 is capable of taking, capable of exercising. Here was his 
 old saying of the Villa Bolongaro : " We will do some- 
 thing." Before long, he had added the ministry of com- 
 merce to that of finance ; he held in hand the Mdiolc 
 economic government of Piedmont, and Victor Emmanuel 
 had said truly, that was not all ! 
 
 XII. 
 
 My desire is to point out the nature of a situation in 
 which a vanquished country has the good fortune, in 
 the moment when most wanted, to meet with a well- 
 inspired prince, and devoted men, who do not despair of 
 raising it, by the aid of patriotism and constitutional, 
 liberty, from a disaster apparently irreparable. 
 
 This difficult and complicated task was not accom- 
 
46 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUIl. 
 
 plished in a single day or by a single blow ; it passed 
 through many an obscure and peculiar crisis. In 
 fact, it had two characteristic phases, of which the 
 first is represented by the ministry of D'Azeglio, which 
 Cavour entered in October, 1850, and wliich, immediately 
 after Novara, was the true terminating point of the 
 ruin, when things began to mend. It was really the 
 ministry of an imperative peace, heightened and made 
 good by the maintenance of liberal institutions. 
 
 "While D'Azeglio, with his affable dignity and loyal 
 moderation, was endeavouring to disperse external dis- 
 trust, and re-establish the diplomatic position of Pied- 
 mont, Count Sicctu'di took the lead in ecclesiastical 
 reforms. After having restored peace at Genoa, General 
 Alfonso La Mamiora, the minister of war, used all his 
 efforts to reconstruct an army disorganised l)y defeat. 
 Militaiy institutions had to be modified, a new system of 
 military instruction begun, officers' corps reconstructed, 
 by an opening of the ranks of the regular army to most 
 of the other Italian provinces who had fought with the 
 Piedmontese during the war ; and he inspired all with 
 the same spirit. " I trust," said he, " that from wliatever 
 province they may come, the officers are fully penetrated 
 ■with the national sentiment which makes all Italians 
 equally devoted sons of the same great country — Italy ! " 
 La Mannora did not shrink from making himself respon- 
 sible before the chambers by pusliiug on the fortifications 
 of Casale, fortifications which, ten years later, in 1859, 
 were to arrest the Austrian invasion. 
 
 In this renovating work Cavour, as minister of 
 commerce and finance, lent important assistance, by his 
 
WOBK OF RECONSTRUCTION. 
 
 
 economic reforms, by throwing off the shackles from 
 commerce, and by his combinations of imposts ; especially 
 by an inexhaustible fertility of resource and untiring 
 activity, which soon gave him influence in parliament. , 
 
 Piedmont started afresh. But in advancing it had 
 to face a double difficulty ; one which I should call a 
 matter of general policy, and another of parliamentary 
 conduct. 
 
 The question of general policy seemed decided, but 
 it sprang up at every step and in every form, under 
 conditions in which everything was changed. At the 
 time when D'Azeglio's new ministry had been formed, in 
 upholding under the hard blow of Novara the flag of the 
 "statuto," and the Liberal cause of the nation, Cavour 
 had been compelled to dissolve a chamber when a warlike 
 and revolutionary opposition could only prove to be 
 dano-erous. It was not before a second dissolution of 
 parliament, and through the intervention of the king, 
 that he had obtained from the country a parliamen- 
 tary assembly that he could work with. In this new 
 Ministry the majority, composed of all shades of Con- 
 servatism, was immense ; the Left represented a minority 
 too small to be feared. This Conservative chamber gave 
 Piedmont peace and good order, and saved her from 
 perdition. 
 
 The acceptance and conclusion of peace was the 
 signal for a totally new state of things, in which the 
 internal affairs of the country resumed primary import- 
 ance, and parties began visibly to become modified and 
 transformed. While a fraction of the majority represent- 
 ing a Liberal Conservative Centre, and headed by such 
 
48 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 mcu as Pinelli, Boncompagui, and Castelli, did not 
 hesitate to follow the Ministry in its attempts at reform 
 in a wisely Liberal course, the ' extreme Right, with 
 whom were Balbo, Count Eevel, Colonel Menabrea and 
 a few deputies from Savoy, ofifered a certain resistance. 
 It did not wish to separate itself from the Government, 
 nor was it other than sincerely constitutional ; but, on 
 the whole, it was a stationary' or reactionary party, 
 which was for the " statuto," but with none of its con- 
 sequences, and in supporting the Goveinment often 
 perplexed it. 
 
 When the Ministry presented the law of the foro, 
 Count Balbo and his friends opposed it. When Cavour 
 carried out his reforms in political economy, and was in 
 negotiation with France, England, and Belgium for a. 
 treaty of commerce, he met with opposition from Count 
 Revel, and from the Conservative protectionists. 
 Although Colonel Menabrea, then a young and brilliant 
 officer of engineers and an able speaker, was not pre- 
 cisely adverae, his attitude resembled that of a clerical 
 and Conservative dissenter ; when the question of eccle- 
 siastical privileges was broached, he had quitted the post 
 of first secretary of foreign affaii*s. Meantime, in the 
 opposite camp, a movement w^as taking place in a con- 
 trary direction. The extreme Left — of the Tecchios, 
 Sineos, Brofferios — was hvely, and retained its pas- 
 sionate and declamatory habits. But already a group 
 was detaching itself from this Democratic party, forming, 
 as it were, a Left Centre, with Rattazzi, Lanza, Cadorna, 
 and BufFa. This Left Centre was gradually drawing 
 nearer to the Government, presemng no more than an 
 
PARLIAMENTARY DIFFICULTIES. 40 
 
 opposition of tactics, or of the occasion, and even some- 
 times upholding ministerial reforms with its votes. 
 
 Parliamentary conditions began to wear a strange 
 aspect. On the one hand, the Ministry had a majority, 
 with which it had made peace ; but a portion of it 
 seemed to resist or fall off whenever the policy of 
 the -Government followed its national and liberal 
 course ; on the other, the Cabinet had adversaries 
 to encounter, from whom it had become estranged, 
 chiefly in 1848 and 1849 ; but these had been visibly 
 affected by the sobering influence of events. They 
 might cither become useful allies or dangerous oppo- 
 nents. Hence a stirring situation, dubious and un- 
 certain. Some positive step had plainly to be taken. 
 To remain at the disposal of the Eight was to allow the 
 policy of Government to drift towards reactions, which 
 would one day affect the system of religious reforms, 
 and probably, also, the liberty of the press and electoral 
 law. Persistency in the policy that had been inaugu- 
 rated was to accept in advance the necessity of making 
 up for defections in the Right by other alliances and 
 other support. The Ministry was not deceived, and here 
 the question became complicated by the differences of 
 the temperament in two men who were at the same time 
 friends and competitors in the Government — D'Azeglio 
 and Cavour. 
 
 XIII. 
 
 D'Azeglio and Cavour took exactly the same view of 
 the liberal and national course to be adopted by Pied- 
 mont ; but, for reasons of diplomacy, as well as from 
 
50 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 personal characteristics, D'A^eglio found it hard to make 
 up his mind to an open and avowed rupture with the 
 Right. Devotion to the service of his countrj^ rather 
 than taste or ambition, had raised him to the Ministiy ; 
 and he remained, when in power, the same generous and 
 softly-mannered gentleman — clear-sighted and amiable, 
 courageous in danger, a little languid in overcoming 
 everyday difficulties, and easily wearied of business. 
 Cavour had the energy and activity of a political man 
 who had a passion for business matters, and not only 
 fores aw co ming difficulti es, ]>ut instantly sought to 
 ^ cou nteract or to ov ^riiOTTlPi t^*>"^ 
 
 He was not insensible to the seriousness, and even 
 the pain, of having to separate from " friends of child- 
 hood," as he called them ;* if the success of a liberal 
 and national poUcy could only be bought at that price, 
 he did not hesitate ; he was not one to halt half way. 
 With the instincts of a man born to govern, he often 
 grew impatient with the jierplexities caused to the 
 Ministry by a more or less avowed resistance ; he under- 
 stood that, with an uncertain, shifting, and restless ma- 
 jority, it is impossible to govern " on a needle's point." 
 "I have been accused," lie says later, " of having separated 
 from old friends ; the accusation is unfounded. I have 
 not left them, but they have left me. I did everything 
 
 * Abont that time, vrhen in an animated discnssion, ho chanced to meet 
 with opposition from old friends, he said with emotion, but resolutely : " Yes, 
 gentlemen, I know that in entcriug on political life, in time of such diflScuUies 
 as these, one must be prepared for the greatest deceptions. I am prepared for 
 it. Should I be compelled to give up all the friends of my childhood ; if 1 
 should have to see my most intimate acciuaintances transformed into my 
 bitterest enemies, I would not fail in my duty. I will never almndon thtf prin- 
 ciples of liberty, to whicli I have vowed allegiance " 
 
RATTAZZI. 51 
 
 to retain them, and to persuade tlieni ; it is tliey who 
 have refused to follow me. Ought I, then, to have 
 stood alone, rejecting the co-operation of those who 
 were disposed to follow me ? " 
 
 Those who showed themselves disposed to follow r/ 
 him belonged to the Left Centre, chiefly represented by 
 Urbano Eattazzi, a man of tact and resource, a lawyer 
 rather than a politician, but a clever orator, who might 
 some day become a powerful auxiliary. Cavour was not 
 forgetful of the part played by the Left Centre in the 
 parliamentary affairs of 1848 and 1849 ; he well remem- 
 bered having had to combat them, and he did so again, 
 and as often as occasion offered, to the end. He was not, 
 however, the man to hamper himself with irritating 
 recollections of past divisions, and in the alliance pro- 
 posed to him he saw a means of emancipating the 
 Government and strengthening the condition of par- 
 liament, by forming among men of extreme opinions the 
 party of all shades of Liberalism. He had no fear of 
 these new allies ; he felt himself able to hold them in. 
 It was all deducible to a cjuestion of d propos ; and 
 Cavour, by a marvel of dexterity, chose for the more 
 decisive affirmation of that evolution of liberal policy 
 meditated by him exactly the moment when Piedmont 
 was compelled to ''reef sail," and pay an apparent 
 tribute to the reactionary spirit. 
 
 Let me explain. It was when the coup d'Stat of 
 December 2, 1851, burst upon France. The new 18tli 
 hrumaire, appearing to Europe in the garb of a new 
 Napoleon, w\as not reassuring to smaller countries like 
 Piedmont and Belgium, where the press had full inde- 
 
 E 2 
 
52 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 pcndencc, and wliere the defeated in Paris went in 
 search of a refuge. It was a menace to constitutional 
 liberty wherever it existed, as Avell as an encouragement 
 to the parties of absolutism and reaction. Piedmont 
 was especially in a position to feel the double pressure 
 of France under the coivp cVetat, and of Austria ready to 
 take cveiy advantage ; she had to screen hei-self from 
 the stoi-m that might be drawn do\\Ti on her by the 
 vexatious imprudences of the press or refugees. 
 
 The Cabinet at Turin was sensible of the difh- 
 cidties and delicacies of this situation, and as earl}' as 
 Januaiy 7, 1852, it hastened to justify itself to the French 
 Government by proposing a law on the press, by which 
 offences against foreign princes were to be transferred 
 to the ordinary' tribunals and not to be tried by jur}\ 
 The Piedmontese Cabinet submitted to what could not 
 be avoided ; it made a virtue of necessity, and D'Azoglio 
 ingeniously expressed his meaning in a transparent 
 apologue : " Suppose we had to traverse one of those 
 regions where wild beasts abound, and pass close to a 
 den where a lion was sleeping, and that one of our 
 guides told us : ' Do not speak ; make no noise, lest you 
 should awaken him,' and if one of us were to begin to 
 sing, I imagine we should all combine to shut his moutli. 
 .... Or again : if, notwithstanding all possible precau- 
 tion and prudence,. the lion awakes and springs upon us, 
 then, if we arc men, we must fight !" So much for 
 prudence ; but the bold and able deed was the taking 
 advantage of this occasion, when a concession had been 
 perilously made, to break ^^'ith those who would fain 
 have pushed reaction farther, establish the integrity of 
 
THE CONNUBIO. 53 
 
 Piedmontese policy, and keep inviolate the institutions 
 of the country, by the drawing togetlier of Liberal 
 parties, brought about in full parliamentary combat. 
 This was the work of Cavour. 
 
 XIV. 
 
 There was a sort of parliamentary diversion led 
 by Colonel Menabrea, who did not conceal his Con- 
 servative alarm, and his desire yet more to restrict 
 the liberty of the press. Eattazzi, on the other hand, 
 intervened, promising to support the Ministry provided^ 
 it maintained a law which he considered temporarily 
 needful, and stuck to Liberalism. Hereupon Cavour 
 joined the debate, defending the law^, and exposing the 
 whole policy of the Government mth great precision 
 and ability, accepting offei-s of aid from the chief of 
 the Left Centre, and from that moment considering 
 Colonel Menabrea's speech in the light of a rupture. 
 
 The struggle became sharp ; all the passions were 
 alive, and joined in the melee. Peacemakers endeavoured 
 to soften the acrimony of the combat. It was evident 
 that no one expected this sudden change ; a divorce 
 proposed by the Right, followed by a new marriage — 
 a Conniibio, as Revel termed it, in recalling the events of 
 1848, for an argument against the new alliance. Colonel 
 Menabrea, more surprised than anyone else at the out- 
 burst he had provoked, remarked with some sadness : 
 "The minister of finance wants to set sail in the direc- 
 tion of a new parliamentary coast, and land on another 
 shore. He has a right to act as he pleases, but 1 shall not 
 
 1/ 
 
54 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 go with liim " Cavour's rejoinder was : " It i» 
 
 not true that the Ministry has directed its helm towards^ 
 other shores. It has made no movement of the sort, 
 but wishes to go in the direction of the prow instead of 
 in the direction of the stem." With the explanations 
 the divisions increased, and the somewhat insignificant 
 matter of the law of the press became the pretext for 
 a decisive evolution that was well planned and resolutely 
 fought out in the parhameiitary battle-field. 
 
 The manoeuvre was certainly daring, the more so as 
 C^avour was binding the Ministiy to more than it was at 
 all inclined to bind itself Some few of the members of 
 the Cabinet complained of this, whilst D'Azeglio did his. 
 utmost to moderate the conflict and account for the words 
 of his impetuous colleague. But the blow had been 
 dealt ; it had resounded through parliament and through 
 the countiy. It constituted Cavour the manifest chief 
 of liberal opinions, the representative not of a new policy, 
 but of a new and more active and decisive phase of 
 Piedmontese policy, and the Connuhio became more 
 pronounced. The president of the chamber of deputies 
 died suddenly ; the minister of finance instantly sup- 
 ported the candidature of Rattazzi for tlie presidency, 
 and did so successfully. 
 
 A conflict so ably fought could, -sooner or later, only 
 result in the supremacy of Cavour. A ministerial crisis 
 which, in May, 1852,* temporarily retarded his progress 
 to power, only hastened the • inevitable conclusion. 
 Rattazzi's election to the presidency had provoked this 
 new change. D'Azeglio thought his formidable col- 
 league, the " dear inventor of the Connuhio," as he loved 
 
A CBI8IS. 55 
 
 to call him, went a little too fast ; perhaps he felt 
 slightly wounded, and also dreaded the effect on the 
 outside world of these sudden changes. Cavour saw 
 nothing to be apprehended in his leaving the reins to 
 D'Azegiio, while he retired for a time with the prestige 
 of an ever-increasing authority, and, in writing to his 
 friend Salvagnoli, in Florence, he described the recent 
 crisis : "It was, in my opinion, not only useful but 
 indispensable that a Liberal party should be firmly 
 constituted After having, at first, been con- 
 vinced of such a necessity, D'Azegiio has not accepted 
 all the consequences, and he provoked a crisis which 
 could only result in my retirement, or his removal from 
 power. External policy required that I should be the - 
 sacrifice. I think D'Azegiio would willingly have abdi- 
 cated, but I did my utmost to dissuade him ; he stayed, \y- 
 and we have not ceased to be friends, privately and 
 politically. It mil next be his turn to retire, and then 
 we can constitute an openly Liberal Cabinet. In the 
 meantime I take advantage of my new liberty for a. 
 journey to France and England " 
 
 XV. 
 
 That this was only a truce, that this journey to 
 England was not simply one of pleasure, can well be 
 perceived. Cavour's intention was to see the statesmen 
 of both countries, and disperse the prejudices of which 
 Liberal Piedmont was perhaps the object, thus clearing a 
 way for his own combinations. In England he found it 
 easy to do this. Lord Malmesbury, then the head of 
 
66 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 the Foroigu Office, openly stated his hope of seeing him 
 come to tenns with his friends — with the party he had 
 worked so hard to bring together. In Paris, where he 
 had arranged to meet Rattazzi, he met with the warmest 
 reception. He saw the Prince-president Napoleon, 
 whom he won by his air of easy superiority ; he saw, 
 too, some old friends of the parliamentaiy world, among 
 others M. Thiers, who said to him : *' Be patient, if 
 after they have given you snakes for breakfast they give 
 you snakes again for dinner, do not be disgusted." In 
 this expedition Cavour made many new friends, and had 
 an opportunity of observing the situations which he 
 might one day have to manipulate. 
 
 In London and in Paris he kept his eyes fixed upon 
 Piedmont, where the Ministiy seemed to be sufficiently 
 unsettled ; and he wrote to his friends : " Instead of 
 combating D'Azeglio, we sliould lend him a frank 
 support ; but we cannot sacrifice our good name to 
 him As soon as I return we will consult to- 
 gether ; we will see La Marmoiu and speak bluntly to 
 him. It is time for all this to be settled. If D'Azeglio 
 wishes to remain in power, let hun say so, and he will 
 have in us sincere allies. Should he l)c tired of it, 
 let him no longer render the problem of government 
 insoluble by his continual vacillations." 
 
 The fact is that D'Azeglio was beiuling under the 
 weight of government ; while abroad, as at home, Cavour 
 was weighing upon the Ministry. If his presence in 
 the Government had been a difficulty, his absenci^ was a 
 still greater embarrassment. 
 
 The Ministry had not been able to live with him ; it 
 
D'AZEGLIO ON CAVOUR. 57 
 
 could not subsist without liim. An ally of the Cabinet, 
 he would have absorbed and eclipsed it ; as chief of 
 the Opposition he could vanquish and render it power- 
 less. 
 
 As soon as he returned to Turin, in September, 1852, 
 it became evident that the question would not long be 
 unsettled. Cavour was called to form a Ministry, of 
 which he was to be the chief; and DAzeglit), with- 
 drawing from before so brilliant a rival, and without 
 regret, wrote : " I had accepted the helm at a time when 
 it was pointed out to me that, better than any other 
 man, I could direct it for the country's best advan- 
 tage Now tha't the ship has refitted, let the 
 
 winds fill her sails. I surrender my quarterdeck to 
 another ! He, whom you know, is possessed of a dia- 
 l^olical activity, fitted for the work both in mind and 
 body ; and it gives him so much pleasure ! " And thus 
 throughout a series of changes and metamorphoses, the 
 preponderance of a Liberal Conservative is seen in 
 sharp outline, creating, by means of alliances with the 
 " Moderates of all parties," a parliamentary position 
 whereon to lean, that he may put Piedmont and Italy in 
 the track of new destinies. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE POLICY OF CAVOUR — THE FIRST ACT OF THE NATIONAL 
 
 DRAMA. 
 
 Cavour President of the Cooncil — The National and Liberal Idea — Financial 
 Policy — Commercial Policy — Religious Policy — Party Opposition — Letter 
 of Cavour on his Policy — Beginning of Operations — The Eastern Ques- 
 tion and the Crimean War of 1856 — Alliance with France and England — 
 The Piedmontese Corps in the Crimea— Peace, and its Effects upon 
 Piedmont — Victor Emmanuel in France — Cavour at the Congress in Paris 
 — First Interviews with the Emperor — The Italian Question as i-egards 
 Europe — The Session of the 8th of April — Carour's Illusions — Piedmont 
 and Italy after the Peace. 
 
 I. 
 
 When, after a retiiement of a few months, Cavour 
 victoriously returned to political life as president of the 
 council, he entered into power, November 4, 1852, 
 under circumstances which could not fail to give his 
 advent a more distinct character than heretofore. 
 
 At the timejp^en D'Azeglio's ministry, which had so 
 patriotically rfmoled affairs immediately after Novara, 
 was vanishiog, a last attempt, and one not discounte- 
 nanced by Victor Emmanuel, was made by Count Balbo 
 to reconstitute a purely Conservative Cabinet, which 
 might almost be called a ministry of reconciliation with 
 Rome. Cavour, consulted in the matter by Victor 
 
CAVOUB AS PRESIDENT. 59 
 
 Emmanuel, had left them to make experience of this 
 proceeding, the inanity of which he perceived ; he had 
 then started for Leri. Balbo had exhausted all forms 
 of negotiations and overtures, but had broken down ; he 
 had met with nothing but refusals, even from his friends, 
 beginning with Revel, who did not feel himself equal to 
 overcome the current of opinion. Cavour's resumption 
 of office after this failure was all the more significant ; 
 it settled the way between the two systems, which for 
 the space of about three years had been perpetually at 
 conflict in Turin. 
 
 The new president of the council entered parliament 
 under conditions that he himself had arranged, and they 
 only needed now to be broadened and strengthened. 
 Let Cavour's manner of going to work be noted : 
 resolved not to allow himself to be checked by re-i 
 sistance from the Right — the Clerical party — he hadj 
 by no means the intention of suddenly disturbing] 
 political equilibrium and separating himself from his 
 friends — the moderate Liberals ; he was careful not to 
 " break the chain," as he called it ; and, above all, he 
 held fixedly to secure the concurrence of the principal! 
 members of D'Azeglio's cabinet, whose colleague he had' 
 been. " Without La Marmora," he used often to repeat, 
 " I could not be minister." In his eyes La Marmora 
 represented military reorganisation, just as Paleocapa 
 (an engineer of the greatest eminence) represented that 
 of progress in material works, and Boncompagni that of 
 wise reforms in religious matters. The new ministers of 
 foreie-n affairs and of the interior, General Dabormida 
 and Count Ponza di San-Martino, clung to the same 
 
 1^ 
 
60 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 traditions. It still remained a government of the Right 
 Centre, with a chief of firmer gait, who retained simply 
 the financial depaitment for himself, but was well able 
 to undertiike every ministry or government. 
 
 It was only some months after this, when time had 
 been given to the Cabinet to consolidate, that the elevation 
 of Rattazzi to the ministry of justice established a final 
 alliance with the Left Centre. The change was accom- 
 plished, and it was right that it should be, by a 
 sort of assimilation imder guidance. Cavour was not 
 at the mercy of the Left Centre ; he absorbed or annexed 
 it ; and the Left Centre was wise in allowing itself t« bi^ 
 Jinnexed, since it was furtherinir the success of a fresh 
 and fruitful idea, by the union of the whole Liberal 
 party under the ablest of guides. Before one year had 
 passed this idea received a striking siinction from the 
 countr}', in the immense ministerial majority returned to 
 the chamber in the elections. 
 
 From this moment Cavour might truly say that ho 
 had "raised a barrier sufliciently high for the reaction 
 to be unable to reach above it." Henceforth he had, 
 together with the confidence of his King, a Ministry, 
 and a majority, that is to say, an entire parliamentary 
 situation brought about by him, upon which to lean for 
 tin; accomplishment of his designs and the progressive 
 realisation of his policy. 
 
 II. 
 
 That policy, which commenced by creating its own 
 insti-ument of action, had indeed been the original work, 
 I might almost call it the manifestation of a man's 
 
THE NATIOKAL POLIGY. 61 
 
 genius. No doubt Cavour had not drawn it from liis 
 own imagination, it had been handed to him by circum- 
 stances. He was not the only one who ever thought of 
 it ; others had had a similar instinct or presentiment, 
 but it was he who shaped it, and brought it within 
 practical limits,, stamping it with the seal of his adven- 
 turous yet prudent mipd, by changing into a reality that 
 saying of a conquered but not despairing nation : " We 
 will begin again !" 
 
 Cavour was one of the first to perceive the conse- 
 quences of this great truth, which he summed up one 
 day by saying : " It is impossible for the Government to 
 have an Italian or national policy outwardly without y 
 being inwardly reforming and liberal; just as it would be 
 impossible for us to be inwardly liberal without being- 
 national and Italian in our external relations." More 
 clearly than any other he perceived that, if Piedmont 
 wished, in her difficult position after her overthrow, and 
 lying under the jealous eye of Austriii, to cany out this 
 design, she must, within her narrow compass, put forth 
 all the energy, wisdom, and activity of a great country : 
 "Piedmont must begin by raising herself, by re-esta- 
 blishing in Europe as well as in Italy, a position and a 
 credit equal to her ambition. Hence there must be a 
 policy unswerving in its aim, but flexible and various ! 
 as to the means employed, embracing the exchequer, 
 military reorganisation, diplomacy, and religious aflairs. " 
 
 Everything proceeded from a settled thought in' 
 this work, gradually revealing itself under a vigorous 
 impulse. Economic and financial matters first engaged 
 the attention of Cavour. Like all the vanquished, 
 
62 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOTJR. 
 
 Piedmont had to pay for defeat. The country lay 
 under the burden of two unfortunate campaigns which, 
 with the Austrian indemnity, had abeady cost it veiy 
 nearly three hundred miUions of francs. TIius the public 
 debt, wliich before 1848 amounted to no more than five 
 millions per annum (£200,000), was rapidly increased to 
 more than thirty millions. The budget of its expenses, 
 only eighty millions before the war, was above one 
 hundred and seventy-eight millions in 1848, two hundred 
 and sixteen in 1849, one hundred and eighty-nine in 
 1850, and finally it remained fixed at between one 
 hundred and thirty and one hundred and forty millions. 
 From almost the first moment, then, the expenses of 
 the country had doubled ; the public debt was now six 
 times as large as before, and, in making due allowance 
 for the time we are speaking of — twenty-five years ago 
 — ^for a countiy of less than five millions of souls, and 
 whose resources were still undeveloped, these figures 
 represent a weight almost as heavy as that which lias 
 been laid upon France under still more tragic circum- 
 stances. Such was the situation. 
 
 Two systems were possible — and how frequently have 
 they confronted one another ! One scheme was, to pro- 
 ceed with the strictest and most scrupulous economy, 
 keeping a modest balance, by cutting down expenses, 
 lessening the deficit, and increasing only the most neces- 
 sary taxes. But then it would be imperative to abandon 
 all hope of playing a part in the world, to reduce the 
 army, and abstain from the most useful pul)lic under- 
 takings, or at least indefinitely postpone the completion 
 of them. This was prudence of a certain kind ; it was 
 
CAVOUB'S BUDGET. 63 
 
 not foresight, in that it was to burden the country with 
 an inevitable increase of charges without offering it any 
 eompensation, or doing anything that would assist the 
 development of its vitality, or help it to support a weight 
 that could not be lightened. Cavour had other plans; 
 and it was he who originated the financial system of 
 the new order of things in constitutional and liberal 
 Piedmont, he who drew up that which, to use his 
 own language, I mil call the budget of "action and 
 progress." 
 
 III. 
 
 Cavour's budget witnessed to a policy derived from 
 a situation : it was the work of a man afflicted by the 
 necessity of obtaining of the country the price to be 
 paid for its own misfortunes, who prepared to make that 
 forced indemnity a means of reparation. New taxes 
 could not of course be avoided ; they were the conditions 
 of Piedmont's credit and solvency. A combination of 
 these new taxes with the old ones, unequally distributed 
 in the provinces, was of the first importance. Cavour 
 was thoroughly cognisant of the problem he had to solve, 
 and, on his first entrance into power he had commenced 
 the work mthout hesitation, without being discoun- 
 tenanced by the unpopularity which always awaits a 
 minister reduced to rattle the money-box. 
 
 He, too, had to contend with propositions of radical 
 reforms and plausible theories, even with the tax on 
 income. He resolutely put aside unseasonable ex- 
 periences as mere Utopias, to attain just to that which 
 appeared to him possible. His whole ingenuity was 
 
 Z' 
 
64 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUIL 
 
 exercised in wresting from the Opposition, cxtmcting 
 from the patriotism of the chambers, a certain number 
 of taxes on pei-sonal property and furniture, on patents, 
 on wills, and on registration deeds. Besides this he hoped 
 to give to his budget a ballast of from twenty-five to 
 thirty millions ; but this was only a part of his schemes. 
 He felt that it was quite insufficient to meet the ends of 
 his policy. He knew that if Piedmont remained poor, 
 taxes would always be too heavy, and that the best way 
 of revivifying the budget and filling the exchequer was 
 to renew the life of the countr}% by giving a new start to 
 industry and commerce, ])y the development of its pro- 
 ductive energies, and by all that couhl assist the im- 
 provement of the national fortune. This completed 
 his financial system, or rather this was the essential and 
 original part of it. 
 
 On the one hand, instead of retrenching expenses, at 
 the risk of temporarily increasing the deficit by new calls 
 on the national credit, Cavour was not afraid to devote 
 more than two hundred millions towards the contri- 
 bution of the railways of Genoii and the Lago Maggiore, 
 Novara, Susa, and Savoy, in works of ever}' description. 
 He hastened the development of interior communi- 
 cations, eveiywhere favouring the spii-it of association 
 and enterprise. Agaui, scarcely had Cavour come into 
 power, when he resolved to realise in little Piedmont 
 a great idea — that of commercial freedom, which he 
 J inaugurated by a custom-house reform ; and further 
 diplomatically established by treaties of commerce with 
 France, England, Belgium, and Switzerland. Cavour, 
 let us add, did not proceed as a dogmatist — as a 
 
FINANCIAL REFORM. 65 
 
 prejudiced or a whimsical freetrader ; he carried out 
 a gradual reform practically, one proportioned to the 
 circumstances, and which was to become profitable to 
 consumers through the diminution of tariffs ; to further 
 maritime commerce, stimulate the internal industry of 
 the country by foreign competition, and feed it by the 
 decrease of taxes on raw material, while it made an 
 opening for the exportation of national productions. 
 
 To increase expenses and make new debts when it 
 was necessary to levy new taxes ; to carry out a reform 
 of tariffs immediately after a j^ostal reform, this together 
 with a reduction of the salt-tax, when the budget pre- 
 sented a deficit, was assuredly to be bold — perhaps rash. 
 In this difficult and complicated work Cavour exhibited 
 an imperturbable confidence, relying on ''Liberalism and j. 
 the marvels it can work," to use his own expression ; 
 with a full conviction of the vivifying influence of these 
 particular expenditures for which he was blamed, and 
 which he was continually compelled to stand up for, 
 against all attacks. He demonstrated that if one or two 
 millions of francs were devoted to the improvement of 
 the ports, it would bring in five hundred thousand francs 
 per annum ; that if ten millions of francs were spent in 
 piercing the Luckmanier, it would increase the com- 
 merce of Genoa by a third, perhaps by one half. He 
 explained that to take shares and secure an interest in 
 the railway of Savoy, was to cause the circulation of 
 fifty millions of francs,, in a province that sorely needed 
 capital. " In order to realise our programme," said 
 Cavour, " and profitably cultivate the country's resources, ip. 
 it was necessary to give a powerful impulse to works of 
 
66' LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 public utility ; to work our railways with all possible 
 , circumspection, while we gave encouragement to other 
 
 enterprises In order that the position which, for 
 
 so many centuries the monarchy of Savoy has main- 
 tained, should aiot be suffered to decline, it was necessaiy 
 
 to reorganise and fortify our army This scheme 
 
 made it necessary for us to raise new loans, or rather to 
 contract larger loans than they would need to have been, 
 if we had acted on the system of modesty and economy. 
 It consequently became necessary to increase the taxation ; 
 but that could not be done, nor could the resources of 
 the country be developed without undertaking the re- 
 form of our economic system on a large scale 
 
 -* This reform, undertaken to awaken the activity of 
 the country's resources, was, in truth, not only a com- 
 / mercial and financial work; the diplomatic form under 
 which it was introduced had, in the mind of Cavouv, 
 and among his designs, another character and another 
 pai't to play. It was to draw Piedmont forth from the 
 isolation in which the countr}'' had remained since its 
 misfortunes, bringing it into closer contact with great 
 western nations, with England and with France ; in a 
 word, it formed a bond of united interests which might 
 grow into one of policy and of ideas. Austria was not 
 deceived. Before he died. Prince Schwartzenberg, tlje 
 Austrian prime minister, remarked, with faintly-masked 
 ill-humour : " Piedmont intends, with its commercial 
 policy, to purchase the support of England for Italy I " 
 This was not absolutely true ; or, at least, Cavour made 
 no sacrifice, and sometimes he protested against having 
 been influenced by a hidden policy in the direction of a 
 
\y 
 
 COMMEBCLIL TREATY WITH FRANCE. 67 
 
 reform which he thought serviceal)le to his country. In 
 reality, he was trusting to the logic of things ; he had 
 no doubt but that, in remaining constitutional, and in 
 adopting commercial with the other liberties. Piedmont 
 would rapidly gain public sympathy in England, and 
 that that would give it additional strength. "England," ^ 
 he said to an intimate friend, ''is no longer the cham- 
 pion of absolutism on the Continent, and an English 
 minister would find it difficult to take part with Austria 
 in the oj^pression of Italy." 
 
 As to France, Cavour did not hide his intention of 
 contracting a friendship with France under the veil of a 
 commercial treaty. If that treaty was not in every point 
 what he could have desired, and if he had been obliged to 
 make some concessions to the French protectionist system, 
 he made up his mind to it; he recognised a political 
 rather than an economical advantage in so doing. " The 
 horizon is still dark around us," he said, "and our insti- 
 tutions are not as yet protected from all danger. Some- 
 thing perhaps may chance to make us desire at least 
 the moral support of France. Let me say frankly, in 
 the face of impending possibilities I think it prudent, 
 conformable with the interests of the country, to be on 
 good terms with France. We have not neglected matters 
 of econom}^, but merely left them in the background. 
 Views of policy have caused us to accept a treaty ^ 
 which will strengthen a good and cordial understanding 
 
 between us and France " And Cavour adds, yet 
 
 more strikingly, words that, spoken in 1851, seem 
 almost prophetic : "Is it not possible that complications 
 may arise, in which all surrounding nations may be' 1/ 
 
 F 2 
 
68 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 concerned, in two great questions — the Eastern and the 
 Western ? Were this to happen, should we not do well 
 jto be on good terms with France ? . . . ." 
 
 Thus all concurred successfully under the thoughtful 
 and liberal direction of one who knew how to use 
 finance, commerce, and diplomacy, in placing Piedmont 
 on her feet again. 
 
 IV. 
 
 That which Cavoui- accomplished by his financial 
 and commercial -system, he not only attempted but 
 effected, in a higher moral sphere, by his religious policy, 
 which has been one of the clearest manifestations of 
 Liberalism in clerical matters. 
 
 He had this problem to solve : the reconciliation of 
 / the ecclesiastical situation with the principles of the 
 "statuto," and the maintenance of the liberal and 
 national Piedmontese policy in its civil relations with 
 the Church and the Court of Rome. It was ever 
 recui'ring as a natural consequence to new conditions, 
 with the decrees of the laws for the abolition of eccle- 
 siastical privileges, that of civil marriages, the law for 
 the reorganisation of Church property, and the sup- 
 pression of certain monastic orders. 
 
 AVith every new project the contention l>ceam(' 
 warmer; the clerical agitation, kept up by the remon- 
 strances of Rome, was combated by the anti-clerical 
 agitation. In parliament, the Government was accused 
 by the Left of not proceeding with sufficient resolution 
 and energy in religious matters ; while the Right com- 
 plained that no negotiations were entered into witli tlio 
 
RELIGIOUS POLICY. 69 
 
 Holy See, and that tlic good pleasure of Rome was not 
 consulted. Cavour's manner of handling the questions, 
 as delicate as they were formidable, showed a mind full 
 of decision, and at the same time absolutely free from 
 prejudice. For a moment, no doubt, he had thought it 
 possible to come to some arrangement with the Vatican, 
 but he very soon perceived that it was impossible ; the 
 more so, that the religious reaction, which was spreading 
 in Italy as well as Europe, only hardened the Court of 
 Rome in its demands and its refusals. It was not long 
 before he saw the Pontificate involved in dangerous 
 fellowship with the enemy beyond the Alps by the 
 Austrian Concordat 
 
 He had, in reality, ceased to believe in an under- 
 standing with Rome, for the realisation of the reforms 
 Piedmont had at heart, and as for him, he had ceased to 
 desire it. " If we put ourselves in direct relations with 
 Rome," he said, writing to an intimate friend, " we com- 
 pletely ruin the political edifice we have so laboriously 
 erected. If we enter into an arrangement with the 
 Pope it will be impossible for us to retain our influence 
 in Italy. Let us not go too far, but neither let us sufter 
 ourselves to retreat even one step. You know that I 
 am not a priest hater, that I am disposed towards con- 
 ciliation, and would willingly give the Church greater 
 liberty than she now enjoys ; you know that I should 
 1)0 disposed to give up the exequaturs, the exclusive 
 management of the universities, &c., but, under present 
 circumstances, I am persuaded that all attempts at con- 
 cord would be to our disadvantage " He spoke 
 
 much to the same effect in another circumstance, in the 
 
 i 
 
70 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUK. 
 
 heat of action : " AYe liavc to fight Austria at Venice and 
 at Milan, a^d also at Bologna and at Korae ! " 
 
 Thus the question of ecclesiastical reforms, the rela- 
 tions with the Church and with Rome, was contemplated 
 by Cavour as being a national question, besides one of 
 interior order — it was one of the elements of the Italian 
 situation. To pretend to solve that question by- 
 stratagem or compromise, woidd only result in endless 
 weariness and waste of time. With Cavour there was 
 / but one solution — liberty and complete independence 
 of civil and religious authority ; a grand yet simple idea, 
 which was soon to resolve itself into these few emphatic 
 words : "A Liberal Church in a liberal State ! " He 
 who raised that standard in a small corner of Italy was 
 neither a theorist nor a revolutionist yielding, at the 
 risk of overthrowing interests, beliefs, and traditions, to 
 a fanciful love of novelty ; neither was it the work of a 
 puzzled tactician, trying to conceal a parliamentary 
 campaign against Clericalism under the cloak of an 
 
 J epigram. Cavour neither had the passion of a leader of 
 a faction, the subtlety of a casuist, nor the flippancy of a 
 thoughtless innovator. In a liberty accepted without 
 subterfuge, he saw a sure means of freedom for tlie lay 
 portion of the country — I may call it that of the nation, 
 since he did not separate Italy from Piedmont— without 
 in any degree subjecting the spiritual portion, namely, 
 the Church. 
 
 " Oh, that man," said Archbishop Darboy — the 
 same who later fell a victim to the Commune — when 
 
 1 at Rome, ''that man was indeed of a rare sort! he 
 had not the slightest sentiment of hatred in his heart. "^ 
 
CHURCH AND STATE. 71 
 
 Nothing could be truer: the Liberalism of this great 
 Piedmontese did not proceed from any sentiment of 
 hatred or vulgar animosity. Assuredly Cavour was not 
 what he called a " priest hater," and this it was that 
 constituted the superiority and originality of his re- 
 ligious policy. He had inaugurated and started 
 reforms wherein he saw the development of the 
 '"' statuto," and he intended to carry them out ; 
 but in claiming social independence he did not refuse 
 liberty to the Church ; he left her entire mistress of 
 her own ground ; indeed he carried rather far his feeling 
 of lay incompetency. 
 
 Wlien some members of the Left, Brofferio and 
 Asproni, requested that the State should supervise the 
 education in the seminaries, he replied, emphatically: 
 " If I had to give an opinion as a citizen, and not as a 
 minister, I should say that the Government ought not to 
 interfere in the teaching of theology, which it is solely T 
 the province of the bishops to watch over. Bishops 
 should not have to do the work of members of 
 parliament, nor deputies that of bishops. We are at 
 liberty to believe or not to believe, and to select whom 
 we choose for our spiritual advisers. If we are dissatis- 
 fied with the moral teaching of the seminaries, we will 
 choose our confessors from among theologians who have 
 attended the school of Asproni." And he added, more 
 seriously : " How can the clergy become converted to 
 our institutions, and how will they love them if, after 
 having, not unreasonably, withdrawn some of the privi- 
 leges which they enjoyed under the old regime, and just 
 as we are about to deprive them of the few that remain, 
 
72 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 we should say to them : * We reform, according to 
 the principles of liberty and equality, all those points 
 of legislation which formerly were ftivourable to you; 
 but as to your independence and your liberty, we 
 wish to preserve those traditions of the past which 
 we call, so far as they are opposed to you, the glorious 
 
 I heritage of our fathers !'.... The best way of in- 
 creasing the political influence of the clergy is to give 
 
 j them an exceptional position, peraecute, or even subject 
 
 ' them to petty vexations." 
 
 V. 
 
 Cavour doubtless had his own opinions upon the 
 absolutist and theocratic tendency of the Church at that 
 time, and the risks of such a tendency. He was under 
 no illusion about the nature of Clericalism when com- 
 bined with politics, having frequently to combat and 
 hold his ground against it. He was careful, however, 
 not to meet these aggressions with retaliations on the 
 part of the Government ; he continued moderate even 
 in the reforms for which he was so vehemently 
 reproached. 
 
 What, for instance, was that law — one of those which 
 caused the greatest uproar — on the suppression of cer- 
 tain monastic orders, and on Church property ? Without 
 affecting the rights of religious associations, it suppressed 
 the mendicant and a few other orders, depriving them 
 of civil status ; while it sanctioned the teaching and 
 nursing orders, especially that of the Sistera of Charity, 
 which Cavour was foremost in defendinor against the 
 attacks of the Left, declaring that nothing should induce 
 
CHURCH PROPERTY. 73 
 
 him to subscribe to a law suppressing charitable orders. 
 " I would quit the Ministry ten times/' he said, " rather , J^v 
 than bind myself to an act that would, in my opinion, \ 
 be immensely prejudicial to our country in the eyes of j 
 civilised Europe " 
 
 As to the possessions of the Church, the object was 
 to create a special fund, endowed with the revenues of the 
 suppressed orders, and dedicated entirely to the clergy. 
 
 On this point Cavour did not hesitate ; it was one of 
 the fixed ideas of his policy. He had always been 
 opposed to what was called the incameration of eccle- 
 siastical property — in other words, to the dispossession 
 of the Church, transformed into a corps receiving salary 
 from the State ; and the reason he gave for such an 
 opposition was a singular one from the mouth of a 
 minister. It w^as, that this measure would create the 
 worst form of despotism, the administrative despotism. 
 *• I have," said he, " the misfortune — or the good luck, 
 Avhich you will — to be minister in a country where a 
 certain degree of centralisation reigns, and where the 
 Government has quite enough in its hands. I declare 
 to you, that if you add this one of which you speak to 
 the powers of Government, you will give what will be 
 
 threatening to liberty " But this was not the 
 
 f^hief reason ; the one which determined Cavour was one 
 of " high policy." 
 
 His true reason was that the expropriation of the 
 clergy would lead to the extension and intensifying of the 
 spirit of caste, by the complete isolation of the clergy, in 
 the midst of a civil centre, and the tightening of the bonds 
 uniting the priest with the sacerdotal hierarchy. "It has 
 
74 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 Lecu," he said, "carried out on a very lai'ge scale in some 
 European countries. In France, before the Revolution, 
 the clergy was, if I am not mistaken, as rich as that 
 of Spain. It was totally stripped, and was not allowed 
 to retain a vestige of its old possessions. What ensued ? 
 I have a great respect for the French clergj-, and I admit 
 that it is more moral and also more zealous than it used 
 to be ; but no one can deny that it is also less national 
 and less liberal than was the clergy of the old regime. 
 For that was animated by a spirit of independence with 
 regard to Rome, and a certain degi'ce of attachment to 
 national views ; it had the instincts of liberty. Now 
 things are diiferent ; all facts go to prove that the 
 modern French clergy is infinitely more Ultramontane 
 than our national clergy. It will be said : * But there 
 is another course that could be pursued : let us leave the 
 followers of the faith to remunerate their own clergy.' 
 Do you -know what would be the consequence of this ? 
 A double amount of zeal, fanaticism, and Ultramon- 
 tanism. Such a system exists in Ireland. There the 
 clergy is unsalaried; its means of existence consist of 
 charity and the voluntary contributions of the fiiithful. 
 That clergy is both more fanatical and less liberal than 
 the clergy of France." 
 
 On this point Cavour was of the same mind as De 
 Tocqueville. Thus it was that he refused to have any- 
 thing to do with ecclesiastical expropriations, or to make 
 use of any such means for the balancing of his budget. 
 Religious reform was to result from a legitimate and 
 progressive secularisation of civil society, not from hos- 
 tility and pei-secution. 
 
CAVOUB'S LIBEFiALISM. 75 
 
 Cavour was a great Liberal and at the same time a 
 great politician. Determined to persevere to tlie end to 
 keep the Liberal aims of the country free from interested 
 motives, and to protect these formidable religious ques- 
 tions from revolutionary passions, he was anxious to 
 avoid any hasty step. He tvas especially desirous not 
 to cause divisions in the public mind, and he frankly 
 stated his reasons to Sig. Depretis, who one day ques- 
 tioned him about it : " It is in order that the nation may I ^ 
 be unanimous, if an opportunity should present itself of} 
 regaining our lost position by an energetic effort." 
 
 He wished neither to divide public opinion nor to 
 .allow^ the good name of the country to be compromised 
 by causing useless annoyances, and when it was proposed 
 to subject all students, including those at the seminaries, 
 to military service, he made a firm resistance. " Your 
 proposition will be regarded throughout the country as 
 
 a revolutionary act In the present state of 
 
 things I should consider as a great evil any act that could, 
 even externally, present the appearance of a revolu- 
 tionary measure." He had no difficulty in remaining "p 
 moderate, despising party excitement, precisely because ^^ 
 he was a politician who, without paltry prejudices, fol- 
 lowed out the realisation of a lofty scheme. 
 
 His genius was essentially tolerant and practical ; 
 lie could not see the necessity for wasting words to wound// 
 the feelings of the clergy ; he was careful rather to winj 
 them over to the reforms which he required of them, andji ' 
 to captivate them : and he succeeded. Witness the ' 
 amazement of the head of a religious order coming from 
 Eome at the cordial reception he met with at the hands 
 
76 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 r 
 
 I of Cavour ; who afterwards remarked with a sniilc : " On 
 leaving my house that brother has gone to the Bishop's 
 palace, where he will certainly not have had such a recep- 
 tion as I gave him. He will compare the two, return to 
 Rome, tell his story, and, if he is honest, he will say that 
 T am not the persecuting minister and diabolical person 
 which at Rome they imagine me to be." This was, per- 
 haps, not owing to a spirit of calculation ; he acted 
 spontaneously, just as, without display or ostentation, he 
 would distribute alms to any of the poorer clergy who 
 asked them of him. Sometimes in the morning, dipping 
 into his private purse as often as into the impoverished 
 coffers of the State, he would, with one of his fellow- 
 workers, prepare the slender pittance that a few priests 
 were waiting for, while he remarked, cheerfully rubbing 
 his hands : ** Ah, if the gentlemen of the Left could see 
 us at what we iu*e doing ! " 
 
 In its very groundwork Cavour's mind was a Liberal 
 one ; there was nothing in him of the vulgar freethinker, 
 turning to ridicule the belief in which he has been 
 educated ; and of this he gave a curious proof which 
 long remained unknown. Seven years before his death, 
 at the time when the contest about Conventual Laws was 
 hottest, and when a fatal epidemic was raging in Turin, 
 Cavour had taken precautions, shoidd he too be stricken, 
 against the painful scenes which had occurred at the 
 death of Count Santa-Rosa. He wished to make sure 
 that the ministrations of the Church would not be re- 
 fused him. 
 
 One morning he had quietly ordered and prearranged 
 everything with Fra Giacomo, the parish priest of the 
 
BAD TIMES. 77 
 
 Madonna clei Angeli, whom he made the confidant of 
 his chanties. At the conclusion of their interview, 
 Rattazzi, the recently-instituted minister of the interior, 
 chanced to come in, and Cavour, after having courteously 
 accompanied the priest to the door, turned to his col- 
 league and said, simply : " We have arranged everything 
 together in case any misfortune should befall me." It 
 is remarkable that, seven years afterwards, faithful to 
 his promise in 1854, Fra Giacomo hastened to the death- 
 bed of the Piedmontese minister, then prime minister of 
 Italy. It was with this resolute spirit, a mixture of / 
 boldness, shrewd tact, simplicity, liberal confidence, and 
 universal activity, that Cavour conducted the religious 
 campaign which, with the Exchequer and diplomacy, 
 expressed his policy. 
 
 VI. 
 
 To say the truth, that policy did not propel itself; 
 it had to work its way through many a resistance, many 
 a contradiction and passionate opposition, and Cavour 
 had daily to contend against difficulties of every kind, 
 both within and without. 
 
 In the early part of 1853, almost immediately 
 after he had become president of the council, relations 
 with Austria had undera;one a first shock. Taking ad- 
 vantage of a hot-headed Mazzinian outburst at Milan, 
 Austria thought fit to strike a blow at the Lombard 
 emigres at Turin ; she sequestrated the property of the 
 Casati, the Arese, the Arconati, the Torelli, and many 
 others. After having frankly fulfilled its duties of inter- 
 
/ 
 
 J 
 
 78 LIF^ OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 national police in suppressing the Milanese outljreak, 
 Piedmont could not refrain from protesting against ji 
 measure of spoliation which affected men who not only 
 were manifestly innocent of any offence, but who had 
 become naturalised Piedmontese, and of whom some 
 were members of parliament. This protest had no effect ; 
 hence arose, if not a rupture, a coldness manifested by 
 a reciprocal recall of ambassadors. 
 
 Cavour in his heart did not regret an incident that, 
 in less than four years after the conclusion of peace, 
 seemed to revive the national question, and in which 
 Austria had to bear the responsibility of a bitter provo- 
 cation, condemne<l alike by France and England. 
 " Austria," he said, " has managed to set public opinion 
 and all the Governments of Europe against her. In 
 trying to damage us, she has done us sei-vice ; we will 
 take advantage of it." Nevertheless, this half-ruptm-e 
 gave rise to a delicate and })recarious situation ; one not 
 without anxiety, and which reactionists in Piedmont 
 and in Europe did not fail to turn to account by repre- 
 senting it as due to an improvident and impatient 
 policy of a Cabinet inspiring revolutionary agitation ; 
 Ijut this, as yet, was nothing. In the interior, diffi- 
 culties were hourly becoming more serious and more 
 painful. 
 
 Unfortunately the new system of taxation, the 
 financial reforms, and the commercial treaties could not 
 be carried out without clashing with many interests, 
 provoking much uneasinesss, and causing temporary 
 panics. To these were added bad liarvests, and diseases 
 smiting the silkworms ;ind the vines. The spirit of 
 
POPULAR AGITATION. 79 
 
 party or faction took advantage of whatever occurred. If 
 bread rose in price, the fault was charged against Cavour 
 and his reforms. Harangues were raised against the 
 ministry that starved the people, and took what was 
 theirs by right ; and one evening, in the peaceful city of 
 Turin, an excited crowd, crying ''Death to him," 
 streamed in the direction of the house of Cavour, Avhose 
 windows were broken, while an attempt was made to 
 take it by assault. This, however, was but a skirmish ; 
 it was by no means a true index of the sentiments of 
 the people of Turin. The following day Cavour, accom- 
 panied by La Marmora, walked through the streets on 
 his usual way to the ministry of finance, and as he went 
 he everywhere met with signs of respectful affection. 
 
 In Savoy, reactionary newspapers endeavoured to 
 inflame the populace and encourage discontent by a 
 perfidious comparison between the old and the new 
 rates of taxes. Cavour Avas publicly accused of crushing 
 the artisan and the labourer with imposts that he might 
 prosecute his Utopias about Italy. The municipal 
 council of Chambery, altogether under reactionary in- 
 fluence, almost gave the signal for a refusal to pay the 
 levy. The National Guard declined to be present at 
 the rejoicings in honour of the " statuto." A Savoyard 
 wrote to Cavour : " If you are obstinate we are doubly 
 so ; it is not in Savoy that heads are weathercocks." 
 
 Cavour's religious policy was made a pretext for . . 
 still greater excitement. External agitation kept pace 
 with the parliamentary combat. The Government 
 which was leading Piedmont " to schism, anarchy, and 
 destruction," was threatened. The execution of the 
 
80 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 law for the suppression of certain convents provoked 
 painful scenes of resistance. Epidemics and famines 
 were declared to be a visitation from heaven for the 
 institution of sacrilegious laws. How much more so 
 was it when misfortune fell on the royal family itself ; 
 when death removed the queen's mother, the queen, and 
 the Duke of Genoa in the space of a few days ? These 
 unforeseen occasions for mourning were spoken of at the 
 court, among those immediately about the person of the 
 king, as warnings from heaven. 
 
 In this tangle, although Cavour did not waver an 
 instant, he was sometimes anxious : *' Policy is becoming 
 more and more perplexing," he wrote to his friends at 
 Geneva ; "we have to contend against famine, new 
 
 taxes, priests, and reactionists Nevertheless, I 
 
 do not relinquish hope." Another day he wrote thus 
 from Leri, where he had gone to enjoy a few moments' 
 needful rest : " After a desperate struggle, in parliament, 
 in the salons, at the court, as well as in the streets, to 
 which are added a number of lamentable circumstances, 
 I found I had reached the end of my intellectual re- 
 sources, and I have come here to restore them by a few 
 days* rest. Thanks to my natural elasticity of fibre, I 
 shall shortly be able to resume the weight of affairs ; 
 before the week is out I hope to be back at my post, 
 where difficulties await me, giving rise to a political 
 situation likely to become more and more strained. ..." 
 
 It wjis a laborious and an unceasing struggle, com- 
 bined, as it was, with intricacies and vicissitudes, to 
 which a prime minister of less " elasticity of fibre " than 
 he must have succumbed. 
 
rUBLIG W0BK8. 81 
 
 This stoutly-contested policy, nevertheless, began 
 to make itself felt and seen in its primary results, 
 and in a few years it began to bear fruit. On 
 all sides the movement was discernible. With his 
 persevering and methodical energy, and by the helj) 
 of a minister of finance who did not begrudge the 
 money necessary. La Marmora had already had time to 
 reorganise the military institutions, and construct an 
 army, which, although it could not be numerous, was 
 nevertheless able to bear with dignity the Italian 
 standard. Nor was the new econdSaic management 
 sterile. Stimulated by liberty, national activity mani- 
 fested itself in every form of industry and commercial 
 enterprise. The works of public usefulness, when com- 
 pleted, were a source of wealth. At the beginning of 
 1854 the Genoese railway was opened; cutting its way 
 through the Apennines to that Gulf of the Mediterranean, 
 where Cavour was proud to have arrived on the first 
 locomotive. 
 
 By small degrees Piedmont began to present the 
 appearance of a little country full of life, quick to spring- 
 to her feet, knowing how rightly to make use of the 
 freedom of a constitutional rule ; and she soon acquired 
 an honourable name in Europe ; and in France, as in 
 England, the country won attention and sympathy. 
 
 Cavour himself was visibly rising in public considera- 
 tion. The ability he displayed in the management of fi^ 
 struggles, out of which he always came the stronger, in- 
 sph'ed a growing interest and confidence in those around 
 him. In the midst of all these affairs, his thoughts re- 
 mained fixed on the momentous enterprise before him ; 
 
 G 
 
82 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 he did not overlook the serious character of it, and, in a 
 private letter to Madame de Circourt, in 1854, he wrote 
 as follows : 
 
 "Circumstances have led Piedmont to take aj 
 clear and positive position in Italy. I know that it 
 is not without danger, and I feel all the responsibility 
 that it imposes on me ; but honour and duty have laid 
 the burden on us. Since Providence has so willed it that 
 Piedmont should alone be free and independent in Italy, 
 it is the duty of Piedmont to use that liberty and indepen- 
 dence in pleading the cause of our unfortunate peninsula 
 before Europe. We will not shrink from that perilous 
 task ; the king and the country are determined to ac- 
 complish it to the uttermost. JVIaybe your friends, the 
 doctrinaires and the Liberals, who deplore the loss of 
 liberty in France after they have helped to stifle it in 
 Italy, will consider our policy absurd and romantic. I 
 am resigned to their censui'cs, feeling cei*tain that 
 generous hearts like yours will sympathise with our 
 efforts to recall to life a nation for centuries buried in a 
 frightful tomb. If I should fail, you will not refuse to 
 give me a corner among the eminent vanquished wlio 
 
 \j fly to group themselves about you Take this 
 
 confession as the avowal that my whole life is conse- 
 crated to one object — that of the emancipation of my 
 country. . . . ." 
 
 This, then, was his avowed aim and object ; but in 
 
 ' ' order to reach it Cavour knew there must be many a 
 
 halting-place ; there might still be more than one road 
 
 I to it, and the result of the policy he had been following 
 
 Ifor more than four years, and by which he was raising 
 
THE CRIMEAN WAR. 83 
 
 ■himself in raising his country, was precisely tliat one 
 which was to enable Piedmont to reach its aim by any 
 road, taking advantage of any favourable opportunity 
 that might offer. When such an opportunity should 
 present itself, Cavour was not the man to let it pass. 
 
 What Cavour had foreseen as eaSJ^^s 1851, when 
 he spoke of the diplomatic advantage of a treaty of com- 
 merce, was at hand. The Eussian war with France and 
 England was the event which might involve the interests 
 of all countries, and divide " into two camps the East and 
 the West." From the first Cavour watched the great 
 conflict with an attentive eye ; he apprehended its in- 
 evitable extension, and was, as it were, fascinated by it. 
 In the spring of 1854, when the armies of France and 
 England were making for the Black Sea, one evening 
 in the company of Count Lisio, at the house of his niece. 
 Countess Alfieri, in whose society he loved to seek 
 repose, Cavour appeared absorbed. "AVhy should you 
 not send ten thousand men ? " said his niece to him, 
 suddenly, as though guessing at what was in his mind. 
 " Ah ! " he replied, eagerly, " if everyone thought that, 
 it would already be done." Every now and then the 
 Countess Alfieri, a woman of intelligent mind, and well 
 fitted to understand her uncle, would ask : " Well, are 
 we ready to start ? " and he would only reply, with a 
 smile : " Who knows ? " 
 
 The truth was that Cavour was entirely in favour of 
 such a scheme, and if it had rested only with him he 
 
 G 2 
 
 U 
 
84 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUH. 
 
 would have been one of the first to join the AV^estuin 
 alliance, thrown open by the Anglo-French treaty of 
 alliance of April 10, 1854. Piedmont could well do as she 
 would ; she had not been in direct relations with Russia 
 since 1848. Perhaps, from antipathy to the Liberal 
 Government of Turin, and also no doubt with a view to 
 pleasing Austria, the Emperor Nicholas had not even 
 vouchsafed a reply to the first official notifications of 
 King Victor Emmanuel. Piedmont's liberty of action and 
 sympathies with the Western cause were therefore under 
 (/ no restraint ; but Cavour wjis not acting alone. Besides 
 the king, whom he first brought round to his views, 
 there were his colleagues, nearly all stubborn men, to 
 win over — the minister of foreign affaii*s, Dabormida, 
 RatUizzi like the rest — then parliament, then public 
 opinion. 
 
 It must be admitted that when at first the report of 
 this project spread abroad in Turin, it produced an im- 
 pression that it was the madness of an adventurous spirit. 
 Why throw the country into this fiir-off enterpiise ? 
 What place would little Piedmont t^ake beside llie two 
 greatest Powers of Europe ? What the part of the 
 modest Sardinian contingent among the annies of France 
 and of England ? AVas it a time to impose new sacri- 
 fices on the country for a ruinous piece of folly, when it 
 was so difficult to meet the deficit of the budget ? 
 
 Without being insensible to oppositions of which he 
 could not be independent, Cavour did not relinquish his 
 aim. He saw an opportunity of blotting out Novara 
 and bringing forwiU'd the new Sardinian army, while 
 securing the support of England and France, and acquir- 
 
QUESTION OF AUSTRIAN FOLIGY. 85 
 
 ing for Piedmont both moral and diplomatic credit. 
 He centred all liis energies in popularising his scheme 
 and in gaining allies ; and, at one time, persuaded that 
 another might be more- successful in the matter than 
 himself, he proposed to Massimo d'Azeglio that he should 
 take his place as president of the council, while he served v 
 under his orders, or even, if necessary, quitted the 
 ministry. *'Do what you think best," he wrote; "I 
 will support you through and through, provided you 
 make the alliance." D'Azeglio promptly declined, pro- 
 mising to give his fullest aid to a policy of which he 
 appreciated the greatness, and feeling that none could 
 conduct it more sagaciously than he who had conceived it. 
 In the midst of his perplexities Cavour's eye was on 
 Austria, when suddenly the news went forth at Turin 
 that the Viennese Cabinet had signed the treaty of 
 December 2, 1854, with France and England, by which 
 it both did and did not bind itself. From that moment 
 the question became urgent. If, before going any 
 further, the scheme of Austria was to cause her assist- 
 ance to be purchased at Paris and in London by pledging 
 her Italian possessions, it would be the interest of 
 Piedmont to counteract it by an immediate alliance with f 
 the West ; if, on the other hand, Austria intended to 
 drag on in an equivocal neutrality — and this the pene- 
 trating eye of Cavour foresaw — the Cabinet of Turin 
 would necessarily gain an advantage by outstepping 
 it with a frank and bold resolution. Lastly, if Austria 
 through some unexpected circumstance threw herself 
 towards Russia, then all would be for the best, and the 
 Italian question would spring up of itself. In any case 
 
\J 
 
 86 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUIi. 
 
 no hesitation was possible, and at the last moment 
 Cavour was encouraged by one who ever remained 
 his devoted friend, Sir James Hudson, the English re- 
 presentative at Tm-in, who had just received from his 
 Government the order to propose, in conjunction 
 wath the minister of France, a treaty of alliance with 
 Piedmont. 
 
 As long as the conditions of the aUiance were not 
 fixed there would of com-se still l)e difficulties to contend 
 with. Would the Sardinian Government be satisfied by 
 sending a contingent for an auxiliary corps in the pay of 
 England ? The Cabinet of London seemed to have 
 understood it thus ; but neither Cavour, who held to the 
 independence of his policy, nor La Marmora, who felt a 
 just pride in the small expeditionary corps of which he 
 was to be chief, would ever consent to lend themselves 
 to that arrangement. They would admit of no other 
 part for Piedmont than that of one ally negotiating with 
 another, defraying its o^\^l expenses, and preserving the 
 dignity and disinterestedness of its co-operation, that it 
 might retain equal rights. All that was asked of the 
 English Cabinet was the facihtation of a loan. 
 
 On the other hand, the ministry of Turin would 
 evidently have preferred some guarantee for Italy, or, at 
 the least, some sort of ostensible pledge of sympathy. 
 It would have wished England and France to bind 
 themselves to claim at Vienna the raising of the decree 
 sequestrating the Lombard estates ; but to this condition, 
 which the Sardinian Government held to in a spirit of re- 
 fined generosity, neither France nor England could agree, 
 and the question might perhaps have proved serious> 
 
SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE. 87 
 
 liad it not been happily put an end to by the principal 
 Lombard emigres, wlio, in tlie interests of the negotiation, 
 begged that Cavour would not trouble himself about 
 them. 
 
 At the eleventh hour, on the refusal of General 
 Dabormida to yield the point of the guarantee, Cavour 
 was compelled himself to take the management of foreign 
 affairs, in order to sign without conditions : and thus, out 
 of much perplexity and much deliberation, was con- 
 cluded the treaty of January lO, 1855, u niting Piedmont 
 to France and England, and which Count von Usedom 
 called *'a pistol fired in the ear of Austria." 
 
 VIII. 
 
 There was yet another battle to fight in parliament, 
 and Cavour had clearly to face every sort of opposition. 
 In the camp of the Eight the Piedmontese inter\^ention 
 was looked upon as a totally unnecessary adventure, 
 which might prove ruinous, and which would condemn 
 the country to waste of money, while it caused the army 
 to play an ill-defined subordinate part. And more : that 
 which Cavour had so laboriously effected was termed an 
 act of weakness, the enforced penalty of the revolu- 
 tionary policy of the Cabinet, the consequence of the 
 change to Liberalism of the president of the council, and 
 his alliance with the Left Centre, or party of action. It 
 was said that France and England, in directing their 
 arms to the East, had been unwilling to forego the 
 chance of complications in Italy, and had therefore in- 
 
y 
 
 88 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 sistecl on binding Piedmont. That treaty was on their 
 part a precautionary measure ; an imposed guarantee. 
 
 In the camp of the Left things were still more extra- 
 ordinary. The entry of Piedmont into that " European 
 concert," in which Austria was to be one of the principal 
 '* perfonners," was sneered at. A treaty with the 
 Western Powers was a desertion of the national cause. 
 " The alliance," said Brofferio, " is economically charge- 
 able with rashness ; militarily, it is a piece of folly ; and 
 politically, it is a wicked act." It would surely lead to a 
 desertion of Liberal principles ! The extreme Liberals 
 went so far as to provoke among a few misled subaltern 
 officers a protest, in which it was stated that "no 
 Government had a right to dispose of Italian soldiers to 
 fight in an anti-national war ; " and it went on to say : 
 " Let us rise, and sweai' that we will only consent to fight 
 for the unity of Italy, and for those people who aspire to 
 defend their nationality !...." The more moderate, 
 and tliose who had a certain pretension to shrewdness, 
 complained that for a time at least neutrality was not 
 maintained, an armed neutrality, which could seize its 
 favourable opportunity in the midst of the complications 
 with which Europe was threatened. 
 
 Neither one side nor the other seemed to see that 
 there was yet another means of serving Italy. Cavour 
 let them have theii- say, and then he laid before them his 
 policy in a speech which was animated with the breath 
 of a new life. He showed them that neutrality could 
 not be other than a danofcrous falling:; into the back- 
 ground ; that to stop the progress of Russia towards the 
 Mediterranean was more in the interest of Piedmont 
 
CAVOUR ON THE TREATY. 89 
 
 than in that of any other nation ; and, making straight 
 at the knotty point of the matter, he asked whether the 
 alliance would be favourable or injurious to Italy ? 
 
 Here was the whole question : " We have joined the 
 alliance/' said he, " without relinquishing our exterior 
 sympathies any more than our interior principles. We 
 have not hidden our anxiety for the future of Italy, or 
 our desire to see its condition ameliorated. But how, I 
 shall be asked, can the treaty serve the cause of Italy ? It 
 will serve it in the only way possible— in the actual 
 situation of Europe. The experience of these last years, 
 as well as that of centuries, show^s how little Italy has 
 benefited by conspiracies, plots, revolutions, and futile 
 excitements. Far from bettering her condition, they 
 have been among the greatest evils which have befallen 
 this beautiful portion of Europe, and that, not only on 
 account of the innumerable misfortunes to individuals re- 
 sulting from them, but because these perpetual schemings, 
 these insurrections and uprisings have resulted in a 
 diminution of the esteem and sympathy which other 
 
 nations might have entertained for Italy And 
 
 now the first of conditions for the good, of the peninsula 
 
 is the restitution of her good name To effect this, 
 
 two things are necessary : first, we must prove to Europe 
 that Italy has sufficient civil sagacity to govern herself 
 liberally, and that she is in a position to give herself the 
 most perfect form of government ; secondly, we must 
 show that our military valour is still what it was in the 
 time of our ancestors. In the last seven years you have 
 done much for Italy. You have proved to Europe that 
 the Italians can govern themselves sagaciously 
 
90 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 But you must do more. Our country must give evi- 
 dence that her children can fight courageously on the 
 field. Believe this, that the glory our soldiers mil know 
 how to achieve on the Eastern coasts will do more for 
 the future of Italy than all the noisy talking in the 
 world " 
 
 In speaking thus, fascinating the Chambers with the 
 patriotism of his ideas, and in carrying, not without some 
 trouble, a disputed vote, Cavour was not unaware that 
 he was playing a formidable game. He had said to a 
 friend, to whom he wrote immediately after signing the 
 treaty : "I have undertaken a terrible responsibility ; 
 but, come what may, my conscience tells me that I have 
 fiilfilled a sacred duty ! " 
 
 After that day of April, 1855, when La Marmora 
 and his 15,000 Piedmontcse soldiers were making their 
 way towards the Crimea, Cavour was many a time 
 affected with the consciousness of responsibility. 
 
 The little army was showing itself worthy of a 
 place side by side with the allies before Sevastopol, 
 and it had the instinct that it was there for the fulfil- 
 ment of a great idea. On one occasion, when a poor 
 soldier was struggling with deep mud in the trenches, 
 a young officer cheerfully rallied him with the words : 
 " Never mind, it is with this mud that Italy is to be 
 made." Nevertheless, Cavour was deeply anxious, for, 
 before fighting the Russians, the little Piedmontesc anny 
 had, on its arrival, to contend with disease — with 
 cholera. The epidemic struck its heaviest blows in 
 the Picdmontese camp. At one time, in summer, a 
 constant succession of deaths was recorded in Turin. 
 
THE ABMY IN THE CRIMEA, 91 
 
 Major Cassinis, Victor de Saint-Marsan, and a Casati — 
 all these fell victims to an obscure death in the flower 
 of their youth. General Alexander La Marmora, 
 brother to the commander-in-chief, was the next to be 
 taken away. 
 
 The truth was sad enough, but public rumours exag- 
 gerated it ; those foretellers of evil who had tried to hinder 
 the expedition already triumphed over what they now, 
 more than ever, called a mad enterprise. Cavour anxiously 
 watched the course of events, writing to La Marmora : 
 *'AVe often meet together, and we always speak of you. 
 Our thoughts and our best wishes are with you in that 
 glorious but hazardous campaign to which your devo- 
 tion to your country has led you." He never doubted 
 the result, but he began to find time hang heavily ; his 
 mind w^as full of anxious apprehensions, of which he 
 spoke when sitting one Sunday under the trees at 
 Santena, whither he had gone with Sir James Hudson, 
 Eattazzi, Minghetti, and Massari. " I knew it," he said ; 
 "when I advised the king and the country to venture 
 upon this great enterprise, I was sure that we should 
 meet with many heavy obstacles, and be sorely tried ; 
 but this battle with disease fills me with alarm ; it is an 
 evil complication. Let us not be discouraged, however ; 
 now that we have thrown ourselves headlong into the 
 fio-ht, it is useless to look back. I know that, when 
 dying, Eosmini expressed a presentiment that the 
 Western Powers would conquer. I hope so ; and I, too, 
 believe it. Never mind, we are but under a cloud." 
 Those around him, and Avho heard him, could perceive 
 a dramatic and patriotic conflict taking place between 
 
\J 
 
 92 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 the anxiety of a serious man, and the unbounded confi- 
 dence which never quitted him. 
 
 On that day Cavour might be said to have reached 
 the eventful moment in a lifetime whore everything 
 depends on the success or failure of one event ; where a 
 minister who has played with fortune has no other 
 alternative than to be either shunned and disgi-ac^dLas 
 an adventurwY or bfi a great jiiaJJ. Had he failed, there 
 wouIdfTt is true, have been nothing in the spirit of 
 V^;, vulgar adventure in what he attempted ; but he was of 
 ? the order of those who succeed, because they know how 
 
 to deserve success ; because they know how to combine 
 judgment with boldness in their schemes ; and when he 
 himself still seemed uncertain of succeeding, he was on 
 the eve of seeing his policy come victoriously out of 
 the ordeal, to be crowned witli all that can reward 
 success. 
 
 IX. 
 
 ^^ The fij'st satisfactory sign was the simple and laconic 
 message which Cavour received the day following the 
 battle of August 16, 1855: "This morning the 
 Russians, with 50,000 men, attacked the lines of the 
 Tchernaya. Our pass-word was, 'King and country.' 
 This evening you will know by telegram whether the 
 Piedmontese were worthy to fight beside the French and 
 the English. We have two hundred dead. The French 
 despatches will tell you the rest." Piedmont was thus 
 relieved of its heavy load of fears ; it gladly welcomed 
 this good report with a zealous, patriotic pride. As to 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE TGHERNAYA. 03 
 
 Cavour, lie felt as much pleasure in the success of La 
 Marmora as in his own. The brilliant conduct of the 
 troops, and of their leader, not only justified the treaty, 
 but it also justified the president of the council in the 
 eyes of all those who had accused him of neglecting to 
 settle the position of the Piedmontese general in the 
 midst of the allied forces. Cavour had left nothing- 
 undone ; in a delicate situation he had exhibited confi- 
 dence, under which great good sense was hidden. He 
 had said to himself that if, as was reasonably hoped, the 
 army proved true to itself, and worthy oT its country, 
 its IcMef" would naturally be raised to the position he 
 had been able enough to win, and which no one would 
 
 think of refusing him : in the contrary case, all diplo- 
 niatic stipulations would be useless. He had placeci 
 confidence iii ' i;Ke army anSTlnXa TSlarmora, and he had 
 the delight of seeing it justified. The army was making 
 a good appearance in the great conflict. With his 
 military qualifications, and his spirit of command. La 
 Marmora had had no difiiculty in taking rank beside the 
 generals of the allies in the Crimea, just as a little later 
 he took his place in a council of war assembled in 
 Paris. The military result, which formed a part of the 
 scheme of Piedmontese intervention, was therefore 
 attained by the courage of the combatants on the 
 Tchemaya, and by the attitude of their leader, in whom 
 Lord Clarendon recognised the bearing " of a soldier, a 
 gentleman, and a statesman." 
 
 /The next encouragement for Cavour's policy was 
 Victor Emmanuel's visit to Paris and to London in the 
 latter part of 1855, which proved how Piedmont had 
 
94 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 progressed in a short time. Instead of being an obscure 
 and insignificant State, lying bidden and forgotten at the 
 feet of the Alps, Piedmont was gaining a firm footing 
 on the European platform ; she was bringing hei-self into 
 notice, and being talked about Victor Emmanuel was 
 everywhere welcomed as the sovereign of a small king- 
 dom which had known how to t^ke a great and important 
 step. In Paris he soon became popular ; in London he 
 was made much of, not only because he was a Crimean 
 ally, but also l^ecause he was a constitutional king — the 
 legal prince who had made Piedmont into "a small 
 England in Italy." 
 
 Victor Emmanuel was accompanied in his travels by 
 D'Azeglio, to whom Cavour had assigned a special 
 mission. " His presence is necessary," he said cheer- 
 fully, " to prove to Europe that we are not infected with 
 revolutionary leprosy." To this D'Azeglio lent himself 
 with the delicacy and good-nature of the most genuine 
 patriotism. Cavour himself was naturally of the party, 
 and had his share in the rejoicings and ovations of the 
 occasion. Once more he found himself in Paris — ^he had 
 not visited it since 1852 — which he now entered as a 
 negotiator for the French alliance, an all-powerful and 
 able minister, and a political personage of refined and 
 fascinating manners. From the Tuileries, where he held 
 counsel with the chief men of the day, he woidd go to 
 the house of Madame de Circourt, where he often met 
 the representatives of the beaten parties. 
 
 " From six o'clock in the morning until two hours 
 after midnight," he wrote, " I am always about ; I have 
 never led so unquiet a life or one so useless: patience, 
 
IN PARIS. 95 
 
 however. .... The king is in good health and in the 
 best of tempers. To-day there is a grand review, to- 
 morrow a ball at the H6tel de Ville, and Thursday we 
 leave. I send Cibfario the programme of our stay in 
 England ; it is not an amusing one. AVhen I shall reckon 
 up my various rights to a retiring pension, I hope that 
 
 the present trip will be counted as a campaign 
 
 I have seen Thiers ; he approves of the war, but he 
 would now desire peace. He despairs of his party, and 
 almost despairs of parliamentary rule. Cousin has be- 
 come a fusionist I chanced to meet with Mon- 
 
 talembert, and, notwithstanding the small amount of 
 sympathy existing between us, we shook hands. I have 
 also seen the Nuncio, and told him that we should wish 
 for an agreement on the same basis as the French 
 
 system ; he pretended not to understand me " 
 
 Cavour saw much society; he saw every branch of 
 Parisian society, and he even sometimes regretted not 
 being able to escape the turmoil of official visits and re- 
 ceptions, to go to the theatre and be cheered by the 
 sight of the " nymphs of the ballet." 
 
 In all these diversions, however, he never lost sight 
 of the one essential point, the fixed subject of all his 
 thoughts, and it was about that time, in the interviews 
 he had with Napoleon III. at the Tuileries, that for the 
 first time he heard those words which were to be the 
 prelude to many an important event : " What can be 
 done for Italy ? " It was perhaps only lightly uttered, 
 perhaps merely a vague manifestation of sympathy and 
 courtesy; but he who heard it, in December, 1855, was 
 not a man to let it fall unheeded, and, if the stay of 
 
96 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 Victor Emmanuel in Paris and London could have no 
 immediate results, it was still the sign of a new era for 
 Piedmont. It was like a sort of prologue or preparation 
 for the more serious moral victory tliat Cavour was on 
 the eve of securing at the Congress of Paris, by means 
 of the general negotiations which wore for a time to 
 restore peace to Europe. 
 
 X. 
 
 Let me summarily recall the fsicts. L^p to that time 
 the war had been circumscribed in the East. The fall 
 of Sevastopol, on September 8, 1855, had in reality 
 brought the Crimean campaign to an end ; and since 
 that bloody and glorious feat of arms, the presence of 
 whiter had produced a tacit suspension of hostilities. 
 It was now a matter of speculation whether the war 
 would rekindle in a still more violent form, what point 
 it would select, and what new direction it would take ; 
 and it was there that all interests met in a conflict half 
 veiled between pacific and warlike influences. Russia 
 appeared disposed henceforward to pay for her defeat by 
 concessions in the Eiist. England was the least anxious 
 to lay down her arms, but she could do nothing without 
 France, and France began to incline for peace. Austria, 
 not having engaged her army, felt herself compelled to 
 take some decisive measure, and was doing her utmost to 
 bring about a settlement : and from all this an armis- 
 tice came, with the preliminaries of peace. Such was the 
 situation. 
 
 Cavour would, at heart, have desired a continuation 
 
PIEDMONT IN THE CONGRESS. 97 
 
 of the war. In a prolongation of it he perceived a 
 further chance for Italy. Intervention and diplomacy- 
 were to him only a delusion. But, after all, if instead 
 of war there was to be an armistice, he felt he must 
 make the most of it, and hold himself in readiness for the 
 negotiations which were about to commence at the 
 European congress assembled in Paris. 
 
 The selection of a suitable agent had been a cause of 
 considerable perplexity at Turin ; D'Azeglio was pointed 
 to as the probable plenipotentiary. To say the truth, 
 everybody was a little frightened by the difficulties ; 
 the more so as no one saw very clearly in this new 
 diplomatic phase. It soon became evident that Cavour 
 alone could bring to happy issue a matter which he 
 had been chiefly instrumental in promoting and direct- 
 ing. After hesitating a moment, he consented to start 
 for Paris as chief Sardinian plenipotentiary, and from the 
 moment of his arrival there he had to settle questions of 
 the greatest importance. What part was Piedmont to 
 play ? What was to be her position in the congress ? 
 Nothing had as yet been decided. What Cavour had 
 done for the Piedmontese general in the Crimea, he did 
 for diplomacy, and he said : " When the king's govern- 
 ment signed a treaty of alliance with England and 
 France, it did not think fit positively or particularly to 
 state the position to be assigned to Sardinia in the con- 
 gress. The Government was convinced that, with nations 
 as with individuals, influence and public esteem depend 
 on conduct and reputation more than on diplomatic 
 stipulations. 
 
 In Paris he relied on his natural resources, as he had 
 
 H 
 
98 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 relied on La Marmora in the Crimea ; and he was not 
 deceived. Austria vainly tried to persuade France and 
 England that Piedmont could take part in the war and 
 not have a right to be represented at the congress ; 
 that she was only a state of the second order — an in- 
 truder in European affairs ; Austria did not succeed. 
 Neither France, England, nor Russia would consent to 
 so humiliating an exclusion. This was the result of the 
 " acquired status " of Piedmont, and also an opening 
 victory for Cavour, who entered the congress on the same 
 level as the representatives of the greatest Powers ; and 
 that day the Austrian plenipotentiary, Count Buol, might 
 well fear that he would have, as he called it, a web to 
 unravel. The position was still full of difficulty for one 
 who, entering a congress with a contested right to his 
 place there, had some day or other to introduce a per- 
 sonage even more objectionable — ^viz. Italy. It was in 
 this that Cavour gave special evidence that he could 
 mount with the occasion. Placed for the first time in the 
 highest political position in Europe, and mixed up with 
 matters of the greatest importance — as arbitrator of war 
 and of peace — he proved himself equal, without effort, 
 to everything required of him. 
 
 Perfectly master of himself, courteous with everyone, 
 patient and slirewd, he chose to keep in the background 
 at the few first meetings of the Congress ; he spoke 
 little, and when obliged to give an opinion on the 
 matters under discussion — the free navigation of the 
 Danube, or the neutralisation of the Black Sea — he gave 
 it concisely and clearly, always taking the most liberal 
 view. He very soon won golden opinions from his 
 
AUSTRIA IN THE CONGRESS. 99 
 
 colleagues, astonishing them with the variety, justice, 
 and depth of a mind that nothing seemed ever to take 
 unawares. In the midst of this assembly, where so 
 many interests met, and where policies were antagonistic 
 or jealously eyeing one another, Cavour found no diffi-j 
 culty in taking a clear course, and in seizing affinities! 
 and antipathies in different natures ; nor was he slow in 
 taking advantage of them, always being particularly 
 careful not to separate himself from France and England. 
 
 As it appeared that peace was seriously contemplated, 
 he saw no reason to wound the pride and feelings of 
 Eussia, plus the conditions already imposed upon her, 
 and the more Austria was tenacious, the more lenient he 
 became. By a singular contrast, Austria, which had 
 done nothing and not lost a man, held rigidly and 
 inflexibly against Eussia, while Piedmont, which had 
 bravely sent her soldiers to the fight, maintained a 
 perfect' moderation in the common victory of the 
 Allies. 
 
 This difference in the attitude of the representatives 
 of Austria and Sardinia did not fail to strike the Eussian 
 plenipotentiaries, and Count Orloff was grateful to 
 Cavour. The friendliest understanding existed between 
 them. One day, when the question of the neutralisation 
 of the Black Sea was mooted, Count Orloff turned to 
 Cavour and said, loud enough to be heard: " Count Buol 
 speaks as though Austria had taken Sevastopol ! " On 
 another occasion, when the Austrian plenipotentiary was 
 insisting on the subject of a small cession of territory — 
 which by a diplomatic euphemism would be termed a 
 '^' rectification of frontiers " — in Bessarabia, Count Orloff 
 
 H 2 
 
100 . LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 said to Cavour in a significant tone : " Austria's plenipo- 
 tentiary does not know how much blood or how many 
 tears this rectification of frontiers will cost his country." 
 Assuredly the Piedmontese took no measures to soften 
 the resentment of Kussia towards Austria. 
 
 Before a month was out Cavour had solved the 
 problem how to establish his position and acquire real 
 authority, by the frankness and graciousness of his 
 manners, as well as the superiority of his mind; and 
 while the Congress was considering the question of the 
 East and the Black Sea, the energetic plenipotentiary 
 of Victor Emmanuel did not lose his time. Besides 
 the official negotiations which were to be crowned by 
 the treaty of peace of March 30, 1856, he had his 
 own work to carry out. He had interviews with the 
 Emperor at the Tuileries, with Lord Clarendon, Lord 
 Cowley, and the representatives of Russia ; from some 
 he secured support, from others co-operation,' or at least 
 a benevolent neutrality. His effort was to get the 
 congress to consider the Italian question — that was the 
 only question he had at heart, and he burned to be the 
 champion of it before Europe. There indeed was the 
 difficulty. 
 
 The Italian question was not discussed ; it did not 
 exist officially; it could not therefore present itself 
 under a diplomatic and regular form. The " principle 
 of nationahties " had not its accredited plenipotentiary. 
 
 The yoke of the foreigner could not be spoken of; 
 Austria would have had a right at once to protest 
 against the discussion of such a matter in a congress 
 assembled to consider the Eastern question. Doubtless, 
 
THE SITUATION IN ITAi'jY./\\^yi'^iY<^{\\\l/: 
 
 this great Italian question, so difficult to lay hold 
 of, had one vulnerable point ; it was a permanent . / 
 violation of the treaties which diplomacy was accus- / 
 tomed to regard as the basis of the peace of Europe. / 
 A French army occupied Rome, and the indefinite pro-/ 
 longation of that occupation was a living testimony to\ 
 the incapacity of the Papal Government to support itself. ^-^ 
 The Austrians had occupied the Legations ever since "^' 
 
 1849, and appeared to be in no way disposed to quit 
 Bologna. The Austrian dominion, a legal government / 
 in Lombardy, extended by an abuse of treaties to the 
 duchies of Modena and of Parma as well as to Tuscany. ■'' 
 The king of Naples could only sustain himself by acts of 
 extreme arbitrary power. Hence a state of things chaotic 
 and violent, which was dangerously favourable to revo- 
 lutionary intrigues, and even menacing to Piedmont. 
 In this direction it might be possible to strike on the 
 Italian question, and bring it under the observation of 
 diplomacy. Cavour left no stone unturned, and from 
 the moment that he set foot in Paris he prosecuted the \ 
 matter with indefatigable activity. 
 
 To the question which Napoleon III. had asked him — 
 " What can be done for Italy ? " the Piedmontese minister 
 replied by handing in a statement remarkable for vigour 
 and lucidity. On the eve of the signing of peace, on 
 March 27, he sent to his allies, France and England, 
 a note, representing the situation of Italy under a new 
 aspect ; he proposed for the Roman States — at least for 
 the Legations — plans that were perhaps impracticable, but 
 which might be at least a point from which to start and 
 make a beginning. The more the congress advanced on 
 
;!ip^;''\\ I /:.j^):fe of count gavour. 
 
 the road to peace, the more Cavour became pressing, as 
 though he felt that the opportunity purchased at such 
 cost was about to escape him. In the end he won his 
 mark. He succeeded in rousing Napoleon III. and 
 fascinating Lord Clarendon, and in securing at least a 
 certain favourable neutrality of the Russians. 
 
 Meantime the Emperor commissioned the French 
 plenipotentiary, Count Walewski, to kindle the powder 
 Cavour had amassed, and thus it was that eight days 
 after the peace the Italian question was suddenly 
 exploded in the congress at Paris, in that sitting 
 of April 8, 1856, when Austria was for the first time 
 compelled to hear the announcement that after Russia 
 she might have to pay the expenses of the next war 
 to come. 
 
 XI. 
 
 The sitting that day was very curious and memor- 
 able, from the consequences that ensued. The French 
 plenipotentiary called every diplomatic euphemism to his 
 assistance; he took advantage of the congress to provoke 
 " an interchange of ideas on different subjects which were 
 waiting to be settled, and which it would be well to take 
 into consideration in order to prevent fresh complications." 
 He mixed all the questions together, the occupation of 
 Rome by the French troops, the occupation of the Lega- 
 tions by the Austrians, the situation of the kingdom of 
 Naples, the anarchy of Greece, and the excesses of which 
 the Belgian journals were guilty. 
 
 What the real question was it was easy to perceive, 
 and Austria was the last to misunderstand it Count 
 
THE ITALIAN QUESTION. 103 
 
 Buol immediately protested the incompetency of the 
 congress, and declined all discussion on the affairs of 
 Italy. He would have no explanation, no manifestation 
 whatever ; and by his very attitude he forestalled any 
 possibility of a practical solution. He very well per- 
 ceived whence the blow came : up to a certain point he 
 could evade it officially, but he could no longer prevent 
 the outburst. Count Walewski said some hard words 
 about the interior government of the king of Naples, 
 and he admitted that the situation of Rome and the 
 Roman States, reduced as they were to live under foreign 
 protection, was "abnormal." Lord Clarendon, still 
 more severe upon the king of Naples, plainly declared 
 that the Pontifical government was the worst of all 
 governments, and that the condition of the Romagna, 
 hovering between a state of siege and one of brigandage, 
 was frightful ; adding that the only remedy for such a 
 state of things was secularisation, liberal reforms, and 
 an administration conformable to the spirit of the age. 
 Cavour, whose game was being thus so ably played, came 
 forward in his turn to corroborate all that had been said, 
 and to show that yet more wanted doing. He demon- 
 strated that the " abnormal " was not only the situation 
 of the Pontifical States and of Naples, it was that of the 
 whole peninsula ; and that Austria, stretching her power 
 from the Ticino to Venice, encamped at Ferrara and 
 Bologna ; mistress of Piacenza and possessing a garrison 
 at Parma, destroyed the political equilibrium of Italy, 
 constituting a permanent danger for Sardinia. " The 
 Sardinian plenipotentiaries," he said, as he faced Count 
 Buol, " therefore think it their duty to call the attention 
 
104 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 of Europe to a state of things so abnormal ; that which 
 results from the indefinite occupation of a great portion 
 of Italy by Austrian troops " 
 
 What he uttered at the congress on April 8, 
 he energetically confirmed a few days later in a com- 
 munication to France and England on April 16, in 
 which he stated that the condition of Piedmont was be- 
 coming insupportable, and that if nothing were done 
 she would be driven to the terrible alternative of bending, 
 like the other Italian States, under the yoke of Austria, or 
 taking up arms. " Internally troubled," he went on to 
 Sfl-y* ** l>y t^6 action of revolutionary passions instigated 
 around her by a system of violent compression and by 
 foreign occupation, menaced with a still greater extension 
 of Austrian power, the king of Sardinia may from one 
 moment to another be compelled by an inevitable neces- 
 sity to adopt extreme measures, of which it is impossible 
 to foresee the consequences. ..." It was, in a word, 
 the exposure of a whole situation, and of a policy laid 
 before all Europe by the most strenuous of men ; and if for 
 the moment nothing came of it but an empty protocol, 
 the energy mth which the question had been started 
 revealed the growing gravity of Italian affairs. 
 
 But had not Cavour hoped for something more than 
 a protocol ? Was he not deceiving himself ? No doubt 
 he too, in spite of the high balance of his mind, was 
 sometimes carried away in action. After having suc- 
 ceeded as far as success was possible for the moment, he 
 thought he had not done enough, and then, side by side 
 with official diplomacy, there was another chapter, show- 
 ing him the victim of fits of impatience and frenzy. 
 
LETTERS OF CAVOUR. ~ 105 
 
 Quick though he was to control himself, Cavour was 
 subject to these hot moods ; he felt it himself, and in a 
 hurried account which he sent to Turin of all that he 
 was doing and attempting, and of his mental agitation, 
 he says : " I trust that after reading this you will not 
 imagine that I have brain fever, or that I have fallen 
 into a state of delirium ; on the contrary, the condition 
 of my intellectual health is excellent. I have never felt 
 more calm ; I have even obtained a great reputation 
 for moderation. Clarendon has often told me that 
 Prince Napoleon accuses me of being wanting in energy, 
 and even Walewski ]3raises my behaviour ; I am really 
 persuaded, however, that boldness might not be un- 
 attended with success." 
 
 XII. 
 
 The fact is that for part of April, 1856, Cavour was 
 mentally revolving every kind of plan. He did not 
 even shrink from an immediate war with Austria ; even 
 flattering himself into the belief that he could drag 
 France and England into it too. His secret diplomacy 
 was raised to a singular pitch, chiefly in two letters, 
 certainly expressing the most curious of his mental pre- 
 occupations, and even of his particular situation, imme- 
 diately after the congress. 
 
 " Yesterday morning," he says in one of his letters, 
 *' I had the following conversation with Lord Clarendon : 
 * My lord, that which took place at the congress proves 
 two things — 1st. That Austria is determined to persist 
 in its system of oppression and violence towards Italy ; 
 2ndly. That diplomatic efforts are quite inefficient to 
 
106 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 modify that system. The results to Piedmont are ex- 
 tremely injurious. What with party irritation on the 
 one hand, and the arrogance of Austria on the other, 
 there are but two courses open to us ; either to become 
 reconciled with Austria and the Pope, or to make pre- 
 parations for the declaration of war with Austria at no 
 distant period. If the first alternative is the better, I 
 ought, on my return to Turin, to advise the king to 
 call to power the friends of Austria and the Pope. If 
 the second is preferable, we shall not fear, my friends 
 and J, to prepare ourselves for a terrible war — for war to 
 the death ! ' Here I stopped, and Lord Clarendon, with- 
 out expressing either surprise or disapprobation, then 
 said : ' I think you are right, yoiu: position is growing 
 critical ; I can imagine tliat an outburst may become 
 inevitable ; only the time to speak of it openly has not 
 yet come.' I replied : * I have given you evidence of 
 my moderation and prudence; I think that in policy 
 one should be excessively reserved as to speech, and 
 exceedingly decided as to deeds. There are positions in 
 which less danger will be found in an excess of audacity 
 than in one of prudence. With La Marmora for our 
 commander-in-chief, I am persuaded that we are fit to 
 begin a war, and if it should last long you will be 
 forced to come to our assistance.' Lord Clarendon 
 eagerly replied : ' Oh, certainly, if you should be in 
 trouble you can rely upon us; you will see how ener- 
 getically we shall hurry to your aid.' ..." Cavour did 
 not doubt that these words, coming from so reserved a 
 man as Lord Clarendon, showed that England was ready 
 to let herself be drawn into a war having for its aim the 
 
INTERVIEW WITH TEE EMPEBOB. 107 
 
 freedom of Italy. But here began his illusion, and 
 perhaps he exaggerated to himself the real meaning of 
 Lord Clarendon's words, and the extent of his sympathy 
 in this matter. 
 
 In another of Cavour's letters about the same time 
 he gives an account of a visit he paid the Emperor, 
 describing that busy mode of life so full of succeeding 
 impressions, and in which he throws some light on the 
 relations existing between the Piedmontese and the 
 Austrian plenipotentiaries. " I have seen the Emperor," 
 he says, " and I said much the same thing to him as I 
 had said to Clarendon, only putting it a little more 
 mildly. He listened courteously, and added that he 
 hoped to bring Austria to a better view of things. He 
 told me that on the occasion of last Saturday's dinner 
 he had said to Count Buol that he deeply regretted to 
 find himself in positive contradiction to the Emperor of 
 Austria on the Italian question; upon which Count 
 Buol immediately went to "Walewski to tell him that 
 Austria's greatest wish was to comply with the Emperor's 
 wishes in every respect, that France was her only ally, 
 and that it was therefore imperative that she should 
 follow the same policy. The Emperor appeared pleased 
 with this mark of friendship, and he reiterated that he 
 would take advantage of it to obtain concessions from 
 Austria. I showed myself incredulous, I insisted on 
 the necessity for adopting a decided attitude, and I 
 told him that to begin with I had prepared a protest 
 which I would hand to Walewski the following day. 
 The Emperor hesitated long, and finally said : * Go to 
 London, come to a clear understanding with Palmerston, 
 
108 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 then come and see me.' The Emperor must have 
 spoken to Buol, for he came to me with a thousand 
 protestations about Austria's good feeling towards us, 
 her desire to live peaceably with us, and to respect our 
 institutions, &c. &c., and more humbug of the sort. 
 I replied that he had not given much evidence of such 
 a wish when at Paris, and that I was leaving with a 
 conviction that the understanding between us was worse 
 instead of better. The conversation was a lone: and 
 animated one, but always in a tone of urbanity and 
 courtesy. ... At parting he shook my hand, saying : 
 'Allow me to hope that even politically we shall not 
 always be adversaries.' I conclude from these words 
 that Buol is somewhat uneasy at the exhibitions of 
 opinion in our favour, and possibly also at what the 
 Emperor may have said to him. . . . Orloft' made a 
 thousand protestations of friendship — he agreed with 
 me that the condition of Italy was insupportable. . . . 
 Even the Prussian speaks ill of Austria. After all, if 
 we have not gained anything practically in the eyes of 
 the world, our victory is complete. ..." 
 
 It was evident that this idea of a coming war with 
 which Cavour flattered his mind could not long be 
 indulged. It met with no encouragement in Paris, and 
 Cavour soon perceived that nothing was to be gained 
 from that journey to London which the Emperor advised 
 him to take. A gracious reception from the Queen and 
 the Prince Consort, who exhibited a somewhat platonic 
 interest in the affairs of Italy, an invitation to be 
 present at a naval review, protestations of s}Tnpathy 
 from Tories as well as Whigs for the Piedmontese 
 
GAIN8 OF PIEDMONT. 109 
 
 Constitutional Government — all this he met with in 
 London ; but beyond this he found the English very 
 little excitable in favour of the national question. In 
 fact, he was able to see but very little of Lord 
 Palmerston, and such an interview as he had had in 
 Paris with Lord Clarendon was not renewed in London. 
 Cavour's steady mind soon reverted to the practical 
 truth and a just appreciation of circumstances. But 
 though the war which he had been prematurely dreaming 
 of kindling, immediately after a recent peace, was only an 
 illusion of a moment ; and though he could not have all 
 that he wished, what he had actually obtained in reality 
 was nevertheless very real and singularly encouraging. 
 
 What more was wanted ? Piedmont had united her 
 arms with the arms of the greatest nations in the world, 
 and wiped away the painful recollection of her defeat ; 
 she had offered in the fire of great battles the spectacle of 
 what one of the French generals, Bosquet, called " a 
 jewel of an army." She had taken her seat round the 
 green-table of a congress, beside France, England, Russia, 
 Austria, and Prussia. She had made herself one of the 
 European Powers, and shown that the importance of a 
 country is measured rather by its ability and valour than 
 by extent of territory. She had acquired the right to 
 touch upon forbidden questions, to speak for Italy, and 
 constitute herself Italy's plenipotentiary. / 
 
 This was the result of a policy as consecutive as it 
 was resolute ; and when Cavour returned to Turin after 
 the congress, and there met with the same opposition 
 which had assailed him before the Crimean campaign, 
 harassing him anew with questions as to what he had 
 
110 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 gained, he was able quietly to reply : " We have not 
 reached any very definite object, it is true ; but we have 
 secured two things : In the first place, the anomalous 
 and unhappy situation of Italy has been laid before 
 Europe, not by demagogues or hot-headed revolutionists, 
 nor again by excited journalists, but by the representa- 
 tives of the highest powers of Europe ; by statesmen who 
 govern the greatest nations, and who are accustomed to 
 take council of reason rather than emotion. In the 
 second place, these very Powers have declared that it 
 was not only in the interest of Italy, but in that of 
 Europe, that the ills of Italy should be remedied. I 
 cannot believe that a judgment passed an(J a counsel 
 given by such powers as those of France and England 
 can be barren of good results. The principles which have 
 guided us in these last years have enabled us to make a 
 great advance. For the first time in the whole course of 
 our history the Italian question has been broached and 
 discussed in a European congress ; not as formerly at 
 Laybach and Verona, with a view to aggravate the evils 
 Italy had to bear, and put new chains about her neck ; 
 but, on the contrary, with the openly-avowed object of 
 finding some remedy for her oppressed condition, and to 
 exhibit the sympathies of great nations towards her. The 
 congress is ended, and now the cause of Italy is brought 
 before the tribunal of public opinion. The action may 
 
 be long, and the shif tings many We await the 
 
 issue of it with an entire confidence " Thus 
 
 spoke Cavour before the Chamber on his return to Turin. 
 He was popularly tecognised as the representative of a 
 revived and strengthened Piedmont, and Italians hailed 
 him as the hope of Italy. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 PARLIAMENTARY REIGN OF CAVOUR — PREPARATIONS 
 FOR WAR. 
 
 A Pause after 1856 — New Sifcnation of Piedmont — Moral Headship of Cavour — 
 Portrait of the Man — His Character —His Speeches — A Parliamentary Reign 
 — Watchword of the New Phase — Alere flammam ! — Activity in Turin — The 
 Fortifications of Alessandria — Maritime Arsenal of Spezzia — Boring of the 
 Mont Cenis — Piedmontese Policy in Italy — Cavour and Daniel Manin — 
 Piedmont before Europe — Relations with Russia, with England, and with 
 France — Crisis in Piedmontese Policy — Elections of 1857 — The Crime of 
 Orsini in Paris — Effects in Turin — Ofiicial and Secret Diplomacy — Speech 
 of Cavour on the Alliances — Private Communications of the Emperor — 
 Negotiations — Interview at PlombiSres — Secret Treaty — Scene on the 1st 
 of January, 1859, at the Tuileries — Speech of King Victor Emmanuel 
 before Parliament — Prologue of the War. 
 
 I. 
 
 It was a particular clement of strength in Cavour, 
 that he kept a definite object in view, obscured, it may 
 be at times, by passing events, but ever present to his 
 mind. His courage, though great, was surpassed by his 
 presence of mind and political tact, by the art, which he 
 possessed in an eminent degree, of suiting his actions to 
 circumstances. Manzoni used to say of him that he was 
 every inch a statesman, with " all a statesman's pru- 
 dence and even imprudence." He could be prudent or 
 imprudent as circumstances required. After the Paris 
 congress, he found himself in a position equally brilliant 
 
112 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 and difficult. He had sown seed assiduously, and with 
 a careful hand, and he looked for a harvest. But if, in 
 the midst of all his excitement in Paris, he had indulged 
 a hope of the possibility of a war of liberation being 
 speedily entered upon, he had soon been obliged to 
 recognise that, for one campaign, it was enough to have 
 introduced the subject of Italy in the midst of the con- 
 gress ; that further steps in the same direction would 
 only for the present set France, England, and the whole 
 of Europe — slowly recovering from a recent conflict — 
 against his scheme. He had quickly understood that 
 the new situation, inaugurated by the peace of March 30, 
 1856, was still immature ; that it was needful to give 
 to all political views, all alliances and conflicting in- 
 terests, time enough to assume a definite shape, by fami- 
 liarising public opinion with the Italian question, which 
 had been so suddenly brought forward. He had 
 seen, in a word, that no decisive step could be taken for 
 some years to come — perhaps two, or even three ; and 
 that until then the struggle must be continually re- 
 newed, in order, not only to keep possession of the 
 ground already gained, but also to prepare for an onward 
 march. One thing remained certain : the Paris congress 
 had left the Italian question an open one ; beyond the 
 Alps, Piedmont and Austria now stood opposed face to 
 face. On his return to Turin, Cavour remarked : " The 
 Sardinian and Austrian plenipotentiaries, after sitting 
 side by side for two months, parted without personal 
 animosity, but thoroughly imbued with the conviction 
 that the two countries were farther than ever from 
 political union, and that the principles professed by the 
 
IRRITATION OF AUSTRIA. 113 
 
 two States are irreconcilable." This avowed antagonism, 
 thus laid before the whole of Europe, and accepted by 
 Piedmont, was felt by Austria with all the rancour of a 
 Power that has been set at naught ; irritated by an 
 antagonism which she rightly qualified as unequal, so 
 long as only insignificant Piedmont was concerned in it, 
 she increased the evil by her complaints and accusa- 
 tions. A few months later the quarrel would receive the 
 perilous emphasis of a diplomatic rupture. 
 
 Even before the war in the East, in 1853, Austria 
 had recalled Count Appony ; after the war, early in 
 1857, she recalled Count Paar, recently sent as envoy to 
 Turin. This was not yet a declaration of hostilities, but 
 it was an acknowledgment of incompatibility between 
 the imperial supremacy established at Milan, and the 
 only free State in the Peninsula. To say the truth, this 
 rupture could excite neither surprise nor emotion in 
 Cavour, who had foreseen it, and was relieved by it, but 
 desired to lay all the responsibility of it on Austria. He 
 did not ignore " the difficulties and dangers " of ever-in- 
 creasincr tension in the relations between the two Powers ; 
 he saw in it one of the inevitable consequences of the 
 situation accepted by Piedmont, one condition of the 
 new campaign he had opened by the bold initiative he 
 had taken at the Paris congress. To sap the Austrian 
 domination morally, without affording her the pretext 
 for a rash attack — to maintain the Liberal ascendency of 
 Piedmont, though at the cost of much effort — to rally ^ 
 Italian patriotic sentiment around the banner of Victor 
 Emmanuel without committing himself with the different 
 Governments — to obtain allies by any means, while 
 
114 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 leading Europe gradually to consider the liberation of 
 Italy as important in the interests of conservatism — to 
 prepare' for war under cover of peace — and to pursue 
 all these objects in the midst of conflicting parties, and 
 of incidents equally new and unforeseen : such was 
 Cavour's work during the two or three years following 
 1856. A task so bold and intricate could only be carried 
 on to the end by a man who had succeeded in obtaining 
 a real preponderance, a sort of parliamentary kingship 
 or dictatorship, an instrument powerful and supple to 
 his hand. Few of the phenomena of contemporary 
 parliamentary history are more striking and original than 
 the power thus obtained by one man through parliamen- 
 tary action. 
 
 n. 
 
 " We have a Government ; " so said the Turinese at 
 this period ; "we have Chambers of representatives ; 
 and we have a Constitution : the name for all that is — 
 Cavour." The playful turn of the remai-k did not trifle 
 with the truth of the matter. The fact is that at one 
 time it was Cavour's fortune to eclipse, or rather to 
 personify the Piedmontese constitutional regime, which 
 owed him all its lustre and eflficiency. Assuredly he was 
 not alone in a country which numbered among its 
 senators D'Azeglio, Count Sclopis, Count Gallina, 
 ]\Iarquis Alfieri ; and among its deputies^ Balbo, Revel, 
 Menabrea, Boncampagni, Rattazzi, Lanza, Mamiani 
 Farini. More rapidly than the rest he had obtained the 
 exceptional position of a man reigning in and by the 
 Chambers, ruling parties and leading public opinion, 
 which followed humbly in his train. 
 
INFLUENCE OF CAVOUB. 115 
 
 As the complication of events increased, and com- 
 binations of internal policy were added to diplomatic 
 action, Cavour's influence increased also to an extraor- 
 dinary degree. The Chambers shrank from refusing him 
 anything he asked for ; and if some eccentric members 
 of the Eadical or the Absolutist party, if Broff'erio 
 or Count Solaro della Margherita worried him with 
 their conflicting attacks, they gave him but fresh occa- 
 sion to strengthen his ascendency. Deputies who had 
 come prepared to question anything and everything were 
 frequently reduced to silence by a gesture or a keen glance 
 from him — like the worthy tradesman of the Via di Po^ 
 who, one day while exhibiting his wares to the Countess 
 Stackelberg, suddenly vanished into the colonnade, but 
 as quickly reappeared, saying : " Pray excuse me, but 
 I caught sight of Count Cavour, and I wanted to see 
 how matters are progressing. He looked cheerful and 
 smiling, so things must be going on all right ; I feel 
 comfortable now." It was thus in parliament ; the habit 
 was contracted of judging things by the countenance 
 of the President of the Council. 
 
 Call it a dictatorship : but it was a most exceptional 
 one, daily granted and hourly assented to ; continually 
 exercised under the control of the Chambers. Under the 
 eye of a free nation Cavour, with a confidence which he 
 knew how to impart to those around him, accepted all 
 the conditions of a parliamentary life which he loved, 
 and the strength and dignity of which he appreciated. 
 Neither the conflict nor its consequences repelled him. 
 On one occasion, on its being pointed out to him that a 
 measure to which he attached the highest importance 
 
 I 2 
 
116 IIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 would already have been carried had he but been a 
 minister of an absolute Government, he replied with 
 great animation : " You forget that under an absolute 
 Government I neither would nor could have been 
 minister at all. I am what I am because I am fortunate 
 enough to be a constitutional minister. A parliamentary 
 government has its drawbacks like any other ; and yet, 
 with all its drawbacks, it is worth more than all the 
 others. I may lose patience with the opposition I 
 meet with, and resist it energetically; but then, on reflec- 
 tion, I am thankful for such opposition, since it compels 
 me to make my views clearer, and to renew my efforts 
 to convince the majority. An absolute minister com- 
 mands ; a constitutional minister, in order to be obeyed, 
 must persuade: and I mean to persuade the majority 
 that I am in the right. Believe me, the most inferior 
 chamber of representatives is preferable to the most bril- 
 liant imperial anteroom." Thus he who appeared to be a 
 dictator was in truth only the head parliamentary official, 
 putting honestly into practice, with equal fidelity and 
 liberal confidence, the regime which he appeared to 
 overshadow. 
 
 No doubt Cavour owed the authority he had thus 
 obtained to his success, to his being leader in an 
 onward movement, and to the pre-eminence he had 
 been able to give his little country in the settling of 
 European difficulties. He owed it also to his genius 
 for business, to the breadth and versatility of his mind, 
 to a marvellous fertility of expedients, to the ready 
 influence exerted by a sympathetic nature, at once 
 amiable, easy, and forceful. Be sure it was no ordinary 
 
EIS^ CAPACITY FOB BUSINESS. / 117 
 
 party-chief who could be at once Minister of Commerce, 
 Minister of Finance, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister 
 of the Interior, and even at a given moment, Minister 
 of War; bearing all these burdens without bending under 
 them, with never-failing aptitude and unwearying 
 activity. Whether in parliament or directing business, 
 Cavour reaped the advantages of his early practical 
 training. He combined the superiority of a politician 
 pursuing the realisation of an idea, with that of a man 
 who had mastered all the details of administration and 
 of political economy. Completely identified with his 
 country, he was as well acquainted with every province 
 and town of Piedmont as with his own estate at Leri. 
 
 Agriculture, commerce, industry, maritime interests, 
 state finances, and even the finances of the communes-^ 
 none of these came amiss to him. He often amazed and 
 disconcerted his enemies, proving to them with playful 
 gusto that he knew the affairs of their particular locality 
 better than they did. He had the art of interpreting 
 dry financial statements, so grouping facts and figures 
 as to lend them a living interest. In the endless discus- 
 sions upon the. new taxes, he would give a graphic and 
 animated description of what the people had to pay for 
 these terrible taxes, and, on the other hand, how much 
 they had been the gainers by the diminution of tariffs, by 
 increased facilities of traffic, and by railroads ; and he 
 would depict with a master-hand the increase of national 
 prosperity under the happy influence of this system of 
 economical Liberalism so much cried down by its oppo- 
 nents. To a member who was complaining on behalf of 
 his provincial district, the fertile regions of Monferrat, so 
 
118 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 ricli in wine and cereals, Cavour replied, vsdtliout hesitation : 
 " The honourable member who has just spoken on behalf 
 of the Monferrat agriculturists must be himself a skilful 
 cultivator, and doubtless he makes thirty-one hectolitres 
 of wine per hectare. The means of communication 
 between Nice (in Monferrat) and Alessandria give him a 
 profit of at least If. 50c. per hectolitre, which represents 
 45f. per hectare. I beg him to inform us whether he 
 pays 45f. per hectare in taxes." Much laughter greeted 
 this home-thrust by way of demonstration. Cavour 
 possessed the advantage of a thorough acquaintance, of 
 the most precise and intimate kind, with all that con- 
 cerned his country. This was no doubt one of the causes 
 of his ascendency ; but it was far from being the only 
 one, nor even the truest, or, if the word is allowable, the 
 most human. 
 
 m. 
 
 The real cause of Cavour's superiority and authority 
 in parliament, as well as at the head of aflfairs, was the 
 quality of the man — the attractive originality of his mar- 
 vellously well-balanced nature. Cavour had nothing in 
 common with the mediocre statesman, ambitious of power, 
 and yet encumbered with it ; full of his own importance, 
 exhausting subtleties and complications, and, with much 
 labour, achieving infinitesimal results. In him there 
 was no arrogance, no strain, no uncertainty. He was 
 the most natural and straightforward of politicians, 
 carrying out his innumerable engagements with the 
 greatest ease ; doing the most engrossing work without 
 effort or fatigue ; holding cheaply all etiquette and regu- 
 
EIS CHEERFULNESS. 119 
 
 lations; cordial and pleasant in all his relations with 
 men. He shrank instinctively from whatever savoured 
 of affectation or display ; and when, after having been 
 hard at work ever since daybreak in sending off des- 
 patches or receiving visits, he went on his way along the 
 colonnade of the Via di Po to the Office of Foreign 
 Affairs, or that of Finance, he seemed only a worthy 
 citizen of Turin, bowing to an acquaintance here, or 
 talking to one there, affable with everyone. In the 
 midst of the most important affairs he had the gift of a 
 cheerful animation, the wholesome brightness of an 
 elastic temperament and a well-regulated mind; a 
 cheerfulness which manifested itself in a hearty laugh, or 
 in a way of rubbing his hands in a certain manner which 
 has become traditional. 
 
 Thus endowed with a happy spirit, a ready intelli- 
 gence, and a great enjojrment of life, he never knew 
 what ennui was, any more than rancour or bitterness. 
 He used to say that rancour was absurd, and that nothing 
 need ever be wearisome. Thus he would pass with 
 perfect equanimity from the study of some profound 
 political problem to the reading of a novel or a news- 
 paper article ; from conferring with an ambassador to 
 conversing with some humble peasant or modest appli- 
 cant for office ; from the most complicated state affairs 
 to mere parish matters. This was the man who, in the 
 gravest crisis in his career, between the ministry of yes- 
 terday and the ministry of the morrow, could write from 
 Leri to one of his friends : '' Do not be vexed with me if 
 I don't write to you. It is because I don't wish to en- 
 tertain you with the discussions of the vestry-meetings 
 
120 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 of Trino, of whicli I am a very active member. Don't 
 lose this letter ; it contains the direction of the apothe- 
 cary who sells chestnut-oil to cure gout. At Leri one 
 has leisure for everything, even for reading Madame 
 de S.'s prosing. Here I am, shelved for an indefinite 
 time. . As far as I am concerned, I am quite content, for 
 this life suits me perfectly. I am quite happy by 
 myself, or with the worthy agriculturists amongst whom 
 I Uve." 
 
 He could indeed find time for everything, because he 
 took an interest in everything, and he could find good in 
 everytjiing. He despised neither men nor things, and 
 he used to say wittily that many card-players only lose 
 because they have no regard for the small cards ; as for 
 him, he knew the value of the small cards — of insignifi- 
 cant people, even of counsels and remarks which he 
 would call forth and listen to and make his own. But 
 under this apparent facility and good humour, Cavour 
 possessed the highest qualities of a statesman ; clearness 
 and precision of ideas, and a strength of will w^hich at 
 times could make all give way before it. Neither peril 
 nor difficulty proved an obstacle to his will. Only, this 
 iron will was clad in graciousness, the sharp outline of 
 his ideas was veiled in the garb of amiability ; his prac- 
 tical good sense, so unerring and fully developed, was 
 combined with great and broad conceptions ; and thus 
 this gifted nature — hearty, liberal, impetuous, and fasci- 
 nating — became irresistible : friends, adversaries, dissen- 
 tients, all were attracted and carried along by it. 
 
 The innumerable speeches by which Cavour defended 
 his policy, and which subsist as a monument of the 
 
HIS CHAEAGTER AS AN ORATOB. 121 
 
 parliamentary regime, represent faithfully his character 
 and tone of mind. Cavour was not a born orator, and 
 at the beginning of his career he obtained a hearing with 
 some difficulty. His voice was rather harsh ; there was 
 a certain sharpness in his tones, not abated by the wear 
 and tear of conflict ; and he never lost a slight .cough, 
 which at times interfered with his well-rounded periods, 
 and which, indeed, he knew how to turn to account when 
 necessary. Besides this, he had to acquire the habit of 
 speaking Itahan, and he rather piqued himself upon his 
 literary inability ; he used sometimes to pretend to con- 
 sult his friends as to the correctness of some sentence ; 
 but he rapidly became the first debater in the Pied- 
 montese parliament, riveting attention by the reliableness 
 of his views and the substantial soundness of his elucida- 
 tions ; fascinating his hearers by the subtlety of his 
 reasoning, and making himself formidable by the brilliant 
 sarcasm of his repartees. 
 
 Usually he would allow the discussion to develop 
 itself, and speakers to follow each other in succession, 
 while he betrayed emotion or impatience, or appeared to 
 listen with smiling animated bonhomie ; for in him all 
 was life and action. When the discussion seemed to be 
 at an end, when everyone else had spoken, he would 
 enter the arena with one of his telhng speeches. He 
 never wrote them down beforehand ; a few hours' medi- 
 tation was sufficient preparation ; he relied for the rest 
 on the inspiration of the moment, like a man master of 
 his thoughts. Cavour had the art of grasping a question, 
 at once elevating and simplifying it, answering each 
 interruption without breaking the order of his ideas. 
 
122 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 combining tlie superiority and novelty of his views with 
 the accuracy and abundance of his facts ; and this too in 
 the most natural language, without declamation or 
 literary artifice, with a logical clearness of demonstration 
 which vanquished his enemies, captivated and encouraged 
 his friends, and satisfied and reassured public opinion. 
 Was he a witty or an eloquent man ? — He was essentially 
 the richly-gifted politician, making use of wit and 
 eloquence ; an orator with a practical aim ; with a com- 
 prehensive grasp of every subject, quick to disengage 
 whatever was practicable, and to seize the gist of the 
 matter ; enlarging his own influence while enlarging his 
 sphere of action. He was always on a level with the 
 situations which his own inventive genius had created, 
 and equal to all the difficulties which he did not shrink 
 from provoking. 
 
 For Cavour the parliamentary rSgime was by no 
 means a mere medium for his eloquence or an arena of 
 party stratagem ; it was a powerful lever for practical 
 government, a means of awaking public opinion, and 
 associating it with the progressive realisation of an ever- 
 active idea. Cavour would sometimes say : "I am 
 willing to lead and even to spur on the country, but the 
 country must back me up ; between it and me there 
 must be no rupture. Should any such rupture arise, 
 not only could I no longer indulge the hope that my 
 poHtical plans would ever prevail, but I could no longer 
 be minister." To precede and direct public opinion, 
 without ceasing to be in living contact with it, to know 
 on occasion how to wait, this was his grand secret ; the 
 secret of a great Liberal who only obtained the voluntary 
 
EIS MOTTO, 123 
 
 confidence of his country by proving himself a far-sighted 
 and able promoter of a national work ; and not a mere 
 partisan or faction leader. Such was his view of the 
 parliamentary regime of which he made such happy use 
 in order to take the first forward step. And he had 
 more than ever to make use of it after the Paris cojigress, 
 in a policy comprehending at once internal and external 
 action : Piedmont, Italy, and Europe. 0^-^hese tl 
 points he had to concentrate his efforts. /^^^ '^^ ^^^^ 
 
 The position attained by the Cabinet of Turin, through 
 its co-operation in the Crimean war and the general 
 negotiation for peace, was certainly flattering to-" the 
 pride of a small country. The point was to maintain, 
 strengthen, and extend it for further progress. 
 
 Cavour knew well that there could be no drawing 
 back ; that after having raised Piedmont to a certain 
 level, he could • not allow it to decline again ; and that 
 after having excited the hopes, interests, even the 
 impatient expectations of his country, he could no 
 lono;er extinguish the flame he stood in such need of 
 Immediately, therefore, upon his return to Turin, after 
 the Paris congress, he busied himself with giving a fresh 
 impetus, that he might enable Piedmont to keep up her 
 ambitious rdle of a small power bent upon becoming a 
 great one. ''Aleve Jktmmam" was his motto. It was 
 necessary to go forward, to do something ; to prove the 
 omnipresence and activity of the Piedmontese leader- 
 ship, which had to manifest itself in eveiy possible way. 
 In less than two years, amid a multiplication of enter- 
 
124 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 prises and projects, Cavour had fortified Alessandria, 
 created a great marine arsenal at Spezzia, and urged on 
 the boring of the Mont Cenis tunnel — all this at the risk 
 of appearing to exceed the stretch and force of a small 
 nation by a policy of moral action or of militiiry 
 preparation which told heavily upon its exchequer, and 
 necessarily called for fresh loans. 
 
 The fortifications of Alessandria, and especially the 
 national subscription for one hundred cannon, set on 
 foot by Italian patriotism, to mount on the Piedmontese 
 citadel, might well, and with more reason than the 
 alliance with the Eastern Powers, pass for a " pistol-shot," 
 or indeed a cannon-ball, fired in the ear of Austria. 
 Cavour denied nothing, asserted nothing; he did not 
 deny the moral bearing of the demonstration, though 
 still avoiding anything that would have seemed like a 
 direct provocation. He got out of the difficulty by 
 representing the fortifying of Alessandria as the carry- 
 ing out of an old scheme, and brought forward, in his 
 light-hearted way, his former terrible colleague of the 
 War Office, La Marmora. "When I was Minister of 
 Finance," he said, " he was always tormenting me ; 
 and I remember well, that on his departure for the 
 Crimea, his last words to me were : ' Do not forget that 
 if you fail to look to the fortifications of Alessandria, 
 some fine day I shall protest formally and publicly 
 against you.' " In like manner, on the subject of Spezzia, 
 he would repeat : ** When peace was made, my colleague 
 La Marmora, who is at heart as tenacious as myself, 
 said to me as he turned into the War Office : 'Alessandria 
 and La Spezzia ; * to which I replied, * La Spezzia and 
 
MILITARY WORKS AND CIVIL ENGINEERING. 125 
 
 Alessandria.' " The fortifying of Alessandria, by com- 
 pleting the fortifications of Casale and of Valenza on the 
 Po, made good the defence of Piedmont against the first 
 shock of an attack ; and, in truth, it was this ensemble of 
 public works suggested by far-sighted wisdom, which, 
 in the decisive epoch of 1859, were destined to save 
 Turin, by arresting the Austrian invasion, and leaving 
 the French army time to arrive. 
 
 The creation of a great arsenal at La Spezzia, at the 
 utmost limit of the kingdom, a work which Cavour did 
 not shrink from attempting, even after Napoleon, would 
 evidently lead to vaster combinations, which compre- 
 hended at least the whole of Northern and Central Italy. 
 Under diverse forms, these two projects of La Spezzia 
 and Alessandria, strongly opposed, and carried almost 
 arbitrarily, were in truth military works, a sort of making 
 ready for the conflicts of the future, perhaps of a speedy 
 war. The boring of the Mont Cenis tunnel represented 
 another side of this indefatigable policy : the thought of 
 aggrandisement by moral action, by a fertile initiatory 
 movement, by the extension and ever-increasing facility 
 of intercourse between the nations. It was indeed a 
 great enterprise for an insignificant country, this attack 
 upon Mont Cenis ; this gigantic speculation, in which 
 political and financial questions were mixed up with the 
 original and purely scientific aspect — that of the possi- 
 bility of its execution, and the means by which to carry 
 it out. Cavour was undismayed by so venturesome an 
 undertaking. His keen glance no doubt apprehended 
 its practical benefits, the happy consequences which must 
 ensue for the sub-Alpine population, for the national 
 
126 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 industries, and for the part his small country would have 
 to play in the world's onward progress. He reckoned 
 with the precision of an economist, like a long-headed 
 financier, all the material advantages of the Mont Cenis 
 tunnel ; but at the same time he was, perhaps, especially 
 alive to the honour Piedmont would achieve by tliis 
 proof of indomitable resolution. He threw himself into 
 the enterprise with all his accustomed ardour ; and one 
 day, on the Piazza d'Armi of Turin, pointing in the 
 direction of the amphitheatre of Alps which shut in the 
 horizon, he observed to his friends : " If Louis XIV. said 
 the Pyrenees would be no more, I hope some day to say 
 with more truth that the Alps are no more. People 
 speak of the great obstacles in the way, and I admit 
 them ; they say also that we are still too small a State 
 to attempt an enterprise of such magnitude. I reply 
 that, as for the obstacles, we shall surmount them, and 
 in order to become great we must do this. The Alps 
 must actually come down." And, thus saying, his looks 
 revealed the ardour and power of will animating him. 
 
 Cavour had from the first taken the greatest interest 
 in this undertaking. He followed with deep attention 
 all the experiments of Sommeiller, the able Savoyard 
 engineer, who, after distinguishing himself in the works 
 among the Apennines, in the line to Genoa, applied all 
 the power of his genius to the solution of the problem of 
 employing compressed air in the boring of Mont Cenis. 
 Cavour not only seconded SommeiUer in his ministerial 
 capacity, he also upheld him by his own faith in the 
 scheme ; and just as in La Marmora he had always found 
 an equally faithful and active fellow-worker, so in the 
 
VOTE FOB THE TUNNELLING OF MONT CENIS. 127 
 
 matter of the Mont Cenis, his associates and supporters 
 were his colleagues in public works — ^Paleocapa, and 
 Menabrea, who laid aside his political views in order to 
 aid in so great an enterprise. Cavour busied himself 
 with all that could insure success, defending with equal 
 energy the engineers, the means of execution, the neces- 
 sary loans, or the treaties signed with the Savoy Railway 
 Company ; smoothing down all difficulties, and winning 
 over all hesitative opinions. " I trust," he energetically 
 declared in parliament, ''I trust none of you will 
 belie what you have already done at the close of this 
 laborious session of the Legislature ; I feel sure you will 
 follow out a frank and resolute policy. If you should 
 adopt another proposition, you would inaugurate a totally 
 different system ; and I should indeed deplore this, not 
 only because a great work would be compromised, but 
 because it would be a fatal omen for the future political 
 system of parliament ; we had the choice between two 
 ways, and we preferred the bolder and hardier of the 
 two ; we cannot now stop half way. It is for us a con- 
 dition of existence, an unavoidable alternative — On, or 
 perish ! I firmly believe that you will complete your 
 work by the greatest of modern enterprises — by voting 
 for the tunnelling of Mont Cenis." It is thus that 
 success is won, and when short-sighted opponents troubled 
 Cavour, asking him to what lengths he intended to go, 
 and pointing out the danger of placing the strongest 
 military establishment at the extreme end of the king- 
 dom, multiplying fortifications and armaments, engaging 
 Piedmont in enterprises quite beyond its strength, and 
 when they accused him of creating an artificial and 
 
128 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 hazardous situation which could not last, he did not 
 always reply, although he was not one to disavow his 
 thoughts. He well knew all that could be said on the 
 subject. For the present he had attained the more 
 obvious aim of his policy, since at the cost of efforts and 
 sacrifices, the greatness of which he did not deny, and 
 the justification of which he left to the future, he was 
 able to present Piedmont as the active, acknowledged, 
 and ever-advancing representative of the liberal and 
 national idea. 
 
 V. 
 
 The problem for Cavour was not only at Turin : from 
 henceforth it extended beyond the Alps. This problem 
 consisted in penetrating Italy with the new spirit which 
 animated the Piedmontese policy ; rallying, organising, 
 and disciplining Italian patriotism under the tricoloured 
 flag waving in the hand of a popular king. Cavour 
 knew what had been the cost of dreams, chimerical ideas, 
 factions, secret societies, and revolutionary movements 
 to Italy. His one thought was to break with such 
 disastrous associations,* disengage the cause of Italy from 
 all that had compromised it, set it free from revolu- 
 tionary parties by maintaining its character of a just 
 and honest work of restitution, and carry on the work 
 he had begun at the Paris congress. 
 
 He relied upon the propaganda of his liberal and 
 national policy, not upon revolutionary dreams, the 
 fatal sterility of which he knew and repudiated. He 
 would siiy, speaking of the Mazzinians : " I admire their 
 devotion to an idea ; I abhor their fanaticism." An > 
 
REBUKES DEFENDEBS OF ASSASSINATION. 129 
 
 attempt upon the life of the king of Naples by the 
 ^soldier Ao^esilas Milano excited nothins: hut diso;ust in 
 him, nor would he have dreamed of making a merit of 
 his indignant repudiation of it. 
 
 To those who reproached him with not favouring all 
 attempts at insurrection in the other Italian States, or 
 who in his presence applauded deeds of murder or 
 incendiarism, he replied in parliament : " Our speeches 
 and our policy are not intended to prompt and foster 
 rash enterprises, vain and foolish attempts at revo- 
 lution in Italy. It is quite otherwise that we under- 
 stand the regeneration of the country. We have ever 
 followed a straightforward and loyal policy, and as long as 
 we shall be at peace with the other sovereigns of Italy, 
 we shall never employ revolutionary means nor promote 
 disturbances. As for Naples, mention has been made 
 of recent and painful facts : the explosion of a powder 
 magazine, and of vessels of war; a horrible outrage. 
 Some have spoken in such a way as to throw the credit 
 of these deeds upon the Italian party. I repudiate 
 them ; I repudiate them utterly, and for Italy's own 
 sake. No ; these are not deeds that can be attributed 
 to the national Italian party, they are the isolated acts 
 of some misguided wretch, which must be stigmatised 
 by all good men, especially by those who value Italian 
 honour and welfare." 
 
 Words like these, uttered by him who had intro- 
 duced Italy into the congress of European Powers, 
 awakened deep and salutary sympathy beyond the 
 Alps. They renovated public opinion ; they had the 
 advantage of depriving the factions of their plea that 
 
130 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 they conspired for the national cause, and the other 
 Powers of any pretext to charge the national cause with 
 the blame of conspiracies commonly resulting from the 
 violence of measures of repression. The factious spirit 
 was not to be lightly overcome. Its adherents felt that 
 this minister of a constitutional monarchy was their 
 worst enemy; and at the very time Cavour was thus 
 disowning revolutionary means, Mazzini, on the Pied- 
 montese territory itself, at Genoa, was making a last 
 eflfort to regain his influence. Mazzini's wild attempt 
 at Genoa failed miserably, thanks to the good sense of 
 the public, more surprised than alarmed at this outbreak. 
 It was only one more proof that the power lost by the 
 factious party was steadily being gained by the party of 
 national Liberalism. 
 
 In proportion as it became more marked in word 
 and deed, Piedmontese policy had the happy result of 
 reviving everywhere a belief that the work of liberation 
 was to be brought about by open and regular means. 
 And in this work Cavour quickly found allies or fellow- 
 workers, who flocked to him from all parts of Italy, 
 sometimes without his seeking them or knowing them. 
 The national society formed at this period, organised 
 by Giuseppe La Farina, a Sicilian emigrant, was one 
 manifestation of this new phase in Italian affairs. 
 Cavour found in this society an independent auxiliary, 
 rather a dangerous one at times, perhaps ; but it had 
 the advantage of bringing back into the great patriotic 
 current many honest minds until then entangled in 
 Mazzinian "affiliations." Cavour had especially won 
 over the most generous and powerful of allies, Manin, 
 
MANIN. 131 
 
 living in retirement in Paris ever since^ the fall of 
 Venice. 
 
 Although placed under such different conditions, the 
 one in all the 6clat of an official post, the other an exile, 
 these two men were made to understand each other ; 
 they had numerous points in common : impassioned 
 patriotism, clear-sightedness, and a keen and practical 
 insight into events. At the time of the congress Manin 
 had an interview with Cavour ; he had speedily appre- 
 hended the meaning of the Piedmontese minister's 
 policy, and in spite of his Venetian predilection for 
 Eepublicanism, with the resolution of a man " in search 
 of that which is practically possible, loving Italy more 
 than the Republic," he did not hesitate to declare himself 
 in favour of a policy whose success he had hailed in the 
 Paris negotiations. Broken by family affliction — the 
 death of a daughter, who was in his eyes the pathetic 
 image of his beloved Venice — suffering already from the 
 malady which carried him to the grave, he was spending 
 his remaining strength in developing his ideas, his pro- 
 gramme for the future. It was he who had promoted the 
 subscription in Paris for the hundred cannon of Ales- 
 sandria, concerning which a particular significance was 
 found in the toleration extended to it by the French 
 Government. He wrote innumerable letters and mani- 
 festoes upholding the alliance with France ; warning his 
 fellow-countrymen against old divisions and sterile party 
 conflicts ; repudiating especially, as did Cavour, assassina- 
 tion and the stiletto of the conspirator ; urging Mazzini 
 to give up his plots, and to retire from an arena where 
 his presence was only an obstacle. "I accept the 
 
 K 2 
 
132 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 monarchy of Savoy," he said, " provided it will help 
 loyally and efficiently in the making of Italy. The 
 Piedmontese monarchy, in order to be faithful to its 
 mission, must ever keep in view the final goal — the 
 independence and unification of Italy. It must make 
 use of aU the means which will enable it to advance one 
 step in the way leading to that goal. It must remain 
 the kernel, the centre of attraction of Italian nationality." 
 
 Manin could not know that before the close of four 
 years from that date what seemed a dream would have 
 become a reality — which he was not destined to see. 
 His dying eyes and longing heart anticipated and em- 
 braced the future in its ultimate issues. 
 
 Cavour, for the time being, could not keep pace with 
 him, or at least he could not acknowledge that he did 
 so. He felt the danger of moving too fast ; he was 
 accustomed to repeat in his own intimate circle : " We 
 can do but one thing at a time. Let us begin by turn- 
 ing the Austrians out of Italy 1 " Being the minister of 
 a regularly-constituted State, he believed himself Ijound 
 to allow for certain necessities of government, to avoid 
 false steps and useless or premature complications. 
 
 When France and England, in 1856, engaged in a 
 diplomatic intervention, to moderate the rigorous 
 despotism of the king of Naples, Cavour kept out of it ; 
 not because he was not tempted to make the best of 
 such an occasion, but because he could not see how far 
 the two Powers meant to go, and because he dreaded an 
 inefficient demonstration, by which Piedmontese credit 
 would sufier without compensation. When, in the 
 summer of 1857, Pope Pius IX. went to Bologna, Cavour 
 
SAYING OF SALVAGNOLL 133 
 
 did not consider himself free from the obligation required 
 by custom; he sent Boncompagni, then representing! 
 Victor Emmanuel at Florence, to greet his HoHness. 
 He considered such homage due to the head of the j 
 Church and the Piedmontese Catholics, whom he would j 
 not slight unnecessarily. Cavour was a minister who! 
 kept on good terms with governments and tradition, but| 
 that did not hinder him from following his own path. 
 
 His words as well as his deeds continually strength- 
 ened the ascendency of his policy on the other side of 
 the Alps, and from this tendency of Cavour, from the 
 impulse given by Manin, from the manifold action of the 
 National Society, there sprang the new and rapidly- 
 growing Italian Party, prompt to submit to the dis- 
 cipline and march under the orders of him of whom the 
 brilliant and accomplished Florentine, Salvagnoli, used to 
 say : " After a conversation with that man I breathe more 
 freely ; my mind dilates." 
 
 VL 
 
 For the parliamentary leader to have won over 
 Piedmont and Italy by the attraction of a national 
 policy was much, but more was needed. Cavour had to 
 obtain allies by taking advantage of the somewhat 
 critical situation in which Europe found itself imme- 
 diately after the Paris congress. The peace of March 30, 
 1856, had left a certain number of points unsettled — 
 the limitation of the new Russian frontier in Bessarabia ; 
 the possession of the Isle of Serpents at the mouth of 
 the Danube ; the regulation of the navigation of that 
 river; the organisation of the principalities of Moldo- 
 
184 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 
 
 Wallachia — and the solution of those complementary 
 questions was almost as delicate and thorny as the peace 
 itself. It was rendered all the more so by the interests 
 and resentments that it brought into play, and by the 
 disturbing of aUiances which might come of them. One 
 thing was certain — there were mutual misunderstandings. 
 European diplomacy was divided into two camps. In 
 the one, Austria, rather suspicious in its attitude towards 
 Russia, and holding to the conditions of the peace with 
 the utmost rigour, had the support of England and 
 Turkey ; in the other, France showed a visible inclina- 
 tion for Russia, putting the most favourable interpreta- 
 tion on the conditions, and seemingly anxious to flatter 
 the nation she had lately fought. Peace had hardly 
 been signed a few months, and already the allies of 
 Cavour seemed no longer in harmony. 
 
 At first Cavour only interfered with much reserve in 
 these private dissensions, wherein he feared to find divi- 
 sion, if not hostility, between two powers, England and 
 France, which he would fain have conciliated equally. 
 If his intervention soon grew more active, it was because 
 he was called to action by what he considered a political 
 necessity, and by the confidence of the Cabinets, who 
 grew more and more in the habit of refening to this 
 clear and creative mind. He acted the part of a kind of 
 mediator or peacemaker in the conferences held at Paris 
 or at Constantinople. Thus, in the matter of boundaiy, 
 known under the name of the "question ch Bolgrad," it 
 was he who suggested an arrangement desired by France, 
 destined to accommodate Russian susceptil)ility, and be 
 definitively accepted by England. 
 
RUSSIA AND PIEDMONT. 135 
 
 When the organisation of the Principalities was being 
 settled, he sided with Eussia and France for the union 
 of Moldavia and Wallachia ; he considered this a due 
 recognition paid to nationality, and he showed himself 
 the more resolute when Austria proved hostile. Count 
 Buol had said : ""We have quite enough with one Sardinia 
 at the foot of the Alps, without having another at the 
 foot of the Carpathians." 
 
 These questions were of importance in his eyes 
 only in proportion as they tended to strengthen Pied- 
 mont, concerned Italy, and helped the latter to attain 
 the object in view ; which was, to gain fresh allies 
 or sympathies against the enemy he had to combat. It 
 was the ruling thought in his diplomacy in the midst of 
 all the European incidents which he endeavoured to turn 
 to account, in order to create, as he said, an atmosphere 
 favourable to Italy. 
 
 In fact, by his readiness and wise moderation, he had 
 first won over Russia, which displayed towards Pied- 
 mont a marked cordiality, if only to show hatred of 
 Austria. As soon as the intercourse between the two 
 countries had been renewed. Prince Gortchakoff said to 
 the representative of the court of Turin : " I do not wish 
 to enter into recriminations. We have been ill-advised 
 since 1849 in our refusal to allow you a Russian legation 
 at Turin, and in refusing to grant you a legation at 
 St. Petersburg. We have been too much influenced by 
 Austria ; I never approved of it. Now the path is open 
 before us ; we may, if we choose, be friends. Let me 
 say that Russia and Piedmont are natural allies. We 
 are very well pleased with your attitude towards us." 
 
136 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOTJB. 
 
 The Emperor Alexander II., during the festivities of 
 his coronation at Moscow, had spoken in most flattering 
 terms to General Broglia, ambassador of Victor Em- 
 manuel, purposely raising his voice in order to be over- 
 heard by the Austrian ambassador. Shortly afterwards, 
 the Czarina, mother of Alexander, had gone to spend the 
 winter of 1857 at Nice, where she had been treated with 
 marked consideration and deference. The Grand Duchess 
 Helena paid a visit to Piedmont. The Grand Dukes 
 Constantine and Michael, who were going on a visit to 
 their mother, had been to Turin, where princely honours 
 were shown them. They had gone with Victor Em- 
 manuel to a State representation at the theatre, and 
 these demonstrations were all the more significant in 
 that they coincided with the diplomatic rupture which 
 had just taken place between Austria and Piedmont. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Russian diplomatists repeated to the 
 Sardinian representatives : *' Piedmont must have a 
 more extended territory, even in the interest of Russia. 
 But this must be brought about independently of revo- 
 lution ; the initiative must come from above. Pending 
 this, let the Sardinian Government continue to prove to 
 Europe that it is capable of maintaining order ; let it 
 abstain from disturbing the other Italian States. If 
 Piedmont can calmly await the great day, that day will 
 come, and Russia will assist her in driving Austria out 
 of Italy." These promises and demonstrations might 
 indeed be rather flattering than efiicacious. In any 
 case, they marked the culminating point of the relations 
 between Russia and Piedmont about the year 1857, and 
 were of sufficient importance to encourage Cavour, at the 
 
THE POLICY OF ENGLAND. 137 
 
 risk of offending Lord Palmerston, to yield to the Czar 
 a permanent right of anchorage in the Mediterranean, 
 in the harbour of Villafranca, and Eussia's hatred of 
 Austria was at least the earnest of a sympathetic 
 neutrality when a conflict should take place. 
 
 VII. 
 
 There remained now only England and France, the 
 two great allies whom Cavour kept continually in view, 
 from whom he expected more direct and active support, 
 without knowing to what extent it would go. Evidently 
 his ideal would have been to maintain the alliance 
 between these Powers in all its integrity, while he 
 cherished the hope of one day making use of it for the 
 cause of Italy. It was a dream, as he had lately been 
 made aware in the negotiations set on foot after the 
 Paris congress. As soon as difficulties arose, England 
 had turned towards Austria, and England had assuredly 
 not allied herself with Austria in affairs of the East in 
 order to abandon her in the affairs of Italy. 
 
 The policy of England, that of Liberals and Con- 
 servatives alike, could be lavish in encouragement, and 
 in proofs of the warmest sympathy towards the constitu- 
 tional government flourishing at Turin ; it was willing to 
 call for internal reforms in the other Italian States, to 
 lecture the Pope and even the king of Naples ; nay, if 
 need were, it would not refuse its help to Piedmont if 
 it were attacked : but it would go no farther. The 
 words of Lord Clarendon, which had for a time misled 
 Cavour, did not go beyond this limit. 
 
138 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUE. 
 
 England, bound traditionally to the treaties of 1857, 
 desired neither war nor a readjustment of tenitory for 
 Italy. She took especial umbrage at any complication 
 offering France occasion to interfere beyond the Alps. 
 Accordingly Cavour met with demonstrations of friend- 
 ship and of much consideration at England's hands, but 
 scarcely of encouragement, rather mistrustful and u'ritat- 
 ing advice. In spite of all his efforts he gained no 
 ground; he had perhaps excited suspicion by yielding 
 to Russia the right of anchorage in the Mediterranean 
 harbour of Villafranca. Lord Palmerston had said 
 sarcastically : " Really, I did not expect Count Cavour 
 to become Russian." To which Count Cavour, when 
 told of it, replied : " Tell Lord Palmerston that I am 
 Liberal enough not to be Russian, and too much so 
 to be Austrian." 
 
 When the diplomatic rupture between Austria and 
 Piedmont was at its height, at the beginning of 1857, 
 the Sardinian ambassador to London, the Marquis 
 Emmanuel d'Azeglio, had a decisive explanation with 
 Lord Palmerston : " Your error," said Lord Palmerston, 
 " lies in beheving that in order to promote the good of 
 Italy the best way is to be on bad terms with Austria. 
 With the means of action Austria has at command, she 
 will turn the other Italian States against you, and will 
 be an ii-reconcilable enemy to all your plans of reform. 
 Would it not be better to disarm her opposition by 
 taking from her every plausible pretext of combating 
 Piedmontese policy ? " " But, my lord," replied the 
 Marquis d'Azeglio, "we shall never sec Austria con- 
 curring with us to amehorate the situation of Italy. 
 
LORD PALMJEBSTON AND B'AZEGLIO. 139 
 
 She has all the Governments on her side — we have the 
 people. She says to the former : * Will you have my 
 protection ? I grant it you. Do not forget that I repre- 
 sent absolutism, the reign of the sword, and Catholic 
 intolerance.' But as for us, we say to the people : 
 * Follow us ; we have Italian blood in our veins ; we 
 uphold the flag of independence, religious toleration, free 
 institutions, and moral and material progress.' It re- 
 mains to be proved which of these two policies England 
 will be inclined to support.". . . . Lord Palmerston 
 did not answer, or at least he only answered by evading 
 the question, leaving to Piedmont the responsibility of 
 its own policy and of " the consequences, good and bad," 
 that might result therefrom. In default of England, 
 Cavour might hope for more success with France. He 
 daily felt more and more that the great and decisive 
 succour for Italy must come from that quarter. It was 
 no new thought for Napoleon III. The independence 
 of Italy had been one of the cherished day-dreams of 
 the young insurgent of the Eomagna in 1831 — of that 
 man whom Pius IX. used to speak of long afterwards, 
 when he was at the summit of his greatness, as '• the 
 conspirator of Forli." The Paris congress had but laid 
 bare the intentions or desires of which Cavour hastened 
 to take advantage, and which he attempted to make 
 permanent in spite of the difficulty of the task. It is 
 quite evident that at one time there was between Cavour 
 and Napoleon III. a sort of mysterious intelligence, un- 
 acknowledged, and only revealing itself by degrees. As 
 is now well known, it was at the instigation of the 
 French sovereign, in consequence of a private con versa- 
 
140 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 tion between the Emperor and Count Villamarina at 
 Compi^gne, that the Cabinet of Italy took the initiative 
 in the combination which settled the last conditions of 
 the peace in a manner that proved favourable to Russia 
 and acceptable to England. 
 
 The Emperor had made use of Cavour in order to 
 save, as he said, the Anglo-French alliance without 
 alienating Russia ; and what had been done by Piedmont 
 Napoleon III. considered a personal service. A few days 
 later Count Walewski observed to Villamarina : " The 
 Emperor has ordered me to testify his gratitude and 
 satisfaction to Count Cavour as well as to yourself, 
 and to tell you from him — pray take note of his words 
 — that aU this wiU not be in vain ; that he will never 
 forget it" 
 
 The representative of Victor Emmanuel in Paris 
 was desired to make the most of these friendly 
 dispositions, and about this time he wrote to Turin : 
 " Napoleon wants time to insure the success of 
 his favourable intentions towards Italy. Allow me, 
 therefore, to express my earnest hope that the Italians 
 will not by any iU-timed movement compromise the 
 future which Sardinia has prepared for them by her 
 sacrifices on the battle-field, and by her success at the 
 Paris congress. For the present we must have patience, 
 and await the course of events. We must show great 
 faith in the Emperor's personal policy, and not put any 
 hindrance in his way. Napoleon and the times are in 
 favour of our cause and Italy's ; I maintain this asser- 
 tion, even at the cost of being considered a mere enthu- 
 siast." These Italians were clear-sighted people. 
 
SENTIMENTS OF FBANOE TOWARDS ITALY. 141 
 
 But what increased the difficulties of the situation 
 was that the France of 1857, whose alliance and co- 
 operation Cavour sought and hoped to obtain, was for 
 the time being singularly involved and embarrassed. 
 France presented the phenomenon of a sovereign favour- 
 able to Italy, with a personal policy which was shrouded 
 in mystery ; and of ministers who seemed to follow 
 another policy, unheeded by the sovereign. And then, 
 outside the official regions, in Parisian society, in 
 the old parliamentary world, there reigned a tone of 
 opinion somewhat affected by the manifestations of the 
 congress on the Eoman question, hostile to the empire and 
 rather adverse to the cause of Italy. Cavour knew aU 
 this. If, justly enough, his first care was the manage- 
 ment of the taciturn sovereign on whom everything 
 depended, he had also each day to encounter the dis- 
 cordant elements, the conflicting influences, and the 
 private difficulties which characterised the internal 
 regiTYie of France, and might at any given moment turn 
 aside or thwart the designs of the Emperor. Moreover, 
 he was not ignorant of the fact that this imperial alliance, 
 if it acquired weight, might endanger or threaten the 
 constitutional liberties of Turin. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 Cavour's situation had now become a very extraordi- 
 nary one, both as minister and man. If he turned to 
 England, he found there a government, statesmen, Con- 
 servatives and Liberals alike, openly declaring themselves 
 in favour of all liberal progress in Italy, but utterly dis- 
 
142 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 countenancing any policy of national liberation. If he 
 turned to France, he found an all-powerful sovereign, 
 enigmatical, secretly disposed to favour the triumph of 
 Italian independence, but suspected of wishing to give 
 his help in this national work at the cost of sacrifices of 
 internal liberty, which Italy neither could nor would 
 make. 
 
 In the midst of these difficulties and apparently 
 insurmountable obstacles, Cavour neither allowed himself 
 to be troubled nor checked. He pursued his course, 
 preparing the Napoleonic alliance, with the fixed resolve 
 to surrender no vital libei-ty ; possessing himself more 
 and more of the confidence of the Emperor, with whom 
 he had already private communications, besides the 
 usual diplomatic means; transacting ])usiness with the 
 imperial ministers, who sometimes were not made fully 
 aware of what was taking place, and endeavouring to 
 conciliate or reassure the French Liberals. He had full 
 need of all his dexterity, in a work often interrupted or 
 resumed. On this complex matter he brought to bear 
 such sagacity, such well-directed firmness, such fertility 
 of expedients, such an art in handling affairs and men as 
 made old Prince Metternich, then still living, remark : 
 " Diplomacy is dying out ; there is only one diplomatist 
 left in Europe, and unfortunately he is against us ; I 
 mean Count Cavour." 
 
 Skilful diplomatist Cavour certainly was ; suffi- 
 ciently so to rank among the first of all diplomatists ; 
 and yet when everything was said and done, beyond that 
 mere confidential part in which discretion is one more 
 means of insuring success, the strong point of his 
 
CEABACTER OF HIS DIPLOMACY. 143 
 
 diplomacy Avas frankness and open dealing. He spoke 
 out his opinions and aim with an openness which 
 awakened surprise, and was sometimes mistaken for 
 cunning ; and when once the Prussian envoy at Turin, 
 Count Brassier de St. Simon, astonished at Cavour's 
 freedom of speech, was searching for some hidden mean- 
 ing in his words, Cavour replied quickly : " Do not 
 deceive yourself. I say only what I think. As for the 
 habit attributed to diplomatists of disguising their 
 thoughts, it is one of which I never avail myself." 
 He used often to say laughingly to his friends : "Now I 
 have found out the art of deceiving diplomatists ; I speak 
 the truth, and T am certain they will not believe me." 
 
 Thus, besides his diplomacy as courtier and chancellor, 
 he had another at commatid, a diplomacy without re- 
 ticence or arriere-pensee, which after all was but the 
 commentary and complement of the negotiations he 
 pursued in secret. More than one of his notes was 
 written less for the Cabinets than for the public of 
 Europe — for general opinion ; for if he studied to con- 
 vince or to manage the divers governments, he wished 
 also, as he said, to prepare matters in such a manner 
 that Piedmont, the day she entered the lists, should find 
 European public opinion favouring her. 
 
 The danger of this policy, doubtless straight- 
 forward alike in its principle and its aim, but to all 
 appearance intricate, consisted in its being liable to 
 misconception, and dependent upon a multitude of 
 circumstances. It was only a great promise before 
 it became a reality, and meanwhile it began to 
 weigh heavily upon the small State of Piedmont, 
 
144 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUIi. 
 
 which had so great a stake in what might after all prove 
 to be but an adventure. The results might yet be far 
 distant, and were quite indefinite ; the sacrifices required 
 were positive, immediate ; and the extreme parties, 
 equally hostile to the new policy prevailing at Turin, 
 were necessarily always ready to make the worst of 
 mishaps, incidents, or any more or less specious causes 
 of complaint. Irreconcilable revolutionists, like Mazziui, 
 never ceased to agitate, trying to rally all the demagogic 
 passions at once excited and suppressed by Cavour's 
 national Liberalism. The reactionary parties in their 
 turn made the most of the threats of revolution, the 
 taxes, the loans, the rash enterprises, the suffering of the 
 populace — which they attributed to a permanent system 
 of high pressure. At the least sign of vacillation in 
 those in authority, the public mind was in danger of 
 being unsettled. 
 
 This was precisely what appeared to take place 
 towards the end of 1857, after Mazzini's wild outbreak 
 at Genoa ; the election of a new parliament seemed to 
 indicate that a reaction had set in. The Liberal majority 
 was still numerically of good proportions, but morally 
 it had suffered loss in the contest. The Minister of 
 the Interior, Rattazzi, and Lanza, Minister of Public Li- 
 struction, were only elected by a second ballot. One of 
 the chiefs of the extreme Right, Count Solaro della 
 Margherita, had votes enough to elect him four times 
 over. A certain number of canons, men notorious for 
 their reactionary opinions, now entered parliament. 
 Savoy had made herself conspicuous by returning 
 deputies who almost all of them belonged to the Clerical 
 
THE ELECTIONS OF 1857. 145 
 
 party. "What was the signification of this result of the 
 elections ? — It was no doubt due to very special circum- 
 stances. Aristocratic and religious influences had been 
 at work for the first time, even over-acting their part, 
 in the elections. The Liberals had become divided, rely- 
 ing rather too much on their ascendency. The Minister 
 of the Interior had been at any rate unfortunate, if not 
 imprudent, in the affair of the sedition at Genoa, as also 
 in directing the operations of the elections. The expla- 
 nation given softened without cancelling a result that at 
 first gave Cavour deep pain. " We have got into a bad 
 way," he said that evening to a friend. " The policy of 
 an eight years' reign is in danger of being forsaken, and 
 then what will become of our poor Italy ? What can 
 the king do, who is pledged to the triumph of this 
 policy ? He will abdicate, and then what will follow ? — 
 Coups d'etat ? I shall never advise coujps d'etat even in 
 the interest of the Liberal policy. Dissolve the Chamber. 
 That might be done ; that is constitutional. And then, 
 if the same Chamber should be returned, or a worse one ? 
 This eight years' policy, it goes to my heart to think 
 we need ever forsake it ; but no, no, it cannot be. 
 Good sense always helps Gianduja (the Piedmontese 
 John Bull) at critical junctures. No, no, we will 
 not forsake this policy; we will have recourse to no 
 extraordinary means to preserve it ; we shall gain the 
 day by constitutional and legal means, wherein our 
 strength lies. Do not doubt it ; remember the red 
 crisis of 1849 : it was alarming and very serious, but we 
 surmounted it. AVell, we shall also surmount the black 
 crisis of 1857." It was in any case a warning which 
 
146 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 Cavour would certainly not disregard, especially at a 
 time when he needed more than ever the reconstruction 
 of a majority that would remain faithful to him. The 
 first emotion over, he looked things in the face ; he 
 quickly realised that this apparent hesitation in public 
 opinion was not the disavowal of " an eight years' reign ;" 
 that his personal influence was untouched ; and that 
 faults really had been committed ; and, in order to save 
 his policy, he allowed the fall of Rattazzi, who, though 
 somewhat bruised, was not yet transformed into an 
 enemy by it. Cavour himself took the Ministry of the 
 Interior, as he had already taken in succession the 
 Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 "This change," he wrote to Paris, "has been forced 
 upon me by the necessity of raising the morale of the 
 administrative body, which has been depressed by a 
 series of vexatious circumstances. We thought it would 
 not be expedient to introduce into the Cabinet a new 
 element that would have led to the belief that the 
 minister inclined to the Right or to the Left, whereas 
 he perseveres in the line of conduct he has pursued until 
 now without the least deviation." 
 
 Very soon matters returned to their former condition ; 
 Cavour found his authority ever on the increase, rising 
 more and more above the level of parties, drawing to 
 his assistance the " moderate men " of all shades of 
 opinion. Right as well as Left. He was now more than 
 ever master of the field ; and against the Clerical 
 absolutists, who persisted in their opposition to liim, he 
 called to his assistance the most unlooked-for accomplice, 
 Joseph de Maistre himself, whose diplomatic letters, 
 
EXTRACTS FROM DE MAI8TBE. 147 
 
 abounding with such sentences as the following, he 
 caused to be republished : " The diameter of Piedmont 
 is out of proportion with the grandeur and nobility of 
 the House of Savoy. As long as I breathe I shall repeat 
 that Austria is the natural and eternal enemy of His 
 Majesty. If Austria rules from Venice to Pavia, there 
 will be an end to the House of Savoy : Vixit ! Mark 
 well the Italian spirit ; it was born of the revolution, 
 and will soon play a tragic part. Our system, timid, 
 neutral, hesitating, groping, is fatal in the present state 
 of things. Let the king put himself at the head of the 
 Italians, and let him employ revolutionists, indiscrimin- 
 ately, in all ci^dl and military posts. This is essential, 
 vital, paramount. This is my ultimate view of the 
 matter; if we remain or become an obstacle, requiem 
 ceternam" &c. 
 
 What more was the Piedmontese premier saying and 
 doing in 1857, half a century after Joseph de Maistre 
 had uttered these words, which now came back sounding 
 like an importunate tocsin in the ears of the reactionary 
 members of the Eight ? 
 
 IX. 
 
 Doubtless Cavour was not mistaken ; this " eight 
 years' policy," guided with such consummate skill through 
 so many complications, was not in danger of foundering 
 because of an electoral mischance. It emerged from the 
 crisis as it did from many others ; and by one of those 
 happy strokes of fortune which befall none but able men, 
 that which seemed likely to destroy it, much more than 
 the passing disturbance of the election, on the contrary, 
 
 L 2 
 
 ^ 
 
148 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 tended to hasten its success, by making good fortune issue 
 from the most sinister of events. Something very similar 
 to what took place at the beginning of 1852, the day 
 after the 2nd of December, but far more serious and 
 threatening now, gave Cavour the opportunity of dis- 
 playing the same dexterity, attended by the same good 
 fortune, and enabled him to steal a march triumphantly 
 on the enemy. 
 
 This alarming and unforeseen event was the attempt 
 made at Paris on the evening of January 14, 1858, to 
 assassinate the Emperor and Empress as they entered 
 the Opera House. At the first intelligence of it trans- 
 mitted to him by telegraph, Cavour exclaimed : "Provided 
 only the assassins be not Italians I " Unfortunately they 
 were Italians. The rash originator of this criminal 
 attempt, Felice Orsini, was an emigrant of the Roman 
 revolution, known to have made a romantic escape from 
 his Austrian prison, affiliated with the secret societies, 
 and a man from whom the Piedmontese premier remem- 
 bered to have lately received a letter to which he had 
 returned no answer. What was now to happen ? 
 
 All might undergo a change ; the fanaticism of a 
 handful of conspirators might defer for a long time the 
 fulfilment of Italian hopes. A reaction probably, nay, 
 almost inevitably, would destroy all that had been done. 
 Cavour was soon aware that influences, all of them 
 hostile to Italy, surrounded Napoleon III. The Papal 
 nuncio had not hesitated to tell the Emperor that " these 
 were the fruits of the revolutionary passions fostered by 
 Count Cavour." The ambassador of the Em2)eror Francis 
 Joseph had immediately asked whether the time had not 
 
REVOLUTIONISTS AND BEAGTIONISTS. 149 
 
 yet come in which to " establish between France and 
 Austria a mutual understanding, in order to constrain 
 Piedmont to leave off protecting the machinations of the 
 refugees and the licence of the press." On the other hand, 
 the President of the Council received from London and 
 Geneva, as well as from Paris, the assurance that the 
 revolutionists had not lost hope ; that they were pre- 
 paring new plots against the Emperor, and even against 
 Victor Emmanuel. Cavour, without letting himself be 
 intimidated, was quite aware that a storm was raging. 
 "The present time," he wrote, "is full of perils and 
 difficulties, daily on the increase. The fury of factions 
 is unbridled ; their perverseness adds to the forces of the 
 reactionists, who become daily more formidable. If the 
 Liberals get divided among themselves they will be lost, 
 and the cause of Italian freedom and independence will 
 fall with them. We will resolutely stand in the breach, 
 but we shall assuredly fall unless our friends rally round 
 us to help us against the attacks besetting us on all 
 sides." 
 
 The situation was indeed a perilous one, and fore- 
 most among the causes of alarm was the panic which 
 appeared to prevail at Paris. The French Government 
 needed no fresh stimulus. In the face of a murderous 
 plot carried out by Italian hands, prepared in England, 
 pointed out as the premeditated deed of revolutionary 
 cosmopolitanism, pledged to conspiracies and assassina- 
 tions, it was for the time convulsed, as it were, with the 
 spirit of reaction. While a general was being appointed 
 Minister of the Interior, Count Walewski, the head of 
 French diplomacy, was writing in all directions : to 
 
150 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 London, to Brussels, to Kome, to Turin, calling for 
 acts of repression, guarantees, assurances against the 
 right of refuge, against emigration, and against the 
 freedom of the press. The French Government so far 
 forsfot itself as to even insert in the Moniteur certain 
 military orations, animated by a spirit of bravado, alike 
 useless and oflfensive to England. 
 
 In London, the French demonstrations resulted only 
 in awakening English susceptibility and hastening the- 
 downfall of Lord Palmerston's cabinet, which was 
 replaced by a Tory administration. In Turin the French 
 minister. Prince de Latour d'Auvergne, was commis- 
 sioned by Count Walewski to demand from the Pied- 
 montese Government a number of measures due to the 
 occasion : the suppression of Mazzini s organ, the Italia 
 del Papolo ; the banishment of dangerous refugees ; a 
 new law to regulate the press ; the prohibition of 
 refugees to TVTite articles in the newspapers, &c. To say 
 the truth, though disguised under the appearance of 
 courtesy and friendliness, this amounted to a command^ 
 Cavour, who was prepared for every emergency, was 
 willing to satisfy the French Government as much as lay 
 in his power by an increased surveillance and a moderate 
 reform in the laws regulating the press, but he unhesi- 
 tatingly refused to lend himself to any arbitrary pro- 
 ceedings, such as the suppression of newspapers, which 
 would amount to coups d'etat. Especially did he resist 
 any measure which bore too visibly the stamp of an 
 attempt at foreign interference. To avoid making 
 matters worse, he prudently abstained from all diplo- 
 matic controversy ; he contented himself with giving 
 
DEMANDS MADE BY NAPOLEON III. 151 
 
 verbal answers, offering promises and protestations, with 
 which Walewski refused to be satisfied, and which only 
 provoked more urgent representations. 
 
 The Emperor himself, soon after Orsini's attempt, 
 had a singular and significant conversation with General 
 della Rocca, whom Victor Emmanuel sent to congratulate 
 him on the failure of the outrage, and also, perhaps, to 
 appease him. " Do not believe," said Napoleon III. to 
 the General, and to Count Villamarina, " do not believe 
 that I wish to put any pressure upon your Government. 
 In the many vicissitudes of my life, I have had occasion 
 to learn to esteem highly the dignified attitudes preserved 
 by small States with regard to the demands of their 
 more powerful neighbours. But these things that I ask 
 are easily carried out, and might be acceded to by any 
 allied government, even by one which cared but to see 
 justice done. Let us suppose that England refused to 
 grant my legitimate demands, the intercourse between 
 the Cabinets of Paris and London would soon cease, and 
 the next step would be a declaration of hostilities. If 
 that should ensue, let us consider honestly what would 
 be the condition of Sardinia. There are two alterna- 
 tives : she would be for or against me, but you 
 must not deceive yourselves. The realisation of your 
 hopes and your future are in the French alliance, which 
 alone can support you efficiently. Well, in order to be 
 with me in that day, it is indispensable that you should 
 accede to my present demands. If you refuse, you set 
 yourself against me, you will be with England, and 
 what advantage can you derive from that ? What good 
 will you get from a few English war ships at La Spezzia 
 
152 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOJJB. 
 
 or at Genoa, if England cares to keep the treaties of 1815 
 in all their integrity ? In that case, much against my 
 will, I should be constrained to lean upon Austria, and 
 once embarked in that policy, I should be forced to give 
 up my most cherished day-dream, my dearest wish — I 
 mean the Independence of Italy." These words, equally 
 persuasive and menacing, left Piedmont in a cruel 
 dilemma. 
 
 X. 
 
 In short, during several days a crisis reigned of the 
 most gloomy, violent, feverish description, between 
 Turin and Paris. More than once the official attitude of 
 the French Ministry made Cavour think all was lost, and 
 the king conceived that he must again have recourse to 
 a great stroke. 
 
 Of his own accord, as from sovereign to sovereign, 
 Victor Emmanuel wrote a confidential letter to Napo- 
 leon III., in which he expressed himself openly, protest- 
 ing his attachment and his desire to please the Emperor, 
 but at the same time declaring, with dignified emotion, 
 that there were concessions he could not make ; that if 
 he were driven to it, he, like his ancestors of Savoy, would 
 go and fight on the Alps to defend his crown. In com- 
 menting upon these words, the President of the Council 
 likewise wrote to his representative at Paris : " Stand 
 firm, and hold your ground with dignity and moderation ; 
 do not draw back a single step. His Majesty has written 
 to the Em^ror in terms of the most cordial friendship, 
 but as a king who will stand upon his rights. In order 
 " to save the independence and honour of the country he 
 
THE FRENCH MINISTRY AND THE EMPEROR. 153 
 
 will shrink from nothing, and we are ready to follow 
 him. The Emperor has evidently been persuaded that we 
 have become more friendly with England since Orsini's 
 attempt. Nothing can be farther from the truth. I have 
 written nothing about our difficulties with France to our 
 envoy in London, and I have not even whispered a word 
 about them to Sir James Hudson." This was when the 
 crisis was at its height. 
 
 Soon, however, the pressure began sensibly to 
 diminish. The mere confidential diplomacy was telling 
 upon the official diplomacy, and was effectually averting 
 all danger of a possible rupture. The Emperor's anger 
 was also gradually dying out ; even he admitted that if 
 there were any conspirators it was not Piedmont, but the 
 hazardous situation, of Italy that was to blame. At the 
 Tuileries it had come to be repeated that : "So long as 
 there should be Austrians in Italy there would be at- 
 tempts at assassination in Paris ; that Count Cavour was 
 in the right, and ought to be seconded." Napoleon III. 
 had finally written to Victor Emmanuel that it was 
 'only betw^een great friends that it was possible to speak 
 out ; he bade him do what he could, and not trouble 
 himself further. And now comes the most singular part 
 of this crisis in the relations between Paris and Turin. 
 While the Emperor was growing more and more calm, 
 and was ceasing to interfere at all in a matter which he 
 had learnt to see in a new light, the French ministry 
 persevered increasingly in the demands with which it 
 stormed the Turin Cabinet ; it doubled the number of 
 its almost threatening communications, until at length 
 matters reached the climax. Prince de Latour d'Auvergne 
 
 // 
 
154 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 had been requested to read a fresh and still more 
 peremptory despatch to Count Cavour. The latter lis- 
 tened calmly and patiently, until, the reading over, he 
 replied with the utmost tranquillity and a tone of friendly 
 sarcasm: "But the affair is over; the King received 
 yesterday a letter from the Emperor which terminated 
 all." It was literally true ; and Prince de Latour 
 d'Auvergne, a benevolent and enlightened man, who 
 fiiithfuUy carried out his instructions, but was growing 
 sceptical on many points, had only to fold up his de- 
 spatch and return home, pondering on the difficulty of 
 serving princes who have two kinds of diplomacy. 
 
 Cavour's invariable policy was to preserve the alliance 
 with France without sacrificing the honour and freedom 
 of his country. Let the inviolability of the " statuto " 
 and the national liberty be secured, and he never hesi- 
 tated to seek any means of giving the Emperor satisfaction 
 or guarantee. It was in his interest to do so, were it 
 only by way of open protest against sinister plots. 
 
 He found his justification in the sufficiently scandalous 
 acquittal of a Turin newspaper, which at that very time 
 indulged in a justification of the outrage of Januaiy 14. 
 The President of the Council hoped to have found the 
 means of keeping Piedmont within the bounds of 
 rightful authority, by proposing a law which increased 
 the penalties to be inflicted on persons conspiring 
 against the life of foreign monarchs, or defending political 
 assassination, and choosing a new jury for cases of trans- 
 gression of the law on the part of the press. This new 
 law was not in any way exceptional ; it interfered neither 
 with the " statuto " nor with the essential conditions of 
 
OPPOSITION TO HIS MEASURES. 155 
 
 tlie freedom of the press, nor yet with the principle of 
 trial by jury : its value lay in its moral influence ; it 
 protected the responsibilities of Piedmont. 
 
 It was difiicult, notwithstanding, to obtain so simple 
 a measure from a parliament which was not and could 
 not be made aware of all the circumstances of the case. 
 Cavour lost no time, and while he pursued his diplomatic 
 work he brought all his activity and authority to 
 bear u23on the task of reconciling his opponents, and 
 awakening all to a sense of the gravity of the situation. 
 He gave numerous audiences, in which he displayed an 
 inexhaustible vein of good sense and patriotism. As a 
 matter of course, he met with strong opposition, which 
 he was quite accustomed to overcome. The one accused 
 him of carrying out his bold and dangerous policy at 
 the cost of the humiliation of Piedmont by foreign 
 Powers ; others brought forward against him the old and 
 hackneyed accusation of not seeking his support in the 
 people and in the revolution, instead of buying over the 
 dangerous co-operation of despotic Governments. 
 
 Virtually, however, an immense majority in the 
 Chambers was predisposed to side with him, feeling- 
 more than ever how indispensable and secure was his 
 guidance. The one question with Cavour was, how to 
 give this majority an occasion of declaring itself He 
 hoped to do this in the public discussion shortly to be 
 opened, and which insured his victory. Once more, in 
 a few master-strokes, he set before them that " eight 
 years' policy," which had begun so humbly, but had 
 spread and increased and culminated in that " system of 
 alliances," which the new law was intended to strengthen. 
 
166 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 Cavour did not attempt to conceal the truth, that 
 this law, proposed and defended by him, had two 
 essential objects. The first was to achieve the definitive 
 conquest of the French alliance ; not by any act of 
 subordination or abdication of dignity, but by a reliable 
 and spontaneous proof of good-will : and to those persons 
 who despised all alliances, or proposed to wait until a 
 change of government should have taken place in France, 
 he responded by an explanation equally luminous and 
 astute ; a very model of rational policy and profound 
 diplomacy. 
 
 The second object was to set Italy .free from all 
 dangerous secret societies ; and to those who persisted 
 in confounding the cause of Italian emancipation with 
 insurrectionaiy movements, in short, with universal 
 revolution, he replied with emotion: " How senseless ! to 
 believe that the revolution which would again imperil 
 the great principles of social order could be favourable 
 to the cause of liberty. How senseless 1 not to perceive 
 that the effect would be the destruction of every vestige 
 of liberty on the Continent. How senseless ! those who 
 betray that their aspirations are revolutionary rather 
 than patriotic ; that they love the revolution better than 
 they do Italy." And, going on directly to the situation 
 of the moment, he pointed out the harm which factions 
 had ever done to Italy ; the harm they had again done 
 her by carrying out their principle of assassination. " It 
 is a mournful and deplorable fact," he exclaimed, " de- 
 plorable beyond all expression, that an Italian faction 
 should be known to profess and practise such horrible 
 maxims. In the fiice of such facts we have felt that it 
 
FELICE OBSINI. 157 
 
 was absolutely necessary for the good of Italy that in 
 the one Italian State which has a Liberal Government a 
 voice should be lifted up, not only by the Government, 
 but by the nation represented by its Chambers, in 
 solemn and indignant protest against these criminal 
 doctrines of political assassination." 
 
 XI. 
 
 While Cavour spoke thus, carrying his parliament 
 with him by the sheer force of reason and patriotism, 
 he had gained his cause already in other quarters where 
 he most felt the importance of gaining it. 
 
 The Emperor was grateful to him for what he was 
 doing. The question had lost its threatening aspect ; 
 but what was not yet known, nay, could scarcely be 
 gathered from certain obscure indications, was that the 
 crime of January 14 was about to form the strange and 
 mysterious commencement of a new phase of Italian 
 affairs. The question has often been asked, what part 
 the attempted assassination in the Rue Le Peletier 
 really had in the preliminaries of the war of 1859. 
 The sudden impression of terror it awakened certainly 
 did not give birth to an idea which existed already ; the 
 attempt on the Emperor's life was but the pretext or 
 the occasion of an incident equally strange and signi- 
 ficant. While diplomatists and parliaments were still 
 discussing various small amendments or unimportant 
 articles of legislative measures — this was what was 
 taking place. 
 
 Felice Orsini, the man who had not shrunk from 
 
158 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 
 
 scattering death around him in order to take the life of 
 the only sovereign likely to help his country, was 
 doubtless a great criminal — a murderer from sheer 
 fanaticism — but there was nothing of the mere vulgar 
 assassin about him; he stood high above his obscure 
 accomplices, 'and by one of those strange revulsions of 
 feeling which a violent crisis will sometimes bring about 
 in the mind of a fanatic, the presence of death restored 
 to him a stoical clearness of vision. He had written 
 from prison a letter to the Emperor Napoleon which was 
 produced in his defence, and even published in the 
 Moniteui\ in which he implored Napoleon to deliver 
 Italy. " Let your Majesty call to mind," he wrote, 
 "that the Italians, among whom was my father, shed 
 their blood freely and joyfully for Napoleon the Great, 
 that they continued faithful to him until his downfall. 
 Let it not be forgotten that the peace of Europe and that 
 of your Majesty will remain a mere chimaera as long as 
 Italy is not free. If your Majesty will but deliver my 
 country, the benedictions of twenty-five millions of men 
 wiU resound from generation to generation." 
 
 This was not all : at the last moment, without 
 attempting to escape from the supreme expiation due to 
 so many victims, without flinching in any way in the 
 very face of death, Orsini had written a second letter, a 
 sort of last testament, in which he said : "In an hour or 
 two I shall have ceased to be ; but before I breathe my 
 last I wish to make it clear, nay, I would affirm it with 
 aU the frankness and courage wliich until now have 
 never failed me, that assassination, however it may dis- 
 guise itself, is no principle of mine, although in a fatal 
 
ORSmrS PAPERS. 169 
 
 moment of mental aberration I allowed myself to be 
 drawn into organising the attempt of January 14. 
 Instead of having recourse to a system of assassination, 
 may my fellow-countrymen reject it far from them ; 
 may they learn that redemption can only be obtained by 
 abnegation, and by a constant union of efforts and 
 sacrifices, without which Italy can never be made free. 
 As for the victims of January 14, I ofter my life as an 
 expiatory sacrifice, and I implore the Italians, when once 
 they have become independent, to give some worthy 
 compensation to those who have in any way suffered." 
 These words of retraction had visibly affected the 
 Emperor, who charged one of his most trustworthy 
 secret agents to place Orsini's papers in the hands of 
 Count Villamarina, with orders to send them to Turin. 
 
 Why should the Emperor have been so anxious to 
 send these documents to Turin ? What could his aim 
 be ? Was it one of the eccentric proceedings of a com- 
 plex mind, trying all paths, however devious, in order to 
 reach a goal as yet but dimly perceived ? Be it as it 
 may, one morning, towards the end of March, Cavour 
 suddenly received this unexpected communication. In 
 vain he sought for an explanation of it. He had dis- 
 approved of the insertion of Orsini's first letter in the 
 Moniteur, but on receipt of the packet, all hesitation on 
 his part ceased. Next day the official gazette of Turin 
 published all the papers, including the testament, which 
 was new to the public, accompanied by a note, asserting 
 the retractation and repentance of the criminal, and his 
 counsels to trust in "an august Will propitious to Italy." 
 This unexpected publication, which sceptics at first took 
 
160 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 
 
 for a mystification — it appeared on April 1 ! — produced 
 everywhere a rapid and profound impression, and as 
 it only preceded by a few days the discussion on the 
 law of the Press, and on " conspiracies against foreign 
 sovereigns," it greatly tended to insure success, the 
 spirit of it animating the debate which followed. 
 
 The President of the Council naturally abstained 
 from touching upon the point, and involving himself in 
 explanations which, for that matter, he could not have 
 given. He knew nothing for certain ; he had only seen 
 in the communication he had received a kind of in- 
 distinct encouragement, or a sign of intelligence from the 
 Emperor, and this was much. It was evident that from 
 this time he felt greatly reassured ; he was in a state of 
 suspense when, soon after, towards May, he received 
 from another quarter, from a friend living in Paris and 
 familiar with the Palais Royal, a fresh letter, containing 
 a well-defined plan of alliance between France and Pied- 
 mont, the conditions of arrangement, the reciprocal 
 advantages, and even a project of marriage between 
 Prince Napoleon and a daughter of Victor Emmanuel. 
 The writer was a friend to Italy and the Piedmontese 
 Ministers, and spoke like a far-seeing man of the possi- 
 bility of a decisive negotiation. 
 
 This looked pregnant with serious matter. The Presi- 
 dent of the Council submitted everything to the King. The 
 first question was how far the letter was to be depended 
 on, and Cavour decided to send to Paris a young man, 
 Cavaliere Constantine Nigra, for some years past his 
 confidential secretary, whom he knew to be capable of 
 carrying out the most delicate of missions. It was placed 
 
BB. CONNEAU'S JOURNEY. 161 
 
 soon beyond a doubt, and this on the authority of a 
 confidential agent of the Tuileries — the same who had 
 despatched the Orsini documents — that the letter received 
 at Turin, without having had any direct sanction, faith- 
 fully interpreted the Imperial mind. Napoleon III. was 
 quite disposed to act, but nothing could be done without 
 an interview, which was to be arranged in such a manner 
 as to disarm all suspicion. Dr. Conneau, on pretext of 
 a pleasure trip to Italy, was about to pass through Turin, 
 where he accordingly appeared in June : he had an 
 interview with the King and the President of the Council, 
 and a quiet excursion was planned for Count Cavour to 
 Plombieres, whither the Emperor was proceeding soon 
 to take the waters. 
 
 XII. 
 
 While this interview, the veiled preliminary step to 
 such remarkable and important events, was being 
 arranged, Cavour was terminating a long session which 
 placed no more hindrances in his way, but left him 
 wearied with the hard winter's work of 1858. He had 
 passed through trials of aU kinds, diplomatic struggles, 
 parliamentary conflicts, and with his accustomed energy 
 and flexibility had remained master of the situation. 
 Perhaps he was getting a glimpse of the end of what 
 would restore to him his lost vigour, and reward him for 
 all his labours ; but not a word of it escaped his lips, he 
 spoke only of his weariness and want of rest ; he hoped 
 to be able to forget all for a few days, as might weU be 
 believed, and it was on July 7, the eve of his journey 
 to Plombieres, that he wrote to his friend, Madame de 
 
162 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 Circourt, in the pleasing, careless tone of a wearied poli- 
 tician, or a diplomatist out for a holiday : 
 
 "Were I free to turn whither my sentiments and 
 desires would lead me, I should certainly take advantage 
 of my vacation to come and crave your hospitality at 
 Bougival ; but, chained as I am to my political chariot, 
 I may not turn aside from certain paths. If I were to 
 go to France at this moment, where diplomatists are 
 vainly trying to solve a problem that they themselves 
 have rendered insoluble, my journey thither would give 
 rise to all sorts of comments. AVhen once the session is 
 over I shall go and inhale the fresh mountain air of 
 Switzerland ; far from men whose minds are crammed 
 with petitions. I intend staying a few days at Pressinge ; 
 I shall not be suspected of conspiring with my good 
 friends the De la Kives, against the peace of society. 
 We shall often speak of you ; we shall travel in spirit to 
 the charming hermitage you have turned into an earthly 
 paradise for your friends* enjoyment." 
 
 The fact was that matters had been kept quite 
 private ; no one knew anything either at Paris or Turin, 
 while Cavour, who was " going to inhale mountain air in 
 Switzerland," and who really had passed through Pres- 
 singe, was quietly making his way to Plombi^res, where 
 he arrived on July 20. As he had no passport, prime 
 minister though he was, he might have been arrested on 
 landing by an officious gendarme, had not an imperial 
 agent happily been present to extricate him from his 
 difficulty. 
 
 Immediately upon his arrival, after breakfast, the 
 Emperor, on pretext of showing him some works in pro- 
 
TEB INTERVIEW AT PLOMBIMeS. 163 
 
 gress, took him out into the country in a small chaise, 
 driven by himself, and it was during this tSte-d-tete of 
 three or four hours' duration, that the general conditions 
 of an alliance were agreed upon ; it only needed a few con- 
 versations to define them more precisely. Events, while 
 somewhat modifying, afterwards revealed what these 
 conditions were. At that time they were as follows : A'r 
 war with Austria ; the formation of an Italian kingdomj 
 of eleven millions of souls, or thereabouts ; the cession ofii 
 Savoy and Nice to France. The marriage of Prince 
 Napoleon with Princess Clo tilde was foreseen and wished * 1 
 for at Paris, and agreed on at Turin, but it was to remain 
 an incident, not a condition. Cavour did not stay longer 
 than twenty-four hours at Plombieres. The Emperor 
 treated him in so cordial a manner as to surprise his 
 courtiers ; he " laid himself out to please," it was said. 
 He felt more than regard for the Piedmontese minister ; 
 he had as much confidence in him as he was capable of 
 placing in anyone. During Cavour's stay at Plombieres 
 Napoleon III., who had just received a despatch, turned 
 to his guest, and said with a smile : " Here is Walewski 
 announcing your arrival to me " — thus in one word illus- 
 trating the situation. 
 
 The presence of Cavour at Plombieres could not fail y 
 soon to transpire ; and in order to lessen the effect it|/ 
 might produce he hastened to leave, as though he were 
 continuing his travels. He went as far as Baden, where 
 he encountered the Prince Regent of Prussia, the future 
 Emperor "William, who, after having seen him, declared : 
 " But he really is not such a revolutionist as people 
 make him out to be." Thence, returning through 
 
 u 2 
 
164 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 Switzerland, he halted at a wayside inn, where he wrote 
 out at length the memoranda of his conversations at 
 Plombi^res, and of the arrangements decided upon 
 there. 
 
 In the midst of all this, meanwhile, would the reader 
 learn how Cavour employed his leisure moments ? On 
 his passage, at Pressinge, he had taken up a thick book. 
 Buckle's " History of Civilisation," and he read it, take 
 my word for it, thoroughly. Six weeks later he apolo- 
 gised for not having returned it. *' I wished," he said, 
 " to read it from end to end, no easy matter when one 
 has two ministerial portfolios on one's hands. In spite 
 of its deficiency of method, its lengthiness, and its want 
 of clearness, this book deserves to be read ; for, to my 
 thinking, it denotes an evolution in the English mind 
 that will necessarily entail remarkable consequences. If 
 I were not a minister I should try to write an article on 
 the book." This man was one certainly who found time 
 for everything. 
 
 Cavour, being a minister, might well dispense with 
 writing an article on Buckle's book. For the time 
 being he had other matters on hand ; he was en- 
 grossed by the combinations he had assisted in forming, 
 and the hopes he had a right to entertain. He had 
 returned from Plombi^res, having laid aside all his weari- 
 ness, silent about matters needing to be kept secret ; but 
 full of vitality, and inspiring life and confidence in all 
 around him. He employed the autumn of 1858 in com- 
 pleting his work ; he sent to Paris the memorandum he 
 had prepared, containing a resum6 of the ideas exchanged 
 at Plombi^res with the Emperor, who found only a 
 
TEE SECRET TREATY. 165 
 
 few insignificant details to modify in his manuscript. 
 Throughout these months, Cavaliere Nigra, Cavour's 
 young messenger, travelled backwards and forwards 
 between Turin and Paris, like an incarnation of diplo- 
 macy, transmitting the words of each to each with 
 equal fidelity and intelligence. The result was a secret / 
 treaty of alliance, ofiensive and defensive, between 
 France and Piedmont; until then there had been 
 merely verbal conventions. 
 
 Cavour and the Emperor were in perfect accord 
 together, as was shown by an incident which now 
 appears somewhat strange. The Prince Regent of 
 Prussia had lately placed Prince Hohenzollern at the 
 head of affairs at Berlin. Cavour conceived the idea, on 
 an understanding with Napoleon III., of sending the 
 Marquis Pepoli to Germany; the marquis being a con- 
 nection not only of the new Prussian premier, but also 
 of the Napoleons. 
 
 Pepoli, who took his instructions from Paris as well 
 as from Turin, was ordered to flatter Prussia, awaken 
 her ambition, detach her from Austria, and draw her into 
 the new-made alliance. Prince Hohenzollern declined 
 these overtures, giving in return vague expressions of 
 sympathy, accompanied by protestations of respect for 
 the treaties. A common enterprise of this sort was 
 surely a strong proof of the growing intelligence between 
 the allies of Plombieres. 
 
 One point remained undecided in these arrangements, 
 otherwise so nearly completed. The Emperor, who 
 wished or believed himself to be master of the situation, 
 had reserved to himself the right of choosing the time 
 
166 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 and the manner of starting the question, and Cavour at 
 times was anxious and troubled by a state of uncei-tainty 
 which after all might end in an adjournment sine die ; 
 it is evident, however, that when such warlike combina- 
 tions are made, they tend fatally towards their object. 
 Secret alliances get noised abroad, men's minds are dis- 
 turbed, relations are embittered, and this ciime to pass 
 towards the end of 1858. 
 
 Italy, thus skilfully worked upon, was thrilled with 
 excitement, and earnestly desired the conflict. France, 
 somewhat astonished and ill-informed, was reduced to 
 consulting the oracles of the imperial policy. Europe 
 felt an imeasiness, the cause of which was not as yet 
 perceived by her, when suddenly the nature of the 
 situation was made known by two events happening 
 almost simultaneously; or, if you will so call them, 
 speeches. 
 
 On January 1, 1859, Napoleon III, giving audience 
 to the Diplomatic Corps, testified in a brusque manner 
 to the Austrian ambassador his regret at the hostile 
 spirit prevailing between Paris and Vienna. A few days 
 later, at the opening of the Chambers, Victor Emmanuel 
 remarked : " Our hoiizon is not at all cleai'. Our countiy, 
 small indeed territorially, has yet become influential in 
 Europe, through the greatness of the ideas it represents- 
 and the sympathies it inspires. This situation is by 
 no means without its dangers ; for while we would respect 
 treaties, we cannot remain insensible to the cry .of 
 anguish which reaches us from so many parts of Italy." 
 Victor Emmanuel could not, it was understood, speak 
 thus without an understanding with his French ally. 
 
THE KING'S SPEECH. 167 
 
 On the evening of the day on which this speech, so 
 full of warmth and colour, was uttered, the Eussian 
 minister. Count Stackelberg, while complimenting the 
 President of the Council, observed : "It was like a 
 crimson aurora." Count Cavour replied that the colour 
 was not the artist's work. "It is the landscape," he 
 said, " which glows with sparks and flames ; " on 
 which Sir James Hudson remarked : " It is a flash of 
 lightning striking the treaties of 1 8 1 5. " It might indeed 
 be all these ; but above all it was the first result of the 
 secret understanding and treaty at Plombieres, or rather 
 the fruit of a policy which, before reaching its goal, had 
 still many a trial to undergo and many a battle to 
 fight. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The War of 1859 — Cavour and the Peace of Villafranca — Prologue of the 
 War of Italian Independence — The Situation at the Beginning of 1859 — 
 Napoleon III. and Cavour — Marriage of Princess Clotilde and Prince 
 Napoleon — The Pamphlet "Napoleon III. and Italy" — Position of AflEaira 
 — Diplomatic Phase — English Negotiations — Diplomacy of the Emperor — 
 Proposed Congress — Cavour daring the Winter of 1859 — Italy in a Ferment 
 — The Volunteers at Turin — Preparations moral and military — Cavour and 
 Diplomacy — Trip to Paris — Two French Politicians — Napoleon III. and 
 Count Walewski — Mot of Cavour to M. de Rothschild — The knotty Point 
 — Crisis in April — Dramatic Situation, Coup de Th46.tre — The Austrian 
 Ultimatum at Turin — War is declared — French Troops at Turin — Military 
 Operations — Napoleon III. and his Proclamations — March of the Franco- 
 Piedmontese Army — Movements at Modena, Parma, Florence, and Bologna 
 — Cavour during the War — Solferino and the Preliminaries of Villafranca 
 — Cavour in the Camp — Scene at Desenzano — Victor Emmanuel — Despair 
 and Retirement of Cavour — Departure for Switzerland — Uncertainty after 
 Villafranca — Mental Condition of Cavour — Departure of the Emperor for 
 France. 
 
 Now that the national drama of Italy hastens to its 
 crisis, let us recall two dates to the mind's eye, and 
 compare them. On March 23, 1849, Piedmont fell van- 
 quished on the battle-field, with nothing left in her 
 grasp save a broken sword and a torn flag. She had no 
 allies and but few friends remaining ; friends, too, more 
 disposed to blame her rashness or compassionate her 
 want of military success than to assist her. Austria 
 triumphed by her armies; the reactionary party 
 
THE TEN YEARS' POLICY. , 169 
 
 triumphed through the invariable logical result of dis- 
 orderly revolutions. For a long time all seemed lost on 
 the other side of the Alps. In the first days of 1859 all 
 was won back again. All had changed. The cause of 
 Italy had regained the attention of Europe ; it engrossed 
 Governments and public opinion alike. 
 
 Such was the work of the policy started at Turin 
 and stoutly pursued during ten years : the policy which 
 guided Piedmont from Novara to the Crimean war; 
 from the Paris congress to the negotiations of Plombieres. 
 This ten years' policy succeeded in isolating Austria 
 within her contested dominions ; it rallied all Italian 
 feeling around a national monarchy ; it separated the 
 question of independence from that of revolution, and it 
 awakened the Foreign Ministers. Its success was due 
 to an amazing combination of circumstances, cleverly 
 prepared or still more cleverly laid hold of; and at the 
 given hour, it found supporters in two men who, difierent 
 as they were in position, character, and mind, were yet 
 able, by supplementing each the other, to render the most 
 difficult of enterprises a thing of possible achievement. 
 Napoleon and Cavour meet and come upon the scene ! 
 
 There was assuredly but little resemblance between 
 these two men ; they stand before us rather in vivid 
 and mysterious contrast with each other. They came 
 into collision more than once, but nevertheless they 
 mutually attracted each other, each feeling that the 
 other was necessary to him. 
 
 For Cavour, Napoleon III. was the powerful, perhaps 
 dangerous, but indisputable ally, the head of one of the 
 foremost of Continental nations and of an army still 
 
170 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 reputed iiTesistible. For Napoleon III. Cavour was the 
 Foreign Minister and instrument of his enigmatical views 
 with regard to Italy, the man best calculated to sweep 
 him on, to oppose him if necessary, and ease him of the 
 burden of his irresoluteness by putting pressure upon 
 him, in offering him in a variety of ways the occasion of 
 deciding and acting upon his decision. 
 
 It was said that during the interview at Plombi^res, 
 the Emperor, then credulous of his own omnipotence, 
 observed to Cavour : '* Do you know that there are but 
 three men in Europe, we two and a third whom I will 
 not name ? " Who was this third person ? No one 
 knows. Out of this meeting of the other two ** men," in 
 the little town of the Vosges, originated, in the beginning 
 of 1859, the coincidence of the scene of January 1 at the 
 Tuileries and the thrilling speech of Victor Emmanuel 
 in the Turin parliament on January 10. 
 
 Cavour, without any previous warning, had neces- 
 sarily at once divined the meaning of the words care- 
 lessly spoken by Napoleon III. to M. de Hubner, and 
 on hearing them he remarked with a smile : " The 
 Emperor means to go ahead, it appears." As for 
 Victor Emmanuel's speech a week later, the Emperor 
 had kno\\Ti and approved of it beforehand. It was a 
 part of his tactics that his ally should say what he would 
 not or could not as yet say himself. 
 
 Some few days subsequently another incident 
 startled the world as with a fresh revelation. It became 
 known almost simultaneously that Prince Napoleon, 
 accompanied by General Niel, had left Paris for Turin, 
 and that the marriage of a Bonaparte with Princess 
 
THE IMPERIAL PAMPHLET. 171 
 
 Clotilcle of Savoy was accomplished. All was settled 
 before January 30, at Turin, where an excited public 
 regarded this union of the dynasties as the promise of 
 events at hand. From this period, dating January 18, 
 the previously personal and implied understanding ^^ 
 between the Emperor and the King took a more dis- '^ 
 tinct diplomatic form, and grew into a regular alliance, 
 founded on the apprehension of an attack on the part 
 of Austria. 
 
 For a final coup de tMdtre : on the morrow of the 
 marriage of Prince Napoleon and the Princess Clotilda, 
 there appeared suddenly in Paris a startling pamphlet, 
 " Napoleon IIL and Italy," known to be inspired by 
 the Emperor, and in which was traced a whole pro- 
 gramme of Italian reorganisation by national federation, 
 independent of the foreigner. 
 
 Thus within a narrow period consecutive events 
 wej-e crowded. The words spoken by Napoleon III. to 
 Baron Hubner found their supplement, a sort of swelling 
 echo, in the speech of Victor Emmanuel, and these two 
 public acts were crowned by the family alliance, and by 
 the imperial manifesto, which raised the problem of the 
 destinies of Italy before Europe, as though the treaties of 
 1815 were not in existence. A few weeks, it might be 
 said a few days, sufficed to bring the crisis to a head. 
 Meanwhile nothing was decided, and the question still 
 was whether the knot would have to be finally cut by 
 the sword, or whether, by a last effort, the Governments 
 would succeed in conjuring the storm which, gathering 
 its ominous black masses to all appearance over Austria 
 alone, threatened the whole Continent. During this 
 
172 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 winter of 1859 the struggle continued between the war- 
 like and the pacific currents ; a confused and agitated 
 prologue to the great drama. 
 
 n. 
 
 It was indeed a most strange situation, where every- 
 thing seemed to lead fatally to a conflict, and the definite 
 point of the discussion remained obscure ; where diplo- 
 macy knew not how to touch this ItaUan problem, which 
 had undoubtedly its origin with bad government in 
 the Legations and in the Duchies, but was also above all 
 attributable to the domination of the foreigner ; that is to 
 say, to a condition of things presenting difiiculties only to 
 be settled by an appeal to force. We see, for an example 
 of this curious phase in modern history, Cavour himself, 
 the only one of all the actors who was in the secret of 
 what he wished, passing nearly four months between a 
 national movement, alternately stimulated or bridled by 
 him, and the perplexities assailing him from Europe, 
 projects of negotiations on all sides rising to bar the road 
 to him. 
 
 Had Austria possessed more initiative and more, 
 pliability, she might easily have simplified the question, 
 greatly to the confusion of her enemies. She seemed 
 once to be awake to the idea, and the episode glances 
 with a covert melancholy before plunging into the torrent 
 of events. 
 
 Some short time previously, in the year 1858, the 
 Cabinet at Vienna had despatched the Archduke Maxi- 
 milian as Viceroy to Lombardy, on a mission of peace 
 
TEE ARCHDUKE MAXIMILIAN. 173 
 
 and conciliation. The ill-fated prince, doomed to tlie 
 Mexican tragedy, arrived at Venice and Milan full of liberal 
 designs. He had youth in his favour, a very cordial and 
 gentlemanly manner, Austria to back him, the good 
 counsel of the prudent Leopold of Belgium — whose 
 daughter he had just married — and through King 
 Leopold the best wishes of England in his favour. 
 Maximilian had taken up his task in earnest. In the 
 course of an excursion on the Lago Maggiore, and in a 
 conversation with the Prussian minister at Turin, Count 
 Brassier de Saint-Simon, he spoke of Cavour in the 
 warmest terms, " I greatly admire Count Cavour," he 
 said ; " but as the business in contemplation is a policy 
 of progress, I shall not let him outstrip me." Cavour, 
 who gave ear to everything, disdaining nothing, was not 
 insensible to this attempt, which might have disconcerted 
 all his plans ; and subsequently he confessed that the 
 mission of the Archduke Maximilian had caused him the 
 liveliest anxiety. 
 
 Suppose for a moment that Austria, strong in her 
 incontestable territorial rights, and a military power per- 
 mitting her to make concessions that could not be deemed 
 dishonourable, had persisted in this Liberal idea, diverting 
 and weaning the national Italian sentiment, softening her 
 rule, and taking Europe to witness to her generosity : do 
 but imagine this drama turned to a reality under the 
 quieting administration of an Archduke ; how different 
 might events have been from the war of 1859 to the 
 war of 1866, and all that since ensued — not forgetting 
 Mexico. 
 
 Though she should not have succeeded in it, the 
 
174 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 policy was at least worth making a trial of ; but owing 
 to one of those fits or false calculations, of which she has 
 given more than one example, and which have always 
 cost her heavy, at the first signs of a public crisis, 
 Austria fell back affrighted on her traditions of immo- 
 bility and repression. She did not confine herself to 
 cancelling the mission of the Archduke Maximilian, but 
 exaggerated her military rule in all her Italian posses- 
 sions. She had already commenced her preparations 
 for war before January 1, 1859 ; she hurried them 
 forward feverishly on the morrow of this date, despatch- 
 ing army corps upon army corps into Italy, organising 
 her forces as on the eve of a campaign, and going so far 
 as to take a position on the Ticino, in face of Piedmont. 
 Some of her officers, carried away by their bellicose fury, 
 were guilty of acts of grave imprudence. At their 
 banquet-tables in Milan, they talked of nothing less than 
 a speedy departure for Turin, which was to be the first 
 stage of a march on Paris. 
 
 Austria did not see that by her precipitancy and her 
 excitement she compromised everything, disarmed in 
 advance those who were striving for peace, and placed 
 herself in a position that firom one day to another exposed 
 her to a fit of rashness, by the excess of her military 
 display and of her expenditure. She was unable to 
 perceive that she played the game of her enemies, and 
 might possibly be tumbling into a pitfall ; and in any 
 case she began by offering Piedmont a pretext that, 
 finding herself supported, the country did not fail to 
 profit by. Piedmont replied to armaments by arma- 
 ments, to demonstration by demonstration, putting the 
 
DIVIDED WISHES OF ENGLAND. 175 
 
 fortresses of Alessandria and Casale in a state of defence, 
 and getting together her regiments scattered on both sides 
 of the Alps. The parliament voted a loan of two millions 
 sterling, ostensibly necessitated by the "provocation of 
 Austria," so that the two Powers were already all but 
 front to front ; or at least the question of peace or war 
 became terribly vexed and envenomed when diplomacy 
 went to its task of holding back issues on the verge of 
 explosion. 
 
 III. 
 
 What was it that diplomacy sought to do, or rather, 
 what could it do in the state to which affairs had come ? 
 All these incidents whirling about had not failed to 
 produce an impression revealing a positive danger of 
 war. The wish was for peace, and diplomacy strove to 
 preser^^e it. 
 
 England, represented by the Tory ministry of Lord 
 Derby and Lord Malmesbury, held to peace more than 
 the other Powers. Unhappily, Europe was deeply 
 divided, and England herself, upon whom the initiative 
 of discussion and negotiations devolved, was full of per- 
 plexity. She felt herself divided between her traditional 
 Continental policy, which held her to the treaties of 
 1815 and Austria, her sympathy with the cause of 
 freedom, which made her lean to Piedmont and Italy, 
 her interests as a commercial Power, and her anxiety 
 regarding the designs of France, whose growing intimacy 
 with Turin filled her with misgivings. She would have 
 conciliated everything — peace and that which menaced 
 peace — Austria, France, and Piedmont; and she could 
 
17G LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 not discern that her urgent applications to one and the 
 other imperilled her chances of success with them all. 
 
 When England appealed to Vienna, Count Buol 
 Schauenstein, minister of the Emperor Francis Joseph, 
 replied impatiently : " You are mistaken, it is not here 
 that you should come with your entreaties and your 
 counsels ; go to Paris and Turin, and speak your mind 
 out plainly there. Let the Emperor Napoleon learn 
 that, if his army crosses the Alps, England will not look 
 on quietly; let the King of Piedmont know that 
 England sanctions no plundering of the Austrian posses- 
 sions in Italy. If the Queen's ministers hold a resolute 
 language we shall have no war. Italy is not in want of 
 reconstruction ; let them cease to stir her up, and we 
 shall hear no more of it." 
 
 Turning to Turin, the English Cabinet was told that, 
 if it desired peace, it had better apply to Vienna ; that 
 the source of the evil lay in the foreign lordship in 
 Italy, which was a dangerous friend to bad govern- 
 ments, a menace to Piedmontese constitutional liberty, 
 and the perpetual fosterer of revolutionary passions ; it 
 was explained that, taking Austria to be on the legal 
 ground of 1815 in Milan, she was not so in her occupa- 
 tion of Bologna and Ancona for a period of ten years, 
 binding the Central Duchies to terms amounting to 
 vassalage, and turning Piacenza into an imperial fortress 
 on the frontier of Piedmont. 
 
 When England put her questions to France, the 
 Emperor gave her every encouragement in her peaceful 
 mission, disavowing the barest idea of aggressiveness, 
 and assuming the air of a prudent friend by whom 
 
EUSSIA'8 VIEW OF AUSTRIA. 177 
 
 Piedmont was kept back, while in tlie main letting 
 certain ideas be seen, with regard to Italian affairs, that 
 had small chance of being accepted by Austria. 
 
 England might have found a lever in the neutral 
 Powers ; but the assistance with which Prussia favoured 
 her was sufficiently platonic ; and as to Eussia, Prince 
 Gortchakoff, from the very commencement, held these 
 words to Sir James Crampton, the English minister at 
 St. Petersburg : " Decidedly Eussia wishes for peace, she 
 has need of it ; but allow me to tell you with my habitual 
 frankness that we are unable to look with the same eye 
 upon France and Austria. We are upon terms of close 
 cordiality with the former ; as to the latter, it is the 
 contrary. The Court of Vienna has behaved disgrace- 
 fully in return for our services to her. In other times 
 Eussia offered her counsels to her allies, she refrains now 
 from counselling whomsoever it may be. If we are asked 
 for an opinion, our reply is favourable to peace : so far 
 we go and no farther. Be good enough to understand 
 that, if the peace of Europe is disturbed, I do not tell 
 you on which side you will find the Eussian arms. Upon 
 this head we have determined to remain quit of any 
 engagement." 
 
 Beset by such contradiction and confusion, England 
 had reason to be embarrassed, but she did not lose 
 heart. She had commenced by trying since the month 
 of January to bring Napoleon III. to specify his views. 
 She soon took another step : before the end of February, 
 the Queen's ambassador at Paris, Lord Cowley, was 
 despatched to Vienna with a sketch of negotiations, 
 and instructions to do his utmost to bring Austria to 
 
178 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 agree to them. In this first programme it was a ques- 
 tion of the abandonment of the military occupation of 
 Bologna and Rome, the abrogation of the Austrian 
 treaties with the Duchies, the establishment of a system 
 of liberal reform in the Italian States, and, above all, 
 the putting of the relations between Austria and Sardinia 
 on a proper footing. 
 
 Lord Cowley's mission was not much of a success ; 
 nor, in fact, had it altogether failed — or at least the 
 English Cabinet fancied it had not, and possibly flattered 
 itself already that it would be able to command events 
 by means of mediation, when suddenly, on or about 
 March 20, Europe was startled by the proposition 
 of a congress, coming from St. Petersburg, in reality 
 responding to the secret wishes of the Tuileries. It was 
 the first apparition of that idea, or it might be said 
 chimaera, of a congress, so frequently and so vainly 
 pursued since by Napoleon III. 
 
 A congress to consider the Italian problem ! Under 
 what conditions and where should it sit ? Of whom 
 should it consist? Was it to treat of Italian afiairs 
 without the Italians? Was the congress to open to 
 the sound of armaments that were still being pushed on 
 hard and fast on the Ticino ? Plainly the question, far 
 from being simplified, became more complicated by the 
 bringing of these European inconsistencies into broad 
 daylight, and entering on a path devoid of outlet. An 
 acute diplomatist remarked : Behold a congress that 
 will never sit ! 
 
B'AZEQLIO TO CAVOUR. 179 
 
 IV. 
 
 It was in the midst of difficulties like these that Cavour 
 was plunged between January I and April, 1859. For 
 him the main trial of his dexterity was not simply 
 to lead to war out of such a state of confusion ; it was 
 to gain his end without too much separating himself 
 from Europe ; ahove all, without for a moment losing 
 his junction with France, whose vanguard he was across 
 the Alps. The prime task for Cavour was to reconcile 
 the interior movement upon which he leaned — of which, 
 more than ever, he was now the prudent and impassioned 
 guide — with the exterior difficulties that could not be 
 avoided. In this double labour he spent four months of 
 an inexhaustible and lively activity, always with an eye 
 on the Ticino and on Austria; passing from a diplomatic 
 conference to an inspection of the fortresses of Casale 
 and Alessandria, watchful over every service, and re- 
 ceiving all the world, inspiring everyone about him with 
 his own spirit and fire. 
 
 The first incidents of the new year, the moment 
 when, to use the expression of the period, *'the bomb 
 had burst," had shaken Piedmont and the whole of 
 Italy with deep commotion. It was understood that 
 the hour had come, and there was from that time but 
 one thought for all. D'Azeglio, the knightly man, 
 ever prompt to generous resolves, had hastened to write 
 to Cavour : *' It is no longer the hour for the discussion 
 of politics, there is nothing to be done but to succeed ; 
 make what use you will of me." 
 
 The words of D'Azeglio expressed the universal sen- 
 timent. From all parts a stream of frank confidingness, 
 
 N 2 
 
180 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUR. 
 
 so to speak, flowed towards Cavour. Those whose 
 thoughts were set above all upon independence turned 
 their faces to Turin ; and from Lombardy as from 
 Tuscany, from the Komagna and from Modena, shoaled 
 hosts of young men eager to be enrolled under the 
 banner of Victor Emmanuel There was nothing of the 
 turbulence of 1848 in these manifestations ; on the 
 contrary, they were signalised by a formal and serious 
 spirit, even in the excitement of the national emotion. 
 It was like a conspiracy of a novel order, whose word of 
 command was to shun the errors of the past, and to 
 rally without bargaining round him who had carried 
 Italy so far on the road. 
 
 Cavour took joy in a movement that was a work of 
 his own creation ; it responded to his heartiest wishes, 
 and he designed to make the best use of it by organising 
 it. If, on the one hand, the supple and forethoughtful 
 patriot had done his utmost to procure a powerful ally, 
 he was not, on the other, ready to consent that every- 
 thing should be o^ving to this ally. He wrote to La 
 Marmora : " In order that the war may come to a 
 fortunate issue, we must prepare for greater efforts. 
 Woe to us if we triumph solely by the aid of the 
 French ! " For the sake of national dignity, as well 
 as for the independence of his policy, he stood for not 
 receiving freedom as a gift. To this end he was diligent 
 in the moral and material preparation of his countr}% 
 and strove to the utmost to associate Italy with Pied- 
 mont. At the risk of embroiling himself with diplo- 
 macy, he busied himself in creating, under the title of 
 *' Chasseurs of the Alps," the battalions destined to form 
 
QABIBALBL %^-^Jp§%*'iO^ 
 
 cadres for the Lombard and Tuscan youth pouring into 
 Turin, to place them beside the Piedmontese army ; and, 
 intrepid as he was, he did not shrink from the idea of 
 entrusting these battalions to Garibaldi. 
 
 One morning in the winter of 1858-59, before break 
 of day, an unknown visitor had presented himself at 
 the house of the President of the Council, who had 
 been immediately informed of the visit by his valet 
 somewhat in alarm. "Who is the man?" said Cavour. 
 *' He has a broad hat, a big stick in his hand, and he 
 will not deliver his name ; he says that your excellency 
 expects him." It was Garibaldi, who had come to 
 arrange with Cavour for putting himself under the 
 orders of Victor Emmanuel. But as his name was still 
 sufficient to scare many, Garibaldi quitted Turin for 
 Caprera, leaving behind him Colonel Medici to organise 
 the Chasseurs of the Alps ; and in Medici Cavour 
 soon found a zealous and devoted auxiliar. No doubt 
 it was a risk to run, and it was not impossible that such 
 a coadjutor might prove an embarrassment in the future. / 
 Cavour alone could manage these elements and throw 
 the die ; he saw herein the means of reuniting all the 
 forces of the country, to annul or rally the Eepub- 
 licans, leaving aside only the inveterate disciples of 
 Mazzini ; and as to these, he did not hesitate to declare 
 that, if they stirred a step, he would shatter them with 
 grape as pitilessly as he would the Austrians. 
 
 V. 
 
 The gravest difficulty for Cavour lay outside the , 
 kingdom, with England, and even to a certain degree 
 
182 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 with France. England, finding liim always in the way 
 of her negotiations for peace, treated him roughly. Lord 
 Derby and Lord Malmesbury did not cease to worry him 
 with their recriminations and admonitions, which his 
 friend, the brilliant Sir James Hudson, delivered with 
 more fidelity than of personal shai-e in them. 
 
 The English Cabinet beheld in liim, and not without 
 some truth, the great agitator and constant provoker of 
 Austria, the most dangerous adversary of all endeavours 
 after peace. Cavour, for his part, listened patiently, 
 sometimes anxiously, decided both to resist the wishes 
 of England and not to wound her. Upon occasion, if he 
 was pushed too far, he burst out, replying boldly to an 
 English diplomatist, who told him that public oj^inion in 
 London accused him of imperilling the peace of Europe 
 by his Italian policy : " Admirable ! and I, on the con- 
 trary, think that the most serious responsibility for the 
 troubled position of Italy rests with England, her parlia- 
 mentary orators, her diplomatists, and her writers, who 
 have been labouring for years to excite political passions 
 in our peninsula. Is it not England that has encouraged 
 Sardinia in her propaganda of moral influences opposed 
 to the lawless preponderance of Austria in Italy ? " 
 
 Susceptible as he was to the rebukes of the English 
 Cabinet, Cavour still exerted his utmost wariness in 
 dealing with England, trying all he could to win her by 
 allusions to her previous good favour, her liberal 
 traditions, and her sympathies for Piedmontese Consti- 
 tutional Government. He seized opportunities for 
 addressing his speeches in parliament to the English 
 
BEGEPTION OF ENGLISHMEN. 183 
 
 people; he reminded them that every just cause — emanci- 
 pation in Ireland, and negro emancipation — had finished 
 by triumphing ; and he exclaimed : *' Can it be that the 
 cause of Italy is less holy than that of the Irish, or that 
 of the blacks ? And she also, Italy, will vindicate her- 
 self before English public opinion. I can never believe 
 that a man so distinguished as Lord Derby, presiding 
 over the counsels of England, will, after having affixed to 
 the great act of negro emancipation the name transmitted 
 to him by history, conclude his noble career by com- 
 plicity with those that would condemn the Italians to 
 eternal servitude." 
 
 The astute minister was at that time graciously giving 
 receptions at Turin to many eminent Englishmen, among 
 others, a member of the Whig party. General Fox, and 
 Mr. Grladstone ; the latter had recently left the Ionian 
 islands, where he had completed an official mission, and 
 returned through Venetia and Lombardy, which he found 
 in fuU military occupation. Cavour neglected nothing 
 in indicating to his guests that England was mistaken 
 when she identified peace with Austrian domination. {/ 
 " You have been privileged to see," he said to Mr. Glad- 
 stone, " that Austria threatens us ; here we are tranquil, 
 our country is calm, we shall do our duty." 
 
 He knew what he was about ; if he could not have 
 England for friend he would not have her for an enemy, j/^ 
 and he sent her as ambassador-extraordinary the man 
 best calculated to reawaken her sympathies and liberal 
 instincts, Massimo d'Azeglio, saying of him hopefully : 
 *'Therejis the father of the Italian question; he is a 
 
184 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 Moderate ; they will not be suspicious of liim. His 
 presence in London should be of first-rate service among 
 all who are not of pure Austrian blood." 
 
 And D'Azeglio departed for London, fresh from his 
 journey to Rome, whither he had been despatched to 
 decorate the Prince of Wales with the collar of the Order 
 of the Annunciation on his visit to the eternal city. 
 
 The relations of Cavour with France were of a difierent 
 character, without being less complicated and laborious. 
 The dauntless Piedmontese had found, it is true, a friend 
 ^ of the Italian cause in Napoleon IIL, an ally more than 
 half pledged to him, and after the month of January the 
 marriage of Prince Napoleon with the Princess Clotilde 
 gave him a firm auxiliar in one who had become a 
 member of the royal family. His relations with the 
 Tuileries continued close and secret through the Count of 
 Villamarina, above all through the Cavaliere Nigra, his 
 young and trusty lieutenant, whose private mission 
 circumstances were rendering important. 
 
 The influence of Turin on Paris was as real and as 
 active as that of Paris on Turin. The alHance, contracted 
 and close-linked six months ago, was untroubled ; but 
 Cavour was not unaware of the uncertain and shifty 
 character of Napoleon IIL, nor of what difficulties beset 
 the master of France. In fact, the policy indicated 
 from the date of January 1 had raised a storm of oppo- 
 / sition in a portion of French society — in the religious world, 
 among the veterans of the parliamentary world, and 
 even in a certain set of the friends of the Empire. 
 
 Some of the more thoughtful minds apprehended, in 
 this war which was approaching, a destruction of equili- 
 
CONFLICT IN COUNCILS OF THE EMPEROR. 185 
 
 brium that could not but be harmful to the traditional 
 interests of the country. Others foresaw danger for the 
 temporal power of the Pope in an Italian war. Worldly 
 Paris, the ardent and hot-brained city, little heeded by 
 the Empire, though it exercised its influence on opinion, 
 was for peace. Cavour knew it well, and did what he could 
 to win the support of liberal minds ; but the views of a good 
 part of Parisian society were notorious, and he knew also 
 that in the Imperial councils the Minister of Foreign Af- 
 fairs, Count "Walewski, shared those views so little favour- 
 able to the striking of a blow for Italy. Napoleon III. 
 was manifestly attached to the cause for which he had 
 made the alliance of Plombi^res and Turin, while Count 
 Walewski talked and behaved like a minister pursuing a 
 directly opposite line of policy — the policy of objection to 
 war with Austria, severity towards Piedmont and Italy, 
 suspicion approaching almost to personal hostility to 
 Cavour : and the singular thing was, that in a despotic 
 government there was a sort of conflict going on, under 
 shelter of which the Emperor, acting either from indolence 
 or calculation, allowed his minister's pacific efibrts and 
 declarations to proceed publicly, without interposing the 
 decisive word. 
 
 Napoleon III. likewise was anxious to calm the mind 
 of England. He wished to appear forced into war, 
 taking up arms only in the interests of peace, conserva- 
 tive principles, and the European equilibrium, trans- 
 parently compromised or threatened by Austria in Italy. 
 He suffered Count Walewski to perform with perfect 
 sincerity on the thema he had selected, insomuch that 
 ■Cavour, already embarrassed by England, found himself 
 
186 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB. 
 
 in addition face to face with this crack-skull of a double- 
 headed French policy. The Emperor who sustained him 
 was not given to speak every day, and, on the other hand, 
 he had to deal with the salons, the financial powers, 
 religious influences, and official diplomacy, which, in the 
 prolonged intervals of the imperial silence, made them- 
 selves heard. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Often during these laborious and agitated weeks of 
 the beginning of 1859, obliged as he was to show front 
 to all difficulties and perils, Cavour underwent woful 
 anxieties, owing to the ceaseless contradictions torment- 
 ing him. He did not let them thwart him. He pursued 
 his course through all these entanglements, multiplying 
 as they continued. 
 
 The situation began to be really critical towards 
 March 20, when the proposition of a congress startled 
 the world. There was a sharp scene in Paris between 
 the French Minister of Foreign Afiairs and the Sardinian 
 envoy. Count Villamarina. Count Walewski, in a fit 
 of ill-temper, possibly designed to intimidate the Cabinet 
 of Turin, allowed himself to be carried away so far as to 
 say that : " The Emperor would not make war to fiivour 
 the ambition of Sardinia ; and that all would be settled 
 pacifically at a congress, in which Piedmont would have 
 no right whatsoever to participate." At the same time 
 Prince do la Tour d'Auvergne, under the directions of 
 Count Walewski, held disquieting language though it 
 was without acerbity. Cavour stood ready to face the 
 
CAVOUB AT PARIS. 187 
 
 storm. ' He wrote to Prince Napoleon, and transmitted a 
 letter from the King, tliat Cavaliere Nigra was deputed 
 to hand to the Emperor ; and he added his instructions 
 to Nigra to speak " energetically to his Majesty ; telling 
 him that Count AValewski writes to the minister of 
 France at this Court in a manner to dispirit us 
 and push us to acts of despair." The Emperor replied : 
 " Let Count Oavour come hither to Paris, without 
 further delay." The summons brought Cavour to Paris 
 .on March 25. 
 
 No sooner had he arrived than he saw himself in 
 the presence of machinery labouring not only for the 
 maintenance of peace, though it should be at the sacrifice 
 of Piedmont, but to have him thrust aside, as the chief 
 obstacle in the way of peace. More than ever he was 
 the great suspected ! 
 
 Count Walewski's reception of him was courteous and 
 cold. Lord Cowley also was sufficiently serious. At 
 the Tuileries his welcome was cheerful and trusting, as 
 it had been at Plombieres. He enjoyed repeated inter- 
 views with the Emperor, and the few days he spent in 
 Paris were not lost time for him ; he employed them in 
 reconnoitring the situation, and studying the game of 
 Parisian politics, never losing his independence of mind 
 and natural airiness. " I should certainly come to see 
 you," he wrote to Madame de Circourt, " but I dread find- 
 ing in your salon the frantic partisans of peace, who 
 would be mortally shocked by my presence. In spite 
 then of my warlike disposition, as I do not wish to make 
 war on your friends, I shall not present myself to you 
 save on your promising to receive me privately, or in the 
 
188 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 presence of those who will not tear out my eyes for the 
 love of peace." 
 
 One morning of this end of March, a financial 
 sovereign, Baron James de Rothschild, called on Cavour, 
 whom he had known for some period, and a curious 
 dialogue ensued between them. The all-powerful banker, 
 strongly opposed to war, and desirous to know how far 
 things had gone, became pressing. " Well," replied 
 Cavour, " there are many chances in favour of peace, and 
 there are many in favour of war." ** Always joking, 
 M. la Comte I " ''Look here. Baron, I will make you a 
 proposal ; let us buy together in the funds ; we'll buy 
 for a rise ; I'll resign my post and there'll be a rise of 
 three francs." " You are too modest, M. la Comte, you 
 are worth fully six francs ! " 
 
 The fact is that at the moment when Baron Roths- 
 child received this waggish confidence, there was really 
 in Europe a man disposing of peace or war, and this was 
 the prime minister of Piedmont ; and the truth further 
 is that when he spoke thus, Cavour was not much wiser 
 in the matter than his interlocutor. He carried back a 
 lively sense of the gravity of the situation to Turin, 
 where he had returned on April 1. He saw the busi- 
 ness badly begun. Without suspecting the Emperor, 
 he apprehended difficulties and delays, which might 
 indeed be sharply abridged by Austria, if only Austria 
 would do him the good service to commit herself to some 
 rash step. 
 
 The matter could not long remain undecided. From 
 the first days of April it narrowed more and more, and 
 concentrated definitely in two points, which were but 
 
PROPOSAL OF GENERAL DISARMAMENT. 189 
 
 one — the congress and the preliminary disarmament. 
 It was there that the understanding was next to im- 
 possible. Austria on her part would not have Sardinia 
 admitted to the congress, and besides, she demanded 
 irritably and haughtily the disarmament of Piedmont in y^ 
 advance of any European deliberation. Cavour, on his "^ 
 side, looked with an evil eye on this sudden apparition 
 of a congress, and in any case he could not consent that 
 Piedmont, after for three years joining in all the deli- 
 berations of Europe, should be left at the door of later 
 conferences on Italian affairs. 
 
 He had declared from the first moment that " the 
 congress must have a disastrous effect on Italy if Sardinia 
 were excluded," and that he should be drawn or forced 
 to send in his resignation. As to disarmament, he would 
 not hear of it ; he wrote resolutely to Prince Napoleon : 
 " We will not disarm. Better fall vanquished, sword in 
 hand, than perish miserably in a state of anarchy, or see 
 ourselves degraded to maintain public tranquillity with 
 violence, like the king of Naples. To-day we have a 
 moral force worth an army ; if we abandon it, nothing 
 will give it us back." 
 
 How was conciliation practicable between such 
 opposing pretensions? Diplomacy was bewildered; for 
 if Piedmont was refused a seat at the congress, it was 
 difficult to insist on her disarming ; and if she was asked 
 to disarm, it appeared simply justice to invite her to the 
 congress. Out of this came a combination put forward 
 by England, modified and shaped by France ; it was to 
 be a general disarmament, in which Piedmont was to 
 participate on her admission to the congress with the 
 
190 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 other Italian States. The Cabinets made the last throw 
 for peace in this scheme. It was not at all to the taste 
 of Cavour, who watched the latest labours of diplomatic 
 expedients most anxiously. So long as he had to do 
 only with England on the question of disarmament, he 
 could shuffle from the pressure of English diplomacy, 
 and dexterously elude replying. When the official 
 proposition to disarm came to him from France, he was 
 J seized by a strong emotion, as in the very crisis of his 
 life. 
 
 On the evening of April 18, towards midnight, 
 a secretary of the French Legation had brought him a 
 brief and peremptory telegram, in which the French 
 Cabinet demanded his immediate adhesion, and on 
 reading it he exclaimed in a paroxysm, "that there 
 was nothing more for him to do but to blow out his 
 brains." He fancied all was lost ; that the Emperor 
 had forsaken him in the heat of the crisis ; and he felt his 
 soul overwhelmed with patriotic anguish at the idea of 
 this work, at which he had laboured for six years, and 
 which had seemed so near succeeding, being jeopardised. 
 But the first dolorous instant passed, his natural elas- 
 ticity, that never gave him time to blow out his brains on 
 any of the occasions when the thought of it came to him, 
 revived, and he began to reflect. 
 
 Every possible scheme and resolution worked in his 
 brain. " It is true," he said animatedly to his friends, 
 " true that we are unhurt on the score of our personal 
 pride. England first stipulated for a preliminary dis- 
 
SUBMISSION TO THE WILL OF EUROPE. 191 
 
 armament, and we replied in the negative ; she then 
 asked us to subscribe to the principle of disarmament, 
 and this likewise we declined. To-day, if we adhere to 
 a proposition to disarm on the condition of being ad- 
 mitted to the congress, we submit to a demand addressed 
 to us by Europe. Our honour is safe. We resisted as 
 long as we could. Nevertheless our situation is grave : 
 not desperate, but grave." 
 
 Cavour had more than one good reason for calming 
 himself and believing that things were not desperate. 
 Despatches and telegrams received by him on the 
 morrow from London, above all from Paris, helped to 
 reassure him. There was also another point of which he 
 had not at first seized the importance : the adhesion 
 demanded of him, which he had sadly transmitted by 
 the telegraphic wire — what value wajs there in it if not 
 completed by the adhesion of Vienna ? He had most 
 prudently made his sacrifice to be in accord with 
 Europe, not to separate himself jfrom France. Would 
 Austria likewise submit ? Far from being decided, 
 the question became more than ever doubtful. During 
 the first days nothing was known, and Cavour himself 
 began to say : " Austria does not speak ; if she should 
 refuse, Napoleon must have divined her ! In truth the 
 Cabinet of Vienna did not speak, and it remained mute 
 because it had already come to its resolve. 
 
 Was it that Austria yielded to a movement of 
 wounded and angry pride ? Did she see in the propo- 
 sition made to her a merely captious expedient, invented 
 to gain time ? Did she suppose herself ready to be 
 ahead of her adversaries in the battle-field, and undo 
 
\l 
 
 192 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 their plots by the swiftness and vigour of her blows ? 
 However it may be, during these latest negotiations, 
 when diplomacy imagined that a solution had been 
 found, Austria prepared to force events. She likewise 
 had made a last effort at Berlin to endeavour to interest 
 Kussia and Germany in her cause, by widening the war, 
 and proposing to open the conflict on the Rhine as 
 well as on the Po. Though unsuccessful, she let herself 
 be carried away hy a warlike mood. She wished to 
 have done with it ; and without waiting further she 
 determined to address an ultimatum direct to Turin, 
 summonuig Piedmont to disarm, and allowing her a 
 delay of three days to reflect on it. Cavour could have 
 wished for nothing better in his dilemma, and his sole 
 fear was to see Austria stop short. 
 
 He still knew nothing certain on the 19th April. 
 He could not know that the ultimatum that very day 
 was ready to be launched at him from Vienna. On the 
 20th he began to gather the first signs of the coming 
 coup de ihedtre. He was in the Chamber of Deputies 
 at the Carignano palace on the 23rd, when a word 
 written in haste by one of his intimates informed him 
 of the arrival of Baron Kellersperg, bearer of a commu- 
 nication from Count Buol ; and shortly afterwards at the 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at half-past five of that 
 afternoon, he received from the hands of the Austrian 
 envoy this communication, which was nothing other 
 than the command to disarm. Three days later, at the 
 same hour — being the term of the delay granted — he 
 delivered the reply of the Piedmontese Government to 
 Baron Kellersperg, whose hand he courteously pressed in 
 
DEFIANCE TO WAR ACCEPTED. 193 
 
 assuring him of the happiness he would have to sec him 
 again *' under more fjxvourable auspices." Immediately 
 he gave his final orders to Colonel Govone, deputed to 
 accompany the Austrian officer to the frontier ; then, 
 turning to some of his friends who were waiting for the 
 end of the scene, he cried with friendly familiarity, the 
 natural key that never forsook him : " It's done ; Alea 
 jacta est ! we have made some history, and now to 
 dinner ! " 
 
 Austria might justly declare that she had been 
 pushed to extremity. She had some reason to say and 
 believe that she was only defending herself in appealing 
 to arms to decide a question threatening and harrying 
 ber on all sides. Still it was in a measure her fault that 
 it so befell that the provocation coming from her should 
 alienate Europe, chill England, and disengage Piedmont 
 in assuring the latter, as the word flew instantly from 
 Paris, "the fullest aid from France." Of this long 
 and laborious diplomatic imbroglio of three months, 
 there remained nothing but a defiance to war, flung 
 down hastily, caught up with feverish zeal, and opening 
 the road of events to Italy and the brave statesman, 
 who had w^orked for it ten years, and had gone to the 
 Crimea and to Plombieres to prepare this crucial hour. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 When, dating from the morning of April 30, 
 the first French columns descended from the Alps, 
 and debouched in the Piazza Castello of Turin, in the 
 midst of an excited population, Cavour stood on the 
 
194 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 balcony of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with other 
 persons of distinction, French and Italian, and Sir 
 James Hudson as well. He had verily good reason 
 to see the march of his own policy in this thrilling 
 spectacle. A few days later Napoleon HI. disembarked 
 at Genoa, and did but express a manifest truth in 
 saying to him : " You ought to be satisfied, your aims 
 are being realised." 
 
 Under this aspect, war was doubtless a blessing, 
 for it delivered him from uncertainties, by making his 
 long ten years' dream a living and striking reality. 
 War was not, as may be imagined, a time of repose 
 for him, more especially in the earlier period, when 
 Turin expected at any day to sight the enemy, and 
 the Austrians might, with a little dash, have undone 
 the combinations of their adversaries, before the junction 
 of the armies of Piedmont and France. 
 
 Much was at one moment to be feared, in fact, if 
 the Austrians, having crossed the frontier, had known 
 how to profit by their weightier numbers in resolutely 
 marching on Turin : if, after committing an error of 
 diplomatic precipitancy, they had not been guilty of 
 another and stranger, by faltering in their military 
 steps. What prevented the war from leading off with a 
 disaster for the Allies ? It may be entirely the fortunate 
 inspiration of Marshal Canrobert, w^ho, on his arrival 
 on April 29, took upon himself to throw out his 
 first French lines to Casale, in a manner to deceive and 
 intimidate the Austrians. Cavour stood ready for the 
 worst, shrinking neither from the determination to 
 defend Turin to extremity, nor, in case of need, from 
 
HIS LABOURS IN WAR-TIME. 195 
 
 the cruel alternative of inundating the Lomellina to 
 arrest the foe. There was enough all about him to 
 kindle and occupy his wakefulness in this war he had 
 challenged, and whose risks and troubles he encountered 
 with an intrepid heart. 
 
 Eemaining alone at Turin, while the King and 
 General La Marmora went to the camp, he was Pre- 
 sident of the Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
 Minister of the Interior, Minister of War, Minister of 
 Marine — everything, and equal to all his duties. He 
 lived in the centre of the fire of these devouring labours. 
 His bureaux were his field of battle, which he worked 
 in night and day, and, after his fashion, may be said to 
 have fought in ; having at once to arrange for military 
 transports and provisioning, to reply to petitions for 
 instructions pouring in on him from all sides, to 
 maintain his diplomatic correspondence, and look to his 
 relations Avith the French army. 
 
 Nothing dashed him, nothing perplexed. AVitness 
 that day of the month of May when, within four-and- 
 twenty hours, he found means to solve the problem of 
 feeding the French army, reduced to extremities. 
 According to special arrangements, the Piedmontese 
 Government had undertaken to provide for the wants 
 of the French troops up to a certain date. The day had 
 come, and the French military administration found 
 itself painfully embarrassed in considering of the 
 morrow. The Emperor, in camp at Alessandria, sur- 
 prised by such annoying intelligence, could think of 
 nothing better than to despatch Cavaliere Nigra, whom 
 he kept near his person, to Turin. Cavour, after some 
 
 o 2 
 
190 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 show of vexation .at the bad maiiagemeut, did not the 
 less hasten his measures to amend it. He at once put 
 in motion the whole body of mayors of the communes 
 within reach of the lines of rail ; he gave them 
 orders to requisition all the meal they could lay hands 
 on, heat the bakeries, and make as much bread on the 
 spot as they could ; then, without loss of a minute, to 
 the nearest stations — and behold, next morning there 
 was provision beyond what was needed at Alessandria ! 
 This is but one of many instances of his indefatigable 
 promptitude in regard to administrative and military 
 business. 
 
 IX. 
 
 The gravest point ahead Wiis in the political bearings 
 of this war, which opened with numerous victories, and 
 from Montebello, Palestro, Magenta, Melegnano, can*ied 
 the allies to the Mincio. 
 
 There can be no doubt that the agreements between 
 Cavour and Napoleon III. remained at first intact 
 with the original programme of the war. The Emperor, 
 before leaving Paris, had himself declared in a procla- 
 mation : " Austria has brought things to such a pass 
 that she must lord it up to the Alps, or else Itahj must 
 he free up to the Adnatic : for in that countr}' every 
 nook of earth holding independence is a danger to 
 
 the power of Austria The aim of this war 
 
 is to restore Italy to herself, not that she should change 
 masters, and we shall have on our frontiers a friendly 
 people, owipg their liberty to us." The Emperor added 
 also, it is true : " We do not enter Italy to foment 
 
NAPOLEON III. TO THE ITALIANS. 197 
 
 disorder, nor to shatter the authority of the Holy 
 Father, whom we have replaced on his throne, but to 
 relieve it of a foreign burden weighing upon the whole 
 peninsula." 
 
 Shortly afterwards, at Milan, following the victory 
 of Magenta, which gave Lombardy to the allies. Napo- 
 leon III. addressed far more serious words to the 
 Italians, telling them : "Providence sometimes favours 
 a people by giving them the opportunity to spring 
 to hfe at a blow, but it is on the condition that they 
 shall know how to profit by it. Profit, then, by the 
 good fortune offered to you ! Unite in a common aim 
 — the deliverance of your country. Give yourselves 
 military organisation. Fly to the banner of Victor 
 Emmanuel, who has so nobly shown you the path of 
 
 honour ; and animated by the sacred fire of 
 
 patriotism, be but soldiers to-day : to-morrow you will 
 be citizens of a great country." 
 
 So spoke the Emperor, and naturally whatr was to be 
 anticipated ensued. Already in the last days of April, 
 at the opening of the war, Florence had made her 
 revolution, letting her Grand Duke depart in peace 
 and find an asylum in the camp of the Austrians. The 
 Governments of Modena and Parma had melted away. 
 Towards the middle of June, the Austrians, anxious 
 to have all their forces on the Adigc, hastened to quit 
 the Papal territory, Ancona and Bologna, which they 
 had occu23ied for ten years, and immediately, with a 
 spontaneous outburst, the Romagna joined the move- 
 ment. 
 
 All these things were accomplished without a 
 
198 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 struggle, insomucli that in the track of the armies 
 there was a half-emancipated Italy turning to Pied- 
 mont. Here was the most delicate part of the pro- 
 gramme of the war, and Cavour watched it keenly. 
 Day by day he marked the successive steps of this 
 work of liberation ; it had all his sympathies, and he 
 strove to keep it in good order, for it was one of the 
 sources of his strength. He had sent Count Pallieri 
 to Parma, the ardent and devoted Farini to Modena, 
 and to Florence the sagacious Boncompagni. He 
 reserved for Bologna, a difficult position, the person 
 the best fitted to exact obedience by the authority of 
 his name, his noted loyalty, and his lofty mind — 
 Massimo d'Azeglio. 
 
 What was to be done with these provinces, for the 
 moment delivered up to themselves, was the business 
 of the war. The men he forwarded represented among 
 them the lordship they had besought of Victor Em- 
 manuel. He gave similar instructions to each of them : 
 •'Kepression in the cause of order, activity on behalf 
 of the war; what remains leave to the future." His 
 principal care was to allow no opening for agitation and 
 declamation, and it was with this mind that he wrote to 
 Signor Vigliani, a Piedmontese magistrate, of a liberal 
 and conciliatory disposition, whom he had made governor 
 of Milan : "We are not in 1848 ; we permit of no dis- 
 cussion. Take no notice of the excitement of those who 
 surround you. The smallest act of weakness wrecks the 
 Government." 
 
 His lieutenants were everywhere, even in the camp 
 of Garibaldi, whither he had sent a young Lombard, 
 
BEFORE SOLFEBINO. 199 
 
 Emilio Visconti-Venosta — who has since been Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs — who there served as Eoyal Com- 
 missioner with the Chasseurs of the Alps, with whom he 
 made the campaign. In a word, the armies marched, 
 Italy was in movement, and Cavour inspired and directed 
 all, while holding himself as much as possible within 
 the bounds of the imperial programme. The culminating 
 point was about to be touched — Solferino ! 
 
 X. 
 
 But already, before this more bloody than decisive 
 battle of June 24, there had been some clouds in the 
 camp of the allies. 
 
 With the progress of events the situation grew more 
 complicated. In approaching the Mincio and the Adige, 
 the armies of France and Piedmont had heavy operations 
 in view instead of battles ; they had to conduct sieges 
 and carry formidable positions : they were soon to be in 
 the presence of the Quadrilateral. European diplomacy, 
 at the same time, after leaving the war to its first shots, 
 appeared disposed to resume work ; Prussia, without 
 showing any hostility, seemed inclined to play a more 
 active part. On the other hand, the successive move- 
 ments in Italy, troubling the provinces of the Pope, 
 awakened suspicions and animosities against what was 
 called " Piedmontese ambition ;" and all these circum- 
 stances tended to feed certain busy eflforts, having their // 
 centre in Paris, which were soon to reach the head- 
 quarters of Napoleon III. in the heart of Lombardy. 
 The policy that had been unable to prevent the war, 
 
200 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 now attempted to limit and stop it as speedily as might 
 be, by exciting the doubts and fears of the Emperor ; 
 and assuredly such a policy found efficacious backers in 
 the overwhelming heat of a torrid season, and the 
 fatigues of a sovereign who, at an age past fifty, 
 fancied himself capable of conducting great military 
 undertakings. 
 
 In truth, the glorious and bloody battle of Solferino 
 was Ijut the final coup de soleil, which, so to say, ripened 
 the situation. Immediately after it the Emperor received 
 ; news from Paris leading him to dread the aj^pearance of 
 Germany on the scene. He had, moreover, been pro- 
 foundly shaken by the frightful carnage he had wit- 
 nessed. " I have lost 10,000 men," he said to someone, 
 with the accent of a man absorbed by the thought 
 of it. 
 
 His mind was variously swayed. He saw the diffi- 
 culties and dangers lying in a continuation of tlie war, 
 and the possible though restricted advantages of an 
 arrangement proposed in the hour of victory ; and 
 under this impression he despatched General Fleury, on 
 the evening of July 7, to be the bearer of a proposition 
 of an armistice, that in his idea might lead to peace, 
 to the Austrian camp at Verona. Three days sub- 
 sequently, after an interview between Napoleon III. 
 ^ and the Emperor Francis Joseph, at Mllafranca, on the 
 road to Verona, the preliminaries were signed which 
 put an end to the war. The main headings of the 
 treaty of peace were sketched : Cession of Lombardy to 
 the king of Sardinia ; creation of an Italian confedera- 
 tion under the " honorary " presidency of the Pope ; the 
 
VILLAFBANCA. 201 
 
 ultimate return of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the 
 Duke of Modena to their principalities ; Venetia to 
 remain *' under the crown of the Emperor of Austria." 
 These preliminaries were the basis of the definitive 
 treaty signed by the plenipotentiaries in the neutral 
 city of Zurich. 
 
 Thus, then, the French vanguard reached Turin on 
 April 30 ; on May 20 the first battle was fought, that 
 of Montebello ; and the Italian war terminated on 
 July 11 at Villafranca. To conclude it Napoleon III. 
 had been compelled, as he stated, to "cut off from his 
 programme the territory stretching between the Mincio 
 and the Adige. In stopping midway in the execution 
 of plans that had been the object of the alliance of 
 Plombieres, he had likewise to renounce — temporarily, 
 we will say — the benefits to be obtained by France on i^ 
 her side of the Alps ; nor did he hesitate — he asked for 
 nothing. Plainly he believed himself to have perfoimed 
 a great act in the face of Europe in signing peace. But 
 it was a perplexed and precarious peace, leaving many 
 problems unsolved, and open to the capital charge, that 
 it left the permanent interests qf France unconsidered 
 and disappointed the hopes of Italy. It spoke strongly 
 of that unhappy tendency of a mind so strangely fas- 
 cinated by chimaeras and wanting in will. Not enough 
 or else too much had been done. 
 
 This, however, is positive : the Emperor had con- 
 ceived and executed his design without consulting his 
 ally. Notwithstanding the indications of a difficult 
 situation naturally disquieting him at times, Cavour 
 had not foreseen so proximate a coup de thedtre. 
 
202 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUIf. 
 
 Shortly previous he had been summoned to the Mincio 
 by the Kiug, specially to tranquillise the Emperor con- 
 cerning what was passing in the Legations. He thought 
 he had succeeded ; and he had quitted the army, deeply 
 affected by the spectacle of the field of Solferino, but 
 without suspicion. Further, on July 6 he had written 
 to Marquis Sauli, Sardinian ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg, who had mentioned the possibility of a mediation : 
 ** A mediation at present could bring nothing but bad 
 consequences. Austrian influence must entirely dis- 
 appear from Italy before we can have a solid and durable 
 peace." Still less did he consider the likelihood of a 
 peace directly negotiated between the belligerents. He 
 was unaware while writing this that the idea of a direct 
 negotiation had already been accepted by the Emperor. 
 
 Two days later, on July 8, he received a despatch 
 at Turin from General La Marmora, Avith news of a 
 suspension of arms ; and La Marmora confessed that 
 no one knew " how or by whom the armistice had been 
 l^roposed." He started for the camp at once ; and 
 reaching Pozzolengo, the King's head-quarters, he knew 
 the truth : he found himself in the presence of a peace, 
 all but established, which frustrated his hopes and con- 
 founded his policy. The peace was visible; as yet he 
 was ignorant of the conditions. They were communi- 
 cated to him only on July 11, in a familiar and dramatic 
 scene, when the King came from the imperial camp at 
 Valeggio bearing the deed, which he signed with this 
 formula or singular reserve : "As far as I am concerned." 
 
 Throwing off his unifomi, with a heavy face, Victor 
 Emmanuel seated himself in his habitual soldierly atti- 
 
1118 GRIEF AT TEE TERMS OF PEACE, 203 
 
 tilde, and commanded one of the four persons present to 
 read the preliminaries aloud. Cavour at this reading 
 fell into a violent passion. So intemperate was he that 
 the King had some trouble in calming him, and entrusted 
 him to La Marmora. But Cavour knew well that the 
 King had done no more than he was obliged to do. 
 Between the alternatives of singly carrying on an un- 
 equal war, or subscribing to a peace that rescued 
 Lombardy while leaving many questions open, Victor 
 Emmanuel had not or could not have hesitated. Indeed, 
 his resolution once taken, he had shown some finesse 
 even in his submission — letting his grief be seen, but 
 no resentment. 
 
 Nor would Cavour himself, in his bitterness of spirit, 
 have counselled other proceedings to the King. As for 
 him, he declined to accept the responsibility of the L. 
 peace, and he washed his hands of power under the 
 w^eight of so cruel a deception. As soon as things were 
 settled, he considered it due to himself, his honour, and 
 his policy, to quit the Ministry, and after handing his 
 resignation to the King, he left for Turin, overcome with 
 grief, revolving all kinds of projects in his head. As he 
 was passing through Milan, many persons, and among 
 them the Governor, Vigliani, were at the station, im- 
 patient to sec him. The weariness following stormy 
 amotions had thrown him into a deep sleep. They did 
 not awaken him. It was his first wink of sleep during 
 the whole of his lamentable excursion to the camp. 
 
204 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 XI. 
 
 Cavour, while on the Mincio, had not seen the 
 Emperor, and tlic Emperor had not, for his part, been 
 desirous of entering into explanations with him. The 
 interview at Valeggio would have been somewhat 
 diflerent from that at Plombi^res. It was only on his 
 passage through Turin, returning to France, some days 
 later, that Napoleon III. expressed a wish to see him, 
 and the interview softened the acuter pangs of his recent 
 wounds. The two at least parted like men who may 
 meet again. Cavour had gone to the palace in the 
 evening with a friend, who accompanied him through 
 the most deserted streets of the city, and on his way 
 he said : " I have been invited to a Court dinner, but I 
 refused. I am not in a state of mind to accept invita- 
 tions. To think that I had done so much for the 
 union of the Italians, and that to-day all may be com- 
 promised ! I shall be reproached for not having con- 
 sented to sign the peace. I was unable absolutely, and 
 I cannot sign it." 
 
 Cavour's sole idea was to be out of the wmv. and 
 leaving La Marmora to form a ministry with Rattazzi and 
 General Dabormida, he hastened to depart for Switzer- 
 land. 
 
 The state of his mind is seen in a letter he wrote 
 on July 22 to Madame de Circourt : " If," he said, 
 " Bougival, instead of being at the gates of Paris, w^re 
 in some obscure corner of France, I would eagerly 
 accept the hospitality you offer me so cordially. You, 
 
LETTER TO MADAME BE GIBGOUBT. 205 
 
 dear countess, would help me, I am sure, not to despair 
 of my country ; and I should leave you after some time 
 in a better condition than I am in at present to renew 
 the struggle for independence and liberty. But I could 
 not be at the gates of Paris without entering it; it would 
 look as if I were sulking ; and there is nothing so ridi- 
 culous in the Avorld as the sulking of a fallen minister ; 
 especially if he is so foolish as to pout with the city of 
 all others the most careless of misfortune and most 
 mocking. I am bidden by my position to be as quiet as 
 I can. I came trudging into Switzerland, the hospital 
 of the politically wounded ; but as the announcement of 
 a congress at Zurich might give my innocent journey a 
 suspicious look, I shall beat a retreat to Savoy, and I 
 shall take my station at the foot of Mont Blanc, there 
 among the marvels of nature to forget the wretchedness 
 of the works of men ; then, when the heats are over, I 
 shall return to my estates." 
 
 He added with fine irony, doubtless replying to 
 rather hasty compliments on his retirement : " What 
 you tell me of the new kindness of my former friends 
 entirely consoles me. I am bound to look on my fall as 
 a providential event, if I may owe to it the recovery of 
 the esteem of the chosen circle around you, from which 
 my misconceived policy had in some sort shut me out." 
 
 Writing and speaking in this manner, he used the 
 language of a beaten man ; he thought himself van- 
 quished, and he was less so than he supposed. He still 
 retained a touch of the bitterness which had burst from 
 him so terribly in his first anguish. He had need to 
 escape from the fiery atmosphere he had lived in for 
 
206 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 six months, and seek the repose he was sure to find in 
 Switzerland, in the society of liis friends De la Rive. 
 One morning at the end of July he disembarked at 
 Hermance, on the Lake of Geneva. Findiujr no other 
 means to get to Pressinge, he hired a farm-cart, and the 
 owner of it offering to drive, Cavour talked with the 
 honest countryman on the road of the harvests, the 
 value of the land about, and the divers cultivations 
 going on in those parts. At Pressinge there was no one 
 to receive him, so he went afoot, his coat on his arm, 
 under a tremendous heat, to another house of the De la 
 Rives, where he was hailed as a guest as little foreseen 
 as he was welcome. None would have said to see him 
 that he was the man who had just stirred all Europe. 
 He passed some days there, happy in the family life, 
 conversing freely with his friends, fishing in the lake, 
 and for a solitar}' incident coming across a huge Bernese 
 soldier with a long moustache, who asked him if he was 
 Cavour in person, and then passed on in silence, after 
 squeezing his hand. 
 
 It might be called the convalescence of Cavour after 
 the fever. A week had barely passed, and he was no 
 longer the same man ; he had recovered his prodigious 
 elasticity of nature which saved him from the danger of 
 those first fits of passion he could not always control 
 in the heat of action. 
 
 He judged matters with perfect freedom of mind, 
 without recrimination and superfluous regrets, striving 
 above all to comprehend them as they had come to pass. 
 
 *' It is useless to look back," he said, " now let us 
 look ahead. We have been ifollowing one trail ; it is 
 
VILLAFRANCA AND THE ITALIANS. 207 
 
 cut : well tlieu, now let us follow another. It will cost us 
 twenty years to do what might have been done in so 
 many months. What is there for us ? Besides, England 
 has not yet done anything for Italy ; to-day it is her 
 turn." And to his friend Castelli, who had remained at 
 Turin, he did not delay to write : "I have not aban- 
 doned politics. I should if Italy were free ; then my 
 work would be finished : but so long as the Austrians 
 are on our side of the Alps, it is my duty to dedicate 
 what remains to me of life and energy, to realise the 
 hopes I have laboured to make my countrymen conceive. 
 I have resolved to waste no time in vain and sterile 
 agitations, but I shall not be deaf to the call of my 
 country." 
 
 Manifestly Cavour, in yielding to a sudden fiery 
 impulse, had by his protestations and his retirement 
 gone rather far. All one can say is that he had been 
 the first to feel what Italy felt almost instantaneously. In 
 all parts of the peninsula, excepting perhaps Lombardy, 
 where a deep sense of deliverance was foremost, the 
 feeling was deep and poignant. The disappointment 
 was measured by the hopes and the confidence in a war 
 undertaken to make Italy free up to the Adriatic, 
 according to the proclamation of Milan. Nothing 
 was seen at first but the abandonment of Venice by a 
 new Campo-Formio, and the threat of the restoration 
 of their former masters to Florence and Bologna. 
 
 The peace of Villafranca caused the Italians to forget^ 
 for the moment at least, what France had done for 
 them; and even at Turin they were far from the 
 enthusiasm which had welcomed the French soldiers on 
 
 ^ 
 
 U 
 
208 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUIi. 
 
 April 30. "If this problem had been proposed six mouthy 
 ago," wrote the most moderate of men, Massimo 
 d'Azcglio : "-To enter Italy with 200,000 soldiers, spend 
 half a million of money, gain four battles, restore the 
 Italians one of their finest provinces, and then to return 
 with their cui'ses ; such a problem would have l)een 
 declared insoluble. Well then, it is not ; and fiicts have 
 proved it. In Central Italy, where all heads have been 
 inflamed by the great deeds of the war, they wQl not 
 accept the peace of Villafranca. For me, I abstain from 
 judging the conduct of the Emperor. The end of it is, 
 he has been under fire in our cause against the Austrians ; 
 and as regards the splendid soldiers of France, I could 
 embrace their knees. Still all this does not hide the 
 fact, that the situation of our poor Italy is terrible. To 
 
 tell the truth, I lose my head " 
 
 It was this sentiment of a terrible situation, and of an 
 unforeseen and bitter deception, that Cavour expressed and 
 caused to resound when he gave in his resignation, which 
 made the vanquished minister the popular representative 
 of a national crisis, the possible workman of new fortunes. 
 He was in full accord with the public instinct ; if he had 
 been guilty of hastiness he had committed this fault in 
 common with the country ; for him, as for his country, it 
 was a force of which he, in his temporary and voluntary 
 retirement from office, was the always-ready champion. 
 
 XII. 
 
 Nevertheless, when the first outburst was over, people 
 looked about them ; and herein Cavour soon found 
 
TEE NATURE OF TEE PEACE. 209 
 
 liimself in accord with Italy. The impression was 
 unmitigatedly keen, but there was a disposition to look 
 close at the situation newly created for them, to read 
 the meaning of events, and seek a fresh direction. 
 
 The peace of Villafranca was not without its advan- 
 tages, though it had stopped military proceedings. If ^ 
 it allowed the foreigner to keep a footing in his last 
 entrenchments in Venetia, it offered the prospect of new 
 combinations, and a certain liberty that might be put to 
 profit. The dukes might re-enter their duchies : and in 
 what manner ? " Indispensable reforms " were to be 
 demanded from the Pope. Supposing the Pope to refuse 
 the granting of these reforms, and the Romagna to refuse 
 to submit to the Pope ? France, after fighting for 
 Italian independence against Austria, could not abjure 
 the moral consequences of her intervention, and join 
 Austria against Italy. Napoleon III. was bound by his ^^ 
 deeds, his connivance, and his sentiments; England, 
 which, according to Cavour, had as yet done nothing, 
 had just gone through a ministerial crisis that had over- 
 thrown the Tories and brought the Whigs to power — 
 Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell. England, with- 
 out lending material assistance, upon which they must not 
 count, might give good help with her sympathies and 
 her diplomacy ; and her interests lay in doing so, if it 
 were but to extend her influence beyond the Alps and 
 seek her advantage in the new organisation of Italy. In 
 reality, everything hung more than ever in suspense. 
 
 What was to come of it ? The first moment had been 
 one of confusion, trouble, and irritation. That which 
 neither Napoleon III., in improvising a peace that he 
 
210 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 deemed necessary, nor the Italians, in submitting to this 
 peace, which seemed a mortal wound to them, had fore- 
 seen, was, that Villafranca, far from settling, was hardly 
 a stage between the crisis of yesterday and that of to- 
 morrow; it w^as only a truce, by favour of which an 
 Italian campaign of a new character was prepaiing, and 
 Cavour could return on the scene to gather fruits of a 
 kind very differently unforeseen from this peace he had 
 imprecated. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE ITALIAN CRISIS AFTER VILLAFRANCA — CAVOUR AND 
 THE CESSION OP SAVOY. 
 
 Speech of Napoleou III. at St. Cloud — Character and first Consequences of the 
 Peace of Villafranca — France and Austria — Piedmont and the New Ministry 
 — Italian Phase — The Annexation Movement in Central Italy — Farina at 
 Modena and at Bologna — Eicasoli at Florence — Portrait of Ricasoli — The 
 Military League of Central Italy — The Tuscan Envoys in Paris — Official 
 Policy of France —Personal Policy of the Emperor — Contradictions of 
 French Diplomacy — Negotiations with England — ^The Emperor's Tactics to 
 disengage himself — New Cov,p de TM'ltre — Change in the French Ministry 
 — M. Thouvenel takes the Place of Count Walewski — The Pamphlet " The 
 Pope and the Congress " — Change of Ministry at Turin — Cavour recalled to 
 Office — Negotiations with Central Italy and with Paris — Preparations for 
 the Bdno'&inent — The Annexations — Cession of Savoy and Nice to France — 
 Opinion in Italy — Opinion in Europe — The External and Internal Situation 
 — ^The Treaty of March 24, 1860, before Parliament — Speech of Cavour on 
 Italian Policy and the French Alliance — Cavour at Pisa and at Florence — 
 Results of the Annexations and the Cession of Savoy — The Policy of Action 
 — Revolution in Sicily. 
 
 L 
 
 On the day folloAving the campaign of 1859, when 
 Napoleon III. gave audience at St. Cloud to senators, 
 deputies, and councillors of state, all as eager to belaud 
 his moderation as they would have been to acclaim his 
 resolution and energy if he had pursued the war, the 
 Emperor seemed to think the occasion good for explaining 
 and specifying the nature of his work at Villafranca. 
 
 p 2 
 
212 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUB, 
 
 It was a singular scene. To the adulations of 
 courtiers comparing liim to Scipio, and raving of the 
 " prodig}' " of a will that could so control itself, the 
 Emperor replied in the nervous tone of a man who had 
 to defend himself for having in " weariness " abandoned 
 " the noble cause he had wished to serve." He was 
 thinking doubtless of Cavour when he confessed that it 
 had cost him much to stop short in a work he had com- 
 menced, and to see " brave hearts robbed of their noble 
 illusions and patriotic hopes." He appealed to the 
 interests of France, endangered by the probable extension 
 \J of a struggle that might at any moment have broken out 
 on the Rhine as well as on the Adige. "AVhcn the 
 destinies of my country seemed in peril, I made peace," 
 he said; and in explaining why he had stopped, it pleased 
 him to point to the fruits of victory, once more an exhi- 
 bition of the prevailing of French arms ; Piedmont 
 enlarged by an opulent province ; Italian nationality, 
 recognised and organised by a federation ; the Princes 
 restored or supported, " understanding at last the 
 imperative necessity of salutary reforms." 
 
 This was unfortunately but a vain flourish before 
 courtiers, barely disguising the truth of things. The 
 peace improvised or patched together in a little village 
 of the Mincio, between two emperors equally sick of the 
 horrors of a battle-field, had nothing stable or settled in 
 it. The war was terminated, but none of the problems 
 let loose by the war were solved. France and Austria 
 had joined hands, and Piedmont stood deceived and 
 v/ embaiTassed; the Central Duchies were half emarflSpated 
 and left to themselves ; the national sentiment cf Italy 
 
L^ 
 
 THE SITUATION. 213 
 
 was cheated and irritated ; and Europe stood astonished 
 and suspicious, in contemplation of that enigmatic meeting ^^ 
 of the two emperors on the Mincio. 
 
 I wish to specify the exact situation, immediately 
 after the arrested conflict. France thought right to 
 push the war no farther ; Austria thought right to 
 purchase peace, at the cost of a province, that still left 
 her Venetia and the hope of restoring the Princes to 
 Florence and Modena. Between France and Austria 
 laying down their arms, the Treaty of Zurich completed 
 what had been outlined at Yillafranca. The Italian 
 questions proper — the questions of reorganisation, 
 federation, and reform — were reserved for a European 
 congress. 
 
 Here we have everything apparently arranged or 
 foreseen. It was on the contrary a new beginning of the 
 unforeseen. The settlement was but on the surface ; and 
 side by side with Villafranca, Zurich, the congress, and 
 official diplomacy, suddenly we behold an original and 
 startling phase, which I may call the phase of the Italians 
 taking the conduct of their destinies into their own ^ 
 hands, upsetting all calculations, and themselves ven- 
 turing to give their interpretation to a peace by which 
 their hopes were fettered. Cavour had said : " The track 
 is cut ; let us pursue another." Napoleon III., before 
 leaving the Mincio, had let fall these strange words to 
 Victor Emmanuel : " Now we shall see what the Italians / 
 can do unaided." It is the secret of the period com- 
 mencing on July 11, 1859, that of another and a 
 national diplomatic drama, which, under new conditions 
 and with new characters, is about to work itself out by 
 
214 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 unexpected ways, up to the crisis once more prepared by 
 the great master of the Italian revolution. 
 
 II. 
 
 Tlie terms of the peace of Villafi*anca had the mis- 
 fortune to be fitted to a different situation, and not to be 
 suitable to circumstances ; they were but an insufficient 
 ^ and a contradictory make-shift, without vitality in 
 regard to the future. 
 
 This confederation, imagined by Napoleon III. as a 
 means of presei-ving a portion of his programme, would 
 have been a gain and a guarantee — before the war. 
 Transpose the hypothesis : the confederation would still 
 have been possible, even with the restored Princes, if 
 the war had been pushed on to the Adriatic, up to an 
 independence made complete by the total ejection of the 
 foreigner from Italy ; and thus France would have had 
 more right to demand the acceptation of it, the Italians 
 less reason to refuse it. But with Austria encamped in 
 Venice, holding formidable positions, and continuing to 
 overshadow Italy with her powder and her alliances, the 
 confederation was rather a permanent menace than a 
 / promise of repose ; for the enemy, that is to say the 
 foreign preponderance, w\as left in possession of the field. 
 
 The peace, such as it had been concluded, destroyed 
 in advance the idea of confederation, or, in other words, 
 the confederation thus organised compromised the peace 
 of the two emperors from the veiy beginning. A further 
 contradiction. The preliminaries of July 1 1 said : 
 ** The Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena 
 
THE NEW MINISTRY. 215 
 
 shall return to their States." At the same time the 
 Emperor Napoleon had prohibited the use of force to 
 help their return ; he had stipulated that the rights and 
 the will of the populations should be consulted ; so that 
 the Italians discovered in this strange, incoherent piece 
 of work, at once a stimulant to revolt and an easy- 
 means to evade the deceptive tangle wound about them. 
 
 For a moment undoubtedly their uncertainty was 
 grievous and full of anguish. Cavour had disappeared, 
 and with him apparently the last chance of a national ^ 
 policy and leadership. The new Piedmontese Ministry 
 of La Marmora, Rattazzi, Dabormida, formed to execute 
 the terms of peace, was necessarily compelled to make 
 its official proclamation. At Florence, Modena, Parma, 
 and Bologna, still more than at Turin and Milan, the 
 treaty of Villafranca burst like a clap of thunder, and 
 seemed to offer Central Italy the option of an ener- 
 vating submission, or the more perilous issue of revolu- 
 tion in resisting it. A single hesitation, one false step, 
 a riot, might ruin everything, and complicate events 
 irremediably. 
 
 Resolute men were needed to hold the country in 
 hand ; masters of themselves, and capable of seeing, as 
 by inspiration, the resources belonging to so novel a 
 position. The Cabinet of Turin was obliged at first, that 
 it might act in harmony with diplomacy, to disengage 
 Piedmont from Central Italy, and abdicate the semblance 
 of a protectorate, by the recall of its representatives — 
 Farini at Modena, Boncompagni at Florence, Massimo 
 d'Azeglio at Bologna ; but the link officially broken was ^^^ 
 renewed morally in the elections made by the people. 
 
\/ 
 
 216 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 Farini ceased to be the commissary of Victor Emmanuel, 
 only to become the dictator of Modena and Parma. 
 Baron Ricasoli was made governor of Tuscany in the 
 place of Boncompagni. The head of the new government 
 of Bologna was one little known till then — Colonel 
 Leonetto Cipriani, prudently chosen on account of his 
 close relations with the Napoleons. 
 
 There was hardly even an apparent change, and these 
 chiefs and improvised dictators lost no time in developing 
 what they were meditating — to win through the peace 
 possibly more than they would have gained by the war. 
 Before the end of August, assemblies were sitting to 
 systematise the interregnum. A military league for the 
 common defence was established between these States 
 abandoned to their fate. Envoys were despatched from 
 Bologna, Parma, and Florence — Count Linati, Marquis 
 Lajatico, Bianchi, Ubaldini Peruzzi, Matteucci — to plead 
 for the national cause at Turin, Paris, and London. In 
 a word, while diplomacy, deeming itself all-powerful, sat 
 in the thick of its more or less specious webs. Central 
 Italy was organising and marching to its fixed aim. 
 
 This aim was indicated by circumstances and the 
 very nature of a situation so unexampled. For seeing 
 that Austria, shorn of a province only, remained with 
 the overflowing resources of the empire on the Mincio 
 and the Po, there was nothing for it but to gather 
 together what Italian forces could be got, create what 
 was called the " strong kingdom," and at all costs 
 unite with Piedmont. 
 
 Annexation was the predominating thought. That 
 which had been done to forestall greater changes, 
 
INFLUENCE OF FIEDMONT. 217 
 
 turn aside or suspend the current of fusion represented 
 by the Piedmontese protectorate, was precisely what 
 quickened the work of unification, and drew the small 
 central states nearer to the subalpine kingdom. " Austria " 
 in the Quadrilateral," writes D'Azeglio, "has Italy at 
 her mercy whenever she pleases. Italy sees nothing 
 else ; she has but this one desire — that of constituting; 
 never mind how, a group of States able to offer some 
 serious opposition to a Power that has lost nothing of ^ 
 her strength, and is twice as evily disposed to us as she 
 was. How are we to be thinking of our historic tradi- 
 tions and particular clock-tower interests ? But for this 
 peace, they might not have been without their influence. 
 In our actual position, we think solely of creating fresh 
 forces. That has been marvellously well understood 
 by the good sense of all Italy. Hence we have this 
 unanimous movement towards Sardinia, hence the 
 casting away of egotistical traditions, the deepest rooted 
 of our instincts, the dearest to Italian municipalism." 
 
 Two things may be cited to account for this re- 
 markable change in the feelings of the Italians : pri- 
 marily the national necessity, and next, the ten years' 
 long influence of Piedmontese policy; the watchword 
 of courage, the conception of military honour, tried 
 patriotism, constitutional government, and an orderly 
 
 and beneficial freedom. In other words — ^mark well — 
 
 . . . t^ 
 
 even in his eclipse, it is the policy of Cavour triumphing 
 
 and bearing fruit : when seeming beaten at Turin, it 
 
 reappears under another aspect at Modena as at Florence, 
 
 in the person of Farini and of Eicasoli, who in their 
 
 turn come to the front. And if anything proves the 
 
218 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 ripeness of a revolution it is the fortune of Italy in 
 finding at every decisive step workmen fitted for the 
 work of the hour. 
 
 III. 
 
 One of the chiefs of Central Italy, Farini, was a 
 doctor of medicine, Komagnole by origin, Piedmontese 
 by adoption, a fervent and devoted heart, of a mind 
 both brilliant and lettered, who had written his recol- 
 lections in a " History of the Roman States." Mixed up 
 in youth with the Liberal movement of his native pro- 
 vince, but holding aloof from factions, he had been in 
 turn one of the Pope's ministers with the unfortunate 
 Rossi in 1848, then deputy and minister at Turin with 
 Cavour, whose ideas he shared, and whose policy he 
 passionately supported. The representative of Victor 
 Emmanuel at Modena during the war, he signalised 
 liimself by not wavering an instant. At the first 
 rumour of negotiations between the emperoi*s, before he 
 knew a single word of the peace, he had telegraphed to 
 Turin : " Do not leave me without instructions. Under- 
 stand that if, owing to conventions of which I am 
 ignorant, the Duke makes any attempt here, I shall 
 treat him as an enemy of the King and of the country. 
 I will not be driven from my place, though it cost me 
 my life." Recalled by the Piedmontese Government, 
 he remained at Modena, the elected chief of a provi- 
 sional government, and raised the courage of the 
 people to the height of his own, launching from the old 
 ducal palace the significant words, that Italy had not 
 " countersigned the peace of Villafranca." Before 
 
FARINL 219 
 
 quitting Turin, Cavour had time to write to him : " The 
 ministry is dead ; your friend applauds your resolve." 
 
 In all probability things were saved by Farini's 
 initiative. He checked a hasty restoration, that might 
 easily have been tried by the Duke with his little army 
 from his place of refuge in the Austrian camp, in the 
 same way that a handful of troops left by D'Azeglio 
 along the line of the Marches stopped the irruption 
 of the Papal Swiss troops into the Komagna. The 
 first danger over, Farini soon took occasion to go 
 farther, extending his governorship from Modena to 
 Parma, and as far as Bologna, and forming a sort of 
 provisional state under the old Latin name of the 
 Emilia. He had but one idea, the realisation of which 
 he prosecuted feverishly — to hurry on, at all costs, the 
 fusion with Piedmont. " The stroke is done," he wrote, 
 on the day of his entry into Bologna; *' there is now 
 only one government. In the coming year, from Pia- 
 cenza to the Cattolica, laws, orders, down to the very 
 names of them, all shall be Piedmontese. I shall see to 
 the fortifications of Bologna; good soldiers and good 
 guns against those who are for combating the annex- 
 ation — ^there you have my policy !" It was in fact the 
 sole end of his policy. Farini would possibly have had 
 to . succumb, even with his reunion of the Emilia, if 
 there had not been in one of the States of Central Italy, 
 in Tuscany, another chief at that time who stamped 
 his energetic and fiery originality on the movement — • 
 Baron Bettino Eicasoli. 
 
 He virtually — after Cavour, or with Cavour — was 
 one of the ffreat authors of the Italian transformation. 
 
220 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 Through him Tuscany became irrevocably pledged to the 
 path of unification ; and the adhesion of Tuscany was 
 far more decisive than those of the minor duchies. 
 Baron Ricasoli had distinguished himself in the revo- 
 lution of 1848 as one of the heads of the Moderate 
 party. He had been of those who recalled the Grand 
 Duke from his refuge at Gaeta, and experienced the 
 bitterness of seeing that prince allow an Austrian escort 
 to lead him back to Florence. He thereupon sent in all 
 his grand-ducal decorations and retired to his beautiful 
 estate of Brolio, near Sienna, where he gave himself up 
 to agricultural pursuits ; blending with an independent 
 existence the duties of an all but feudal patronage, the 
 cultivation of the mind, and a taste for the arts ; nor 
 less, though absent, the strict ally in his opinions of 
 that patrician liberal class — the Capponi, the Ridolfi, 
 the Corsini, the Peruzzi. He had, like many others, 
 watched with increasing interest the Piedmontese policy; 
 and he had been one of the first, on the approach of the 
 conflict with Austria, to give sign to Florence. Minister 
 of the Interior during the war, under the Piedmontese 
 protectorate of Boncompagni, President of the Council 
 after the peace of Villafranca, he, like his colleague at 
 Modena, had henceforth no other thought than that of 
 annexation ; and no one, in truth, better than he could 
 cast an air of grandeur on this abdication of Tuscan 
 autonomy before the idea of the one Italian Land. 
 
 There was nothing in him of the common politician. 
 He was like a portrait of Holbein's — with his erect, stiff" 
 figure, severe bearing, frigid yet courteous dignity, his 
 fine and lofty mien, and imperious gestures. He was a 
 
EICASOLL 221 
 
 Tuscan of the old stock, preserving in his person the tra- 
 ditions of that Ricasoli of former days, a Guelphic captain 
 in the wars of the Romaorna, who wishinof on one occasion 
 to obtain a decree of the Council of the Twenty-four of 
 Florence, put the councillors under lock and key, and 
 starved them until the decree was voted. The baron of 
 our time, without starving anyone, used the iron will of 
 his ancestor in the service of a modern idea, a national 
 desire, of which, when in power, he was the impassioned 
 and haughty representative. It was he who said one 
 night at the Palazzo Vecchio to a compatriot on the 
 point of starting for France : " Go, tell those gentlemen 
 that I claim an existence of twelve centuries' duration, 
 that I am the last of my race, and that I would give my 
 last drop of blood to maintain my political programme 
 in its integrity." And what he said he did in his 
 own particular manner : not with the large and pliable 
 genius of a Cavour, but with the firmness of a man 
 whose energy was dreaded, whose disinterestedness and 
 patriotism were respected, and who would be obeyed. 
 Beholding this grave and imperturbable minister, who, 
 instead of drawing emoluments from the Treasury, gave 
 on the contrary from his private fortune to assist it, and 
 worked steadily from six in the , morning till midnight, 
 the people did not seek to reward him with vain 
 acclamations, which he would have disdained : they felt 
 they were safe under such a leader, and held him in the 
 esteem ranked by Eoyer-Collard above all popularity. 
 
 The work Ricasoli was engaged in had no revolu- 
 tionary taint in it. It was a work of national necessity, 
 and he made it his business to carry it through without 
 
222 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 suffering it to deviate and be compromised by intrigues 
 on the one hand or agitations on the other. The 
 Florentine dictator knew well that he was encircled by 
 every kind of danger. Above all, he knew that the first 
 condition of well-being for the country lay in the preser- 
 vation of order ; he felt that an appearance of disorder, 
 whatever tended to complicate the imminent question by 
 revolutionary irruption from without, would weaken the 
 national cause, and serve for a pretext to the abettors of 
 restorations or for foreign interventions, and he would 
 not suffer them to have a pretext. Therefore, he was 
 inflexible in repressing any show of agitation or division. 
 Mazzini had flattered himself that Tuscany might be 
 made a centre of operations, of which he was to be ever 
 the shrouded chief. Ricasoli, not without some haughty 
 irony, gave him to understand that, if he caught him, he 
 would hinder him from doing harm by locking him up 
 in his castle of Brolio, till such time as the definitive 
 constitution of Italy was proclaimed. Republicans were 
 straightway conducted to the frontier. Guerrazzi him- 
 self, the president of the democratic ministry of 1848, 
 found a difficulty in entering Tuscany. The brilliant 
 Montanelli, with his dreams of the kingdom of Etruria 
 for Prince Napoleon, was only licensed to stay because 
 there was very little fear of him. Garibaldi, w^hose 
 services had been accepted, and to whom the Tuscan 
 contingent of the military league for the common defence 
 had been entrusted. Garibaldi himself came under the 
 scourge of the terrible baron. Once with his Tuscans 
 and Romagnole volunteers, he was on the point of 
 invading the Marches and Umbria ; if he had done it, the 
 
RIGASOLI'S FIRMNESS. 223 
 
 immediate intervention of France would have been the 
 result — this was known at Florence as well as at Turin. 
 Eicasoli did not delay an instant to check Garibaldi's 
 warlike propensities and cut short the earliest manifesta- 
 tions of a turn for military dictatorship ; and Garibaldi 
 had to submit ; he fell back growling, but without 
 attempting anything, to Caprera. The stubbornness of 
 Ricasoli, seconded by advices from Turin, warded off a 
 possibly mortal danger. 
 
 In a word, the redoubtable Florentine meant to be 
 master of his domain on the Arno ; he would not yield 
 it up to soldierly dictation, nor let it be swamped by 
 demagogues ; nor would he allow it even to be joined in 
 a fusion proposed to him with Modena, Parma, and the 
 Legations. Vain efforts were at one time exerted to 
 draw him into a sort of political league that should com- 
 plete the existing military league ; in vain Farini and 
 Marquis Pepoli did their utmost to show him the advan- 
 tages of a partial and temporary fusion, a prelude to the 
 absolute junction with Piedmont, that they might 
 appear before Europe with the authority of an undivided 
 government, speaking in the name of the whole of 
 Central Italy. Ricasoli positively refused, and he refused 
 for a characteristic reason. He declared that it would be 
 offering Europe the " elements ready made for a separate 
 kingdom," and nothing would induce him to hear of a 
 separate kingdom of Central Italy, though with the 
 addition of the Legations to it, as little under a Napoleon 
 or any other new prince as under a Lorraine duke. 
 
 The annexation to Piedmont was his fixed point, 
 because annexation signified the strong kingdom, as 
 
224 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 against Austria, and meant a constituted and armed 
 Italy : before Italy only would be put off the splendid 
 crown of Tuscan independence. Declining a union 
 that he considered dangerous, he did not the less move 
 in harmony with Farini, and thus, for a space of six 
 months, by the help of some few men, Central Italy was 
 enabled to present the spectacle of orderly populations, 
 bound together by the same sentiment, neither carried 
 away by enthusiasms nor listening to provocations. There 
 was one crime, the murder of Colonel Anviti, that afflicted 
 Parma, and it was followed by a universal outcry of 
 condemnation. D'Azeglio writes in homely style : "If 
 what is now passing had been foretold to me two months 
 back, I should have laughed in the face of the prophet. 
 Who would have thought it possible we should see the 
 Romagnoles gentle and wise, the Tuscans energetic, and 
 all the grudges ages old, crumbling to pieces with so 
 entire a concordance in every Italian city V 
 
 TV, 
 
 It is true that this pacific campaign of Central Italy 
 could hardly have been carried through, even with the 
 skilful boldness of such chiefs, and the docility of the 
 populations they headed, had not the troubled mind of 
 / Europe on the morrow of the peace of Villafranca 
 unexpectedly favoured it. The advantage of being 
 animated by one firm idea was ^vith the Italians ; they 
 had a distinct policy in opposition to a diplomacy that 
 knew not what it would nor what it could. Their irood 
 genius taught them to control themselves, and turn all 
 
AUSTRIA POWERLESS. 225 
 
 tilings to profit, in the midst of one of tlie most curious 
 imbroglios that have ever disturbed human affairs — a 
 six months' confusion, during which Austria, France, 
 England, and Piedmont played so strange a part, per- 
 petually arranging matters for a congress — ^that was 
 never to sit ! 
 
 The object of Austria was clear enough. She had 
 been compelled to relinquish one of the most brilliant 
 provinces of the empire, and she designed to keep fast 
 hold of the remainder of her dominions in Italy, specifi- 
 cally as regarded Venice, indirectly as to the restoration 
 of the Princes to their duchies, which had been promised 
 to her. She lent her ear to the scheme proposed by France 
 for a confederation that Venice should form part of, but 
 her immediate demand was for the execution of the 
 treaties ; she held tenaciously to these restorations which 
 had been danced before her eyes, and took care to 
 remind France, as well as Piedmont, that if the restora- 
 tions were not granted, she should on her side consider 
 herself disengaged from the terms of the peace, even in 
 Lombardy. 
 
 It is incontestable that she was justified by Villa- 
 franca and Zurich ; but morally lessened by defeat as 
 she was, more than ever doubtfully viewed by the 
 Italians, all but abandoned by her European allies, and 
 shaken by internal dissensions, Austria was in fact 
 powerless. She could do no more than vainly fret, with 
 an impatience mingled with bitterness, at these revolu- 
 tions of Central Italy where she was disabled from 
 interfering : she dared not cross the Po. Each fresh 
 proceeding then called forth a series of protestations 
 
 Q 
 
226 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 from her, which Florence could afford to deride. Europe 
 made no answer to her appeals, or encouraged Italy. 
 Austria had a sufficient task to defend herself in a situa- 
 tion more threatened than threatening, altogether aban- 
 doned to herself as she was. Kussia left her to her 
 isolation. Prussia, accused of treason by the resentful 
 Cabinet of Vienna, was beginning to reflect on the 
 example set by the Italians, and maintained a particular 
 reserve. England went much farther. After having 
 been the advocate of Austria up to the eve of the war, 
 and stoutly defending the treaties of 1815, England 
 / went straight over to the Italian camp after Villafranca, 
 showering her sympathies and encouragements on her 
 new allies. 
 
 English foreign policy was no longer guided by Lord 
 Derby and Lord Malmesbury, but by Lord Palmerston 
 and Lord Russell, and the England of the Whigs was 
 now as fervid on behalf of Italian independence as she 
 had previously been lukewarm. She was little inclined 
 to a federation that offered a less safe guarantee to her 
 commercial interests than the extension of Piedmont, 
 the country of economic freedom. Naturally she had 
 not a word to say to arrangements that dismembered the 
 temporal power of the Pope. She was the first to 
 uphold the liberty of the Central Italians, and their right 
 to dispose of themselves and to cast in their lot with 
 J Piedmont if it pleased them. She made herself the 
 guardian of the principle of non-intervention, and the 
 patroness of the ambitions and broadest hopes of the 
 Italian people. 
 
 The Whigs had assuredly no intention, not a whit more 
 
ENGLAND FAVOURS ANNEXATION. 227 
 
 tlian the Tories, to pledge England to promises of armed 
 succour. They promised " all possible moral support," 
 in the words of Lord Palmerston ; and Marquis Em- 
 manuel d'Azeglio, Sardinian representative in London, 
 could write to Turin : " The English ministers, in 
 alluding to annexation, are always careful to add 
 that England looks on it as the best arrangement. 
 England perceives the double advantage in the annexa- 
 tion, that it renders us more independent, and will be 
 done in deference to the wishes of the populations." 
 The Queen's ministers appeared desirous to make up for 
 lost time by showing themselves more Italian in their 
 feelings than the French, who had just fought for Italy, 
 by flattering and goading the passion for nationality on 
 the other side of the Alps. Provided that no attack 
 was made on Austria in Venetia, anything might be 
 done at Florence as in the Papal States. 
 
 The design of the English ministers — and there was 
 scarce any disguise about it — was to stimulate the an- 
 nexation scheme as a means of counteracting French t-— 
 ascendency, in the fear of seeing France in the place 
 formerly usurped by Austria in Italy, either owing to her 
 direct influence, or through some half-vassal kingdom 
 under a Napoleon. They were increasingly distrustful 
 of the Emperor. Lord Eussell, as head of the Foreign 
 Ofiice, gave himself up to this propaganda with his 
 habitual impetuous candour, which had more than once 
 afirighted and perplexed his companions in power. He 
 did not reflect that his conduct exposed him to serious 
 contradictions ; for after inflaming the minds of the 
 Italians, he could hardly think of turning them aside 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 from the war for the recovery of Venice; and in favouring 
 the extension of Piedmont he hurried on the eventuality 
 he stood in fear of — that cession of Savoy which the 
 Emperor had renounced at Villafranca, but which the 
 creation of a powerful North Italian kingdom could not 
 but cause to be reconsidered. The Italians were not 
 deceived. If they were wary enough to make use of the 
 support of England, they were not the less aware that for 
 them the question lay rather in Paris than in London, 
 rather with the country whose army was still encamped 
 in the heart of Lombardy. 
 
 V. 
 
 / The main point was what France wanted and meant 
 ^ to do. Lord Palmerston declared that there were two 
 policies in Paris, and no great sagacity was required to 
 penetrate this mystery. These two policies had existed, 
 confounding and thwarting one another, all along : one 
 triumphed in the war and the kindling proclamations of 
 Milan ; the other in the prematm'e and imperfect deed 
 executed at Villafranca ; and now the two policies were 
 WTcstling again over the interpretation and execution of 
 the peace. Indeed, if there was a chance that the term& 
 of Villafranca would be realised in their fuUest integrity, 
 it lay with the continuing in office of the French 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Count Walewski, a gentleman of perfect loyalty, was 
 not only for making good the engagements contracted 
 with Austria; his opinions, traditions, and instincts, 
 were opposed to the development of the Italian revolu- 
 
LANGUAGE HELD TO THE TUSCAN ENVOYS. 229 
 
 tion, favourable to the ducal restorations, and disposed 
 to limit Piedmontese influence. He would not have the 
 annexation at any price, and he was assiduous in making 
 the weight of the imperial authority and French diplo- 
 macy felt at Turin, at Florence, and at Bologna. 
 Agents upon agents had been despatched by him to 
 propose the restoration, and Count Walewski appeared 
 as astonished as indignant at the resistance his diplo- 
 macy encountered. 
 
 He chose to imagine that there was nothing serious 
 in what was going on at Florence, and that it was only 
 the conspiracy of a party in the pay of Piedmont ; a 
 revolutionary work, managed with considerable skill and 
 boldness by Baron Ricasoli. He held the very same 
 language as Austria ! At Paris, in his audiences with 
 the Tuscan envoys. Marquis Lajatico, Signers Ubaldino 
 Peruzzi and Matteucci, he delivered himself sharply and 
 very menacingly. The French Minister was not afraid 
 to declare that the Tuscans must " bow the head ; " he 
 expressed regret that the Italians had been permitted to 
 think that there would be no armed intervention : 
 humiliating discussions from which the Tuscan envoys 
 withdrew without having " bowed the head." On 
 another day Count Walewski summoned the Sardinian 
 minister and said to him : " I do not intend to enter 
 into a dispute with you ; I wish simply to make you 
 acquainted with the state of things, and ask your 
 aid in inducing your Government to come to an 
 understanding with us upon the affairs of Central Italy. 
 These populations must be taught that it is inevitable 
 that the Pope should return to the Legations, the 
 
/ 
 
 230 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 Lorraines to Florence, Francis V. to Moclena. If Pied- 
 mont helps us, compensation will be given in Parma 
 and Piacenza ; if the annexations are persisted in, fresh 
 evils will be raised in Europe, and Piedmont will have 
 to bear the merited punishment for them." 
 
 Such, without doubt, was the policy of Count 
 AValewski; but there was at the same time the policy 
 of the Emperor. Do what he would. Napoleon III. could 
 not evade the responsibility of the Italian uprising, due 
 to his progress in Italy and the noise of his awakening 
 proclamations. He had bidden the Italians arise and 
 organise, follow the banner of Victor Emmanuel, and 
 ^y make their own destinies : the Italians had risen ; they 
 were shaping their own destinies; they were acting 
 " unaided " — what reply was there for him ? He 
 believed evidently that he had accomplished much by 
 means of the peace of ViUafranca ; he thought at least 
 that the Italians had been assured of a degi'ee of inde- 
 pendence and advancement compatible with the circum- 
 stances, and once pledged to the peace, he could not 
 immediately disavow his work. He spoke the same 
 language, to all appeai-ance, as his Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs. He likewise, through the medium of diplomacy, 
 in his communications with Victor Emmanuel, and in 
 his conversations ^nth the Italian delegates who ap- 
 proached him, began by putting the obligations incurred 
 at Villafranca beyond question. He assumed a j^articular 
 ostentation of good faith, all the more from feeling him- 
 self suspected, and above aU, jealously watched from all 
 parts of Europe. He bore the burden of his reputation, 
 according to the saying of Prince Napoleon. 
 
 Events, however, did not fail to operate on the 
 
NAPOLEON III. AND THE TUSCANS. 231 
 
 mind of tlie Emperor. This mind, which no one had 
 ever sounded, was undergoing a singular travail ; 
 and at all events the words of the Emperor, far less 
 downright than those of Count Walewski, lent themselves 
 to all kinds of interpretations. Attempts to fathom his 
 designs by inquiries whether he was not interested in 
 seeing the dispossessed princes restored, were met by the 
 answer, that he had " no personal interest whatever in 
 desiring the re-establishment of the Lorraine dukes : " 
 and he spoke with a smile of incredulity of the candidature 
 of Prince Napoleon for one of the crowns of Central Italy. 
 Asked if there was not a limit to the obligations to which 
 he declared himself to be bound, he replied with some 
 melancholy that they had doubtless a limit : ''The limit 
 of the possible." When ultimately the question was put 
 as to how far foreign pressure was to go in favour of 
 the restoration in the Duchies, he said unhesitatingly : 
 " No violence shall be done to the Italians." He did 
 more ; he informed Prince Metternich at Compiegne, 
 that if Austria crossed the Po, it would be instant war 
 with France. 
 
 One day, when he was subjected to a certain pro- 
 bation, at the instigation of Signor Peruzzi, he replied : 
 " Signor Peruzzi seems to be a man of comprehension ; he 
 should know that when I am asked as to my intentions 
 concerning Tuscany, I can only answer as I have done ; 
 but let the populations vote, and when it shall be shown 
 that the terms of Villafranca can only be executed in 
 contempt of those principles of popular rights from which 
 I draw my power, I may change my mind."''' 
 
 * These negotiations of the Italians with the Tuileries are full of curious details ; 
 Bome of them are luminous at the present day. Signor Peruzzi, in one of the 
 
232 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 It was sufficiently significant. By perpetually 
 invoking Villafranca, the Emperor abandoned it by 
 degrees ; he opened the door slowly to all possible 
 combinations, even those which involved a dismember- 
 ment of the States of the Church ; and what he could 
 not say himself, his friends said for him. Dr. Conneau 
 occasionally served for the echo of his secret thoughts 
 with the Tuscans. The French ambassador in London, 
 M. de Persigny, saw no harm in disavowing the language 
 of Count WalewskL This devoted follower and con- 
 fidant of the Emperor, ambassador to one of the fii-st 
 Powers of Europe, went about repeating everywhere 
 that the Emperor perceived that he had been mistaken 
 in Italian afiairs ; that he insisted no farther, and that 
 an evasion of the obligations of Villafranca depended on 
 the fimmess and wisdom of the Italians. Before he had 
 b^en very long Sardinian minister at London, Marquis 
 Emmanuel d'Azeglio was able to write to Turin : ** I 
 have read the autograph letter of Napoleon, thanking 
 the English Government for their protest against foreign 
 
 very interesting reports of his mission, relates a conversation that he had with 
 Prince Napoleon. The Tuscan envoy did not forbear to say that, if they were 
 abandoned, the Italians might be reduced to throw for all or nothing, dragging 
 Piedmont with them, and that the Emperor would then be obliged to uphold 
 them. Prince Napoleon replied : " You will be in a pretty pass, tchen you have 
 caused the ruin of the Emperor and the arrivaZ of the Prussians in Paris." He 
 was answered that the Emperor exposed himself to ruin more certainly by 
 abandoning Italy, and that France, in the presence of the Prussians, would 
 repeat the prodigies of 1792. " The Prince," says Signer Peruzzi, " then remarked, 
 that before the war his hopes were in war, because he believed that the Emperor 
 would prove himself to be a general, and would be at the head of capable 
 generals ; but that now his illusions had been dispersed ; for the army knew 
 well both that the Emperor was no general, and that he had no capable generals 
 under him." These words were spoken in October, 1859. I confine myself to 
 stating that then as ever, courageous and capable generals would have beea 
 found, if there had been an able chief who could plan and command. 
 
THE IMPERIAL POLICY. 233 
 
 intervention. ... . It is thought here that the official 
 language, so different from what is said in the letter, has 
 no other object than to keep Austria quiet. The Emperor 
 adds, that it will not grieve him to see events making 
 his first provisions impracticable. All the statesmen 
 here, including the French ambassador himself, are of 
 opinion that we must proceed resolutely and rapidly, 
 though with prudence, taking for rule that in reality at 
 Paris they only want to have their hands forced." 
 
 In the depths of his mysterious policy. Napoleon III. 
 had a double thought. He asked for nothing better than 
 to have his hand forced, as was said, that he might extri- 
 cate himself as soon as he could, and cover with the name 
 of England, in his relations with Austria, the non-perform- 1/ 
 ance of the engagements undertaken at ViUafranca and 
 Zurich. Was it England or the Emperor that first had 
 this idea ? It matters little : Lord Cowley had been 
 the useful intermediary in a negotiation by which the , 
 Queen's ministers assisted the unravelment, still obscure 
 and slow, of the French potentate. Napoleon III. had 
 another thought, that he did not confide to the English 
 Cabinet. In preparing to tolerate the tacit abrogation of 
 the treaties binding him to Austria, he was careful not 
 to unmask, and to hold himself in reserve. With the 
 freedom of action granted them, he wished to burden the 
 Italians with the responsibility of their deeds — this ^ 
 creation of a great kingdom, not openly encouraged by 
 him, but for which he had resolved to demand the price. 
 
 He, too, like Lord Russell and Lord Palmerston, 
 deceived himself strangely. If, as it appeared, the 
 English ministers did not perceive that, in pushing 
 
234 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUE. 
 
 forward the sclieme of annexation in Central Italy, 
 they offered the Emperor an apology for renewing his 
 pretensions to Savoy, the Emperor, for his part, did not 
 see whither he might be led by this temptation to claim 
 Savoy — in which, for that matter, there was nothing so 
 very extraordinary. One and the other seemed to be at 
 a game of weaving and unweaving the web, until the 
 coming of the firm hand to cut it. 
 
 But Piedmont, surrounded by conflicting policies, in 
 the thick of divers influences, attracted or held back 
 by Italy and by Europe, was the most embarrassed. It 
 was no mystery that Piedmont was in connivance with 
 Italy. Piedmont encouraged her efforts, often covered 
 her with her diplomacy, lent her officers — was for Italy, 
 in a word, the rallying-point and the centre of action. 
 An official distinction between them, however, was 
 matter of necessity. Dangerous enemies were on the 
 frontiers : a French army was in Lombardy, the treaty- 
 makers were at Zurich, difficulties everywhere. The 
 King was obliged to hold incessant communications wdth 
 the Emperor, to whom he sent, now General Dabormida, 
 now Count Arese, a trustworthy Milanese gentleman, 
 always welcome at the Tuileries. And Victor Emmanuel, 
 in giving audience to deputations that brought him 
 offers of the crown of Italy, certainly promised to defend 
 their rights as well as respect their wishes, but without 
 daring or being able yet to take the title of their sove- 
 reign. Piedmont was thus reduced to shrink from the 
 
FIRMNESS OF TEE CENTRAL ITILIANS. 235 
 
 object of her desires, and appear to repulse those who 
 besought her to do as she wished. 
 
 The Central Italians well understood that in main- 
 taining order, accomplishing a national revolution, in the 
 least possible revolutionary manner, they would have 
 right on their side, and that the main point for them 
 was to hold firm and proceed. They replied to Villa- 
 franca by decreeing in their Assemblies the deposition 
 of the princes, and a proclamation of the principle of 
 annexation. They replied to the Treaty of Zurich by 
 voting the regency of the Prince of Carignano ; a step 
 that diplomacy smoothed over, but it was not the less 
 one distinctly in advance. Hostility and provocation 
 were met by the daily exhibition of a settled calmness, 
 an obstinate adherence to their scheme. Such was the 
 marvel of the policy of the Eicasolis and the Farinis. A 
 settlement became necessary at last for all concerned. 
 The provinces of Central Italy had stood fast for six 
 months without belying themselves for a single day; 
 they were sick of so perilous a provisional state of 
 things. • Piedmont could go no farther, with a despotic 
 ministry falling into unpopularity from its weakness and 
 inability to cope with the embarrassments of the time. 
 And Europe was approaching a congress that she 
 dreaded while seeming to invoke it. 
 
 Circumstances were pressing all round, when the 
 world was astonished by a double coup de thedtre, that 
 speedily changed the aspect of affairs. The Emperor 
 Napoleon emerged from the cloud of his negotiations 
 with England to have an end to them after his own 
 manner. In a letter of December 31, 1859, he proposed 
 
\J 
 
 236 LUB OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 to the Pope to place the Legations under the viceregency 
 of Victor Emmanuel : a plan that had small chance of 
 obtaining the sanction of the Head of the Church. By 
 the pubhcation of a pamphlet, "The Pope and the 
 Congress," as famous as that one of the winter of 1859, 
 he contrived to render the congress impossil^le. In 
 dismissing Count "Walewski from the jMinistry of Foreign 
 Affairs, he signed the burial deed of Villafi-anca and the 
 policy inimical to Italy ; and it was M. Thouvenel, a 
 man still young, and able as he was resolute, who came 
 from his embassy at Constantinople to take in hand the 
 new policy of France. 
 
 Cavour, too, was called back to the government in 
 Turin, and he reappeared on the scene as the only man 
 who could meet the crisis, and lead Piedmont and Italy 
 on the road together. The Emperor's change of policy, 
 and the retui'n of Cavour to Turin, were facts indicating 
 perhaps the beginning of the end ; at any rate, the 
 period of action had set in. M. Guizot, a sagacious 
 judge of passing events, could then pronounce that : 
 "Two men divide the attention of Europe at the pre- 
 sent moment — the Emperor and M. de Cavour. The 
 game has commenced, and I should bet on M. dc 
 Cavour." 
 
 VII. 
 
 Thus the force of circumstances brought back the 
 first of Piedmontese, next to the King, to direct the 
 Italian movement he had relinquished on the morrow of 
 Villafranca. He had supposed it partly lost ; he found 
 it amplified, strengthened, penetrated as it were with his 
 
HIS RETURN TO PIEDMONT. 237 
 
 own spirit. The six months that had gone by did not, 
 in truth, stand for lost time either with him or with 
 Italy ; they had but ripened the situation of the country, 
 and permitted him to hold his liberty of action and natural 
 vigour in reserve for the opportune moment. 
 
 If, during his excursion in Switzerland, the feeling 
 of a bitter deception which had driven him from Turin 
 in July survived, he came back to Piedmont rein- 
 vigorated, full of fire and confidence. His position was 
 not a light one in the front of a ministry scarce able to 
 bear its loads, about as much embarrassed by his assist- 
 ance as by his passivity ; and his wish was to avoid any 
 annoyance to this ministry, sprung from an imperative 
 necessity. He had written from Pressinge to his friend 
 Castelli : " Greet Eattazzi from me, assure him of my 
 goodwill in everything, and for all purposes. I have 
 no curiosity whatever to know the secrets of his policy. 
 My choice would rather be to remain an entire stranger 
 to the affairs of the day. Though, should Eattazzi seek 
 my counsel, I am always ready to give it candidly." 
 And some days later: "I shall take my way back to 
 Turin to go into a corner and there give advice if I am 
 asked for it, or be silent if there is no need of me." 
 
 He was hardly the less an embarrassing presence ; 
 he felt it himself, when some weeks afterwards he wrote 
 with a free and flowing pen to Madame de Circourt : 
 " You will perhaps be astonished to see me in a state of 
 incertitude, for commonly I do not hesitate. This 
 astonishment will cease if you reflect on the position in 
 which I find myself My presence in Turin is of use to 
 none, and it is a burden to many. I am well disposed 
 
238 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 to support the ministry, composed of honourable men, 
 and animated by the best intentions ; but I cannot stir 
 without giving it a shock. And again, I should injure 
 it if I took to hiding in my rice-fields. They would say 
 I was pouting, and I should look absurd. I have the 
 option of travelling, but whither ? Italy is interdicted 
 by policy, and it would not be becoming to visit France 
 or England. I have not the heart to encounter the 
 cold and heavy atmosphere of Germany, and I am 
 too much a victim of sea-sickness to attempt a trans- 
 atlantic trip. So I am compelled to cast about for 
 what I should do, without reading the riddle. It is pro- 
 bable that as I can find nothing good to do I shall do 
 nothing, and let fortune direct me." Here is a man 
 considerably perplexed ; but Cavour was of those who 
 * have an understanding with the chances of fortune, and 
 the chances had this time decided that he should stay in 
 Piedmont — ^now at Turin, now at Leri, always ready and 
 at the disposition of events and his country. 
 
 Do what he would, Cavour could not cease to be the 
 leader of Italy, and to interest himself in the common 
 work. He was minister no longer, and his manner of 
 quitting the ministry had only augmented his popularity, 
 by identifying him with a national crisis. Italy con- 
 sulted him on aU sides. At Leri or at Turin he received 
 visits from Italians and foreigners of every description : 
 one day Lord Clanricarde, " who insisted on coming ; " 
 another day a deputation from Parma, with Verdi in the 
 list ; or else it was the Tuscan deputation, bearing the 
 offer of the crown to Victor Emmanuel. What was 
 passing at Florence, Bologna, and Modena had revived 
 
THE MURDER OF COLONEL ANVITL 239 
 
 his ardour and his hopes. He was the centre of the 
 general activity though not in power, cordial with all 
 around, counselling prudence or boldness, or suggesting 
 expedients ; above all, anxious for the purely noble 
 character of the revolution that was being accomplished. 
 At the first bruit of the murder of Colonel Anviti at 
 Parma, he hastened to write to Colonel Bardesono, whom 
 Farini had made a minister : " I do not doubt that you 
 will know how to fulfil your new duties as well as those 
 you have fulfilled hitherto ; and if the people of Modena 
 should yield to excesses similar to what has occurred at 
 Parma, you will stand to the death to save the Italian 
 cause from being dishonoured by acts of savage van- 
 dalism Tell Farini that if he does not bring 
 
 more energy to bear on these Parmesan assassins, the 
 
 Italian cause runs the greatest risks " To the 
 
 Tuscans he said : " Quick, get together a Liberal Govern- 
 ment, firm to resist diplomatic pressure or armed assail- 
 ants. Let Tuscany maintain the national spirit, and she 
 may save all." 
 
 After having cursed the peace of Villafranca, he 
 spoke of it with an exaltation that might have passed 
 for irony, to such a degree did the commentary belie 
 the first apprehension of that piece of work, and he did 
 not delay writing to Prince Napoleon : " The conse- 
 quences of the peace of Villafranca have developed 
 splendidly. The military and political campaign follow- 
 ing that treaty has done more for Italy than the military 
 campaign preceding it. It works higher claims to 
 gratitude in the hearts of the Italians to the Emperor 
 Napoleon than the battles of Magenta and Solferino. 
 
240 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 How often in the solitude of Leri have I not cried out : 
 Blessed be the peace of Villafranca ! " The more these 
 results, so little foreseen by the author of the treaty, 
 developed, the more did Cavour strain nerve and brain 
 to make the most of them. He joined with increased 
 earnestness in the fray, set himself to all kinds of busi- 
 ness, even official business ; and naturally there came an 
 hour when occasion only was wanted to make him again 
 the necessary minister of a new situation. 
 
 Everything led him to power ; two things facilitated 
 his accession. It is well known that at first the peace 
 had caused delicate relations to exist between the 
 Emperor and Count Cavour. Napoleon HI. had not 
 been unaware of the Piedmontese minister's outbursts of 
 indignation : he had striven to soften them ; at heart he 
 entertained no malice towards his confidant of Plom- 
 bi^res ; and if the former friendship had been subjected to 
 a trial, it had only been half eclipsed. Cavour was wary 
 enough to avoid breaking with the Emperor, who, on 
 his part, soon recovered his taste for this fresh and 
 fecund genius. Napoleon HI. thought so little of ex- 
 cluding him from power that, when it was supposed 
 the congress was about to sit, he had asked King Victor 
 Emmanuel to send him as plenipotentiary. Cavour had 
 accepted it, and he wrote with his usual good-humour to 
 a friend : "If this winter you make a journey to Paris, 
 you wiU find me at the H6tel Bristol. I have taken the 
 apartments occupied by Count Buol in 1856, just for the 
 sake of invading Austrian territory." The disappear- 
 ance of Count Walewski, and the friendly disposition of 
 the Emperor, lightened the difficulty for Cavoui* in Paris, 
 
THE MINISTRY OF THE PEACE. 241 
 
 and at Turin things conspired to recall him to the 
 Grovernment. 
 
 The Ministry of six months, which had certainly 
 performed an act of devotion in accepting the mission to 
 conduct Piedmontese policy through a crisis of graceless 
 transition, was bending under the weight of circum- 
 stances. La Marmora continued the vigilant and active 
 organiser of the new army, a function he had preserved 
 for the last ten years. The Cabinet was well meaning 
 and honest, but mediocre. It shrank from acting 
 decisively under the pressure of Central Italy ; its laws 
 of assimilation for the Lombards wounded them without 
 satisfying the Piedmontese. It delayed the calling 
 together of parliament, retaining beyond time of war 
 the full powers voted for the war, and in sheer indecision 
 prolonging a despotism principally embarrassing to itself. 
 Kattazzi, though eager to create a party and a policy, 
 wanted the breadth of a directing minister, and his 
 insufficiency, by leaving the minds of the people fluctu- 
 ating, was the cause of wretched divisions. In brief, 
 there was need of a vigorous hand. Admitted frequently 
 to the councils of ministers, Cavour saw that an end 
 must be put to this wavering state of things, and a dis- 
 sension with the Ministry on the subject of the sum- 
 moning of parliament gave the signal. Probably 
 Cavour may be accused of a certain impetuosity that 
 did not always smooth the way for the feelings of his 
 former colleagues. He yielded to that " impatience to 
 have power again in his grasp," of which one of the 
 faithfuUest and most intelligent of his followers. Sign or 
 Artom, speaks, a "joyful high excitedness," that gave 
 
242 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 him prospect of "new horizons opening before him." 
 He felt that he was needed, and on all sides, in Italy 
 as well as in Europe, it was felt that he was needed. 
 Marquis Lajatico had written from London in October : 
 " Wc want Cavour for minister now." At the end of 
 1859, Lord Russell pointed him to the seat of power in 
 expressing the wish for a conference with him ; and 
 when the matter was settled in the early days of 1860, 
 Massimo d'Azeorlio wrote : " Now we shall o^o ahead : I 
 have the full assurance that we shall ; a firm hand directs 
 the Government." 
 
 VIII. 
 
 Cavour was not of those who have the passion for 
 power, to do nothing with it. What was it he purposed 
 in returning thus, borne back, we may say, by the reflux 
 of events ? He had, it is clear, now as ever, a distinct 
 and fixed design, a policy derived from the situation and 
 adapted to it. 
 
 His first determination was to call parliament to- 
 gether as early as possible. Vainly the difficulties in 
 legislating with a parliament, bureaucratic foimalities, and 
 the complications that would come of telling the electoral 
 lists in the new provinces were objected to him ; he 
 placed above everything the necessity of associating the 
 country with the resolutions which might have to be 
 taken. He saw that the country had a right to claim it, 
 and that it would be a support and a guarantee for 
 himself. He was ready to undertake the responsibilities 
 of the proceeding, and he was anxious in so urgent an 
 hour that the national revolution should no longer be 
 
BETUBN TO POWER. 243 
 
 separated from free institutions. More, and principally, (/^ 
 he wished to settle without delay the annexation of 
 Central Italy. He knew that he would have to square 
 accounts with Paris ; and that the Emperor, fallen back 
 into one of his impenetrable moods after his recent 
 coup de thedtre, would be making stipulations and re- 
 servations ; he knew his man ; he was able to read his 
 mind, and prepared to come to an understanding with 
 him. '' We must," he said to a confidant, " treat France 
 and England with all the consideration compatible with 
 our dignity and the definitive success of our aims ; I do 
 not expect the Emperor to pronounce in favour of 
 annexation. I fancy he will hardly do it ; and, in truth, 
 his Villafranca engagements render it impossible for 
 him ; but I think it necessary to assure myself that his 
 opposition will not be very positive. We have to study 
 him, sound his mind, observe his bearing towards us at 
 every step that we take. At all events, I mean to admit 
 the deputies of Central Italy to our parliament." Cavour 
 counted on the half superstitious, more or less sincere, 
 respect entertained by Napoleon III. for popular rights 
 and the national will. And, moreover, he had another 
 card to play with the Emperor — Savoy — of which there 
 had been no mention since Villafranca ; and which again 
 became a decisive element of negotiation in Italian 
 interests. Cavour's merit was to perceive a necessity and 
 frankly accept it ; to seize, at one glance of the eye, the 
 relationship between the fortunes of Central Italy and 
 the cession of Savoy. " The knot of this question," he 
 wrote to Count Pepoli, "appears to me to be no longer 
 in the Eomagna and Tuscany, but in Savoy. Althouoh 
 
 B 2 
 
 w^ 
 
244 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 I have not received any communication on the subject 
 from Paris, I have seen that we were on the wrong road, 
 and I have taken another direction." The idea of the 
 sacrifice of Savoy had in reality been part of Cavour's 
 programme on his resumption of power : it was soon to 
 bear the title of " an incident of his policy." 
 
 A singular question has sometimes since been raised : 
 Who was it that had the chief part in this negotiation — 
 Baron de Talleyrand, the successor of Prince de la Tour 
 d'Auvergne, at the court of King Victor Emmanuel, or 
 M. Benedetti, at that time political director of the French 
 Foreign Office, and who unexpectedly departed for Turin 
 as plenipotentiary ? M. Benedetti has written : " In 
 1860 I suddenly received orders to proceed to Turin to 
 hasten the union of Savoy and Nice with France, a 
 union that met with unforeseen obstacles. Leaving 
 Paris on March 20, I signed the Treaty of Cession on 
 the 24th." I do not desire to lessen the value of our 
 diplomatists. The fact is, that this time they had 
 nothing to win, for the simple reason that the whole 
 thinjr had been settled beforehand, and Cavour had in 
 no way been taken unawares, when, even before the 
 arrival of M. Benedetti, Baron de Talleyrand was com- 
 missioned to speak officially of Savoy. It was at Milan, 
 during the winter fetes of 18G0, in the honeymoon of 
 the new independence. A despatch reached Baron de 
 Talleyrand from Paris, charging him to announce to 
 Cavour at once the wishes of the Imperial Government 
 in the matter of Savoy, and the recall of the French 
 army from Lombardy. This double communication 
 implied something as much as follows : " You are about 
 
SAVOY AND NIOE. 245 
 
 to annex Tuscany, you will run tlie risks, you will 
 assume the responsibility of it ; ours we disengage by 
 calling our army out of Lombardy. We do not counsel 
 this annexation; but, as after all we look on it as accom- 
 plished, we ask you for the price that is due to us." 
 Cavour was not deceived in his anticipation, he was 
 astonished only at the hasty recall of the army, and he 
 answered smiling : *' If the English had occupied Genoa 
 under the same conditions as your occupation of Milan, 
 do you think they would have been in such a hurry as 
 you are to abandon Italy ? However, all is for the best. 
 We shall accept the Emperor's decision with greater 
 satisfaction than we do the second half of your despatch. 
 The Emperor seems to hold extremely to Savoy and this 
 unhappy city of Nice ! " 
 
 Oh ! without doubt the prime minister of King Victor 
 Emmanuel would have been glad to avoid the cession of 
 Savoy, still more " the unhappy city of Nice ; " and 
 naturally he did not think himself obliged to anticipate 
 the sacrifice, and opposed some of those little resistances 
 even in the minor points of a negotiation, which are for 
 the honour of diplomatic arms. If he could have kept 
 everything and given nothing, he would have done it. 
 Having escaped the dilemma a first time, on the morrow 
 of Villafranca, be sure that he would not have failed to 
 elude it still, had he been able. He had not made up his 
 mind to it without chagrin, he took it as the king did, say- 
 ing, with a secret pang, " that after giving the daughter, 
 they might give the cradle." Signor Artom, a frequent 
 assistant at these private deliberations, relates that " this 
 act was the sole one of his political life to which he did 
 
246 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 not bring the kind of heroic serenity he displayed in the 
 gravest situations." Although during a space of ten 
 years he had often found Savoy hostile to his policy, he 
 loved this land, which was like a native country to him ; 
 for it had given its old name to the dynasty whose 
 ensign it was. He was very much at the mercy of these 
 old recollections, even while at work upon his firm 
 resolve to proceed, and he thought what D'Azeglio ex- 
 pressed, when wTiting to a French friend : " You know 
 that it would be unbefitting us to show oui*selves 
 indifierent to a separation that bids us say adieu to 
 brothers-in-arms of eight centuries. JMy personal senti- 
 ment — shared, I believe, by everyone — is to regret 
 sincerely the severance from a population full of rare 
 and eminent qualities, counterbalanced by some few in- 
 significant defects, who have always faithfully followed us 
 in our Italian struggles, have filled our armies, councils, 
 and diplomacy with devoted, gifted, energetic men. 
 Once let the Savoyards have said : * We will be annexed 
 to France;' we shall be like a father who lets his daughter 
 marry according to her desire, embraces her with a 
 painful heart, wishes her full happiness, and says adieu 
 to her." 
 
 In common with D'Azeglio, Cavour said adieu to 
 Savoy painfully ; but it was not a matter of sentiment 
 for him. He had come to his determination as a duty 
 in policy, weighing what he did, resolutely cutting " the 
 knot of the question," as he called it ; and, be it said, 
 seeing more clearly and farther than those who asked 
 him to relinquish what liberated his hands. If the 
 French plenipotentiaries had been tempted to rate their 
 
TEE SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY. 247 
 
 victory high, they might have been undeceived in the 
 hour when the act was made irrevocable. Cavour walked 
 up and down his cabinet thoughtfully and gravely, not 
 on this occasion rubbing his hands, as he listened to the 
 reading out of the treaty. His signature was affixed to 
 the deed in silence ; recovering his habitual sprightliness 
 the moment it was done, he went up to Baron de Talley- 
 rand, and said to him, with a significant smile : " Now 
 we have you for accomplices ! " 
 
 Foreseeing all the issues of the act he had pre- 
 meditated, Cavour knew well that the question of Savoy 
 would raise a storm, and create every kind of difficulty 
 for him at home and abroad. He stood resigned to 
 meet it — even the prospect of the discontent of England, 
 which was not long in showing itself. Eeassured for 
 a term after the peace by the declarations of Count 
 Walewski, England's distrust revived at the rumours of 
 a fresh transaction, and she at once began to worry 
 Cavour. Interrogations, complaints, and remarks poured 
 in on him. Lord Kussell took up his sharpest pen to 
 write to Sir James Hudson : "In speaking to Count 
 Cavour of the rumours relating to the cession of Savoy, 
 you will not disguise from him that it will be a blot on 
 the escutcheon of Savoy to cede to France the cradle of 
 the illustrious house reigning in Sardinia." Cavour, at 
 home as he was with his friend Sir James Hudson, was 
 put to it a little at times ; and I know not indeed if he 
 did not make shift to slip out of the net like that Pied- 
 montese minister of the eighteenth century, the Marquis 
 D'Ormea, who, in a similar position, being pressed to 
 state whether Sardinia had joined in a treaty with 
 
248 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 France and Spain, required that the question should be 
 submitted to him in writing. " Is it true that the King 
 of Sardinia has contracted an alliance with France and 
 Spain ?" The Marquis D'Ormea wrote spiritedly under- 
 neath : "I7m alliance does not exist." There was, in 
 fact, a treaty with France only I 
 
 Cavour behaved in some such manner. To all the 
 interrogations besetting him, he replied that the Sar- 
 dinian Government had not the slightest intention to 
 cede, exchange, or sell Savoy. He added, it is true, 
 that "if the people of that country had any proposition 
 to make for the bettering of their condition, the pro- 
 position would be examined in the usual parliamentary 
 manner, and justice would be done to it as parHament 
 might decide." Sir James Hudson understood perfectly 
 what was meant by that. 
 
 The best means of shaking off England was to refer 
 
 her to France, and here England found the eflforts she 
 
 / • • • 
 
 ^ was contmumg more vigorously than ever on behalf of 
 
 the annexation of Central Italy turned against her. She 
 was caught in her own meshes. Lord Cowley said to 
 M. Thouvenel that, **in the opinion of the English 
 Government, the annexation of Savoy to France was a 
 European question;" and M. Thouvenel replied: "Yes, 
 if England will accept the proposition that the annex- 
 ation of Tuscany to Sardinia shall not be accompUshed 
 Avithout the co-operation and assent of the Great Powers, 
 we will accept the same conditions for Savoy." In 
 vain the English Government carried its protests to all 
 quarters. Addressing itself to Vienna, Austria replied 
 ironically, that there was nothing more extraordinary 
 
GARIBALDI AND NICK 249 
 
 in the annexation of Savoy than in that of Tuscany. 
 AVlien it turned to St. Petersburg, Eussia replied, that 
 the cession of Savoy appeared to her to be a transaction 
 in due form. And the Emperor Napoleon seized the 
 occasion to soothe the vexed temper — rather noisy 
 than efficacious — of England with the rich indemnifica- 
 tion of the commercial treaty of January 23, 1860. 
 This simplified remarkably the diplomatic position of 
 the Piedmontese Government in relation to England, as 
 well as in relation to Switzerland, which was left alone 
 to cry for a portion of Savoy neutralised by the treaties 
 of 1815. 
 
 The inevitable internal difficulties to bo encountered 
 had been clearly foreseen by Cavour. He was well 
 assured that the renunciation of two ancient provinces 
 might stir some emotion in Piedmont proper, and even 
 in other regions of Italy. In any case he knew that 
 it would be a pretext for hostile parties — Mazzinian 
 agitators, and every form of opposition inclined to make 
 iise of a weapon when they found one. Had it been 
 Savoy only, passions perhaps would not have been so 
 angrily roused ; but the ultra-Italians laid particular 
 stress on Nice, and, as it happened, Nice was the birth- 
 place of the popular chief. Garibaldi, in whom the aban- 
 donment of his natal city provoked a deep and bitter 
 resentment against the man who, in his own words, 
 "made him a stranger in his countr}\" The Italians^ 
 held that Cavour had yielded a fragment of their 
 national territory ; the Piedmontese of the old school 
 accused him of sacrificing the stoutest and solidest 
 portion of the state ; all declared that he had paid a 
 
250 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOTJB. 
 
 reckless price, in an almost humiliating concession, for 
 an equivocal alliance. 
 
 Cavour was aware of the risks he ran, but neither 
 internal nor diplomatic complexities arrested him. He 
 was ready to bring before parliament the responsibility 
 of an act in which he saw a pledge of national policy, 
 and, to begin, the union of the Central provinces of 
 Italy with Piedmont. 
 
 IX. 
 
 It was on January 20, 1860, that Cavour took 
 up the reins of power ; and from that date he was at 
 his work, hurrying forward the annexation of Central 
 Italy, carrpng on negotiations with London and Paris, 
 j making use of England in spite of her moodiness, 
 appeasing France by the cession of Savoy, and triumpli- 
 ing over the last hesitations of Napoleon III. by means 
 of a plebiscitum in Tuscany and the Emilia. Matters 
 proceeded briskly. On March 11, the voting in the 
 central provinces took place; on the 18th a decree 
 established the result by pronouncing the annexation 
 to be confirmed. On the 24th the treaty of the cession 
 of Savoy was signed and sealed ; on the 25tli the 
 election lists were opened for the Chambers in all the 
 provinces of the new kingdom, so that it was no 
 longer before the Piedmontese parliament, but before 
 the first national Italian parliament that the question 
 was to be laid which embodied for the moment the 
 policy of Cavour. The head of the Cabinet hardly 
 knew how near the truth he was when in April, 1859, 
 after a parliamentary sitting that had voted full powers 
 
GUERBAZZL 251 
 
 on the eve of the war, he exclaimed : " I have left the 
 last Piedmontese Chamber, the next will be that of 
 the kingdom of Italy ! " This forecast was a reality 
 one year later ; nor could Count Cavour have much 
 fear of being unsupported by an assembly owing its 
 life to him, and of which he became more than ever the 
 experienced and trusted guide. 
 
 The new assembly, composed of the elite of Italy, 
 represented marvellously in its spirit the national 
 Liberalism which for ten years had decided the success 
 of Piedmontese policy; and this made it of priceless ^^ 
 assistance, a strong governing force under a skilful 
 hand. The prime minister of King Victor Emmanuel 
 had first to demand an act of patriotism and good 
 sense of it — the sanction of the treaty ceding Savoy 
 and Nice, and the discussion following thereon pre- 
 sented curious features. As a matter of course, an 
 unrestricted liberty reigned throughout this discussion. 
 Every form of opposition was exhibited, even the most 
 eccentric, and Guerrazzi, the former Tuscan chief, pro- 
 digal in sarcasms, threatened Cavour with the fate 
 of Clarendon, condemned to exile for having ceded 
 Dunkirk to France; but the opposition containing the 
 greatest elements of danger centred in a man in whom 
 Cavour found an adversary both impassioned and self- 
 contained, all but an enemy — Eattazzi. 
 
 Here was a sort of dramatic counterstroke of the 
 differences and dusky conflicts which had brought 
 about the last ministerial crisis leading to the eleva- 
 tion of Cavour and the fall of Eattazzi. The latter 
 had evidently been profoundly mortified, and it was 
 
252 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 said tliat between these two men, in spite of all 
 parliamentary and ministerial alliances, notwithstanding 
 an intimacy of long date, all personal intercourse had 
 ceased. Under an appearance of moderation, with 
 calculated art and polished shrewdness in his blows, 
 Kattazzi delivered a speech of the nature of an impeach- 
 ment, full of bitter shafts against the treaty ceding 
 Savoy, and principally the cession of Nice. Every- 
 thing had been unfortunate in this miserable business, 
 the principle, the proceedings, the negotiations. It 
 would have been possible to unite the Italian provinces, 
 without prostration to a powerful ally, without thus 
 abjectly courting the Emperor, who would undoubtedly 
 in the end have resigned himself to consent to the 
 annexations. With Savoy, a conservative and dynastic 
 force, precious in a crisis of transformation, was lost. 
 With Nice an Italian city was lost, the Italian pro- 
 gramme was cast aside, and a policy of territorial 
 barter supported the policy of nationality 1 The price 
 of the annexation was paid without even a guarantee 
 in exchange. Like an able tactician, Eattazzi did not 
 indeed, like Guerrazzi, speak of Clarendon, " severe to 
 the king, scornful of parliament, and believing in 
 his pride that there would be no check to his authority ;" 
 he did not adopt such angry taunts, though he alluded 
 maliciously to Cavour's retirement in July, "an excel- 
 lent method of escape from a dilemma, no doubt, 
 but of small use in solving the difficulties." In one 
 way and another he said sufficient to betray an im- 
 placable animosity, and compel the President of the 
 Council to take up all those gauntlets of the Opposition, 
 
THE COMPARISON WITH CLARENDON. 253 
 
 and justify his honour and the character of his policy 
 before the Itahan parliament, now for the first time 
 assembled at Turin. 
 
 The struggle, we may remark, was unequal, for facts 
 told weightily for Cavour, and his was a genius as 
 prompt to seize an advantage as it was formidable 
 to his adversaries. Clarendon was alluded to : " Signor 
 Guerrazzi will permit me to observe to him," he said 
 loftily, " that if Lord Clarendon, to defend his conduct 
 from violent accusations, could have pointed to several 
 millions of Englishmen delivered by him from a foreign 
 yoke, several counties added to the dominions of his 
 master, it may be that the parliament would not have 
 been so pitiless, and perhaps Charles II. would not have 
 been so ungrateful towards the faithfullest of his servants. 
 Since the honourable deputy Guerrazzi has thought 
 proper to give me an historical lesson, he should have 
 given it complete. After telling us what Lord Clarendon 
 did, he should have told us who were his enemies, what 
 sort of men his accusers, who shared the spoil they had 
 torn from him. He should have told us that these 
 enemies formed the famous coterie of men possessed of 
 no antecedents in common, no community of principles, 
 no ideas, and who were actuated by nothing but the most 
 impudent egotism ; men fallen away from every party, 
 professing all opinions — Puritans, Presbyterians, Anglican 
 Churchmen, and Papists, each in turn ; to-day Republicans, 
 Royalists to-morrow ; demagogues in the street, courtiers 
 in the palace ; Radicals in parliament, reactionists in the 
 councils of the king ; men, in short, whose coming 
 together produced the ministry stigmatised in history as 
 
J 
 
 254 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 that of tlie Cabal. So mucli being said," he added, " I 
 leave it to the Chamber and to the country to consider 
 what may be thought of the present case." Not one 
 stroke of this magnificent fulmination escaped the 
 electrified assembly acclaiming to the end. 
 
 No, of a surety, Cavour had sold no cities, as the 
 sarcastic Guerrazzi cliarged him with doing, nor had he 
 turned aside from the national programme, as Rattazzi 
 hinted ; he had simply performed an act that he deemed 
 necessary, an act forced. upon him by everything in the 
 state of Italy and of Europe. The real cause of the 
 cession of Savoy he confessed before the assembly, 
 without circumlocution, with a mind above petty con- 
 siderations : " The true ground for it is that the treaty 
 is an integral part of our policy, the logical and inevit- 
 able consequences of a past policy, and an absolute 
 necessity for the carrying on of this policy in the 
 future." 
 
 A consequence of the past, a condition of the future ; 
 in this the whole case was stated. Nothing was easier 
 than bandying words, disputing over little points. The 
 truth was, a choice had to be made between a system 
 of barren isolation that was barely practicable, involving 
 perilous revolutionary measures, and the policy of the 
 alliances that in the space of ten years had led from 
 Novara to the Crimean war, from the Congress of Paris 
 to the war in Italy and the new kingdom, whereof the 
 parliament was the living image. The choice could not 
 
SPEECH ON THE CESSION OF SAVOY. 255 
 
 l»e doubtful. In the path followed up to that time, and 
 which had led to success, the thing to do was to advance 
 without deviating, or even stopping ; and admittiog 
 alliances to be part of the policy, where was the useful 
 and helpful ally to be found if not in France ? Cavour 
 was perfectly clear-sighted. He knew the posture of 
 French affairs, and with unfailing penetration he traced 
 out the game of parties, the troubles, doubts, and 
 antagonisms of opinions in France regarding Italy ; he 
 felt, moreover, that sympathetic though the Emperor 
 was, omnipotent though he appeared to be, he had also 
 difficulties at home to manage. The object of Cavour, 
 an interested one, as we need not say, and cleverly 
 conducted, was to hold the Emperor engaged up to a 
 certain point, without alienating the general opinion of 
 the country, but to keep the bond of sympathy fast 
 between the French and the Italian nations. His most 
 devoted friends in Paris wrote to him : " For the love of 
 Heaven, for the love of Italy, sign, sign ! if you wish to 
 have the French alliance ; for if you hesitate your country 
 will lose all sympathy in France." Hence the treaty, 
 the moral nature of which raised it above the acrimo- 
 nious and ribald commentaries running along with it. 
 
 Such was the feeling with which he signed it, and he 
 now did his utmost to impart it to the Italian parliament 
 with an increasing vehemence of argument and emotion : 
 " I tell you, under a profound conviction of the truth, 
 that the cession of Savoy and Nice was indispensable to 
 keep the French people friendly towards Italy. Eight or 
 wrong, I will not debate on it. They believe that these 
 provinces belong naturally to France. It may be an 
 
 y 
 
 \ 
 
256 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 error, but whoever is acquainted with France must 
 acknowledge frankly that it is a fixed idea. Now, this 
 cession being once demanded of us, if we had replied 
 with a refusal, the minds of Frenchmen would not have 
 taken into consideration the difiiculties that a matter of 
 the kind would encounter in Italy. We should have 
 been charged with ingratitude and injustice ; we should 
 have been told that we declined to apply on one side of 
 the Alps principles which we invoked on the other, and 
 for which France spent her blood and treasure. In 
 presence of these facts, was not the ministry bound to 
 accede to the Emperor's demand ? a demand made — yes, 
 I can say it — not solely in the name of French interests, 
 but in the name of the alliance of France with Italy. 
 For my part, I hold it a great honour to have yielded to 
 it, for it behoved us to consolidate the French alliance 
 necessary to us. The true, the only advantage for us, 
 is the consolidation of the aUiance, not so much of two 
 Governments as of two peoples. You then, who are the 
 Italian people, forbear to put yourselves in opposition to 
 French interests. If there must be chafings and dis- 
 putes, let them all be borne by the Government. If 
 there is something odious in it, I counsel that it should 
 fall upon us. We are as fond of popularity as others 
 are, and often have my colleagues and I di-unk of 
 that intoxicating cup ; but we know how to waive it 
 away at the bidding of duty. When signing, we were 
 aware what unpopularity awaited us ; but we knew like- 
 wise that we laboured for Italy, for that Italy which is 
 not the sound body a certain member has spoken of; 
 Italy still has big wounds in her body. Look towards 
 
MARQUIS COSTA DE BEAUBEGABD, 257 
 
 the Mincio, look on the other side of Tuscany, and say 
 whether Italy is out of danger." And speaking thus he 
 carried the assembly with him ; he obtained the abandon- 
 ment of an order of the day that a distinguished deputy 
 from Vintimiglia, since President of the Chamber, 
 Signor Biancheri, had proposed on a question of frontiers, 
 and which, at the request of the President of the Council, 
 he withdrew. Cavour gained the vote for the treaty by 
 a majority of 229, while 33 protested against it, and 
 23 members obeyed the signal to abstain from voting 
 given by Eattazzi. 
 
 XI. 
 
 One year previously the Marquis Costa de Beauregard, 
 foreseeing the separation that already seemed inevitable, 
 had exclaimed in the Piedmontese parliament : " So long 
 as we are united, you will see Savoy in the front rank 
 fighting the enemies of Piedmont. If one day our soldiers 
 are in line with the powerful armies of France, like us 
 they will be too proud to express a regret." Shortly 
 after the annexation Victor Emmanuel reviewed with 
 emotion the old brigade of Savoy departing for France. 
 The work whereby the chief of the Piedmontese Cabinet 
 proposed to give scope to his policy was accomplished. 
 
 Preoccupied as he was, before the meeting of par- 
 liament, and in the interval of these exciting discussions, 
 Cavour had found time to visit some of the provinces 
 recently united. He had accompanied the king to 
 Milan during the winter fetes, in the midst of ova- 
 tions of all kinds. He had seen the venerable Manzoni, 
 who reminded him of the conversation that had taken 
 
268 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 place one day in 1850 in the house of Rosmini at 
 Bolongaro. He had desired to see some of the cities 
 of Lombardy — Cremona, Brescia, Bergamo, and every- 
 where on his road he had received a welcome that bore 
 witness to his popularity. Shortly after the annexation, 
 still accompanying the king, he had also gone to 
 Tuscany and the Romagna, and strange to say he beheld 
 those provinces for the first time ; he knew neither 
 Florence nor any of those delightful Tuscan country- 
 sides. 
 
 One morning at Pisa, wakening at break of day, in 
 the silence of the still sleeping city, he had with Signor 
 Artom betaken himself to the Campo Santo. He 
 remained speechless a moment, then the words escaped 
 him : " How pleasant it would be to repose here ! " 
 Signor Artom observed laughingly that he would find 
 himself on holy ground, for that this earth they trod 
 upon had been brought from Palestine in the period of the 
 Crusades, and he answered gaily : " Are you sure they 
 will not one day canonise me ? " He had marvelled 
 greatly at all that he had seen at Pisa and Florence — the 
 profusion of the works of human genius there ; and he 
 declared on his return that he had discovered in himself 
 a sense he had not imagined he possessed, that of art. 
 This expedition was like a happy interlude for him, 
 which he appeared to enjoy. 
 
 Already, however, even before the annexation of 
 Savoy, strange rumours began to rise in Italy, " on the 
 other side of Tuscany," according to the expression of 
 the Piedmontese minister. Scarcely had they come upon 
 a term of tranquillity when a new campaign was pre- 
 
NATURE OF A GUARANTEE. 259 
 
 paring across the Mediterranean ; and with a man every 
 one of whose words had a bearing, notice might have 
 been taken of a phrase and a declaration that Cavour 
 had let fall lightly : " And now we have you for our 
 accomplices," he had said to the French plenipotentiaries 
 when signing the Treaty of Savoy. On the other hand, 
 on being asked whether he had at least obtained a 
 guarantee from France for the annexation of Central 
 Italy, he had replied : " Not only the union of the 
 Emilia and Tuscany to the ancient provinces of the 
 kingdom has not been guaranteed by France in retui^n 
 for Savoy and Nice, but I will affirm that if this 
 guarantee had been offered us, we should have declined 
 it ; a guarantee would have implied a control." With 
 this in his mind, Cavour was capable of leading those 
 who thought they held him ; and of this complicity 
 without control, as it pleased him to put it, he was one 
 to win prodigious fruits, still richer than those he had 
 been gathering. Already his eyes were on Sicilian and (/' 
 Neapolitan waters. 
 
 « 2 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 CAVOUR AND THE UNITY OF ITALY — ROME AND NAPLES. 
 
 The Idea of Unity in the Mind of Cavonr — Insurrection of Sicily and the Expe- 
 dition of Garibaldi — Attitude of Cavonr at Turin-^ielationa with Naples 
 and with Borne — Negotiations with Europe-^<;!avour and the Dictatorship 
 of Garibaldi in Sicily — Matters touching his Policy — Advance of tho 
 Insurrection in the South — The Revolution in Naples — Projects of 
 Craribaldi — Threats of an Attempt on Rome and on Venice — Private Dis- 
 sensions between Cavonr and Garibaldi — Necessity for a Resolution — The 
 Chambory Mission — Words of Napoleon III. — Invasion of Umbria and the 
 Marches — The Piedmontcso Army in the Kingdom of Naples — Assembly of 
 the Chambers in Turin — The Policy of Cavonr before Parliament — Triumph 
 of that Policy — Annexation of Sicily and Naples — Programme of Cavonr 
 as to Venice and Rome — Letters and Speeches — Rome the Capital — Tho 
 Free Church in the Free State— Views of Cavonr concerning the Papacy. 
 
 A QUESTION naturally arises from this labour of a 
 daring head beset by a developing national revolution. 
 Count Cavour, the scion of an old Piedmontese house, 
 prime minister of the King of Sardinia, standard-bearer 
 of the House of Savoy, had he originally the idea of the 
 unity of Italy ? If he had stood predetermined a 
 fanatic for unity, and Had based his proceedings on that 
 idea, there would have been only one Mazzinian the 
 more across the Alps, and Italy would probably still be 
 seeking her way. The secret of his strength and his 
 success lay, on the contraiy, precisely in his having a 
 
SECRET OF EIS STRENGTH. 261 
 
 mind exempt from prejudice and extravagance, in his 
 reckoning always with the reality of things, mixing his 
 policy, according to the saying of Napoleon, with " the 
 calculation of combination and chances." He held but 
 to one fixed point, the restoration of Italy to her national 
 independence and powers through the absolute departure 
 of the foreigner, that is to say, the Austrian lordship or 
 ascendency ; he left the rest to circumstances, fortune, 
 the changes of the times, never refusing an advantage, 
 however small and partial it might be, when it was 
 offered; as also he never shrank from broader visions 
 wlien the horizon opened out before him. 
 
 In the ''fair days" of Plombik'es, his calculations 
 did not extend beyond the kingdom of Upper Italy, and 
 he did not reject the idea of a confederation in which he 
 would naturally have maintained the headship of " eleven 
 millions of Italians," gathered together under the flag of 
 Savoy. For lack of better, the morning after Villafranca, 
 he would have been satisfied with the semi-independence 
 of Tuscany, provided that there were to be no more 
 Lorraine princes in Florence. Even after the annexa- 
 tions, he would have agreed to go no farther for the 
 moment, that he might devote himself to organise and 
 consolidate the kingdom just issuing from six months of 
 laborious negotiations. 
 
 The question of unity burst forth imperiously in 
 reality only on that day of May 5, 1860, when, while the 
 parliament in Turin was discussing the cession of Savoy y 
 and Nice, Garibaldi, followed by his companions-in-arms, 
 the " Thousand," quitted the villa Quarto, near Genoa, 
 to cross the Mediterranean, with the intention of raising 
 
262 , LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 Sicily, Naples, and still more perhaps, to the echoing- 
 cry of " Italy and Victor Emmanuel ! " It was, if you 
 like, another result of Villafranca, a fatality of the situa- 
 tion, a fresh extension of the national movement which 
 had already absorbed Florence and Bologna ; but it was 
 at the same time most certainly a strange complication, 
 a crisis graver than all those that had been passed. 
 
 Up to that period, in fact, things had come about 
 (/ without a conflict, by a sort of pacific victor}^ in 
 harmony with national rights. Tuscany had not been 
 conquered, she had given herself freely. Even France 
 regarded the Romagna as vii-tually detached from the 
 Holy See. These provinces belonged to the territorial 
 system of Upper Italy, and the annexation up to the 
 Cattolica had nothing in it that was not in the nature of 
 things. But beyond it, in the South, the unknown 
 reigned fuU of doubts and perils. The work of unifica- 
 tion could only be carried out by revolution or by war ; 
 it assailed the independence of a kingdom having friends 
 in Europe, it touched another portion of the States of the 
 Church — that Roman question which agitated the Roman 
 Catholic world — and the inviolability of Austria, which 
 could not but feel herself defied and menaced by such a 
 concentration of Italian power. 
 
 All these problems burst forth at once in the risky 
 enterprise Cavour was suddenly called to face, by the 
 terrible logic that swept Garibaldi over Sicilian waters^ 
 Danger was everywhere, in every form; and here, in 
 this supreme and decisive conflict, the fertility of genius 
 and supple -sdgour of the man waxed in the fire of action ; 
 quick in expedients, knowing how to remain a Liberal 
 
GARIBALDI'S EXPEDITION TO SICILY. 263 
 
 and a Conservative still in a revolutionary chaos, 
 determined above all not to be subordinate to events, 
 even when they seemed pressing to force his hand. 
 
 II. 
 
 " The unexpected leads us and leads all Europe," it 
 was said, in this spring of 1860. It is the key-note of 
 the fresh crisis, that begins with a heroic adventure ; un- 
 folding, for a term of five months in the thick of our 
 European commonplace, as a very drama of revolution, 
 diplomacy, and war, to conclude with the fiery junction 
 of the South and the North of Italy, the consummation 
 of the unity. 
 
 It is like a fabulous history, this of Garibaldi : speed- 
 ing secretly on a night of May from the gulf of Genoa, 
 sweeping in his pair of vessels, the Piemonte and the 
 Lomhardo, through the Neapolitan cruisers, landing at 
 Marsala, and conquering kingdoms at a gallop — it reads 
 like a legend. Cavour at Turin was the spirit of policy 
 working his combinations amidst every form of change. 
 Without the first, the drama would not have opened ; 
 without the second, the end would have been lost in dis- 
 orderly tumults : and for a further singularity between 
 these two men, bound at one and the same time to the 
 same campaign, holding the future of Italy in their 
 hands, there was neither an understanding nor a pre- 
 arranged plot. Garibaldi had gone with an angry heart, f^/ 
 easily won over to the Sicilian insurrection by resentment 
 at the cession of Nice ; and on starting he had let fly a 
 barbed arrow at Cavour in a letter, in which he said to 
 
264 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 the king : " I know that I embark on a perilous enter- 
 prise. If we fail, I trust that Italy and Liberal Europe 
 will not forget that it was undertaken from motives pure 
 of all egotism and entirely patriotic. If we achieve it, 
 I shall be proud to add to your Majesty's crown a new 
 and perhaps more brilliant jewel, always on the condition 
 that your Majesty will stand opposed to counuiillors who 
 would cede this province to the foreigner^ as has been 
 done with the city of my birth." Cavour, for his part, 
 had not encouraged the epedition. Without doubting 
 the sincerity of Garibaldi, he dreaded his rashness, and 
 he mistrusted in a higher degree those who surrounded 
 and bore him on, hoping to turn his popularity to their 
 own account. But when once the enterprise was on foot, 
 he had only one idea — to hold himself ready for the up- 
 shot, and play as he best could the terrible game, in 
 which the business he had led up to Bologna might be 
 completed at one blow beyond expectation — or else might 
 founder suddenly. 
 
 It would be childish simplicity at the present time 
 to ask whether Cavour was a minister of irreproachable 
 orthodoxy, and did or did not violate public law. He 
 played his game like a man who did not mean to lose 
 if he could help it. He had in truth done nothing to 
 hasten the explosion of this question of Southern Italy ; 
 he had not even desired it. He would have wished 
 rather to connect the "two great kingdoms of the 
 peninsula," as he called them, in an alliance, to bind the 
 federative bundle of Italian forces of North and South in 
 common interests for a national future. A year pre- 
 viously, on the death of King Ferdinand and the acces- 
 
FRANCIS II. 265 
 
 sion of the young Francis IL, son of a princess of Savoy, 
 Cavour liad seized the occasion to send Count Salmour 
 on a mission of peace to Naples. It was an offer of 
 amity and support to a reign in its infancy. Early in 
 1860 the Cabinet of Turin had renewed the attempt by 
 sending Count Villamarina, formerly ambassador at Paris, 
 to Naples, charged to bring about an understanding if 
 possible. Both with Rome and Naples Cavour would 
 gladly have had dealings and arrangements. Unhappily 
 those governments of the South were purblind in their 
 prejudices and passions. 
 
 At Naples, the unfortunate Francis II., deaf to the 
 appeals of " revolutionary Piedmont," as weU as to the 
 counsels of France and England, in a mesh of court 
 intrigues and Austrian and absolutist influences, bent 
 under the weight of a crown already within a few 
 months jeopardised by a reactionary policy, puerile as it 
 was violent. At Rome all the vapouring fire-eaters were 
 for reconquering the Romagna. An army was to be 
 formed to take the place of the French garrison, whose 
 departure seemed close at hand, though it was inde- 
 finitely adjourned by events. Nothing was talked of 
 but the recruiting of soldiers, Zouaves of the Roman 
 Catholic and French legitimists' aristocracy, Belgians, 
 <lisguised Austrians, turbulent Irish ; and a thankless fate 
 destined the command of the army of the Holy Keys for 
 one of the most brilliant of French captains, condemned 
 by the coup d'etat of December 2 to a premature retire- 
 ment, and impatiently thirsting for action, a man of 
 perfect sincerity and not less imprudence — General 
 Lamoriciere. The impetuous Lamoriciere had signalised 
 
266 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 his entry into office as " gonfalonier " of the banner of 
 the Church by an order of the day resembling a 
 challenge, in which the Italian revolution was likened to 
 " Islamism," and the cause of the Pope was identified 
 with that of Europe and civilisation. In a word, Rome 
 and Naples were nests of hostility, and had become 
 centres of a coalition, of which Austria was the soul, 
 wand whose dream it was to head Europe in a crusade 
 for the restoration of order. These unfortunate Southern 
 Courts imagined that they had to defend themselves — and 
 be it so. But in their perplexity they did not see that, 
 instead of warding off, they attracted the danger, and 
 after their own way of doing it, made ready the unity 
 they shrank from : by their persistence in clinging to an 
 illusion they turned all liberal instincts and the passion 
 for nationality into auxiliaries of Piedmont, and accom- 
 plices of the first indications of a movement. The 
 Sicilian insurrection was a symptom and a prelude. 
 
 Cavour knew there was a plan that might result at 
 any given moment in placing Northern Italy between 
 the Austrians encamped on the Mincio, commanding the 
 Po, and Lamorici^re leading an army from the south. 
 He had seen his offers of conciliation declined ; he heard 
 of the march of a Neapolitan corps in the Abruzzi, and 
 that is how it came that, without having advised it, and 
 in no degree misapprehending the peril it involved, 
 Cavour allowed Garibaldi to go forth and bear the spark 
 '^ to the fiery elements of the South. Not only did Cavour 
 abstain from preventing the expedition of Garibaldi, 
 it is notorious that he covered it with a protection that 
 expanded and grew in the ratio with its success. The 
 
PEBSANO. 267 
 
 President of the Council, who had been careful at the 
 same time to make himself Minister of Marine, was 
 served in the Mediterranean by him whom we now know 
 as the luckless Persano ; and Persano knew how to play 
 his part, by aiding in the furnishing of supplies, and 
 covering the passage of new convoys of volunteers under 
 Medici and Cozenz. Cavpur did what he could to keep 
 on terms with the popular chief, beloved of Italy, and 
 ardently watched by all eyes ; on the other hand, he 
 would not surrender everything to an adventurer, nor 
 compromise his position before Europe by too open a 
 support. Hence came a policy mixed up of audacity 
 and stratagem, perfectly unfathomable, the natural issue 
 of a complicated and desperate situation. The difficulties 
 were enormous ; and all the more critical that, imme- 
 diately surrounding him, Cavour had to deal both with 
 those who accused him of not doing enough, and with 
 those who were alarmed at his rashness, even when, like 
 D'Azeglio, they said of him that "he only could save 
 the ship." 
 
 III. 
 
 No sooner was the landing of Garibaldi at Marsala 
 noised abroad, than a tempest of protestation broke 
 loose on Turin. Austria did not fail to seize the occa- 
 sion to renew her pleadings against Sardinia in Paris 
 and London, representing Sardinia as more than ever 
 the disturber of Europe, and asking nothing better than 
 the privilege of bringing her to her senses. A step 
 farther was taken at Berlin, where nothing less was 
 talked of than the revival of the alliance of the Northern 
 
 ^ 
 
268 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 Courts, to protect public rights and laws against " Pied- 
 montese ambition." At St Petersburg, Prince Gort- 
 chakofF delivered himself sharply to the Sardinian envoy 
 to the effect that, " if the Cabinet of Turin was so far 
 carried away by the revolutionary spirit as to be unable 
 to pay due respect to international duties, the European 
 Governments would be bound to take such a state of 
 things into consideration, and regulate accordingly their 
 relations with Piedmont K the geographical position 
 of Russia permitted it, the Emperor assuredly would 
 intervene with arms to defend the Neapolitan Bourbons, 
 without allowing the proclamation of non-intervention 
 of the Western Powers to stop him." France had a 
 word to say ; and even England was anxious — less, it is 
 true, concerning the deeds of Garibaldi, than as to what 
 might be the consequence of them. As to the Govern- 
 ments of Naples and Rome, they filled the Courts of 
 Europe with their outcries and recriminations. Cavour 
 preserved his usual serenity in the thick of the storm. 
 
 His first act was to reject every interpellation in 
 parliament upon the affairs of the Soutli. Diplomacy, 
 of course, demanded speech, and with diplomacy he had 
 recourse to subterfuges, gaining time by disavowals that 
 disavowed nothing. He replied to those who accused 
 him of abetting revolutionists, in the words he addressed 
 to his friend Sir James Hudson : " On what ground is 
 Sardinia charged with the crime of not having hindered 
 the landing of this hardy adventurer in Sicily, when the 
 whole Neapolitan fleet was incapable of doing it ? The 
 Austrians and Irish embark at their ease to go to the 
 assistance of the Pope; how then can the Sardinian 
 
DIPLOMACY AND ACTION. 269 
 
 Government, supposing it cognizant of the expedition, 
 stay tlie Sicilian exiles from running to succour their 
 brethren in a struggle with their tyrants ? The flower of 
 the youth of all Italy flies to the banner of Garibaldi. 
 Were the Sardinian Government to attempt to check 
 this national movement, the monarchy of Savoy would 
 destroy its own prestige, and therewith its own future, 
 and we should soon have anarchy in the peninsula and 
 new troubles in Europe. To stem the tide of revolu- 
 tionary ideas, the Italian constitutional monarchy must / 
 preserve the moral power it has won by its resolution to 
 make the country independent. This is a beneficent 
 treasure which would be lost if the Government of the 
 King stood against the enterprise by Garibaldi. The 
 Government of the King deplores the enterprise, but 
 cannot stop it ; does not aid, but is unable to use force 
 to put it down." 
 
 Meanwhile he, whom they called a *' flibustier," 
 pursued his prodigious undertaking, becoming in a few 
 days master of Sicily, and causing the Neapolitan 
 Government to fall upon a course of Liberal concessions 
 which might, six months previously, have been of some 
 eff'ect, but were now useless, and significant simply of a 
 cause more than half lost. 
 
 The art of Cavour was shown in the skill with which ^/ 
 he turned Garibaldi's successes to use before Europe, and 
 kept the Courts of the North from passing to more deci- 
 sive acts than protestations. The fact is that Eussia and 
 Prussia soon ceased to speak of interfering in Italian 
 affairs ; they showered their off'erings of sympathy on 
 the King of Naples, but confined themselves to promises 
 
270 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 of "moral support." Cavour hung mainly upon what 
 / would be done or would be permitted in London and in 
 Paris. English ministers might entertain good wishes 
 for the independence of Naples, but nothing would be 
 done by them to ensure or defend it. England was 
 pledged up to a certain point by what she had done in 
 promoting the annexation of Tuscany and the Romagna. 
 On the very day of Garibaldi's departure from Genoa, 
 May 5, Lord Russell charged Lord Loftus at Vienna 
 to communicate particular views and ideas that in- 
 dicated the course likely to be taken by England : 
 " If tyranny and injustice are the characteristic features 
 of the government of Southern Italy, liberty and justice 
 are the features of the government of Northern Italy. 
 Tliis being so, sooner or later the people of South Italy 
 will come to a political union with their northern 
 brethren, and will insist on being governed by the same 
 sovereign." Cavour could not have said more. 
 
 The anxiety of England, in reality, was lest Piedmont 
 r / should be led to "acts of aggression" against Austria, 
 and she feared still more that Cavour, beset by so many 
 perplexities, should be tempted to purchase the aid of 
 France by new cessions of territory, the sacrifice of the 
 island of Sardinia or even Genoa. When a note of six 
 lines was presented to him, demanding his guarantees 
 upon these two points, Cavour naturally hastened to 
 reassure Lord Russell. He signed an engagement readily 
 not to attack Austria, and " not to cede to France any 
 portion qf territory beyond and in addition to that 
 which had been ceded by the treaty of Turin of March 24." 
 Seeing acutely what it was that Lord Russell had most 
 
EXPECTATIONS FROM FRANCE. 271 
 
 at heart, the dexterous Piedmontese had been careful to 
 put in the first line the article of cession, which had been 
 made secondary in the English note. Satisfied on this 
 head, England felt herself at liberty to encourage all 
 proceedings or hinder none. 
 
 What in her turn was to be expected of France ? 
 Cavour was not ignorant that there was the grave and 
 delicate question for him : more depended on France than ^ 
 on England in this new phase. He counted on the 
 ''complicity," of which he had spoken the day when he 
 signed the cession of Savoy and Nice, which had only 
 become an accomplished fact at the moment when 
 Garibaldi was already at Palermo. He counted also on 
 the force of circumstances, the secret leanings and the 
 interests of the Emperor, the thousand ties by which 
 Napoleon IH. and the destinies of the Empire were 
 linked with the success or failure of the Italian cause. 
 With profound sagacity he discerned, in short, that the 
 Napoleonic policy could not push very far the protection 
 of decaying legitimacy. Nor was he much in error in 
 his calculations. 
 
 France, it was true, had been one of the first of the 
 Powers to protest against the expedition of Garibaldi, 
 and against the enrolment of volunteers day by day 
 being shipped for Sicily. Evidently Napoleon III. did ^ 
 not look with a favourable eye on this revolutionary 
 enterprise ; he had no wish to see the Southern Kingdom 
 disappear, or the annexation pushed to the uttermost. 
 What he thought of it was, however, sufficiently 
 placable or sufficiently obscure. To those who spoke to 
 him of Southern Italy, the Emperor replied sadly : 
 
272 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 " What is to be done with a Government like that of 
 Naples, which refuses to listen to advice of any kind ? " 
 i/ Napoleon III. chose to go into retirement for a time. 
 "The Emperor is absent," wrote Marquis Antonini, 
 " and the Minister of Foreign Aflfairs (Thouvenel) is not 
 of the best mind towards us. He has told me that 
 nothing can be done here for the King's Government. 
 It would appear that this government believes a revo- 
 lution inevitable, even in Naples." The Tuileries declined 
 all responsibility, could not, whatever happened, do any- 
 thing without acting in accord with its allies ! 
 
 When at last the King of Naples, reduced in his 
 extremity to submit to the infliction of a Liberal Ministry, 
 a constitution and alliance with Piedmont, solicited the 
 mediation of France, Napoleon III. said to the Neapolitan 
 envoys : " It is too late ; a month back, all might have 
 been arranged ; to-day it is too late. The position of 
 France is very difficult ; a revolution is not to be stopped 
 by words. The Italians know what they are about ; 
 they understand perfectly that after having given the 
 blood of my soldiers for the independence of their 
 country, I shall never let a shot be fired against that 
 independence. This conviction has led them to annex 
 Tuscany contrary to my interests, and now it pushes 
 them on Naples. I am not strong enough to save the 
 king. I must have the aid of my allies." " What ! " 
 said the Neapolitan envoys, " can France consent to the 
 success of an enterprise so opposed to her interests, so 
 advantageous to England, so radically revolutionary ? " 
 " All that may be true," said the Emperor, " but we have 
 to do with facts ; the force of opinion is irresistible ; in 
 
 i 
 
EI8 MANAGEMENT OF THE POWERS. 273 
 
 one way or another the national idea in Italy must 
 triumph." And the last piece of counsel was : " Go 
 to work quickly, furnish the means of backing you 
 up ; Turin is the place for you. It is not to me, it is 
 to King Victor Emmanuel that you should appeal. 
 Sardinia alone can stop the course of the revolution ; I 
 will support you at Turin." 
 
 At Turin Cavour was too adroit not to offer the 
 Emperor and Europe the semblance of a negotiation 
 Avith Naples. He felt himself under the necessity of 
 managing the Powers, who, without being of one mind, 
 were yet assailing him with remonstrances and recom- 
 mendations. One day, indeed, to quiet them and shake 
 himself loose, he allowed the king to try personally what 
 could be done with Garibaldi — to check the " hero " in 
 mid career if he could, or at least turn him from carry- 
 ing the war over to the mainland. 
 
 In reality, Cavour used extreme dexterity in opening 
 the doors which he appeared to be wishing to close. He 
 practised evasions, and manoeuvred with the Neapolitan 
 messengers who were sent to him ; appeared to lean 
 on England as regarded France, and on France and 
 England when it concerned Eussia and Prussia. Pressed 
 a little too urgently to do something for the King of 
 Naples, he rephed promptly: "The Neapolitan Govern- 
 ment is in a singular position. After several times 
 refusing our alliance, after letting slip the favourable 
 moment for seating its authority on a broad basis of 
 national policy, now surrounded by dangers of its own 
 making, it suddenly shifts its tactics and clsiims our 
 friendship. Under what circumstances is this claim 
 
274 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 made ? Francis II. has lost the half of his kingdom ; in 
 the other half, the people, rendered suspicious by the 
 foimer proceedings of the Government, have no longer 
 even a belief in Liberal ministers, and dread that they 
 may hear the cannon of the reaction in the streets at 
 any moment. In order to destroy that incurable feeling 
 of suspicion, and to fill up the abyss which exists 
 between the king and the people, Victor Emmanuel is 
 asked to become surety for the Neapolitan Government ! 
 to invite Francis II. to share with him the halo of popu- 
 larity which a sound and liberal policy, and blood spilt 
 on the battle-field, have obtained for the house of Savoy ! 
 
 The true enemy of the Neapolitan Government 
 
 is the discredit into which it has fallen ! . . . ." Cavour 
 might be unable always to convince, but he knew how 
 to interest some while he encouraged others, leaving 
 with all a deep impression of his ascendency ; and by 
 dint of suppleness he contrived to steer clear of Europe 
 while still keeping her in suspense, and preparing fresh 
 facts for her to swallow. 
 
 IV. 
 
 It was not only with Emopean Governments, whose 
 divisions and indecisions might serve him, that Cavoui; 
 had to do. He had at the same time to measure his 
 policy hour by hour with what was taking place in 
 Sicily, with the progress of the revolution, which he 
 screened in every possible way without recognising it, 
 and fully intended to make the most of. He had to 
 deal with Garibaldi, and this was anything but diplo- 
 
HIS BEADING OF GARIBALDI. 275 
 
 matic work : it was a strange, complex, and feverish 
 interchange between Turin and Palermo — between poli- 
 tical genius and nngoverned instinct in the form of a 
 revolutionary chief in South Italy. Garibaldi was quite 
 sincere in selecting for his pass-word, " Italy and Victor 
 Emmanuel !" He was not one of those whom D'Azeglio 
 anxiously accused of the cry Viva Vittorio ! to which 
 they added in a whisper : Re provisorio, while promising 
 themselves to raise the republic out of a convulsion. He 
 sincerely liked the king, but he liked him in his own 
 way, just as he had his own way of working for 
 Italian unity, dashingly and defiantly; and he carried 
 into this new enterprise his passions, his intemperate-, 
 ness, his indefinite aspirations, his tenderness towards 
 the revolutionists, his misgivings, and his personal 
 animosities. It will perhaps be said that but for all 
 these he would not have been Garibaldi ; and had he 
 not been Garibaldi, he would not have landed at Mar- 
 sala, nor been to Calatafimi, Palermo, Milazzo, Messina, 
 and ultimately Naples ; and so it may be. Cavour was 
 under no illusion about the "hero;" he understood him 
 thoroughly, knew his weakness as well as his strength ; 
 and his ability consisted in manipulating the powerful 
 nature of the popular chief by leaving him the utmost 
 liberty of action, saving the liberty to ruin or com- 
 promise the common cause. 
 
 The watchful and daring Piedmontese marked with 
 unwavering eyes the man disembarking at Marsala, and 
 rapidly becoming dictator of Sicily, as a prelude to the 
 mastership of the whole of the Southern Kingdom. He 
 neither grudged him the help which Persano and his 
 
276 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 ships were ordered copiously to supply him with, nor 
 did he withhold manifestations of sympathy. He sent 
 him word that " the King and his Government placed 
 entire confidence in him." He congratulated him, almost 
 officially, after the battle of Milazzo, in July. " I am 
 happy," he wrote to Persano, " to hear of the victor}^ at 
 Milazzo, which does honour to Italian arms, and will 
 prove to Europe that the Italians are henceforth deter- 
 mined to sacrifice their lives to recover liberty and their 
 country. I beg you to take my sincere and warmest 
 congratulations to General Garibaldi. After this brilliant 
 victory, I do not see how he can be hindered from pass- 
 ing over to the continent The national standard 
 
 once hoisted in Sicily, should traverse the kingdom, and 
 
 float along the coasts of the Adriatic " 
 
 So spake Cavour, and no doubt he believed what he 
 said ; but at the same time the victor was made aware 
 of a sting ; Cavour did not shrink from imperiously de- 
 manding of the dictator the arrest of Mazzini, should the 
 latter set foot on Sicilian soil ; nor would he allow Bertani, 
 well known for his republican opinions, to be left at 
 Genoa as the representative of the new Sicilian Govern- 
 ment. This Mazzinian intervention, the influence of the 
 rasher spirits of revolution over Garibaldi, and the grow- 
 ing anarchy in Sicily, w^re causes of deep anxiety to 
 Cavour. "The King's Government has no intention 
 of being trifled with," he wrote ; . . . . " the course 
 which General Garibaldi is following is fraught mth 
 danger. His idea of governing, and the consequences 
 ensuing from it, reflect discredit upon us in the 
 eyes of Europe. If the disturbances in Sicily are 
 
TEE GOVERNMENT AND THE HERO. 277 
 
 repeated at Naples, the cause of Italy will run tlie 
 risk of being misrepresented before public opinion, 
 and condemned by a verdict that the greater Powers 
 might hasten to put into execution." Cavour was not 
 always successful in averting the evil ; he saw his con- 
 fidential envoys, such as La Farina, sent back by the 
 dictator, who took a pleasure in spiting the ministry at 
 Turin. He, who so well knew how to evade others, felt 
 Garibaldi slipping from his grasp, to be led away by 
 sinister counsels. 
 
 The relations between the head of the Government 
 at Turin and the dictator of Sicily could not indeed be 
 other than delicate ; they were both conspiring for the 
 same object, and were allied by the force of circum- 
 stances, but divided by numberless diversities of opinion, 
 character, and instinct. There was, however, between 
 them a difference that the roving chief did not perceive. 
 The chief of the Piedmontese Cabinet had one great 
 advantage over his formidable ally : he knew him and 
 could judge him ; he had a hold upon him in the pro- 
 tection afi'orded him, and without which nothing would 
 have been possible, from the landing at Marsala to the 
 passage of the Straits of Messina. The minister mastered 
 the dictator by the ascendency of his policy, by an in- 
 exhaustible spirit of resource, and the incessant and 
 occult activity which he exercised in every direction — at 
 Naples as in Sicily. He did not desire a rupture ; on 
 the contrary, he did all in his power to avoid one ; but 
 while willingly granting Garibaldi the popular title of 
 conqueror of kingdoms, Cavour felt tli,at sooner or later 
 there must be a struggle, unless he consented to be 
 
J 
 
 278 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUH. 
 
 carried away with the rest of Italy, by the burning zeal 
 of passion or of imagination, which the bold soldier no 
 longer disoruised. At what moment and under what 
 form this conflict, not to be anticipated without some 
 degree of anxiety, would take place, he could not foresee ; 
 everything depended upon the march of events, and the 
 manner in which the now inevitable downfall of Neapo- 
 litan monarchy was brought about. 
 
 Cavour at heart would have preferred that the revo- 
 lution, already victorious in Sicily through Garibaldi, 
 should take place, as it were, spontaneously at Naples, 
 without Garibaldi, or at least before the dictator crossed 
 over to the continent. He had prepared everything for 
 that object by divers communications with the navy 
 and army, extending even to the Government of King 
 Francis II., not omitting members of the royal family. 
 He considered it the best chance of his being able 
 to govern the crisis, that he should keep the power 
 to limit it, and so hold Europe to her attitude of 
 observation. " The problem we have to solve," he 
 writes, "is this: to further the revolution, while we 
 contrive that before Europe it should appear to be 
 spontaneous. In that case we shall have France and 
 England "wdth us ; othenvise I do not know what they 
 will do." In default of this more or less spontaneous 
 revolution, if it should not declare itself, in the event of 
 the arrival or decisive intervention of Garibaldi, and 
 of the disorder and threatening agitation that might 
 result from it, Cavour took the measures and precautions 
 he deemed requisite. Like a general engaged in vast 
 and delicate operations all pointing to the same end, hia. 
 
DIBEGTIONS TO THE ADMIRAL. 279 
 
 eye and hand were alert and ready, issuing orders that 
 were always the expression of a clear and resolute 
 thought. He wrote to Persano : " The real object is to 
 cause the national principle to triumph at Naples, clear 
 of the Mazzinians. Italy must be saved from foreigners, 
 evil principles, and madmen. ... If the revolution is not 
 accomplished before the arrival of Garibaldi, our con- 
 dition will be very serious, but that must not trouble us. 
 You will, if you are able, take possession of the forts, you 
 will gather together the Neapolitan and Sicilian navy, 
 give every officer a commission, make them swear fealty 
 to the king and to the ''statuto" — and then we shall see ! 
 The king, the country, and the ministry have full confi- 
 dence in you. Follow the instructions I give you as 
 closely as possible. If any unforeseen case should occur, 
 do your best to further the great object we have in view, 
 which is to build up Italy without letting the revolution 
 overwhelm us." At the same time he despatched addi- 
 tional naval forces and hersaglieri, that were only to be 
 used in the last extremity. He took every measure to 
 prevent being outstripped on the eventful day ; and thus, 
 in protecting the most perilous of enterprises, for a 
 great national cause, he resolved to keep it from deviating 
 and lapsing into excesses ; while, on the other hand, he 
 exercised all his diplomatic craft in masking it before 
 Europe. 
 
 V. 
 
 In the midst of these ever-increasing complications, 
 he found time to write the following to Madame de 
 Circourt : " If I get out of the scrape this time, I shall 
 
 J^ 
 
280 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 try not to be caught again. I am like the sailor, who, 
 finding himself surrounded by tempestuous waves, swears 
 never more to expose himself to the perils of the 
 
 sea " He was, for the time being, in the midst 
 
 of tempestuous seas, and at every turn he had a false 
 move to correct, a new resolution to take, or a peril to 
 avoid. I do not pretend to say that violence and intrigue 
 had no place in the dramatic affairs of South Italy in 
 August, 1860. In reality, the struggle in which Cavour 
 was engaged, and which he was determined to carry on 
 to the end, far exceeded the limits of vulgar intrigue, or 
 even those of personal antagonism betw^een two men 
 brought face to face with one another by the irony of 
 fortune. 
 
 In this conflict of policies, schemes, and passions, the 
 fortunes of new Italy were at stake; but even in a 
 labyrinth from which he seemed scarcely able to extri- 
 cate himself, Cavour never swerved. He remained the 
 representative of a ten years' policy, sanctioned by 
 success ; a consummate politician, making Piedmont, as it 
 y/ were, the solid centre point of ail assimilations, and the 
 monarchy an instrument of every national and liberal 
 transformation, while it was the guarantee of conservative 
 interests ; knowing how to press forward, as well as to 
 combine prudence with boldness, diplomacy with war ; 
 always taking into consideration the necessity for 
 alliances, and the situation of Europe, especially that of 
 France. What was the policy opposed to him ? It was 
 l^ a policy of rashness and defiance, that aimed at disturbing 
 the centre of action, adjourning the union of the South 
 with the North, prolonging the state of revolution while it 
 
GARIBALDI AND THE ENGLISH MINISTER. 281 
 
 made use of the king's name, making Naples the first 
 stage of a series of conspiracies against Kome, Austria, 
 and the peace of the whole of Europe. 
 
 So long as the revolution, triumphant in Sicily, had 
 not crossed the Straits, the collision of the two policies 
 was avoidable, or not of moment ; an island in the 
 Mediterranean circumscribed the problem. With the 
 development of events, however, on the day when 
 Garibaldi touched the continent, and finding nothing 
 before him but a king and an army in flight, entered 
 Naples, and, in the midst of an intoxicated people, sud- 
 denly became dictator of the two Sicilies and master of 
 a kingdom, things underwent an extraordinary change. 
 The question narrowed and showed its features ; it was 
 the more serious that, with a victors confidence in 
 himself, Garibaldi appeared less than ever disposed to 
 listen to advice; and indeed it seemed as though nothing 
 now could stop him. 
 
 Carried away by his own instinct, urged on by those 
 about him, living in the exciting atmosphere of revolu- 
 tion and war, giving little heed to the anarchy he 
 allowed to spread under his name at Naples and in the 
 provinces. Garibaldi resembled a lunatic ready to burst 
 forth. He did not conceal either his audacious projects 
 or his animosity towards Cavour; and at that very time, 
 in a conversation he held with Sir Henry Elliot, the 
 English minister, who had gone to moderate and influ- 
 ence him, and endeavour in the name of England to 
 dissuade him from pushing his enterprises farther, he 
 showed his real colours. "I will," he said, ''speak to 
 you frankly, without hiding from you my intentions, 
 
282 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 which are just and clear. I purpose going as far as 
 
 Eome. AVhen we have become masters of that city, I 
 
 // will offer the crown of united Italy to Victor Emmanuel. 
 
 It will be his business to set Venice free ; and in that 
 
 war I will be no more than his lieutenant In 
 
 the present condition of Italy, the king cannot refuse to 
 do this without losing his popularity and his high 
 position. Permit me to say, I am certain that in advising 
 that Venice be left to her fate. Lord Russell does not faith- 
 fully render the opinion of the English people. . . . ." In 
 vain Sir Henry Elliot endeavoured to dispel his illusions, 
 by declaring to him that the English people, however 
 much they might sympathise with Italy, would not 
 forgive provocation to a Euroj^ean war : Garibaldi did 
 not stick at such a trifle. " But," said Sir Henry Elliot, 
 " have you made a fair reckoning, general, of all the 
 contingencies likely to ensue from a collision between 
 Italian arms and the French garrison at Rome ? ,.. If 
 th^ takes_place^ it will im mediately result in the inter- 
 vention of France. It is the interest of your country 
 to avoid that." At these words Garibaldi lost his 
 equanimity, and exclaimed : " Well, then ! is not Rome 
 an Italian city? Napoleon has no sort of right to 
 interfere with our possession of it. By the cession of 
 Nice and Savoy, Cavour has dragged Sardinia through 
 the mire, and thrown her at the Emperor's feet. I have 
 no fear of France, and I would never have consented to 
 so profound a humiliation. Whatever the obstacles — 
 even if I should be in danger of losing all that I have 
 gained — nothing shall stop me. There is no other road 
 for me than the one to Rome; nor do I believe the 
 
GAEIBALDI TO THE KING. 283 
 
 undertaking to be so very difficult : the unity of Italy 
 must be accomplislied ! " And, as it were, drunken with 
 his mad project, not content with speaking abusively of 
 Cavour in a conversation with Sir Henry Elliot, 
 Garibaldi wrote a flaming letter to one of his friends at 
 Genoa, in which he declared that he could never be 
 reconciled to those who had heaped humiliation on 
 national dignity and sold an Italian province. He went 
 further ; he sent one of his confidential friends to Turin 
 to demand of Victor Emmanuel the dismissal of the 
 ministers. He wrote to the king with an easy assur- 
 ance : " Sire, send away Cavour and Farini ; give me 
 the command of one brigade of your troops ; send me 
 Pallavicino with full powers, and I will answer for every- 
 thing." Another moment, and war would be declared 
 in the midst of a tremendous anarchy ; this was the 
 climax of the crisis. 
 
 The situation was fraught with every sort of danger. 
 A march of the Southern volunteers upon Eome would 
 lead fatally to French intervention, as Sir Henry Elliot 
 had said; and the intervention of France, in existing 
 conditions, would change everything, even at Naples, 
 where Francis II. still had forces enough to defend him- 
 self on the Volturno and at Gaeta, perhaps also in the 
 recently-annexed provinces. Not only did Cavour per- 
 ceive all the political consequences likely to follow upon 
 so rank a piece of folly, but his very soul revolted ^ 
 against an antagonistic encounter between the Italians 
 and the French; for though not disposed to "abase the 
 national dignity " to France, he had a profound belief in 
 an alliance in the blood of the two countries; and more 
 
' 284 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 — a strong feeling of all that Italy owed to the Emperor. 
 Threats on the subject of Venice afiforded too plausible a 
 pretext to Austria, herself impatient to seize her oppor- 
 tunity, and occupied at the time in trying to win the 
 support of Russia and Prussia, To put back the settle- 
 ment of Neapolitan affairs, in order to press the claims 
 of Venice and Rome ; to adjourn the annexation of the 
 Southern provinces, as Garibaldi proposed to do, was to 
 throw the gates open to every passion, and superinduce 
 a term of revolution and anarchy likely to threaten the 
 safety of the Northern Kingdom itself To yield to 
 Garibaldi's orders, demanding the dismissal of ministers, 
 . or even one of them, was to degrade king, parlia- 
 ment, liberal institutions, and public authoiity beneath a 
 military dictatorship. To do nothing was no longer 
 possible. 
 
 VL 
 
 "What was to be done ? Cavour was not beating 
 about to comprehend the nature of the crisis, Or to find 
 a way out of it. For some days past he had written 
 incessantly to his agents : " The critical moment has 
 arrived ! We are nearing the end ; it must come up to 
 our hopes, and answer the true interests of Italy I" Then 
 it was that Cavom-'s hardy spirit had recourse to one of 
 those resolutions by which a man who has reached the 
 last extremity stakes all for all. He saw but one way of 
 cutting the knot : boldly to take the initiative, and 
 resume the direction of this movement about to go 
 V astray, by accepting the unity as far as it was realisable, 
 treading down the revolution to stop it in its mur- 
 
EIS VERSION OF " ANDBEMO AL FONDO !" 285 
 
 derous follies, and so prevent it from compromising the 
 national cause, perhaps irreparably. But to get the 
 mastership in Naples, and to unite the North to the 
 South, a way must be cut through Umbria and the 
 Marches, and the Pontifical State enclosed ; in its ^ast 
 hold, and in order to have the whip-hand of Garibaldi, 
 strength of arms would not suffice — ^the moral strength 
 of liberal institutions must be tellingly opposed to^ 
 soldierly extravagance. Cavour determined upon two 
 ways : the intervention and the convocation of parlia- 
 ment. He, too, whispered to himself the famous saying, 
 Andremo at fondo ! but in the meantime he laid his 
 plans so that the independence of a fortified Italy should 
 be plucked from this new crisis, aitd the monarchy of 
 Savoy established more firmly than ever. 
 
 To accept the unity in full activity, as it were, in 
 mid-career of conquest, and to act as though the 
 revolution of Naples were a fact requiring only to be 
 recorded, before Francis 11. had fought his last battle ; 
 and, moreover, to cross the Marches up to the Neapolitan 
 frontier, for the sake of holding Garibaldi from a move 
 back to the North, or a mad dash on Kome, was an 
 extraordinary proceeding. Cavour knew that well 
 enough ; regular methods were not to be thought of; 
 and he bowed to international right, only to demand of 
 it, with his peculiar air of self-possession, permission to 
 outstep it. He felt absolved in doing so, only by the 
 national necessity impelling him and by the trans- 
 parently imminent danger. He required, besides, a 
 mask for his undertakings ; and it was here that the 
 danger of these unreserved manifestations of hostility, 
 
286 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 and the armaments which the Roman Government had 
 been preparing since the beginning of 1860, burst forth. 
 This fact had been lost sight of : that with the 
 creation of an army comes the temptation to make use 
 of it, especially with a chief burning to fight the enemy. 
 It had been overlooked that the strength of the Papacy 
 lay, as it has often been said, in its material weakness, 
 and all that was being done was too little for serious 
 military work, and too much for the part befitting the 
 Holy See. Pius IX., with his profoundly religious 
 instinct, felt it to be so. He had but a weak belief in 
 the armaments. He sometimes looked on ironically, 
 asking whether the lost provinces were to be reconquered 
 by such means. Cardinal Antonelli, more afiected by 
 human considemtions, felt it less. The warlike prelate 
 and IVIinister of War, M. de Merode, had no such feelinor. 
 The compromising defenders of the temporal power had 
 taken a pleasure in turning Rome into the camp of a 
 militant Catholicism, and the meeting-place of that 
 cosmopolitan army which roused the irritation of the 
 Italians, and of which the leader of the Piedmontese 
 Cabinet had foreseen the danger, six years previously. 
 This was precisely the pretext he now availed himself of, 
 by sending, as early aa September 7, a summons to 
 Cardinal Antonelli, bidding him "disarm those corps, 
 the existence of which is a continual menace to Italian 
 tranquillity."'^ He found another pretext in certain 
 
 • Human events sometimes reproduce themselves, after an interval of half 
 a century, with startling analogies. Cavour had no idea how greatly his sum. 
 mary proceedings resembled those of Napoleon, in 1808, when he endeavoured 
 to make General Miollis suddenly enter Rome. Napoleon wrote to his 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. de Champagny : " You must inform Alquier 
 
PIEDMONTESE INTERVENTION. 287 
 
 deputations from Umbria and the Marches, who had 
 hastened to Turin to ask the king's protection. 
 
 Cavour had no time to lose if he wished to outstrip 
 Garibaldi, who had already reached Naples. He put 
 everything to account, and in enforcing his summons 
 with the threat of immediate military execution, he 
 promptly furnished Europe with the word for what he 
 was doing. 
 
 Piedmontese intervention thus became a guarantee 
 against revolutionary excesses. The Venetian question, 
 the settling of which time alone could bring about, was 
 kept back, and every mark of respect bestowed on the 
 Pope, who was reassured as to the integrity of the 
 patrimony of St. Peter's. The organiser of the invasion 
 of the Marches concluded by expressing, as he called it, 
 " the conviction that the spectacle of the unanimity of the 
 patriotic sentiments now bursting forth in the whole of 
 Italy will remind the Sovereign Pontiff that he was, a 
 few years ago, the sublime inspirer of this great national 
 movement." He needed all his resources to emerge 
 successfully from this new campaign. 
 
 In spite of aU his explanation and assurances, Europe 
 
 that General MioUis, who commands my troops, and who appears to be 
 directing his steps upon Naples, will stop at Rome ; that he will assume the 
 
 title of commander of the division of observation of the Adriatic " 
 
 Alquier, hearing of the arrival of the troops at the gates of Rome, was to hand 
 to the Cardinal Secretary of State a note, ultimatum, or " summons," containing 
 chiefly this order : " That the assembling together of Neapolitan sub- 
 jects which had taken place at Rome, be dispersed " Napoleon went 
 
 on to say : " As soon as this note has been delivered, Alquier will be careful to 
 
 see that all is prepared for the reception of the army The Emperor does 
 
 not desire an extension of territory for his Italian States ; but he insists 
 
 that the Pope shall be in his scheme " Of course there was this differ- 
 ence in the two instances : Napoleon entered Rome, to convert it shortly into a 
 French department ; Cavour entered Umbria and the Marches, Italian territory, 
 to convert them into provinces of Italy. 
 
288 LIFE OF COUNT GAVOUR. 
 
 could not but be stirred by such a coup de thedtre, and 
 Austria might be tempted to find the occasion she sought. 
 Cavour was prepared for it : he was prepared for every- 
 thing. But before engaging himself he had taken the 
 precaution of confiding his plans to France, and, at least 
 apparently, consulting the Emperor. He had despatched 
 iy^ Farini, the Minister of the Interior, and General Cialdini 
 to meet the Emperor, who was passing by Chambdry. 
 Napoleon III. did not utter the words so often 
 attributed to him : Fate presto ! He had listened in 
 silence with a brooding look, perfectly understanding 
 what was being done, recognising the sagacit}^ of Cavour, 
 but refusing to make promises or any engagement, and 
 on the morrow of the interview at Chambdry he said 
 once more : " If Piedmont thinks this absolutely neces- 
 sary to save herself and Italy from an abyss of evil, be it 
 so ; but it must be at her own risk and peril ; let her 
 bear in mind that should she be attacked by Austria, 
 ^ France cannot support her. . . . ." He who had often 
 dealt with the Emperor, and had often heard this 
 language, and who was used to the reserves and inde- 
 cisions of that complicated mind, found this enough. 
 Cavour knew Napoleon III. well He knew what had 
 taken place at Kome on the subject of the formation 
 of that very army which he was now about to disperse. 
 He weU knew the imprudence of aU these semi-political, 
 semi-religious manifestations which for some time had 
 been taking place at the Vatican, whose aim was directed 
 quite as much against the Empire as against Italy. "^^^ 
 
 * This was the period when, according to official diplomatic reports, visitors 
 to the Vatican were questioned at the doors as to whether they were Bretons, 
 and when it was triumphantly stated : " The Pope is receiving the homage of 
 
A PRETEXT FOB AUSTRIA. 289 
 
 Finally, he knew, having read it in the pamphlet called 
 "The Pope and the Congress," that Napoleon III, by 
 protecting the temporal power at Rome, and in the 
 " Comarca," relinquished the Marches and the Romagna. 
 From that moment he knew beforehand to what 
 extent French policy would consent to move; and with ^^'• 
 regard to the attack from Austria, of which the Emperor 
 had spoken, he had foreseen the chance of it. He 
 understood how much danger there would be in an 
 Austrian attack at the time when Piedmontese divisions 
 existed in the South. He was not asleep : he and 
 certain Hungarians had already come to an understand- 
 ing. He did his utmost to gather together the forces 
 in Lombardy, and he wrote to La Marmora : "In the 
 serious position of the country I am sure you will not 
 think it strange in me to turn to you with the confidence 
 I have always shown you since the days when we were 
 
 colleagues and friends I flatter myself that you 
 
 will not refuse to lend your help to save the country 
 from the dangers that may be menacing her. The inva- 
 sion of the Marches, rendered necessary by the entry of 
 Garibaldi into Naples, gives Austria a pretext for 
 attacking us. France is aware of it, but she seems 
 little inclined to oppose it with arms. We must rely i^ 
 only on ourselves. I admit that an aggressive movement 
 on the part of Austria is not likely, it is true, for the 
 internal condition of the empire would make it perilous 
 
 Brittany ! " A citizen of Lyons who, though a fervent Catholic, did not think fit 
 to repudiate his nationality, was told : " Sir, you must be the Pope's subject 
 before being the subject of your king ; if these be not the doctrines you 
 profess, why are you here ?" I recall the matter in order to show that 
 Cavour, thoroughly alive to all that was going on, had some reason to think 
 the Emperor's tone at Eome would necessarily be somewhat cool. 
 
 U 
 
290 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 for her ; nevertheless it is not impossible." He calcu- 
 lated in his mind that France would not so easily detach 
 herself from solid co-operation with Italy, and that in 
 any case she would still have an interest in holding back 
 Austria. He had at all events done what he could, and 
 while he kept a watchful eye upon the Mincio, whence ' 
 an attack might spring, he continued to negotiate with 
 the Tuileries ; and he felt sure of England, for England 
 t/ at that very time was backing the intervention of 
 Piedmont at Vienna, with singular vivacity. It is thus 
 that he pressed forward. 
 
 vn. 
 
 " Fate presto ! " Cavour did not need such a recom- 
 mendation from the Emperor, which indeed would have 
 been a strange one from him who gave it and to him who 
 received it. The hardy politician was the first to know 
 that promptitude, dexterity, and definiteness of aim 
 could alone secure success. Even before the signal was 
 given he had everything in readiness — he had temporarily 
 assumed the management of the AVar Department, the 
 Naval and Foreign Affairs. On the one hand he was 
 hurrying the march of the relatively considerable, and 
 intentionally considerable, army towards the frontier, to 
 open the campaign under Generals Fanti and Cialdini. 
 On the other hand he wrote to Persano as follows : 
 " General Cialdini will enter the Marches, and direct his 
 steps rapidly upon Ancona, but he cannot hope to make 
 himself master of that place unless he is energetically 
 seconded by our squadron Tell me what you 
 
THE EXAMPLE TO PRUSSIA. 291 
 
 think necessary for the success of this enterprise, and in 
 what way you intend to carry it out " This en- 
 terprise, skilfully prepared and promptly put into 
 execution as early as September 11, was carried through 
 in a startling manner, in a few brief days, by the joint 
 efforts of the army and the fleet. 
 
 Protests instantly burst forth on all sides from 
 Eussia, Prussia, and France, each in turn recalling her 
 ambassador. Cavour had a perfect escort of protests : 
 he listened ; he did not allow himself to be discomposed. 
 He replied to Prussia's admonitions, conveyed to him 
 by Count Brasier de Saint-Simon : " I am sorry that the 
 Cabinet of Berlin should think fit so severely to judge 
 the king's conduct and that of his Government. I am 
 conscious of acting in accordance with the interests of 
 my king and of my country. I could with advantage 
 reply to all that M. de Schleinitz says, but, in any case, 
 on this occasion I cotisole myself with the belief that I 
 am setting an example which, probably some little time 
 hence, Prussia may be very happy to follow." He scarce 
 made any reply to France, not being anxious at the 
 desire exhibited by the Cabinet of the Tuileries to get 
 away from him. He had guessed what the Court of 
 Kome at this moment either did not or affected not to 
 perceive, which was that France might protest by the 
 recall of her minister, but would go no farther; the 
 Emperor would confine himself to protecting the Pope, 
 and the patrimony of St. Peter in a strictly military arc. 
 He left Cardinal Antonelli and French diplomacy to 
 contend at Eome as to whether or no the Emperor had. 
 said that he would see himself " compelled to oppose 
 
 u 2 
 
292 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 Pieclmontese aggression," or whether he had said that he 
 woukl ''oppose it by force" — a grave question, which 
 Cavour proposed to settle by success. 
 
 During this time, in fact, the Piedmontese army was 
 cutting the knotty point. It is true that it was for a 
 moment about to encounter a handful of men, joined 
 together by honourable convictions, and headed by a 
 chief who deserved a better fate ; but what could 
 Lamorici^re do in the false position in which he was 
 placed ? He had no longer even his illusions left, for he 
 had had a close view of the incurable disorders of Roman 
 administration. He knew that he had no army fit to 
 be brought face to face with a positive army. If he had 
 believed for a moment or so what was told him about the 
 intervention of France, he had soon been undeceived. 
 His honour being engaged, he could still say with his 
 soldierly vivacity and dash : " If we stand alone, God 
 will fight for us ; we will cry to him in the name of our 
 right and our steel — to our trusty sword ! " He could 
 but gild with one last ray a defence broken by the shock 
 of Castelfidardo. It expired in the square of Ancona, 
 harassed by the army of Cialdini and the fleet of 
 Persano ; it was soon compelled by stress of arms to 
 capitulate. 
 
 This done, the question of the Marches was settled. 
 The Piedmontese army, reaching the Neapolitan frontier, 
 remained mistress of the situation, and, strange to say, 
 the unfortunate Francis 11. , no longer able to help 
 himself, had just done Cavour a singular service with- 
 out intending it, or even without knowing it. He 
 had stopped Garibaldi on the Volturno ; and it was 
 
DICTATORSHIPS. 293 
 
 fortunate ; for tlie terrible fellow, more obstinate than 
 ever, might, had he not been prevented, have pushed on 
 to Rome, and reached it before the arrival of the Pied- 
 montese. This was no longer possible. Cavour saw 
 Fortune smiling on his audacity in every direction, by 
 the rapid conquest of the Marches, and by the resistance 
 offered by the Neapolitan royalists. 
 
 The blow had been cleverly dealt, it is quite certain. 
 If the military game was won, the political one was still * 
 more triumphantly so ; and I venture to say that if, in 
 this matter of the invasion of the Marches, there is a 
 character of violence and subterfuge from which bold 
 men, struggling against the difficulties of a hazardous 
 situation, do not always shrink, the political and parlia- 
 mentary side of it showed loftiness of mind and liberal 
 confidence in this powerful and subtle nature. In the 
 thick of this tangle of troubles and conflicts, Cavour was 
 urged on every side to assume the dictatorship, or at 
 least to demand full power in parliament. He was deaf 
 to all suggestions of the sort : and as one day, during 
 his deepest embarrassment, Madame de Circourt com- 
 municated to him the contents of a letter, from a 
 personage of high position, who proposed a similar 
 expedient, he replied : 
 
 " I am greatly flattered by the opinion your illustrious 
 friend entertains about me, but I cannot share it. He 
 too greatly mistrusts the influence of liberty, and he 
 relies far too much on the influence I possess. For my \ j 
 part I have no confidence in dictatorships, especially civil 
 ones. I believe that many things can be done with a 
 parliament which are impossible with an absolute power. 
 
294 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 Thirteen years' experience has convinced me that an 
 honest and energetic minister, who has nothing to fear 
 from revelations of the tribune, and who is not in a 
 humour to allow himself to be intimidated by the violence 
 of extreme parties, can only gain by parliamentary 
 struggles. I never felt so weak as when the Chambers 
 were closed. Besides, I must be true to my nature ; I 
 
 i/ cannot be false to the principles I have held all my life. 
 I am a son of liberty, and it is to her that I owe all that 
 makes me what I am. If a veil had to be put on her 
 statue, it is not I who would consent to do it. If the 
 
 j^ Italians could be persuaded that they need a dictator, 
 they would choose Garibaldi, and not me, and they would 
 be right ! The parliamentary road is the longest, but it 
 
 is also the surest " 
 
 The idea of Cavour, in political life, was that of a 
 great liberal — of the greatest of liberals — knowing how 
 to invent expedients if necessary ; but giving the chief 
 place to that policy which was the secret of his strength, 
 and which, with a sort of audacity, he practised to the 
 end. AVhat he said to Madame de Circourt, in the form 
 of a friendly and homely confidence, he repeated with 
 greater energy and deeper intent, more keenly defining 
 the situation, and giving a sharper outline to the nature 
 and conditions of the Italian movement, of wliich he had 
 to be the leader. It was to Salvagnoli, of Florence, that 
 
 he wrote : " You remember how greatly the 
 
 \/ English papers blamed the Italians for suspending con- 
 stitutional guarantees during the last war. To renew 
 this measure now, in a moment of apparent peace, would 
 have a fatal effect on public opinion in England, and on 
 
LETTER TO SALVAGNOLL 295 
 
 all tlie liberal papers of tlie Continent. It would not 
 bring concord to the national party in the interior. 
 The best way of showing how far the country is from 
 sharing Mazzini's ideas, and the animosities of certain 
 others, is to leave parliament full liberty of censure and 
 control. The favourable vote of the great majority of 
 deputies will give the ministry far greater power and 
 authority than any form of dictatorship. Your advice 
 would only carry out Garibaldi's idea, which tends to 
 establish a great revolutionary dictatorship, to be exer- 
 cised in the name of the king, without the control of 
 a free press, and without individual or parliamentary 
 guarantees. On the contrary, I am convinced that it 
 will not be Italy's smallest title to glory that she has 
 known how to constitute herself into a nation without 
 sacrificing liberty to independence, and without passing 
 through the dictatorial hands of a Cromwell, keeping 
 aloof from monarchical absolutism without falling into 
 revolutionary despotism. Now there is no other means 
 of attaining this end than by asking parliament for the 
 only moral force capable of overcoming factions and pre- 
 serving the S5anpathies of liberal Europe for us. A 
 return to committees of public safety, or what comes to 
 the same, to one or more revolutionary dictatorships, 
 would be to smother legal liberty at her birth ; and it is 
 legal liberty that we want, as being the inseparable com- 
 panion of national independence." 
 
 Thus he spoke both in public and in private, aiming, 
 through liberty, and legal powers in the bosom of 
 liberty, to solve the most complex as well as the 
 simplest questions, and making the parliamentary regime 
 
296 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 the most persuasive instrument of moderation or the 
 fullest means of action. It was with this view that 
 from the beginning of his conflict with Garibaldi he had 
 decided on the convocation of the Chambers ; and on the 
 day that parliament met at Turin, early in October, 
 while the crisis in the South was still proceeding, he 
 used no subterfuge, nor did he consent to envenom or 
 cloak the conflict He defined the whole situation : the 
 necessity of calling on the Southern provinces to declare 
 their wishes as to annexation, and to close the revo- 
 lutionary state of things by the definitive creation of a 
 kingdom of twenty-two millions of Italians ; and he 
 dwelt on the seriousness of this new fact, of the inter- 
 vention of " a man justly precious to his country " exhi- 
 biting a lack of confidence in the Cabinet. "A profound 
 breach," he says, " exists between us and General Gari- 
 baldi : we did not provoke it What could the 
 
 ministers do ? Pass on without even knowing whether 
 or no parliament shared Garibaldi's ideas on the sub- 
 ject of his policy? If we had done that, we should 
 with reason have been blamed for not taking parlia- 
 ment into consultation on so critical a matter 
 
 Kesign ? If the crown had come to changing her coun- 
 cillors at the demand of a citizen, however illustrious 
 and meritorious he might be, it would deal a death-blow 
 to our constitutional system. .... We could not but 
 
 call parliament together, and we did so It was 
 
 for parliament to decide If your vote is against 
 
 us, the ministerial crisis will take place, but in con- 
 foi-inity with great constitutional principles. If it is in 
 our favour, it will act on the generous soul of Garibaldi. 
 
THE NEAPOLITAN QUESTION SETTLED. 297 
 
 We are convinced that he will have faith in the repre- 
 sentatives of the nation rather than in bad citizens, 
 whose miserable work it is to put division between men 
 that have long and persistently struggled for the national 
 
 cause " The discussion ended with an almost 
 
 unanimous vote of confidence in the Government, accom- 
 panied by a not less unanimous one of admiration of 
 Garibaldi, which the minister was very careful not to 
 oppose. 
 
 The victory, therefore, both moral and political, was 
 Cavour's, leaning on parliament ;■ and Garibaldi himself, 
 it must be admitted, did not assume the air of a rebel. 
 He no longer contested the immediate annexation sanc- 
 tioned by vote ; he hastened to go to meet the king, 
 who entered Naples with him. And if, in starting 
 suddenly, almost covertly, to return to Caprera, he 
 concealed a secret wound ; if he did not lay aside his ill- 
 feeling, and mentally resolve to reappear some day, his 
 momentary retirement at least testified both to his dis- 
 interestedness and his simplicity of character. What 
 followed — the final resistance of Francis II. at Gaeta, 
 and the troubles immediately following upon a revo- 
 lution — was but the epilogue of the drama. The 
 Neapolitan question was settled, and Piedmontese in- 
 tervention had gained its point. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 On the day when new parliamentary elections had 
 just taken place in all the provinces, and when the new 
 parliament met at Turin to inaugurate the existence of 
 
298 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 the kingdom of Italy, a curious scene was taking place on 
 the Piazza cli Castello. Old Manzoni, notwithstanding 
 his advanced age and enfeebled condition, had insisted 
 upon making the journey from Milan to Turin in order 
 to be present at what he called the coronation of Italy. 
 An excited crowd surrounded the palazzo Madama where 
 the parliamentary debates were taking place, when sud- 
 denly Manzoni appeared leaning on the arm of Cavour. 
 Applause immediately burst from the crowd, while the 
 minister turned to the poet, saying : " This is intended 
 for you ! " The old poet quickly withdrew his arm in 
 order to clap his hands, pointing to Cavour. The enthu- 
 siastic acclamations of the crowd became greater, and 
 Manzoni exclaimed with pride : " Well, Signor Conte, do 
 you see now for whom this applause is intended ? " Both 
 minister and poet may have at that moment called to 
 mind the first meeting between them, ten years pre- 
 viously, at the house of Rosmini, the villa Bolongaro, 
 when Cavour said, while he rubbed his hands ; ** We will 
 do something ! " He had assuredly turned time to 
 account in those ten years, for representatives of Naples, 
 Turin, Milan, Palermo, Brescia, Florence, Bologna, and 
 Genoa were that day assembled in parliament. " Some- 
 thing " had indeed been done, and that " something " 
 exhibited itself in an outburst of popular enthusiasm for 
 one man. Yet, even with the prodigious annexation 
 just accomplished, much remained to do. Not only had 
 Cavour laboriously to pursue the work of pacification in 
 the Southern provinces, and maintain before Europe a 
 position always difficult and perilous, he had also to 
 shape and diiect his policy under the very eyes of foreign 
 
VENICE AND ROME. 299 
 
 diplomacy, and place himself, as it were, on a solid 
 footing with regard to two questions constantly in agita- 
 tion, and which henceforth stood out like two formidable 
 problems, before united but incomplete Italy : Venice 
 and Rome ! One of these questions, the Venetian 
 question, was still the sorest wound, owing to the 
 Austrian dominion left beyond the Mincio ; the other 
 was a great moral question, and more than a territorial 
 one. Both were in reality as difficult to settle as to 
 evade, and Cavour only emerged from one crisis to find 
 himself face to face with tasks more than ever thorny 
 and delicate. With the help of a little revolution and 
 a little fighting, Naples and the Marches had been 
 carried ; to go to Venice and Rome with an army of 
 red-shirted volunteers and noisy manifestations was 
 not possible. Garibaldi alone thought it so; and the 
 situation became the more serious that it was no longer 
 a time to stake all for all, or risk in new adventures the 
 existence of a kingdom of twenty-two millions of Italians, 
 and Italian unity, scarcely as yet more than nominally 
 acquired — still unfinished. 
 
 Cavour, we may well believe, had the freedom of 
 Venice at heart as warmly as Garibaldi ; he could not 
 forget Venice, for it was in her behalf that he so violently 
 burst out after Villafranca, almost causing a rupture with 
 the Emperor ; nor could he lose sight of the dangers 
 which an act of imprudence might at any moment pro- 
 voke on the Mincio, and he was resolved not to commit 
 it or allow it to be committed. To him it was hence- 
 forth a matter of leadership, an opportunity in which he 
 sought, as he always did, to have the mind of the country 
 
300 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 with him, and not to deceive it. " However strong may 
 be our love for Venice — that great martyr," he said, 
 f* we must admit that war with Austria at this moment 
 ■would be impossible ; impossible because Europe will not 
 suffer it. I know that there are men who think little of 
 the opposition of Cabinets. I do not. I would remind 
 them that to run counter to the wishes of the Powers 
 lias ever been fatal to princes and people. Great catas- 
 Itrophes have resulted from too great a contempt for the 
 feelings of other nations." When asked how, then, he 
 meant to solve the Venetian question, he would reply 
 that Europe must be brought round; opposition springing 
 from Governments only must be disarmed ; this last illu- 
 sion of a possible reconciliation between the Venetians and 
 Austria must be dispelled ; and, finally, it must be shown 
 that the Italians, after constituting themselves into a 
 nation, were capable of being organised and formed into 
 a solid State based on the will of the people. *' Then," 
 he exclaimed, "the opinion of Europe will change. 
 , . . . When the truth can no longer be seriously 
 contested, the fate of Venice will awaken immense 
 sympathy, not only in generous France and in just- 
 minded England, but in noble Germany. I believe 
 a time is not far distant when the greater paij of 
 Germany will no longer consent to be an accomplice in 
 heaping misfortunes on Venice. When this occurs we 
 «hall be on the eve of deliverance. Will this deliverance 
 take place through the agency of arms or negotiations ? 
 Providence alone can decide upon that." 
 
 AVe see that Cavour gave himself time to take 
 counsel with circumstances, though he well knew that 
 
COMPLEXITY OF THE ROMAN QUESTION. 301 
 
 at any moment the Viennese Cabinet might be tempted 
 to bring matters to a sudden termination, and he held 
 himself in readiness for what might happen. JWie^ 
 Ve netian qu estion was as j^et_ relatively simple. The 
 Eoman question was far more complex : it affected 
 everything, from the very constitution of Italian unity 
 by the choice of a capital, to the beliefs, interests, and 
 traditions of the Catholic world through the Temporal 
 Power ; and by the prolonged presence of a French gar- 
 rison at Kome it affected the most intimate relations 
 with France. It was at once a national and universal, 
 a religious and diplomatic question : and it is here that 
 Cavour displayed indeed the powers of a mind marvel- 
 lously penetrating and clear, showing himself a master 
 in the art of contriving and combining, absolutely free 
 from vulgar prejudice, and pursuing, by the aid of 
 Liberalism, the solution of an apparently insoluble 
 problem. 
 
 IX. 
 
 This Roman question, which he had so often met 
 with for the last twenty years, and could not fully face 
 when he was only the representative of little Piedmont, 
 he again encountered as minister of united Italy ; and 
 the business he had to settle was in reality nothing less 
 than a complete transformation of the political condi- 
 tions of the Papacy. He had one advantage which 
 belonged to his liberal and open mind, and it had often 
 come to his assistance in all these delicate religious 
 affairs. He had no animosity or prejudice of any sort 
 as regards the Church : it is true that he looked upon 
 
 Lx' 
 
302 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 the Temporal Power as lost ; he thought it as incom- 
 patible with Italian nationality as it was little favourable 
 to religion ; he spoke of it openly and temperately, like 
 one wdth a great problem to solve, no sectarian passions 
 to appease ; and precisely because he looked abroad from 
 the height of a lofty policy, he was able to accept what- 
 ever was in harmony with his object in view, and eager 
 to offer the Church the fullest compensation in liberty 
 and independence for her lost Temporal Power. One 
 day, about this period, he wrote to a confidential friend : 
 ** There are to my mind two methods ; the one above 
 board, the other secret. The first would be resolutely to 
 submit the matter to the public judgment : for instance, 
 if I or another member of the Cabinet, or the king 
 himself, were officially to declare, either in public speech 
 or before parliament, the views of the Government in 
 relation to religious affairs. The second would be to 
 despatch a secret agent to Rome, whose presence would 
 be unknown to our adversaries, and Antonelli among 
 them : this agent to have the fullest confidence of the 
 Government, in a manner to impress the belief that he 
 is the bearer, and may be the receiver of serious pro- 
 posals." Cavour made use of both these methods alter- 
 nately, sometimes simultaneously, as a man who joined 
 to a purely logical mind the rarest flexibility in practical 
 issues. 
 
 It should be understood that even in the sharpest of 
 these struggles and crises Cavour was not long without 
 having secret dealings with Rome. Early in 18 GO the 
 king's private chaplain, Abbate Stellardi, had been sent 
 to the Pope, with the mission to propose a Vicariat 
 
BR. PANTALEOm. 303 
 
 stretching to Umbria and the Marches, as well as over 
 the Legations. Pius IX. listened suavely, and with some 
 show of emotion ; he went so far as to discuss certain 
 points, and ended by refusing his consent. When the 
 Marches were being overrun, or shortly afterwards, 
 Cavour, instead of envenoming the breach, did his 
 utmost to moderate the wrath of Kome. He gave 
 orders for the unconditional release of the prisoners, and 
 wrote, towards the end of October, to Dr. Pantaleoni, 
 a friend of his established in Eome : " I send a person 
 to Rome deputed to yield up the captured gendarmes. 
 The same person is commissioned to inquire whether the 
 Holy Father begins to perceive the necessity of coming 
 to an understanding with us, which the Roman Court 
 will do well to do, and by which its spiritual indepen- 
 dence will be far better assured than by foreign arms." 
 The same idea had struck Dr. Pantaleoni, and of this 
 came a secret negotiation, continuing up to the close of 
 18 GO and the first weeks of 1861, Father Passaglia 
 speedily becoming associated with it. 
 
 Other negotiations were concurrent ; the one con- 
 ducted by Dr. Pantaleoni was the main one. Cavour 
 concealed nothing from the Emperor, who had his own 
 projects, but ended by joining the mysterious business in 
 hand. AVhat was the aim of it ? The Temporal Power 
 was quietly to be swept away. The Pope remained sove- 
 reign with all sovereign prerogatives, rights, inviolability, 
 and honours ; with a large patrimony in real estate in 
 the kingdom, and absolute ownership of the Vatican and 
 other palaces and residences. The Church became com- 
 pletely free and independent in its spiritual ministry. 
 
304 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 The State renouneecl all rights of intervention in the 
 ^ affairs of the Church. It was the notable treaty of peace 
 long dreamed of by Cavour, and summed up in his famous 
 phrase : " A free Church in a free State." 
 
 How far was the Court of Rome serious in tliis nego- 
 tiation ? At all events it seemed at one time to lend an 
 ear to it. Father Passaglia was the most active inter- 
 mediary between Eome and Turin ; Cardinal Santucci 
 accepted the office of negotiator. One and the other 
 had interviews with the Pope, who listened to them, 
 insomuch that Cavour one day received the following 
 despatch at Turin : " Cardinal Santucci has thought fit 
 to tell the Pope everything ; he has spoken to him of 
 the certain loss of the Temporal Power, and the friendly 
 propositions that have been made. The Holy Father 
 has shown himself resigned. Antonelli has been sum- 
 moned ; he began with a lively opposition, then became 
 equally resigned, and requested the Pope to absolve him 
 and Santucci from the oath, that they might treat of the 
 possible surrender of the Temporal possessions. They 
 are to see Passaglia, and the latter asks me on their 
 behalf for someone to be indicated here or sent from 
 Turin to negotiate. It is desired that the person selected 
 be not a lawyer." The telegraph was immediately at 
 work to carry the news to the Emperor, who, to tell 
 truth, while anxious for success, seemed to have little 
 hope of it. Cavour, of course, could scarcely flatter 
 himself that he was so near his ends ; still, he thought 
 he perceived a door open ; he redoubled his efforts ; he 
 designated the negotiators that had been asked of him, 
 and wrote to Father Passaglia : "I entertain the behef 
 
IN SECBET AND BY PARLIAMENT. 305 
 
 that before next Easter you will be able to send me the 
 olive branch, symbol of peace between the Church and 
 
 the State — between the Papacy and the Italians " 
 
 And what occurred ? At the moment when the first step 
 to a negotiation seemed to be made, the whole aspect of 
 things changed. Either it was that Cardinal Antonelli 
 had only appeared to yield in order the better to master 
 the designs of his enemies and find the means of com- 
 bating them, or else that his hope of evading the neces- 
 sity had revived, and he believed he saw symptoms of 
 coming events in Europe, signs of a possible intervention 
 of the Catholic Powers. 
 
 A final attempt had evidently been risked to hold 
 back the Pope, half inclining to reconciliation. In any 
 case, Cardinal Antonelli lost no time in cutting the 
 threads of the projected arrangement ; and he went so 
 far as to give orders to Dr. Pantaleoni to quit the 
 Eoman States within four- and- twenty hours ! The 
 intrigues of the foes of peace triumphed for the time : 
 everything was in suspense. Cavour had not succeeded 
 by the "secret means;" he had the "public means " to 
 try — the parliament ; and he found occasion in due course 
 in an interpellation addressed to him on the affairs of 
 Eome, in March, 1861. This opportune interpellation 
 was for him but another manner of taking up and con- 
 tinuing the negotiation in the light of day, in the face 
 of Italian and universal opinion, and frankly avowing to 
 its full extent — I might add, in its grandeur — the policy 
 whose realisation he had never ceased to prosecute. 
 
 He had said in parliament : " The star now directing 
 us is this, that the Eternal City, upon which twenty 
 
306 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 centuries have cast glory of all kinds, should become the 
 capital of the kingdom of Italy." What he had ah-eady 
 said he confirmed, with more precision and breadth, in 
 the month of March, 1861. Cavour certainly was not 
 one to be led astray by imagination and artistic enthu- 
 siasm. He confesses, with some humorous modesty, 
 that for his part he preferred the plain straight streets of 
 his native town to all the monuments of Rome. He 
 loved Turin ; it was not without regret that he thought 
 of sacrificing it ; and he was led to exclaim : "Ah ! if 
 only Italy could have two capital cities : one for 
 Sundays, the other for the days of the week!" His 
 resolution was taken entirely on political grounds, 
 because the name and majesty of Rome alone could 
 dominate the rivalries of Italian cities, and so put the 
 definitive stamp on vmity ; and he considered it was of 
 prime necessity to let Europe know that Rome was 
 looked on by the whole nation as vitally the capital of 
 the country. "No city but Rome," he cried, "can be 
 the capital of Italy; but here we come upon the per- 
 plexities of the problem. We must go to Rome, but on 
 two conditions : that we are acting in concert with 
 France, and that the great body of Catholics in Italy 
 and elsewhere do not see in the reunion of Rome with 
 Italy the source of the subjection of the Church. In 
 other words, we go to Rome, but not to restrict the 
 independence of the Sovereign Pontiff" — not to bring 
 spiritual things under the yoke of civil authority " 
 
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE POPE. 307 
 
 X. 
 
 Unquestionably the task was not a light one ; neither 
 was it an impossible one as regarded France. He said 
 plainly : "It would be madness, in the present state of 
 Europe, to think of going to Rome in spite of France. 
 
 We owe France a great debt of gratitude ; but ^ 
 
 there is a graver motive for being in harmony with her. 
 When, in 1859, we called France to our aid, the 
 Emperor did not conceal from us the engagements •^ 
 by which he was bound to the Court of Rome. We 
 accepted his assistance without protesting against the 
 particular obligations he had imposed on himself; and 
 now that we have won so much from this alliance, we 
 cannot protest against the engagements to which, up to 
 a certain point, we have consented." There was but 
 one way of disengaging France, and quieting with her 
 the whole Catholic world ; and it was by giving the 
 Church what a pretended Temporal Power — ^painfully 
 sustained for twenty years by foreign arms, incapable 
 of supporting itself or regenerating itself by reforms — 
 could not give it : this was by establishing the dignity ^ 
 with the independence of the Sovereign Pontiff and of 
 the Church by the separation of the two powers, a large 
 application of the principle of liberty in relation to civil 
 and to religious society. " It is clear," he pm-sued, 
 " that if this separation were distinctly and irrevocably 
 accomplished, if the independence of the Church were 
 thus established, the independence of the Pope would 
 be much more securely based than it is to-day. His 
 authority would be more efficacious, being no longer 
 
 X 2 
 
308 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 bound by concordats, and all those bonds and treaties 
 which have been and must remain indispensable so long 
 as the Pope is a temporal sovereign. The authority of 
 the Pope, far from diminishing, will be greatly extended 
 in the spiritual sphere which is his own." If it was but a 
 mighty hope, and if they were not to succeed at the first 
 stroke, let there be no discouragement, and let it not fail 
 to be reiterated : " Whether or not an understanding 
 with the Pope precedes our entrance into the Eternal 
 City, Italy will no sooner have declared the fall of the 
 Temporal Power than she will separate Church and State, 
 and establish the liberty of the Church on the broadest 
 foundations." 
 
 Cavour sincerely believed what he said, and he 
 believed what he asked was in the interests of the Church 
 as well as in the interests of Italy. One day, when his 
 intimate friend, Signor Artom, was expressing his doubts 
 and fears, he exclaimed with his kindling vivacity : 
 " I have more faith than you in the effects of liberty. 
 Do you not see that the time has come to settle the 
 question of the TemporalTower, which has ever been the 
 stumbling-block in the way of Italian nationality, and 
 that the only way of settling it is to reassure the Catholic 
 world as to what Italy will do with the Papacy ? In- 
 justice is done to Catholicism, when it is urged that it is 
 incompatible with liberty. On the contrary, my con- 
 viction is, that as soon as the Church shall have tasted 
 liberty, she vdU feel herself renewed in youth by that 
 wholesome and fortifydng regimen. When Europe shall 
 have been convinced that we are not striving against 
 Catholicism, she will find it natural and fitting that the 
 
THE AIM FOB ITALY. 309 
 
 Italian rather than any other flag should float over 
 Eome. The enterprise is not easy, but it is worth being 
 attempted." More than any other, Cavour was made to 
 attempt it. He had not yet succeeded, it is true ; but 
 after disentangling a revived Italy from her disorders 
 and divisions, he had marked on the horizon a final aim, 
 while shaping the road to reach it. He himself had 
 touched the supreme point in human destiny, when a 
 man made powerful by freedom, begirt by a solid 
 popularity, though still with struggles before him, can 
 only be stopped by death surprising him in harness, and 
 in the hour of victory. 
 
 
 [TJKI7EE3IT71 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE FINAL VICTORY OF A POLICY — DEATH AND 
 LEGACY OF CAVOUR. 
 
 Italian Unity and Eorope — Austria and the Annexations — La Marmora's 
 
 Mission to Berlin — Last Negotiation with Napoleon III. — Unity at Naples 
 
 — Baron Bicasoli's Discourse and Interpellation — Cavour and Garibaldi 
 
 before Parliament— The Sitting of April 18, 186WA Minister's last Victory 
 
 j^f^^Sndden Illness of C^irtfor— His last Moment83**[is Death — Fra Giacomo 
 
 ^■'^ — Legixry of Cavoirf^His Work and his Policy — Conclusion. 
 
 To have shaped a reality out of a dream ; to have suc- 
 ceeded in leading the revolution of a partly-enslaved 
 people almost to the farthest limit, without sufifering it 
 to run to wreck in convulsions, by covering it before 
 Europe with the mantle of a traditional monarchy — such 
 was the fortune of Cavour early in 1861. 
 
 What the bold Piedmontese had accomplished up to 
 that time, he had not done unaided. Had he not met 
 with many favourable circumstances on his way ; many 
 propitious conditions — a European situation lending 
 itself singularly to adventurous daring ; a small countr}^ 
 forming a firm and vigorous instrument of action ; a 
 soldierly and patriotic king ; concurrence of opinion and 
 
BEVIEW OF THINGS ACCOMPLISHED. 311 
 
 national sentiment ; auxiliaries of every kind seconding 
 liis designs, either skilfully or audaciously — had he not 
 met with all this, he could not have succeeded. His 
 genius was shown in his power of combining these 
 many elements, and in handling them with a profound 
 knowledge of the secret springs of policy ; and if he was 
 successful to the end, it was because he knew how to lay 
 out his work ahead. In fact, that which had lately 
 occurred — ^this last act of the drama enacted at Ancona 
 and at Naples — was after all but the crowning event, 
 itself perhaps somewhat precipitate and unexpected, of 
 the scheme which for twelve years had been developing 
 itself in successive widening circles from Novara to the 
 Crimean war ; from the congress at Paris, to the war of 
 1859 ; from the peace of Villafranca, to the annexation 
 and final unification. The unity of Italy, springing to 
 life ultimately in a whirlwind — it might almost be said, 
 a victory over revolutionary passions as well as over 
 Bourbons and the Pope — had become now and hence- 
 forward a living fact. It comprised Italy, from the Alps 
 to the Adriatic, except Venice and Eome, the two 
 immovable points before which it must halt for a time. 
 Italy had her king, her army, her parliament, and her 
 chancellor. The thing was done, and though, like many 
 others, elated by so prodigious a transformation, Cavour 
 himself could not be ignorant of the fact, that all was 
 not as yet accomplished. He knew that, following the 
 romance and adventure, the entire political business 
 remained to be taken up and settled, and it was a thorny 
 and complicated business : thus, amid the victor's cares, 
 never doubting of the future, but putting away illusions. 
 
 i/ 
 
312 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR 
 
 he wrote : " My task is even more laborious and painful 
 than it used to be. To build up Italy, to blend the 
 divers elements of which she is composed, and har- 
 monise the North with the South, presents as many diffi- 
 culties as does a war with Austria and the struggle with 
 Rome " 
 
 The question was i^ fact exceedingly serious. 
 Knowing what others did not know, and with an eye 
 fixed on Europe as well as on Italy, Cavour could not be 
 deceived, and he lost not a moment in fitting himself 
 either to overcome or evade the difficulties of ever}'' 
 kind surrounding him. 
 
 The first of these was the probable collision with 
 Austria openly defied. The situation of Italy relative 
 to Austria was perilous when the annexation of Tuscany 
 or Romagna was at stake ; it became very much more 
 so when the whole of Italy united under the influence 
 of an ardent passion of nationality, and Venice became 
 the watchword. Morally speaking, war had begun 
 through the violation of all treaties, and by the very 
 nature of that Italian revolution of which every step 
 threatened the imperial power on the Mincio and on the 
 Adige. Hostilities might commence at any moment ; 
 Austria might take advantage of the Southern crisis, 
 and more than once in those cruel moments of suspense 
 Cavour had feared that she would. Towards the end of 
 1860 he wrote, not without some emotion, to Madame 
 de Circourt : " We may perhaps be severely tried. It 
 seems as if Austria meant to take advantage of the 
 
APPREHENSIONS OF AN ATTACK. 313 
 
 absence of the king and of all our divisions to attack 
 us. We are preparing to- oppose her to the uttermost. 
 Cialdini and Fanti are at Naples, but we have here La 
 Marmora and Sonnaz, and they are not men to be in- 
 timidated. We are ready to stake all for all. The 
 country is as calm as though the sky were cloudless ; it 
 knows the danger but ^ does not fear it, for it also 
 knows the cause to be great enough to warrant any 
 sacrifice. . . , ." 
 
 Austria, it is true, had remained motionless ; she had 
 been unable to obtain either from Eussia or Prussia the 
 support and encouragement she had hoped to gather 
 from an interview then famous — the interview of War- 
 saw ; and on the other hand she was made dubious by 
 the enigmatical attitude of the Cabinet of the Tuileries, 
 as well as by the protection France was in any case 
 bound to extend over Lombardy. She stood to her 
 arms, nevertheless, ready to enter on a campaign, re- 
 solved not to fail in her steps forward if the fault of an 
 attack on her were committed : in reality, perhaps 
 anxious for a pretext, if it were only some rashness 
 on the part of the Italian volunteers, which she might 
 have made good use of before Europe. Cavour warily 
 avoided furnishing the pretext ; he was, on the contrary, 
 especially vigilant in preventing anything that might 
 have worn a semblance of an armed aggression. After 
 having feared that he himself would be attacked, he 
 was not long in detecting the Austrian game. *' It is 
 evident," he wrote in March, 1861, to Count Vimercati, 
 at Paris, " that Austria seeks a provocation : we will not 
 do her the particular service." 
 
314 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 At this critical moment Cavour was chiefly solicitous 
 to keep Austria in good humour without yielding to her, 
 while leaving the Venetian question in some sort open, 
 without wildly and prematurely rushing to meet a 
 contest that might prove mortal for Italy. In order to 
 succeed, Cavour had not only to make use of the wariest 
 \J prudence towards Austria, he had to clear away all the 
 suspicions and prejudices that were roused in Europe by 
 recent events : in a word, to reconcile all policies to the 
 idea of Italian unity and the existence of a new Power. 
 With England this was not difficult. The English 
 Cabinet was the protector and backer of Italy, so long 
 as Italy engaged not to attack Austria on the Mincio, 
 thus giving the signal for a European war. Russia and 
 Prussia had evinced their displeasure by an open rupture, 
 and by the recalling of their ministers from Turin : with 
 them the task was not so easy. Notwithstanding all 
 this, Cavour did not relinquish the hope of calming the 
 two Northern Powers, at least Prussia, whose secret 
 ambition he always contrived to flatter, trusting sooner 
 or later to win her over to his cause. He had been wise 
 enough not to attach too great an importance to the 
 rupture ; he only looked for a good opportunity to 
 renew an amicable understanding with Prussia ; and 
 accordingly in the early part of 1861, when the Prince 
 Regent — the future Emperor William — was about to 
 assume the Crown, Cavour despatched La Marmora with 
 a special mission to Berlin. 
 
 This act of royal courtesy from Victor Emmanuel 
 towards the Prussian sovereign was really only a cloak for 
 the renewal, after the war and annexations, of Marquis 
 
LA MABMOBA AT BEBLIN. 315 
 
 Pepoli's mission before the war of 1859. Cavour sought 
 to reassure Prussia as to his pacific intentions, persuading- 
 her that this Venetian question, which troubled her, had 
 nothing of the importance regarding German frontier 
 defences that artful Austria sought to attach to it. La 
 Marmora was especially charged to reiterate, in all his 
 conversations at Berlin, that the two Governments had 
 common interests, that they both drew their strength 
 from the national idea they had in view ; that a united (/ 
 Italy could never be other than a natural and useful ally 
 to Prussia, destined to create and support the hegemony 
 of Germany. 
 
 King William had not yet had time to become accus- 
 tomed to the views that another bold hand was about to 
 open to him " with fire and sword." He received La 
 Marmora with courtesy, but said not a word of the 
 events which had recently taken place beyond the Alps. 
 Baron Von Schleinitz, the Minister of Foreign Aflfairs, 
 complacently pursued the conversation, in a tone half 
 sympathetic and half reserved, expressive of the unde- 
 cided attitude of Prussia. "No doubt," he said, "there w . 
 is between Piedmont and Prussia a striking analogy ; 
 but we cannot approve everything that you have done. 
 I admit that in the critical situation in which you were 
 placed, you could scarcely do otherwise. AVe, for our 
 part, have thwarted you as little as possible. As to 
 Venice, and her unfortunate condition, rest assured that 
 we have no intention of throwing oil on the fire, should 
 Austria sooner or later show herself disposed to relinquish 
 it ; but in that case we must come to an understanding 
 how best to secure the interests of Germany on the 
 
316 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 Adriatic I understand your wish that Prussia 
 
 should acknowledge the kingdom of Italy ; do not put a 
 knife to our throats, and we will do all in our power to 
 keep on good terms with the Government of Turin. We 
 leave it to Count Cavour's keen-sighted wisdom to afford 
 us the opportunity for doing more." It was all that 
 Cavour wanted ; in leaving to the future what the future 
 was actually to bring forth, he had for the moment 
 succeeded, since he perceived at once Prussia less hostile 
 and Austria more isolated. 
 
 III. 
 
 Another element in this still uncertain and always 
 perilous situation, and another source of perplexity, was 
 Rome : a question affecting everything ; aftecting Italy in 
 the definite construction of her unity ; France in the 
 protection with which she covered the Papacy; and 
 Europe and the Catholic world as to the independence 
 of the Pontiff. Cavour felt the weight and measured the 
 difficulties of all these things. " I do not conceal from 
 you," he wrote about this time, " that even in my 
 moments of busiest occupation, my thoughts are always 
 centred on the Roman question " 
 
 At the point reached by Italian affairs, Cavour could 
 not put aside that problem of " Rome for the capital," 
 and the Temporal Power of the Pope, imposed upon him 
 by the irresistible logic of events, and which the re- 
 volutionary passions, heated by Garibaldi's call, might 
 turn into a formidable weapon and a plan of action. 
 At the same time, he well knew that he dared not 
 
INTRIGUES AND DEBATES. 317 
 
 deal with what remained of the Temporal Power, 
 with Rome and the patrimony of St. Peter as he 
 had done with the Eomagna, Umbria, or the Marches 
 — he knew that he must not attempt or sanction any 
 surprise vi et armis in the presence of Catholic Europe . 
 disquieted and France encamped in the Eternal City. 
 Cavour had a profound consciousness of these difficulties, 
 which might prove a stumbling-block to the unity he 
 sought; and to make head against a situation so en- 
 tangled, he became doubly energetic and wary, not 
 excluding any transaction compatible with the national 
 integrity. Scarcely emerged from the great Southern 
 crisis, he was tentatively pushing at Rome, about the 
 person of the Pope, those mysterious advances which he 
 did not despair of bringing to a good issue. While 
 diplomatising with the cardinals, he took advantage of 
 the full light of parliamentary debates, to lay his schemes 
 of liberal policy before Italian and European opinion, nor 
 did he limit himself to this. He was at the same 
 moment giving his whole attention to a private negotia- 
 tion with France, in order to obtain from the Emperor , 
 the recognition of the kingdom of Italy, and, by a new 
 application of the principle of non-intervention, the 
 recall of the French garrison at Rome. 
 
 It would have been a decided success for Cavour, and 
 a step towards the realisation of that portion of his pro- 
 gramme by which he declared that nothing should be 
 done but what was in agreement with France at Rome, 
 and to this end he did not refuse the guarantees claimed \ 
 of him. Here was one more phase in the everlasting 
 diplomacy between Turin and Paris. Prince Napoleon 
 
^ 
 
 318 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 was the agent in this secret negotiation. In the earlier 
 days of April, 1861, he communicatecl to Cavour the 
 Emperor's views on the subject of Roman affairs as 
 follows : " The Emperor, who has occupied Rome for 
 twelve years, will not consent that the withdrawal of his 
 troops should be interpreted as a giving of the lie to his 
 policy ; and as the beating a retreat before this unity of 
 Italy, eflfected independently of his wishes; but he 
 desires to withdraw his soldiers from Rome to be free 
 of a false position. It is of the greatest importance to 
 the ItaHan Government that this act should take place ; 
 it behoves it, therefore, to overlook all secondary and 
 temporary difficulties in the matter. The policy of non- 
 intervention applied to Rome and the patrimony of 
 St Peter might serve as the basis of a common accord. 
 The Pope being considered as an independent sovereign, 
 France could withdraw her garrison from Rome without 
 affording Austria the opportunity of taking her place ; 
 the Italian Government, on its part, would enter into 
 an engagement with France, not only to abstain from 
 hostilities with the Pontifical Government, but also to 
 prevent any anned attack either from Garibaldi's volun- 
 teers or other Italians AVithout recognising the 
 
 Pope's right to have recourse to foreign intervention, the 
 Emperor will probably require that the Italian Govern- 
 ment should grant the Pontifical Government the right 
 to organise a Catholic army of foreigners, on the condition 
 of that army being a defensive force, and deprived of the 
 power of becoming a means of offence against Italy. To 
 you the immense advantage of this understanding is that 
 it will give you an immediate opportunity of renewing 
 
REPLY TO PBINOE NAPOLEON. 319 
 
 your diplomatic relations with France, considering that 
 Austria may recommence hostilities at any instant, and 
 
 you will see Rome liberated of a foreign garrison " 
 
 Cavour, on his part, hastened to reply : "I confess 
 that in the first instance I was alarmed at the difficulties 
 and dangers presented by the execution of the plan to 
 which the Emperor might consent, that we may come to 
 a provisional solution of the Roman question. The 
 promises we should have to make, and the probable con- 
 dition of Rome after the departure of the French troops, 
 place us in a most equivocal position before the country, 
 parliament, the Romans, and especially iDefore Garibaldi ; 
 but when only two courses are open to us, we must 
 choose the least dangerous, whatever the precipices lying 
 in our way. I have not been long in convincing myself 
 that we ought to accept the proposals made to us ; 
 alliance with France being the basis of our policy, there 
 is no sacrifice I would not be disposed to make, that the 
 
 alliance should not be questioned " The two 
 
 confederates of Plombieres, though they had one 
 momentary rupture, more apparent than it was serious, 
 always felt attracted towards one another ; they found 
 themselves in harmony again as to the new condition of 
 Rome, and the remains of the Temporal Papacy in the 
 midst of a united Italy. This was virtually the origin, 
 as it were the first sketch, of a combination that did not 
 become an act of official diplomacy until three years 
 later, but which was being arranged by Cavour and 
 Napoleon III. in the months of excitement and alarm 
 beginning 1861. 
 
 J 
 
 y 
 
320 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 IV. 
 
 But this was only a part of the difficulties brought 
 about by the new situation. The more serious and 
 immediate complication was in the interior — at Naples, 
 in those southern provinces suddenly annexed to the 
 North. I am not even alluding to the defence of 
 Francis II. at Gaeta, the final resistance of a young and 
 unfortunate sovereign, prolonging the struggle for nearly 
 four months, as if to afibrd to Europe time to come for- 
 ward to his assistance. The Bourbon standard, fixed on 
 the rock of Gaeta until February 13, 1861, represented 
 but a vanquished cause. 
 
 There was less difficulty in this military protest, 
 without response or hope as it was, than in the moral 
 condition of this southern country, suddenly given up to 
 a kind of stormy transition, and the disorganisation of a 
 revolutionary interregnum. As long as the annexation 
 extended only to such regions as Lombardy, Tuscany, 
 the Romagna, or Parma, it was easy. But represent- 
 ing, as it then did, an entire kingdom, separated from 
 the North by manners, customs, and traditions — the 
 passionate, clever, mobile, and exuberant Neapolitans 
 formed at the extremity of Italy an ungovernable mass, 
 rebellious to any assimilation. Every element of 
 anarchy accumulated under a demoraHsing system was 
 bursting out. In the bosom of unbounded liberty, each 
 party naturally took advantage of the fanaticism, the 
 passions, and disorderly instincts of an impressionable 
 population, easily set against laws, taxes, and the whole 
 new order of things. A veritable system of brigandage 
 
FERMENT IN THE SOUTH. 321 
 
 was organised, with a political cloak to it, by the de- 
 fenders of the fallen regime. Mazziniism, on the other 
 hand, took up the name of Garibaldi ; to make the 
 southern provinces the centre of its agitations. In vain 
 the Cabinet of Turin tried to govern this chaos by send- 
 ing a succession of lieutenants — first Farini, then the 
 Prince of Carignano, with Cavaliere Nigra ; next Signor 
 Ponza di San Marttino ; these excited, turbulent, and 
 undisciplined rather than hostile southern provinces 
 continued an anarchical riddle to the Piedmontese who 
 succeeded one another at Naples. The South threatened 
 to become another Ireland in a scarcely constituted 
 kingdom, so that Cavour was brought face to face with 
 every external and internal complication of an unfinished 
 work. 
 
 He might well say that he had not yet the right to\ 
 rest on his oars, or be satisfied with his conquest. He / 
 had simultaneously to negotiate the accession of a new/ 
 Italy with Europe, to fix his policy in Venice andEome,l "TI^-^^^^ 
 to continue to quiet the southern provinces, assimilate / '"^ 
 the legislation and administration of all these different \ 
 provinces, reorganise the army of the new kingdom, and 
 unite six or seven budgets into one, which from the very \ 
 first presented a deficit of 500 millions of francs ! 
 
 Sometimes, notwithstanding his natural vitality and 
 vigour, he fell into indescribable apprehensions, asking 
 himself whether he could carry out this absorbing work 
 on which he was bestowing his activity and his life ; but 
 he soon took courage again. He braced himself against 
 the difficulties which assailed him, and which proceeded 
 from divisions, personal resentments, things, and men, in 
 
 y 
 
\i 
 
 322 LIFE OF COUNT OAVOUB. 
 
 {turn — often from men in the highest position ; and from 
 those many questions of organisation which he directed 
 and settled in the midst of absolute liberty, for he would 
 consent neither to a dictatorship, to simplify the work of 
 unification, nor a state of siege to pacify Naples. It 
 was through discussion that he hoped to succeed, though 
 the trials in store for him should be hea\y. His strength 
 was in the parliament and in the confidence of the 
 country, in his immense influence on the popular mind, 
 and the gatherings of the elect of the nation, the liberals 
 who rallied to his view^s. His weakness consisted in a 
 situation still unsettled and undecided, where all might 
 be wrecked by some ill-rogulated outburst, or the daring 
 of some popular leader ; a condition of things in which 
 incandescent passions, especially in the South, might 
 rush headlong into some adventure in the direction of 
 Rome or Venice, and ruin in a mad enterprise schemes 
 of the most far-sighted policy. 
 
 What was wanted to revive a struggle such as that 
 which Cavour had sustained with Garibaldi, in October, 
 1860? Perhaps only a pretext, any unforeseen incident ; 
 and neither pretexts nor incidents were wanting in the 
 spring of 1861 — one of those stormy springs of that 
 period which, to use Lord Palmerston's expression, " came 
 in like lions." The pretext of the moment was the 
 dissolution or reorganisation of the army of the South, 
 that is to say of those volunteers who had gone through 
 the campaigns of Sicily and Naples with Garibaldi. So 
 irregular a force evidently could not be allowed to sub- 
 sist, good as it was at best either for an adventure like 
 the Sicilian expedition, or any such time of high national 
 
THE GARIBALBIAN VOLUNTEERS. 323 
 
 enthusiasm. G-eneral Fanti, the Minister of War, would 
 not have it, in the interests of the army ; and in the 
 interests of diplomacy, Cavour could not consent to retain 
 it. G-reat consideration was shown. Generals, who proved 
 worthy of their rank, were made of officers like Nino 
 Bixio, Cozenz, and Medici. Many of the officers were 
 offered rank in the national army ; in short, the principle 
 of volunteer service was maintained. Nevertheless, the 
 southern army, such as it had existed, existed no longer ; 
 <and perhaps the Minister of War may have been guilty 
 of some slight want of judgment in the execution of 
 these delicate matters. 
 
 No more was needed to awaken the wrath of Garibaldi,"^"^, 
 and this was precisely the kind of conflict Cavour was 
 far from seeking ; he was troubled by it, but he accepted 
 it with as little animosity as weakness. It was felt that 
 the quarrel of the previous October was but inefficiently 
 settled, and that it might at any moment kindle again 
 with all its fury, with all its dangers likewise. 
 
 V. 
 
 It was Garibaldi's misfortune not to content himself 
 with being a man of mark ; he mistook his warlike or 
 revolutionary fancies for a policy, and flattered himself 
 with the belief that nothing would be denied to him. 
 
 Stopped in his plans with regard to Rome and 
 Venice, after the annexation of Naples, Garibaldi had 
 carried with him to his island of Caprera a soured and 
 irritated mind, full of an undying resentment against 
 Cavour. He had retired, leaving to his companions an 
 
 T 2 
 
324 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR 
 
 order of the day, in which he appointed to meet them 
 the following spring. In the meantime, from the depth 
 of his retreat, which he had not even left to go to the 
 meeting of parliament at Turin, he was spreading fire 
 and flame. He gave utterance to declamations which 
 were a signal for disturbance. Had he rested content to 
 be the defender of the southern army and of the volun- 
 teers, or had he even agitated for a general arming of 
 the people, he would have been keeping to his part ; and 
 his impetuous patriotism, although it might have been 
 thought imprudent, would only have met with sym- 
 pathy ; but he would not rest content with that. AVith 
 the intemperateness of the soldier and popular idol he 
 attacked everything, abusing the Government and all 
 who upheld it. He pointed to the Moderates and 
 Liberals, to those parliamentary members who recog- 
 nised in Cavour their first representative and their 
 guide, as being all but conspirators in treason. To a 
 deputation of Milanese workmen, who presented an 
 address to him at Caprera, he said, among other things : 
 "For the holy redemption of this land, I rely on the 
 rough hands of men of my stamp, rather than on the 
 lying ^promises of false politicians. Notwithstanding 
 the sad effects of a vassal policy nmvorthy of the 
 country, and notmthstanding all tJmt the crou'd of 
 lackeys ^upholding this monstrous and anti-national 
 
 policy may say, Italy must stand : she must live " 
 
 Shortly afterwards, in accepting the presidency of the 
 Association of Italian Unity, he used the same violent 
 expressions, arousing the same excitement. He recom- 
 mended to his fellow-countrymen to fortify themselves 
 
WRATHFUL DECLAMATIONS. 325 
 
 against " that cowardly fear which those seek to inspire 
 who have dragged ItaHan honour in the dust." 
 
 It was with such declamations as these that the 
 Cincinnatu s of Caprera called for a general arming ! 
 He strangely outstepped the limits of his popularity, 
 and of his prestige as conqueror of the Two Sicilies. 
 He did not see that he was subjecting Italian unity, 
 only just created, to a still greater risk than any that it 
 had yet known ; that with one blow he struck king, 
 army, and the parliament of which he was himself a 
 member ; and that if a man, whoever he might be, could 
 speak thus, nothing was left but the dictatorship of an 
 ungoverned will and an implacable resentment. Gari- 
 baldi certainly had not calculated the effect of these 
 intemperate and dangerous words, which, no doubt, 
 stirred up the passions of the country, and might find 
 an echo in the South, but reverberated in a very di±- 
 ferent manner at Turin and in the Chambers, where 
 they excited the Hveliest susceptibilities. Not only was 
 the Government offended, but the deputies expressed a 
 firm resolution not to allow such an outrage to pass 
 unnoticed ; and thus this singular conflict began to 
 assume serious proportions. It was loudly said that it 
 was time to have done with it ; and that even for the 
 honour of liberal institutions parliament was bound to 
 set a watch over its. dignity, though it should strike the 
 popular hero, and show him that he could not have 
 impunity in abuse. 
 
 But who was to take the initiative ? If the Govern- 
 ment, it would seem too official ; besides, the President 
 of the Council would not appear to accept offensive 
 
326 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 words which were, more than at any other, aimed at 
 him ; if a deputy, notorious for particular \iews, or 
 obscure, the parliamentary demonstration might be led 
 astray or fail of its object. There happened to be a man 
 in parliament exactly fitted for the part, Baron Betti no 
 Kicasoli. By his energetic and decisive activity in the 
 events which had brought about the unity, by his rela- 
 tions with Garibaldi during the interregnum in Central 
 Italy, and by his independence both of station and 
 character, he fulfilled all the required conditions, and 
 he was fashioned to measure himself ^vith any one. 
 
 The former dictator of Florence had just arrived at 
 Turin ; and on his first appearance in the Chamber, his 
 proud and grave aspect, the natural dignity and severity 
 of his manner and person, made a strong impression. 
 His presence inspired a mixture of cuiiosity and respect. 
 Like many others, the Florentine baron had been 
 wounded by Garibaldi's violent language. He spon- 
 taneously undertook to meet the defiant attack, and 
 protest on behalf of institutions ; and in Kicasoli a par- 
 liamentary manifestation necessarily assumed the most 
 serious character. He proposed to ask the Government 
 for explanations on the measures it had taken, or was 
 about to take, with regard to the southern army, and 
 the development of the military forces of the nation. 
 But, previous to this, he had another account to settle : 
 he wished to put an end to the anxieties for some days 
 past troubling every mind; and it was on April 10, in 
 the midst of an excited assembly, that he rose to his 
 feet, all being hushed about him instantly. 
 
 He was knowTi as the dictator at Florence ; it was 
 
SPEECH OF BIGASOLI. 327 
 
 not yet known what sort of a speaker he might be, nor 
 what he was going to say, when with a clear vibrating 
 voice, and an imperious tone, which gathered fire as it 
 went, he uttered the following overwhelming words : 
 " A calumny has been circulated abroad concerning one 
 of the members of the Assembly. Expressions hostile 
 to the majority in parliament have been attributed to 
 General Garibaldi. They cannot have been uttered by 
 him. I know him, and I shook his hand when he was 
 about to take command of the central army : we were 
 then animated by the same sentiments — we were both 
 equally devoted to the king. We both swore that we 
 would do our duty ; I have done mine ! . . . . Who is 
 it, then, that could proudly claim for himself the exclusive 
 privilege of devotion and patriotism, and exalt himself 
 above his fellows ? One head only has the right to be 
 higher than any other among us — that of the king. Before 
 him we must all bend, and any other attitude would be 
 that of a rebel ! . . . . Victor Emmanuel has made our 
 
 nation Italy's liberator being the king, and all 
 
 Italians having marched to liberty under the command 
 of a chief so magnanimous, one citizen is not above 
 another. He who has had the good fortune to do his 
 duty more generously, in a wider sphere of action, or in 
 a manner more profitable to his country, and who has 
 perfectly fulfilled it, a greater duty still lies before him, 
 and it is to thank God for allowing him the inestimable 
 privilege, which is granted to so few, of being able to 
 say : * I have served my country weU, I have absolutely 
 done my duty !' " 
 
 These words, emphasised by his bearing and a 
 
328 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOTIR. 
 
 vibrating delivery, as it were with the inflexible judg- 
 ment of conscience and patriotism, shot a thrill through 
 the whole of the Assembly, which burst forth in 
 acclamations. Cavour had never heard his austere 
 Florentine ally and rival speak, and had not always 
 found it easy to deal with him in the affairs of Central 
 Italy, and he had listened rather curiously at first ; but 
 he soon began to share the universal excitement, and 
 in leaving the House, he said to a friend : " To-day I 
 have understood and felt the nature of true eloquence." 
 Others have declared that he said : " Were I to die 
 to-morrow my successor is found ! " In any case, 
 royalty, parliament, institutions, and the dignity of an 
 entire poHcy, had just received satisfaction by this 
 harangue, replete with a noble severity, which singularly 
 changed the parts, and transformed Garibaldi into one 
 accused, and put him at the bar before his judges. 
 
 Garibaldi, under pain of being considered a rebel — 
 and notwithstanding the violence of his language he 
 was not one — evidently could not decline the challenge. 
 On first arriving at Turin, and as though he had felt the 
 importance of Baron Ricasoli's words, he hastened to 
 publish a letter, wherein he disavowed — and not without 
 some spirit of dignity — all intention of censure either 
 towards the king or the national representatives; this, 
 however, was but a beginning. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Shortly after came the decisive collision in parUa- 
 ment, now unavoidable, for which rendezvous had been 
 
GARIBALDI AND CHAMBDB OF DEPUTIES. 329 
 
 given, and the presence of Garibaldi made it dramatic. 
 For the last week Turin had filled with volunteers, 
 hurrying thither to escort and support their leader. The 
 sturdy Piedmontese city, faithful to its king, looked 
 upon this uproar with no favourable eye ; it had little 
 enthusiasm for the conqueror of Naples ; it saw with no 
 little impatience and apprehension a conflict in which its 
 firmness would have to be the mainstay of the Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 On the day fixed — the 18 th of April — the sitting 
 was opened with a particular solemnity. The diplomatic 
 corps had wished to be present at it; the tribunes bent 
 under the weight of an excited crowd. A few moments 
 elapsed, and then Garibaldi appeared in his singular cos- 
 tume — the legendary red shirt and South American 
 poncho. As he entered, the galleries burst forth in 
 shouts of welcome, but the Chamber remained immov- 
 able and cold. When the first moment was over. Baron 
 Ricasoli, taking up the thread of his former subject, 
 questioned the Government as to the southern army and 
 the military reorganisation of the nation. 
 
 The Minister of War, General Fanti, repHed in his 
 turn in a detailed statement of the measures he had 
 adopted, and had found necessary. Without either 
 weakness or diplomacy, he did his best to prove 
 that he had done all he could do for the volunteers 
 and the Garibaldian officers — for an institution born 
 of the circumstances of the time — without running the 
 risk of introducing into the regular army a disastrous 
 spirit of rivalry, or wounding military feelings and 
 interests. It was the speech of a minister defending his 
 
330 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 acts on good grounds. Garibaldi then rose, and the 
 scene became animated. 
 
 At first Garibaldi felt a little strange on this new 
 stage ; he entangled himself in laborious phrases em- 
 barrassing to his friends ; but speedily setting circum- 
 locution aside, he went straight to the point in question, 
 and to the antagonism of which he had been accused by 
 Baron Ricasoli — to the personal question in short — he 
 replied : *' I have not given any occasion for dualism. 
 It is true that plans of reconciliation have been proposed 
 to me ; but these have only been in words. Italy knows 
 me to be a man of deeds, and deeds have always been 
 
 in opposition to words Whenever dualism could 
 
 have damaged the cause of my country I have bowed, 
 
 and shall always bow But I leave it to the 
 
 conscience of the Italian representatives here present to 
 state whether I can give my hand to one who has made 
 me a stranger in Italy I " 
 
 The agitation was beginning to manifest itself in 
 loud interruptions, when Garibaldi, returning to the 
 subject of the southern army, which he stated was 
 " the principal object of his presence in the Chamber," 
 added, with growing excitement : " Having to speak of 
 this army, I should above all relate its glorious deeds. 
 The wonders it achieved have been darkened only when 
 the cold and inimical hand of the Ministry has made its 
 evil influence felt. When, through love of peace and 
 horror of a fratricidal war, provoked by that same 
 
 Ministry " At these words, before the sentence 
 
 was complete, the tempest burst out, and protestations 
 were shouted on every side ; the real struggle had come 
 
UPROAR IN PARLIAMENT. 331 
 
 at last ! Cavour, full of indignation, scarcely able to keep 
 seated among the ministers, called upon the President of 
 the Chamber, saying : " Such insults as these are not 
 permitted ; we cannot suffer them ; see that proper 
 respect is paid to the Government and representatives of 
 the nation. We demand a call to order!" Eattazzi, 
 the President, sadly perplexed, and almost extinguished 
 in this storm, could think of no better way than to 
 request Garibaldi to clothe his opinions in a less gene- 
 rally offensive form. Cavour exclaimed : "He has said 
 that we provoked a fratricidal war ; this is far more than 
 an expression of an opinion." "Yes, a fratricidal war!" 
 replied Garibaldi with vehemence. An extraordinary 
 agitation convulsed the assembly. Loud shouts on the 
 part of the deputies for a call to order, mixed with 
 frantic applause from the galleries crowded with Gari- 
 baldians ; abusive challenges, and violent invectives 
 crossed each other in rapid succession, causing an inde- 
 scribable confusion. The President was reduced to break 
 up the sitting. 
 
 This scene in reality, by awakening the irritation of 
 the majority in the Chamber, had confounded the mo^ 
 sincere among Garibaldi's friends, and when, after some 
 minutes the debate was resumed, one among them, Nino 
 Bixio — himself one of the band of heroes of Sicily and 
 the Volturno — made himself the spokesman of the 
 general sentiment of affliction. Bixio endeavoured to 
 palliate the violent language of his ancient chief by 
 invoking a patriotic return to reconciliation. " Count 
 Cavour," he hastened to say, " has undoubtedly a 
 generous heart. The earlier part of this day's session 
 
332 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 should be forgotten. It is a misfortune that it has 
 happened : let us banish it from our minds " 
 
 In spite of the wound he had received, and the 
 emotion he had been unable to repress, Cavour controlled 
 himself sufficiently to reply to Bixio's request that the 
 insult should be overlooked, and to enter into an ex- 
 planation. " It is not," he replied immediately, "that I 
 flatter myself with the hope of seeing the friendly 
 feeling spring up again, which the honourable member 
 Bixio has just entreated us to entertain. I know there 
 is one deed which has put a gulf between General 
 Garibaldi and me. I thought to accomplish a painful 
 duty — the most painful I have ever known — in urging 
 upon the king and parliament the approval of the 
 cession of Nice and Savoy to France. Through the 
 pain it caused me, I can realise that which General 
 Garibaldi must now feel on the subject, and if he is 
 unable to forgive me for that deed, I cannot hold it to be 
 a reproach to him " 
 
 Garibaldi in his turn became more calm, expressing 
 a desire that, according to him, would tend to moderate 
 their dissensions ; he said : " Although my sentiments 
 towards Count Cavour are those of an adversary, I have 
 never doubted that he also is the friend of Italy. My 
 wish would be that the honourable Co.unt should make 
 \) use of his powerful influence to cause the law which I 
 propose for the national armament to be adopted ; 
 namely, to despatch the forces remaining of the southern 
 army to a point wherein they might serve Italy, by 
 combating a reaction daily gi-owing more threatening : 
 this is my desire ! " It was always this question of the 
 
TEE DEBATE ON THE VOLUNTEERS. 333 
 
 volunteers and the southern army, which reappeared in 
 the shape of a desire, after showing itself under the form 
 of an injunction. 
 
 Cavour was ready to do all he could to relax a 
 situation of extreme tension, promote reconciliation, and 
 strive to bring Garibaldi to reason. Quick to recover 
 his coolness, after the first moment of just indignation, 
 he was not long in reflecting that all these rashly 
 kindled conflicts descending from parliament to the 
 country, might become civil war, to the destruction of 
 the dawning unity ; therefore no efibrt was too strong for 
 him, no sacrifice too great — neither the forgetting of 
 personal injuries, nor concessions in particulars. There 
 was but one thing — the essential one, it is true — ^that he 
 230sitively refused, because in it he saw another danger, 
 the external danger. He would at no price, in appearing 
 to submit to Garibaldi's desire, accept a sort of active 
 organisation of volunteers, which would have the appear- 
 ance of preparation for an ofiensive war, and might ruin 
 all his labour of diplomacy, of which he alone had the 
 secret. " We will not," he said resolutely, " have an 
 active volunteer corps, in the positive acceptation of the 
 word. We decline to do what would be a real pro- 
 vocation, because we do not think ourselves bound to 
 follow a provocative policy." 
 
 This was the question at issue, and for the space of 
 three days he fought with consummate skill, not exactly 
 in order to win over a Chamber already convinced and 
 devoted to his schemes, but to prevent an equivocal state 
 of things from sliding, under pretext of conciliation, 
 into a not carefully weighed vote. He wished, since they 
 
334 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR, 
 
 were in for the struggle, that the result of it should be 
 clear and decisive. 
 
 "You know the policy of the Ministry," he said, 
 rising high above the sense of a personal conflict " We 
 have proclaimed it before the country, as well as to 
 
 the whole of Europe More than once we have 
 
 repeated, in various ways, that, in our opinion, the Italian 
 question will remain unsettled as long as the independ- 
 ence of the peninsula is not thoroughly established ; as 
 long as the important questions of Rome and Venice 
 have not been satisfactorily arranged ; but at the same 
 time we have declared that the Roman question should 
 be settled peaceably, without hostility or discord with 
 France. We do not look upon the French troops at 
 Rome as enemies. In the same way with regard to 
 Venice, we have stated moderately and firmly that the 
 present state of Venetia is incompatible with a durable 
 peace ; we have also avowed that, in the present state of 
 Europe, we should not have the right to kindle a general 
 war. In other terms, we have declared that, with regard 
 to Rome, our policy relies entirely on an alliance with 
 France ; and that, in the case of Venice, we must take 
 European interests into consideration, and the counsels of 
 friendly Governments and Powers which at critical times 
 have lent us willing and efficient help. Such is our 
 poHcy. No doubt there is another. Declaration may 
 be made that Italy is in a state of war, tempered by a 
 kind of tacit truce, a truce at Rome and a truce at 
 Venice; and that, as a natural result of this condition of 
 things, it is not only desirable, but also indispensable, that 
 we should take measures necessaiy for an immediate 
 
INTERVIEW OF GARIBALDI AND CAVOUR. 335 
 
 war. These are the two alternatives in juxtaposition. 
 We frankly tell you that the first policy is the only one 
 
 suited to the nation The other is practicable 
 
 too ; it is a very dangerous one, fraught with difficulties, 
 obstacles, and snares, but it may be adopted. That 
 which, however, would be fatal, and which would lead to 
 inevitable ruin, would be to adopt one policy one day 
 and another the next, and neglecting to follow before 
 the eyes of the country, and still more before those of 
 Europe, a definite, frank, and honest line. England 
 would more easily overlook a piece of folly than she 
 would forgive us for misleading her." It was under the 
 influence of these words that the vote for an order of 
 the day, proposed by Baron Ricasoli, and accepted by 
 the Grovernment, put an end to the conflict. 
 
 That which had begun in a wild tumult and uproar, 
 and might have turned to a dangerous crisis, finished 
 quietly enough ; the drama had an epilogue, due to the 
 diplomacy of the king, who used all his influence to 
 bring about, if not a personal reconciliation — a task of 
 some difficulty — at least a meeting between the President 
 of the Council and Garibaldi in one of the private 
 apartments of the Palace. A few days later, on 
 April 27, Cavour wrote as follows to Count Vimercati 
 at Paris : " My interview with Garibaldi was courteous 
 though not warm ; we both kept within the limits of 
 reserve. I acquainted him, however, with the line of 
 conduct which the Government intends to follow, as 
 regards Austria as well as France, assuring him that, on 
 those points, no compromise is possible. He declared his 
 readiness to accept the programme and to be willing to 
 
336 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUB. 
 
 engage himself not to act contrary to the views of Govern- 
 ment. He only asked me to do something for the army of 
 the South. I gave him no promise ; but I told him I would 
 seek a means to provide, as well as might be done, for 
 the future of his officers. We parted, if not good 
 friends, at least without any irritation." 
 
 Once more Garibaldi disappeared to return to his 
 Mediterranean island, and out of an ordeal that for a 
 moment seemed to be so full of danger Cavour's policy 
 emerged more than ever whole and free, sanctioned by 
 the vote of parliament, and by the defeat and eclipse of 
 his terrible adversary. 
 
 VIL 
 
 At the time when Cavour was winning his last and 
 decisive victory of reason and foresight over the dis- 
 orderly instincts of an empty-headed popular hero, he 
 was still in full vigour. He had even appeared ^nth a 
 sort of new brilliancy, as though in the fulness of a 
 generous maturity. 
 
 The greater and more complicated the work, the more 
 inexhaustible seemed to be his resources of vigour and 
 
 o 
 
 activity. He needed his robust constitution and strength 
 of mind to suffice to all tliis. At one and the same 
 moment he was engaged in establishing the relations of 
 Italy with Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal ; he was in 
 the heat of negotiations with the Emperor of the French 
 on the subject of Rome ; he was minutely observing the 
 troubled affairs of Naples ; he was regulating tlie finances, 
 and attending to the navy of the new kingdom ; and 
 every day he was in parliament, taking his part in 
 
SUDDEN ILLNESS OF CAVOUB. 337 
 
 every discussion. No doubt he was not called upon to 
 struggle for a majority — that was not wanting to him ; but 
 he had to direct it, to guard its inexperience from 
 surprises and imprudent measures which he alone could 
 counteract. 
 
 In reality it was a trying life, enough to break the 
 strongest constitution. The contest with Garibaldi 
 especially had given Cavour a heavy blow. The effort 
 he had made to master himself in the thick of the storm, 
 and the constraint he had put on himself, told seriously 
 upon him. Excess of work of every kind could hardly 
 be other than murderous to his health. On May 29 
 he was still in parliament animatedly discussing a 
 project that was to be turned into a sort of manifestation 
 in favour of the republicans fighting at Rome in 1849, 
 and on that day, still more than on preceding ones, he 
 exhibited a certain over-excitement and an impatience 
 under contradiction causing some surprise. That evening, 
 on returning home, he seemed weary and gloomy : *' I 
 am exhausted," said he, " but I must go on working, for 
 the country needs me ; perhaps this summer I may be 
 
 able to take some rest in Switzerland "• That 
 
 same night he was seized with violent indisposition ; the 
 athlete was already beaten ! 
 
 His illness indeed began to show grave symptoms. 
 For a moment it seemed to be conquered by early care 
 and bleeding — ^the habitual remedy at Turin — and even 
 Cavour thought himself all right. On May 31 he was 
 again able to assemble about him his colleagues of the 
 Ministry. He worked with Nigra and Artom ; but this 
 was only the illusion of a man fretting himself with the 
 
338 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOTJR. 
 
 idea that he had not time to be ill. From June 1 the 
 remedies ceased to take effect, and all hope was vanish- 
 ing hourly. Cavour fell into the last struggle between 
 life and death for some days, passing from fits of deli- 
 rium to lucid moments, during which all that had been 
 occupying him came to his mind. With his niece, the 
 Marchioness Alfieri, always attentive at his pillow, and 
 with his friends Farini and Castelli, he spoke of all he 
 had yet to do : of the loan of 500 millions which was 
 impending, of the recognition of the kingdom of Italy 
 Ijy France, a letter expected from Count Vimercati in 
 Paris, and of the navy it was necessary to create. He 
 was anxious about Naples, and spoke of it urgently. 
 
 "Northern Italy is established," he said. "There 
 are no longer Lombards nor Piedmontese, Tuscans nor 
 Romans. We are all Italians ; but there are still 
 Neapolitans. Oh ! there is much corruption in their 
 country. Poor people ! it is not their fault, they have 
 been so ill-governed ! . . . . We must impress the country 
 morally, but it is not by abusing the Neapolitans that 
 
 they will be brought to reason Above all, there 
 
 must be no state of siege, none of the measures of abso- 
 lutist Governments. Anyone can govern with a state of 
 siege. I will govern them with liberty, and I will show 
 what ten years of liberty can do for these fine countries. 
 Twenty years hence they will be the richest provinces in 
 Italy. No, have no state of siege ; that is my advice 
 
 to you " Victor Emmanuel wished to visit 
 
 his illustrious minister, and Cavour, recognising the 
 king, exclaimed : " Oh I your majesty, I have many 
 things to communicate to you, many papers to lay 
 
FBA GIACOMO SUMMONED. 339 
 
 l)efore you ; but I am too ill, it will be impossible for 
 me to come and see you, but I will send you Farini 
 to-morrow, lie will give you all particulars. Has your 
 majesty received no letter from Paris ? The Emperor is 
 friendly to us now " Sometimes Cavour com- 
 plained of confusion in his brain, imagining that his 
 illness lay there : he felt that the power of thinking was 
 fast leaving him. 
 
 To the end, however, he remained what he had been 
 — what he wished to be. He requested that]^ the priest 
 of the Madonna dei Angeli, the Fra Giacomo, Avith 
 whom he had seven years previously made every 
 arrangement, should be in readiness to come to him ; 
 and accordingly, at the summons of the Marchioness 
 Alfieri, Fra Giacomo hastened to the deathbed of the 
 great man. Cavour spent half an hour alone with the 
 priest ; and when the latter left him, he called for 
 Farini and said to him : " My niece has summoned Fra 
 Giacomo ; I must prepare for the great passage into 
 eternity ; I have confessed and been absolved. I desire 
 that it be known — that the good people of Turin should 
 know — that I died the death of a good Christian. I am 
 without anxiety ; I know that I have injured no man." 
 That same day, the "good people of Turin," who 
 were anxiously watching the course of the illness, tear- 
 fully followed the priest carrying the viaticum to the 
 most illustrious citizen of the Piedmontese capital. The 
 worthy priest himself, it is said, comforted a relative of 
 the Count by reminding her that "no man in this world 
 had known better how to succour and pardon than that 
 one." Among the last words uttered by Cavour to Fra 
 
 z 2 
 
MO LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 Giacomo, who was reciting at his bedside the prayer for 
 the dying, were these : *' Frate^ frate" he said, in press- 
 ing the priest's hand, ^* libera chiesa in Iibero stato!'' 
 It was almost in pronouncing these words that, at a 
 quarter before seven o'clock on the morning of June 6, 
 1861, Count Camillo Cavour rendered to his God one of 
 the noblest souls that ever animated a mortal being. 
 
 He seemed to have been struck down in the heat of 
 action, as on a field of battle, on the morning after a 
 victory that he owed to the moderation as well as the 
 greatness of his intelligence. Massari states that : " He 
 who did not see Turin that day, knows not what is 
 meant by the grief of a people." The town was filled 
 with mourning. The tribunes of the Chambera and the 
 standard on the palace were veiled wnth crape. The 
 whole of Italy responded to the feeling in Turin. The 
 startling rapidity of the catastrophe, as well as the 
 immense void left by the sudden disappearance of one 
 particular man, spread consternation everywhere, and the 
 news of this death resounded over Europe as well as in 
 Italy. 
 
 Friends and enemies alike felt that the world had to 
 sustain the loss of one of its forces and one of its great 
 lights. In the English House of Commons, Palmerston, 
 following Brougham in the Lords, and Milnes, said : 
 " The name of Count Cavour will live for ever, 
 embalmed as it were with gratitude and admiration in 
 the memory of the human race. And when I speak of 
 Count Cavour I do not mean simply to praise him for 
 those administrative acts which have most astonished 
 the world, that is to say, for the unity of his countr5^ 
 
PALMERSTON ON CAVOUB. 341 
 
 He has done many other things that make him no less 
 great. The foundation of the constitutional Government 
 in which Italy now rejoices was laid by him ; it is he 
 who managed all the affairs of the peninsula, and secured 
 inestimable benefits to those who are living, and to all 
 who will live after us. Of Count Cavour it may truly 
 be said that he taught a moral, and ornamented a 
 history. The moral is this : that a man of eminent 
 genius and indomitable energy, as well as of inex- 
 tinguishable patriotism, thanks to the impulse he knew 
 how to give to his fellow-citizens, may by devoting 
 himself to a just cause, seizing favourable opportunities, 
 overcoming difficulties which seemed insurmountable — 
 I say that such a man may endow his country with in- 
 estimable advantages. The history he ornaments is an, 
 amazing one ; the most romantic in the annals of the 
 world. Under his influence and his directing authority 
 Ave have seen a people awakened from a sleep of cen- 
 turies These are events which history will 
 
 record, and he whose name wiU pass on with them 
 to posterity, however premature his end, will not have 
 
 died too soon for his glory and his renown " 
 
 Thus they spoke of Cavour in London. France, for 
 her part, felt an emotion deep- as it was sincere, and 
 Cavour's sudden end had, as a first result, the hastening, 
 in one degree at least, of the negotiations which had 
 secretly been carried on for two months past by the 
 sreat minister with Paris : it caused an immediate 
 recognition of the new kingdom of Italy by the French \y 
 Government, and thus, even in death, Cavour triumphed 
 in doing one more service to his country. 
 
342 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUIt. 
 
 Many a time, especially at first, and even since 
 June 5, 1861, when the creator of a new Italy sud- 
 denly disappeared, a singular question has been raised : 
 it has been suggested that perhaps Fortune favoured 
 Cavour to the end in causing him to die before ex- 
 periencing possible deceptions. Up to that time he had 
 been successful ; everything, it is urged, had turned out 
 well with him ; he might have failed in the work he 
 had in hand, and which he had not as yet completed; 
 and D'Azeglio himself, who confessed to having been 
 " stunned by the death of poor Cavour," whom " he 
 mourned for as a brother," even D'Azeglio said, three 
 days after : " For him it may be well ; to disappear 
 without having fallen is not given to everyone. For us 
 it is a terrible trial ; but if it be the will of God to save 
 Italy, will he be at a loss to do so without Cavour?" 
 This, of course, was only a touching sentiment, or else 
 the wild impression of a shaken imagination. If Cavour 
 did not die too soon for his glory, according to Lord 
 Palmerston, a prolonged career would not have exposed 
 him to a " fall," as D'Azeglio seemed to fear ; he was not 
 of those who have to rely on the mysterious poetiy of 
 a premature and opportune end, in order to leave a 
 famous reputation behind. 
 
 No, he who for the space of twelve years had passed 
 through every difficulty and every snare, displaying new 
 resources at every step, and acquiring greatness in the 
 fire of strife; bringing his country from the depth of 
 defeat to the summit of fortune even beyond the limit 
 of hope ; such an one had no cause to dread to live on 
 or to shrink from a few more trials before reaching the 
 
HIS LEOAGY TO ITALY. 343 
 
 point distinguishable to him. Had he been capable of 
 falling he would not have been himself. He would 
 have finished what he had begun, and he was in full 
 working order. He would have continued his negotia- 
 tions and his combinations, more and more uniting 
 Italy, who had confidence in his directing power, and 
 daily winning for her the interest of Europe, already 
 accustomed to his clear and inventive diplomacy. If 
 more struggles had been in store for him he would have 
 sustained them with a growing authority. Never had 
 he shown more activity or more security than when 
 disease came and crushed him in the midst of his un- 
 finished task ; and I do not know on what was founded 
 the statement so often repeated after D'Azeglio, that 
 Cavour had disappeared "just in time for his glory." 
 
 There is no doubt that his death was a dangerous 
 crisis, a *' terrible trial " for Italy ; but that which in the 
 first moment of excitement was hardly discernible, and 
 which has given a fresh testimony to Cavour's greatness, 
 is, that although he was prematurely snatched away, he 
 had done enough for his work to survive him. Had he 
 lived, he would have continued to be the most powerful 
 athlete of the new kingdom he had founded ; and dying, 
 he left it, as an inheritance — together with the unity 
 almost complete — his idea, his traditions, his whole 
 policy, one which had been the instrument of his 
 schemes, the secret of his success, and which, after him, 
 remained the guarantee and strength of new Italy — the 
 inspiration of the liberal elite who continued his work. 
 
 Let there be no misunderstanding about it. It 
 is with this idea, and these traditions, it is by 
 
344 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 following Cavour's directions, often by adopting his 
 plans and realising his schemes, that Italy has managed 
 to exist and to consolidate and complete herself during 
 the past fifteen years ; and so true is this that a strange 
 phenomenon of a significant eloquence may be obsei'\^ed : 
 whenever difliculties have presented themselves, or 
 questions arisen which Cavour had not in some degree 
 at least prepared the answer for, or enlightened with 
 the luminous rays of his reason, perplexity has been 
 the consequence ; and this the honest minds which, 
 for fifteen years, have had to conduct the affairs of the 
 peninsula at the most critical times, do not conceal ; 
 they never felt more reliance in themselves than when 
 able still to follow out the designs of that guide in great 
 struggles. Each time that a deviation from the path 
 he had traced has l^een made, doubt, disquietude, and 
 threatened crises have resulted. A living testimony to 
 the influence of a great brain. 
 
 Italy a nation is the legacy of. C avoui -. The fruit of 
 a policy starting from an idea of independence and 
 patriotism, and embracing internal order, economical 
 interests, religious affairs, and diplomacy, developing 
 and enlarging itself daily, by the help of the most 
 astonishing mixture of dexterity and daring, justice 
 and high-mindedness, practical good sense and unbaffled 
 energy in contrivance. 
 
 Others in good numbers, no doubt, before jiim and 
 about him, have been devoted to the cause of iintioual 
 liberation. Cavour outstepped them from thdiu giKiit 
 
ii..^-^^.y* 
 
 HIS UNDERSTANDING OF LIBERTY. 345 
 
 that lie was able to make use of jthat idea seriously ; he 
 knewhowtobring it into the sphere of possibilities, that 
 might be realised ; j/te made it pure of any factious 
 spirit, led it away from barren Utopias, kept it clear of 
   reckless conspiracies, steered stoight between reyoluti^^ 
 and r eaction, and ^ave it an organised force, aJLag',,JL 
 gwernment, and foreign allies. This difficult task, 
 laborious as we have seen, he pursued by a process as 
 simple as it was grand ; for it was in the large under- 
 standing of liberty practised in all its forms. He had 
 the passion and the science of liberty, for which he felt 
 himself shaped ; and none more than he has repudiated 
 anarchical agitations and dark plottings on the one hand, 
 and dictatorships, arbitrary combinations, and the con- 
 venient measures of a state of siege, on the other. ^As 
 parliamentary leader of a small county, devote d, tem- 
 perate, and firm, he knew how to make this Piedmontese 
 land a centre of attraction for Italy ; as minister to the 
 King of Sardinia, he worked for the moral ascendency of 
 the House of Savoy, before^, he. .^£. his liand .. to its 
 materjal aggrandisement. 
 
 He was at heart a Liberal Conservative, a Con-i 
 stitutional Monarcliipi"^ih the broadest interpretation of 
 the word. He often repeated that : " No republic is able 
 to grant so true and fruitful an amount of liberty as that 
 which a constitutional monarchy affords, provided it be 
 on a solid basis. The form of republic best adapted to 
 the customs and needs of modern Europe has still to be 
 discovered. It presupposes, in any case, the accomplish- 
 ment already of that great task of poj^ular education 
 which will be the work of our century." Cavour wga in 
 
346 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 Jivour.QfuiQliatilail igflal monarchy^ as being the necessary 
 regulator of consecutive and eflfectual action, in the whirl- 
 wind of parties : but he held the interests of royalty to 
 be inseparable from thosejpf tfi^ i^t^qn^ he believed that 
 " far from languidly following the thoughts and neces- 
 sities of the people, it should, on the contrary, take 
 the initiative with regard to generous and practicable 
 measures, that it might be able to make head with a 
 capable authority against popular passions, when dan- 
 gerous impulses misled the mob." 
 
 His ideal, whi ch a patriotic dynasty help ed him .to 
 Idealise, was that t he Govenunen t shojol^be a guide and 
 an ever active adviser ; and it was thus that he worked 
 out his problem. He used liberty as a means of extension 
 and conquest, on behalf of monarchy, at the same time 
 that he converted monarchy into the regulating force of 
 a victorious revolution, and made it the guarantee of 
 unity. He so fully identified the two causes that, on 
 the day when the House of Savoy became, almost with- 
 out an effort, the Italian House, the Republicans, altering 
 a famous saying, have been able to say, subsequently : 
 " It is Royalty that causes the least division among us." 
 There is the originality, the novelty of the policy of 
 Cavour : he has bequeathed a monarchy to Italy, which 
 cannot be touched without endangering national exist- 
 ence itself 
 
 One of the most characteristic manifes.tatitfifiUQjLihe 
 Liberalism of Cavour was undoubtedly t jiat part of his 
 policy touching religious matters, which never ceased to 
 develop itself through every event, until it was summarised 
 in the prophetic words he uttered with his last breath : 
 
BIS POLICY IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS. 347 
 
 " Libera chiesa in liber o stato." He had encountered 
 these formidable and delicate questions at the outset of 
 his career, even before he became minister, in the narrow 
 circle of Piedmontese affairs ; he had seen them grow and 
 become more complicated in proportion as the Italian 
 movement broadened, to the extent of questioning, at 
 Eome, the Temporal Power of the Pope ; these were a 
 part of the elements of the national problem. He could 
 not avoid them. Nothing, however, less resembles 
 despotic or revolutionary traditions, than the bold and 
 independent mind with which he broached these 
 religious difficulties. Without doubt he had a grand 
 aim in view, and he never lost sight of it — it was the 
 complete emancipation of national and civil society ; he 
 consented neither to inflict persecutions nor to impose 
 shackles, nor indeed to run counter to opinion or national 
 habits and customs. He was especially careful to avoid 
 rough dealings, and angry provocations, and intemperate 
 language in discussions, and in deeds from which he did 
 not shrink. 
 
 To his essentially politic nature, the passionate con- 
 tests were repugnant in which religious excitement might 
 tend to weaken the national cause. His faith as a 
 reformer made him indifferent to what he considered 
 useless precautions with regard to the Church regula- 
 tions and the interference of the State in sacerdotal 
 matters ; he did not even claim the right to a very 
 close supervision of ecclesiastical teaching. He did not 
 behave as an enemy to the Church. He intended to 
 make the abolition of the Temporal Power a means of 
 freedom for the spiritual power of the Pope. In exchange 
 
 y 
 
348 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 for the complete liberty lie claimed for the State, he was 
 ready to grant every liberty ; and if it was observed to 
 him that perhaps it could not be done without risk, and 
 that in certain provinces it was necessary that civil 
 authority should hold a fii-m hand over a fanatical, hostile, 
 or rebellious clergy, he did not allow himself to be 
 deteiTcd by such reasons as these ; he never doubted the 
 beneficent effects of a liberal system. 
 
 He wished to ennoble the revival of Itidy by some 
 memorable act, and to Signer Artom, who expressed his 
 doubts to him, he replied, ^nth a certain enthusiasm : 
 " To us belongs the privilege of putting an end to the 
 great combat now going on between the Church and 
 
 civilisation Whatever you may say, I have a 
 
 good hope of gradually bringing the more enlightened of 
 the clergy, the good Catholics, to accept this view. May 
 be I shall be able to sign, from the top of the Capitol, 
 another religious peace, a treaty which will have con- 
 sequences much more important to the future of human 
 societies than the peace of AVestphalia ! " 
 
 In this confident and generous intrepidity lay the 
 strength of Cavour. Two things were in his fiivour : 
 there was this liberal conception, which has clung to the 
 Italian revival ; and until the realisation of this fair dream 
 — if it was ever to be other than a dream — there was at 
 least the option of living on quietly, preparing the means 
 for the end. CavourLs4a:acLical mind JiegleotjecL nothing ; 
 even up to the moment of his death he had made every 
 combination, leaving the solution readyTo r his succ essors . 
 The settlement he was negotiating at Pans, which "was 
 awaiting the signature delayed only by his death, became 
 
 si^ 
 
EIS IDEA IN DIPLOMACY. 349 
 
 tlic convention of September 15, 1864! The object of 
 the secret negotiation with the Pope and Cardinal 
 Antonelli, early in 1861, shaped itself later into the law 
 of guarantees ! All was linked together in that policy, 
 to which perhaps Italy owed the fortune of entering 
 Rome without breaking up the religious world ; and 
 assuredly she will not find her advantage in straying 
 from it. 
 
 IX. 
 
 What finally I wish to point out is the idea of 
 Cavour in that labour of diplomacy which, from the first 
 day of his entrance into the Ministry, was one of the 
 most essential features of his policy. The force of the 
 national sentiment, that liberal propaganda of Piedmont 
 and of the constitutional government, created Italy. Be 
 it so : but in reality i't became possible only through the 
 most far-sighted and watchful diplomacy, pursuing its 
 task now with commercial treaties, now with a military 
 alliance and co-operation in the Crimean war, now Avith 
 the interview at Plombieres, and the many combinations 
 preceding or following the arrival of French troops at 
 the decisive moment. If in his impetuosity and the 
 nature of some of his acts Cavour sometimes resembled 
 a revolutionist, every art of a negotiator Avas known 
 to him. He had not the futile infatuation to believe 
 that Europe was made for Italy ; on the contrary, 
 he held that Italy should adapt herself to Europe ; 
 he knew how to estimate European interests, and 
 measure circumstances ; and with his indefatigable 
 activity in acquiring alliances, retaining them, or 
 
 ^ 
 
350 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 adding to tlieir number, his whole ability consisted in 
 constantly indicating that the liberation of a people, 
 for which he was indefiitigably working, was the best 
 guarantee of peace. The revolutionist became a Con- 
 servative in order to reassure or win over Cabinets, 
 while proving to them, if necessary, that in the most 
 audacious of his resolves, and in the accomplishment of 
 Italian unity, he was still the defender of order. In 
 playing this part he had the immense advantiigc of 
 leaning on one of the oldest monarchies of Europe, long 
 'since admitted into the circle of recognised Powers. He 
 had his place in the Courts of Europe, his credit among 
 Governments, and the new force he represented to 
 prompt his dealings with the various policies. 
 
 Fronting Europe, whose friendliness he had to win, 
 or to disarm her suspicions, Cavour was perfectly free 
 from any prepossessions of mind ; and as events deve- 
 loped he left no stone unturned to extend his diplomacy. 
 He had especially, at an early date, turned his attention 
 to Germany and Prussia. He was anxious to reassure 
 Germany and Prussia, and take away from them every 
 pretext for joining arms with Austria on the Adige. It 
 was to his mind a necessity of the hour as well as of the 
 future : he was unremittingly busied with it. 
 
 " Prussia," he said, " is one of the Powers having a 
 .^Ji^direct and immediate interest in changing the actual 
 
 I ir^ state of Europe. Prussia cannot have forgotten Olmutz ; 
 
 r^^ Yt. y she cannot look malevolently on the efforts we are making 
 to bring down her fortunate rival. We do not ask her to 
 draw the sword for our good pleasure, but I think when 
 Austria is weakened Prussia will find the benefit She 
 
HIS FEELING TOWARDS FRANCE. 351 
 
 would therefore be committing a grave error should she 
 espouse the cause of Austria against us. We do not 
 ask the Cabinet of Berlin to help us in the struggle, we 
 only claim to be let alone." On another occasion, after a 
 fresh attempt to get hold of Prussia, he said : " What 
 cannot be done now, shall be done later on. Prussia 
 must inevitably be carried away with the current of a 
 national idea. The alliance of Prussia with an enlarged 
 Piedmont is written in the book of the history of the 
 future." Cavour was clear-sighted, and in this respect, 
 as in many others, he opened a way for those who came 
 after him ; but at bottom, great as was the importance 
 he attached to bringino; about future relations with Ger- 
 many and Prussia, his intelligence and instinct were 
 all with the two great Western Powers — France and ^ 
 England. 
 
 It was through them that he had been able to take 
 part in the affairs of the world in the glorious days of /^ 
 the Crimean war. The aid of French arms had enabled 
 him to engage in the struggle against Austria. His 
 dream was ever the intimate relations of Italy with the ^ 
 two Powers in his eyes representing the greatest forces 
 of civilisation. 
 
 Gratitude towards France was no burden to him ; he 
 was glad to express it, as a man who stood naturally 
 above the perfidies and puerilities of party spirit, who 
 knew how to remain an ally ; independent, doubtless, 
 but an ally. 
 
 If sometimes he was not insensible to the animosities 
 levelled against him in a certain Parisian circle, his more 
 sober judgment, and I venture to say his sentiments. 
 
352 LIFE OF COUNT CAVOUR. 
 
 were not affected by them. He took his revenge without 
 bitterness. "I have no desire to speak ill of French 
 society ; I am too greatly indebted to it. I resign 
 myself to the fact of the regeneration of Italy, in spite of 
 the salons of Paris." Cavour loved our nation, which he 
 only reproached on the score of so little knowing how to 
 use or to retain liberty. He made the French alliance 
 an important basis of his policy, a permanent condition 
 for both countries ; and what may most assuredly be said 
 is, that if he had lived he would, by his counsels perhaps, 
 and a daily increasing mfluence, have succeeded in 
 givinff a different direction to events that have resulted 
 in a disaster for France. 
 
 In this passage of an age in which so many things 
 vanish, and so many others are doubtful, the last Empire, 
 it has been said, has produced two great novelties and 
 two great ministers : unity in Italy and unity in Germany; 
 Count Cavour and Prince Bismarck. I will attempt no 
 comparison where there would be more contrasts than 
 analogies. Prince Bismarck is still living, and the future 
 belongs to us all. It is now fifteen years since Cavour 
 disappeared from the scene, and for his part he has had 
 the good fortune to realise the freedom of his country 
 through liberty ; he did not make his great work a 
 menace to Europe. And in this reconstruction of a people, 
 which is now the triumph of his policy, and the legacy 
 /of a cordial and powerful genius, he did not deem it 
 ! necessary to mutilat^ 
 
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