MSi^firP's^
NATIONALITY
IN MODI'RX HISTORY
WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR
THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON I
Two vols., i8i-.
Cheap Issue, two vols, in one, Sixth Edition, 6s.
(Bell and Sons).
THE LIFE OF WILLIAM PITT
Part I, is. 6d. ; Part II, js. 6d.
Second Editions (Bell and Sons).
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN
NATIONS (1870-1914)
Fifth Edition, extended to 1914, 7s. 6d.
(Constable and Co. ).
THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC
ERA (1789-1815)
Sixth Edition, y. 6d. (Cambridge University Press).
THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR (1914)
Second Edition, is. (Cambridge University Press).
NATIONALITY
AS A FACTOR
IN M0D1:RX HISTORY
r.Y
J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D.
FELLOW OF Christ's cfoLLECE, Cambridge
READER IN MODERN HISTORY TO THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
CORRESPONDING MKMBER OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY
"Avoir fait dc j^randes choses ensemble, vouloir en
faire encore, voil.\ la condilioii csseiiticlle pour etre un
peuple." — Renan.
R 1 \' I N G J' O N S
34, KING STREET, CO VENT GARDEN
L ( ) N I ) C) N
I916
COPYRIGHT
PREFACE
Lectures I-VIII of this series were delivered at
Cambridge in the Michaelmas Term of 1915 ; and
Lectures IX and X are based on those which I de-
livered in December last to the Historical Associa-
tions at Birmingham and Bristol. My aim through-
out has been historical, namely, to study the varied
manifestations of Nationality among the chief
European peoples, before attempting to analyse or
define it. That I have sought to do in Lecture VUL
It is noteworthy that only in recent times has Nation-
ality become a conscious and definite movement.
Apart from the writings of Machiavclli, where that
instinct figures dimly, it was not (I believe) treated
by any writer before the year 1758. Then an anony-
mous Swiss brought out a book entitled " Von dem
Nationalstolze " {Of National Pride), in which he
discussed its good and bad characteristics. I have
no space in wliii li to summarize his work ; hut at
some points it breathes the spirit of Scliilier's W'ilhdni
Tell, the inner meaning of which 1 liavt- sought to
portray in Lecture III.
I began these studies several years ago, and early
in 1916 was about to complete them. Most of my
conclusions have not been modilifd by the present
vii
viii NATIONALITY
war ; but the questions discussed in the later lectures
arise out of that conflict. There, as elsewhere, I hope,
my treatment has been as objective and impartial as
present conditions admit. Lack of space has pre-
cluded a study of the lesser national movements in
Europe and of all similar movements outside of
Europe. I regret this latter omission because the
growth of Nationality in the United States and the
British Commonwealths is developing a wider and
cosmopolitan sentiment which makes for peace.
At present, however, we are confronted, by Nation-
ality of the old type ; and to pass it by with sneers
as to its being antiquated does not further the inter-
national cause. A careful study of past and present
conditions is the first requisite for success in the
construction of the healthier European polity which
ought to emerge from the present conflict ; and
criticisms of German Socialists such as will be found
in Lectures IX and X, are, I believe, necessary if
mankind is to avoid a repetition of the disastrous
blunders of July, 1914.
The sense which I attach to the words " race,"
" people," " nation," "' nationality," " nationaHsm,"
is, briefly, as follows : For the reasons stated in
Lecture VIII, I have rarely used the word " race,"
and then only as a quasi-scientific term. The word
" people " I have generally used as implying a close
sense of kinship ; " nation " as a political term,
designating a people which has attained to state
organization; "nationality" (in the concrete sense)
PRKFACE ix
as a people which has nut yet attained to it ; but
I ha\-e nearly always referred to " Nationality," in
the ideal sense, namely, as an aspiration towards
united national existence. In Lecture IX I have
used " Nationalism " to denote the intolerant and
aggressive instinct which has of late developed in
Gemiany and the Balkan States.
Mv thanks are due to Professor Bury, litt.d.,
Regius Professor of Modern History in the University
of Cambridge ; to Professor Deschamps of the
Institut superieur de Commerce of Antwerp (now
resident in Cambridge) ; to Mr. G. P. Gooch, m.a.,
formerly Scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge ; and
to Mr. A. B. Hinds, m.a., formerly Student of Christ
Church, Oxford, for their valued advice and criticism.
J. H. R.
February, 1916.
rxcE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LECTURE I
THK DAWN OF THE NATIONAL IDEA
A ^ur\cy of Europe through the centuries suggests
the question : Wiiat has made States ? — No
national State in the Aneient World — The bar-
barian invasions split up Europe into tribal areas
— Discords arising from struggles of Pope and
Emperor — Was Dante's ideal in De Monarchid
national? — Why national feeling emerged in
England and France — Unifying forces at work in
reign of Edward III — Chaucer and the English
spirit — The Hundred Years' War developed
a national spirit in France — The influence of
Jeanne d'Arc. ...... i
LECTURE II
VIVE LA NATION
TJie work of the UKjuarchy in helping on the union
of France— New spirit in 1791— " If the King
has escaped, tlic nation remains " Influence
of Rousseau on tlic (le\fIopmtiii ol French
Nationality —Its manifestations in 1789-91 —
"Sovereignty resides in the natum " - The
" federations " a consolidating force, e.g. in
Alsace - Lorraine — The uprising against the
invaders in 1792-j ; rmally it erred by excess;
hence lionapiirtisiu , . . . . 1<S
xi
xii NATIONALITY
LECTURE III
SCHILLER AND FICHTE
PAGE
German ideals in eighteenth century were rather
international than national — Kant — Germany
weak and attracted by French Revolution —
Schiller at first decried patriotism ; so, too,
Fichte, figured Europe as a Christian Common-
wealth — Schiller's Wilhelm Tell (1804) struck
the national note — Significance of its message to
Germans and Swiss — After Prussia's overthrow
by Napoleon, Fichte delivered his Addresses to
the German Nation (1807-8) — Selfishness had
ruined Germany ; a renovated nation must re-
store her — National education and its influence
on the events of 1813 ..... 35
LECTURE IV
THE SPANISH NATIONAL RISING
Differences between the German and Spanish
national movements — Aloofness of Spain and
pride of her people — Excessive confidence of
Napoleon in dealing with her — The rising of
-' May- June, 1808, and alliance with Great Britain
— Fury against him — Weakness and strength of
provincial procedure — Efforts at reform partial
and imitative — -The constitution of 1812 short-
lived—Influence of the Spanish resistance on
European developments and the fall of Napoleon 58
TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii
LECTURE V
MAZZINI AND YOUNG ITALY
PACE
Tlioutijht detcrniincs the course of action — The
Italian movement a struggle against the policy
of division and subjugation imposed in 1815 —
Italian parties: (i) Neo-Guelf, (2) Monarchist,
(3) Mazzini and Young Italy — His programme
of national unity (1831) — Charm of liis person-
ality — His faitli in Italy's mission, after the
failure of French individualism in 1789-93 —
True patriotism needful in order to attain
cosmopolitan ideals, which otherwise are un-
attainable — Mazzini failed for his day — \\"\\\
his ideals now be realized ? . . . -7^
LECTURE VI
THE AWAKENING OF THE SLAVS
The Slav character moulded by the life of the
steppes — Russia profoundl}' stirred by Napo-
leon's invasion of 1812 — Patriotism soon diverted
into reactionary channels — Friction with the
Poles — Centrifugal tendencies of the Slavs —
The South Slavs of Austria-Hungary awakened
by Napoleon — ^The Kingdom of lUyria influenced
the Serbs, who in 1815 gained large rights from
the Turks — Development of Serbia^ — The Russian
Slavoj)Jiiles and Panslavists — All Slavs excited
l)y Halkan events of 1875-6— The Hulgars and
their efforts— Ucaconslield's pro-Turkish policy
xiv NATIONALITY
PAGE
— Russia's liberating campaign of 1876-7 and
the settlement of 1878— Union of the two
Bulgarias in 1885 9^
LECTURE VII
THE GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE
Varied conceptions of the State— Ancient democracies
required very much from their citizens — So, too,
the absolute monarchies of Europe — Frederick
the Great was the Prussian State— His activities
and stern resolve— Kant's gospel of duty—
Fichte in 1804 exalted the State as furthering
KnUnr—Uis Spartan aims— In 1807-8, he as-
signed supremacy to the nation — His. successor,
Hegel, glorified the State as an absolute and all-
pervading entity (1820, 1830)— Did he confuse
it with the nation ? — Rochau in Realpolitik
(1853) affirmed: "The State is Power"—
This theme developed by Treitschke, who de-
manded the absorption of Saxony and of Alsace-
Lorraine— His State morality ; subordination
of the people to the State . . . • 115
LECTURE VIII
NATIONALITY AND MILITARISM
Necessary omissions from our studies ; but clearly
Nationahty has made Europe what it is—
Reasons for thinking that Nationahty does not
depend on race or language — Examination of
Hegel's "World-Spirit" theory — Nationality
became a moulding force in 1789— The family
TABLE OF CONTENTS xv
PACE
instinct uf the French pro\-inces made France a
nation — Reaction against her aggressions in 1808-
15 — Failures of sporadic Nationalism in 1848-9
— Successes of organized Nationalism in 1859-70
— Militarism an outcome of the national and
democratic instinct in 1792-3 — Armed democracy
(developed by Napoleon) routed the monarchs —
Militarism began again with the national policy
of Wilhclm I of Prussia in i860, and triumphed
over Austria (1866), and France (1870)— Like
Napoleon I, Kaiser Wilhclm II has misused
national forces raised originally for defensive
purposes . . . . . .141
LECTl'Rh: IX
NATIONALISM SINCI- T8S5
Nationality a great constructive force up to Septem.-
bcr, 1885, has since altered its character, witness
the fratricidal attack of Serbia on Bulgaria, the
failure of Greek aims in 1897, and racial strifes
in Macedonia — Russia's defeats in the Far East
emboldened the Central Empires, and in 1908
Austria annexed Bosnia — Support of Germany,
Bismarck's defensive alliance of 1879 with Austria
thus became aggressive— Austro-German ambi-
tions— The Pangerman and Navy Leagues pushed
the Kaiser on — Germany's charge that the
Entente I^owers " encircled " licr Cjiaiu iiiism
in Austria-Hungary, whi( h probably i)romi)te(l
Bulgaria's attack on her Allies in June, 1913- -
Signifi( an( e of the alliance of the Central ICmpires
with Turke\- and Bulgaria .... lOo
xvi NATIONALITY
LECTURE X
INTERNATIONALISM
PAGJ
Great wars have often produced efforts to mitigate
or avert tliem, e.g. those of Grotius (1625)
and of eighteenth-century thinkers — Kant in
Perpetual Peace (1795) proposed, though doubt-
fuHy, a federation of free Repubhcs — Reasons
for deprecating the supremacy of any one State
and requiring proportionate equahty — Unwise or
unreal efforts after 1815 — " Young Europe "
(1834) — Organized NationaHsm overshadowed
the Internationale, which started in 1864 — Fohy
of the Paris Communists in 1871 — Divergence
of French and Slav " Internationals " from
German, many of whom have been attracted by
the Kaiser's commercialism — Proposals of the
Internationale in 1901, 1907, 1910 — Deadlock
on Alsace-Lorraine Question (1912) — -Inaction
of German Socialists at the crisis of July-
August, 1914 — Temporary collapse of Interna-
tionalism — Reasons for hope in its revival . 18;
LECTURES OiN NATIONALITY
LECTrKK I
THE DAWN OF THE NATIONAL IDEA
It is well sometimes to do with the map of Europe at
critical periods what a painter does with his canvas, stand
away from it and view it with half-closed eyes so as to
behold only the salient features. What is the impression
produced by the Europe of the Roman Empire of 1800
years ago ? Solidity and universality are its characteris-
tics. Eight hundred years later the scene is changed to
one of chaos. The attempt of the rulers of the Holy Roman
Empire to achieve unity has failed and civilization is lost
in a medley of little domains. By slow degrees these sort
themselves out, like to like for the most part ; and by the
year 1600 the outlines of large States are clearly defined,
especially in the West of Europe. Italy and Germany are
minutely divided ; and the inroads of the Turks have
worked havoc in the South-East. Still, Europe is settling
down on a new basis ; and not even the Wars of Religion
long delay the assorting process except in Germany, The
political bioscope continues to shift until there emerge
large blocks of territory which tend to absorb the smaller
areas. TIm- NajKjleonic Wars and the series of mockrn
wars beginning in 1859 comi)lc'te this solidifying work ;
and only in the South-East of Europe do we find a great
Empire splitting up into smaller parts. Elsewhere, the
1:
2 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
contrary is the case ; and in 1878-1914 Europe consists
of solid blocks, which stoutly resist every attempt to
break them up.
To resume ; in the old Roman times Europe forms a
solid whole. In the fifth century it splits up into small
areas ; and the period of small areas and fleeting
States continues far into the Middle Ages ; but by slow
degrees these minute subdivisions lessen in number and
increase in size ; until, in the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, the map of Europe acquires a clearness and
consistency never known since the time of the old Roman
Empire. First, there is unity ; then chaos ; then an ap-
proach to simplicity and solidity.
If we inquire into the causes of these very striking
changes we come to these general conclusions : The unity
of the Roman world was due to its conquest by a single
State, which possessed a far greater military and political
efficiency than that developed by other peoples. Therefore
they were absorbed by it, until, on the break up of that
wonderful organism, there ensued utter confusion, the
natural result of unchecked racial strifes. The chaos
became semi-organic during the Middle Ages, and at their
close another influence began to operate, which grouped to-
gether the units and brought them into ever larger masses.
These masses are the modern States. Now, what has been
the influence most conducive to State-building ? That,
I hope, we shall discover in this course of lectures.
This brief survey will have shown that some mighty
influence has been at work in the modern world far different
from anything that was known to the ancients. In Europe
and on its confines there was no State that was conter-
minous with a great people. Assyria, Persia, and Egypt
held sway over several peoples alien to the ruling race ;
and the Mogul Empire was a mere conglomerate. But
THK PAWN OF THE NATIONAL IDEA 3
there was one exception, small in extent but inlnntcl}-
interesting. The Jews during some generations formed a
single compact national State. \\'ith the possible excep-
tions of China and Babylon they are the first example of a
nation in the modern sense. Their records show the rise
of the family into the tribe, of the tribe into the nation ;
and for a time the nation was lield together by a strong
instinct of kinship. The union was sanctified and strength-
ened by religious rites and by a profound sense of consecra-
tion to the Deit}-. Tims there came about a sense of unity
which held together a singularly stiff-necked, clannish
people ; and there grew up that spiritual and moral
fellowship which has survived eigliteen centuries of dis-
persion. True, the Jews did not long hold together poli-
tically. But, despite the disruptive tendencies of their
degenerate days, they remained and still remain one at
heart. The consciousness of being " the chosen people "
still unites them, whether they dwell in the mansions of
Paris and New York, or vegetate in the slums of Warsaw
and Lisbon, or practise their ancient rites in the valleys of
Abyssinia. Israel is still a moral and religious unit, inspired
by the most tenacious sense of kinship known to histor}'.
Elsewhere in the Ancient World there was no State that
can be called national, at least not in Europe. The Greeks
never achieved political union. Thrilled though they were
by their legendary epic, and inspired at times by the
worship of Zci« o Trai'tAAv/itos, they very rarely joined in
defence of their peninsula. Only when the Persians covered
the plains ol Thessaly did the Greeks make common cause ;
and then the union was brief and doubtful. For all their
scorn of other peoples as barbarians, for all their c arc in
excluding non-Greeks from the Olympian and other great
festivals, they often sided with aliens against their own
kith and kin. The patriotif apixals of Demosthenes
4 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
failed to unite them against Philip of Macedon ; and they
fell, because at bottom their political system was not
national, only municipal. City fought with city ; and
never at the supreme crisis did the City-States effectively
unite. The Greek polity stopped short at the city or the
clan. Except in regard to religion, art and athletics it
never attained to nationality. ■■■
Very different is the history of Rome. Her people,
though far less imaginative than those of Athens, possessed
the political gifts needful for the upbuilding of a Common-
wealth. Rome early absorbed other cities ; she then
absorbed the Samnites, the Greeks of South Italy and the
Gauls of the North. After unifying Italy, she went far
towards unifying the then known world. From the Clyde
to the Euphrates, from the Tagus to the Rhine, she moulded
diverse tribes and formed an almost universal State. As
Professor Reid^ has shown, she accomplished this wonderful
feat largely by the grant of wide municipal liberties,
thereby welding into her imperial system the City-States
which Greek separatism had failed to unite. Besides
tactful toleration in local affairs. Imperial Rome displayed
a peculiar attractive power which drew aliens into her
polity ; and in this faculty of assimilation lay her chief
strength. Vergil proclaimed that it was her mission to
crush the proud and spare those who submitted. The latter
process is more important than mere conquest. Indeed,
the only real conquest is that which assimilates the con-
quered. All other triumphs are vain and evanescent.
Now, Rome had this absorbing power to a unique degree.
The Jews and Greeks were exclusive and intolerant towards
^ The Amphictyonic Council was the only Pan-Hellenic institu-
tion ; but it rarely acted with vigour. Isocrates desired to unite
all Greece with Philip of Macedon for the invasion of Asia; but
Demosthenes and nearly all Athenians scouted the scheme,
2 J. S. Reid, Mttmcipaliiies in the Reman Empire.
THE DAWN OF THE NATIONAL H)EA 5
Gentiles and barbarians. Not so the Roman. He brought
the conquered within the pale ; he adopted their deities/
he enrolled their warriors and made them proud of fighting
under the eagles, until it seemed possible that tribalism
would vanish from Europe and that the world would
become Roman.
It was not to be. Oilier barbarian tribes, obeying some
unknown but potent impulse, burst into the imperial
domain ; and ci\ilization reeled back into the tribal stage
from which Rome had raised it. The political unity
of Europe vanished ; and the human race has never again
been able to realize the homogeneity attained by Imperial
Rome. During the Dark Ages the annals of mankind
became pettily local. Nevertheless, amidst those be-
wildering shiftings to and fro, racial settlements of the
utmost importance were taking place. Indeed, since the
year 1000, few ethnical clianges of any moment have
occurred, if we except the Norman settlements, the incur-
sion of the Turks and the expulsion of the Moors. With
those exceptions the groupings of the European peoples
of to-da\' are discernible at that date ; and the course of
events, especially during the last fifty years, has tended
to identify more or less closely the political frontiers with
the bounds of the habitations marked out by tlie great
European peoples during the long and obscure struggles
of the Dark Ages. As will appear in the seciuel, some
peoples, possessing greater attractive or organizing power,
have gained at the expense of others less gifted or energetic ;
but in their bnjad outlines the great States f>f t(j-day recall
thoseoftlicf liir-f sc^ltlementsconseiiiK III on t li. W.i in 1. rings
of the Pfopl.s.
How came it that the binding inlluenccs of Christianity
' Sec the complaint of Juvenal [111, (.0] :
" Jam |)ri(lc-iii Syrus in 'libcrim ik-llu.\it Orontcs."
6 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
and the haunting memories of the old Roman Empire did
not group together in a soHd poHty the barbarous tribes
that then overran Europe ? The triumph of Christianity
over paganism was swift and complete ; and even the
proudest and fiercest of the barbarians venerated Rome
and her laws. But during the Middle Ages the city which
had united the Ancient World became the source of dis-
union. The successors of St . Peter contended for supremacy
with the heirs of the Caesars, with results fatal both to the
Papacy and to the Holy Roman Empire. Institutions
which claimed a dominion as wide as Christendom were
rent by schism and faction ; and both lost in vitality
owing to the intolerable strain.
During the struggle the first glimmerings of national
consciousness become visible. In their struggle for Tem-
poral Power Hildebrand and his successors at the Vatican
could rarely rely on armed support outside Italy. The
wavering fortunes of the Empire were sustained in the
main by Germans. Yet the struggle never became
national in the modern sense. The Popes could always
range many a German duchy against its Emperor ; and
he embattled not a few Italian cities against the Vatican,
even when the Lombard League formed its sure bulwark
in the North. Thus, clashing claims of world-supremacy
were sustained by forces that were not even national ; and
to this cross division of forces, as well as of ideals, the
wretched welter of Germany and Italy in the Middle Ages
may largely be ascribed. Weltpoliiik cannot succeed unless
its foundations are both extensive and solid. Both Pope
and Emperor sought to found their polities on a basis no
less shifting than narrow.
Against this perversion of a divine mission and of a national
puty the first great political thinker of the Middle Ages
uttered a solemn protest. Dante, no less a statesman and
THE DAWN OF THE NATIONAL IDEA 7
patriot than a poet and seer, protested against the schism
to which Italy and Gemiany were a prey ; and in the course
of his protests he uttered words which foretold the future
glory of the Roman people. The challenge to action rings
through the verses in which he bewails the degradation of
his land : —
" Ah, slavish Italy ! Thou inn of griefs !
Vessel without a pilot in loud storm !
No mistress of fair provinces,
But brcTthel-house impure !
• • • • •
Ah, people ! Thou obedient still shouldst live
And in thy saddle let thy Caesar sit
If well thou markedst that which God commands."
And then he appeals to the Emperor, Albert I, to
come and claim his due : —
" Come and behold thy Kuine, who calls on thee,
Desolate widow, day and night, with moans —
' My Caesar, why dost thou desert my side ?
Come and behold what love among thy people.' "'
For these and the like utterances Dante has been dubbed
a Ghibelline. He was more Ghibellinc than Guelf ; but
in truth he was a farseeing patriot who sought to reconcile
the Empire and the Papacy, thereby assuring peace to
Italy and order to the world.
Such is the theme of his chief political work, Dc Mon-
archiii. It rests on the fundamental conception that the
world, being a thought of God, is designed for unity, the
attainment of whi( h is tlie chief aim of ni;in. Tlie human
race never acliieved political unity and peace except during
the reign of the Emperor Augustus, at the time of the birth
and life on earth of Jesus Christ. N'arious episodes of that
life (even the trial by Pontius Pilate) are cited as proofs
' Dante, J'urgntonu, Cantu \l, II. 70 ct icq.
8 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
of His recognition of the Roman Empire. Further, the
whole history of that Empire showed it to be the organism
divinely ordained for promoting unity and peace : " The
Roman people was ordained by nature to command."
There must be one such people ; and Rome by her spirit,
no less than by her exploits, proclaimed herself to be the
executant of the divine will : " Who is so dull of mind as
not by this time to see that by right of ordeal the glorious
people gained for itself the crown of the whole world ? "^
What, then, has of late lost them the crown ? Mainly, the
conflict between Pope and Emperor. The striving of the
Pope for temporal power has brought endless strife on the
people which ought to be one at heart : " O blessed people !
(Dante exclaims==) O glorious Ausonia, if only he who en-
feebled thy Empire had either ne'er been born, or ne'er been
misled by his own pious purpose." This vigorous outburst
is directed against Constantine, whose alleged donation of
the Roman domains to the Papacy was claimed as the
basis of the Temporal Power of that institution.
Thus Dante, good son of the Church though he was,
recognized her Temporal Power to be an evil, because it
introduced strife where there ought to be harmony. Let
the Pope be solely the vicar of Christ ; let the Emperor
wield the sword in the name of Christ. In no sense does
the Emperor derive his authority from the Pope." Each
derives his authority from Christ : the Pope, in order to
lead men to eternal life ; the Emperor, to lead them to
temporal felicity.
By this teaching Dante hoped to heal the strifes which
desolated Italy and Germany. The conflicting authorities
of Pope and Emperor were to merge ; then the Roman
people would once more direct human affairs. The con-
1 Dante, De Monarchid, Bk. II, chs. 7, ii.
2 Bk. II ad fin. » Bk. Ill, passim.
THE DAWX OF THE NATIONAL IDEA 9
ception is no less imaginative than statesmanlike. Pope
and Emperor (i.e. in the main, Italy and Germany) were
to work together for the welfare of mankind ; but the
guiding impulse must come from Rome, the divinely
created source of religion, statesmanship, and armed might.
In pursuance of this theme Dante sought to revive the
Holy Roman Empire, Christianizing its spirit, but keeping
the initiative always with " the holy Roman people." In
this sense, and this alone, is Dante an Italian nationalist.
To me it seems that Mazzini in his essay " On the minor
Works of Dante " read into the Dc Monarchid much of his
own perfervid nationalism. But it is true that Dante's
world-empire was to be Roman. Other peoples were to
yield up their wills and act in conformity with the tiat of
the Eternal City. This doctrine is not Italian nationalism,
very far from it. It is a flash of the old Roman Imperialism
focussed in a Christian lens. But here we find the source
of the inextinguishable faith in Rome which nerved many
Italian patriots, even when, like Mazzini, they rejected
Roman clericalism.
Dante, by ascribing a divine mission to the Roman
people, exerted on the fourteenth century an influence not
unlike that of the patriotic priest, Gioberti, on the mid-
nineteenth century. Each declared the Romans and their
descendants to be a chosen people, marked out by special
gifts and consecrated by divine decree. When people
believe that, they can never be wholly enslaved. They have
taken the first difficult step which leads, it may be through
ages of torture and despair, towards political independence.
In this sense Dante was the father of Italian nationalism.
In one other respect Dante uplifted his people to an
incalculable extent, lb taught them to wing their thoughts
t(j the liigh<st ecstasies in tlicir mother-tongue. He
delibcratelv chose to \nn\\- fnith tlir holiest and most
10 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
thrilling thoughts in the vernacular. Leaving other scholars
to stalk on Latin stilts, he strode forth easily but majes-
tically, using the language of the streets of Florence. He
defended his choice in the work De Vulgari Eloquentid ,
which is the first conscious effort at nationalizing literature.
Other poets, notably Fazio degli Uberti [circa 1370),
wrote canzoni more directly inspired by the national idea.
But the instinct of the Itahan people singles out Dante
as the source of the Italian spirit. In the year 1844
Mazzini thus wrote of the mediaeval seer : —
" The splendour of no other genius has been able to eclipse
or dim the grandeur of Dante ; never has there been a dark-
ness so profound that it could conceal this star of promise
from Italian eyes. . . . As if there had been a compact, an
interchange of secret life between the nation and its poet, even
the common people, who cannot read, know and revere his
sacred name. The mountaineers of Tolmino, near Udine,
tell the travellers that there is the grotto where Dante wrote
— there the stone upon which he used to sit ; yet a little
while, and the country will inscribe on the base of his statue —
' The Italian nation to the memory of its Prophet.' "
Yes : Italy has become a nation, and she owes her
nationhood no less to the thrilling words of her seers than
to the bravery of her soldiers. As will appear in the sequel,
her union is due very largely to the thrilling thoughts of
her gifted sons. Indeed, the unique interest attaching to
the Italian movement is due to the inspiration which it
drew from the noblest natures and thence spread through
the masses. Italian nationality is no mechanical product,
the result of warlike pressure from without, as was else-
where often the case. It is rather a soul-politic than a
body-politic.
But if the genius of Dante inspired the leaders of thought
in Italy, he did not and could not inaugurate a trul}'
national feeling. The times were not ripe for that.
THE DAWX OF THE NATIONAL IDEA il
Lawgivers, statesmen, warriors, even inventors and
mechanics, had to play their several parts before the com-
mon people in remote provinces could come into touch
and feel the consciousness of a common life. As a rule,
such an awakening is due to forces that compel a people
to fall back on its reserves of strength ; and these forces
act most potently in time of war. It is probable that Italy
and Germany would have arrayed themselves in conscious
hostility but for the cross currents that swept across them,
diverting their fortunes into side channels and many con-
fusing eddies.
As it was, the national issue was first definitely posed
between the Western peoples. Of these the Spaniards were
almost wholly immersed in the internecine struggle with
the Moors, from the long agony of which there emerged
the fierce ballads of the Cid as a promise of many a deed
of fanatical heroism in the more prosperous future. But
France and England learnt to know themselves during
the earliest of the great national struggles, the Hundred
Years' War. The combatants were well matched. What
England lacked in ])ulk she made up in the excellent
organization of the monarchy bequeathed by William I
and Henry II to the three Edwards. The French, superior
in numbers, were weakened by feudal divisions and the
strifes of the great nobles. Neither State, however, was
nmch distracted by papal or other external claims ; and
thus a dispute arising (jut of Plantagenet ambition de-
veloped into a trial of strength between two warlike
peoples.
To trail- in detail the growtli nt Englisli ;iii(l I'ltiuh
national feehng during the course ot this long struggle is
an impossible task. Limiting ourselves for the present
to the islanders, we may note that the loss of Normandy,
unitv of law and administration, and the intluence of lirm
12 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
government under Henry II and Edward I, had prepared the
way for a union of hearts between Norman and Saxon ; but
that union was cemented on the fields of Crecy and Poitiers.
Fighting side by side against great odds, Norman knight
and Saxon archer forgot their old feuds and merged their
racial differences in the pride of Englishry. Thenceforth
signs abound of the victorious sweep of the new insular
sentiment. In 1362 proceedings in the Law Courts were
ordered to be conducted in English ; and in the following
year our mother-tongue gained its Poitiers, when Edward
III opened Parliament in a speech delivered in the ver-
nacular.
The union of Norman energy and Anglo-Saxon stubborn-
ness in a single type is an event of unique importance. For
when two or more hostile or jealous races coalesce, the
result is a notable increase of mental vigour as well as of
physical force. In England the reigns of Edward III,
Elizabeth, James I and Anne are remarkable for the
broadening of national life and also for literary triumphs
which express the fuller vitality of the time. A similar
access of martial and literary energy marks the complete
union of Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella, and that of
France under Louis XIV. These and other cases reveal
the connection that exists between politics and culture.
Enlarge the outlook of peoples previously cramped and
you quicken all their faculties. The result is frequently
seen in an outburst of song, as happens with birds at mating
time. It was so in England. The age of the Black Prince
was also the age of Chaucer, Langland, and Wycliffe. The
dawn of English nationality coincided with the dawn of a
truly English literature.
There was something in the air as well as in Chaucer's
genius which prompted him to write in English. French
in ancestry, courtier by choice, and thereby condemned
TIIF DAWN OF TTIK XATKA'AL IDEA 13
to speak mainly in French, he chose to write in the tongue
of the street and mart. Moreover, not only the language,
but the spirit of his chief work is thoroughly English. In
their origin most of the " Canterbury Talcs " are Italian,
or, in a few cases, French ; but Chaucer's presentment is
thoroughly insular. The plot and the setting of the Tales
are aggressively Cockney or Kentish. Through Mine Host
the poet chaffs those of the company who prefer to mangle
the French language rather than speak their own. As for
the characters, they are such as might be found to-day at
a village penny-reading. Perhaps it was Chaucer's cap-
tivity in France which sharpened his insular patriotism ;
for no experience can be more nationalizing than a time
spent as prisoner of war. Whatever the cause, Chaucer
was a thorough Englishman. I think that we know him
as well as, and perhaps lo\-e him better than, most men of
our acquaintance.
The writing of charming poems in what had before been
a despised vernacular is a landmark in the national life.
A people cannot attain to its full powers until its thoughts
and aspirations are wedded to the mother-tongue, until
tliat mother-tongue ceases to growl or stammer, or learns
to sing. The difference in the life of the folk resembles
that which comes during the growth of a youth, say,
between fifteen and eighteen. The boy of fifteen is tongue-
tied, awkward, perhaps a mere hobbledehoy. The youth
of eighteen is a different being ; he has felt the first thoughts
of love ; he has, perhaps, spoken them forth ; he has
become vocal. Possibly, too, those feelings are accom-
panied by others much the reverse towards an individual
of his own sex. If so, he knows what jealousy or hatred is.
In short, he has begun to know himself. That delicious
time of life lias its counterpart in the experience of a people.
A crisis comes wliich sets the blood tingling and calls forth
14 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
energies and aspirations hitherto latent. That is what
happened to us at the beginning of the Hundred Years'
War. The Black Prince, Chaucer, Wycliffe are the first
complete manifestations of the native spirit. An indefin-
able energy, vigour, and splendour radiates forth from our
people at that time, as it does from all peoples in the hey-
day of ripening manhood. So brilliant are the exploits of
the Black Prince that Froissart regards England as the
chosen abode of chivalry. Chaucer awakens her brain
and her sense of beauty. Wycliffe speaks to her soul. On
all sides of her being the nation is awake. It was a keen
historic sense which led Shakespeare to place in the mouth
of men of that age the loftiest of patriotic paeans. Old John
of Gaunt sings his swan-song in praise of England : —
" This royal throne of Kings, this sceptred isle.
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
This other Eden, demi-paradise,
This fortress built by Nature for herself
Against infection and the hand of war,
This happy breed of men, this little world,
This precious stone set in the silver sea."
And Bolingbroke, on departing for banishment : —
" Then England's ground, farewell ; sweet soil, adieu ;
My mother and my nurse, that bears me yet !
Where'er I wander, boast of this I can,
Though banish'd, yet a true-born Englishman. "»
The clash of war, which first made England know herself,
also summoned to conscious life the French nation. There
again forces were at w^ork, some promoting, others re-
tarding, national unity. The centripetal influences were
pride in the old Roman heritage, and the community of
language and culture which it bequeathed ; also the work
» Richard II, Act I, Sc. 3 ; Act II, Sc. i.
THE DAWX OF THE NATIONAL IDEA 15
of tlie clergv, the effects of the Crusades, ami tlic efforts
of the stronger inonarchs to promote uniformity in law
and the administration. Of the centrifugal influences the
chief were of Frankish origin, the instinct to follow the
chief rather than the King, whidi divided the realm
amongst rival and greedy feudatories, each a law to himself
and the source of law to his vassals. The Kings, allied
with the Gallic populace, were waging a doubtful conquest
with the Teutonic and feudal elements, when there hurst
upon this divided roalm the Hundred Years' War. The
natural result was the triumph of the invaders, under
whose blows all that was left of the French dominions
began to solidify. The one possible rallying point,
the monarchy, gradually gained ground over rebellious
feudatories ; but, owing to the contemptible weakness
of Charles VII, the struggle was still going against France,
when the most remarkable figure of the late Middle Ages
arose to vivify her people and confound their enemies.
Jeanne d'Arc left her sheep at Domremy and came to drive
forth the invaders. Her resolve to do battle against the
English until Charles be crowned at Rheims was the more
remarkable because legally she was not a Frenchwoman.
She was born and lived in the Burgundian part of that
border village. But in her meditations in the woods the
high-souled maiden heard angelic voices that bade her
" go into France " ; and we may question whether with the
religious impulse were not mingled the promptings of that
national sentiment which has often Sj)okcn forth in the
moving tones of a woman. The Baraks of a great crisis
have rarely lacked their Deborahs ; and a cause that
deeply stirs woman's nature is on llu' road to triuiiij)h.
Certain it is that the advent of Jeanne d'An meant in-
finitely much to the French ; for it heartened them and
bewildered their enemies ; and this, not onl}- f(jr super-
i6 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
stitious reasons, but also because Jeanne was France
personified. No figure in history has more fully typified
a nation ; and when a nation sees itself thus incarnate its
powers are doubled.
From our present point of view it matters little that she
was captured, was deserted by the French and barbarously
burnt by the English. Those actions belong to the super-
stition and cruelty of the time. What belongs to all
time is the saintly heroic influence that radiated from her
and passed into the heart of her people. While Charles VII
was trimming his sails to every breeze she uttered words
instinct with patriotic wisdom : "As to the peace with the
English, the only one possible is that they should go back
to their country in England." That is the national ideal,
for the first time clearly defined. The French are one
people and must possess the whole of France. There will
be no peace while the islanders hold down part of France.
The thought is very simple. It is the inspired common
sense of a peasant girl gifted with vision. How much misery
would mankind have been spared from that time to this
if rulers and warriors had realized the truth, that every
civilized nation, when thoroughly awakened to conscious
life, must control its own destinies and will not long submit
to be held down by another people. — " Let each nation be
content with its natural boundaries, and not seize the lands
of its equally civilized neighbours." How simple ! And
yet the nation which claims to be at the summit of civiliza-
tion has, even now, not learnt that rudimentary lesson in
the doctrine of nationality.
Notice, too, these words of Jeanne after her capture :
" I know well that these English will kill me, because they
hope, after my death, to gain the Kingdom of France.
But, were there 100,000 more of them, they shall conquer
it never, never." There spoke forth clearly for the first
THE DAWN OF Tlir XATK^NAL IDEA 17
time the soul of France, unconquerable in the fifteenth
century- as in the twentieth century.
The head typifying France on tlu' coins of the lirst
Republic was that of a beautiful actress who became
transiently famous during the Terror. Certainly, the
French genius is best personified by a beautiful, high-
spirited woman. But when 1 think of France I always see
the Maid of Orleans.
Italy — not merely the Italy of to-day, but of seven
centuries — seems to resolve herself into the figure of
Beatrice ; or, in her many tragic phases, to be transformed
into the sad yet serene features of Dante.
The English people, surely, are not well represented by
the conventional Britannia. Their character, ruggedly
insular yet widely adaptable, and marked by a maturity
that does not age, is perhaps best typified by the genial
humanism of the countenance of Chaucer or of Shakespeare.
The time is not j'et ripe for limning the features of our
enemies ; and Russia is still somewhat of a sphinx, liut
that every nation has a distinct personality, who can
doubt ?
LECTURE II
VIVE LA NATION
" La nation, c'est vous ; la loi, c'est encore vous, c'est votre
volonte ; le roi, c'est le gardien de la loi." — Adresse de rAssembUe
nationale au Peuple franpais, Feb. ii, 1790-
In the last lecture we found reasons for regarding Dante,
Chaucer, and Jeanne d'Arc as the first exponents of the
national ideal for their several peoples. But it is very
doubtful whether that ideal was visible to the people at
large, except in the chief crises of war. At such a time
every man and woman who could think felt deep hatred
of the foreign invader ; and in this sense of repulsion for
the foreigner nationahsm of the cruder sort doubtless had
its rise. Idealized though it might be by the loftier minds,
yet in its lower forms it was little more than dislike of the
aggressive stranger. This feeling it was which ranged
French and English against one another in almost solid
phalanxes.
But the cross currents, which we have noticed as con-
fusing the issues in mediaeval Germany and Italy, soon
began to sweep across England and France. Both lands
fell a prey to civil strifes which nearly effaced the nascent
sense of unity. England, whose polity had far excelled that
of other peoples, was soon distracted by religious and
constitutional disputes lasting through most of the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries. In that period the
Elizabethan Era stands out as a smiling oasis ; for then,
id
VIVE LA NATION iq
during a brief space, England was almost one at heart ;
and the Spanish menace united Englishmen of all creeds
in defence of their homes and liberties. That danger past,
the island realm was again rent by schisms which the follies
and perversity of the Stuarts prolonged until the Settle-
ment of i(kS8. Consequently, English patriotism did not
fully emerge until the times of Marlborough and the two
Pitts.
The fortunes of the French were not very dissimilar.
After monarchy brought them within sight of political
union there fell on them the Wars of Religion. The
exhaustion of the people and the statecraft of Richelieu
and Mazarin finally brought about internal peace, but at
the expense of popular liberties ; and the reigns of Louis
XIII and XI\', which consummated the external union
of the French provinces, left the people themselves unfree
and exhausted. This state of things (not unlike that of
the English under Henry VIII) is unfavourable to the
growth of patriotism, a virtue whose highest manifestation
needs a large measure of civic freedom and an abounding
vitality. The French provinces, brought together by
Louis XI\'. resembled a new plantation of shrubs in time
of drought. They were sapless; their leaves drooped;
they were starved by the royal oak hard by. " L'Etat,
c'est moi," exclaimed the monarch ; and it was true during
his reign, when patriotism centred in the person of the
King. A political catechism, drawn up for the training
of his grandson, the Duke of Burgundy, stated that the
King represented the entire nation, which had no corporate
existence apart from him.' TJiat was correct. During
the long interregnum of the States General (1614-1789)
the only bond of union was the royal administration ;
' " I-.i natirm n«- fait i)as corps en France ; elle ri-side lout
rnti^re dans la pcrwinno Mii mi."
20 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
and the edicts of the Royal Council of Ministers
formed at best only a partial protection against feudal
injustice and provincial inequalities. The people cried
out for efhcient government, which could come only with
a close and effective union of all classes and provinces.
Their cry finds expression in many of the cahiers, or writs
of grievances, drawn up in the spring of 1789. The Com-
mons of Beauvais demand — " an invariable rule in all
parts of the public administration and public order, that
is to say, a constitution. ... It is because France has
never had one that her administration has been subject
to ceaseless changes and she herself has been in danger."
So again a village near Metz writes : " May all your
subjects. Sire, be made truly French by the Government,
as they already are by the love which they feel for their
King." Again : " Your peoples seek refuge at the foot
of your throne and come to seek in you their tutelary
deity."!
These and many other similar assertions prove that
France had no constitution (though Burke denied it) and
that she fervently desired to achieve in the sphere of law
and administration the national unity of which she was by
this time conscious. That Louis XVI should make her
effectively a nation was at first the desire of all ; and even
when he egregiously failed, and the National Assembly
seized the reins from his nerveless hands, the old instinct
of regarding the King as the keystone of the national arch
for a long time survived. At the news of his flight towards
the eastern frontier at midsummer, 1791, the dismay of
very many Frenchmen almost resembled that which fell
on the Peruvians when Pizarro and his handful of despera-
does seized the sacred person of the Inca. Such were the
! Archives parlementaires, III, 299 ; VI, 24, 31S. See too Sorel,
J^' Europe et la Revolution franfaise, I, p. 187.
\IV]-: LA NATION 21
feelings of an official in a French village, who, on learning
that Louis X\I had fled, exclaimed to a better educated
acquaintance : " Alas ! What shall we do ? The King
has escaped." The nascent consciousness of the new age
flashed forth in the reply: "Well! If the King has
escaped, the nation remains. Let us consider what to do."
France did consider ; and, after a time of compromise and
hesitation, she decided that the only thing to do with a
King who desired to run away was to dethrone him.
Tliereafter the idea of the nation was paramount ; and,
despite the triumph of reaction in and after 1815, it has
been paramount ever since.
The delay of the French in abolishing the old monarchy
is somewhat surprising, if we remember the ardour with
which their leading thinkers had adopted the political
theories of Rousseau. The reader who peruses his chief
work, Lc Contral Social (1762), may not at first perceive
the importance of the national idea. But that idea is
fundamental to his whole treatise. The dominant notion
of the work is of a contract or compact by which men,
when emerging from savagery, form themselves into a
civil society. Rousseau, with the eye of faith, beholds
them frame an agreement as free men and equals ; and by
this mystic contract, which may or may not have actually
happened, they become citizens and fonn a State. It
matters not (says Rousseau) that the existence of the social
contract cannot be proved. He takes it for granted, and
so do all his f(jllowers.
Now, this explanation ol the rise ol civil societ}', though
it is altogether fanciful, lias exercised a potent influence.
It lies at the root of the early Socialism ; and it also helped
«)n the national idea. Take this statement of Ivousscau :
" Before examining the act by which a nation elects a
King, it would be fitting to examine the act by which a
22 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
nation becomes a nation." ^ That act is the social contract,
which he then examines. When the union takes place,
the result is a body politic, a respuhlica. Men who before
were separate units are now citizens. He temis their
association in its passive aspect a State (a use of the term
which is open to grave objections). But he applies the
term " sovereign " to the body politic when it is active.
Thus, according to him, the whole body of citizens, when
at rest, forms the State ;- when it makes laws it is " the
sovereign." For purposes of convenience or efficiency it
may choose a man from one family to become ruler ; but
his powers always remain subordinate to the real sovereign,
the people.^
Again, when they have decided on a law or any course
of action, their will is final. The " general will," as he calls
it, is the ultimate court of appeal. He declares it to be
inalienable, indivisible, impeccable. Before this quint-
essence of negations all other authority, especially that of
the Church and of privileged Orders, must bow down, so
that there may be no divisions in the body politic. It must
be compact in order to be supreme ; and that supremacy
must have no limits. The newly formed nation may make
use of a legislator to draw up laws ; but even then its
authority is dominant.
Now, in this sweeping claim we have the foundation,
not only of modern democracy, but also of nationality in
a complete and conscious sense. The influence exerted
by Rousseau on the development of the national idea has
^ Contrat Social, Bk. I, ch. 5.
2 Again, Bk. II, ch. 10 : " It is the men that constitute the
State."
^ Dante, in the De Monarchid, proclaimed this truth : " For
citizens do not exist for the Consuls, nor the nation for the King ;
but, on the contrary, the Consuls for the citizens, the King for the
nation."
\1VE LA NATION 23
not, I think, been sufficiently emphasized. Every student
knows that Lc Coniral Social is the source of French
democratic notions ; but that work is equally the fountain-
head of modern nationalism. Before Rousseau, writers on
government and law had been comparatively little influenced
by the idea of the nation. Montesquieu, writing only some
fourteen years before Rousseau, scarcely mentions the
nation. He sometimes seems to feel his way towards that
idea as influencing the character of laws ; but only in that
particular. It was reserved for Rousseau to set forth the
national idea with a force and cogency which opened up a
new era both in thought and deed.
The Swiss thinker not only gave birth to the idea of the
nation, but he endowed it with the strength of an infant
Hercules. The French people could scarcely have achieved
the miracles of the new age had they not been doubly
inspired. The notion of liberty, doubtless, was the chief
impulse urging them forward ; but with it there then
worked the powerful feeling of nationalit}'. For the first
time in their history all Frenchmen realized their essential
oneness. That is a unique occasion in the life of a people.
We know what it meant from our experience in August,
191 4. Then, for the first time in our history, the peoples
of the whole of the British Empire were enthusiastically
of one mind ; and the mighty unison was not marred,
only emphasized, by a few thin discordant pipings. Much
the same was it in the France of 1789. Resolute in her
quest for liberty, she was nerved by the consciousness tliat
practically all her children were one at heart. Froni the
cramped sphere of provincialism they rose by one bound
to the far loftier plateau of nationality. There they
breathed the pure air of freedom and were exhilarated by
contact with others whom they liad deemed half foreigners
and now found U) be Frenchmen. The results of this
^4 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
double inspiration were portentous. Relatively to the
still torpid peoples of the Continent, the Frenchman of
the Revolution was a superman.
After that brief time of exhilaration, which inspired
Wordsv/orth and Coleridge with some of their best work,
the then allied ideas of liberty and nationality were
destined soon to come into collision, with results disastrous
to the cause of progress. We who are living amidst a cata-
clysm such as the world has never known can realize the
extent of the disaster ; and we find it difficult to understand
the buoyancy of heart, the vigour in action, of the year
1789, when the two powerful principles, Liberty and
Nationality, pulled together. Then the human race
experienced the spring tide of achievement. May it be
the lot of us, who now toil through the dead time of the
neap tides, to be borne ahead once again on that bounding
flood !
The dominance of the national idea in the early part
of the French Revolution is obvious at many points.
Very significant is the title assumed by the Tiers Etat
(Commons) of the States General, That body, hitherto
divided into three distinct Orders, had not met during
175 years : and the Commons desired to break with the
past. After long deliberations as to various cumbrous
titles that had been proposed, an obscure member called
out : " Assctnhlcc nationale." " Yes, yes," they all cried ;
and the motion was carried, despite the grave fears of
Mirabeau and others, who foresaw its destructive effect
on the monarchy. The name, indeed, recalled the ambi-
tious claim of Sieyes in his pamphlet Qu'est~ce quele Tiers
Etat ? that the Commons formed the nation ; the Commons
(said he) furnish all the productive classes, from professors
to lacqueys ; therefore they are the nation. This term he
defined thus : " a body of associates living under a common
VIVE 1 A NATION 25
law and represented by a single legislature." The definition
is utterly defective because mechanical ; it would include
such cases as the peoples of the old Holy Roman Empire,
or of the Indian Empire of to-day where there is no real
unity of sentiment. But this cold, mechanical definition
inspirited the deputies of France to seek for a single
legislature ; and so what had been merely the unprivileged
Order of the ancient States General became the National
Assembly, the organ of the general will (June 17, 1789).
In vain did Louis X\'I seek to force the deputies back into
the three distinct Orders. In vain did he declare that if
they could not agree, he alone would effect the welfare of
h\s peoples. He spoke the language of the past. No longer
were they diverse peoples sheltered by his care. The
thinking part of France now realized that the nation
existed apart from him. Such, too, was the significance
of the famous Tennis Court Oath of June 20, when the
deputies, without a single reference to the King, swore
never to part until they had made a constitution.
The consequences of this change of outlook were
momentous. Even in the first and very moderate draft
of the Rights of Man, which Mounicr presented to the
National Assembly on July 27, there is this significant
clause : " The principle of com})lete sovereignty resides
essentially in the nation. No corporation, no individual,
can exercise authority whi( h dues not emanate expressly
from it."
The essence ol the Revoluticm lies in those wonls. Ihey
enthrone the nation and tlethrone the King of France.
Thenceforth he becomes " the hereditary representative,"
as he is f)ftfn termed ; wliilr ;ill pnhhi bodies ;ire subjecteil
III the nation. Tin' Roman Catliolii ( liur( h is fori I'd to
acknowledge the supremacy (jf the State ; and the abolition
of all bodies, like the olil I'arlcmcnts, which contest that
26 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
supremacy, is a foregone conclusion. With the Parlements
vanish the Provinces and all their local exemptions and
rights. From Brittany to Provence, from French Flanders
to Spanish Roussillon, there is a clean sweep of all the local
privileges which had fettered the action of the old mon-
archy ; and in the spring of 1790 France stood forth
united, unshackled, as she never had been. Against
myriads of local or social abuses which had defied the
absolute monarchy, the nation forthwith prevailed. Some
of its early champions sought to moderate its zeal. Among
them, Mounier endeavoured to arouse the local feeling of
Dauphine, where he and the provincial Estates had
exercised a paramount influence. But now throughout
France there was but one cry : " We are not provincials ;
we are Frenchmen " ; and before the cry " Vive la
Nation " down went all the walls of privilege and local
custom.
The resistance which Mounier offered in Dauphine served
to inaugurate those federations of towns and villages
which helped on the levelling process. The first of these
unions of citizens with those of neighbouring towns took
place at Etoile on the Rhone, in Dauphine, in November,
1789. There the townsfolk and peasants assembled, some
12,000 strong, fully armed as National Guards, and took
the following oath : " We, soldier-citizens of both banks of
the Rhone, fraternally assembled for the public welfare,
swear before high heaven, on our hearts and on our weapons
devoted to the defence of the State, that we will remain for
ever united. Abjuring every distinction of our provinces
[Languedoc and Dauphine], offering our arms and our
wealth to the fatherland, for the support of the laws which
come from the National Assembly, we swear to give all
possible succour to each other to fulfil these sacred duties,
and to fly to the help of our brothers of Paris, or of any town
VIVE I. A XATIOX 27
of France which may be in danger, in the cause of Hberty."'
This episode is of high significance. It sounded forth the
call to national unity on behalf of the peasants and small
traders ; and, throughout the next eight months, similar
federations of districts or Departments helped to abolish
provincialism. The climax was reached in the national
Festival of Federation, held in the Champ dc Mars on
July 14, 1790. A spectator, the denationalized Gcnnan
baron, " Anacharsis " Clootz, pointed the moral of the
episode by a reference to the mass meetings of Celtic and
Frankish warriors yearly held on that spot : "It carries
you back two thousand years by an indefinable tone of
antiquity : it carries j'ou forward two thousand years by
the rapid progress of reason, of which this federation is the
precocious and delectable foretaste." Certainly these
federations helped to brand on the French the feeling of
indissoluble oneness. It is easy to pass a law for political
union ; it is a far more dilTicult thing to secure a union of
hearts. Our Union with Ireland in 1801 is an example of
the former ; the French Departmental System of 1790
achieved the latter, because the people themselves at once
registered the edict of their legislators. Thenceforth Celtic
Brittany, the half-Flemish north, the half-Spanish Rous-
sillon, and almost wholly German Alsace threw in their
lot for ever with France.
Yes, for ever. This present war is in part the outcome of
this resolve of Alsace and North-east Lorraine to be French,
not German. Whether Germany might not have won over
the Alsacians if her treatment had been less brutal is an
open ({uestitiu. But the outcome is that Alsace has never
been Germanized, and that a province, which is almost
entirely Teutonic by race, is still iilmost entirely Freni h
at heart. It was the magical intluciicc of the great idea
' lltst. parUmentairc, IV, p. j.
28 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
incarnate in the France of the Revolution which won that
heart for the French nation.
One of the distinctive features of those federations of
1790 was the exaltation of law. It is rather difficult in
England to imagine rustics and small shopkeepers assem-
bling in tens of thousands for the glorification of law.
Generally, when they assemble in large numbers it is for
the opposite purpose. But, when one remembers that in
France the old feudal and royal edicts had been the de-
tested decrees of a class or of a domain, one can see why
the populace hailed the dawn of a regime of truly national
law. For by 1790 law was the same for all classes. It had
swept away the distinctive Orders. It had abolished the
old game laws, corvees, gabelles, and other means of
oppression ; and recently it had mapped out France in
Departments and smaller self-governing areas, with nearly
4,300,000 " active " citizens, to whom fell the duty of
electing all the officials. Thus, law had become what
Rousseau had declared it ought to be, the expression of
the general will. Therefore it occupied a place in the new
political trinity. " The Nation, the King, the Law," such
were the sacred entities in the new Order. — -The Nation,
the source of all political energy ; the King, merely its first
officer ; the Law, its channel.
Every feeling that makes the heart of man beat high
conspired to make those federations scenes of inspiration
and strength. They were the social contracts of the young
democracy. Imagine in the square of the town or village
an altar of green sods erected to la patrie ; the patriarch
of the village, or else the cure, administers the patriotic
oath ; children dressed in white are taught what it means ;
and tlie day ends in dances and merry-making. At one
village in the Cevennes, where religious passions previously
ran high, the cure and the Protestant pastor meet and
VIVE LA NATION 29
embrace at the national altar ; then tlie Roman Catholics
conduct the Protestants to church and listen to the pastor's
address ; next the Protestants conduct the others to their
church and hear thr words of the cure.
On other federative groups there descended the genius
of patriotic doggerel. We read of one occasion when the
cure composed verses on the spot and also chanted a Hymn
to Liberty ; whereupon the mayor felt moved to reply
in stanzas, the purport of which was undiscoverable.
Worthy folk ! You typify French patriotism at its loftiest
pitch. Did fate permit 3'ou to see the ghastl}^ sequel ?
In view of all the scenes that followed, it is not surprising
that Thomas Carlyle poured a douche of his cold northern
sarcasm on all that southern demonstrativeness. But,
after all, were those federation festivals merely " miglit>'
fireworks " or a " grand theatricality " ? Surely they were
something far deeper than that. The sensitive, impres-
sionable Gauls need to visualize their political creed ; and
they hold it all the more strongly for having exulted
about it.
The strength of the national instinct appeared in grim
guise when war broke out between France and the German
Powers. The causes of that war do not concern us here.
What concerns us is that it was a measuring of strength
between an anned nation on the one side and two artificial
though well-disciplined States on the other. The French
Revolutionists had no doubt as to the issue. Ill anned and
drilled though they were, they believed in their power to
overcome the professional ariuies drilKd in the school of
Eugene and Frederick. Brissot, the bellicose wire-puller of
the Girondin group, desired to disguise some French soldiers
near the frontier as Austrians to sack and burn French
villages in order to hurry on the rupture; ami on a far higher
plane, Vergniaud, the great Girondin orator, appealed to
30 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
the National Assembly to commence a crusade which would
liberate other peoples still unfree. Even so moderate a
thinker as the Swiss publicist, Mallet du Pan, prophesied
in the Mercure de France, in Januar}/, 1792, that Austria
and Prussia would be defeated unless they could emblazon
on their banners the device, " the Charter of the Nations " ;
for that alone could fitly oppose the watchword on the
lips of the hosts of France, " The Rights of Man."i Of
course, the German Powers did not adopt Mallet's advice.
Brunswick's manifesto, issued at Coblentz in deference to
the emigres, laid stress on the restoration of royalty in
France and the punishment of all rebels.
This was the first of the many blunders of the German
Allies in 1792-3. From the outset they exasperated French
national feeling, when their aim should have been to
separate the moderates from the extreme Jacobins then
in power at Paris. They ruined the French monarchy
which they came to rescue ; for they identified the cause
of royalty with that of the invaders who were coming to
partition France.
After the fall of the French monarchy, in August, 1792,
the national idea acquired a force never known before.
Previously it had been confused by the lingering sense of
devotion to the King and Queen. But after the over-
throw of the monarchy the issue was clear. French
democracy and nationality were ranged against the German
invaders and royalism ; and the French were compelled
to put forth all their strength and energy. In August and
September, 1792, they had practically no Government ;
the exchequer was empty ; credit had vanished ; and the
armies were for a time leaderless. But it is in such straits
that patriotism becomes a burning force that shrivels up
quibbling factions and kindles boundless energy. Only
^ Mallet du Pan, Mems., I, 249.
\'n'E LA XATTOX 31
when a nation is stripped of all external aids and is faced
with absolute ruin does it discover its reserves of strength.
If they are utilized in time it may encounter defeats, but
it will not pcrisli. The spirit wliich then nerved France
is finely expressed in the appeal of the young poet, Andre
Chenier : " All ye who have a fatherland and know what
it means ; ye for whom the words ' to live free or die '
mean something ; ye who have wives, children, parents,
friends for whom ye would conquer or die — how long shall
we speak of our liberty ? . . . Come forth. Let the nation
appear."
It did appear — an armed nation. Service in tlie National
Guards had, from tlie beginning of the Revolution, been
one of the recognized duties of citizenship. No definite
decree declared it to be either universal or compulsory ;
but the Constitution of 1791 laid it down that all " active
citizens" were National Guards. The National Guards
were merely citizens called to uphold the force of tlie
State. For tlie present they did not form an organized
force.' They therefore held a rather indefinite position.
In principle every citizen was a soldier ; only he was not
drilled. Probably this vague state of things resulted
from the conflict f)f opinion which had broken out in the
National Assembly during the debates of December, 1789,
on military service. Dubois-Crance, a strong democrat,
insisted on universal service : " I tell you that in a nation
which desires to be free, which is surrounded by powerful
neighbours and harassed by factions, every citizen ouglit
to be a soldier, and every soldier a citizen, if France is not
to be utterly annihilated. . . . How is it possible to make
a man march forth to battle whose indolence has driven
tiiiii into the ranks . . . who in fact has sold his liberty
for a price, side by side with the man who lias taken
' Constitution oj 1791, 1 li. \ , § .|.
32 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
up arms to defend liberty ? ... It is necessary to establish
a truly national conscription, which should include every
one from the second man in the Kingdom down to the last
active citizen." The Due de Liancourt, Mirabeau, and
others resisted this proposal as contrary to the principles
of liberty and of the Rights of Man, besides being preju-
dicial to a complex industrial society ; and the Assembly
decided in favour of voluntary enlistment for the regular
army ; but it did not impose any rule respecting the
National Guards. ^
When war seemed imminent in the early part of 1792
many thousands of National Guards volunteered for service
at the front to fill up the gaps in the regular army caused
by desertion. Consequently the armed forces of France
were in a chaotic state at the beginning of the war with the
Gennan Powers. Great efforts were made in July, 1792,
to attract more volunteers. The alarm gun on the Pont
Neuf was fired once an hour. Bands paraded the streets.
Speeches were delivered at the recruiting tents ; and
thousands of patriotic youths at once enlisted. If we may
credit the very critical estimate of von Sybel, these efforts
produced little result. He says that only 60,000 recruits
were forthcoming between July 11 and September 20.
It is also well known that the French success at Valmy
was decided by the steadiness of the troops of the old royal
army, and still more by the timidity of the Duke of Bruns-
wick, who never pressed home his attack.
All this may be granted ; and the admissions somewhat
dim the glamour of those days. Yet it is undeniable that
the enthusiasm which the volunteers brought to the front
was a weighty factor in determining the issue on the hill
^ Jung, Dubois-Crance, I, pp. 16-28, quoted by Morse Stephens,
French Rev., I, 383 ; Proces Verbanx de I'Assemhlee Nafionale, IX,
X, Dec. 12 and 16,
WW. \.\ NATIOX 33
of Valniy. All the life and energy were on the side of the
French. Experience and mechanical discipline Nvere ranged
under the banners of Prussia ; and in tlie few moments
when the issue seemed dttubtful the mighty shout of " \ive
la Nation " rooted the Frt-nch to the earth and carried
doubt and dismay to the hearts of the invaders. Well
might Goethe, who was present at the German head-
quarters, declare that that day inaugurated a new epoch
in the history- of the world. That was true. It inaugurated
the era of militant democracy.
Subsequent events served to dull democracy and quicken
militancy. The contrast between the political chaos at
Paris and the conquering march of the French into Holland,
Germany, and Italy was so sharp as to become a grave
danger to an impressionable people. Unable to achie\-e
political liberty at home, they overpowered all opposition
abroad ; and thus the very men who had hailed the war
of 1792 as a crusade on behalf of the liberty of ensla\cd
peoples were soon drawn into methods inconsistent with
tht'ir political principles. In the constitution of 1791
they declared solemnly that the French nation would
never undertake a war for the sake of making conquests.
Yet the constitution of 1795 declared that all lands up
to the Rhine and the Alps were thenceforth an integral
part of France. This solemn declaration, that France
intended to fight on until she gained her " natural limits,"
was an event of sinister import, preluding two decades of
war ; for Waterloo was the final retort to the French claim
for the Rhine and Alps.
How are we to explain that extravagant claim ? In
part, of course, by that luckless statement of Casar
that those were the boimdaries of Gaul. ]U\t tlu'
new Gospel of Nature here reinforcecl tin' oM ("asarisiii.
Rousseau in his essay, A Treaty of Pi tpr/ital Prt'cc, urged
I)
34 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
that natural features, such as mountains and rivers,
seemed to mark out the bounds of the nations of Europe ;
and (he added) " one may say that the poHtical order of
this part of the world is in certain respects the work of
nature." This incautious utterance of the master, which
subordinated men's feelings to the lie of the land, was
exceedingly useful to his follow^ers. In November, 1792,
when the French desired to annex Savoy, Bishop Gregoire,
in his report on that topic, made use of similar arguments.
As a certain number of Savoyards petitioned for union
with France, he insisted that this was their universal
desire ; and he then stated that " the order of Nature would
be contravened if their Government was not identical
[with ours]." The turn of the Belgians came next, early
in 1793. As for the Germans of the Rhineland, they were
not consulted at all. And thus it came about that the
national impulse in France, which up to 1791 promised
to link all free peoples in a friendly federation, soon
degenerated into a warlike and aggressive impulse, the
parent of rapine abroad and of Caesarism in France herself.
i.ECTrRi-: III
SCHILLER AND FICHTE
" The first original and truly natural frontiers of States are
unquestionably their spiritual frontiers. " — Fichte, Addresses to the
German Saiiou, No. XII.
It is difficult now to realize the divisions and helplessness of
Gennany in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Spilit up into some three hundred different domains, for
whicii the Holy Roman Empire provided no effective bond
of union ; distracted, too, by the endless rivalry of the
chief States, Austria and Prussia, the Gemians seemed
doomed to subservience to their better organized neigh-
bours. The energizing and new grouping of these torpid
fragments was the greatest political event of the nineteenth
< entury.
Before its commencement, there was no desire for close
union on a national basis. The ideals of the leaders of
(iemian thought were international. Wry characteristic
are the words penned by the philosopher Kant, at Ktinigs-
berg, in his tractate, Perpetual Peace. 17(^5. " If Fortune
ordains that a powerful and enlightened people slu)uld
form a Republic which by its very nature is inclined to
jx-rpctual peace this would serve as a centre of federal
union for other States wishing to join, and thus secure
conditi(jns of freedom among the States in accordance
with the idea of the law of nations."
35
36 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
In that passage Kant expressed the aspirations of his
age for a federative and pacific union of nations. The
idea had been cherished in France among the more reason-
able of the Girondins, and found expression in the hope
that neighbouring States would form Republics which
would link on to France and gradually extend the bounds
of liberty. The German thinker warmly adopted this
programme and included it among the conditions con-
ducive to the abolition of war. If it had come about, the
world would have taken a long stride forward towards the
international ideal. In that case France would have passed
quickly through the national phase, impelled onwards
towards a far loftier ideal, that of ministering to the needs
of humanity at large. The years 1791-2 formed, perhaps,
the most favourable opportunity in that direction that
the world has ever known. For at that time Europe was
in a transition stage. With the exception of England and
France, the peoples had not yet awakened to full pohtical
consciousness. True, they had thrilled at the news of the
French Revolution ; but the first message that it sent forth
from Paris was international. The motto — " Liberty,
Equality, Fraternity " — ^was for all peoples on equal terms ;
and all seemed likely to press forward to the goal, without
the jostling which Nationalism soon engendered. In
1792-4 there was a chance that the Germans of the Rhine-
land would accept the French connection, if it were really
fraternal and not too paternal. At first the German
reformers fraternized with the French troops. That
eminent savant, Forster of Mainz, went up to some French
National Guards then in garrison in his city, and ex-
claimed — " Long live the Republic ! " to which there came
the discouraging reply, " She will live very well without
you."
The incident is characteristic of the superiority then
SCHILLER AXT) FICHTE 37
affected by the French over the divided and beniglited
Germans. That feehng had long permeated the Parisian
factions that desired a war of propaganda. So far back
as October, 1791, the first leader of the Girondins, that
restless wire-puller, Brissot, had attacked the German
Powers in the most provocative terms, and his colleague,
Isnard, fired off the following salvos on November 29 :
" A people in a state of revolution is invincible. . . . Let
us tell Europe that, if the Cabinets engage the Kings in
a war against the peoples, we will engage the peoples in
a war against the Kings" — this, too, at a time when tlic
Austrian and Prussian monarchs had withdrawn their
former veiled threats of intervention, to which, indeed,
they had scant means of giving effect. Central and Southern
Europe were so wretchedly weak that the foremost pub-
licist of the time. Mallet du Pan, wrote thus of the chances
of a successful attack by France : " Divided into a multi-
tude of separate governments, Europe offers few bases
for a common resistance, and the first great nation which
changes the face of society has to fear only dissociated
units." »
The words are a remarkable forecast of the collapse
of the old order before the new ; and the sequel was
to show the peril that besets wars of propaganda. Lofty
though the motives of the crusaders may be at the outset,
they are apt speedily to degenerate under the lure of con-
quest. A strong natir)n which overruns weak States will
in the pro( t'ss reveal the truth of the far-seeing remark of
.Montes<|uieu, that, if a Kepiibhc subdues other peoples,
its own Hberty is endangered by the authority which it
entrusts to its generals and proconsuls. In the rampaigns
^^^ I703~9 France triumphed too easily, lb 1 iiiofouiidly
national system too spcediK* uj^set the European 1 i|uin-
' .M.ilkl <lu I'aii, Mnm., i, 251.
38 Lectures on nationality
brium ; and in the process the Hberator merged into the
mere conqueror. The results were soon felt by the
" liberated " Germans of the Rhineland. The fraternal
embracings of the first few days soon gave place to exac-
tions, confiscations, forced loans, even to plunder. The
irreligious customs of the French troops completed the
work of disillusionment ; and when those harpies, the
military contractors, flew on the spoil, the Germans
experienced all the miseries of the conquered. All the
salaried posts in the new administration were given to
French officials, often of a very corrupt type. The soldiery
bettered their example, until, in 1799, a Rhinelander
complained that everybody concealed money and valuables
in order to save something from the orgies of plunder.
In the five years after the French occupation of 1794-5
exactions amounting to £6,000,000 were wrung from the
Rhineland ; and there was a general regret for the earlier
time of undisturbed slumber under equally somnolent
translucencies and abbesses.
The change of tone in German literature between 1789
and 1799 is remarkable. In August, 1789, the Swabian
poet, Schubart, had extolled the felicity of the Germans
in Alsace, who shared in the blessings of the French
Revolution, while behind them (i.e. in Germany) cracked
the whip of the despot. But, after the French conquest
of the Rhineland, references to France and to her
Revolution become cold and critical. In the writings
of Goethe there are comparatively few references to
the public sentiment of the time ; for, as he explained
in Walirheit iiud DicJifuiig (anno 1775), " Our object
was to get to know man ; we M'ere content to let
people in general go their own way." This aloofness
from the aims and stri\'ings of the masses is a noteworthy
feature of Goethe's character. It probably explains his
SriniTFR ANT) FK HTE 39
indiflcrcncc to the struggles of his countiymen agauist
Napoleon, which sometimes has been ascribed to want of
patriotism. That charge is unjust ; for there are persons
so constituted as to be unable to take interest in the
collective activities of mankind. In their eyes the soul
of man is the onlj- study of any worth. The strivings of
the many weary or disgust them. They are interested in
the problems of the individual life ; but popular move-
ments, whether present or past, leave them cold. Such was
the cast of Browning's mind. Though he li\ed in the
midst of the most romantic of national movements, that
of Italy, he has left no poem inspired by it ; whereas
Mrs. Browning, who possessed the collective sense, has
left many such poems. Goethe, like Browning, lacked that
sympathy with the masses, which every ardent reformer
and patriot nmst possess. Such minds do not vibrate
responsive to the appeal of the many in the present, or
to that appeal from the past, which is the very soul of
history.
In Goetlie's writings, as in those of Browning, there are
only scattered references to public affairs. But in Hermann
und Dorothea (1797) there is this passage : " The man who,
in a tottering age, is unsteady in character only increases
the evil and spreads it further and further. ... It is not
for the Germans to carry on the terrible Kevolutiun, and
to waver hither and thither." The words show that
Goethe, for all his cosmopolitan leanings, cherished liltlc
hope for liberation by France. In his opinion the revolu-
tionary movement had gone astray ; and mankind could
hope for improvement only by the steady development of
all that was best in the leading nations.
The disillusionment comes out most clearly in the works
of S<hilier. His sensitive sj*iril thrillfd rcsponsixe to tlie
collective impulses of his time. in«kctl, his works iorm a
40 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
mirror of the age. His first play, The Robbers (1779).
produced in liis twentietfi year, belongs to the poetry of
revolt. Animated by his defiance of law and custom, all
spirited German students then dreamt of overthrowing the
petty tyrannies around them— a topic portrayed in The
Robbers with school-boy extravagance. Later on, when
for a time he quitted the drama for the domain of history,
his thoughts still turned towards topics of rebelHon. His
Revolt of the Netherlands and Thirty Years' War deal with
upheavals that affected many peoples. It is the downfall
of tyranny, the progress of mankind in its sterner experi-
ences, that interested Schiller. Like Lessing and many
other German thinkers of that age, he was not a national
patriot ; he was a cosmopolitan. Those leaders in thought
and literature did not belong to Jena, Wolfenbiittel,
Weimar ; they belonged to the world at large ; and their
thoughts touched the imagination in spheres far removed
from the ducal or electoral States in which they were
conceived. Those writers, cramped though their sur-
roundings were, gave to the world a literature no less
universal than that of Voltaire, Diderot, and the Encyclo-
pedists. How strange, that those giants of the eighteenth
century should have prided themselves on the effacement
of national boundaries at the time when the political
convulsion partly brought about by their teaching was
destined to parcel out the peoples in distinct and hostile
groups !
As an example of Schiller's contempt for a merely
national patriotism, take this fine passage from one of
his letters, dealing with the aim which the historian ought
to set before him. It was written in 1789, shortly after
he became Professor of History at Jena : —
" This is the problem ; to choose and arrange your materials,
so that, in order to interest, they shall not have the need of
SCHILLER AM) LICHTE 41
decoration. We moderns have a source of interest at our
disposal which no Greek or Roman was acquainted with, and
which the patriotic interest does not nearly equal. This last,
in general, is chiefly of importance for unripe nations, for the
youth of the world. But we may excite a very different
sort of interest if we represent each remarkable occurrence
that happened to men as being of importance to man. It is
a poor and little aim to write for one nation ; a philosophic
spirit cannot tolerate such limits, cannot bound its views to
a form of human nature so arbitrary, fluctuating, accidental.
The most powerful nation is but a fragment ; and thinking
minds will not grow warm on its account, except in so far as
this nation or its fortunes have exercised influence on the
progress of the species."
" Arbitrary, fluctuating, accidental " ; these terms well
describe the life of the average Gcnnan State — a mere
atom in a kaleidoscope. How could one feel much en-
thusiasm about Wiirtemberg, Anhalt, or the little county
of Limburg-Styrum, with its standing army of six officers
and two privates ! Yet it was in some of those pigmy
societies that the human mind took its loftiest flights ;
and it is open to question whether small States, the life of
which is homely and the burdens light, do not favour the
growth of the intellect far better than the enormous
aggregations of the present, with their vast and diffuse aims,
their complex problems, and the crushing load of taxation
and military service. Contrast the cast-iron philosophy
and brassy literature of modern Germany with that of the
quaint and kindly age which witnessed the birth every
year of Sfjme masterpiece ennobling the life of the little
town. \N'lii« h is the greater (icnnany? Th.it of (iuttlic
or that of Wilhelm II ?
A figure e«iua]|y typical of the serene cosmopohtanism
of (j|d (icnnany is thr philnsoplin I-ii htc {17OJ- 1M14).
We arc concerned now only with his ideas on natinnal
dcvcloj)ment ; but in a later lecture I shall ictuiii (o Jiis
42 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
theory of the State, which contains much that is question-
able, even dangerous. Here I wish to point out the con-
trast between his earlier and later teachings in reference
to the German polity. The most important work of his
earlier period is the series of lectures entitled " Charac-
teristics of the Present Age," which he delivered to a
general audience at Berlin in 1804-5. The lectures are
remarkable for their complete neglect of the principle of
nationality, though revolutionary France was largely the
product of that potent force. Fichte discourses at large
on the human race as a whole. He asks : What is the plan
of the world ? What is the fundamental idea of human
life viewed collectively ? In Lecture I he defines it thus :
" The End of the life of mankind on earth is this — that in
this life they may order all their relations with freedom
according to reason." ^ Stated with Anglo-Saxon bluntness,
this means that Reason is to rule in human affairs, and
that men ought to be free to choose the methods by which
they act reasonably. Everywhere in his lectures he
considers Europe as a whole. There is no need to follow
him in his tedious mapping-out of the different ages of
human history, except to notice his conviction, that the
world was then in the third age — that of liberation from
external authority. He declares the age to be one of
unrestrained licence and selfishness ; but he hopes that
the race will ultimately win its way back to justification
and sanctification. In all his tedious disquisition there is
no sign that he perceives the force of national differences
and of the diverse parts which different nations may have
to play. With serene indifference to such distinctions,
he assumes that somehow mankind will miove, or be moved,
onward through the live cycles. In Lecture XIV he says :
" The Christian Europeans are essentially but one people ;
1 Fichte, Characteristics of the Present Age (Kng. TransL, p. 5).
SiIllLLLf^ AM) IKHTE 43
they recognize tliis common Europe as their one true
Fatherland ; and, from one end of it to the other, pursue
nearly the same purposes and are ever actuated by similar
motives." The statement proves how blind cosmopolitan
philosophers can be to disagreeable facts. Enclosing
themselves in their own theories, and confusing what is
with what ought to be, minds of that order often construct
a world of their own, and rail at persons who remind them
of the existence of the world of actualities. Fichte. in his
earlier phase, was one of these philosophizing spiders, living
in a web which he had evolved from his inner consciousness,
and caUing it the world. Consider the facts. Napoleon
had overrun Hanover and the Kingdom of Naples in the
endeavour to beat down the British Power. He had
turned Germany upside down with his Secularizations,
and the war was clearly about to become world-wide ;
for Russia and Austria were arming against the great
Emperor, wIkj recklessly defied them. Yet Fichte says
that all Christian peoples recognize Europe as their common
Fatherland, are pursuing nearly the same purposes, and
arc actuated by similar motives.
Elsewhere, however, he admits that these Christian States
are striving perpetually for supremacy. Sometimes one
prevails : then another ; and (says Fichte) the truly
enlightened man will always owe allegiance to the one
which prevails a startling touch of worldly prudence.
Only the earth-born souls will remain c itizcns of the fallen
State, recognizing their Fatherland in its soil, and rivers
and mountains, wliic li is all tlicy desire. I'.ut " the sun-
like Spirit, irresistiljly attracted, will wing its way wherever
there is Light and Liberty. And in this cosmopolitan
frame of mind we may look with perfect serenity on the
actions and the fate of Nations, for (jurselvcs and our
succesbors, e\en to the end of 1 ime."
44 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
This theory, if translated into practice, works out thus :
If Prussia prevails over Austria, all enlightened Germans
will transfer their allegiance to her. If France prevails
over Prussia, these neo-Prussians will become Frenchmen
at heart. If France falls, and there ensues a complete
Balance of Power these political chameleons will run about
distracted, seeking in vain for a predominant colour.
Was Fichte's fluid cosmopolitanism the outcome of despair
at Germany's helplessness and of Napoleon's omnipotence ?
Or did he share Goethe's conviction as to the need of
renovation by " the new Charlemagne " ? It is difficult
to say. One thing alone is clear, his utter indifference
to the claims of country. Whether France, Prussia, or
Austria gained the supremacy was nothing to him.
No ! The national idea in Germany was first set forth
by a man who dealt, not with abstractions but realities,
not with States but peoples. While Fichte was groping
his way through these hazy abstractions, a poet and
historian found his way to firm ground. Schiller gave to
the world Wilhelm Tell (1804).
He designed it as " a national drama, in sympathy with
all the liberal tendencies of the age." I beheve that he
hoped to stir up a truly German feeling, and thus stay the
dry-rot that was creeping into the hfe of his people. With
the insight of a poet he had long noted the strength of
patriotism. The national revival of France, effected by
the Maid of Orleans, had inspired his drama on that
subject ; and in 1803-4 he turned his thoughts towards
the German Swiss of the Forest Cantons. The inner
meaning of the play lies in the conflict between the free
mountaineers of the Ur-Cantonen and the greed and
usurpation of the House of Hapsburg. True, the human
interest of the story centres in the character and action
of the legendary hero. Tell. The drama must have heroes.
>ciiilli:r and j-k hte 45
not heroic abstractions ; and Tell is a fine specimen of
the Swiss mountaineer, frank, generous, misuspicious, no
meddler in politics, and slow to act against recognized
authoritv. He is the central figure of the drama ; but he
is not the moving spirit of its action. That spirit is the
instinct of the people. Outraged by the barbarities of the
Hapsburg soldiery, that instinct asserts itself at lirst in
saving this or that defender of his home ; further than this
Tell will not go. He represents the average good-natured
mountaineer, who will save an individual, but does not
understand political action, so that he is reproached for
his want of fervour in the common cause. In fact, the
instinct of the people wells forth most fully in the person
of a woman. Gertrud is the moving influence of the piece.
While her husband, Werner Stauffacher, seems likely to
endure tamely all the threats and insolence of the Hapsburg
officers, she counsels resistance ; and when he speaks of
the horrors of war she replies : —
" Look forward, Werner, not behind yuu, now."
When again he reminds her of the nameless fate that
may befall her, she utters these lofty words : —
" None are so weak, but one last choice is left.
A leap from yonder bridge, and T ;ini free."
Spurred to action by his wife's heroism, Stauffacher takes
counsel with other men of Untcrwalden ; and they resolve
to assemble on the Riitli rock above the Lake of Lucerne.
meeting there the men of Schwytz and I'ri. In that
primeval solitude, and under (()\cr r)f night, they assend)Ie
to renew the ancient b(jnd of union between the three
cantons. Acts of brutal tyranny by the minions of .Austria
now bring together men long sundered in limts ol peace.
Thev listen as Stauffacher unfolds to them the story of
46 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
their Germanic parentage ; how, driven forth by famine
from the northern plain, their forefathers forced a way
into the Swiss mountains and made them homes in diverse
valleys ; yet ever were they mindful of their Switzer
origin. Now, against Hapsburg usurpation they must
make common cause, not only as free Switzers, but also
as loyal sons of the old Germanic Empire.
Before they swear to resist Austria's novel claims, a
priest, Rosselmann, steps into the ring and urges them,
for the sake of peace and quietness, to give way before
Austria. One and all, they scout the proposal as that of
a traitor ; and they pass this decree : — ■
" Whoe'er
Shall talk of tamely bearing Austria's yoke.
Let him be stripped of all his rights and honours ;
And no man hence receive him at his hearth."
After this drastic treatment of the pacifist case, they
proceed to renew their bond of union : —
" We swear to be a nation of true brothers,
Never to part in danger or in death."
{They swear, with three fingers raised.)
" We swear we will be free as were our sires,
And sooner die than live in slaveiy."
{They swear, as before.)
What is this but a Social Contract in a poetical setting ?
Schiller had been an enthusiastic student of Rousseau ;
and he believed firmly in the formation of political societies
by the action of the people, which would necessarily lead
to liberty and harmony. The States thus formed would
be strong and stable, far different from the artificial areas
ruled over by Gennan princelings. The new Germanic
State or States would guarantee the welfare of Germans
sciiilli:r and iuhtk 47
and keep at arm's length the aggressor. Tlie tone of the
drama is tliroughout intensely German. The last scenes
reveal the peasants free, united, and happy, while the
House of Hapsburg is rent asunder by re\olt and by the
murder of its chief.
The moral of it all is clear. Schiller appeals to his
countrjnnen to forget their miserable divisions which have
left them a prej' to the aggressions of Napoleon. He seems
to say to the Germans of his day : " \\ ill \'»u not forget
your absurd differences? Will you not join hands across
the political barriers, and unite for the defence of your
honour and your dearest interests ? Only so can you save
the Fatherland from subjection to an insolent usurper.
Your princes cannot, or will not, save you. Your own
right hands, your own good sense, must save you from
servitude to the foreigner."
This, surely, is the inner meaning of the drama. It
describes the birth of a nation, and as such it is regarded
by all Switzers. They look back to the scene on the
Riitli rock as the beginning of their political life. Whether
that event is historical, or semi-historical, or legendary
is of small account. Even if it be legendary, it has exerted
upon the fortunes of Switzerland an influence more im-
portant than that of cartloads of documents of unimpeach-
able authenticity. It is one of those episodes which make
the heart of a people beat fast with pride and hope. In
the Swiss House of Parliament at Berne the Riitli scene
has been painted large on the wall behind the President's
chair. In that Parliament there are nun who speak
French, Gemian, and Italian ; but the feeling of unity
aroused by the contemplation of that scene transcends
mere diversities of tongue, and merges the fragments of
those now warring peoples in a fervidly Swiss nationality,
which bids fair to outlast even the divulsive influences
48 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
of this war.i It is true that the strain just now on Swiss
nationality is very severe ; and the sharp tension which
prevails between the German and the Latin portions
reveals the strength of the tie of language. But here lies
the interest of the case of Switzerland. The Swiss cherish
a collective sentiment which far transcends race and lan-
guage, a sentiment springing from pride in a glorious past
and love of the mountains around which they cluster.
The Swiss will, I believe, remain a nation, and will not
merge into the three great peoples that surround them.
Their keen historic sense, their romantic attachment to
their mountains and rivers, will keep them united. In
this respect they are the " earth-born souls " at whom
Fichte scoffed ; and this clinging to the soil, this pride in
their achievements, will, I venture to say, help to keep
Switzerland a united whole. In this sense the legend of
Wilhelm Tell, and the presentment of it by Schiller, form
a national asset of priceless worth.
For Genuany, too, Wilhelm Tell soon became pre-
eminently the national drama. The instinct of the people
caught at the truth which was there enshrined. Thence-
forth Napoleon was regarded as the national enemy, and
union against him as the paramount duty of all. The
patriotic songs in this and others of Schiller's dramas
inspired thousands of youths who went gladly into the
almost hopeless struggle against the great Emperor. As
was finely said at a meeting in memory of Schiller : " Thou-
sands who trembled not when the earth groaned with the
weight of the despot's mailed cavalry ; men who with
fearless hearts confronted the thunder of his artillery . . .
^ Count Mamiani, Rights of Nations (Eng. edit., i860), p. 44,
says that the Swiss are not " in the ordinary sense properly a nation."
This I deny. For, as I shall show, in Lecture VIII, it is sentiment and
will, not language, that make a nation.
SCHILLl-R ANP 1 KUTE 49
all carried with them into Iho strut,'gle the entlnisinsin
kindled by Schiller's poetry ; his songs were i>n their lijis,
and his spirit fought with them."
During the years 1S05-11 that struggle brought nothing
but disaster to the opponents of Napoleon. The organized
might of the French Empire seemed likely to overbear
the rest of Europe ; and if one investigates the causes of
this superiority, they appear to be these-: France was the
only great nation completel}- permeated with tlic new-
national spirit, and also thoroughly organized for war.
The British and Spanish peoples were patriotic, but were
ill-organized, while in Napoleon France found the most
ruthlessly efficient organizer of all time. The other
European States were in a chaotic condition. Austria
was a house of cards ; Prussia was little better ; Russia
was honeycombed by corruption. In fact, after the death
of Pitt and the dismissal of Stein, Napoleon was confronted
by mere mediocrities both in the Cabinet and in the field.
Or, to sum up. the new national spirit, born in and after
1804, was a mere infant of days by comparison with the
splendid adolescence of France. The experiences of those
terrible years prove that the justice of a cause is of little
avail unless that cause adapts itself to the needs of the
time. If the work of adaptation be slowly and inefficiently
carried out, the peoples that are at fault will suffer for tluir
sins of omission. One of the sternest lessons of history
is that inefficient and slipshod work, even if it be in the
best of causes, must bring disaster. Peoples are punished
for slackness and inertia as iimch as they are for positive
crimes. So it was with England, Spain, and Prussia in
the years 1804-12. Until they found out Wellington,
Scharnhorst, Cineisenau. and Pliiclier, all the Iolt\- aspira-
tions and enthusiasms were of little avail.
Out of the darkness of despair that brooded oxer I'rnssia
50 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
after the disaster of Jena, one voice sounded forth in words
of inspiration and hope. When she lay under the heel of
Napoleon ; when Berlin and all Prussian cities were
garrisoned by French troops, Fichte's easy cosmopolitanism
fell from him. Like all noble natures, his was not con-
vinced by conquest. In those dark days he found that he
could not transfer his allegiance from Berlin to Paris,
though Paris wasincontestably supreme, and Berlin seemed
to have gone under for ever. Even before the campaign
of Jena he addressed the Prussian army in glowing terms ;
and when it streamed away eastwards towards the Vistula
and Niemen in utter rout, his patriotic feelings deepened,
as will those of all true men and women in time of anxiety
or disaster. Then it was that he discovered cosmopoli-
tanism to be only a fair-weather creed. After the Peace
of Tilsit, when Prussia lost half her lands and all her
prestige, Fichte stood forth at Berlin, and, within sound
of the drums of the French garrison, delivered his
" Addresses to the German Nation." They purported to
be a continuation of the lectures given in 1804-5 ; but they
breathe an utterly different spirit. For in the interval
the idea of nationality laid hold of the popular imagination;
and now, too, when the fabric of the Prussian State had
fallen in ruin, Fichte saw the German nation. Previously
he had discoursed about States : now his theme was far
more definite, more human. In face of the Napoleonic
ascendancy, what were Prussia and Austria, Saxony and
Bavaria ? As those miserable divisions had invited
disaster, so, too, a close union might bring salvation. The
topic was dangerous, as Fichte was well aware : "I know
the risk [so he wrote to Beyme in January, 1808]. I know
that a bullet may strike me down as well as Palm.^ But
^ Palm, a Nurnberg bookseller, was shot by Napoleon's order
for tlie crime of selling a patriotic pamphlet.
SCHILLER AND FICHTE 51
that is not what I fear ; and, for the aim which I have in
\iew, I too would gladly die."
IIJN aim was to convince Germans everywhere that their
present ruin was due to selfishness. Egotism had divided
them up into myriads of petty States and kept them
divided : so that, what with political barriers and class
divisions, they never caught a glimpse of wide and generous
aims. He called his age the age of giant selfishness, which
had developed to the utmost on all sides and was about
to destroy itself. The description is apt if applied to
Gennany ; for. if the Germany of that time was the result
of petty selfishness. Napoleon was also the incarnation of
colossal acquisitiveness. In the game of grab, into which
European politics had degenerated since the accession of
Frederick the Great, all trust and confidence had vanished,
and thus the great robber-baron beyond the Rhine was
able to prey on the thieving knights and footpads of
Gennany. As yet there was no sign of effective union ;
for how can there be a firm union among thieves ? Fichte
was correct in his diagnosis of the disease which paralysed
Europe in 1804-7. Egotism and greed had made of it
mere political rubble, and the cement of public confidence
was nowhere to be found. Distrust must give way to
trust (said Fichte) ; the old jealousy between German
States nmst vanish in view of the urgency of their universal
interests ; in place of the class feeling, which had weakened
Prussia, there must arise a national feeling, based on the
perception of kindred aims and duties. Selfishness (said
he) is self-destructive ; for, when it has run its full
rours<^', no linn foundati<;n is left. That vice had ruined
(icnnany. How nmst she be reconstructed ?
Fichte's answer is not altogether clear. It does not
sound forth with the trum|)ct tones of conviction by which
.Maz/.ini tlirilltd ltal\- in tlic 'thirties. Tlic (Icrnian pliiloso-
52 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
pher had not the abounding faith and enthusiasm of the
Itahan prophet. Further, he was hampered by the
endeavour to express everything in abstract terms, while
Mazzini spoke straight to the heart of the people. The
cloudiness of Fichte's views also resulted from his being
a pioneer of thought in this direction^ — ^witness his definition
of a nation (Lecture VI) — " A nation is the whole com-
munity of persons living in social intercourse, ever pro-
pagating itself in a natural manner, and existing collec-
tively under a certain special law of the development of
the divine out of it."
This nebulous circumlocution in no sense advances our
knowledge of the subject ; and it must be confessed that
the Addresses are often both dull and confused. Especially
tiresome are Lectures IV-VII, which demonstrate the
Germanic nature of the Germans with an iteration that
seems wholly needless to-day, however much it was needful
then to awaken their dormant national sentiment. After
these digressions Fichte's narrative straightens and
broadens. Very effective is the reference to the ancient
Germans, who refused to face the possibility of being
Romanized and were resolved at all costs to order their
lives in their own way. Coming to the present he lifts the
idea of the nation to an eminence whence it may radiate
hope to the myriads of Germans who had vegetated in
little States, one and all now subject to Napoleon. The
following passage in Lecture VIII must have been a revela-
tion to all who could grasp its meaning : —
" Nation and Fatherland in this sense, as bearer of and securer
for immortality in this world, and as that which alone here
below can be eternal, far transcend the State in the usual
sense of that term. . . . This [the State] aims only at security
of rights, internal peace, a livelihood to everyone, and pre-
servation of material existence during Heaven's pleasure by
SCHILLER AND 1 irUTF 53
means of toil. All this is only the means, condition, prepara-
tion for that which patriotism essentially aims at, the blossom-
ing of the eternal and divine in the world. For that very
reason, as being the supreme, final, and independent authority,
must govern the State itself, while limiting it in the choice
of means for its next object, internal peace. With this object
in view, the natural freedom of the individual must be re-
stricted in many ways ; and, if one has no other intention and
aim than this, it would be well to restrict it within the
narrowest limits possible."
Idealism lierc tails off into lealisni. Fichto's celestial arc
ends in a Prussian drill-yaril. In laUr passages he insists
on the need of conscription and the drastic restriction ot
individual liberty. Of course, there were powerful motives
why he should urge the claims of Fatherland. It had been
ruined by individual selfishness, both of Princes and classes.
Now, says Fichte, all Germans must think first of the nation
and of the duties which they owe to it. No longer must
they shift their responsibilities on to someone else. Every
man must realize his duty and perforni it manfully. For
this purpose he will nerve himself by catching a glimpse
of what the future may bring to the German nation. He
will resolve that the Fatherland shall be absolute!}' in-
dependent of alien rule. Just as the eye can be trained
to feel disgust at dirt and disorder, so, too, the political
vision of Germans can be ([uickened until they will reject
all thought of subjection to the foreigner. In order to fire
them with the heroism necessary for driving out the French,
Fichte faces the problem oi the motive power dormant
in the will of man. How shall the onlinary citizen be
nerved to the self-abandonment that <an accomplish
wonders of bravery? That is the j)robk'ni. lAidentlj',
no (jrdinary juotive will suince. Or, to cpiote his words :
" Not the spirit <»f <|uiet civic obedience to the constitution
and the laws. So ; but the Inuning Hume of the higher
54 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
patriotism which conceives the nation as the embodiment
of the eternal, to which the high-minded man joyfully
devotes himself ; while the base-minded man, who only
exists for the other, must be compelled to devote himself."
Developing this thought, Fichte seeks to fortify the
heroism, even of the high-minded man, by the following
inspiring thought. Such an one will prize his nation above
all else ; for it is only the nation which can assure the
continuity of his work. He will value his life, not for the
sake of mere existence, but for the amount of work which
he can accomplish ; and, as the nation is the guardian of
that work and its guarantor for the future, he will value
its safety far above his own. For the nation, then, he will
gladly lay down his life, so that, as far as in him lies, he
may assure the survival of the larger life which alone lends
significance to his own.^ The thought is like that which
Kipling, by a flash of genius, has enshrined in one glorious
Ime :— „ ^^^^ ^.^^ -^ England lives ? "
It is obvious that Fichte's doctrine as to the absolute
sovereignty of the nation over the lives of all its members
was and is liable to great abuse. Fichte's glowing words
must not blind us to the risk of entrusting the nation for
ever with unlimited powers of life and death. ^ Noble
though his theory may be when the question is of expelling
the foreigner, it becomes pestilential when that task is
achieved, and the nation of death-defying heroes look
forth upon less redoubtable neighbours. This, as we have
seen, was the temptation that lured Revolutionary France
into wars of conquest. A similar temptation has lured the
Germany of William I into the mad ways of William II.
' Fichte, Lecture VIII.
2 See Lord Acton's remarks (Essays on Liberty, p. 228) on the
Machiavellian traits in Fichte's teaching.
SCHILLER AND LlCHTE 55
In the time of Fichte the onl\- tiucstion was that of
regaining the independence of Germany. But how was it
to be regained ? Not by force ; that was impossible when
the French held all the fortresses. By moral means, then,
— says Fichte (Lectures IX-XI)— by education ; for that
is the only domain in which Napoleon leaves the Germans
free. The philosopher points out that in many respects
German education has been utterly defective. It has been
narrow and uninspiring ; it has left its pupils cold and
selfish; so that, despite all the teaching, they have not
followed its higher precepts and warnings, but have gone
on following the impulses of their own natural selfishness.
Hitherto education has neither instructed nor inspired.
But its true function is to inspire. The true educator will
not be satisfied with instructing. He will seek to uplift
the moral nature of his students. He will set forth so
glowing a picture of the ideal life that, before it, cold
selfishness will melt away. The moral order of the universe
will appear in so radiant a vision that the petty egotism
of the individual will vanish. And not only the wealthy
and middle classes are to be thus inspired. All classes will
be influenced by the wider and nobler education of the
future. " We desire to inspire Germans by a feeling of
unity which may throb through all their limbs." At this
point, as. he catches a vision of what a better training may
effect, he doffs his academic stiffness and exclaims in the
inspired words of Ezekiel : " Come fniiii tlic f<nn winds,
O breatii, and breathe upon these slain, that tiiey ma\ li\c.
So I pnjphesied, as He commanded me; and tlir ijreath
tame into them, and they lived, and stood up ujjon lluir
feet, an exceeding great army."
As to the edu< ational methods to i)e adopted, l-'idilc
strongly recommended those of the Swiss reformer,
Testalo/./.i. They were adopted, and, after the infusion
56 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
of German iiietliod, they were found to be of great service.
Elementary education, therefore, received an impetus of
great value in Prussia ; and this development, together
with the reforms of Stein, Scharnhorst, and Hardenberg,
laid the basis for the healthier polity of the future. In the
academic sphere equal progress was made by the establish-
ment of the thoroughly national Universities of Berlin and
Breslau (1809-11). An enlightened patriotism watched
over them from the start. The King gave a royal palace
so that Berlin might have suitable University buildings ;
and from the nearly bankrupt Treasury 150,000 dollars
a year were awarded for the maintenance of the new insti-
tution. Hitherto, for the most part, German Universities
had existed in small towns remote from political life ; and
in them there was evolved the type of professor depicted
by Carlyle in the person of Diogenes Teufelsdrockh,
Professor of Things in General in the University of Weiss-
nichtwo. Readers of Sartor Resartus will remember that
Teufelsdrockh in the early part of his career was mainly
occupied with the cognate employments, — " to think and
smoke tobacco." These led him only to the Everlasting
No. But in lucid intervals he gradually fought his way
towards the Everlasting Yes — " The chief end of life is
not thought but action. . . . Up ! Up ! Whatsoever
thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might." -
This surprising change mirrors that which came over the
life of Germany in the decade 1S04 to 1813. The time of
divisions, of sloth, of pleasurable self-seeking passed away ;
and in its place there came a time marked by terrible
suffering and poverty, but irradiated by the noblest deeds
of self-sacrifice and heroism. For the most inspired poet
and philosopher had spoken to that people in words that
burned. Schiller showed what the heroism of unlettered
mountaineers could effect in a great and inspiring cause.
Scllll.l.l-.K AM) I 1(11 IE 57
Fichte, too, after emerging from dreamhind, came out into
the world of reality and helped tt» lead his countrymen
thither. Emerging from their holes and corners, they dis-
covered their essential oneness ; and, as happened to
Frenchmen twenty years earlier, the uplift from a narrow
provincialism to a sense of nationality endowed them with
a buoyancy ami vigour never known before. Arndt,
Korner, and others composed national songs that stirred
the blood ; and from the Universities there came pro-
fessors and students, resolved to win the freedom and
independence which Fichte's glowing words had made an
essential of life. He, too, formerly so unpractical, sealed
the new doctrine with his life-blood ; for he died of a fever
caught while his wife and he tended the wounded in hospital
- ;in episode as significant as any in the drama of the
War of Liberation.
LECTURE IV
THE SPANISH NATIONAL RISING
" C'est de I'Espagne que rEurope apprit que Napoleon pouvait
etre vaincu, et comiiie il pouvait I'etre." — Talleyrand, Memoires,
I, 389.
The rising of the German people against Napoleon in 1813
is for ever memorable, not only for a heroism finally
crowned with well-merited triumph, but also for the work
of intellectual and moral preparation, which endowed
their national movement with solid backing and per-
manent results. On turning our thoughts towards the
Spanish Peninsula we are conscious of an entire change of
conditions, both external and internal. The Spaniards
are sometimes reproached with having drawn from that
same time of testing, the years 1808-13, none of the
beneficent influences that renewed and enriched the life
of the German nation. To explain the causes of this
divergence is one of my aims in this lecture.
Firstly, Germany held an honoured place in the intel-
lectual movement of the eighteenth century. Her leading
men, even some of her rulers, were in full sympathy with
" Illuminism," which promised peacefully to banish
ignorance and to make of mankind one happy family.
They welcomed the French Revolution ; and only after
the perversion of its aims did Teuton and Gaul come into
serious conflict. Even when racial animosities were
embittered by the Napoleonic occupation, the leaders of
58
THE SPANISH NATION AL RISING 59
thuught in Gennany continued their efforts, albeit witli
aims that were distinctly national, not international as of
\ore. Consequently, eighteenth-century culture did much
to invigorate the new life of Central Europe.
Far different was the condition of Spain. She had stood
apart from the intellectual movement, which found
exponents among a mere handful of her sons. Conse-
(juently there were no influential groups of savants, no
inspiring traditions, on which the Spanish revival could be
based ; and, as wc ^hall see, the strange shifts to which
their patriots were reduced prevented any well-considered
plan of action.
Of all these difticulties the fundamental cause was the
aloofness of Spain irom Europe. Her aloofness explains
not only her intellectual separation, but also her exclusive
nationalism. The divergence of her interests from those
of her neighbours is due to her insularit}'. Though seas
connect, mountains divide ; and the Pyrenees form the
most rigid barrier in Europe. No land-power has much
inlluenced the life of Spain, because no land-power has ever
been able to control it for long. In the Dark Ages con-
querors from the North, \'an(lals and \'isigotlis, swept
over and even tried to hold the Peninsula. But the effort
of the latter people to rule it from Toulouse broke down,
just as a similar attempt of Charlemagne broke down.
Tlie rugged and impervious barrier of the Pyrenees accounts
for the failure. Spain either dehed her would-be conquerors
from the North, or else she absorbed them.
On the other hand, her Mediterranean coasts almost
invite the invader ; and she was in succession all but
subdued by Carthaginians, Romans, and Moors. But there
again, a.s Livy remarked, the extremes of climate, the barren
plateau in the interior, and the wonderful tena< ity of the
Spaniards in defending tiieir towns rendered complete
6o LECTl/RES ON NATIONALITY
conquest almost impossible. The Moors, even at the height
of their power, never crushed the defenders of the northern
fastnesses, who little by little pushed back the invaders,
and in the process fashioned the national character to its
extremes of valour, bigotry, and pride. Later on, the
French monarchs were to experience the toughness of the
Spanish nature, and Henri IV summed up their enterprises
in the phrase : "In Spain small armies will be beaten,
large armies will starve." The memories of conquest of
the New World and of in\incibility in their own peninsula
stiffened the neck of the Spaniards even in the days of
their decline. Robert Southey, during his travels in Spain
in 1794-5, relates that a Spanish manufacturer who had
sought to introduce wheelbarrows into his works could not
persuade his men to use them. All kinds of vehicles were
meant for beasts of burden, not for Spaniards ! The
experience of the Italian poet, Alfieri, was the same. He
declared the Spaniards to be the only people of Europe
" possessed of sufficient energy to struggle against foreign
usurpation."
Such was the people whom Napoleon sought to harness
to his conqueror's car. In the encyclopaedic studies of his
youth there is a serious gap. Nowhere does he seem to
have studied national character. It was one of the defects
of eighteenth-century thought to ignore differences of race.
Man was considered as man ; and, though Rousseau
echoed some of the cautions which Montesquieu had given
forth as to those differences, the French Revolutionists
paid little heed ; and Napoleon certainly erred in assuming
that men would in general respond to the same appeals.
In his official correspondence is included one letter (dated
March 28, 1808) which cautions Murat against ignoring
the national energy of the Spaniards ; but that letter is
a later invention. In the genuine letters there appear no
THE SPANISH NATIONAL KISING Cm
signs even of ordinarj' caution, as to the risk of proxoking
the Spaniards. So far as we can judge, Napoleon sliared
the belief, connnon in France since the days of Choiseul,
that they were a decadent people, negligible as a political
force.
This e.xtrenie confidence was, perhaps, natural after his
conquest of Austria, Prussia, and Russia in the caiupaigns
of 1805-7. England had blundered badly on land ; and
tlie Emperor hoped, by means of the new Russian alliance,
and thanks to the enforced assistance of the Spanish n;i\y,
to reverse the victory of Trafalgar and overthrow e\en her
naval power. Spain, then, he regarded as a tool in the
world-wide strife. Early in March, 1808, when Barcelona
was scarcely held down by the troops of General Duhesme,
the Emperor wrote to Murat : " There is no discontent
wliatever at Barcelona, (ieneral Duhesme is a gossip.
... On the whole, the people are well disposed, and when
we have the citadel, we liave everything." Napoleon was
then at Paris. He had never been in Spain ; yet he
claimed to know about the Spaniards better than the
French generals then in that country. On April 26, while
at Bayonne, he wrote to Murat, at Madrid : "It is time
for you to show fitting energy. I expect you will not
spare the Madrid mob, if it stirs, and that you will lia\e it
disarmed innnediately." On April 29 he wrote to the Tsar
Alexander I : " These family (juarrels [those of Charles I\'
of Spain with the Heir Aj)parent, Ferdinand] cause me
some trouble ; but I will soon be free to arrange the great
affair with NOur .Majesty." (The " great affair " was the
partition of Turkey, in wlii< Ii tlir Spanish fieet was to be
serviceable.) After Murat's troops had shot down himdreds
of the men of Madrid in the patriotic rising of May 2, the
ICmpcror comjilimcnted him on his energy, and ann(»uneed
to him the signature of n treatv with the senile ( iiailes I\'
62 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
at Bayonne, whereby the latter resigned to him (Napoleon)
all rights to the throne of Spain. The Estates of Spain
would assemble at Bayonne to take suitable measures !
All the genuine letters of the time show no sign of
apprehension of a national rising in Spain. They are
those of a general who believes that he has that people by
the throat. Because French troops occupy Madrid,
Barcelona, all the chief northern fortresses, and those of
Portugal ; because also very many of the Spanish troops
are absent either in Portugal or in Holstein, he deems the
Spanish problem at an end. For him Spain is the royal
family, the Court, the grandees who form the Estates.
If he can bully the rightful successor, Ferdinand, into a
renunciation of his rights ; if he can intern in France both
Charles IV and Ferdinand ; if he can cajole the Spanish
grandees into a recognition of his own claims — then he is
master of Spain.
He left out of count one all-important factor — the
nation. So soon as the astounding news from Bayonne
became known, every town, every province of Spain
rejected his sovereignty with scorn and loathing. In vain
did Charles and Ferdinand advise submission to the
usurper ;^ in vain did the Junta, composed of the leading
men of Madrid, inculcate the duty of obeying the new
ruler ; in vain did the Holy Inquisition preach the same
degrading course ; in vain did responsible persons and
thinkers point out the madness of opposing the master of
the Continent. The people rejected the counsels of
authority, religion, experience, and reform. With an
impulse which was both furious and sustained, both local
and universal, they rushed at the French forces and re-
duced them suddenly to the defensive. District by district,
province by province, they rose separately, yet with
^ Ann. Register (i8oS), p. 214.
THE SPANISH NATIONAL RISINC; 63
astounding unanimity. The rising did not begin in Madrid ;
for the turbulent in that city had been cowed by the
cannon and cavalry of Murat. How the same thought or
instinct laid hold of the whole of Spain within a few days
is a mvsterv. The episode reminds us of the incalculable
forces which now and again have aroused the tribes of
Arabia or of the Soudan to united action. Indeed, the
Spanish Rising is a recurrence to the ways of pviniiti\c
man, or at least of the mediaeval levies when the faithful
mustered to hght the Moors. Then, as in 1808, the impulse
was general, yet the action was provincial. Above all, it
was action by the populace. In many places those who had
advised submission to the French were butchered without
mercy, and patriotic Juntas were chosen by acclamation
to arrange for the defence of each province.
Especiallv noteworthy was the action of that of Asturias.
That little province of the North-West was the first to
organize a Junta which took decisive action. With splendid
audacity that single Junta declared war against Napoleon ;
and those who notice the connection of tlio instinct of
nationalitv with tlie historic sense will remember that in
the long warfare against the Moors, Asturias had been the
last hope of Spanish freedom. Now it was to be the first
hope of the coming national independence. That Junta
took another important step. It despatched two deputies
t(; L(jndon to beg help from the British people. Legally,
Spain was at war with us, as she had been since 1804.
Hut Asturias recked little of legality at such a time.
Neither did our great statesman, Canning. Tlic warm
welcome accorded by our people to tlie Asturian di'puties
revealed to him as by a flash the change that had just come
over the S|>irit of the age. Hitherto (as Sheridan finely
said) " Honaparte had rtin a victorious race because he
had contended nLT'iinst ])rin(('S without dif^nity, Ministers
64 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
without wisdom, and countries where the people were
indifferent as to liis success." Clearly, a new age had
dawned when a provincial Council dared to throw down the
gauntlet to the great Emperor.
I have failed to find in the British archives an account
either of Canning's interview with the two delegates or
of the Cabinet meeting where the decision was formed to
help the Spanish people. It must have been formed verj'
quickly ; for on June 15 Canning spoke as follows in the
House of Commons : " We shall proceed upon the principle
that any nation of Europe that starts up to oppose a
Power, , . . the common enemy of all nations, whatever
be the existing political relations of that nation, it becomes
instantly our essential Ally." In pursuance of this defi-
nitely national policy. Great Britain on July 4 ordered the
cessation of hostilities with Spain ; and there ensued
an informal but binding alliance with the Spanish
people. There was an inner fitness in this compact ; for
it bound together the only States which then were con-
terminous with nations. Napoleonic France had far out-
leaped her natural bounds. The British and Spanish
peoples now undertook to restrain her within just limits ;
and the potency of the national impulse is seen in the
rally of every people in Europe to their side in the
years 1812-14.
The Anglo-Spanish Alliance is, therefore, a turning point
in the long struggle against Napoleon. Up to the year 1807
he had embodied the genius and strength of Revolutionary
France ; and her strength (at once democratic and national)
far exceeded that of the torpid and artificial States around
her. But now, from motives of ambition, he went out of
his way to interfere with a people that only asked to be
left alone ; and his conduct aroused in it a hatred that
nothing could quench. Consequently, the national impulse,
THE Sl'AM^ll NATIUXAL KLslXG 65
which had helped France to overthrow tlie moribund
States of Italy and Germany, now began to operate against
her ; and even the military genius of Napoleon could not
make up for the downward drag which this fatal incubus
entailed. No campaigns were so much detested by the
French suldicry as those in Spain ; and that, not so much
because they had to face Wellington and the Spanish
climate, as on account of the savage hatred which thev
encountered from the Spaniards then selves. The outcome
of that hatred will appear in the following passages, taken
from the first Proclamation of the Supreme Junta. After
recounting some successes of the Spaniards and advising
a war of partisans, the appeal thus refers to tlic memor\-
of the glorious past.
" France has never domineered over us, nor set her foot in
our territory. We have many times mastered lier, not by
deceit, l>ut by force of arms ; we ha\e made her Ivings
prisoners, and we have made that nation tremble ; we are
the same Spaniards ; and France and Europe and the world
shall see that we are not less gallant than the most glorious
of our ancestors."
The proclamatitm then states that when their lawful
King, Ferdinand, is restored
" the Cortes will be assembled, abuses reformed, and such
laws be enacted as the circumstances of the time and experi-
ence may dictate for the public good and haj)piness — things
which we Spaniards know how to do, which we have done as
well as other nations, without any necessity that the vile
French should come to instruct us ; and, according to their
custom, under the mask of friendship and wishes for our
happiness, should contrive to plunder us, to violate our
women, to a.ssassinatc us, to deprive us of our liberty, our
laws, and our King, to scoff at and destnjy our holy reli-
gion. . . . "'
• 11/1(1.. pp. 2lX, 2 10.
I
66 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
That is an official document. As for the pamphlets of
the time, let this suffice. It is a retort to Napoleon's offer
of reforms, beginning with the usual formula : " Napoleon,
Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the
Confederation of the Rhine," etc. The counterblast
begins : —
" Yes ! Napoleon, that is Napo-dragon, ApoUyon, Ruler
of the Abyss, King of the monsters of Hell, heretics, and heretic
princes, — Abominable Beast, Protector, Head and Soul of the
Confederation of the Rhine, that is of the seven heads and ten
horns of the beast, which bear blasphemies against God and
the Saints. ..."
Thus religion was now invoked against the French.
For this the Emperor had himself to thank. As if his
Spanish business were not enough, he in that same spring-
time despoiled the Pope of four provinces. In consequence,
Pius VII anathematized his despoiler, and urged the
Spaniards to arise like David and slay Goliath. The
Spanish Rising therefore partook of the nature of a crusade.
Their armies were placed under the protection of saints,
and in some cases relics of saints went with them to battle,
thereby inflaming the Spanish nature to its utmost.
All these aids were needed ; for in a military sense Spain
was almost defenceless. Her regular troops were, in the
main, absent ; her capital and chief fortresses were held
by the French ; there was no one centre of union for the
various provinces, which soon fell to quarrelling about
the allocation of the money and stores sent from England.
Indeed, Spain was in a worse plight than France was
before the Battle of Valmy ; but the same potent impulse
nerved the defenders ; and, fortunately for the Spanish
patriots. Napoleon's eagerness to seize the fleet at Cadiz
(including the French ships that escaped from Trafalgar)
led him prematurely to press on a large French force
THE SPANISH XATIuXAL RISING O7
towards that port. It was surrounded, overborne, and
compelled to surrender at Baylen (July, 180S). What
\'ahny had been to France, Baylen was to Spain, a proof
that she could overcome troops hitherto ileemed invincible.
In one respect the Spanish victory at Baylen was a
misfortune. It filled the Spaniards with intolerable
conceit. When Joseph Bonaparte and the French troops
fell back behind the line of the Ebro, the perfervid imagi-
nation of the South saw in fancy the standards of Spain
soaring over the Pyrenees and entering the plains of
Guienne. Napier relates that the Spanish officers remarked
to those of Sir John Moore's anny : " We are much obliged
to our friends, the English ; we thank them for their good
will ; we shall escort them through France to Calais ;
. . . they shall not have the trouble of fighting the French ;
and we shall be pleased to have them as spectators of our
victories."' This lofty spirit went before a terrible fall.
In the autumn and winter of 1808 Napoleon burst in on
these cackling fowl and scattered them to the winds.
Yet, even so, Spain was not conquered. After every defeat
she rose, still defiant. The defence of her walled towns,
especially Saragossa, was sublime ; and that defence was
conducted by the people themselves, no less than by the
military. Fifty French cannon during forty days played
upon its walls and massive monasteries before the eagles
of Napoleon floated over the ruins of the capital of Aragon.
It was both the weakness and the strength of the
Spaniards that their national sense was largely provincial.
It was their weakness because the provinces rarely worked
well together. The different Juntas were absurdly jealous
as well as greedy. Besides, owing to the occupation of
Madrid by the enemy, there was no possibility of dinrtion
from a central jxijnt. Further, the haiightv and suspicious
' Xafjicr, I, S.,.
68 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
nature of the Spaniards rendered cordial co-operation
with Wellington extremely difficult. Hence the Duke,
after Talavera, left them alone and operated from Portugal
as a base. Not until Napoleon's Grand Army perished
in Russia was there a chance of beating the French in
Spain. But then, in 1813, after numerous defeats had
rendered the natives more reasonable, all the forces of the
Peninsula pulled well together. The results were pheno-
menal, and French domination vanished in the brief
campaign of Vittoria.
Nevertheless, the provincial sentiment also strengthened
the Spanish cause ; for when one province was lost, the
others resisted none the less stoutly ; and the task of the
French in holding down a population that scorned surrender
increased with every success. As Marshal Jourdan wrote :
" The more soundly the Spanish armies were beaten, the
more eagerly did that people rush to arms ; the more the
French gained ground, the more dangerous did their
position become." The broken and inhospitable nature
of the country singularly favoured the partisan warfare
of the defenders, so that, provided Wellington held a large
French force to the West, and all the other provinces
persevered, the ultimate failure of the French was inevit-
able. Even the genius of Napoleon could not break down
the alliance of the Spanish national spirit with the great
Sea Power. Moreover, the display of this tenacious
vitality in a land hitherto deemed moribund created a
profound impression amidst every nation of the world.
Spain derived little permanent benefit from all this
expenditure of energy ; and the reason for this disappoint-
ing finale seems to be that the Spanish movement differed
■in toto from that of France nineteen years before. In its
essence the French Revolution was a revolt of the brain
of France against a cramping system which she h;id long
THE SPANISH NATIONAL RISING 69
outgrown. In 1808 it was not the brain, but the heart of
Spain whicli led to action ; and the action was directed
solely against foreign invaders or usurpers. The Spanish
Rising offers an example oi nationalism in its most pas-
sionate form. It is, on a large scale, the action of a family,
which seeks to expel intruders who have violated its hos-
pitality. In such a case we do not expect the family
immediately to set about the reform of its internal economy.
Long before the events of 1789 France (if we may pursue
our simile) had been outgrowing its ancestral abode, and
the call for reconstruction and refitting was imperative.
The case of Spain was utterl}' different. Therefore, to
reproach the Spaniards for not making so good a use as
the French of the opportunity offered by an outburst of
national zeal is manifestl}' unfair.
Nevertheless, the Spaniards did attempt to make some
changes, though in a somewhat hurried and one-sided way.
The defects of their procedure resulted from two dominant
facts. They had to legislate at Cadiz ; and at that city,
within sound of the roar of Marshal Soult's guns, deputies
of the unconcjuered provinces could assemble freely ; but
refugees from the large portions of territory held by the
French were accepted as representatives of those un-
fortunate towns and districts. Naturally, such a haphazard
assemblage did not evince (Qualities of prudence and good
sense, but rather of passion and prejudice. Naturally, too,
it was violently anti-Frem h ; and yet this very body,
almost of necessity, borrowed from France the ground-
w<jrk for tilt' new constitution. As the English ccmstitution
was too vague t<j appeal to Continental reformers, those of
Cadiz fell bai k upon the examplf mI by the I'ltinh ( nn-
stituent Assembly in 1791. They restricted the functions
of their future King within narrow limits ; and, copying
the pliraseology of the i^ight^ of .Man, tluy declared that
70 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
" sovereignty resided essentially in the nation." In this
view of things, Ferdinand VII, when restored, would be
merely the tirst magistrate of the land. Further, the men
of Cadiz swept away Feudalism root and branch, dissolved
the monastic Orders, and abolished the Int|uisition. This
servile imitation of the French legislators of 1789-91 at
once produced sharp friction ; and Ferdinand, after his
restoration in 1814, found it easy to abrogate this imported
constitution. Thus the misuse of the national idea by a
few extremists at Cadiz, was destined to work infinite
harm both to Spain herself and to the cause of democracy
and nationality so unwisely championed. But it is only
fair to remember that that cause had not a fair chance
amidst the storms and excitements of so wholly exceptional
an epoch.
Despite its obvious faults, the Spanish constitution of
1812 aroused much enthusiasm among neighbouring
peoples. During the period of reaction and despair which
followed the downfall of Napoleon, the " Carbonari " of
France and Italy and the " Liberales " of Spain continued
to strive for the strange compromise of 1812 ; and it took
tangible form during a few months in Spain, Portugal, and
Italy at the time of the democratic risings of 1820-2.
Those risings failed ; for the Austrian and other auto-
cratic rulers (Louis XVIII among them) intervened to
crush them ; but the memories of popular liberty in Spain
during the years 181 2-3 lived on ; and, amidst the gloom
of the time of reaction, the Spanish constitution of those
years aroused fond recollections and hopes for the future.
Especially was this so in Naples and Sicil}', where the
Spanish movement of the Napoleonic time helped on that
which is associated with the names of Mazzini and Gari-
baldi.
If the Spanish movement uf 1808-1 j bears only a super-
Tin-: SPANISH NATIONAL RISING 71
licial resemblance to that of revolutionary France, still
more did it diverge from that of Germany. W'c ha\e already
noticed one cause of that divergence, but others will now
occur to us. Napoleon imposed his supremacy on the Ger-
mans piecemeal and with some measure of caution. On
the neck of the proudest people of Europe he forced his
yoke with sudden and almost contemptuous insolence.
'Consequently, while the uprising of the Gennans was not
unlike the mounting of a tide over sandbanks, that of the
Spaniards resembled an explosion. The difference was
also due to diversities of national character and environ-
ment. The Spaniard was proud and resentful ; the German
of the eighteenth century was torpid and diffident. During
four centuries the Spaniards had formed a nation. The
average Teuton could neither remember nor imagine a
time when all his people were united. The political
helplessness of Germany led her sons to a humorous
depreciation — witness these lines of Goethe's Faust, when
the boon companions in Auerbach's cellar troll the catch : —
" The Holy Roman Empire now,
How holds it together ? "
And again : —
" Thank God, every morn,
To rule the Roman Empire, that you were not bom.
I bless my stars at least that mine is not
Either a Kaiser's or a Chancellor's lot. "
No Spaniard would ever have sung those lines about the
compact and glorious kingdom which had conquered, and
still ruled over, the greater part of the New World. Nature,
which had made the Spaniards a nation, seemed, until the
year 1812, to doom the (iermans to division and helpless-
ness. During the winter of 1807-8 Prussia's boldest son,
richte, did not counsel revolt, only a system of national
72 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
education with a view to some eventual revolt. The
German movement therefore was no flash of passion, but
rather the growth of an intellectual and moral conviction
that Germany must some day form a nation. In the spread
of that belief, which became contagious when Napoleon's
Grand Army reeled back frostbitten from Russia, lie the
unique interest and the exceptional fruitfulness of the
German movement. Heralded by a poet and a philosopher,
it uplifted the people and bore them to a higher plane of
existence. The national policy of the years 1808-13 began
by improving and inspiring the individual ; it ended by
making an intelligent and valiant nation.
The blaze of wrath which flashed forth in Spain in 1808
could not mature her national life. That life was scorched,
not ripened. No literary work of any note was forth-
coming ; and, apart from the abolition of Feudalism, no
lasting reforms resulted from the sudden and premature
efforts of that time. For lack of preparation or wise
guidance the national movement at Cadiz and Madrid
went astray, and ended in political reaction. The case of
Spain, therefore, proves that an appeal to the past, and to
a pride rooted in that past, may incite a people to great
exertions ; but, whatever their military results, they will
have no effect on its development, and may drag it back-
wards. In short, nationality in its crudest form is merely
an appeal to the emotions or passions and may arrest the
progress of a people that indulges them. Under wise and
strict control, as in the Germany of those years, it may
further the cause of progress. In the case of revolutionary
France, and still more of Spain, nationality was a narrowing
influence, begetting intolerance towards neighbours and
promoting the interests of despotism at home.
These, I think, are the conclusions to be drawn from a
survey of the Spanish movement in its wider issues. But
TH1-: SPANISH NATIONAL RISING
7i
now let us consider it, tinally, in its bearing on the Napo-
leonic Wars. In that respect its importance can scarcely
be overrated. Tlie spectacle of a nation challenging to
mortal conflict a powerful enemy that occupied her chief
cities and had hlched away her King stirred the blood of
all nations, as does the sight of gallant little Serbia holding
up against two military Empires on the North and her
perfidious neighbour on the East.^ Moreover, the success
of the Spanish efforts in the summer of 1808 at Baylen and
Saragossa roused an excitement unequalled in that genera-
tion. The spell of invincibility that had long protected
the French and bewildered their foes was broken, and
forlorn peoples caught a gleam of hope. Germany, then
writhing under the heel of Napoleon, ceased to despair.
In October, 1808, the writer, \'arnhagen von Ense, visiting
his confrere, Jean Paul Richter, heard him say that he
never doubted that the Germans would one day rise
against the French as the Spaniards had done. " The
Spaniards were the refrain to everything, and we always
returned to them." The statesman. Stein, actually pre-
pared for a popular rising in Prussia like that of Spain,
and when found out was dri\en from olfice and from
Prussia by the order of Napoleon. Austria, whose subjects
had fought against the French Iropelessly and nervelessly,
early in 1809 made a really national effort. In Ai)ril the
Archduke Charles issued this stirring appeal : " The liberty
of Europe has taken refuge under your banners. Your
victories will loose its fetters, and your brothers in
(iermany, yet in the ranks (jf the enemy, long for tin ir
deliverance."
'1 1k-s<' hopfs and asjiir;itioiis were ilirec tly tiir oiidoiin'
of the Spanish Rising. It is true Ili.it iicilhcr Spain nor
Austria succeeded in those years. The Siumiards displayed
' Tlicsc wonlb were spoken early in November, 1915.
74 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
no skill in organization and proved to be very exasperating
allies. The Austrian Government and its generals behaved
with their usual want of energy and enterprise. In both
lands the spirit of the people far excelled the conduct of
Governments and generals. But such a symptom bodes ill
for the enemy. For ultimately the energy and determina-
tion of the people will find leaders to give full effect to its
resolves; and that happened in 1813-5. By that time the
new national feelings of Spain and Germany were incarnated
in formidable armies led by the ablest of their generals.
During the four intervening years, generally marked by
defeat, the fortitude of all patriots was tried to the utter-
most. It may be well to recall the feelings of those dark
days when the Napoleonic supremacy seemed irresistible^
In May, 1809, the Quarterly Review thus described the
situation : —
" A more tremendous system never appeared for the
desolation and subjection of the world. Every country was
to be compelled in succession to furnish men for the plunder
and conquest of others. If any one nation presumed to be
dissatisfied, the population of another was to be driven to
arms to oppress it. . . . Napoleon's vast designs have been
executed with the most lavish profusion of human blood.
He cares neither for distance, famine, nor disease. ... It is
indifferent to him how many thousands of his troops drop
from mere fatigue and want. It is suificient that enough
reach the point of action to accomplish his purposes. If he
disperses the enemy, he gains a new extent of population to
drive into his ranks, and to make the instruments, however
unwilling, of new depredations. Being consumed so fast,
there is no time for mutiny and little demand for pay. For a
certain time, therefore, this terrible engine of war acts in his
favour with dreadful energy, though it is one which may
ultimately recoil upon himself."
Five weary years were to elapse before the spirit of
nationality was completely embattled. Then it overthrew
THK SPANISH NATIONAL RISING 75
tlie great Emperor. In that time of awakening the people
of Spain hokl a foremost place ; fur they dared to beard
the conqueror in his prime. Before they knew that England
wuuld help them they challenged the master of the Conti-
nent. Thus, once again, Europe showed the diversity of
racial impulses that go to make up its life. The balance
of that life lias been in succession restored by races as far
removed, as widely dissimilar, as the Franks, Dutch,
English, Swedes, Poles, Spaniards, and Russians. The
motives prompting these efforts were very different.
Byron thus outlined the Spanish Rising : " Pride points
the way to Liberty." That is true. The proud and
passionate resentment of the Spaniards Ictl the more
phlegmatic peoples of the North into the crusade that
finally overthrew the might of Napoleon. So long as
the British and Spaniards held firmly together, he could
not conquer Europe ; for it is of the very nature of World-
Policy that, sooner or later, it }novokes world-wide re-
sistance. All honour to the two nations that first dared
to offer an unbending resistance.
LECTURE V
MAZZINI AND YOUNG ITALY
" Every people has its special mission, whicli will co-operate
towards the fulfilment of the general mission of Humanity. That
mission constitutes its nationality. Nationality is sacred." —
Mazzini, 1834.
Our previous studies have, I tliink, pointed to the con-
clusion, that no popular movement has led to results of
lasting importance, unless it proceeded from some forma-
tive thought. If it be true, as Carlyle says, that the end
of man is action, not thought, it is equally true that the
beginning of all action is a thought ; and the usefulness
of the action corresponds to the correctness of the thought.
Only where the thinkers have led the masses, and led them
aright, has the resulting movement been well sustained
and healthful in its effects. Where, as in the case of the
Spanish Rising of 1808, the impulse has been that of out-
raged pride and dignity, unconnected with the deeper
convictions of the mind, little has come of it. An ex-
plosion of terrific force took place, but thereafter every-
thing tended to settle down in nearly the same condition
as before. That is nationality in its elemental form, an
almost blind impulse, which cannot lead to continued
progress, and may even retard progress.
But now we turn to a land where the popular impulse
found wise and inspiring leaders. A cynic once called
the Italian national movement " the poetry of politics."
76
MAZZIM AM) \\)INC. ITALY 77
The taunt veiled a tnitli ; for tliat inovement initiated
not only tiic poetry but the philosophy of modern politics.
Nearly all movements start as a protest against a wrong ;
and the Italian movement is ni) exception to the rule. The
people of the Peninsula struggleil against the barriers im-
posed on them by the Treaties of Vienna of 1814-5, which
divided and enslaved them. A consciousness of their one-
ness had grown among them during the Napoleonic regime,
when unity of administration and comradesliip in arms
evoked a sense of manliness and citizenshiix As Mrs.
Browning phrased it : —
" Children use the fist, until they arc of age
To use the brain, . . .
And so we needed Caisars to assist
Man's justice, and Napoleons to explain
God's counsel."
In 1S15 came the cruel awakening. On a neck straighten-
ing with national pride there now fell the yoke of two
kings, a Pope, four dukes, and, worst of all, the military
despotism of Austria in the North and North-East. It
was in vain that Italians resisted. Austria, encamped in
her Quadrilateral, and strengthened by her Italian satraps,
defied all the puny efforts of the subject race. In vain
did the Carbonari strike down a general here, a police
officer there, they could not drive out tlie white coats of
.\ustria. .\11 the tyrants made conunon cause ; and, if
one of them were in danger, the Hapsburgs sent down their
legions to restore " order." As the mandatory of tiic
Holy Alliance, Austria repressed not only every movement
f»f the people but every i)roposal of an Italian ruler to
admit them to the least share in the government. She
would neither reform herself nor let any Italian State reform
itself, for fear that lu 1 rule might seem the inon- ("lions by
78 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
the contrast. ' In fact, the House of Hapsbnrg now became
the chief barrier to national aspirations in Europe ; and
its Chancellor, Metternich, occupied the position formerly
occupied by Napoleon as the deadliest enemy of nationality.
The Hapsburgs held down their Magyar and Slavonic sub-
jects ; they barred the way to an effective union of the
German States ; above all, they played the watch-dog to
the sheepfolds in which the Italians were penned up.
Austria strove to stifle thought in her dominions, as
appeared in the injunction of the Emperor Francis to the
professors of the L^niversity of Pavia ; " Your duty is less
to make learned men than faithful subjects." Conse-
quently, every Italian patriot longed to drive the Austrians
beyond the Alps. On this topic there was practical
unanimity. On all else there were grave differences.
Putting aside smaller groups, we may single out from
the patriots three parties : (i) Those who desired the
supremacy of the Pope ; (2) those who championed the
cause of the House of Savoy ; (3) Republicans who desired
the end both of monarchy and of the Temporal Power of
the Popes, in order to frame an Italian Republic.
The first party pointed to the services which the Popes
had often rendered to the Italian cause, e.g. to the Holy
League which Julius II formed in 1510 for the expulsion
of the foreigners from Italy. Naturally enough, they left
out of count the occasions when the Papacy had sided
with foreigners against the Italian cause ; and the armed
support which was consistently claimed from Austria by
Gregory XVI during his pontificate (1831-46), alienated
the respect of all patriots. Nevertheless, the mystical
devotion of a priest, Gioberti, pointed to the Papacy as the
rallying point for Italians. This was the theme of his book,
The Moral and Civil Supremacy of the Ilalians (1843), a
1 Farini, The Roman State, I, ch. I.
MAZZINI AND Y()rN(; ITALY 79
work which made a deep impression and contributed
largely towards the election of a reforming Pope, Pius IX,
in 1846.
The second party had its headquarters at Turin, and
refused to admit a Papal hegemony. Even after the advent
of a popular and reforming pontiff, they held to the belief
that the House of Savoy alone could bring union or
complete unity to the Peninsula. They pointed to the
deep-seated abuses of clerical government in the Papal
States, where only ten per cent of the people could read ;
also to the fact that those States, stretching from the
Adriatic to the Tyrrhene Sea, cut off the North from the
South of Italy, and barred the way to political union.
Finally, they claimed that their royal house, traditionally
brave and patriotic, was tlic natural champion of Italy
against Austria, and therefore the only hope of freedonr
and independence. The monarchists of Piedmont did not
at first openly aim at national unity ; for such an avowal
would have e.xposed the House of Savoy to the charge of
mere ambition. Ostensibly, then, their aim was to federalize
Italy under the a;gis of that dynasty ; but the bolder spirits,
headed by Cavour, always kept unity before them as the
goal. Such a consummation was anathema to Gioberti
and the neo-Guelfs. Looking to the Pope as head of a
future Italian federation, they perforce rejected the idea of
Italian unity. Nationalism, however, was the very breath
of life to a third party, the Mazzinians, or Young Italy.
Joseph Mazzini, born at Genoa in 1803, matured his
precocious intelligence in the decades following Waterloo,
when Italy under\vent the torture of division antl servitude.
Endowed with a highly sensitive natun', he hated the
kings and dukes who divided and held down his people.
As he wrote in i8ji : " There is nf»t one of tlitsc princes
wlio has not signed a compact uith Austria in the Mwod of
8o LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
his subjects ; not one whose past Hfe is not a violent and
insurmountable barrier between him and the future of his
people." As for Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, his
timidity and vacillation finally brought him into the
position of a renegade to the patriotic cause ; and the
young enthusiast even connived at an attempt at his
assassination. A theist by conviction, Mazzini detested
the Papacy on religious no less than political grounds.
Further, the failure of the " moderates " in 1831, and their
cowardly abandonment by Louis Philippe, filled him with
contempt for constitutional monarchy and all political
compromises. Accordingly, during his time of exile at
Marseilles in the autumn of that year, he matured the
republican organization known as Young Italy.
The name indicates its character. Despairing of the
men of advanced years, who were nearly all " moderates " ;
despairing, too, of all help from France and England,
where dull moderation sat enthroned, Mazzini appealed
in burning words to the youth of Italy to raise the red,
white, and green flag for the Republic and for national
unity. In the first document of the Association he ex-
plained what he meant by a nation and also the Italian
nation : " By the nation we understand the totality of
Italians bound together by a common pact and governed
by the same laws." This definition marks a great advance
on that of Fichte and all previous thinkers. The only
objection to it is the emphasis which it lays on Rousseau's
idea of a common pact, which is certainly not essential
to the forming of a nation.
Equally significant are the boundaries of the future
Italian State. They will be from the River Var, in Nice,
to Trieste on the North-East, and will comprise the Tren-
tino ; also " the islands proved Italian by the language
of the inhabitants." This description would include
MAZZINI AND YOING ITALY 8i
Corsica and several islands of the Adriatic ; but it is
worthy of note that Mazzini did not claim for Italy the
Dalmatian coast-line, which he knew to be Slavonic, not
Italian. Though there is a veneer of Italian culture in some
of the towns on the coast, yet the great body of the popula-
tion is Slavonic, closely akin to the Serbs, or, in the North,
to the Croats. It is, therefore, certain that Mazzini, if he
were now alive, would heartily approve of Italy attacking
Austria in order to recover the Trentino and Trieste ; but
he would disapprove of those eager patriots who hanker
after the Dalmatian coast because it once belonged to
^'enice. In his eyes the historic argument weighs light
as against the instincts of the people concerned. We
can imagine his scorn at the argument that Italy nmst have
Dalmatia because she has no good harbour in the Adriatic.
He decides the question on the ground of nationalit\-, nut
on the naval considerations which have so often worked
mischief. He claims for Italy only those islands where
the inhabitants are Italian. Thus his nationalism is
thoroughly fair as between Itnlians and Slavs. He leaves
the Slavonic islands and all the lands East of the Adriatic
to the Slavs ; and, if the Italians are wise enough to recog-
nize that those islands and all the Dahiiatian coast arc
properly Slavonic, not Italian, Europe will avoid complica-
tions that may in the future lead to war.
Mazzini then explained that Italy ought to be a Repub-
lic, because there were no truly monarchical elements in the
Peninsula, and her best epochs were those of republican rule
I-iirther, an Italian monarchy would be reduced to bargain
with and imitate other Courts ; whereas Mazzini iletested
compromise with and imitation of foreigners, as certain
to weaken and degrade Italy's mission to mankind. His
soaring idealism also rejected both the fi-deral s< ju'ines and
insisted on unity as the aim of It;ili,ni strivings. The Poj.e
82 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
in the centre, the two kings at the extremities, the Aus-
trians in the North-East and their four ducal satraps — all
must go, because they hindered that absolutely free inter-
course of the people which was essential to the full develop-
ment of the Italian Family. To divide it up under eight
different governments would be equivalent to tying the
body-politic with so many ligaments fatal to the free circu-
lation of the blood.
Mazzini had boundless faith in human nature and its
lofty destinies. In his view the life of the human race
was essentially one. True, there were great differences
between this and that race. He never held Fichte's early
opinion, that all the nations were alike, and followed the
same aims. He regarded them as members of the great
human family, not rivals engaged in ceaseless com-
petition and strife. He also hoped that, if the members
were allowed free play, they would come to see their true
interests towards each other and to the family of which they
formed a part. But, said he, they could not see this truth
if they led a cramped and artificial existence. Therefore,
Italy must attain to her free life, not for any selfish pur-
pose ; certainly not in order to invade and despoil her
neighbours, but rather that she may minister to their
welfare. She will gain unity for the purpose of carrying
out her mission to other nations.
As to the nature of that mission Mazzini nowhere gave
a definite answer. In the programme of Young Italy he
pointed out that Europe was undergoing a series of changes
destined to transform European Society into large and
compact masses. The large States, or federations of
States, were absorbing small States ; large towns were
growing at the expense of small towns or villages : the
big factory was superseding the small w^orkshop and
cottage industries. What would be the upshot of it all ?
MAZZixi Axn ynrxG itai.y 83
Would the new agglomerations be peaceful or aggressive,
healthy or noxious? That was an urgent question, and
it still is. How Italy could lu'lp to solve these political and
social problems Mazzini does not explain. Later on, he felt
his way towards a partial answer. Meanwhile he insisted
on Italy gaining an unfettered existence. This he defined
as follows : '" Without unit}' of religious belief and unity
of social pact ; without unity of civil, political, and penal
legislation, there is no true nation."
The ideal is lofty. Unity of religious belief is hard to
attain and keep in the modern world ; and it is strange
that one who had broken away from the Roman Catholic
Church should postulate it as essential. Again, legal
unity is desirable, but scarcely attainable without doing
violence to local customs. Mazzini's requirements would
also rule out Switzerland froiu the list of nations. Yet,
as we have seen, the Swiss form a nation. His aim, doubt-
less, was to hold up a lofty ideal which should inspire
Piedmontese, Venetians, Tuscans, Romans, and Nea-
politans with a passion for self-sacrifice. Nothing short of
utter self-sacrifice could nerve them to the colossal task
of breaking their eight prison-houses and forming a national
home. What a task ! To expel Austria, to destroy the
Temporal Power of the Papacy, and to dethrone six Italian
sovereigns. What wonder that he pitched his aims high !
The fault of all his predecessors lay in their proneness to
bargain and compromise— tactics wliicli gained some out-
side help but stifled the enthusiasm of Italia's sons. Maz-
zini sought to arouse that enthusiasm. It throbs in every
sentence of the oath whi( h N'oung lt;il\' im|)osed at
initiation : — ■
" In the name of (iod an<l <.l ll;il\-. In ilic name of all the
martyrs of the holy Italian cause who lia\e fallen beneath
foreign and domestic tyranny. . . . I'y ilie l<i\e J bear to
84 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
the country that gave my mother birth, and will be the home
of my children. . . . By the blush that rises to my brow when
I stand before the citizens of other lands, to know that I have
no rights of citizenship, no country, and no national Hag.
By the memory of our former greatness, and the sense of our
present degradation. By the tears of Italian mothers for their
sons dead on the scaffold, in prison, or in exile. By the
sufferings of the millions — I swear to dedicate myself wholly
and for ever to strive to constitute Italy one free, independent,
republican nation."
Such was the enterprise undertaken by a group of penni-
less Itahan exiles at Marseilles in the autumn of 1831.
They aimed at arousing Italians, whether in Italy or South
America, ^ to a sense of duty to the nation ; and out of their
slender means they started a journal. Young Italy. When
expelled from France by Louis Philippe's Government,
they sought refuge in Switzerland ; and a few of them
attempted a raid into Piedmont which completely failed.
In fact, most of their undertakings were so ill-timed and
imprudent, as to lead to a useless effusion of blood. But
nothing could long daunt Mazzini. Whether hunted about
Switzerland, or vegetating in distress among Itahan organ-
grinders in Hatton Garden, he (with the exception of some
dark hours of doubt and despair) maintained a firm resolve
to persevere in his quest.
This fixed determination was fed from diverse sources.
His nature, though intensely nervous and far from strong,
was singularly buoyant. It rallied soon, even after trials
and reverses that depressed men of sounder physique.
His mind, too, possessed that sharp edge, that rigid grip,
which fortified him against disappointment. Under soft
and almost feminine features there worked a powerful
brain, a steel-like will. Moreover, his personality brought
^ In Uruguay, Joseph Garibaldi (born at Nice in 1807) was won
back for the Italians by Mazzini 's propaganda.
MAZZIM AM) VOLNG ITALY S5
him troops of friends. His conversation charmed and
dehghted all who came near him. Men so diverse in
character as Carl vie, George Meredith, and Joseph Cowen
of Newcastle, acknowledged the spell of his presence.
Meredith, in Viitoriii, speaks ecstatically of his " large,
soft, dark, nieditative eyes." which drew in the soul of the
observer into the midst of a " capacious and vigorous
mind " ; of his smile which " came softly as a cur\e in
water," which " seemed to flow with and to pass in and
out of his thoughts, to be a part of his emotion and his
meaning when it shone transiently full. For, as he had
an orbed mind, so he had an orbed nature." Mrs. Hamilton
King, in that inspired poem, The Disciples, tells enthusiasti-
cally how
" the orb of that great human soul
Did once deflect and draw this orb of mine
Until it touched and trembled on the hnc
By whicli my orbit crossed tlic plane of his."
And Swinburne, in .1 Sow^ of Italy, hails him as the
first of her liberators. He hjmns the Italians as :
" Thy children, cv'n thy people thou hast made,
Tliine, with Ihy words arrayed.
Clothed with thy thoughts, and girt with thy desires,
Yearn up towards thee like lires."
Not that Mazzini was devoid of faults of character. They
were the excess of his (lualities, but some of theiit were
serious. His convictions were so intense as to blind him
often to the good advice of others. Hence he was often
intolerant towards tlujse who differed from him. lint
these defects belong rather to Mazzini, tlir man of action,
than to Mazzini, the thinker ; and we are concerntMl solely
with his political Ihouglil, not witli liis many alioiti\f
conspiracies or even with his highest ai hievement , Hk
administration (jf the Roman k<'pul)li< ol i.S4(^.
86 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
In this sphere of thought he had one great advantage
over his German predecessors. They were so obsessed by
the idea of the State as to work their way tardily and
doubtfully to the idea of the nation. This was natural.
In modern Germany the Prussian State overshadowed
everything else ; and under it the German nation loomed
nebulous. Therefore, the German thinkers on nationality
(except during the ill-starred democratic efforts of 1848-9)
tended to Prussianize their notions and often became hide-
bound bureaucrats. Not so with the Italians. They were
not overshadowed by the Sardinian State ; and they de-
tested every other State of the Peninsula. Consequently,
the political thought of Italy was free from the distracting
influence of the State idea. The Italian thinkers, including
Balbo, Cavour, Mamiani, and Gioberti, saw the nation
clearly ; and for them the State was merely the concrete
embodiment of the national idea. In Germany the national
idea was Prussianized, to its infinite harm. The Italian
idea was never in danger of being Sardinianized ; though
Mazzini, amidst the disappointments of old age, declared
that to have been its fate.
During his manhood, Mazzini not only saw clearly, but
believed absolutely in, the nation. The story of Italy's
past as well as her natural tendencies to unity combined
to nurture in him a profound belief in her future. In
common with all thinkers who have exercised a lasting
influence on their fellows, he was pre-eminently a man of
faith ; and his creed for Italy aroused a unique fervour,
because it formed part of a far wider creed — the Gospel of
Humanity. Nowhere does he describe the creed in set
terms. No prophet ever does. But we catch a glimpse of
his meaning in these words : —
" When in my earhest years I believed that the initiative
of the third life of Europe would spring from the heart, the
MAZZIXI AND YOUNG ITALY Sy
action, the enthusiasm, and the sacrifices of our people, 1
heard within me the grand voice of Rome sounding once
again ; its utterances treasured up and accepted with loving
reverence by the peoples, and telhng of moral unity and
fraternity in a faith common to all Humanity. ... I saw
Rome in the name of God and a republican Italy substituting
a Declaration of Principles for the sterile Declaration of
Rights ; . . . and I saw Europe, weary of scepticism, egotism,
and anarchy, accept the new faith with acclamations."
The Genoese republican here speaks almost with the
tongue of the old monarchist of Florence. This neo-
Roman creed is a modern version of the Dc MoiKirchid of
Dante. Rome (not the ci>ty of the Popes but the centre
of a world-republic) calls the peoples about her to listen
to the voice of faith and authorit3^ faith in the perfectibility
of man, authority inherent in the genius of the eternal
City. A dream, you will say. Well ! a glorious dream.
It inspired Mazzini to struggle on through a life full of
disaster, until, as he breathed his last at Pisa in 1872, his
ideals lay shattered by collision with coarse reality. That
faith must have been intense which impelled him forward,
ami w hich, working through him, impelled many thousands
of Italians to endure prison, exile, torture, and execution
for the cause. An intense faith like his evades mere
analysis. Cold criticism misses the soul of it. If we ask
— What do you mean by your neo-Romanism ? — \vc
receive an inadequate answer. The disciple may reply —
Rome has twice given laws to the world, once through the
matchless organization of the old ILnipire, and again
through tin- decrees of the Church ; therefore she is
destined a third time to initiate an eia for mankind.
" Not proven," the logician will say. " Contrary to the
tendencies of Vatican policy," the historian will say.
Mazzini and his disciples ignored both objectors. The
eye of faith saw Rome rid herself of N'aticunism and w ilh
Sa LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
magical power gather Italians about her in order to revivify
the life of all peoples.
The conception was not wholly visionary. Mazzini was
convinced that French democrats at the time of the
great Revolution had gone utterly astray. That is the
meaning of his phrase, " the sterile Declaration of Rights,"
a reference to the Declaration of the Rights of Man drawn
up by the Constituent Assembly in August-September,
1789. In its place Rome, the true birth-place of law, was
to sound forth a Declaration of the Duties of Man.
This is the bed-rock of Mazzinian doctrine. Let us test
it. He declares the French Rights of Man to be sterile ;
and elsewhere he terms that programme false, hurtful, the
mother of selfishness and strife. Thus, in Faith and the
Future (1835) • — ■
" Right! is the faith of the individual. Duty is the common
collective faith. Right can but organize resistance ; it may
destroy, it cannot found. Duty builds up, associates, and
unites ; it is derived from a general law, whereas Right is
derived onl}^ from human will. There is nothing, therefore,
to forbid a struggle against Right. Any individual may rebel
against any Right of another individual which is injurious
to him ; and the sole judge between the adversaries is force ;
and such, in fact, has frequently been the answer which
societies based upon Right have given to their opponents.
Societies based upon Duty would not be compelled to have
recourse to force. Duty, once admitted as the rule, excludes
the possibility of struggle, and by rendering the individual
subject to the general aim, it cuts at the very root of those
evils which Right is unable to prevent. . . . The doctrine
of Rights puts an end to sacrifice and cancels martyrdom from
the world."
Such is the moral elevation of this teaching that we are
apt at first to overlook its good sense. But students of the
■• Mazzini in this passage uses the term " liight " as equivalent
to " The theory of individual Rights."
MAZZIM AM) VorNC. ITALY Sq
French Revolution, who look beneath the surface of
events, will realize tiie truth of Mazzini's criticism. The
fact that the reformers of 1789 laid stress only upon the
Rights of Man produced at once the wrong kind of impres-
sion both on the deputies and the people at large. They
were led to regard politics as a struggle in which you seize
what you can for your class and yourself. In the course
of such a struggle the rights of others are disregarded ; they
resist ; and the only method of deciding the issue is in the
last resort by tumult or by ci\il war. To emphasize the
rights of the individual in the sunmier of 17S9, when the
old order was vanishing amid the flare of burning castles,
was the very worst training for the young French
democracy ; for it accentuated the egotism of the time,
which needed to be kept under restraint. In the absence
of the old authorit}-, the only method of preserving order
was a sense of civic duty, which would prescribe first and
foremost a feeling of regard for the common weal, a con-
viction that the new democratic system nmst be based on
the loyalty and self-restraint of the masses. Some deputies
(e.g. the Abbe Gregoire and Camus) realized this all-im-
portant truth. Mounier's connnittee on the constitution
proposed an article (coming just after the definition of
Rights) which thus defined duty: " The duty of everyone
consists in respecting the rights of others." But the
Assembly struck out this article and also another phrase
binding them to prescribe tlir Duties ul Man. A motion
of Canms to that effect was defeated on August 4 by 570
votes to 4JJ. One mendx'r went so far as to say that the
fluties of man spring naturally from his rights- -a disastrous
blunder, whi< h was to cost l-'rani c dear.' Its result was
s«»ii in the rampiint indi\idiialisiii ol (lie lollowing UKtntlis,
when politics degenerated into a game of grab and the
' JJiil. patlctncntairc dc la Jiiv. Jrauiaiic, II, 177, m-i.
90 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
Revolution into a tug - of - war between hostile parties.
The tendencies towards anarchy were quickened ; and
seeing that anarchy leads, sooner or later, to a military
despotism, Mazzini scarcely exaggerated when he summed
up the dynamics of the time in this suggestive formula :
" The French Revolution, having begun with a Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man, could end only in a man. Napo-
leon."
The French Revolution, running in this vicious circle,
fatally prejudiced the success of the democratic experi-
ment. Mazzini maintained that it merely closed an old
era, the era of individuahsm, and did not initiate the new
era, the era of collective energies inspired by duty. This,
then, was to be the mission of Italy. Looking back over
her annals, blood-stained but ennobled by the unceasing
self-sacrifice of her best sons, he believed that so much
suffering must lead to a noble consummation. Community
in suffering had weakened the old local feelings : the glory
of dying for la patria had aroused generous feelings which
would banish political egotism. Italy, therefore, was the
chosen land of the future ; and from Rome would sound
forth the gospel of duty which Paris had stifled. This is
the essence of Mazzini's faith — no blind instinct, but a
belief based on knowledge of the past. France had lost
her opportunity. England was a land of timid com-
promise. From Italy, when fully aroused, would come the
life-giving message, that all the peoples were bound to-
gether by the sacred tie of duty towards Humanity.
Mazzini believed that this inspiring ideal would widen
the outlook of Italian patriots. They must be true patriots
in order to deaden petty local jealousies. But they would
not cast the slough of provincialism in order to encase
themselves in the mail of patriotism. The idea of duty
must reign in the national sphere. The Italian Republic
MAZZIM AND YOUNT. ITALY 91
of the future must consult, not its own interests primaril}',
but those of all nations, an ideal which would finally sterilize
national rivalries. Or, as he developed the theme in his
Didics of Mil n (1858), family duty saves a man from being
hide-bound in egotism ; the national idea ought to exorcize
merely family or clan selhshness ; while duty to mankind
will raise national patriotism on to that higher level where
wars of aggrandisement become impossible. As he pithily
phrased it : " You are men before you are citizens or
fat hers."'
On the other hand, he reminded those who sneered at
patriotism, and put their trust only in cosmopolitanism,
that theirs was a futile creed. How can 3'ou attain to the
vague and vast ideal of Humanity unless you have midway
some intemiediate form of association ? How can in-
dividuals, as mere units, move the world ? Of course, the
thing is impossible save to a handful of idealists. The
niasscs must have something tangible to work on. To take
a parallel case. The nation can effectively exist only where
men are hrst banded together in towns and counties. Be-
cause narrow-minded peoj)le cannot see beyond their town
or county, you do not therefore abolish the organization
of the town or county. You retain that organization and
seek to widen their outlook, so that tlie Yorkshireman or
the Devonshireman may attain to the nobler pride of being
an Englishman. During long ages tribe fought with tribe,
county with county, then Scots with Knglish. Bui Ihc
tendency, though painfully slow, is sure, which endows
men with the wider vision; and then these local strifes of
Irish and linglish, \'enetians and Genoese, Lombards and
Tuscans, seem absurd. They die of themselves because men
have gained th<- bnjadcr \iew, and use these local senti-
ments as means of attaining to a higher Ie\el than would
' Mazzini, Duties nj Man (I:.VLTyinau edit. J, ch. 5.
92 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
be possible if they sought to reach it by a single bound.
The cosmopolitan, who sneers at his country and raves
about Humanity, is like a man who disdains the use of
stairs and seeks to leap to the first floor. Such efforts
have always failed. To ignore the tremendous force of
nationality, and grasp at a vague cosmopolitanism by
means of groups and unions, is to bridge the torrent by
gossamer, as recent events have shown. No ! The true
line of advance is, not to sneer at nationality and decry
patriotism, but to try to utilize those elemental forces by
imparting to them a true aim, instead of the false aim
which has deluged Europe with blood.
No part of Mazzini's teaching is sounder than that which
deals with the necessity of recognizing the patriotic in-
stinct as fundamental to human nature, and also of edu-
cating and directing it to nobler ends than those to which
it has so often been perverted. To the Italian working-
men, some of whom were running after cosmopolitan
will-o'-the-wisps, he gave this wise advice : " Do not be
led away by the idea of improving your material conditions
without first solving the national question. You cannot
do it." And again : " In labouring, according to true
principles, for our country we are labouring for Humanity.
Our country is the fulcrum of the lever which we have to
wield for the common good. If we give up this fulcrum,
we run the risk of becoming useless both to our country and
to Humanity." 1
On the question of assuring political unity to his divided
and oppressed countrymen, Mazzini accepted no com-
promise. He would not hear of a federalized Italy, vege-
tating under the shadow of the Vatican. On the surface
that scheme of Gioberti (outlined above) seemed easy to
realize ; and in 1846, when the reforming Pope Pius IX
^ Mazzini, Duties uf Man, pp. 54, ^^.
MAZZIXI AND YOUNG ITALY 03
was elected, its chances seemed roseate. Gioberti npponlod
to history and tradition as proving that ItaHans needed a
large measure of freedom of action in local affairs ; and
he summed up his contention in these impressive words :
" To suppose that Italy, divided as she has been for many
centuries, can peacefully submit to the rule of one man is
mere folly. To desire that it should come about by violent
means is a crime."
Well ! The folly has been committed. The crime has
been perpetrated. The impossible has come to pass.
Thanks to the fiery zeal kindled by Mazzini ; thanks also
to the sword of Victor Emmanuel, the diplomacy of
Cavour. and the self-sacrificing heroism of Garibaldi, Italy
is united, tiiough not in the fomi of a Republic. The
causes of tiie failure of the Republic do not concern us
here. The ideal of Mazzini was unattainable, but not
because the Italians rejected it. On the contrary, they
rallied to it enthusiastically and in large numbers. In
the early half of 1849, when Mazzini was the leading
Triumvir of the Roman Republic, with Garibaldi as virtual
commander of the troops ; when also brave Manin and the
\'cnetians kept the banner of the Republic flying against
the shot and shell of Austria, there was some ground for
hoping that the cause of Young Italy would survive. All
depended on the action of the young French Republic ;
and if that Government had granted the support wliidi
Mazzini at first expected, France and Italy might have
expelled Austria's white coats, as they did ten years later.
The fate of Young Italy was sealed when the French Re-
j)ublic {ar rather its President, Louis Najioleon) attacked
the Roman R(j)ubli< , while Austria W(»re down the de-
fenders of \'eni<e. The Itahan Republic was crushed by
foreign inter\'ention ; and the Judas of tin time was
I^ouis Napoleon.
94 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
Nevertheless, though Young Italy lay crushed in the
summer of 1849 > though Mazzini and Garibaldi barely
escaped with their lives ; though French bayonets sup-
ported the Pope at the Vatican, and the white coats of
Austria terrorized the North, Italy did not die. She lay
stunned and bleeding under the heels of the autocrats,
Napoleon III and Francis Joseph. But she had caught
life-giving words that were more potent than the bayonet
and the gibbet. Garibaldi had shown that her sons could
fight on equal terms with the best troops in Europe. The
" honest King," Victor Emmanuel, was a centre of hope ;
and his Minister, Cavour, sought by all possible means to
remedy the disasters of 1849 by pitting France against
Austria. He succeeded ; and the Italian monarchy of
to-day is largely the outcome of his masterly statecraft.
Even Cavour and Victor Emmanuel, however, would not
have succeeded but for the faith and enthusiasm kindled
by Mazzini. Men who are nerved by a conviction of the
justice and beneficence of their cause arc not daunted by
one or two disasters. As Mazzini wrote after the surrender
of Rome to the French : " What was failure to men who
were imbued with our beliefs? "
That faith was rooted more deeply than in a merely
national patriotism. The men of Young Italy shed their
blood, not merely that their country might gain the unity
she so much needed, but in order to assure her civilizing
mission to mankind at large. They caught a vision of
other peoples freed and regenerated. In words which are
prophetic, if not for his day, then perhaps for ours, Mazzini
thus outlined the future : " The map of Europe will be re-
made. The countries of the peoples will arise, defined by
the voice of the free, upon the ruins of the countries of
kings and privileged castes. Between these countries there
will be harmony and brotherhood. . . . Then each of you,
MAZZINI AND YOrXG ITALY (15
strong in the affections and aid of many millions of men
speaking the same language and educated in the same
historic tratlition, may hope by your personal effort to
benefit the whole of Humanity."
Yes : the map of Europe is now to be remade. The re-
making can proceed on two methods ; either on force or
on a sense of duty ; either on ihc military results and the
calculations deduced therefrom, or according to the dic-
tates of justice and enlightened common sense. If tlie
peace of the year 1916 or 1917 be merely the law of the
strongest, expressed in terms of their actual losses and
hoped-for gains, it will be the parent of future wars. If,
however, the settlement be dictated by a deep sense of
public dutv both towards the present and future genera-
tions, then the future may prove to be that which the
prophetic eye of Mazzini discerned.
LECTURE VI
THE AWAKENING OF THE SLAVS
There is a homely saying, " It takes all kinds of people
to make the world." And this, which is said of individuals,
is equally true of the peoples. The richness of the life of
Europe is due mainly to the variety of its races and to
their strong individuality. Their competition in the
spheres of thought and action, even their collisions in war,
are healthier than the stagnation produced by the dead
uniformity of the life of pre-reform China. Even to-day,
surely, it is true :
" Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay."
To dash off the characteristics of the European peoples
would lead merely to smart epigrams, and I will not
attempt it. It is impossible to assess correctly the pecu-
liarities even of the subdivisions of the great family which
we are now attempting to study. But there is a general
likeness about all the Slavs, especially those who still
remain in the great plain of East Europe.
Those wind-swept steppes, where winter fastens a relent-
less grip for five months and then breaks into a brief spring
and an almost torrid summer, beget extremes of character.
The long and bitter cold fosters the virtues of toughness
and endurance, also of firm comradeship. For the millions
of Russian peasants life is a stern struggle, and only by
holding stoutly together in their Mir, or village commune^
96
THK AWAKKMXc. OF THE SLA\^
07
have tlicy survived. The drought of summer is equally
to be dreaded. A prey, therefore, to extremes of climate,
the peasant develops a tenacity unequalled except among
races that struggle against the sea ; and there is in the
landsman of the East more of resignation and melancholy
than is found among the seamen of the ^\'cst. When the
Muscovite has fought on to the vcr}' end and knows he
is beaten, he lies down and dies with the fatalism of the
Asiatic. The Slavs, essentially an emotional people, have
been moulded by this life of extremes. Both they, their
literature, and their music are intense and passionate ;
but an undertone of melancholy pervades even their
outbursts and their excesses. It is the grund-)no{{v of the
Russian winter.
Their great enemy of peace time is also tlieir best friend
in war time. From the dawn of history- in the daj's of
Herodotus the dwellers in the great plains have, with
the aid of this fearsome ally, worsted all invaders. Darius,
the Tartars, the Poles, Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon
(shall I add Hindcnburg ?) recoiled, shattered. On the
other hand, the plain-dwellers have been remarkable for
a certain want of enterprise in war. In campaigns far from
home they have rarely been formidable, except against
Turks and Tartars. Russia, while strong for defence, is
weak for offence. She resembles Antaus rather than
Hercules. Ibr j)eople and her Governiiunt lack the
resourcefulness, foresight, and organizing capacity needful
for the success of distant expeditions. Professor Brandes
goes so far as to say: " Passivity shows itself in Ihcir
public and private life, in the submission to the powers that
be. , , , Though the Russians are a brave and a remark-
ably steadfast peo])Ic in war, they are the most peaceful
and unwarlike people in the world."'
* G. 15ran(Ji-s, Impressions of Russia, p. 20.
II
98 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
This is a little exaggerated ; for Russian Tsars have
given rein to warlike ambitions ; and their people have
followed them ; but the people themselves cling to their
homes, to their creed, and to the old ways. From the time
when the Greek colonists of the North Euxine gazed with
terror on the Scythian tribes moving about in their quaint
caravans, those barbarians were far less formidable than
they appeared. Only when pressed from the East, in the
Dark Ages, did they or their successors send forth swarms
that overran Europe. Considering her vast bulk, Russia
has played a curiously small part in European history.
Her natural trend was towards Asia rather than Central
Europe ; and she rarely moved westwards except after
attacks from the west.
The first event that thoroughly aroused her from
Oriental torpor was the invasion of Napoleon in 1812.
Untaught by his failure to break down the resistance of
the Spaniards, he strove to wear them out in the South-
West and the Muscovites in the North-East, though
in both cases he confronted an enraged people, unconquer-
able if only they would persevere. The life of Russia was
widespread, impalpable, scattered through myriads of
villages, each of which, thanks to the Mir, was a self-
sufficing unit. So soon as these units were resolutely of
one mind, the only thing left for the invader was — to
decamp.
Among the many perversities of that curious book,
Power and Liberty, Tolstoi hit upon an undoubted truth,
that Napoleon's Grand Army had to leave Moscow because
the peasants burnt their corn and fodder rather than let
the French have it. The triumph was essentially a national
triumph ; and the spirit of the Russian troops led even
single individuals to attack the French during the long
retreat. In a military sense, the Russian pursuit was often
THK AWAIvKXLXd ( »1- illi: >LA\N 99
tardy and ineffective ; but General Winter ditl liis work
thoroughly ; antl tiic Russian people have ne\er lost the
feeling of pritle in that owrthrow d the great Emperor.
It was in Spain and Russia that lie encountered forces
beyond even his power, the strength of a truly national
resistance.
As in Spain, hu\\e\cr, the new patriotism was soon
diverted into reactionary paths. The Tsar, Alexander I,
drifted away from the Liberalism of his youth ; and,
worst of all, he did not keep troth with the Poles. That
gifted people had done and suffered much for Napoleon ;
and in I1S14-5 Alexander held out to them the hope of a
national kingdom under his suzerainty. The autonomous
Kingdom of Poland soon xanished, antl Alexander's
suzerainty became a despotism. Since then there has been
no real union of sentiment between Poles antl Russians,
and tiie latent hostility of the Poles to Russia is, perhaps,
the chief of the weaknesses of that Empire. That huge
organism has never been thoroughly unified. It is an
agglomerate, in which the Great Russians of the North and
North Centre predominate ; but their hard and practical
nature consorts ill with the more sensitive Little Russians
of the South, the Poles of the West, and the Finns of the
North-West. Whether these peoples will ever cordially
unite is one of the problems of the future. Certainly, the
autocracy has failed t(» unite them. Perhaps this war,
and after the war, democracy, will accomplish the feat.
Russian enthusiasts are confident that democracy will
succeed where despotism has failed. In this respect the
development of Russia jjresents a signal contrast to that
of Prussia and (iermany, wlii( h has been \-itally connected
with the Houm; of llohenzcjllern. That House has unified
the German j)eoplc, and, since unification, has drilled them
with Prussian rigour. Whatever be the faults of the
100 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
Tsardom, it has not cast all the Russians into the same
mould ; but perhaps the failure to unify them results from
the lack of cohesion which has always marked the Slav
peoples. They have attained to a racial feeling, but not to
the wider feeling which may be tenned national.
The centrifugal tendencies of the Slavs of the Austrian
Empire are also very marked. Limiting our attention
here to the South Slavs, we notice that the awakening of
their national sentiment somewhat preceded that of the
Russians. Nature and the current of events had alike
been unfavourable to the South Slavs. Their furthest off-
shoots on the South-West had settled in the mountainous
country a little to the North-East and East of the Adriatic.
Those living north of Trieste and around Laybach are
termed Slovenes ; those further East are Croats ; those
to the South-East, Serbs. The Slovenes are almost com-
pletely cut off from the Adriatic by a thin but tough belt
of Italians around Trieste ; and the Croats and Serbs, who
stretch as far as that sea, have long been severed from it
politically by the Venetian Republic and by its heir,
Austria. Those Powers kept a tight hold on the coast line
and rigorously subjected the Slavonic population. It has
never been Italianized, still less Austrianized. These
Slavs, cut off from effective use of the sea, and divided
between Hapsburg, Venetian, and Ottoman rule, remained
in a state of torpor until about the time of the French
Revolution, when the blows dealt by the Republican armies
to Venice and Austria awakened the Slovenes and Croats.
Already the latter had resisted the attempts of the Magyars
to denationalize them. In the Hungarian Diet the proud
nohiles began to use the Magyar tongue instead of Latin.
The Croat deputies resisted ; and in 1805 the Bishop of
Agram advocated the use of the Slavonic tongue in public
speech and documents. Thus the national sentiment of
THE AWAKF.XING OF THE SLAVS loi
the South Sla\s was tirst excited by Magyar aggressions at
the expense of their mother-tongue.
Next, the blows of Napoleon fell on the House of Haps-
burg. After Austerlitz he compelled Austria to cede
East \'enetia, Istria, and part of Dahnatia to his new
Kingdom of Italy. After the campaign of Wagram, he
forced her to give up the lands which he styled the Illyrian
Provinces, and they formed part of the French Empire
during the \-cars 1S09-13. Marshal Marmont, the new
Governor, introduced the Code Napoleon antl many of the
benefits of the French administration. The effects were very
marked. These South Slavs, previously divided and mis-
governed, now entered into a large and generous polity.
The French encouraged the official use of the Slovene and
Croat languages, which had previously been proscribed ;
and a new national feeling was aroused by newspapers and
books written in the \ernacular. Sucli was the gratitude
of these downtrodden peoples to the French Emperor
that the poet \'odnik sang his praises in an ode, entitled
Risen Illyria : " Napoleon has said ' Awake : arise,
lUyria.' She wakes, she sighs — ' Who recalls me to the
light ? O great hero, is it thou who wakest me ? Thou
reachest to me thy mighty hand ; thou liftest me up.'
. . . ' Resting one hand on Gaul, 1 gi\e the other to
Greece that I may save her. At the head of Greece is
Corinth ; in the centre of Europe is Ill}ria. Corinth is
called the eye of Greece. Illyria shall be the jewel of the
whole world.' " On the fall of Napoleon, the Slovenes again
reverted to .Austria, and the Croats to Hungary. Again the
.Magyiirs began their attempts to Magyari/.e, but encoun-
tered an ecjually oljstinate resistance, the Croat and Serb
provinces declaring their C(iuality of rights with the Hun-
garian. They were sister j)rovinccs, not daughter provinces. '
' I.cgcr, Austro-Iluni^ary. p .} jo : Soton W.ilsoii, I he Si>iitlu)ii
iilav Queilion, jjp, 25-9.
102 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
When part of an oppressed people gains the boon of
self-expression it is natural that the other part, which is
still gagged, should struggle ceaselessly. Already the Serbs
had striven valiantly against Turkish tyranny. They
never despaired of casting off their vassalage to the infidel ;
for deep in their hearts was the memory of the glorious
days of King Dushan, who, about 1350, ruled over all the
lands from Philippopolis to Agram, and southwards as
far as Corinth. Serbia was then the most powerful State
of South-East Europe, and owned ports on the iEgean
and Adriatic. At the capital, Uskub, Dushan held a
splendid Court, Greeks, Bulgars, even the proud Magyars
bowing before Serb supremacy. This promising civilization
fell at one blow. The Turks burst upon it and levelled it
to the ground at the Battle of Kossovo (1389). A legend,
preserved ever since in ballad form, tells how the fate of
Serbia and of Christendom was decided by the treachery
of a Serb chieftain, Vuk Brankovich, who, at the crisis
of the struggle, rode over to the infidels with 12,000
panoplied horsemen. Whether true or not, that story
struck deep into the hearts of the Serbs. During five
centuries of slavery the exploits of Dushan and Milosh
were handed down by minstrels {gosslayi), who secretly
assembled the peasants and sang to them of the great days
when Serbs gave the law to Bulgar and Greek, and fell
beneath the Moslem yoke only because of treachery within
the fold. Thus a consciousness of superiority lingered on,
inspiring the belief that, if ever they had a chance, they
would beat back the infidel to Asia and renew the ancient
glories of Uskub. A people that cherishes those historic
memories can never be altogether enslaved. The fire of
patriotism, though choked down, will smoulder on ; and
a spark may bring it to a flame.
That spark, as we have seen, was blown eastwards from
THE AWAKENING OF THE SLAVS 103
Italy and Croatia. The exploits of Napoleon and the fall
of \'enice and Austria sent a tlirill through the Slavonic
world ; and the Serbs challenged the supremacy of the
Turks. At that time the Ottoman Empire was rent
asunder by revolts of local pashas and of that pii\ ileged
military caste, the Janissaries. The Serb peasants there-
fore won many successes ; and the invasion of Turkey
by the Russians in 1S09 promised for a time to lead to the
expulsion of the Turks from Europe. In 1812 the Russians
had to withdraw in order to meet Napoleon's Grand Army ;
but, as formerly in 1791, they had spread far and wide
the hope that the great Slav brother would free his " little
brothers," the Roumans, Bulgars, and Serbs. By the
treaty of 1812 Russia wrested from the Turks the boon of
autonomy for the Roumans, together with certain pri\i-
leges for tlie Serbs. These last w^ere soon revoked by the
ever faithless Turks, who sought to cow the Serbs by
impaling or brutal floggings. They failed. An enterprising
Serb peasant, Milosh Obrenovich, proclaimed a general
rising on Palm Sunday, 1815, worsted the enemy and ex-
torted the right to bear arms.
In the sequel the Ottomans might, perhaps, have over-
whelmed the Serbs but for the risings of the Greeks, the
revolts of the Janissaries, and the Russian invasion of
1829. The rapid advance of the Russians as far as Adrian-
ople spread dismay among the Turks ; and Sultan
Mahmud II made peace with Russia, conceding among
other tilings further rights to the Serbs. Thus a second time
Russia befriended the Slavs of the Balkans, and they (the
Bulgars included) acknowledged her as their champion,
Jn 1842 Serbia (now enlargi-d) refashi(jned her p<)i)ular
Assembly, so that what had been merely a mass meeting
of warriors became an organized representative body. Thus
the Serbs were the first of the lesser Slav peoples to develoj)
104 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
constitutional rule, albeit of a very crude and primitive
type. This fact is far more significant than the sanguinary
strifes between the rival Houses of Karageorge and Obreno-
vich. Those struggles, culminating in the murder of
King Alexander in 1903, are relics of a barbarous past ;
but they have not very seriously retarded the progress
of the people at large. That progress is what really
matters ; and the acts by which a community of peasants
step by step won its freedom from the warlike Turks and
then gradually attained to self-government bespeak not
only tenacious bravery, but also a political capacity of no
mean order. In the nineteenth century nationalism which
is limited solely to military exploits counts for little. As
Napoleon once remarked, the civilian is a wider man than
a mere warrior, because " the method of the soldier is to
act despotically ; that of the civilian is to submit to dis-
cussion, truth, and reason." Similarly, a people which
Excels in the affairs of peace must in the long run surpass
one which, like the Turks, devotes itself almost exclusively
to war. In fact, nothing is more remarkable than the
manner in which the Christian peoples of the Balkans,
though often defeated and massacred, have slowly but
surely outstripped their Ottoman conquerors and perse-
cutors. It is because the latter have relied upon force,
while their subjects have applied the new national en-
thusiasm to all sides of the widening life of to-day. The
futility of relying merely upon armed might nowhere
appears more clearly than in the changed relations of the
Turks and their victims.
. The fortunes of those subject peoples, however, depended
largely upon their champion, Russia. In that Empire,
especially at the old capital, Moscow, pride of race has
always been strong. If Petrograd was, as its founder
claimed, the eye by which Russia looked out on Europe,
THE AWAKEXIXG OF THE SLAVS 105
Moscow was the eye of faith, which discerned in Muscoxy
the means of national upHfting. There are always two
currents of thought in Russia — the cosmopoHtan, strong
at Petrograd, which lias tended to rely on Germany and
France ; the other, all-powerful at Moscow, which circles
about things Muscovite, and claims that they alone will
save Russia. The foimcr party tend to depreciate Slavonic
customs and sometimes vent their despair in such an out-
burst as that of Turgenieff : "What have we Russians
invented but the knout ? " The others, strong in faith
and contemptuous of foreign ways, retort : " Yes : when-
ever it rains at Paris, you put up your umbrellas at Peters-
burg." The men of faith point out that in 1812 the
might of Napoleon collapsed before the patriotic endurance
of Russian peasants ; and in that time of trial the nation
proved its capacity both to save itself and save Europe.
Away, then, with servile imitation of the foreigner ! Away
with the German customs and notions imported by Peter
the Great and Catharine !
Such was the creed of a group of students at the Univer-
sity of Moscow. They sought " to found an independent
national culture on the basis uf popular conceptions and
Byzantine orthodo.\y, forsaken since the time of Peter the
Great."* In the main the\' relied on the Mir and the
connnunal customs connected with it ; also on the Greek
Cliurch as the true exponent of Christian tradition. They
forswore the use of French and German in fa\(jur of the
hitherto despised vernacular. At first, i.e. early in the
'thirties, the m(»v«-iiiint had no p<iliti<al signili* anci- ; Imt
Ni«lic>las I s(t(in used it to fnitlni his reactionary p(»hry ;
and till- ttiidi-m y «»f a naiiou n;it ion.ihsin to pla\- into tlir
hands of a despot was illustrated in Russia mori' proiiiptl\'
anrl banelully than perhaps anywhere else. Thanks to the
' liussia bejute and after the M'ui, j). i jM.
io6 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
Slavophiles of Moscow, Nicholas was able to subject the
teaching of philosophy to the clergy of the Greek Church
and that of history to the supervision of the public censor.
Foreign books and newspapers were as far as possible
excluded ; and Russia entered upon the path of political
and religious reaction.
A similar degradation befell a somewhat cognate move-
ment. Panslavism can boast a revolutionary origin. It
was first proclaimed at Paris by a Russian, Bakunin, who
is also the father of Nihilism. A Russian student, he sat
at the feet of Hegel at Berlin, and finally settled in the
French capital, where he associated with many Polish
exiles. At a banquet, held in 1847 ^o commemorate the
Polish rising of 1830, he spoke passionately in favour of a
federative union of all Slavs. Such a scheme implied the
grouping together, not only of the Russians and Poles,
but of the Checs and Slovaks of Bohemia and Moravia,
and of the South Slavs oppressed by Austria and Turkey.
As a revolutionary programme this scheme of Bakunin
surpassed all the political schemes of the nineteenth
century. Its complete realization would involve the
destruction, not only of Austria and Turkey, but also of
the Empire of the Tsars ; for, as was said by Herzen, one
of the Russian revolutionaries : " When we win Constanti-
nople, then the iron sceptre of Peter the Great must break ;
for it cannot be lengthened to reach to the Dardanelles."^
The Russian anarchists, then, hoped by arousing a Slavonic
enthusiasm among all branches of that widely scattered
race to break up three great Empires and spread revolution
far and wide. In its origin Panslavism was rather an
anarchic than a merely national movement. In this
respect it contrasts with the Pangerman movement, which
has always been intensely national.
^ Ibid., p. 308.
Tin: AWAKENING OF TIIK SI,AVS 107
Panslavisni, however, gradually shed its revolutionary
slough and became almost a conservative force. The steps
by which this came about are obscure ; and we need merely
note that in the critical years 1875-7 Panslavists and
Slavophiles tended to merge. Both sections sought to
force the Tsar, Alexander II, to draw the sword against
Turkey ; and. despite his clinging to peace, thc\- prevailed.
In the period of reaction which set in under Alexander III
Panslavisni and the Slavophile movement proper were the
twin steeds yoked to the autocrat's car. Both proved to
be equally amenable to the yoke ; and the reactionary
Ministers of Petrograd succeeded so skilfully in manipu-
lating Panslavisni that wags ha\e wittily dubbed it " the
romanticism of red tape." The phrase crystallizes the
tendencies of the Slavs towards emotionalism in politics,
which, in practice, inclines them towards submission to the
powers that be in Church and State.
Another weakness of the Sla\s is tlicir wide disi)crsion.
The Germans and Magyars thrust a solid mass between
the North and South Slavs of the Austrian Empire ; so
that, even in the cataclysm of 1848-9, the two halves of
that people failed to unite. For all their eager fraternizing
in a great Slavonic Congress at Prague in the spring of
1848,' the South Sla\s soon ranged themselves on the side
of the Hapsburgs and helped to re-establish that dynasty.
It is curious that those jears witnessed the rise both of the
Panslavonic and Pangerman ideas, the former at Prague,
the latter at the German Parliament assembled at F'rank-
furt ; but nothing came of either (•! thcin. Democracy
and nationality then hindered each otlu 1, and found no
' I l>e Coinimltces inunilesto cunlained these words: "After
centuries of misery we have at last become aware of our unity, our
responsibility for one another." But the proceedings at the Congress
demonstrated the extreme difficulty of common action.
io8 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
support from any powerful State. Their ignominious
collapse subjected those formative ideas two decades later
to the domination of Realpolitik ; of Gortchakoff in Russia,
of Bismarck in Prussia.
Not that the call which in 1875 came to Russia from the
Slavs of the Turkish Empire was devoid of romance ;
for, if ever cause was lofty and holy, it was that which the
Tsar, Alexander II, championed in the ensuing years.
But the Slav movement was finally to suffer from the
bargaining and the statecraft which accompanied and
closed those liberating efforts. Assuredly, the cries which
came from Bosnians, Serbs, and Bulgars were such as no
patriotic Russian could hear unmoved. Bulgaria had
lagged far behind her neighbours in developing the national
idea, a fact which we may explain partly by her semi-
' Slavonic origin. The Bulgars are akin to the Magyars
and Turks. True, after their long stay in Russia, near
the Volga, they were Slavized and finally became Christian.
But their stolid and unemotional temperament still
. proclaims their aftinity to the Turanian stock ; so that
persons who lay stress on mere questions of race and
ignore the higher and more lasting influences making for
nationality may perhaps find some slight excuse for the
recent treachery of the Bulgars to the Slavonic cause.
But let it ever be remembered that the Bulgars owe every-
thing to the Slavs. Besides, of themselves they would
. never have shaken off the Turkish yoke. In 1834 Kinglake
travelled from Belgrade through Sofia to Constantinople.
In Serbia he recognized the people as Serbs. East of the
Dragoman Pass, that is in Bulgaria, he deemed all the
inhabitants Turks, except a substratum of Christian rayahs
unworthy of his notice. It was reserved for the French
professor of Slavonic literature, Cyprien Robert, to unearth
• the Bulgars, and he found them secretly cherishing their
THE A\\AKi:XlXG OF THE SLAVS 109
religion, customs, and language, all of them not vcv\ unlike
those of the Serbs.
Apart from a few local risings of Bulgar peasants, goaded
to madness by Turkish tyranny, nothing of importance
occurred in their history until 1870, when they gained the
riglit to have their own religious conununity, that is, apart
from the Patriarch of the Greek Church. The Porte was
induced to take tliis step, partly by the demands of Russia,
France, and Great Britain, who always favoured Bulgarian
claims ; partly also because it hoped by this means to
divide the Christians and weaken them. Far from that,
the fonnation of a national Church strengthened the Bul-
garian movement at the expense both of Greeks and Serbs.
To the new Church were allotted Bulgaria Proper, also the
vilayets of Adrianople, Salonica, Kossovo, and Monastir.
In these districts, which Serbs and Greeks also claimed,
the Bulgars soon began a vigorous propaganda by means of
churches and schools, which soon withdrew vast numbers
from the Greek Church. Sir Charles Eliot believes that this
act halved the numbers of those who previously were
counted Greeks.' The Bulgars also stole a march on the
Serbs in the districts of Kossovo and Monastir. A Serb
gentleman once informed me that his people never suffered
a worse blow than the allocation of Old Serbia to the
Bulgarian Church. The consequence was the growth of
an intense rivalry between Bulgar, Greek, and Serb,
especially for supremacy in Macedonia. The present war
is in large measure the outcome of the racial jealousies
which the Porte kindled, or rather rekindled, by its finnan .
of 1870. Bulgaria is making a mad bid for the conquest
of the territory which the Porte gave to her ecclesiastically
in 1870. It was not until late in the nineteenth century
that the Serbs gained the right to open their S( hools in the
' Sir C. liliot, iitrhey in liurxpr, |i|) ly), 2<.)\.
no LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
vilayets of Monastir and Salonica : and not until 1900
did they acquire a national church.
In this respect Serbia has been very unfortunate, while
Bulgaria enjoyed exceptional good fortune. Ever since
1805 the Serbs were struggling for their independence from
the Turks. Yet in 1870 at one bound the Bulgars passed
them by in the race for supremacy, which depends largely
on religious organization. How much this meant was seen
in the racial statistics of Macedonia ; in which the priest
and schoolmaster were able to make what they liked of
that doubtful material. The report of a Russian victory,
a lavish distribution of Austrian gold, or fear of the incur-
sion of a robber-band of Greeks sufficed to make the
wretched peasantry of Macedonia turn over from one side
to the other with unblushing effrontery.
To revert to the events of 1875 ; the reopening of the
Eastern Question certainly came from the Serbs of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Their revolt in the autumn of 1875
was caused by the exceptional cruelty of the Turkish tax-
gatherers after a bad harvest. That rising has by some been
ascribed to Austrian agitators. But when crops were seized
wholesale, and the sanctities of home were foully out-
raged, what need is there to drag in the foreign agitator ?
The explanation is not supported by the facts of the case,
and it is, in general, a singularly superficial way of account-
ing for a widespread movement.
Last of all the Slavonic peoples, the Bulgars began to
stir, but in the partial way that might be expected from
their canny and suspicious nature. An ambitious Bulgar
youth, named Stambuloff , who had been educated in Russia
but expelled thence as a revolutionary, came back to
Bulgaria in 1875 and sought in mid-September to raise
the peasants against Turkish tyranny. Of the thousands
who promised to help him only thirty assembled at the
THE AW AKl.MNG 0¥ THl-: SLAVS in
reiiilezvous near Eskizat,'ra. Tlicse courageous men fled
to tlie Balkans. Thence Stanibuloll and a \cry few
escaped to Russia, where once again he sought to rouse
his shiggish countrymen.
He had grounds for hope. The men of Herzegovina and
Bosnia lield out on the mountains, despite tlie hardships
of the winter of 1875-6. The efforts of the three Empires
(Austria, Russia, and Germany) to induce the Sultan to
grant effective refomis were thwarted by the British
Cabinet. Lord Beaconsfield, unwarned by the utter failure
of our Crimean War policy, refused to support the efforts
of the three Empires to apply pacific coercion in order to
e.xtort from Turkey the needed reforms. The British
Ministry went further. It sent our Mediterranean squadron
to Besika Bay, near the entrance of the Dardanelles, a step
which encouraged the Sublime Porte to expect the armed
succour of Britain in case of war with Russia. These events
increased the excitement both of Moslems and Christians
in the Peninsula. Serbia could scarcely keep her sword in
its scabbard ; and the Bulgars hoped for amied aid from
Russia. A Bulgar schoolmaster found out a curious
anagram. The Bulgarian letters which make up the words
" Turkey will fall," when put in the fonii of an addition
sum (letters serve as figures in the Cyrillic aljihabct) ;
amount to the total 1876.
The news whetted the eagerness of the peasants. The
Bulgarian novelist, V'azoff, in his romance. Under the Yakc,
has described the secret preparations for the revolt. The
women worked hard to ])ake quantities of biscuit for the
men who were to take to the hills at the end of April, i87().
The men made guns, pikes, knives ; wliiK- the more
ambitious of tlu-m, wlio had heard tell of what tlu- C arlists
did long beffjrc in Spain, cut down their lin«s( cherry trees,
jiollowed ihcm out, hooped tiiein witli iron clamps, and
112 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
hoped for great things from these curios mounted on the
hills. Imagine the sequel on the first of May, when the
Turkish Bashi-bazouks marched in. No deafening roar,
no devastating volleys of grape shot on the Moslems ;
only a dull puff, a sound of rent wood, and the gunners
themselves laid low. That pathetic incident was typical
of the whole rising. With the narrow view of things, which
is characteristic of the Bulgars, some villages waited for
the others to begin ; and most never began at all. On the
few bolder spirits the Turks burst like a whirlwind ; and
then the work of murder and outrage began. At Batak
the Moslems, after accepting the surrender of the place,
drove the men into the great church and set it on fire.
Out of seven thousand inhabitants five thousand were done
to death.
But the victims did not die wholly in vain. When these
horrors became known in England they aroused a storm
of indignation against Turkish misrule. Mr. Gladstone
voiced that indignation in tones which rang through the
world. Even to-day, or certainly up to their last mad
plunge, the Bulgars reverenced his memory and kept his
portrait in their cottages beside that of " the Tsar
Liberator."
For Alexander II now listened to the fervid demands
of his people for anned intervention. Gallant little Serbia
had drawn the sword against the Turks ; and the sight
of the Serbs struggling against great odds stirred Slav
opinion to its depths. As before, Slav sentiment centred
at Moscow, while official circles at Petrograd and the
Tsar himself, suspecting that crusading fervour concealed
revolutionary designs, sought to turn the people from their
purpose. In this they failed. Finally, after curbing
Slavophile sentiment for a year, the Tsar perceived that
further delay would unite the naturally conservative
THE AWAKENIXG OF THE SLAVS 113
Slavophiles with the Nihilists ; and when the Sublime Porte,
still trusting to British succour, refused all offers of com-
promise, he declaretl war on Turkey. The ensuing struggle
was fertile in surprises. Even witli the help of Roumania,
Russia barely overcame the Turks at Plevna, and then had
to submit her first terms of peace, those of San Stefano, -
to the arbitrament of Europe. Owing to the opposition
of England and Austria, a far less drastic settlement of
the racial questions of the Balkans was arrived at in the -.
Treaty of Berlin (July, 1878). That treaty cut down the
new Bulgarian State, from the San Stefano limits, which
would have brought it near to Salonica, and penned Bul-
garia Proper up in the province north of the Balkans.
The Bulgars there were divided from their brethren south
of that chain so as to weaken that people, whom British
and Austrian statesmen hastily assumed to be the puppets
of Russia. The gratitude of the Bulgars to Russia, how-
ever, vanished when the new Tsar, Alexander HI, proceeded
to treat them as puppets. His harsh overbearing ways
alienated them ; and on their declaring for the union of
the two Bulgarias in 1885, it was England, under Lord
Salisbury, which favoured the union, while the Tsar, y
chiefly from hatred of the Bulgarian prince, Alexander,
opposed that most natural and salutary step. The
statesmanlike policy of Lord Salisbury had been prompted
largely by our ambassador. Sir William White, a warm
friend of the Christians of the Balkans ; and thus the evil
effects of Beaconsfield's pro-Turkish and anti-national -
policy were reversed.
We must postpone to a later lecture a consideration of
Balkan politics in the sequel. I have sought to bring before
you a succession of scenes in which the Slavonic peoples
struggled for self-c.xpression and for the most part utterly
failed. During many years Panshuism was a nanu' that
J
114 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
aroused terror in the clubs and salons of London. The
reality never alarmed those who observed the centrifugal
tendencies always potent among the Slavs. Hitherto
Panslavism has been a political Tower of Babel.
LECTURK VII
THE GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE
" The aim of the State is not dominion or the restraining of men
by and the subjecting of them to a foreign yoke. On the contrary,
its aim is to deliver each man from fear so that he may be able to
live with the utmost possible security. . . . The aim of the State
is liberty." — Spinoza, Theological Politics, ch. 20.
At the beginning of this lecture I wish to make it clear
that my aim is, not to discourse upon any one tlieory of
the State, but rather to show how the notions about the
State, now prevalent in Prussia and Germany, developed
tiiere. I will also not waste time by seeking to frame an
elaborate definition of tiie term " State." The word itself
means that which is fixed or established, that is, in regard
to law and government. Setting aside minor differences,
there are three chief conceptions regarding the State. The
first regards it as depending on the will of the monarch
(e.g. I'Etal c'csi moi, of Louis XI \') ; or, secondly, of a
])rivi]eged set of persons ; or, thirdly, of the mass of the
people. The organisin which gives effect to one or other
of those wills is the State. Notions respecting it are always
changing ; and amidst the present cataclysm he would be
a bold man who would ascribe definiteness and fi.xity to
the conception of the State.' But the desire for something
' I accept the description given by .Mr. C. Delisle Burns (The
Morality of Nations, p. 28) as " tlic sovereign organization for tlic
attainment of common ixjlitical good."
ii6 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
approaching to definiteness, if not fixity, is inherent in
the human mind, witness the declaration of poor, be-
wildered Louis XVI not long before the French Revolution.
Conscious that le regime du hon plaisir (i.e. of the King's
will) was doomed, he declared that France desired tine
maniere fixe d'etre gouvernce. That admission heralded the
dawn of a democratic order on the Continent. Thence-
forth the typical State was not to be the expression of one
man's w'ill, but of " the general will," which Rousseau
affirmed to be the source of all law and administration.
But even when we limit ourselves to the modern State
based on representative institutions, we find a great
variety of conceptions regarding its functions. The
most important of these differences arise respecting the
claims which the State may make on the liberty and
services of the individual citizen. Here at once w^e plunge
into the region of controversies that are certain to become
more and more acute. In this connection it is well to re-
member that the democratic States of the Ancient World,
e.g. that of Athens, required implicit and almost un-
limited obedience from their citizens. These were bound
in many ways which we should deem abhorrent to true
liberty. Transport a Londoner to the Sparta of Lycurgus,
and he would protest vigorously that he was a mere bond-
man, not much better off than the actual slaves. Again,
the fact that a Roman citizen could for heinous crimes be
degraded to the position of a slave illustrates the radical
difference between the authority of the State over the
individual in the Ancient and Modern World. The power
of the Greek or Roman State was far greater than we
should allow ; yet that power was accepted as in the
natural order of things by citizens who considered them-
selves entirely free.
When, therefore, we approach the subject of the authority
GERMAN THKORY OF Till': STATl': 117
of the modern State over its citizens, we must remember
that all well-educated men were familiar with a condition
of society in which a democratic State could demand
nearly everything from its subjects. Lord Acton well
describes the State in ancient times as being " both Church
and State " in one.' It was even more. It was Church
and State and an exacting employer all in one.
Lord Acton's simile is even more applicable to the
absolute monarchies of \\'estern Europe ; for their
authority was based on a theocratic creed as well as on
military force. Henry Mil, Philip I\', and Louis Xl\'
claimed to exercise an authority conferred by divine power
and sacred unction. This was the theory adopted by the
HohenzoUerns in the year 1701. The claim in their case
was singular ; for everj'one who looked on at the gaudy
ceremony of coronation of the first Prussian King at
Konigsberg was aware that the royal title was gained by
hard bargaining with the Hapsburg Court at Vienna.
Nevertheless, Frederick I of Prussia decided that he would
be a king by the grace of God, and he did his utmost to get
himself taken seriously in that character. He crowned
himself, as all his successors have done, excepting the
greatest of them. Frederick the Great deemed that cere-
mony a farce, besides wasting money better spent on troops
or road-making.
By this resolve he struck the ke}-note oi Prussian policy.
Nothing for show, everything for eflkiency. Rigorous
efficiency in all departments of government, such was the
aim of Frederick II. Nothing was too small to escape his
ken. In time of peace he visited once a year every part of
liis kingdtjin. I \<- <li( idcd what marslus should !)<• (hained,
or what rivers embanked U)V the i>re\inlion of Hoods.
It was his fostering care that inij)ro\cd the woollen trade,
• Acton, History of J-'rceJom and other Lssays, \>. i(>.
ii8 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
founded new villages, and sought to construct a navy and
plant colonies overseas. He was his own commander-in-
chief, foreign minister, chief engineer, and chief develop-
ment commissioner. Woe betide the official who neglected
his work ! Frederick's eye was sure to detect the fault and
punish it severety. During one of his journeys he happened
to find out that a courier was kept waiting owing to the
somnolence of a postmaster. The King rushed upstairs
into the offender's bedroom, dragged him from bed, and
administered a severe caning under the most favourable
conditions.
Frederick II was the Prussian State. To his nephew
he described his feelings early in the reign as he surveyed
the splendid troops and full coffers bequeathed by his
fathers. He spent some of the mone}' and increased the
troops. Then he looked around him and saw four provinces
that he might seize. He chose Silesia. " Therefore " (he
wrote to his successor), " have money, give an air of
superiority to your troops, ^^'ait for opportunities, and
.you will be certain, not merely to preserve, but to increase
your dominions. . . . All depends on circumstances and
on the courage of him who takes." Such are the funda-
mental maxims of Prussian statecraft : "Be strong, be
ready, then make your coup."
But if Frederick schemed and tricked, it was for Prussia ;
and it was for Prussia that he was ready to bleed and die.
His letter, of October, 1760, written in the midst of a
seemingly hopeless campaign, strikes a high note : "I
regard death from the Stoic point of view. Never shall I
see the moment that forces me to make a disadvantageous
peace. No persuasion, no eloquence, shall ever induce
me to sign my dishonour. . . . Finish this campaign I
certainly will, resolved to dare all, and to make the most
desperate attempts, either to succeed or to find a glorious
GERMAN IIILUKY Ub THE STATE iic)
end." — That is the spirit which prevails o\or less deter-
mined foes, whose chatter about peace proclaims their
half-heartedness, or at least their lack of the supreme
resolve of the hero. It is this rigorous spirit, rigorous
towards self as well as towards others, which has made
Prussia so formidable. Rightly to understand the Prussian
idea of the State, you must first understand historically
the Hohenzollern spirit ; for it is that spirit which has
made the State. The State is merely the machine ; that
spirit is the inner fire whicli imparts to the machine its
terrible force ; and that spirit is still in its essence the
relentless but also self-sacrificing energy of Frederick
the Great.
The extent to which the personality of her rulers affected
the administration of Prussia is obvious from a glance at
her fortunes. Frederick the Great raised her to the rank
of a Great Power. But, as Mirabeau pointed out in 17SO,
that position was \ery precarious. Under the rule of his
vicious, extravagant, and vacillating nephew, Frederick
William II, Prussia sank quickly to the second rank. The
weakness and pedantry of his son, Frederick \\'illiam III
completed her misfortunes. But a change came over the
scene in the years 1807-13. The people, formerly passive
in the hands of their rulers, became keenly interested in
the revival of their State. Schiller and Fichte had awakened
a truly national Gennan feeling ; and the reforms ol the
Prussian statesmen, Stein, Scharnhorst, and Hardenberg,
in those years made Berlin the one possible centre of
j)olitical uni(jn for all Germans. The Prussian people were
identified with the Prussian State, as was the case nowhere
else in (jerniany ; and Germans elsewhere looked to
Prussia to sa\i- thcin from Xa|)<il(<>ii. It was the energy
of thinkers and men of actii^n at ImiIIm that expilled
the Frent li and made i'russia the leader of (ierman\.
120 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
Depressed by the weaknesses of Frederick William IV,
she was raised to unexampled glory by William I and his
paladins ; and in 1871 she unified Germany.
Now, Prussia was the same State, yet that State varied
enormously according to the human element. Therefore
it is fallacious to suppose that there is some magic in the
Prussian State, or in the German Empire founded on it.
To theorize about the Prussian State as though it were
everything in the development of Prussia and Germany
is absurd. The rulers and statesmen are more important
than the State. Indeed, from the time of the Great Elector
down to Wilhelm II it is they who have made or unmade
the State.
Nevertheless, the development of ideas about the Prus-
sian State deserves careful study. Though that polity made
unheard of demands on the citizens, j^et it looked after
their interests with almost grandfatherly care. Bismarck,
on introducing the first measures that were to be kno\Mi as
State Socialism, declared that they formed no new depar-
ture ; for the House of Hohenzollern had always governed
with a view to the welfare of the poor. This was certainly
true of its best members. For instance, Frederick the Great,
in 1766, refused to countenance a proposal of one of his
officials to tax fat cattle when imported. " A crown a
head on the import of fat cattle ? Tax on butcher's meat ?
(he exclaimed) . No. That would fall on the poorer classes.
To that I must say no. I am, by ofiice, procurator of the
poor {avocat dit pauvrc)." The Hohenzollerns have generally
sought to consult the welfare of their poorer subjects ; and
this was the reason why German provinces, like Silesia,
which were annexed to the Prussian monarchy, soon
became Prussian. That kingdom was not liked — it never
has been — but its vigorous rule promoted prosperity and
pushed the people on. By these qualities many able
GERMAN THKORV OF TH1-: STATE 121
Geniians wore attracted to Berlin. Of the men who
lielped to raise up Prussia after llie terrible overthrow of
1S06-7, tli<-' niost illustrious were non-Prussians. Stein
was a Franconian, Hartlenberg and Scharnliorst were
Hanoverians, Queen Louisa and Bliicher were ]\Iecklcn-
burgers, F'ichte and Gneisenau were Saxons, etc.* Scarcely
a single able leader was a Prussian. Yet the best brains
in Germany gravitated to Berlin. What was the attractive
force ? Not mere ambition ; but rather the conviction
that there alone worked an eflicient machine.
These considerations explain why practically all German
theories as to the State originated in Prussia. Omitting the
F'^rench and freedom-loving theories of William von Hum-
boldt, the first is that of Kant, the idealist of Konigsberg.
Sir John Seeley said that Kant's severe gospel of dut}- was
a natural outcome of the age and the polity of Frederick
the Great. It may even be affirmed that Kant's teaching
about the State is an idealization of all that was best in the
actions of the great King. Kant seeks to repress the
seltislmess of individuals, and to compel them Ic) work
for the general weal. They nmst do so (he claims) in the
interest of order ; for order is essentially the aim of the
State ; and order can be assured only by submission of
individual whims to the will of the community. True ;
for the purpose of securing order, the State nmst be en-
dowed with force ; but it does not exist for the sake of
developing force. (There Kant is far ahead of the latest
school uf German thinkers.) The raison d'etre of the State
is order.
On the outbreak of the F^rench Revolution, liberty,
progress, and peace become the dominant aims of Kant.
They are set forth in his essay, Perpelual Peace (i7<)5), which
remains a landmark of the generous ( ()sm()|)olil;inisiii
' Scek-y, SItiii, 11, .joj.
122 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
that was soon to be submerged by the Napoleonie dehige.
We shall return to Kant's Essay in Lecture X.
The next of Germany's political thinkers was a Saxon
by birth. Fichte (1762-1814) spent most of his early life
in Saxony, Switzerland, and at Jena ; but a charge of
infidelity drove him from his professorship at that Uni-
versity ; and in his thirty-seventh year he settled at
Berlin, where he found more toleration and freedom of
speech than in the smaller centres. In 1800 he published
an Essay, Tlie Exclusive Commercial State, in which he
advocated rigorous protection and an almost socialistic
ordering of all activities. The work glorified the rigorous
tendencies of Prussian politics ; and may be termed a
rather viewy precursor of the State Socialism of Lassalle
and Bismarck.
Far fuller and more philosophical were Fichte's lectures
on " The Characteristics of the Present Age " (1804) — at
which we glanced in Lecture III. In them he eulogized
Prussia. In the tenth lecture he rejected a theory of the
State which describes it as merely a juridical institution,
i.e. concerned with the making and administering of law.
Such a conception might do for Saxony or Wiirtemberg ;
but it appeared to him inadequate amidst the varied
activities of Prussia. He put forward one which certainly
did not err on that side. He called the absolute (i.e. com-
plete or perfect) State " an artistic institution, intended
to direct all individual powers towards the life of the race
and to transfuse them therein." In previous lectures he
had explained his sense of the importance of the universal
life, declaring that the aim of mankind was, or should be, " to
order all their relations with freedom according to reason."
Human life, then, ought to be concerned with reasonable
activities, which must enjoy a reasonable amount of free-
dom. As for the State, it would be the means of furthering
GERMAN Tin-URV OF THE STATE 123
the higher aims of nianl<iml. It wmild restrain the selhsh-
ness of individuals by direeting their energies towards the
welfare of the whole of Socict}'. Fichte's aim, at this
time, was cosmopolitan, not Prussian.
But his methods were autocratic. As the collective
activities of mankind do not in the least degree attract the
numerous indi\iduals to whom the triumph of reason is
naught and the pursuit of their own unreason is everything,
he maintains that they must be compelled to enter into the
coUectix e life. Seeing that they " feel no desire, but, on the
contrary, a reluctance, to ofTer up their individual life for
the race," there must be some power which will compel
them, if need be, to die for the community. That power
is the State.
Fichte's words describing the State as an artistic institu-
tion are somewhat odd, seeing that it directs all individual
powers towards the life of the race. But he explains that
by " artistic " he means that which raises men above their
natural level so as to fulfil the destinies of the race.* The
State carries out this purpose and compels all citizens,
without a single exception, to dedicate themselves to this
duty. Even the rulers are subject to this obligation. It
is their directing power and the directed energies of the
governed, which together make up the State. He proceeds
to make another claim : " All individual power which is
known and accessible to the State is necessary to it for the
furtherance of its purpose : its purpose is Kitltur (civiliza-
tion) ; and in order to maintain the position to which a
State has already attained, and to advance still further, it
re«juires at all times the exertion of every available power ;
for, only through the united j)(jwer of .\i.i., has it attained
this position. SiiouI<l it imt tnkc the Wlmlr into ai ( mmt,
' I ihink tliat llu- |)lir.ise " a ( ivilizinn institiitir)n " comrs ncarrr
I'. I i> lit<-'!i ri-al tlioii^lit .
124 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
it must needs recede, instead of advancing, and lose its
position in the ranks of civilization."
These statements call for some explanation. Fichte
spoke at a time when the Government of Prussia was in the
weak and nerveless hands of Frederick William III ; when,
also, Germany was sinking under the control of Napoleon
and accepted his direction in the spoliation of the Ecclesias-
tical States and knightly domains. In view of that dis-
graceful scramble Fichte desired to strengthen Prussia ;
he sought also to remind her King and nobles that the
State had declined in authority and prestige since the days
of Frederick the Great. Then the Prussian State was the
embodiment of power. In 1804 it was not ; and unless it
recurred to the forceful ideals of the earlier generation
Prussia must degenerate. Fichte therefore sought to
press every faculty of the Prussian people into the public
service ; and he chnched his demand by this declaration :
" In a perfect State no just individual purpose can exist,
which is not included in the purposes of the community,
and for the attainment of which the community does not
provide." Or, to translate it into modern parlance :
" Every activity of life belongs to the State ; and the
perfect community will have a place for every man and
will see that he fills that place to the utmost of his
power."
Obviously, Fichte was heading towards a drastic State
Socialism. He did not use the term " Socialism," which,
indeed, does not first appear until some thirty-two years
later. Still less did he see his Spartan ideals realized.
But his system would have imposed on Prussia a polity
as absolute as that of the Pharaohs, a regime in which
individual liberty would vanish and all the activities of
life would be regulated as they are in an ants' nest. " The
general will " of Rousseau, having passed through the mill
GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE 125
of German pliilosophical metliod, cnnie out as tlie Prussian
State, tluis outlined by Ficlite.
For the attainment of its complete and characteristic
growth one nu)re element was necessary -tiiat of Nation-
ality. In 1N04-3 Fichte had not yet hit upon that formative
idea. Perhaps he derived it from Schiller's Willi dm Tell,
which seems to have influenced Fichte's Addresses to the
German Nation. Or else, as I ventured to suggest, the fall
of the Prussian State after Jena (1806) revealed to him the
German nation. In the earlier lectures on the State he
never mentions the nation. He conceives the Christian
European peoples as being very much alike and concerned
with the same purposes. It is the States that are in per-
petual conflict, some rising, some falling, according to the
degrees of energy and ability which they display ; and
their true aim is to further the progress of the race as a
whole. To take a concrete instance, Prussia and Austria
are in constant competition, sometimes in actual conflict.
Their rivalry calls forth the powers of their rulers and
subjects. Prussia wins because she is the better organized ;
and her triumph, being a survival of the fittest, furthers
the progress of the human race. Fichte was not then
thinking of the German race : for indeed it was in so
divided and discordant a condition that \<)u could not
discern it as a political unit.
By the winter of 1807-8 the way was cleared, and
Fichte's Addresses to the German Nation called to action,
not hide-bound States, but a half-strangled people. As
always happens in time of crisis, he sought to revive their
courage by recalling the mighty deeds that Germans had
accomplished both in war and in the peaceful arts— their
inventi(ms, commercial de\elopment, and learning. He
( laimed the Kcfonnation as a truly (jerman assertion ui
liberty '»f th(mght ; and Jie \aunled the sujxrini it\- of the
126 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
pure Germans over the Franks and other Teutons that had
unlearnt their mother-tongue. The nation was now the
dominant thought. It echpsed the idea of the State, as
appeared in this passage (Lecture VIII) : " Nation and
Fatherland in this sense as bearers of and security for
earthly immortality ... far transcend the State in the
usual sense of the term. . . . The State only aims at
security of rights, internal peace. All that is only the
means, the condition, the preparation, for that which
patriotism essentially aims at, the blossoming of the
eternal and divine in the world." He then asserted that
patriotism must direct the State, individual liberty being
restricted within as narrow limits as possible. In his
earlier notions the State was supreme in order by competi-
tion with other States to advance the welfare of the human
race as a whole. In 1807-8 he reduced the State merely
to a piece of mechanism, driven onwards by the nation,
with patriotism as the directing agency. The union of his
earlier Pharaoh-like theory with his later claim of the
supremacy of the nation prepared the way for the later
theory of the German State, conterminous with the German
nation, and both impelling, and impelled by, that nation.
His teaching bore fruit in many directions. As the State
or the nation requires all the activities of its citizens, it
follows that all distinctions of privilege must vanish ; for
the unprivileged (e.g. the serfs) cannot develop their full
powers. The serfs therefore become freeholders ; national
education begins, so does municipal governinent, in which
men are compelled to take up their duties. All these
changes aim at the increase of power and efficiency. For
this same purpose compulsion is laid upon them to defend
their country. That duty had been required of all French-
men of military age by the French Republic in 1793, and
more systematically in 1798. After the Peace of Tilsit (1807) ,
GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE 127
Prussia extended the principle of compulsory service to
all her sons. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the chief de-
sii^Miers of the new Prussian army, demanded in the [)re-
amhle to their reforms that the army nuist be " the union
of all the moral and physical energies of the nation." The
phrase recalls the words of Fichte ; and it well summarizes
the aims of the Prussian patriots of that time. The realiza-
tion of their ideal in the glorious efforts of the War of
Liberation reveals the potentialities of the Prussian State.
Dowered with the toughness of the Frederician regime,
it is strengthened and enriched by the doctrines of civic
self-sacrifice proclaimed by Kant and Fichte.
Long after the fall of Napoleon, the memory of the
events of 1813-5 inspired the thinkers of Prussia and
Germany. The energy and order prevalent at Berlin
attracted thither many thinkers who began life in the small
States. That had happened to Fichte, and in 1818 it
happened to Hegel, his successor in the chair of philosophy
in that University. Earlier in his career Hegel (1770-1831)
had been an enthusiastic admirer of Napoleon and viewed
the overthrow of Prussia with supreme indifference ; for
he saw in the French people and their Emperor the outcrop
of the world-spirit. But in his Berlin period he became
Prussian. In his lectures delivered there in 1820 he
delivered his theory of the State in regard to law. His
conclusion was that the State was in the moral order
what Nature was in the physical order. As the State
sustained and regulated everything, it formed the chief
necessity of life for civilized men, and became, in effect,
the realized ethical ideal or ethical spirit.
By these claims Hegel raised the Stati- to a supernatural
level. There it existed as something perft'ct, absolute, and
superhuman, yet dominating the fortunes of mankind.
Apparently, the Hegelian State could not deselop or
128 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
change ; for development implies advance from a less
perfect condition to one that is more perfect. Hegel also
made no allowance for its permeation by the ideals of
other States.^ His ideal creation remains alone, like some
Zeppelin tethered a mile or so above Berlin, and dominating
earth, air, and heaven itself. Indeed, this simile is too
weak to express the absolute self-sufftciency of the Hegelian
State. Its creator scoffed at all inquiries as to its origin ;
for it had always existed while the nation existed. All
that he will say on this head is that the State is the outcome
of the deep-seated principle of order." This it is which
determines the exercise of what Rousseau termed " the
general will."
Here at last we come to firm ground ; but we remember
that forty years earlier Kant had affirmed the raison
d'etre of the State to be the craving for order. In this
respect, then, the Hegelian notion links itself on to the
doctrines of Rousseau and Kant ; but the outcome is a
terrifying and sterilizing creation, whose chief practical
duty is to protect " the life, property, and free-will (!) of
every person, simply in so far as he does not injure the life,
property, and free-will of any other." But, he proceeds,
the State is far more than a magnified police officer. The
perfect State is a spiritual and all-pervading entity. It is
not something separate from each of its subjects. It is
not distinct from you, from me. We fomi part of it ; and
in this consciousness lies our political freedom. Here we
must remember that Hegel admits that a bad State is
finite and worldly. But wherein the perfect State consists
and wherein a State is bad is not clearly defined.
It may seem impertinent in a mere historian to criticize
Hegel ; but I cannot avoid the suspicion that, in idcnti-
^ See D. Burns, op. cit., pp. 45, 53.
2 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, transl. by S. W. Dyde, pp. 240-65.
GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE ijq
fying the subjects witli a perfect State, he is confusing
the State with the nation. My insuhir imagination fails
to conceive so complete an identification of the citizen
with the most perfect State as to become merged into it.
That merging is possible in the case of the nation ; and I
believe that it can be aHfinued of every true patriot at a
great crisis. Certainly every Briton who now dies for his
country makes that supreme surrender on behalf of the
nation, or for His Majesty as typifying the nation. Pro-
fessor Edward Meyer in a recent work claims that it is the
great defect of our public life that we do not think about
the State. He says: "The Briton never speaks of his
State — a State does not exist for him. He either speaks
of the Empire or he speaks of the Government, meaning
the Government which then handles the rudder of State.
A State high above the clash of parties does not exist for
the Briton as it exists for the German " ; and to this he
attributes our political helplessness in this war. Events,
of course, will decide that point ;' and I question whether
the average German is filled with much enthusiasm for
the German State. I believe that he fights and dies for
das Vatcrhmd, which is a far more human and inspiring
conception than that of the State. The idea of the State,
I believe, appeals chiefly to the intellectuals ; for, ever
since Hegel's day, it has supplied them with a motiv for
theory-weaving.
However, the question whether a soldier fights and dies
for his nation or his State is academic trifling ; and (to
return to Hegel) I believe that he ascribed to the State
much that Fichte had ascribed to the nation. It seems to
me that on this topic Fichte's view was sounder. The
* Sec the suggestive rcmark.s of Rev. J. Oman, The War and its
Issues, ch. in (Camh. L'niv. Press, 1915), as to tlic dilloronro of
liritish ami (iiriiian ul<as of tl»e Stale.
130 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
nation it was which fired France with hope and enthusiasm.
The Germans defiantly retorted with their national idea
in 1813 ; and though the idea of the German nation did
not in that age find visible expression in a national State,
yet there was the chance that it would one day embody
itself. To idealize the State in 1830 was surely doubtful
psychology and false as history. The criticism of some of
Hegel's contemporaries crystallized in the joke that he mis-
took the Kingdom of Prussia for the Kingdom of Heaven. ^
Hegel even affirms that the State is the nation's spirit.
That again is a question of words ; and I cannot see that
such a description of the State advances our knowledge
of it. We worldly-minded students of history want to
know, not what the State is, but how it works ; how it
reconciles the often divergent claims of general order and
the liberty of the individual. On these topics Hegel is as
silent as Rousseau. In fact, Hegel, like Rousseau, seems
to believe that in that ideal entity, the absolute State,
there will be no opposition. We reply that that is un-
thinkable among a free community ; and our suspicions
of the Berlin professor are not lessened by his assertion
that to offer the people a constitution is a mere whim,
seeing that a constitution must grow from the consciousness
of the people. " True ! " we English reply ; " that is the
best method, the English method ; but is that a sufficient
reason for refusing the beginnings of a free government
to a less fortunate people ? " There is, of course, much
truth in Hegel's further statement, that every nation has
the constitution that suits it and belongs to it ; but this
assertion again is liable to abuse, if it implies that no
arbitrary Government is ever to be overthrown, because
the people do not deserve a better. ^ In practice, Hegel's
1 G. P. Gooch, in Contemporary Review, June, 1915.
2 Dyde, op. cit., pp. 274-S2.
GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE 131
theorizing about the State came to be a defence of paternal
and ahnost despotic Government. " You have a nearly
perfect State " (said he) ; " be content with it ; identify
yourself with it ; you need not wisli for anything better."
Some of his friends reproached him with deserting his
earlier progressive views ; and the charge seems proven.
In his next pohtical work, The Philosophy of History
(1S30), Hegel implicitly defended the Prussian system,
which excluded the populace from the political life of the
State : he also decried the results of the French Revolu-
tion ; and, as for the English Reform Bill, he declared that
it would destroy what slight measure of governing capacity
still survived in these islands. Moreover (said he), the
typical Englishman was too insular, too whimsical, to
understand real liberty, and always looked at it from the
point of view of his own home. As for Prussia, despite her
exclusion of the citizens from ])olitical affairs, she was on
the right track ; for she embodied the principle of reason.
She was Protestant, and she admitted capable men to all
posts. ' What more could they want ?
Notwithstanding tliis discouraging conclusion, the in-
fluence exerted by Hegel was very great. Discredited
though he was by the later Liberalism (which found its
exponent in Bluntschli-), his State-absolutism lived on
and helped to reinforce the masterful notions of the Bis-
marck-Treitschkc period. Another HCf^elian theory tending
in the same direction was that of the World-Spirit visiting
and vivifying the great peoples in turn, and, in the fulhiess
of time, the German people. But we nmst postpone to
Lecture X an examination of that theory.
' Hegel (op. cit., p. 4^7) recogni/es a S(nith tiLTinan n.itionulity.
>)ccausc that j>coplc was too mixed to accept Protestantism.
* See J. K. HluntsclUi, The T/imry 0/ the State [ICng. edit, (.ind),
Oxford, iMg2] ; especially !>k 11 (or suggestive remarks on tlie
State and NatKJiiaiitv.
132 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
So far we have been considering the German idealists.
It has been stated that their pohtical teaching was sound,
and that the poison which has crept in was due solely to
materialism of thought and to its political resultant,
RealpoliiikJ But, as I have tried to show, danger lurked
in the teachings of Fichte and Hegel. In their Berlin
periods they denied individual liberty and exalted the
State to a dangerous pre-eminence, while Hegel's later
teachings fostered the growth of Prussian Chauvinism,
The following years witnessed the publication of Clause-
witz's work On War, memorable for its declaration that
States were always in a condition of struggle, of which
war was only an intenser form. Then, too, appeared that
exciting poem, " Deutschland, Deidschland uber alles."
The popular outbreaks of 1848-9 in Germany concern
us here only because the populace everywhere afhrmed the
supremacy of the whole nation ; and when Frederick
William IV for a time surrendered to his " dear Berliners "
and declared that thenceforth Prussia would merge herself
in Germany, the triumph of the nation over the Prussian
State seemed assured. Owing to the inexperience and
reckless enthusiasms of the first German Parliament, which
met at Frankfurt in 1848, all went awry. The old political
mechanism was set up again ; and, when Germany achieved
her union in 1870-1, it was through the House of Hohen-
zollern and the Prussian State. Consequently, the failures
of German Liberalism in 1848-9 have profoundly affected
the trend of political thought. Idealism, democracy, and
voluntary methods being discredited, the tendency was
towards the precepts and practice of Frederick the Great.
In short, the age became ripe for Bismarck's gospel of
" blood and iron," the way for which was further facilitated
^ Prof. J. H. Muirhead, German Philosophy in Relation to the
War, Lects. I, II.
GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE 133
by prosperity, and the development of a materialistic
philosophy.* Bismarck often gibed at the professors and
barristers of 1S48 ; but it was their viewiness which pre-
pared the way for his statecraft. The excesses of democrats
have always been the best help of reactionaries.
The first sign of the new spirit was an essay by Rochau
on Rcalpoliiik. Published in 1853, when the reaction was
in full swing, it trumpeted forth the new political mate-
rialism. " The State is Power " — such is its thesis. It
attracted a far more important man than Rochau, Heinrich
von Treitschke, who afterwards developed that theory to
its logical conclusion. Treitschke (1834-96) came of a
Slav family and was endowed with Slavonic intensity and
vehemence, which he vented against that race with all the
acerbity of a renegade. His father was a Saxon olficer of
proved loyalty and steadfastness ; but the youth soon dis-
played far other tendencies. For his first recorded speech,
delivered at a prize-giving, he chose as his subject praise
of Prussia's championship of Gemian unity ; and that
incident is typical as illustrating his natural bent towards
Prussianism. As a student, he read with ardour the
Politics, of Aristotle and the Prince of Machiavelli, dangerous
reading for a youth of his ardent temperament. The study
of Fichte and Hegel fortified his conviction of the need for
the supremacy of the State ; and in 18O1 (the year of the
consmnmation of Italian unity) he set forth the ideal of
" the nationally exclusive State," i.e. a State composed of
one people. "For" (said he) "where the living and in-
dubitable consciousness of unity pervades all the members
of the State, there and there only is the State what its
nature re(}uires that it should be, a nation possessing
organi< unity." lb- prophesied that the great peoples
would everywhere form national States— a singularly
' Sec I'rofcssor Muirhcid, op. cit . Lcct. HI.
134 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
correct forecast. In common with all nationalists he
detested the House of Hapsburg as artificially clamping
together diverse elements which Nature meant to exist
separately. What, then, would he have said about the
Hohenzollern-Hapsburg-Bulgar-Turkish compacts for the
domination of neighbouring lands ? Probably he would
have defended that strange league on the ground that the
State is power and must hew its way through to more
favourable positions on the North Sea and in the Levant ;
but assuredly such a plea would contradict his earlier
contention, that the State must be conterminous with the
nation, and that it is well even " to amputate alien elements
of the population."!
His eager nationalism led him to advocate the absorption
of the smaller Gennan States by Prussia ; and indeed he
invited her to attack them. The end, said he, would justify
the means ; and they would soon benefit by her vigorous
rule. Such was his plea in 1864. He knew perfectly well
that the King and Bismarck were then governing illegally
and despotically. All the same, he prayed that they might
succeed ; for Prussia alone could unify Germany. She
alone could win the coveted duchies, Schleswig-Holstein,
and thereby assure to Germany a commanding position
in the North Sea and the Baltic. Similar reasons induced
him to side against Austria and her South German allies
in the struggle of 1866. After the triumph of Prussia, he,
a Saxon by birth, demanded that she should annex Saxony
outright, for the crime of taking the side of Austria ; and
he professed to be surprised and pained that his father
should speak of hhn as " a political Jesuit."
Treitschke persisted in his claim that Prussia should
lead the German people forward to power and prosperity
! Treitschke overlooked the Poles of Posen, then, as now,
utterly un-Prussianized.
GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE 135
far beyond the bounds of the nation. In a remarkable
passage in his essay BinKfessUini unci EinJiciisslaat he
pleaded for an effective unity of Germans so that they
might be able to compete with other peoples for the
commerce of the oceans. The South Sea was calling for
traders ; and mighty united nations were pressing in,
while the Germans could only follow humbly at a distance
their more fortunate predecessors. Why should Germans
be steeped in inland notions ? Let them hear the call of
the sea and organize themselves fitly for a great future.
That future they could realize only by means of political
unity. Enough of their old federalism ! What they
needed was unity — an EinJicitsstmU (a united State).
This was the thought that impelled his angry demand for
the annexation of Saxony, as well as Hanover and Hesse
Cassel. In August, 1870, even before Napoleon III was
overthrown at Sedan, Treitschke passionately demanded
the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. That the people of
those provinces objected to such a change was nought to
him. " These provinces " (he cries) " are ours by the right
of the sword ; and we will rule them in virtue of a higher
right ; in virtue of the right of the German nation to pre-
vent the permanent estrangement of her lost children
from the Germanic Empire. We Germans, who know both
Germany and France, know better what is for the good of
the Alsatians than do those unhappy people themselves,
who, in the perverse conditions of a French existence,
have been denied any true knowledge of modern Germany.
\N'e desire, even against their will, to restore them to
themselves." Then comes the naive and illuminating
admission : " We are by no means rich enough to renounce
so precious a possession." He also ex])ressed the hope that
the extension of the responsibilities of the German people
would lift their politics above doctrinaire pettiness " to a
136 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
great, strenuous and positive conduct of the affairs of the
State." 1
This last statement is instructive, in view of the opposi-
tion ah^eady offered by German Liberals and Socialists
to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. The progressive
elements in German}' deprecated such an act,- not only
from principle, but also from expediency ; from principle,
because the transfer of people like cattle to an alien rule
was abhorrent to democracy ; from expediency, because
the Government of these unwilling subjects must be more
or less coercive ; and coercion renders the Government
harsher towards its own subjects, besides furthering the
growth of militarism. Now, it was precisely for these
reasons that Treitschke advocated the annexation. He
wanted to have done with idealism in order to assure " a
positive conduct of the affairs of the State," in other words,
he aimed at the triumph of Realpolitik. Bismarck was of
the same mind as Treitschke. The Iron ChanceUor,
speaking to Busch just after Sedan, laughed at the notion
that Germany would annex Alsace in order to re-teutonize
her lost children. All that talk was merely the vapouring
of German professors (not yet in favour) : " It is the
fortresses of Metz and Strassburg which we want, and which
we will take."
That is the essence of Realpoliiik. Germany needs
Metz and Strassburg for military reasons. Therefore she
will annex them. True, a little later, Bismarck wavered
about annexing the wholly French population of Metz ;
but the German Staff never wavered. They had their way,
and that way led towards a more drastic polity. Thus,
just as Frederick II's persistent rigour resulted from his
deliberate choice of an aggressive and therefore militarist
^ H. W. C. Davis, The Political Thought of Treitschke, p. 112.
* Busch, Bismarck in the Franco-Geyman War, I, 147.
GERMAN THEORY OE THE STATE 137
policy, so, too, the aggrandized Germany of 1871 imposed
on Europe the evils of an armed peace and on herself a
more absolutist regime.
In proportion as the aims of Berlin politicians became
n.ore and more objective, so did the teaching of Treitschke.
He laughed at a political science based on abstract prin-
ciples, viz. the science of Kant, Fichte, Hegel. He claimed
that it must be the outcome of the experience of each
people. As the peoples differed widely in character and
local conditions, so, too, must their polity. To affirm the
necessary superiority of any one State-system was ridicu-
lous. The nation must construct its own fomi of polity
in order that it might lead its own life. The true guide
was history, not the doctrine of abstract right ; for history
showed what the people was and what it wanted. So far,
good. Few Englishmen will dispute these dicta. But
Treitschke proceeded to claim that in matters pohtical
there was no positive right and wrong. Every nation
must construct its own moral code — as the Germans have
done.
His reasoning at this point is illogical; for, though
he postulated the complete supremacy of the State in
secular affairs, he deliberately excepted matters of con-
science which (said he) pertained to the relations between
G(xl and man, and were beyond the cognizance of the State.
Yet the State must form its own code of morality. The
only escape from the dilhculty is to claim that State
morality is something entirely separate from the morality
(.f tli«' individual. That is what the followers of Treitschke
have both afTirmed in their lecture-rooms anfl practised
in Belgium.
I'inally wr may nwti that Treits* like- nKntilifd tin- ^t.it<
and the nation. He defined the State as a peo])!*- unitid
by legal ties to form an independent power. On this
138 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
subject again his ideas were inconsistent. Sometimes he
denied that the State was an organism and declared it to
be a person (presumably the nation personified). Else-
where, however, he thus defined it : " The State is the
public power for defensive and offensive purposes." (That
is, it is a magnified drill-sergeant.) Pursuing this trend of
thought, he thus narrowed down the functions of the State :
" It only represents the nation from the point of view of
power" (a political Hercules). But, again, he said:
" The State is the basis of all national life " (an eternized
Frederick the Great) . ^
It is difficult to frame any intelligible theory out of
these descriptions ; and the composite photograph made
up from these personifications would be an odd creature,
recognizable only by the spiked helmet. But there is one
feature common to them all. They body forth the idea of
power ; they imply a something which functions with
tremendous energy, which belongs more to the barracks
and the workshop than to the Church and the University.
Treitschke's State, whatever he may at times say to the
contrary, is a mechanical contrivance designed for con-
quest ; and to this contrivance the Gennan people is
closely linked.
These conceptions of the State as drill-sergeant and of the
populace as recruits mark a serious set back from the ideas
of Fichte ; for he insisted on the ideal character of the
nation. In his view the nation far transcended the State,
which concerned itself with government and law. The
nation looked to higher things, to the blossoming of the
eternal and divine in the world. Despite his too hopeful
idealism, Fichte was far nearer to the truth than Treitschke.
For, surely, the State is the organism, while the nation is
^ Treitschke, Politik, I, pp. 28-32, 62-3 ;
quoted by H. W. C. Davis, op. cit., pp. 127-131.
GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE 139
the brain and the soul. True, the nation needs the State
to endow it with hands and feet. But the nation remains
the directing agency vitahzing and directing the body
poHtic. Indeed, the nation survives, even when all the
machinery of Government is shattered. At this very time
the Belgian State and the Serbian State scarcely exist ;
but the Belgian nation and the Serb nation endure — aye,
and will endure ; for their sublime courage has endowed
them with immortalit}'. This is what Gemian politicians
and German professors cannot understand. Destroy all'
the machinery of government and you have destroyed the
nation, say Treitschke and his successors. Possibly it is,
in part, these mechanical notions which have led them
astray into their recent adventures ; for otherwise their
conduct is altogether inexplicable. It becomes dimly
intelligible when compared with that of Napoleon, who,
carrying eighteenth-century niaterialism into the realm of
high policy, deemed the Spanish nation conquered when he
had beaten their armies and seized the machinery of
government. It is the nemesis of a forceful regime that
it neglects everything which cannot be measured in
battalions, money, and foot-pounds.
Treitschke had before him the example, not onl\- of
Napoleon's disastrous blunder, but also that of two peoples
who defied all assessment by ofl'icial measures. During a
century (with a short interval after Waterloo) the Poles
enjoyed no political existence. Yet have the Poles ever
ceased to be a nation ? The other instance is even more
striking. During 1800 years the Jews have liad no State.
Nevertheless, Jewish nationaUty is one of the powerful
influences of the world, often seemingly destioyed, but
ever rising again in Phanix-like vitality. In sjjite of these
patent proofs of the superiority of the nation to the State,
Treitschke and his many followers insist upon degrading
140 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
the nation, which is essentially a spiritual entity, to the
level of the organism which merely endows it with power
for action. I believe that there is no hope for German poli-
tical thought until it frees itself from this disastrous
confusion. " Back to Fichte " ought to be the cry of all
German idealists ; for, though his political creed contained
much that was despotic, yet he proclaimed the all-important
truth (veiled to Treitschke), that a nation exists in the
realm of spirit and cannot be made or unmade by force.
When that discovery is brought home to the German
people they will have taken the first step towards a political
renascence. Then they will liberate themselves from the
traditions of Frederick the Great. Then they will re-
organize themselves on rational lines, free from the
overmastering influence of the Prussian State.
LFXTURE VTTI
NATIONALITY AND MILITARISM
Our studies in national movements liave been bj' no means
complete. We have passed by the struggles of the Poles,
Belgians, Greeks, and Hungarians, also the efforts of the
French for a revival of their polity in the critical years
1871-5. The study of the French Risorgimento reveals
the sterling worth of that people and also the practical
usefulness of patriotism in rebuilding an almost shattered
societv. No better guide and inspiration can be found
for the tremendous work of reconstruction which awaits
the European peoples at the close of this disastrous war. '
We have also had to omit from our sur\ey the most
surprising of all national movements in our age, that of
Japan. A genuinely patriotic impulse it was which
suddenly transformed Japan from a mediaeval into a
modern State, which absorbed much of the best in European
civilization without impairing the strength of the old
Japanese chivalry {Bitshidu). Finally it was a keen sense
of national lionour which flung back Russia from Korea,
expelled Germany from Shang Tung, and is now loyally
lielping the Allies by furnishing Russia with the munitions
of war. All this has been done by a people which less than
half a century ago fought with bows and arrows and
• The revival of France in 1 871-5 will form one of the " special
periods " for the Historical Tripos of 191 7, etc. ; and will be dealt
with by members of the (ambiidge History School.
141
142 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
frightened the enemy with masks. It is a romance ; and
the soul of the romance is the intense patriotism which
nerves the Japanese, from the highest to the lowest, with
devotion to the Mikado as the embodiment of all that is
holy and lofty in the national life. There is terrible poverty
in Japan ; but no Japanese would dream of whining :
" I have no country to fight for."
These great movements one and all demonstrate the
tremendous force of Nationality. It may be granted that
that feeling appeared long ago in England, France, and
Spain ; yet its influence was fitful by comparison with
that which it has recently exerted upon the European
peoples ; and I think we may ascribe its development
largely to the spread of education and of facilities for trade
and travel. In the Ancient and Mediaeval Worlds the
town or even the village was the typical social unit. By
degrees that unit enlarged. In times of general danger
men recognized their kinship with men previously
deemed strangers or enemies ; and with the widening of
social intercourse that conception acquired strength until
it flashed forth in a universal consciousness at a time of
mental exaltation such as that which exhilarated France
in 1789-90. Elsewhere, as in Spain, England, and North
Germany, danger of conquest by the foreigner furnished
the mental stimulus ; and then what had been a group-
consciousness, a county or provincial feeling, became a
permanently national feeling. As I have tried to show in
these lectures, this widening outlook, this pride in the
country instead of merely in the county, opens up an im-
mense store of vital energy. There passes through those
diverse groups and classes a thrill which makes them one
body politic — not a corpus vile on which Kings and law-
givers may work their will, but a conscious powerful entity
which bends them to its will. Such is the change which
NATIONALITY AND .MILITARISM
IV.
has come over the peoples. It has refashioned the map of
Europe, forming in the centre massive blocks out of what
was a feudal niDsaic, ilissohing the Ottoman Empire into
its component racial groups, in short, giving political
expression to the settlements of the peoples effected during
the Dark Ages.
Reverting to our political bioscope of Lecture I, we see
that the political boundaries of Europe now correspond
nearly to the more permanent of the conquests made by the
barbarian invaders who shattered the Roman Empire.
First there was imperial unity, which gave way before
tribal chaos ; then there ensued long and painful jostlings ;
then an assorting process under monarchs ; then there
emerged groups of tribes nearly related, which developed
at the expense of merely traditional or enforced groupings ;
finally there were formed the solid homogeneous blocks of
to-day. Obviously, here we have an elemental force of
incalculable potency, whether for good or harm. The
reasonable method of regarding this national instinct is,
not to sneer at it as something old-fashioned and certain
soon to disappear before an enlightened cosmopolitanism,
but rather to try and understand it, so as to dissociate its
baser elements from those which may further the progress
of mankind.
Firstly, then, what is Nationality, using the term in its
abstract sense?' Perhaps we shall come nearer to the
truth if we apply the method of exclusion and discover
what it is not. Our studies have, I believe, led us to doubt
whether it is determined by race. Let us consider this
question in the light of the science of ethnology. We now
know that the old notions about " the Eurojiean family "
and its supposed division into Celts, Teutons, etc., are
• Sfc tlic Preface for notes on Iho forms " people," " nation,"
nationality."
144 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
without scientific foundation. There is no European
family, no Celtic race, no Teutonic race. Anthropologists,
by their careful examinations of certain physical charac-
teristics, such as the shape of the skull and the colour of
• hair and eyes, have proved that so-called racial divisions
based on language or tradition are not fundamental.
Speaking broadly, there are three races in Europe :
(i) the tall, fair, long-haired race which spreads from the
British Isles and the North of France through Flanders
and the North European plain and Scandinavia as far as
the Gulf of Finland ; (2) the broad-headed race, generally
termed the Alpine, which inhabits the greater part of
Central France, Central Europe, and the Balkan Peninsula ;
(3) the Mediterranean race, inhabiting the European lands
north of the Mediterranean Sea, with the exception of
North Italy and the Balkan Peninsula.^
Science, then, knows of no essential physical difference
between a North-West German, a Fleming, and a North
Frenchman. There is a difference between this northern
family and the Central and Southern Germans and
Frenchmen. Considered according to race, Germany is
tripartite, and so is France. There is no marked distinction
of race between a Norman and a Hanoverian ; between
a Lyonnais and a Bavarian ; between a Provencal and a
Calabrian. In the French army there are three distinct
racial types : so there are in the German army. Yet
those three diverse types are welded into political and
military entities, which oppose each other with the most
desperate determination. But this political and mihtary
grouping is not racial ; it is based on difference of culture
^ The above summary, of course, does not comprise the Jews,
Turks, Bulgars, Magyars, and Finns. It is only a very general
statement. Deniker subdivides the three races named above into
several groups.
NATIONALITY AND MILITARISM 145
(using the term in its widest sense). Though there is
no such thing as a Celtic or Teutonic race, Celtic or Teutonic
culture is a reality. So, too, the Anglo-Saxon people is a
conglomerate, made up of several racial elements ; but
Anglo-Saxon culture has marked and distinct characteris-
tics, which, from our present point of view, overshadow
the physical differences above noted. It is also important
to get rid of the old notion that there is a fundamental
physical difference between the average Englishman and
the average North Frenchman, and between him and the
average North German.* What differences there are have
developed later. They are due to language, tradition,
religion, custom, and, finally, political grouping and
political sentiment. Of course these differences make up
nearly the whole of life to the modern man ; but (to put
it baldly) the Englishman is not a different animal from
the North German, or he, again, from the North French-
man. Science has rendered a great service b}' dispro\ing
that hoar}' superstition.
No ! Only in a very crude form (like that which now
prevails in Germany and the Balkans) does Nationality
depend on race. The Belgian litterateur, Laveleye, well
expressed the thought : " In proportion as the culture of a
people advances, identity of race and of blood exercises
less power on it, and historic memories exercise more
power. Above ethnical nationalities there are political
nationalities, formed by choice (one may say), rooted in
love of liberty, in the cult of a glorious past, in accord of
interests, in similarity of moral iileas, and of all that forms
the intellectual life."- Here, however, I must regretfully
remark that this ]»eaceful iuid idc.il (U-vclopment is apt
to be interrupted by inrushes of sentiment and passion.
* W. Z. Kiplcy, The Races of Hurupe, i li. (>.
* E. Laveleye, Le Gouvernemeut tl Li liinuwratie (1891), I, p. 58.
146 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
At such crises, especially during war, the adage " Blood is
thicker than water " holds good ; and the affinities pro-
duced by generations of culture vanish under the drag of
racial instincts that seemed to be dead. Then the cultured
European gives place to the tribal warrior.
In normal circumstances, however, Nationality does not
depend on race. Does it, then, depend on language ?
Here certainly we come nearer to a powerful political
influence. But again consider. In the French army are
Bretons and a few Basques and Spaniards who speak no
French, yet are enthusiastically French at heart. In the
German army are Wends who in a political sense are
thoroughly Germanized, not to speak of PoleSj Danes, and
Lorrainers who are not Germanized. In the Austrian army
are peoples speaking eleven distinct languages ; yet there is
in that army, as in the Austrian Empire, far more solidarity
than was believed to be possible. But the crowning proof
that language does not determine Nationality is found in
Switzerland. The Swiss comprise portions of three peoples,
which speak French, German, and Italian ; ^ yet they
remain at peace, though over the borders their kith and
kin are at war. How is this possible ? Merely because
language does not determine Nationality. The sentiment
of Swiss Nationality, rooted in pride in their historic past
and in contentment with an almost ideal polity, has
triumphed over linguistic differences. Trilingual Switzer-
land remains at peace — agitated, it is true, for language
is a powerful tie. Nevertheless, the spiritual union of
that people holds firm ; and its triumph is an augury of
hope for the future. Scarcely less remarkable is the case
of the Jews, at which we glanced in Lecture I. They have
retained their solidarity, though dispersed during long
^ I omit the Romansch, spoken in the Engadine, as too small to
count
XATIOXALITY AND MILITARISM 147
ages, and divided by sharp differences of language. Only
where congregated together in large numbers do they
habitually use Hebrew. In Spain and the Balkan States
they use Spanish ; in Russia and Polanil they speak either
Polish or a corrupt German ; in Morocco, Arabic. Yet they
rarely lose their Nationality.'
The case of the Swiss and that of the Jews, then, seems
to show that language is not necessary to, though it may
help on, the forming of a nation. Probably, with the spread
of education, language will play a smaller part than before.
Welsh is dying in several parts of Wales, especially in the
industrial districts ; and the smaller languages will doubt-
less vanish, and with them racial differences and jealousies.
Migration and emigration help on the assimilating process.
In the United States and Canada few languages except
English, French, and German have a chance of surviving,
and French and German only in certain areas. Speaking
generally, in the new lands the smaller languages tend to
disappear. Dutch (in a very simplified form) persists in
South Africa ; but there, too, commerce helps on the more
useful language, English. Indeed, the victory of General
Botha over Hcrtzog at the polls in South Africa may prove
to be the beginning of a genuinely Anglo-Dutch reunion,
which wiij be neither English nor Dutch, but Africander
(perhaps bi-lingual for some generations), loyal to the
Empire which not only tolerates but fosters within its
fold all peoples, all creeds, all languages. The j)resent
war has been a terrible set back to the progress of mankind ;
for it has revived national hatreds and has arrayed against
each other peoples speaking different languages ; but
> Ripley, op. cit., p. 369 ; S. B. Hohold. The War atut the Jew
(Torontrj, 191 5), sliows that 350,000 Jcw.s arc li^litin^ for Kiissia,
iHo.ooo U)T .Austria, f)vcr I5,()(«) for us, and over lo.ooo for I-iaucc.
Yet, though lf)yally obeying their Governnients anil lighting against
their co-reiigionisls, tlu-y nniaiii Jews.
148 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
there are tendencies at work, more permanent than war,
which lessen Hnguistic differences and induce peoples of
diverse tongues to live together in friendly union. Of
these Federations, Switzerland, the United States, and the
British Empire (which is in spirit a Federation rather than
an Empire) form the most promising examples ; and the
present disastrous conflict will probably tend ultimately
to strengthen the development of such unions existing
independently of race or language. Such at least is the
tendency among the leading peoples of the West. They
do not need to conquer their neighbours ; they attract
them by the charm of their culture. And this, surely, is
the type of Nationality which will ultimately prevail over
the crude force that is now devastating the w^orld.
No ! Nationality does not depend on language. Still
less does it depend on a State. As we saw in the last lecture,
a nation that depends on a State is mistaking an organism
for the life and soul of that organism. In modern times,
national feeling has fashioned States, and is always at work
refashioning them in accordance with new needs. Nations
make States ; not States, nations. The one exception is
Prussia ; so long as she limited herself to the unification
of the German people, she achieved remarkable success ;
but so soon as the Prussian State sought to Germanize
other peoples, it utterly failed. Herein, surely, lies one
of the chief causes of the deep hostility between the Ger-
mans and other peoples. The Germans have glorified the
State and have sought to force their Kultur on neighbouring
highly civilized peoples, who resent that process. Even if,
by some miracle, they succeeded in this war, their effort
would be doomed to failure, as surely as that of Napoleon
the Great. For it violates a fundamental conviction of
the modern man.
Lastly, is Nationality an emanation of the World-
NATIONALITY AND MII.ITARIS:\I 149
Spirit ? Hegel (in his Philosophy of History, 1S30) put
forth a theory which assumed that a world-force visited the
peoples in a predetermined order and endowed them
with exceptional vitality for some special task. \Miile
they performed that task, they were " moral, virtuous,
vigorous." Thereafter, they declined, and another took
up that or some similar task. The theory finds little
support from History. It breaks down in the case of China,
which during thousands of years has pursued the even
tenor of its way, with few signs of decline, and, indeed,
recently with many signs of rejuvenescence. The theory
also seeks to account for the decay of the nations, both
ancient and modern, on a single hypothesis ; whereas
history shows that decline and decay were due to very
diverse causes, many of them of an agrarian or social
character but slightly understood in Hegel's day. Nations
also may seem to be on the downward trend, like the France
of Louis XV and X\T, and then by a conscious and deter-
mined effort of reform they will shoot up again to un-
imagined heights of power, declining once more when that
power is abused by a dictator. Napoleon. If Napoleon
was the chief emanation of the World-Spirit, as Hegel
long assumed him to be, how came it that he left France
far weaker than he found her ? Did the World-Spirit
suddenly change its mind in 1813 and resolve to desert
him and go over to the Allies ?
On these and similar topics the World-Spirit theory
offers no adequate explanation. Indeed, it cannot explain
the complex phenomena of the rise and fall of nations.
That certain peoples have now and again displayed marvel-
lously increased vigour is true ; but that ])]K'n<unenon is
generally due to one or more nf the folhtwing causes:
There may be a fusing together of various tribes by
s<jn'.e able leader or under the impulse of religious ferxour
150 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
(as happened to the Arabs after the time of Mohammed).
A great warrior may have incited peoples to wars of ambi-
tion. Or, on the other hand, a nation, when threatened
with conquest, may be thrown back on itself and develop
to the utmost the powers that generally go unused.
Or, again, a people can be stimulated by becoming the
exponent of some great idea, as were the Sw^edes of Gus-
tavus Adolphus by Reformation fervour, or the French
Revolutionists by the ideas of liberty, equality, and
Nationality. Lastly, geographical discoveries and me-
chanical inventions bring some peoples to the front and
depress the fortunes of others, as is evident from the
history of Venice, Portugal, Holland, Great Britain.
Looking at the causes that make for the rise and fall of
nations, we discern a great variety ; they range from war-
like ambition or the spur of hunger, to impulses of an ideal
nature, such as religious zeal, or newly aroused national
pride, or wars of liberation. Sometimes a new energy
raises the people to a higher level of thought, art, or
invention. Again, it drives them to the conquest of new
markets. How is it possible to refer to any one cause
impulses of so bewildering a variety ? Label your causa
causans " World-Spirit " if you like ; but remember that
it is a very Proteus, now flashing forth as a warrior, then
shrinking into a huckster ; now an artist or poet, then a
politician ; now a philosopher, then an explorer ; now an
admiral, then a mechanic or engineer. You must run
through the whole range of life in order to fill up all the
characters that your Spirit may assume.
Lastly, remember that the theory of a World-Spirit
inflating one people and deflating others in a predeter-
mined order is morally mischievous. For it tends to puff
up with pride a people which believes it detects some sign
of the spiritual afflatus ; while it also disheartens peoples
NATIONALITY AND MILITARISM 151
tliat deem the deflating process begun, and thereby dis-
courages the timely efforts at reform which can nearly
always avert collapse. Believe me, that a fatalistic theory,
such as that of tlu- \\'orld-Spirit, has little warrant from
history. It does not apply to peoples that refuse to bow
down to the supposed decrees of fate. Only those peoples
are sure to perish who tamely prostrate themselves before
those decrees. •
\\'e have now cleared the ground of fault}' ur huiJcquatc
explanations of Nationality. Perhaps we shall best under-
stand what it is if we briefly review the events that first
made it a force in the modern world.
Recent history is held to begin with the French Revolu-
tion of 1789 : and Alison classed all the campaigns up to
Waterloo under the Revolution. Is it not truer to fact to sub-
divide the period and say that the first phase of Nationality
as distinct from Democracy begins with the Spanish Rising
of 1808 ? It ends with Waterloo. The second phase com-
mences fitfully in 1830 and 1848, and more definitely with the
Italian War of Liberation in 1859. From 1859 to the present
is pre-eminently the climax of the Age of Nationality.
By this I mean that the idea has permeated the masses of
the population and lias increased their power for action.
True, the national idea had previously dawned upon poets
and thinkers. It vibrates in the verse of Dante, Chaucer,
and Shakespeare ; but, as we saw in Lecture I, it did not
penneate the masses, except at intense moments of their
life, such as coincided with the exploits of Jeanne d'Arc,
the rej)ulse of the Spanish Armada, or the revolt of the Dutrli
" Beggars " against Spain. Subse(|uently, it dit-d down
even in France, Fngland, and Holland ; for the Religious
Wars divided peoples against themselves, and. on tiic
' I think that Nationality explains several of the cases of
exceptional vitality which Hegel Obcribed to his World-Spirit.
152 LECTURES ON NATIONALITV
cessation of those strifes, dynastic wars or the growth of
absolutist States half stifled the sentiment. Louis XIV
personified the French nation, but so successfully that the
nation was but half aware of its own existence.
Much preparatory work had to be done before this
discovery was possible. The shipbuilders, road-makers,
and traders played their part in bringing men together.
Thinkers pointed out what was natural, what artificial,
in their society. But when all this preliminary work was
ended, and men of different provinces of France began
to greet each other instead of scowling, any widepread
impulse was certain to produce a new and vital union.
Such an event was the Revolution. It changed the half-
animate clods into citizens, but it also sent through them
a sympathetic thrill which made the citizens a nation.
France is often termed the political laboratory of Europe ;
for her actions are more striking than are the gradual
unfoldings that characterize our annals. Certainly, it is
in French history that the development of Nationality is
most clearly outlined. The merging of different peoples
and diverse provinces in a single monarchy was the work
of French monarchs and statesmen, so that, except in a
few moments of inspiration, the nation existed only by
and in the person of the King. As the monarchy declined
under Louis XV and XVI, the nation emerged ; and, early
in the Revolution (as we saw in Lecture II), the disputes
of the National Assembly with the King brought the sense
of Nationality to sudden maturity. It found expression
during the famous sitting of August 4, 1789, when Lorraine,
youngest of the French provinces, expressed her desire to
join intimately in the life of " this glorious family."
I know of no words that better describe Nationality.
It is an instinct, and cannot be exactly defined ; it is the
recognition as kinsmen of those who were deemed strangers ;
NATIONALITY AND Mll.irAKISM 153
it is the apotheosis of family feehng, and begets a resolve
never again to separate ; it leads to the founding of a
polity on a natural basis, independent of a monareh or a
State, though not in any sense hostile to them ; it is more
than a political contract ; it is a union of hearts, once made,
never unmade. These are the characteristics of Nationality
in its highest fonn — a spiritual conception, unconquerable,
indestructible. So soon as clans, tribes, or provinces catch
the glow of this wider enthusiasm, they foriia a nation.
And thus it was that France burst into her new life. Her
long chrysalis stage, when patriotism clung about the old
monarcliy, was ended ; and the nation stood erect and
defiant. England, Italy, Illyria, Spain, Russia, Gemiany,
successively felt the impact of this new vital force, and
responded with messages, first of sympathy, then of dis-
trust, finally of hostility. Thus, within twenty-five years,
Europe was awake, and became a camp of warring nations.
During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Age, then,
France exhibits Nationality at its best and at its worst.
In its higher developments in 1789-91 that principle
endowed her with a distinct and vivid consciousness, so
that what had been a set of limbs, worked in the main by
a master, became a body-politic — nay, more, a soul-politic
that defied division. In this new ami intense life she
exerted a singular fascination on all peoples. Thinkers
felt licr magnetic potency. Goethe, unresponsive to
Gennan politics, bowed before the manifestation of her
uncanny strength at \'almy. Schiller and Fichte hailed
her as the source of light and warmth to a dead world.
Wordsworth and Coleridge first felt the full thrill of jioctic
ecstasy as they gazed on her ci\'ic rajiturcs, and foretold
defeat to all who withstood her new-found might. That
was Nationality in its purest form. It <orre.sj)onds to the
time in life when the youth finds himself.
154 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
But, as often happens in human affairs, this strength
ran riot. Self-reahzation begot self-confidence, and that
in its turn contempt for those who were still inert. Hence
the crusade of 1792 for the liberation of unfree peoples
degenerated into wars of aggression. As Wordsworth
phrased it : —
But now, become oppressors in their turn.
Frenchmen had changed a war of self-defence
For one of conquest, losing sight of all
Which they had struggled for. . . .
... I read her doom,
With anger vexed, with disappointment sore." ^
This sudden degeneration of French Nationality reminds
us that there is a baser side to the instinct. In this respect
it does not aim at the union of all who desire to share in
the common life, but seeks to compel aliens to come in.
It uses force, not attraction. Its outcome is tyranny, not
liberty ; a military Empire, not a free Federation.
Not only events in France in 1792-1815, but also the
Continental movements of 1848-9 reveal the ease with
which Nationalism is perverted and becomes an enemy
to freedom. When the peoples of Italy, France, Germany,
and Austria-Hungary rose to demand constitutional rule
and a more natural political grouping, Democracy and
Nationality seemed for a time to have achieved a complete
triumph. But the two principles soon clashed, especially
among the Germans and Magyars. In Hungary, the
Magyars won their freedom from the House of Hapsburg,
but soon showed their unfitness for the boon. No sooner
did they gain constitutional rights than they used
them to force the Magyar language on their Slav fellow-
subjects — an act of intolerance fatal to Hungary in 1849,
^ Wordsworth, Prelude, Bk. XI.
XATIOXALITY AND MILITARISM 155
as similar acts have been in tlie recent past.' At other
points, too. the Xationahsts of 1849 strained their case to
breaking point, witli the result that in Central Europe and
to a less extent in Italy Democracy and Nationality parted
company, to their mutual detriment.
The upshot of it all was that the progranmie of Mazzini
failed in the sphere of practice ; and the peoples, unable to
achieve self-expression by their unaided exertions, fell back
on the methods of diplomacy and force exemplified in the
careers of Cavour and Bismarck, and championed by the
Houses of Savoy and Hohenzollern. In that statement
much lies enfolded ; for it implies that they entered upon
paths parallel to those which led Revolutionary France
towards Militarism.
True : the successes won by Cavour and Bismarck were
phenomenal. The Italian and Gemian movements rushed
to victory in the elc\cn years 1859-70 ; but I believe
that all intelligent Germans now regret the suddenness
and the brilliance of that triumph uf military force. Better
that Germany and Italy had struggled on some decades
longer, and won their national unity by less forceful means
and at the cost of fewer national antipathies.
Let us retrace our steps in order to observe the parallel
courses of Militarism in Republican France and Bis-
marckian Prussia. As we saw in Lecture II, France
adopted the princii)le of ci\ic service for her newly en-
franchised sons in 1789 ; and Lafayette, sh<^rtly after the
ca|)ture of the Bastille, wheii f(mnding the new National
(iuaril, j)ronounced that force "an institution at once
civic and military, which nmst prevail over the old tactics
(A Europe, ami whitli will reduce arbitrary Governments
' Uluntschli (Theory of the Stale, Hk. II, cli. j) says lluit a Stale
(.innot fleny a Naliun.ilitv tin- use of iU l.ini^uaKf and lilciatiirf,
thuugli it may u^c the prcduininanl laji(^aagc lur cuuvc-nicncc.
156 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
to the alternative of being beaten if they do not imitate it,
or overthrown [by their subjects] if they dare to imitate
it."i This remarkable prophecy did not come true until
the national danger became acute ; but then, in the spring
of 1793, the organization of the National Guards was greatly
extended, so much so as to cause the first outbreaks in
recalcitrant La Vendee. After the individualist Girondins
were overthrown on June 2, thorough -going Jacobins
leaped to power, and they proceeded to enforce the prin-
ciple of national service. With Robespierre supreme in
the Committee of Public Safety and Carnot as its military
organizer, conscription became the groundwork of the
national defence. In a great speech at the Jacobins' Club
on August 1 1 Robespierre thus set forth the gravity of the
military crisis : "... The remedy is in you yourselves.
... If the whole people does not derive fresh courage
from our reverses ; if one single citizen fails to rush forward
to devote himself to the salvation of the country by beating
back its oppressors, it is all up with Liberty : she will not
survive our courage." Thereafter a Report was presented
to the National Convention urging drastic measures,
because " half measures are always fatal in extreme peril.
The whole nation is easier to move than a part of the
nation. . . . Let there be no exceptions save those which
are necessary for the sowing and harvesting of the crops."
Barere then declared that the whole nation ought to rise
in defence of freedom and constitution and to drive out
the foreign despots and their satellites. On August 23 the
National Convention placed all males of military age per-
manently at the service of the armies. The decree ran thus :
" The young men shall go to fight ; married men shall forge
weapons and transport supplies ; the women shall make
tents and uniforms or serve in the hospitals ; the children
^ Lafayette, Mems., II, 267.
NATIONALITY AND .MILITAKI^.M 157
shall make lint ; the old men shall be carried to the public
squares to excite the courage of soldiers, hatred of kings,
and enthusiasm for the unity of the Ropubhc."' That is
how France interpreted the new dc\ice on its flags : " The
French nation risen against tyrants."
It has been asserted that the decree of 1798 is the first
law of conscription. True, it carried out more methodically
the system imposed in August, 179J. But the later decree
was merely the extension of the earlier decree, which gave
France those massive arrays so fatal to the thin lines of
Coburg and the Duke of York. The momentum of the
new national forces carried them into Holland, the Rhine-
land, and tlie Genoese Riviera in the campaigns of 1794-5,
thus inaugurating the period of conquest, which was
prolonged by the genius and ambition of Napoleon.
These facts should be noted carefully ; for they dispose
of the assertions often made, that conscription was a device
of the monarchs for the enslavement of their peoples.
Far froni that, conscription was a device of the most
democratic government in the world for the expulsion of
the armies of the monarchs. None of them dared to copy
the deniocratic principle of national service, until Frederick
W'iUiam III of Prussia doubtfully adopted it as a desperate
expedient for saving that humiliated State from utter
ruin ; and tlie Prussian army, when nationalized, played
a very important part in the o\ert]irow of Napoleon.
I believe that there is a \-ague notion that conscription
(jriginated with him. He merely systematized its appHca-
tion. The responsibility for the introduction of the system
lies with tlie French Republicans of iy()^ and 179'S. It was
therefore a result of the national and democratic sentiment
which swept through France at the time of her great
Revolution. The statement that Militarism is the outcome
* Hiil. parlementairc, XXVIII, .\55-\(i9-
158 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
of a deep-laid plot of rulers to enslave their peoples is so
far wrong, that, after the Restoration of the French
Bourbons in 1814-5, the national army was considerably
reduced ; and the same thing happened among other
peoples. Autocrats do not like universal service ; for they
cannot trust it. Thus ended Militarism in its first phase.
The second, or Prussian, phase began in i860, when,
for purposes of defence, after the humiliations of the
previous years, the Regent (soon King), William I of
Prussia, introduced the first of his famous Army Bills.
They were fiercely opposed by the Prussian Parliament
in the belief that he would make the army the tool of
absolutism. But his aim was patriotic, not despotic.
After the overthrow of Denmark and Austria by means
of that army, Prussian Liberals withdrew their opposition
and condoned all the illegal proceedings of the years
1860-6. Why ? Because, however high-handed, the
Bismarckian policy had enabled them to win Schleswig-
Holstein from the Danes and to weld the North German
States on the firm basis of the Prussian monarchy. Their
constitutional scruples vanished when it appeared that the
policy of " blood and iron " had prevailed over two neigh-
bouring States, and had nearly solved the problem of
German unity. The Prussian deputies now saw that the
King's aim had been national. The triumph of 1870
clinched the success of Prussia ; and the German Empire
of 1871, though federal in form, was, in effect, an enlarge-
ment of Prussia. In March, 1849, Kii^g Frederick William
IV had solemnly promised that Prussia should merge
herself in Germany. In 1871 Germany merged herself
in Prussia.
The brilliance of these military triumphs led neighbouring
peoples to copy the Prussian army ; and once again
Europe became an armed camp. The results are well
XATIOXALITY AXD MILITARISM 159
known. Just as Napoleon diverted to purposes of conquest
a citizen-anuy wliich at first was solely defensive, so Kaiser
Wilhehn II lias misused the enormous resources of men,
arms, and money which his grandfather is believed to have
amassed primarily for the sake of defence. Worst of all,
the national army which enabled Prussia in 1866-70 to
effect the unity of Gennany, has been prostituted to colossal
schemes of aggrandizement at thr expense of weaker
neighbours. The conduct of \\'ilhLlin 11 in this century
therefore resembles that of Napoleon a century ago. But
in one respect the Hohenzollcrn has less excuse than the
Corsican. In the years 1805-15 national sentiment was
far less developed than it is to-day. A century of effort
has strengthened the individuality of all the peoples, so that
their merging in any one State or Union, which was possible
under Napoleon, is unthinkable under Wilhehn. Prussia
now offers her victims no higli ideal of citizenship, only the
prospect of unlimited drilling with a view to the subjection
of other peoples ; no inspiring traditions such as glorified
the French Empire— little else than records of astute
oj)portunism, sudden attack, and now, as in 1871, brutality
in the hour of real or fancied triumpli. Such is the history
of fifty-five years of Prussian Militarism. L'ndcr Nai)olt()n
(at any rate up to Friedland, 1807) the French polity had
not so far belied its democratic origin as to be a tool of
despotism and ambition. The men who carried NapoKon's
eagles to Vienna, Rome, and Warsaw believed that they
were furthering the cause of liberty. Do the German
troojjs in Belgium, Poland, and Serbia believe that ? Will
a foreign poet and a foreign composer ever sound forth
the heroism and chivalry of zwci Crciuniicroi, as Ihiiic
and S< humaim immortalized those of N,ij)oleon ?
LECTURE IX
NATIONALISM SINCE 1885
" Weak and incapable nations must look on while foreign
nationalities gain in number and importance within the borders of
their State." — Prince von Bulow, Imperial Germany, p. 240.
The previous studies have illustrated the excellences and
defects of the national movements up to the year 1885.
The instinct of Nationality has endowed the European
peoples and Japan (perhaps soon we shall add China) with
a vitality and force which resembles, say, the incoming of
steam-power into industry. What previously had been
minutely subdivided and inert became united, vigorous,
aggressive. Contrast the ridiculous Germany at which
Heine mocked, the torpid Italy which Mazzini awakened,
with the great and powerful nations of to-day. The
changes wrought by the national wars of the years 1859-70
are among the most important of all time ; for they altered
not only the polity but the national character in France,
Germany, and Italy. ^ Further, the Balkan peoples were
nerved to struggle for their rights, and in 1876-8 and 1885
1 In a Paris paper early in February, 1871, was an article by
" Ferragus " which began : " Bismarck has probably done better
service to France than to Germany. He has worked for a false
unity in his country, but ver}^ effectually for a regeneration of ours.
He has freed us from the Empire. He has restored to us our energy,
our hatred for the foreigner, our love for our country, our contempt
for life, our readiness for self-sacrifice, in short all the virtues which
Napoleon III had killed in us."
160
NATIONALISM SINCK 1SS3 161
they largely succeeded in shaking off the Turkish yoke.
In the autumn of 1885 the union of the two Bulgarias
almost completed the aspirations of that people ; and (as
we saw in Lecture \'I) it enabled them to escape from
Russian tutelage and to proceed with internal developments
of great promise. On the other hand British polic}-, which
under Lord Beaconsfield had thwarted the national efforts
of the Balkan peoples, now, under Lord Salisbur}', resumed
its traditional role of protector of the small nationalities.
Thus, up to the month of September, 1885, Nationalism
won portentous triumphs. True, in 1866 Prussia over-
stepped her fair limits In' annexing the Danes of North
Schleswig, and in 1871 by wrenching Alsace-Lorraine from
France. Still, the balance was decidedly favourable for
the national principle.
We now approach c\-ents of a different order. I propose
to review them here as impartially as possible, and in the
main to leave you to draw your own conclusions.
On November 14, 1885, King Milan of Serbia suddenly
declared war against Bulgaria on a frivolous pretext, his
real reason being jealousy of the increase of her power
consequent on the recent union. The Serbs entered Bul-
garia, and were advancing towards Sofia, when the Bulgars,
speedily rallying, soundly beat them at Slivnitza, and
chased them back into their own territory. Near Pirot
the victors were bidden to halt. The Austrian general,
Khcvenhiiller, declared in imperious terms that any
further advance would oblige the Dual-Monarchy to send
in its white-coats. The Bulgars thereafter retired, ;in(l
patrhed up matters with Serbia ; but the incident rankled
in the breasts of both peoples and excited racial jealousies
dating bark five centuries to tli<' time of Serbia's glory
under the sway of King Dushan.
The ( onisif)n has a double signifieance. Only se\cn years
.M
i62 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
after deliverance from their bondage to the Turk two
Christian peoples flew at one another's throats and thereby
provoked hatreds whose ghastly sequel has recently
appalled the world. Secondly, the intervention of Austria
on behalf of her protege, King Milan, gave colour to the
story that she had incited him to that fratricidal attack
in order to weaken the Balkan peoples and thus prepare
the way for her advance southwards to Salonica. As she
had bargained with the Tsar in 1876 with a view to the
acquisition of that long-coveted port,i she probably had
a hand in Milan's enterprise. Thereafter both he and his
son, Alexander (the latter reigned at Belgrade from 1889
to 1903) were notoriously under Hapsburg patronage,
which often screened them from the resentment of the
Serb people. The murder of Alexander and the accession
of Peter (of the Karageorge family) inaugurated a national
policy, which increasingly incurred the displeasure of the
Hapsburgs. But, despite the long tutelage of Serbia by
them, and that of Bulgaria by the Tsar Alexander III ; even
despite the cruelties of the Sultan Abdul Hamid II against
both the Serbs and Bulgars in Macedonia, these races could
not lay aside their mutual hatreds. Consequently, the
ideal of a Balkan Federation remained a dream ; and
disgust at the narrow and vindictive Nationalism of the
Balkan peoples probably figured among the motives which
led the new Tsar, Nicholas II (1894), to turn away from
their exasperating feuds towards the golden visions opening
out in the Far East. Whatever his reasons, he certainly
took less interest than his father in Balkan affairs.
In 1897 the Greeks struggled unsuccessfully to extend
their too narrow bounds in Thessaly. They met with no
support whatever from Serbs and Bulgars, and succumbed
to an unexpectedly sharp counter-stroke from Turks and
^ Debidour, Hist, diplomatique de I'Europe, II, 515.
NATIONALISM SINCE 1SS5 163
Albanians. In the same year ruthless massacres of Mace-
donians and Armenians by order of Abdul Hamid mani-
fested his resolve to effect a Moslem rex i\al by tiie
traditional Turkish method ; and the sight of this energy
produced no small impression at Berlin. In face of these
glaring violations of tiie articles of the Treaty of 1878,
guaranteeing good government to the Christian subjects
of tlie Sultan, Great Britain, France, and Italy displayed
an apathy highly discreditable to their rulers. Their
inaction in a matter closely concerning their honour, the
orientation of Russian policy, and the warlike prowess of
Abdul Hamid served to strengthen a Panislam movement,
which soon received a public benediction from Kaiser
W'ilhehn II. During his Eastern tour in 1898 (that is, two
years after the adoption of Wdtpolitik) he announced his
resolve to befriend the Sultan and the 300,000,000 Moslems
— a declaration destined to strengthen Mohammedan fanati-
cism and to cause further massacres of the Christians of
the Ottoman Empire. Further troubles having ensued,
especially in that seething cauldron of races, Macedonia,
the Emperors of Russia and Austria drew up at !\Iiirzsteg
in 1903 a programme of reforms for an improved
administration of that province.* The " Miirzsteg Pro-
gramme " completed and strengthened one that the two
Sovereigns had framed in 1897, ^^^^ other Powers on both
occasions agreeing to delegate special functions to those
i)reviously rival Empires. Both efforts to put down
iiarchy in Macedonia failed, either from lack of energy
in the efforts, or because the racial feuds were insoluble.
' Very many Macedonians have no definite racial afiinity, which
• nablcs rival claimants to number the Greeks either 600,000 or
^cxj,(j<x> ; the liulf^ars 2,000,000, 1,500,000, or 60,000; the Serbs
2,o5o,or>o or nil ; the Wallaths 100,000 or 75,000 ; the Turks
Ooo,fX)o or 230,000. Sec J. Cvijic, Renutrques sur I'Ethno^raphie de
'1 Mac/fioittf : Ichircoff, Ktudc cthnof^raphique sur les Slaves de
laceJume (l*ari.s, lyoh).
i64 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
Accordingly, the Great Powers once more took up the duties
imposed on them by the Treaty of Berhn, and in April,
1907, sought to cure the maladministration of Macedonia.
This attempt came too late ; for the situation had recently
changed in favour of the Central Empires. Russia was
badly beaten by Japan in 1904-5, whereupon the Berlin
Government dictated terms to France in the Moroccan
affair of 1905-6 ; and, with the accession of Aehrenthal
to office, in 1906, Austria entered upon a vigorous foreign
policy. The results were seen in an increase of Teutonic
energy in all quarters, while the Slav cause, which Russia
had neglected since 1897, underwent a notable decline,
the prestige of Austria and Turkey proportionately rising.
These facts explain the daring stroke of Austria in annex-
ing Bosnia outright ; while at the same time her protege,
Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria, proclaimed himself Tsar
of the Bulgarians (October, 1908). Coming soon after
the Young Turk Revolution at Constantinople, these
events foreshadowed a future in which Austria, Bulgaria,
and a renovated Turkey would share the Peninsula about
equally between them. Germany threw her weight into
the scale in favour of Austria ; and a threat from Kaiser
Wilhelm to Russia in the spring of 1909 caused the latter
to accept the Hapsburgs' fait accompli in Bosnia. Thence-
forth the futiue of the Balkans lay with the Central
Empires and with their proteges, Bulgaria and Roumania.
To the confusion caused by threats from without were
added the miseries due to ever-increasing racial feuds and
mad misgovernment. The Young Turks, far from carrying
out their much-vaunted programme of reforms, soon
exasperated their subjects by an " Ottomanizing " policy
of the most pedantic and irritating kind. Consequently,
the Greek, Serb, and Bulgar elements in Macedonia
despaired of obtaining redress except by force, and what
NATIONALISM SINCE 1885 165
the Turkish vampires spared the armed bands of these
rival races swept oft". The beginning of the end came for
Ottoman rule when the usually faithful Albanians rose in
revolt against stupid interferences with their customs and
language. Consequently, the Eastern Question in 1909-12
entered upon its last and most terrible phase.
While Nationalism in the Balkans made more and more
for strife, the same instinct waxed powerful and aggressive
in Central Europe. The interaction of these cyclonic
systems has finally produced the present appalling tempest.
In order to understand that interaction and the tremendous
forces which it set in motion, we must retrace our steps
and note the rise of Chauvinism in Germany and the outlet
which it sought to acquire towards the East.
As we have already seen, Kaiser Wilhehn II has
modelled his policy largely on that of Frederick the Great.
Now, during that reign, as also subsequently, Prussia often
made ^se of the Turks to annoy and weaken either Russia
or Austria, whenever those realms were at feud with her.
Another fact is equally significant. The rival Houses of
Ilapsburg and liolienzollern have rarely continued long in
close union except for purposes of aggression against their
neighbours. Cases in point arc their agreements to effect
the Partitions of Pohmd (1772, 1793, 1795, though in 1793
Austria comi)lained of being left in the lurch) and those of
1792 and 1815 for the annexation of large portions of
France. In 1827-30 they united in order to tliwart the
emancijjation of Greece, then championed by Russia,
Frant e, and EngUuid, the general aim of the (jcrmanic
Powers being to ujjhold Turkish authority and stay the
growth of the Christian peoples of the Balkans.' But tiiat
' See, l(K), l)fbni(:\T, Hist, dtplomaliqiie de I'liurope, II, i8i-j.
for Austria's opposition to the formation of the Principality of
Koumania in 1H5H, wliicli was helped on by Kuhsia ami N'apolion
III. " the frun<I of n.itionaiitu-s."
i66 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
negative and cramping policy has of late given way to one
that has sought to range Turkey, if possible along with
Roumania and Bulgaria, on the side of the Central Empires.
Serb nationalists, inspired by jealousy of Bulgaria and the
hope of detaching their kith and kin, the Croats and Slovenes,
from Austria, firmly opposed all attempts at bullying or
bargaining from Vienna. But the stolid Tartar strain in
the Bulgars' nature afforded some hope of rallying them,
under their Coburg prince, to the side of their Moslem
oppressors and against their Russian liberators. This done,
Serbia alone barred the way to the formation of a Teutonic-
Magyar-Turanian League, extending from the North Sea
to the Persian Gulf. For such a purpose HohenzoUern and
Hapsburg might well clasp hands and consort with the
butchers of the Balkan Christians. That this Eastern
expansion would crush Balkan Nationalism was nothing
to the leaders of thought and action in the Central Empires ;
for their conception of things had wholly changed since
the time when Bismarck and Deak achieved the triumph
of that principle for the German and the Magyar.
Let us, then, review the events which transformed
Bismarck's Austro-German alliance of 1879 (an essentially
defensive compact) into an aggressive league aiming at
the domination of the land hemisphere. The determining
event was the accession of Kaiser Wilhelm II to the German
throne in 1888. Inheriting a powerful and prosperous
domain, protected by an invincible army and unassailable
alliances, he nevertheless declared in his first proclamation
that he would ever be responsible for the glory and honour
of his army. To this was added keen sohcitude for naval
and colonial expansion, as appeared in his very profitable
bargain with Lord Salisbury in 1890 for the cession of some
untenable claims over Zanzibar against the acquisition of
that valuable naval base, Heligoland. But the fact that he
XATIOXAI.ISM SINCE 1885 167
bargained anytliing away in East Africa angered the more
eager of the Gemian patriots, who sought to prevent a
recurrence of such a humihation by founding a kind of
watchdog Society in 1S91, which, three years later, became
the Pangerman League. Claiming that the Gennan Empire
must become a World-Empire, it set forth the following
ideal : " Above the interests of the State should be those
of the Nation. Even more sacred than love of the Father-
land should be love of the ilothcrland." It soon appeared
that the nation was the totality of all German-speaking
peoples, and the Motherland was the area (geographically
vague but mentally stinuilating) which would bring all
these peoples into the Teutonic fellowship. The Germans
of Austria, Switzerland, and the Baltic provinces of Russia
(though the last were but a small minority among the
Letts and Esthonians) were all to be swept into the
-Motherland's anns, which would finally close around
Dutch, Flemings, and Scandinavians. The day of little
States and little peoples was over ; for they lived a narrow
existence, oppressed by fear of vigorous neighbours. Let
them, therefore, merge their miserable lives in tliat of the
Teutonic Supennan. Such was the Pangerman propaganda,
directed by a friend of the Kaiser, Di . Hasse. It soon
gained an inmiense vogue ; and around tlic League clus-
tered several organizations, chief among tliem the Navy
League.
The generation which grew up during the years of
Koniggriitz and Sedan (William II's generation) was in
the mood to regard even those triumphs as precursors to
others of world-wide import. Merely by skilful carpet-
bagging and diplomatic hustling, Bismarck and agents
like Peters, Nachtigall, and Liideritz had secured a con-
siderable colonial Empire ; and if that were gained by
craft, what might not be the outcome <j1 a well-i)r('pare<l
i68 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
effort of the whole German nation ? After the surrender
of Paris in January, 1871, Bismarck called his people " the
male principle, the fructifying principle " of Europe ;
while the Celts and Slavs represented the female sex.
As for the English, they were contemptible hucksters,
envious of the brave Germans but afraid to fight them.^
Such was the doctrine taught to young Germany in and
after 1871. To it Treitschke merely added an academic
veneer. Viewing history from the standpoint of a patriotic
pamphleteer, he excited the youth of Germany by sentences
such as these : "To tell the truth, the Slav seems to us a
born slave " ;2 or again : " What nation will impose its
will on the other enfeebled and decadent peoples ? Will
it not be Germany's mission to ensure the peace of the
world ? Russia, that immense Colossus with feet of clay,
will be absorbed in its domestic and economic difficulties.
England, stronger in appearance than in reality, will
doubtless see her colonies break loose and exhaust them-
selves in fruitless struggles. France, given over to internal
dissensions and the strife of parties, will sink into hopeless
decadence. As to Italy, she will have her work cut out
to ensure a crust to her children. The future belongs to
Germany, to which Austria will attach herself if she wishes
to survive." With a few honourable exceptions the
teachers at the German Universities adopted this tone,
and thus nursed the feeling of national pride which the
parade ground brought to lush maturity.
Along with this, however, there grew up a passion to
excel, to push through every task to thorough completion.
An English correspondent long in Germany has described
■ 1 Bismarck : some secret Pages of his History, I, 500, 526 ;
Bismarck in the Franco-German War, I, 277, II, 8, 19, 333, 345 (note).
^ Treitschke, Germany, France, Russia, and Islam, p. 17 (Eng.ed.).
XATIOXALISM SINCE 1885 169
it by their word Draug — driving force, ox tlie resolve to
make your will prevail.^ It is a formidable force in all
departments of life, and contrasts sharply with the easy
good nature and weak tolerance of bad work far too pre-
valent among us. In this respect we need to copy the
Germans and regain that passion for thoroughness which
used to be ours, but which has vanished of late under the
influence of pleasure, sport, or the worship of the eight-
hours' day. It is significant that the German phrase
Allcs in Ordnung, which corresponds to our " All right,"
conveys a guarantee that all is right. Whereas our phrase
" All right " has come to mean : " Now, don't bother :
I've done all I mean to do." This is the spirit which we
must drive from our Uni\'ersities and schools, our work-
shops and public offices. We need a new sense of the dignity
of work such as Thomas Carlyle hammered into his genera-
tion — a healthy public opinion which will be stronger than
official etiquette, stronger than red tape, stronger even
than Trade Union regulations. In this respect Germany
has nmch to teach us regarding her matchless power of
organization ; and at bottom that means power of hard
work and clear thinking. In the fierce competition of the
modern world (a competition which will be fiercer than
ever after the war) no nation is sure of holding its own
unless it puts forth its utmost powers, directs them
wisely, and minimizes the friction between Capital and
Labour.
To return to Germany : the intense devotion of her
people, fostered in the schools and Universities, lias
permeated all parts of the national life ; ami it must be
remembered that that feeling, with its ( (tunterjjart,
(ontemj>t for (Hlier peoples, is based on a not unnatural
belief in the primacy of Germans in all important spheres.
' C. Tower, Chanmnti (icnnauv, \>. z^^.
170 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
Thus a new tone has permeated the German people during
the reign of Wilhehn II. It has also profoundly affected
their settlers in other lands, who, under the influence of
patriotic clubs, have tended to form garrisons for the
Empire, ready, when called upon, to take action against
the communities out of which they have made their money.
No harm would have resulted from this fanatical Teutonism
if the Kaiser and his paladins had been wise and prudent.
But startling results followed when he, they and the leading
professors and journalists sought to outcrow each other
in praise of Germania. Sheer political vertigo was the
-outcome, especially since 1896, when Wilhelm proclaimed
Weltpolitik as the goal of her efforts. The Pangerman
League first enunciated the programme in 1894. Not to
be outdone, the Kaiser adopted it at the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the proclamation of the Empire (January 21,
1896).
In other matters the League has pushed him on.
In 1895 it urged the acquisition of a good naval base in
China ; the mailed fist in 1897 descended upon Kiao-Chao,
after the opportune murder of two German missionaries.
In 1896 the League eamiarked Asia Minor as a fit sphere
for economic penetration by the Germans. Again after
an interval of two years, the Kaiser proceeded to Con-
stantinople and Damascus, making at the tomb of Saladin
his promise ever to champion the Moslem World. In
1896-7 the Pangerman and Navy Leagues began a sys-
tematic agitation in favour of a great navy. The Kaiser
responded by appointing Admiral von Tirpitz to the
Admiralty, and an expansionist, Count (now Prince) von
Biilow, to the Foreign Office ; while the Navy Bill of 1898
ushered in the long series of measures for the systematic
and sustained increase of the German marine. Certain
acts of the Kaiser, such as his proclamation as to Well-
NATIONALISM SINCE 1885 171
politik, bear the impress of his personality, whicli loves to
seize a great occasion for the utterance of a sonorous and
telling phrase. But in the main it seems that he has been
pushed on by eager and ambitious patriots, who, after
gaining the ear of a morbidly sensitive public, have re-
proached him for timidity whenever he has sought to steady
the pace.
It is worthy of note that he has gi\en them thrii head
on occasions when he deemed Germany to be well prepared
for war. Such occasions were the years succeeding the
opening of the Kiel Canal in 1895 ; the completion of the
first instalment of the new navy in 1905 (which coincided
with Russia's defeats in the Far East) ; the opportunity
which offered for supporting Austria's forward move of
October, 1908, in the Near East ; and the completion of
the enlarged Kiel Canal in June, 1914 (which coincided
with singular difficulties for the Entente Powers and a
unique state of militar}' preparation in Germany). On
other occasions he has often held in the Pangermans
despite their champing the bit and pawing the air. But
again, as if to relieve his pent-up feelings, he has uttered
words that struck like a spur : " Our future lies on the
water " — " The trident must pass into our hands " —
" We are the salt of the earth " — " The German nation
alone has been called upon to defend, cultivate, and de\ elop
great ideas " — " Our Gennan nation shall be the rock of
granite on which the Almighty will finish his work of
civilizing the worl<l. Then shall i)c fuHilled the words of
the poet : ' (iemian character shall save tiir world.' "
The ruler who uttered these words, and tried to live up
to them, must bear a heavy share of responsibility for the
growth of an o\erwcening Chauvinism. The collective
impulse, which up to 1870 had been a healthy endea\our
to achieve national union, has un<ler Kai^-r W'illielm II
172 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
been degraded into an aggressive Nationalism utterly
callous to the claims of other peoples.
Rash in word but prudent in deed, ^^'ilhelm kept a tight
curb on his high-spirited charger until a clear field was
before him ; and in this respect he may count as the new
'Machiavel. During the Boer War of 1899-1902 he turned
the furiously Angiophobe passions of his subjects into a
practical channel by carrying through an immense naval
programme ; and in the spring of 1905, when Russia's
military power tottered under the blows of Japan, he
embarked on the Moroccan policy which the Leagues had
pressed on him long before. Meanwhile his Chancellor,
Billow, had secured the passing of the Tariff Laws of 1902
for the protection of agriculture so that the Germany of the
future might not depend too largely on foreign foodstuffs. A
further aim of the Kaiser and Chancellor was to stimulate
tillage of the soil so as to maintain a healthy balance
between industry and agriculture, as was summed up in
the phrase, " Agriculture must provide soldiers and
industry pay for them.''^
Thus was built up a polity no less prosperous in peace
than well prepared for war ; and the outcome of this
material preparedness and national confidence was seen
in the rebuffs dealt to France in the Moroccan affair of
1905-6. Apprehension of Germany had prompted the
Anglo-French Entente of 1904, and in 1907 came that
between England and Russia, which was clinched by the
recent declarations of Germany at the Hague Conference,
that she would neither lessen her armaments nor submit
disputes to arbitration. The Ententes, though merely
conditional agreements far removed from definite alliances,
ought to have warned the German people of the need of
lowering its tone. In normal conditions a nation would
^ Billow, Imperial Germany, pp. 20Q-11.
NATIONALISM SINCE 1885 17;,
regard the alienation of an old friend, like Russia, and
her drawing towards other States for protection, as a
sign that its conduct had been unduly provocative, and
that bluster must give way to conciliation. But this is
not the way of champions of Drang. Their aim being
to carry matters with a high hand, they interpret all
signs of distrust as a challenge to their honour. Newly
awakened Nationalism (and that of Germany dates from
1S70) has always displayed the morbid sensitiveness of
youth, and has given out that tlie Entente is contriving
a villainous plot to " encircle " Germany and Austria
with a view to bringing about their isolation and de-
struction.
Let us examine this charge in the light of facts. They
are as follows : The Central Empires had a close alliance
with Italy and a personal compact with tlie King of
Koumania, a member of the Swabian branch df the House
of Hohenzollern. A German prince reigned over Bulgaria,
the Kaiser's sister had married the Crown Prince of Greece,
and the Sultan of Turkey was notoriously a satrap of
Berlin. Consequently, the " encircling " of a block of
territory, which extended from the North Sea to the
Tyrrhene and .Egean, could scarcely be taken seriously
by those who knew the facts of the case. But by dint of
much noise and skilful suppression of facts, the Germans,
and n(jt a few Englishmen, were led to regard the Central
Empires, etc., as pinched in by wily and aggressive foes
under the direction of the arch-plotter. King Edward ML
The theory of " encircling " proved to be especially
ser\'iccable in dulling the opposition of German Socialists
to the successive Army and Navy Bills. I'nacciuaintcd
with military history, they failed to realize the enormous
advantage* of the central position in warfare ; and the
authorities, who every year increased that advantage by
174 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
constructing strategic railways to the western and eastern
frontiers, ceased not to alarm their subjects as to the
terrible might of the Eastern Colossus, the quenchless
thirst of Frenchmen for a war of revenge, and the malignant
jealousy of England.
That the German Government was not actuated by
fear of Russia or France is obvious from its policy. At the
Hague Conference of 1907, as we have seen, it rejected
all proposals for arbitration and limitation of armaments ;
at the close of 1908 the Reichstag passed Bills for the
Germanizing of Alsace-Lorrainers, the Poles of Posen, and
the Danes of North Schleswig. At the same time Germany
supported her ahy, Austria, in her annexation of Bosnia ;
and in March, 1909, a threatening note from Berlin to
Petrograd led the Tsar to withdraw his opposition to that
step. Further, the vigorous efforts of Teutonic diplomacy
to recover the ground at first lost at Constantinople in the
Young Turk Revolution of 1908 were completely successful.
This forceful policy upheld the arms of Austria-Hungary,
browbeat Russia, and encouraged the Young Turks to
proceed with the " Ottomanizing " of their Christian
subjects.^
In no quarter did the Teutonic idea work more effec-
tively than in Austria-Hungary. In its early stages the
Pangerman movement seemed to threaten the disruption
of the Dual Monarchy, whose Germanic subjects, hard
pressed by 'Slavs and Magyars, seemed likely to break
away from the crumbling heritage of the Hapsburgs and
form a southern annexe of the Hohenzollern Empire.
But, however much the Pangermans played \vith tlie
notion, the statesmen of Berlin finally discouraged it as
tending to form a diffuse realm in which Prussian influence
^ Nationalism and War in the Near East, by " Diplomatist,"
Chs. Ill, IV.
NATIONALISM SINCE 1885 175
would be lost.' They deemed it better to favour the Ger-
man elements in Austria and support tliat Empire in tiie
difficult enterprise of dominating the Balkans. In 1906
the Archduke Ferdinand and the new Foreign Minister,
Aehrenthal, inaugurated a spirited foreign policy which
succeeded in quieting, or crushing, racial strifes within the
Empire. The revival of the prestige of the Dual Monarchy
was assisted by the passionate Nationalism of the Magyars,
which at times amounted almost to frenzy. Excited by the
celebrations of the thousandth anniversary of their organized
national life in 1896, Hungarian patriots had resolved
to ride roughshod over their Slavonic and Roumanian
subjects ; and their exuberant patriotism reduced parlia-
mentary elections and procedure to the level of a farce ;
while their sense of justice received startling illustration
in incidents such as that of the Agram trial.- Nevertheless
this crude Nationalism succeeded for the time ; and,
joining hands with the boisterous anti-Semites of Vienna
and the expansionists of Berlin, it prepared to stride
southwards to conquest over the hated Serbs.
Austro-Hungarian Chauvinism secured its first triumph
in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in October,
1908. The significance of this event was doubled by its
coincidence with the assumption of the title " Tsar of the
Bulgarians " by Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria immediately
after a visit to the Hapsburg Court. Half Austrian by
upbringing, and largely Magyar by sympathy and terri-
torial connexions, that wily schemer by his title now laid
• G. Weil, Le Pangermanisme en Autriche, chs. 7, 8. But tlie
revelations of Mr. Wickham Steed (Xineleenth Century. Feb., igiO)
as to the alleged bargain between Kaiser Wilhelin and the .An liduke
Franz Ferdinand in June, i<ji.\. seem to show that the lornicr niaj-
then have revived the older PanRerman scheme.
* Sec Dr. Seton-W.itson's works, Cor uption and Reform i)i IIioi-
gary, Racial J'roblttns in Hungary, etc.
176 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
claim to lordship over the large Bulgar population of
Macedonia ; and Austria's longings for Salonica being
notorious, it was clear that the Dual Monarchy and her
satrap were contemplating an eventual partition of that
troublous province. In view of the decline of Russia's
prestige in the Near East since her disastrous adventures
in the Far East, the Central Empires and their pro-consuls
at Sofia and Bukarest had in their hands the future of the
Balkan Peninsula.
These brilliant successes, I repeat, rehabilitated the
prestige of Austria, stilled her racial disputes, and reduced
the Serbs and their Croat cousins to despair. The details
of the compromise framed by the Pangermans and the
Dual Monarchy are, of course, not known ; but the success
of Austria's forward and Teutonic policy, as contrasted
with the barren parliamentary and racial strifes of the
earlier period, opened up a new and promising future, in
which it seemed that Austria-Hungary would be pre-
dominantly German-Magyar and would control the
Balkans, thus forming an essential link in the future
Zollverein stretching from the North Sea to the Bosphorus,
the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. As this scheme
developed, it naturally aroused alarm in Russia and among
the Mediterranean Powers. The Italians began to sheer
off from the Triple Alliance as its Oriental ambitions
developed ; and fear of Austro-Gemian aggressions
grouped Great Britain, France, and Russia more closely
together. The Franco-German agreement of 1909 re-
specting Morocco did not, and could not, solve that
question ; while the Russo-German compact arrived at
late in 1910 failed to compose their rivalries in the Near
East.
This brief survey will suffice to explain not only the
political tension prevalent throughout Europe but also
NATIONALISM SINCE 1S85 177
the growth of a neurotic Nationalism in German}'. Not
satisfied with lier supremacy in Europe, she prepared to
achieve world-tUnninanco ; and the mihtary weakness of
Russia, together with the absorption of Erance and Engkmd
in parliamentary disputes, furthered lier schemes.. The
Western Powers sought to solve social questions by con-
cessions and bargains ; Germany prepared to soh'c tliem
bv distracting the attention of tlie masses to national
issues. Prince Biilow has frankly avowed that intention.
He states that the successive Army and Navy Bills were
designed to help on Gennany's world-policy, and, in order
to secure a majority in the Reichstag, the middle classes
and as many as possible of the working classes had to be
won over. He admits that, notwithstanding all the efforts
put forth against the Social Democrats, their votes at the
polls steadily mounted, though the number of seats gained
curiously varied.
Votes polled. Seats gained.
1898 . . 2,107,000 56
1903 . . 3,011,000 81
I9"7 •• 3.539.000 43
1912 .. 4,250,000 no
Their losses of seats in 1907 were due to speeches,
explanations, and " the direction of the electoral cam-
paign."' As to the Socialist gains of 1912, Biilow says
nothing, because they were due to the spirited protests
of that party against Weltpolilik. On the general question
of combating the Socialists, he says : " W'e must accustom
them to the idea of the State. . . . The idea of the nation
must agaip and again be emphasized by dealing witli
national problems, so that this idea may continue to move,
unite, and separate tli<- p.irtics. Nothing has a more
* Hiilow, Intperiitl Cscrtmniy. \>\>. 15.S-168. The tot.il iiumlur of
deputies i.H 397.
N
178 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
discouraging, paralysing, and depressing effect on a clever,
enterprising, and highly developed nation such as the
Germans than a monotonous, dull policy, which, for fear
of an ensuing fight, avoids rousing passions by strong
action." Biilow also advised the Government to fight
Social Democracy by " a great and comprehensive national
policy." By this he declares that he meant the Germanizing
of all the races within the Empire, especially the Poles,
whose political incompetence had subjected them to the
superior organization of Prussia. But he deprecated the
conquest of neighbouring territories. ^
Such a limitation of Germany's expansive power dis-
pleased German Chauvinists, who exercised greater pressure
on Billow's successor, Bethmann-Hollweg (1909). The
Foreign Assistant Secretary, Kiderlen-Waechter, favoured
the Agadir coup of July, 1911, which is known to have
been contrived by the Navy and other patriotic Leagues.
First, they pointed out in the Press the urgent need of
German expansion in Morocco ; and then the two Ministers
declared that they must try to keep pace with public
opinion. Thus the mutually exciting influences of the
Leagues and the Administration worked up a furious
national feeling which formed the chief danger of the
situation. The dispute at Agadir in itself was trivial, as
was afterwards admitted by German patriots. But their
masterful tone nearly brought about a general war.
Probably this was their aim ; for great was their wrath
when the Kaiser and his Ministry finally patched up the
Morocco dispute by the compact of November 4, 1911,
with France, gaining about 100,000 square miles of French
Congoland at the price of their acquiescence in French
supremacy in Morocco. The rage of German Chauvinists
against the Kaiser for this profitable though inglorious
1 Ihid., pp. 157-204, 239-245.
NATIONALISM SINCE 1885 179
bargain burst out in downright insults, Die Post calling
him cc poUron miserable. '
In a siiort time the Germans saw that they had exag-
gerated the importance of the Moroccan affair. In 1912
that astute publicist, Maximilian Harden, said : " As for
the Morocco escapade, God knows the colonial fever was
there expended for nothing. It was simply an affair oi
prestige, — national prestige, personal prestige. German}"
had no real interests in Morocco." The Pangerman
champion. Count Reventlow, also blamed that adventure
as ill-judged because it offended both England and France.
Nevertheless the Pangermans stirred up intlignation
against that " failure " in order to effect and increase the
already formidable armaments. The expenditure on the
army was increased by ^TG, 450, 000, despite the incidence
of a severe financial crisis in 191 1. A prominent German
newspaper stated that a great war would be " perhaps
delayed, but not averted, if German armaments are not
of a nature to intimidate every adversary into beating a
retreat." That is the essential thought at the bottom of
German Nationalism of the Sturm und Drang type. -
The formation of the Balkan League and its successful
attack upon Turkey in the autunm of 1912 caused great
* Dr. Kohrbach {Der deutsche Gedanhe in der Welt, p. 216)
declared that Germany took the wrong turn about Morocco, which
was not a vital alluir ; besides the Hedjaz Jvailway, tlic Kiel-North
Sea Canal and the forts at Heligoland were not then in rcadine.ss.
In the future, too, the stake must be a greater one than a strip of
Moroccan co;Lst. He concludes : " We are now (1912) in a jiosilion
to launch out boldly." Kohrbach is a champion of the liagilad
and other Ix-vantine schemes, which will probably prove to be the
chief cause of the present war. Certain! v tiicv interested Austria
and Turkey, which Morocco never did.
* IViurdon, The fjerman I-.ttif^ma, ])p. 15"^, i '^", igH. Prof. \'an
Vollonhoven (W»r Ohvialed by an Itilcniatimiul Police, iQio, |). 7)
calls tlicm " force-monomaniacs." They were long laughed at in
Germany , but carried the day in July, 1914-
i8o LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
concern in Germany and Austria, where the triumph of
the crescent had been taken for granted. At once the
Central Empires declared the new League to be a mere tool
of Russia ; whereas it was certainly the outcome of the
grinding pressure of the Young Turks on all their Christian
subjects. M. Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, at
first discouraged the Leaguers and advised them to come
to terms with Turkey. ^ As is well known, after the con-
clusion of a Balkan peace in London in the spring of 1913,
the Christian States fell out, and, probably under the
impulse of Austria, the Bulgar troops in June, 1913,
perfidiously attacked the Greeks and Serbs, only to suffer
condign punishment. Finally, the Treaty of Bukarest
(largely decided by the two Central Empires) imposed the
present unsatisfactory frontiers and left all the races of the
Peninsula at feud (August, 1913). Their friction kindled
the spark which set Europe in a blaze in August, 1914.^
Here again, then, the principle of Nationality, for which
Gladstone pleaded and Stambuloff struggled, has undergone
dire degradation. Promising to sort out the Balkan peoples
according to ethnic affinities, it has of late aroused their
baser passions and lent itself to intriguers who have ruined
their people and deluged the Peninsula with blood. The
part recently played by Bulgaria completes the career of
infamy on which she entered in June, 1913. Owing all
that she is to the principle of Slav Nationality and to the
^ For proofs see I. E. Gueshoff, The Balkan League (Eng. transL),
PP- 9-45-
^ Ibid., pp. 71-94. As to Austria's responsibility for the war of
1913 (not yet fully proven) see " Balkanicus," The Aspirations of
Bulgaria (1915), pp. 132-42. Very significant were the remarks of
the Austrian Reichspost (the organ of the Archduke Ferdinand) :
" The results of the Balkan War (of 191 3) have no disagreeable
features for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or for the German
nation. The last Balkan War was more disastrous for Panslavism
than the first one was for Turkey."
NATIONALISM SINCE i8t;3 181
po^^•c^ful aid of Russia, she has acted as Judas both to tlic
principle and to her champion. In order to stab Serbia
in the back she has helped her age-long oppressors, the
Turks, and those more recent and more formidable enemies
of Balkan independence, the Germanic Empires.
To all who were not blindetl by revenge or blinkeretl by
mere peasant-cunning, it ought to have been clear that the
Austro-Gemian intrigues with the Sublime Porte for pre-
dominance in the Near luist involved the suppression of
all the free races which lay in their path ; that, conse-
quentlv, the subjection of Serbia in the present war would
but prelude the subjection of Bulgaria. The Teutonic-
Turanian policy, summed up in the Bagdad Railway
scheme, is based on military and trading considerations,
in which Belgrade and Sofia figure merely as stages on the
route from Berlin to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. What
would be the lot of Turkey in case of the triumph of the
new imperial commercialism is far from clear. That the
lot of Bulgaria, Serbia, and probably of Roumania and
Greece, would be one of political impotence, no student
of German developments can harbour a doubt. Such a
finale to the present war would in\ply the extinction of
Serbia and the reversal of all that Roumans, Greeks,
Bulgars have achieved with the help of Byron, Canning,
and Gladstone; of Napoleon III and Gambetta ; of
Diebitsch and Skobeloff. The results of a century of
national striving would be swept away in order that the
Teutons might force their way to the East. It is in face
of such an issue tiuit (ireece, the lirst-born of Europe's
children, vacillates, while Bulgaria, the youngest of the
family, has foully betrayed the Slavonic national cause to
which she owes her very existent e.
Such are the crucial developments of Nationalism since
the year 1885. The revival of racial feuds in the Balkans
1 82 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
at that time ensured the triumph of the barbarous pohcy
of Abdul Hamid, which continued to desolate Macedonia
and Armenia until 1908. The accession of Wilhelm II in
1888 inaugurated an era of aggressive Nationalism in Ger-
many and, somewhat later, in Austria, the result being
Pangermanism and its varied efforts which culminated in
July, 1914. After the accession of the Tsar Nicholas II in
1894 the diversion of Russia's energies towards the Far
East emasculated the Panslav movement, so powerful
under his predecessors ; and Slavonic sentiment retained
its vitality chiefly among the Serbs and other South Slavs,
who could not effect much. The growth of Pangermanism
and its alliance with the Turks and the Panislam movement
has proved to be the chief determining factor in recent
history. That these national movements have developed
immense energies in their respective peoples admits of no
doubt ; but the events of 1914-5 form the supreme test
as to the worth of the new Nationahsm.
LECTURE X
INTERNATIONALISM
" Si unc guerre menace d'eclater, c'est un devoir do la ckissc
ou\Tidre dans les pays concern^s, c'est un devoir pour leurs repre-
sentants dans les Parlements, avec I'aide du bureau international,
force d'action et de co-ordination, de faire tous leurs efforts pour
einpecher la guerre. . . ." — Resolution of the Congress of I'lnter-
nationale at Stuttgart, August, 1907.
Periods of war and peace succeed each other with a per-
sistence which must arouse the curiosity of every well-
wisher of mankind. Unless we accept Bernhardi's view
(now so popular in Germany) that war is a necessary
S'.hool of the manly virtues, its periodicity is a distressing
symptom. Certainly, those who believe that human pro-
gress is advanced more by peace will continue to incjuire
whether means of avoiding conflicts may not be discovered
and successfully apphed. I will tiy here to review this
(jUL'stion in the light of the teachings of history.
Incjuiries of this kind have been especially numerous
at the end of long and devastating campaigns ; and it is
not too nmch to say that efforts in favour of peace and
legality have been in proportion to the horrors of warfare.
This truth is ()l)vi(jus in the case of the founder of
International Law, lingo \an droot ((irotius). Li\ing
amidst the atrocities that disgraced the Wars of Religion,
that Dut< h Scholar p»>ndered over the utter lawlessness
that had of I;ite aftli. ted mankind. In words that might
i8j
i84 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
now be written by a Belgian, Pole, or Serb, Grotius in 1625
thus set forth his reason for inculcating the principles of
public right : "I saw prevailing throughout the Christian
world a licence in making war of which even barbarous
nations would have been ashamed, recourse being had to
arms for slight reason or no reason ; and, when arms were
once taken up, all reverence for divine and human law
was then thrown away, just as if men were henceforth
authorized to commit all crimes without restraint."^
The subsequent atrocities of the Thirty Years' War
emphasized the need for some guiding and restraining
authority ; and hence by degrees there grew up a code of
public law, the chief contributors to which (hke the German
Pufendorf in 1661) were those who had experienced the
terrors of lawlessness. In 1693, during our campaigns
against Louis XIV, the Quaker, William Penn, set forth
proposals for the preservation of peace ; and in 1713, at
the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, the French
priest, Charles de St. Pierre, drew up a scheme which
I shall notice presently. As the din of anns filled the
greater part of the eighteenth century, thinkers occupied
themselves with the problems of war and peace. Voltaire,
Montesquieu, and Rousseau in France ; ^ Adam Smith and
the younger Pitt in England ; Kant and Lessing in Ger-
many, all voiced the pacific aspirations of the age. The
French Economistes and Adam Smith advocated principles
^ Quoted by Dr. T. J. Lawrence, The Principles oj Inter )iational
Laiv, p. 42. I omit Henri IV's peace project as unimportant.
2 Again it is worth noting that the books which dealt heavy
blows at the warlike ambitions and false aims of the ancien regime
appeared at or near the end of wars, e.g. Les Leitres persanes (1721),
L'Esprit des Lois (1748), L'Encyclopedie (1751-65), Le Contrat
social (1762), Le Systeme de la Nature (1770). As I have shown in
my Life of Pitt (I, p. 340), William Pulteney in 1786 proposed to
Pitt a plan of arbitration, and Pitt's treaty with France of that year
was an effort for lasting peace.
INTERNATIONALISM 1.S3
which would have transfonned the Continental States
into friendly economic units among a comity of nations.
Especially noteworthy were the efforts of German thinkers
on behalf of peace and brotherhood. The philosophical
movement in France found a clear echo across the Rhine,
where leading men desired to end racial rivalries. Deeming
patriotism a promoter of strife, they belittled that instinct.
The genial Lessing wrote : "I lui\e no conception of the
love of country ; and it seems to me at best a heroic
failing, which I am well content to be without." Indeed
he aspired to a far higher ideal. In liis most perfect play,
Xailiini dcr Weise (1779), the hero is a Jewish merchant of
the time of Saladin, who, even in that time of bigotr}-,
disarms racial and religious hatreds by the attractive
power of goodness. Rivalries vanish before the magic of
his virtue ; and the play ends with a spectacle of concord
and happiness. Lessing took the leading incident of the
play from Boccaccio ; but he transformed the story by
investing it with the ethical promise of his own time, the
Age of Enlightenment.
Kant enforced similar precepts in his tractate Perpetual
Peace, published in 1795 shortly after Prussia came to
terms with France in the Peace of Basel. He proposed
as the chief step towards peace a Federation of free
States. They must be Republics, i.e. they must be States
endowed with really representative institutions — which
would rule out all fonns of Bonapartisni with their modern
e(iuivalent, Kaiserism.' These free States would form
delinite compacts one with Die other, thus lajing the foun-
dati(jn for a system of International Law, binding on all,
and tjicreby substituting the reign of right for merely
national aims. Just as indi\idu;ilsha(l by degrees consented
' Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. \Zi (ling, tnuisl. I)y .M. Campbell Smith).
i86 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
to give up something of their entire liberty so as to
secure order, similarly (he urged) it ought to be possible
to substitute some measure of international control for
that extreme ideal of national liberty which often led to
war. Kant was not very hopeful on this score. He saw that
for nations to give up their natural liberty (including the
liberty to expand and to make war) implied an immense
advance in ethical ideas, as is now painfully obvious.
Farther, in his Rechislehre, he stated that mankind can
arrive at permanent peace " only in a universal Union of
States, by a process analogous to that through which a
people becomes a State. Since, however, the too great
extension of such a State of Nations over vast territories
must, in the long run, render impossible the government
of that Union — and therefore the protection of each of its
members — a multitude of such corporations will again
lead to a state of war. So that perpetual peace, the final
goal of international law, as a whole, is really an impractic-
able idea." Nevertheless, he hoped that these political
principles might approximate towards that end.
For my part I do not admit that the extension of the area
of these federating States is an objection to Kant's theory.
His fear on this topic was, I believe, grounded on the
objection felt by him, by Rousseau, and by all his contem-
poraries, to the formation of great realms. They all held
that civil liberty was incompatible with great States and
could be attained and retained only in small communities.
The fear was very natural in times of slow and difficult
communications. It is groundless now in the days of
railways and telegraphs ; and in that respect we are far
more favourably situated than our forefathers for building
up a great Union of States. Indeed, it is essential that such
a Union or Federation should comprise practically all the
great States. It is not too great an extension, but too
I^TER^AT10^■AL1^M 187
partial an extension, that is the danger. As we have recently
seen, there is no security for peace so long as one great
nation remains outside the circle of those that desire peace.
Furtlier. if any groat State conies into such a Union with
the notion of being the leader, that Union will be a sham
and a dokision. Not until tlie federating States, one and
all, put far from tlicni the idea of predominance, will there
be a reasonable lu»pe of securing fair play, justice, and
therefore peace. Kant saw this clearly, and therefore
stipulated that there must be a " universal will determining
the rights and property of each individual nation " ; and
this universal will (an extension of Rousseau's " general
will " of a single community) must take the form of a
contract.'
Let us look at this (jucslion i\y the light ol experience.
In 171J, at the end of the ^^'ar of the Spanish Succession,
I'Abbe de St. Pierre published a tractate on peace.
His chief contentions were that Christendom should com-
bine to fonn a federation of States under the lead of
France, and proceed, as the first of its pacific duties, to
turn the Turks out of Europe. Tht^e proposals sufficed
U) danm the scheme as a device for re-establishing French
[jrestige recently shattered by Marlborough.
Not very dissimilar was a scheme of Napuleun 1. During
his sojourn at St. Helena (which ought to have cured him
of his notions of world-supremacy) the illustrious exile
described his plan of forming the European Association.
He would have imposetl the same system, the same princi-
ples every wliere, the same Code of Laws, a SujMeme
Tribunal, tJie same weights and measures, a similar coinage,
so that I'iurope would have formed but one ])eo])le. But
it is signilifant that all these plans wert- closely coimecled
in his ii.ind with the conciuest of Kussi.i. That implied in
' K^nt, App. II, ^ 2.
i88 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
his mind tlie " beginning of security " ; and then only
could the European System be founded. Thereafter he
would have his Congress to settle Europe ; also his Holy
Alliance.^
In much the same spirit the German Chancellor, Beth-
mann-Hollweg, said to the Reichstag on August 19, 1915 :
" If Europe is to come to peace, it can only be possible
by the inviolable and strong position of Germany. The
English policy of the Balance of Power must disappear."
These words imply that Germany will not accept a position
of mere equality of power ; she must be supreme. The
claim is not urged with the extravagance that characterized
Napoleon's final regrets. Nevertheless, the German claim
to supremacy is absolutely incompatible with the principle
of proportionate equality on which alone a federation of
free States can be firmly established. Minds of a certain
bent cannot conceive of any other way of imposing order
and quiet than that of enforcement by some superior
Power. Well ! It cannot be too clearly understood that
that way lies war. For, sooner or later, your constabulary
guardian will develop into a drill sergeant ; and thence
must ensue the rule of force and therefore strife. I grant
that the drill-sergeant theory is the simpler ; and very
many people can understand no other way. They cannot
see that harmony attained by the agreement of all is
infinitely preferable to, and more probably lasting than,
a harmony produced by dread of a superior.
Let us, however, frankly confess that a union of peoples
on proportionate terms is difficult to attain and still more
difficult to maintain. The French Revolution egregiously
failed in the international sphere. Though it began with
^ Las Cases, Memorial de Ste. Helene (V, 398-400), (August,
1816). So, too, he told Count Rambuteau {Memoires, p. 55, Eng.
edit.) that his Empire would be safe only when he was master of
all the capitals of Europe.
INTERXATIONALTSM 189
the profession of fraternity, yet its practice degenerated
under tlic strain of war. Military considerations, backed
up b}' national pride, carried the da}' at I'aris ; and French
democracy, even before the rise of Bonaparte, was com-
mitted to courses directly opposed to the cosmopolitan
aims of 17S9. It was a German thinker who in 1795
pointed towards peace, while France headed towards
wider conquests — ^and Bonapartism.
The efforts of the Tsar Alexander I in and after 1S15 to
promote a Confederation of Europe need not detain us
long. There prevailed then a general desire for peace, one
expression of which was the founding of the Peace Society
in London in 1816.* Whether Alexander had more in
view an Association of Peoples on equal terms or a Con-
federation of States more or less under his direction cannot
be discussed here. Certain it is that, if ever he cherished
the lofty views ascribed to him in 1815, they soon vanished ;
and the promised federation of the European peoples
became a mere device for depriving them of political and
civic liberty. The period of the Congresses (1818-22)
therefore merits the sarcastic censure which Sorel applies
to International Law, that it was known " only through
the declamations of publicists and its violation by the
(iovernmcnts." It is not surprising that all students of
that disapp(jinting era should view with reserve and sus-
j)icion all proposals for World-Tribunals and International
Congresses. But the optimist may repl}' : " Both the men
and the methods were defective. The men were autocrats
and were easily turned aside into reactionary paths."
This is undenial)le ; and I refuse t(j bclicNc that, because
Metternic h lun-d Alexander aside, therefore Congresses of
' I liave no space in whicli tu notici- tln' works of ('.i.tiI/, I'Alihu
<\c I'raflt, etc. See Pradt's I.' Europe aprds le Con^ris, and Alison
I'liillips' Confederation <ij Empire.
190 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
delegates chosen for the purpose of founding a Union of
European States need necessarily be held in vain. We have
nearly a hundred years of experience behind us since
Aix-la-Chapelle and Verona. I trust that, after the present
war, we shall have before us principles more definite and
sound than that of " morality based on bayonets," which
aptly summarizes the bastard Internationalism of 1818-22.
It is, however, instructive to notice the extreme ease with
which the philanthropic views of the Tsar were perverted ;
and the experience of those years bids us beware of benevo-
lent doctrinaires no less than wily diplomats. The dreamer
is as dangerous as his first cousin, the trickster, into whose
hands he frequently plays.
More genuine than the federalism of the Tsar Alexander
were the aims of Mazzini and the Young Europe Movement
of 1834-5 by which he sought to group together the
democrats of Italy, France, and Switzerland, as well as
other peoples. The sporadic movements of 1830 having
failed owing to utter lack of concert, Mazzini now sought
to co-ordinate them. By means of a central advisory body
in Switzerland he endeavoured to form what he called a
" college of intellects," which would both incite and guide
democrats of various lands. But that movement failed,
largely because its lofty aims appealed only to groups of
intellectuals. The generation that grew up under Napoleon
and his conquerors was too exhausted to rise in revolt
until the hardships of 1847-8 reinforced the teachings of
idealists. As Lord Acton observed, Mazzini's conspiracy
was founded not on a grievance but "on a doctrine " ;^ and
the experiences of 1848 were to show that the doctrines
must be practical and the grievances intense to produce
unanimity among peoples only half awakened. " Young
Europe " virtually collapsed with Mazzini's removal to
^ Lord Acton, Essays on Liberty, p. 286.
INTERNATIONALISM 191
London in 1837 '< ^^'^^ ^^ ^^ questionable whether the exiles
who founded " Young Eurojie," or the fiercer group of
Panslavists that gyrated around IJakunin in Paris in 1S47,
had any practical influence on the democratic movements
of i848-<).
The events of those luckless years showed the extreme
difliculty of Democracy antl Nationality working well
together, and justify the belief that they are in tlieir
nature opposed. Wherever the fervid nationalists got the
upper hand, liberty was jealousl}' restricted to the leading
race ; and as a result there prevailed those cries : " Hun-
gary for the Hungarians," etc., which brought Nationalism
into deserved disrepute. In Italy alone were the democrats
inspired by broader views, thanks to the inspiring influence
of Mazzini ; but at Rome and Venice the foreigner stamped
out both Nationalism and Democracy, so that by the end
of 1849 the future of the Continent was most dreary. In
his essay Europe : Us Condition (1852) ^lazzini pointed
out that Europe no longer believed in the Papacy, or in
dynasties or aristocracies. In fact Europe possessed no
unity of aim, of faith, or of mission. But, he proceeded,
a new initiative would probably arise out of the question
of nationalities, which would destroy the Treaties of Menna
and assort the peoples in accord with their desires. " The
question of nationalities" (he wrote), "rightly understood,
is the alliance of the peoples, the balance of powers based
on new foundations, the organization of the work that
l'2ur<;pe has to accomplish." At that time such a solution
was jiossible. The jieoples were not yet at enmity ; and
they all had an interest in striving for more complete
self-expression, firstly, by becoming ( omjilete political
entities instead of remaining di\'ided fragments ; secondly,
by solving the social and industrial proi)Iems in a way tliat
was impossible in their then fragmentary existence. Alas !
192 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
the nations did not rearrange their pohtical boundaries
without strifes that left behind rankhng hatreds ; and
in consequence the social and industrial problems have
gone unsolved. Nationalism asserted itself in its cruder
form, clothed itself in Militarism, and made the Continent
a series of self-contained and hostile nations.
Consequently, the international movement, which con-
currently struggled for recognition, had little chance of
success. Its beginnings may be traced in the famous Associa-
tion called r Internationale, which was started by French
and British workmen in London in 1864. Originating in
meetings of French working-men visitors to our Exhibition
of 1862 with our own artisans, it soon had branches in all
countries ; and at its Congresses revolutionary Socialism
of the most advanced type gained ground. The anarchic
section got the upper hand in 1869, when Bakunin and his
Russian and Polish Nihilists joined the Association. Its
influence on the Paris Commune of 1871 has been disputed,
but I think on insufftcient grounds. M. Hanotaux estimates
the number of its members in Paris at between 70,000 and
80,000, and thinks that Bismarck may have encouraged
the anarchic propaganda of the French Communists. The
idea may seem far-fetched ; but Bismarck was a past
master in the art of weakening his enemies ; and, on
January 27, 1871, during an interview with Jules Favre,
he alluded to the dangerous state of public opinion in
Paris on the eve of its surrender to the Germans, and
gave the following Machiavellian advice : " Provoke an
emeute while you still have an army to suppress it with."^
Favre looked at him with horror, for making so bloodthirsty
a suggestion. But evidently Bismarck knew the state of
things in Paris better than Favre, who, later on, probably
regretted that he did not follow that cunning counsel.
J- Busch, Bismarck during the Franco-German War, IT, 265.
IXTERXATIOXALISM 193
The Internationale played Geniiany's game admirably
in completing the ruin of Franco in the spring of 1871,
when Lyons and other cities of the Centre and South
sought to copy Paris and overturn the national Ciovern-
ment. In its place they sought to erect a sjstem based on
the Commune as governing unit, with federations to endow
these microcosms with some solidarity. That the Com-
munists should have made their bold bid for power while
France was still writhing under the heel of the Gennans
sufhciently characterized their movement. It proved that
among a fanatical minority of " Internationals " all claims
of country were ignored ; nay, that the greater the agony
of la patrie, the better was the opportunity deemed for
sweeping away old-world notions and imposing a com-
munistic and anti-national fomi of society. Of course the
national view prevailed, but after a terrible struggle,
which brought France to the verge of dissolution. The
violence of the fetroleuscs in Paris and other signs of
political lunacy discredited the cause ; and in 1872 the
Internationale split into two factions. The more moderate,
led b}' Marx, outvoted the desperadoes of Bakunin ; but
the latter found a considerable following among the
artisans of France, and, still more, of Spain aii<l ltal\.
Worsted at their own game of violence, the Nihilists
gradually declined in nundicrs ; Imt llic Russian branch
of the sect effected the murder of the reforming Tsar.
Alexander II, ;ind thus threw Russia into the anns of
reaction.
The chief significance of these facts lies in the reckless
unwisdom of the champions of Internationalism antl their
utter disregard of the claims of country, even after a most
disastrous war ; but it is of prim*- importance to observe
that anarchic and anti-national tli« orits liad a far greater
hold on the Slav and Latin propjts than nii the (iciinans.
o
194 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
The Karl Marx party dominant in German Socialism,
though advanced in its opinions, was not anarchic. Indeed,
Marx often behaved like a German patriot. On July 20,
1870, just before the Franco-German War, he wrote to
another Sociahst, Engels, that he hoped the French would
be well thrashed ; then the centre of the Internationale
would be in Germany. He was no less hostile to the
French Republic. On the contrary, Bakunin did his best
to help the young French democracy against the Germans. ^
Thus, the Teutonic Socialists tended towards Nationahsm,
the French and Russians towards Internationalism ; the
fractions that now and again terrorized the Latin and
Russian peoples were the declared enemies, not only of
those Governments, but of all government.
This divergence between the Teutonic peoples on the
one hand and the Latin and Slav peoples on the other
suggests that there must be a fundamental difference of
temperament and outlook. In the Latin and Slav peoples
the sense of the ideal is certainly stronger ; and the notion
of a common law and civilization has taken deeper root.
Consequently, on every important question the authority
of the community tends to prevail — a heritage bequeathed
in rich measure by Ancient Rome to the Romance peoples.
The Slav peoples are characterized by similar notions, and
by an even stronger vein of sentiment. Consequently a
movement that aims at far-reaching changes, such as the
sovereignty of the community or of the human race at
large over the individual, has a greater chance of success
among them than elsewhere. In fact, far-reaching social
revolutions have generally originated with them. On the
other hand the Germanic, Anglo-Saxon, and Scandinavian
peoples are remarkable for attachment to the home and
^ James Guillaiime, Karl Marx pangermaniste, et V Association
Internationale (Paris, Colin, 1915), pp. ^5, loi.
INTERNATIONALISM 195
to intlividual liberty. Luther and rroniwell are tlieir
characteristic products; Rousseau aiul Mazzini {\\o^c ol
the Latin peoples. Accordingly, it seems probable that
Internationalisni will develop first among the latter, and
will be retarded by the individualism of the former.
However, in 187 1 the movenient was wrecked mainly
by the extravagant ardour of its disciples. Mrs. Browning
has sung of the proneness of the French of her day to hurry
to extremes : —
" these too fiery and impatient souls,
They threaten conllagration to the world.
And rush with most unscrupulous logic on
Impossible practice.'
Never was this defect more flagrant than in the spring of
1871. It was due to the Con^munists that the French
Republic became for a time a prey to reaction. In Germany,
on the contrary, the anarchist movement never was serious ;
and tiie majority of the Socialists in the long run tended
to express not much more than the discontent naturally
aroused by the autocratic proceedings of the present Kaiser.
Even the Marxian Socialists have diminished in Germany,
where, indeed, the Socialists are often little more than
upholders of individual liberty. During tlie first seven or
eight years of his reign William II sought to appease them
by measures known as State Socialism : but in and after
1895 he found that his imperial palliatives were not
appreciated, and in 1896 he threw himself into Wdtpolilik.
As we have seen, this commercial Imperialism gained
ground rapidly ; and, what is most remarkable, it won over
very many German Socialists. The reasons for their
defection are still far from clear ; but one cause, perhaps
the fundamental cause, has been pointed out by a Belgian,
M. Emile Royer. y{v, the Socialist deputy for Tournay.
states that Marxism had tlevoled itself almost exclusively
196 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
to the national side of social questions, thereby losing sight
of the wider and humanitarian issues which nerved the
Socialists of 1848.^ This explanation goes far to solve the
riddle ; for since the year 1888 the German Government
has done much for the workmen, and recently has tried
to convince them of the need of colonies and better outlets
to the sea. To men who looked chiefly to the loaves and
fishes the Kaiser's policy presented irresistible attractions.
For instance, the Pangerman programme, which he
patronized, has aimed at the inclusion of Belgium and
Holland in a Greater Germany — to which a Central
Zollverein would be the convenient prelude ; and this
programme has immensely furthered the growth of imperial
and Chauvinistic ideas among the Bavarians. Shedding
their former separatist notions, they have embraced the
new programme with ardour, because, as their King
recently stated, it promises to give to South German trade
its natural outlets to the sea, Rotterdam and Antwerp.
Similarly in the great commercial centres, very many
Socialists have favoured the imperial policy of expansion.
Their conduct has dealt a heavy blow to the international
cause. Most of the fathers of Socialism believed in Free
Trade between nations as a means of furthering friendly
intercourse and lessening the chances of war. But Bis-
marck's policy of protecting home industries (supple-
mented by that of Biilow respecting agriculture) had very
important results, far beyond the limits of commerce and
agriculture. For there were two alternatives before Ger-
many ; either to continue in the path of Free Trade, which
imphes peaceful intercourse, or to adopt a protective and
narrowly national policy. Bismarck chose the latter, and
Wilhelm accentuated the choice, his aim being to make
^ Independance beige, Feb. 17, 1915 ; quoted by J. Destree,
Les Socialistes el la Guerre europeenne, p. 20,
INTERNATIONALISM 197
the nation as far as possible a self-sufficing unit. The
result was that Germany in forty years of peace piled up
great stores of industrial energy which threatened to burst
their bounds. On the basis of protection vast industrial
interests were built up, which could find no adequate
markets unless other States let in German goods on easy
terms ; and this they would not do to a sufficient extent.
Consequently the national or protective system led to an
impasse. The new trade interests clamoured for new
markets, and the artisans concerned in them tended to
become imperial expansionists. Thus the protective
system adopted in 18S0 served to strengthen the demands
for further annexations.
In fact the whole system gyrated in a vicious circle,
somewhat as follows : First the colonial party demanded
colonies and protection. Then the colonies were stated
to need a great fleet ; while protection led to a mushroom
growth of industries which helped to pay for the fleet.
Industries, inflated to near bursting point, demanded new
outlets, and all classes of the community, including many
of the Socialists, believed it necessary to support that
demand, which the army and fleet were prepared to
satisfy. If Germany had persevered with the system of
free exchange which makes the whole world an open market,
the present cataclysm would probably have been averted ;
for though the Prussian Junkers would in any case clamour
for war, tlieir cries would have f(jund no response in com-
mercial circles, still less among the artisans of Germany.
These last, I repeat, have been largely Kd astray from
international ideals by a narrow commercialism, which
made either for an inttrnal exjjlosion or a luirojx'an war.
In these islands we- think of (onimerci' as a bond of pi ace.
It has acted far otherwise in (iennany, where it takes on
the guise (jf tlie old mercantile system, that fruitful parent
igS LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
of wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Indeed, over-speculation and over-production in Germany
probably prompted the mad plunge of July, 1914.^ Ant-
werp, Salonica, Constantinople, and Bagdad were to be
the safety-valves for a surcharged industrial system. The
conquest of Belgium and North-East France, Poland,
Courland, and the Balkans seemed no difhcult task in
view of the confusion and weakness in the Entente States
and Serbia. Commerce therefore joined hands with
Militarism, and German Socialists did not bestow on that
suspicious union the expected shower of curses.
Imperialism, of course, has sometimes assumed a
threatening guise in these islands ; but on the whole it
has aimed at safeguarding the Empire by the upkeep of
an adequate fleet, the increase of which barely kept pace
with that of the mercantile marine and of our colonial
responsibilities. The role of the British fleet was neces-
sarily defensive ; that of the German fleet, on its very
limited coasts, could, after the recent huge additions, well
be offensive. In truth, the danger of the situation lay in
the fact that the greatest military Power in the world
aspired to rival on the oceans the Power for which maritime
supremacy is the first law of existence. This difference
in the situation of Germany and Great Britain was never
admitted by the German people ; and of late years their
Socialists have ceased effectively to protest against the in-
crease of their armaments, and that, too, despite the per-
sistent refusal of the Berlin Government to accept proposals
at the Hague Conferences for limitation of armaments. -
^ See M. Millioud, The Ruling Caste and frenzied Trade in
Germany (Eng. transl., 191G).
^ Bernhardi's claim, that Germany needs new colonics lor licr
surplus population, is refuted by the official statement in the
Preussische Jahrbilcher of March, 1912, that her emigration had of
late sunk to about 20,000 a year.
INTERXATIOXALlbM 199
In view of the inaction of German Socialists at the
greatest crisis in the modern world, it is of interest to
glance at the resolutions which their delegates helped to
pass at the chief Congresses of the Internationale. At Paris
in 1901 the Congress engaged the Socialists of all countries
to oppose votes for naval construction and colonial
wars. At Stuttgart in 1907 that able French writer,
Gustavc Herve, spoke vehemently against patriotism as
an anti-social prejudice. The German leader, Bebel,
opposed this on the ground that la patrie belongs more to
the poor than to the dominant classes ; and he warned
Herve not to encourage the German General Staff against
" the eventual enemy." For himself, he would not support
war, but he supported defensive preparations. Herve, in
reply, said that his propaganda in France had disarmed the
Government, which in case of mobilization, would be faced
with insurrection and chaos. Bebel declared that there
were two million Socialists in the German army, but ga\'e
no promise as to their conduct in case of a war, which,
moreover, would further their cause better than ten years
of propaganda. The Congress unanimously voted a motion,
the chief clause of which appears at the head of this lecture.
The Congress held at Copenhagen in 1910 rejected Keir
Hardic's motion for a general strike of workers in case of
war by 131 votes to 51. In the majority were German^'
20 votes, Austria 18, Italy 15, America, 14, etc. ; in the
minority, Great Britain 20, France 12, Russia 7, Poland 5,
etc. The delegates who met at the Bale Congress ol
November, 1912, were cheered by the sweeping triumi)lis
of the party in the recent General Election.^ to th* Rri( li-
stag (sec ante, p. 177). Referring to the Balkan War then
raging, the French leader, Jaures, called on the workers
in (jermany, France, and I'lngland to i>re\ent an\' help
going to Austria or Russia if those Powers ( aiue to blows.
200 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
The German delegate, Haase, for his party, promised to
use all possible means to prevent a war.^
A sinister incident followed. In the hope of clearing up
the Alsace-Lorraine Question i8o French Socialists went
on to Berne, expecting to meet the same number of German
delegates. They found a mere handful ; for as one of
them said to ]\I. Vergnet : " Every German, from the
highest to the lowest, considers that the Alsace-Lorraine
Question can be reopened only on the battlefield. Let the
French have no illusion on that head."- The German
Socialists also made no sustained protests against the
barbarous treatment of certain harmless civilians of
Zabern by German officers near the close of 1913. At that
time the centenary celebrations of the German War of
Liberation of 1S13 turned all heads in the Fatherland ;
and Germany, though she had no Napoleon to fear, whipped
herself to a frenzy of warlike ardour, amidst which the
no Socialist members of the Reichstag raised scarcely a
protest against the enormous votes passed in that autumn
for military and naval purposes — votes which far exceeded
all possible demands of a defensive character. Thereafter
the Berlin Government was convinced that in any even-
tuality the German Socialists would (to use a famous
phrase of Bebel's) " fight to the last gasp for the Father-
land." Of course, the great Socialist had spoken thus only
for a really defensive war. In July-August, 1914, his party
condoned the action of the German Government when it
precipitated the long-dreaded European conflict.
Here it is well to recall the condition of Labour in the
chief countries. The spring and summer of 1914 were
1 E. Royer, La Social-Democratie allemande et austro-hongroise
el les Socialistes beiges, pp. 8-24 (17-18 Green St., Leicester Square,
London) .
* Vergnet, The Geyman Enigma, p. 138.
INTERNATIONALISM joi
characterized by great unrest in France, Great Britain,
and Russia. Strikes were numerous and others were
threatened. Frequent ministerial crises at Paris and pubHc
admissions as to the unpreparedness of the anuy weakened
pubhc confidence. As for the United Kingdom, it seemed
on the verge of civil war in Ireland. In Russia the strikes
of tlie transport workers and others opened up the most
serious prospects. It was in this state of affairs, when the
Fntente Powers hovered on the brink of social revolution
or ci\il war, that Genuany launched her ultimatums to
Pctrograd and Paris (July 31). Those acts alone, following
on the insolent demands of the Austrian Government on
Serbia, suflicientl}' revealed the aggressive designs of the
Central Empires, which became clear as day when Germany
sought to " hew her way " through Belgium.
It is curious that, in the early stages of the diplunuitic
quarrel, the German Socialists raised protests against being
dragged into war. On July 28 they held twenty-eight
l)ubhc meetings in Berlin alone for that purpose ; and those
meetings were even protected by the police. This fact
seems to show that either the authorities had not yet
decided in favour of war (it is thought that tliey decided
on the evening of July 29) or that they were using the
Socialists to lull those of Russia, France, and Belgium into
false security. In either case the opposition of German
Socialists to war thenceforth collapsed— why is a mystery.
Were they coerced by the officials? Or were they terrified
by the Muscovite bogey which Berlin ofi'icials magnified into
colossal proportions ? Tlie latter supposition is incredible
in \ itw of the almost complete paralysis of the transport
services in Russia. It seems, then, tliat thf German
Sorjalists must have followrd tin- inipfriahst inipulsr \\lii( h
had won them over in and after IIh- year H)i2. \\liate\er
the ( ause. they all (though a few silently dennured)
202 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
supported the war votes of August 4 for a campaign whicli
a mere tyro in diplomacy could see was of an offensive
character. Nevertheless, Haase read out the Socialists'
declaration that they no longer had to pronounce on the
cause of the war, but only to defend their frontiers ; and on
this wretched excuse he and his party gave the lie to their
protestations of several years past. His action was all the
more disgraceful because on July 29, at a great meeting of
Socialists at Brussels, he declared Austria's demands on
Serbia a veritable provocation to war, and affirmed the
conviction of the German people that its Government ought
not to intervene, even if Russia intervened. It was then
decided to hold a great International Congress at Paris
on August 9 to concert general measures to prevent war.^
Did the knowledge of that fact induce the Berlin Govern-
ment to hurry on its ultimatums to Russia and France
on July 31 ? And why did not those obvious signs
of hurry arouse the suspicions of the no Socialist
deputies ? Why, during the sitting of August 4th,
did they not protest against the violation of Belgium's
neutrality, which the Chancellor admitted to be a lawless
act ? Why, finally, did they not protest against the
horrors perpetrated in Belgium in August-September ?
In justice, it must be said that the Socialist journal,
the Vorwdrts, protested both against the war and
the barbarities of the army. Liebknecht, too, in
December, 1914, in opposing the second war credits,
^ Royer, pp. 24-31. P. G. la Chesnais, J'he Socialist Party in
the Reichstag and the Declaration of War, ch. 3, shews that
that party abandoned all opposition to war in its manifesto of
July 31, that is before war became certain. The Vorwarts also
wrote: "Social Democracy bears no responsibility for forth-
coming events " — a forecast of the passivity of the party on
August 4. On August i a German Socialist, Miiller, arrived at
Paris, and sought to induce his French comrades to oppose the
war credits at Paris.
INTERNATIONALISM 203
declared tlie w ar to be an imperialist and capitalist war for
the conquest of the world's markets. By that time all
German Socialists were aware of the absolute preparedness
of German}' and the unpreparedness of her opponents.
Yet only sixteen Socialist deputies joined in his opposition
and protest. By degrees his following increased ; and
the majority of the German Socialist party has finally
condenmed the policy of annexation openly avowed in
the time of fancied triumph. Some of its members,
however, sought to persuade their French and Belgian
comrades that France and Belgium ought to discuss
tenns of peace. Against this suggestion Bernstein,
editor of the Bremer Bi'irgerzcitting, strongly protested,
pointing out that, as France was attacked and part of her
territory still occupied, discussions of peace by her would
be a fatal act. Bernstein, Liebknecht, Kautzky, and Haasc
published a Socialist manifesto demanding peace, without
annexations or conquests. They and their manifesto were
repudiated by the party, which thus associated itself with
the pohcy of the Government (June, 1915).*
As for the French Socialists, though stunned for a
moment by the assassination of their leader, Jaures, they
soon took up the position which, assuredly, he would liavc
taken up. In face of the unprovoked and treacherous stab
of the Germans at France through Belgium, they rallied as
one man to the defence of la palrie. There was now no talk
of a " general strike " such as might conceivably have
' Dcstrcc, i)p. 17, 35-40. 11. IJourgin, Les Responsabilitcs dii
Socialisme allcmaiid, pp. 14-22. The assertion of Mr. Snowden,
M.P., in the debate of February 23, I9i(>, tliat in no country of
Euro|>c (except Hungary and Italy) )i;us Internationalism been
sfi well kept .alive ;us by the German Socialists, is incorrect. Ilu y
have made some fine si)eeches, but their actions have been timid
and far too tardy to influence events, except in a sense favourable
to Germany.
204 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
stopped the war at its two sources, Berlin and Vienna.
The treason of German Sociahsts to the Internationale
consigned it for the present to the limbo of vain hopes ;
and nothing remained for their comrades in Belgium,
France, Serbia, and Poland but to fall back on the old
principle of duty to their several nations. The supreme
lesson of the crisis of July-August, 1914, is that Inter-
nationalism can succeed only when its votaries stand firm
in every nation ; and that treason in one quarter involves
collapse in all quarters.
The genius of the Latin and Slav peoples was quick to
discern the truth that in August, 1914, the patriotic
principle, which many of them had consistently derided,
formed the pnly possible basis of action during the war ;
also that, in fighting for la pairie against its violators, they
were taking the first step towards reafftrming the cosmo-
politan ideal. Very noteworthy was the action of Gustave
Herve. He at once became a flaming patriot, the champion
of war to the death against Germany. The Belgian
Socialist, Destree, by his fiery denunciation of the Huns,
did much to arouse Italy from her indecision and range
her on the side of national liberty against an overweening
Imperialism, In Great Britain the action of the workers
has in general been marked by self-sacrificing devotion ;
but unfortunately one section of the Labour party has
been blind to the wider issues at stake in this mighty
struggle. Consequently there has not been here that
unanimous rally to the nation's call which has lifted
the whole life of France to a higher level. In France,
despite a sharp rise in prices, there has not been a single
strike since the beginning of the war up to mid-February,
1916 ; but here as many as 698 strikes occurred during
the year 1915 alone. Of these several were due to merely
local and sectional considerations, and many were highly
I^'T^:R^ATlo^ALl^M 205
detrimental to the public service. The contrast is deeply
humiliating, and is not to be explained away by saying
that France is invaded and we are not ; for the same
principle, the freedom of the smaller peoples, is at stake
ever\-\vhere. Inability or refusal to see this truth must
discredit a portion of the British Labour party ; and leader-
ship in the international movement of the future will
probably lie with the Latin or Slav peoples, whose workers
have almost unanimously shown the capacity of taking
a wide, generous, and statesmanlike view^ of this un-
exampled crisis in the fortunes of the European peoples.
In Russia the Socialists were at first divided on the ques-
tion of the war, as was natural in view of the despotic
nature of their Government. But their leaders, notably
Prince Kropotkin, soon perceived the seriousness of the
German menace ; and the party rallied enthusiastically
to the national cause. At the International Socialist
Congress held in London in February, 1915, all the Russian
delegates voted for the prosecution of the war until the
rights of nationalities were restored and a federative system
could be designed for the protection of the peace of Europe.
That has become the aim of nearly all Socialists in this
war ; but, in spite of the increase of distress in Germany,
her Socialist party continues to support the Government.
In a debate early in January, 1916, Liebknccht's anti-war
group mustered forty-one strong ; but the refusal of the
German Chancellor to repudiate aims of annexation
on either frontier failed to alienate the majority of the
Socialists. For tiieir part, the French Socialists demand
that the future of Alsace-Lorraine shall be decided by>a
plebiscite in those provinces, a proposal scouted by their
German confreres, who claim that that future is irrevocably
bound u|j with (icrman rule. On this rock, then, as well
as that of Poland, Internationalism has foimilcred ; and
2o6 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
it will be observed that, while its ideal is championed by
French and Russian Socialists, those of Germany have
in the main taken up the nationalist standpoint and hold
to the lands seized or conquered by Frederick the Great
and Wilhelm I.^ In January, 1916, the Socialist leader,
Scheidemann, spoke strongly for peace and against
annexations; but he uttered the fatal words: "We
refuse any thought of an annexation of Alsace-Lorraine
by France, in whatever form it may be attempted."
Another blow to the cosmopolitan movement is the
utter failure of neutrals to give effect to their obligations,
contracted at the Hague Conferences, for assuring the
sanctity of neutral territory and the rights due to non-
combatants. Though Germany's weaker neighbours were
obviously terrorized into silence, yet the United States
could safely have protested in the case of outrages so
notorious as those committed in Belgium and Poland.
No protest has come from Washington ; ^ and this
dereliction of duty has rendered futile all the labour
expended at the Hague Conferences, at least during
this war. Here again, then, experience has proved
the extreme fragility of the cosmopolitan ideals. At the
first contact with a brutal and overweening Nationalism
they vanished ; and Germany has plunged the world back
into a state of lawlessness and bestiality comparable with
that of the Thirty Years' War.
Men are asking everywhere : Can International Law
and morality ever be re-established in such a way as to
^ See the Temps for Nov. 6, 191 5, and the Nation (London) for
Jan. 15, 1916.
2 In his Allocution of January 22, 1915, the Pope reprobated
all acts of injustice, but in terms so general as to render the
protest useless. Equally disappointing is the letter of Cardinal
Gasparri, of July 6, 1915, to the Belgian Minister {L'Allemagne
el les Allies devaut la Conscience chreticnne, ad fin., Paris, 1915)-
IXTERNATIOXALISM 207
restore confidence ? Pessimists and cynics deny it. On
historical grounds, I dissent irom this sombre estimate.
For, as has appeared in these stuiUes, Nationahsm shows
sit^ns of liaving exhausted its strengtli except among the
most backward peoples. This war is the rcdiictio ad
ahsurdum of the movement in its recent narrow and
intolerant form. The persistent attempt of one nation
to overbear its weaker neighbours in order to achieve
world - supremacy has sufficed to unite against it nearly
all the world ; and the frightful exhaustion which failure
must entail will be a warning to would-be world-conquerors
for centuries to come. Further, as we have seen, the more
brutal and perfidious the violation of International Law,
the stronger is the demand for the re-establishment of that
law, with adequate guarantees for the future. In the
domains of politics, finance, and law violent action always
begets a strong reaction ; and we may be sure that, when
the base Nationalism of recent years has brought its
protagonists to ruin, there will be a potent revulsion in
favour of international ideals. In 1871 those ideals were
foolishly championed by the fanatics of Paris; in 1914 they
were foully betrayed by turncoats at Berlin. Let us ho])e
that in the future good sense and good faith will work hand
in hand for their realization. Already in the Hague Tri-
bunal there exists the means for assuring the triumph of
reason in place of force. If in due course all the European
Powers consent to substitute the will to reconcile for the
will to conquer, the task is half accomplished.
Why sliould not the new Europe will to reconcile its
interests? ICvery leading thinker now admits that the
saner of the national aspirations (that is, those which
prompt the political union of mm of like sentiments)
must rei eive du<- satisfaction. Pxluium will l)e recon-
stitutfd, more glorious than beftjre. France must recover
2o8 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
Alsace-Lorraine. But the French and Belgian peoples,
if they are wise, will not covet the Rhine boundary.
Poland (the Poland of 1771) ought to emerge once more,
free in civic affairs, though under the suzerainty of the
Tsars. Italy will gather in her people of the Trentino and
Trieste, but, if she is wise, will annex no Slovene or Slav
lands further east. The Austrian and Eastern Ouestions
are more difficult, but can be settled on a federative system
based on Nationality and equality of rights. The Mace-
donian tangle should be settled by a commission appointed
by the Great Powers, not by wrangling delegates of the
peoples concerned. On the questions concerning Albania,
Bulgaria, and Constantinople no prudent person will at
present dogmatize ; for they must be settled largely accord-
ing to the course of events. This much is certain : the
enormous importance of the issues now at stake ought to
nerve every Briton to do his utmost so that the solution
shall be thorough and shall not end in the ghastly fiasco
of a stale-mate. Better five years of war than that.
The new Europe which I have outlined ought to be
a far happier Europe than ever before. For the first
time practically all the great peoples will have sorted
themselves out, like to like ; and it may be assumed that
all dynasties hostile to that healthy process will have
disappeared. Then, after the attainment of civic freedom
and national solidarity, the national instinct, which
strengthens with opposition and weakens after due satis-
faction, ought to merge in the wider and nobler sentiment
of human brotherhood in the attainment of which it is only
a preparatory phase.
THE END
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