. 
 
 
BANCROFT 
 LIBRARY 
 
 O 
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
' 
 
 
 December 1895, 
 
 I_jeotu.x*@s in. tlie Dei3a.rtm.ent of" Mlilitstr y 
 Delivered Before tn.e Olass of Oflfloer s.at tn.e 
 TJniteci States Infa,ntry anci Oa,va,lry Son.ool, 
 Fort Ijea,venwortn., BLeunsas. 1S3 15. 
 
MILITARY GEOGRAPHY. 
 
 LECTURES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART, 
 
 DELIVERED BEFORE THE CLASS OF OFFICERS AT THE 
 
 U. S. INFANTRY AND CAVALRY SCHOOL, 
 
 FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS, 
 
 1893-1895, 
 
 COHSTTZEZSTTS. 
 
 The Military Geography of Canada, 
 
 Captain ARTHUR L. WAGNER, 6th Infantry, Instructor. 
 
 The Military Geography of Chili, 
 
 Captain EP.EN SWIFT, 5th Cavalry, Assistant Instructor. 
 
 The Military Geography of Mexico, 
 
 1st Lieut. A. L. MILLS, 1st Cav, Assistant Instructor. 
 
 The Military Geography of Central America, 
 
 1st Lieut. CARL REICHMANN, 9th Inf., Ass't Instructor. 
 
 ("NITED STATES INFANTRY AND CAVALRY SCHOOL, 
 1895. 
 
Bancroft Libnry 
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Page 5, line 2, for statesmen read statesmen and generals. 
 
 Page 6, line 8, for georgaphieal read geographical. 
 
 Page 47, line 32, for Novia read Nova. 
 
 Page 53, line 13, for Indian read Indian. 
 
 Page 53, line 14, for produeeda read produced a. 
 
 Page 56, lines 5 and 6, for Tarcapaca read Tarapaca. 
 
 Page 60, line 21, for pretaining read pertaining. 
 
 Page 62, line 14, for rail-road read railroad. 
 
 Page 62, line 29, for Korner read Korner. 
 
 Page 64, line 6, for mould read would. 
 
 Page 65, line 7, for rail-road and rail-way read railroad and 
 
 Page 65, line 14, for rail-roads read railroads. 
 
 Page 69, line 31, for verdue read verdure. 
 
 Page 74, line 12, for Mexicon read Mexican. 
 
 Page 75, line 4, for fundemental read fundamental. 
 
 Page 75, line 25, for Government read Government. 
 
 Page 76, line 28, for Polosi read Potosi. 
 
 Page 81, line 1, for indians read Indians 
 
 Page 81, line 17, for customery read customary. 
 
 Page 83, line 1, for warrented read warranted. 
 
 Page 84, line 1, for parallelling read paralleling. 
 
 Page 84, line 13, for canons canons. 
 
 Page 86, line 13, for was read were. 
 
 Page 87, line 3, for /Softitfe read &ifti/fo. 
 
 Page 93, line 17, for indians read Indians. 
 
 Page 117, line 18, for definitely read definitely. 
 
 Page 122, line 32, for revivifications read revivification. 
 
 Page 126, line 20, for /ie read toe. 
 
 Page 129, line 6, for western read western. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 It being impracticable to illustrate the following lectures 
 with suitable maps, the reader is referred to the maps in the 
 Kncyclopsediu Britannica (Ninth Edition) presented with the 
 subjects America, Canada, Ontario, Quebec, New Bruns- 
 wick, and Mexico, or to the maps of Canada, Chili, and the 
 West Indies in Stieler's ''Hand Atlas." 
 
THE MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF CANADA. 
 
 By Captain ARTHUR L. WAGNER, Sixth U. S. Infantry. 
 Instructor in Military Art. 
 
 O n/~ 
 
 \ A / HEN one nation finds itself at war with another, its 
 V V statesmen are at once confronted with the problem 
 of so shaping the conduct of the war as to gain the greatest 
 possible advantages from existing conditions; to encounter 
 the forces of the enemy unde such circumstances as to gain 
 the greatest probability of success, to reap the greatest 
 results from victory, and suffer the least from defeat; and, in 
 brief, so to conduct the war as to lead to an honorable peace 
 with the least outlay of blood and treasure, and to relieve 
 their own people, as much as possible, from the burden of 
 misery inseparable from the state of war. 
 
 As we know from our studies in the Art of War, the 
 question which first arises is, whether to assume the offensive 
 or await the enemy in a defensive position. This, as Ha-mley 
 says, will depend upon many considerations, to wit, the 
 relative strength of the opposing forces, the political policy 
 of the nation, the relative capacity of the belligerents for 
 
6 
 
 the prompt mobilization and concentration of their forces, 
 <>r certain geographical considerations which may give to one, 
 and deny to the other, the power of assuming the offensive. 
 Then, if the offensi ve be chosen, conies the question of the 
 selection of an object; in which also political and geographi- 
 cal considerations enter; the selection of a theatre in which the 
 same considerations are to be weighed; and finally the choice 
 of a line of operations, in which georgaphical considerations 
 are generally paramount, as affecting the all-important mat- 
 ters of supply, of the composition of the forces, and the 
 general strategy of the campaign. 
 
 Taking these questions ID their order, we find in the first 
 a greater field, perhaps, for the diplomat than for the general; 
 i i the second and third, military circumstances increase in 
 importance; and in the fourth, political considerations gener- 
 ally (though not always) vanish, and the solution depends 
 upon military conditions alone. It is impossible, however, 
 to weigh any of these questions without being influenced by 
 geographical considerations, from the time the war-policy of 
 the nation is discussed in the cabinet, until the problem is 
 wrought out to a practical solution on the field of battle. 
 
 Hence arises the importance of the study of military 
 geography; which may be described as the study of geogra- 
 phy with reference to the operations of armies; and 
 which from its very nature, necessarily embraces many 
 features of political as well as physical geography. 
 
 To a student of the Art of War, the study of the mili- 
 tary geography of any country is an interesting one; but it is, 
 perhaps, only when the study is applied to countries whose 
 interests are closely bound to our own, whose foreign policy 
 may cla.sh with that of the United States, and whose territor- 
 ies may be the theatre of operations of our armies or t< 
 tho-e parts of our own land which may feel the tread of the 
 invader that it becomes to us a study of importance second 
 to no branch of the Art of War. Applied thus to the Do- 
 minion of Canada, the subject becomes one of great moment 
 
to every American officer. 
 
 British America embraces all of the North American 
 continent north of the main portion of the United States?, 
 excepting Alaska and Danish America. With the exception 
 of Newfoundland and Labrador, it is all comprised in the 
 Dominion of Canada, which, with a population of only 
 5,000,000, has an area of 3,500,000 square miles an area 
 nearly equal to that of Europe. It comprises the provinces 
 of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince 
 Edward Island, Manitoba, and British Columbia, and the 
 territories known as Assinaboia, Saskatchewan, Alberta 
 Athabasca, North West Territory, Keewntin, Northern 
 Territory, and North East Territory. A glance at the map 
 shows us that this immense country is, roughly speaking, 
 bounded on the east by the Atlantic Ocean, on the west by 
 the Pacific, and on the south by the United States; while on 
 the north its boundary is lost in the region of perpetual ice 
 and snow. For us, the southern boundary of the Dominion 
 is the only one which requires careful examination; for Cana- 
 da is unassailable on the north, while she can be attacked on 
 the east and west only by a nation superior to Great Britain 
 in naval power in other words, three sides of the irregular 
 quadrangle which forms the Dominion of Canada are practi- 
 cally safe from assault. 
 
 The boundary line between the United States and Canada 
 begins in Passamaq noddy Bay and follows the St. Croix 
 River to its head waters; then goes due north to the St. John 
 River; passes up the St. John to the mouth of the St. Fran- 
 cis River; ascends the latter river about thirty miles; then 
 runs in a southwesterly direction on an irregular line (almost 
 coincident with the crest of the watershed of the Atlantic and 
 the St. Lawrence) to the 45th parallel of north latitude; 
 along this parallel to the St. Lawrence River; up the St. 
 Lawrence, Lake Ontario, Niagara River, Lake Erie, Detroit 
 River, Lake St. Clair, St. Glair River, Lake Huron, and St. 
 Mary's River to Lake Superior; through Lake Superior to 
 
the mouth of Pigeon River; up a chain of lakes and small 
 rivers to the Lake of the Woods; then, from the outlet of 
 this lake into Rainy River, across to the point known as the 
 Northwest Angle of the Lake of the Woods; due south to the 
 49th parallel of north latitude; then, in a great sweep across 
 the Continent, along this parallel to the Gulf of Georgia; and 
 then down this gulf, passing west of the San Juan Island, 
 through the Juan de Fuca Strait, to the Pacific. One-third 
 of this great boundary line consists of natural frontier. 
 
 The great physical divisions of the United States known 
 as the Atlantic Slope, Pacific Slope, and Mississippi Valley, 
 each with a more or less pronounced declination towards the 
 equator, have in the Dominion of Canada their continuation 
 or counterpart with a general slope to wards the Arctic Ocean. 
 The main chain of the Rocky Mountains, running parallel to 
 the Pacific coast, marks the eastern boundary of the Pacific 
 Slope of Canada; a region some 400 miles wide (from east to 
 west) and 1500 miles long, possessing "a mild and humid 
 atmosphere as far north as the 55th parallel, but inhospitable 
 and barren beyond the boundary." East of the Rocky 
 Mountains lies the Great Northern Plain, the southern bound- 
 ary of which is the watershed between the waters of Hudson's 
 Bay and those of the Gulf of Mexico or the Great Lakes, and 
 the greater part of which may, roughly speaking, be said to 
 be coincident with the 50th parallel; while south of James 
 Bay, the boundary between the Plain and the Atlantic Slope 
 consists of the Height of Land and the Watchish Mountains, 
 trending in a direction generally parallel to the St. Lawrence 
 River, and about 150 miles from it. The greater portion of 
 this region has been well described as a "bleak and bare 
 waste, overspread with innumerable lakes, and resembling 
 Siberia both in physical character of its surface and the rigor 
 of its climate." 
 
 The Pacific Slope of the Dominion may be dismissed 
 from our consideration in a very few words. In one sense, 
 British Columbia is more exposed to invasion than Canada 
 
proper, the boundary line being mainly an artificial one; but 
 the roads leading across the frontier are few and poor, and 
 though there are now two railroads* penetrating the heart of 
 the province from the south, which would greatly facilitate 
 the supply of an invading army, there is no objective in the 
 main portion of the province of sufficient importance to justify 
 military operations of any magnitude. The two points of 
 special importance, Victoria, (the capital) and Esquimault 
 (the great naval station) are both on Vancouver's Island, safe 
 from attack so long as England maintains her supremacy on 
 the sea. 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to consider the Alaska-Canada 
 frontier at all, though Colonel Strange in his able paper on 
 the "Military Aspect of Canada" seems to regard Alaska as a 
 possible secondary base for the Americans. If our navy were 
 what \ve should like it to be, but what we may despair of its 
 ever being, we might protect Alaska; but we could make no 
 earthly use of it as a base, owing not only to the difficulty, 
 under the best conditions, of transporting an army thither, 
 but to the absence of any sane objective after we got there. 
 Under existing conditions, if war should occur between the 
 United States and Great Britain, our flag would, doubtless, 
 be speedily lowered in Alaska, to be raised again only as a 
 result of American victories in other theatres. 
 
 The Atlantic Slope of Canada comprises all the older, 
 more populous, and wealthier provinces of the Dominion. 
 In it would lie all the important theatres of war if we 
 were engaged in a conflict with Great Britain; and a consid- 
 eration of its geography is, therefore, a matter of especial 
 consequence ro the American military student. This portion 
 of Canada embraces the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New 
 Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island; though 
 the last named province may be neglected as not lying within 
 
 *The Spokane Falls and Northern ;ui(l the extension of the Great 
 Korthern K. R. Iron) Everett to New Westminster. 
 
10 
 
 any probable theatre of operations. 
 
 Mountain*. Quebec is generally mountainous, The 
 portion of this province lying south of the St. Lawrence is 
 traversed through almost its entire length by the Notre Dame 
 (or Green) mountains, a continuation of the Appalachian 
 range, running almost parallel to the St. Lawrence River, 
 and terminating at the Gulf of St. Lawrence in a high table- 
 land having an elevation of 1500 feet. The highest peaks of 
 these mountains are about 4000 feet high. 
 
 North of the St. Lawrence the Laureutian Range, begin- 
 ing in Labrador, trends in a south-westerly direction, and 
 skirts the north shore of the great river to the vicinity of 
 Quebec, where it leaves the banks of the stream. It then 
 keeps nearly parallel with the river, but some miles back from 
 the shore, until about thirty miles west of Montreal, where it 
 skirts the Ottawa River for a hundred miles, leaps the river, 
 as it were, and trends in the direction of Kingston. From 
 the vicinity of that city, the range extends north-westward 
 to the shores of the Lakes Huron and Superior, and finally 
 tapers off into the levels of the Great Northern Plain. "Some 
 of the hills of the Laurentian Range are 1300 feet high, and 
 below the city of Quebec their altitude is 8000 feet. 
 
 In the northern and northwestern portion of New Bruns- 
 wick are several hill ranges, of altitude varying from 1200 
 to 2000 feet. In the southern part a considerable range of 
 hills runs almost parallel to the coast of the Bay of Fundy, 
 and at a distance of 20 or 30 miles from it. 
 
 In Nova Scotia are several chains of high hills (some 
 having an altitude of 1100 feet) running generally parallel 
 to the coast. These hills lie nearer to the coast of the Bay 
 of Fundy than to that of the Atlantic. The principal chain, 
 known as the Cobequid Mountains, runs east and west, par- 
 allel to the path by which an invading army would enter 
 from the isthmus joining Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, 
 and thus might have a strategic value of some importance. 
 Topography <n\<] I'm/I net*. The southern, or most popu- 
 
11 
 
 lous part of Ontario is, generally speaking, a plain; though 
 it is rather undulating, and along the shores of Lakes Erie 
 and Ontario is in many places broken by shelving rocks and 
 precipices. The province is often termed "The Garden of 
 Canada," and is a region of surpassing fertility. Its average 
 yield of wheat, oats and barley exceeds that of our best 
 States. It produces fruits of various kinds in great abun- 
 dance, is without a superior as a sheep-raising country, and 
 its exports of cattle and bread-stuffs are large. 
 
 The province is generally well cultivated, and has fairly 
 good roads. On the whole, it is well suited to military ope- 
 rations. The heavily timbered region lies almost altogether 
 north of the probable theatre of operations; and the products 
 of the province would greatly facilitate the supply of an in- 
 vading army. 
 
 In the province of Quebec, wheat, barley, oats, rye and 
 hay are produced in large quantities, and the exports of cat- 
 tle and beef are considerable. "Dense forests cover enor- 
 mous tracts of territory," and the province, as a whole, is 
 heavily wooded. The country has a great number of good 
 wagon roads. Artillery could thus be easily transported ; 
 but, owing to the mountainous and wooded nature of the 
 province, an invading army would, doubtless, require a mini- 
 mum of artillery and cavalry and a maximum of infantry. 
 The products of this province, too, would greatly facilitate 
 the supply of armies operating in it. 
 
 Except in the mountainous region already referred to, 
 the surface of New Brunswick is generally undulating. 
 Though the country is not infertile, the agricultural products 
 are not sufficient for home consumption. Hay is produced 
 in great quantities, but the province is not suited to the 
 operations of cavalry or the extended use of artillery, being 
 one of the most heavily wooded regions in the world. The 
 supply of an invading army would receive scanty assistance 
 from the products of this province, and its operations would 
 be impeded by natural features which would lend great ad- 
 
12 
 
 vantages to the defense. 
 
 Nova Scotia is a more productive province than the one 
 just considered, cereals and fruits growing in abundance. 
 The country contains extensive forests, but its roads are 
 numerous, and of excellent quality. The obstacles that 
 would be encountered by an invading army would, however, 
 be found in other natural obstacles than those yet considered. 
 
 Rivers. The waterways of Canada, whether we consider 
 the creations of the Almighty or the work of man, demand 
 the chief attention ot any one who considers the Dominion 
 either from a commercial or military point of view. No 
 country in the world has a more complete system of water 
 communication. First of all is the St. Lawrence River, 
 draining the Great Lakes and extending from its head at 
 Lake Ontario 728 miles to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. This 
 noble stream, which from its very source is a river of the first 
 magnitude, has an average width of about one and three- 
 fourth miles from Montreal to Quebec, narrowing to three- 
 fourths of a mile at Cape Diamond near the latter city. 
 Seven miles below Quebec it is 4 miles wide; 22 miles further 
 down the width is 11 miles; at the mouth of the Saguenay 
 it expands to a width of 16 miles; and at Cape Chat it has a 
 magnificent sweep of 39 miles from shore to shore. The 
 largest ocean vessels can ascend to Montreal. 
 
 We may regard the Saguenay River as part of the east- 
 ern boundary of the possible theatre of Military operations 
 in Canada. Above this river are many others emptying into 
 the St. Lawrence ; the principal ones on the north being the 
 Montmorency, the St. Anne, the Batiscum, the St. Maurice, 
 the Du Loup, the Assomption, and the great tributary, the 
 Ottawa, 600 miles long, with its tributaries Du Nord, Petite 
 Nation, Du Lievre and Gatineau on the north, and the Pete- 
 wawa, Bonne Cliere, Madawaska, Mississippi and Rideau on 
 the south. The St. Lawrence river system is completed by 
 numerous tributaries on the south, of which the principal 
 ones are the Richelieu, the Yamaska, the St. Francis, the 
 
13 
 
 Beconcour, en 1 the Ohaudiere. 
 
 Emptying into Lake Ontario on the'Canada side are the 
 Moira and the Trent rivers; into Lake Erie, the Grand River; 
 and into Lake St. Clair, the Thames and the Sydenham. 
 With the exception of the last two rivers, the courses of 
 these tributary streams are all perpendicular to the path of 
 an invading army from Detroit to Quebec on the left of the 
 St Lawrence or from Rouse's Point or Montreal, on the 
 right of the great river to the same objective. 
 
 Among the rivers of the eastern provinces of Canada, 
 the St. John is the most important. Navigable for large 
 vessels as far as Fredericton, 88 miles from its mouth, and 
 with its course partly perpendicular and partly parallel to a 
 line of operations east from Maine, it might, in the event of 
 a war with Great Britain, play a great strategical part which 
 we will consider later. The Restigouche, Mirimichi, and 
 other streams in the northern part of New Brunswick lie too 
 far out of any probable theatre to call for notice. At the 
 head of the Bay of Fundy is the Petitcodiac River, navigable 
 for ships 25 miles from its mouth, and for schooners of 80 
 tons burden 12 miles further. From the head of ship navi- 
 gation it is less than 15 miles across the isthmus to Shediac 
 Bay, measured from the points Moncton and Shediac which 
 are connected by rail. Thirty miles further to the east, the 
 same isthmus again narrows its width, from Cumberland 
 Basin to Bay Verte being about 15 miles. Two excellent 
 positions are thus made to order, as it were, and we shall in a 
 proper place, consider their great military value. 
 
 As to the rivers of Nova Scotia, we will only note that 
 in mapping out a route, from the isthmus to Halifax, we find 
 the path crossed by the Phillip, Wallace, Salmon, and Shu- 
 benacadie rivers, while the line of the invading army would 
 be parallel to the general direction of the Stewiacke and 
 Musquodoboit. All these rivers are navigable for small craft, 
 and the Shubenacadie is navigable for vessels of large size. 
 
 Canals. Let us now consider the admirable system of 
 
14 
 
 canals, by which the defects of the natural system of Cana- 
 dian waterways have been remedied, and its advantages in- 
 creased. Immediately above Montreal the navigation of the 
 St. Lawrence is obstructed by the St. Louis or Lachine 
 Rapids. Other rapids obstruct the navigation of the river 
 between Montreal and Prescott (about 100 miles above), the 
 total fall of the river from the latter to the former city being 
 206J feet. These obstacles are overcome by means of the 
 St. Lawrence canals, which consist of the Lachine canal, 8J 
 miles long; the Beauharnois Canal, 11J miles long; the Corn- 
 wall Canal 11^ miles long, and the Williamsburg Canals, 
 three in number, aggregating 12-J miles in length, or 27^ 
 miles including intervening spaces of river navigation. The 
 total length of these canals is 43J miles. The Lachine Canal 
 is on the Island of Montreal. The Beauharnois, about 25 
 miles above Montreal. The Cornwall is about 45 miles, and 
 the Williamsburg about 18 miles, below Prescott. The 
 locks of the Lachine Canal are 270 feet in length by 40 feet 
 in width, with a depth of 14 feet, and the upper canals are 
 being enlarged coriespondingly. These canals will then ren- 
 der practicable the passage of vessels of large size, as far as 
 Prescott. Above that city the navigation of the St. Law- 
 rence is without obstruction, and vessels can pass through 
 Lake Ontario to Port Dalhousie, the outlet of the Wellancl 
 Canal. This canal gives a passage from Lake Ontario to 
 Lake Erie, which would otherwise be barred by the impracti- 
 cable Niagara River, and is 27 miles long. Its locks are 275 
 feet long by 45 feet wide, and the depth of water on the sills 
 is 14 feet. On emerging from the Welland Cannl at Port 
 Colborne, a vessel can pass without hindrance up the lakes as 
 far as Chicago on the one hand, or the St. Mary's canal on 
 the other. A canal at Sault Ste. Mario, a mile long and 17 
 feet deep, gives a passage into Lake Superior. As this canal 
 belongs to the United States, and could easily be destroyed if 
 ii could not be defended. Great Britain has had the foresight 
 to construct a similiar canal lying entirely within her terri- 
 
15 
 
 ton*. This ca:ial commences at the navigable channel of the 
 St. Mary's River, opposite the town of Sault Ste. Marie, and 
 extends upstream 5,300 feet, to the foot of St. Mary's Island, 
 thence westward 3,500 feet to the head of the island, thence 
 westward 9,300 feet through shoals, until the navigable chan- 
 nel of the river, above the rapids, is again reached, at an 
 elevation of 18 feet above the lower entrance to the lock. 
 The canal has one lock, in the middle section, 900 feet in 
 length, 60 feet wide, and 20 feet 3 inches of water upon the 
 mitre sills at low water. 
 
 The lakes are thus open to any vessel of the British navy 
 that can pass through the canals mentioned; in other words, 
 when the improvement of the canals is completed, they will 
 be open to any vessel drawing less than 14 feet of water. In- 
 cluding the vessels now building, England has just one hun- 
 dred and forty-six such vessels, three of them armored. 
 
 With one exception, all the British canals mentioned lie 
 on the left side of the St. Lawrence. The Beauharnois 
 Canal, which is south of the St. Lawrence and only 20 miles 
 from the northern boundary of New York, was the weak link 
 in the chain of canals, as its defense would be difficult, and 
 its capture fraught with serious results to the British Empire. 
 
 This fact was recognized by Great Britain; and measures 
 have been taken to remedy the serious defect by which the 
 seizure or destruction by the Americans of a canal less than 
 12 miles long might absolutely prevent the reinforcement of 
 the British naval forces on the lakes, or its withdrawal in case 
 of disaster. The Soulanges canal is being constructed on the 
 north side of the St. Lawrence. It is 14 miles long, with 
 five locks, which are 270 feet in length, 45 feet w r ide, and 14 
 feet deep. The Rideau canal gives a water passage from 
 Kingston to Ottawa, and thence down the Ottawa River and 
 Lai'hine canal to Montreal. This canal does not at present 
 admit of the passage of vessels of a draught greater than four 
 and one-half feet, and is, consequently of no strategic iriinor- 
 
16 
 
 tance. It is a significant fact, however, that it was construct- 
 ed, sixtv years ago, "with a view to the defense of the 
 province," and that its enlargement is contemplated. Its 
 new locks will have a depth of nine feet, and will accomo- 
 date fifty-four vessels now on the list of the British navy. 
 But even when the enlargement of the Rideau Canal is com- 
 pleted, its strategic importance will be less than that of the 
 proposed Ottawa and Georgian Bay Canal, by which vessels 
 will be able to go from Montreal (by the Lachine Canal, 
 Ottawa River, Lake Nipissing, French River, and Georgian 
 Bay) into Lake Huron. To obtain the fullest strategic value 
 of the latter canal the construction of two others is requisite, 
 and both are now under construction by the Dominion Gov- 
 ernment. One of these canals is to connect Toronto with 
 Georgian Bay by way of Lake Simcoe, the other is to join 
 Hamilton with Port Franks on Lake Huron. With these 
 canals completed, the loss of the Beauharnois and Soulanges 
 Canals could be regarded by the British with comparative 
 complacency. 
 
 The Trent River Navigation is "composed of a chain of 
 lakes and rivers extending from Trenton, at the mouth of the 
 Trent, Bay of Quinte, north shore of Lake Ontario, to Lake 
 Huron." This system may be dismissed without serious con- 
 sideration. It does not admit of the passage of vessels of a 
 draught of five feet; and as it would confer no strategic ad- 
 vantages not obtained by the canals just mentioned, and as it 
 seems in its present condition to answer all the demands of 
 local traffic, its enlargement does not seem probable. 
 
 There is another waterway of less importance, perhaps, 
 than the Welland and St. Lawrence canals, but which may 
 nevertheless be of great value to Great Britain, or perhaps to 
 the United States, in case of war between the two nations. 
 Forty-six miles below Montreal is the mouth of the Richelieu. 
 This river is navigable up to Lake Champlain, by means of a 
 lock and dam at St. Ours (14 miles above the mouth), and 
 the Cliiimhly Canal, 12 miles long (32 miles further up), for 
 
17 
 
 Vessels drawing six and one-half feet. A new canal is pro- 
 posed from Caughnawauga, on Lake St. Louis, to connect 
 with the Chambly Canal, thus admitting of quick water trans- 
 port from Montreal to Lake Champlain via St. Johns. The 
 Chambly Canal is to be enlarged to the same dimensions as 
 the Welland, and the new canal is to be constructed < n the 
 same scale. The possession of the Richelieu canal system 
 would give to the British navy access to Lake Champlain 
 a fact sufficient to demonstrate its importance. 
 
 It is evident that while the Canadian canals are admira- 
 bly adapted to the requirements of commerce, their projectors 
 did not labor under the idea that disputes between the United 
 States and Great Britain are always sure to be settled by 
 arbitration. 
 
 Railways. The Canadian system of water communication 
 is supplemented by an extensive system of railways, the most 
 important of which have a general direction almost parallel 
 with the general course of the waterways. Stretching across 
 the continent, from Halifax* to Vancouver, with a total 
 length of about 3000 miles, is the Canadian Pacific Railroad. 
 This road, in commercial aspects one of the greatest in the 
 world, is furthermore of great strategical value to Great 
 Britain. If left intact, it could, in conjunction with the 
 Pacific steamers, in a space of forty days, transfer troops 
 from the banks of the Ganges to the shores of the St. Law- 
 rence; and would enable England speedily to place an Anglo- 
 Indian army any where in Canada. But, fortunately for us, 
 the portion of the road from Lake Superior to the Pacific 
 runs parallel to our boundrj and within easy striking distance 
 of'it; while the branch from Montreal to Halifax not only 
 lies on the wrong side of the St. Lawrence for safety, but a 
 part actually lies within the borders of the State of Maine. 
 Col. Strange, writing more than a decade ago, says: "I have 
 
 'From Moncton, N. B., the Canadian Pacific trains run to Hali- 
 fax over the Intercolonial R. K. 
 
18 
 
 not taken note of the wilderness between Lake Superior and 
 the Pacific, as it can scarcely be said to contain a military 
 objective; an army could not subsist in it, and in any case we 
 could not defend it, unless the Canadian Pacific Railway is 
 constructed." 
 
 Since Col. Strange wrote the railway has been con- 
 structed. It now furnishesin itself an objective in the region 
 referred to, and from the very situation of the road, all the 
 efforts of the British Empire probably could not save it from 
 the destructive forays of cowboys from Montana and North 
 Dakota. The Montreal and Halifax branch would, so far as 
 being a part of the system of British communications is con- 
 cerned, cease to exist as soon as war was declared. But the 
 strategic value of the Canadian Pacific, though greatly im- 
 paired by these conditions, is still very great. A great arm 
 of the road runs from Windsor, through Toronto and Mon- 
 treal, to Quebec, with brandies extending to Hamilton, 
 Kingston, Brockville, Prescott and Ottawa. in brief, con- 
 necting the most important strategic pointsof the Dominion by a 
 railroad behind the great natural wet-ditch of the Canadian 
 fortress. Of secondary, but not insignificant, importance, is 
 that portion of the main line between Montreal and Port 
 Arthur, on Lake Superior, with its branch from Sudbury to 
 SaultSte. Marie. This part of the road is connected later- 
 :ally by a branch of the Grand Trunk from North Bay (on 
 Lake Nipissing) to Toronto, and a small road from Renfrew 
 to Sharon Lake. 
 
 The Michigan Central R. R., after leaving theboundary 
 of the United States, runs from Windsor to Welland, at 
 which point it branches to Buffalo on the right, and to Clifton 
 and Niagara on the left. From St. Clair Junction a branch 
 extends to Courtright on St. Clair River, from St. Thomas a 
 short branch runs to London, and from two points, not far 
 from Detroit branches run respectively to Amherstburg and 
 Sea Cl iff Park, both on Lake Erie. On the outbreak of war 
 between the United States and Great Britain, the rolling 
 
19 
 
 stock of this road might, perhaps, be speedly assembled on 
 American soil; but the Canadian part of the road would still 
 exist as a part of the British lateral communications. 
 
 We will next consider the Grand Trunk Railway, which 
 is, perhaps, the most important of all. One branch of this 
 road runs from Windsor to Fort Erie; another from Sarnia 
 to Hamilton arid Niagara Falls, and a third, from Sarnia, 
 through Toronto, Kingston, Brockville, and Prescott, to Mon- 
 treal. These branches are joined laterally by a number of 
 railways belonging to the same system, which not only con- 
 nect the main lines, but are extended to points on Lake 
 Huron, Georgian Bay, Lake Nipissing and various points in 
 the interior of Ontario. From Coteau Junction a branch 
 runs to Ottawa. From Montreal the main line continues to 
 Richmond, at which point it divides into two branches, one 
 running to Portland, Maine, and the other to Levis, opposite 
 Quebec. From the latter branch is a sub-branch running 
 from Arthabaska to a point opposite Three Rivers. It is 
 evident that the part of this road, east of Montreal, loses much 
 of its strategic value, as it lies on the wrong side of the St. 
 Lawrence for safety, and a portion of it lies within our own 
 territory. 
 
 At Levis, the Grand Trunk unites wir.h the Intercolonial 
 R. R. The latter road follows the St. Lawrence for more 
 than a hundred miles, then turns to the right, skirts the upper 
 part of Chaleur Bay, and continues in a southerly direction 
 to Halifax. At Moncton the road branches east to Point 
 Duchene (near Shediac, on Northumberland Sound) and west 
 to St. John, N. B. From Truro, N. S., the "Eastern Exten- 
 sion" runs to Mulgrave Wharf on the Strait of Canso. It 
 is evident at a glance that the Intercolonial R. R. would be 
 of great value to Great Britain in case of war with this 
 country, as a means of preserving lateral communication be- 
 tween the New Brunswick and St. Lawrence theaters. 
 
 From St. John, N. B., the New Brunswick R. R., as far 
 
20 
 
 as its junction with the Maine Central, forms a part of the 
 Canadian Pacific. Through Frederic-ton a branch of the N. 
 B. R. R., connects the Intercolonial and Canadian Pacific. 
 Another branch from the same city and one from St Andrews 
 unite at Newburg Junction (near Woodstock), and the road 
 then continues near, and in the general direction of the Maine 
 frontier as far as Edmunds ton; a continuation from that point 
 to Riviere du Loup being now in process of construction. 
 
 The roads mentioned comprise all the principal railways 
 of the Dominion, and are the strategic railroads par excellence 
 of ( 'anada. There are a few other lines, but they are so short, 
 and their military value is so insignificant, that a description 
 of them would only tend to confuse the subject, without 
 adding any information of importance.* 
 
 The Strategic Ensemble. Bearing in mind the directions 
 and relative positions of the waterways and railroads just 
 described, we can appreciate the appositeness of Colonel 
 Strange's description of the country in question. "Canada,'' 
 he says, "is a long strip of communications, its main artery, 
 the St. Lawrence, being the fosse of a natural fortress, open 
 during the summer season (winter operations may be deemed 
 impracticable in this climate) to the gunboats of Great Britain, 
 and to them alone as long as the fortress of Quebec is kept in 
 a defensive condition. * * * * The 
 
 Grand Trunk Railway and others on the south shore 
 are now supplemented by railways on the north shore of the 
 St. Lawrence and the lakes, with their usual telegraphic 
 lines, the whole forming a series of communications which 
 have always enabled Canadian troops to act upon what are 
 practically interior lines, arid so concentrate readily upon im- 
 portant strategic points, as was proved in the late Fenian 
 
 "' In the article "Canada," the Encyclopaedia Britannica (Ninth 
 I'M it ion) mentions eighteen Canadian railroads, All the important 
 roads there mentioned are included in the railway systems described 
 above. 
 
21 
 
 raids." 
 
 That Colonel Strange is ri^ht in saying that the St. 
 Lawrence is open to British gunboats, and to them alone, as 
 long as the fortress of Quebec is kept in a defensive 
 condition cannot be denied. The treaty of 1817 limits 
 the naval force to be maintained by the United States 
 and Great Britain to the following vessels on each side, namely: 
 
 On Lake Ontario, one vessel, not exceeding one hundred 
 tons burden, and armed with one eighteen pounder cannon; 
 
 On the upper lakes, two vessels not exceeding like burden 
 each, and armed with like force; 
 
 On the waters of Lake Champlain, one vessel not exceed- 
 ing like burden, and armed with like force. 
 
 Each nation is also forbidden by the treaty to build ves- 
 sels of war on the lakes. 
 
 It would, therefore, be impossible for the United States 
 to place a fleet of gunboats on the lakes without sending them 
 around (by way of the ocean and the St. Lawrence) past 
 Quebec; for we cannot build gunboats on the lakes in time of 
 peace without such violation of the treaty as to furnish a casus 
 belli; and after war breaks out the opportunities for unmo- 
 lested naval construction are gone. Quebec is strongly forti- 
 fied, and can be further strengthened to such a degree that 
 nothing larger than 'a bird could pass by on the river without 
 the permission of the British commandant. England, on the 
 contrary, could assemble a great fleet on the St. Lawrence 
 without violating the treaty, and, at the first sound of war, 
 could send it thence through her own canals into the great 
 lakes. 
 
 The disadvantage under which this unfortunate treaty 
 places us c^n be overcome only by a careful preparation, in 
 time of peace, of strategic canals within our own borders. 
 The enlargement of the Erie Canal (including the Oswego 
 branch) would enable gunboats to pass from the Hudson into 
 Lake Erie and Lake Ontario. The Oneida Ship-canal 
 
22 
 
 would also be of great value. The proposed route of this 
 canal is from Oswego by means of the Os\v ego Canal to a 
 point near Phoenix; thence by means of a new canal and the 
 Oueida River to Oneida Lake; thence by the lake and the 
 Oneida Canal to the Erie Canal at Durhamville. The en- 
 largement of the Champlain and Erie Canal (from Lake 
 Champiain to the Hudson) or the construction of a new canal 
 from Whitehall to Fort Edward would be of very evident 
 strategic value. 
 
 The Hennepin Ship-canal is designed to connect the 
 Mississippi with Lake Michigan. The proposed route for 
 this canal is from Watertown, 111., to Hennepin, then by the 
 Illinois River (14 miles) to LaSalle, and from that point to 
 Chicago, via the Illinois and Michigan Canal enlarged. 
 
 The improvement of the navigation of the Wisconsin and 
 Fox rivers, and their connection by means of a canal would 
 unite by water Prairie du Chien and Green Bay in other 
 words, it would give water communication between the Mis- 
 sissippi and Lake Michigan. 
 
 All these plans seem to have been more or less seriously 
 contemplated by our Government, and the construction or 
 improvement of the canals in question may be hoped for. It 
 is a significant fact, however, that the advocates of the im- 
 provements in our internal waterways seem to consider the 
 commercial advantages alone advantages so marked that the 
 most bitter opponents of the canals are those who are working 
 in the interests of the railroads; and the strategic value of 
 the canals (like most other military matters) seems to have 
 been generally ignored by our people. 
 
 Yet the strategic value of the canals would be beyond 
 computation. Our naval depots for the lake fleets could be 
 established in safety far within our own borders; and in case 
 of war an armada of gunboats could be sent from the Missis- 
 sippi into the Lakes a full month earlier in the year than a 
 similiar naval force could be sent thither from the Gulf of 
 St. Lawrence. The canals joining the Mississippi and the 
 
23 
 
 Lakes are not designed, however, to have a depth equal to 
 that of the Canadian canals; the minimum depth of the Hen- 
 nepin Canal being specified at eight feet, and that of the 
 Winconsin Canal at five. 
 
 The Ohio and Erie Canal (from Portsmouth to Cleve- 
 land) and the Miami and Erie Canal (from Cincinnati to 
 Toledo) could not easily be sufficiently enlarged to serve as 
 ship-canals. 
 
 We may, however, question the correctness of Colonel 
 Strange's judgment in deeming winter operations impractica- 
 ble in Canada. Our own troops have endured, in winter 
 campaigns in Montana and the Dakotas, weather of greater 
 severity than they would be called upon to face in most parts 
 of Canada; and the all-but-successful campaign against Que- 
 bec made by the ill-clad and half-starved soldiers of Mont- 
 gomery and Arnold, who conducted siege and assault late in 
 December, shows that "Field-Marshal Frost" is not such a 
 formidable British ally as Colonel Strange would have us 
 believe. In fact, without a naval superiority to Great Bri- 
 tain, our best hopes of success must be found in a winter 
 campaign. I am by no means inclined to underestimate the 
 hardships and difficulties of a campaign in the terrible rigor 
 of a Canadian winter; but I shall endeavor, further on, to 
 show that a winter campaign in the Dominion would be 
 attended with results that could scarcely be hoped for in 
 summer. 
 
 Climate. Although Canada is always regarded as a cold 
 country, its climate is one of extremes of heat and cold. The 
 temperature at Toronto varies from 12 below to 91 above 
 zero, Fahrenheit. At Montreal the limits are 17 below and 96 
 above. At Quebec the thermometer ranges from 24 below 
 to 91 above zero. At Halifax the lowest point is 9 
 below, the highest, 88 above; while the greatest extremes of 
 heat and cold seem to be found at Fredericton, N. B., where 
 the mercury has been known to drop in winter to 35 below 
 zero, and in summer to rise to 100 above. 
 
24 
 
 Cities. The cities of Canada are so well known tliat 
 nothing but a brief description of them is here requisite. 
 
 First in commercial importance is Montreal (situated on 
 an island of the same name) having a population of 216,650, 
 and covering an area of eight square miles. The St. Law- 
 rence is here crossed by three bridges, one of which is the 
 celebrated Victoria bridge, an iron tubular structure nearly 
 two miles long, supported on twenty-four piers of solid mason- 
 ry. As a railroad centre, the head of unimpeded ocean 
 traffic;* the outlet of the Canadian system of canals; in brief, 
 as the connecting link between the ocean and the Lakes, 
 Montreal is a point of immense commercial and strategical 
 value, and has been termed "the key and the capital of 
 Canada." In strategic importance it is second to Quebec 
 alone. 
 
 Toronto (population 181,220) is, in commercial conse- 
 quence, the second city of the Dominion, and is the capital of 
 Ontario. It owes its importance to its excellent harbor on 
 Lake Ontario and to the junction here of several important 
 railroads. It is also a considerable manufacturing city. 
 
 Quebec, the capital of the province of the same name, 
 has a population of 63,090, and is thus the third city in 
 Canada. From a strategic point of view, it is the most im- 
 portant place in the Dominion, completely controlling the 
 St. Lawrence, to which it can admit friendly vessels and from 
 which it can bar out all hostile fleets. The history of every 
 war fought on Canadian soil shows* that the possession of 
 Quebec is essential to the mastery of Canada. The place is 
 described as "the most picturesque and the most strongly for- 
 tified city on the Continent." It was formerly a walled city, 
 but several of the old fortifications have been demolished , 
 and some of the gates have been removed. The chief forti- 
 
 - : ' Vessels drawing Tt\ feet can ascend the St. Lawrence as far as 
 Montreal. 
 
25 
 
 fication is the Citadel, which stands on Cape Diamond, 333 
 feet above the river, and covers an area of forty acres. A 
 large factory for the fabrication of small-arm cartridges and 
 artillery projectiles is located at Quebec. The harbor of the 
 city is excellent, and its extensive docks are among the best 
 in the world. 
 
 Hamilton, Ontario, is a considerable manufacturing cen- 
 ter, has a good harbor on Lake Ontario, and is the junction 
 of several railroads connecting it with Lake Erie, Lake Hu- 
 ron and Georgian Bay. The population of Hamilton is 
 48,980. 
 
 Ottawa, on the Ottawa River, is the capital of the 
 Dominion. Like the city of Washington, its importance 
 rests almost exclusively upon its character as the political 
 heart of the country. Its population is 44,154. 
 
 Next in size is St. John, the chief city of New Bruns- 
 wick, with a population of 39, 179. It has an excellent har- 
 bor, which never freezes, and which is protected by strong- 
 batteries. It is a port of importance, a considerable manu- 
 facturing city, and has good communications with the interior 
 by means of the Intercolonial and New Brunswick railroads. 
 
 Halifax (population 38,536) is the chief city of Nova 
 Scotia. It has an excellent harbor, and is the winter port 
 for the Dominion of Canada the St. Lawrence being frozen 
 over in that season. The hill on which the city stands is 
 commanded by a citadel a mile in circumference and of 
 great strength, and the harbor is defended by several forts 
 and batteries. It is the only place in the Dominion which 
 still has a garrison of British regular troops, and it is a naval 
 station of great importance. 
 
 Kingston owes its strategic importance to its situation on 
 Lake Ontario at the point where the St. Lawrence issues 
 from the lake, and to its location at one extremity of the 
 Rideau Canal. It is an important naval station, audits popu- 
 lation is 19,264. 
 
26 
 
 London, Ontario, (population 31,977) is of considerable 
 importance as a railroad centre, as are also Guelpli and Strat- 
 ford, in the same province. Sarnia, on St. Glair River, and 
 Windsor, opposite Detroit, are, from their positions, of some 
 strategic importance. 
 
 Population. The population of Canada may be broadly 
 divided into two great classes Anglo-Saxon and French. 
 The former class consists mainly of the descendants of early 
 British colonists in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, of later 
 immigrants, and the descendants of Tories who emigrated 
 from the United States to the British provinces after Ameri- 
 can independence had become assured. The Anglo-Saxon 
 Canadians resemble, in most respects, the people of our 
 Northern States. They are energetic, enlightened, progres- 
 sive and independent; and to them the prosperity of the 
 Dominion is almost altogether due. 
 
 The French Canadians are descended from the old colo- 
 nists of the days of Froutenac and Montcalm, and now num- 
 ber about 1,083,000. They are limited mainly to the pro- 
 vince of Quebec, of which they furnish the great bulk of the 
 population. They resemble their Anglo-Saxon compatriots 
 in L./ift, but in scarcely anything else. They are slow, con- 
 sarvative, and as completely priest-ridden as the peasantry of 
 Spain or Bohemia. Secured in their own language, laws, 
 and religion by the treaty of Paris in 1763, their manners 
 and customs have remained unchanged, and the province 
 to day presents the appearance of a portion of France under 
 the folds of the British flag but it is the France of Louis 
 Quinze, and has nothing in common with the Republic of the 
 present day. Ever since the conquest of Canada the French 
 Canadians have been loyal to the British crown; but theirs 
 has been the loyalty of self-interest rather than affection, and 
 has been largely a matter of obedience to their church, which 
 has in Quebec an influence, authority and sway, such as no 
 church lias in any other part of the British Empire. Indus- 
 
27 
 
 trious and humble, the typical French Canadian passes a 
 monotonous existence in working hard, saving money, hear- 
 ing mass, and obeying the biblical injunction to propagate 
 and multiply. As a result, the population of Quebec not 
 only steadily increase?, but overflows into New England, 
 where in some localities it is begining to root out the native 
 population; for a French Canadian can grow rich on wages 
 that would mean starvation to an American. Many of these 
 people return to Canada; and there is a constant passing to 
 and fro which serves to bind the province in sympathy with 
 its great neighbor, and doubtless engenders in a considerable 
 degree such friendship for the United States as grows out of 
 the natural affection of a man for his treasury. Though this 
 friendship springs spontaneously from the pocket-book rather 
 than the heart, it is perhaps none the less potent for that 
 reason; and it may, and doubtless does, inspire the population 
 of Quebec with an aversion to war, and a desire for peace, 
 with the United States. 
 
 But, though the French Canadians are doubtless sincere- 
 ly desirous of remaining at peace with the United States, 
 their attitude in the event of a declaration of war w 7 ould be 
 decided entirely by the policy of their church, and it may be 
 doubted that the priests would consent to any change that 
 would make them mere ministers of religion instead of politi- 
 cal factors. If war should come upon this peacefully inclined 
 population, it is probable that they would accordingly enter 
 with heart and soul upon the defense of the British flag. Sir 
 George Cartier declared that the last gun in defense of Brit- 
 ish supremacy in Canada would be fired by a French Cana- 
 dian, and Sir James Carmichsel Smith states that during the 
 entire war of 1812 not a single French-Canadian militiaman 
 deserted. 
 
 In addition to these two great classes of population there 
 are many Irish,, English, Scotch, Germans, Dutch and 
 Americans in Canada, besides a considerable sprinkling of 
 
28 
 
 Welsh, Scandinavians, Icelanders and Russian Mennouites. 
 The ubiquitous African is found in the Dominion to the 
 rxUMit of 22,000, being mainly a somber reminiscence of the 
 ante-bellum "underground railway." 
 
 Military Forces. I cannot, within the bounds of this lecture, 
 give an extended description of the military forces of Canada. 
 \Ve must, however, have some knowledge of the strength 
 and composition of the enemy's armies before we can utilize 
 our geographical knowledge in deciding upon a general plan 
 of campaign. 
 
 The militia of Canada is divided into four classes, as 
 follows: 
 
 1st class: Unmarried men and childless widowers from 
 eighteen to thirty years or age. 
 
 2d class: Unmarried men and childless widowers from 
 thirty to forty-five years of age. 
 
 3d class: Widowers with children and married men from 
 eighteen to forty-five years of age. 
 
 4th class: Men from forty -five to sixty years of age. 
 
 This force is divided into active and reserve militia. 
 
 The active militia consists of 2,024 cavalry, 1,639 field 
 artillery, 2,099 garrison artillery, 243 engineers, and 28,948 
 infantry, giving a total of 34,953 men, all of whom are taken 
 from the first class. If a sufficient number of men is not 
 obtained from that class by volunteering, the quota is filled 
 by draft. The period of training is only twelve days each 
 year. 
 
 Each company of Canadian militia consists of three offi- 
 cers and forty-two non-commissioned officers and men. In 
 mobilizing the militia for war, it is the intention of the Cana- 
 dian authorities to increase each company to a strength of 
 eighty-seven non-commissioned officers and men by the addi- 
 tion of privates from the reserve, and it is estimated that a 
 call to arms would raise the militia at once to a strength of 
 nearly 65,000 men. The present militia system was estab- 
 lished in 1868, since which time about 30,000 men have been 
 
29 
 
 trained each year. Three years is the period of service in 
 the active militia, but many of the men do not serve more 
 than two. It is estimated that there are accordingly upwards 
 of 200,000 men in Canada who have served in the ranks, 
 and acquired some knowledge of the rudiments of drill and 
 target practice/ 
 
 There are Cavalry, Artillery and Infantry schools for 
 officers and non-commissioned officers of the active militia. 
 Since 1865, more than 15,000 students have taken certificates 
 of qualification for their respective ranks on the completion 
 of a three months course. Many of these men would be 
 available as officers and non-commissioned officers should the 
 reserve militia be called out. 
 
 There is a military college at Kingston, which is 
 modeled after West Point. It has graduated 185 cadets 
 qualified for staff positions. The staff and engineering 
 school attached to the Koyal Military College has granted 
 some sixty certificates to qualified active militia officers. 
 
 The active militia would probably be immediately avail- 
 able at the outbreak of war, as their mobilization could be 
 quickly effected; for the Canadian government has so far 
 adopted the German system as to divide the Dominion into 
 twelve military districts, each of which i.s sub-divided into 
 regimental and company districts each district and sub-dis- 
 trict having its own commanding officer and staff, its muster- 
 rolls prepared, and everything in readiness for prompt 
 mobilization. The concentration and supply of these forces 
 would, however, be a matter of great difficulty; for "the 
 weakest spot in the Canadian militia system is the total 
 absence of any nucleus ot transport." 
 
 If the Canadians were to accomplish feats of organization 
 and mobilization equal to those of the Germans, and were to 
 call out the four classes of their militia, they might produce 
 an army of 800,000 men. But such results are obtained 
 only when popular clamor absolutely demands war; when 
 
30 
 
 each man feels that his religion, his well-being, or his per- 
 sonal freedom is in jeopardy; or when from some great cause, 
 his combative ness has been roused to the highest degree. 
 The presence of people in Canada favorably disposed to the 
 United States, of those actually hostile to Great Britain, of 
 internal difficulties owing to racial antipathies, and of many 
 other conditions, must be ignored if we imagine this great 
 aggregate possible. 
 
 It is more probable that the first call would bring out 
 about 60,000 Canadian militia, essentially the same hi quali- 
 ty as our National Guard. The Canadian militia has, doubt' 
 less, improved since the day when the "Queen's Own" of 
 Toronto ran away from the Fenians; the American militia 
 is certainly better than it was when it fled from the field of 
 Bladensburg. The Canadian militia would, doubtless, be 
 increased more or less from the reserve. Under the stimulus 
 of victory it might even grow into a formidable army; but 
 under the depressing influence of defeat it would suffer the 
 disintegration characteristic of all militia armies in adversity. 
 
 Colonel Strange expects entirely too much, I think, 
 from the militia of the Dominion. He says of Canada: 
 "The history of her struggles against invasion showed that 
 she could and did, with the assistance of but few British 
 troops/ bear the brunt of it with her militia, who, almost 
 unaided, rolled back the tide of war from her shores. Before 
 the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace of 1814-15, not a single 
 American post or sentry remained on the Canadian shore, 
 while we were in posession of Fort Michilimachinac and 
 other points in what is DOW the State of Michigan." 
 
 We may as well take issue with Colonel Strange right 
 here as to the accuracy of his historical statements. Canada 
 was not defended by her militia, "with the assistance of but 
 few British tioops." In 1814 it was defended by a body of 
 veteran British regulars exceeding in number the largest 
 army that the United States ever placed on the Northern 
 
31 
 
 Frontier; and while the impotence of our attempts to conquer 
 Canada, owing to incompetent generals, a misplaced reliance 
 on militia, perverse governors thwarting the efforts of the 
 National Executive, and the influence of a powerful peace 
 party, must ever be a source ol mortification to every true 
 American, we may remind Colonel Strange that American 
 soldiers more than once saw the backs of troops who had 
 passed victoriously through the carnage of Badajos and had 
 stood in triumph on the bloody field of Salamanca. 
 
 In a later paper by Colonel Strange on "Canadian 
 Defense," reprinted in the number of the Journal of the 
 Military Service Institution for January, 1891, that 
 gentleman speaks of the militia law of Canada as "theoreti- 
 cally perfect;" but adds that "its practical result depends upon 
 its administration, which, from the meager pittance applied 
 by Parliament, is faulty." 
 
 In 1885 the Canadian government mobilized a force of 
 men 5500 by an order dated March 27 of that year, and in 
 two weeks had concentrated it in the Saskatchewan valley. 
 A speedy suppression of the Kiel rebellion was the result. 
 From the small number of troops called out, this prompt 
 action was, however, hardly a fair indication of the time that 
 would be required lor the mobilization and concentration of 
 the entire militia force of the Dominion. An anonymous 
 but able Canadian correspondent of the Military Service 
 Institution in an article on "Mobilization and Concentra- 
 tion of the Canadian Militia," published in June, 1887, esti- 
 mates that a total militia force of 81,900 men could be 
 assembled for the defense of the frontier line from Quebec to 
 Detroit; but he adds, "the complete work of mobilization, 
 from the raising of men through all the stages of arming, 
 equipping, clothing and combining into units, up to the final 
 concentration at the strategic points, would occupy an inter- 
 val of time which could only be calculated by months." A 
 paper in the same magazine for December, 18S6, gives a 
 
32 
 
 description of the annual training of the Canadian militia, 
 from which I infer that those troops are not one whit superior 
 in efficiency to our own organized National Guard. Of the 
 twelve days training each year, it seems that one day is con- 
 sumed in reaching carnp, one in leaving it, one in marching 
 through town on a holiday parade, and one in sham battle 
 nonsense, leaving only seven days for real military "work, 
 Sunday being, of course, a day of rest. 
 
 I am not inclined to underestimate the fighting capacity 
 of the Canadians their history shows them ever to have been 
 a brave and warlike people but their forces are merely mili- 
 tia, which could become really efficient only in the course of 
 many months of successful (or at least not disastrous) war. 
 The military importance of Canada lies in the fact that it is a 
 base for the military operations of a powerful empire which 
 controls the ocean and is capable of putting forth great 
 strength on land. 
 
 The regular army of Great Britain consists, in round 
 numbers, of 200,000 men. The Regular Army Reserve, the 
 Militia, the Volunteers and the Indian Native Army swell 
 this force to a total war strength of 772,000 men, without 
 including 14,000 armed constabulary in Ireland, and 190,000 
 native military police in India. Of course this force could 
 not all, nor even a great portion of it, be concentrated on any 
 one theater; for the vast extent of the British Empire and 
 the smoldering discontent of millions of British subjects 
 require the distribution of this huge army among many dif- 
 ferent regions of the globe. We know, however, that Eng- 
 land easily sent 40,000 regular troops to Egypt in 1882, and 
 there is no reason to doubt that she could, withoutsacrificingher 
 security in other quarters, place in Canada two highly orga- 
 nized, perfectly equipped, and thoroughly efficient army 
 corps and a division of cavalry.* She could spare these 
 
 *0olonel Maurice in ''The Balance of Military Power in Europe," 
 says that the British Government is aiming to "work up to the stan- 
 dard of putting two army corps and a cavalry division 
 into a condition for effective action abroad." As to the practicability 
 of being able to reach that standard, Colonel Maurice does not seem 
 to entertain the slightest doubt. 
 
33 
 
 troops, and there is no doubt that she has abundant trans- 
 portation for them. Great Britain could, thei}, begin the 
 American Avar with some 70,000 regular troops the best in 
 Europe and about 60,000 militia. We could oppose this 
 army at first with 25,000 regulars and 112000 organized 
 militia. Our ultimate preponderance in military strength 
 cannot be doubted; but I do not share the views of those who 
 think the conquest of Canada would be a military promenade 
 for the American Army. 
 
 EFFECT OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS UPON MILITARY 
 OPERATIONS. 
 
 As a means of forming an estimate of the military value 
 of these various conditions of the physical and political geog- 
 raphy of Canada, let us suppose that a war has broken out 
 between the United States and Great Britain. The first 
 question, "Shall we assume the initiative, or wait in a defen- 
 sive position the assault of the enemy?" is quickly answered. 
 As to our Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific sea-board, circumstances 
 plainly demand the adoption of the latter course. As to 
 Canada, the natural aggressiveness of our people, combined 
 with a confidence born of our traditions, will demand the 
 adoption of a vigorous offensive. 
 
 In the selection of an object, it is of paramount impor- 
 tance so to direct our efforts as to isolate the Canadians as 
 much as possible from Great Britain, and to separate the 
 different provinces from each other. Quebec is the most 
 important objective, for its possession by us would prevent 
 the naval or military reinforcement of the British armies or 
 fleets above that point, and history proves that it is the key 
 to the conquest of Canada. Though we should therefore 
 regard Quebec as our ultimate objective, we cannot make it 
 our immediate one. The old line of invasion, via the Kcn- 
 nebec and Chaudiere rivers, followed by Arnold difficult to 
 the last degree for his small force may be regarded as alto- 
 gether impracticable for the large army that would now be 
 
34 
 
 required for the reduction of the strongest place on the 
 Continent. 
 
 The route via Richmond and Arthabaska would lend a 
 flank to the attacks of the British, and expose our communi- 
 cations to assault from Montreal. The only other route is 
 tlie one adopted by Montgomery the line via Montreal: and 
 the reduction of that city must be first effected, in order to 
 protect the flank of the army marching down the St. Law- 
 rence. Moreover, that river is desirable for the transporta- 
 tion of heavy ordnance, without which the siege of Quebec 
 would be a farce. Finally the control of the river by vessels 
 of war or heavy floating batteries is necessary, in order that 
 the city may be invested otherwise the investing army 
 would be cut in two by the stream. We are, then, at first, 
 neither in a position to reach nor .to reduce Quebec. 
 
 The capture of Montreal is a necessary stepping-stone to 
 the reduction of Quebec. But there are many other reasons 
 why we should choose Montreal as our primary objective. 
 We have already seen that the Canadian canals give entrance 
 to British war-vessels into the Great Lakes. The capture of 
 Montreal would cut Canada in two; it would give us posses- 
 sion of the Beauharnois and Lachine canals, and protect the 
 country above from naval attacks by any vessels except such 
 as might have ascended the St. Lawrence before the surren- 
 der of that city; and the ultimate capture of such vessels 
 would be certain. Moreover, it would place us in possession 
 of the metropolis and chief railroad centre of the Dominion, 
 thus causing such embarrassment to the trade of the Cana- 
 "dians as to bring them to a realizing sense of the inconven- 
 ience, if not the horrors, of war. Finally, it would place us 
 in the best possible position for operating in any direction 
 that military circumstances might require. 
 
 The operations against Montreal would be of such im- 
 portance as to demand the efforts of a great army. This 
 army should have its primary base at Albany, a point easily 
 
35 
 
 reached by rail or water from all parts of the country. A 
 secondary base would be at Rouse's Point. The enemy would 
 probably be first met at Fort Isle-aux-Noix near the frontier; 
 and would almost certainly be encountered in force at St. 
 John's, as that place is a strategic point of importance, 
 commanding the junction of several railroads, the Richelieu 
 Canal, and the Vermont Central R. R. bridge over the Rich- 
 elieu River. If dilatory mobilization and concentration on 
 our part should give time to the British, we should probably 
 find them strongly intrenched at St. John's; at any rate, in 
 this vicinity would be fought the battle for the control of the 
 Richelieu Canal and the possession of the Montreal angle 
 formed by the St. Lawrence and the Richelieu. Victory here 
 would enable us to hold the waterways as far down as Sorel, 
 would cause the retreat of the British to the Island of Mon- 
 treal, and would give us possession of the Beauharnois Canal. 
 Proximity to its base, and the fact that its front would cover 
 its line of retreat, would save our army from heavy disaster 
 in case of defeat. 
 
 Arrived opposite Montreal, the American commander 
 would find himself confronted by a serious problem. The 
 river here is navigable for the largest vessels of the British 
 navy, and is a mile and a quarter wide. Just above the city 
 the stream narrows to half a mile, but the water rushes 
 through the narrow channel at the rate of eighteen miles an 
 hour. It goes without saying that the bridges would be ren- 
 dered impassable at the first approach of the Americans. A 
 passage of the St. Lawrence at Montreal by a large army 
 while the river was open, opposed as it would be by a formi- 
 dable force on land, aided by naval vessels in the river or by 
 the active alliance of nature in the foaming rapids, would 
 require military genius of the highest order, and would be 
 an achievement worthy of ranking with Napoleon's passage 
 of the Danube at the Island of Lobau. But even if our 
 army were baffled for months in attempting the passage, the 
 
36 
 
 approach of winter would change matters for the better; and 
 ail ice-locked river would place the island and city at the 
 mercy of the Americans as surely as the Dutch ships frozen 
 in the Helder were at the mercy of Pichegru's hussars. An 
 advantage of immense importance that would, in the mean- 
 time, be derived from the mere presence of our army before 
 Montreal, would be the holding in check of all naval and 
 military reinforcements for Ontario; for, as the fall of the 
 city would cut off the retreat of such reinforcements, the 
 British would hesitate to place them in jeopardy by sending 
 them beyond the menaced city. 
 
 It seems clear, then, that Montreal should be our first 
 objective, and that we should here assume the initiative 
 promptly and with as large and efficient an army as possible. 
 This army, from the nature of the theatre, should be com- 
 posed of a large proportion of infantry, with field artillery 
 not exceeding three guns to each thousand men of other 
 arms, and with only enough cavalry for screening and recon- 
 uoitering duty. The army should not be encumbered with 
 heavy artillery; for its movements should be made with the 
 utmost celerity, and, once before Montreal, its siege trains 
 could be speedily forwarded by rail and water from Albany. 
 A large force should be detached to seize and occupy Rich- 
 mond, thus holding an important railroad junction, protect- 
 ing the right wing of the army before Montreal from attack 
 from Quebec, covering Vermont from invasion, and main- 
 taining communication between the army at Montreal and 
 one in Maine which we will consider later. 
 
 An army operating from Albany as its primary base, 
 with a secondary base at Watertown, should move against 
 Prescott and the Williamsburg canals. A successful passage 
 of the St. Lawrence and the capture of the canals would snap 
 the water communications of the British at an important 
 point; and if the passage were absolutely secured, the army 
 would be in a position to operate against Kingston, or to 
 
37 
 
 move down the left bank of the river against Montreal. In 
 the latter case, however, the British would have the advan- 
 tage of interior lines, and the movement against Montreal 
 should not be undertaken unless the army, after masking 
 Kingston with a strong detachment, could still be superior to 
 any force that it might encounter. Otherwise the move- 
 ment would be an imitation, on the same theatre, of the dis- 
 mal strategy of Amherst in 1760, and Wilkinson in 1813 
 the former undeservedly successful and the latter deservedly 
 unsuccessful. If the activity of the British military and na- 
 val forces on the St. Lawrence should protect Prescott and 
 the canals by barring the river, this army could, at least, 
 defend New York from incursions of the enemy, protect the 
 left flank of the army operating against Montreal, and in 
 case of need be drawn in to the assistance of that force. It 
 would probably be the part of wisdom to limit the strength 
 of the army in question to the numbers sufficient to insure 
 the destruction of the canals and the defense of the New 
 York frontier. 
 
 Hamilton would be an objective of great importance; 
 mainly as furnishing a base for further operations. In the 
 case of Montreal, to designate the object is to name the thea- 
 tre; but with Hamilton such is not the case. Ontario can be 
 invaded from the west as well as from the east; and an army 
 based on Detroit and Port Huron would have as secure a 
 starting point as one invading from Buffalo and Niagara. 
 But the operations would not be so decisive. If in the former 
 case we were in complete naval control of Lake Erie, the 
 theatre would give us the advantage of a reentering base; but 
 otherwise the enemy, if beaten back, would continually cover 
 his line of retreat, would abandon only such territory as was 
 actually wrested from him, and would draw nearer to his re- 
 inforcements with each step in retreat. On the other hand, 
 an army invading from the Niagara frontier would at once 
 break the general line of the enemy, and a successful battle 
 
would probably mean the reduction of the province. A 
 glance at the map shows that if we were to undertake simul- 
 taneous movements from Buffalo and Detroit, the Canadians 
 would have the advantage of interior lines with excellent 
 communications. Instead of invading by double lines, we 
 should, then, throw our greatest weight on the side of Buffa- 
 lo; but the Detroit line should not (as we shall see) be alto- 
 gether neglected; and under certain circumstances it might 
 even become the most important line of all. 
 
 A large garrison of regular troops should be continually 
 kept at Forts Porter and Niagara; and at the first sound of 
 war they should be thrown across the frontier, seizing and 
 holding the International R. R. bridge between Fort Erie 
 and Buffalo, and the Roebling, Keefer and Cantilever bridges 
 below the falls of Niagara. Pushing on with the utmost 
 celerity, they could then seize the Welland Canal and blow 
 up its locks, If unable to maintain its position on the canal, 
 this force could then fall back and occupy bridge-heads at 
 che bridges mentioned until the main army should begin its 
 passage. Unless the Ottawa and Georgian Bay Canal were 
 completed and in successful operation, the destruction of the 
 Welland Canal would insure the safety of the upper lakes. 
 LieutenantSchenck in his valuable essay on "Our Northern 
 Frontier," states that within 100 miles by rail of the Welland 
 Canal, the Canadians have 9,000 militia with 42 gnus, com- 
 pletely armed and equipped; but he fails to note that the 
 mobilization of this force would require some appreciable 
 time. Recognizing the value of the initiative, the slowness, 
 at best, of militia assemblement, and the superiority of regu- 
 lar troops, it seems probable that a force of two regiments of 
 regular infantry with a squadron of cavalry and two or three 
 batteries of light artillery would, if acting promptly and 
 with celerity, be amply sufficient for the destruction of the 
 canal. 
 
 A victory in the Niagara peninsula would almost certainly 
 
39 
 
 put us in possession of Hamilton. If defeated we could fall 
 back, covering our line of retreat, to our base. The enemy 
 if defeated would doubtless retire either to Toronto or Lon- 
 don. In the former case he would sacrifice all the territory 
 lying between the lakes; and (unless we have read the history 
 of militia wrongly) he would lose by desertion masses of men 
 from that region. In the latter case, he would give up his 
 communications with the forces farther east; and a second 
 defeat would, probably, cause the capture or dispersion of 
 his army. In either case, then, the entire railway system 
 between Detroit and Toronto would fall into our hands; we 
 should have a bass at Detroit as well as at Buffalo; new 
 levies or other inferior troops could cross at Datroit and Port 
 Huron to occupy the conquered country and guard the com- 
 munications; and the victorious army, easily supplied and 
 reinforced, could then safely attack in succession Toronto, 
 Trenton and Kingston, even though the enemy were in naval 
 control of Lake Ontario. The capture of these important 
 points would doubtless ba a costly matter iu men, material, 
 and above all, in time. If, however, the canals near Pres- 
 cotthad been destroyed in the meantime, the defense of these 
 places would be greatly crippled so far as naval assistance is 
 concerned; and in any'event they might be masked while the 
 army pushed on to the capture of Ottawa and the reinforce- 
 ment of our first army at Montreal or Quebec. The army 
 operating from Buffalo should be composed of the regular 
 proportion of the three arms. 
 
 The relations between Russia and England might neces- 
 sitate the retention in India of a great British military force. 
 But national friendships and enmities are essentially fickle; 
 and arrangements with Russia might enable England to send 
 a formidable Anglo-Indian army against us. At any rate, 
 unless Great Britain were actually at war with the Czar, we 
 should be obliged to provide against a reinforcement of the 
 Canadian armies by troops from India. A small army com- 
 
40 
 
 posed of volunteers raised in Minnesota and the Dakotas 
 should be assembled at St. Vincent and sent against Winni- 
 peg, which place should be captured and strongly held, the 
 railroads to the east and south being carefully guarded, and 
 the railway west of the city being utterly wrecked for miles. 
 Raiding parties should be sent from various parts of the fron- 
 tier of Montana, with instructions to blow up bridges and 
 viaducts, and tear up the road to the utmost degree in their 
 power. An attempt should be made to destroy the Canadian 
 Pacific in British Columbia, but further than sending a small 
 force for this purpose, the operations of our armies on the 
 Pacific Coast would, as we have already seen, be necessarily 
 limited to.; the defensive. 
 
 Thus far we have considered things in a rather favorable 
 aspect for the Americans. Let us suppose, however, that 
 the war, while of a nature of a surprise to^us, has been pre- 
 meditated by Great Britain. Her 146 war-vessels suitable 
 for service on the lakes, while probably not all available for 
 duty in American waters, permit her to assemble a large fleet 
 on the St. Lawrence; a force is posted -on the Niagara River, 
 covering the Welland Canal, and strongly intrenched; the 
 St. Lawrence canals are strongly guarded, and a large army 
 in an intrenched camp at St. John's bars the way to Mon- 
 treal; in other words it is impossible for us to cross the St. 
 Lawrence or the Niagara, and the British navy has free 
 access to Lakes Ontario and Erie. The Detroit route now 
 becomes of paramount importance. Vessels taken from our 
 merchant marine on the lakes, regardless of cost, are sunk in 
 the channel of the Detroit River, and the passage of the 
 British fleet is further barred loy submarine mines. If the 
 Ottawa and Georgian Bay canals be completed, similar ob- 
 structions are placed in St. Clair River. We thus secure a 
 passage into Canada, which passage will be greatly facilitated 
 \)y the completion of the tunnel of the Detroit River. Our 
 worst strategic line now, becomes our only one. We must 
 
41 
 
 beat the enemy back upon his natural line of retreat, and 
 drive him upon his reinforcements. The war will be long, 
 bloody, costly, and bungling in fact it will be just such a 
 war as we have carried on more than once in the past. Our 
 military force must be enormous, because we shall have long 
 lines of communication, and they will be everywhere exposed 
 to combined naval and military expeditions "naval raids' 
 if I may be allowed to coin that term. Still, by sheer dint 
 of superior numbers and resources, we should probably be 
 able to reach Ottawa, open new communications via the 
 Canadian Pacific to Sault Ste. Marie and Winnipeg, and 
 push on to Montreal in spite of the British gunboats control- 
 ling the lakes. It would be a case in which "the longest 
 way round would be our shortest way there" because it 
 would be our only way. Even in this case, unless such 
 places as Kingston were masked by very large detachments, 
 their reduction might occupy as much time as the capture of 
 .St. John's and Montreal by the first army considered. Our 
 lack of preparation and our want of naval force would place 
 us at a heavy disadvantage. 
 
 We will suppose, however, thatthe canals have been 
 seized as already indicated, and operations carried on as 
 already described. Thus far, it may, I think, be safely 
 claimed that the military geography of Canada has favored 
 the Americans quite as much as it has their adversaries. But 
 in the eastern theatre the geographical balance, so to speak, 
 is heavily against us. After the capture of Montreal our 
 next steps are by no means easy. If the St. Lawrence were 
 controlled by our navy, it would be an easy matter to trans- 
 port the heaviest kind of ordnance by water from the arsenal 
 at Troy to the trenches before Quebec; but otherwise we 
 should be under a very serious disadvantage; for the trans- 
 portation of heavy ordnance by rail would necessarily be a 
 matter of considerable time and difficulty. Besides the ad- 
 vantages of its situation and fortifications, Quebec would, 
 
42 
 
 therefore, have the advantage of heavier ordnance than we 
 could readily bring against it. Its capture by regular ap- 
 proaches would be impossible; and its reduction by blockade 
 would be a matter of the most serious difficulty. For the 
 latter purpose, the complete investment of the city would be 
 requisite; and this would be quite impossible with the St. 
 Lawrence cutting our lines in two and bearing a British fleet 
 upon its bosom. Winter, it is true, would close the river; 
 but during the open season all the resources in men, muni- 
 tions, and supplies that the British Empire could afford 
 would have access to the beleaguered city. It would only be 
 when the Americans, succeeding in building a formidable 
 fleet of war-vessels or floating batteries, should send them 
 down the St. Lawrence beyond Quebec, or by heavy batteries 
 on the shore combined with some system of booms and sub- 
 marine mines, should succeed in permanently barring the 
 passage of the British fleet to the city, that the place would 
 succumb to the slow process of starvation. In any event, 
 whether resulting in success or disaster to us, the siege of 
 Quebec would be one of the most memorable in the annals of 
 war. 
 
 With the British navy controlling the St. Lawrence, the 
 American advance from Montreal would be a matter of ex- 
 treme' difficulty. If our army were to move entirely by the 
 left bank of the river, a small force of the enemy could hold 
 Quebec, while with the assistance of the navy a large part of 
 the British army could advance via Richmond against our 
 communications, secure in its own retreat so long as the fleet 
 patrolled the river. If our advance were made entirely 
 along the right bank of the river, ths investment of Quebec 
 on the north bank would be practicably impossible. If Mon- 
 treal were captured in the winter (as it probably would be; 
 the march upon Quebec would be very much simplified, as 
 the river when frozen would cease to exist as an obstacle 
 parallel to the path of our army. Otherwise it would be 
 
43 
 
 necessary to advance from Montreal on the left bank and 
 from Richmond on the right; thus moving by independent 
 lines against an enemy able to concentrate upon either. A 
 military superiority such as to render the American force on 
 each line able to cope successfully with the entire force 
 guarding Quebec would, therefore, be necessary. The com- 
 munications of the army operating from Richmond would 
 probably be via the Vermont Valley R. R., and its base of 
 supplies might be shifted from Albany to Springfield or 
 Bellows Falls. This force would also serve to maintain com- 
 munications between the army from Montreal and another 
 important army which it is now time to consider. 
 
 The theatres thus far considered do not lend themselves 
 readily to offensive returns by the British; but on our 
 extreme eastern frontier we are peculiarly open to invasion. 
 A British army based upon the St. John River from Freder- 
 ick ton to St. John could invade the state of Maine with a de- 
 gree of impunity not pleasant for us to contemplate. Having 
 the active support of a fleet superior to anything that wo 
 could oppose to it, this army could advance westward, estab- 
 lishing a secondary base at St. Andrew, and moving upon 
 Bangor. The complete naval control of the coast would give 
 the enemy many of the advantages of a reentering base; for 
 it would enable him to make combined naval and land opera- 
 tions against our communications, with much injury to us 
 and but little danger to himself. The capture of Bangor 
 would be greatly facilitated by the fleet; and the British 
 army could advance as far west as Portland without uncover- 
 ing its communications by its front, its left flank protected by 
 the sea, and its right covered by a region impracticable for 
 the operations of a large force. The extent to which the com- 
 munications of an American army operating in Maine would 
 be endangered is shown by the fact that all the railroads by 
 which the army could be supplied lie within about thirty 
 miles of the coast, and thus within easy reach of the enemy V 
 
44 
 
 incursions. Oil the other hand, the British communications 
 would, as we have seen, be safe from serious menace, and even 
 a heavy defeat would not mean ruin. 
 
 The object of a British invasion of Maine would be to 
 deflect the American efforts from unfavorable theatres to 
 those favorable to the British. A successful invasion of thr 
 State, especially if accompanied by an ostentatious proclama- 
 tion of its annexation to the British Dominions, would so 
 rouse popular indignation in our country that the demand for 
 the recovery of Maine would be even more potent in influenc- 
 ing the conduct of the war than was the cry "on to Rich- 
 mond" thirty years ago; and other operations might be for- 
 gotten in a desire to drive the "insolent invader" from our 
 own soil. An invasion of Maine might be conducted, then, 
 as a diversion in favor of the British armies in Quebec or 
 Ontario, or it might be made from the first the supreme mili- 
 tary effort of Great Britain . 
 
 The military geography of the state of Maine is alto- 
 gether in favor of an invader. The Penobscot, Kennebec, 
 and Androscoggin rivers, would, it is true, be obstacles lying 
 directly across his path; but we know that such obstacles 
 have no further strategic value than causing delay to the 
 invader a delay which would in each case be minimized by 
 the cooperation of his navy. 
 
 If England were able, as she might be, to seize the initi- 
 ative promptly and to send a powerful naval and military 
 expedition from Halifax or St. John, N. B., against Port- 
 land, the capture of that city would give her all the advan- 
 tages that could be gained by marching across the State to 
 that point. The place would be at once fortified by the cap- 
 tors, and its supply would be assured from the sea. It would 
 furnish a convenient base for minor operations against various 
 points of the New England coast, which would serve to annoy 
 us and to distract our military plans. Moreover, to anyone 
 familiar with the Art of War, it is evident at a glance that 
 
the occupation of Portland by the British would protect the 
 eastern provinces from invasion; for they would have the 
 communications of the invading army by the throat. It 
 would be necessary to recapture Portland, or to mask it with 
 an efficient force, at least equal in strength to the army hold- 
 ing it, before an American army could advance against New 
 Brunswick. 
 
 If the British in Portland found their position effectually 
 masked, and discovered that the American army was pushing 
 on towards New Brunswick, their fleet could quickly transfer 
 them back to the St. John River. If the Americans assem- 
 bled in great force for the siege or assault of Portland, the 
 withdrawal of the British could be affected in the same way, 
 as easily as Moore's army withdrew from Corurma. If, 
 instead of seizing Portland by a combined military and naval 
 expedition, the British were invading Maine by marching 
 across the State, their army could, in the face of superior 
 numbers, fallback to the same base; and the army thus based 
 on the St. John would be in a position to reinforce, or receive 
 reinforcements from, the army at Quebec or Montreal so long- 
 as the New Brunswick and Intercolonial railways remained 
 intact. 
 
 It seems clear, then, that at the outbreak of war a large 
 and effective army should be assembled by us, at the earliest 
 possible moment, on the eastern frontier of Maine. Boston, 
 Salem, Newburyport, Portsmouth, Portland, Bath, Belfast, 
 and Bangor, should be strongly defended as a measure of pro- 
 tection to the communications of this army, which should 
 have its primary base on the Merrimac River, with succes- 
 sive bases at Lewiston, Augusta and Bangor. Raids should 
 be early and persistently made against the New Brunswick 
 and Intercolonial railroads, which should be damaged as com- 
 pletely as possible, and kept continually broken, so as to de- 
 stroy the lateral communications of the British armies. The 
 nearness of these roads to the Maine frontier renders them 
 
46 
 
 peculiarly open to the attacks of raiding forces; but, on the 
 other hand the nature of the country makes the operation 
 unusually difficult for cavalry the only force with which 
 raiding is possible. It may be confidently asserted, however, 
 that cavalry which can operate in Arizona and Colorado 
 would be able to surmount the natural difficulties of Maine 
 and New Brunswick. 
 
 The geographical difficulties of our army, instead of 
 diminishing, would increase with the commencement of the 
 invasion of New Brunswick. The St. John River forms for 
 the enemy a rectangular reentering base, controlled as far a* 
 Frederickton by his navy, and forming a serious obstacle 
 above that point. An attempt by our army to cross the 
 eastern side of this angle would be opposed in front by the 
 fleet, and would lend an exposed flank and communications 
 to British attacks from the other side. An attack upon the 
 northern face of the angle could be met by a retarding force, 
 while a heavy attack from the east could be made against 
 our flank. A passage in the vicinity of Woodstock would 
 compel a separation of our army under penalty of a complete 
 exposure of our communications. In addition to these diffi- 
 culties, the protection of our communications would require 
 the deta'.-ameut of a force for the capture or masking of St. 
 Andrew. It is fortunate for us that we could assemble final- 
 ly in this theatre an army much larger than the British; for 
 the numerical superority would be urgently needed. 
 
 Nor would the difficulties of the situation be ended by a 
 successful passage of the St. John. The Maine Central R. 
 R. would constitute a line of supply via Bangor, McAdam, 
 and Woodstock to Fredericton; but from Fredericton to St. 
 John there are no railway com'munications on the left bank 
 of the river, and that stream would be in the hands of the 
 British navy. The construction of about 35 miles of railroad 
 would be necessary in order that we might reach Chipman, 
 from which point there is a railroad to Norton on the Inter- 
 
47 
 
 colonial. The somewhat circuitous railway communications 
 resulting would require strong detachments for their protec- 
 tion. The Keswick, Nashwaak, Salmon and Washedemoak 
 rivers would form obstacles lying directly across the path of 
 our army and affording the enemy facilities for delaying us 
 with a rear guard while conducting his retreat in safety. 
 
 St. John would offer us some of the disadvantages of 
 Quebec. Though a strung natural position, strengthened by 
 batteries, it does not approximate in impregnability to the 
 old Walled City of the North; but it has the advantage of a 
 never-freezing harbor. Until we could assemble on the St. 
 John River a naval force superior to the British fleet, or line- 
 the stream with batteries powerful enough to drive away the 
 enemy's vessels, the reduction of St. John would be well-nigh 
 impossible. 
 
 It may be assumed, however, that the entire British 
 army in New Brunswick would not shut itself up in St. John. 
 Easily defended by permanent batteries and the navy, that 
 place could be entrusted to a comparatively small force, with 
 full confidence that, owing to its position on the flank of our 
 communications, we should not dare to neglect it, but should 
 have to mask it with a force much larger than the garrison. 
 The main force of the British would doubtless retreat behind 
 the Petitcodiac River, \vhere it would find a position of re- 
 markable strength. With a front of less than fifteen miles, 
 the army could rest its right flank on Northumberland Sound 
 and its left on the Petitcodiac, a great part of its front covered 
 by a small river, and a railroad running along the rear of the 
 position. The flanks could not be turned, the navy could 
 deliver a flanking fire along the lines, reinforcements could 
 l>e speedily sent from one part of the line to any other, and 
 supply from the sea and by rail from Novia Scotia would be- 
 sure and easy. I have not been able to learn the exact nature 
 of the topography of this place; but unless it presents disad- 
 vantages not hinted at by any ordinary map, it would he a 
 
48 
 
 position not one whit inferior to the Lines of Torres Vedras; 
 for while there would be no Monte Junto to divide the assail- 
 ant's front, the position is scarcely more than half as long as 
 Wellington's famous lines, the navy (from the nature of the 
 position and the increased power of its ordnance) could lend 
 a greater degree of assistance than it was able to give the Iron 
 Duke, and the rail road would give advantages not dreamed of 
 eighty-four years ago in Portugal. St. John would be connected 
 with the lines by about 120 miles of waterway, by means of 
 which, should the New Brunswick metropolis prove unten- 
 able, its garrison could be withdrawn to the lines of Petitco- 
 diac. Should the freezing of the river deprive the line of the 
 support of the navy, and thus expose a flank, a position of al- 
 most equal strength could be taken up thirty miles to the 
 rear, where the army would form on about the same front as 
 before, its left resting on Cumberland Basin, its right on Bay 
 Verte. On the left is a high hill, occupied in colonial times 
 by the French Fort Beausejour, while a great portion of the 
 front is covered by the marshes of Missaguash and Tantemar. 
 In fact, the absence of the railway in rear of, and parallel to, 
 the lines is the only point in which this position is inferior to 
 the one on the Petitcodiac; while the marshes covering its 
 fiont would make it much stronger as a purely defensive 
 position. 
 
 It is not necessary to consider at length the strategic 
 features of Nova Scotia. Without great naval strength we 
 probably could not overcome the lines on the Nova Scotian 
 isthmus, if Great Britain saw fit to make a strong exertion at 
 that point, and an invasion of Nova Scotia would be out of 
 the question. If, on the other hand, we had a navy superior 
 to that of England in American waters, we could land a force 
 at any point on the coast of Nova Scotia, and the defense of 
 the province would be so difficult that it probably would not be 
 seriously undertaken. It may, however, be well to note that if 
 f though having a naval inferiority) we should force the lines 
 
49 
 
 on the Isthmus, it would be an evidence of such enormous 
 military superiority as to make a rapid retreat upon Halifax 
 the only thing left to our adversaries; but the Philip and 
 Wallace rivers, the Cobequid mountains, and then the Sal- 
 mon and Shubeuacadie rivers would furnish fine obstacles 
 for the use of the British rearguard; and, if skilfully com- 
 manded, their army could safely reach Halifax. We should 
 then have a repetition of the old problem; namely the reduc- 
 tion of a city strongly fortified, fully garrisoned, assisted by a 
 powerful fleet, and open the year round to supply from tin- 
 sea. 
 
 It is, I think, evident that with a suitable naval force 
 cooperating with our armies, the conquest of Canada, if not 
 speedy, would be at least sure. But in the absence of such 
 naval auxiliary the situation could, perhaps, be best expressed 
 by a Celticism: England could not hold Canada, and we 
 could not conquer it. In other words, our military power, 
 properly directed, would enable us to conquer Canada from 
 the Georgian Bay to the city of Quebec, and perhaps to the 
 Xova Scotian isthmus. But the capture of Quebec, the in- 
 vasion of Nova Scotia, and the reduction of Victoria and 
 Esquimault would be well-nigh impossible while the British 
 fleets w^re superior to Our own, unless the English comman- 
 ders on sea and land should display the most pitiful incapacity, 
 and our own, the most dazzling genius. Let me not be mis- 
 understood: I do not' say that the United States could not 
 conquer Canada. I mean that a complete conquest as the 
 result of the operations of war alone, uninfluenced by inter- 
 nal troubles, foreign alliances, or financial difficulties on one 
 side or the other, could probably be effected by us only when 
 we had provided ourselves with a naval force superior to any 
 armada that Great Britain could send to the American 
 waters. 
 
 It is impossible within the limits of a single lecture, to 
 uive more than the barest epitome of this important subject. 
 
50 
 
 Many weighty considerations have necessarily been omitted. 
 I do not profess to have indicated the only lines of invasion, 
 or counter invasion, nor to have outlined all the military pos- 
 sibilities presented by the geography of Canada. We may be 
 sure, however, that, whatever be the plans of campaign or 
 the conduct of the war, the next invasion of Canada, whether 
 successful or unsuccessful, will furnish an illustration of the 
 truth of Von Moltke's apothegm: "Geography is three- 
 fourths of the science of war." 
 
 [BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTH. The following works have been con- 
 sulted in the preparation of this lecture: Military Aspect of Canada, 
 by Col. Strange; Canadian Defense, by the same author; Strategic 
 Value of the Inland Canal Navigation of the United States, by Lieut. 
 T. H. Bliss; Our Northern Frontier, by Captain T. M. Woodruff; 
 Our Northern Frontier, by Lieut. A. D. Schenck; The Operations of 
 1870 and 1885 in the N. W. Territories of Canada; Notes on the Ca- 
 nadian Militia; Precis of the Wars in Canada, by General Sir James 
 Carmichael Smith, Bart. ; Bancroft's History of the United States, 
 Vol. V.; Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. VI.; Lossing's 
 Field Book of the Revolution; Logging's Field Book of the War of 
 1812: Parkman's Montcalm and Wolfe; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
 Ninth Edition. Valuable information has also been obtained from 
 the Bureau of Military Information.] 
 
51 
 
 THE MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF CHILI. 
 
 By Captain EBEN SWIFT, Fifth Cavalry. 
 Assistant Instructor in Military Art. 
 
 ( HI! 
 
 HILI occupies a long, narrow strip of country lying be- 
 ^'" x tween the Andes and the Pacific, with an average 
 width of 120 miles and a coast line of over 10,000 miles. On 
 the east its boundary follows the main divide of the most im- 
 passible mountain range in the world a mountain range which 
 runs up as high as 22,000 feet and is crossed only by a few 
 muletracks cut out of the solid rock at twice the elevation of 
 the highest point of the Union Pacific Rail-road. Outhe west 
 the coast is beaten by a sea which has been misnamed Pacific. 
 Unlike the northern continent this line has few indentions; 
 good anchomges are scarce, being mostly open and exposed. 
 At the north the region along the coast, like that of 
 Peru, consists of a series of deserts separated from each other 
 by narrow valleys which are watered by rivers taking their 
 
source in the mountains. Throughout these lands rain is 
 unknown and the deserts are dry, sandy plains, broken some- 
 times by rugged heights or by hills of shifting sand. By 
 day the tropical sun beats upon the earth and produces a 
 suffocating heat; at night the temperature falls 25 to 30 de- 
 iTivi-s and the extreme of cold is encountered. 
 
 The largest of these barren tracts is the desert of Ata- 
 cama, extending for several hundreds of miles along the 
 coast, without water, without verdure and without roads. 
 The number of travelers who have dared to penetrate into 
 these deserts has, until recently, been small. They would 
 prefer to go to the coast and to make their trips by sea. 
 
 To travel in such a country you must carry fuel, food, 
 forage and water. If you have two wheeled vehicles you 
 must cut a road for yourself in many places. The trials of 
 the small armies which have campaigned there have been 
 told many times, and the difficulties must surely increase 
 immensely with the size of the army. In the Campaign of 
 Tacnwa, to be noticed hereafter, the provision for water had 
 to be made at a rate of 10,000 gallons per day, which was 
 small indeed for an army of 10,000 men with their animals. 
 
 The valleys at the north are no more suitable for an 
 army of foreigners than the deserts themselves for the climate 
 is deadly to strangers. 
 
 In the central portions of the country the deserts dis- 
 appear, the valleys are wider, the rivers longer, aud consider- 
 able areas are available for cultivation and pasture; the cli- 
 mate is healthy, the rainfall is very great, and in fact nearly 
 every condition is different from that just described. 
 
 At the south Chili controls the Straits of Magellan and 
 ends on the barren islands of Cape Horn. 
 
 The rivers are mostly mountain torrents, running by 
 short^ straight courses from the mountains to the sea. Several 
 are navigable for a short distance, and the longest is a little 
 over two hundred miles in length. 
 
53 
 
 With an area of over 300,000 square miles, which is as 
 large as Texas with Western Kansas tacked on, there is only 
 eighteen per cent, of arable laud. One fourth of this area lies 
 near the snow line, one fourth is near the level of the sea,and 
 from north to south, or east to west, all extremes will be 
 found. Hence portions of the country are mutually depen- 
 dent upon each other. A blockade of certain ports leaves 
 the population in the hopeless condition of the inhabitants of 
 a barren island. This state of affairs existed many times in 
 the last war. 
 
 The population was estimated at three and a quarter 
 millions in 1890, which at that time was smaller than a half 
 dozen of our states. The mixture of white and indian blood 
 seems to have produceda race not inferior to the Spanish of 
 the Sixteenth Century and not unworthy of the very last 
 native tribe to be conquered by the whites. 
 
 There are few generalities which apply to such a land, 
 except that it is particularly inaccessible from without and 
 that its inhabitants have been aggressive and warlike from 
 their earliest traditions. 
 
 Looking at Chili from a military point-of-view, with an 
 eye to its opportunities for attack from without and its capac- 
 ity for resistance from within, it will be profitable to study 
 some of the wars of which we have knowledge, m the same 
 theater. In this way we will discover that a certain general 
 character has been given to all military operations; invading 
 armies have been forced to follow similar lines and all strategy 
 has been made the same by the nature of the country. 
 
 We know that the Incas, a hundred years before the 
 discovery, conquered the country as far south as the Maule" 
 river. They took the hard road through the deserts. 
 
 The Lieutenants and Successors of Pizarro carried their 
 conquests further to the Bio-Bio river; but were driven back 
 again and their cities were destroyed. It is stated that the 
 
54 
 
 first century of this conflict cost Spain :i hundred thousand 
 lives and eighty millions of ducats. 
 
 The way through the desert is not the only road from 
 the north. Another road may be had along the high, snow 
 covered plateaus and passes of the Andes. Almagro, the 
 companion of Pizarro, with an army of Spaniards end In- 
 dians, took this route. He assembled at Jujuy, crossed to 
 Coquimbo and fought battles with the natives in the neigh- 
 borhood where Santiago now stands. He met with great diffi- 
 culties and great suffering and retreated finally, taking the way 
 of the desert. Valdivia came next and accomplished the per- 
 manent settlement of the Spaniards. He came by the deserts. 
 
 In these campaigns little reliance could be placed on the 
 sea. The natives used rafts which were not suited to naval 
 warfare or to long expeditions. The number of ships avail- 
 able to the Spaniards on that coast was not sufficient to fur- 
 nish a solid support. 
 
 In 1810 the Spanish colonies in South A merica revolted. 
 In Chili the rebels were at first driven from the country, but 
 receiving assistance from Buenos Ayres in 1817, they collect 
 ed an army of four thousand men and crossing the mountains 
 at the Uspallata Pass they defeated the royalists in two de- 
 cisive battles. The independence of the country wns not 
 assured, however, until the rebels called to their service the 
 celebrated English Admiral, Lord Cochrane. This comman- 
 der with an inferior force blockaded the Spanish fleet, cap- 
 tured their base of supplies at Valdivia, and in fact obtained 
 control of the sea. 
 
 The freedom obtained by this means gave opportunity 
 for further operations. Peru was still under Spanish domin- 
 ion when the Chilian army of 4,000 men embarked on the 
 transports of the fleet and sailed north. They were landed u 
 few miles south of Liriia, advanced on the capital and de- 
 clared the independence of the country on July 28, 182 J. 
 
 The countries were at war in 1836 again, in the same 
 
55 
 
 way am] with the same result. The Chilians again entered 
 the capital of Peru, and destroyed its army in the battle of 
 Yungai. 
 
 Alter this the deserts which had been considered to be 
 the most worthless parts of creation, began to assume a great 
 importance. They were found to contain immense mineral 
 wealth and the sandy covering of the ground hid inexhaust- 
 ible supplies of nitrate of soda used largely as a fertilizer in 
 Europe. The jealousy of neighboring states and their con- 
 flicting interests brought on the war of 1879. Peru and Bo- 
 livia, owning the nitrite provinces, were allied against Chili. 
 Chili was first in the field with five hundred men and occupied 
 the seaport of Antofagasta at the edge of the desert of Atacama 
 on February 1st. Other troops followed quickly and finally 
 16,000 men were assembled there under drill and instruction. 
 The Alliescollected 2,500 at Tacua,4,000 at Arica, and 14,000 
 at Inquiqui. 
 
 Meanwhile the main struggle for supremacy was going on 
 at sea. It was ended in October by the capture of the Peru- 
 vian ironclad Huascar. After this the plans of the Chilians 
 developed rapidly and received no check. Arms, ammuni- 
 tion and war material arrived from Europe and were distri 
 buted to their troops. 
 
 Early in November, after ten months in preparations, 
 the army of 10,000 men embarked at Antofagasta and sailed 
 to Pesagua. It seems that this would have occurred much 
 sooner if the Peruvian Navy had been sooner disposed of. 
 Pisagua is a poor roadstead, like most places along the coast, 
 but its strategical advantages were of importance. It placed 
 the Chilian army midway between the allied forces massed at 
 Arica and Inquiqui and was intended to cut off the 'retreat of 
 the main allied army. As matters turned out the Chilians 
 did not get the full advantage which it would seem they had 
 a right to expect from their position. They pushed a divisi- 
 on to Dolores, where they were attacked by the allies from 
 Inquiqui. Reinforcements were brought up and the allies 
 
56 
 
 were beaten, hut the Chilians did not follow, did not know 
 the direction ot the hostile retreat and, in fact, failed to cut 
 them off. The main body of the allies retreated to Tarapaca, 
 and the garrison of Iiiquiqui itself evacuated that place and 
 unde good its retreat. A body of Chilians marching to Ta- 
 rcapaca, expecting to encounter a disorganized rear-guard, was 
 roughly handled by the main allied force which then made 
 good its retreat to Arica without being harassed or delayed. 
 To us it will seem strange that the opportunity was missed to 
 destroy or capture this allied force, but we must Dot fail to 
 consider the difficulties on the Chilian side, campaigning in a 
 desert where cavalry horses and animals of the train must be 
 transported by sea and landed at an unprotected anchorage. 
 You can easily see what great and careful provision would 
 have to be made to transport such an army even one day's 
 march into the interior. 
 
 At Pisagua the Chilians were fortunate in finding the 
 great works for the distillation of sea water and casks for its 
 preservation and transportation. In these provinces the 
 water used is mostly obtained in this way. An, invading 
 force would generally nnd these things destroyed by the 
 enemy, and the fact points to one of the many odd conditions 
 which attend a campaign in that country. 
 
 The allies now collected 8,000 or 9,000 men at Tacna 
 and Arica. The Chilians perfected their organization and 
 equipment and made ready for the second campaign. 
 
 On February 24, 1880, 10,000 men embarked at Pisa- 
 gua and under convoy of the fleet went up the coast and 
 landed at the port of Pacocha. A second division of 3,000 or 
 4,000 men followed. The strategy employed was the same 
 as in the first campaign. The Chilians now closed all the 
 roads by which the allies south of Pacocha might reach 
 Peru. The difficulties and obstacles to be encountered were 
 -imiliar in this campaign to those in the first, but the Chili- 
 ans had more success. They successfully maneuvered their 
 
jirmy in the desert, made roads for their wagons in places, 
 and fought the allies in the battle of Tacna. The result of 
 this battle was to beat and desperse the army of the allies. 
 The capture of Arica followed and the second campaign closed 
 in June, 1880. Since then the Nitrite provinces have re- 
 mained in control of Chili. 
 
 Bolivia did not oppose the Chilian armies after the bat- 
 tle of Tacna but another campaign was nrceseary to subdue 
 Peru. The capital was surrounded by a large army and was 
 provided with excellent means of defense. To capture it, it 
 was calculated that an effective field force of 25,000 men 
 would be needed. To bring such a force to the colors and to 
 garrison the conquered provinces as well as to have suitable 
 reserves at home required greater efforts and larger prepara- 
 tions than had ever been made before in that country. In 
 August of 1880 the Lima campaign was decided on. New 
 battalions were mobilized, additional transports were obtained, 
 and the army and navy was reorganized, and at the end of 
 three months more the first division of the new expeditionary 
 force embarked at Tacna. They landed upon that spot 
 where sixty years before the republican troops had disembarked 
 to undertake the capture of Lima for the first time. This 
 divison continued its inarch up the roads to the north. The 
 fleet conveyed the remainder to a point on the coast nearer to 
 Callao. Finally the army was collected on the Lurin River, 
 eight or nine miles from the entrenchments of Chorillos. 
 
 One of the features of the campaign is here shown. The 
 Peruvians were in doubt as to the direction of the Chilian 
 advance and had to make preparations to resist an advance 
 from the north as well as from the south. Much useless 
 labor in fortifications had been expended at the north when 
 the Chilians landed at the south and there indicated their in- 
 tentions. 
 
 The battles of Chorillos and Miraflores were favorable to 
 the Chilians and placed Lima in their possession for the third 
 time. 
 
58 
 
 Up to 1891 Chili could boast of an absence of those fre- 
 quent civil wars which have ruined the development and 
 disturbed the peace of all other Spanish-American Republics. 
 It seemed to be peopled by a race, more serious, more stable, 
 and more patriotic than that of any other country of similar 
 origin. Its laws seemed better, its development more secure, 
 than any others up to the very moment when the revolution 
 broke out. 
 
 The conflict came from a quarrel between the president 
 of the republic and the congress. The army declared for the 
 president Balmaceda, and the navy took the side of the oppo- 
 sition. 
 
 The army at that time, January 7, 1892, was composed 
 of about 5,000 men of all arms with Headquarters at Santia- 
 go, and a battalion of 500 men stationed at the Forts of Val- 
 paraiso. This standing army was a nucleous for the forces 
 called out and as the country had on hand all equipments 
 necessary for an army of 75,000 men the Government had no 
 difficulty in uniforming and arming all recruits. 
 
 The field artillery and mountain batteries were of Krupp's 
 make. The Infantry were armed with the Gras, Beaumont, 
 and Comblain rifles weapons which were not of the latest 
 type of military fire-arms, but still good arms and probably as 
 efficient as our own Springfield. The Cavalry had a twelve- 
 shot Winchester. 
 
 The coast fortifications, before the outbreak of hostilities, 
 were insignificant with the exception of those at Valparaiso 
 where 19 guns were mounted, commanding all the water 
 approaches. 
 
 The available navy consisted of seven vessels of a good 
 type, well armed and manned. 
 
 Both the Army and the Navy contained many veterans 
 of the war with Peru and Bolivia eleven years before. But 
 the command of the Government forces was in the hands of 
 ! wo men of nearly equal power, who did not agree on military 
 
59 
 
 or other matters and were probably jealous and distrustful of 
 each other. The latest developments of modern tactics had 
 not reached them for they adhered to the use of mass forma- 
 tions and they underrated the raw and newly recruited army 
 of their enemies. On the other side Colonel Del Canto com- 
 manded the forces of Congress. He also was distinguished 
 in former wars, but he was wise enough to place himself in 
 the hands of a German officer, Emil Korner by name, who 
 came to organize a military school, but who now joined the 
 congressional army. To the skill and energy of this one man 
 the final result seems to be due. 
 
 The novel condition was now presented of one side with 
 an army and the other side with a navy. Such a state of affairs 
 was unfavorable to both sides, with the advantage in favor of 
 the Government at the outset. So long as the navy remained 
 without a base of supplies on land, from which it could obtain 
 coal, provisions, recruits and revenues, it could not count on 
 success or maintain itself long. This was afterwards shown 
 in Brazil, when Admiral De Mello revolted with the fleet, 
 but the character of the country was different and he could 
 not establish himself firmly on land, and after wandering 
 about like a pirate for a while he was finally entirely defeated. 
 
 These facts were appreciated at once by the party of the 
 Congress. They seized as many large steamers as possible 
 for use as transports. In a short time they had thirteen large ves- 
 sels and some smaller ones, capable on the whole of carrying 
 a force of 10,000 men with artillery, animals, ammunition 
 and stores. In the selection of a base they chose to fasten 
 on to the nitrate provinces at the north in order to obtain 
 money by seizing the revenues arising from the custom duties 
 on the exports of nitre. The provinces were protected by 
 very few troops and the raid was successful. The mining 
 camps afforded a good recruiting ground. In the matter of 
 money, recruits, and security from attack, they had thus se- 
 cured an ideal base. It is true that nothing in the way of 
 
60 
 
 provisions or any other supplies could be obtained there, but 
 they had control of the sea and the ports of Peru were near 
 at hand where they had free access. In fact foreign merchant- 
 men during the whole war plied freely between the Govern- 
 ment and the rebel ports. 
 
 To equip a brand-new field army many things were 
 needed which were entirely lacking, but when the money is 
 available the supplies will be gotten in the course of time. 
 One effort of the Congressists to obtain these necessary arti- 
 cles resulted in the Itiita incident which came near getting 
 our own country involved in a war. This attempt, as is well 
 known, resulted disastrously for the Congressional party, but 
 in the month of May, a little over four months after the be- 
 giuing of the revolution, they finally succeeded in lauding a 
 cargo of 10,000 Manlicher rifles and ammunition and a large 
 quantity of field artillery, blankets and other military stores. 
 
 Colonel Korner applied himself with great energy to 
 the task of organizing, disciplining and drilling the new 
 troops. A noteworthy part of his system was to call together 
 the chiefs and officers of the different commands, and to give 
 lectures on various matters pretaining to the military art 
 particularly giving attention to detailed instruction in the 
 open order of fighting. On the evening before the last bat- 
 tle of the war he perfected all the details and explained them 
 to each brigade and regimental commander, drawing with 
 charcoal on the floor of a room the positions of the enemy 
 and the movements of the various fractions of his own army. 
 
 His success in forming a modern army in three months 
 may be judged by results. We tried it in 1861 and the re- 
 sult was the battle of Bull Run in which few laurels were 
 gathered by either side. 
 
 When all details were ready the army of the constitu 
 tioualists,9,000 men in three brigades,embarked uponit< trai 
 ports, and under protection of the navy, went to Quinten 
 
61 
 
 Bay, where it was safely disembarked on August 20. (Quin- 
 teros to Valparaiso 15 miles.) 
 
 The army of the Government was placed as follows: 
 
 7,000 at Santiago. 
 
 7,000 at Valparaiso. 
 
 7,500 at Concepcion. 
 
 8,500 at Coquimbo. 
 
 2,500 scattering. 
 
 32,000 men in all. 
 
 The railroad running from Valparaiso by Santiago to 
 Concepcion should have been able to concentrate f of this 
 force in a few hours. But the force at Coquimbo, consisting 
 of the best of the troops, was so far away that it was cut off' 
 from participation in the war. The troops were constantly 
 drilled and maneuvered and were supposed to be in a high 
 state of efficiency. 
 
 The plan of the Congiessional leaders was to act by 
 surprise. To carry out such a plan it was necessary to dis- 
 embark rapidly, to cut the telegraph line to Valparaiso, to 
 make a difficult march and pass a mountain torrent where 
 there were only two fords. Their careful preparations were 
 not entirely successful. The fleet was drifted northward by 
 the ocean currents so that the work of disembarking, instead 
 of beginning at daylight, was delayed four hours. The plan 
 to cut the telegraph by sympathizers on shore failed, and the 
 Government was promptly notified. The roads were difficult 
 and when the Congressional troops reached the Aconcagua 
 river they found the passage barred by an equal force of the 
 enemy. 
 
 The Government troops had apparently an easy task to 
 defend an impassible stream, crossed by only two fords which 
 could not be flanked. But they made such a faulty disposi- 
 tion at the ford at the mouth of the stream that the crossing 
 was not properly commanded by the artillery. Korner dis- 
 covered this promptly and at once led a brigade across with 
 
62 
 
 little trouble, turned the flank and caused the complete de- 
 feat of the Government troops. This was the battle ol 
 Concon. 
 
 The Government troops then occcupied the strong posi- 
 tion of Vina del Mar in front of Valparaiso and brought up 
 reinforcement? from Santiago and Concepcion. The Con- 
 gressists did not venture to attack. 
 
 The original plan of campaign had therefore failed be- 
 cause the Government was not taken by surprise as was 
 expected. 
 
 Valparaiso is accessible on the land side by only two 
 roads, and this fact imight be generalized to show the difficul 
 ties of operating in every other part of Chili. One road is 
 by Vina del Mar and the rail-road, entering the city on the 
 north. The other is the old road formerly used before the 
 rail-road was built. It was then in poor repair and entered 
 the city from the south. 
 
 It was decided to strike over to this last road by difficult 
 paths. It was a bold and dangerous move. It was almost a. 
 desperate undertaking to cut entirely loose from the fleet and 
 all communications, marching over roads which in the rainy 
 season were as bad as any in our own country, and fighting 
 a battle in a position where defeat would be ruin. Looking 
 for a similarity in the Vicksburg Campaign we see at once 
 that there was not the chance which Grant had of retreating 
 upon a new base, and there was not ! the justification which 
 Grant had of a largely superior army and a theatre of opera- 
 tions where supplies were abundant. The Prussian Colonel 
 Korner argued against the movement and advised an attack on 
 Vina del Mar for the reason that the city could be defended 
 from an attack at the south in positions just as favorable as 
 those at the north. In this he seems to have been correct. 
 Del Canto says that his reason for taking the southern route 
 was to save a Chilian city from an open assault. It seems 
 more probable that the Chilian Congress expected to deceive 
 
63 
 
 the Government generals as to the direction of their attack, 
 relying upon secrecy and rapidity of movement and upon 
 the difficulty the enemy would find in taking up new positions. 
 
 (Fort Callao to Quilpue 4 miles. 
 
 Renaca to Quilpue 8 miles. 
 
 Quilpue to Las Pal mas 12 miles. 
 
 Las Palmas to Las Cadenas 9 miles. 
 
 Las Cadenas to La Placilla 6 miles.) 
 To accomplish that march of twenty-seven (27) mile.* 
 the troops marched mostly at night on two days. A large 
 portion of the artillery was left behind on account >f the dif- 
 ficulty of getting across the rough country between Renaca 
 and Quilpue. In addition to the natural difficulties of the 
 country the troops suffered greatly from exposure, from rain 
 and cold. The Government troops, under as great or greater 
 difficulties, managed to change the position of the army to a 
 formidable position at La Placilla across the road by which 
 the Congressional troops advanced. 
 
 The battle that ensued was well contested. Out of 
 20,000 men engaged, 5,000, or twenty-five per cent, were 
 killed and wounded. The battle was won by a charge of 
 cavalry in a way that cannot fail to excite our admiration 
 and wonder in these days when cavalry is not supposed to 
 win victories as in the days of Frederick and Napoleon. 
 
 Three hundred of these troopers, whom we may easily 
 imagine were not the embodiment of a high type of cavalry, 
 because thev were new levies mounted on the underbred, 
 undersized horses of the country, threw themselves upon the 
 flank of the Government troops with a vigor and dash that 
 was truly extraordinary. They lost 74 men and eight officers, 
 of whom 44 men and five officers belonged to the leading 
 squadron. 
 
 Valparaiso was entered in a few hours and the war 
 was ended. 
 
 We have now seen that on several occasions small armies 
 
64 
 
 have succeeded in crossing the Andes and entering Chili from 
 the east but they met with no resistance .and they suffered 
 greatly. However we have little interest in such a line of 
 operations. We have also seen that small armies, not strong- 
 ly opposed, have penetrated Chili from the north, but a 
 study of the difficulties of such a march mould deter most 
 commanders. We have found that the true key to the situa- 
 tion lies in control of the sea. The strategy of all recent 
 campaigns has been the same, that is to obtain supremacy at 
 sea before anything else is attempted. Military operations 
 will not occur along the greatest length of the country. 
 Few movements, independent of a co-operating naval force, 
 can be attempted. Attacks by the fleet upon sea-ports can 
 have only a local effect owing to the impossibility oi extending 
 its operations over more than a limited territory. It is neces- 
 sary to capture place after place along the coast and work in- 
 to the interior from these ports as bases. For these purposes 
 an active field army of 10,000 to 25,000 men must be formed, 
 and each part of the country becomes the objective of a cam- 
 paign by itself. Such an army, supported by such a navy, 
 with its advantages in choosing its point of attack each time, 
 must surely overpower the country, in the end. 
 
 In two campaigns the nitrate provinces, although unpro- 
 vided with everything that we rely on to sustain life, have 
 been important, strategic points. The export duties on ni- 
 trate of soda amount to about thirty million dollars in a year. 
 By their loss in 1879 the Peruvian government was impov- 
 rished. By their possession in 1890 the Congressional 
 party gained the means for carrying on the war. 
 
 The strategical advantage of the possession of the Nica- 
 raugua Canal by the United States would be great. As it 
 now stands Chili has a central position while we have a coast 
 line on the Pacific as well as one on the Atlantic to defend, 
 both separated by many thousands of miles. While the Chi- 
 lian navy may be concentrated for attack or defense, ours 
 
65 
 
 must be dispersed in either case. J MID not sure what influ- 
 ence the possession of the Straits of Magellan and the neigh- 
 boring lands and islands may have, but t imagine that a small 
 force could there be used effectively by Chili against a greatly 
 superior force from our Atlantic coast. 
 
 Since the last war great changes have taken place in the 
 rail-road system of Chili. A trans-Andean rail- way is pro- 
 bably now completed by way of the Uspallata pass I may 
 say under the pass with a single tunnel three miles long. 
 Several other trans-Andean roads are contemplated. It is 
 also intended to attempt to connect the rail-way systems of 
 Chili by a north and south line. Such improvements would 
 add immensely to the defensive power of the country. With 
 rail-roads running into friendly territory in the interior of 
 South America and to its seaports on the Atlantic, a blockade 
 would not mean starvation or surrender to many portions of 
 the country as it would at a prior date. There, too, allies 
 might be found beyond the Andes to send their armies to the 
 assistance of Chili by these roads. The projected road in the 
 interior would make it easy to supply and reinforce distant 
 points, but it would always be in easy reach of a superior 
 navy with a mobile field force which could raid any point of 
 a line several thousand miles long. 
 
 Since 1891 Chili has added to her navy and within a few 
 weeks nineteen German officers have been granted a leave 
 by the Emperor to take service in the Chilian army. 
 
 (BOOKS CONSULTED.) 
 
 Estadistica y Geografica de laRepublica de Chili. 
 Manual . Hispano Americano. 
 
 Une Campagne de Huit Jours, par le General Lamintux. 
 La Guerre de Pacifique, par Don Diego Barros de Arana. 
 Chili by B. V. M. 
 Dark Days in Chili. 
 
 The Chilian Revolution of 1891 by Lieutenants Sears and 
 Wells, U. S. N. 
 
66 
 
 THE MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF MEXICO. 
 
 By 1st Lieutenant A. L. MILLS, 1st Cavalry. 
 Assistant Instructor. 
 
 o- 
 
 I V I EXICO extends from the United States to Central 
 ^ ^^ America, and from the Gulf of Mexico and the 
 Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean. In extreme limits it em- 
 braces about thirty degrees of longitude and eighteen degrees 
 of latitude. Its superficial area is about 744,000 square miles, 
 equal to about two and three-fourths times that of the State 
 of Texas. The length of the northern frontier line is about 
 1,900 miles, of which 1,000 miles is formed by the Rio Grande 
 River; that of the eastern coast line is about 1,600 miles. 
 The Pacific coast line, including that of the Gulf of California, 
 is about 4,500 miles in length; the southern boundary is 
 about 500 miles. 
 
 Mexico's greatest length is about 2,000 miles; her great- 
 
67 
 
 est breath is about 750 miles. At the Isthmus of Tehuante- 
 pec her width is only 140 miles. Geographically, Mexico, 
 lying between two great oceans, is highly favored. 
 
 TOPOGRAPHY. 
 
 The Cordillera of the Andes, as the mountains of Mexico 
 are called, enter Mexican Territory from Gautemala, and, to 
 about latitude 18 extend east and west, almost midway be- 
 tween the two oceans. From this line the mountains follow 7 , 
 in a general way, both t^e eastern and western coasts. Be- 
 tween these branch chains lies a great central table-land, 
 called the Plateau of Anahuac, embracing nearly three-fifths 
 of the entire area of Mexico. The highest portion of the pla- 
 teau is in the vicinity of the City of Mexico, south and east, 
 where it cu.minates in four volcanic peaks, ranging in height 
 from 15,271 to 17,720 feet. From this locality, where the 
 general elevation is more than 7,600 feet, the plateau has a 
 general inclination toward the north-west, gradually subsid- 
 ing until the United States is reached. Low mountain ran- 
 ges divide the great plateau into smaller ones, the general 
 but gradual northerly tilt being shown by the altitudes of 
 Mexico City, Durango, Chihuahua, and Paso del Norte, on 
 the frontier, which are respectively 7,600, 6,630, 4,600 and 
 3,800 feet. There is no point of the great plateau from 
 which mountains may not be seen in clear weather; they arc 
 all the same in appearance abrupt, bleak, and without ve- 
 gatation. No great valleys traverse the plateau, nor art' 
 there many small ones. By avoiding the mountains, accord- 
 ing to authority, "there is a good natural carriage road fiom 
 Santa Fe, N. M., to the city of Mexico, a distance of 1,400 
 miles, with only slight variations from the level." Between 
 Saltillo and San Luis Potosi, a distance of 240 miles, the pla- 
 teau is a treeless region, containing but little water, and fc 
 practically a desert, the greater part of the remainder is a 
 habitable region, largely under cultivation. In 1883, Cap- 
 tain Dorst, Fourth Cavalry, made a horseback journey through 
 
68 
 
 Mexico; he gives the following general description of the 
 plateau: "Some fifty or sixty miles from Laredo, Texas, tra- 
 veling by rail to Monterey, a long, flat topped hill is seen 
 some miles to the right, extending in the distance nearly 
 parallel to the road. Alter traveling fifteen or twenty mile.- 
 further, this hill is higher and broken, its top has become 
 serrated and jagged, and it finally merges into a range of 
 mountains. Other mountains then appear to the left, and 
 all increase in height towards Monterey. From thence south- 
 ward to every place visited on the Mexican plateau, moun- 
 tains were always in sight, either near or distant, and gener- 
 ally in every direction. Saltillo is regarded as located at n 
 point on the northern edjje of the Mexican table land. Start- 
 ing from it and proceeding southward, the traveler at once 
 enters a chain of mountains extending in an easterly and 
 westerly direction and more than forty miles in breadth. 
 After passing through it he comes upon a broad and almost 
 desert plain, flanked by distant mountains, which produces 
 scarcely anything besides a few stunted bushes and cacti, is 
 sparcely populated, wholly uncultivated, poorly watered, and 
 extends without change one hundred miles .further to the 
 south. He then meets a few towns, some evidences of culti- 
 vation, and near Charcas, a town more than two hundred 
 miles from Saltillo, the first stream of running water. The 
 plain has become more or less hilly and broken, and both 
 population and cultivation increase perceptibly as he nears 
 San Luis Potosi. The country to the west of that city, how- 
 ever, as far as Zacatecas, is barren and almost uninhabited. 
 Farther south lie more fertile, though partly sterile plains 
 and valleys, cultivated by irrigation to as great an extent as 
 the water supply will permit, and separated from each other 
 by intervening mountains. This alternation of plains and 
 valleys with mountains extends southward to the City of 
 Mexico, and eastward from thence to the edge of the plateau. 
 Except where the soil is tilled, nearly all this great expanse 
 
69 
 
 of country is bare, and the whole is almost treeless and but 
 scantly supplied with water. * As far 
 
 south as the state of Guanajuato, the mountains are bleak, 
 dry, and desolate in appearance; but there, and farther south, 
 a partial covering of bushes, stunted live oak, or occasionally 
 pine, is not unusual." Scarcity of water and fuel will be the 
 greatest obstacles to military operations on the great plateau, 
 as they have been to the developement of its resources. 
 
 The mountains of the western coast, the Sierra Madre of 
 the Pacific, are continuous, extending from Oajaca to Arizo- 
 na, at a mean elevation of over 10,000 feet. The mountains 
 of the eastern coast, the Sierras Madres of Nuevo-Leon and 
 Tamaulipas, have a mean elevation of about 6,000 feet; they 
 gradually subside toward the north, and finally merge into 
 the great plains of the Rio Grande river. The eastern range 
 slopes abruptly to the sea, while the ranges of the western 
 and southern coasts fall through a series of well marked ter- 
 races to the Pacific. 
 
 Between the foot of each of the great mountain chains, 
 bounding the plateau, and the sea, lies a strip of low flat coun- 
 try, called the Tierras Calientes, or Hot Lands. Along the 
 western coast, these lands form a strip from thirty to seventy 
 miles in width. They are much more extensive along the 
 eastern coast, where they include the greater part of the 
 States of Tamaulipas, Vera Cruz, Tabasco, and Yucatan. 
 
 The Territory of Lower California, comprising the penin- 
 sula of that name, has an area of 61,544 square miles. It it 
 about 750 miles long and from 30 to 150 miles broad. The 
 Peninsula is traversed throughout its length by a continua- 
 tion of the Sierra Nevada Mountains of California, which 
 range from 1,000 to 5,000 feet high, and are bare of verdue. 
 The soil of the Peninsula is wonderfully fertile where there is 
 water, but the greater part of it, being subject to excessive 
 droughts, is but thinly settled. It is credited with a popula- 
 tion of less than 30,000. Separated from Mexico proper by 
 
70 
 
 the great Gulf of California and the Colorado River, and its 
 resources being comparatively small, the importance of Low- 
 er California in war between the United States and Mexico 
 would be confined probably to some point on its coast being 
 taken as a secondary base in operations against the ports ofi 
 the West coast of the main country; the original base being 
 some point on the coast of California, probably Ban Diego, or 
 on the Colorado River below Yuma, Arizona. 
 
 HARBORS. 
 
 The seaboard of Mexico is little varied either by deep in- 
 lets, bold headlands, broad estuaries, or large islands. On 
 the west side is the Gulf of California, the open Bay of Te- 
 hauntepec, and the smaller inlets of Acapulca and San Bias; 
 the two last named are two of the finest harbors in the world, 
 and almost the only safe ones in Mexico. The coast of the 
 Gulf of Mexico is low, Hat and sandy, and is without one 
 good harbor. Those of'Progreso, Carnpeachey, Tabasco, Ve- 
 ra Cruz, Tuxpau and Tarnpico, (the last three being of the 
 greatest strategic importance), are mere open roadsteads, af- 
 fording little or no protection from the ''northers," which 
 frequently blow, with great violence, along this coast. Ves- 
 sels lying in these harbors are liable to be wrecked during 
 these storms and often are compelled to put to sea to avoid 
 their dangers. The best anchorage on this coast appears tobe 
 at Anton Lizardo, south of Vera Cruz, where the fleet con- 
 veying General Scott's army assembled before disembarking 
 the troops to attack that city. The harbors on the Caribbean 
 Sea are excellent, but owing to their distance from what must 
 necessarily be the main objective in the event of war they 
 have but little strategic value. 
 
 RIVERS AND LAKES. 
 
 Mexico is imperfectly watered. Its rivers as a rule arc 
 small and unimportant, and owing to the peculiar topogra 
 phy of the country, but a small number are navigable, and 
 
71 
 
 then but for a short distance. On the north, the Kio Grande 
 is navigable for large vessels but a few miles above its port, 
 Matamoras. The Panuca, 290 miles long, and the Coatza- 
 coalcos, 112 miles, are the principal rivers of the eastern 
 coast; the former is navigable for small vessels for over 100 
 miles, and the latter, were it not for a bar at its mouth, might 
 be navigated for a considerable distance by large vessels. The 
 Grijalva, or Tabasco river, rises in Guatemala, flows through 
 the two states of Chiapas and Tabasco, and empties into the 
 Gulf of Mexico through two mouths; it is navigable for small 
 vessels for about one-half its course. The longest rivers of 
 the Pacific coast are the Santiago, 540 miles long, and the 
 Balzas, 420 miles; both of these rivers rise in the State of 
 Mexico, the former entering the sea at the small but good 
 port of Zacatula, and the latter at San Bias. Neither are 
 navigable on account of rapids; nor are any of the other riv- 
 ers flowing into the Gulf of California, except the Colorado, 
 which is open to the largest vessels from its mouth to the 
 frontier of the United States. 
 
 Mexico has 59 lakes. Most of them are shallow lagoons, 
 ihe remains of what were once large basins of water. Like 
 ihe rivers, they are all small and of little value for the pur- 
 poses of commerce or communication. The most consider- 
 able one is Lake Chapalla, in the State of Jalisco, which is 
 about 70 miles in length and from 10 to 20 in width. The 
 Santiago river flows through this lake. The valley of Mexico, 
 tibout 42 miles long by 30 wide, contains six lakes, which 
 were originally one large lagoon. Their total area is about 
 58 square miles. The largest is Lake Texcoco, directly east 
 of the city. It, and the three lakes to the north, are salt, 
 while the two remaining ones, about ten miles south-east of 
 the city, are fresh. Many of the so-called lakes along the 
 Gulf coast, such as the Laguna Madre, Laguna deTerminos, 
 etc., are really arms from the sea. 
 
 Upon the whole, Mexico is poorly supplied with water. 
 
72 
 
 and, upon the great plateau, the supply has been steadily de- 
 m'lising since the Spanish Conquest. 
 
 CLIMATE. 
 
 Intersected about midway by the Tropic of Cancer, and 
 stretching across seventeen parallels of latitude, Mexico nec- 
 essarily enjoys a great diversity of climate. The four seasons 
 are more or less distinctly marked in the northern port'on, 
 but in the central and southern portions there are but two 
 seasons Summer, or the Rainy Season, which lasts from May 
 to October, and Winter, or the Dry Season, comprising the 
 remainder of the year. Tne heaviest rains fall in August 
 and September. With reference to temperature, Mexico, in 
 common with all the countries of Spanish America, isdivided 
 into three great terraces: the coast regions, or tierras calientes 
 (hot lands); the mountain slopes, or tierras templadas (tem- 
 perate lands); and the elevated plateaus, or tierras frias (cold 
 lands). 
 
 The Hot Lands include the region along each coast lying 
 between the sea and an elevation of 2,500 feet. In these 
 lands the usual temperature ranges from 70 to 85 F.; but 
 near the sea level, consequently at all sea ports, the summer 
 temperature frequently rises higher than 100 degrees; during 
 the winter months the average temperature is only a few de- 
 grees lower than in the summer. 
 
 The Temperate Lands lie between 2,500 and 5,000 feet 
 above the sea, and here the ordinary daily temperature ran- 
 ges between 65 and 70 F. throughout the year. 
 
 The Cold Regions include the portions of the surface 
 higher than 5,000, and this division embraces more than three- 
 fourths the area of Mexico. The extremes of 45 and 80 F. 
 are seldom exceeded below 8,000 feet altitude. The climate 
 is cold as compared with that of the coast country; but not 
 as compared with that of any portion of the United States, 
 except portions of Florida and the Gulf Coast. 
 
 The healthfulness of the different regions of Mexico de- 
 
pends upon their climate; the most healthy being those en- 
 joying a dry climate, whether hot, temperate, or cold; and 
 the most unhealthy being those in which humidity prevails. 
 The climate of the Temperate Lands is healthful and pleas- 
 ant, and that of the Cold Regions is salubrious below the 
 elevation of 8,000 feet; but the climate of the Hot Lands is 
 one of the worst and most unhealthful on the face of the earth. 
 Yellow Fever and Black Vomit are the great scourges of the 
 coast regions. They usually set in at Vera Cruz about the 
 middle of May and last until November. At Campeachy, 
 Tampico, and Acapulco the season often passes without a sin- 
 gle case, but no such respite is ever enjoyed by Vera Cruz, 
 Merida, or any of the coast towns of Yucatan, at all of which , 
 the mortality is generally great. Mexico has therefore every 
 variety of climate from tropical heat to cold, but it should be 
 noted that the climate of any particular place will depend far 
 more on its elevation than on its latitude. 
 
 FOOD PRODUCTS. 
 
 The soil of Mexico is for the most part extremely fertile. 
 The comparatively few exceptions are nearly all attributable 
 to insufficient irrigation due to lack of water. In the Hot 
 Lands the entire surface, excepting certain small areas of 
 sand, is covered with a very luxuriant vegetation. Oranges, 
 bananas, rice, hemp, and all kinds of tropical plants are found 
 in abundance. In the Temperate Lands, coffee, sugar, cot- 
 ton, tobacco, and other plants are cultivated. In the Cold 
 Regions, wheat, corn, barley, and other products of temper- 
 :tte latitudes are found; the maguey, whose fruit is edible 
 and which supplies the famous "pulque," the national bever- 
 age of Mexicans, is however, the principal object of cultiva- 
 tion. Wheat is cultivated with some success in portions of 
 nil but five of the Mexican states, but corn, frijoles or browD 
 beans, and chile Colorado constitute the subsistence of nine- 
 tenths of the population, and are extensively produced in 
 every state. On the plateau north of the 20th parallel, crops 
 
74 
 
 depend upon irrigation. South of this, the rain fall is often 
 sufficient, but cannot always be depended upon. 
 
 Two crops of either corn or wheat are grown on the same 
 ground every year in the various parts of Mexico, and in the 
 States of Vera Cruz and Tatasco on the Gulf coast, Mexico 
 on th* 3 plateau, and in Jalisco, Guerrero and Oaxaca on the 
 Pacific coast, three crops of corn are cultivated on the same 
 ground in a single year. The yield per ,<cre per annum is 
 considerable greater than in the United States. All this is 
 done with the simplest farming implements.. 
 
 The following items will afford an idea of the annual 
 .Mexiconfood production: 
 
 Corn 200,000,000 bushels. 
 
 Wheat 12,000,000 
 
 Barley 10,000,000 
 
 Potatoes 4,000,000 
 
 Frijolcs 508,000,000 pounds. 
 
 Sugar 158,000,000 
 
 Rice 33,000,000 
 
 . Coffee 17,500,000 
 
 The annual value of the food crops of Mexico is esti- 
 mated at $60,000,000, and of all agricultural productions at 
 $110,000,000. A large portion of the area under cultivation 
 jrives indifferent results, but the remainder is equal in fertili- 
 ty to any country in the woild. Mexico has been described 
 as composed of regions of great fertility, separated by moun- 
 tain ranges, or by tracts of very unproductive country, which, 
 in many cases, are simply deserts. The portions of the coun- 
 try not suitable for agricultural purposes are, in general, 
 more or less suitable for grazing, and support large numbers 
 of horses, cattle, sheep and goats. The rivers and lakes 
 abound in excellent fish, as do also the waters of the coasts. 
 Mexico is also rich in precious metals, which are extensively 
 mined. 
 
75 
 
 GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Mexico is a federative republic, consisting of 27 States, 
 a Federal District and 2 Territories, each of which has a 
 right to manage its own local affairs, while the whole are 
 bound together in one body politic by fuudemental and con- 
 stitutional laws. The powers of the Federal Government are 
 divided into three branches, the legislative, executive, and 
 judicial. The legislative power is vested in a Congress con- 
 sisting of a Hou^e of Representatives and a Senate, and tbe 
 executive in a President. Representatives and Senators are 
 elected by the suffrage of all respectable male adults and hold 
 office for two years. The President is elected by electors 
 popularly chosen, as in our own country and holds office for 
 four years. The administration is carried on under the direc- 
 tion of the President and a Cabinet of seven secretaries. 
 
 Each separate State has its own internal constitution, 
 government and laws, with its governor and legislature popu- 
 larly elected. 
 
 DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION. 
 
 In 1892 the estimated population of Mexico was 11,885- 
 607, of which 19 per cent are of pure, or nearly pure, white 
 race, 43 per cent of mixed race, and 38 per cent of Indian 
 race. The great mass of the people are extremely poor and 
 densely ignorant, the natural result of their treatment by the 
 Spanish conquerors and their sucessors; but under the en- 
 lightened policy pursued by the Governmeneof the Republic, 
 a great change is in progress and education is now compul- 
 sory. The Indian population has been very little affected by 
 nearly four centuries of contact with the white race. They 
 are to-day very similiar to their Aztec forefathers in manners, 
 customs and mode of life. They follow the same pursuits 
 and use exactly the same implements as did the Aztecs. 
 
 Nearly the whole of the Mexican population live in 
 cities, towns or villages. Detached houses are rarely seen; 
 travelers report riding from town to town, in the most popu- 
 
lated districts, without observing a house. Except in the Hot 
 Lands the houses are usually built of stone or adobe, and are 
 very strong for defense, and almost impossible to set on fire. 
 
 The chief cities are the capital, Mexico, with a popula- 
 tion of about 326,000; Guadalajara, 95,000; Puebla, 78,000; 
 San LuisPotosi, 62,000; Guanajuato, 52,000: Leon, 47,000; 
 Monterey, 41,000; Aguas Calientes, 32,000; Merida, 32,000; 
 Vera Cruz, 29,000; (about four-fifths of the exchanges of 
 Mexico pass through this Port.) Colima, 25,000; Pachuca, 
 25,000; Jalapa, 18,000. 
 
 For convenience in considering the Military Geography 
 of Mexico, the States of the Republic are divided into three 
 groups. The northern groups comprising the States of Sono- 
 ra, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Sinaloa, 
 Durango, and the Territory of Lower California; the south- 
 eastern group comprising Yucatan, Campeachey, Tabasco, 
 and Chiapas; and the central group comprising all the re- 
 maining States and the Federal District. Of these groups, 
 the northern, containing more than half the area of Mexico, 
 contains less than one-ninth the population; while the central 
 group, containing less than one-third the total area, contains 
 more than four-fifths of the population. This central region 
 must therefore be regarded as "the heart of the country," not 
 only in geographical position, but also in population; it is so 
 also in wealth, productions, manufactures, in fact, in every- 
 thing but the grazing and mining interests; its boundaries, 
 approximately, are two east and west lines, the one drawn 
 through San Luis Polosi on the north; the other through Ori- 
 zaba on the south. 
 
 COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 Mexico is lacking in good roads. From the City of Mex- 
 ico roads radiate to the different cities of the central plateau, 
 but from this plateau, communication with the coast, with a 
 few exceptions, is limited to bridle paths. There is a car- 
 riage road from Saltillo to Monterey and Matamoras; from 
 
San Luis Potosi to Tula and Tampico; and from the City of 
 Mexico to Vera Cruz, Tehauntepec, Acapulco and San Bias; 
 but the Sierra Madre Mountains of the Pacific are crossed by 
 no road from ^Guadalahara to Arizona. Travel from the 
 State of Souora to the Capital must be by sea to one of the 
 Pacific ports, or by way of El Paso in the United States. The 
 roads of the central plateau, poor under the most favorable 
 conditions of weather, are quagmires during the rainy season; 
 those leading to the coast are steep, rough, and always diffi- 
 cult to travel. The government has of late years been en- 
 gaged in improving its highways, but much yet remains to be 
 accomplished. 
 
 In railroad communications the country is much better 
 off. It is now pretty well intersected by railways, and their 
 construction is being pushed forward rapidly. In a short 
 time Mexico will possess a system of railroads that will not 
 only develop her great natural wealth, but will greatly in 
 crease her power of defense. At present her railway mileage 
 is over 7,000 miles. 
 
 The principal lines are: The Mexican Central, from El- 
 Paso, Texas, to the City of Mexico, 1,225 miles, with branches: 
 Irapuato to Guadalahara, 160 miles, and under construction 
 to San Bias: Aguas Calientes to Tampico, 415 miles. 
 
 The Mexican International, from Eagle Pass, Texas, to 
 Torreon Junction, 383 miles, where it connects with the Mex- 
 ican Central. Its branches are: Torreon to Durango, 157 
 miles: Trevino to Tampico, 387 miles. 
 
 The Mexican National, narrow gauge, from Laredo. 
 Texas, to Mexico City, 840 miles'. Branches: Mexico to E) 
 Salto, 19 miles: Acambaro to Patzcuaro, 96 miles. (This 
 branch is being constructed to Manzanillo, 440 miles); Mata- 
 moras to San Miguel, 75 miles. 
 
 The Mexican railroad, from Vera Cruz to Mexico, 268 
 miles, with a branch to Puebla, 29 miles. 
 
 The Mexican Inter-Oceanic, narrow gauge, from Vera 
 
78 
 
 Cruz to Mexico, with braDches from Mexico to Jojulta, 122 
 miles; and from Puebla to Chiaulta, 64 miles. This last 
 branch is being continued to Acapulco, 200 miles. 
 
 The Mexican Southern, from Puebla, through Oaxaca, 
 is now in operation to Tehauntepec. 
 
 The Tehauntepec Railroad, from Coatzacoalcos to Te- 
 hauntepec, 140 miles. 
 
 The Sinaloa and Durango Railroad, from Altata to Culi- 
 acan, 60 miles, is to be continued to Durango. 
 
 The Sonora Railroad, from Nogales, Arizona, to Guy- 
 mas, 265 miles. 
 
 The Eagle Pass and Laredo lines are connected by cross 
 lines from Sabinas to Lampaxos, and from Jaral to Saltillo. 
 
 A glance at the direction of these roads will show how 
 greatly Mexico is favored by them with the advantage of in- 
 terior lines for her forces. 
 
 Still more developed is the telegraph system of Mexico, 
 which is now extended to all the State capitals and the prin- 
 cipal cities, and is connected with the systems of the United 
 States. In 1893, there were 37,800 miles of telegraph line? 
 in operation. 
 
 MILITARY STRENGTH. 
 
 The total land fighting strength of Mexico, in 1893, wa*< 
 reported to be 131,523 infantry, 25,790 dragoons, and 3,650 
 artillery. As every Mexican capable of bearing arms is li- 
 able for military service from his twentieth to fiftieth year, 
 there would be a general reserve of over one-half million meD 
 to draw on in case of necessity. 
 
 Her naval strength consists of 1 7-knot gunboat, 2 des- 
 patch vessels, 2 unarmoured gun-vessels, 1 transport, 1 steel 
 training ship, 5 first class torpedo-boats, and 1 police-steamer. 
 The fleet is manned by 84 officers and 416 men. In 1890 the 
 mercantile marine, of vessels over 100 tons, comprised 16 
 steamers, and 16 sailing vessels. Her shipping also includes 
 many smaller vessels engaged in the coasting trade. 
 
79 
 
 The forces immediately available in case of war are 
 about 2,000 officers and 36,000 men, as follows: 
 
 1. The regular army 29 battalions of infantry, 13 
 regiments of dragoons, 4 battalions of artillery, engineers, 
 etc. Total 1,700 officers and 30,000 men. 
 
 2. The Rural Guards and Gendarmes, mounted, 3,000 
 men. 
 
 3. The local troops of the several states, about 3,000 
 men. 
 
 The regular troops are well armed and equipped, the 
 artillery being provided with steel breech-loading guns of 
 modern pattern. They do not lack field experience and have 
 shown high efficiency in Indian warfare. Remarkable march- 
 ing qualities, combined with ease of subsistence, are ascribed 
 to the infantry, while the "Rurales," as a mounted body, is 
 said to be without a superior in the world. It is to be re- 
 gretted that no information has been received as yet of Mex- 
 ico's partial mobilization of her forces for war, which recently 
 seemed iraineut with Guatemala, Such would be of interest 
 now as indicating her readiness for war, and on which to base 
 un opinion of the efficiency of her general staff. 
 
 Railroads constitute Mexico's best means of transporta- 
 tion, and pack animals the next; wagon transportation is un- 
 developed, due to the nature of the country and the kind of 
 service her regular forces have been called upon to perform. 
 
 Mexico has no permanent fortifications of modern design. 
 Works exist at the Capital, Puebla, Vera Cruz, Perote, Aca- 
 pulco. and Mazatlan, but they and the guns manning them 
 are obsolete. An excellent military school, modeled largely 
 after West Point, is maintained near Chapultepec. The 
 country also has in operation a national armory for the man- 
 ufacture of small arms, and works for the production of pow- 
 der. 
 
 FINANCES. 
 
 The fiscal value of property in Mexico in 1892 is given 
 
80 
 
 as $497,865,195, the fiscal value being taken as one-third les* 
 than the actual value. The total debt of the country, June 
 30, 1892, was $174,449,510. The exports of the country, in 
 1892-93, amounted to $87,509,221 . The budget estimates of 
 the government for the year ending June 30, 1895, were as 
 follows: Revenue, $43,074,053; Expenditures, $43,054,371; 
 of the latter, $10,402,866 were Cor the army and navy. 
 
 MILITARY CHARACTER. 
 
 Captain Shunk, 8th U. S. Cavalry, in an article on the 
 Military Geography of Mexico (freely used in the prepara- 
 tion of this lecture), describes the military character of the 
 Mexican as follows: 
 
 "Readers familiar with Mexican history, knowing that 
 Mexican armies have been defeated repeatedly by greatly in- 
 ferior forces of Spaniards, Americans, and Frenchmen, will 
 be inclined probably to regard the Mexican soldier as inferior 
 to the soldiers of other civilized countries, and there is much 
 in history to justify such an opinion. However, before ac- 
 cepting this conclusion as final, several facts should be taken 
 into consideration, among them the following: 
 
 1. In the encounters referred to, the Mexican troops 
 were invariably poorly instructed, poorly armed, and desti- 
 tute of good officers in the lower grades; disadvantages that 
 could not be equalized by the efforts of a few able men in 
 high command. In future wars, this state of affairs will no 
 longer obtain in their regular forces, nor to so great an extent 
 as formerly in any part of their forces. 
 
 2. Their want of good communications and the general 
 poverty of the country have been such that their resources 
 could not be made available on a threatened line in any, rea- 
 sonable time. This condition has almost completely disap- 
 peared. 
 
 3. The Mexican soldier has also been accustomed to 
 handle and use fire arms from childhood, and he often dis- 
 plays the recklessness and prowess that we are familiar with 
 
81 
 
 among our native Indians. In physical bravery and contempt 
 for danger, he will probably be found equal to any soldier he 
 may be called upon to meet. Instances show that Mexican 
 troops, bravely and skillfully led, fight well; poorly led they 
 are easily stampeded. 
 
 4. The true point of inferiority of the Mexican soldier 
 lies in his dense ignorance; but compulsory education is cor- 
 recting this evil and will in time eradicate it. 
 
 5. The marching power of Mexican troops has been 
 commented upon by many officers who have visited the coun- 
 try; and if it has been corectly reported, it far exceeds that 
 of all other countries. It is asserted that Mexican infantry, 
 in small bodies of 2, 000 or 3,000 men, has repeatedly marched 
 about 50 miles a day for several consecutive days. While 
 this can scarcely admit of belief, it can not be doubted that 
 Mexican troops are accustomed to march with greater rapidity 
 lhan is customery in any other country." 
 
 From the foregoing it appears that our neighbor on our 
 southern frontier is not unprepared for war. Her condition 
 is prosperous; her finances are good; her resources in soldiers 
 and supplies are large. Nature, with mountains, deserts and 
 climate, has made her strong in defense, and her communica- 
 tions, giving all the advantages of interior lines, increase 
 this strength. Finally it is apparent, with a determined de- 
 fense, her conquest by an enemy from without must prove to 
 be a great undertaking. 
 
 POSSIBLE LINES OF OPERATIONS. 
 
 In the event of war between the United States and Mex- 
 ico, our country will naturally assume the offensive; if not at 
 first, then shortly after the breaking out of hostilities, and 
 will carry the war into Mexican Territory. To prosecute the 
 war to a successful conclusion, it is evident, from what has 
 already been pointed out, that our forces must conquer the 
 ^reat central plateau of Mexico from San Luis Potosi, on the 
 north, to Orizaba, on the south. Our first objective there 
 
32 
 
 would be the capital city. Examining the map, we find a 
 number of routes to it. We might base ourselves on the 
 Rio Grande river, and assisted by the railroads, invade Mexi- 
 co by way of El Paso, Eagle Pass, or Laredo; or, having con- 
 trol of the sea, we might establish ourselves atone of the Gulf 
 or Caribbean ports, or at a Pacific port south of Guy mas, 
 and move thence towards the Capital. Considering these 
 several routes, reflection will show that the great distance of 
 the Pacific ports from our resources and the lack of roads to 
 the capital, puts these lines out of the question when compared 
 with nearer routes; and that similar reasons distance from 
 the objective and the character and climate of the intervening 
 country throw out all sea ports south and east ofVeraCruz. 
 Taking up the other routes, the following table gives the 
 lengths of the remaining lines: 
 
 El Paso to Mexico City 1,225 miles. 
 
 Eagle Pass, via Torrean, to Mexico City 1,091 " 
 
 Laredo to Mexico City 840 '* 
 
 Tampico, via San LuisPotosi to Mexico City. . . 637 " 
 
 Vera Cruz, via the Mexican R. R, to Mex. City 263 " 
 
 Laredo to San Luis Potosi : 478 " 
 
 Tampico to San Luis Potosi 275 " 
 
 These figures are significant. Controlling the sea as we 
 would in the case considered, they show Vera Cruz to be the 
 available point on the Gulf coast nearest the capital, 374 
 miles nearer than Tampico, and 577 miles nearer than Lare- 
 do, the point on the Rio Grande closest to the objective. The 
 shortest line, to fight for, if a possible and an effective one, is 
 plainly the best. In the past, Vera Cruz has been an effec- 
 tive point of invasion as attested by the fact that the greatest 
 successsul invasions of Mexico have been based on it in 
 1519, by Cortez; in 1847, by General Scott; and in 1863, by 
 the French. Cortez followed the route Vera Cruz, Jalapa, 
 Tlascala, Mexico; General Scott: Vera Cruz, Jalapa, Perote, 
 Puebla, Rio Frio, Mexico; the French: Vera Cruz, Orizaba, 
 
83 
 
 Esperanza, Puebla, RioFrio, Mexico. We are warren ted in 
 assuming that tliese lines are still practicable, for, although 
 the armament of armies has been vastly improved since they 
 have been tried, and railroads now follow the routes, yet, as 
 our studies show to be true, the relative advantage of im- 
 provements, to the defense and offense, remains about the 
 same. 
 
 The absence of suitable roads to the plateau must confine 
 any effective invasion of Mexico, at the present time, by the 
 Gulf coast, to a base at VeraCruz or Tampico. A writer in 
 the Cavalry Journal, of June, 1892, advocated the latter 
 point as a better base than Vera Cruz, but its few advantages 
 do not offset one great disadvantage. The Mexican Central 
 railroad runs directly from Tampico to the plateau at San 
 LuisPotosi, distant 275 miles. This line is equally as long as 
 the lines from Vera Cruz, and evidence is wanting that it 
 would be any less difficult to force. The advantages of the 
 port are that it is some 200 miles nearer by sea to the United 
 States than Vera Cruz: that we could count on securing ear- 
 ly in the war the control of the railroad from it to Monterey 
 and Laredo, thus giving, in addition to the sea route, an alL 
 rail route from our country; and, lastly, the Rio Panuco riv- 
 er, being navigable for small vessels for over 100 miles and 
 following closely the line of the railroad, would afford greatly 
 increased means of advancing- These advantages are appar- 
 ent, but the controlling objection to the port as a base is that 
 the point of the plateau we would gain by it would find our 
 army, not at the gates of the capital and chief city of Mexico, 
 but over 300 miles north of it, with a further advance of 140 
 miles to the west, to capture the city of Aguas Calientes, be- 
 fore we could turn towards it. The great effort that would be 
 necessary to move our army from San Luis Potosi to the capi- 
 tal will be shown later, in discussing invasion from the Rio 
 Grande frontier. 
 
 Returning to the VeraCruz line, two railroads, the Inter- 
 Oceanic (narrow gauge), and the Mexican (standard gauge), 
 
8-1 
 
 parallelling the respective routes of. General Scott and the 
 French are now in operation from Vera Cruz to the City of 
 Mexico; they cross each other at San Marcos, 150 miles from 
 Vera Cruz, but for the greater part of the way are separated 
 by lofty and impassable mountains. An old carriage road 
 follows the course of each railroad about one-half the way to 
 the capital. One or both of these railroads must be the line 
 of advance, the possession of either to San Marcos would give 
 control probably of the other back to Vera Cruz; but posses- 
 sion would be obtained only by overcoming great obstacle? 
 and at the cost, certainly, of desperate fighting. Both roads 
 abound in strong defensive positions; both ascend tremendous 
 grades, cross deep canons, traverse brinks of precipices and 
 pass through tunnels; they will be easy for the enemy to des- 
 troy and difficult for us to repair, but in the light of past ex- 
 perience they ought not to prove insurmountable obstacles. 
 
 A short description of the course of the Mexican railroad 
 will be sufficient to give some conception of the obstacles that 
 must be overcome in gaining the central plateau. Leaving 
 Vera Cruz, the road crosses a strip of the hot lauds, a plain 
 30 miles wide, to the Soledad river, where the ascent to Ori- 
 zaba, 82 miles from Vera Cruz, begins. Orizaba is 4,000 feet 
 above the sea, and in attaining this height the road ascends a 
 tremendous grade and crosses the Barranca de Matlac on an 
 iron bridge, 350 feet long and 90 feet high. A few miles be- 
 yond Orizaba the road runs in the Barranca del In fernillo 
 with numerous bridges, tunnels and steep grades, thence to 
 the plains of La Joya, crossing which the road rises an addi- 
 tional 3,600 feet in a short distance and attains the plateau, 
 at an altitude of 7,900 feet, at Esperanza, 111 miles from 
 Vera Cruz. The road then follows, for 90 miles, abroad and 
 generally level plain to Apam, 58 miles from Mexico city, 
 where it passes through a narrow gap into a flat valley, gen- 
 erally 5 to 6 miles wide, which it traverses, past the north- 
 western shore of Lake Tezcoco, to the capital. 
 
85 
 
 With the difficult Sierra Madre mountains in rear and 
 with insufficient communications for the prompt withdrawal 
 of a large body of troops, it is not likely that Mexico would 
 seriou>ly oppose invasion in the State of Vera Cruz. Her 
 nrst great, efforts would be met in the defense of the mountain 
 chain. If these efforts should prove futile we must then ex- 
 pect to meet the Mexicans in large force on the plateau in 
 the vicinity of Puebla, which from its position, would be a 
 strategic point which we would have to take. Victory there 
 will open the way to the capital, and to the objective of the 
 campaign the destruction of the main army of the enemy. 
 Preliminary, however, to any sustained operations to 
 gain the central plateau, a large depot and entrenched camp 
 must be established across the hot lauds, at a sufficient eleva- 
 tion above the sea to afford the army security from sickness. 
 
 No time should be lost in doing so; the army as soon as 
 debarked should be pushed forward rapidly to the point 
 selected. On the line of the Mexican railroad, Orizaba would 
 be such a point; or, the vicinity of Jalapa, if the advance be 
 by the Inter-Oceanic road. 
 
 With Vera Cruz as the point of invasion, our operations 
 on the northern frontier and the Pacific coast should be li- 
 mited to diversions, having for their object the capture of 
 important points and the detaching of bodies of troops from 
 the enemy's main army to defend them. The sea port of Te- 
 huautepec at present, and when the railroads now being con- 
 structed are completed, Acapulco, Manzanillo, SanBlasand 
 Mazatlan, are all especially important points and must be 
 blockaded, and occupied if possible. 
 
 Let us now consider the northern frontier. Without 
 entering into a discussion of the War of 1845-7, it may be 
 safely asserted that the expeditions of Generals Taylor and 
 Wool proved that a decisive invasion of Mexico from the Rio 
 Gra'ide frontier was not then practicable, due to the great 
 distance to traverse, the want of necessary supplies in the 
 
86 
 
 country, the lack of sufficient wood and water, and the ini 
 possibility of protecting long lines of supply from guerrilla 
 warfare in which Mexicans are adepts. General Taylor ad- 
 vanced with the greatest difficulty to Saltillo although success- 
 ful in every battle. Urged by the War Department to push 
 on to San Luis Potosi, he objected to doing so, and recom 
 mended that Saltillo be held only as a defensive line and all 
 remaining troops be thrown into the column operating from 
 Vera Cruz. Ambition, alone, would have spurred General 
 Taylor on had success been probable. The Saltillo desert wa? 
 in front of him, and its ruinous effects on Santa Anna's army, 
 which crossed it to meet him and be defeated at Buena Vista, 
 was known to him. Railroads did not then exist in Mexico. 
 To-day they do, and from our knowledge of the use that may 
 be made of them in war, it is believed the lines running from 
 our frontier now make a decisive campaign from the Rio 
 Grande practicable. But when we consider what such a cam- 
 paign will require in men and efforts, it is not likely our gov- 
 ernment would undertake it, unless Mexico should have an 
 ally denying us control of the sea, or making uncertain our 
 ability to establish ourselves at a suitable point on the Gulf 
 coast. The probable course of such a campaign and the 
 efforts necessary for its successful prosecution are well set 
 forth by Captain Shunk, in his article already referred to, a* 
 follows: 
 
 "The choice of a line of operation would be from among 
 the railroads leading into Mexico from the Rio Grande. The 
 first effort of the main army would probably consist in a 
 movement upon Monterey and Saltillo. Eagle Pass or La- 
 redo would be the starting point. A choice would, no doubt, 
 be largely influenced by topographical considerations. The 
 Laredo route is more direct; but the Eagle Pass route favors 
 an attack in a more effective direction, and would probably 
 be preferred at first, for this reason, and because it is a stan- 
 dard-gauge road, while the Laredo road is a narrow-guage. 
 
87 
 
 and especially because points thereon, such as Trevino and 
 Jaral, must be occupied to protect the flank while moving 
 upon Monterey and Saltille, 
 
 Selecting the Eagle Pass route, the army would probab- 
 ly advance to Jaral. Holding that place by means of a de- 
 tachment, it could then advance from Trevino upon Monte- 
 rey and then upon Saltillo. The Mexicans observing these 
 movements would probably evacuate the country from the 
 Rio Grande to Monterey; and, concentrating all their avail- 
 able forces, would either fight a battle in defense of Monterey 
 or Saltillo, or would retire without much fighting, beyond 
 the desert, using both the railroad line to Tampico and that 
 to San Luis Potosi for the purpose. It is plain that Mexico 
 could not better serve our interests than by putting forth her 
 whole strength in this region; just as the Russians in 1812 
 might have served Napoleon by fighting him on the Vistula, 
 instead of which they preferred to retire among their deserts. 
 But the probability is that the Mexicans would evacuate this 
 region without severe fighting, destroying the railroads, and 
 the water tanks in the Saltillo desert. In any event, it must 
 be occupied, and an intrenched camp would probably be 
 formed at Monterey or Saltillo which would be occupied by a 
 strong force to guard against an attack from Tampico and to 
 ^ive security to a further advance. The strategic value of 
 this locality would be very considerable. 
 
 It would next be necessary to establish the army in the 
 fertile and populous districts of the Great Central Plateau. 
 The point to be ultimately secured is San Luis Potosi, as being 
 the first important point south of the desert, on our direct 
 line; by which line it is 240 miles from Saltillo. In the en- 
 tire distance, water, in sufficient quantities for a force of some 
 size, is found only inartificial tanks, easily destroyed by the 
 retreating enemy. If the railroad could supply with water. 
 as well as other necessities, a force large enough to attack 
 San Luis Potosi with a reasonable prospect of success, the at- 
 
88 
 
 tempt should, of course, be made to advance directly. But, 
 as this is out of the question, the army must pass to that 
 point either by following the railroad lines to the east of the 
 desert, or by following those to the west of it. 
 
 The distances are as follows: 
 
 From Monterey to Tampico 321 miles. 
 
 " Tampico to San Luis Potosi 275 " 
 
 Total via Tampico. 596 " 
 
 From Trevino to Torreon 160 " 
 
 " Torreon to Aguas Calieutes 342 " 
 
 " Aguas Calientes to San Luis Potosi 140 ' 
 
 Total via Torreon 642 " 
 
 The Tampico line is somewhat shorter; but the Torreon 
 line, passes through a far less barren country and is entirely 
 secure from the enterprises of an allied army that might land 
 at Tiimpico, and interrupt the communications, should the 
 attempt be made by the eastern line to reach San Luis Potosi. 
 
 By whichever line the attempt be made, the whole 
 strength of Mexico will certainly be encountered. Her rail- 
 roads furnish ample means for concentrating all her forces at 
 any .point between Tampico and Aguas Calientes, or between 
 the latter place and Torreon. This is her time to beat back 
 the invading army, if she can do this at all; and the greatest 
 battle of a war begun under such conditions might be expected 
 before the Americans would be allowed to get possession of 
 their objective, San Luis Potosi. 
 
 The distance from Eagle Pass to Torreon is 383 miles; to 
 Zacatecas, 651 miles; thus the Americans, guarding a line 
 600 or 700 miles in length, would need vastly superior forces 
 in order to put equal numbers in line of battle. Torreon 
 Junction is a point of much strategical importance and, when 
 captured, an entrenched camp would, no doubt, be estab- 
 lished there. Detachments would occupy Chihuahua and 
 Durango, and the resources of the country would be secured, 
 
89 
 
 while Mexico would be cut off from her north-western States, 
 about one-fourth of her area. 
 
 Under the supposed conditions, it has not been supposed 
 that Mexico would fight a pitched battle north of Zacatecas, 
 because guerillas operating on the American communications, 
 would compel them to detach so many men that their superi- 
 ority of numbers would rapidly disappear. But, it has been 
 assumed, that the great battle would be fought in defense of 
 Aguas Calientes, because, while that point was in their pos- 
 session, the Americans would not dare to attempt to march 
 on San Luis Potosi. If the Mexicans win the battle, the 
 American campaign is checked until reinforcements enable 
 them to resume it. If the Americans win, they establish 
 themselves at San Luis Potosi, thus shortening their line of 
 communications about 250 miles, form an entrenched camp, 
 repair the railroad in their rear, and are now prepared to 
 move upon the capital from their new temporary base, mean- 
 while guarding a line 475 miles in length a line about as 
 long as Sherman's line from Louisville to Atlanta. But the 
 capital is still 365 miles distant. 
 
 The Mexican National Railroad'is a narrow guage road, 
 while the other lines are of standard guage. The above 
 (hange of base would be greatly facilited if the two lines were 
 of the same guage, and this change could be made in a few 
 days as we know by experience. (The P. Ft. W. & C. R. R. 
 was changed in a single day from narrow to ordinary guage, 
 and every regular train ran on time as usual.) 
 
 With the principal army thus established at San Luis 
 Potosi, (or perhaps at Aguas Calientes,) the war, so far as 
 decisive results are concerned, has really only begun. It has 
 progressed only so far as a European war has done when one 
 urmy has crossed the frontier and has gained the first action; 
 the army has only reached a position from which a vital part 
 may possibly be struck. 
 
 The next operation would probably have in view the 
 
90 
 
 capture of Celaya Junction which would effectually isolate 
 the capital from the north and west. But when the army 
 finally arrived before the capital, there would be behind it a 
 line of communications 840 miles in length. This would 
 have to be guarded against the efforts of a hostile population, 
 greatly addicted to guerilla warfare. The city itself would 
 be defended by an army behind powerful works, and an ally 
 could land troops at Vera Cruz and send them by rail to their 
 assistance. 
 
 To give an idea of the force necessary to g ard such a 
 line, #40 miles in length, let us compare the supposed situa- 
 tion with the very similiar one on a much smaller scale of 
 Sherman before Atlanta. "On the 31st of August, 1864, 
 Sherman had at the front about 72,000 men, and in his rear 
 about 68,000. (These numbers represent combatants only. 
 He had besides, in his rear, an army of civilian employes en- 
 gaged in running his trains and keeping the track in repair.) 
 His main line, Louisville, Nashville, Stevenson, Chattanooga, 
 the Chattahoochee Bridge, Red Oak, was about 480 miles. 
 
 * * * It is worthy of note that the portion of 
 the line north of Chattanooga was held by about 533 men per 
 etape (distance of fifteen miles), while that from Chattanooga 
 to Red Oak required a force per etape of 3,500 men." 
 
 When we consider the force necessary to conduct an oper- 
 ation such as the above, and estimate the strength that would 
 necessarily be employed in guarding the line of communica- 
 tions, enforcing requisitions, checking partisan operations, 
 besieging or garrisoning important places such as Monterey, 
 Saltillo, Torreon Junction, Aguas Calientes, San Luis Potosi, 
 Celaya, and many others, quelling uprisings, the difficulties 
 of supply so far from the base, etc., then we begin to appre- 
 ciate the magnitude of such an undertaking in case we did 
 not control the sea. 
 
 In fact, if Mexico, in the case supposed, should make a 
 respectable resistance, according to the number of her popu- 
 
91 
 
 lation and the advantages of her topography, the conquest of 
 the country by the overland line of operations (and without 
 the use of the sea; would constitute a task of immense magni- 
 tude. And, even with control of the sea, another Mexican 
 war will bear only a faint resemblance to the war of 1846-7, 
 so far as the scale of the operations is concerned." 
 
 In that war, Mexico was poor, her people were not 
 united and her government was threatened with revolutions 
 during its progress. To-day Mexico is prosperous, her people 
 are fairly united, and her government is strong. The United 
 States employed forces in the last invasion aggregating about 
 100,000 armed men 26,690 regular troops, 56,926 volun- 
 teers, and the balance in the navy and supply departments. 
 In another war, these numbers will be but a fraction of the 
 force that will be necessary to bring Mexico to terms. 
 
92 
 
 NOTES ON THE MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF 
 CENTRAL AMERICA. 
 
 By 1st Lieutenant CARL REICHMANN, 9th Infantry. 
 Assistant Instructor. 
 
 HE continents of North and South America are cou- 
 uected by a narrow strip of land of varying width and 
 irregular outline. From the purely geographical point of 
 view the term Central America would apply to all the land 
 between the isthmus of Tehauntepec and that of Darien. 
 Several states of the Mexican republic as well as Panama, 
 one of the United States of Colombia, would thus be com- 
 prised in Central America. In its political meaning, how- 
 ever, the term Central America is exclusively applied to the 
 territory embraced by the republics of Guatemala, Salvador, 
 Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. This territory lies be- 
 tween 8 and 18 northern latitude and is thus wholly within 
 the northern torrid zone. It was discovered by Columbus, 
 who landed at Point Casinas, now called Cape Honduras, on 
 
93 
 
 August 14, 1502. The Spaniards rapidly overran and sub- 
 dued the country, and foimed it into the Spanish kingdom of 
 Guatemala, which it remained until 182L In that year the 
 Spanish yoke was shaken off, the states of Chiapas and Soco- 
 nusco joined Mexico, while Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, 
 Nicaragua and Costa Rica formed the federal republic of Cen- 
 tral America. This federation was dissolved in 1848, since 
 which date these several states have remained independent. 
 
 The general topography of Central America is entirely 
 determined by the Andes, that mountain range which extends 
 under various names from Patagonia to Alaska and forms the 
 backbone of the two American continents. In Central 
 America this mountain range runs approximately parallel to 
 the Pacific coast at an average distance of 50 miles. The 
 eastern slope is gradual, the western slope is abrupt and fur- 
 rowed by many torrents. The population consists of whites, 
 negroes and Indians and an intermixture of the three. 
 GUATEMALA. 
 
 Guatemala, the northernmost of the five republics of 
 Central America, is bounded on the west and north by Mexi- 
 co; on the east by British Honduras and the Bay of Hondu- 
 ras; on the south-east by the st; tes of Honduras and Salva- 
 dor; and on the south-west by the Pacific Ocean. The terri- 
 tory thus circumscribed has an area of 48,238 square miles, 
 a population (in 1892) of 1,510,326, and extends between 
 1345' northern latitude, and between 8810' and 9312' 
 western longtitude. For administrative purposes the repub- 
 lic is divided into 22 departments; the capital is the city of 
 Guatemala with a population of 70,000, and an elevation 
 above sea level of 5,720 feet. The city is defended by the 
 adobe fort of San Jos, 
 
 The character of the country is essentially mountainous. 
 The Andes traverse the republic from south-east to north- 
 west with a mean elevation of about 7,000 feet; some of the 
 peaks, among them volcanoes, are as high as 14,000 feet* In 
 
94 
 
 point of climate the surface of the state may be divided into 
 three zones according to altitude. The first zone comprises 
 the low, hot and unhealthy districts along the coasts of less 
 elevation than 1,300 feet. The second zone comprises the 
 highlands with elevations between 1,300 and 4,900 feet, 
 where the climate is temperate and salubrious. These 
 highlands constitute the greater part of the surface of Guate- 
 mala. The third, cold, zone comprises all land of 5,000 feet 
 elevation and more. 
 
 The greater part of the northeastern portion of the state 
 is drained by the Usumacinta river and its numerous tribu- 
 taries. For a considerable part of its course the river form? 
 the boundary between Guatemala and the Mexican state of 
 Chiapas. It empties into the Gulf of Mexico and is naviga- 
 ble for small vessels from its mouth to Tenosique in the Mex- 
 ican state of Tabasco, so that no Benefit accrues to Guatema- 
 la directly from its navigability. 
 
 The chief drain of the southeastern portion of the state 
 is the river Mutagua, which has its sources on the northern 
 slopes of the Andes; its valley is covered by forests and the 
 head of navigation is at Qualan, whence a wagon road starts 
 and accompanies the river upward for some distance. The 
 general direction of the course of this river is eastward; it 
 empties into the Bay of Honduras. The river next in impor- 
 tance is the Polochic, north of, and smaller than, the Muta- 
 gua, to which it runs approximately parallel and from which 
 it is separated by the Sierra de las Minas. In its lower course 
 the river flows through the large Lake of Yzabal and through 
 the smaller one of Golfette, and empties in the Gulf of 
 Arnatique under the name of Rio Dulce. Sternwheelers as- 
 cend the river from Lake Yzabal to Panzos, where a wagon 
 road begins. The port of Yzabal on the lake of like name is 
 defended by an old fort to the west of the town. The nar- 
 row gorge through which the river leaves the lake is defended 
 by the old and tumble-down fort of San Felipe. 
 
The rivers flowing into the Pacific are numerous and 
 .small with abrupt courses. In the rainy season they become 
 furious torrents and obstacles to land communication along 
 the coast. 
 
 Numerous lakes are spread over the surface of the state. 
 In the highlands of the northern, thinly settled, part of Gua- 
 temala there is a multitude of small lakes, the largest one, 
 that of Peten, being 45 miles long and 3 wide. The Lake of 
 Yzabal, which has been mentioned before, extends 30 miles 
 east and west with a width of 12 miles. It is deep enough 
 for all vessels, but a bar at the mouth of the Rio Dulce pre- 
 vents any but small vessels from coming up into this lake. 
 In the southern portion of the state is the Lake of Atitlan, 
 completely landlocked, 5300 feet above the sea, 18 miles long 
 and 10 wide. Lake Amatitlan lies about 4, 000 .feet above 
 sea level. Astride of the border between Guatemalaand Sal- 
 vador lies the Lake of Gulja, 2,100 feet above sea level, and 
 20 miles long by 12 wide. 
 
 The harbors are all of indiiferent character. On the At- 
 lantic, Livingston is a free port, but the water is so shallow 
 that vessels have to lie a great distance off shore. The har- 
 bor of San Thomas in the southernmost recess of the Gulf of 
 Am atique has 18 feet of water, but is unhealthy; its port, 
 Puerto Barrios, is three miles to the northeast, and the termi- 
 nus of a planned, but not yet constructed, transcontinental 
 railway, San Jose on the Pacific being the other terminus. 
 So far this railroad has been constructed from San Jose to the 
 city of Guatemala. The chief ports on the Pacific are Cham- 
 perico and San Jose, but both have poor harbors, shallow 
 water and unprotected anchorages. San Jose has a pier 600 
 feet long, but the water is too shallow for vessels to come up 
 to it. 
 
 Two railroads are in operation; 
 
 One from San Jose to Guatemala, 75 miles, which it is 
 proposed to extend to Puerto Barrios, 186 miles from Guate- 
 
96 
 
 mala. This railroad is owned by an American company and 
 subsidized by the government of Guatemala. 
 
 The other railroad runs from Champerico to Ketalhuleu, 
 25 miles, and thence to San Filipe, 15 miles further; it is 
 proposed to extend this road to Quetzaltenango, 50 miles 
 from Retain uleu. 
 
 Quite a number of wagon roads exist in Guatemala, but 
 many of them are not to be relied upon. Three roads lead 
 from the Pacific shore to the highlands north of the main 
 chain of the Andes: one from Champerico to Quetzaltenango 
 and Totonicapan, another from Ocos to San Marcos, and a 
 third from San Jose to Escuintla and Guatemala. 
 
 There are several roads running in the foothills of, and 
 parallel to, the main course of the Andes; these should be 
 regarded with suspicion on account of the many watercourses 
 they cross. An east and west road in the highlands, men- 
 tioned before, serves to connect most of the prominent towns: 
 San Marcos, Quetzaltenango, Totonicapan, Quiche, Solola, 
 Chimaltenango, Antigua, Amatilla, Guatemala, Guajuiquila- 
 pa, and Jalapa. No wagon roads run from the interior to 
 the Atlantic coast. 
 
 There are 2,411 miles of telegraph with 127 offices. A 
 line to Libertad in Salvador reaches the cable at that point. 
 
 The principal articles of export are coffee, cacao, hides 
 and wool. The mines produce gold, silver and copper. In 
 1893 the imports and exports amounted to 6,384,000 pesos 
 nnd 19,087,000 pesos. For the fiscal year 1893-94 the reve- 
 nue and expenditures were 10,422,752 and 11,401,418 pesos 
 respectively, while the interior and foreign debts amounted to 
 6,020,062 pesos and 920,000 respectively. (The peso is no- 
 minally equal in value to a silver dollar, in fact it is worth 
 but 77 cents,) 
 
 In 1891 the army consisted of 3,718 men, the expenses 
 for which constituted one-tenth of the public expenditures. 
 The militia numbers 33,700 men (on paper). 
 
97 
 
 The country is capable of producing great wealth, but 
 the prime requisite for development, as in all Central Amer- 
 ican states, is the construction of roads and railroads, which, 
 however, presents unusual difficulties on account of the very 
 irregular surface, and is at present beyond the means of the 
 states. The next great requisite is the development of agri- 
 culture. 
 
 The Mutagua river leads from the Atlantic to the very 
 heart of the state and the harbor of San Thomas is but a short 
 distance from the valley of this river, through which as yet no 
 wagon road runs from the coast to the capital. By 
 means of light draught vessels an invading force might enter 
 the Lake of Yzabal from Livingston and have its supplies 
 transported by water up the Polochic as far asPanzos, whence 
 a wagon road leads to Coban and Salama. The occupation 
 of these points would cut the northern half of the state off 
 completely, but on the other hand this force would be practi- 
 cally cut off from troops operating in the southern part of the 
 *tate, as no wagon roads cross the Sierra de las Mi nas or lead 
 to Guatemala from the two places just named. Invasion 
 from San Jose or Champeiico or both, would reach more di- 
 rectly the capital as well as the highlands which produce and 
 contain the wealth of the state. In any event, from what- 
 over point an invader may start, he will find in his path 
 many strong natural positions and mountain passes, he will 
 have difficulty in moving his artillery and have to rely on 
 pack animals for transportation and on mounted infantry for 
 fighting. The highlands once conquered, the invader is mas- 
 ter of the country. 
 
 SALVADOR. 
 
 This is the smallest of all Central American states, hav- 
 ing an area about 8,000 square miles, with a population of 
 780,000. The state extends between 1315' and 1430' 
 northern latitude, and between 8745' and 9015' western 
 .longitude, and is bounded on the north by Honduras, on the 
 
98 
 
 east by Honduras and the Gulf of Fonseca, on the south by 
 the Pacific and on the north-west by Guatemala. The capi- 
 tal is San Salvador with 20,000 inhabitants and an altitude 
 of 2,800 feet. For administrative purposes the state is 
 divided into 14 departments. The outline of the state is 
 practically a rectangle with sides of 1 40 and 60 miles in 
 length. 
 
 The greater part of the country consists of a plateau, 
 with an average elevation of about 2,000 feet above sea level, 
 broken by a large number of volcanic cones. The main chain 
 of the Andes lies to the north, beyond the boundaries of the 
 state. 
 
 The river Lempa drains the greater part of the state; it 
 rises in the Lake of Gulja, follows for two-thirds of its course 
 an easterly direction, then curves to the south and empties 
 into the Pacific. It discharges a considerable body of water 
 throughout the year, but is not navigable on account of rapids. 
 The harbors are those of Acajutla, La Libertad and La 
 Union. The first has a pier, but the water is so shallow that 
 vessels have to lie quite a distance offshore and lighters have 
 to be employed. La Union is situated in a recess of the Gulf 
 of Fonseca, forms a landlocked basin with four or five fathoms 
 of water, aud is spoken of by some writers as the best harbor 
 of Central America. This statement is disputed by others, 
 who maintain that the harbor has but eight feet of water. La 
 Libertad has an iron pier running three-quarters of a mile 
 out into the sea, but the water is so low that vessels cannot 
 approach within less than two miles of it. 
 
 A railway connects the port of Acajutla with the inland 
 towns of Santa Anna and Ateos, 53 miles, and is nearly 
 completed to San Tecla (1892). The country is said to be 
 traversed by many miles of good wagon road. ''Although 
 San Salvador is the smallest in area of the group of republics, 
 and only a little larger than Connecticut, it is the most pros- 
 perous, the most enterprising, and the most densely populated, 
 
99 
 
 having even a greater number of inhabitants than the land 
 of wooden nutmegs. The population averages about 80 to 
 the square mile, almost twenty times that of its neighbors. 
 The natives are inclined to civilized pursuits, being engaged 
 not only in agriculture, but quite extensively in manufacture. 
 They are more energetic and industrious than the people in 
 other parts of Central America, work harder, and accomplish 
 more, gain wealth rapidly, and are frugal; but the constant- 
 ly recurring earthquakes and political disturbances keep the 
 country poor. When the towns are destroyed by volcanic 
 eruptions, they are not allowed to lie in ruins, as those of 
 other countries are, but the inhabitants at once clear away 
 the rubbish and begin to rebuild. The city of San Salvador 
 has been twice rebuilt since Leon of Nicaragua was laid in 
 ruins, but the debris in the latter city has never been dis- 
 turbed. The capital of San Salvador has been thrice almost 
 entirely, and eleven times in its history partially, destroye d 
 by earthquakes and volcanic eruptions corning together. 
 
 San Salvador has always taken the lead in the poli tica] 
 affairs of Central America. It was the first to throw off the 
 yoke of Spain, and uttered the first cry of liberty, as Vene- 
 zuela did among the nations of the southern continent."* 
 
 In 1893 the revenues and expenditures were $7,133,000 
 and $7,153,000, the internal and foreign debts $3,964,000 
 and $1,305,000, the imports and exports $1,853,000 and 
 $7,491,000. The chief articles of export are coffee, indigo, 
 minerals and tobacco. 
 
 There are in existence 1,803 miles of telegraph with 138 
 offices; La Libertad is the cable office. 
 
 The army numbers 4,000 men and the militia 15,000, all 
 males between 18 and 40 years of age being liable to military 
 service. 
 
 *W. E. Curtis, "The Capitals of Spanish America." 
 
100 
 
 HONDURAS. 
 
 The state of Honduras extends between 1310' and 15 
 45' northern latitude, and between 8530' and 8945' western 
 longtitude, and is bounded on the north by the Caribbean Sea, 
 on the south-west by the Gulf of Fonseca and the state of 
 Salvador, on the north-west by Guatemala. The population 
 is 306,048, the area about 45,500 square miles. The capital 
 of the state is Tegucigalpa, which has 12,000 inhabitants and 
 is situated 3,200 feet above the sea. The state is divided into 
 13 departments. 
 
 The character of the country is mountainous and very ir- 
 regular. The general direction of the watershed between 
 the Atlantic and Pacific is east and west, its course tortuous- 
 The river system is the best developed in Central America, 
 the principal rivers, all of which flow into the Atlantic and 
 are navigable by small vessels for considerable distances, 
 being the following: 
 
 The Ulua, which drains nearly one-third of the area of 
 the state and is navigable for small vessels for many miles; i t 
 flows into the Bay of Honduras. 
 
 The Aguan, emptying into the Antilles Sea east of Tu- 
 jillo. 
 
 The Rio Negro, 
 
 The Rio Patuca and 
 
 The Rio Segovia (also called Wanks or Cocos), which 
 rises in the Corpus Christi Mountains within 35 miles of the 
 Gulf of Fonseca, and in the lower half of its course forms the 
 boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua. 
 
 The three principal rivers which flow into the Pacific 
 (Gulf of Fouseca), the Goascaran forming the boundary 
 between Guatemala and Salvador in the lower half of its 
 course the Nacaome and Choluteca, are smaller than tnoso 
 flowing into the Atlantic and not navigable. 
 
 The headwaters of the Ulua and the three rivers flowing 
 into the Pacific, enclose a plateau in the center of the state. 
 
101 
 
 The climate as in other Central American states, depend? 
 on the altitude; the greater part of Honduras consists of 
 salubrious highlands. 
 
 The principal harbors are those of Ornoa and Trujillo on 
 the Atlantic and Amapala on the Pacific. Omoa, near Puer- 
 to Caballos, which it has supplanted, hasdocks"on which the 
 largest steamers can tie up" (?) and "is defended by a strong 
 (?) work 'El Castillo de San Fernando.' " The harbor of Tru- 
 jillo has little depth and the ships have to anchor a mile from 
 shore in an unprotected roadstead. The best harbor is that 
 of Amapala in the Gulf of Fonseca. This magnificant gulf, 
 50 miles long and 30 wide, is entered through a gate 18 miles 
 wide, a massive volcano on either side foiming the gate posts 
 as it were. The gulf is dotted with islands belonging to 
 Honduras and Salvador. On Tigre island, belonging to Hon- 
 duras, is the port of Amapala with a harbor which is safe and 
 has sufficient depth for seagoing vessels. The traffic between 
 the port and mainland, the towns of LaBrea and San Loren- 
 zo, is carried on by lighters. "The first impression on land- 
 ing at Tigre Island is its splendid facilities for fortification, 
 and the formation of a irreat central commercial depot from 
 which to command the trade of the three states bordering on 
 the Bay of Fouseca. Its resources fully developed, Amapa- 
 la might be made the most important port on the Pacific south 
 of San Francisco." In the southern portion of the gulf is the 
 mouth of the Nicaraguan river Estero Real, which is naviga- 
 ble for large vessels for a considerable distance. 
 
 The construction of a transcontinental railroad was be- 
 gun some time ago, and shared the fate of all such railroads 
 in Central America except those of Tehauntepec and Pana- 
 ma, i. e., it has not been completed. Beginning at Puerto 
 Caballos the railroad runs to San Pedro Sula, its present ter- 
 minus; from here it is to follow the course of the Ulua river, 
 cross the watershed and terminate at the Gulf of Fonseca. 
 The length of road in operation is 37 miles. A good wagon 
 
102 
 
 road leads from San Lorenzo to Tegucigalpa, and thence to 
 Puerto Caballos, but its quality over the latter course is not 
 vouched for. 
 
 1,800 miles of telegraph with 70 offices are in operation. 
 
 Agriculture is in a most primitive state, the chief pro- 
 ducts being tobacco, sugar and bananas. In minerals Hondu- 
 ras is the richest of all Central American states, but mining 
 like other industries, is of primitive character. In view of 
 this undeveloped state and the recent wars in which Hondu- 
 ras has been engaged, we need not be surprised at finding in 
 matters financial a large balance against her. The foreign 
 debt, on whicn no interest has been paid since 1872, amounts 
 to $26,992,850 and the internal debt to $2,742,574. In 1892 
 the revenues and expenditures were $1,764,137 and $2,603,- 
 000. In the same year the imports and exports were 
 $2,005,000 and $1,873,000, the chief exports being livestock, 
 bananas and silver. 
 
 The army numbers 500 men; the militia consists (on 
 paper) of some 20,500 men. 
 
 The Ulua river and Gulf of Fonseca form the natural 
 gateways of the country. The capital is 65 miles from the 
 latter and 150 miles from the former. In view of this differ- 
 ence in distance, in view of the facilities offered by the Gulf 
 of Fonseca and the harbor of Amapala, and in view of the 
 good communication from San Lorenzo to Tegucigalpa, an 
 invader would naturally base himself on Amapala. 
 NICARAGUA. 
 
 This state, lying between 1030' and 15 northern lati- 
 tude, and between 8311' and 8740' western longtitude, con- 
 tains an area of 49,500 square miles and a population of 312- 
 845 souls; it is bounded on the north by Honduras, on the east 
 by the Caribbean Sea, on the south by Costa Rica and on the 
 west by the Pacific Ocean. The capital, Managua, has 16,700 
 inhabitants. 
 
 The territory is traversed by the Andes from the south- 
 
103 
 
 east to the north-west, with a mean elevation of about 5,000 
 feet. The eastern slope is gradual, and the land falls in 
 broad terraced plateaus down to the Mosquito Coast and is 
 drained by the Wanks, Wawa, Rio Grande and Escondido 
 rivers, all unsuitable for navigation. In the northern part of the 
 state the Andes send out a spur, the Sierra of Yeluca, which 
 penetrates far to the north-east between the Wanks and Wawa 
 rivers. The east coast is flat and unhealthy, fringed with la- 
 goons and keys. 
 
 The western slope of the Andes is abrupt; at its foot lies 
 an extensive depression stretching 300 miles from the south- 
 east to the north-west, parallel to the coast, and with a mean 
 elevation of about 100 feet. In this basin lie the great lakes 
 of Nicaragua and Managua, the former of which measures 
 100 miles in length and 40 miles in width and has about 15 
 feet less elevation than Lake Managua, which is 50 miles long 
 by 25 wide. The communication between these two lakes 
 bears the name of Tipitapa river: it contains water only when 
 the rainy season has swelled Lake Managua, and, at any rate, 
 cannot be utilized for navigation because of the abrupt drop 
 of 15 feet into Lake Nicaragua. The Nicaragua Canal Com" 
 pany is required by its contract to build a canal connecting 
 the two lakes. Between the lakes and the steep rocky coast 
 of the Pacific intervenes an elevation which from a mere 
 range of hills in the south-west swells to a high ridge dotted 
 with volcanic peaks and runs to the north-west parallel to the 
 coast. A similar chain of volcanoes extends from the north- 
 western shore of Lake Managua to the Gulf of Fonseca, 
 where its northernmost volcano, Conseguina, forms the south- 
 ern gatepost of the gulf. In the depression in which the 
 lakes lie, is concentrated the civilization and wealth of the 
 state, here lies the capital Managua, the commercial center 
 Leon, which formerly was the capital, and most of the towns 
 of any importance. Here are also the large estates and plan- 
 tations which produce the wealth of the country. The eastern 
 >Iopes of the Andes are almost uninhabited. 
 
104 
 
 Nicaragua boasts of two railways, one from Corinto (also 
 called Realejo) to Momotombo, on Lake Managua, 58 miles 
 in length, and another from Managua to Grenada, 38 miles in 
 length. Concessions for several other roads have been 
 granted. "There is only one road in the country suitable 
 for carriages and that is seldom used except by carts. It runs 
 from Grenada, the easternmost city of importance on the 
 shore of Lake Nicaragua, to Realejo, the principal seaport; 
 and over this road, which was built 300 years ago by the 
 Spaniards, all the commerce of the country passes. * * 
 Over it have passed hundreds of armies and no end of insur- 
 gent forces, and the whole distance has been washed in blood, 
 shed in public and private quarrels." 
 
 The harbors are those of Corinto and San Juan del Sur 
 on the Pacific, and San Juan del Norte (Greytown) on the 
 the Atlantic coast. The latter has a very poor harbor (not 
 many years ago it had sufficient water for the largest vessels, 
 but has been rapidly filling with sand), which is now being 
 improved by the Nicaragua Canal Company. San Juan del 
 Sur is an open roadstead, vessels anchoring five miles from 
 shore. Corinto is said to be a magnificant harbor with deep 
 water, but there are also statements to the contrary. 
 
 The mines produce gold and silver, other products and 
 chief articles of export, are coffee, rubber, woods, indigo, 
 sugar, cacao and bananas. There is practically no manufac- 
 ture. The revenues and expenditures in 1892 were $1,764,- 
 1)28 and $2,983,576, the interior and foreign debts $2,742,565 
 and (estimated) $6,000,000; the imports and exports in 1890 
 were $2,780,000 and $3,500,000. 
 
 The army numbers about 700 men, the militia 25,000. 
 
 "There is no spot of equal area upon the globe in which 
 so much human blood has been wasted in civil war, or so 
 much wanton destruction committed. Nature has blessed it 
 with wonderful resources, and a few years of peace and indus- 
 try would make the country prosperous beyond comparison; 
 
105 
 
 hut so much attention has been paid to politics that little is 
 left for anything else. Scarcely a year has passed without a 
 revolution, and during its sixty-five years of independence 
 the republic has known more than five times as many rulers 
 us it had during the three centuries it was under the do- 
 minion of Spain. It was seldom a principle or policy that 
 brought the inhabitants to war, but usually the intrigue of 
 some ambitious men. It is a land of volcanic disturbance, 
 physical, moral and political, and the mountains and men 
 have between them contrived to almost compass its destruction. 
 
 For sixty years the country has been going backward; 
 its population is less than when independence was declared, 
 and its wealth has decreased even more rapidly. Its cities 
 are heaps of ruins, and its commerce is not so great as it was 
 at the beginning of the century" * 
 
 COSTA RICA. 
 
 Costa Rica, the southernmost of the five republics of 
 Central America, extends between 8 and 11 16' northern 
 latitude, and between 8140' and 75 40' western longtitude. 
 The area is 31,220 square miles, the number of inhabitants 
 262,700. The state is bounded on the north by Nicaragua; 
 on the east by the Caribbean Sea; on the south-east by Pa- 
 nama and on the south-west and west by the Pacific Ocean. 
 The state is divided into five departments and two provinces. 
 
 The boundary between Costa Rica and Panama seems as 
 yet unsettled; on some maps it is shown as an irregular line 
 from Punta Burica on the Pacific to Punta Tervi on the At- 
 lantic, which is the boundary claimed by Panama. Other 
 maps make the boundary an imaginary line from Punta Buri- 
 ca to Punta de Chiriqui, which is the boundary claimed by 
 Costa Rica and is the ancient boundary under Spanish domin- 
 ioo. The northern boundary has only quite recently been 
 settled by President Cleveland, by arbitration between Nica- 
 
 *W, E. Curtis, "The Capitals of Spanish America." 
 
106 
 
 ragua and Costa Rica. On the Atlantic side the boundary 
 begins at the Puntade Castilla and follows the San Juan river 
 as far as Castillo Viejo; at this point the line recedes two 
 miles to the south of the river and continues westward in this 
 relative position to the river and to Lake Nicaragua until 
 the Sapoa river is reached, whence the line turns to the 
 south-west and runs in one straight course to the Bay of Sali- 
 nas. 
 
 The east coast is flat, fringed with lagoons and stretches 
 in almost straight line from south-east to north-west. The 
 water is shallow. The only port is that of Limon which has 
 A pier 900 feet long and 22 feet of water at low tide. The 
 town is surrounded by marshes, has bad drinking water and 
 is unhealthy. The Pacific coast is more diversified and pos- 
 sesses numerous gulfs and bays, the most important of which, 
 beginning from the north, are those of Salinas, Santa Elena, 
 Murcielago, Culebras, Nicoya, Herradura (said to be a mag- 
 nificant harbor (?) ), and Dulce. There are also two consi- 
 derable peninsulas, those of Nicoya and Dulce, both embrac- 
 ing gulfs of like names. In the northern one of the two 
 gulfs lies the port of Punta Arenas; there is but seven feet of 
 water in the harbor so that vessels have to lie a long distance 
 offshore. The locality is hot and unhealthy. Culebra, lying 
 farther to the north at the head of a small bay of the same 
 name, is said to have a very fine harbor and anchorage for 
 the largest vessels. 
 
 The Andes traverse the country from the south-east to 
 the north-west in a course more nearly parallel to the west 
 than the east coast. In its northern portion this range cuts 
 off the peninsula of Nicoya from the rest of the state. 
 
 The Pacific slope is abrupt and furrowed by numerous 
 watercourses, which in the rainy season, November to May, 
 come rushing down the mountain side with great force and 
 carry everything before them. The Atlantic slope is more 
 gradual and contains the greater area. Along the coast the 
 
107 
 
 climate is hot, but in the highlands of the interior it is mild 
 and very pleasant. On the Atlantic side of the mountains 
 are vast stretches of impenetrable, virgin forests; the north- 
 eastern part of the state, which is comparatively level and 
 unexplored, is likewise covered in part by great wooded dis- 
 tricts, in part by extensive prairies, and traversed by two riv- 
 ers, the San Carlos and Sarapiqui, tributaries of the San Juan, 
 and navigable for some distance by small craft. 
 
 At about 10 northern latitude the mountain chain 
 shows a broad gap in the direction from east to west. In 
 this gap lie highlands of an elevation of 5,000 feet, which de- 
 scend on the one side to Puuta Arenas, on the other to Limon. 
 These highlands constitute the healthiest, most populous and 
 cultivated part of the state. Here lies the capital San Jose, 
 the city of Cartago and most of the large towns. 
 
 Calvo in his work on Costa Rica states that all the towns 
 and villages are connected by more or less well built wagon- 
 roads. The only good wagon road vouched for is that from 
 Punta Arenas to Cartago. Other roads, as those from Punta 
 Arenas north to Rivas and Managua, from Cartago to Grey- 
 town, from Cartago to Terraba and David (Panama), and 
 from Cartago to Limon are stated by some to be mere trails; 
 they should therefore not be unconditionally relied upon. 
 
 The construction of a transcontinental railroad from 
 Punta Arenas to Puerto Limon was undertaken in 1871. It is 
 a narrow gauge and the portion from Esparta to Alajuela, 
 some thirty or forty miles, has not yet been completed. Li- 
 mon and Punta Arenas are the termini of the road. 
 
 620 miles of telegraph with 43 stations are in operation. 
 
 The resources of the country are great but poorly devel- 
 oped. There are practically no manufactures. Coffee and 
 bananas form the chief exports. The forests abound in valu- 
 able timbers and cabinet woods, the mines produce gold, sil- 
 ver and copper. Of live stock there were in 1888, 50,000 
 horses, 262,000 cattle and 2,152 sheep in the country, which 
 
108 
 
 does not produce all the cereals it consumes, as flour figures 
 largely among the imports from the United States. The 
 revenues in 1892 amounted to 5,808,474, and the expendi- 
 tures 5,449,290 pesos. The interior and foreign debts in the 
 same year were 2,811,102 and 18,864,541 pesos. No interest 
 has lately been paid on the foreign debt, and the state is now 
 trying to compromise with its creditors on 50 per cent. 
 
 The standing army numbers 600 men, the militia (on 
 paper) 31,824 men; every male between 18 and 50 years of 
 age is liable to military service. 
 
 From what little has been stated, it is evident that the 
 highlands in the gap of the Andes form the key to the coun- 
 try. The gap contains the only communication between the 
 east and west coast. From the towns in this gap radiate 
 what few communications the country boasts of. The culti- 
 vation, civilization and wealth of the state are concentrated 
 in this gap. To an invader either Limon or Punta Arenas 
 might serve as a base. If Limon were selected, no benefit 
 would be likely to accrue from the railroad as it runs over so 
 many high bridges, that it could easily be disabled beyond 
 repair, for a long time at least. The only communication 
 with the interior would then be a fairly good trail suitable 
 for pack animals only, for the road from Cartago to Limon 
 is nothing more than that. To these disadvantages should 
 be added the deathly climate of Limon. On the other hand 
 if an invader base himself on Punta Arenas, he will have good 
 wagon roads assured him; the climate of Punta Arenas, if bad, 
 is better than that of Limon, and last, but not least, the dis- 
 tance from the coast to the capital is much shorter and more 
 easily traversed from the Pacific than from the Atlantic side. 
 
 A new railroad has lately been planned starting from 
 Rio Jimenez on the Limon Cartago railroad, to the north, 
 crossing the San Carlos and Sarapiqui at the head of naviga- 
 tion and terminating at some point on Lake Nicaragua. This 
 railroad is designed as a competitor of the Nicaragua Canal. 
 
In the area described in the preceding pages are two 
 districts, which of late have come prominently before the 
 American public, but have not yet been described here. 
 They aie British Honduras, or Belize, and the Mosquito 
 Coast. 
 
 British Honduras is a strip of territory in northern Gua- 
 temala to which state it originally belonged. The boundary 
 begins at the mouth of the Sarstoon River in the Gulf of 
 Amatique, ascends the river to the rapids of Gracias a Dios, 
 turns to the right in a straight line to Garbutt's rapids in the 
 river Belize, whence it runs due north until it meets the Rio 
 Bravo; from this point it follows the Bravo to the mouth of 
 the Hondo, of which the Bravo is a tributary. The first 
 British settlement was made here by log cutters; by succes- 
 sive treaties the settlement was enlarged until it assumed it& 
 present boundaries. In the treaties with Spain as well as in 
 the treaties made by Great Britain subsequently o the inde- 
 pendence of Central America with other states, it was express 
 ly stipulated that Great Britain should not acquire aiiy- 
 sovereignty over this district. If, nevertheless, Belize is a 
 British colony to-day, it is chiefly to be ascribed to the fact 
 that in the Clayton Bulwer treaty concluded between the 
 United States and Great Britain in 1850, an exception was 
 made in favor of the British settlement in Belize as in favor 
 of everything else that might enable Great Britain to gain a 
 foothold in Central America or the West Indies and prevent 
 us from doing the same. This treaty was for the United 
 States a diplomatic defeat of the first magnitude and since ite 
 conclusion our people have vainly endeavored to find out 
 whether its ratification was due to culpable indifference or 
 gross lack of foresight. 
 
 The area of Belize is 7,652 square miles, with a population 
 of 31,000. The climate along the coast is unhealthy. The 
 chief exports are mahogany, logwood and fruits. "The ap- 
 proach to the coast is through keys and coral reefs and is both 
 
110 
 
 difficult and dangerous. The population is mainly negro, in- 
 troduced originally as slaves, whence has sprung a hybrid 
 race from intermixture with Europeans and Indians." The 
 chief importance of Belize lies in the fact that it constitutes a 
 British foothold on the mainland of Central America and 
 that it is situated so as to flank the water route from the 
 eastern outlet of the Nicaragua Canal to the Gulf of Mexico. 
 
 The Mosquito territory is a quadrangular piece of laud 
 extending about 180 miles north and south and 40 miles east 
 and west, and constituting the greater part of Nicaragua'^ 
 Atlantic coast. The southern boundary begins at the mouth 
 of the Rama river, ascends the same about 40 miles, turn> 
 due north until it meets the Wawa river, which it follows to 
 its mouth. Great Britain exercised a protectorate over the 
 Mosquito coast from 1660 to the conclusion of the Clayton 
 Bulwer treaty. In accordance with this treaty Great Bri- 
 tain ceded the protectorate of the Mosquito Coast along with 
 the Bay Islands to Honduras, a proceeding which gave rise 
 to much discontent among the natives of the coast and a com- 
 plete rebellion of the islanders. By a subsequent treaty, con - 
 eluded January 26, 1860, the whole territory was finally 
 handed over to Nicaragua. 
 
 The principal settlement is Bluefields, of recent notorie- 
 ty. The coast is flat, fringed with keys, and difficult to ap- 
 proach. The chief exports are mahogany, cacoa, ginger and 
 sarsaparilla. The population is much like that of Belize, 
 and is insignificant in numbers. Importance attaches to this 
 strip of land only on account of its proximity to the eastern 
 outlet of the Nicaragua Canal, and to the evident endeavors 
 of Great Britain to recover her foothold there under one pre- 
 text or another. 
 
 After giving this brief outline of climatic, topographical, 
 and political conditions of Central America, it becomes the 
 further task of military geography to discuss the relative ad- 
 
Ill 
 
 vantages aud disadvantages that would accrue in time of war 
 from the configuration and nature of the frontiers and the 
 geographical situation of each state relative to its neighbors, 
 and to consider the probable lines of operation and communi- 
 cation, and theaters of war. In this task we are greatly re- 
 stricted by the limited information as to topographical detail 
 and routes of communication. With the exception of San 
 Salvador the Central American States are very sparsely 
 settled, in fact the greater part of the territory they comprise 
 may, for our purposes, be considered uninhabited. This is 
 true ol the northern half of Guatemala, a large part of Hon- 
 duras, nearly all of Nicaragua east of the Andes (with the 
 exception of a small portion of the Mosquito Coast), and the 
 northeastern as well as the southwestern portion of Costa 
 Rica. That is the real reason why the sources of information 
 are deficient, yet for placing an estimate on the military adap- 
 tibility of theaters of operation, topographical knowledge is 
 the first requisite. Still what information we have, will al- 
 low us to draw some military conclusions of a general charac- 
 ter. 
 
 The military forces of the Central American states consist 
 of small standing armies and of the militia. The former all 
 writers agree are of the most miserable character and unwor- 
 thy of the term ''armies" as understood by the military stu- 
 dent. The regular forces are recruited from the lowest 
 classes, and as regards intelligence, training, armament and 
 equipment, are as sorry a lot of men as ever styled themselves 
 soldiers. The lower classes of the people are a mixture of 
 white, negro and Indian blood, uneducated and ignorant, lazy 
 and averse even to what little labor the fertile soil requires to 
 furnish them with subsistence. In the veins of the whites 
 runs the fiery southern blood, but their arrogance and pride 
 are equaled only by their ignorance. The militia, which is 
 called out in cases of emergency, would, on account of the ad- 
 mixture of this white stock, no doubt prove far superior to 
 
112 
 
 the regular army as a fighting body. In the absence of any 
 training of this militia in time of peace, it is not believed that 
 in war it would amount to more than an assemblage of armed 
 bands; but if ably led and with its fierce passions roused, it 
 would no doubt give a good account of itself. If it were con- 
 fronted, however, by good regular troops, it would be the old 
 story of enthusiasm, patriotism and valor pitted against or- 
 ganization, training and discipline, so frequently and luridly 
 illustrated in war history. The country would succumb to- 
 day to any civilized power as readily as it did 300 years ago 
 to a handful of avaricious cavaliers from Spain. Once dis- 
 persed these armed bands would probably carry on a trouble- 
 some guerrilla warfare and be hard to hunt down. 
 
 It lies iu the nature of such forces to operate in small, 
 mobile columns. Unencumbered by the impedimenta of a 
 modern army, they are able to move by routes impracticable 
 for regular troops. Moreover in such sparsely settled coun- 
 tries as those under consideration, forces of this character, 
 besides being the only ones available, may be perfectly able 
 to bring the war to a decisive issue. In the following discus- 
 sion no notice can of course be taken of such operations, for 
 there may be many passes over the many mountain chains on 
 the frontiers and elsewhere of which we are not aware and of 
 which they may avail themselves. The discussion is there- 
 fore limited to such considerations as would be important to 
 regularly organized and trained troops. 
 GUATEMALA. 
 
 This state has lately attracted some attention by its dis- 
 pute with Mexico, which at one time threatened to become a 
 <'osus belli. On the west and north Guatemala is bounded by 
 the Mexican states of Chiapas, Tabasco and Yucatan. This 
 frontier may be divided into three unequal portions as follows: 
 
 1 . The Pacific portion from the mouth of the Suchiate 
 -river to the crest of the Andes. 
 
 2. The central portion from the crest of the Andes to 
 
113 
 
 the poiut on the Usumacinta river where the frontiers of Ta- 
 basco, Chiapas, and Guatemala meet. 
 
 3. The northern portion from the Usumacinta river to 
 the Hondo. 
 
 The territory contiguous to both sides of this northern 
 frontier seems to be almost uninhabited and devoid of com- 
 munications; both sides would therefore find great difficulty 
 in assembling their forces here. The valley of the Rio San 
 Pedro, a tributary of the Usumacinta, might serve either side 
 as a route for a raiding invasion. 
 
 Along the northern half of the central portion of the 
 frontier, according to one division, the course of the Usuma- 
 cinta marks the boundary line. The territory on either side 
 is mountainous, sparsely settled even for those parts, and de- 
 void of communications. For these and other reasons, it is 
 not expected that in case of war we shall hear of strategic 
 feats based on the salient and re-entrant angles formed here 
 by the S shaped course of the Usumacinta. The southern 
 half of this central portion of the frontier is crossed by many 
 ridges and water courses, tributaries of the Chiapas river, 
 which empties into the Gulf of Mexico. The maps here show 
 a road from San Cristobal, the capital of Chiapas, to Huehue- 
 tenango in Guatemala. A Mexican army taking this road 
 would thus reach the settled and cultivated parts of Guatema- 
 la, the highlands mentioned in the first part of this paper and 
 the roads by which its towns are connected. Operations on 
 this road would therefore strike at the heart of Guatemala. 
 It is probable that difficulties of supply would detract much 
 from the eligibility of this road as the principal line of com- 
 munication. A Guatemalan army invading. Chiapas by this 
 road would of course encounter similiar difficulties, though 
 perhaps to a less degree, since it would descend into the more 
 open country on the banks of the Chiapas. The selection of 
 this line by Guatemala, were she able to assume the offensive, 
 would enable her to meet her superior opponent on more 
 
114 
 
 nearly equal terms by depriving him of the services of his 
 shipping in supplying his forces, which would not be the case 
 if the operations took place near the coast; for Mexico has a 
 few war vessels and some merchant shipping, while Guate- 
 mala has neither. 
 
 The Pacific portion of the frontier would seem to con- 
 stitute the natural line of operations for Mexico which, by 
 its great superiority over Guatemala, ought to force the latter 
 on the defensive from the beginning. Advancing along the 
 coast against Champerico the invading army could march 
 light, having its supplies carried and subsistence insured by 
 a fleet moving abreast of the army. Champerico might be 
 made into an immediate base. This place gains all the more 
 importance from the fact that it is not only a port, but the 
 terminus of the railroad to Retalhuleu. At the latter point, 
 if it could be gained and the railroad be made available, the 
 invading force would be within a few marches of the rich part 
 of Guatemala with short and commodious communications in 
 its rear. Still more decisive would be a direct descent on 
 San Jose*, the port of the capital and terminus of a railroad 
 leading to that city. There the invader would find himself 
 on the shortest road to the most important part of Guatema- 
 la. Whether Mexico possesses sufficient shipping for such a 
 . move is not known . It is likewise impossible to state what 
 difficulties the invader would encounter when striking out for 
 the interior either from Champerico or San Jose, but it seems 
 safe to assert that they would be many and considerable on 
 account of the mountainous character of the terrain and the 
 many defensive positions offered by such ground. Mexican 
 4ufantry % has been known to march forty miles per day in 
 midsummer on the lower Rio Grande, and for all we know, 
 the road from San Cristobal to Huehuetenango may be as 
 practicable for it as is a chausse"e for an European army. 
 
 Perhaps it is not out of place here to point out the advan- 
 tages Mexico derives from her trans-isthmian railway of Te- 
 
115 
 
 huantepec which places the resources of her east and west 
 coast alike at her disposal on either coast. 
 
 In the discussion of the other frontiers of Guatemala, as 
 well as of those of the remaining Central American states, it 
 will be found that the spaces are few where armies could move 
 with effect. This is due partly to the uninhabited state of the 
 contiguous territories, partly to the impenetrable obstacles 
 offered by the frontiers. It is only along the Pacific coast 
 that communication throughout seems to exist. 
 GUATEMALA HONDURAS. 
 
 The line of demarcation between Guatemala and Hon- 
 duras lies on the crests of the Sierras del Espirito Santo and 
 Merendon, which extend, one in prolongation of the other, 
 from the bay of Honduras to Lake Culja (situated astride of 
 the Guatemala-Salvador frontier.) What kind of passes, if 
 any, lead across these mountains, we do not know. This 
 chain of mountains is the water-shed between the Mutagua 
 in Guatemala and the Ulua in Honduras. The valleys of 
 both form the natural thoroughfares from the east coast to the 
 interior. These rivers converge as they approach the Bay of 
 Honduras, and are less than 40 miles apart at their mouth. 
 GUATEMALA SALVADOR. 
 
 The frontier between these countries offers two highroads 
 of invasion, the <-ne along the Pacific coast, the other, separ- 
 ated from the first by an intervening range of mountains, 
 along the shores of Lake Gulja. The valleys leading down 
 to the lake on the Guatemalan side and up to it on the Salva- 
 dorian side, furnish the shortest thoroughfare from the center 
 of one state to that of the other. Of their practicability or 
 otherwise nothing is known. 
 
 SALVADOR. 
 
 The frontier between Salvador and Honduras is irregular 
 in outline and intersected by mountains and watercourses. 
 Too little is known to allow us to venture any statement on 
 this point beyond this, that the valleys of the Lempa and its 
 
116 
 
 tributary Guarambala seem to constitute the only natural 
 communication between the two states along the northern 
 frontier of Salvador. The eastern boundary of this state runs 
 almost due north and south and is formed by the Goascoran 
 river which empties into the Gulf of Fouseca. Nothing fur- 
 ther can be stated here except the fact that a Salvadorian 
 force on the Goascoran would threaten the highroad from the 
 gulf to Tegucigalpa, while a Honduran force similiarly placed 
 on this river would not threaten the communications of the 
 Salvadorian capital with its port. Of the islands situated in 
 the gulf, that of Amapala has been mentioned before on ac- 
 count of the many advantages it offers. To the south of 
 Araapala, just inside of and opposite the center of the en- 
 trance to the gulf, lies the island of Manguera so as to com- 
 mand the entrance. When Honduras and Salvador shall 
 have developed into powerful states on land and sea, these is- 
 lands are bound to play a great role in matters military. 
 HONDURAS. 
 
 The frontiers of this state toward Guatemala and Salva- 
 dor have been discussed, and it only remains to deal with th- 
 Nicaragua frontier. Beginning at Cape Gracias a Dios on th; k 
 eastern coast the boundary is marked by the course of the 
 Wanks river for about 150 miles (on the air line) and is then 
 taken up by a series of sierras continuing to within 25 miles 
 of the Gulf of Fonseca. The uninhabited state of the coun - 
 try on both banks of the Wanks and the long mountain 
 barrier point to the shores of the Gulf of Fonseca as the pro- 
 bable theater of hostilities in case of war between these states. 
 NICARAGUA. 
 
 As in the north, so in the south, Nicaragua is limited as 
 regards maneuvering ground, to the narrow strip adjoining 
 the Pacific. Those parts of Costa Rica which adjoin the great 
 lake and the San Juan river, consist of extensive plains, densi 1 
 forests and some hilly country almost unexplored and unin- 
 habited. North of the San Juan the Nicaraguan territory 
 
117 
 
 next to the lake is very rugged, and what few settlements 
 there are, are in the low lands adjacent to the eastern coast. 
 There remains thus but the small part of the frontier marked 
 by the line from the Sapoa to the Bay of Salinas, in which to 
 conduct operations. By advancing thence toward the head 
 of the Bay of Nicoya, a Nicaraguan army would skirt the 
 western slopes of the Andes, that side of the mountains on 
 which the wealth and population of Costa Rica are to be 
 found. A Costa Rican force taking the same route forinvad- 
 ing Nicaragua would have to gain in the first place the com- 
 mand of the lakes as otherwise it might be assailed in rear 
 and have its communications intercepted. On the other hand 
 the control of the lakes would confer enormous advantages on 
 the invader as this control means the control of the wealthy 
 and settled part of Nicaragua. 
 
 COSTA RICA. 
 
 The northern frontier of this state has just been con- 
 sidered. Of the southern boundary nothing can be said, of 
 course, since that boundary is not as yet definately established. 
 
 We cannot conclude this part of the subject without 
 making a few remarks on the Gulf of Fonseca, and its adap- 
 tability as a central base of operations in Central America, 
 by land and sea. It has previously been pointed out that the 
 Pacific surpasses the Atlantic coast in salubrity of climate, 
 number and quality of its harbors, density of population, pro- 
 duction, wealth and routes of communication. To all of these 
 considerations so important from the commercial as well as 
 from the military point of view, we must add the advantages 
 offered by the Gulf of Fonseca to any power which might en- 
 tertain designs of general conquest in Central America. 
 
 Situated about midway between the northwestern and 
 southeastern extremities of the Pacific coast of Central Amer- 
 ica, the Gulf of Fonseca may be termed the doorway to the 
 whole country. The Gulf itself makes a splendid place of 
 rendezvous for any fleet or fleets of whatever size. Of the 
 
118 
 
 southeastern arm of the Gulf Mr. Wells, in his ''Adventures 
 and Explorations in Honduras," says: "It would be safe to 
 say that the whole mercantile fleet of America might ride in 
 security together in this great southern bay, inferior in no 
 respect to that of San Francisco and bordered by three states 
 possessed of the greatest natural resources within the tropics, 
 their hills stored with the richest mineral deposits in Spanish 
 America." And of the northern half of the gulf the author 
 remarks in the same place: "We had now shut out the ocean 
 beyond the outer islands, and were cutting through an ex- 
 panse of water, smooth as a trout lake, but deep enough to 
 float the largest vessels in the world; not a hidden rock or 
 shoal in any direction; the playas or beaches approachable 
 with large ships to within pistol shot of the rock and room to 
 anchor or move a thousand vessels, even in the comparative 
 nook made by the four islands, which here form almost a com- 
 pletely landlocked circle of water, in which the frailest canoe 
 might safely navigate." The island of Amapala offers a com- 
 modious harbor and place for a grand central depot and can 
 readily be strengthened by fortifications. The island of Man- 
 guera, situated south of Amapala, protects the latter and at 
 the same time commands the entrance as well as the interior 
 of the Gulf. Once firmly established here decisive operations 
 by land and sea may be begun. For operations by sea the 
 Gulf of Fonseca would be a magnificent central point for 
 blockading the Pacific coast of Central America. All the 
 harbors can be reached from here in less than 24 Lours, for 
 the most distant harbors, Champerico in Guatemala and 
 Punta Arenas in Costa Rica, are but 300 miles away (measured 
 on the air line), San Jose* in Guatemala and San Juan del Sur 
 (outlet of the Nicaragua canal) are but 200 miles from the 
 Gulf, while Acajula and Libertad in Salvador and Corintoin 
 Nicaragua can be reached in a few hours steaming, and the 
 Salvadorian harbor of La Union and the Honduran landings 
 at La Brea and San Lorenzo as well as the Estero Real would 
 be closed by the occupation of the Gulf. 
 
119 
 
 For operations on land the situation of the Gulf of Fon- 
 seca is no less favorable. A semicircle described from the is- 
 land of Manguera as a center with a radius of 125 miles, in- 
 closes the most populous and productive portions, as well as 
 the capitals of Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. The 
 capital of Honduras is but 75 miles inland and were it de- 
 sired to open communication with the eastern coast, the val- 
 ley of the Ulua would seem to present the shortest and 
 otherwise most favorable route from Tegucigalpa to the Bay 
 of Honduras. As regards the capital of Salvador, it may be 
 remarked that it is situated but 18 miles from the coast (air 
 line) and 25 miles from its port of LaLibertad, which latter 
 is but 100 miles from the Gulf of Fonseca. 
 
 In the southeastern recess of the gulf is, as previously 
 stated, the mouth of the Estero Real, said to be navigable 
 by large vessels for a considerable distance inland; how far it 
 has not been possible to ascertain. The mouth of this river 
 is but 50 miles from the waters of Lake Managua, on whose 
 Chores lie the capital of same name and the termini of the two 
 Nicaraguan railroads, the one connecting the lake with the 
 port of Corinto and passing the city of Leon, the commercial 
 metropolis, the other connecting the cities of Managua and 
 Granada and furnishing the transportation between the two 
 lakes. Brito is the western outlet of the Nicaragua canal and 
 within short steaming distance from the Gulf of Fonseca. The 
 strip of land which separates Lake Nicaragua from the ocean, 
 is here but 15 miles wide. The command of Lake Nicaragua 
 would imply command of the southern half of that portion of 
 Nicaragua which lies west of the Andes. The shallowness of 
 the water near the shore would be a disadvantage which, 
 however, may not be insuperable. Brito would therefore be 
 an attractive point to an invader. 
 
 THE NICARAGUA CANAL. 
 
 The strip of earth which we have attempted to describe 
 from the military point of view, is destined to play a promi- 
 
120 
 
 nent part in the future. Yet such prominence seems hardly 
 in keeping with present conditions. The resources of the 
 states are undeveloped, their treasuries empty, their people 
 arrogant and ignorant, their governments unstable, their 
 powers insufficient to preserve peace at home, their land de- 
 fenseless against aggression from without, their existence 
 guaranteed only by what tardy respect our not always force- 
 ful foreign policy has heretofore been able to exact from for- 
 eign powers. It is neither by virtue of her people, her civi- 
 lization, her policy or her power that Central America to-day 
 forms a prominent topic in diplomatic circles, it is entirely 
 due to her geographical situation. America may be said to 
 occupy a central position on the surface of the earth, with her 
 face toward Europe, and her back toward Asia, and Central 
 America lies in the middle of America. The construction of 
 a trans-isthmian ship canal, the water communication between 
 the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, which has been the dream of 
 the nations since the days of Charles V., is about to be rea- 
 lized. Tttis canal is to be constructed across Nicaraguan ter- 
 ritory, and for a short distance will skirt the Costa Rican 
 boundary. It is this canal that raises Central America to 
 such high ^importance. 
 
 The construction will be an American enterprise, and the 
 work will be done by the Maritime Canal Company, an 
 American corporation. This company is at present laboring 
 under financial difficulties, and needs but the moral support 
 of our government to enable it to complete the work already 
 begun. So far this support has been denied, but patriotic 
 and far seeing statesmen have advocated it, chief among them 
 Senator Morgan, from Alabama, and demonstrated the im- 
 portance of the work for ourselves and the world at large. 
 Owing to the dismal failure of the French enterprise at Pana- 
 ma, some doubts are still entertained as to the feasibility of 
 the work, but the good cause has made such progress that, 
 although the congress just passed has declined its support, it 
 
121 
 
 lias authorized the President to appoint a commission to veri- 
 fy the claims of the Maritime Canal Company as to the prac- 
 ticability of the scheme, and voted the necessary funds. The 
 President has appointed the commission and it is to be hoped 
 that, when its report is rendered, another congress will be 
 friend the Maritime Canal Company and thereby pave the 
 way to that commercial and political supremacy on the west- 
 ern hemisphere, to which our republic is rightfully entitled. 
 The subject has been so thoroughly discussed in all its 
 details by abler pens than mine, that nothing new can be pro- 
 duced here; and it is merely intended to outline the chief 
 features the construction of the canal will produce. 
 
 With regard to our own commercial interests it is suffi- 
 cient to point out, that the water route from New York to 
 San Francisco around Cape Horn is 15,100 miles, and that 
 the Nicaragua canal will reduce this distance to 5,640 miles. 
 This means a great reduction in time and cost of transporta- 
 tion; the products of the east will be cheaper on our Pacific 
 coast, in eastern Asia and on the whole coast of South Amer- 
 ica, and the reverse, than heretofore. The market will there- 
 fore be enlarged. To what degree it will stimulate our indus- 
 try is impossible to calculate now. 
 
 From the military point of view the possession of such a 
 canal will greatly augment our naval power in the adjacent 
 as well as in more distant waters. Not only could our Atlan- 
 tic and Pacific squadrons combine on either side of the isth- 
 mus, but a fleet might be maintained in the waters of Lake 
 Nicaragua as a central reserve, with which to reinforce either 
 of our squadrons, while the fresh water of the lake would re- 
 move many features which impair the efficiency of vessels in 
 salt water and render their maintaiuance costly. In his able 
 and truly patriotic speech on the Nicaragua Canal, Senator 
 Morgan says in this connection: '-It is a simple and inade- 
 quate illustration of the military feature to say that it requires 
 two fleets, separated by 12,000 miles of sailing distance, to 
 
122 
 
 blockade cme fleet of equal power to either in Lake Nicaragua. 
 But this doubling of the power of a fleet at anchor in Lake 
 Nicaragua over that of any great maritime power that is 
 moving across the Atlantic or the Pacific to attack our coasts, 
 is but a small part of the strategic advantage of such a situa- 
 tion." 
 
 "As &. point d' appui, a foothold from which to attack or 
 defend, to threaten or protect, all the coasts of this hemis- 
 phere and the islands and adjacent seas, it is more a point of 
 commanding power in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, than 
 Gibraltar in the Mediterranean Sea." 
 
 Another aspect of the canal is the way in which it affects 
 the world at large. On this point Major Wachs of the Ger- 
 man army says:* "As early as 1847 Napoleon III. compared 
 in a detailed essay this artificial water communication of the 
 future with the advantageous geographical situation of the 
 European channels. Any comparison of the completed water 
 route in the new world with the natural ones between the 
 Pontus and the Aegean Sea must, in our opinion, be unfavor- 
 able to the latter. For, though the importance of the latter 
 is certain for all times, yet they cannot compete with a high- 
 way on which the whole world is dependent. When the bar- 
 riers of the isthmus shall have been pierced and the central 
 gate of the Pacific opened, then the strength of the two oceans 
 must disclose itself, founded upon the incomparable base in 
 Nicaragua; the battlefield of peaceful and warlike competition. 
 Incomparable we call this base, not merely because here there 
 will be established the great warehouses of the world, but be- 
 cause high politics will be directed in other paths, and because 
 every stone thrown in the canal will produce wide circles to 
 the east and west. From its completion will date a transfor- 
 mation and revivifications of t the great economical, political 
 and mili ta r y relations. 
 
 **Tlu- West Indies and the Nicaraguan Canal.' 1 
 
123 
 
 "Because this one is straightest and easiest, there will 
 be but one world route, one universal path, joining the Paci- 
 fic to the Atlantic and the latter to the Indian Ocean, and 
 thence leading back into the Pacific. This is the great ring 
 whose eternal passes, constructed by nature herself, are repre- 
 sented by the gates Gibraltar and Singapore, to which are 
 now added the one rendered practicable by human skill at 
 Suez and the one to be rendered so in Nicaragua. Natural 
 superiority is assured the possessor of the Nicaragua canal; 
 this, however, does not in itself entail strategic superiority." 
 Such is the geographical location of the canal that is to be. 
 It lies on an air line from western Europe to Polynesia and 
 Australia, and almost on an air line from New York to the 
 Pacific coast of South America. 
 
 Notwithstanding our previous remarks on the great 
 military advantages the possession of the canal will confer on 
 us, the strategic situation to the east of the isthmus is,, never- 
 theless, not altogether favorable to us under existing condi- 
 tions. We would control the canal but not its approaches. 
 
 The watery elements have encroached upon the central 
 part of our western continent until nothing is left but the 
 narrow strip of Central America and a chain of islands mark- 
 ing what would be the natural eastern coast line of America. 
 The body of water to the west of this chain of islands is di- 
 vided in to two 1) isins of unequal size, the Gulf of Mexico and 
 the Caribbean Sea. The Gulf of Mexico is encircled on the 
 east and north by Florida and our gulf states, on the west 
 and south by the states of the Mexican republic, and is open 
 only to the south-east where an opening 500 miles wide is left 
 between the peninsulas of Florida and Yucatan. Squarely 
 opposite the center of this opening, lies the western extremi- 
 ty of Cuba which diverges from the general direction of the 
 island and bends away to the south-west. In this manner two 
 passages are formed: the Yucatan strait connecting the Gulf 
 with the Caribbean Sea, lying between Cape San Antonio of 
 
124 
 
 western Cuba and Cape Catoche of northeastern Yucatan, 
 110 miles distant from each other; and the Florida Strait 
 connecting the Gulf with the Atlantic and situated between 
 the southern extremity of Florida and the north-west coast of 
 Cuba, which are here about 85 miles distant from each other. 
 Opposite this passage lie the Bahama islands which extend 
 from opposite the eastern shore of Florida in a southeasterly 
 direction to opposite the island of Haiti, thus commanding 
 the Florida strait as well as the Windward Passage between 
 Cuba and Haiti, which furnishes the direct route from the 
 isthmus to New York. The Bahama islands belong to Great 
 Britain which has established a station for coaling and repair 
 on the island of New Providence (Nassau). Opposite Key 
 West, our military station, lies Havanna, the strongly forti- 
 fied and garrisoned capital of Cuba. 
 
 The Caribbean Sea is encircled on the west by Central 
 A merica, on the south by the isthmus and the northern coast 
 of Colombia and Venezuela, on the east by the Lesser Antil- 
 les, on the north by the Greater Antilles, and communicates 
 with the Gulf by ihe strait of Yucatan, with the Atlantic by 
 the Windward Passage (between Cuba and Haiti) and the 
 Mona Passage (between Haiti and Porto Rico). Porto Rico 
 belongs to Spain as does Cuba, and that power is thus placed 
 in position to command the three principal approaches to the 
 Nicaragua canal. Since we are more than a match for Spain 
 on land and sea, her favorable position gives us no disquietude. 
 
 A more powerful rival is Great Britain, both on account 
 of her sea power and her commanding position in the Carib- 
 bean. There she owns the island of Jamaica and many of 
 the islands which bound the Caribbean toward the Atlantic. 
 In Kingston (Jamaica) Great Britain possesses a strongly for- 
 tified naval base. The island is situated 100 miles west of 
 Haiti and 90 miles south of Cuba. Its situation as regard* 
 the Caribbean is, therefore, central, it commands the Wind- 
 ward Passage directly and flanks the approaches to the Nica- 
 
125 
 
 ragua canal through the strait of Yucatan and the Mona Pas- 
 sage. To the west of Jamaica Great Britain possesses the 
 Caymans, and (the Monroe doctrine notwithstanding) has 
 gained a footing on the mainland in Belize in the same man- 
 ner in which she is now trying to regain a footing on the 
 Mosquito Coast, at the very mouth of the Nicaragua Canal. 
 The islands on the eastern front of the Caribbean belong 
 nearly all to England except Martinique, Guadeloupe, and a 
 few minor islands which are French. Trinidad has a good 
 roadstead and is fortified. Tobago, north-east of Trinidad, 
 has good anchorages in Man of War Bay and Cumberland 
 Bay, while St. George's Bay is almost completely landlocked 
 and encircled by heights. "The island capital of the same 
 name lies in terraces along the northern edge of the basin, the 
 entrance to which is constricted to 800 metres by two pro- 
 montories. The harbor, city, and all military establishments 
 (hospital, arsenal, coal depot, etc.) are protected by strong 
 forts and water batteries. The aspect of St. George remind? 
 one. of La Valetta at Malta, only this Malta is as luxurious a,* 
 that of the old world is bleak and rocky." The island of St. 
 Vincent, where the American and European cables meet, has 
 a harbor protected by fortifications. Barbados, the British 
 military headquarters in the West Indies, has a splendid har- 
 bor and strong fortifications. Santa Lucia also boasts of good 
 harbors, anchorages and fortifications. Of the many islands 
 possessed by Great Britain in these waters, those enumerated 
 are the most important. 
 
 Among the French possessions in the West Indies are to 
 be noted, besides a number of small islands, those of Guade- 
 loupe and Martinique, the latter of which possesses a good 
 
 harbor and is defended by forts. 
 
 The Virgin Islands belonging partly to England, partly 
 to Denmark, form the connecting link between the Greater 
 and Lesser Antilles. St. Thomas, the principal Danish is- 
 land, is a coaling station, has a good harbor with docks, and 
 is defended by strong batteries. 
 
126 
 
 The Netherlands also have possessions here, i. e., Curayao 
 and two smaller islands off the coast of Venezuela, and a few 
 small islands of the Leeward group. A small garrison i* 
 maintained at Curacao and a vessel kept cruising between the 
 several islands. 
 
 Spain, as we have seen, commands by her West Indian 
 possessions the three principal approaches to the Nicaragua 
 canal. This is still more the case, however, with Great Bri- 
 tain. Leaving her superior sea power out of consideration 
 she commands the interior of the Caribbean Sea from Jamai- 
 ca, she owns most of the Lesser Antilles on the eastern edge 
 of the Caribbean, she owns the Bahamas north of the Spanish 
 islands, and within convenient distance she has a great naval 
 base in the Bermudas. Thus if Spain commands the passages 
 to the Nicaragua canal, Great Britain does the same and 
 more directly so, and more than that, she commands the ap- 
 proaches to the Caribbean as well as to the Gulf of Mexico; 
 She has isolated Spain in the West Indies. The Bermudas 
 are connected by separate cable with the naval fortress of 
 Halifax, rendering concert of action on he part of her scat- 
 tered fleets possible, 
 
 Wnile many nations thus have footholds in the West 
 Indies near the Nicaragua canal, we have none. Worse than 
 that, by the Clay ton-Bui wer treaty concluded July 4 y 1850, 
 Great Britain and the United States agreed on a joint pro- 
 tection of the canal and mutually pledged their faith that 
 neither of them would ever colonize, annex, fortify, or exer- 
 cise exclusive dominion over any portion of Central America. 
 At the time when this treaty was concluded, the United States 
 possessed a vast undeveloped territory and had just acquired 
 from Mexico an immense district. In view of this fact and 
 the love of peace ever professed by our country, it may seem 
 excusable at the time that the military part of the question 
 was disregarded and that the present rather than the future 
 was kept in view. The fact nevertheless remains that w< 
 
127 
 
 were outgeneraled. We had no possession of any kind in the 
 West Indies or in Central America; Great Britain had both, 
 and fortresses, arsenals, etc., to boot. Great Britain gave up 
 nothing except a defective title to the Mosquito Coast, we 
 gave up the right of exclusive control of the canal, the pre- 
 requisite for our future commercial and political supremacy. 
 The treaty has become a thorn in our flesh. Until recently 
 the disregard of the military features of such questions has 
 been, on our part, a notorious and deplorable fact, Great Bri- 
 tain on the other hand has kept them steadily in view. For 
 illustration we will only quote that Great Britain has pro- 
 vided the means for assembling a powerful naval force on the 
 great lakes, we have done nothing of the kind. In conse- 
 quence our great cities on the lakes would in case of war lie 
 helplessly under the guns of British gunboats. But the sen- 
 timents that animated us in 1850 are no longer the same. 
 Even now our boundaries are becoming too narrow for us. 
 The immense importance of the Nicaragua canal has been 
 fully recognized and we are chafing under the obligations im- 
 posed on us by the Clay ton -Bulwer treaty. 
 
 We are to-day but seven days steaming from Europe. 
 We are gradually corning under the operation of the same 
 laws which affect the nations of Europe and render naval 
 power a necessity. The element of overpopulation which 
 <^uses the overflow of European boundaries by tides of emi- 
 gration, does not affect us yet. But we are affected as Euro- 
 pean countries are, by the conditions created by the age of 
 inventions, the 19th century. The introduction of labor sav- 
 ing machines has enormously increased industrial production, 
 rendered the home market inadequate and has made compe- 
 tition sharp and acrimonious. The electric telegraph and 
 ,4eam transportation have contributed largely in this direc- 
 tion. Every nation seeks to gain new territory' by which to 
 expand its market, to antagonize those nations which are the 
 strongest competitors, to enhance its markets where they are 
 
128 
 
 existing, and last but not least, to provide the means for pro 
 tecting its commerce, the source of wealth and strength. The 
 principles, that combined effort is superior to isolated action, 
 in politics and war, in industry and commerce; that com- 
 merce means wealth and wealth means power; that military 
 strength on the sea, the bearer of commerce, insures its safety; 
 have never been more generally lived up to than now. They have 
 given rise to grander combinations commercially, to grander 
 territorial aggregations politically. To promote his ends in 
 the struggle for existence man has opened passages between 
 waters heretofore separated by land barriers. Notice the 
 Suez canal, the cut across the isthmus of Corinth, the Man- 
 chester ship canal, the Amsterdam ship canal, the canal be- 
 tween the Baltic and North Sea, the proposed canals across 
 Italy and France connecting the Adriatic with the Tyrrhenian, 
 the Atlantic with the Mediterranean. Wherever there is 
 wealth or a source of wealth, there a nation must safeguard it 
 from the covetousness of others. Great Britain has shown 
 great foresight in obeying these laws and principles. She is 
 linked to India by a water route defended by a series of mili- 
 tary and naval strongholds, Gibralter, Malta, Cyprus, Aden, 
 Singapore, Hongkong, Esquimalt. She has supplemented 
 the strongholds by powerful fleets, she has converted the In- 
 dian Ocean into a British lake, as she has the West Indian 
 waters and the Mediterranean. A glance at the map shows 
 her flag on every continent. What we are pleased to call the 
 British game of grabbing, is nothing more nor less than true 
 foresight, though it may be selfish. If Great Britain now 
 should gain control of the Nicaragua canal, she would control 
 the commercial routes of the world. Even now she is said to 
 cast longing glances at the Galapagos Islands, from which to 
 control the approaches to the western outlet of the canal. 
 Other nations are developing the same policy of expansion, 
 foremost among them France, who has indeed become a pow- 
 erful rival of Great Britain, and gives promise of seriously 
 
contesting the latter's supremacy on the seas. Wherever tht 1 
 cross of St. George floats in the breeze, there the French tri- 
 color waves from the neighboring shore. If France has no 
 foothold on the North American continent, she holds two is- 
 lands at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, and Clipperton 
 Island opposite the western outlet of the Nicaragua canal. 
 
 The commercial struggle of the nations which is now go- 
 ing on before our eyes and becoming more embittered every 
 year, this struggle which is in fact a contention for power 
 and supremacy, compels every nation to make provisions for 
 the future, for extending and protecting its sources of wealth. 
 It will readily be perceived how the control of the Nicaragua 
 canal will enable us not only to hold our own in the interna- 
 tional competition, but will give us the means for acquiring 
 that supremacy in American waters to which we Americans 
 feel ourselves entitled by virtue of the civilization and genius 
 of our people. The control of the Nicaragua canal is as ne- 
 cessary for our development and greatness as was in the past 
 that of the harbors of New York and San Francisco. The 
 control of that canal will also prove in our hands n powerful 
 instrument for enforcing the Monroe doctrine. This national 
 creed of ours implies more perhaps to-day than its author fore- 
 saw. Occasionally, disclaimers notwithstanding, it may be 
 said to mean the championship of the United States for the 
 cause of all America against all others, however various may 
 he the interests involved. The principal people we have to 
 reckon with, are our cousins across the Atlantic; their in- 
 terests and ours are even now coming in daily conflict, and 
 will do so still more in the future. If history teaches any- 
 thing, it is that no nation worthy of the name, will tamely 
 surrender valuable possessions and highly prized privileges. 
 However averse we may be to a war with Great Britain, our 
 interests will continue to clash until history repeats itself, i. 
 o., until friendly negotiation can no longer reconcile the con- 
 flicting interests and the arbitrament of the sword is appealed 
 
130 
 
 to. No nation will arbitrate where vital interests are at 
 .stake; Great Britain has amply proved, that she will not sub- 
 mit to arbitration unless she is sure she has a clear case, nor 
 is she in the habit of giving up valuable rights or privileges 
 such as a share in the control of the Nicaragua canal without 
 receiving something equivalent in return. In view of the 
 importance of the Nicaragua canal to Great Britain, none but 
 a blind opinionist will assert that we shall* ever be the sole 
 possessors of the canal without a determined and protracted 
 struggle with Great Britain. 
 
 When the great struggle comes, the possession of the 
 Nicaragua canal will place us in much better position for 
 meeting our opponent than is the case at present. But as is 
 evident from the present conditions in the West Indian waters, 
 we shall still be under grave disadvantages until in one way 
 or another we gain a firm foothold there. It has often been 
 suggested that we purchase the Spanish islands in those 
 waters. That would plaee us at once on a par, strategically, 
 with Great Britain. Whether it be these or any other islands, 
 a firm footing in the West Indies is a prerequisite for our fu- 
 ture national welfare. Its absolute necessity will be clear to 
 all the moment the struggle begins. That struggle is una- 
 voidable. We shall not be supreme on the American conti- 
 nent, until we free ourselves from the influence Great Britain 
 exercises by means of her American possessions. That we can 
 no more hope to accomplish without war, than Germany could 
 rid herself of Austrian and French influence without the wars 
 of 1866 and 1870. We are not advocating wanton national 
 aggrandizement, but merely such prudent measures as will 
 guarantee us that future supremacy in America which every 
 American is deeply convinced we must have. Commerce 
 means wealth, wealth means power. The nation that fails 
 correctly to interpret the signs of the present, to make suita- 
 ble provisions for safeguarding its future welfare, to pave by 
 .a wise policy its way to the high plain it feels itself destined 
 
131 
 
 to reach, will fall behind in the international struggle for ex- 
 istence. At no time could a nation disregard the military 
 feature of her policy with less safety than now. To do so 
 would be a sign of hopeless inferiority. The fortincation of 
 our seacoast was the first step taken upon the correct inter- 
 pretation of the military question of our situation, the increase 
 of the navy was the second wise step. The control of the 
 Nicaragua canal will be the corner stone of our future great- 
 ness. To carry out our policy consistently, we must further 
 increase our offensive and defensive forces on land and sea, 
 and we must acquire a strong foothold in the West Indies. 
 Then we shall be ready to enter the lists and do battle for tin- 
 hegemony in our hemisphere, a prize which no nation yet has 
 been permitted to gain without hard battle and spilling of 
 much precious blood. 
 
 The foregoing are some of the reasons that make tlu- 
 geography, political as well as military, of Central America, 
 so important to us.