' A A o — = i 1 1 1 cno 3^= 6 - b| 1 ss== * 1 California Regional acility \W 5 G&fL UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES IN MEMORIAM BERNARD MOSES THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE THIRD, KING OF SPAIN- THE FIRST FOUR BOOKS. By ROBERT WATSON, LL. D. Principal of the United CoHege in the Univgrfity of St. Andrew's. THE TWO LAST BY WILLIAM THOMSON, LL. D. A NEW EDITION. VOL. I. BASIL: Printed and fold by J. J. tourneise tf. MDCCXC1I. W^X 1:1° \*& ^ADVERTISEMENT* o X HE firft fonr books of this volume, which contain the progrefs of the war in the Nether- * lands , the eftablifliment of the truce with the Dutch , and the expulfion of the Morefcoes from ^ Spain, are printed literally from the manufcript ^ of Dr. Watfon : *iior has the fmalleft alteration been made , either in the arrangement of his matter , or in his flyle. It is , however , but juflice to the memory of that author, as well as * to the public, to acknowledge, that, in the two } lad, he had not the lea A participation. Thefe £ were written by the editor of Dr. Watfon's ma- nufcript , at the defire of the guardians of his ^ children. This was deemed an attention due to I the curiofity of the reader ; a curiofity which , in the prefent important era, may be fuppofed to be fomewhat enlivened by the great events which have lately happened in the world. It is evident that Dr. Watfon has exerted in this work all that care to difcover the truth , which diftinguilhes his Hiftory of Philip II. He has con- futed the moft approved writers on this fubjecl: and by that refpecl.able friend to literature , the Earl of Hardwicke, he was favored with ma- rmfcripts of equal authority and importance. The contmuator of Dr. Watfon's narrative ha» 3-2'HK^l ADVERTISEMENT. iiot thought it proper to give a detail of thofe hoflile operations at lea, which were continued, beyond the line, even after the paciiication of Antwerp. Thefe operations, in his opinion enter into the Spanifli Hiftory, by the moll natural connexion, at the expiration of the truce ; when the Spanifli minifters compared the advantages and difadvantages that haft ^efulted from that engagement, and deliberatedw Aether they fliould prolong the peace , or renew the war. The conferences now firft published, between the Spanifli and Engliih commiflioners , for ef- fecting a peace between their refpeclive nations, at London, in 1604, were carried on with extra- ordinary ability, decorum, and dignity, on both fides: and they ferve not only to gratify a curi- ofity relative to their particular fubjeel, but alio, to throw light on the interelts and views of the courts of London and Madrid , at that time ; on the Hate of commerce; and the fentiments, man- ners, and general character of the age. THE THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE THIRD, KING OF SPAIN. . BOOK I. X HILIP the Third, King of Spain, fon of b o O & Philip the Second, and of Anne of Au- j. flria, daughter of Maximilian II. Emperor of *S9S Germany, was in the 21 ft year of his age at his acceflion to the throne. He was a prince of a character extremely oppofite to that of the late king, although no pains had been fpared to form him to a fimilarity of manners. From the inftruc- tions delivered to thofc who had the charge of his education , it appears l to have been a prin- cipal object of his father's attention, to infpire him with the fame bigoted attachment to the fuper- ftition of the church of Rome, by which he him- felf had been actuated ; and the means which he employed for this end, were attended with the de- fired fuccefs. But he was not equally fuccekful Hiftoria de la vida y hschos , del inclito monarcha D. Felippe tercero. Pur Gil Gon. Davila , Cronifta de log Sennores Reyes D. Fdippe III. y IV. lib. i. cap. 6. Vol. I. B 2 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK in his endeavours to overcome that averfion which I, his fon , from the natural indolence of his tem- jsss- per, early difcovered to almoft every fpecies of manly exertion and activity \ With this part of the young prince's charac- ter, Philip was well acquainted; and fore fa w , with much anxiety , the unhappy confequences which it was likely to produce in his future reign. In order to introduce and habituate him to the management of public affairs, he formed a coun- cil of his ableft and mod experienced minifters, who, in the prefence of the prince, debated three times a week, concerning various important matters relating to the adminiftration of the king- dom ; and the prince was required to prefide in this council, and to report the opinion of the ma- jority to the king \ But neither this, nor any other expedient which Loifa, the prince's faithful preceptor, could devife, proved effectual for the purpofe for which it was intended. Inactivity or indolence ftill remained the mod confpicuous fea- ture in his character; and it early excited in the king , a ffcrong and well grounded apprehenfion that his fon, unable or unwilling himfelf to hold the reins of government, would furrender them into the hands of the marquis of Denia, or of fome other favorite. Againft this conduct, which is fo commonly attended with the moft pernicious confequences , Philip had often put the young Addiciones a la Hiitoria del Marques Virgtiio Malvezzi. Yanez, Memorias , p. i j6. Davila , lib. i. cap. x. PHILIP III, KING OF SPAIN. 3 prince upon his guard ; and it was bis Jafl: advice rook to him, which he delivered with great earneftnefs, i, a few hours before his death , that he fhould go- *5??« vern his kingdom by himl'elf. He had likewife requeued of him to employ, as his principal coun- fellors , Don Chriftopher de Moura, marquis of Caftel Rodrigo , and Don John Idiaquez ; from whofe experience, fidelity, and great abilities, he might derive the higheft advantages, efpecially in the beginning of his reign *. The foft and gentle temper of the prince had hitherto rendered him extremely obfequious to his father's will 5 : but, confcious of his incapa« Gon. Davila , lib, i. cap. 12. Porreno, Dichos y Hechos, pa Aim. It was a faying of Philip's concerning his fon , Que era mas para fer mandado , que mandar. Addiciones de Malvezzi. ' The author of " Addiciones a la Hiftoria del Marques Viigilio Malvezzi , " gives the following lingular inftance of the truth of this affertion. Philip II. intending that his fon fhould marry one of the daughters of Charles , archduke of Auftria, and having fent for the pictures of thefe princefTes , he one day , in pretence of his daughter Ifabeila and feve- ral of his minifters , defired the young prince to examine the pictures , and make his choice of the princefs, whom he would prefer for his wife. Philip , with his ufual deference and humiiity , fubmitted his choice to the king. The king remonltrated with him on the impropriety of requefting any other perfon to judge for him, in this matter, in which his own tafte alone ought to be confultcd , and defired him to carry the pictures to his own apartment , where he nvght care- fully examine them and fix his choice. I have no choice, replied the prince , but your rmjefty's pleafure , and I am cer- tain that that princels will appear to me the belt and the moft beautiful whom you/ majefty fhall prefer, jp. i 37. B 9 ^ 4 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK CJt y ; an ^ prompted by his indolence , he no fooner j, mounted the throne, than, difregarding the coun- iS9». fels which had been given him, he refolved to avoid the perplexity which mi^bt attend hi? having recourfe, on any occafion, to different cotinfellors , and therefore committed the whole adminiftration ^ of affairs to his favorite the marquis of Denia. , The marquis del Caflel Rcdrigo , in \vholrfT 5 hi- ]ip II. had long repofed the mod perfect confi- dence , was honorably difmiffed from court, and appointed viceroy of Portugal \ Idiaquez had the prefidency of the military orders conferred upon him; and being of a lefs ambitious, and more complying temper than Cafk-l Rodrigo, and willing to act in an inferior or fubordinate ca- pacity, he was fuffrred to remain, and occafion- aily confulted , on account of his long experience and the high character which he held for pru- dence and fagacity 7 . But all power was lodged in the hands of the favorite , who , having been chjef e quer ry to the king, before his accelfion to the throne , and having in that ftation had fre- quent accefs to his perfon , had gained his affecti- __ Ji-& ons , and acquired an entire afcendant over him. C^\A^ ^ e was J ni ^ ant 'y created duke of f erm a , and admitted into the council of ftate : after which, the king tranfmitted edicts to all the councils in the kingdom, requiring obedience to whatever orders mould be communicated to them in his name by the duke \ Davila , p. 36. 7 Ibid. p. 37. * Ibid, p. 41. ^MK/ate QcMiz pe $a^j>cval y Ko^ytf PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. $ This determined partiality, which Philip was B00K at no pains to conceal , occafioned a genera! dif- ( content. The grandees of the tirft rank were IS 98. filled with indignation, when they beheld one whom they had been accuftomed to regard as their inferior, inverted with fuch unlimited autho- rity; and all ranks of men, judging from former inftances of the fame nature , dreaded an unprof- perous and unquiet reign. Their complaints were the louder and the more generally difFufed, as the duke of Lerma was utterly unpractifed in the af- fairs of government, and had not yet given any proof of merit or abilities. It was a demonftra- tion, they thought, of extreme weaknefs in the character of the king, fo avowedly, and in con- tradiction to the advice and example of his father, whofe memory they revered , to declare his choice of a favorite ; and they apprehended that , on trial, the character of this favorite would be found , in this refpect, too nearly fimilar to his own '. Their apprehenfions were not without foundation. By his courteoufnefs and affability , the duke impofed on the penetration of many of thofe who approached him; and, by difcovering on all occafions the moft devoted attachment to the church , he conciliated the favor of the eccle- fiaflics, but it foon appeared that his views and abilities were extremely limited ; and that he nei- ther poflclTed the economy, the firmnefs, or the capacity requifite for the difficult and important charge with which he was intruded ". Vide Addiciones to Malvezzi , p. 144. Mayerne Turquet, p. 1295. B 3 6 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF B O O K It was peculiarly unfortunate for the Spanifli I. monarchy to have the helm of government com- I ** 8 * mitred to fuch weak hands at the pre lent period. The late king indeed had forefeen, and, in fome meafure , provided for this event, by the peace which he had concluded with France, and the re- signation of his fovereignty in the Netherlands ; which he hoped would put an end to the war in that country , and prove the means of recovering the revolted provinces. He had likewife left all his other dominions, not only in Spain, but in Italy, and in the new world, in the enjoyment of peace ; and Portugal , now accuftomed to the yoke, yielded a ready obedience to his authority. But although Philip II. through the vigilance and vigor of his adminiftration , had left his do- minions every where, except the Netherlands, in the enjoyment of internal tranquillity, he had not left them in a flourilhing condition On the con- trary, Spain, his place of refidence, and his feat of empire, was greatly exhaufted, and fome of the principal fources of her opulence and profpc- rity were dried up. By the war in which he had made fo many great exertions, both by fea and land , and, ftill more, perhaps, by the migration of the people to the new world, the inhabitants of Spain were greatly reduced in number. All emoluments and honors which the fovereign could bellow, had, for ages pa ft , been divided between the military and the ecclefiaftical profeflions. Hy this means, the mechanic arts and agriculture, having come PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 7 to be regarded as comparatively mean and defpi- book cable , were alike abandoned by the indolent or j inactive, and by thofe who were endued with a m». fpirit of ambition and enterprife. This contempt , and the confequent neglect of the more ufeful arts, the profits arifing from which, though fure, are always moderate , was heightened by the fre- quent inftances of enormous fortunes, fuddenly acquired by the adventurers in America. That proportion of the riches arifing from the Ameri- can mines, which the fovereign received, was fpent either in thofe countries in which his wars were carried on , or in purchafing naval and mili- tary ftores from other nations. The greater part of what was imported by merchants and other in- dividuals was laid out in England, Italy, and the Netherlands, for manufactures, which the colo- nies required , but which Spain was become un- able to fuppry ; and the remainder was drained off by taxes which the king had , from time to time, been necellitated to impofe. From this fcarcity of money; from the want of manufactures; from the neglect of agriculture , joined to the numberlefs lofTes fuftained at fea, where Philip had been almofl: always foiled by his enemies , trade of every kind was reduced to the lowefe ebb; and fo great was the confequent diforder in the finances, that, befides a debt of 140 millions of ducats which he left upon the crown, he had been obliged to have recourfe to the dtfgraceful expedient of employing ecclefialtics to go from houfe to houfe , to receive from his fubje£ts in B 4 8 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK Spain fuch afliftance, as they were willing; to af- I. ford ; a meafure which was not attended with the 1598, advantage which he had expected to derive from it, while it contributed to fink his reputation in Spain, as his refufal to pay the intereft of his fo- reign debt, before related, had already done in the reft of Europe ". 'I he danger to which the SpaniOi monarchy was expofed, from that debility to which it was reduced at the prcfent period, was the more to be dreaded , becaufs many parts of this widely ex- tended empire were removed to fo great a dif- tance from the feat of government ; and nothing, there was ground to believe, could avert the im- pending ruin , but a vigorous exertion of the higheft abilities, joined to the mod rigid and ju- dicious economy. It was likewife obvioufly ne- cefTary that peace fhould inftantly have been eftab- limed with the maritime powers; who, having for f-veral years paft, held the fovereigntv of the fea«, fremed to poflefs fufficient naval force en- tirely to de^roy the Spanifh trade , and to cut off all communication between the mother country and her colonies. But. the duke of Lerma was equally incapable of difcerning this danger , and of providing a- gainft it As he had feen the difficulties in which tV late king was involved , through the diforder of his finances, and could not be ignorant of the exhaufted condition of the kingdom . it might have been expected , that one of the firft objects Gon. Davila, p. 25. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 9 of his attention would have been to retrench the BOOK unnecefljry expenfes of the court, by attempting, 1. if practicable , to reduce the number of fuperflu- 1 " 8 * ous offices, to which, in times of greater profpe- rity, the vanity of former kings had given birth. But inftead of this , he greatly multiplied fuch fort of offices **; and , in the very infancy of his adminiftration, gave other fignal proofs of the degree of profufion which would have been un- juftihable , had the kingdom been in the mod flourifhing condition. One of the firfb events of this reign was the marriage of the king with M argaret of Auftria ", whom the archduke Albert had conducted into Spain. He had gone, for this purpofe, from the Netherlands to Germany , about the time of the late king's death; and had foon afterwards fet out with her from Gratz , by the way of Italy : but fo great were the preparations made for her re- ception in Spain, and, agreeably to the characler of the nation, fo flowly were they carried on , that the fleet fent to bring her thither did not arrive at Genoa till feveral months after. In the marriage folemnity, in the city of Valencia , above a mil- lion of ducats were expended , befides a great number of rich prefents, which were made to fo- reign princes and to the church 14 . By the ec- clefiaftics , who on this, as on many other occa- fions, fhared amply of the duke of Lerma's mu- nificence , his conduct was extolled as highly Gon. Davila , p. 4*;. Daughter of Charles , archduke of Auftiia. ,4 Gon. Davila, lib. ii. io HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK liberal and magnificent, but filled the minds of the J. more impartial and difcerning part of men, who were concerned for the true glory and intereft of the nation and of the crown, with indignation, mingled with contempt ". April. H99. About the fame time with the royal nuptials , thofe of the archduke with the infanta were fo- EmJofMay. i cmn j ze( i •*. Dut not long after, they fet out to- gether for the Netherlands , having received full afiurance from the king and his minifter, that no afllflance in money or in troops, which Spain could afford , fliould be wanting to fupport them in their new fovereignty , and to enable them to accomplifh the reduction of the revolted provinces. In forming this refolution , there was no room for hefitation. From the conditions upon which the late king had transferred the fovereignty of the Netherlands to his daughter, joined to the age of that princefs , there was little ground to doubt that it would ere long revert to the Spanifh mo- narchy. It could not be confidered , even during the life of the infanta, in any other light, but as a fief of Spain : for fhe and her fuccefTors were expresfly required to take an oath of fidelity to the kings of Spain, and, in order to infure the faith- ful obfervance of this oath , the liberty was re- ferved of putting garrifons of Spanifh troops into Antwerp , Ghent , Cambray , and other places; Addicr nes a la Hiftoria de Malvezzi, p. is 2. Albert had before-hand refigned his dignity of cardinal into the hands of the pope. PHrLIP III. KING OF SPAIN. n betides which , both parties had folemnly engaged BOOK to regard the fame powers as enemies , or as I. friends, and promifed mutually to affift and de- ls "' fend each other againft all the world befides l \ It would probably have faved the Spanifh mo- narchy from the extreme debility into which it fell in the prefent and in the following reign , and would have highly contributed to lefien thofe dif- ficulties which, in his future adminiftration, the duke of Lerma was about to encounter, had the fovereignty yielded been enjoyed , free and inde- pendent, by the infanta, and Spain been delivered from the burden of the war with the United Provinces. But Ifabella could not, in this cafe, have accepted of the fovereignty conferred on her. Without the affiftance of Spain , fhe rauft have funk under her unequal conteft with the Dutch, fupported by the queen of England; or file mud inflantly have made peace with thefe powers , oil whatever terms they fhould be pleafed to pre- fcribc. The fovereignty of the United Provinces would thus have been eftablifhed , and both their religious and civil liberty have been recognifed. To embrace a meafure which would be attend- ed with fo difagreeable a confequence, Philip was hardly lefs averfe than his father had ever been. With a temper gentle and obfequious to excefs, he was devoted with the moft bigoted attachment to the popifh faith ; and being entirely governed by his minifter, who, on all occafions, afliduoufly courted the favor of the Spanifh ecclefiaftics , and Thuanus, lib. cxxi. cap. 2. 12 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK the fovereign pontiff , he would have believed I. himfelf highly criminal in the fight of God , had iss/9. he not refolved to employ his utmoft power to reduce the revolted provinces under obedience to the holy fee. He had befides, before his father's death, formally given his confent to the deed of transference, with all the conditions that were an- nexed to it; and, as he could not, confiftently with honor , fo, from his affection to the infanta, he was not, inclined to retract. Prompted by thefe motives , which were not likely ever to lofe their force, he refolved to con- ficW his lifter's and her hufband's intereft as his own, and to take the fame concern in all the af- fairs of the Netherlands, as if the fovereignty of that country had never been transferred. Con- formably to this refolution, both the money and the troops of Spain continued to be employed in the Low Countries, as in the preceding reign. All the affairs of thefe provinces were directed as for- merly by Spanifb council?. The intereft of the Spanifh monarch was affected as much as ever by what happened there; and, for thefe reafons, al- moft all the important tranfactions which palTed in the provinces , for feveral years after the prefent period, make an eflential part of the Spanifh hif- tory. The archduke having, during his abfence, committed the government of the Netherlands to his coufin, car dinal Andrew of Auftria , bifliop of Conftance , and the command of the forces to~ Mendoza , marquis of Gaudalette , and admiral PHILIP III. KING. OF SPAIN. 13 of Arragon , had inftructed the latter to fecure BOOK fome convenient pafTage over the Rhine, which 1. might open an entrance into the northern provin- n 59 - ces, and enable him either to fupport the army at the cxpenfe of the enemy, or, if that fhould be found impracticable , to quarter them in the coun- try of Cleves, and the other neutral adjoining ftates. Albert gave Mendoza in ft ructions, at the fame time , to avoid expofing the army to any unneceflary rifle, before his return; and therefore there is little room for doubt that his principal in- tention , in ordering him to crofs the Rhine , was to furnifh the troops with free quarters , in com- penfation for their pay. To form this extraordi- nary refolution, it is faid , he was determined by neceffity ; the fouthem provinces of the Nether- lands having been greatly exhaufted by the depre- dations of the Spanifh troops, which had fo often mutinied, and his exchequer drained, partly by the fums lately advanced in payment of their ar- rears , and partly by the preparations for his jour- ney to Spain, which, in honor of the young queen , had been performed with unufual mag- nificence '*. But whatever were Albert's motives for hav- ing recourfe to fo unjuftifiable an expedient, it fhould feem that he could not have made choice of a perfon better qualified by the native temper of his mind for carrying his plan into execution, scptcmi;:. Immediately afcer the archduke's departure , Mendoza , having collected together all the Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. v. p. 47 5. i 4 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK troops which could be fpared from the neceffary I. defence of the country, pafied over the JVlaefe iS99. llcar Ruremonde, and directed his march, at the head of twenty thoufand foot, and two thoufand rive hundred horfe " towards Orfoy , a town on the weft fide of the Rhine, belonging to the dutchy of Cleves. The garrifon of this place, being utterly unprepared for defence, were eafily induced by promifes mingled with threats, to open their gates and receive him. He then ap- plied himfelf to ftrengthen the fortifications of the town and citadel, and at the fame time employed a great part of his forces for feveral weeks in fortifying Waffum , a fmall town on the eaft fide of the river, directly oppofite to Orfoy. Although his communication with the coun- try beyond the Rhine was thus fecured , he judg- ed it to be of great importance to get poffefiion of fome other town upon the Rhine, at a fmaller dis- tance from the enemy, and therefore he marched down the river, with all his forces, and laid fiege to Rhinberg. This place, belonging to the bifh- opric of Cologne, was, as above related, in the hands of the United Provinces. It was deemed a place of confiderable ftrensth, and was defen- ded by a fufficient garrifon. The Spaniards, after battering the walls, attempted to take the town by ftorm , and were repulfed with great {laughter. This army confifted of feven thoufand Spaniards , three thoufand Italians, two thoufand Burgundians, a thoufand Irilh, and feven thoufand Germans and Walloons, befides the cavalry. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 15 But the fiege was much fooner brought to a book conclufion than the befiegers had reafon to exped, 1. through one of thofe fatal accidents which have ^^ often happened fince the invention of gun pow- der, when the utmoft precaution is not employed in preferving it. Having caught fire, from a fpark occafioned by the ftroke of a cannon-ball againft: the tower where the magazine was kept, and which the ball had entered by a window, not on- ly the tower, but a great part of the wall of the town was thrown down. Several vefTels in the river were, by the violent agitation of the water, overwhelmed and funk, and the governor, his wife and family, with a confiderable number of the inhabitants, were buried in the ruins. The garrifon flood aghaft at this unforefeen difafter ; and, dreading that the town muft now be taken by afiault, they refolved , without further refift- ance , to capitulate on terms, to which Mendoza, in order to fave time, immediately agreed 1 ". By the fuccefs which had attended the Spanilh October 15. arms in the reduction of Orfoy and Rhinberg, all the other towns in that quarter were filled with anxiety and tenor. Burick , a town on the weft- fide of the Rhine, in the dutchy of Cleves , having, without hefitation, admitted a Spanifh garrifon, Mendoza began to make preparations for em- ploying force againft Wefel , one of the mod flourifliing places in the circle of Weftphalia f and which had lately received a confiderable Thuanus, lib. «xxi. cap. 9. Grotius, lib. via. Bentivo- glio , p. 474. 16 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK augmentation of Proteflant inhabitants from the I. neighbouring provinces. Having abolifhed the iss*. exercife of the Catholic religion , and efhblifhed the Reformed , as taught by Calvin , in its ftead, they knew how guilty they muft appear in the eyes of a Spaniard, and were at the fame time confcious of being unable to defend themfelves againft fo great a force. 1 hey attempted , by fending the general an embafjy with prefents for himfelf, to divert him from his purpofe. But IViendoza, laying hold of this opportunity to co- lor his prefent expedition with the pretext of zeal for the popiih faith, peremptorily required they fhould immediately reftore the exercife of the Catholic religion. With this condition the inhabitants, in order to avoid a fiege, were obli- ged , though extremely reluctant, to comply ". After which, though he had before rejected their prefents, he demanded a large fupply of provi li- ons, and of money for his troops; and having obtained his demands , he continued his march down the river , and took poffeilion of the towns of Rees and Emmerick. The inhabitants of the latter of thefe places , having been long diftinguifhed by their attach- ment to popery , had , from fome interefted mo- tive, invited the Spanifh army to come into that quarter, and had received a promife in writing from Mendoza, that neither their town nor terri- tory fbould fuffer any inconvenience from the The Spanifh army had no fooner left Germany than the priefts were aj;. em frontier, prince Maurice had haftily affem- bled together at Arnheira a body of troops , amounting to fix thoufand foot, and fifteen hun- dred hoi fe,- and had ventured to crofs the IfTel, and advanced towards the enemy as far as Zeven- aer, which lies at little more than a day's march from Emmerick. With fuch unequal forces he could not pre- tend to cope with the enemy in the open field; but on no occafion had he ever exhibited greater mi- litary (kill and conduct. By making choice of the mod proper Rations, which the nature of the country could afford , and the prudence and vigi- lance which he difplayed in ftrengthening all the approaches to his camp, he rendered it impoffible for the Spanifli general to attack him with any pro- bability of fuccefs ; while, at the fame time, he prevented him from advancing any farther, or un- dertaking the fiege of any of the frontier towns upon the IfTel. The two armies, between which there was fo great a difparity of numbers , lay for a considerable time almoft in fight of each other; and , from the anxiety which Mendoza difcovered on that occafion, it mould feem he was deeply im- prefled with a fenfe of his inferiority to prince IMaurice, in refpecl of military knowledge and capacity. For ten days and nights, without in- termiflion, his whole army, horfe and foot, flood under their arms ; and were permitted to take no other reft , though it was the middle of PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN, 19 winter, but in their ranks in the open air. It BOOK was neccflary , mean while, to fend out his ca- 1. valry, and the retainers of his camp, in fearch of %c^ f forage and provifions; arid between them and de- tachments of the prince's army various rencoun- ters happened, in which they were always worded, and confiderable numbers taken prifoncrs. Both the Spanifh infantry and cavalry had be- gun to fuffer fo much from the cold , joined to a fcarcity of provifions, and were at the fame time fo much difheartened by that anxiety and dread of which their general's conduct was fo expreffive, that there was ground to believe, that if Maurice had thought himfelf at liberty to attack them , ho would have acquired a cheap and eafy victory. Finding it at length impoffible, on account of the want of provifions, to remain any longer in their prefent fituation, they directed their march towards Duyfburgh, which commands an import- ant paffage over the Jffel, into the territory of Veluwe. But Maurice , who lay nearer to that place, eafily reached it in time to be fully prepared for their approach. They ftopt (hort therefore at Novembcv. Dotechem, a town on their road to Duyfburgh; and there deliberated what courfe they (hould next purfue. To a general of fuch mean capacity as Mendoza, and fo little endued with the fpirit of laudable am- bition or enterprife , there appeared to be no room for hefitation. By the feverity of the feafon, by the fword of the enemy, and by defertion, his army had fuffered confiderable diminution; C % 2 o HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK and, having been long permitted to plunder the I. country through which they paffcd, and to live i5s,s. in the moft licentious manner, they were become reluctant to fubmit to the control of military difcipline. He dreaded, befides , the great abili- ties of Maurice , and thought it doubtful whether, in cafe he fhould fucceed in effecting his paflage over the Illel, he would find it practicable to fup- port his army during the winter-feafon in the ter- ritories of the ftates, where almoft all the towns were fortified , and prepared for their defence. Determined by thefe confiderations , he refolved to turn back, and to take up his winter quarters in the dutchy ofCleves, and other neutral ftates in the territory of Weftphalia. He accordingly re- tired with precipitation, leaving behind him many of his fkk and wounded , expofed to the mercy of the inhabitants of the country, who were high- ly exafperated by the injury and outrage they had received. Maurice putfued him for feveral miles, and cut off or took prifoners fo great a number of Bid '-on. his troops, that, including thofe who had deferted, i""!' and thofe who had fallen or were taken prifoners in former rencounters , it was computed that he had loft; above feven thoufand men. He fixed his head-quarters at Rees, having left a flrong garnfon in Emmerick, which Jay nearer to the enemy, under the command of the count de Boucquoi , one of his ableft officers. But the count, having foon after been ta!-en prifoner in a fkirmifli with count Lewis of Naffau , Maurice conceived the defign of making himfelf mailer of PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 21 the town. For this purpofc he ordered count BOOK Hohenloe to invert it ; and , in order to prevent 1. Mendoza from returning to its relief, he cut the is?9. dike of the Rhine, and laid all the country be- tween Kees and Emmerick under water. By this device the garrifon , having no profpect of aflift- ance from their friends, were intimidated , and , after a feeble refinance, laid down their arms. Maurice was equally fuccef-ful againft the garrifon of Zevenaer : but being well pleafed with an oppor- tunity of fhowing his condemnation of the con- duct of the Spanifli general, who, with fo great a contempt of the eftablifhed laws of nations, had feized on the towns of neutral powers , he re- Majjnani. taincd polfeffion of neither of thefe places , but rooils p° h - . . l cy or Mai)- delivered Fmmerick to the citizens, and Zevenaer rice. to the duke of Cleves 2? . After which he put his troops into winter-quarters, and went himfelf to the Hague, where he was employed during the remaining part of the winter in making prepara- tions for the next campaign. In the mean time Mendoza, equally inatten- The incen- tive to his character and to the laws of huma- tioufoefs of nitv , permitted his troops to exercife the moft atds> cruel opprefilon over the people of Weftphalia, from whom he could not pretend that either the king of Spain or the archduke had received the fmalleft injury. After plundering the inhabitants of the open country, and leaving them neither corn nor cattle for their funport, he allowed his foldiers to employ force againft fuch of the towns c 3 Grotius , p. 555 , &c. *2 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF JJ O K as refufed them admittance; and the towns being I. generally unprepared for defence , they got pof- iw« feflion of many of them, where they not only liv- ed at free quarters on the citizens , but robbed them of their moft valuable effects , which they fold at Cologne, and, by the merchants there, tranfmitted the price , amounting to very great fums , to Antwerp or other places in the Netherlands. Nor Were they fatisfied with pillage or plunder , but indulged themfelves in every fpecies of licentiouf- nefs ; and treated the inhabitants , on innumer- able occafions , with a degree of barbarous cru- elty and outrage , of which the troops under Fre- deric de Toledo bad , in their treatment of the people of Zutphen and ISIaarden , fumifhed the only inftance which occurs in the annals of Eu- rope for many years **. their bar* ^ n order to compel fuch of the people as they bamy. fufpected of being rich, to reveal their treafures, they wounded fome, they mutilated others, and, under the pretext of their being heretics , they committed others to the flames. Count Falcoftein , lord of Bruck , a Proteftant, having refufed them admittance into his caftle, which for fome time he defended againft them with great refolution, at length furrendered on condition that he and his domeftics fhould be allowed to depart in fafety; but he was no fooner in their power , than they firfl butchered his domeftics before his eyes, and afterwards himfelf. IMendoza had the effrontery to avow and vindicate fome inftances of this kind » Grotius , lib. vii. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 23 by alledging, that thofe who had fuffered were he- BOOK retics; but it was not the Proteftants only, but I. great numbers likewife of the Catholics, who l *> 99 ' experienced the barbarity of his troops ; and even many of thofe who had diftinguifhed them- felves by their attachment to the Spanifh interefl in the Netherlands; among whom were the fub- jects of the bifliops of Munfler , Paderborn , Liege, and Cologne , as well as the dutchies of Cleves and Juliers , who were all treated with the fame violence and inhumanity 15 . By thefe enormities the German princes were affe&ed in the manner which it was natural to ex- pect. Thev were fired with indignation againft their barbarous oppreflbrs , and had early deli- berated concerning the meafures proper to be purfued. No European nation had been more diftinguifhed than the Germans by their warlike difpofition , and their military prowefs, as no na- tion had exerted greater intrepidity and vigor in the defence of their property and liberty when state of attacked. But, having enjoyed profound tranquil- Gcrma »y- lity for near half a century , and all of them , but a few who had entered into the fervicc of foreign ftates , having been difufed to war, their tame- nefs and timidity invited the injuries of the Spa- nifh fcldiers; who found not only the inhabitants of the open country, but thofe likewife of mofi: of the towns, utterly dcfencelefs and unarmed. It was probably Albert's knowledge of this,. Grotius , lib. vii. Thuanus , lib. exxi. Piafecn Cine nka, anno 1598. Geftorum in Europa fingularium. C j. 24 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK joined to the con fi deration of the character of I. Kodolph, the prefent emperor, a prince of a tame %S99a and indolent difpofition , that had induced him to refolve to fupport his army at the expcnfe of the Germans ; and what they fuffered affords a linking proof how neceffary it is that every people, expofed by their fituation to be invaded, fhouid, inftead of trufting to their neutrality, or to the faith of treaties, Hand, on all occafions , in a pofture of defence. The people who fuffered moft from the depre- dations of the Spaniards were the fubjecis of the duke of Cleves , and of Ernefr. of Bavaria, who held , at the prefent period , the four bishopries of IYIunfter , Paderborn , Liege , and Cologne. Frnefl: , who had formerly been much indebted to the court of Spain, and was extremely defi- rous of avoiding a rupture with the archduke, in order to obtain redrefs , refolved to content him- fe!f with making remonflrances and complaints. The duke of Cleves was a weak prince, and, cv ot G« r- ... . wan -princes being at times difprdered in bis judgment, was in- capable of holding the reins of government. But his plnce was well fupplied , on the prefent occafion, bv his fifler , Sibylla , a princefs of a mafculine fpirit , who exerted great activity in roufing the indignation of the neighbouring dates and princes, and libored to convince them of the neceflity of uniting together , in order to drive the Spani- ards out of Germany. The elector Palatine, the landgrave of HelTe, feveral imperial cities on the banks of the Rhine, and a great number of counts, asrainli Mentloza PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 25 and other fovereign princes in Weftphalia, readily BOOK entered into Sibylla's views, and endeavoured to 1. intercft the reft of the empire, or at leaft the ^9?. neighbouring circles, in their caufe. They began with remonftrating to the arch- duke againft the iniquity of his conduct; and they were feconded by an ambafTador, fent for that purpofe by the emperor, who likewife publifhed a refcript, commanding Mendo;:a immediately to evacuate the town> and territories of which he had taken pofl.fhon. But, finding that no regard was paid by IYlendoza to the emperor's refciipt ; and that, inftead of complying with their requefts, Albert only lamented that the neceflity of his fitu- ation had obliged him to adopt a meafure which he faid was equally difagreeable to himfelf as to them, they ahxmbled together at Munfter, and refolved all of them, but the bifliop, or elector of Cologne, to have recourfe to arms. It was agreed that a numerous army fliould be raifed with the utmoft expedition. The proportion of mo- ney and troops which each prince or ftate fliould furnifh wasafcertained ; and the count de La Lippe, lieutenant general of the circle of Weftphalia , was appointed to be commander in chief. From the unanimity, alacrity, and ardor which ap- peared in this alTembly, there was ground to hope for the utmoft difpatch and vigor in carrying the plan adopted into execution; yet from the flow- nefs incident to the motions of a league, in which no one member pofTeffes authority fufficient to control the reft, the feafon, as will be feen in the 26 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK fequcl, was far advanced before the count de la I. Lippe was in a condition to take the field *'. *m. The Spanifh army, in the mean time , kept poileOion of all the towns into which they had entered; and, without reftraint from their gene- ral , continued to exercife over the people the fame opprellion as before ; till the feafon arrived when the cardinal governor of the ^Netherlands judged it proper to begin the operations of a new campaign. They were then withdrawn from all the towns in which they were quartered, ex- cept Orfov, Rhinberg, Rees, and Emmerick ; the lafl; of which places they had again obliged the in- habitants to furrender, after prince Maurice had retired. The cardinal, having come to Rees, where he Siege of ' ° ' Bommei. held a council of war, to deliberate concerning an expedition againft fomc of the frontier - towns of the United Provinces, it was determined to undertake the fiege of Bommei , the conquefi: of which would open an entrance into Holland: but, in order to conceal this intention from the ftates , and to facilitate the landing of the troops on the ifle of Bommei , it was agreed to fend a detachment of the army to make a feigned attack on the fort ofSchenck, which, as formerly dtferi- bed , is fituated on the upper extremity of the Retuwe. Thi« detachment was fent down along the right or north fide of the Rhine, while Men- doza, with the main army, marched down on Rentivoglio , part. iii. lib. v. ab. initio. Grotius , lib. vii , & viii. Thuanus, lib. exxi, &c. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 27 the other; and both divifions began about the fame BOOK time to play off their batteries againft the fort ; 1. the former from the banks of the Rhine, and the 'sp- latter from thofe of the Waal. Prince Maurice's head - quarters were at Arnheim, only a few leagues diftant from Schenck. He had never before experienced fo great anxiety or f.itigue. Almoft all the officers , on whom he chiefly depended for the execution of his orders, were abfent : count Hohenloe was in Germany, employed in exciting the princes of the league of IYlunfter to take the field again ft the Spaniards ; colonel Vere was not returned from England, whither he had gone to haften a body of frefh troops, which had been promifed by Elizabeth; and the younger la None had not flnifhed fome levies which, with the connivance of the king, he had been making among the Proteftants in France. All the troops therefore which Maurice April# had been able to mufter, after leaving fufficient garrifons in the fortified towns, amounted only at fj° 3 " , i lis this time to four thoufand men. With this little army he eroded over to the Betuwc; and having reinforced the garrifon of Schenck, and ftrength- ened the banks oppofite to Mendoza, where only he had occafion to fufpect that an attack might be defigned, he lay prepared to oppofe him in cafe he fhould attempt to land on the ifland. The Spaniards , having the river between them and the fort, were at too great a diftance to do execution with their attillery ; and, as this attack was only a feint to amufe prince Maurice , for 28 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK this reafon they had not taken time to employ I. the ufual precautions for their fhelter from the I ^ 9 - enemy's fire, they loft upward of four hundred men. This expenfe of blood, which the prince could eafily obferve from the ramparts, contribut- ed to confirm his belief that their defign againft the fort was ferious, and his attention was there- fore wholly engroffed with providing for its de- fence. In the mean time the count of Berg, with a body of troops, under the command of the colonels Stanley, Zapeau, and Barlotta, was ordered to march down along the left or fouth fide of the Waal ; and , in order to cover his in- tention , a great number of boats had been trans- ported to this river overland from the Maefe, on board of which he embarked his troops, and feemed to intend pa Ming over to the Betuwe. Prince Maurice could hardly doubt that this was his defign ; and , to prevent him from accomplish- ing it, he carefully watched his motions with a part of his forces, which being put on board of boats collected together at Nimeguen, kept direct- ly oppofite to the Spaniards in their progrefs down the river. In this manner both parties continued to advance, fometimes approaching within reach of each other's fire, and the Spaniards feemingiy intend. ng on forne occafions to effect a landing on 'he Betuwe, till they both arrived in the neigh- bourhood of the Voorn; when the count de Berg, having difembarked his troops, drew all his boats on fhore , and having put them into carriages which had been prepared for that purpofe , he PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 29 marched with great expedition acrofs the country, book from the Waal to the Maefe, where having again I. launched his boats , he failed down the river till I ^? < he arrived at l.mpel, and thus fecured a paifage into the ifle of Bommel. The fortifications of the town of that name, which Hands on the other fide of the lfland, though, on account of its fituation, deemed a place of great importance, had, amidft the mul- tiplicity of objects which required the attention of Maurice and the ftates, been extremely negle&ed ; the old fortifications were ruinous, and new ones, which had been begun, were yet unfiniflied. Had the troops therefore under the count de Berg been fufficiently numerous, or had Mendoza advanced in time to his fupport , he might with- out much difficulty have accomplifhed the object of his expedition. But the army having been detained longer than it ought to have been in the fictitious attack on the fort of Srhenck , the count was obliged to reft fatisfied with fecuring his Na- tion at Fmpel,or with making fhort excurfions in- to the country. Prince Maurice was, in the mean time , every day receiving frefh fupplies of troops from France, England, and other places; and his army amounted now to fo great a number, that he could afford to leave a pare of it for the defence of the Betuwe, and lead the reft to Bommel. He accordingly no fooner received information of the count of Berg's invafion of that ifland than he fet out with the greater part of his army, and go HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF book arrived there in time to prevent the inhabitants J. from abandoning the town, which they were pre- iss9. paring to do, from their defpair of being able to defend it. Mendoza left his camp oppofite to the Schenck about the fame time, and, having in his march reduced the fort of Crevecceur, which would have interrupted his communication with Bois le Due , he tranfported his forces into the ifle of Bommel, and began to lead them towards the town. He firft attempted to make himfclf matter of the dike of Waal, on which he in* tended to have erected batteries, in order to ftraiten the navigation of the river, but was pre- vented by an mediant fire from a great number of armed veffels, which IYlaurice had prepared for that purpofe. From the delay occafioned by this unneceflary enterprife, and the reduction of Cre- vecceur , a general of fo great activity as Maurice had leifure to put the town of Bommel into a proper pofture of defence. His army, at this time, was not inferior to that of the enemy, and amounted to eighteen thou- fand foot and three thoufand horfe. Having pitch- ed his camp on the right fide of the Waal, oppo- fite to Bommel, and conftrudied two bridges 27 , formed of barks covered with planks, one above and the other below the town , he committed the defence of the place to a felecl body of four thou- fand foot and two thoufand horfe. Bommel was too fmall a place to admit of fo numerous a garrifon ; but, in order that he might Each four hundred and fifty paces in length. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. N 3 i avail himfelf of the great number of his troops, BOOK his firft care had been to give the town an arti- I. ficial magnitude, by drawing round it at a little iv/., diftance from the walls, an intrenchment, ftrength- Maurice in. ened with a ditch, and with redoubts at proper ventsanc w r diftances ; to which he added a covered way ; a toruhcau. new fpecies of fortification, of which he himfelf on - was the inventor, and which he firft put in prac- tice on the prefent occafion. Mendoza was greatly difconcerted by the cele- rity and difpatch with which thefe works were ex- ecuted: and as not only the cannon planted upon them , but a ftrong battery which Maurice had raifed on the dike of the river, was ready to be played off upon the Spaniards, as foon as they approached, they fuffered a confiderable lofs of men , before they could cover themfelves with their trenches. Mendoza might now have feen his error in not advancing iooner to the fiege: and, if he reflected on the ftrength of the place, and the number of the garrifon , or on the neigh- bourhood of the prince's army, and the facility with which, as he was matter of the river, he could, at all times, introduce fupplies, or rein- forcements into the town , it muft appear furprif- ing that he did not perceive the iropoffibility of fucceeding in his attempt. Prince Maurice, on the other hand, was blam- ed by many of his countrymen for refting fatif- fied with defending a town againft an enemy, whom it was alledged, as he was fuperior to thern in numbers , he might have fuccefsfully encoun- 32 HISTORY OK THE REIGN OF BOOK tered in the open field. It began to be furmlfed I. that I\Liurice did not wifli to bring the war to a IS99> conclufion; and the dates fent deputies, to repre- Sufpicions ^ ent to him, that, as they could never expect to concerning afTemble a more flourifhing army than was at pre- pnnce £ ent unc | er nis command, and the expenfe which Maurice. . r their late preparations had colt them was enor- mous **, they could not help exprefiing their de- fire that he would fiiorten the campaign as much as poffible , and muft therefore recommend to him, if he could do it with fafety, to try the for- tune of a general engagement. IVTaurice was the more furprifed at this re- monftrance of the flates , as they had hitherto been extremely averfe to all adventurous meafures ; and, on many occafions, had difcovered a degree of caution bordering on timidity. He could not account for it, but on the fuppofition that they had liftened to the infinuations of his enemies , who ace u fed him of protracting the war, with the view of perpetuating his own authority: and, in order to wipe off this groundlefs afperfion , he would not have declined the riik of a battle, in cafe a favorable opportunity had offered. " But, in the prefent fituation of the Spanifh army, in a country fo narrow and confined, where his caval- ry, in which only he was fuperior , could be of little ufe, no fuch opportunity could reafonably be expected. Should he attempt to tranfport his army over the Maefe into Brabant, Bommel muft Twelve thoufand guilders. See Reidan. quoted by Le Clerc, p. 197. thereby PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 33 thereby fall into the hands of the Spaniards; BOOK -and, although, after the reduction of that ptace, i. they fliould be induced to follow him , and to of- xsm- fer battle, yet, without the greateft probability of fuccefs, he fliould doubt whether it would be ex- pedient to accept; as the fate of battles often de- pended on accidents, which no human prudence could forefee ; and the king of Spain, with fuch inexhauftible refourccs, could much more eafily fullain the lofs of an army than the Rates. It was for thefe reafons, not only his opinion, but that of his mod experienced officers , that the enemy fliould be permitted to fpend their ftrength in the fiege of Bommel, which, fliould they perfift in it, he was confident would prove their ruin. n The - ftates , convinced by thefe confederations, entered without much difficulty into the prince's views, and left him at liberty to purfue the plan of ope- rations which he had laid before them. The car- dinal Andrew, in the mean time, having with gieat activity formed at Bois le Due, the molt ample magazines of every thing neceflary for the fiege, JVlendoza was enabled to make his ap- proaches to the town , with greater expedition than there was reafon to expect His troops were now, in a good meafure, covered from the enemy's fire; and he had begun to play oft his batteries. Rut it foon appeared how little reafon he had to flatter himfelf with the hopes of fuccefs in his en- terprife. The garrifon, fupported by frefli troops fent to their alliilance by the prince, could not only prevent them from making farther progreis Vol. I. D 34 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK in the fiege , but fallied out againfl: them , fomc- I. times by day, and fometimes by night, demolifh- H99. ing their works 4 and putting a coniiderable num- ber to the fword. The Spanifli troops difplayed , on every occafion , the mod determined intrepi- dity; and thereby fully juftified the caution of prince Maurice, in declining to reduce them to the neceflity of a general engagement. They gave the moft ftriking proofs likewife of the ex- cellence of their military difcipline, by recover- ing themfelves with a facility which aftonifhed the enemy, from the confufion into which they were fometimes thrown; an.d they were every where fuccefsful in reprefling the fallies of the garrifon , although thefe fallies were performed by nume- rous bodies, amounting to five or fix thoufand men , of the beft of the French and Englifh forces, • conducted by la None, colonel Vere, and other officers of the moft unqueftionable bravery. They fuffered, however, confiderable lofs. In the fpace of three weeks , upwards of two thoufand pe- rifhed; and the cardinal governor, being at laft convinced of the abfurdity of perfifting in his en- terprife , fent ordeis to Mendoza to raife the fiege. invention He was determined , however , by the advice of »r the hid Colonna, the hiftorian, who was, at this time, torian Co* „ • i r> • n an officer in the Spanun army, to attempt accom- plifliing, in another way, the object of the pre- fent expedition, by creeling a fort in another part oftheifland, from which the fame advantage might be derived as from the poffeflion of Bommel : lonna. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 3 5 and, for this purpofe, agreeably to the counfel book that was given him , he made choice of a narrow j. neck of land which unites the upper with the IS99 . lower part of the ifiand, intending to occupy, with a fortification of the ftrongelr. kind, the whole fpace between the Maefe and the Waal ; and thus, not only to facilitate an invafion of the United Provinces, but to check the enemy's na- vigation in both rivers. The conftruclion of this fort was committed to Beginning Velafco , general of the artillery. A thoufand of Junc » foldiers , and two thoufand pioneers , were em- ployed in the work ; and the army was ported about the neighbouring villages of Herwyn and Roflfem , to prevent the approach of the enemy. Maurice having penetrated this defign^ led up his troops along the north fide of the Waal, and took his flation directly oppofite to the Spaniards; where, having planted batteries of his largeft can- non , [he greatly annoyed the' workmen, and, though not without fome lofs, did confiderable ex- ecution. Velafco , however , perfevered , and was at length able to cover his men from the enemy's fire. The prince finding then that all his efforts in this quarter mult be ineffectual , tranfported his army into the adjoining lfle of Voorn; and, from thence, fent over a detachment of three thoufand men, to the upper part of the ifle of Bommel; giving them inftructions to intrench themfelves at the village of Hervorden , winch lies at a little Uiftance from the place where the Spaniards were D * 36 HISTORY OF THE R.EIGN OF BOOK employed in making the new fort. His orders I. were executed with the greateft expedition, and i5?9. the intrenchments almoft; completed before the Spaniards got notice that the troops had landed on the ifland. Mendoza , fenfible of the danger and inconve- niencies to which he was expofed, from having the enemy fo near him, immediately difpatched the count de Berg, to attack their lines, with a numerous body of chofen troops. The count was repulfed with the lofs of more than five hun- dred men , among whom were many officers of diftinguifhed merit : but having ftationed the greater part of his army on that fide of the fort which lay next to the enemy, he kept the prince at bay, and enabled Velafco, without interrup- tion , to carry on his operations in the conftruc- tion of the fort. The Spanifh cavalry, in the mean time, which could neither have proper accommodation, nor be fupplied with forage in the ifle of Bommel, were quartered in Brabant, in the neighbourhood of Megen. Their communication with the main ar- my was kept open by a bridge over the Maefe; but as they lay at the diftance of feveral miles, a fort, called Durango , from the name of the en- gineer employed in conftrucling it, and feveral redoubts, had been ere&ed on that part of the dike of the river by which the enemy might ap- proach. Notwithftanding thefe prudent precau- tions, prince IVlaurice ftill refolvcd to attack the Spanifh cavalry, and, with this view, having PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 37 thrown a bridge over the Maefe from the ifie of BOOK Voorn, he kept his own cavalry in readinefs to 1. march as foon as orders fhould be given them, nj ? . But judging it neceflary before-hand to diflodge the Spaniards from their fortifications on the dike of the river, he fent the fieur de la Noue, and colonel Vere, with a felecl body of troops, chief- ly ringlifh and French, to make an attack on fort Durango. Nothing could furpafs the fpirit and intrepiditv which thefe troops, animated by the example of their leaders, difplayed in the attack. Having thrown down their pikes and mufkets, they fcaltd the ramparts in feveral places, and at- tacked the garrifon , with extraordinary fury, fword in hand. But this garrifon, confining of Spaniards and Walloons, though amounting only to five hundred men , commanded by Ladeiano , an officer of dillinguilhed bravery, in their de* fence difcovered a degree of intrepidity not infe- rior to that of the ailailants. The fmallnefs of their number was compenfated by the advantages of tlvir fituation; and the combat was thus pro- longed for feveral hours, with mutual (laughter, till !a Xoue and Vere, being informed that Men- j u i,-. doza was approaching towards them with fupenor fores, judged it prudent to retire. No oiher memorable tranfactions happened be- tween the contending parties during this cam- paign. IMaurice could not venture now to attack the Spanifh cavalry with fafety ; and, from the precautions which had been taken to cover the workmen employed in erecting the (ort in Bomme! 3 D 3 3 8 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK joined to the advantageous fituatlon of the Spanifh I. army , he found it impoffible to prevent them n„. from carrying that defign into execution. Afortereft The fort was accordingly finiflied in the mofl ed in the regular manner: the ramparts, flanked with Bommel. baftions , and inflantly planted with cannon, in a great meafure commanded the navigation of the Macfe, on the fouth, and of the Waal, on the north. On the eaft: and weft , they were fe- cured with ditches of extraordinary breadth and depth, which being at all times filled with wa- ter from the rivers, ferved as harbours for twelve armed vefTels , ftationed in them to cruife againft the enemy. And , in imitation of the example which Maurice had exhibited in the fortifications of Bommel, the whole was flrengthened with a covered way , which was ftrongly fortified with redoubts The cardinal came himfelf to vifit this fort as foon as it was finiflied ; and having marked out a place for a church, of which he laid the firft ftone with his own hand, he gave both to the. church, and to the fort, the name of Saint An- drew. He had been extremely defirous to diftin- gnifh his administration by fome remarkable achievement; and he was overjoyed to have been able to finifli fo great a work, which he hoped would be found of great importance towards the reduction of the revolted provinces. Prince Maurice, on the other hand, notwittV ftanding his fuccefsful defence of Bommel , could not fail to be feverely mortified; although, as PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 39 will appear in the fequel , this fort, the erect- BOOK ing of which he had exerted his utmoft fkili and I. vigor to prevent, ferved only to furnifh him ,,s ** with one opportunity more than would other- wife have occurred to difplay his wonted activi- ty and enterprife. In the mean time, he built another fort directly oppofite to Saint Andrew, on the right fide of the Waal , which rendered the country of Betuwe fecure againft the excurfx- ons of the enemy 19 . During the courfe of thefe tranfactions in the Netherlands , the Germans in the circle of Weft- phalia had begun their operations againft the Spa- nifh garrifons in Rhinberg, and the other towns upon the Rhine. But as neither the emperor, nor the electors of Cologne, Mentz , and Treves, befides feveral other popifh princes, were willing to come to an open rupture with the court of Spain , their 'preparations for war had not been carried on with that alacrity which might have been ex- pected from the ftrong and juft refentment with which they were inflamed ; and the feafon of action was far fpent before they were ready to open the campaign. The elector Palatine had withdrawn his contingent of troops, under the pretext that the league had been violated by the other electors •> and the bifhop of Cologne , though his fubjects had fuffered greatly from the depredations of the Spaniards, had carried his complaifance to them to fo great a length, as to Grotius , lib. viii. Bentivoglio , part iii. lib. v. Thua- nus, lib. exxii. D 4 4 o HISTORY OF THE REICjN OF BOOK permit them to make levies in his dominions , 1. and to furnifli them with provifions and military IS99 - ftores. It was therefore with the utmofl difficulty that the count de la Lippe could muftcr twelve thoufand foot and two thoufmd horfe '° , and the greateft put of thefe were raw troops, en- tirely nnaccuftomed to military difcipline. With fuch an army it is probable that no gene- ral could have fulfilled the expectations of thofe by whom it had been affembled , and the count de la Lippe polfefled neither experience nor ca- pacity furliuent to entitle him to the fupreme com- mand. The counts Hohenloe and Solmes had been fent to his affiftance by the United States ; and thefe men were neither deficient in courage nor in activity and enterprife ; but they diicover- cd a jealoufy of each other, which proved per- nicious to the caufe in which they were engaged , and when they differed in their opinions , the ge- neral was incapable of determining aright to which of their counfels the preference was due. The firft enterprife in which he was engaged was the fiege of Rhinberg; but having no part of the apparatus neceflary lor carrying it on, except what he received from Holland, and the inhabit- ants of the adjacent country , whofe refentrnent the governor of the Netherlands had found means to appcafe , being unwilling to fupply his troops with provifions, he foon abandoned his attempt, and directed his march towards Recs, where he expected the Dutch could more eafily convey to him fuch adiftance as his exigencies Ihould require, brotius. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 41 The garrifon of Rees was ill prepared for their BOOK defence, and if la Lippe had liftened to the coun- I. fel of count Hohcnloe , who advifed him to ftati- 1S99 * on a part of his army on the other fide of the ri- scptembtr. ver , to prevent them from receiving any reinforce- Sie?e of ment or fupplies , they would foon have found it neceflary to lay down their arms : but he neglected this neceflary precaution. The garrifon were fe- veral times reinforced by detachments from the army in Bommel; and at length, finding them- felves pofTefled of fufficient ftrength , and obferving that the fiege was carried on in the moft remifs and negligent manner, they made a vigorous at- tack upon his trenches, put a great number of his men to the fword, nailed up feveral of his can- non , and even carried off fome of them in tri- umph to the town. This difafler increafed the divifion which from, the beginning had fubfifted among the leaders. The troops were disheartened, and became more difobedient and refractory than ever; and in two days after the count gave orders toraife the fiege. 'I he retreat of this army was ftill more dif- graceful than their conduct during the fiege. Dreading that the garrifon would renew their at- tack upon the trenches, they fled in the moft pre- cipitate manner , leaving behind them a great part of their baggage and provifions. The Spaniards hung in their rear for feveral miles, put many to the fword, and threw the whole army into confu- fion. Not long afrer, a party of them mutinied aeainft their officers, left their ftandards, and, in 4* HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK their way home, indulged themfelves in the fame I. rapine and depredation againft their countrymen , "">"* as had formerly been exercifed by the Spanifh troops. The Dutch had, in the beginniug, entertained the hopes of rinding ufeful allies in the Germans. With this view they had exerted all their influ- ence in roufing them to arms, and had feveral times fupplied them with ftores and provifions. On the prefent occafion they fent William de NafTau, a near relation of prince Maurice, an experienced officer, and a perfon of diftinguiflied prudence , to attempt to re-eftablifh difcipline among the troops , and a good underftanding among the leaders, but all his endeavours having proved ineffectual for thefe ends, and the winter- N f ovemBer. f ea f on approaching, it was judged neceffary to dif- army dif- band the army, and put an end to this inglorious banded. campaign. Such is frequently the fate of confederacies formed by the union of independent princes , even when there is one common intereft to unite them , unlefs the fupreme command be devolved on fome perfon of extraordinary abilities , whofe want of power may be fupplied by the confidence infpired by his fupcrior merit. Notwithstanding the feeble efforts of this confederacy , the archduke having only intended , by feizingthe German towns, to accommodate his troops for a feafon, ordered mod of them to be evacuated. He likewife promifed to indemnify the feveral dates for the injuries and damages which PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 43 they had fuftaincd ; and two commiflioners were BOOK appointed by the emperor to cftimate their lofles ; I. but it does not appear that any thing effectual was 1S99 * ever dorie in confequence of this appointment ". In Spain the duke of Lerma, defirous to give fome proof of vigor in the beginning of his ad- miniftration , fitted out a fleet of fifty fhips of war, which he put under the command of Don Afleetre " e '. . . . to crime a- Martin de Padilla , and fent to cruife againft the gainft the Englifh ; but this entcrprife proved equally un- En s llA * fortunate as raoft of the former ones which the Spaniards had undertaken againlt. their northern enemies. Padilla had not been many days at fea when a violent ftorm arofc, which obliged him, without having feen the Englifh fleet, to return to Spain. The duke of Lerma was more fuccefsful in the t« B 'ty ■"* meafure which at this time he fuggefted to the "^"duke king, for conciliating the affe&ions of his fub- of Lerma. jects in Arragon , who had been difgufted by the treatment which they had received in the for- mer reign. Philip and his young queen, accom- panied by the duke and many other courtiers, having fet out to vifit the city of Saragoffa, notice was fent to the inhabitants, by order of the king, that he could not enter their town with pleafure till the heads of thofe citizens, who had fuffered in the unfortunate affair of Antonio Perez, were Grotius, lib. viii. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. v. Pia- fecii Chronica Geftorum in Europa Singularium , an. is 99- Gon. Davila, lib. ii. cap. 4, Thuan. llift . lib. exxii. cup. 6. S j etc. 44 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK taken down from the gates, and that ipfcription I. erafed which recorded their pretended crime. is»§. m This order, foagreeable to the people, and which was inftantly obeyed, was accompanied with the royal pardon to all thofe who had been concerned in the infurrection, and a declaration, that the king could not be happy while any of his faithful fubjecfs had caufe of grief. He then made a mag- nificent entry into the town, amidft: the ftrongcfl; demonftrations of affection and joy on the part of the inhabitants; and foon after he folemnly con- firmed all their rights and privileges '*. Among the entertainments which the people of Saragoffa prcfented to their king on this occafion , there was one, which , at the prefent period, will appear fomewhat extraordinary; a difpute held at the univerfity , at the conferring the degree of doctor, the fubject of which was, whether the emperor be the lord or fovereign of the whole world }} . September. During the courfe of the tran factions that have The arch- been related , Albert and Ifabella arrived in the .lube's arrL Netherlands '*. They entered Bruffels with a Nether- fplendid court and retinue, and were received lands. with extraordinary magnificence. There was confiderable difficulty in adj lifting the form of the oath of allegiance which they adminiflcred to their new fubjects; and the ftates of Brabant Gon. Davila , lib. ii. cap. R. ? Davila. He had tarried much longer than his new fubjects had reafon to expect, but no cotemporary hiftorian has informed us of the reafon of his delay. PHILIP III. KItfG OF SPAIN. 45 demanded that, beforehand, certain forts and ci- BOOK tadels fhould be demolished, and the ancient rights 1. and privileges of the provinces ratified; but, find- I599 * ing that the archdukes, (this was the title which Albert and lfabella now aflumed ) were utterly averfe to comply with their requefls , they were perfuaded to defift from their purpofe, and agreed, though with much reluctance , to take the oath required. It was likewife a matter of great offence to the Flemings that Albert, befides affuming the Spanifti drefs, and requiring to be ferved upon the knee, had formed his court according to the mo- del of that of Spain , and in everything adopted the Spanifh manners and cuftoms , in preference to thofe of the Netherlands. This conduct was pro- bably intended to gratify the Spaniards, on whom Albert faw he muft principally depend during the continuance of the war; but it contributed to ali- enate the affections of his Flemim fubjects , and to prevent them from exerting themfdves with active zeal in his behalf ". He ftood however much in need, at the prefent juncture, of all the affiftance which they were able to aftord. Although he had received a confider- able fupply from the duke of Lerma , before his departure from Spain, yet having, in conformity to the practice of the age, expended hrge fumr. in idle pomp and fliow in his marriage folemnity 9 and his magnificent entrance into Bruttels , and other towns which he and lfabella vifited on their Grotius j lib. viii. p 379. Bcntivoglio , part, iii, lib. v. 46 HISTORY OF> THE REIGN OF oV BOOK I. 1599. A mutiny among the Spanish troops. If. CO. January. In March. Siege oFSt. acceffion , he found himfclf utterly unable to dif- charge the arrears due to his troops, who no foon- cr entered their winter-quarters than they began to mutiny againft their officers. The Spanifli forces , to the number of two thoufand foot , and eight hundred horfe , having abandoned their commanders , took pofTeflion of the town of Hamont, in the bifhopric of Liege, where, ha- ving firfl; ftrengthened the fortifications , they li- ved at free quarters on the inhabitants , and laid all the adjacent country under contribution. Their example was quickly followed by fixteen hundred Italians , and foon afterwards the garri- fons of Crevecceur and St. Andrew , confiding of Germans and Walloons , expelled their officers and elected others from their own number m their room 5 *. Prince Maurice , having received information of thefe diforders , did not fuffer fo favorable an opportunity of action to efcape. After reducing the town of Wachtendonc , and the fort of Creve- cceur , and making a fuccefsful attack on the Spanifli cavalry , in the neighbourhood of Bois le Due, where he put near five hundred of them to the fword , he laid fiege to St. Andrew. This fort, the only fruit of the operations of a whole campaign , the archduke juftly confidered as a place of the firfl importance, both on account of the flrength of the fortifications , and the great advantage which it afforded him for invading the revolted provinces. He was therefore extremely folicitous to preferve it , and for this purpofe 3 * See Metercn, fol. 49 x. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 47 afTembled together at Bois le Due fuch a body of BOOK troops as were deemed fufficient to raife the fiege. i. Of thefe troops he gave the command to Velafco, iv* by whom the fort had been ere&ed ; and on the part of this officer no time was unnecefiarily loft. But all his attempts were rendered ineffe&aul by the vigilance and forefight of Maurice , who , be- fides fortifying his camp and all the approaches to it, had cut the dike of the Maefe, and laid all the low grounds betwixt it and Bois le Due under water. The garrifon confifted of twelve hundred men ( who , although they had mutinied againft their officers, yet regarding the fort as their only pledge for the payment of- their arrears , ftrenu« oufly exerted themfelves in its defence. But perceiving that, notwithstanding their mod vigorous efforts, Maurice was making daily pro- grefs in the fiege , and having no profpect of de- liverance , they liftened to a propofal which was made to them by the prince , in order to fave time, and agreed to furrender the fort for a fum of money equal to their arrears J7 . Immediate- May. ly after which , confeious that they had committed an unpardonable crime againft the Spaniards, they inlifted in the array of the United States; and as they knew that they could not expect quar- ter in cafe they fhould fall into the hands of their former mafters , they were on many occafions of fingular ufc , by the defperate intrepidity which they difplayed "« 17 A hundred and twenty-five thoufand guilders. Triumphs of NafTau , printed 1613. Grotius , Hifl. lib. ix. and Bentivoglio, 48 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK By thefe difafters the archdukes were afflicted I. in the rnoft fenfible manner. They received in- 2 ^9. formation at the fame time that prince Maurice , having on no former occafion exerted greater di- ligence in his military preparations , was refolved to profecute the approaching campaign with ex- traordinary vigor, in the hopes of making fome important conquefts before the mutineers were perfuaded to return to their duty. All their en- deavours for this end had hitherto proved ineffec- tual. They had fome ground to fufpect that the reft of the troops were infected with the fame mutinous fpirit , and dreaded that many of them might be induced to imitate the treacherous exam- ple of the garrifon of St. Andrew. Convention The ftates of the provinces fubject to their au- ©ftheftates thority , having been lately convened at Bruffels, Albert reprefented to that affembly that , as the fource of all the diforders which prevailed was his inability to difcharge the arrears due to his troops, it was necellary they fbould grant him an extraor- dinary fupply. He had reafon to expect that ere long he fhould receive remittances from Spain ; but the demands of the mutineers muft be imme- diately fatisfied , otherwife there was ground to dread that the mod pernicious confequences would en fue. The ftates replied , by cxprefling their appre- lienfion of thefe confequences, and by giving him the ftrongeft: affurances of their attachment and fi- delity; but infmuated that, confidering the ex- hvuifted ftate of the provinces, and the dirliculty which PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 49 which the court of Spain had ever found in fup- BOOK porting fo great a number of forces , no other ef- I. fectual remedy could be applied to the' prefent l609 * diforders but an accommodation with the revolted ftates. They had conceived hopes at this time that an Advifean accommodation might be brought about by the dati01 , wi | h mediation of ambafTadors , whom the emperor therevoited had fent into the Netherlands, in order to procure ""' a reflitution of fome towns on the German fron- tier , of which the contending parties ftill retain- ed the pofleffion. The ambafTadors found no dif- ficulty in accompiiihing the object of their com- million ; and having pafled over into Holland., they prevailed on the United States to fend depu- ties to Bergen op Zoom , to negociate a treaty with deputies fent thither by the archdukes. But the Dutch being unalterably determined to main- tain their independence, and difcovering the fame diftruft of the archdukes , with which they had long been actuated towards the Spaniards , the conferences were no fooner begun than they were broken off, and both parties retired, extremely dift'atuiied with each other. While a reconciliation was thus, in vain, at- a negocia- tempted between the archdukes and the United t'<>» for tj ■ urn P eace be * rrovinces , a negotiation was begun tor reltoring lV veen Spain peace between the queen of England and the king »" d En &' of Spain. Some advances had been made for this land * purpofe to the Hnglifli minifters by the cardinal Andrew , while he was governor of the Nether- lands, and neither of the courts at variance feemed Vol. I. E 5 o HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK at this time to have been inclined to prolong J. the war. It was agreed that a congrefs fhould be icco. j-j^j at Boulogne; and minifters were fent thither by the contending powers. But this negotiation abortive Jikewife proved abortive, as the plenipotentiaries found it impolfible to adjuft the ceremonial among them to the fatisfaction of their refpe&ive courts. The precedence had, from time immemorial, been yielded to the crown of England, by the kings of Caftile and Arragon ; and Elizabeth maintained that it ftill belonged to her , notwithstanding the union of thefe crowns , and the conquefr. of Gra- nada , fince Spain , confidered as one kingdom , was greatly inferior to England in refpedl of anti- quity, which was the only ground on which a point of this nature could properly be decided. But the Spanifli minifters could not perceive the force of this reafoning. They claimed the prece- dence on account of the fuperior extent and power of the Spanifli monarchy; and, even when Eliza- beth, in order to prove the iincerity of her pacific difpofition , offered to agree to an equality, they reje&ed this offer, and infifted that the fuperior dignity of the catholic king fhould be recognifed. To this the queen as peremptorily refufed her con- fent; and, foon afterwards , the plenipotentiaries left Boulogne. This unexpected ifiue of the congrefs was mat- ter of great joy to the United States. They had fuffered much anxiety from the apprehenfion of united lofing !o powerful an ally as queen Elizabeth; loVvctJin- and now , when they were delivered from this PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. $t apprehenfion , they refdlved to improve to the ut- BOOK mod the advantages which they derived from her r. alliance , by employing the Englifh forces , and lfido ' as many of their own , as could be fpared front vaiie Flan, the defence of the frontier-towns, in ah invafion Uers * of Flanders. To form this refolution, they were encouraged by the mutiny of the Spanifli troops ; and they were , at the fame time , earneftly folt- cited to carry it into execution by the merchants of Zealand , who were extremely defiroils of dif- poffennig the archduke of the fea-ports in Flan- ders, which afforded flleltef to fome Spanifh fhips of war, by which their trade had lately received confiderable interruption. In compliance with their requeft, it was agreed to undertake the re- duction of Nicuport ; and about the middle of June, the army, amounting to fifteen thoufand foot, and two thoufand five hundred horfe , fet fail from Ramekins in Walcherert, the place of rendezvous, and landed in Flanders near Ghent. After reducing fome fmall forts , prince Maurice led them towards Bruges, and pafTed alnioft within reach of the cannon of that place, not without hopes, which proved fallacious, that by the fight of fo flourifhmg an army , and the late difafters ■which had hefallen the archdukes , the inhabitants might have been induced to throw off the Spa- nifli yoke , and return to their former connexion with the United Provinces. From Bruges he marched towards Nieuport, and, by the way thither, made himfelf matter, with little difficulty , of certain forts called St. Albert* $2 HISTORY OF THK REIGN OF BOOK Snacrfeerck , Bredene , and Oudenburgh , in I. which he left garrifons, with the view ot retard- i6oo. ing the progrefs of the enemy, in cafe they mould venture to approach ". He then in veiled sic»eof Nieuport by land, while his fleet blocked up the Kieuport. harbour ; and , as the town was neither very ftrong nor well prepared for a vigorous defence, he hoped in a few weeks to be able to compel the garrifon to furrender. The archduke, in the mean time, exerted him- felf with great activity in his preparations for an attempt to make him raife the fiege; and, having had the good fortune to perfuade a confiderable number of the Spaniih mutineers to return to their duty, his army foon amounted to twelve thoufand foot, and twelve hundred horfe. Both he arid IfabelU, upon the in ft news of the ene- my's arrival in Flanders, had repaired to Ghent, in order to provide for the fecurity of that im- portant place, and the other towns of the pro- vince. The troops were ordered to alTemble to- gether at Bruges; and as in their march thither they palled near Ghent, Ifabelia, mounted on horfeback, went out to meet them, and rode along the lines animating and exhorting them, giving them repeated afiurances that, in future, they fhould not have the fame ground as hitherto to complain of the irregularity of their pay; and declaring that, rather than their demands fhould not be fatisfied, file would expofe to fale her plate 3 * Maurice was attended by a number of the deputies of the dates. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 53 and jewels, and deliver up to them the futids ap- BOOK propriated to the fupport of her court and fer- 1. vants. This fpcech , joined to her majeftic air 1609. and manner, produced a powerful effect upon the minds of the foldicrs, who received it with fhouts of high applaufc, and called out to her that they were ready to expofe their lives to every danger in her defence. Albert, on this occafion, omit- ted nothing in his power to confirm them in their prefent difpofition , and acquainted them that he was determined to fight at their head , and to fliare their fortune. Agreeably to his refolution, having joined his army at Bruges, he fet out with it from thence about the end of June. His firfl object was the reduction of the fores above mentioned , in which his fuccefs correfponded with his mofl fanguine hopes. The garrifons which Maurice had left in thefe forts, were intimidated by the Tight of fo great a force , and after a feeble refiftance fur- rendered them, on condition, that they fhould be fuffered to depart with their arms and baggage. The archduke himfelf fubferibed the capitulati- on; but, though his intention was fincerc, he could not protect the garrifon of Snaerfeerck , confifling of two companies of foldiers, from the fury of the Spanifh mutineers , who fell upon them , notwithftanding their officers prohibition, and put them all to the fword. Prince Maurice being at the fame* time in- formed of the furrender of the forts, which he had expected would have held out much longer, E 3 54 HISTORY OF Tl^E REIGN OF BOOH 3nd of the near approach of the enemy , was 1. thrown into great perplexity. From his cpnfi- iiiqo. dence pf bringing the liege to a fpeedy conclnfi- pn , lie had neglected tp fortify his camp; the number of bis troops was not fufticient tp enable him bo^h to continue the liege, and to oppofe the enemy in the open field; and he had even reafon tp dread, from the rapidity of their march, that be fhould not have leifure before their arrival, tp put himfelf i ( ntp a proper poflure of defence. In order to regard their; progrefs , and tp gain as much time as poffible, he immediately difpatch- cd his kinfman, count Eruefi of Naflau , with two regiments of foot, confiding of Zealanders and Scots, and four troops of horfe , to fcize on the bridge of Leffingen , by which the enemy inufl: pafs in their way tp Nieuport. But before count Ern,eft could reach this place, they had ad- vanced , and taken poflcflion of it. Krneft how- ever, knowing how neceifary it was tp afford time to Maurice to prepare for their reception , re- folved , how fatal foevcr the confequences fhould prove to himfelf and his detachment; , that he •would not retire without fighting: and this gene- rous refolution was happily attended with the de- fired effect Albert, believing that Maurice's \vho!e army muft furely be at hand, (pent a con- fiderable time in making the proper difpofirions for a general engagement. At length , being in- formed that Erneft's troops had received no aug- mentation fince their firfl appearance, and that np pther part of the enemy's army was in fight, he PHILIP III. K^NG OF SPAIN. 55 gave orders for an attack. The troops under Fr- book reft kept their ground for forne time; bqt, the I. horfe having quickly given way, they were over- iscg. powered by numbers, and obliged to retire. In Julys. this action , upwards of five hundred of the Scots were flain, with many officers of diftinguifhed re- putation 4 \ The archdukes hope? were greatly heightened by this fuccefs, and he wrote to Ifabella that hav- ing with fo great facility difcomfited the van-guard of the enemy's army, he expected foon to in- form her of the defeat of the whole. He judged, however, that there was ground to hefitate with regard to the conduct which it was proper to pur- fue ; and, in order to aflift him in forming his re- folution, he called a council of his mod experi- enced officers. Gafpard Zapena, a Spaniard of great experience, was of opinion that it was alto- gether unneceflary, and would therefore, in the prefent circumftances , be extremely imprudent to rifk a battle. The enemy's general, through his confidence of being able to reduce Nieuport be- fore an army could be aflembled to oppofe him, had brought himfelf into the moft dangerous fi- tuation in which he had been ever placed. He durft not, now, in the face of fo powerful an ar- my, continue his operations againfl the town. His communication with Oftend was intercepted, fince the archduke was fortunately fituated be- tween him and that place; and, fliould he attempt to make his efcape by fea, when his highnefs w%# Piafecius, p. 182. E4 56 History of the reign of BOOK ready to fall upon him, in the hurry of embark- I. ation, the greateft part of his troops mud be cut i«oo. to pieces. He therefore thought that the arch- duke ought not immediately to advance, with a defign to attack the enemy ; but ought rather to take the proper meafures for reducing them , without expoling himfelf to the chance of a bat- tle; and if he did, he believed, that ere long he would be able to oblige the enemy to lay down their arms. Rut whether his opinion on this head fhould be rejected or embraced, it was at leaft neceiTary that, before he advanced any fur- ther, he fhould procure information of the fitua- tion of the enemy, of which he was entirely ig- norant; and, before adventuring to attack them, fhould wait for the arrival of Velafco, who in a few days would join him with a reinforcement of three thousand troops. This prudent council was warmly oppofed by the fieur la Barlotte, an old Flemifh commander, of no lefs experience than Zapena , but whofe courage, notwithstanding his advanced age, ftill bordered on temerity. He maintained that the prefent favorable opportunity of attacking the enemy ought not to be furfered to efcape; that the archduke would find them entirely unprepared for their defence, intimidated by the rapidity of his approach , and difheartened by the defeat which their troops, under Erneft of NafTau, had fo recently fuftained; that, as the advantages he muft derive from thefe circumftances , weic more than fufficient to compenfate for the want of the PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 57 troops under Velafco, fo his inferiority in number BOOK to the enemy was more than counterbalanced, by 1. the fuperior difcipline and bravery of his troops; icoo. that his troops were at prefent animated with the higheft: degree of ardor; and that the delaying to lead them forward , when they were fo eager to engage , would only ferve to damp their alacrity, while it would afford leifure to the enemy, either to fortify their intrenchments , or to fecure their retreat. This reafoning was received with high applaufe by a great majority of the council; and the fol- diers, efpecially the Spanifh mutineers, impatient to advance, could hardly be reftrained. Albert , however , being ftrongly imprefied with a fenfe of the folidity of Zapena's reafons for delay, ftill hefitated as to which of the councils given him, he fliould embrace; when chance, which often dire&s the moft important events, contributed to fix his refolution. The army hav- ing a view from their prefent fituation of the fea- coaft, a great number of fhips were feen in their cotirfe from Nieuport to Oftend. The Spaniards prepofieffed with the idea that the enemy durft not wait for their approach , concluded that they had already begun their flight, and that ,'at leaft, a part of them were on board the fhips which they obferved. Albert himfelf too readily yielded to this dclufion; and inftantly gave orders to his troops to begin their march. He was, at this time , only at the diftance of a few miles from Nieuport, and , as he advanced with great rapidity, 58 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF X o O K his cavalry arrived within fight of the enemy I. about mid-day, and his whole army about four i6co. or five hours before fun-fet. He foon difcovered how greatly he and his of- ficers had erred in their conjectures wuh regard to the conduct and fituation of the enemy. Far from meditating flight, prince Maurice had or- dered his fleet to quit the coafl, and retire to Oftend; by which prudent meafure, he at once gave his army proof of the confidence which he repofed in them , and reduced them to the alter- native of death or victory. He had withdrawn all his troops from the fiege , except a number which he judged fufficient to reflrain the fillies of the garrifon. He had advanced to a little dift- ance from the town , partly to encourage his troops, by fliowing that it was not with reluctance that he had refolved to accept of battle; and pirtly becaiife the fituation of the ground was more convenient for drawing them up in the order which he moft approved. Bcfides his Dutch forces, he had feveral regi- ments of Briti/h , French, and Swifs , commanded by officers of diRinguifhed merit, who had ac- quired the molt confummate knowledge of the military art in the civil wars of France, and in the Netherlands; and thefe men, he well knew, from long experience, would execute his orders with equal {kill and valor. He thought it neceflary, however, to encou- rage and animate the troops, and for this purpofe, he rode from rank to rank , reminding them thai PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 50 they were about to engage with an enemy who BOOJi were not only inferior in numbers, and fatigued with 1. their march; but, who, in the manner of their »6oo« approach, had given proof of extreme temerity: that it entirely depended on themfelves whether they mould return to their country and their friends, crowned with glory and vi&pry, or be cut to pieces by an enemy over whom they had often triumphed, and have their names for ever covered with infamy. From his confidence in their bravery, he had ordered the tranfports to leave the coaftj and he now led them on to bat- tle , under a conviction that they would follow the example which he would fet before them , and refolve either to die or conquer. Thefe exhorta- tions were every where received with the raoft joyful acclamations ; and the whole army feemed to be animated with that intrepid fpirit which he wiflied to infpire. He gave the command of his van-guard to fir Francis Vere , that of his main body to the count of Solms , and of the rear-guard to Oliver Van- der Tempel, lord of Corbeck. He diftributed his cavalry , commanded by count Lewis of Naf- fau , partly in the front, and partly on the flanks, and having taken no particular ftation to himfelf , he was at liberty to go from place to place , where- foever he found his prefence necelTary. He was accompanied by his brother the celebrated prince Frederic Henry , who was only fixteen years of age *' ; and by the duke of Holftein, the prince of Maurice urged his brother to-go by fea to Oftend , but 60 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF * O O K Anhalt, the count of Coligni, lord Gray, and fir i. Robert Drury , grandfon of the famous admiral J600. of that name , and by feveral other noblemen of the firft rank , in the different proteflant ftates in Europe, who had lately come info the Nether- lands to improve themfelves, by his leflons and example , in the art of war. Plaving drawn up his army upon the downs by the fea-fhore, and planted his artillery on fome of the higheft of the little hills of fand of which the downs are formed, he refolved , in that pof- ture , to wait for the enemy's approach. Albert was greatly difappointed, when he found him fo well prepared for his defence; and he was fome- what difcouraged when he obferved, that from the pofition he had made choice of, the Spanifh army would have both the fun and the wind in their face: the latter of which circumftances he dreaded would prove particularly inconvenient, from the light fandy foil on which they were about to engage. It was now, however, too late to entertain the thoughts of a retreat; and his troops were as confident and as eager and impa- tient for the combat as before. 1 hey had long cherifhed a contempt of the enemy; and they were now heard in all the ranks uttering threats, that they would give no quarter to any of the he- retics, except prince JVlaunce and his brother, whom they would referve to adorn the triumph of their general. Henry infifted that he fhould be permitted to remain and to fhare his brother's fate. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 61 The battle was begun by the Spanifli cavalry , BOOK under Mendoza, admiral of Arragon , who en- j m deavoured to gain the flank of the Dutch array, 1*00. by advancing along the fands between the fea and BattIe of the downs; but Maurice, having forefeen that this might be attempted, had made provifion againit it, by planting cannon on the fands, and ordering fome of his fbips of war to approach the fhore as near as poflible. Mendoza was therefore unable to effectuate his purpofe, and was obliged tp retire, after having fuftained confiderable {laughter. In the mean time, the two armies, after a dif- charge of their artillery, having advanced within mufket-fhot of each other, the Englifli forces in the van, under fir Francis Vere, were attacked by the Spanifli mutineers, who, in order to re- trieve their honor, difplayed on this occafion the mail defperate intrepidity. The Britifli troops received their a (fault undaunted, and for fome time withftood their fury; their general had his horle (hot under him , and was twice wounded. Still, however, he maintained his ground, refut- ing to give any attention to his wounds, till his brocher , fir Horatio Vere, arrived with frefh troops to his relief. Thefe troops, while en- gaged in combat, with the mutineers, having been vigoroufly attacked in flank by the Spanifh cavalrv , were thrown into diforder , and many of th obtained the higheft military honors, and was confidered as one of the ableft officers in the fervice of Spain. His low birth , joined to his native arrogance and prefumption procu- red him many enemies among his inferiors and equals : but the archduke was fincercly forry for his death. ** Davila , &c. p. 77. ch. ix. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 71 money : and this they afcribed partly to the great BOOK quantities of plate that were employed in the I. churches, and in the houfes of the rich, and 16c*• ordered them to rendezvous in the neighbour- hood of the fort of Schenck, feemed for fome time to intend an attack on Bois le Due; but it foon appeared that his real defign was to attempt the reduction of Rhinberg; the pofleffion of this im- portant place being neceffary in order to facilitate the expulfion of the Spaniards from Guelderland t a part of which was ft rJl fubjeel to their authority. The archduke no fooner received intelligence of his defign, than he ordered count Herman of Berg to fet out with a body of troops to reinforce the garrifon ; but before the count had time to execute his commiffion, Maurice had drawn lines of circumvallation round the place, and fortified (he approaches to his camp in fuch a manner, as rendered all accefs impracticable. Albert had therefore no other expedient for laving Rhinberg left, but to make a diverfion, by attacking fome important place belonging to the United States, in the hopes that Maurice might be thus induced to abandon his prefent enterprise. Ac the earneft requeft of the people of Flan- ders, he refolved to lay fiege to Oftend; the gar- rifon of which place , though fomewhat check- ed by adjacent forts, had been able to make in- curfions into the heart of the province, and often laid the inhabitants of the open country under the moft burdenfome contributions. 74 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK The ftates of this province , notwithftanding I. the peculiar hardfhips under which they labored, 1601. had difcovered great alacrity in raifing their pro- portion of the fupplies lately granted to the arch- duke j and they now promifed flrenuoufly to exert themfelves in furnifhing him with every thing neceffary for carrying on the fiege with vigor. Such were the motives by which Albert was in- fluenced in forming his refolution to undertake the fiege of Oftend ; the moft hazardous enter- pnfe in which he had ever been engaged , and which was attended with more important confe- quences, than any other which occurs in the hif- tory of the Netherlands. Defcription Oftend ftands on the fea-coaft, in a marfhy ofoitcnd. foil , and almoft furrounded with canals; two of which being much larger than the reft, and com- municating with the fea , receive f mailer vefifels at all times, and at high-water, admit of fhips of a confiderable magnitude. It was an open rifliing- town, till the year 1572, when it was fir ft fortified with a palifade by the duke of Alva. At the pa- cification of Ghent, the inhabitants having thrown off the Spanifh yoke, the foitifications were fo much ftrengthencd and augmented by the United States, that the duke of Parma, who invefted it in the year 1 5 S 3 , defpairing of fuccefs , aban- doned his enterprife, and could never afterwards be perfuaded to refume the fiege. Oftend is divided into two parts , called the Old and the New Town. The former of thefe is PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN* 75 waflied by the fea , againft the ravages of which BOOK it was fecured by a ftrong fortification , formed of 1. huge and well compacted beams or palifades ; inl- and the latter was defended by a wall flanked with baftions, and the canals already mentioned, to which there had lately been added a covered way, fortified with numerous redoubts. As, from the fituation of Oftend , on the coaft of Flanders, it afforded a convenient fiielter to the fhips of the United Provinces , the ftates had ever been ex- tremely folicitous for its prefervation. They had fpared no expenfe in rendering the fortifications as complete as pofTible, and befidcs a numerous garrifon under the command of an experienced officer, they had always kept it richly furnifhed with provifions and military ftores. Nor were thefe the only circumftances which had deterred the duke of Parma from renewing his attempt againft it. He confidered , what was of much greater importance than even the ftrength of the place, that while the Dutch preferved their fupe- riority at fea , the garrifon might continue to re- ceive whatever fupplies and reinforcements they fhould ftand in need of, till his ftrength and re- fources being exhaufled, he fhould be compelled to raife the fiejrc. To this confideration, the archduke feems not to have paid that attention which it merited. He did not poffefs the fame military fkill as the duke of Parma , and could not therefore fo clearly perceive the difficulties he muft encounter in his intended enterprife. He was not by nature bold or rafh; yet, from the 76 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK facility of his temper, he was apt too readily to I. adopt the rafh imprudent meafures that were re- i6or. commended by his counfellors *'. Having fet out, with his numerous army about the end of June, he brgan his operations againft Oftend on the 4th or 5 th of July. Prince Maurice, in the mean time, who fccredy rejoiced to ob- ferve his enemy engage in fo dangerous an under- taking, perfifted in the fiege of Rhinberg; and in a few weeks, notwithstanding the moft vigor- ous defence on the part of the garrifon, he com- Rhinbers pelled them to capitulate. capitulates g ut t ^ e attention of both parties was now al- moft totally engrafted by the fiege of Oftend ; where Charles Vander Noot the governor, before the beficgers had time to complete their intrench- ments , had {allied out upon them, and kil- led upwards of five hundred men. This un- fortunate beginning, however, did not deter the archduke from the profecution of his en- terprife. Siese of Having taken the neceftary precautions to pre- vent the future fallies- of the garrifon, and Ration- ed one part of his troops in the downs to the weft- ward of the town, and the reft of them on the fouth and eaft , he foon opened his batteries, and began a furious cannonade in every quarter. Rut his diftance from the body of the place , occafion- ed by the canals, ditches, and other outworks, which the induftry of the befiegers had greatly Vide Bentivog.io , Le Clerc , and Grotius. Thuanus , lib. vi. p. 76, etc. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 7; multiplied , rendered his fire of fmall effed ; and BOOK fliowed him that it mufk long remain impoffible 1. to compel the garrifon to furrender , unlefs he *&>i. could prevent them from receiving reinforcements and fupplies by fea. In this opinion he might have been confirmed by the proof which the United States had lately- given, how much they were determined to exert themfelves with vigor in the defence of the place. Though Vander Noot was an officer whom they highly efteemed, yet they had taken from him the chief command, and given it to fir Francis Vere, who, next to prince Maurice , was the raoft renowned of all their generals , for his military- prudence and capacity ; and to engage Vere to accept of this command , they had confented to his felecting the flower of the Englifh forces , for a reinforcement to the garrifon. They had, at the fame time, fent to Oflend a copious fupply of military (lores and provisions; and were unanimous in refolving that whatever it fhould coft them , they would defend the town to the laft extremity. This refolution, and the vigor which the Rates had begun to difplay , drew the attention of all Europe to the operations of this important fiege ; and with the permiflion of the Rates, the town was vifited by many illuftrious foreigners, from Germany, Denmarc, France, and En- gland "\ who were led there by curiofity to view fo interesting a fcene of a&ion , and the As the duke of Holface , the king of Denmark's bro* thcr, the earl of Northumberland} and others. 78 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK defire of being thereby enabled more clearly to com- I. prehend the relations of thofe military achieve- 1601. ments which they expected to be performed by the contending parties. The archduke had ground for much folicitude with regard to the final iflue of his enterprife ; but he could not now defift , without expofing himfelf to reproach and ridicule ; and therefore he applied himfelf with redoubled ardor to the profecution of the fiege. It might be brought to a period, he imagined, either by carrying it on in the ordinary form, by mines, batteries, and aflaults, or by rendering himfelf mailer of the entrance of the canals, and thereby intercepting the communication of the garrifon by fea , with the United Provinces. He ought naturely to have confidered which of thefe two methods of procedure was the moft likeiy to prove effectual, and to have confined his at- tention to one of them, without fufiering it to be diverted by the other. But, inftead of this , he employed his forces , fometimes in carrying on attacks upon the enemy's in- trenchments, and fometimes in attempting to block up the canals; and, by this divifion of his ftrength , as the fiege was protracted to an enormous length , fo it was attended with an im- menfe expenfe of blood and treafure. For feveral weeks his principal object was to approach flill nearer than where his batteries were firft opened to the fortifications of the town. The garrifon, on the other hand, omitted PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 79 nothing in their power that could obflruct his ap- BOOK proach. They adventured , on fome occafions , to j. filly out, and to attack the befiegers fword in l60tt hand: and in the mean time , they labored in- defatigably in calling trenches, and railing new redoubts, wherever they apprehended there was danger of the enemy's attempting an aflault. An inceffant fire was all the while kept up from the Spanifli batteries, on the one hand, and the fortifications on the other; and great numbers were killed on either fide. At length, the archduke, perceiving that his operations were not attended with the fuccefs which he expected , had recourfe to the other ex- pedient above-mentioned , and employed a great part of his forces in attempting to obftrudt the entrance of the canals. One of them was the entrance of the harbour, and here he began his operations. Rut, as all the ground to a confider- able diftance from the fhore was fand , no mound which he formed of it , could fuftain a battery, or refill the violence of the waves. He was therefore obliged to colled: together from the neighbouring towns, a great quantity of huge beams, of which and bricks he refolved to form a dike at the mouth of the canal. The beams were driven deep into the ground, then bound to- gether, and the intermediate fpaces filled with bricks. Of this fort of building, one was piled upon another, till the whole was raifed to a fuflfi- cient height; after which, being planted with a numerous battery of cannon, the enemy's ihips So HISTORY OF THE REIGN OK book found all accefs to the harbour utterly impraG- I. ticable. 1601. But the hopes which Albert had from thence conceived, of being able ro reduce the town by- famine, were quickly fruftrared by the ingenuity and great exertion of the governor and garrifon. They inftantly applied themfelves to enlarge the mouth of the other canal , which paflcd through the heart of the town, and foon rendered it ca- pable of receiving the largeft (hips. The archduke, however, did not defpair of be- ing able to deprive them of this refource; and he immediately began the fame fort of operations at the entrance on this canal, as thofe by which he had made himfelf matter of the other. At firft, his troops and pioneers proceeded with great alacrity , as they were flieltered from the lire of the befiegers, by a dike which had been raifed to defend the town againft the encroach- ments of the fca. But the garrifon refolved to forego the advantage which they derived from, this defence ; and having ftrengthened their for- tifications, as well as they could, by ftakes , huge ftones , and other materials fitted to repel the fury of the waves, they demoliflied the dike, and, as by this expedient, the Spanifh works were ex- pofed to the artillery of the town, and a great" part of the adjacent country laid under water, the archduke was obliged to draw off his troops to a greater diftance, and to have recourfe ro other meafures which required greater experience and time to carry into execution* In PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. gi In the mean time, the ftates general of the BOOK United Provinces held frequent conferences to !• confider how they might beft improve the leifure »* 01t « which they enjoyed, while the Spanifh army was detained before Oftend. They wifhed to have made an attack on the ifland of Cadfant, and af- terwards to have undertaken the reduction of Sluys. But, at the prefent juncture, they had neither the money nor the troops which prince Maurice thought neceflary for fo difficult an en- terprife. The flower of their army had , after the taking of Rhinberg , been fent to Oftend; and the great expenfe which attended the defence of that place, had almoft exhaufled their finances. Much time was fpent in deliberating, and various expeditions were propofed. At length , towards the end of October, when the feafon of action was nearly clapfed, they formed the refolution of undertaking the fiege of Bois le Due, the garrifon of which important place, they underftood , amounted only to three hundred men. In obedience to their commands, though ex- siefeoF tremely diffident of fuccefs, prince Maurice im- BoisieDnc, mediately began his march, and having arrived before the place on the firfl of November , he judged, that, confidering the great extent of the fortifications, the garrifon muft foon find it ne- ceflary to capitulate, provided he could prevent the entrance of more troops. With this view, he inftantly began to draw lines of circumvaJla- tion round the town, and at fir ft, this work was carried on with great rapidity. But foon aft«r- Vol. I. G 82 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 8 O OK wards, it was retarded by a violent frofr. , which I. happened, this year, much fooner than ufual : i«i. and the archduke had time to fend a large de- tachment of his army, above a thoufand of which forced their way into the town , before the in- trenchments were complete ; while the reft lay at a little diftance from the prince's camp, with the defign of embracing any opportunity that might offer of annoying him. Still , however , he perfifted in his defign : but as the froft continued daily increafing in violence, and put an entire flop to his operations , he complied with the de- End of f jre of the deputies of the ftates , who as ufual , November, attended him in the camp, and raifed theficge '\ Maurice had no fooner retired from Bois le Due, than Albert, having recalled his troops, re- fumed his operations, which had been fufpended during their abfence, againft Oftend : and in a f < w days after, he had ground to entertain the hope of being able to terminate the fiege. The fortifications of the town next the fea , had lately fuffered confiderable prejudice from the fury of the waves; and thegarrifon, through fir.knefs and defertion, and the great numbers killed by fatigue and the mediant fire of the befiegers, was re- duced from eight thoufand to between two and three thoufand men Sir Francis Vere had given repeated notice of his diftrefsful fituation to the United States: but, till the raifing of the fiege of Bois le Due , they had no troops which they could fpare ; and after troops were procured , and Meteren , lib. xxii. Grotius , lib. x. Bentivoglio , &c. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 83 put on board the tranfports, they were prevented BOOK from failing by contrary winds. About the fame j. time , the archduke had ordered a felect body of icoi. forces to pafs over the harbour at low water, in the middle of the night, who fet fire to a tem- porary defence, compofed of huge piles of fag- gots and other combuftible materials, which had been placed at the foot of the rampart, on the north fide of the town , to prevent the further encroachments of the fea. The fire burnt furi- oufly for three days and nights, baffling all the attempts of the garrifon to extinguifh it. The rampart was thus much weakened , and a greater number of men were neceflary for its defence. In the midft of this diftrefs, the governor receiv- ed notice that the archduke had been afliduoufly employed in preparing for a general afiault, and would certainly carry his defign into execution on the next day, or, at fartheft , on the day im- mediately following. Vere, though poffefled of the moft unqueftionable courage , was too fenfi- ble of the prefent weaknefs of his garrifon and fortifications, and too well acquainted with the perfevering and intrepid fpiric of the Spanifh troops, not to be alarmed with the danger which threatened him; and, in order to avert it, he made ufe of an expedient to which a brave man will hardly, even when neceflity requires it, have recourfe. Without any ferious intention of ca- pitulating, he fecretly fent over to the archduke an officer, to fignify that he was ready to treat with him for the furrender of the town. Albert, G 1 &* HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 3 OK fufpecting no diflimulation, gladly liftencd to I. this propofal, and hoftages were inftantly ex- uc *- changed. He came foon, however, to entertain fome doubt of the governor's fincerity, and urged him, without delay, to propofe his terms. This, the governor, by employing different pretexts , found means to defer from day to day, till a rein- forcement of troops which he had expected, ar- rived from Zealand. This reinforcement confid- ed only of five companies, amounting to four hundred men. But finding that the archduke could not be any longer deceived, and having al- ready gained fufficient time to repair the breaches in the rampart, he fent him word, that fince his mafters the dates had augmented his garrifon, he could not now, confidently with his honor, con- tent to give up the town. As Vere had begun this tranfaftion without communicating it to his officers, fome fufpicions were at firft entertained of his fidelity by all fuch perfons as were averfe to a furrendcr ; and the ftates general were not entirely fatisfied , either with the duplicity he had employed, or the exam- ple which he had given of entering into a treaty with the enemy, without the knowledge of his council of war. But no perfon had fo much rea- fon to be offended as the archduke, who though he did not hefitate to fend back the hoftages was both incenfed and mortified when he confidered how he had been deceived bv an enemy , whom be might probably have compelled to lay down his arms ". $l If he had improved the opportunity which he had loft. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. $5 The fortifications of the place were now more BOOK fecure than formerly, and the garrifon had been I- reinforced. Still, however, being moved by paf* fion , more than the probability of fuccefs, he re- folved to execute the defign which the hopes of a capitulation had induced him to lay afide, and gave orders for a general afiault. He intended to make his principal attack on the weft, near the harbour , which had been for fome time in his pof- feffion; but, in order eto divert the enemies atten- tion and divide their forces, he refolved at the fame time to make attacks in other quarters, and gave the command of a body of troops , deftined to act on the^eaft fide, to the celebrated count de Bucquoi; having committed the execution of his principal defign to Auguftin Mefcia, an experienced officer, and governor of the citadel of Antwerp. Early in the morning he began to play off his January batteries, and kept up a furious cannonading in 7:h * x532, every quarter till midnight, when, the tide hav- ing gone back, Mefcia led forward the Spanifh troops. They were drawn up in a compact body, forty men in front , and the foremoft ranks clothed in complete armour, followed by the mufketeers and by others, who were provided with fcaling ladders, and whatever elfe was judged neceflary, either for acquiring or fecuring poffeffion of the rampart. They advanced acrofs the old harbour, in which there was between three and four feet water, with great ardor and the moll determined intrepidity ; but the garrifon were well prepared for their defence. The governor had beforehand G 3 86 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK ordered the cannon to be removed from that part I- of the fortifications where he expecled their prin- cipal attack, and in their place had planted feven large mortars, which were loaded with ftones, flints, bullets , and other inftruments of mifchief. He had likewife inftructed thofe to whom he had committed the charge of thefe mortars to keep up their fire till the enemy fhould approach. This order was well obeyed, and the Spaniards had almoffc reached the foot of the rampart, when the mortars were difcharged , and made dreadful havoc among the foremoft ranks: a great num- ber was killed and wounded, and the ranks were thrown into confufion. Still, however, they conti- nued to advance, thofe who were behind pufhing forward thofe who were before, till the greater part of them were fo near that every ftroke and fbot of the befiegers did certain execution. The night came on , yet the Spaniards feemed ftill de- termined to perfift. To prevent a furprife, the governor ordered a great number of fires to be lighted up within the rampart, and the battle con- tinued to be as bloody and defperate as before. The Spanifh troops at the fame time crowded together in the harbour, ready to advance to fill up the places of thofe who fell; when the gover- nor had recourfe to an expedient which he had meditated from the beginning. There were two fluices within the fortification , one of which ferved in the time of ebb to keep the water in that part of the canal which lay within the town, and the other to reftrain it in that part which ran up into PHILIP 111. KING OF SPAIN. * 7 the country. Having ordered both thefe fluices BOOK to be opened , fo great a quantity of water was i. poured into the harbour, that many of the Spa- 1602. niards were carried down by the violence of the ftrcam, and drowned; while many others, at- tempting to fave themfelves by laying hold of the palifades on the rampart, were ftaughtercd by the enemy. The archduke had commanded his cavalry to keep clofe in the rear of the infantry to prevent them from having recourfe to flight. It was thus rendered impoffible for the latter to make their retreat fo foon as neceflity required; and by this means they were obliged to ftand ex- pofed to the fire of the befiegcrs , long after it was manifeft that their mod vigorous efforts could be of no avail. A part of the cavalry having en- tered the water, with a defign to obftrud. the violence of the current, feveral horfes with their riders were likewife drowned, and IVlefcia at length found it neceflary to give the fignal of re- treat. The aflailants having been equally unfuc- cefsful in every other quarter, were obliged to abandon the affoult. In this rafh and defperate enterprife about fourteen hundred of the Spani- ards and Italians were either killed or drowned, among whom were feveral perfons of the firft rank , while the lofs of the befiegers amounted only to forty killed , and a fmall number wound- ed ". Meteren, liv. xxiii. Grotius , lib. xi. ab initio. Ben- tivoglio , part iii. lib. vi. G 4 58 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK The archduke would have renewed the a (fault I. on the fecond day after his repulfe, but was pre- i«oi, vented by a mutiny of his Italian and Spanifli troops, who were highly exafpcrated at the bar- barous, and what they deemed difgraceful man- ner in which they had been ufed. They bitterly complained that they had been treated like flaves or brutes, and not like foldiers of unquestionable bravery, when they were compelled by the cavalry to ftand expofed to the enemy's fire, after the ■fluices being opened, it was rendered impofiGble for them to advance. They complained that this meafure, which had been adopted without confent of the council of general officers, was contrary to every rule of war, and they declared, that fince they had not been treated as foldiers » they would no longer act as fuch. Albert, foured with his ill fuccefs, was equally alarmed and pro- voked at this behaviour , and in order to prevent the infection of their example from fpreading through the reft of his army, he inflantly caufed between forty and fifty of the moft feditious to be executed, and fent a hundred and fifty to the gallies. By this prompt feverity he quelled the mutiny , but, finding it necefiary to relinquish his defign of renewing the affanlt, he now bent his whole attention to the blocking up of the canal. Spanish le- During the courfe of thefe tranfa&ions the vies m Italy court f Spain, notwithstanding their inability to excite jea^ r ' c- J loufies, furnilh the archduke either with the troops or money neceffary to infure fuccefs in his conteft i«o: PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 89 with the United States, was engaged in other ex- BOOK penfive enterprifes. By their order the count de I. Fuentes , governor of IVlilan , had foine time before made fuch numerous levies of troops, as excited in the minds of the Italian ftates and princes an apprehenfion , which at the prefcnt period feems to have been without foundation , that fome am- bitious defign had been conceived of reducing Italy under the Spanifh yoke. Of thefe troops a part was fent to the archduke Ferdinand, to affift him in his operations at CanifTa againft the Turks; another part of them to the Netherlands; and the reft were intended for an expedition againft Algiers, which was ilill the principal feat of thofe numerous pirates , by whom the coaft and the fhips of Spain continued to be no lefs molefted than in the former reign. About ten thoufand troops were employed in feventy gallies, partly Genoefe and partly Spanifh , commanded by the celebrated Doria, and they had a profperous voyage till they were within a few days failing of the deftined pore. Had they immediately landed, it is probable they would have fucceeded in their enterprife , as the greater part of the pirates, agreeably to informa- tion which Doria had received , were abfent , and fuch of them as had been left behind , were unpre- pared for their defence: but, unfortunately, one of the capital fhips had been feparated from the reft of the fleet, on which account the debarcati- on was delayed till next day; and in the interven- ing night a dreadful ftorm arofe, which not only rendered all attempts to land impracticable , but T602. Invafiotiof Ireland. 90 HTSTORY OF THE REIGN OF book obliged the fleet to leave the coaft and return to I. Sidy ". I he court of Spain was not difcouraged by the failure of their attempt againft Algiers, from en- gaging in another enterpnfe, which was flill more dirfii ult to be carried into execution. The war with England had not for frveral years been vigo- roufly profecuted by either of the two contending powers ; and no event had happened which de- ferves to be recorded: but Philip, or more pro- perly the duke of Lerma , had, about this time, conceived the hopes of being able to give a mor- tal wound to the power of Elizabeth , by an inva- fion of Ireland , where a great number of the na- tives were in open rebellion againft her, under the earl of Tyrone. Philip the Second , by various intrigues car- ried on by ecclefiaftics , had fomented the difcon- ten»ts of the Irifh , and on different occafions had fent them fupplies of arms and military ftores. IVLiny of them had been engaged , by the kind treatment which he ordered to be given them, to enter into his fervice in the Netherlands: and of thefe, many having returned to their native country, had, through the knowledge which they had acquired , in fome meafure contributed to teach their countrymen the rules of military difci- pline, thereby rendering them a much more for- midable enemy than they had hitherto been to the Englifli troops. " Thuanus, lib. exxvi. Piafecii Chronica , an. 160 r. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 91 Tyrone, whofe affections Elizabeth had in vain BOOK, endeavoured to conciliate , though noted for his I. treachery and cruelty, vices which generally attend ,6 ° on barbarous manners, yet, being brave and ac- tive , had perfuaded many of his countrymen to inlifl; themfelves under his banners, by flatteringly infpiring them with the hopes of deliverance from the Fnglifh yoke. He had applied for afliftance to the court of Spain , and being feconded in his application by feveral feminaries of Englifti priefts and Jefuits, folicitors the mod likely to fucceed with Philip and his minifter, he had obtained a promife both of arms and troops. A bull of excommunication having been publifhed by three fucceeding popes '* againft Elizabeth , abfolving her fu ejects from their alle- giance , and inviting all catholic princes to take pofTeflion of her dominions, the fuperftitious mind of Philip was eafily impreffed with a perfuafion that, by fupporting the rebels, and abolishing Elizabeth's authority in Ireland, he would act the meritorious part of a faithful foil of the church, and ferve the caufe of God and of the catholic religion. And, although he had too much indo- lence to be capable of being principally actuated by ambition, yet he could not but defire to add Ireland to his dominions , a? , befides the great extent and fertility of that ifland , its commodi. ous harbours would occafionally afford a retreat and flicker to his /hips, and better enable him to difpute the empire of the fea with England and the United Provinces. Pius V. Gregory XIII. Clement VIII. the prefent pope. 92 HISTOPvY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK Determined by thefe confiderations , he gave '• orders for the equipment of a fleet of tranfports 1 ^oz. and fhips of war, fufficient for carrying fix thou- fand troops , and fo confident was he and his minifter of the fuccefs of their intended enterprife , that, befide.s the troops, a great number of fami- lies, including women and children, were put on board, with the defign of eftablifhing a Spanifli colony in the kingdom which thev expected to fubdue. They had lent too eafy faith to the ex- aggerated accounts which Tyrone had given them of his ftrength : and they were not furficiently acquainted with the character and abilities of lord Mountjoy , whom Elizabeth had appointed viceroy and commander in chief of the Englifli forces. The command of the Spanifli troops, and the conduct of the expedition , were committed to Don John d'Aguilar , who had learnt the rudi- ments of war under the duke of Alva, and had afterwards acquired fome military reputation from a fuccefsful enterprife , in which he had the chief command , againfl the town of Rlavet in Bretagne. He fet fail from Spain in the end of Auguft, accompanied by fome fhips of war, under Don John Guevara, and arrived at Kinfale , in the fouth of Ireland , on the Sth of October : but a part of his tranfports having been fcparated from the reft of the fleet, he found, on his arrival at Kinfale, that he could mufter only four thou- ftnd men. With this little army , he applied PHILIP III. KING OF SPAItf. 93 himfelf to ftrengdien the fortifications of the place, BOOK refolving to remain there, till he fhould be joined I. by Tyrone, or till the reft of his forces Ihould ar- 1602. rive. The fhips of war under Guevara returned immediately after the, troops were landed; and, foon after, the harbour of Kinfale was blocked up by a fqu .dron of Englifh men of war, com- manded by fir Richard Levifon. Agreeably to his inftrudions from the court of Spain , d'Aguilar difperfed a manifefto, over the adjacent country > in which he affumed the title of general in the holy war, undertaken for the prefervation of the catholic faith in Ireland ; and whilft he invited people to come unto his afliftance , he declared , that he was fent by his matter the king of Spain , with no other intention but to deliver them from the dominion of the devil and the heretical queen of England. The Irifli had formerly, on different occafions , received the jufteft grounds of complaint againft the Englifh government; and at this time they were highly incenfed on account of the intro- duction of what the Englifh , with good reafon, regard as one of their moft valuable privileges, the inftitution of trials by jury; they were there- fore generally animated with a fpirit of difcontent againft: their ancient mafters. The greater part of them were likewife ftrongly attached to the popifh faith; and their priefts, who were wholly in the intereft of Spain , polfelfed an entire afcendant over them , having perfuaded them that their anceftors had originally fprung from Spain , and thereby 94 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK created in their minds a ftrong predilection in fa- I. vor of the Spaniards. koz. They were difcouraged , however , from com- plying with d'Aguilar's invitation to have re- courfe to arms, by confidering the fraall number of troops which he had brought to their afliftance ; and they refolved to remain quiet till the arrival of the reft, which he had affured them would quickly follow. The viceroy was, at this time, engaged in the profecution of the war againfl: Tyrone , in the northern parts of the iiland. His arms had been attended with great fuccefs ; he had defeated fe- veral parties of the rebels , and had made prifon- ers of many of their leaders, fome of whom he had fent to England. Tyrone himfelf, with his adherents, had fled before him, and taken fhelter in thofe faftnefles in the northern provinces, where the marfhy ground rendered it difficult for the Englifh general to advance. Here, however, the rebel chief was in a manner befieged , and as the country was but little cultivated, he muft erelong have been obliged , through the want of fubfift- ence , to fubmit to the conqueror. In this criti- cal fituation were the affairs of the infurgents when the Spanifh troops arrived. Upon receiving information of their arrival , the viceroy , juftly dreading that the infurreclion would foon become more general, refolved, without delay, to exert his utmoft vigor againfl: the invaders. With this intention, having left a part of his cavalry to watch the motions of Tyrone , he f:t out for PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 95 Kinfale, and having marched with great rapidity, BOOK he foon arrived before the place, and began the I. fiege with between eight and nine thoufand men. icoz. But before he had time to make any confideraHe progrefs , he received notice that the Spanifh tranfports above mentioned, which had been fe- parated from the reft of the fleet, had arrived at Baltimore, with two thoufand foldiers on board, under the command of an officer named Ocampo; and foon after he was informed, that the froft having fet in with great violence in the marfhy country where he had left Tyrone, that leader and his followers had made their efcape over the ice, had joined Ocampo with upwards of four thou- fand men, who together with the Spaniards, were on their march to raife the fiege of Kinfale. This alarming intelligence he procured by intercepted letters from Ocampo and Tyrone to Aguilar; and from thefe letters too he underftood their plan of operations, the time of their approach, and the route which they intended to purfue. He there- fore prepared himfelf for his defence; and, having drawn off the greater part of his army to an ad- vantageous fituation, at fome diftance from the town . he left no more forces than were fufficient to reftrain the eruption of the Spaniards under Aguilar. When Tyrone faw the Englifh army fo advan- tageoufly pofted, and prepared for his attack, his courage failed; and norwithftanding the rennn- ftrances of Ocampo, who reproached him with cowardice, he gave orders to his men to change ij6 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK the dire&ion of their march , hoping to reach a I. marih which lay near , and thus to avoid the ne- i«oz. cefiity of fighting. But the viceroy, perceiving his intention, flattened forward with all his forces , and attacked him in the rear. Finding then that an engagement was unavoidable, he refumed his courage , and faced about to the enemy. But the rebels were no match in the open field for the Englifli forces. They were quickly thrown into confufion, and put to flight. The Spaniards, who fought defperately for fome time , being forfaken by their daftardly aflbciates , were overpowered by numbers, and Ocampo himfelf with fevcral offi- cers, made prifoners. In this battle, above twelve hundred men were killed upon the fpot ; a great proportion of whom were Spaniards. The reft of that nation fled to Baltimore and other places on the coaft, in which they had left garrifons. Such of the Irifh as were taken , were hanged as rebels; the greater part of them, among whom was Tyrone, efcaped through their knowledge of the country ; but were totally difperfed. It was eafy for d'Aguilar, when he received intelligence of this defeat , and the cowardly be- haviour of the Irifh, to perceive how much the court of Spain had been miftaken in their judge- ment of the facility of eftablifhi ng their authority in Ireland. There could be no fecure dependence, he faw, on afiiftance from the natives ; and no army, which in the prefent ftate of the finances could be fent from Spain, could be able to con- tend alone with the Englilh forces. He refolved, therefore, PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 97 therefore , to employ all his influence to diffuade book the king from perfifting in fo defperate an attempt- : «.. and, being at the fame time confcious , that with i * os * fo fmall a number of troop* as were under his command in Kinfale , he could not juftly expect to be able, above a few weeks, to defend the town ag-unft a general of fo much (kill and vigor as the viceroy, he refolved to fave the lives of his foldiers , and to deliver the place into the hands of the Englifh , provided he could obtain from them fuch terms as his honor would permit him to accept. In a few days after the battle, he gave the vice- roy notice of his intention , and explained to him the motives of his conduct , and the fentiments which he had come to entertain of the Irifh rebels, and of the folly of the enterprife , into which the court of Spajn, through mifinformation , had been betrayed. But he accompanied his offer with a declaration exprefled in the flrongeft terms, that, in cafe the viceroy mould refufe to grant him the conditions which he required , the honors of war to his troops, with a promife of tranfporting them and their cannon and ammunition to Spiin, in Englifh fliips ; and an act of indemnity to the inhabitants of Kinfale , by whom he had been fo kindly re- ceived and entertained, he and his foldiers were unalterably determined to defend the town to the laft extremity. Lord Mountjoy could not but refpect the fpirit by which this declaration was dictated. He was Vol. I. H 98 HISTORY etc. BOOK prompted by the native generofity of his difpofition J- to comply with the terms propofed,and he thought lt ° 2 ' himfcJf juftifiable in point of prudence for comply- ing with them , when he considered how much his army was likely to fufFer in the operations of a ficge, carried on in the middle of winter, againft fo brave and fo determined an enemy. Without hefitation , therefore , he agreed to d'Aguilar's demands. Kinfale, Baltimore, and fome other forts , in the poffeflion of the Spaniards, were delivered into the hands of the viceroy; and d'Aguilar with his troops , cannon , and aramunic tion , were foon after tranfported to Spain in an Englifli fleet. Philip , after hearing of the Hlue of the battle , having defpaired of their piefervation , greatly re- joiced at their arrival. He highly approved of the capitulation, and, with the advice of his counfel- Jors, refolved, in confequence of the information which he received from d'Aguilar, to abandon the Irifh rebels to their fate ; and henceforth to apply himfelf with more undivided attention to his affairs in the Netherlands 55 . Van Meteren , lib. xxiii. Carte's Hift. of England, book x,ix. Thuanus , &c. THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE THIRD, KING OF SPAIN. BOOK II. A HE archduke, after trie repulfe of his array, BOOK as above related , by the garrifon of Oftend , was H* advifed by fome of his principal officers to raife iwa * the liege. He was hirafelf extremely reluctant to comply with this advice, but thought it necefTary, before rejecting it, to know the fentiments of the court of Spain. Philip's minifters could judge of the propriety of his perfifting in his enterprife , only by the information which he tranfmitted to them ; and there is ground to believe that, having conceived an opinion that it would be inconfiftenfc with his honor to relinquifh it, his reprefentation was calculated to make them think too lightly of the obflacles which it was necefTary to furmount, and too highly of the importance of the place. They believed it to be impoflible for the garrifon to defend it much longer again ft fo great a force, and they imagined that by the reduction of it H % ico HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK they might ruin the trade of the United Provin- II. ces , and thus infure fuccefs in the future operations isoa. of the war. It was therefore determined that the archduke fhould continue the fiege , and that no afliftance fhould be with-heid which could enable him to brinjr it to the defircd conclufion. siege of or- Their afliftance on the prefent occafion was tend conti. t j ie raorc ncceflary , as his own finances were al- nueu. . ' moft entirely exhaufted , and he had little pro- fpecl; of receiving any confiderable fupport from the affembly of the ftates. He convened this af- fembly, however, and urged them, on account of the ncceffity of his affairs, to grant him an imme- diate fupply. The deputies were liberal in their profeffions of loyalty ; but, in return to his ap- plication , they reprefented that, in their prefent circumftances, it was impoflible for them to com- ply with his requeft, as the province of Brabant had, almofl every feafon, been obliged to pay the moft exorbitant contributions to the enemy, and not only that province but feveral others had long been cruelly robbed and plundered by the muti- neers. Confcious of the truth of this reprcfentation , he could not perfift in his demand, but was obli- ged to reft fatisfied with what he received from the ftates of Flanders, who, being more deeply interefted than the reft in the conqueft of Oftend , contributed to the utmoft of their power to aflift him in carrying on the fiege. Having , fince the failure of his late attempt, defpaircd of being able to reduce the garrifon by PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 101 florm , his principal object now was to intercept BOOK the communication with the United Provinces, 11. by blocking up the entrance of the canal. For 1. They had conceived an expectation at this time that the people in the fouthern provinces, who had lately fuflered great oppreflion from the rapa- city of the mutineers, might be induced to fhake off the Spanifh yoke ; and in this expectation they publifhed a memorial addrefled to the ftates of thefe provinces , enumerating the grievances which they mult be confcious of having fo long fuflered ; reprefenting how much they had been H 4 104 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK abufed in the late king's transference of the fover- H. eignty over them to the archdukes, notwithftand- i6o». * ntr wn j cn tne y were dill as much as ever fubjecT: to the tyranny of Spain ; and calling upon them, in remembrance of their firft engagements, to re- turn into their former connexion and alliance with their kinfmen in the United Provinces. In order to procure attention to this memorial, they rcfol- ved that their army fhould march into the heart of Brabant, to be ready to afford fupport to fuch of the inhabitants as fhould be willing to vindicate their liberty: and this meafure, it is faid, received the approbation both of the French monarch and the queen of England. But prince Maurice could not be fatisfied that it was either expedient or practicable. The peo- ple , he thought, were too much inured to the Spanifh government, and too much overawed by citadels and garrifons, to liften to the invitation of the ftates; and he dreaded the difficulty of be- ing able to fupport fo numerous an army in an enemy's country for fo long a time as would be neceflary for the end in view. The Spanifli army , indeed, could not at prefent contend with him in the open field ; but they could harrafs him in his march, and intercept his convoys of provifions; befides , that the archduke was in daily expectation of receiving a reinforcement of troops from Spain and Italy \ Siri fays that tyau-ice intended marching through Bra- bant to lay fi?*ge to Nit* unort , or fnme other fca - coaft town. Vide vol. i. p. 126. Mem. recondite. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 105 Moved by thefe confidcrations, the flates con BOOK fented that, till it fhould appear whether their 11. memorial was likely to produce the defired effect, Ifi02, he fhould lead his army along the eaft: fide of Brabant; that, by keeping it near the Maefe, he might more eauly receive fupplies from the neu- tral powers in that neighbourhood. Having af- fembled his army at Nimeguen , he paffed the Maefe near Mark , and towards the end of June he had advanced as far as Mafeyk, when he was obliged to (top for feveral days, through an un- juftihable action of his Englifli troops, who hav- ing on their march fold a great part of the bread with which he had furnifhed them, could not pro- cure any in the country where they now were, and were obliged to bring it from a confidcrable diftance. This delay was, in. the iflue, attended with important confequences. The archduke, having heard with much anxie- ty that Maurice had begun his march, had dif- patched Mendoza, admiral of Arragon, who had lately been fet at liberty, with fix thoufand foot and four thoufand horfe, to watch his motions, and, if poflible , to obftruct his progrefs. Men- doza was come as far as Tienen , a fortified town in the centre of Brabant, and was there employed in cafting up intrenchments to fecure his troops. Could prince Maurice have immediately advanced , he might have attacked him with the higheft pro- bability of fuccefs. But through the delay occafi- oned by the improvident conduct of the Englifli troops , Mendoza had not only full leifure to io6 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK complete his intrenchments, but received a rein- II. forcement of eight thoufand men , under the 1602. marquis of Spinola, who at this time arrived from Italy , and , if the prince could have haftened for- ward, might eafily have been intercepted before he reached the Spanifh camp. TVJaurice fbll how- ever continued to advance, till he arrived within a little diftance of the enemy , and once and again offered battle; but, finding that JVIendoza was un- alterably refolved to decline it, and was now too flrong to be compelled , and confidering how dan- gerous it muft be, in the face of fo great a force, to remain much longer in a country where it was fo difficult to procure provifions, he returned haf- tily towards the Maefe ; and, about the middle of July, began to put in execution the only part of the general plan of his operations which he him- felf had judged practicable, by laying fiege to the town of Grave. sie*e of This place , one of the ftrongeft in the Nether- Grave, lands, and deemed of great importance, on ac- count of its fituation on the banks of the Maefe, and its neighbourhood to the dominions of the ftates , had remained in the hands of the Spaniards, fince the year 1586, when, as above related, the young baron de Harmont, involved himfelf in ruin and infamy, by furrendering it, without ne- ceffity, to the duke of Parma. It was defended, at this time, by Antonio Gonfalez, a Spanifh officer of diftinguifhed merit ; and , as the arch- duke had before -hand dreaded the danger which impended over this important place , he had fent PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 107 a body of felect troops to reinforce the garrifon , BOOK which, after their arrival, amounted to fifteen 1L hundred men. From fuch a governor and garri- I6oa * fon Prince Maurice expected to meet with the moft vigorous refiftance; and he could not doubt that Mendoza would quickly follow him, and at- tempt to compel him to raife the fiege. But he did not defpair of bringing his enterprife to a happy iffue before the approach of winter, pro- vided he could prevent the entrance into the town of any farther reinforcement and fupply. With this view, he drew lines of circumvallation round his camp, extending from that part of the river which is above the town to that other part of it which is below. Thefe lines were more than half a German league in length , of an extraordi- nary height and depth , and ftrengthened by a great number of redoubts planted with cannon. While this laborious work was going on, he re- duced a fort belonging to the garrifon, on the other fide of the river, directly oppofite to the town, and having Rationed a part of his troops there , he next threw two temporary bridges over the Maefe , one above, and the other below the town. When thefe works were finifhed, the town was completely inverted on every fide, and the garrifon muft, ere long, have found it neceffary to capitulate: but, as he knew not what quantity of ftores they pofTefled , and confequently was ignorant how long they might be able to fuflain the blockade , he refolved , in order to fave time, to carry on the fiege in the ufual form, and ira- ic8 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK mediately began by opening trenches in different 11. quarters, to make regular approaches to the town, ifioi. a cotemporary hiftorian 2 , who upon the fpot ' examined the various works which prince Mau- rice executed on this occafion , fpeaks of them as the moft mafterly which bad ever been exhi- bited in any liege. In order the more effectually to fave hi* men from the enemy's fire , the tren- ches were made of a greater depth than ufual ; both the workmen and foldiers were, at every ap- proach , fecured againft the fallies of the garrifon , by mounds and batteries ; and when the trenches were advanced within a certain diftance of the fortifications, fpacious covered ways, offufficient breadth to admit of carriages, were formed, which led from the trenches to the ditch. The garrifon made frequent fallies, in which they difplayed the moft unqueftionable bravery; but, through the precautions mentioned , they were as often repul- fed with lofs, while few of the befiegers were kiiled either in thefe failles , or by the artillery of the place. Mendoza had, in the mean time, advanced from Tienen as far as Venlo, which (lands on the banks of the Maefe, about twelve German miles higher than Grave, and there deliberated with his council of war, whether it was practicable to compel prince Maurice to raife the fiege. But he quickly perceived how vain and ruinous it muft prove to attack a numerous enemy in fuch ftrong intrenchments, for whom he was not an equal Van Meteren. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 109 match in the open field; and therefore herefolved BOOK to reft fatisfied with introducing a reinforcement 11. of felect troops into the place. Had this meafure I6US> been attended with fuccefs, it mud have rather ferved to haden than to retard the furrender , as the flock of provifions in the town muffc thereby have been fooner confumed. It was adopted, however, by Mendoza, who was probably more influenced by the dread of the reproach which he would incur, if he made no attempt, than by the profpecl of any advantage that could accrue from it. The execution of this enterprife was commit- ted to an Italian general of the name of Spina; who was ordered, with a thoufand chofen troops, to attack the enemy's intrenchments in the night, at a place where they appeared to be the weakeft, and to attempt to force his way acrofs their camp into the town. Another party, equal in number, was appoint- ed to fupport him, and, in cafe of a repulfe, to fecure his retreat; while a third detachment was fent to make a feigned attack in another quarter, in the hopes of dividing the attention of the be- fiegers , and thereby rendering it eafier for Spina to execute his defign. But prince Maurice was every where upon his guard. The Spaniards were repulfed ; and , leaving behind them their carriages, with their fcaling ladders, and other apparatus, they fled precipitately to their camp. Mendoza, now defpairing of fuccefs, retired „ * . Sept. 2Cw with his whole army towards Maeftricht, and, a no HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK few clays after, the garrifon capitulated upon ho« 11. norable terms \ i6o:. During the courfe of thefe tranfactions the con- Jfaval affairs. , . j i r i r • 1 tending parties exerted themlelves at lea , with fomewhat greater vigor , than for feveral years preceding. The court of Spain had , before the prefent period, fenta fquadron of gallies to cruife on the coaft; of Flanders, under the command of Frederic Spinola, a Genoefe nobleman, who had ferved under the duke of Parma, and given fome diftinguiihed proofs of vigor and abilities. From this fquadron the Dutch trade had fuftained con- fiderable prejudice: and Spinola, encouraged by his fuccefs , having gone himfelf to Madrid to fo- licit an augmentation of his fleet, had obtained fix gall ie-s more, which he had conducted in fafety into the harbour of Sluys. This harbour afforded him the mod commodious fheiter and retreat. His gallies lying at anchor in the canal which leads to it, iflued forth againft the enemy when they were leaft prepared to oppofe them, and either took or funk a great number of their tra- ding veffels. With a more numerous fquadron , and a greater number of foldiers on board, he would have ventured to a greater diftance from the coaft , and thus have in fome meafure inter- cepted the communication of Oftend with Holland and Zealand. He could likewife have fometimes ventured to make a defcent upon their coafls ; or have entered their harbours and canals , and feized or burnt their (hipping. Van Meteren , 1. xxiv. Bentivoplio, part. Hi. lib. vii. Grotius , lib. unckcimo , Heroic Acts of Prince iVlaurice, &c. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. in ImprefTed with a conviction that from fuch fpi- BOOK rited naval enterprifes the enemy muft fuffer more II. eflfentially than from the fiege of their towns , or ico*. the operations of the Span ifh army in the field, he this year made a fecond journey into Spain, after having communicated his intention to his elder brother Ambrofe , the celebrated marquis of Spi- nola. This nobleman , fo juftly renowned on ac- count of the military talents which he afterwards difplayed, had not yet entered into public life, though he was at this time about thirty years of age. But his ambition was now roufed by his brother's fuccefs , and being confeious of great abilities, he refolved henceforth to avail himfelf of his fortune, which was one of the greateft in Genoa, in order to render himfelf illuftrious. Having , from the information communicated to him by his brother, conceived an opinion that the war in the Netherlands might be fuccefsfully carried on at fea , he empowered his brother to propofe to the court of Spain that, in cafe they would grant an augmentation of the number of their gallies at Sluys, he would raife at his own expenfe a body of eight thoufand troops , to be commanded by himfelf, and to ferve occafionally on board his brothers fleet. The Spanifli minifter readily confented to this propolal , and gave the marquis a commiffion for levying the troops , while orders were at the fame time iffued for the equipment of the gallies. The marquis, with the affiftance of his numerous friends, and of the count de .tuentes, governor ii2 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK of Milan, punctually fulfilled his part of the 11. agreement, and, as above related, arrived with 1602. liis troops in the Netherlands at a fortunate junc- ture , when , without his aid , the admiral of Ar- raeon muft have abandoned the province of Bra- bant to the army of the United Provinces. His brother was not fo fortunate in conducting from Spain the gallies with which the king had furnifhed him. They were eight in number, with above a thoufand foldiers on board, and fif- teen hundred flaves, who ferved as rowers. But two of thefa gallies were, before their departure, burnt by fome Englifh (hip? of war on the coaft: of Portugal ; and other three, having been inter- cepted by an Engl-fh and Dutch fquadron, which lay in wait for them in the narrow feas , and either taken or deftroyed , Frederic arrived in Flanders only with the remaining three. He was deeply affected by this difafter. His force, which he had been at fo great pains in foli- ating, was ftill too fmall for carrying the defigns which he had formed into execution, and for feveral months he could not engage in any memorable en- terprife. But, having become impatient under this inactivity which neceftity impofed on him, he ven- tured with eight gallies, having a great number of foldiers on board, and fome frigates, to attack afqua- dron of Dutch fhips of war , which had for fome time been ftationed on the coaft. "I he contcft was bloody and obftinate on both fides ; but as the Dutch were favored by the wind, and could na- vigate their fhips with greater dexterity , they were enabled PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 113 enabled to avoid grappling with the Spaniards , BOOK and had thus a much fmaller number killed. At 11. length Frederic himfelf received a mortal wound, of which he died foon after, and his fleet, dif- heartened by this calamity, and perceiving that their utmoft efforts to come to clofe fight were in- effedual , retired into the canal of Sluys \ The marquis of Spinola was at this time em- ployed in raifing troops in Italy, and Mill enter- tained the hopes of being able to carry his firft defign into execution; but his brother's death, joined to the weaknefs of the Spanifh fleet at Sluys, obliging him to abandon it, he now refolved to turn his attention from the fea to the land-fervice, and with this intention he returned to the Nether- lands, where the archduke was difpofed to give him every mark of efteem and confidence. This prince had never before flood fo much in need of the counfel and afliftance of his friends. The promifes of money made him by the court of Spain had been only in part fulfilled , and the mutinous fpirit of his troops, occafioned by his inability to pay their arrears, had rifen to the greateft height. They had no fooner retreated after their re- Mutiny and pulfe in attempting to raife the fiege of Grave, than almofl: all the Italians, except thofe who were commanded by the marquis of Spinola , refufed to obey the order which the admiral of Arragon had ifTued for their marching towards Maeftncht, and withdrew thcmfelves in a body from the JNU'Vren , Bcntvoglio . &c. Vol. I. I ii4 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK camp. They were accompanied by feveral offi- II. cers of experience and abilities, and by thefe 1603. men conducted towards Hochftrate , a fortified town in Brabant, of which, as they came upon the garrifon by furprife , they eafily acquired pof- feflion. Their number having been augmented by other mutineers , who flocked to them from every quarter,- foon amounted to three thoufand foot and two thoufand horfe, and almoffc the whole of them were veteran foldiers , diftinguifh- ed for their knowledge ;of military difcipline. Having chofen an elect , or leader, and filled up from among themfelves the places of all fuch offi- cers as had not joined in the mutiny, they eftab- lifhed , with general confent, a fyftem of regu- lations which they judged neceflary for their fafe- ty and prefervation , after which they applied themfelves to ftrengthen the fortifications of the town, and then lent out parties to lay the inha- bitants of the adjacent country under contributi- ons. Emboldened by their numbers, they made incurfions into the interior and more diflant parts of the province, and when the people refufed to comply with their exorbitant demands, they laid wafte the country , and indulged themfelves in every fpecies of injury and outrage. This populous and fertile province had long been expofed to the inroads of the troops of the United States ; but they had never been treated with fo great cruelty by the enemy as on this occafion, by the troops Which had been hired for their defence. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 115 The archduke having convened the dates to book deliberate concerning a proper remedy for thefe n. diforders , he was urged by that aflembly to era- 1 «^ ploy whatever money could be raifed to give the foldiers immediate fatisfa&ion with regard to their arrears, becaufe without this they reprefented the country muft be involved in utter ruin. Rut Albert , confcious that he had not funds fufricient at once to fatisfy the mutineers, and to pay the arrears due to his other troops; and judging, from pad experience, that unlefc he could fatisfy them all, the example of thofe who had mutinied would be quickly followed by their companions, for this reafon he entertained fome doubt of the prudence of the advice which the dates had given him , and declined complying with it, till he fliould know the fentiments of the court of Spain. That court ought to have been fenfible of the Mifcondoa folly of expecting that difcipline could be main- ° i$ l h \ Q ** % [ tained among troops, efpecially foreign troops, uninterefted in the iffue of the war, when their pay was with-held from them. They ought, long before this time, to have perceived the abfurdity of keeping an army on foot, which they were un- able to fupport. They ought, on the prefent occafion , to have refolved to reduce the number of their troops, and to reft fatisfied with a defen- five war, or, by greater economy at home, to enable themfelves to make more liberal remittan- ces to the archduke, or to have put an end to the war, by empowering him to grant to the United I % u6 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK States fuch terms of peace as they were willing II. to accept. But, inftead of adopting any of thefe *6°3. meafures , which prudence and neceflity required , they refolved that, for an example to the reft of the army , the mutineers ought to be reduced to obedience by force , and for this end they gave orders for levying feveral new regiments with the utmoft poffible expedition. It does not appear that the archduke was diflatisfied with this reioiu- tion of the Spanifh council , and he inftantly applied himfelf to carry it into execution. IVlorc than half a year was fpent in raifing the troops, and making the other necefTary preparations; and during all that time, the people of Brabant were expofed to the violence and depredations of the mutineers. In order to intimidate them Albert publiflied an edict of profcription , in which he declared, if they did not return to their duty in three days after receiving the copy of the edict which he fent them, they fhould be confidered as rebels to his government, and be all put to the fword without mercy. To this edict the routineers publiflied an anfwer, exprelTed in the rooft contemptuous terms. They were more than ever exafperated , and they refolved that, rather than fubmit to a prince, by whom they thought their fervices were fo ungratefully requited , they would enter into the fervice of the United States, and make him feel the weight of their refentment. January 2. Agreeably to this refolution they fent a depu- lfi04 ' tation of their number to prince Maurice, to in- quire whether , in cafe they were attacked by the PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. n? archduke's forces, he would afford them his pro- BOOK tecrion. Maurice, conformably to his conduct on n. a former occafion , gave them the raoft gracious iaPadors Thefe ambafladors, on their arrival in London , fromHoUand, f ounc i t h at t h e fufpicions which the flates had en- ITance , and , . . Spain, to the tertamed ot the kings prejudice againlt them, were kinpofGreat b ut t 00 well founded. James ftiil continued to employ the fame difrefpectful language, when he fpoke of their republic as formerly; nor could they at firft obtain an audience. After fome delay, they were at length admitted into his prefence , through the perfuafion of his Englifh counicllors. But though Harnevelt exerted all his eloquence , which he pofteffed in fo eminent a degree, to make him fenfible of the danger to which Britain would be expofed, if, by with - holding his affiftance , he fliould fuffer the United Provinces to fall back again under the dominion of Spain , he could only draw from him a general and vague reply : "That he had not , at piefent , leifure to conflder fully of the fubjedt which had been propofed to his confi- deration , and would not, therefore, now declare what refolution he fhould form; but he was him- fclf defnous to live at peace with them , and all his neighbours ; and , in cafe they would imitate PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 127 his example, he would chearfully employ his good BOOK offices to procure them peace with Spain, upon n. reafonablc terms. " i«o3. It fufticiently appeared from this reply , that the plan of conduct which the king had formed, was extremely different from that which had been pur- fued by his predecefTor ; and the ambafladors would have immediately returned home , in defpair of being able to interefl; him in their behalf, had not they been in daily expectation of the arrival of the French ambafTador ; through whofe interceflion they hoped that James might be induced to lend a more favorable ear to their requeft. Henry had appointed for his ambafTador to Eng- land , on this occafion, the marquis of Rofni 7 , whom , on account of his fuperior talents and fidelity , he efteemed the mod of all his minifters. No fubject had ever performed more important fervices to his prince ; and Henry could not , without great inconvenience , fpare a minifter fo necefTary to him in the adminiftration of his king* dom. But from various reports, which were pro- pagated at this time, he had conceived a fufpicion that James might be perfuaded to enter into an alliance with the court of Spain , and no perfon he believed was more likely to engage him to al- ter his intention than Rofni , whom he highly refpected on account of his inviolable attachment to the proteftant religion , and ufed to celebrate as the greateft: ftatefman in Europe. Afterwards duke of Sully, 128 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK James was highly pleafed with Henry's choice II. of his ambaflador, and received him with more 1 *° 3, than ordinary marks of distinction and regard. It had been reported to him by fome of the partifans of Spain , that Henry, and even Rofni himfelf, had fpoken difrefpectfully of his character*; and James fo far defcended from his dignity as to men- tion what he had heard to the marquis; but the imprefllon which it had made upon him was eafily effaced; and Rofni, from his firfl audience , con- ceived the hopes of being able to accomplifh the object of his embady. A party among the Englifh minifters were, not without reafon , fufpected to be attached to the interefts of Spain, and others , dreading the dif- ficulties which they muff, encounter in providing funds for carrying on the war, were averfe to all engagements either to France or the ftates gene- ral. From thefe men, the propofals of the French monarch met with confiderable oppofition. But the ambaifador , having been admitted by the king to a private audience, and having explained to him at full length his matter's views , which he fhowed were all calculated to promote the ge- neral intereft. of Europe , and the fecurity of the proteflant religion , whereas the court ot Spain were daily giving frefli proofs of the molt inordi- nate and turbulent ambition ; he had the addrefs to convince him , that a regard to the fafety of his dominions, as well as ths intereft of his religion , required Tt was reported to him , that Henry had called him captain of arts , and clerk of arms. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 129 required that he fliould join himfelf with France , BOOK and refolvc to fupport the United Provinces. A 11. treaty of alliance to this purpofe, was accordingly Uw3 > drawn up, and foon after figned and ratified; of which the following were the principal articles. That the two kings fliould mutually contri- bute their affiftance to prevent the Dutch from being overpowered by the Spaniards ; that , for this purpofe, a fufficient number of troops fliould be levied within the dominions of the king of England , and fent from thence to the Nether- lands as foon as poflible ; that the whole expenfe of thefe troops fliould be defrayed by the king of France, but that the half* of what he advanced, fhould be deducted from the debt which he owed to Elizabeth. It was refolved, that in order to avoid an open rupture with the court of Spain the utmoft fecrecy fliould be obferved in levying the troops, and in tranfporting them to the continent ; but it was agreed, that in cafe thefe tranfa&ions could not be concealed, and the Spaniards, in re- venge for the affiftance afforded to the Dutch, fliould attack either, or both of the contracting princes, they fliould mutually aflift each other, and furnifli fuch a number of troops, to be em- ployed by fea or land , as fliould be judged fuf- ficient for their mutual defence, and the prefer- vation of the United Provinces l \ * Grotius fays two thirds. 10 Sully's Memoirs , book xvi. Carte's Hiftory of Eng- land. Vol. I. K 13 o HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK James immediately fulfilled his part of this II. agreement, by giving fecret orders to the lord i6°3. Buccleugh to raife a body of two thoufand men in Scotland; who, fome months after, were fent over to join the army of the ftates ". The archdukes and the court of Spain were greatly alarmed, when they heard of the kind reception which the king had given to the French ambaftador, and they fufpected that fome treaty- had been concluded between them. It does not, however, appear that they received particular in- telligence of the^ purport of it; and they ftill en- tertained the hopes of being able to fix James in their intereft. The archdukes had early fent over the count cVAremberg , as their ambaffador, to congratu- late him on his acceffion ; and foon after Don John de Taxis, count of Villa Mediana , arrived in the fame capacity from Spain. It was com- monly believed that the former of thefe noble- men, who waseftecmed asafoldier, but was ex- tremely ill qualified for his prefent employment, had, foon after his arrival in England, given his countenance to a confpiracy , formed by the lords Grey, Cobham, Sir Walter Raleigh, and others, for fubverting the prefent government, and raif- ing Arabella Stuart to the throne. It fhould feem that he had, at lead, lent an ear to the confpira- tors , without thinking it incumbent on him to Cart£ a*d Meteren, Vittorio Siri , torn. i. p. 148. For the prec-ife fum due to Elizabeth , vide Sully , book xxi. near the beginning. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 131 communicate their intention to the king's minif- book ters; and by this imprudent conduct he rendered 11. himfelf fo obnoxious to James, that, in his hands, 160 *> 110 treaty of agreement with his mafter could have fuoceeded. But James was ftill as much a* ever bent on peace with Spain , nor had he m^ant to preclude himfelf from concluding it by his treaty of alliance with the French monarch. Taxi* left no art untried to confirm him in this pacific difpofuion; and, at the fame time, labor- ed tc remove thofe prejudices againft the Spa- niards which he had long entertained , and had been lately awakened by count d'Aremberg's con- cern in the confpiracy. He was warmly feconded by the queen, who, being attached to the Spa- nifli intereft, had conceived the defire of having the young prince, her fon, married to the in- fanta; and, by bribes and promifes, it was be- lieved, he had gained over a confiderable party of the Englifli counfellors. The French king and the ftates general, thought they had much reafon to dread the influence of fuch powerful agents, and they employed aif their intereft to counteract them, and to divert the king irom his intention. James gave them repeated afTurances that Henry fhould have no ground to complain of him for any breach of the alliance into which he had fo lately entered, nor the ftates lor being inattentive Co their intereft; but the prefent fituation of his affairs, he told them, rendered it necelTary tor him to put an end to the Spanifh war. K * i 3 2 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK ^ c accordingly gave orders to his rainifters for n. holding conferences for this purpofe, with the ««04. Spanifli and Flemifh ambaffadors , and in the mean time caufed an entire flop to be put to all hoftilities. Thofe appointed by the archdukes were d'A- rernberg, and Richard of Verreicken; and Rou- ida , a fenator of Milan, had come over to the af- fiflance of Taxis. The letter which Taxis brought to James from the king of Spain was add re fled to him not in the ufualftyle, To our Brother, but to our Coufin ; and, in enumerating James's titles, though France was mentioned, Ireland was omitted. James laugh- ed at the latter of thefe abfurdities, into which he fuppofed the Spanifli court had been led, by their complaifance to the pope, who had publish- ed a boll, declaring Ireland to be a fief of the holy -lee; but he fharply exprefled his refentraent at the term Coufin. It foon appeared that the claims of the two na- tions on each other, were but few in number. No conquefts had been made by either of the two parties, which the other could infill to have re- ftored; and neither of them claimed an indemni- fication for the expenfes of the war; but there were two points which were difficult to be adjufl- ed , and occafioned the holding of many confer- ences. The Spaniards, on the one hand, infilled that James fliould engage to prevent his fubje&s from entering for the future into the fervice of the United States j and he , on the other , required PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 133 that they fhould enjoy the liberty of trade to book the Indies. 11. The Spanifh ambaffador reprefented, that his 1&0 *« mafler had expected to find in his Britannic ma- jefty, a good and faithful ally; and hoped to have formed an offenfive and dcfenfive alliance ■with him, but if he was flill determined, in imi- tation of his predeccflor , to give affiftance to the rebels in the Netherlands, it was impoflible but the catholic king rauft confider him rather as an enemy than a friend. The Englifh commiffioners replied , that their matter could not now regard the Dutch in the light of rebels; their fovereignty had been aknowledged by fome of the greateft princes in Europe, and the king had, on his ac- ceflion, found fo clofe a connexion fubfifling be- tween them and his EngliHi fubjects as could not be diflblved without confiderable prejudice to his kingdom : he was therefore refolved to permit Peace b^. them to make levies within his dominions as for- tween s P'« i '= and Eng. rnerly; but as he intended to obferve a ftricl neu- i an; |, trality, he was ready to grant the fame permiflion to the archdukes and the king of Spain, and far- ther to engage that he fhould not fend any of his own troops to the affiftance of the ftates , nor fur- nifh them either with money or with military ftores. The Spanifh commiffioners finding , after fevcral conferences , that all their remonflrances on this head proved ineffectual , were obliged to acquiefce in the king's propofal. The other article above mentioned, which re^ lated to the India trade , was the fubjedt of fevcral K 3 134 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK conferences, and of great altercation between the U. commiHioners. The Spaniards maintained that, i«04. as they were the firft difcoverers of the Indies, and their right to thefe countries had been con- firmed by the fovereign pontiff, no other nation was entitled to trade there without their permif- fion ; that for weighty reafons they had rtfufed to grant this pcrmiffion; not only to the king of France in the treaty of Vervins, but likewife to the emperor, and to the archdukes; that thefe reafons itill fubfifled , and therefore they muft not only decline granting it to the Englifli, but infift that the king of England fhall, by proclamation, prohibit all his fuhje&s from continuing to trade in India , as they had done for fome years part. This chimerical pretenfion was treated by the Enghfh commiffioners with the contempt which it merited; the Spaniards themfelves had traded to many parts of India , btfides thefe where they had eftablifhed their dominion ; and no rea- fon could be given why the Englifli fhould not enjoy the fame liberty. James peremptorily refufed to pubhfh the prohibition which was requefted of him. His fubjecls had for many years been in pofleffion of the India trade, and he rrfolved that they fhould not be deprived of it by any article in the prefent treaty. The difputes on this fubject rofe to fo great a height as to give ground to apprehend that the conferences would have proved abortive; but, as both parties were eagerly bent on peace, it was at length propofed that no mention whatever fhould PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 13$ be made of the Indies in the treaty , and to this BOOK propofal they both yielded their confent. II. All the other articles were eafily adjufted; but 1604 * as Taxis had not plenipotentiary powers , the figning of it was delayed for fome time longer. This, however, had been referved for Don John de Vclafco , duke of Frias, and conftable of Car- tile, who , feveral months before had come to B rude Is , in his way to England: but had remain, ed till now in Flanders , either on account of his health, which was the excufe he offered for his delay, or, as was fufpe&ed by the Englifh, be- caufe he judged it to be incompatible with his dignity to come over to England till he knew that peace would certainly be concluded. He had re- queued the Englifh monarch to fend his commif- fioners to treat with him in the Netherlands ; but James declined complying with this requeft, be- caufe the catholic king, he faid , had firft offered to fend his ambaffador to England, and he chofe to have the treaty carried on under his own eye ". Vclafco arrived at Dover on the 5th of Au- guft. and was from thence conducted by fome Englifh noblemen fent to receive him, wifh great pomp to London. The treaty was figned on the 19th of Auguft, and next day was ratified by the king ". The publication of it gave general fatis- Carte, Sully, Beaumont, Meteren, and Siri, Mem. recondite, torn. i. p. 200, &c. It was not till the following year that the earl of Not- tingham , lord high admiral , was fert ro Madrid to witnefs the notification of this treaty , by the king of Spain. K 4 i 3 6 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK faction both to the Spanifh and Englifh nations; 11. but was unacceptable to the Englifh failors, be- I604. caufe they alone , by the numerous captures they had made, had^ derived any advantage from the war '\ During the courfe of thefe negociations, the war in the Netherlands was carried on with more than ordinary vigor. The fiege of Oftend had lafted for more than two years and a half, and the befiegers , during all that time, had exerted their utmoft ftrength and flcill, yet fo vigorous was the oppofition which they received from the garrifon, that they had not been able to make any con ft- derablc imprefiion on the place. Thofe huge machines, above-mentioned, which were intended for blocking up the canal, were no fooner brought within reach of the artillery of the town , than , by the well -directed fliot of the befiegers, they were either demolifhed or fet on fire. The be- sieged too made innumerable fallies, in which they difplayed the mod determined intrepidity, and completed the deftru&ion of fuch parts of the Spanifli works as could not be reached by the artillery. The principal engineer employed in conftrucl- ing thefe works was Pompco Targone, an Italian, who pofTeiTed an inventive genius, but had never till now enjoyed an opportunity of reducing his theories to practice. Of this man's ingenuity the archduke unfortunately entertained too favorable For farther particulars relating to this treaty fee, Appendix, A. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 137 an opinion , and was thus too eafily induced to BOOK approve of projects, which, on trial, were found 11. impracticable, but were attended in the execu- l604, tion with immenfe expenfe. His machines were all conftruded at fome diftance from the town , but when they were brought forward to the pla- ces where they were to be ufed , they were ex- pofed , either to the violence of the tide , or to the fire of the beftegers ; and it often happened that works were in a few hours deftroyed, or ren- dered ufelefs, on which the labor of many weeks bad been employed. The archduke came at length to be undeceived in the expectations which he had formed of the fuccefs of thefe works. His patience was now greatly exhaufted ; and he began to fufpect that the repeated difappointments which he had met with muff be in a great meafure owing to the want of ("kill or vigor on the part of thofe to whom he had committed the conduct of the fiege. The marquis of Spinola had been only a few months in the Netherlands , and, till his arrival there , had never witnefled any military operati- ons ; yet Albert, with the confent of the court of Spain , refolved to devolve on him the command The com- of the army, and the profecution of this liege, mandof t h * in which the ftrenuous efforts of his mod experi- m y given to enced commanders had been of fo little avail. the marquis In forming this refolution it was generally Relieved ° pin0 *' that, in the i(Tue, he would find he had been be- trayed into ftill greater imprudence than when he repofed fuch undeferved confidence in the abilities 138 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK of Targone , and many of his officers were great- II. )y incenfed at a choice fo expreflive of his diftrufl 1604. in their abilities; but having conceived a high admiration of Spinola , partly on account of his fpiiited conduct in fome enterprifcs of fmall im- portance iu which he had been engaged , and partly from the prudence and fagacity , of which he had given proof as often as he had confulted him on the conduct of the war, Albert perfifted in his refolution , and was juftified by the event. Spinola was highly pleafed , with fo flattering a diftinction , but could not avoid feeling much an- xiety when the archduke communicated to him his intention. He hefitated for fome time whether to accept , at fo critical a juncture , of fo import- ant a command, in which, in (lead of acquiring fame, he might, at his very entrance upon the mi- litary life, expofe himfelf to fo great a rifk of incur- ring cenfure and reproach : and therefore, before he agreed to the archduke's propofal, he conven- ed together fuch of the officers as he confided in, and defired them deliberately to confider whether it was practicable to bring the liege of Oftend to the defired conclufion. Thefe men differed widely from each other in their fentiments on the fubject , and only contri- buted to increafe his perplexity. But, being con- fcious of rcfourccs within himfelf, of which thofe who attempted to diffuade him could form no conception, his hopes and his ambition at length prevailed over his doubts and fears, and deter- mined him to accept of the command. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 139 The failure of many enterprises , he believed , BOOK had been greatly owing to the mutinous fpirit of n. the troops, occafioned by the irregularity of their l6 °*- pay; and to remedy this evil was the firft object to which he applied his attention. Upon inquiry, he found that large fums of money had been mif- applied, or embezzled by thofc who had the care of the military cheft. Thefe perfons he difmifled from their employments, and fubftituted others, upon a plan of greater economy , in their room. But he (till perceived that the military funds were too fmall to enable him to keep the troops in good humor, and at the fame time to carry on fuccefs- fully all the expenfive operations of the fiege. Of the truth of this he fpared no pains to convince the archduke and the Spanifh mimfters; and, in the mean time , till they fhould devife expedients for furnifhing him with more ample fupplies, he pledged his private fortune for fuch confiderable fums , as put it in his power to give inftant fatis- faction to the troops. In conducting the operations of the fiege , his deference for the judgment of the archduke deter- mined him to perfift. for fome time longer in the attempt, which had colt fo much expenfe of blood and labor, to intercept the navigation of the ca- nal ; and, in order to form the intended dike, and batteries on the banks nf it , great quantities of ftones and earth and other materials were brought fiom a dftance, 0:1 floats or rafts conftructed by Targone. But thi* work . being cxpofed both to the fire and the faliies of the befieged, advanced i 4 o HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK flowly. It could not be finifhed , he perceived, U. for many months; and, even when it fhould be ieo4. finifhed , though it would render the navigation of the canal more difficult to the Dutch fhips, yet many of them, heforefaw, by taking advantage of the night, and winds and tides, might elude his batteries, and the garrifon ftill continue to re- ceive fupplies. In order to prevent this, Targone had, with the archduke's approbation, begun to ered , on large boats ftrongly bound together, a huge floating caftle , which he propofed to ftation in the mouth of the canal , and to plant it with cannon. But Spinola confidered this project as chimerical. A pile fo huge and unwieldy could not, he fufpected, be brought from the place where the engineer was employed in building it to the mouth of the canal; although it fhould be found practi- cable to do this, yet the machine would not long refift the violence of the tide; and, unlefs a dike of an extraordinary height and ftrength could be raifed to fheher it, it would foon be demolifhed by the artillery of the town. Determined by thefe motives , Spinola aban- doned the defign of blocking up the canal , and rtfolved , henceforth , to employ his whole ftrength in carrying on the fiege by mines, batteries, and aflauhs. The archduke, notwithftanding the re- pulfe which he had met with in the affault above- related, would, on the fecond day after, have refumed his attempt, if the troops, difcontented with his treatment of them on that occafion, had not refufed to obey. But the whole army was now PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 141 under the raoft perfect difcipline, and having no book longer any ground to complain of their want of 11. pay , they were ready to give every proof of their uo *» attachment to their general, from whom they had received fo much greater attention than had for- merly been fhown them. Encouraged by this difpofition .of his army, Spinola iffued his orders for a general aflault , in the fame quarter where the former one had failed , at the fmall canal which encompafied the fortifications on the weft. In or- der to infpire his troops with emulation , he divi- ded them into four battalions, orie of which was entirely compofed of Germans, the fecond of Spaniards, the third of Italians, and the fourth of Walloons , and other foldiers raifed in the county of Burgundy. Great quantities of materials had been provided for forming dikes accrofs the canal, at thofc parts where he intended the troops fhould pafs ; and the foremoft ranks were ordered to carry before them a fort of rampart formed of twigs and faggots , to fcreen them from the fire of the enemy's fmall arms in their approach. The garrifon , having received intelligence of his defign , were well prepared for their defence ; and the afTailants had no fooner entered the canal than they began a dreadful fire upon them, both with their fmall arms and their artillery. Great numbers fell , notwithstanding the precautions which had been taken: ftill, however, they con- tinued to advance. The Walloons having been Rationed fartheft from the fea, where the canal was of the fraalleft depth , were the firft who arrived 14* HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK on the other fide, and the reft of the army quickly II. followed. The garnfon ftill maintained their 1604. ground, and kept up an inceftant fire, by which the braveft of the afiailants fell in heaps above one another. Spinola was in the midft of his troops, giving orders , and exhorting them to perfevere. They were animated by his example, -as well as his exhortations, and it being now become more dangerous to retreat than to advance, they haftened forward with the molt defperate intrepidity, and attacked the ravelins and halfmoons which defend- ed the counterfcarp. The garrifon withftood their fury for fome time ; but at length , after great num- bers had fallen on both fides , they were compelled to abandon their outworks, and retire within the ditch. Spinola could not at this time attempt with fafety to proceed any farther in the attack; but, having covered his men from the enemy's fire*, he immediately began , by working trenches , to make ftill nearer approaches to the place 1S . The ftates general were in the mean time deli- berating whether to attempt to raife the fiege, by marching the army to Oftend ; or to undertake fome new conqueft on the coaft of Wanders , by which the lofs of Oftend , which they had now more reafon to dread than ever, might be com- penfated. After mature deliberation , the latter of thefe meafures was adopted , as the eafieft to be carried into execution ; and it was agreed to un- dertake the reduction of Sluys " , which , as it BertivOglio, part. iii. lib. vii. See volume in. p. 78. of Philip II. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. i 4 j Jay nearer to the United Provinces, would prove book in every refpect a more valuable pofleflion than n. Oftend. 16 °4. The troops were ordered to rendezvous at Williamiladt, where prince Maurice, attended by the deputies of the dates, arrived on the 24th of April,, and next day he fet fail with upwards of twelve thoufand men for the ifle of Cadfant, which is feparated from Sluys by the great canal. Having difembarked without oppofition , he foon reduced all the forts upon the ifland. From Cad- fant he pafled over into that part of Flanders which lies to the eaftward of Sluys , and laid fiege to a ftrong fort called St. Catherine. The garrifon of this fort , having made a more vigor- ous refinance than he expected, he refolved, ra- ther than be detained before it any longer, to leave it behind him in the enemy's pofTeffion , and gave orders for having his artillery drawn off in the middle of the night; but one of his cannon hav- ing funk in a marfh , a great number of failors were employed in raifing it, who made fo great a buflle and noife, that the garrifon, believing the whole Dutch army to be at hand , and that they were removing their artillery to a more advan- tageous fituation, in order to renew the attack, were feized with a panic, and fled precipitately towards lfendyck. Of this unexpected event the prince received intelligence next morning, when he took poffeilion of the fort : and from thence he proceeded to lfendyck, Ardenburgh, and other pla- ces, all of which he eafily compelled to furrendcr. 144 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK In the mean time Spinola, having been inform- II. ed by Serrano, the governor of Sluys, ofthedan- 1604. ger which threatened him, fent him a reinforce- ment of three hundred men. With this reinforce- ment, joined to as great a number of the garrifon as could be fpared , Serrano, who was an officer diftinguiflied for his activity and enterprife, re- folved to embrace the opportunity which the pre- fent diltance of prince Maurice's army afforded him , to make an attack on the ifle of Cadfant. Had his defign fucceeded , he mud have got poiTeffion of all the Dutch tranfports , together with their military ftores , and thus have render- ed it impracticable for Maurice to proceed in his intended enterprife againft: Sluys. Some compa- nies of Scots troops, which had been (tationed in Cadi'ant, having no apprehenfion of danger, were off their guard , and Serrano had time to land fix hundred of his men without oppofition ; but the Scots, having foon received intelligence of their Janding, fet out inftantly to oppofe them , and hav- ing come upon them, before they were completely formed, attacked them with uncommon fury, and drove them back in great confufion to their boats. The prince had now fnbdued all the fortified places which lay to the eafl of Sluys, and was ad- vancing weftward, when he was met by Velafco, general of the archduke's cavalry, who had been fent to obftrud: his progrefs. Velafco had pofted Ills troops in a ftrong fituation, near Dam , which ftands on the canal of Bruges. He had the good fortune in the beginning to repulfe a party of the Dutch. PHILIP HI. KING OF SPAIN. 145 Dutch horfe, who were fent before the reft of the BOOK army to attack bis intrenchrnents; but the infan- 11. try coming up, he was overpowered by numbers. I6 °*» About eight hundred of his men were killt-d and taken prifoners, and he himfelf with the reft was obliged to retire precipitately towards Dam. After this fucccfs Maurice, judging it unne- ceflary to lofe time in laying fiege to this fort, proceeded in his march, and, with little difficulty, made himfelf matter of all the forts on the great canal, by which Sluys communicates with the fea; immediately after which he afligned their feveral ftations to his troop* in the neighbourhood of the town ; and began to form a line of circumvallation round the place, by working deep intrenchrnents, where the foil permitted , cafting bridges over the numbcrlefs little canals and rivulets , by which the ground is almoft every where interfered , and fortifying the whole at certain diftances with redoubts ,T . In thefe laborious operations , feveral weeks were employed, and before the works were fin idl- ed , the archduke found means, at different times, to reinforce the garrifon with fifteen hundred men. Prince IVlaurice was not forry for the introduction c',^ 6 . of thefe troops into the town. He had received certain intelligence that the flock of provifions in 7 In ore'er more deeply to imprefs the minds of his foldi- ers with a fenfe of the importance of their prefenc ent^rprife, IVlaurice appointed the 2 1 ft of May to be obferved as a day of falling and of prayer to the Almighty, for his bleffing upon their arms. Vol. L L 146 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF SO OK the place, was not fufficient long to fupport fo II. great a number; he had no intention to carry on 1S04. tne f ie g e by batteries or alfaults , and he hoped foon to be able to render the blockade fo com- plete, as to prevent the entrance of fupplies. The archduke, on the other band, expected ere Jong to be able to raife the fiege , and dreaded no danger but from the weaknefs of the garrifon. He was deeply fenfible of the great importance of Sluys , which , befides affording the mod commo- dious retreat to the Spanifh gallies, was conveni- ently fituated for an invafion of the United Provin- ces , and enabled him to give great annoyance to their trade. He could not, however, perfuade himfelf to forego the fruits of his long continued labors before Oftend , by railing the fiege of that place; but he refolved , for fome time, to fufpend his operations there, and fignified to Spinola, his defire that he fliould immediately march to the re- lief of Sluys, leaving no more troops behind him, than were fufficient to reftrain the fallies of the garrifon. Spinola , who was well acquainted with the character of prince Maurice, had a juft fenfe of the difficulty of carrying the archduke's defign into execution, and remonftrated againfl: it as imprac- ticable; but finding that Albert could not be pre- vailed on to alter his refolution, he agreed to ac- cept of the command , upon condition that the officers of greateft experience fliould accompany him in the expedition. He could hardly flatter himfelf with the hopes offuccefs, and he wilhed PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 147 that others mould partake in the cenfure which he b O ft was likely to incur. The archduke readily con- u. fented to this propofal; and, being joined on this 1<5<: >* occafion by a great number of the mutineers, who had been perfuaded to return to their duty, he began his march with fix thoufand foot, and two thoufand horfe, befides a tram of artillery, and a large convoy of provifions. The garrifon of S)uys had already begun to fuf- fer greatly from the want of wholefome food; and Serrano had repeatedly fent notice, that without a fupply , he could not poffibly hold out for many days longer. Spinola therefore advanced towards Sluys with the utmoft expedition ; and , having received intelligence that the weakeft part of the enemy's lines was at a village called Tervarde, he made an attack upon them in that quarter, in the middle oF the night. But the Du'ch troops were prepared for his reception; and though he had taken every precaution to infure fuccefs, he was obliged , after repeated attempts , to retire with confiderable lofs. He then fetched a compafs round by Arden- burgh , and dire&ed his march towards the ifle o£ Cadfant, in the hopes of making himfelf matter of that ifland , from whence he might by water introduce provifions into Sluys. He expected to have come upon the enemy in furprife , by ford- ing the canal which feparates Cadlant from Flan- ders on the eaft. But prince IYlaurice, having fufpe&ed his defign , had planted a half mooa battery there, and Rationed fome feled troops to L 3 i4 8 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF Afiguft. BOOK difpute his paffage , under count William of Naf- II. fau. Over thefe troops , Spinola at firft gained I404> fome advantage , and drew them from the bat- tery : but Maurice himfelf, coming up with frefh troops to their affiftance, Spinola was, at length, obliged to abandon his attempt, after an obftinate conteft, in which he fuffered the lofs of five hun- dred killed, and as many wounded. Had not Spinola entered with reluctance on his prefent enterprife, his prudence might juftly have been impeached; but as his difapprobation of it, and his diffidence of fuccefs were known to the enemy by intercepted letters , as it had been known from the beginning to his friends , and nothing had been wanting on his part to carry it into fuc- cefsful execution; it ferved, notwithstanding his repulfe , to heighten his character for military fkill, and confirmed the archduke in the high opinion which he entertained of his abilities. He returned without delay to Oftend ; and , on the fecond day after his retreat, Serrano, the go- gernor of Sluys, capitulated upon honorable terms. His garrifon amounted to four thoufand men , befidesa great number of flaves, who had formerly been employed on board the gallies; but his Capitulation ft oc k of provifions had , feveral days before, been entirely confumed , and the ftrength of the foldiers was fo much impaired , that more than fixty of them died on the road to Dam, which is only two hours march from Sluys. I3y one article of the capitulation, all the artil- lery and military ftores, and by another, all the Auguft I9> *>f Sluys. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 149 (hips and ten Spanifh gallies, which had fo long BOOK infefted the Dutch trade, were delivered into the 11. hands of the conqueror. 16a *' Fourteen hundred flaves , the greater part of whom were Turks, were fet at liberty; and as many of them chofe to return to their native country, the United States, in order to conciliate the friendfhip of the Corfairs, treated them with great humanity while they remained in Holland, and afterwards fent them in Dutch Ihips to Bar- bary ". The glory which prince Maurice acquired from fo important a conqueft, was greatly heightened by the comparifon which men generally inftituted between the rapidity of his progrefs , and the flownefs of that of the Spaniards before Oflend. Judicious obfervers thought there was hardly room for this comparifon , the two cafes being ex- tremely different in the mod important refpeds from each other; but it was univerfally acknow- ledged that Maurice had, on no former occafion, difcovered greater vigor and vigilance, or greater military fkill. The archduke , on the other hand , was fe- vercly moitified; nor was he entirely free from apprehenfion of being ere long fubjected to a ftill greater mortification , as a confiderable part of the feafon fit for adion ftill remained, and he ex- peeled that Maurice, whofe army had fuffered al- moft no diminution , would nextattempt to compel Grotius, lib. xiii. Metercn , and the triumphs of Naflau. Beotivoglio, p. 3. cap. vii. L 3 i5o HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK him to raife the fiege of Offcend. In order to H, prevent this, which he would have confidered as *£°4« the greateft calamity that could befal him , he gave immediate orders for (lengthening the for- tifications of Dam , Blackenberg, and other places, by which the prince's army could approach. But Maurice had no intention of entering fo far into an enemy's country , whofe forces were fuperior in number to his own; and the ftates ge- neral, highly fatisfied with the fuccefs which had already attended their arms , reiolved to employ the remainder of the feafon in fecuring their new conquefts. No expenfe was fpared to render Sluys impregnable, and Cadfant, Ifendvck , and feveral other places in the neighbourhood of Sluys, were ftrongly fortified. The marquis of Spinola had, in the mean time, refumed his operations before Oflend , and was daily making nearer approaches to the town. He had already croffed the ditch, and compelled the garrifon to retire from all that part of the place called the old town , but one redoubt " , from which , as it was confiderably elevated above the other fortifications , the befieged made dreadful havoc among his troops. He refolved , what- ever it fhould coll him, to make himfelf mailer of this redoubt. His Spanifh and Italian troops, having been again and again repulfed with great fl.iughter, could not be perfuaded to renew the attack : and this arduous undertaking was there- fore committed to two regiments of Germans, who Called the fand-hill. PHILIP III KING OF SPAIN. 15; 1 allured by promifes, and pufhed on by emulation BOOK" to execute what the Italians and Spaniards had 11. abandoned in defpair, advanced towards the fort ,60 *' with the moft determined intrepidity. The gar- rifon fprung a mine upon the foremoft of thefe regiments, and blew up a great number of them in the air. The reft , however , fupported by the fecond regiment, ftill continued to advance, and having attacked the garrifon fword in hand, they drove them with irrefiftible fury from the place. The garrifon , by the advice of a Scotch engi- neer of the name of Dixter , had provided againft this difafter , by drawing a ftrong intrenchment flanked with baftions, and fortified with artillery betwixt the old and the new part of the town ; and behind this , they had likewife drawn another intrenchment of the fame kind, acrofs the middle of the new town; being determined to difpute every inch of ground, and to maintain their defence till the laft extremity. From the progrefs, however, which Spinola had already made, and the fkill and vigor with which his operations were conducted , it could not be doubted , that he muft ere long get poflfeffion of the place. The garrifon ftill continued to make the moft vigorous tallies upon his miners and his troops; but fmce they had loft the fort of Sand- hill , thefe fallies were made at a much greater expenfe of blood, on their part, than formerly: their new works had not yet acquired the fame folidity and ftrength as thofe from which they had been expelled; and, being now confined within L 4 152 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK fucb narrow limits as could not admit of any com II. fiderable reinforcement of frefli troops, they were **o4. expofed to much greater danger than before , of being overpowered in every affault, by the fupcrioi* numbers of the enemy. , The ftates general, influenced by thefe confider- ations, and thinking it extremely doubtful whe- ther the prefervation of Oftend , fince the con- quefl of Sluys, was an objed: worthy of the ex- penfe and attention it muft cofi: , refolved to per- fift no longer in the defence, and fent inftruclions to the fieur de IVlarquette, the governor, to pre- pare himfelf for capitulating upon honorable terms. On receiving thef: inftruclions , IVlarquette im- mediately conveyed to Fluming, by the fhips which were then lying in the harbour, all deferters, and other perfons , who had any particular reafons for dreading the enemy's refentment , together* •with a part of the artillery and (lores; after which be fent two of his principal officers to treat with Spinola of the furrender of the place. This general, whether from admiration of that intrepid bravery which the garrifon had difplayed, or becaufe he was {till diffident of fuccefs , and defirous to avoid the furthfr effufion of blood , Ofce»ac**i*' readily agreed that the garrifon fliould march out t«um* with alt the honors of war, and be fafely con- ducted by land to Sluys; that waggons fliould be furnifhed to the (ick and wounded ; that the in- habitants fliould be at liberty to quit the town PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 153 without moleftation ; and that all prifoners on BOOK both fides fhould be releafed. This agreement H. was made on the 20th of September , in the be- 1604. ginning of the fourth year fince the commence- ment of the fiege ; and on the fecond day after, Spinola was put in pofleflion of the town. He re- ligioufly fulfilled all the articles of the capitulati- on, and while the garrifon were preparing to fet out, he gave proof of a generofity of fpirit, of which no other inftance has occurred in the hif- tory of the prefent war, by invking the governor, and all colonels and captains in the place , to a magnificent entertainment , where he treated them with every mark of diftinction and refpect. From Oftend , the governor marched at the head of his garrifon , amounting to near four thoufand men, with a fmall train of artillery, along the fea-coaft, till they arrived in the neigh- bourhood of Sluys, where they were met by prin- ce IVlauricc , who received thrm in the mod gracious manner , and gave them every teftimony of applaufe and gratitude. They were foon after followed by almoft the whole body of inhabit- ants , who clofe rather to refide at Sluys than Oftend ; and the chief mngiftrate of Oftend was appointed chief magiftrate of Sluys. Such was the termination of this celebrated fiegc , which , befidcs an enormous expenfe of labor and military Ik res , had coft the contend- ing parties the lives of near a hundred thoufand men. Oftend could not, on any account, be deemed worthy of this expenfe ; yet the Dutch 154 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK fcemed to have acted wifely in defending it with II. fo great obftinacy. They could, no where elfe , 1604. have encountered the enemy on more advantage- ous terms: and, while the fiege continued, they not only enjoyed profound tranquillity at home, but were at liberty to fecure and extend their frontier, by the acquifition of Rhinberg, Grave, Cadfant , lfendyck and Sluys. The conduct of the archduke does not admit of any fuch apology. Hardly any of the places which he had loft was of lefs importance than Oftend ; and Sluys , from its excellent harbour, and its neighbourhood to Zealand, was of much greater importance. His arms, at a juncture, when his finances were low, and his troops muti- nous , ought rather to have been employed in de- fending his own dominions , than in attacking thofe of the enemy : and if he had found leifure for acting offenfively , he ought to have made his attack on fome place of eafier conqueft , in the prefervation of which the United Provinces were more deeply intertfted. But if he ever came to be fenfibie of his error, it was not till he thought that it could not be retrieved with honor; and he was encouraged to perfift in it by the Spanilh minifters , who were at too great a diftance from the fcene of action to judge of the conduct which it was pro- per to purfue. But there was reafon now to expect that nei- ther the archduke, nor the court of Spain , would for the future be guilty of the fame fort of PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 155 imprudent conduct, as that into which, on diffe- BOOK rent occafions , they had been hitherto betrayed ; 11. as both he and they were imprefled with a juft uo ** efteem of the prudence and great abilities of the marquis of Spinola, and had refolved to devolve on him the entire direction of the war. He had already given ftriking proofs of fuperior capacity ; and no perfon doubted that he would (till be found deferving of that extraordinary confidence that was repofed in him. A chief fource , Spinola knew, of thofe difap- pointments and lofTes which Albert had fuftained, was his irregularity in the pay of his troops, and in order to remedy this evil , the marquis re- folved either to reduce their number , or to be well allured of procuring more ample funds for their fupport. But no fufficient funds could be procured , unlefs they were furnifhed by the court of Spain , and therefore , as foon as he put his army into winter-quarters, he fet out for IVladrid, in the hopes of being able to convince the Spanilh minifters of the neceility of either making greater exertions, and furnifliing more liberal lupplies, or of refolving as foon as poifible to put a period to the war. The Spanifh finances were in no better order scarcity of at this time than at any former period. From the precious that decay of induftry , of which the caufes have ^^ n %l been already mentioned , Spain was no longer able to furnifh either her colonies or herfe!f with manufactures of her own production. The gold and filver which (he imported from America no 156 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK fooner arrived , than it was tranfmitted , for the 11. purchafe of manufadures, to other nations that 1604. were more induftrious ; and the fcarcity of the precious metals in Spain , had rifen to fo great a height, that the duke of Lerma had , laft year, raifed the nominal value of the copper-coin , which by a royal edict was made nearly equal to that of filver. But this abfurd expedient ferved only to increafe the evil which it was intended to prevent or remedy **. Counterfeit copper- money , of equal intrinfic value to the current coin in Spain , was poured into that kingdom by the neighbouring nations; thefe nations , at the fame time , received gold and filver in return j they ftill continued likewife to receive the price of their manufadures in gold and filver. And thus was Spain more than ever drained of thefe precious metals. The diftrefs arifing from thence was fenfibly felt from one end of the kingdom to the other, and the minifters often found it difficult to procure money fufficient for the neceffary purpofes of government. But , Thecourt being now delivered from the burden of the war of Madrid w i tn England , and hoping that henceforth the refolwes to c r c a • 111 carry on the returns or trealure from America would be greater v«. and more certain than they had hitherto been , they refolved , in conformity to the king's incli- nation , to fpare no expenfe to enable the arch- duke to carry on the war in the Netherlands with vigor. Gonfalez Davila, lib. ii. cap. xiv. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 157 Agreeably to this refolution , the marquis of BOOK Spinola, to whom Philip, on this occafion, gave 11. every proof of efteem and confidence, was im- I604# mediately furnifhed with a confiderable fum of money. The ftrongeft aiTurances were likewife given him , by the minifters of greater punctua- lity in their future remittances; and there was at the fame time conferred upon him , full power to employ all the money which he received, or was afterwards to receive , in the manner which he fhould judge to be moft expedient. Thecond uct of the archduke , it feems , and that of thofe to whom he had committed the adminiftration of his finances, had rendered this precaution necefTary; he had never obfcrved that ftrict economy which the exigencies of his affairs required ; and it would appear , that being fenfible of this defect in his character, and confcious of his inability to corrcdt it, he was well pleafed to have the difpofal of the money fent from Spain , devolved upon Spinola. The marquis having thus accomplifhed the de- fign of his journey to Madrid, and obtained from Philip and his minifters their approbation of his plan of operations for the next campaign, returned without delay to Bruflels. The firft object of his attention was to remove every ground of difcon- tent among his troops, by applying a part of the money which he had brought along with him to the diftharge of their arrears; immediately after which , he gave orders for making numerous le- vies in Germany and in the Southern Provinces i 5 8 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK of the Netherlands. The Spaniflh minifters had II. promifed to fend him a veteran regiment from "of. Spain by fea ; and they had given inftrudlions to the governors of Naples and Milan, to provide for him a ftrong reinforcement of Italians *\ The United Provinces on the other hand, being already well acquainted with the activity and en- terprife of Spinola, had ftrenuoufly exerted them- felves in their military preparations , and were fooner ready to take the field. They had formed the defign of laying fiege to Antwerp , where they had learnt that the number of the garrifon was neither adequate to the extent of the fortifications, or the great importance of the place. Prince Maurice did not approve of this expedition , but engaged in it at the requeft of the ftates. Having put a part of his army on board tranfports, under count Erneft of Naflau, he himfelf marched over land with the reft front Bergen op Zoom , and joined Erneft, at the fort of Lillo , which ftands on the north fide of the Scheld , about two leagues diftant from Antwerp, and was ftill in poiTeffion of the Dutch. His intention was to lay all the low grounds be- tween Lillo and Antwerp under water, by cutting the dike of the Scheld , together with the counter- dike at Couveftcin, and then to crofs over the inundation , and to pitch his camp on the higher Some officers were fent over to recruit in Britain , but James difcouraged his fubjects from entering into the Spaniflt fervice. Vide Carte. Yet foldiers were raifed among the catholics , as appears from the fequel. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 159 grounds which lie near the town. He would thus BOOK have had a much fmaller fpace to inclofe with his 11. intrenchmcnts, while his army would have been i* ** entirely fecure on one fide againft the approach of the enemy. His defign had been carefully concealed, and if his tranfports had not been de- tained by contrary winds , his enterprife would probably have been attended with fuccefs. But Spinola , conjecturing from the embarkation of a part of his forces , and his choice of Bergen for the rendezvous of the reft, that he could not have any other object in view but the fiege of Antwerp, had time to take every precaution to prevent him from carrying his plan into execution. He had greatly augmented the garrifons of the town and of the forts upon the counterdike ; and at the fame time had lined the banks of the Scbeld on both fides with a fufficient number of troops to oppofe his landing ". Maurice attempted, however, to make a de- fcent on the Flanders fide near Caloo, but finding his utmoft efforts ineffectual, and that Spinola was every where upon his guard , he abandoned his firft attempt; and afcer reducing the caftle of Woude , a ftrong fort in the neighbourhood of Bergen , he embarked his army , and made a defcent in Flanders , near Ifendyck , with an. He had likswife come himfelf to Antwerp, with all the forces which he could collect together , and having thrown a bridge over the Scheld , a little above the town, he ftood prepared to march whenever the enemy fhould Venture to begin their attack. i6o HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF book intention of laying fiege either to the Sas of Ghent H. or Hulft. 1605. Maurice himfelf had difapproved of this expe- dition, as well as of his attempt on Antwerp, and had advifed to employ the army on the banks of the Rhine , where he thought there was reafon to dread an irruption of the enemy ; but he had yielded to the judgment of the ftates , who being anxious for the prefervation of Sluys, were defi- rous of getting poffelTion of as many fortified towns as poflible, in the neighbourhood of th.it important place. They had formerly had repeated proofs, how ill qualified they were to judge of the proper conduct of the war; and from the feqnel , it will appear , how much wifer it had been , if, on the prefent occafion , they had liftened to the opinion of their general. Maurice had not time to begin his operations, either againft the Sas of Ghent or Hulft: , when Spinola , who on this occafion derived great ad- Vantage from his bridge over the Scheld , arrived in fight with all his forces: but, as neither of the two generals were inclined to try the fortune of a battle , they immediately applied themfelves to fortify their refpective camps; refolving , each of them , to await till fome favorable opportunity fhould offer of annoying his enemy , without expofing himfelf to danger. Several flcirmifhes were fought by foraging parties , with various fuccefs, but neither party was able to gain any confidcrable advantage over the other. At PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. i6r At length , Spinola having effe&ually provided book for the fafety of the two places which Maurice had II. intended to attack , left a part of the army under 16os - the count of Berg, to watch his motions, and or- dered the reft, to diredl their march towards Maef- tricht. About this time he expected the arrival of the troops which had been raifed for the archduke's fervice in Germany and Italy, and he had appoint- ed fYlaeflricht for the place of rendezvous. Agree- ably to the promife given him by the court of Spain, a regiment, confiding of twelve hundred men, hv.d been embarked at Lilbon, in eight fhips , which, in order to elude the vigilance of the enemy , had been hired from Hamburgh of the Englifh and Danifh merchants. But, notwithstanding their pre- caution, they were intercepted by the Dutch ad- miral Hautain , whom the fhtes had ordered to lie in wait for them in the Englifli channel Four of them were either taken or deftroyed, and the le- maining four obliged to take flicker in Dover , where they were (hut up by the Dutch till the fol- lowing winter, when the long nights afforded them an opportunity to efcape to Flanders". The ftates dif^raced themfelves , and fullied th? victory which they obtained on this occalion , by ordering all the pri- fi-mers to be tied , two and two Together, and thrown into the feu. Yet neither Grntius nor Van Met p ren , the tun moft ref- pecbable of the Due;.!; hiftorians, have fpoken of their conduit .*•> repreheofible. Their pretext tor this barbarity, was to damp the courage >F the Spaniards, but it rather ferved to in- fyire then: in ail their rencounters "-'iih defperate rage and fu- ry : and as no better reafon could !e given rbr treating with ' Vol. I I\l i6z HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK The marquis of Spinola lamented the lofs of the II. Spanifh troops the more, as they were all veteran i6o*. foldiers, [ commanded by officers of great experi- ence. But all the German and Italian forces which he expected, having arrived in fafety, he refolved without further delay, to enter upon the execution of the plan of operations, which , in concert with the archduke , he had formed for the remainder of spinous this campaign. It had been his intention , ever plan for con. f ince t | le furrender of Oftend , to eftablifli the the- jjc mg ,e ^^^ Q £ t ^ e waf beyond the Rhine , in that part of the dominions of the ftates , where the fuperiority of their naval force could be of no avail. His army would thus , he thought, be in fome meafure fup- ported at the enemy's expenfe ; it would be eafier for him to fupprefs the mutinous fpirit of his troops, in cafe it mould again appear; and as the dates had no dread of an attack in that quarter , he expected to find fome of their principal towns un- prepared for a defence. His defign had been care- fully concealed even from the general officers : councils of war had been held , in which the archduke, in order more cffe&ually a prevent a difcovery , had fometimes propofed to undertake the fiege of Sluys, and fometimes that of Bergen op Zoom , or of Grave, or of Breda; and the dif- ferent opinions of the officers had, from time to fo great inhumanity the prifoncrs whom they took at fea, than thofe who were taken in the fiege of towns , or in the field of battle, it was an example calculated to revive that favage me- thod of carrying on the war, which had excited fiich general honor when it was practiled by the duke of Alva and his fon. PHILIP IIL KING OF SPAIN. 163 time, by fecret agents , been communicated to the BOOK ftates. 11. Prince Maurice, as already mentioned, was l6os * almoft the only perfon upon whom thefe artifices did not produce the defired effect. He could not be perfuaded that Spinola , who had given confpi- cuous proof of fuperior fagacity , would undertake the reduction of any of thefe towns , where the army of the ftates was at hand to interrupt his operations. He fufpected that his attack muft ra- ther be intended againft fome more diftant place , which could not be fo eafily relieved ; and had therefore propofed to ftation the troops on the banks of the Rhine , in order to prevent the enemy from entering the Dutch dominions on theeaftern frontier 5 *. But the ftates baving, in confequence of the information they had received of the deli- berations in the archduke's council of war, rejected this advice , Spinola was now at liberty to carry his defign into execution. Before he left Flanders, he had given orders to the count de Bucquoi , his general of artillery , to fecure a convenient pafiage for his army over the Rhine; and this active officer, after planting batteries on the banks, and thereby clearing the river of fome Dutch armed veflcls , which were ftationed there , had begun to erect two ftrong forts, one on each fide of the Rhine at Keifer- wert, a fmall town in the electorate of Cologn. As foon as thefe forts were finiflied , Spinola fet Jul '* out from Maeftricht, with ali the troops which Grotius. I\leteren. JV1 2 1 64 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK lie had affembled there; and having joined thofe II. which were under Bucquoi , and eroded the Rhine "°** at the paflage which had been fecured for him f he called a council of war, and, forthefirft time, communicated to them his defign. The enemy , he told them, had been flrfl: led to expect an attack in Flanders , and they now believed that he had formed a defign on Rh in berg. But his intention, from the beginning, had been to lay fiege to Lingen ; and by the reduction of that important place, to open an entrance into Friefland. He was fenfible how much it was con- trary to the common maxims of war, to leave behind him fo (Iron g a place as Rhinberg, but he did not from thence apprehend any danger or in- convenience , fmce , with the forts which had been erected, he could always command a fafe paffage over the river ; befides that , the fuccefs of his enterprife againft Lingen , mud greatly depend on the celerity with which it ihould be executed , as prince Maurice would no fooner hear of the dan- ger to which that place was expofed, than he would haften to its relief. That although Lingen lay at a great diflance , and the march mult, be performed in a neutral country " 5 , in which the troops would not be fupportcd by plunder, yet there was no ground to dread a fcarcit'y of provifions ; he had brought a confiderable quantity along with him; he had money fufficient to purchafe whatever more fliould be necefiary ; and, as he was determined to enforce the ftricteir. military difcipline , he had Sf Weftphalia and the dutchy of Clevus. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 165 received afTnranccs from the towns of Weftphalia, DOOK that , on that condition , they would chearfully II. furnifh him with fupplies. Rut attention to difci- I60 ** plinc was indifpenfibly neceffary , and for this rea- fon , he was refolvcd that every violation of the rules of it fiiould be punifiied with the utmoft feverity and rigor. What he declared on this occafion to his officers, he afterwards carried into execution. Some of the foldiers having ventured , notwithftanding the per- emptory orders which hehadifTucd, to leave their ftandards , they were inftantly feized and put to death. The reft were intimidated by this exam- ple , and although a great part of them had long been accuflomed to rapine and difobedience under former generals ; yet fo great is the power of dif- cipline over troops which regularly receive their pay, that almoft no army ever marched through a neutral country againft which the inhabitants had fo little reafon to complain. His camp , in confequence of this prudent conduct , was at all times abundantly fupplied, and no time was loft in fending out detachments to procure provifions. The inhabitants ftill retained a bitter remembrance of their fnflfcrings from the Spanifti army , under the admiral of Arragon, and were in fome meafure animated with gratitude to Spinola for the juftice and humanity which he difplayed. After traverfing a part of the dutchy of Cleves and Weftphalia , he firft directed his march to Oldenzeel , a fortified town in the province of M 5 i66 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK Ovcryflel , and foon compelled the garrifon to ca- IJ « pitulate ; immediately after which he advanced icos. towards Lingen , which lies at the diftance of only one day's march from Oldenzeel , and, without meeting with any oppofition, aifigned to his troops their feveral quarters round the town. Prince IXlaurice, on whon the dates general had, as for- Sp-;noia lays meriy mentioned , bellowed the property of Lin- ficge to Liu. g en an j j ts territory , as a reward for his important fervices, had, at his o\vn expenfe , made great additions to the fortifications of it. But as the enemy's attention had, for feveral years, been tur- ned to another quarter, it was defended, at this time , only by the ordinary garrifon , amounting to five or fix hundred men. Even with fo fmall a garrifon , however, Prince IMaurice had expected it might fuftain a fiege of feveral weeks; and the governor, an officer of the name of Cobbe , feemed at firft determined to- defendit till the laft extremity. Spinola was there- fore obliged to begin the fiege in form , and to make his approaches to the place as ufual , by wor- king trenches. The garrifon had not fufficicnt num- bers to interrupt his operations, and he foon rea- ched the ditch , which was of an extraordinary breadth and depth, and filled with water; nor could the water be drawn off, becaufe the ditch lay confiderably lower than the adjacent ground. But at length, his troops got over it, though not without confiderable flaughter , by filling it up with earth and fafcines, and then begun to work a mine under one of the principal baftions of the PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 167 town ; when the garrifon , importuned by the in- BOOK habitants, and defpairing of being able to defend 11. themfelves much longer, capitulated on honor- l6os * able terms. Prince Maurice, in the mean time, had advan- ced as far as Deventer, the capital of Overyffel , and was employed in preparing for an attempt to raife the fiege. On the firil intelligence which he received of the march of the enemy from Maeftricht, he had difpatched his brother, Henry Frederic , with four thoufand foot , and one thoufand horfe , to watch their motions ; and a few days after, he had fet out himfelf, at the head of another divifion of his forces. But, having judged it neceffary to leave a confiderable proportion of them in Flanders to oppofe any attempts which the enemy might make in that province , he was obliged to flop for fome days at Deventer, till he had collected a fufficient number of troops from the neighbouring towns, to enable him to undertake the relief of Lingen; and before his preparations were complete, a mef- fenger arrived with the news of its furrender. He was highly incenfed againft the governor and officers, for the feeble defence they had made of a place of fo great importance , and threw them all into prifon , where they remained for near a twelvemonth , and though they were afterwards fet at liberty, they were all of them degraded from their rank. He had juft caufe for the refentment which he felt on this occafion, as Spinola, who had thought M 4 168 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK it nnneceflary to fecure his army by intrenchments, li, muft have raifed the fiege as foon as the army of i«05. t j 1c f\ ates |^ad approached. He had ground like- wife for great anxiety , when he confidered the defencelefs (late of mod of the towns in the neigh- bourhood of Lingen; and particularly that of Rour- tanz and Coevorden, by the conqueft of which the enemy would have a free courfe into the pro- vinces of Groningen and Fiiefland. It was belie- ved , that if Spinola had immediately attacked thtfe places, he might, without great difficulty, have made himfelf mafter of therh. But having fpent fome time in ftrengthening the fortifications of Lingen , he thereby afforded leifure to prince Mau- rice to provide for their fecurity. He jugded it to be of greater importance to preferve what he had already acquired, than to multiply his conquefts; and , as Maurice had collected an army in the neighbourhood , nearly equal to his own , he thought that he could not venture any farther into the enemy's country fo late in the feafon , without expoling himfelf to the greateft rifle. Having, therefore, taken every neceffary precau- tion for the fafety of Lingen and Oldenzeel , he re- turned, afterwards to Keyferwert , and repalTed the Rhine. 1 he forts which Iv.d been e reeled there, hav- ing given offence to the elector of Cologn , on whofe territory they had been raifed , the archduke, in order to appeafe his refentment, had fent orders for rfcmolifhing them; which Spinola did accord- ingly, and then began to build other two , a little PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 169 farther down the river , at Rorerort in the county BOOH of JYIeurs , which was at that time fubjedt to the 11. Dutch. l ** While a part of his army was employed in building thefe forts , fo neceflary for preferving his communication with his late conquefts, he fent the reft, under the count de Bucquoi, to lay fiege x to Wachtendonc, a town in Guelderland , which (tood in a marfhy foil, and was deemed one of the ilrongeft towns in that province , but was at this time rendered more acceffibie than ufual by a long continued drought. As the fortifications however were complete , and the garrifon nume- rous'*', he had reafon to apprehend that the fiege muft laft for feveral weeks, and that prince Mau- rice , who had left OveryfTel , and was encamped in the neighbourhood of Wefel, would certainly attempt to raife it. He therefore ordered the count de Bucquoi to fortify his camp with ftrong: intrenchments , and having lately received a ftrong reinforcement of Italians, befides a confiderable number of Ifnglifh, Scotch, and Irifh Catholics, whom James, agreeably to his treaty of peace with Spain, had permitted the archduke to inlift m his dominions, he took his ftation near Rorerort, with a refolution to attack prince Maurice's army in the rear, in cafe he mould venture to approach to U r achtendonc. In distributing their quarters to his troops on he north fide of the Rhine, next to the enemy, hi committed an error which was likely to have Twelve hundred men. i7o. HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK been attended with fatal confequences , by ftation- ii. ing his cavalry at the village of Mulleim, on the 16as ^ banks of the Roer, where they were at too great a diftance from the infantry to receive immediate fupport ; no intrenchments had been thrown up to fecure them againft an attack , nor was there any place of flicker near but a fort on the other fide of the Roer, oppofite to Mulleim, called the caftle of Broeck, which was neither ftrongly forti- fied norfurnilhed with a fufficient garrifon. Prince Maurice, having got intelligence of their pofition, refolved to avail himfelf of the advantage which it afforded him, and inftantly fet out from his camp at Wefel , with all his cavalry, and a felecl body of infantry , amounting to two thoufand four hundred men. That no time might be unneceffa- rily loft on the march, the foot foldiers were put into carriages: the cavalry was ordered to haften forward before the foot, one half of them com- manded by Marcellus Baex, an officer of diftin- guiflied fpirit and intrepidity, and the other half by prince Henry Frederic, who was at that time only twenty years of age, but who had already given confpicuous proofs of fuperior prudence and capacity. Prince Maurice himfelf followed as quickly as poftible with the infantry, colonel Baex was ordered to crofs the Roer, and to en- deavour to get poffeftion of the caftie of Broeck, in order to intercept the enemy's communication with their camp, while Henry, fupported by prince Maurice, was to attack them at Mulleim. Baex was fuccefsful beyond what could juftly have been expe&ed in his firft affault upon the PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 171 fort, having expelled the garrifon from every part BOOK of it but one, which was defended by a fmall 11. number of men ; but he was interrupted in his iw progrefs by the accidental arrival of a party of foragers, who attacked him with great vigor, and obliged him to abandon his attempt upon the fort. In the mean time prince Henry had paflcd a En z*z emtn * nttir the nairow defile, which the enemy had left unguard- v in age of ved, and was about to begin the attack at Mul- Muiieim. lcim. It was unfortunately judged proper to defer it for a little time till the infantry fhould arrive fomewhat nearer. At length he gave orders for his troops to advance , and they obeyed at firfl; with great alacrity; but finding that, through the delay in making the attack, the enemy had taken the alarm, and were in a better pofture of defence than they had expected , they were feized, though greatly fuperior in number, with a fudden panic, and , after an irrefolute and feeble effort, they tur- ned their backs and fled, till they were met by prince Maurice at the head of the infantry. Afliamed of their daftardly behaviour, and be- ing feverely reproached by the prince, they were perfuaded to return. The Spanifli cavalry , from whom they had fo precipitately fled , far from venturing to puifue, were in great confufion re- treating acrofs the Roer, before a fmall number of the Dutch cavalry that had remained with their commander. Henry was now rejoined by the reft, and being likewife fupportcd by the Englifii and Scotch infantry, under colonel Vere and lord 172 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK Buccleugh , he purfued the enemy to the other H» fide of the river; but there the Spaniards , com- **>s. manded by Trivulcio , in the abfence of Velafeo; general of the cavalry, having recovered their ranks, returned with great refolution to the charge; and the Dutch, being again unaccountably (truck with terror, gave way before an inferior enemy r and left prince Henry alrnoft alone in the field of battle. He irnift have been cut to pieces or taken prifoner, but for the feafonabie intcrpofition of the Britifh troops, who , being armed with pikes, attacked the Spanifli cavalry , and kept them long at bay. Henry , perceiving himfelf abandoned by al- moft all his men, went over with the few that re- mained with him, and joined the troops under co- lonel Baex , who had been long engaged in com- bat with the enemy in another part of the field. Soon after this the Spaniards, having received a reinforcement under Velafeo , this part of the Dutch cavahy too was intimidated , and the two commanders, with a fmall number of adherents, were left, iurrounded by the enemy; but in the xneau time prince Maurice arrived with his van- guard, and having planted fome field- pieces on a riling ground, he played them off fo fuccefsfully upon the Spaniards, that he foon threw them into confufion, and put them to flight with confider- ablc (laughter. He was preparing to purfue them into a wood, where they had taken flielter , when he received intelligence that Spinola himfelf was approaching with all his foices. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 173 This general had got early information of the BOOK attack, and had inftantly fet out at the head of 11. fix hundred men, leaving orders for two thoufand l6 °*- more to follow as quickly as pofTible. In order to intimidate the enemy , by making them believe that his whole army was at hand, he fent forward a great number of drummers on horfeback, and as the ground was favorable to this ft rata gem, it produced the defired effect. Prince Maurice gave immediate orders for founding a retreat. Spinola puifned , and made conficlerable flaughter; but his troops were ftopt fhort in their career by co- lonel Verc , who being fupported by the count de Cbatillon , with a felecr, body of French infantry, placed his men in an advantngeous fituation, be- hind a hedge, and kept up fo hot a fire upon the Spaniards, as obliged them to defift from the purfuit. The lofs of men in this action, which lafted for upwards of eight hours, was confiderable; and probably not lefs than five hundred men on either fide. Had the Dutch cavalry arrived at Mul- leins a little earlier, or acquitted themfclvcs after their arrival as they had done on all former occa- fions, the Spaniards miift have been compelled to lay down their arms 17 . Prince Maurice therefore, who had never before conceived more fanguine 7 Grotius , in fpeaking of iliis action, makes the following obfervation, ''turn id ii evenifTec, reliqua exercitus invaders ftatiiit, laudabili confilio, & magnam i!!o die V'Cforiam elatu- rus, ni Deo vifurn, longa Batavorum pmfpera & belli ^Icrinnt adverfis retundere : namque hr;ud alii rtctius ■ •, ■, deferrion of went over to the enemy s camp; while a bo- Spanisft dy of two thoufand horfe and foot , with feveral troops. officers*, directed their march towards Breda, and put themfelves under the protection of prince Maurice; who, agreeably to his ufual maxims, refolved to encourage them in their revolt; and fent orders to the governor of.Breda to grant them perraiffion to fortify their quarters under the cannon of the town, and to purchafe provifions from the citizens. As foon as intelligence had reached him of the furrender of Rhinberg, Maurice had retired with his army into the province of Overyflel, and he now refolved to embrace the opportunity, which the mutiny of Spinola's troops afforded him , to recover fome of the towns in that province which had been loft. He firfl: attacked Lockem , which he reduced in a few days, and immediately after he laid fiege to Groll. Spinola , anxious for the siege f prefervation of a place which he deemed of great <*r©ii. importance, immediately conceived the defign of attempting to relieve it, and called a council of war to deliberate on the fubjeet. A great majority of his officers endeavoured to perfuade him to re- linquim his defign, by arguments drawn from the latenefs of the feafon , the humidity of tlpc Vol. I. O i 9 4 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK country through which he muft pafs, joined to II. the weaknefs of his array, and the pernicious cori- lfc>5, Sequences which muft accompany a defeat. He was deeply fenfible of the force of thefe objec- tions. But he confidered that the lofs of Groll would probably foon draw after it that of all his other conquefts beyond the Rhine.; that his late conqueft of Rhinberg would thereby become in a great meafure infignificant , as i^t derived its im- portance chiefly from .the fecure communication which it afforded with his other conquefts ; that the glory he had acquired would thus be quickly buried in oblivion ; and the fruit of all thofe la- bors loft , which had been attended with fo great an expenfe of blood and treafure. Stimulated by thefe motives , he perfifted in his defign , though it could not perhaps be juftifl- ed on the principles of prudence; and inftantly fele&ed from his whole army eight thoufand foot, and twelve hundred horfe, on whofe obedience and bravery he could depend for the execution of any enterprife, however dangerous. Thefe troops were highly pleafed with the flattering dif- tinclion which they received, and began their march with every fymptom of ardor and alacrity. The fuccefs of his enterprife Spinola knew muft entirely depend on his preventing the enemy from having time to complete their intrench- ments, and with this view he advanced towards them with the utmoft rapidity , and in a few days arrived within fight of the town. Prince Mau- jige, on the other hand , having from the beginning PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. i 9 * believed that Spinola woald not attempt to inter- BOOK rupt his operations, had neglected to employ n. fuch precautions as might have obftru&ed his ap- ,6 °*» proach. Being defirous to fpare his men , he had not as nfual drawn any lines of circumvalla- tion round the place, and his camp itfelf had no other defence on one fide but fome marfhy ground, which he had thought fufficient to prevent any fudden incurfion of tha enemy. It was in this quarter that Spinola refolved to begin his attack; and having drawn up his army in four battalions , each of which hadafmall train of artillery attending them, and a part of the ca- valry fecured by a double row of carriages on their flanks, he firft rode through the feveral ranks, encouraging and exhorting them, and at the fame time declaring that he was determined either to die or conquer ; immediately after which he gave the fignal to advance. But prince Maurice had from the firft appear- ance of the enemy refolved to decline the combat, and had already begun to raife the fiege. He firft withdiew his troops in good order to an ad- vantageous fituation, near his camp, where he was free from danger , and foon after retired to a greater diftance from the town. His army was greatly fuperior in number to that of the enemy; but many of his men were fickly , and worn out with the fatigues of a long campaign; and the event of battles he confidered, depended lefs on the numbers than on the intrepidity and vigor of the combatants. To the ignorant his conduit O 2 i 9 6 HISTORY &c. HOOK was a matter of cenfure and furprife : but, as II. both his fkill and courage were unqueftionabie , i«o6. the conftraint which he impofed upon himfelf on this occafion was , by the more prudent and ju- dicious, deemed deferving of admiration and applaufe. Such was the conclufion of this campaign , through accidents againft which no human pru- dence could provide. Spinola had been difap- pointed in his hopes of reducing the interior parts of the United Provinces; but, from his conduct in the fiege of Rhinberg, and the relief of Groll, all the world were fatisfied that, on his part, neither abilities nor vigor would have been wanting to carry the plan which he had concerted into fuccefsful execution *\ 11 Piafecii Chronica. Grotius, lib. xv. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii. Meteren, lib. xxiii. THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE THIRD, KING OF SPAIN. BOOK HI. jSOON after the tranfa&ions above related a nego- BOOK ciation for peace was begun , in the courfc of m. which it appeared that neither of the two con- Negodatioa tending parties were intent on the farther pro- f°rapeactf fecution of the war. But , in order fully to com- prehend their views and motives, a more parti- cular account of fome of their operations at fea, in the Eaft-Indies, and in America, is. necefiary , than could have been conveniently given in the preceding books. It may juftly appear furprifing, that a ftate pof- fefled of fo fmall a territory as the republic of the United Provinces fhould have been able to -fup- port the expenfe of a war at home againft fo potent an enemy. Yet, during the continuance of this war , their exertions were not confined to the Netherlands. They maintained at the fame time a numerous fleet of (hips of war , with which they generally proved victorious in all O 3 198 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF * BOOK their naval rencounters "with the enemy, while \W, they fuccefsfully attacked his dominions in the raoft diftant quarters of the globe. They had been much indebted for their luccefs in the Low •Countries to the affiftance in money and troops which they received from Henry IV. and queen Elizabeth; but as the aid which thefe princes could afford them was never liberal , they muft have funk under the power of their enemies, but for thofe copious refources which they opened by the extenfion of their trade. Prosrefs of The inhabitants of the Low Countries had for arts in the feveral centuries been diftinguifhed by their in- duftry, and their Lkili in manufactures. Even ia the time of the Roman republic, they had given proofs of their fuperior ingenuity \ When by the irruptions of thofe northern barbarians who overturned the Roman empire, all the ufeful arts of life, as well as letters and fcience, had been well nigh extinguished , they were firft revived and fuccefsfully cultivated by the Flemings, and other inhabitants of the Netherlands. About the middle of the tenth century, free marts, or fairs, were cftabliflied by Baldwin, earl of Flanders, to which great numbers of merchants from Germa- ny, France, and other places reforted , to pur- chafe the manufactures in which the Flemings fo much excelled. The example of Baldwin was imitated by his fuccellors lor alinoffc three centu- ries, during which period the induftry and corn- Eft fummre genus folertias , atque ad omnia imitanda qute a quoquo tradumur aptiili.uum. Vide Cxfur, lib. vii. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 199 merce of the Flemings were carried to the greateft BOOK height, and remained unrivalled by the other Eu- ill. ropean nations. -But the fucceeding fovereigns , finding it neceflary for defraying the expenfe of the wars in which they were often engaged with the neighbouring princes , to impofe various taxes on commodities, great numbers of the manufac- turers and merchants, unaccuftomed to fuch im- pofitions, withdrew into Holland, where they were at once free from taxes, and much lefs ex- pofed to thofe calamities of war, which they had often experienced in the more open provinces of Flanders and Brabant. The art of faking herrings having, in the four- teenth century, been difcovered by William Bu- crem , a native of Pierulem, in Flanders, the her- ring trade, which hath proved fo copious a fource of wealth and induftry to the Netherlands, was firft cultivated by the citizens of Sluys and Bru- ges; but it was foon afterwards communicated to the Dutch , who improved to the utmoft the ad- vantages which their fituation afforded them for Carrying it on with fuccefs. They were, at the fame time, in pofieflion of the cod and whale fiih- ery ; and , while they exported great quantities of fifh, and of manufactures, they were every year extending their trade in the fouthern parts of Europe , in the countries which lie round the Baltic , and in thofe parts of Germany with which they communicated by the Rhine and other rivers which pafs through their territory, before they fall into the fea. O 4 200 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK Before the middle of the fixteenth century the 111. provinces of Holland and Zealand underwent an important change by the great increafe of the » number of inhabitants , occafioned by the perfe- ctions on account of religion in France and Germany. Charles the Fifth had refolved to ex- tirpate the Protectants from his dominions in the Netherlands, as well as from thofe in Germany; but he had been in a great meafure deterred from the profecution of his defign , partly by the partial affection which he bore towards his Dutch and Flemifh fubjects , and partly by his dread of the fatal confequences , with which the rigorous exe- cution of his edicts might be attended , with re- gard to their manufactures and their trade. Both the French and German Proteftants there- fore found an afylum 4n the Netherlands , and imported thither their families, their wealth, and their induftry. Of the advantages refulting from thence Brabant and Flanders participated in com- mon with the more northern maritime provinces , but the intolerant and oppreffive Spirit of the Spanifh government prevented them from long enjoying thefe advantages. It was chiefly by the manufacturers and merchants that the opinions of the reformers were embraced ; they were per- fccuted with the mod unrelenting fury , and they likewife moft fevertly felt the burden of thofe oppreffive taxes that were impofed. By the cruel treatment which they received, feveral thou- fands of them were compelled to withdraw into other countries. Many went over to England , PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 201 where Elizabeth was ready to afford them her BOOK prote&ion. But when the maritime provinces had III. aflerted their liberty , and Ghent , Bruges , and Antwerp, after an unfuccefsful ftruggle, had again fubmitted to the Spanifh yoke , by much the greater part of the Flemifh emigrants retired into Holland or Zealand, and took up their rcfidence in Middleburgh , Haerlem , Leyden , and Amfter- dam. In their new abode they enjoyed the free exercife of their religion , a privilege which they deemed a corcpenfation for every har'.'fhip they might find it neceflary to undergo. The country which they had made choice of being of fmall ex- tent, could not afford fuftenance for one third part of its inhabitants. But being fituated in the heart of Europe , at the mouth of feveral naviga- ble rivers, and moft of the towns communicating with each other by thefe rivers, or by canals, no country could be more commodious either for inland or foreign trade. While their fituation And com- therefore prompted them to apply themfelves mercc to commerce , by the conveniences which it afforded for carrying it on , they at the fame time found it neceflary to engage in it , as the only means of their fubfiftence and fupport. No branch of it , to which they could find ac- cefs, or from which any profit could be derived, was negledted ; nor did they confine themfelves, like other nations, to the exporting cf fuch of their own commodities as they could fpare , or the importing of fuch commodities from other countries as their necefikies required , but they 202 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK likewife traded for other nations , and had many III. of their fhips continually employed in carrying the merchandize of One nation to another. This fpecies of commerce had been formerly poffeffed by the Anfeatic or maritime towns on the Bal- tic; but the fituation of the Dutch, between the Northern and Southern European nations , was more commodious for carrying it on. The necef- fity which their circumftances impofed upon them, of continual action and employment, had prompt- ed them to engage in it; and their extreme fru- gality and rigid economy, by rendering it prac- ticable for them to trade for fmaller profits , had enabled them to wreft it from their competitors* and to engrofs it almoft wholly to themfelves. Among the various branches of commerce in which the Dutch difplayed fo much activity and enterprife, one of the moft confiderable confifted in carrying from the countries lying round the Baltic to the different ports in Spain and Portu- gal, great quantities of corn and naval ftores; in return for which, befides fruits, wine, and other productions of thofe Southern Kingdoms , they received the gold and filver of America , and the fpices and other commodities which the Por- tuguefe imported from India or Lifbon. The pe- riod when this branch of trade commenced , can- not be exactly afcertained. Being of fmall ex- tent at firlt, it has efcaped the notice of hiftori- ans. But it had become confiderable foon after the beginning of the fixteenth century, and be- fore the middle of that century, it was deemed a PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 203 fpeclcs of commerce of the firft importance. It BOOK was equally neceflary to Spain and Portugal as *o 111. the United Provinces , and was for this reafon connived at by the court of Spain for many years after the revolt in the Netherlands; being flill carried op by the Dutch themfelves, who found no other precaution neceflary but to fail under the flag of fome neutral power at peace with Spain. But Philip's refentment againft his revolted fub- je(5ts being on fome occafions too violent to be rcftraincd by confiderations of policy or prudence, the Dutch fhips were fometimes confifcated , the commanders thrown into prifon , and the failors ei- ther fent to the gallies, or compelled to fefve on board the Spanifli fleet. This monarch having come at length to fufpect that the commerce which he had hitherto in fome meafure permitted, was of infinitely greater advantage to the enemy than to himfelf , and being defirous to deprive them of what he believed to be a principal fource of their increafing wealth and ftrength, he refolved to en- force an edict which he had formerly publifhed , prohibiting his fnbjects in Spain and Portugal from holding intercourfe with the revolted pro- vinces; the Dutch traders were, in confequence of this resolution , every year more harrafled than the preceding, till the reftraints and vexations which they fuffered had become intolerable. Finding thcmfelvcs therefore under the rtecef- fity of abandoning this gainful traffic, they began to confider whether they mij>ht not, in another way , fecure to themfelves the advantages which they had hitherto derived horn it. 2o 4 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK Having fo long acted as carriers for the Portu- III. guefe, in diftributing the rich productions of the Kail over the Northern nations , they well knew where to find the fpeediefl fale for thefe pro- ductions, and they likewife knew that the demand for them was every year increafmg: nQr , when they confidered the great advantages of their fituation , joined to their fuperior naval power , could they doubt of being able to deprive the Portuguefe of this profitable trade, provided they cor Id procure the commodities requifite for carry- ing it on. But, for this purpofe, it was neceflary they fliould perform a voyage of feveral thoufand lea- gues , through feas with which they were unac- quainted ; that they mould vilit countries of which they were almoft entirely ignorant; and after their arrival there, mould enter into a com- petition with a bold and enterprifmg nation, who, befides being in poifeffion of the trade of thefe countries , had eftabliihed a formidable military force for its protection. The Dutch , though fuffi- ciently aware of thefe difficulties , were not thereby deferred from perfifting in their defign. In order to fhorten their voyage , the great ex- tent of which through unknown feas, was the principal caufe of their dread , they made three different attempts to difcover a paflage to India, by the Northern Ocean ; but thefe attempts , like all others of the fame kind , proving fruitlefs , they refolved to undertake the voyage to India by the cuftomary route, provided they could procure PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 205 fome perfon already acquainted with it to con- book dud them. HI. It happened opportunely when they were de- liberating on the fubject, that fome merchants of Amfterdam received an application from Corne- lius Houtman , a native of Flandef% , who was in prifon for debt in Lifbon; reprefenting, that hav- ing made feveral voyages with the Portuguefe to India , he was not only well acquainted with the courfe of navigation thither, but likewife with the nature of the India trade; and that, in cafe they would furnifh him with a fum of money to purchafc his liberty, he would gladly communi- cate to them all neceflary information, and un- dertake in perfon the conduct of their fhips. His propofal was inftantly accepted, the money which he requefted for his releafe, was tranfmitted to him , and foon afterwards he arrived at Amfter- dam. The merchants, highly fatisfied with the information which they received from him, and perceiving him to be a man of uncommon pene- tration and abilities, immediately formed an aflb- ciation , to which they gave the name of the Com- pany of Diftant Countries , and equipped a fqua- dron , confifling of four fhips, which they put under his command. This little fquadron had two hundred and fifty men on board , and a hun- dred pieces of cannon , which were furnifhed by theftates; befides naval and military ftores , and a variety of merchandize fitted to the tafle of the Indian nations \ Ths two largeft of thefe fhips were of two hundred and thirty tons j the third, of one hundred und thirty ; and the 2 o6 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK As the principal object of the voyage was to III. procure more particular information than they yet pofTefTed concerning the country, and the dif- ferent branches of trade which it afforded, Hout- man was inftru&ed, as much aspoflible, to avoid the fettlements of the Portuguefe , and carefully to abftain from all hoftilities , when they were not necefiary for his defence: nor was he inatten- tive to thefe inftructions ; he might, in his way to India, have feized a rich carac in which the archbilhop of Goa was returning home; but though he went on board that vefTel , in order to procure intelligence, he fuffered it to proceed on its voyage without moleftation. operations After vifiting the coafts of Africa and Brafil, in ;he Indies. he doub j ed the Cape of Good Hope ^ and prQ _ ceeded to the ifle of Madagafcar , in which ifiand and that of St. Mary he was detained for fomc time, in confequence of a diflenfion which hap- pened between him and the other commanders, with regard to the route which it was proper to June,i596. purfae. From St. Mary he at length proceeded to Sumatra, and from thence to Bantam, in the ifland of Java , where he began to purchafe pep- per and other fpiceries. At firft; he was well re- ceived, and no averfion was difcovered by the natives to enter into a commercial treaty wiih him ; but the jealoufy of the Portuguefe mer- chants , a confiderable number of whom refideti fourth, of fifty. The value of the uhole equipment was eftimated at four hundred thoufand florins. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 207 at Bantam, being inftantly alarmed, they refolved BOOK to exert their influence to effectuate his ruin. hi. For this end, carrying rich prefents in their hands, the only means of procuring accefs to the princes of India, they reprefented the Dutch to the king or general of Bantam as pirates , and the com- mon enemies of human kind , of whofe rapine and violence his fubje&s would foon have fatal experience , if they did not embrace the prefent opportunity , when they were few in number , to cut them off, and to prevent their return. The governor, ignorant, and therefore credulous, was eafily perfuaded of the truth of this reprefenta- tion, and confented to follow the counfel that was given him. But diftrufting his ability to deftroy them by open force, he refolved to employ fraud? and treachery. He pretended an inclination to have a commercial treaty , which had been pro- pofed by the Dutch , concluded , and defired that Houtman and the other officers would come to his palace to adjufi: the terms. Sufpecling no de- ceit, Houtman, and one or two more, complied with his requeft , and were immediately taken into cuftody. The governor had abfurdly be- lieved that all the officers would have accepted his invitation, and that theihips, having no perfons on board that were fit to command them , would then have become an eafy prey. Being difap- pointed in this expectation , he dreaded the con- fluences of putting his prifoners to death , while their companions remained at liberty to take venge- ance on him for his perfidy. Still , however , 2o8 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK he detained tliem in prifon , and refufcd to liften III. to the repeated folicitations of their friends in their behalf; till the Dutch fhips having begun to can- nonade the town , laid part of it in ruins , he at length reftored them to their liberty. Soon after this, Houtman finding, on a review of his men, that by death, occafioned chiefly by the climate , they had fuffered a diminution of more than one third of their number, ordered one of his fhips to be burnt , and fet fail for Europe with the reft; carrying with him fome of the na- tives of Madagafcar and Sumatra, a Japanefe , a Chinefe, and a pilot of the name of Abdul, dis- tinguished for his knowledge of the Indian feas. After a profperous voyage of between five and fix months , he arrived fafe in the Texel in the beginning of Auguft , 1597, having fpent almofl: two years and a half in his expedition. He hardly brought home with him wealth fufficient to de- fray the expenfe of his equipment; but both he and his companions were now able to give the moft Satisfactory information to their employers. The Indians too , whom he had induced to ac- company him , were likely to be afterwards of the greateft ufc ; and the hopes which his countrymen conceived of greater fuccefs in their future voya- ges, were raifed to the greateft height '. T he Portuguefe, they knew, would give all the oppofition in their power to every attempt which * they * Meteren, lib. xvii. &xviii. Antonii Thyfil Hiltoria Nava« (Is , Lugd. Batav. 4to. 1657, P« IJ 7> & c » PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 209 they could make, either to eftabiifh their trade, hook or to procure a fettlement in India ; but, from m. the accounts which they had received of the de- clining power of the Portuguefe, and of the man- ner in which the eaftern nations were affected to- wards them, they hoped to be able, either to elude, or to counteract their malignity. A bolder and more enterprifmg fpirit had ne- Portugurr« ver been difplayed than the Portuguefe had ma- j"i^" U nifefted in their numerous conquefb and difcove- ries; and no conquefls , fo extenfive and import- ant, had been ever made with fo fmall a force, or by a nation poffeffed of fuch fcanty refources. Animated at once by almoft all the paflions which moft powerfully impel the human mind , by ava- rice, by bigotry, and by ambition , they had per- formed exploits, which feemed to be beyond the power of man, and were regarded by all thofe barbarous nations, over whom they triumphed with fo great facility , as more than men. They had made themfelves matters of all the more im- portant parts of the coaft of Guinea. They bad expelled the Arabians from that of Zanguebarj where they had formed fettlements, which gave them the command of all the gold and filver mines in their country, from Sofala to Melinda. They had acquired a decided fup^riority over the Egyptians; though aided by the Venetians, in the Red Sea ; and had thus put an entire ftop to that gainful trade which the Venetians had fo long carried on with India , by the way of Suez and Alexandria. Their arms had been attended with Vol. I P «io HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK equal fuccefs in the Perfian Gulf, and on III. the coaft of Perfia, Malabar, and Malacca. They had acquired poffeffion of Ceylon, and the Mo- lucca and Sunda iflands; and, by their eftablilh- ment at Macao , they had fecured to themfelves the trade of China and Japan. Had the Portuguefe, at the prefent period, poflefTed the fame vigor and intrepidity of which they had given fuch confpicuous proof on their firfl: arrival in India, it is probable that any attempt to difpoffefe them would have proved abortive: but they were no longer the fame people as be- •fore. The firft conquerors of India were all ex- tinct; and their fucceffors, a few only excepted, were men defiled with the mod odious vices, which rendered them a fcourge to the people committed to their care. Removed to fo great a diftance from the feat of government , as gave them hopes of impunity for the moft flagitious crimes; corrupted by profperity , and enervated by the cli- mate , while their religion, of the moft illiberal kind, only ferved to render them more ferocious, their conduct towards the natives was equally op- preffive and perfidious. Attempts were made, by fome virtuous viceroys, to reform the number- lefs abufes which had been committed ; but thefe great men , whofe names are handed down to pof- terity with jufl applaufe, were too few in number, and their government of too fhort. continuance, to produce any permanent effect. Corruption of every kind had (truck its roots too deep to be fo eafiiy extirpated; and the natives, who had been PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. sir Jong difgufted , began to feel contempt, mixed 8 OK with abhorrence of their opprefibrs, in the room III. of that refpect and dread which they had formerly been accuftomed to entertain. After the fubjection of Portugal to the crown of Spain, the affairs of the Portuguefe in India were more than ever neglected by the govern- ment at home, and diforders of every kind were increafed and multiplied. It was believed by fome perfons, that Philip II. agreeably to the maxims of his malignant policy, was well pleafed that the power of his new fubjecls mould fuller a di- minution , as he would thereby find it eafier to maintain his ufurped authority. But it is more reafonable to fuppofe that his attention being wholly engrofled by objects , which he judged to be of greater importance, he had not leifure to attend to the affairs in India; and found it, there- fore, in fome meafure neceffary to leave the fe- veral governors at liberty to act without control. However this be , it is certain that they a&ed more like independent monarchs than the fubjects of one common prince, to whom they were ac- countable for their conduct, and feemed to have forgotten the relation which they had bore , an4 the duties which they owed , both to their coun- try and to one another; while each individual was fc'eiy attentive to his private intereft, and fel- dom fcrupled to promote it at the expenfe either of faith or of humanity. The natives had , on dif- ferent ocrafions , taken arms, and attempted to vindicate their riehts againft their lawlefs opprefibrs. P 2 ais HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK Their efforts hitherto had not been vigorous , nor III. attended in the iflue with fuccefs ; but they were become more than ever impatient under the injuries which they fuffered , and longed for an opportunity to affert their liberty. Such was the (late of the Portuguefe , and fuch the difpofition of the natives with regard to them, when the Dutch t made their firft voyage to the Indies. They were thereby encouraged to perfift in their attempt to eftablifh trade in thofe parts; and afpirit of ehterprife and adventure was excited, which foon diffufed itfelf over all the maritime provinces. The Spanifh minifters imprudently contributed to quicken this adventurous fpirit, and to confirm the Dutch in the refolution they had formed, by republishing, foon after the accef- fion of the prefent king, an edict, prohibiting the Spaniards and Portuguefe from all commercial in- tercourfe with them in the ftrideft manner, and under the fevereft penalties. They might have perceived the folly of this meafure from the effects which their former reftrictions on the Dutch trade had already produced ; but they attended only to the immediate inconvenience which was occafioned thereby to the enemy, without confi- dering either the advantages which the Dutch might ultimately derive from their prohibition, ©r the prejudice which the Spaniards and Portu- guefe were likely to fuftain. By the advice of the count de Fuentes, a no- bleman of great abilities, but naturally haughty and fevere , and extremely ignorant of the PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 313 commercial intereft of his country, the prohibitory BOOK edict was carried into the raoft rigorous execution. In. A ftrict inquiry was made , at all the fea-ports of Spain and Portugal , whether any of the Dutch had come thither under the colors of any neutral power; and as a confiderable number were difco- vered to have been guilty of this temerity , theiF (hips and goods were confifcated , and they therrw felves either caft into prifon , or font to the gallies and condemned to work as flaves. The ftates general , in order to exprefs their contempt of this conduct of the Spanifh court, publifhed an edict, in which, befides prohibiting all intercourfe between their fubjects and thofc of the king of Spain, they declared , that they \vould treat as enemies the fubjects cf all neutral powers, who fhould carry commodities, of what- ever kind, to the ports of Spain, Portugal, op Flanders. To this manifefto, copies of which were fent to the courts of the feveral maritime powers, no aru fwer was returned, nor any objection made, by the ftates or princes who received it ; and the French monarch gave, on this occafion , aftriking proof of his favor for the Dutch, by publishing a declaration , that if any of his fubjects fhould , for the fpace of fix months , adventure to trade with, Spain, they muft do it at their private rifk , with- out the hopes of his protection. While the Dutch in this manner fhowed their contempt of the Spanifh trade , and the prohibitory edict , being more than ever intent on profecuting v 3 2i 4 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK the trade which they had begun in India, feveral lit. different afiociations were formed by the merchants in Holland and Zealand, almoft immediately after the return of their fleet under the command of Houtman ; and before the end of the following year, more than eighty fhips, completely equipped, and furnifhed with various articles of commerce , ©meh trade were fent out; the greater part of them to the Eaft- in both in. ] n dies, and fome to the Weft, and to the coafts tfcecoaitof of Africa, while others were ordered to attempt Africa. t j ie p a fl" a g e by the Straits of Magellan into the Pacific Ocean. They were divided into fmall fleets , confifting chiefly of four, fix, or eight armed veflels, from about one hundred and fifty to three or four hundred tons, fome of which had regular troops on board, that were furnifhed by Prince Maurice and the ftates. Their inftruclions were nearly the fame as thofe which had been given to the com- manders employed in the firft expedition , to avoid the fettlements of the Portuguefe and, as much as poflible, to abftain from hoftilities. But it was impoffible for them ftrictly to comply with thefe inftru&ions. Their enemies were fpread almoft every where over the coafts which they vifited; and being equally animated by jealoufy, and by refentment , were refolved to give them all the oppofition , and to do them all the mifchief in their power. They had labored to infpire the natives with the fame malignity; and on the minds of fome of them their mifreprefentations had produced the defired effect. It Was not only the dangers, PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 915 therefore, of voyages, fo long and difficult, BOOK through climates the moft adverfe to the human ill. conftitution , which the Dutch encountered in the profecution of their defigu ; but, after their arrival on thofe coafU, where the trade, which they defired to eftablifh , ranft be carried on, they found it neceflary to right, and to negociate by turns. They had the prejudices of the natives to overcome ; and they were obliged to ftand perpe- tually on their guard againft the machinations of the Portuguefe, who practifed every method which they could devife to accomplifh their dek truclion , whether by fecret fraud , or open force and violence. The Portuguefe had no fuch formidable oppofi- tion to encounter, when they firft arrived in In- dia. The fhips of their enemies were few in number, and much inferior to their's, both in re- fpcct of ftrength and fize ; and the towns which they attacked were weakly fortified , and unflcil- fully defended by a daftardly , effeminate , and feeble race of men. Whereas the Dutch encoun- tered fleets of fhips of the fame conftrudion as their own, and were obliged to contend with an enemy, who, befides being accuRomed to the climate, and famiiiarly acquainted with the Indian feas , were not lefs diftinguifhed than themfelves for their naval and military fkiil. Rut their conducl was wifely adapted to their circum (lances, being equally prudent whether it refpected the natives or the Portuguefe. They foon convinced the former of the falfhood of P4 2i6 HISTORY QF THE REIGN OF 1O0K thofe injurious afperfions which the latter had caft HI. upon their chara&er; and by the moderation, juftice, and humanity , which they displayed in all their dealings, proved that, in purity of manners, they were much fuperior to their accufers. They were foon allowed to trade in many places , from whence the Portuguefe had labored to exclude them ; and as with indefatigable induftry they improved to the utmoft every advantage which they enjoyed , they came , ere long , to procure admiilion to feveral of the moil important bran- ches of commerce. As the extenfion of their trade , and not con- queft , was the great object which they purfued, they avoided all unneceflary rencounters with the Portuguefe; but they were generally well prepa- red to defend themfelves when attacked , gave many proofs of the mod determined bravery , and fometimes triumphed over the fuperior force and numbers of the enemy. Still, however, they kept the great end of their voyages perpetually in view. The fame time which they found it neceflary to fpend in repairing the damages fuftained in battle, waslikewife employed in trading with the natives; and as foon as their cargoes were complete, and their damages repaired , they returned to Holland : thus enriching their employers, and enabling them not only to defray the expenfe of their equipment, but to exert themfelves with redoubled vigor in the profecution of their defigns. Although fome of the numberlefs voyage? . which they had undertaken , had , through PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 2.7 mifconduct Or crofs accidents, proved unfortunate, BOOK they had been in general fufficiently fuccefsful to m. render it their intereft to perfevere. The focieties , however, of merchants, by whom the Indian trade had been carried on , were not fatisfied with the profits which it afforded. They complained that too great a number of adventurers had enga- ged in it; and that in confequence thereof, as they muft pay much higher prices for Indian goods than had been formerly given by»the Portuguefe, fo they found it neceflary to fell them muck cheaper; and would either be ruined by their ef- forts to eftablifh this new branch of commerce , or obliged to abandon it altogether. This evil , which could hardly have been ap- prehended in the beginning of a trade, attended with fo great expenfe and danger , would proba- bly have foon been remedied by a diminution of the number of competitors , the natural confe- quence of fmall profits in any branch of com- merce ; and if the evil complained of, had been the only reafon for the interpofition of the flates , it * may be queftioned whether they ought to have in- terpofed. But, befides this , there was another rea- fon of greater weight. The Portuguefe in India, being under the direction of their governors or viceroys, could more eafily act in concert, than the great number of independent Dutch focieties : and the fmall fleets or fingle mips , belonging to thefe focieties , were expofed to the danger of being feparately attacked and deftroyed one after another , by an enemy with whom if they too 2i8 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK could act in concert , they might be able to con- III. tend. Determined by thefe confiderations , the 16 °-- ftates general in the year 1602 , united the feveral indif coml focieties of traders into one body , under the pany. name of the Eaft- India company; on which, be- fides the exclufive privilege of. trading beyond the Cape of Good Hope on the one hand, and the Straits of Magellan on the other; they confer- red the power of adminiftering juftice , of building forts , of appointing governors and garrifons , of . raifing troops, and of making peace and war with the Indian princes. A fund, amounting to more than fix millions of florins , was immediately fub- fcribed for by the merchants in the principal ma- ritime towns, and managers were appointed, under whofe d'redion all the trade to India was hence- forth to be carried on. This company being the. rnft regular commercial fociety, of which we read in hiftory, has ferved in fome meafure as a model to all the trading companies that have been cre- ated in modern times. It confifted chiefly of thofe who had been engaged as private adventurers in the Indian trade; and by thefe men, who had profited from their former errors, and were well acquainted with that trade in all its branches, the affairs of the company were, from the beginning, conducted with confummate (kill ; nor was their good fortune inferior to the prudence which they difplayed. Having by their juftice and modera- tion , extinguished thofe groundlefs prejudices againft their national character , which the Portu- guefe had labored to inftil into the minds of the PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 219 x Indian princes, they were aimoft every where re- BOOK ceivcd with favor, -and in feveral places obtained ill. permillion to eftablifh factories, and to build forts 16oa » for the protection of their trade. They were requeft- ed by fome of thefe princes , to lend their affift- ance in expelling the Portuguefe , and in their rencounters with that nation they generally came # off vi&orious. They made innumerable captures of their richeft fhips. Their trade was every year more widely extended, and the profits arifing from it , were greater than they had been accuf- tomed to derive from arty former branch of com- merce. The principal caufes of their weakneft have been already explained , and to thefe rauft be added this confideration , that, on the other hand , the trade and power of the Portuguese were quickly flattening to decay. While their rivals were every feafon receiving reinforcements both of fhips and troops, they were left unfupported by their friends in Europe , to ftruggle with the difficulties which furrounded them. The ftrength of Portugal had long been exhaufted by the too numerous emigration of its inhabitants, and the Spanifli miniftcrs, befides that their attention was entirely occupied by other objects , found more than fufficient employment at home for all the force and treafure which they pofiefTed, It was this reafon, and not , as has been fuppo- fed, the defire of having Portugal reduced to a Hate of weaknefs , and thereby rendered more tame and obfequious, that prevented the Court 1602. 220 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF B 1£ of Spain from affording that afljftance to the Por- in. tuguefe in India, which their.exigencies fo much required at the prefent period. '1 hey were almoft equally inattentive , or equally unable to afford fupport to the Spanijh traders and colonifts as to the Portuguefe. Many captures were made of their (hips loaded with the treafures of America 'and the Indies. Their fleets were fometimes block- ed up in their harbours, till the feafon fit for en- tering on their voyages had elapfed ; and their fet- tlenjents on the coafts were often plundered, fome- times, t>y the Dutch, and fometimes jby the Englifli, with impunity. Nor was it only in the Indies, and on the coafts of America , that the fubjects of the Spanifli mo* riarchy were expofed to the depredations of their enemies. While the war with England fubfifted, the coafts of Spain itfelf had been infulted both by the Dutch and Englifh , and many fliips in the harbours either taken or "deftroyed. After the eftablifhment of peace with France and England , the Spanifh minifters had conceived the hopes of finding it eafy, not only to refift the mod vigo- rous efforts of the Dutch , but ere long , to re- duce them to obedience. But although they had now only a fingle enemy to contend with , whom they had long been accuftomed to defpife , that enemy , through the great increafe of their trade and navigation, were become more powerful, while they themfelves , from the decay of their trade and other caufes , were much weaker than before. For fome tjmepaft, therefore, the Spaniards PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 221 had found it equally difficult to defend themfel- b O It ves againft the Dutch alone, as they had done ill. formerly againft the Dutch , and Englifh , and 1607. French united. Philip's minifters were not ignorant of the four- ces from whence the Dutch had received fo great an acceffion of wealth and power; and of one of thefe we have feen , they had in vain endeavour- ed to deprive them , by the prohibition of their trade with Spain and Portugal. Another not lefs copious they knew, was their cod and herring fifhery , on the coaft of England and the Nether- Jands ; and to deprive them of this , and at the fame time , to intercept their navigation in the narrow feas , between the fouthern and northern ftates of Europe, had for fome years been a prin- cipal object of their attention. It was with this TheSpani. view that all thofe gallies had been equipped , ards attempt Which, as formerly related, had been intrufted J? de h ftroy ,he ' ■' Dutch com- to the command of Frederic de Spinola ; and with m«rie. the fame view there had been fitted out at Nieu- port and Dunkirk a great number of armed vef- fels, from which the Dutch fuffered confiderable moleftation in their coafting trade and fifliery. But all Spinola's gallies had either been deftroyed or had fallen into the hands of the Dutch, when they got polTefiion of Sluys; and the States having pro- vided fome fhips of war on purpofe , had , on fome occafions , taken fignal vengeance on the priva- teers of Nieuportand Dunkirk, the crews of which they always treated as pirates, and either hanged or drowned. Their fleets now rode triumphant 22z HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK from the Baltic to the Jftraits of Gibraltar and Hi. their European as well as their African and Indian i«or. trade was at this time in a much more flouriQiing condition than ever \ The courts of Spain and BrufTels had long be- held this fuperiority of the naval power of the Dutch, with much anxiety. They dreaded from it the utter extinction of their commerce ; and perceived, that in order to prevent this effect, it would, ere long , be necefiary to put a period to caufts which the war. Nor did peace appear to be lefs necef- spanUh mi! f arv » when they confidered what had hitherto nifters to been the iffue of their military operations at land, wish for pea. t jj an w j ieil t j, e y refle<£led on the numberlefs lofles which they had fuftained at fea. Their moft ftrenuous endeavours to reduce the revolted pro- vinces to obedience had ferved only to render the people more expert , and more obRinate in their defence : to ftrengthen the bond of their internal union ; and to confirm the neighbouring powers in their refolution of affording them affiftance and fupport. The maritime provinces almoft furround- ed by the fea, and every where interfered by the rivers and canals , had hitherto been found impregnable; and the fouthern frontier had lately been ftrengthened by the acquifition of fome 4 Recueil He Voyages , &c. Van Meteren paffint ; — Cro- tius. De Wit's IVlaxims. — Thyfii Hift. Navalis , paiiim. Huet on the Dutch Commerce. Janizon, Etat prcfcnt des Prov. Un. Recueil des voyages qui ont fervi a f Etabliflement & aux Progres de la Compagnie des Indes Oriencales formee dan* les Provinces Unies des Pais • Bas, a Rouen , 1725. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 233 of the ftrongeft places in Flanders and Brabant , BOOK Sluys and Breda. III. The IVIarquis of Spinola had wifely directed his i*v- attack againft the* confederates in that quarter, where they were the word prepared for refiftance. The army which he commanded, had been the molt numerous which could poffible be collected. Through the united exertions which had been made by the archdukes, the court of Spain , and by the marquis himfelf , who had mortgaged his ample fortune in order to procure money , his troops having regularly received their pay , had been kept under the ftricleft difcipline. All his operations had been conducted with confnmmate fkill ; and nothing had been omitted on his part which might have enfured fuccefs ; yet he had been utterly unable to furmount the difficulties which he encountered, lnftead of penetrating into the interior provinces', he had been obliged fco reft fatisfied with conquefts , from whence no folid advantage could be derived. From the fatigues which they had undergone , and the moifture of the climate , the army had lately fuffered confider- able diminution, Thofe funds from whence the marquis had defrayed the expenfes of the lafl cam- paign , had for feveral months been almoft: en- tirely exhaufted ; and confiderable arrears being now refting to the foldiers , the fame mutinous fpirit by which they had formerly been actuated , had again begun to appear. A part of them as above-mentioned, had already abandoned, their 2a4 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF "BOOK officers ; and having choferi others from among ill. themfelves , had begun to indulge themfelves in **orr tvcty fpecies of licentioufnefs. To thefe dif- ordcrs no adequate remedy could poffibly be ap- plied during the continuance of the war. All the money which could be raifed in the Netherlands , or furnifhed by the court of Spain , would be hardly fufficient to defray the expenfe of the new levies which rnuft be made before the next cam- paign. And in the mean time the licentious fpirit of the mutineers rauft diffufe itfelf throughout the army ; and both the army itfelf and the provin- ces , be thereby expofed an eafy prey to a watch- ful enemy ; who , being poffeiTed of more certain fefources for carrying on the war, had been always ready to avail themfelves of every advantage that was afforded them $ . Befides thefe confiderations there were fome others, which with Philip tind his minifters , were fuppofed to have had ftill greater Weight. A re- port at that time prevailed , that the Dutch , hav- ing entered into a correfpondence with the Moors on the coaft of Barbary , had agreed to furnifh them with mips to tranfport an army into Spain. And another report was likewife propagated, that the French monarch having formed the defign of annexing the Netherlands to France, was now pre- pared and refoived to carry it into execution. It does not appear, that there was any juft founda- tion for either of thefe reports. But they feem to have made a Arong impreflion on the minds of the 1 Grotius lib. xv. Bentiv. part. xiii. lib. viii. PHiLIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 225 the Spanifh ministers ; who, dreading that either an BOOK interruption of that domeftic tranquillity which 111. Spain had fo long enjoyed , or the entire lofs of l '- 07 - the Netherlands, muft: be the confequence of the continuance of the war , were now more defirous than ever to have it brought to a conclufion *. The archduke was frill more folicitous for peace The Arck- than the Spani(h miniftcrs. From the commence- r '!. e Albert * p (olicitous for inent of his fovereignty he had lived in perpetual peace, and difquietude. He had fully experienced the vanity why ' of his hopes of fuccefs from the fupport of Spain, which he knew to be too much exhaufted , and removed at too great a diftance from the fcene of action , to afford him the afiiftance that was necef- fary. He had no heirs of his own body to whom he could tranfmit his dominions. And both he and the infanta , befidcs being fenfibly affected by the calamities in which their fubjecls were involved, were defirous to pafs the remainder of their days in peace. They were confirmed in their refolution by the Peace recom- marquis of Spinola, who did not hefitate in advi- ™* n ' 1 f rt b * fing peace, notwithftandmg the renown which he had acquired from his conduct of the war. But his ambition being tempered with prudence and moderation , he wifely judged it better to reft fatisfied with the glory which he had already gained, than to run the rii"k of expofing himfdf to reproach, by attempting what he knew to be impoffible. He was better acquainted than any other perfon with the difficulties to be encountered IVlemorie recondite, Vol. i. p. 4.18. v ,l. 1. a 226 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 1607. BOOK in the profecution of the war, and therefore exerted in. all his influence to perfuade the archduke, and the Spanifh minifters, of the folly of perfifting in their attempt. The time might come, he reprefented, when the confederates divided among themfelves, and no longer fupported by fo powerful an ally as the king of France , might be induced or com- pelled to return to their allegiance; but while, through their dread of Spain , their internal union was preferved inviolate, and a prince fo near them, pofleffed of fuch inexhauftible rcfources, ever ready to lent them his affiftance ; as it was abfurd to expect to bring the war to the defired iflue, fo the confequences of perfifting in it muft prove equally ruinous to the dominions of the archdukes, and to the Spanilh monarchy 7 . Albert, who entertained the raoft profound re- fpect for Spinola's judgment, being now more firmly than ever perfuaded , that peace was necefTary , refolved, whatever construction might be put upon his conduct, to make the confederates an offer of it without delay. Having previoufly founded their inclinations , by two perfons of the names of Wittenhorft and Gevart, he fome time after fent thefe men back to Holland , with inftructions figned by himfelf and the infanta *. Thefe inftructions they firft communicated privately to feveral individuals, and afterwards requefted to be permitted to lay them before the aflembly of the ftates. The members were of 7 Bentivoglio, Grotius,, Baudius , &c. * Dated January 3, 1607. Albert offers peace to the confederacy. Prince Mau- rice oppofes an overture for pea<;«. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 227 different opinions with regard to the expediency BOOK of granting them this permifTion : and prince jii. IVIaurice endeavoured to diffuade the flates from l6 «?' granting it , by expreffing his apprehenfions that fome infidious defign was covered under the pre- fent propofal, and that as no treaty with Spain, or with the archdukes, while they were fo entirely governed in all their conduct by the court of Spain , could be productive of any good effect, fo the granting of a public audience to the commif- fioners would only ferve to infpire the people with fallacious hopes of peace, and fo damp their zeal in the profecution of the war. But Maurice yielded ', on this occafion, to the perfuafions of the celebrated John Olden Barnevelt, penfioner of Holland; one of the greateft ftatefmen of the age, and equally eminent for his public fpirit as his political abilities and integrity. By this Peace (h>nu. venerable patriot it was urged, that while the kiner ous1 y rec ' ,m - » . e o mended by of Great Britain flood an idle fpectator of the war, Barnevelt. and the French monarch feemed to have fome great object in view, which he deemed of more importance than the fupport of the Dutch republic, both thefe princes were well pleafed to obferve the Spaniards exhauft their ftrength by an obftinate perfeverance in the war with the Netherlands; and would probably be more liberal in their offers of affifhnce to the ftates than they had hitherto been if there were a negociation begun for the eftablilhment of peace. A great majority of the ' It does not appear to have been candor or conviction. Vide jeannin torn iii. >o<, 107. 228 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK aflembly, with Maurice himfelf, came readily into III. this opinion , and the commiiiioners were readily i6or. admitted to an audience. 1 hey reprefented that the archdukes, being defirous to put an end to the calamities of war, were ready to enter into treaty with them , either for eftablifliing a perpe- tual peace, or a long truce, and would confent to fuch reafonable terms as they could not fuppofe would be rejected by the United Provinces. That the ftates could not be ignorant of the equity of the pretenfions of the archdukes; that in all their conduct they had fliown how averfe they were to every fevere and arbitrary mcafure in the govern- ment of their Subjects ; that they would claim nothing to which they had not the moft unques- tionable title; and that the ftates might affuredly depend on receiving from them every fort of Satis- faction and Security they could require for the full enjoyment of their rights and privileges. To this propofal the ftates, after an interval of a few days, replied, that no regard could be paid to what the commifiioners had delivered in the afTembly, fince the archdukes, it appeared, ft ill perfifted in fuppofing themfelvcs poffefled of a right to the Sovereignty of the United Provinces. That in the folemn deed , entitled the Union of Utrecht, the ftates having, on the jufteft grounds, renounced the authority of the king of Spain, had afferted their liberty and independence ; that this deed had been recognifed by many of the European ftates and princes ; that they had long maintained their liberty by force of arms ; and were ftill PHILIP 111. KING OF SPAIN. 229 determined to maintain it to the laft extremity; BOOK and to reject every propofal for treating with the ill. archduke or the king of Spain, either for a truce 160 "« or a perpetual peace, uniefs they were acknow- ledged as a free ftate, over which thefe princes could pretend to no authority. With this anfwer the commillioncrs returned to The United BruiTels , from whence they wrote a letter to the States infift . • • 11 on a recoent- ilat.es , acquainting them that, by the propofal. t ion of their which had been made, the archduke did not mean freedom, to claim any authority over them, or to introduce any change into their form of government; but, leaving all their laws and inftitutions on their pre- fent footing, to put a period to the miferies attendant; upon war, by a peace or truce; and, foon after- wards, another commiflioner was fent into Holland, in whom it fhould feem, Albert could put greater confidence than in his firft commiflioners. This perfon was Ney, or Neyen, a native of Antwerp, who had been educated in the Proteftant religion, but having afterwards embraced the Popifh faith, had refided for feveral years in Spain, and was at this time general of the order of Francifcans; a man of confiderable learning, and of great inte- grity and abilities , and highly diftinguifhed for his eloquence and addrefs. Having been upwards of twenty years of age before he left the Nether- lands , he retained a warm affection for his native country; he was at the fame time animated with zeal to fignalize himfelf in the fervice of the arch- dukes and the court of Spain , and undertook the talk impofed upon him with great alacrity. O 2 t*o HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF ft tf He had no fooner , after his arrival in Holland lir. had an interview with fome of the principal per- T6 **- fons in the republic than he difcovered thae ic \vould be vain to hope for fuccefs in the execu- tion of his embaffy , unlefs the ftates were in the treaty propofed to be acknowledged free and independent, and for this reafon he immediately returned to Bruffels , in order to convince the archdukes of the neceffity of making this con- ceflion. Thefe princes, conformably to the tenor of the abovementioned letter , written by Wittenhorft and Gevart, at their .defire, were willing to agree that no mention mould be made in the treaty of their right of fovereignty, but exprefsly to difclaim this right, and formally to acknowledge the fover- eignty of the ftates , they confidered as equally dangerous and dishonorable. It would be in words to acknowledge what in their hearts they muft difavow ; it would be to give their fan&ion to rebellion , and thereby to afford encouragement to their fubje&s to imitate the example of the revolted provinces. Being confcious, however, from the ftate of their finances, that they were utterly unable to Carry on the war , they refolved, in conformity to the advice of their counfellors, to yield at leaft fo far as to empower their commiflioners to de- clare, that they were willing to treat with the confederates as with a free people , over whom they pretended to no authority : a form of ex- prelfion which might be adopted they thought PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 231 confidently with their honor , as it only denoted BOOK a matter of fad , but did not import either a ill. renunciation of their own right to the fovereignty, 16 °^ or an acknowledgment of a right inherent in the ftates to independence. In the hopes however that it might fatisfy the * i«»" fr »« confederates, Ney was immediately fent back to duke"™ the the Hague with a letter addrefled to the ftates, VnitedSta- and figned both by Albert and lfabella , of which "** the following were the principal contents : that being extremely folicitous to put a ftop to the effufion of human blood, they were ready to treat with the United States as with a free people, from whom they claimed no fubmiflion or obedience ; that they were willing to treat either for the pur* pofe of eftablifhing a perpetual peace, or a long truce, of twelve, fifteen, or twenty years, during the continuance of which the contending parties fhould retain what they at prefent polTefled; unlefs, it fhould be mutually agreed , for the common, intereft of both, to make an exchange of certain towns and territories: that, in order to prevent all fufpicion of fraud or finiRer intention, ambalTadors, natives of the Netherlands , fhould be nominated by the archdukes, and an equal number named by the United States : that the ftates fhould have their choice of the time and place of meetings and that while the negociation was carrying on , there fhould be an entire fufpenfion of hoftilities for eight months, both by fea and land. From the fequel it will appear that all the mem- bers of the ftates were not equally difpofed to a* 232 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK agree to thefe propofals: but by a great majority HI. they were thought a fufficient ground for a nego- 1607. ciation or treaty. No objection was made to the words in which the declaration of the independence of the repub- lic was expreffed. The ftates , confcious of the fuperiority of their naval force , refufed to con- fent to the ceffation of hoftilities at fea; but they agreed that no hoftile enterprife fhould be under- taken againft any of the towns or provinces of the Netherlands , and no new forts erected. It was declared that the truce of eight months fhould commence on the fourth of May : and the archdukes engaged to procure a ratification of the prefent convention , including the declara- tory claufe, within three months, from the king of Spain io . This agreement having been firft made with Ney , and a few days after confirmed in proper form by Albert and Ifabella , was immediately communicated by the ftates general to the parti- cular ftates, and a day of thankfgiving to Heaven for the profpect of peace appointed to be obferved throughout the provinces. The profpeft The people in general fincerely rejoiced on this ©fpeare mat- occa f lon anc l W ere creatly elated when they ter of |oy to J" . J the people of reflected on the proof which the propofal and the united conceflion of the archdukes afforded of the difficul- ties to which they were reduced. Grotius , lib. xvi. Baudius , lib. i. Bentivoglio , lib. viii. and Meteren , lib. xxviii. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN 233 The war had now fubfifted for almoft forty BOOK years; and though, during a part of that time, Ill- only fome of them had been much expofed to the l607# calamities which are commonly attendant upon war, in the immediate fcenes of action, yet moft of them had experienced thefe calamities in fome degree. They had, on numberiefs occafions, been difquietcd with the moft dreadful apprehenfions; and they had long groaned under the weight of thofe enormous taxes , which the fupporting of fo many fleets and armies made it neceffary to impofe. There was a confiderable proportion however of the people whofe intereft and profperity de- pended on the continuance of the war, and parti- cularly thofe who held employments, which muft either be fuppreffed , or rendered much lefs lucra- tive in the time of peace. By fuch perfons peace A party in was no lefs dreaded than it was defired by the ge- * he Un,ted nerality of their countrymen , and the archdukes prefent the propofals were reprefentcd as deceitful and infidi- arch( iukes TT , -, r 1 1 • • 1 • propofals as ous. Unhappily many ot the clergy joined in re- i n ndiou$. prefenting them in this light; and, by their in- flammatory harangues from the pulpit, contributed to increafe the difficulties which the ftates after- wards encountered in carrying on the treaty. This negociation was a matter of great furprife The neno. to the neighbouring ftates and princes. They p e a a "e n m at. could not fuppofe that the archdukes would have ter of fur- ventured to make fuch humiliating concefTions, if neJghhour- they had not beforehand obtained the confent of in? nates the court of Spain; and that court, they thought, 234 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK would never have confented to it, but in order to HI. procure by artifice what they had been unable to 16o ~- accomplifh by force of arms. They were not wholly unacquainted with the diforder that had taken place in the Spanifh finances; but they could hardly believe that a prince pofTeffed of fuch copious refources as thofe of Philip, could be reduced fo low as to find it neceffary to treat with his rebellious fubjects on equal terms. They Liktwife an were therefore fufpicious that the Spanilh minifters obwt of j iac j f ccre tly formed fome delien, by which their jtaloufy, . . . intereft or the intereft of Europe might be affect- ed ; and they were confirmed in their fufpicion, by reflecting on the fecrecy wuh which the ne- gociation had been carried on. At Biuflels it had been communicated only to a very Cmall number of the archdukes minifters. At the Hague, the ftates general alone had been privy to it; and at both thefe places it had been carefully concealed from all the foreign relidents, till it was made known by the ftates general to the particular flates , when they appointed the day of public thankfgiving. Thefe precautions gave a myfte- rious appearance to the conduct of both parties ; yet they had probably been ufed with no other view, but either to avoid the perplexity arifing from too great a multitude of counsellors , or to prevent oppofition to the treaty in its infancy, and before the refolution was fully formed, whether it fhould be rejected or embraced. There were no princes fo well entitled to be confulted on this occafion by the ftates as the PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 235 kings of Great Britain and France, to whom the BOOK provinces had been fo much indebted for their ill. affiftance in carrying on the war. The former of l6 ° 7 ' thefe princes, from the narrownefs of his reve- nue, joined to his bad economy in the adminif- tration of it, had never been able to furnifh them with pecuniary fupplics : but notwithstanding the difficulties in which he was involved , he had con- fented that the one half of the money with which the French king fupplied them , fliould be de> dueled from the debt which that prince owed to the crown of Kngland, and had at all times af- forded encouragement to their levies of troops in Britain; while he had fecretly difcountenanced thofe which , in coniequence of the permiflion granted in the treaty of peace above-mentioned, were attempted by the archduke or the king of Spain. The obligations , however , of the ftates were much greater to the French than to the Britifh monarch; for Henry was not only more able, but more difpofed to contribute to their fupport. Before the peace of Vervins, he had always con- Conduft of fidered their caufe and intereft as his own ; and , the Flenth . - fc'ng to- after that peace , had given them every proot of wards the friend (hip that was confident with fidelity to thofe iiui« and had , yearly , advanced them fums of money for the payment of their forces. It would be abfurd to fuppofe, that in the kind- nefs which Henry had manifefted to the ftates , his condud had entirely proceeded from motives of friendfhip and generofity. It can feldom happen that a prince , in his con- duct towards foreign ftates, could be juftified for acting under the influence of fuch motives. A regard to the intereft of his fubjects , was, as it ought to have been , the ruling principle of Henry's The amount of thefe fums was feven millions three hundred and feventy- eight thoufand and eight hundred livres. Sully, liv. xxi. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 237 conduct ; and his liberality towards the United BOOK Provinces proceeded from his conviction, that on in. their profperity, in fome mcafure , depended the , ' , -7- peace and tranquillity of his own dominions. Having formerly fuftcred fo much from the arms , and afterwards from the intrigues of the Spaniards , he was (till difquietcd with apprehen- fions of the danger to which he was expofed from their turbulent ambition. He had long be- held with pleafurc their fruitlefs conteft: in the Netherlands, which had contributed fo much to exhaufr. their ftrcngtb. But having, in concert with fome of his wifeft minifters , formed a plan for the humiliation both of the German and Spa- nifh branches of the Aufhian family, which requi- red leifure before he could bring it to maturity t2 , he was not difpleafed to hear that the Hates had agreed to the archdukes propofals for entering into a treaty; but not having been previcifly confut- ed upon the fubjecr., and the archdukes having made greater concelTions than he expecled , he dreaded that the court of Spain mud have form- ed fome deep infidious defign , either ngainft the ftates themfelves or the princes in alliance with them ; and therefore he refolved to beftow all that attention upon the prefent negociation in the Netherlands , which a tranfadtion of the higheft confequence deferved. His affairs in that country had hitherto been ma- naged with great prudence by his refident , mon- fieur de Burerwall ; but, being determined, if Sully's Memoirs , p. 324, &c. 238 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF - BOOK poffible, to acquire a direction of the prefent nego- III. ciation, and vigilantly to watch over the conduct i«o?. f tne contracting powers, he fent to the Hague, dent JeVn- in quality of ambaflador extraordinary, the prefi- nin, rent dent Jeannin , a minifter of great experience, who ^ n ^ ador is equally celebrated in the annals of Henry's reign, Hague from and in thofe of his fucceflbr, for his fidelity, his France. eloquence, and his political abilities. This able negociator had no fooner arrived than he required admiflion into the affembly of the ftates; where, after reminding them of the zeal with which his mafter had for fo many years exert- ed himfelf in their behalf, he inveighed, with much feverity, againft thofe who had falfely accu- fed the king of aiming at the fovereignty of the Provinces ; and then gently reproaching the ftates with giving a color to this afperfion, by enter- ing into a treaty with the enemy, without his knowledge or confent But as no prince , he added, could more eafily forgive his enemies; fo there was none more ready to overlook the omiflions of his friends: and, to prove the fin- cerity of his friendOu'p for the ftates , the king had now fent him in the character of ambafTador, with powers to afiTure them of the continuance of his affiftance , in cafe a continuance of the war fbould be found expedient; or if they chofe to put a period to it, to affift them in eftablifbing an honorable and lading peace. He concluded with requefting that a committee of the ftates might be appointed , to whom he might more particularly communicate his inftrudtions , and PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 239 •with whom he might occafionally deliberate con- book cerning the meafures which it might be proper in. to purfue. ,6sr - The ftates readily complied with this requeft, and expreffed how fincerely they rejoiced to find fo great a king difpofed to take fo warm an inter- eft in their affairs. This interpofition of Henry gave equal unea- finefs to the court of Spain, as it afforded joy to the ftates. They knew that all his influence would be employed , either to prevent an accommoda- tion, or to render it derogatory to the honor and intereft of Spain. And they were well acquainted with the fuperior talents of Jeannin, who, while he would keep the ftates perpetually on their guard , would encourage them to perfift in their mod exorbitant demands. The courts of Spain and BrufTels had reafon likewife to look for oppofition from the Britifh , as •well as from the French monarch. For James had no ground, they thought to entertain any jealoufy of the Dutch ; as their dependence on him for their Englifh and Scotch troops, which formed fo great a proportion of their army, his pofTefTion of the cautionary towns, which were fo many keys of the Netherlands, the fmiation of his dominions, and the coincidence between his fub- jects and thofe of the ftates in religious opinions, feemed to render him fecure of their alliance. It could not therefore but be agreeable, they ima- gined, to this prince, to contribute his endeavours, in the treaty of peace , to promote the intereft of 240 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF book the dates at the expenfe of Spain. They fuppo- III. fed it, however, to be more likely that he might 1607. exert his influence to render this treaty abortive, from an apprehenfion which they had given him ground to entertain , that if Spain were at peace "with the United Provinces, file might employ her leifure in fomenting the difcon tents of his popifh fubjeds in Ireland. The king But they afterwards found that they had erred of England j n ^fg con jecture. Indolence , and an averfion concurs J . ... with the to war, were predominant principles in the cha- Frencn mo. ra & er of James ; and thefe on this oecafion deter- narch m , . . . . A promoting mined him, m oppolition to his political interelt, to peace. concur with the French monarch , in promoting the eftablifhment of peace; befides that, he could not decently have attempted to dilTuade the Dutch from liftening to the propofals which had been made to them, without being more liberal than the narrow ftate of his finances would permit, in contributing to their affiftance. James had been no lefs alarmed than Henry, by the intelligence ■which he received of the negociation between the ftates and the archdukes ; and had expreffed to Caron , the Dutch refidcnt at London, his fur- prife at the fecrecy with which it had been carried on. But the ftates , folicitous to prcferve his friendfhip , having fent two of their number to explain ro him the motives of their conduct, he readily admitted of their apology, and foon after fent fir Ralph Winwood and fir Richard Spencer, in the character of ambafladors , to affift them in bringing the treaty to the defired conclufion. About PHILIP TIL KING OF SPAIN. 2541 About the fame time ambaffadors arrived in Hoi- BOOK land from the king of Denmarc , the elector Pala- ill. tine, the eleclor of Brandenburgh , the landgrave l *°7* of Heffe , and feveral other proteftant princes of Germany; who, having no intereft of their own to adjuft or fecure , could have no other motive in fending them, but to afford to the ftates, on this important occafion, a proof of the concern which they took in their profperity ". In the mean time an event happened, which, by elevating the hopes of one of the contending parties, while it deprefled thofe of the other, con- tributed to haflen the treaty to a conclufion. The ftates having , early in the fpring of this year , equipped a fleet of twenty -fix fhips of war, be- fides tranfports with ftores and provifions, they put it under the command of Heemfkirk , one of P erat,0R, the braved officers, and moft fkilful navigators at Tea, unaer in the Netherlands, with inftructions to fail forthe * dmira! weftern coafts of Spain and Portugal , and by watching the motions of the enemy , to provide for the fafc arrival of the Eaft-India fleet. The pre- fervation of this fleet, which there was ground to believe the Spaniards were prepared to intercept , the ftates informed him was to be confidered as a principal object of his expedition ; but they re- quired befides , that he fliould give all poffible an- noyance to the enemy, and remember, that the archdukes having made piopofals for a treaty of peace , the ifiue of this treaty , and confequently Baudius , lib. i. Bentivog.io, Grocius, and Winwood, vol. ii. Vol. I. R 24a HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK the future profperity of the United Provinces, III. would greatly depend on the fuccefs with which his 1607t arras in the prefent enterprife fhould be attended. Heemfldrk, flattered with the truft rcpofed in him at fo critical a juncture, affurcd the ftates , when he received his inftru&ions , that whether he fhould die or furvive , they fhould not have reafon to repent of the honor they had conferred on him ; and, in ordef to exprefs his confidence of fuccefs, he declared that he would not accept of any reward or pay , unlefs the booty fhould amount to more than five hundred thoufand flor- ins; in which cafe he would accept only of his fhare of what fhould remain after that fum was dedu&ed. He was already, fays Grotius, poffcffed of a greater fortune than his manner of life requi- red ; and , being animated more by the love of glory than of riches , under the fimple fhow and moderate deportment of a citizen , he concealed all the qualities of a hero. Having left the Texel on the 25th of March , he firft directed his courfe towards Lifbon; but April 10. being informed on his arrival in the mouth of the Tagus , by fome merchants whom he had fent before him , under neutral colors , to procure in- telligence, that the firft divifion of the Portuguefe and Spanifh fleet intended for the Indies and Ame- rica, had already failed, and that the fhips belong- ing to the fecond , were neither fully equipped nor had got their cargoes on board ; but that a Spanifh fleet of fhips of war was then riding at anchor in the bay of Gibraltar, he immediately PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 243 fet fail for that place , and foon arrived within fight BOOK of the enemy. III. The Spaniards having, for feveral days, obfer- l *°J' ved him (leering his courfe along the coaft of or as. Andalufia, had given notice to the admiral Don John Alvarez Davila of his approach ; and Davila had full leifure to put his fleet into a proper pof- ture of defence. It confided of twenty -one fhips f nine of which were greatly fuperior in fize to thofe of the enemy, and was drawn up under the cannon of the fort, having the admiral's galleon, which was much larger than the reft, in front. Heemfkirk was fully aware of the great advantage which the Spanifii admiral muft derive from his fituation ; but this confederation rather ferved to conrirm him in his purpofe than to deter him from carrying it into execution. For the greater, faid he to his officers, in a council of war which he held before the engage- ment, the danger to which we fhall be expofed, and the more arduous our attempt, the greater will be the glory we fhall acquire, and the more important the fervice we fhall perform to our country , if our arms fhall be crowned with vic- tory. Many illuftrious exploits have our country- men achieved in different quarters of the globe, but we are the firft who fhall adventure to attack the royal fleet in the ftrongeft port of Spain ; and f by our fuccefs , fhall fliow how little reafon the Spanifii monarch, with his long proud lift of titles, has to boaft that he is the fovereign of the feas. Let us not be diflieartened by the enormous fue R z 244 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK of the enemy's (hips , for this very circumftance , III. by rendering them unwieldy in all their motions, i*°7. w ]jj facilitate our conqueft. I require you to do nothing , of which I fiialJ not fet you an example. But when the engagement (hall be begun, we muft remember it will be no longer poffible to efcape, We muft either conquer or periih. Nor is it only our own prcfervation that depends on the forti- tude we fhali difplay in our prefent enterprife, but the fafety of the rich fleet that is in its way from India, the fafety of all our countrymen, who are engaged in trade in this part of the world , and the terms likewife of peace which the ftates Ihall obtain from the enemy. Let us only exert ourfelves as we have done on former occafions , and difcover that contempt of danger which is the fureft pledge of victory , and we fliall enjoy the glory and felicity of putting a period to the war, and thereby fecure to our countrymen that liberty for which they have fought for more than forty years. Having delivered thefe exhortations with that natural military eloquence , which he pofTefled in an eminent degree, and received from all the offi- cers prefent, the moft folenin aHurances, confirmed by oath, that, to the utmoft of their power, they would imitate his example , and fulfil his commands, be communicated to them his plan of attack, and, as foon as they had returned to their refpeelivc {hips, he gave the iignal to advance. When Davila perceived them approaching, he ordered the mafter of a Dutch merchantman, whom PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 245 he had a prifoner on board his fhip, in chains, to BOOK be brought upon the deck, and inquired of him III. what he imagined might be his countrymen's de. U07 * fign : to attack your fleet , anfwered the prifoner j to which Davila, fmiling contenoptuaufly replied, that he could not fuppofe it, fince his fingle fhip , he thought, would prove an over - match for all the Dutch vefTels that were in fight. That may be true , faid the other , but , either I know no- thing of the character of my countrymen , or the battle will be inftantly begun. Heemfkirk himfelf led the van, and (leered his Heemskiric courfe directly towards Davila, who, inftead of Spanish fleet that contempt which he had fo recently expreffed, r,dm2: at ,. * iti-inT. 1 anchor in the being now overwhelmed witp altonilnment at the bay ofGi- fight of fuch unprecedented intrepidity, gave or- braitar. ders to flip his anchors , and to retire behind his other fiiips , hoping that the enemy would thus be induced to exhauft their fury upon them , and that afterwards he might come in for a fhare of the victory. But Heemfkirk , agreeably to his refolution, which lie had communicated to his officers, that he him- felf would attack the admiral's galleon, without hefitation entered within the line of the Spanifh fleet , and ftill continued to advance , keeping up his fire till he had come within mufket-fhot of the enemy. Davila having, before his approach, given the firft broadfide, it was now returned by Heemfkirk, whofe fire being more fkilfully direct- ed, did greater execution. But foon after , while this gallant feaman ftood giving orders , on the R3 at 4 6 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK moft confpicuous part of the deck , his left leg waS III. carried off by a cannon ball and his thigh being i be taken off : nor were thofe of the T 4 2go HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK ftates unwilling to abolifh fuch of them as had HI. been impofed in confideration of the war ; but they required that the fame duties fhould ftill be paid by the fubjects of the archdukes and the king of Spain as were exacted from the fubjects of the ftates , to enable them to defray the expenfe of the fortifications on the banks of the Scheld, and of the fhips of war that were neceffary for the pro- tection of their commerce. This was the pretext which they employed, although it is probable they were chiefly actuated by their dread left the trade of Antwerp fhould be revived to the prejudice of that of their own commercial towns in the mari- time provinces. Another point which engaged the attention of the commiffi oners, regarded the mutual exchange of thofe towns and diftricts which the contending powers had acquired by conqueft from one an- other. The ftates were at this time in pofleflion of Sluys, and the ifle of Cadfant in Flanders, and of Breda, Bergen op Zoom, and Gertrudenburgh, in Brabant; all of which places were of the firft im- portance , on account of their fituation and ftrength. The Spanifh commiffioners, however, propofed and urged that thefe places fhould be given to the archdukes, who were fovereigns of the provinces in which they lay. and that the ftates, in compenfation for them, fhould accept of Olden- zeel, Groll, and Lingcn. But the Dutch commif- fioners rejected this propofal with great difdain , alledging that the towns pofleffed by the ftates were of infinitely greater value than thofe which PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 281 were offered in exchange for them ; and declaring BOOK that as no conceflions which the archdukes would III. make were a fufficient equivalent, both parties, ,608 * agreeably to what the archduke had propofed in the beginning of this negociation , (hould retain what was at prefent in their pofTeflion. A third queftion related to the boundaries be- The P ro: tween the dominions of the ftates and thofe of the dividual* archdukes; a fourth, to the reftitution of the effects «**<>«<* by belonging to individuals which had been confif- for peacf# rated; and, befides thefe , there were feveral other matters treated of, concerning which the op- pofite parties contended with great warmth , and difcovered a wide diverfity of fentiment. IYlany weeks paft in fruitlefs altercation. The parties feemed to be more than ever exafperated againft each other; and the difficulties which pre- vented them from coming to an agreement feem- ed daily to increafe. The Dutch were extremely tenacious of their obrtinaey claims, and the archdukes commiflioners often ^"jj complained of this obftinacy to the Englifh and French ambafladors ; but their conduct was, at the fame time, explicit and undifguifed ; and, from the commencement of the negociation, they had openly declared, that, whatever conceflions they might be induced to make in other matters , there were two points, religion and the trade to India, on which no fuch conceflion was to be expected as the Spaniards were likely to require. To procure fome new inductions with regard to thefe important articles, hud, as already mentioned, 382 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK been the purpofe for which the Francifcan had in. been fent to Madrid. The time fixed for his 1608. return was expired, and no fatisfa&ory account of his delay was given by the archdukes commiflion- ers , who ftudioufly avoided all difcourfe concern- ing him , and maintained an obflinate filence with regard to his fuccefs. The Dutch were exceedingly difgufted at this behaviour : they knew not to what caufe it could be afcribed : they were not without fufpicion of fome infidious dcfign : and they at length refolved, that either the archdukes ambaffadors fhould give them fatisfaction concerning the caufe of Ney's delay, or that the treaty fhould inftantly be broken off. Having, accordingly, in the m oft: peremptory terms , required to know what was the ultimate determination of the king of Spain with regard to the Indian trade, the ambaffadors, thinking it Auguft ro. unneceffary any longer to conceal what they knew, replied 12 , that Ney had not been able to obtain a more favorable anfvver to his application than Difputes this, that the king, from his ardent defire of re- concerning ~. , . . . . n -n i the catho- itoring peace to his dominions , was itil! ready to lie religion renounce his claim of fovereignty over the provin- diaVtrade ces ' m tne f° rm propofed ; but , in return for fo great a facrifice, required that the ftates fhould abftain from all commerce to the Indies, and per- mit the exercife of the Catholic religion through- out the whole extent of their dominions. Bentivogllo , Grotius , &c. Meteren , liv. xxx. folio 652 , &c. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 283 Of this declaration the deputies of the ftates BOOK gave immediate information to the ftates general, m. and the Englifh and French ambafladors. James li0 *' having lately entered into that defenfive alliance with the ftates which he had formerly declined, and Henry, bcfides concluding fuch an alliance, having empowered *' Jeannin to acquaint them, that, in cafe the prcfent treaty were not broken off without his confent, he had refolved to alFift them in the profecution of the war; both thefe princes were well entitled to be confulted on the prefent occafion. Henry could not decently have neglected the opportunity , which was prefented to him , of interpofmg in behalf of the religion which he profefled , and therefore he had inftruct- ed Jeannin to advife the ftates, if poilible , to grant to their Catholic fubjeds the indulgence which Philip had demanded for them; but he did not infift on their compliance with his advice: he was fen fib] e that this indulgence might endanger their internal peace, efpecially if it was granted at the requeft of the king of Spain ; and there- fore left them at liberty to determine, both with regard to religion and their Indian trade, whether any concellion could be made confidently with their intereft and fecurity. The ftates themfelves unanimoufly thought that there was no room for hefitation on the fubjecr. With the confent of Jeannin, as well as of the Englifh ambaffadors , they rejected the conditions Negotiations de Jeannin , torn. i. p. 44. Setondc InftruOtion a Monfieur Jeannin. 284 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK that were propofed ; and, at the next meeting with Hi. the archdukes commiffioners, it was declared by 1608. thofe of the ftates, that they confidered the infill- ing upon ihefe conditions as a violation of the pro- mife which had been made of treating with them as with a free people; that they could not confider the conduct of Spain as confident, fair, or candid, and were therefore determined to break off the pre- fent treaty; and, without fuffering themfelves to be any longer deceived , to refume the profecution of the war 2 *. The ftates feem to have received fufficient pro- vocation on this occafion for the refentment with which they were inflamed; but, from a letter of the prefident Jeannin's to the king of France, it appears that it was not the court of Spain fo much as the archdukes commiffioners , of whom they had reafon to complain. For Philip, it appears from this letter, had, from the beginning of the negociation, declared that he would never con- fent to renounce his fovereignty , but on the con- dition that the free exercife of the Catholic reli- gion fhould be eftablifhed in all the provinces ; and he had charged the commiflioncrs to open the conferences by acquainting them that this was his unalterable refolution. But the commiffioners had thought it expedient to change the order of their inftrudions , and to begin with an acknowledge- ment of the freedom of the ftates, hoping thereby to render them more obfequious in other articles ; Meteren , liv. xxx. folio 650, &c. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 285 and afterwards, when both parties Were in better BOOK humor with each other, to obtain from Philip fome m. relaxation in his demand with regard to the Ca- nog. tholic religion *'. This information was communicated to the de- puties of the ftates, and afterwards to the ftateS general , with an intention to footh their refent- ment; but it ferved rather to turn it into another channel , by directing it againft the archdukes commiflTioners inftead of the court of Spain. And it likewife ferved to rivet their conyi&ion , that no folid peace could ever be obtained from that court, whofe bigotry was the fame in the prefent as it had been in the former reign , without a con- ceflion on their part, which they deemed to be no lefs contrary to good policy than it was incon- fiftent with fincerity in their profeffion of the Pro- teftant faith. They were confirmed, therefore, in this refolution of declining to proceed any farther in the treaty , and feem to have fatisfied the Eng- lifh and French ambaffadors , that they had fuffi- cient motives to juftify their conduct. Thefe ambaffadors, however, ftill believed it to be practicable to reftore tranquillity to the United Provinces , although not by a perpetual peace , yet by a long truce between the contending powers. The obftacles to the efbblifhment of peace had chiefly arifen from the pride and bigot- ry of the court of Spain; but thefe obftacles, they thought, might be more eafily furmounted in attempting to conclude a truce than a peace, " Negotiations de Jeaanin, torn. ii. p. 403 , 404, &c 236 HISTORY OF THE REIGxM OF BOOK becaufe, if only a truce were concluded, that court Hi. might flatter themfelves with the hopes, that, at J608. tne expiration of it, they might recover their con- ceffions , and accomplifh the feveral objects in which they were fo deeply interefted ; befides that, there was ground to fufpect , that, from the beginning of the negociation, it was a truce, and not a perpetual peace, that was intended by the Spanifh minifters. The prefi. The prefidcnt Jeannin having previoufly con- rh" admit", certed with the Englifh ambafTadors certain pre- ted to an liminary articles , without which he knew that all audience of r . n , „ . the ftates. iarther treaty mult prove abortive, requefted an audience of the ftates, and, being admitted into their aflembly, after exprefling the concern of the French and Englifh monarchs on account of the unfuccefsful iffue of the late conferences, he added, that thefe princes, being deeply imprefled with a conviction of the neceffity of putting a period to the war, had, in cafe it fhould be found impracticable to eftablifh a lafting peace, com- manded their ambafTadors to recommend to the ftares a truce of feveral years , provided that fuch a truce could be obtained on advantageous and honorable terms. For, in recommending this meafure , he fubjoined, it is by a regard for the true intereft; and honor of the provinces, that the French and Britifh kings are. prompted , and therefore they exhort you to adopt it. only on the following conditions: firft, that the king of Spain and the archdukes mail treat with you as with a free people, over whom they pretended to PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 287 no authority; fecondly , that, during the truce, BOOK you fhall enjoy a free commerce both in Europe 111. and in the Indies; and, thirdly, that you fhall "08. retain all the towns and territories which are at prefent in your pofleflion. During this truce you will have leifure to rec- tify the diforders which have fprung up during the continuance of the war, to pay your debts, to reform your government, to extend your trade, and , if you ftudy to maintain internal union and tranquillity, this truce, it is probable, will ter- minate in a lading peace, by which the advanta- ges you have obtained will be perpetuated and fecured : whereas , if at this time the war were to be renewed , we forefee innumerable difficul- ties to which you will be expofed ; and perceive, that , in order to infure fuccefs , your friends muft be much more liberal in their afliftance, than is convenient for them in the prefent fituation of their affairs. You are diflatisfied with the conduct of your adverfaries; but let not your refentment prevent you from liftening to the counfel of your friends. It is our intention to offer them the fame counfel; and, if they refufe to follow it, to acquaint them that the kings of France and Britain are determin- ed to give you every proof of faithful friendfhip in their power. But in return for this, thefe prin- ces expect that you will not, by your obftinacy, engage them in a war to which they are utterly averfe , and for which, if this truce can be accom- pliflied , there is no neceflity. 288 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK It will be difficult, we know, to obtain the III. confent of the Catholic king to the preliminary "° 8, articles; but, if that prince fhall be found equally- uncomplying and intractable, as you have hitherto experienced, and the treaty for a truce, like that for peace, fhall, through his fault, prove abortive, you will be juftified for again having recourfe to arms; and the princes too, whom we reprefcnt,' will be juftified for refolving to exert themfelves with greater vigor in your behalf 2 *. To this propofal the Rates general made no im- mediate reply, but that they would fubmit it to the confideration of the Rates of the particular provinces. It was foon after communicated to the marquis of Spinola, and the reft of the archdukes com- miflioners, by whom it was received with all the fatisfaclion which might be expected from their well known averfion to the continuance of the war. But although they acknowledged how much pleafure it would give them , if any means of an accommodation could be devifed , they dread- ed that the archdukes would be unable to per- fuade the court of Spain to agree to the prelimi- nary articles ; and , for this reafon , they labored to perfuade Jeannin to omit the two firft articles altogether, and to attempt to conclude a truce without any other condition but that both parties fhould retain what they pofleffed. It had been with the utmoft reluctance , they reprefented , that the king of Spain had formerly confented to Jean. ii. 412. acknowledge PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 289 acknowledge the independence of the ftates, even BOOK ■when he expected thereby to gain fome conccf- Hi. fion from them in favor of the Catholic religion; 16 ° s « and to exclude them from the Indian trade, had been his principal motive for defiring to put a pe- riod to the war. To procure his confent, there- fore, cither to the firft or to the fecond of the preliminary articles, would be attended with dif- ficulties, which, there was ground to apprehend * would be found infuperable; and no other agree- ment was like to be obtained than a epilation of hoftilities , or a truce in the common form , dur- ring which both parties fliould retain what was at prefent in their pofleffion. Jeannin was fenfible of the truth of this re- prefentation , and forefaw the difficulties which the archdukes muft encounter, if they liftened to hispropofal; but, befides that thefe princes were, above all things, folicitous to be delivered from a ruinous war, which filled their minds with per- petual difquietude, and would employ all their: influence to overcome the pride and obftinacy of the court of Spain , he knew that the Spaniards were at prefent extremely ill prepared for the re- commencement of hoftilities , and hoped that on this account they might be induced to agree to terms, which, on another occafion, they would have rejected with difdain. He would not, therefore, have been inclined to withdraw the preliminarv articles , even al- though he had found himfclf at liberty ; but they were a part (he faid ) of the archdukes Vol. I. V 2ip HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK commiffioners propofal to the Rates , and the honor III. both of the French and Englifh monarchs , in whofe 1608. name this propofal had been made , was now pledged either to procure the acceptance of them by the archdukes and king of Spain, or to fur- nifh the ftates with fuch affiftance as might be neceflary for the pr.ofecution of the war. This declaration he made to the archdukes commiffi- oners in the moft explicit terms; and added, that while it might be difficult to obtain the king of Spain's affent to the propofed conditions, it was extremely doubtful whether thefe conditions were fuch as would fatisfy the people of the United Provinces; but the commilTioners might firmly believe that nothing lefs than was contained in the preliminary articles would give fatisfaction either to them , or to their friends. Of the truth of this affertion , as far as it re- garded the confederates , there was immediate proof in the difficulty which Jeannin encounter- ed in perfuading them to agree to his propofal. The greater part of the deputies of the particu- lar provinces, being fincerely folicitous for the eflablifhmcnt of peace , were fatisfied with the preliminary articles, and gave their opinion that the truce, with the conditions contained in thefe articles, ought not to be refufed. But there were many, who, whether from motives of pri- vate intereft , or a regard to the public fafcty , being defirous of a continuance of the war, maintained that no agreement whatever fhould be made, but on condition that the archdukes , and the king of PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 291 Spain , fliould grant the fame folemn acknow- BOOK ledgment of the liberty and independence of the in. dates, to which they had formerly confented in i«o». treating for a perpetual peace, including an expli- cit renunciation for ever of all their claims of au- thority over the United Provinces. The former of thefe parties was headed by Barnevelt , fupported by the French and Englifh ambaffadors ; and the Watter by prince Maurice, whofe opinion was efpoufed not only by the whole province of Zealand, over which his au- thority was almoft without control, but by the deputies of Amfterdam, and thofe of feveral other cities in the province of Holland. The former endeavoured to peifuade the latter, Part;«for that it was unreafonable to expedt the fame liber- a u n ' 1 a?alnft " the peace. al conceffions from the enemy, in the cafe of a truce, as where a perpetual peace was to be eftab- liflied; and that, while the ftates were confcious of being free and able to maintain their liberty, it was of no importance whether the Spaniards fhould acknowledge, or refufe to acknowledge, their independence; for it was fufficient for every valuable purpofe which they could have in view, if the Spaniards would treat with them as with a free people , and conclude an agreement upon equitable terms. But thefe confiderations had no weight with prince Maurice , or his partifans. They were averfe to the truce on other accounts , befides their objection to the declaratory claufe , and la- bored to convince their countrymen that a truce, V 3 894 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK on whatever terms, at the prefent period , though III. it might be neceflary for Spain, rauft prove per- 1608. nicious and dangerous to the Dutch republic. They omitted no opportunity of inculcating their opinion , whether in public afiemblies or in pri- vate focieties, and publifhed innumerable letters and pamphlets, which being univerfally perufed , became the fubjedt of difcourfe in every compa- ny. Of thefe writings fome were of the moft in- flammatory kind, intended to infill fufpicions in- to the minds of the people, that Barnevelt and his friends , unable to reftft the allurement of Pe- ruvian gold, had fold their country to the Spani- ards; and even the French and Britifli monarchs, it Was infinuated , by fo eameftly recommending the truce, intended rather to ferve the court of Spain than the United Provinces. Their fufpici- ons on this head were heightened by the arrival at Paris and London of two ambafiadors , who had been fent on their prefent embaffy by the Spa- nifh minifters, though under a different pretext, yet, probably, with no other view but to procure the good offices of James and Kenry in the pre- fent negociation in the Netherlands. No pains were fpared by the French and Fng- lifh ambafiadors at the Hague, to convince the Dutch that their apprehenfions were without foundation. Above all the reft, Jeannin labored affiduoufly for this end; and by giving the depu- ties of the dates the ftrongeft aiTurances that his matter's friendship was inviolable, and that no- thing could be more remote from his intention PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. * 93 than to enter into an alliance with Spain to the BOOK prejudice of their republic, he feems, with re- ill. gard to this matter, in which they were fo deeply 1606, interefted, to have fet their minds at eafe. Theaveifion, however, of a great number of them to the truce, and their animofity againft fuch of their countrymen as promoted it, were as (trong as ever. Their refentment was princi- pally directed againft Barncvelt, who, by his elev quence and addrefs, his great abilities, and long experience, had acquired an entire afcendant over moft of the deputies: he appears, however, to have been too fenfibly affected on this occafion by the odium to which he found himfelf expofed. Having one day bitterly complained , in an aflem- bly of the ftates , of the cruel treatment which he received in the libels daily'publifhed on the fubject,, of the prefent controverfy, he appealed to the deputies , whether he had given jull ground for fuch injurious imputations as had been caft upon him; and then left the afTembly with a re- folution to retire from public life. P>ut he fooq recovered his tranquillity; and, at the earned de- fire of the ftates, he returned to the afTembly, and afterwards continued to apply himfelf to the conduct of public affairs with the fame indefati- gable attention as before ar . It would be injurious to the character of prince INlaurice to fuj.pofe that he would demean him- felf fo far as to be concerned in thofe anonymous pamphlets and incendiary letters , replete with Grctius , &c. lib. xvi V 3. 294 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK threats againft: Barnevelt and his adherents, in. which were publifhed on this occafion He took uos ' no pains to conceal his refentment, and openly- inveighed againft their conduct, as being calcu- lated to involve the provinces in ruin. Having vifited feveral of the towns in Holland , he labored to bring over the deputies to his opinion , and with the fame intention he wrote a circular letter to all the other towns in the province. What he faid and wrote on this occafion was principally intended to infpire the deputies with miftruft of the archdukes and the court of Spain , whofe conduct , in the prcfent negociation , he faid, had been inconfiftent with' their profelTions in the beginning, and who could not have any reafon for declining to grant the moft explicit re- nunciation of their right of fovereignry over the provinces, but that they fecretly defigned to af- fert that right when a more convenient feafon fhould arrive. They would obferve the truce only fo long as they found it necefiary for retrieving the ruinous condition of their affairs; and, mean while, the people of the United Provinces, deceived by a falfe appearance of tranquillity, would not only- quit their arms, but would lofe their military fpirit, and be induced to agree to whatever terms fhould be prefcribed to them, rather, than again expofe themfelves to the dangers or inconvenien- ces of war. The Spaniards, it was evident, being utterly averfe to a perpetual peace, hoped to be able, PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 295 during the truce, to apply fome effectual remedies BOOK to the diforders which prevailed in their finances ; Hi. whereas the flates having fo great a number of l6 &* frontier-towns , where numerous garrifons muft be maintained , would have nearly the fame ex- penfes to defray as during the continuance of the war. It would, however, be infinitely more dif- ficult, after their apprehenfions of immediate danger were removed, to perfuade the people to pay the taxes which it would be necelfary to im- pofe; and the enemy would, at the fame time, pra&ife on their fidelity , and fow the feeds of difcord among the different towns and provinces, of which they would not fail to avail themfelves, without thinking it incumbent on them to delay hoftilities till the expiration of the truce. As this reafoning of prince Maurice coincided with the prejudices which the Dutch had, for many years, entertained againfl: the Spaniards, it made a ftrong impreffjon on the minds of many of the deputies ; nor was it confidered either by Barnevelt or Jeannin , as frivolous. On the con- trary , they treated it with the refpeel which was due to the perfon by whom it was employed , al- though they, at the fame time, labored aflidu- oufly to (how ^hat the arguments on their fide Memorial had greater weight; and Jeannin, in his own ofJeannin •^ 11 r prefentcJ to name and that of the other ambafladors , prefented the Unite4 a memorial to the flates, of the following pur- s,ates « port, intended to remove the objections that were urged by Maurice and his adherents. v 4 296 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK V The princes whom we reprefent, being deep- lii* \y intereftcd in your profperity, and believing the 1608. truce propofed, to be necefTarv, in the prefent fi- tuation of your affairs , are therefore much con- cerned to obferve theoppofition which it meets with from fo many refpeclable members of your ftate. " You ought not, they alledge, to be fatisfied that the archdukes and the king of Spain are wil- ling to treat with you as with a free people, Over whom they pretend to no authority , but you ought to require a declaration that they will confider you in this light for ever afterwards, as W H as during the continuance of the truce. " But in the opinion of the princes, our fove- reign--, \our liberty i* equally well fecured by the former of thefe declarations as by the latter ; be- caufe the former, not being limited to any parti- cular time, but exprefied in terms that are gene- ral and indefinite, it mult be underftood by all the world in the fame fenfe, as if the words " for ever " were fubjoined. Befides this confiderati- on, it is not of the king of Spain and the arch- dukes, that you are to hold your liberty. You have long maintained that yon are already free, having aliened your liberty by a public folemn deed, founded upon reafon and necefjity , and bravely defended it for many years a'gainft your opprclTors, by the force of arms. You ought, therefore, to reft fatisfied with that fimple acknow- ledgment of it, which is implied in the declara- tion of being ready to treat with you as with a free people. You would be fatisfied with fuch an PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 297 acknowledgment from any neutral or friendly BOOK power. You have equal reafon to be fatisfied in. when it is made by the archdukes, and the king lC0 *« of Spain. And you ought not, with fo much fo- licitudc, to require thefe princes to be more ex- plicit, in declaring you to be free, left you be confidered as thereby tacitly confeffing that ftill they have a right to your obedience. "But, even allowing, that the king of Spain, fhould not think himfelf excluded by the form of words made choice of from his claim of fove- reignty , will he call you befoie a court of juf- tice, do you fuppofe, in order to have his rights examined by the rules of law ? It is not in this manner that fovereigns afiert their claims; it is only to the fv/ord that they appeal : and if you be able when the truce expires, to maintain your liberty as you have hitherto done againft the force of arms , you will then , as well as now , with juftice defpife your enemy's pretenfions to domi- nion over you. It will be fufficient then, as it is at prefent , to find yourfelves in actual poffeffion of your liberty. And, in whatever fenfe the words of the truce may be underftood by the king of Spain , you ought to be fatisfied with the af- furance which has been given you , and which we now repeat , that , by the princes whom we re- prefent, whofe friendfhip you have fo fong expe- rienced, and on whofe alliftance you may with confidence rely , thefe words are confidered as a clear and unambiguous declaration, that you are a free people over whom authority cannot ever be juflly pretended by the king of Spain. 2 9 8 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK " It is farther objected by tbofe who oppofe the in. truce, that it will afford leifure to the catholic ito8. king to retrieve the ruinous condition of his finan- ces , and to profecute the war , after the recom- mencement of hoftilities , with greater vigor. Nor can it be denied, that if he was to liften to the advice of wife and faithful counfellors , it might be , in fome meafure, attended with this effect:. But is it to be prefumed that a young king, at the head of a nation noted for reftlefs and in- ordinate ambition, with minifters inattentive to economy , when the exigencies of his affairs re- quired it, will be more attentive when his fitua- tion renders it unneceflary ? Is it not rather to be prefumed , that his treafure will , more than ever, become a prey to the avarice or profufion of his minifters ? that it will be more than ever lavifhed on idle pomp and fhow; or that, by quarrelling with his neighbours, he (hall ere long be engaged in fome ambitious and expenfive enterprife? "It is from your republic, and not from the king of Spain , that thofe prudent meafures may be expe&ed, which are neceflary to repair the mifchiefs that have been occafioned by the war: you are equally diflinguifhed for your private and your public economy; and you are not lefs dif- tinguifbed for your induftry, your activity, and enterprife. With thefe qualities, which you pof- fefsin fo eminent a degree, your trade muft every year be more extended ; and , being carried on with fmaller rifks, and at lefs expenfe , the profits arifing from it will be greater than ever. You PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 299 will thereby be enabled to difcharge your public BOOK debts, to relieve your people from the load of 11 1. taxes under which they groan , and , when the ** 08, truce expires , to profecute the war with lefs de- pendence on your allies, and a greater probability of fuccefs. It will ftill , indeed, be neceflary for you to maintain garrifons in the frontier- towns , and to retain a confiderable proportion of your troops in pay , that , whether the truce be obferved or vio- lated, you may be always found in a proper pof- ture of defence. " But at lead the one half of your army may be difbanded. Your trade will , in the mean time , be carried on with much greater advantage than hitherto , and all thofe lodes by fca and by laud avoided , which you have fo often reprefent- ed to the kings, our mafters, as the caufe why you were unable, of yourfelves , to defray the nccellary expenfes of the war. "But your enemies, it is aliedged by the op- pofers of the truce , will have accefs during the continuance of it, to carry on their intrigues among the people; to fow diflenfions among the towns and provinces, and to perfuade fome of them perhaps to abandon the confederacy; while the peopie tlumfelves, delivered from the appre- henfions of immediate danger, will refufe to pay the taxes which the Rates fiiall find it necelTary to impofe. "With regard to thefe objections, as we do not pretend to any certain foiefight of futurity, itfos. 300 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK we will not affirm that they are entirely deftitute III. of foundation. There is no ftate of human fo- ciety that is not fubject to inconveniences and dangers; and there are dangers attending peace as well as war: but the dangers mentioned are fuch as, with prudent, precautions, it is in your power to avoid. The objections founded on the appreheniions of them are equally applicable to a peace, as to a truce; and if they are fufficient to deter you from hftening to our propofal of a truce, they ought to determine you to perfift in the pro- fecution of the war , till you have accomplished the utter ruin of your enemy. But you are too wife to propofe to vourfelves an object inadequate to your ftrength. And, therefore, unlefs you chufe to live in perperual war, which mult much fooner prove the ruin of your republic than of the Spanifh monarchy, youmuft, fooner or later, agree to bring the war to a conclufion , either by a peace, or by a truce. A peace on the terms which you require, is at pr^fent unattainable ; and even although it were in your power to procure it, yet, in the opinion of many of your friends, a truce is more defirable. For it is a fort of medium between peace and war, and it might prove dangerous for you , before your po- litical institutions have acquired that liability which time alone can beftow , to pafs at once from the one extreme to the other. It might occafion too great a relaxation of the vigor which you have been fo long accuftomed to exert, and expofe you an eafy prey to the refentment of your enemy. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 30 r "But during the continuance of the truce, BOOK you will look forward to the expiration of it. III. By keeping your fortifications in repair, and your I60 *' troops under proper difcipline, joined to a pru- dent adminiftration of your finances, you will provide for that event; and thus, when the Spa- niards fhall perceive that you are well prepared for your defence, they will more eafily agree to thofe equitable terms of peace , which at this time their pride and their fenfe of fliame have determined them to reject. "The example of the Swifs cantons, whofe fortune £0 nearly refembles yours, ought to en- gage you to liften to the counfel which we offer. Like you, they had thrown off the yoke of their opprelfors, and their arms had generally been at- tended with fuccefs; yet they agreed to a truce, when propofed to them , on much lefs advantage- ous terms than thofe which you are exhorted to accept; and, during the leifure which it afforded them, they put their civil government and their military eftablifhments on fo refpe&able a'footing, as effectually determined their ancient matters to lay afide the thoughts of a farther profecutioh of the war. From the fame conduct it is likely that you will derive the fame advantages. The king of Spain will more eafily confent on equitable terms , to a truce than to a perpetual peace , be- caufe he may think that his dignity will fuffer lefs from making temporary than perpetual concef- fions : but many circumftances , it may be pre- fumed , will concur to deter him from a renewal 302 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK of hoftilities. His animofity and refentment will III. be abated, his ancient foverergnty over you will 1608. De ^ i n fome meafure, obfolete and forgotten: having tafted the fweets of tranquillity , he will defire to preferve it undiftuibed: he will have experienced that it is the interefl: of his fubjects at home , and ftill more of thofe in the Indies and America, to live at peace with you. And , as it will be impoflible, unlefs you be greatly want- ing to yourfelves , but that, fome years hence, you rnuft be po Me fled of greater refources than at prefent , he mud perceive the danger of engaging in war with you, after your power is eftablifhed and confirmed ; when he confiders , that in the very infancy of your ftate, his moft vigorous efforts to reduce you to obedience were of no avail. "What has been faid will be fufficient, it is hoped, to evince that the objections againft the truce, which have been urged by its oppofers, ought not to deter you from agreeing to it, in cafe the confent of the king of Spain can be procured to the terms propofed. Thefe objections indeed are urged by fome of the moft rcfpectable members of the ftate, whofe zeal for the profperity of the republic is unqueftionable. But the wifeft men are fubject to error. It may be true, that fome inconveniencies may arife from the truce , but it fhould feem that much greater are to be dreaded from a continuance of the war. And, it is a firft principle of prudence, of two evils to make choice of the leaft. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 303 tt Before we conclude this memorial, it is ne- BOOK cefTary to remind you of two things, which de- 111. ferve your attention. Firft, that it is not only l60i - the counfcl; but the earned requeft of thofe prin- ces, to whom you have been chiefly indebted for afliftance, that you fliould adopt the meafure we have recommended : and, fecondly , that fo fa- vorable a concurrence of circumftances as the prefent, for obtaining equitable terms of accom- modation , may never again occur. The arch- dukes are princes on whofe fidelity you can with fafety rely for the punctual performance of their engagements: they are fond of peace; at their earned entreaty , the king of Spain hath already made , and is ftill likely to make more ample conceflTions than could otherwife have juftly been expected ; and in conducting the treaty propofed, you will have all the afliftance that can be given you by two powerful monarchs , who confider your intereft as their own ".*' This memorial did not immediately produce the defired effect upon all the deputies. Several of the towns in Holland, and the whole province of Zealand, with prince Maurice at their head, ftill remained as averfe to the truce as ever; and Maurice ftill continued to employ his influence to confirm them in their refolution of oppofing it. By his emiffaries , and his letters , he attempted Negotiations de Jeannin , torn. iii. p. 9. Efcrit fait par Monfieur Jeannin, au nom de tous les ambaflkdeurs , jour treizieme O&obre, & mis es mains , de Meflicurs Les F.ftats. 3o 4 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK to gain over the other towns and provinces to his in. opinion. Pie fometimes talked as if both the nog. French and Britifh monarchs were pui filing their private intereft , at the expenfe of the republic. He infinuated that, unlefs they fhould drop the propofal of a truce, and immediately agree to af- fift the ftates more liberally than hitherto in pro- fecuting the war , the more diftant parts of the provinces ought to be abandoned , and the terri- tories of the republic contracted within fuch nar- row limits, as might be defended by the forces which the Dutch themfelves, without foreign af- fiftance ; were able to fupport. He alledged, that no matter of fo great importance as was at prefent under deliberation, could be adopted without the unanimous confent of all the towns and provinces: and threatened , that the province of Zealand , if forfaken by the other provinces, would alone maintain the war againft the Spaniards, till more ample concelTions were obtained z *. The French monarch could not avoid feeling fome refentment at his conduct, which he confi- dered as equally violent and injurious. But Hen- ry's candor would not fuffer him to diveft him- felf of that efteem which he had long entertain- ed for the prince's character ; nor to believe the fuggeftions of his enemies , that he was actuated by fome finifter defign. Fie ftill wrote to him as to a friend whom he highly refpected , fparing no pains, and employing every argument to engage him to adopt his views. Henry's Jeannin , torn. iii. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 305 Henry's endeavours were well feconded by BOOK Jeannin , who acted with the moft confummate ill. prudence, and carefully avoided giving any per- l6 ° 3, fonal offence to prince Maurice, while he exerted himfelf with great activity in counteracting his de- figns. By the eloquence and addrefs of Barnevelt, joined to the influence which he derived from his great experience, and the high opinion which was juftlv entertained of his public fpirit and integrity, Amfterdam and all the other towns in Holland were reconciled to the truce, on the terms pro- pofed ; and not long after, prince Maurice and the province of Zealand, with whom Jeannin and the Englifh ambafTadors, affifted by deputies fent thither by the other provinces, affiduoufiy employed all their influence , were perfuaded to relinquiih their oppofition. The archdukes were employing in the mean Reiuftanee of time their interelt at Madrid to obtain the confent know^* ' of Philip; who, from the beginning, had difco- the indepen. vered no lefs reluctance to Jeannin's propofal than ^""/stl/ prince Maurice or the province of Zealand. Far tes. from being averfe to a truce , this prince was exceedingly defirous that it fliould take place, provided it could be concluded on the ordinary condition of both parties retaining what was at prefent in their poffeffion. But to acknowledge the independence of his rebellious fubjects , and for- mally to grant them his permifTion to carry on their trade in India, were conditions with which he himfelf and many of his fubjects thoueht it ignominious to comply. Vol. I. X I6oS. 306 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK The archdukes endeavoured to convince him, III. that in making thefe conceflions , they would do nothing more than had been already done in con- tenting to the fufpenfion of arms, and that no more important cOnfequences could arife from it. They engaged to have the article relative to the Indian trade exprefled in fuch a manner, that it Ihould not materially affect the intereft; or the trade of Spain. They reprefented, that the declaration fo earneftly required by the United States, could not do any prejudice to the king's right of fovereignty, that it could not remain in force but while the truce fubfifted , and that the Hollanders would find it of no avail, after the renewal of hoftilities, if his majefty's arms were crowned with victory. They added that this was the opinion of the ambafladors of the mediating powers , and likewife of many members of the Rates of the revolted provinces, who oppofed the truce on account of the infigni- ficancy of the claufe which contained the declara- tion of their liberty. Thefe con federations, urged by fuch powerful foli- citors, had great weight with Philip, who would have yielded his confent , provided that fome conceffion could have been obtained in favor of the Catholic inhabitants of the United Provinces. And he had fome ground, he thought, to enter- tain the hope of being able , in fome meafure , to accompliih this object , in which he was more deeply interefted than in any other, when he con- fidered that the prince who was the chief mediator PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 307 in the prefent negociation, was himfelf a Catholic. BOOK But the archdukes having informed him , that in. Jeannin, whofe zeal for the Pop.fh faith was un- ,,! p«- queflionable, had declared that it would be in vain rrriip / s f to attempt to introduce any propofal concerning Philip, religion n^.ong the preliminary articles , Philip doubted whether he could enter with a good con- fcience into any treaty with fuch determined here- tics; and therefore hefitated , for feme time, whe- ther lie mould not utterly reject the truce , whatever confequences roieht follow. In order ro difpel his fcruples , the archduke fent ro Madrid his confeffor, Ignatio Brizuela , a Spaniard of noble birth , eminently diftinguifhed for his piety and virtue, and of great experience in the affairs of the Netherlands. Brizuela knew well how to make impreffion on the timid, fuperftittous mind of Philip; and judicioufly employed religion itfclf as a motive, which fhould induce him to comply with the archdukes requeft. If in the courfe of the treaty, faid he, any indulgence can be procured for the Catholic inhabitants, the French ambaflador will exert his moft ftrenuous endeavours in their behalf; but it is neceffary, he added, even for the intereft of religion, that the truce fhould be concluded, left , confidermg the difficulties under which the archdukes muft labor in renaming the .war, in- ftead or re - eftabliming the Catholic faith in the rebellious provinces, it (hall be expofed to danger in thofe which have been brought back to their allegiance. X 2 308 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK To this reafoning, Philip liftened with great III. attention, and feemed to be in a great meafure 1608. fatisfied, that he ought not any longer to withhold his confent; but chofe, as ufual , before he gave an explicit anfwer , to hear (he opinion of his favorite the duke of Lerma. The duke had not, it fhould fcem , as yet formed a decifive refolution with regard to the part which it would be moft prudent for him to act on the prefent occafion. He had long experienced the moft infurmountable difficulties in furniiliing the neceffary expenfes of the war; and he dreaded, if it were not fpeedily brought to a conclufion, fome great difaftcr might happen in the Netherlands, which would not be : afcribed to the marquis of Spinola , who had fo often given the moft unqueftionable proofs of military prudence and capacity , but to him , by whom that general had been difappointed in the fupplies and reinforcements which had been pro- mifed him. For this reafon , and perhaps too as was fufpected by his cotemporaries , from his jealoufy of Spinola , who had rendered himfelf of fo great importance as to rival him , or at leaft to enjoy too large a fhare in the royal favor, he had from the beginning been extremely intent on the eftablifhing of peace. Obferving , however, that both the pride of the Spanifti nation, and Phi- lip's fuperftition, were alarmed by the concedions demanded by the ftates, he had not ventured to advife a compliance with their requefts. But it would be much eafier, he was perfuaded to recon- cile the Spaniards to the truce, than to a peace, PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 309 as the conceffions to be made in the former were BOOK not to be perpetual; and Philip's religious fcruples 111. being in a great meafnre removed , by what the l6cS - confeffor had rcprefented to him, he laid afide that hcfitation and referve with which he had hitherto a&ed ; and uniting his influence to that of Brizuela, and of feveral other Spanifh ecclefiaftics, who were devoted to his intereft, he foon perfuaded Philip to grant his ratification of the preliminary articles. It was immediately tranfmitted to the archdukes, Phfl jv ratifies accompanied with a recommendation , to avoid , the preiinu- if poffible, the confenting to an cxprefs permiflion nar y attldes * of the Indian trade; and, if poffible, likewife to procure fome indulgence for the Popifh inhabitants in the United Provinces ,0 . During the confelTor's fhy at Madrid , the French and Englifh ambafladprs were employed in preparing at the Hague the feveral articles of the treaty. And as the archdukes commiffioners had fome months before , at the defire of the ftates, who dreaded their fecret practices among the depu- ties, returned to Bruflels, the negociations between the mediators and them had hitherto been carried on by letters. Rut as this method of conducting it was attended with the moft tedious delays , Jeannin in his own name, and that of the other ambaffadors, propofed to the archdukes that they fhould fend their Bentivoglio paffim. Negociations de Jeannin. torn. iii. p. 22J, 224. & 329, 3?o. Grotius. Winwood , vol. ii. p. $?8- 400, &c. Jeannin, torn. iii. p. 10. & torn. ii. P. 535. X 3 3io HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK cornmiflioners to meet with them at Antwerp. 111. This propofal was readily complied with and i«09. both parties arrived in that place m the beginning of February 1609. The ambafladors had brought with them a copy of the articles of the truce , of which they had obtained the approbation of the itates ; and they had engaged, that unlefs the archdukes commif- fioners fhouJd adopt it without any material altera- tion , wiih in eight days after their arrival in Aqtwerp, they fhould break off the conferences, and decline all further negociation on the fubjecl:. Both the archdukes and Spaniards, they knew, were at prefent utterly unprepared for the renewal of the war, and nothing, tiny believed, would contribute fo much to quicken their refolutions, as the dread of its being inftantly renewed. But when the refolution of the ftat.es was communicated to the Spanifh or archdukes com- miflioners, they complained that their, malters were rather ufed unhandfomely , and reprefentcd that the time allowed was too fhort for the difpatch of bufinefs of fo great importance. The ambafla- dors were fenfible of the truth of what they f;nd, and obtained the confent of the ftates , to prolong the time; after which both parties began ferioufly to apply themfelves to the djfcuftjori of the feveral articles of the treaty. Againft the fundamental article, which regarded the liberty and independence of the revolted pro- vinces , the commiffioners offered no objection, except to the title afTumed in it by the ftates, PHILIP III KING OF SPAIN. 31 1 of High and Mighty Lords , which they fo ob« BOOK itinately oppofed , that inllead of the terms high m. and mighty , the ambadadors were obliged to x60 »* fubftitute the word illuflrious. An article relating to contributions , amounting yearly to 300,000 crowns, which had been paid to the Dutch, by the inhabitants of the open country in Bra- bant, in order to procure an exemption from being plundered , was the occafion of much alter- cation. The fUtes very unreafonably required that thefe contributions fhould be continued during the truce But the mediators, having reprefented to them the injuftice of this requeft, and that the levying of contributions was equivalent to a continuance of hoililities, they at length con- sented that the article fhould be expunged , and in return for this conceflion, the archdukes agreed to yield to them fome extenfive diftricts adjoin- ing to Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, and other places, in the pofleflion of the ftates , upon condition that fuch of the inhabitants of thefe diftricls as were Catholics fhould be indulged in the free cxercife of their religion. A propofal was made for a mutual exchange of towns, which the contending parties had lately conquered from each other ; but as the conquefts of the Dutch had been much more important than thofe of the archdukes , no expedient could be deviled , to which the former thought it their intereft to agree : and for this reafon , it was at length determined that both parties (hould re- tain the towns at prefent in their poffeflion. Ihe X 4 3i2 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK Dutch were equally averfe to another propofal , ill. "which was urged with much earneftnefs by the I6 ° 9, Spaivfh commiffioners, that all thofe duties fhould be aboliflied , which were exacted in Zealand from fhips entering the Scheld , in their way to Antwerp. They gave fome ground however to expect that this matter might afterwards be amica- bly a dj lifted : and the archdukes were the more eaftly perfuaded to drop their requeft , as they hoped to be able in the time of peace to improve their pofts on the coaft of Flanders, and thereby to rival the Dutch in, thofe branches of commerce which they had engrofied during the fubfiftence of the war. Cornells about But of all the articles of the prcfent treaty, the uads" aU moft difficult to be adjufted to the mutual fatis- faction of the parties, was that which regarded the Indian trade. The archdukes were aware that unlefs the Dutch were grati fieri in this point, no accommodation whatever could take place ; nor were they or their fubjecls perfonally interefted in refufing to comply with their requeft. But being well acquainted with the obftinate and ab- furd reluctance of the Spaniards again ft making any concellion on this fubject, they ftill fufpected, notwithftanding their fanguine hopes of the fuc- cefs of Brizuela's application, that the king would never confent to ratify the truce, if this conceflion were explicitly exprefied. They were, for this reafon, extremely folicitous to perfuade the French and Englifh. ambafiadors to agree to fuch an in- direct form of expreflion, as might not alarm the PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN 313 pride or prejudice of the Spaniards, while it would BOOK admit of being interpreted in favor of the Dutch. III. The ambafradors were not averfe to this expedient; l6 ? 9 ' and they afterwards prevailed upon the Rates to confent to it, by giving them a declaration in writing, that notwithstanding the generality and obfeurity of the terms in which the article was couched , they underfhood it as containing a full permiffion to the s Dutch to carry on their trade in every part of India, that was not under the do- minion of the crown of Spain ; and by engaging likewife in the name of the kings whom they re- prefented , to guarantee this article relative to the Indian trade , as well as all the Other articles o£ the prefent treaty } \ Such were the principal points difeufTed between the archdukes commiilioners , and the French and Englifii ambafTadors, in the conferences that were held at Antwerp. Soon after the confeflbr arrived at Bruffels with Philip's ratification of the prelimi- nary articles; and nothing now remained, but to fettle fome matters of fmaller confequence , and to give the treaty its jufl; form, in order to its being figned by the contending powers In confequence of permiffion from the arch- dukes, the Dutch commiffioners formerly menti- oned, who had hitherto remained at the Hague, repaired to Antwerp : and that no folemnity might be wanting to a deed of fo great importance, an extraordinary affembJy of deputies from all the Bentivoglio. Grotius , lib. ulc. &c. 3i4 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 1«C». BOOK provinces and towns of the union, was fummoned XH. to meet at Bergen op-Zoom, where they might be 3t hand to ratify the feveral articles of the treaty, as foon as they fhould be digefted by the commif- fioners into proper form. As the confederates had not for many years been engaged in any matter in which they were fo deeply interefted , there were more than eight hundred deputies prefent in this affembly. The commiffioners , together with the French and Englifh ambalTadors , had meetings every day in the Hotel de Ville of Antwerp ; and there was flill confiderable diverfity of fentiments among them with regard to certain articles of the treaty , and particularly with refpedl to the time during which the truce fhould fubfift. It was at length agreed , that it fhould be concluded for twelve j-ears from the prefent period ; and as foon as this and the other points in difpute were fettled, and the treaty drawn up in the ufual form, it was transmitted to Bruffels and Bergen- op- Zoom , to receive the fanclion of the archdukes and of the ftates; and was finally concluded on the 9th of April i6ot>. It confifted of eight- and -thirty articles, the mod important of which were thofe which have been already mentioned. The reft had been pre- pared by Barnevelt , and were equally calculated to promote the fecurity and intereft of individuals and of the ftate '*. No individuals had merited Among other articles it was ftipulated that , duting the continuance of the truce , all hoitiiities fhould ceafe by fcas, rivers j and land, between the fubjeds , inhabitants, and Treaty For a peace concluded. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 315 fo highly from the republic as thofe of the family BOOK of Naflau ; and all parties readily concurred in |ll. perfons refident in the territories of the king of Spain and the archdukes , on the ore hand , and the United States , on the other , without any exception of places or perfons whatever. That either party fhould retain fafe and entire pcffeffion of whatever provinces, cities, places, lands and principalities it then enjoyed ; and that the fame conditions fhould be cbferved with regard to diftii&s , villages , and lands and territories thereon depending. Tnat the fubjects, and perfons refiding in the dominions of Spain and the archdukes, of the one part, and of the United States , of the other , fhould mutually cultivate good- will and friendship. That all reproach, refentment , and revenge on account of pa!t hoftilities and injuries fhould ceafe ; and that there fhould be a free and equal trade betweeD the fubjects of the contracting parties by rivers , feas , and land. That it fhould not be lawful to (top or lay hands on mer- chants, proprietors of fhips , fhipmafters, or their crews, or the fhips , or merchandize , or goods of any kind , on any pretence : but that juftice fhould have its ufual courfe for the recovery of debts, and in criminal profecutions. If any judgments or fentences had been paffed. againft the adherents of either party, on the footing of contumacy, and that fuch pei funs had been condemned without being de- fen led , tidier in civil or criminal caufes , fuch judgments or fer.'tences were not to be carried into execution during the truce , eiiher againft the perfons or goods of individuals Co condemned. Such ptrlbns, cr their heirs and executor*, as had differed the lots of the i: propeny through the rage of party , cr the violence of war ; by the rapine and injuftice of individuals, and without the aurh. r It y of the magiftrates , and the coun- renance and protection of the laws ; fuch perfons were robe reinftated, in virtue of the prefent treaty , inth. full poffeflion and enjoyment of their crn.d:s and eftates, even although 1609. 1 6C?. 316 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK giving them proof on this occafion of their refpect in. and gratitude. By one article of the truce it was they fhould have actually puffed into the condition , and af- fumed the appearance and nature of goods confifcated: whe- ther they might have been depofited as pledges, given away as donations, or alienated and transferred by any fpecies of bargain, tranfa&ion , or renunciation. If the goods or eftates fhall have puffed out of the exche- quer , and been difpofed of to Private poffeffors , then it was ftipulated, that interefi fhould be paid to the right owners of the goods, or eftates, at ths rate of i\ percent, per annum. And if this payment fhould be delayed , it was agreed , that the proprietors fhould be paid out of the ftock or capital. But if the difpofal or transference of fuch goods and eftates , by the exchequer , had been accompanied with fuch folemnitics as conftitute legal deeds , and the names of the right owners been erafed and fupcrfeded , by fuch legal formalities as con- ftitute legal rights and claims , yet even in that cafe , it was provided, that their eftates, rights, and properties fhould be reftored to the right owners , they refunding to any perfons that might be at that time in poffeffion , the bona fide price (where any had been given) which fuch perfons might have paid on purchafing any of the faid lands or properties fmce the confifcation , within the fpace of a year from the date of the prefent treaty. That no length of time, not even the whole fpace from the very beginning of the commotions in 1^67 , fnould be confidered as having conferred a prefcriptive right to property. Perfons who , during the courfe of the prefent war , had reti.ed into the dominions of neutral powers , were to be comprehended , and have the full benefit and advantage of the treaty : they were to return , if they were fo inclined , to the places of their former abodes , or to fettle in whatever place they fhould chufe , provided always , that they fhould comply with eflablifhed manners , laws , and cufloms. It was declared , in general terms , that all confiscations , and difinherifons, and transferences of property that hadori- l6o9. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 317 provided that none of the defendants of William, BOOK the firfl: prince of Orange, mould be liable for the HI. debts which that prince had contracted from the year 1567 till his death. And by another , that fuch of his eftates , within the territory of the archdukes, as had been confifcated , fhould be reftored , and his heirs permitted to enjoy them unmolcfled during the continuance of the truce ". The archdukes engaged that thefe and all the other articles fhould , within the fpace of three months , be ratified by the king of Spain ; and the king's deed of ratification was accordingly delivered to the ftates a few days before the ex- piration of that term, to transfer to his brother and his children the feveral high employments which he held at whatever period he fhould think fit. Thefe refolutions of the ftates feem to have originated from the French monarch , and were ginated in the violence of civil war, and the bitternefs of party - zeal , fhould be broken , cancelled, and to all intents and purpofes , null and void. Befides thefe proofs of attachment to the f.-.mily of the prince of Orange, the ftates had, fome time before thecon- clufion of the truce , refolved that prince Maurice's ?ppoint- nients , as admiral and captain- general , fhould not fuffer any diminution from the reduction of the forces. They even gave him an additional revenue, as a compenfation for his fhare of the prizes and contributions ; and they likewife augmented the appointments of prince Henry Frederic , and count Wil- liam Lewis of NafTau. Such was the conclufion of that nego- ciation , which, for more than two years , had employed the attention, not only of the contracting parties , but likewife of moli of the other princes and ftates in Europe. 3 i 8 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF I O K formed at the inftance of Barnevelt , whom Jean- III. nin had engaged to enter into his matter's 16C9 ' view"!. No perfon queftioned that prince Mau- rice's family were well entitled to every mark of favor which the dates could beftow; it was ra- ther unfortunate however for the prince's charac- ter that , after fo violent an oppofition to the truce , his acquiefcence in it was fo quickly fol- lowed by pecuniary rewards. But although his enemies were difpofed to infmuate that thefe re- wards were rather to be confidered as the price of his filence , than as rewards for his former Cervices , there is nothing to juttify thefe infinil- ations in the numerous letters extant in Jeannin's negociations , either of the king or the minitters of France. The Dutch were henceforward confidered as a free and independent people. Having gained immortal honor by the magnanimity which they had difplayed during the continuance of the war, they were ndw confidered as having obtained the reward which their virtue merited, and were eve- ry where refpe&ed and admired. Their mmiflers at foreign courts were now received with the fame diftinclion as thofe of other fovereign pow- ers ; and their alliance was courted by nations who had formerly regarded them as rebels , that mutt fpeedily fubmit to the yoke which they had fhaken off. On the other hand , the reputation of the Spa- nish nation received a mortal wound; and their PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 319 power ceafed to be regarded with the fame dread BOOK as formerly* They had been foiled by a handful ill. of their own fubje&s , and would not , it was fup- *«°9- pofed , any longer pretend to give law to other nations. The high fpirited nobility , and the people in general , were fecretly mortified by the concefTions which the Dutch had been able to extort; and were ready to afcribe the humiliation which the nation had fufFered, not fo much to any infurmountable difficulty in the conteft in which it had been fo long engaged, as to mifcon* dud and want of vigor on the part of govern- ment. IV. 1609. THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE THIRD, KING OF SPAIN. BOOK IV. A HE Spanifli nation was now at peace with all the world, except the piratic dates of Barbary; and it might j uftly have been expected that the king and his minifters would have inftantly ap- plied tbemfelves to the healing of thofe wounds which the monarchy had received during the continuance *of the war. But their incapacity for government , joined to their bigoted zeal for the Catholic fuperftition , prevented them from avail- ing themfelves of the tranquillity which they enjoyed , and determined them to engage in a new enterprife, which, although their endeavours were attended with greater fucceft , than had ac- companied their attempt to fubdue the United Provinces, proved no lefs pernicious to the nati- onal profperity. The Spanifli arms had been un- fuccefsfully employed againft foreign nations, for more than half a century; and all ranks of men had felt the neceffity of putting a period to the war ; yet no PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 321 no fooner was peace eftabliftied , than it was re- BOOK folved to expel from the bofom of the kingdom iv. feveral hundred thoufands of its moft induflrious t6Q9 * inhabitants. The Morefcoes had lived in Spain for more Account of than eight hundred years; and itill , after fo long ^j* 10 "** a period, remained a feparate people, diftinguifh* ed from the Spaniards by their language , theit religion, their character, and their manners. 1 he prefent race were the defcendants of thofe fanatic warriors, who, ifluing forth from the de- farts of Arabia, actuated with the wild ambition of compelling mankind to embrace the Mahomet- an fuperftition , had , with the moft aftonifhing rapidity , reduced under fubjection to their ca- liphs Perfia , Syria, Paleftine, and Egypt, and had afterwards extended their conquefts as far as the Straits of Gibraltar along the coaft of Africa. From Africa they tranfported an army into Spain, where in lefs than two years they expelled the Chriftian inhabitants from all the open and more fertile parts of the kingdom, and obliged them to take fhelter in the mountainous regions of At turia , and the other northern provinces. Spain had , about three centuries before , been conquered by the Goths, who had not only em{- braced the religion, but had likewife, as far as could be expected from ignorant Barbafiajs , adopted the language of the former inhabitants, and the diftinction between the conquerors and the conquered had long been loft. Their language was that corrupt dialect of the Roman tongue, Vul. i. y 3 z* HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK with a mixture of the Gothic , which is ftill the IV. language of Caftile ; and their religion was the 1609. Chriftian mingled with the fuperftitions of the church of Rome. They held the religion of their invaders in great abhorrence , and being at the fame time zealoufly attached to their own , great numbers of them chofe, rather than be guilty of apoftacy , to abandon the fertile provin- ces which they had fo long inhabited , and to fly, with their wives and children , to thofe uncultiva- ted parts of the kingdom, where, amidft caves and rocks , they might maintain their religion and their liberty. The Moors, in the mean time*, eftablifhed their dominion in Portugal , in the greater part of Caftile, Murcia , Andalufia, Valencia, and Gra- nada. Their kings made choice of Cordova for their place of refidence ; and , as numerous fup- plies of people every year arrived from Africa, they foon attained fuch a degree of flrength as convinced the Christians , that no attempt to re- cover their pofleflions could prove effectual. A predatory war however was begun, within half a century after the conqueft, and the Chrifti- ans, excited and conducted by Felagio, and other defcendants of their ancient kings , gave many fignal proofs of heroic bravery; but their fuccefs did not fully correfpond to their exertions, till a confiderable time afterwards , when various caufes concurred to render the conteft lefs unequal. Their cha- The Moors, naturally prone to eafe and plea- fure, had loft much of that warlike fpirit, which PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 323 they had derived from the fanguinary genius of BOOK. their religion. Their kings were weak, men, dif- IV. folved in luxury , had been from the beginning " 0> * extremely ill obeyed by their viceroys , and at length thefe viceroys , on whom their kings , agreeably to the oriental manners of government , devolved too jrreat a (hare of their authority, (hook off their allegiance , affumed the titles of kings themfelves , and erected their governments into feparate independent ftates. They were often engaged in war againfl; each other , or the king of Cordova, from whom they had revolted. Their ftrength was thereby much impaired ; and they could feldom act in concert againft their common enemy. It was long before the Chriftians could rightly improve the opportunities which were thus afford- ed them. For they too were divided into fcveral unconnected fovereignties ; and, for many years, through mifunderftandings , joined to the diftance at which they lay from one another, they found it no lefs difficult to act in concert than the Moors. But, at length, feveral of thefe little fovereignties being united under one head * , the war was carried on with greater vigor than ever on the part of the Chriftians. The Mahometans were, in numberlefs rencounters, overpowered. They •were expelled from many parts of the open coun- try , of which they had long held polfeilion , and had much reafon to apprehend that , if they dirt not correct the errors in their government , or Under Sancho , an. 1035. Mariana, iib. viii. Y % 324 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK conduct, which had occafioned their misfortunes, IV. they muft ere long fink under the growing power 1609. an j fnpcrior bravery of the enemy. Their downfal was long retarded by the folly of the Chriftians , who, on numberlefs occafions, fuffered equally with the Moors, from the want of concord. Far from taking warning from the misfortunes of the Moors, they were almoft con- tinually at war with each other, and often fcemed to be no lefs intent on one another's deftruclion , than on that of their common enemy. It often happened that, by the conquefts which they obtain- ed over each other, ftatcs of a considerable magni- tude were formed , the fovercigns of which , if they had acted wifely, muft have proved an overmatch for the Moors. But thefe ftates were no fconer formed than they were again difiblved , through the pernicious practice adopted by the kings, of dividing their dominions among their children. This practice , of which there are many inftances in the hiftory of Spain, was, at different periods, a copious fourceof animofity and difcord. It prov- ed equally pernici ous to the people , and to the families of the kings, and long rendered it impof- fible for them to make any confiderable effort againft the infidels. Their exertions, however, were generally much more vigorous and fuccefrful than thofe of their opponents; and before the end of the thirteenth century, they had acquired the kingdoms of Caftile, Navarre, Arragon , Murcia, and Valencia. Their intcftine divifions Jftill arofe , at times , to the PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 325 fame height as formerly ; and the Chriftian , as BOOK well as the Mahometan parts of Spain , exhibited, XV. almofl every year, fome new fcenes of bloodfhed I6C, » and devaftation ; till towards the end of the fif- 'teenth century, when, by the marriage of Ferdi- nand with Ifabella, the crown of Caftile was uni- ted to that of Arragon : an event which , while it in a great meafure fecurcd internal tranquillity to the Chriftians , gave them a decided fuperiority over their ancient enemies. At this period, the only Moorifh kingdom which remained unconquered was that of Granada, which contained a great extent of fertile country, and feveral of the ftrongefl towns in Spain. From the fituation of fome of the chief of thefe towns on the fea-coaft , the Moors could eafily receive afliftance from their friends in Africa; and Ferdi- nand was, on this account, the more folicitous to deprive them of fo important a poffeflion, This artful prince was feldom at a lofs to find pretexts to color his ambitious enterprifes ; and the prefent juncture was the molt favorable to his defign which could juftly be expected. There were two competitors, at this time, for the crown of Granada , Aibohardill , and his nephew Boab- dilla; and the whole kingdom was torn in pieces by the contending parties , who often fatiated their vengeance in each other's blood. Ferdinand could not fuffer fo favorable an opportunity to efcape : he firft entered into an alliance with the nephew againft the uncle, under the cover of which he made war upon the latter, Y 3 326 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK and expelled him from his territories; and foon IV. afterwards . he turned his arms againft. his ally , 1609. made himfelf mafter of the city of Granada ' , and all his other fortified places; and, although he flill affected to treat him with refpect, he foon rendered it neceffary for him to abandon his dominions, and retire to Africa. In the profecution of the war, Ferdinand gave proof of great abilities , as well as of the mod confummate artifice. Notwithstanding which it wa* protected to the unufual length of ten years ; and , from the difficulty which he encountered in his operations againft a people fo much weakened by inteftine divifions, it is probable that he would not have been able to complete their fubje&ion, if their whole force united had been employed in repelling his attacks Their kings had, in a great meafure , loft their affection by their folly and mif- conduct; and, for this reafon , they were not fo reluctant, as they would otherwife have been, ag'iinft transferrins: their allegiance: but they re- quired, and Ferdinand judged it expedient, to grant them fuch conditions as they thought would put them nearly on the fame footing with his other fubjects. Of thefe conditions it was one that they fiiould be permitted the free exercife of their religion; and for the firft feven years after the conqueft , no violence was offered them on that account. Ferdinand expected , that after the abolition of their government, they might eafily be converted An 1492. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 327 to the Chriftian faith. But , finding that the in- BOOK ft.ruci.ions of the ecclefiaftics on this head were not iv. attended with the defired effect, he refolved, not- uo ?« withftanding his engagement confirmed by an oath, rather to employ compulfion, than any longer to indulge fo great a proportion of his fubjects in the exercife of a falle religion. He made choice of the celebrated Ximcnes, achbifhop of Toledo, to carry his defign into ex- ecution ; and \, for this purpofe , ordered him to repair to Granada , with full power to employ whatever meafures he Ihould judge to be mod ex- pedient. Ximenes began with careffing , and making prcfents to fome of the leading men among the IVlorefcoes, and thus perfuaded fome of them to fubmit to be baptized. But, making little progrefs in this way, and his natural impati- ence and feverity quickly prompting him to have recourfe to other methods, more agreeable to his difpofition , he threw all fuch of their leaders as TheMnref- refined to comply with his requeft , into prifons coes p« rfe * and dungeons, where they were treated as if they the S nanj„ had been guilty of the mofi atrocious crimes. arts. The people, highly incenfed againft him, on account of this violent procedure, took up arms, and having furrounded his palace, demanded that their leaders might be releafed. But having no perfon among them inverted with authority to conduct their operations, they were quickly dif- perfed by the count de Tendilla , the governor of the citadel : immediately after which Ferdinand , by the advice of Ximenes, fent judges to Granada, Y 4 3?S HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK and by thefe judges the people were found guilty lv. of rebellion againft his government. It was declar- J6o?, ec j D y t h c f e judges that the whole IVlorefcoes in Granada, though only a fmall part of them had been concerned in the infurredlion , were yet, on that account, liable to be capitally punifhed; and the king was well prepared with his army to carry the fentence into execution. But having offered them a pardon , on condition of their embracing the Chriftian religion ; upwards of fifty thoufand of them, all citizens of the town of Granada, fubmitted to be baptized. The inhabitants of the country were treated with equal violence; for they too, upon receiv- ing intelligence of what had patted in Granada, had begun to put themfelves into a pofture of de- fence. The count de Tendilla was ordered to march againft; them with an army of veteran troops ; and this general , in order to intimidate them , put all the inhabitants of one of their towns, men , women , and children , to the fword. Still, however , they refufed to lay down their arms , till Ferdinand himfelf, at the head of a numerous army, having reduced all their fortified places, the greater part of them confented to ourchafe their lives at the expenfe of their religion ; and the reft, upon paying ten dollars each of them , as a ranfom, were permitted to tranfport themfelves to Barbary. From this time , the Granada IVlorefcoes were confidered by the Spaniards as Chriftians, although it can hardly be fuppoied that any of them were PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 320 fincercly converted to the Chriftian faith. They book were ftyled the New Chriftians, in contradiftinclion IV. from the Spaniards , who were called the Old. l609 ' They were not admitted to the enjoyment of any office, either in the church or flate. But when they difcovered , on any occafion , an attachment to IYlahomctanifm , they were treated by the in- quifition as apoftates ; and great numbers of them were, every year, condemned by that tribunal, and committed to the flames. By this treatment, which was equally impoliti- cal and unchriftian , their prejudices againft the catholic religion , and the Spanifli government , were ftrengthened and confirmed. Their ill-hu- mor, however, fhowed itfelf only in murmurs and complaints: and the Morefcoes in Granada are fcarcely mentioned in the Spanifh hiftory, till the reign of Philip II. when, in confequence of frefh opprellion , having made an unfuccefsful at- tempt to vindicate their liberty , mod of them, as formerly related, were tranfplanted into Caftile , and other inland provinces. It is not to be doubted that Philip would have treated the IVIorefcoes of Valencia, in the fame manner as thofe of Granada , had he not been de- terred by his experience of the expenfe and dan- ger with which the reduction of the latter had been accompanied. The IVloorifh kingdom of Valen- cia had been conquered by James I. king of Ar- ragon, before the middle of the thirteenth century; and this prince had been extremely folicitous to have the people converted to the Chriftian faith. 330 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK He had, for this purpofe , erected fchools, where IV. the ecclefiaftics might learn the Arabic; and, in 16 °?' obedience to his commands, feveral Dominicans and other friars, had applied themfelves to the ftudy of that language, after acquiring which, they had entered on the office of miffionaries among the Morefcoes. But whether they were not furri- cicntly acquainted with that language , to be able to teach in it, or had not fufficient patience for fo arduous a talk as that of combating the religious prejudices of a people noted for their bigotry , they foon began to reprefent the IYlorefcoes as ob- ftinate infidel?, whom it was in vain to expect to convert by inftruction. Even miracles, they pre- tended, had been wrought among them without fuccefs , and, therefore, compulfion was now the only expedient that could prove effectual. At the inftigation of thefe ecclefiaftics , Pope Clement , the fourth of that name , having advifed the king to expel the Morefcoes from his domini- ons if they mould flill refufe to be converted, James would readily have embraced this council, if he could have perfuaded his cortes to confent. But, by the free conftitution of the government of Arragon, to which Valencia was now annexed, the confent of the cortes was requifite; and, al- though the clergy and commons were willing to gratify the king, yet the barons, who forefnv the ruin of their eflates if the IYlorefcoes, their vnlTals, were expelled, oppofed the meafure with fuch in- flexible obftinacy, that James found it neceffary to reJinquifh his defign. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 331 From this period, to the conqueft of Granada BOOK by Ferdinand, almoft two hundred years had elap- IV. fed; and during all that time, the Valencia Moors ,609 ' had been indulged in the free exercife of their re- Thc " ranny of king ligion. Rut when the barons heard of the vio- Ferdinand knee with which Ferdinand had treated the " ftra,ne<1 b T the ccrtcs* JVloors of Granada, they dreaded an extenfion of his tyranny to their vafTals in Valencia; and, in order to prevent it, they required, and, though with fome difficulty, obtairied his affent to a law pafled in the corfes , in the year 1510, where it was enacted that no IVlorefco, within the kingdom of Valencia , fhould either be expelled from the kingdom, or compelled to embrace the Chriftian faith. Nor were the barons fatisfied with taking this precaution; but, in order to prevent the court or the ecclefiaftics from reviving their defign , in any future reign , they refolved to make it henceforth apart of their king's coronation - oath , that, on no pretence whatever, he fnould attempt to expel the INlorefcoes from Valencia , or employ force to engage them to embrace the Chriftian religion; that he fhould never attempt, diredlly or indirectly* to procure a difpenfation from this oath, nor even accept of a 'difpenfation , in cafe it (hould be offer- ed him. This oath was fworn , a few years after, by Charles V. at his ncceilion ; and the barons feem- cd then to poffefs the utmoft fecurity which they could defire againft: any future oppreffion of their valTuls. But they foon experienced, how ineffectual 332 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK the ' wifeft precautions fometimes prove againft; IV. the events of fortune. A bloody war having "09. broken out between the commons, and nobles of Valencia, in the year 1520; the former, actuated partly perhaps by religious bigotry , but prin- cipally by revenge againft the latter, publifhed a manifefto, requiring all the Morefcoes , under the penalty of death, immediately to embrace the ca- tholic religion. The nobles were, at that time, unable to afford them protection againft their enemies; and as the Morefcoes were themfelves fufficiently acquainted with the violent character of the commons , they knew that it would be in vain to offer any remonftrance on the fubject. Without delay, therefore, almoft the whole of them confented to be baptized , in the hopes that, when tranquillity fliould be reftored , no advantage would be taken by the court of this deed of theirs, which was known to be the effect of law- lefs force and violence. But no fooner were the civil commotions of the kingdom compofed , than Charles, having con- vened an affembly of the clergy, to confider of the validity of that baptifm , to which the Moref- coes had been obliged to fubmit; it was deter- mined by this alTembly, that although they ought not to have been compelled to fubmit to be bapti- zed , yet the character thereby imprefled upon them was indelible, they were henceforth to be confulered as Chriftians , and in the cafe of a defection from the catholic religion, to be treated asapoftates; that the name of God, as is fubjoined PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 333 in the decree, may not be blafphemed , nor con- BOOK tempt brought upon the Chriftian profeflion. IV. The IVIorcfcoes, confcious of a fincere attach- 160, • ment to the Mahometan faith , and being at no lofs to underftand, that by this decree it was in- tended they fliQ.uld henceforth be fubject to the jurifdiction of the inquifition , they had no other expedient left to fave themfelves from the cruelty of that barbarous tribunal, but to aflert (which great numbers of them did ) that they had not been baptized ; and as , amidft the confufion of civil difcord , no regifter of their baptifms had been kept, it was impoffible in moft cafes to dis- prove their afiertion. Of this difficulty the ecclefiaftics gave informa- tion to the emperor; and about the fame time, a difpenfation from his coronation oath was fenc him by the pope \ Charles had acquired a great acceffion of power by his fuppreflion of the late rebellion ; and the power of the nobles had fuffered a proportional diminution. Being no longer afraid , therefore , of any oppofition which he might receive from the Valencia barons , and being delivered from his religious fcruples by the pope's difpenfation from his oath , he rirft * gave orders to the clergy to apply themfelves to the in- ftruclion of the Morefcoes in the Chriftian faith, commanding the barons to require a punctual at- tendance from their vaffals, on the inftruclions that fhould be given them ; and in the following ' Clement VII. Vide Geddes. An. ij*f. 3$4 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK year , he ordered all the Morefcoes , who denied IV. their having been formerly baptized, either im- 16u9 ' mediately to fubmit to that initiatory rite, or to quit the Spanifh dominions, under the penalty of perpetual fervitude. The Morefcoes of Pianaguazil refufed to accept of this alternative, and had recourfe to arms in their defence ; but thefe men having been eafily reduced to obedience , it was believed that , after the year 1526, there was hardly a fingle Morefcoin Spain who had notfubmitted to the rite of baptifm. There was no reafon however to fuppofe that any confiderable number of them were fincerely converted to the Chrifiian faith; and, as it is im- poflible for men who act a fictitious part, uniform- ly to conceal their real fentiments , the hiftory of Spain, during the reign of Charles and that of his fucceffor, is filled with complaints againfl: them f , on account of their infidelity. Frequent councils were held at Madrid, to confider of the proper means of effectuating their converfion. Orders were repeatedly fent from thence , requi- ring the clergy to exert themfelves with greater activity in inftructing them; and the inquifition every year exercifed againfl great numbers of them its wonted rigor and feverity. Still, however, it fhould feem that their at- tachment to the Mahometan fuperflition, as well as to their ancient manners and cu Horns , remained as (trong as ever. 5 The reader will remember that the Morefcoes here fpoken of, are thole of Valencia. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 335 Nor will this appear furprifing, if it is true that BOOK men arc commonly attached to a falfe religion in iv. proportion to its abfurdity; becaufe , not being i«o». accultomed to employ their reafon on the fubjedt of religion, they are incapable of being convinced by reafon. But, befides this confideration , there were other caufes which concurred in producing that inconquerable obftinacy which the Moref- coes difcovered in their adherence to Mahomet- anifm. They were proud of profcfling a religion, which was the religion of all thofe mighty em- pires that had been founded by their anceftors. They had often entertained the hopes of being Thetttnch- refcued by means of the Turks, and other Maho- ™« n * oftht r l e •« 1 Morefcots metans, from the Spaniin yoke, and could not re- to the m«- folve entirely to abandon a religion which they ex- homeun r, 1 r 1 1 ... re- religion it. peeled, iooner or later, to be at liberty to profels. «ounteir«r. 1 heir hereditary hatred of the Spaniards, which had been nourifhed by an uninterrupted courfe of hofhlities during feveral centuries, had been riveted, fince the conqueft, by the feverity with which they had been ufed ; while their averfion , to the catholic worfhip was heightened by the appearance which the ufe of images in that worfhip gave it of idolatry, againft every fpecies of which all Mahometans are actuated with the mofl irrecon- cilable averfion. When to thefe confiderations we add how little qualified the Spanifh ecclefiaftics were to inftruct them in the principles of Chrif- tianity, and that mod of the Morefcoes lived de- tached from the Spaniards in towns and villages, and diftri&s by themfelves, feldom affociacing 336 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK with any but thofe of their own perfuafion , and IV. fpeaking a language of which the ecclefiaftics , as 1609. we jj as tne people, were extremely ignorant; when all tbefe circumftances are confidered , it will not be fo furprifing, as at firft fight it might appear, that fo fmall a number of them fhould have been converted to the Chriftian faith. It muft , at the fame time, be acknowledged thattheir infidelity afforded juft ground for unea- finefs to the Spanifh monarchs, who could hardly expect to. gain the affections of a people, differing fo widely from themfelves, and from their Spanifh fubjects , in matters regarded as the mod import- ant and efl'ential. The raoft inveterate enemies of Spain had for many years been the Turks, and the IVloors of Barbary; and it could fcarcely be fuppofed, that, in the cafe of an invafion by thefe powers, the Morefcoes would be averfe to ex- change their prefent mafters for others, whofe re- ligion , cuftoms , and manners , were fo nearly fimilar to their own. Good policy, therefore, required that no pains fhould be fpared , on the part of the kings of Spain, to accomplish the converfion of their Morefco fub- jects. Nor does it appear that thefe princes were at any time neglectful of an object which they juftly deemed fo highly defervingof their attention. They had inftituted fchools, as already mention- ed, for teaching the Arabic tongue. They had often inculcated upon the clergy, to whom the inftruction of the Morefcoes was intrufted , the neceffity of greater diligence in their endeavours to PHILIP III. KING OF SPAltf. 33* to reclaim them. The royal commands on this BOOK head had, on different occafions, been enforced »v. by the Roman pontiffs; and, in order to engage 160,< men, properly qualified, to apply themfelves to this important work, they had augmented the church -livings in many of thofe parts of the king- dom where the Moors rcfided. Thefe were perhaps the only means which the religious prejudices of the people, and the max- ims or genius of the Spanifh government, would permit to be employed; and if the MorefcoeS had, at the fame time, been ufed with greater kindnefs, or even with greater lenity and forbear- ance, it is probable that, fooner or later, thefe means would have been attended with the defired fuccefs. But, befides that, the faith which the Spnnifti princes had pledged to them when they fubmitted to their authority had been often vio- lated, they had been from the beginning treated with every mark of jealoufy and fufpicion ; they had been excluded from all the honors, and from every important office in the ftate; encou- ragement had been given to the moft minute and malignant inveftigation of their private conduct; and after the power of the barons, who had long acted as their protectors, was reduced, they were expofed a defcncelefs prey to the avarice and cruelty of the Inquifition *. The kings of Spain were too deeply tinctured with the bigotry of the Romifh church , and their maxims of government too defpotic, to allow Carta de Don Pedro de Valencia , IMS. No. f. Vol. I. Z 338 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF O K them to perceive the abfurdity of thefe meafures, IV. fo extremely ill calculated to promote the pufpofe 1609. for which they were defigned. Charles the Hfth, however, and Philip the Second, two princes no- ted lor their political difcernment, being aware of the prejudice which the kingdom would fuftain, if the Morefcoes , who formed fo great a propor- tion of their fubjects were expelled, had given no ground to fufpeel that they would ever con- fent to their expulfion ; nor does it appear that the clergy , who earneftly wiihed that this mea- sure might be embraced , ever attempted to re- commend it cither to Charles or his fon. But, foon after the acceffion of the prefent king, they conceived the hopes of being able to accomplifh their defire ; becaufe both Philip and his minif- ter , they thought , would be influenced more by religious than political confederations; and, in eafe they could be perfuaded that the intereft of religion was concerned in the expulfion , would be eafily reconciled to the political inconvenien- cies that might attend it. The motives which determined the eeckfiaftics in their conduct on this occafion were not merely fuch as were fuggefled by religious zeal or bigot- try. The obftinacy of the JYlorcfcoes in adher- ing to Mahometanifm had been generally afcribed to the remiffnefs or negligence of thofe who had been employed to inftruct them 7 ; and the clergy were fen lible that much greater pains were requifre for this end than they were willing to beltow. By a brief from die pope, Gregory XIII. an. 1576- PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 339 Befides which , their revenues had been taxed BOOK for augmenting the IVlorefcoe vicarages, and for iv. building and endowing an additional number of 16o9% churches for their inftrudtion. They were, on both thefe accounts , inflamed againft the Moref- coes with a peculiar hatred; and, in order that they might at once avoid the labor neceffary for converting them, and the cenfure which they muft incur in cafe of their declining it, they earneftly dtfired their expulfion; and, in order to effectuate it , were perpetually inveighing againft them as an incurable race of infidels , of whofe conver- fion, without a miraculous interpofition of Divine Power, no hopes could juftly be entertained* Of all the ecclefiaftics, the perfon who difco- vered the mod unrelenting hatred againft this unhappy people was Don John de Ribera , patri- arch of Antioch, and archbifhop of Valencia , an aged prelate , who was held in high veneration by his countrymen for his piety and learning; and, in different hiftories of his life, publifhed in Spain and Italy, is celebrated as one of the brighteft ornaments that ever adorned the Chrif- tian church. But there is nothing for which the hiftorians have been fo liberal in his praife as the flaming zeal which he difplayed in his unwearied exer- tions for the expulfion of the IVlorefcoes, in which they fuppofe him to have been equally animated by a patriotic concern for the fafety of Spain , and a pious folicitude for the prefervation of the Catholic faith. 340 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK It has been queftioncd , however, whether his lv. motives were in reality fo pure as his admirers ISO?, would have us to believe ; for there is ground td fufpect, that, after the Pope, at the requeft: of Philip II. impoied a new tax of between three and four tboufand dollars yearly on the revenues of his archbifhopric, for augmenting: the falaries of the curates employed in inflruciing the IVJo- refcoes , his zeal for their expulfion became more violent than ever. This tax, it is faid, neither he, nor any of the clergy in his diocefe, ever paid; and although the king; in order more eafily to reconcile the Morefcoes to Chriftianity, had obtained from the Pope an edict of grace in their favor, containing a plenary pardon for all their paft offences, on condition that, within the fpacc of four years, they fhould make confeflion to certain commiffioners, to be appointed by Ribera and the other biihops , yet this edict was not pub- lifhed, nor any commiffioners appointed, till after two years and a half, when Philip III. interpofed his authority for that effect. In defence of the archbifhop's conduct in thefe inftances, it nny be alledged, that, from long experience, and many fruidefs trial? , he believed the infidelity of the Morefto'es to be incurable , and that he would not have thus ventured repeat* edly to difobey the orders of his fpiritual fuperior, had he not known that the fovereign pontiff", having the fame opinion as himfelf of the vanity of all farther attempts for their converfion , did not ferioufly defire to have his orders carried into PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 341 execution. But whatever were the motives of BOOK this prelate's conduit, and though it juftly ex- IV. pnfed him to the imputation of wifliing rather to lC09, have the Morefcoes expelled than converted, no perfon had greater influence on this occafion with the king and his minifters in recommending the meafure that was afterwards embraced. From the arguments which he employed in Memorial! two memorials on the fubject, prefented to the n f splin'af king, the reader will be better able to judge of e-^d the the motives by which both lie and the court of Spain were determined. In his flrft memorial, dated in the year 1602, his principal <\^Cign was to found their inclination, and to awaken in them a fenfe of the danger to which the kingdom was expofed. "After all the pains, he faid , which had been beftowed in attempting to convert the fVIorefcoes to Chriftianitv , they were ftill as ftrongly as ever attached to the Mahometan f'u perflation. In the kingdom of Valencia , the bifhops, the rectors, and preachers , had in vain ufed their mod ftre- nuous endeavours to perfua^e them to avail them- felves of the Pope's edict of grace, which had been lately published. In rcafoning with thei^ leading men , it had been obferved, that, as often as they were put to filence by the arguments employed to convince them , tb^v changed color, and were fo inflamed with indignation, as evidently fhowed how much they dcGred to be able to employ force in defence of their opinions. They correfponded with thofe of their own feet in the Z3 34* HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK moit diftant parts of the country, and fent their iv. emiffanes every where, to encourage the people l6Q9 ' to perfevere in their infidelity. They all fpoke with one mouth , and had the fame anfwer to return to their infhuctors, that they were already Chriftians ; that they had already confeOed all the fins, of which they were confcious, to their re- fpective priefts; and that, being occupied with their proper bufinefs , they had not leifure to at- tend to the conduct of others, and therefore knew not of any perfons who practifed the rites of the Mahometan religion. They had often been con- victed of falfliood ; but on thefe occafions they were either filent, or they repeated the fame reply to the queftions that were put to them. Since the publication of the edict of grace, they had celebrated the feftivals of their religion with greater folemnity than before; and, with much effrontery, had caroufed together, on receiving intelligence of the unfuccefsful iflue of the expedition of his majeity's forces againft Algiers. "From this conduct of the Morefcoes , conti- nued Ribera, which 1 have reprefented with my wonted impartial regard to truth, two important confequences follow, which require your majefty's mod fcrious attention. "The firfl is, that thcbifhops, and other paftors of the church, are laid under the painful neceflky of doing what many learned doctors of the church think unlawful, the adminiftering of the fucra- ment of baptifm to thofe who they know will, foonei or later, become anoftates from the faith j PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 343 for there is a moral certainty that every Morefco BOO^ child, whom we baptize, will, through the ex- iv. ample and inftrudtion of his Mahometan parents, ,to »- become himfelf a Mahometan. And this we are taught to expect, not only by reafon and experi- ence, but by the fpirit of God, who, in fpeak- ing of the infidelity of Rehoboam, makes twice mention, in one chapter, that he was the fon of Naama, a Gentile; which is equivalent to declar- ing that to be the child of a mother who is an infidel, and to be educated by her, is a certain means of making the child an infidel. "In baptizing the Morefco children, therefore, our confeiences are greatly difturbed with the apprthenfion that we are guilty of violating the commandment of our Lord JefusChnft, who has prohibited the giving of holy things to dogs, and the calling of pearls before fwine. "Nor is this the only unhappy confequence arifing from the incurable infidelity of the Mo- refcoes. But the kingdom of Spain is, therefore, expofed to the ereattfr. rifk of becoming an tvfy prey to the hoftile defigns of our enemies. This kingdom was ruined in former times by the in- trigues of a fingle perfon, count Julian , at whofe inftigation it was invaded and fubdued by the Saracens, when they had no friends within the kingdom tofecond their attempt. And frcm thence may be perceived how great occafion there is fat the moft difquieting apprehenfions at this time, when there are efUblifrvd in the kingdom ninety thoufand men fit to carry arras, and ;i]i of them z 4 344 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK actuate! with the moft irreconcilcable averfion to iv. the prefent government. 1 he Turks and Moors 1609. sre t ^Q inveterate enemies of Spain, becaufe flie is the principal bulwark of Chiiftendom ; the French, from jeajoufy , or envy of her grcatnefs; and the Englifh, on account of her zeal for main- taining the purity of the Catholic faith; is there not j u ft ground to dread that fchefe our foreign enemies , allured by the hopes of affiftance from thofe whom we nourifh in our bofom, fhall unite their forces , and undertake the fubverfion of the monarchy ? Efpecially when it is confidercd that, With the powerful affifiance they would receive from the Morefcoes , a fmall number of troops would be fufficient, and no extraordinary pre- parations or expenfe required. " I he Morefcoes, in Granada alone, had with- ftood the whole force which the late king could mufter againftthem, although, befides his Spa- nifh troops, he had fent for into Spain a numerous reinforcement of Germans and Italians. But, if all the Morefcoes in the different parts of the kingdom were to take arms, which it is unquef- tionable they would do, if either the Turks, or French, or linglifij , were to attempt an invafion, our condition would then be the moll deplorable and defperate, and, like our anceftors , we mnft refolve either to yield our necks to the yoke of conquerors, or to take (belter, as they did, among the rocks or mountains of Afluria. "As often as I have refie&ed on the imminent danger to which tbi$ mighty monarchy Hands PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 34* expofed , I have thought it unaccountable, that, BOOK during the long reigns of two fuch wife and power- IV. fulmonarchs, as the emperor, and the late king, 1 *°** no fufficient fecurity againft it was provided. Nor can I account for their negligence in this refpect, but on the fuppofition that God, who rules the hearts of kings, thought fit to referve this import- ant work, fo worthy of your royal breaft, on purpofe to adorn the annals of your pious reign ; as he rcferved the deliverance of his chofen people for IVlofes, their entrance into the promifed land for Jofhua, the conqueft of the Philiftines for Da- vid, and the inflicting of vengeance on the Amale- kites for Saul. "Either this has been his intention, or he hath fo long prevented the Spanifii monarchs from per- ceiving the neceiliry of delivering Spain from fo great a danger, that, by means of the Morefcoes, he may pumfh us for our fins. But, in my opi- nion, one of the greateft: of thefe is the permitting of fo great a number of inveterate enemies of the church and (late for fo many years to retain their power of doing mifchief; nor is it reafonable to exped fuccefs in foreign enterprifes , till the king- dom fhall be purged of its domeftic foes. "In the year 1588, when the great Armada was deftroyed , I was emboldened by my zeal for the interell of religion and ray country , to. repre- fent to your royal father, that, after having long and carefully inquired why it had pleafed God to permit fo great a calamity to befal us, I was pcifuaded that he intended thereby to inftrucl; the 34<5 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK king, that, till he had extirpated herefy from his JV. own dominions, he ought not to have fuffered his ie °*' attention to be diverted by any thing that paffed in foreign dates. And , in like manner , confi- ding in your majefly's clemency for forgivenefs of the liberty which I take, I muft declare that, af- ter the moft mature confederation, it appears to me, that no other account but this can be given of the late failure of your expedition againft Algiers, in which there was nothing omitted which human prudence could, fuggeft to infure fuccefs. "It is the will of heaven, that your maiefty fhould firft provide for the fafety and tranquillity of your own dominions; and, in order to accom- plifih this end , it is neceffarv that your domeftic enemies, thofe apoftates from the faith, who are equally enemies to the ftate and to our moft ho- ly religion, fhould be deprived of the power of difturbing your repofe. No object, furely, can be more deeply interefting; and, therefore, I truft I (hall be pardoned for prefuming, with due hu- mility, to exhort your majefty to require your minifters, without delay, to apply themfelvcs to the confideration of it, with all that ferious atten- tion which it fo highly deferves, excluding from all the councils which fball be held for that pur- pofe, all thofe perfons whofe private intereft may hinder them from perceiving what is conducive to the public good V ' Vida de Ribera. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 34? This memorial was mod gracioufly received by BOOK the king and the duke of Lerma , both of whom IV. wrote letters of thanks to the patriarch for the 16 ° 9 ' wholafome counfel which it contained, and re- quired him to give them his opinion with regard to the proper means of obviating that imminent danger, to which it appeared, from his memorial, the kingdom was expofed. In compliance with this requeft, and emboldenend by the confidence repofed in him, Ribera foon after prefented another memorial, of which the purport was, parti to perfuade Philip that no other means could prove effectual for the utter extirpation of the [YloreC- coes ; and partly to take off the force of fuch ob- jections, as either religion or humanitv might fuggeft, to deter him from having recourfe to this expedient. In facred writ, he faid, there was no precept fo often repeated to the chofen people of God as that of rooting out from among them thofe infi- del nations whom they found in pofTcffion of the promifed land. A fliicl obedience to this precept was particularly inculcated on the kings and rulers oi the people; and the firfr. king, whom God himfelf had appointed to rule over them, incur- red the divine difpleafure, and was deprived of his kingdom , merely on account of his difobe- dience. The pernicious confequences of permit- ting the Morefcoes to remain in Caft'le and Ar- ragon were the fame as thofe which the children of Ifrael experienced from their communication with the idolatrous heathens ; for the faithful 34$ HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK in Spain vrere in equal clanger from the infection Iv « of their example, and the extirpation of thefe infidels was therefore equally incumbent on the catholic king, as that of the heathens on the kings and captains of the Jews. in following the example of David, and other good kings of Ifrael, Philip would likewife imi- tate the conduct of fome of the befl; and greateft of his predeceflbrs ; by whom the Jews had, at different periods , been expelled from Spain , though their provocations had never been fo great as thofe of the Morefcoes ; for the Jews were not heretics and apoftates as they were, and were never a ecu fed of holding correfpondence with the enemies of the flate. His illuftrious grandfather, Charles V. the wifeft and greateft prince of the age in which he lived, Lad publifhed an edict, requiring the Morefcoes either ro fubmit to be baptized, or to depart from Spain; expecting that by fubmittingto be baptized they would become both Chriftians and friends. It now appeared how much he was miftaken in this expectation; but, from the tenor of his edict, it was manifeft how much he thought it his duty, and how necefTary he believed it for the fafety and profperity of his people, to extirpate infidels from his dominions. The pernicious effects of tolerating apoftates from the faith, had been feverely felt by the French monarchs, whofe kingdom had thereby been reduced to the loweft ebb, and their Catho- lic fubjects expofed » for almoft half a century, to THILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 349 all the miferies of civil war; whereas, if they had BOOK a&ed conformably to the meafures of the church, jy. and either put to death their heretical fubjects, i«o9. or expelled them from the kingdom, all thefe un- happy confequences might have been prevented, and the purity of the faith prcferved. The temporal as well as the lpiritual intereft of the king's catholic and loyal fubjects, required that the Morefcoes fliould be expelled; becaufe, if they were not, there was much ground to ap- prehend they would ere long become matters of all the riches in the kingdom. They were not only induftrious , but frugal and parfimonious to excefs. I hey could labor for much lower wa- ges, and were fatisficd with much fmaller profits in trade than were requifite for the fubfiftence of the Spaniards; great numbers of whom were thus excluded from both trade and labor , and thereby reduced to indigence. The Spaniih villages, all Over Caftile and Andalufia, had fallen into decay; while thole of the INlorefcoes increafed and flou- rifbed ; and the Spanifli farmers were unable to pay their rents, though they cultivated the raoft fertile parts of the country; while the Morefcoes, who generally lived in the moft barren parts, after paying the third part of their crops to the proprietors of their farms, were not only able to fupport themfeives and their families , but an- nually 'o nicreafe their ftock. In confequence of this their number had of late been greatly augmented ; and there was ground to dread that, it fome remedy were not fpecdily 350 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK applied , the natives would in a few years be out- IV. numbered and overpowered. But no remedy 1609. whatever, he believed, would be found effe&ual, while the Morefcoes were permitted to continue within the kingdom. The king's humanity, he fuppofed, would revolt at the thoughts of putting fo many hundred thoufands to the fword , and therefore the only expedient which remained , was to tranfport them into foreign parts. He did not however think it advifable to expel them all at once; for, as thofe of Valencia lived in a great meafure detached from the Chriflians, in villages and diflridls by themfeives, there was little danger from the infection of their example; befides that the Moors of thofe parts praclifed va- rious ufeful arts, which were unknown to the Chriflians, but were extremely neceffary for the comfort and convenience of life. If ail thefe Moors were to be at once expelled, thofe arts would be entirely loft, and a great part of the country would become wafle and defolate. But although for thefe reafons it might be judged expedient to delay their expulfion , they ought , in the mean time, to be loaded with taxes for the maintenance of an army, fufficient to prevent any prejudice that might arife from permitting them to remain ; their numbers ought, as quickly as poflibie, to be diminifhed , by fending annually fome thou- fands of their young men to the gallks and the mines, and Chriflians, acquainted with their arts, ought gradually to be iubftituted in their room. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 351 But a different courfe, he thought, ought to no OK be purfued with regard to the Morefcoes in the iv. other provinces, who were, on many accounts, 1<0 *« much more formidable than thofe ot Arragon and Valencia. They had every - where intermixed with the Chriftians ; their example was confe- quently more infectious; and the churches and altars were profaned by their hypocritical and mock compliances with the holy rites of the true religion. They fpoke the Caftilian language ; their mind« were more cultivated and improved; they were better acquainted with the ftate of Spain , and much more capable of giving dan. gerous intelligence to her enemies; befules which, great numbers of them, having ferved in the royal anny , were thereby not only qualified to act as fpies, but to afford aififtance to the enemy, in the cafe of an invafion or attack , or to any foreign enemy, by whom the kingdom fhould be attacked. By . thefe confiderations he was induced to be- lieve that the prefervation of the kingdom , as well as the intereft of religion , required that all the Alorefcoes in Spain , thofe of Arragon and Valencia excepted , fliould be inftantly expelled. 1 hey were all to be confidered as obftinate here- tics, or as apollates from the faith , whom the king, if he thought fit, might juftly punifh with death ; and there could be no room therefore to doubt of the lawfulnefs of tranfporring then to foreign cou uries , which wa s the mildefl punifh- ment th tt , confidently with the faieiy of his king- dom , he could inflict. 35a HISTORY OF THE RELGN OF BOOK Their children, tinder feveri years of age j lv. might be detained, in order to be educated id 1<0 ** the Chi iftian faith ; and the king might, without any fcruple of confcience , compel any number of thofe who were grown up, td ferve on board his gallies , or in the mines of America; while; for the benefit of his exchequer, he might fell the reft for flavcs to his Chriflian fubjects in Spain and Italy. It could not be unjuft to punifli men in this manner, who by their crimes had forfeited their lives ; and if it was juft: to punifh them ei- ther with flavery or death , the fimply expelling them from Spain , and tranfporting them to other countries , where their own religion was profef- fed , could not be confidered in any other light but as an ad of clemency and mercy on the part of the king. It might be difficult, he acknowledged , to ef- fectuate their expulfion, without endangering the internal peace of the kingdom ; but God , he trufted , would enlighten the minds of the king's minifters , and enable them to difcern the mod proper means of carrying fo laudable a defign in- to execution ; for , as the counfel he had offered was equally dictated by his regard to the fpiritual and to the temporal intereft of the kingdom , he could not doubt that it was acceptable to God; and when he reflected on his great age, his natu- ral temper and difpoution, and the habits which he had long indulged of a retired and fequeftered life , he could hardly fuppofe that the zeal and re- folution with which he felt himfelf infpired in his addrcls PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 353 addrefs to the king, on the prefent occalion , BOOK could proceed from any other caufe but the fecret iv. and all powerful influence of the fpirit of God ««C9. upon his mind \ The reafoning in this memorial was admirably The eff-ft fitted to make imprellion on the fuperftitious and "* ' r 1 Tinin? or timid temper of the king; nor was its efficacy Ribera on leffencd by the patriarch's vain pretention to di- ^* rnind of '. * . . the king. vine illumination. But although both Philip's re- ligious fcruples, and his apprehenfions of impend- ing danger, were eafily excited, his natural dif- pofition , which was gentle and humane, rendered him extremely averfe to a meafure fo replete with cruelty, as that which Ribera had exhorted him to adopt. He could not therefore refolve to com- ply with the counfel that was given him , and his irrefolution was increafed by a memorial which was foon afterwards prefented to him by the ba« rons of Valencia. They had received intelligence from fome of their friends at court of the patriarch's two memo- rials. They knew that he had advifed the king to permit their yatTalsto remain for fome time longer, which they afcribed to his dread of their reient- ment ; but they believed that the expulfion of the other Morefcoes, would be quickly followed by that of thofe in Valencia, and for this reafon they were equaliy alarmed as if he had counfelled the whole to be expelled. In order to deter the king from liftening to his ^emon. propofal , they unanimoufly remonftrated aeainfl: . ra " ceof . 11/ J c the baron* * Vida de Ribera, p. ;28- Por Efcriva. Vol. I. A a 354 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK IV. 1609. of Valencia againft the expulliou the expulfion , as a racafure that would be attend- ed with the mod pernicious confequences ; for the Morefcoes were not only a frugal , temperate , and induftrious race of men, but they were the moft: fkilful farmers, and the moft ingenious ma- of the Mo- nu facturers in Spain. There were feveral manu- factures , equally necelfary for internal confump- tion and foreign trade, with which they alone were acquainted ; and without their fkill and la- bor, it was an unqueflionable fact , that a great part of the kingdom would lie wafte , and innu- merable families of the higheft rank , who en- tirely depended on the rents of their lands, be re- duced to indigence. It had been affirmed that they were all Maho- metans, but no fufficient evidence had been pro- duced to prove the truth of this affertion. They had all been regularly initiated, by baptifm , into the Chriftian church ; they all profefled them- felves to be Chriftians ; and although many of them, perhaps, were not able to give a fatisfac- tory account of the doctrines of the Chriftian faith, yet the fame thing might be faid of innumerable other Chriftians of the lower rank , befides the Morefcoes. But if many of them were in reality ignqrant or unbelieving, this could not juftly be imputed to them , fo much as to thofe to whom their in- ftruction had been committed. Sufficient pains to inftruct them , and proper methods of dealing with them , had feldom been employed. They had, at firft, been dragged into the church by PHILTP III. KING OF SPAIN. 355 force and violence , and had afterward"; been book treated with inhumanity; as if- bitter invcftives, iv. corporeal punilhments , and the conhfcation of their l60 *' effects , were the proper means of enlightening their underflandings with the knowledge of the truth. In order to engage them to liften to in- ftrudion , it was neceflary that their inftruclors fhould ffcudy to conciliate their affections. This end could be obtained only by gentlenefs and for- bearance : and if the king would be pleafed to take effectual care to prevent them from being treated more like brutes than men, and flill more, if, as a reward for their relinquifhing the Maho- metan fuperftition , he would grant them accefs to the lame immunities and privileges that were enjoyed by his other fubjeds , there would be no ground to defpair of their converfion. They had been accufed of holding a treafon- able correfpondence with the enemies of the ftate ; but ought a vague and general aflertion to be held as a fufficient evidence of their guilt ? was not this crime of fuch a nature, that it rauft ne- cefiarily be confined to a few? ought the guilt of a few to be imputed to fo great a number ? ought even the few who had been guilty, to be con- demned wichout a hearing, without a trial, and without the fmallefl: evidence ? This imputation had been often caft upon the Morefcoes , by. fpeculative and fequeftered men, who had no accefs to know the truth of their af- fertion, but were prompted by their zeal and pre- judices to belies'e ic. It had always been diire. A a 2 356 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK 'garded by the wifeft of the king's predecefTors; iv. and juflice , they hoped, would determine the l609 ' king to imitate fo laudable an example, till fome proof or evidence was adduced. This remon- ftrance, which the barons prefented in a cortes or parliament held in the year 1604, was not alto- itieffeas. gether without effect. In compliance with the in- tention of it, Philip refolved to delay the expul- fion of the Morefcoes for fome years longer, and, in the mean time, make a further trial, whether it was poffible to effectuate their converfion to the faith; and for this purpofe, he procured a brief *»«i v. from the pope , impofing a tax on the ecclefiaftic- al revenues , a part of which he was authorized to employ in building and endowing a Morefco college; and in order to induce men of abilities to accept of curacies among the Morefcoes, he was empowered, from the fame fund , to augment the falaries of the curates. But no greater regard it would feem was paid to this than to the other brief above mentioned. The college was not endowed , and the church- livings remained the fame as before, from whence there was but too much ground for the fufpicion which was entertained , that the king had neither been able to interefl: the pope nor the Spanifh ec- clefiaftics in the execution of his plan. The latter labored affiduoufly to convince both the pope and the king, that every thing had been already done for the converfion of the Morefcoes , that was in the power of man to perform. The archbifhop of Valencia prefented a third memorial PHILIP in. KING OF SPAIN. 3 57 to the king, containing, as he pretended, a full BOOK reply to what had been aflerted by the barons, but IV. confifting principally, either of invectives againft ltl0% - the IYIorefcocs, or of denunciations of divine judge- ments, which mufl ere long overtake the kingdom, if they were not fpeedily expelled '*. Ribera was powerfully Teconded by feveral other ecclefiaftics , and particularly by Bleda, a Dominican friar, diftinguifhed for his acquaint- ance with the learning of his time, and equally noted for his activity, his zeal, and bigotry; who compofed feveral bitter invectives againft the Mo- refcoes , and, dividing his time between Rome and Madrid, employed all his eloquence to per- fuade the pontiff and the king of the neceflity of their expulfion. But the archbifhop's moll: powerful alTociate, was Don Bernardo de Roias y Sandoval , brother to the duke of Lerma , who was the cardinal -arch- bifhop of Toledo, inquifitor- general and chancel- lor of Spain. This prelate approved and feconded every part of Ribera's memorials , except where he advifed the king to retain fuch of the Moref- co children as were under feven years of age, and to fuffer the Morefcoes in Valencia, to remain till their place could be fupplied by Chriftians; for it Some prodigies are recorded by Ribera in his memorial , and by other writers, as clear and certain indications of the will of heaven on the prefent occalion. Such as that the church-bell of Villila rung of itfelf for feveral days, &c. ;But it does not appear, whether arguments of this kind , were de- fpifed or regarded by the king. Aa 3 35S HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK was more advifable, this cardinal maintained, to IV. put them all, men, women, and children to the i«os. fword, than to have\he Spani-fh blood contaminat- ed, as it would be, if either of thefe exceptions were admitted by a mixture of the polluted blood of infidels. The duke of Lerma, who, from the beginning of his adminiftration , had ftudied , with great af- fiduity and folicitude, to ingratiate himfelf with the court of Rome and the Spanifh ecclefiaftics , readily efpoufed his brother's fentiments; and, as the duke was at this time in the unrivalled and full poifejGTion of the royal favor, nothing now was wanting to fix the resolution of the king". Expuirmu It was accordingly refoived , that all the More f. of the Mo- coes in Spain, thofe in Valencia as well as thofe in the other provinces , mould be expelled. The cardinal -archbiinop went himfelf to Rome, with the defign , it is believed , to perfuade the Sovereign pontiff to grant his fancVion to the expulfion by fome public deed : but, if this was the intention of his journey , it did not produce the defired effect. The pontiff, probably , chofe that the odium which muffc attend a meafure fo barbarous and fo unprecedented, fhould rather fall on the court of Spain than on the holy fee; and, therefore, we do not read of any other papal bull or brief pub- lished on the prefent occafion , but one add retted to the bifhops of Valencia, commanding them to ^lfemble together , in order to confider whether any method of converting the Morcfcoes could Fonfeca Tralcion de los Moiefcoes , p. 1 9,6. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 359 be devifed. This bull was dated in the year 1606, BOOK a few months before the cardinal -primate fet out IV. for Rome , but was not published till after his 16 °** return, in 160X. It was publiihed in the month of April of that year; and, in compliance with it, the bifhops foon after met together, and fpent feveral months in deliberating on the fubjedt. But, as if the defign of their meeting had been to con- demn the Morefcoes, and not to confider of the means of converting them , they at length pro-" nouneed the following fentence : " That the Moref- coes of the kingdom of Valencia were all apoftates from the Chriftian faith, and were, betides, fo obftinate and inflexible in their infidelity, that, whatever means fhould be employed , no hopes could juftly be entertained of their convcrfion. This fentence , having been tranfmitted to the Bieda, p* court, contributed to confirm the king in the re- folution which he had formed. It was agreed , however, that the expulfion fhould be deferred till a more convenient feafon ; and that, in the mean time , the ftricleft fecrecy fhould be obferved. It was judged neceflary to keep the defign fecret, left the Morefcoes fhould, either of themfelves, or inftigated by the barons, have recourfe to arms; and , as no court was ever more diftinguifned for maintaining the moft inviolable fecrecy in its coun- cils than that of Spain, it fhould feem that nofufpicion was entertained , either by the Morefcoes or barons, of the king's determinaticn in a matter wherein they were fo deeply interefted , till every necclfary prepa- ration was made for carrying it into execution, A a 4 3 6o HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK The court having determined to begin with the iv. expulfion of the Valencian Morefcoes , orders were 1609 ' fecretly given to the naval commanders in Spain , Portugal, and Italy, to receive a certain number of troops on board their fhips, and to rendezvous, in Auguft, 1609, at Alicant, Denia , and other fea- ports in the Mediterranean, on the coaft of Valencia. About the fame time, Don Auguftin IYlexia, an old experienced officer, governor of Antwerp, was fent to the city of Valencia to con- cert with the viceroy , the marquis of Cararena, and others, concerning the meafures neceffary to be taken within the kingdom to prevent a tumult or infurrection. The pretext employed for aflem- bling the fleet was an expedition againft the IVIoors in Barbary. But. the barons, obferving that frequent conferences were held, by night and by day, at the viceroy's, with regard to the fubjecl of which they were kept entirely in the dark, and being informed that the archbifliop (who affifled at thefe conferences), as if he expected to be be- fieged, had conveyed into his palace an extraordi- nary quantity of provisions, befides fome troops and arms, they foon came to fnfpecr. what was the real purpofe of the naval armament; and hav- ing, conformably to a privilege which belonged to them by the conftitution of Valencia , fummoned one of thofe affemblies of their own number, term- ed the Military Arms , they fent deputies to the viceroy, requeuing him to acquaint them with the defign of the prefent preparations. To this in- quiry, the viceroy, without pretending ignorance PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 3 6r of the king's intention , replied , that , "what- BOOK ever it was, the barons might reft allured that no iv. rcfolution could be formed, either by the king, K09. ■who had ever regarded them as his mod faithful vafTals, or by the duke of Lerma , their country- man, whofe eftates were intermingled with theirs, which in the ilTue would not be found conducive to the true intereft of Valencia. By this anfwer the barons were confirmed in their fufpicions ; and , as they could not but fuppofe that the viceroy would have chofen, had it been in his power , to difpel their apprchenfions , they could no longer doubt that the object of all the preparations which had been made was the expul- fion of their vafTals. They inftantly convened again, and drew up a remonftrance to be prefent- ed to the king; of which the purport was, that Valencia would be entirely ruined if the Moref- coes, by whom ir.oft of the work in that king- dom was carried on , were expelled. At the dcfiie of the viceroy, who dreaded that this ftep might give an alarm to the JVlorefcocs, the jufliza, or chief juftice in criminal matters, having attempted in vain to divert them from their purpofe, was fo violently agitated with grief and rage , that he dropt down dead in the alfem- bly. This accident prevented them from coming to an immediate dccifion; but next morning they had another meeting , in which they appointed de- puties to carry their remonftrance to the king. It was expreffed in the ftrongeft terms, dictated by a deep conviction of the melancholy truth $6z HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF Book which it contained; but the deputies, though re- IV. ceived by the king and his minifter with much dif- 16 ° 9 - tinction and refpect , were told , that the king's re- ftrance of the folution , having been formed after the moft mature barons of deliberation , was unalterable ; that the Barons had aeainft the been too late in prefenting their petition ; and that expuifion of the edict of expulfion was already published, the Moon. A ftrQng body of Caft j]j an troops had a ft ua jl y entered' Valencia , about the time of the arrival of the deputies at Madrid ; and the Morefcoes were now acquainted with their fate. In the edict of expulfion , which was publifhed with the ufual formalities, by the viceroy , in the beginning of September, 1609, they were all com- manded , men, women, and children, under the penalty of death , to be ready within three days to repair to the fea-ports appointed for their em- barkation, and there to go on board of mips prepared for carrying them into foreign parts. It was ordained, under the fame penalty, that they fhould all remain in the places where they were at the time of publishing the edict , till the commifftries appointed to conduct them to the fea-coaft, mould arrive ; that if any of them fhould, before the arrival of the commiiTaries , prefume to change the place of their abode, they might be carried by any perfort before a judge; and, in cafe they fhould make refiftance , might inftantly be put to death. It was enacted, that all their effects fhould be- long to the lords whofe vaffals they were, except fuch as they could carry along with them ; and , PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 363 that in cafe they fliould conceal or deftroy any BOOK part of their effecls, they fliould be puniflied iv. with death. i« 09 « For the prefcrvation of the fugar- works, grana- ries of rice, drains or aqueducts, and, in order that the Chriftian inhabitants might be inftructed in the 'works and manufactures which had hitherto been carried on by the IVlorcfcocs, it was decla- red that fix families, to be named by the barons, out of every hundred , might remain. It was ordained , that all children under four years of age might remain , provided their parents or guardians fliould confent; that children under fix or feven, one of whofe parents was an old Chriftian, might remain, and the mothers with them, though they were Morefcoes; but if the fathers were Morefcoes, and the mothers Chrif- tians, that the fathers fliould be expelled, while the chijdren might remain with their mothers; that ail fuch of the Morefcoes might remain, who, for any confiderabie time, had demeaned thcm- felves as Chriftians, who could produce certificates from the pari ill -priefts of their having received the facrament, by permiflion of their refpeclive bifhops , or who had not for two years attended any of the ATorefco religious meetings. They were alt permitted to depart into any country, not fub;ecl to the crown of Spain, pro vided they fhould leave the kingdom within the time fpccified ; and an affurancc was given them, that no violence or injury fliould be offered them, by tjiofe who fliould be employed in tranfporting 3*4 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK them to Barbary , or any other country they fhould iv. m?ke choice of **. 1609. 'j |j e f evera j conccflions contained in this edict were confidered by the ecclefiaftics and the court of Spain as proofs of extraordinary clemency on the part of the king; but they could not be re- garded in the fame light by the IVIorefcoes. They were equally overwhelmed with aftonifhment, and with anguifh and diftrefs. They were fur- rounded with enemies on every hand. The king, they perceived, though they had been taught to believe his diftinguifhing character to be gentle- nefs and mercy, was their irreconcileable aud mor- tal enemy; and their hearts funk within them, when they reflected on the mifery which they were doomed to undergo. They were not only dif iuietcd with fo near a profpect of the lofs of their moft valuable poffeflions,, joined to that of perpetual banifhment from their native country; but thev violently dreaded that they were all to be butchered as foon as they were put on board the fhips appointed for tranfporting them to fo- reign parts I} . They had never had any friends to whom they could look for afliftance, except their patrons the barons , whofe intereft was infe- perably linked with theirs; but the barons, they knew, were unable to afford them protection on the prefent occafion , and all the good offices which they had interpofed in their behalf had been without avail. They had little reafon , therefore, v Fonf,-ca, lib iv. cap. }. Fonfeca, lib. iv. cap. g. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 365 to expect that any thing which they themfelves BOOK could do to avert the impending florm would iv. prove effectual. That nothing, however, in I6 °*- their power might be omitted, their leading men, having met together privately in the city of Valencia, drew up a petition, and fenta deputati- on of their number to prefent it to the viceroy; in which, after folemnly afferting their innocence of the crimes imputed to them in the edict, they offered, in cafe the king would be perfuaded to recal it , to maintain a certain number of gallies for the protection of the coaft agninft the coifairs, to build feveral new forts, and to fupport the gar- rifons not only of thefe, but of fuch as were al- ready built; to redeem all the Chriftians of Valen- cia who mould ever be taken captives by the Moors, and, befides, to furnifh the king with a confiderable fum of money '*. But the viceroy though he was himfelf extremely averfe to the expulfion, without taking time to deliberate on their propofals, immediately replied, that there was now no room left for any petition or remon- ftrance; that the king was unalterably determined to put his edict into execution , and they mufl in- flantly prepare themfelves , nowever reluctant, to fubmit ,J . When this anfwer was reported by the dele- gates to the affembly in Valencia , their minds MSS. of Cottington's letters ia lord Hardwick's poffef- fion. Mad. 8cli 0 , the co.-ntof Alaguas, the count of 13. mnl , the count of Anna, the court of Sinareas , the count of Concentayna , and the d"!;e of Maqueda who went over in the firft embarkation to the- pott of 0:3n. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 373 excited in them the moil bitter regret, and gave BOOR them fo much ground for anxiety with regard to IV. their future fortune , was foon fuccecded by ftill 1609 - ... ^ , „ • , Hard fate of greater calamities. Oreat numbers were Inipwreck- the Morefcoe*. ed on their pafTage , and never reached the African coaft ; while many others were barbaroufly mur- dered at fca , by the crews of the fhips which they had freighted; this latter calamity befel only thofe who had chofen to tranfport themfelves in private fhips, and inftances are recorded of fuch inhuman cruelty exercifed againft: this harmlefs, perfecuted, and defencelcfs people, by the owners and crews of thefe fliips , as equals any thing of the fame kind of which we read in hiftory. The men butchered in the prefence of their wives and chil- dren : the women and children afterwards thrown alive into the fea ; of the women , fome, on account of their beauty, preferved alive for a few days to fatiate the lufl of the inhuman murderers of their hufbands and brothers , and then either flaugh- tercd or committed to the waves; fuch were fome of the horrid deeds of which thefe barbarians were convicted upon their trial to which they were brought, in confequence of quarrelling with each other about the divifion of their prey; and fuch, if we may credit a cotemporary hiftorian , was the unhappy fate of a great number of the ]\1orefcocs ". Nor was the fate of the greater part of thofe who reached the coaft; of Barbary lefs deplorable. They had no fooncr landed on this barren inhofphabie " Fonfeca. !3b 2 } 7 4 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF BOOK fhore , than they were attacked by the Bedouin IV. Arabs, a wild banditti who live in tents , and fup- 1609. port themfelves by hunting and by plunder. The IVlorefcoes, unarmed, and incumbered with their wives and children , were often robbed by thofe barbarians, who came upon them in numerous bodies, amounting fometimes to live or fix thou* land men; and, as often as the Morefcoes attempt- ed, with (tones and flings , their only arms, to make refiflance , put great numbers of them to the fvvord. Still greater numbers perifhed of fa- tigue and hunger, joined to the inclemencies of the weather, from which they had no means of fiielter, during their tedious journey through the African deferts , to IVloltagan, Algiers, and other places , where they hoped to be permitted to take up their refidence. Few of them ever arrived at thefe places. Of fix thoufand , who fet out to- gether from Conaftal, a town in the neighbour- hood of Oran , with an intention of going to Algiers , a fingle perfon only , of the name of Pedralvi , furvived the difafters to which they were expofed ; and of the whole hundred and forty thoufand, who were at this time tranfported to Africa, there is ground to believe, from the concurring teftimony of perfons who had accefs to know the truth , that more than a hundred thoufand men , women , and children , fuftered death in its moft hideous forms , within a few irionths after their expulfion from Valencia **. Fonfeca , Gonzalez Davila , p. 146. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. 375 Compared to the dreadful fate to which this BOOK unhappy people were doomed by the Spaniards, IV. it would have been an ad of mercy on the part Ii09# of the king , had he either commanded them to be put to the fword , or committed to the flames; as their mifery would , in this cafe, have been of fhort continuance. The knowledge of what had befallen them ought, at leaft, to have deterred him from expofing the reft of his Morefco fubjeds to the like calamities. Ir5ut the fentiments of humanity in the ecclefi- aftics and court of Spain were overpowered by thofe of the moft illiberal fuperftition. They con- sidered that inexprefliblc mifery , which they them- felves had brought on the Morefcoes, as a fignal of divine judgment againft that unhappy people, which ferved to juftify the cruelty which they had exercifed, and to prove that what they had done was acceptable in the fight of God. Far from feeling remorfe or forrow for what had happened, they rather triumphed and exulted in it, and were confirmed in their refolution of expelling all the IXlorefcoesin Spain without exception, and without thinking it incumbent on them to make provifion for their reception in any of thofe countries to which they were about to be conveyed. But before they proceeded to the expulfion of the IYlorefcoes in Caltile and other provinces, it was judged neceffary to reduce to obedience all fuch of the Morefcoes in Valencia, above menti- oned , as had retired to the mountainous parts of that kingdom , with the refolution of ftanding on Bb 4 3?6 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF $00 K their defence. Their number, including men, women, and children, amounted nearly to thirty iC "- tboufand H.iving collected together a confider- able quantity of provifions of all kinds, they had begun, while the viceroy was employed in trans- porting their countrymen , to fortify themfdves as weij as they were able , and to block up the narrow paffes by which the Spaniards mud ap- proach. But , btifides being utterly deftitute of military (kill , they were extremely ill furniflied both with arm' and ammunition; and the folly of their attempt quickly appeared in the feeblenefs of every effort which they made to repel the at- tach s of the enemy The viceroy having fent againft them the flower of the regular forces , un- der the command of Don Auguflin A/lefica, who bad acquired confiderable military experience and renown in the wars of Flanders, a great part of them were compelled to furrender , through the want of water , from which Mefica had found means to cut them off ; and foon after the reft were beaten from their intrenchments, and put to flight. In the purfuit no mercy was fliown , either to the aged or to the women and children, though rolling in the dud, and imploring mercy, by the favage conquerors. Upwards of three thoufand perifhed *\ The number of thofe who had ai Fonfeca , p. ;io. — From the ftyle of thin author in this and many other paflapes, there is litt'e ground for doubt, that with pleafure he would have acV.-d the tame bloody part which he defcribes. PHILIP III. KING OF SPAIN. $?? fnrrendered was two- and- twenty thoufand , who BOOK were all foon after tranfported to Africa, except iv. the children under (even years of age, whom the l609, foldiers were permitted to fell for flaves. The king decreed, that, afcer a certain number of years, they ftiould be fet at liberty; but, as many of them were fent to foreign countries, there is ground to fufped that the decree was not attended with the defired effect *\ Another order of the king, which he publifhed at this time , proved more effectual. Befides the fvlorefcoes who were killed or taken prifoners , a confiderabje number, diftruftful of the Spanifli faith, Fueron Siguiendo la victoria , los nueftros , matando fin excecion , quantos alcanqavan , viejos op moqos , grandes, pequennos, hombres, y mugeres, por mas que arrodillados ellos, y ellas con los bracos abiertos les pedian mifericor- dia , no mereciendola los que fiempre ufaron mal della. — Fonfeca , ; 10. The viceroy and the archbifhop of Valencia differed widely in their opinion with regard to the proper method of d 1 fpoiing of the children. The former reprefented to the king, that all of them, who were under fifteen years of age, mi^ht be fafJy permitted to remain in the hands of the Chriltians, to whom they had been fold by the foldiers, as there would be no Mahometans in the kingdom by whom they could be perverted from embracing the principles of the C'uift'an faith. Befides , that as molt of their parents and other iclations had perifhed in the late infurreetion , it would be kfs cruel to put them all to the fword , than to land fo great a number of helpleGs young creatures on the coaft of Barbary. The archbifhop, on the other hand, declared that, after a certain age, no Alorefco could poffibly be converted; and that, if the IMorefco children, at fifteen, at twelve, at ten, 01 even feven ye:.: a or age, were iiiffered to remain, 378 HISTORY &c. BOOK or prompted by an unconquerable attachment to IV. their native country , had difperfed themfelves 1609. among the woods and rocks, where they hoped to elude the notice of the Spaniards. Philip put a price upon the heads of thefe unhappy men, and the foldiers were fent out to hunt for them, as for beafts of prey. Hardly any of them were able to efcape. Some of them chofe rather to die of cold and hunger than furrender themfelves to the Spaniards; and at length their leader, who with his wife and children had concealed themfelves in the molt inacceffible parts of the mountains, was taken and carried alive to Valencia, where, after fuffering much mockery and infujt for having al- lowed himfelf to be elected king of the infurgents, he was , by a folemn fentence , condemned and put to death M . the whole kingdom of Valencia would again be peopled with Mahometans before the end of the fecond, or at moft, of the third generation. The king, defirous to gratify both the viceroy and the archbifhon, but leaning more to the fide of the latter, gave his permiflion, as above mentioned, for retain- ing only fuch of the children as were under feven years of age. 11 In the Appendix (B) the reader will find other intc-eft- ing circumftances relative to the condition of the Morefcoes in Spain , their expulfiun and fubfequent fate , collected from Sir Francis Cottington's Letters from Spain, 1609 and 16 10. END OF THE FIRST VOLUME. This book is DUE on the last date stamped below University of California SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 305 De Neve Drive - Parking Lot 17 • Box 951388 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90095-1388 Return this material to the library from which it was borrowed. i.r SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY^ III II HI II III I llll II A A 000 105 346 1 3 1158 00223 2923 IN