C^M.^ V-- VA^CA > / /^ 7A^^ r ^lAvlA^^Mo r 1? r ^> Aw. '^ - rWA Digitized by tine Internet Arcinive in 2007 with funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation littp://www.archive.org/details/essayoninfluenceOOIewirich ON THE INFLUENCE OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF OPINIOTsT LONDON : PRINTED HV SPOTTISWOODB AND CO., NEW-STUEET SQUARE AND PARLIAMENT STREET AN ESSAY ON THE INFLUENCE OF AUTHORITY IN MATTEES.^ffi=.OPINION. GEORGE CORNEWALL LEWIS, ESQ. SECOND EDITION. LONDON : LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO, 1875. AH ri'jhts reserved. 2,^4/^7-2^ CONTENTS, CHAPTER I. ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OP OPINION. lECTION 1. Distinction between matters of fact and matters of opinion . 2. Subject of the Essay : authority in matters of opinion explained 3. Relation between this subject and logical science . PAGE 1 2 5 CHAPTER II. ON THE EXTENT OP OPINIONS FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. • 1 . Children derive their opinions from the authority of their parents . 7 2. Extent to which these opinions are modified in after-life ... 8 • 8. Disposition to follow the crowd in matters of opinion . . . .10 4, Disposition to defer to the authority of others, arising from the habit of ' holding opinions without remembering their grounds . . .11 6. Derivation of opinions from authority in matters of practice . . .13 -OHAPTER III. [on THE MARKS OP TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. } 1. Elements of credibility in a witness to a fact. Distinction between testimony and argument as to moral character ..... 15 2. How far anonymous testimony may have weight 16 3. Oases in which testimony is strengthened by special training . .18 4. Distinction between testimony, argument, and authority . . .18 6. Comparative frequency of qualities which render a man a credible wit- ness, or an authority in matters of opinion . . . . .18 6. Qualifications of an authority in matters of opinion . . . .19 ♦7. Eirst qualification : that a person must have studied the subject care- fully in theory, or have had experience of it in practice . . .19 •8, Second qualification : that his mental powers must be adequate to the subject .21 • 9. Third qualification .' that his moral feelings must be in a proper slate . 24 VI CONTENTS. 10. Process by whicli the existence of tliese qualifications in any person is determined 28 11. Additional indications of trustworthy authority : — (1.) Agreement or oo7i5e?2sws of competent judges . . . .29 12. (2.) Marks of imposture in professors of science 13. (3.) The countries whose opinion is to be considered 14. The guides to opinion are chosen voluntarily 1 6. Supposed opposition between reason and authority f" CHAPTER IV. ON" THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PEIIfCIPLE OE AITTHORITY TO QTJESTIOIfS OF EELIGIOjST. : 1. Gradual progi'ess to agreement in scientific matters . . . .46 2. All nations agree in recognising the existence of a God . . .46 3. All civilised nations agree in recognising some form of Christianity . 48 4. But they differ as to the form or mode of Christianity . . . .48 5. Causes of the existence of numerous Christian churches and sects . 49 6. The various Christian sects remain distinct, and do not tend to an agreement 50 7. Attempts which have been made to bring about an agreement in Chris- tian belief 62 8. One portion of the Christian world makes the teaching of the true church the standard of religious truth 53 9. Differences of opinion as to the marks of the true church . . .53 10. Differences of opinion as to the organs of the true church . . .58 11. Differences of opinion as to the tradition of true doctrines from the Apostolic age ........... 60 12. Differences of opinion as to Fundamentals and Non-fundamentals, in matters of faith .......... 62 13. Differences of opinion between Roman Catholics and Protestants as to the Begula Fidei 63 14. No Christian church or sect can lay claim to a paramount authority in matters of truth QQ 15. In the absence of a general agreement, the authority of each church or sect is limited to its own members 69 16. General results as to church authority and private judgment . . 70 Notes to Chapter IV 72 CHAPTER V. Ton THE UTILITY AND PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY^ -^ 1. Extent to which an independent opinion can be formed by each person on scientific subjects 77 • 2. Deference due to the opinions of competent and experienced judges . 78 * 3. Expediency of being guided by the opinions of others in practical ques- tions 80 CONTENTS. vii SECTION PAGB • 4. Advantage of professional advice 81 • 5. Rules for the selection of professional advisers 84 • G. Origin of the prejudices against professional advice . . . .84 • 7. Voluntary advice of friends upon domestic and private concerns. Auri- cular confession 85 8. Mode of obtaining advice in the purchase of goods . . . .87 9. Advice in joint deliberation 88 10. Deliberation relates to the future. Extent of our powers of prediction 91 11. The advice of competent judges assists in determining the future, and guiding action 98 12. The superstitious reject such advice, and seek to determine the future by means of divination 99 13. Duty of counsellors to give honest advice 100 14. Marks of a trustworthy historian . 100 Note to Chapter V 107 / CHAPTER VI. ^ D ON TKE NTTMBEE OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANT SITB- JECT, AS COMPARED WITH THE NUMBER OF THE REST OF THE COMMUNITY. • 1. The competent judges on each subject are comparatively few in number 110 • 2. The opinion of the body of the people on each subject is devoid of authority 110 _ * 3. The authority of each competent judge is limited to his own class of subjects 113 4. Everybody is a competent judge on some subject ...... 116 -'*■ • 5. No set of persons are competent judges on all subjects r . . . 116 ' * 6, The prevalence of an opinion is not a proof of its soundness . X, • • 116 7. Circumstances which give weight to a prevalent opinion - . . . 118 8. A high degree of knowledge and virtue cannot be formed by the aggre- gation of numerous individuals of ordinary qualities . . . 121 9. The value of proverbs as the expression of popular opinion . . . 122 10. Importance of numerical preponderance as a fact ] 24 ^1. Its importance in political affairs 125 12. In language *. . 126^ 13. In style of composition and eloquence . . . . . . . 126 14. But the popular taste is not the criterion of excellence in the arts r . 128 15. The control of public opinion over individuals in matters of taste ought to be exercfsed lehiehtTy '." . . 130 CHAPTER VII. ON THE APPLICABIUTT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. - V 1. In the decisions of political bodies opinions must be counted, and not weighed < 132 2. Sketch of the origin and nature of political bodies . . . .132 a vili CONTENTS. SECTION TAGS 3. Advantages and disadvantages of plurality of memlDers in administrative and judicial bodies 136 4. And in legislative bodies 139 5. Manner in which the decision of a political body is made . . . 140 6. In administrative and judicial bodies unanimity is sometimes required, but they generally decide by a majority 141 7. Legislative bodies always decide by a majority . . "^ . . . 142 8. The modes in which the majority of votes in a political body is deter- mined 143 9. Reason for decision by a majority in political bodies .... 145 10. Defects of this mode of decision 147 11. Circumstances which tend to counteract these defects — first, injudicial and administrative bodies 147 12. Secondly, in legislative bodies 148 13. It is expedient that a decision by a majority, when made, should be acquiesced in 152 14. And that a political body, having adopted a measure, should not throw the responsibility upon its advisers 153 15. Securities for i-ight decision in the case of an election of a representative by the majority of a constituent body 153 16. Contrivances adopted to modify the simple numerical principle in the summation of votes : — (1.) Voting by composite units 158 17. (2.) Plurality of votes to certain members 159 18. The excesses of a sound principle ought to be counteracted . . . 162 Norps to Chapter VII 166 CHAPTER VIII. ON THE PwELATIOK OF THE PRINCIPLE OP AUTHORITY TO THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE, AND TO THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. ) 1. The theory of aristocratic government is founded on the principle of Special Fitness . ^ 171 2. Objections to this theory as applied to government .... 175 3. The niunerical principle of government is controlled in various ways by the principle of Special Fitness . . . ... . .179 4. Especially through the dystem of political representation . . . 183 5. The supposed ill effects of the tyranny of the majority of the people . 187 6.\The representative system of government is founded on a compromise \ between the Numerical Principle and the principle of Special Fit- ness ; difficulty of arranging the terms of this compromise in each / individual case 191 Notes to Chapter VIII 193 L-- CONTENTS. IX CHArTER IX. ON THE PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS, BY THE CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. SECTION PAGE • 1. The chief permauent influences for the authentication ofojDini.ons . . 197 2. I. The civil government. Duty of the state to encourage truth and discourage error, examined 198 3. The duty of the ^tate with respect to religious truth and error depends upon its power 200 4. Power of the state to promote religious truth by punishment . . 201 5. By reward 204 6. By endowment . 205 7. By public instruction 211 8. And by a censorship of the press 212 9. The state cannot effectually promote religious truth by any of these means 213 10. Objections made to the neutrality of the state in religious questions .213 11. Answer to these objections 215 12. Power of the state to promote truth in secular matters by literary en- dowments and public instruction 218 18. Extent to which the government ought to attempt to influence opinion in secular matters . . . 221 14. Moral authority of the government and effect of its example . . 222 15. A government may countenance sound opinions by upholding good in- stitutions 224 16. Censorship of the press in secular affairs 225 * 17. The qualifications of professional persons may be authenticated by diplo- mas and degrees 227 18. II. Churches and ecclesiastical bodies. The influence of the heads of each church is exercised over the members of that church exclu- sively 228 19. Authentication of ministers of religion by ordination .... 229 20. III. Voluntary associations for political, scientific, and literary purposes. Their influence upon opinion 230 *21. Universities and places of learning 232 22. Political parties 233 23. IV. The periodical press. — Origin and history of newspapers . . 233 24. Influence of newspapers upon opinion 235 25. The chief characteristic of newspapers is, that they are anonymous . 230 26. Reasons of this peculiarity. Its evil consequences, and their cor- rectives 236 27. Reviews and literary journals. Transactions of learned societies. Publications appearing in a series or set. Encyclopaedias . . 245 28. The powers of literary j udgment ought to be impartially exercised . 247 29. Classes of subjects upon which the general diffusion of sound opinions is most important 249 CONTENTS. CHAPTER X. ON THE ABUSES OF THE PKINCIPLE OP AUTHOKITT. SECTION PAGE \ 1. Reasons for illustrating the evils wliicli arise from the abuses of the principle of authority 253 * 2.1 The i-everence for the authority of scientific teachers must not be ex- I cessive 253 * 3. Distinction between excessive reverence for authority and conscious adoption of a defective philosophy 256 * 4. Distinction between opinions handed down from antiquity, and opinions of aged men 257 5, 1 The chief question at present as to the authority of antiquity concerns I political institutions 259 6. Sound legislative reforms are impeded by opposite errors as to the au- thority of established institutions 264 7. Authority of parties and party leaders in politics. Its abuses . . 265 8. Difference between the slow and rapid propagation of opinions . . 270 9. Influence of numbei-s in deliberative bodies 272 * lO.l Concluding remarks 275 APPENDIX. ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY, AND ON THE PROVINCE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. 1. Aristocracy is usually defined to be a government of the minority, and democracy to be a government of the majority of the people . . 279 2. The distinction between these two forms of government is a distinction, not of kind, but of degree . . . , . . . . 280 3. Necessity of caution in laying down general propositions respecting aristocratic and democratic government 284 4. The neglect of proper precautions in speculations upon government has rendered political science uncertain 289 5. Province of political science. Its division into positive or descriptive, and ideal or speculative politics 289 6. Inipoi*tance of treating these two branches of political science separately 294 Errata. P. 54, line 14 from foot, /or to extend read of extending. P. 108, last line, /or septengintos read septingentos. ON THE INFLUENCE OF AUTHOEITY IN MATTERS OP OPINION. CHAPTER I. ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF OPINION. § 1 . As the ensuing Essay relates to matters of opinion, it will be necessary for me, at the outset, without entering upon disputed questions of mental philosophy, to explain briefly what portion of the subjects of belief is understood to be included under this appellation, and what is the meaning of the generally received distinction between matters of opinion and matters gf fact ; a distinction which, though not scientifically precise, is, with a little explanation, sufficiently intelligible for the purposes of the present inquiry, and which marks, with tolerable accuracy, a distinction leading to important practical consequences. By a Matter of Fact I understand anything of which we obtain a conviction from our internal consciousness, or any individual event or phenomenon which is the object of sensation. It is true that even the simplest sensations involve some judgment : when a witness reports that he saw an object of a certain shape and size, or at a certain distance, he describes something more than a mere impression on his sense of sight, and his statement implies a 1^ theory and explanation of the bare phenomenon. When^ howeve r. t]liP j'lfjg^^''^^ i« ^^ «0 pi mple a kind as to become, wholly urn^n- s cious, and the interpretg tioTi of the appearances is a mattm i-£)f general agreement, the object of sensation may, for_ Qur present purpose, be considered a fact. - A fact, as so defined, must be 2 ON THE NATUEE OF AUTHORITY [ch. limited to individual sensible objects, and not extended to general expressions or formulas, descriptive of classes of facts, or sequences of phenomena, such as that the blood circulates, the sun attracts the planets, and the like.^ Propositions of this sort, though de- scriptive of realities, and therefore, in one sense, of matters of fact, relate to large classes of phenomena, which cannot be grasped by a single sensation, which can only be determined by a long series of observations, and are established by a process of intricate reasoning. Taken in this sense, matters of fact are decided by an appeal to our own consciousness or sensation, or to the testimony, direct or indirect, of the original and percipient witnesses. Doubts, indeed, frequently arise as to the existence of a matter of fact, in consequence of the diversity of the reports made by the original witnesses, or the suspiciousness of their testimony. A matter of fact may again be doubtful, in consequence of the different con- structions which may be put upon admitted facts and appearances, in a case of proof by (what is termed) circumstantial evidence. Whenever such doubts exist they cannot be settled by a direct appeal to testimony, and can only be resolved by reasoning ; in- stances of which are afforded by the pleadings of lawyers and the disquisitions of historians upon contested facts. When an indi- vidual fact is doubted upon reasonable grounds, its existence becomes a matter of opinion. The existence of such a fact, how- ever, is not a general or scientific truth, but a question to be decided by a consideration of the testimony of witnesses. - }^§ 2. Matters of Opinion , not being disputed questions of fact, are general prepositions or the orems relatinf y to laws of natu re or ^ind, pri nciples and rules of human condu ct, fu ture probabilities, deductions from hypo tlieses, and the like, about which a doub L _may reasonably^ eiistT All dou bTFulquestums, whetlier "of specu- lation or practice,^ are matters of opinion. With regard to these, the ultimate source of our belief is always a process of reasoning.^ ^^ * The proper mode of conducting tlns^J-ocess, of guarding ^ See Whewell's Philosophy of the InductivJ^mnces, B, I. c. i., B. VIII. c. i., and , B. Xl.ciii. ' * ' I remember it was with extreme diflftculty that I could bring my master to understand the meaning of the word opinion, or how a point could be disputable ; because reason taught us to affirm or deny only where Ave are certain, and beyond our knowledge we cannot do either. So that controversies, wranglings, disputes, and I.] IN MATTERS OF OPINION. j 3 against errors of induction and deduction, of testing the soundness of existing arguments, and of establishing new truths by ratio- cination ; is the province of logical science. The science of logic, having been created by the inventive and penetrating genius of Aristotle, and afterwards systematised by the Schoolmen, was enlarged by the sagacious divinations of Bacon, who indicated its applications to natural philosophy, and freed it from much of the needless subtlety of the schools. Since the publication of the Novurni Organon, the fundamental processes of thought connected with reasoning have been explored by Locke, Leibnitz, and the metaphysicians who have followed in their steps : and of late years, logical science has, in this country, received much illus- tration and improvement, from the writings of Archbishop Whately, Dr. Whewell, and Mr. John Mill : of whom, the first has improved the form of the scholastic logic, and adapted it to the wants of modern students ; the second has expounded the philosophy of induction, and of its subsidiary processes, as applied to the whole field of the physical sciences ; while the latter has determined the province of logic with precision, has established its first principles on a sound basis, and has systematised the methods of observation and deduction, for all the subjects of scientific research. Upon the field of logical science, as defined by the writers whom I have referred to, I do not propose to encroach. The positiveness in false or dubious propositions, are evils unknown among the Houyhn- hnms.' — Swift. The essential idea of opiniou seems to be that it is a matter about which doubt can reasonably exist, as to which two persons can without absurdity think differently. The existence of an object before the eyes of two persons would not be a matter of opinion, nor would it be a matter of opinion that twice two are four. But when testimony- is divided, or uncertain, the existence of a fact may become doubtful, and, therefore, a matter of opinion. For example, it may be a matter of opinion whether there was a war of Troy, whether Romulus lived, who was the man in the iron mask, who wrote Junius, &e. So the tendency of a law or form of government, or social institution, the probability of a future event, the quality of an action or the character of an historical personage, may be a matter of opinion. Any proposition, the contradictory of which can be maintained with probability, is a matter of opinion. The distinction between matter§ of fact and matters of opinion is recognised by Bacon, Advancement of Learning, vol. ii. p. 42, ed. Montagu. See also Locke, Essay on the Understanding, B. IV. c. xvi, § 5 ; On the Conduct of the Understanding, § 24 ; and Whately, Rhetoric, Part I. c. iii. § 3, In the language of jurists, questions of fact are opposed to questions of law. Hence the maxim of our law : ' De jure respondent judices, de facto jurati.' On this subject, see Bentham On Judicial Evidence hy Dunwnt, B. I. c. v. B 2 4 \^ ON THE NATUKE OF AUTHORITY [ch. object of the following pages will be of a subordinate and more limited kind. Without entering into any inquiry into the process of reasoning, or attempting to throw any light upon scientific method, it will concern a portion of the application of logical science, which has often been discussed in a detached or frag- mentary manner, but which seems of sufficient importance to deserve a connected consideration. It is familiarly known, that, in our progress from childhood to I manhood, during the course of our education, and afterwards in the business of life, our belief, both speculative and practical, is, owing to our inability or unwillingness to investigate the subject for ourselves, often determined by the opinions of others. That the opinions of mankind should so often be formed in. this manner, has been a matter of regret to many writers : others again have enforced the duty of submitting our convictions, in certain cases, to the guidance of fit judges ; but all have admitted the wide extent to which the derivation of opinions upon trust prevails, and the desirableness that the choice of guides in these matters should be regulated by a sound discretion. It is, therefore, pro- / posed to inquire how far our opinions may be properly influenced I by the mere authoHty^ of others, 'independently of our own con- ^victLon founded upon appropriate reasoning. /■ (when any one forms an opinion on a question either of specu- lation or practice, without any appropriate process of reasoning, really or apparently leading to that conclusion, and without com- pulsion or inducement of interest, but simply because some other persons, whom lie believes to be competent judges on the matter, entertain that opinion, he is said to have formed his opinion upon authority. If he is convinced by a legitimate process of reasoning — as by » This use of the word authority is in accordance with its sense in classpl writers. One of the meanings of auctoritas is explained by Facciolati, as Mloi^f ' Item pro pondere ac momento quod habent res legitime, sapienter, ac prudenter constitutse, ut sunt leges, decreta senatus, responsa prudentum, res prseclare gestae, sententise clarorura virorum.' — See Cic, Top. c. xix. An auctor meant the originator or creator of anything. Hence Virgil speaks of the deified Augustus as ' Auctorem frugum tempestatumque potentein,' {Georg. i. 27 ;) and Sallust says that unequal glory attends ' Scriptorem et auctorem rerum,' {Cat. c. ii.) Hence any person who determines our belief, even as a witness, is called an auctor. Thus Tacitus, in quoting Julius Caesar as a witness with respect to the former state of the Gauls, calls him • Summus auctorum,' {Germ. c. 28,) — i.e., the highest of authorities. As writers, particularly of history, were the authorities for facts, ' auctor' came to mean a writer. Hence Juvdhal speaks of a preceptor of the I.] IN MATTERS OF OPINION. 5 studying a scientific treatise on the subject — his opinion does not rest upon authority. Or if he adopts any opinion, either sincerely or professedly, from motives of interest, or from fear of persecution, he does not found his opinion upon authority. He who hpliVvAs; upon authority, en tertains the opinion simply because it is enter-] stained by a person who appears to him likely to think c orrec tly / on the subjec t.^^i^ Whenever, in the course of this Essay, I speak of the Prin- ciple of Authority, I shall understand the principle of adopting the belief of others, on a matter of opinion, without reference to the particular grounds on which that belief may rest. In pursuing the inquiry, thus indicated in general terms, I shall attempt, first, to describe the circumstances under which opinions are usually derived from authority, and next, to ascertainy the marks of sound or trustworthy authority in matters of opinion./ Having shown what are the best indications of the competent judges in each subject, I shall inquire as to their numerical ratio to the rest of the community, and shall afterwards offer some remarks upon the application of the ^principle of authority to questions of civil government— JLastly^ I shall make some sugges- tions upon the best means of creating 'a trustworthy authority in matters of opinion, and of guarding against the abuses to which the principle of authority is liable.) § 3. It will be shown presently that a la rp ;e propo rfinn of ihf^ general opinions of mankind are derived merely from nuthm-jtji and are entertained without any distinct understanding of the evidence on which they rest, or the argumentative groun ds by which they are supported. Moreover, the advice of professional persons, or other competent judges in any subject matter, has great influence in questions of practice, both in public and private life. An inquiry, therefore, into the legitimate use of the prin- ciple of authority, and the consequences to which it tends, must be admitted to relate to an important subject. - The importance of investigations in the field of logical science is undoubtedly far superior, inasmuch as logic furnishes the ultimate tests for the discovery of truth. The rules of logic, considered as an art, are a guide to the mind in the conduct of all processes of independent reasoning and intellectual investigation. A complete and philo- sophical scheme of logic is, therefore, a powerful instrument for Roman youth being required, ' Ut legat historias, auctores noverit omnes, Tamqxiam ungues digitosque sues.' — VII. 231. Conffpare Quintilian, Inst. Orat. I. 8, § 18-21. "s^ 6 NATURE OF AUTHOllITy IN MATTERS OF OPINION. [ch. facilitating the confutation of existing errors, and the discovery of new truths. It thus opens the way to the progressive advance- ment of science ; all accurate knowledge must ultimately be de- rived from sound methods of investigation. For all scientific truths we must be indebted to original researches, carried on according to logical rules. But when these truths have been dis- covered by original inquirers, and received by competent judges, it is chiefly by the influence of authority that tliey are accredited and difl'used. Now, it is true that when a person derives an opinion from authority, the utmost he can hope is to adopt the belief of those who, at the time, are the least likely to be in error. If this opinion happens to be erroneous, the error is necessarily shared by those who receive it upon mere trust, and without any process of verification. f oi- exampl e, before the Copernican system of the world was demonstrated, and accepted l)y all com- petent astronomers, persons ignorant of astronomy naturally be- lieved in the truth of the Ptolemaic system, which was received among all astronomers of authority. Until men of science had, \ by independent observation and reasoning, overthrown this erro- neous doctrine, and established the true system of the world, the opinions of all those who relied upon authority were necessarily misled. It must be admitted that the formation of opinions by authority can never (except by indirect means), produce any / increase or improvement of knowledge, or bring about the dis- j covery of new truths. Its influence is at best confined to the \ diffusion and extension of sound opinions, when they are in exist- \nce ; and the utmost that any rules on the subject can effect is to enable an uninformed person to discern who are the most com- petent judges of a question on which he is unable, from any cause, to judge for himself. But it is, nevertheless, of paramount importance that truth, and not error, should be accredited ; that men, when they are led, should be led by safe guides ; and that they should thus profit by those processes of reasoning and inves- tigation, which have been carried on in accordance with logical rules, but which they are not able to verify for themselves. With the view of arriving at the best means for the accom- plishment of this desirable end, we shall proceed, first, to indicate the extent of the opinions necessarily founded on authoiity, and shall afterwards endeavour to trace the manner in which the prin- ciple of authority can be so applied as to be most conducive to the welfare of human society. ^ II. j EXTENT OF OPINIONS FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. S^ OF THE UNIVERSITY CHAPTER II. ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. § 1. The opinions of all children and young persons are neces- sarily derived from their parents and teachers, either without any knowledge, or with a very imperfect knowledge, of the grounds on which they rest, or the objections to which they may be liable. ' Even in cases where the reason is given with the opinion, the belief of a child is often determined rather by the authority of the teacher, than by the force of the argument. The subjects connected with the relations of physical objects, as well as with morals and religion, which are early presented to the mind of a child, often involve considerations so numerous, so complex, and so remote from his limited experience, that a full explanation of them would necessarily bewilder, rather than enlighten his under- standing. Much instruction, too, is conveyed to a child in lan- guage, the full import of which he cannot comprehend. Words are often counters, not money, to children. They counterfeit processes of thought, rather than represent them. Much of the benefit of such early tuition consists in its familiarising the child with the names of ideas, which in its mind are still invested only with a vague and shadowy form, and in habituating it to the use of the great instrument of thought and discourse — language. Hence, in the education of children, a respect for the teacher as teacher, and for his precepts, independently of his reasons for them, is necessary : and it is important to inculcate principles and truths, even though the evidence of them is not, and cannot be, fully understood.* In this manner a person grows up, having imbibed, almost unconsciously, from his parents, teachers, and friends, the opinions ' AeT Tois idea-IP' ^x^oi KaKws tIv irfpl KaXwv Ka\ liiKai^eing thus familiarised with the habit of entertaining an opinion without any present consciousness of its grounds, and from * On the Undersinndivg, B. IV. c, xvi. §§ 1 and 2. 11.] FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. 13 a mere remembrance of a process of investigation which we for- merly went through, it is easy to transfer this origin of belief to another person, and to accept an opinion because that other per- son, (whom, moreover, we believe to be more competent to judge in the matter than ourselves) has gone through a similar process of investigation. Being accustomed to treat his former self as a sort of alter ego, and practically to divide his own identity, a man can easily apply the same mode of reference to another person. At all events, such a ground of belief is quite legitimate until we are able to examine the question for ourselves ; and is far prefer- able to the alternative of a temporary suspension of belief, (which in practical matters may tend to serious evils,) or subjection to a sophistical advocate whose business it is to present one side of the cjise in a favourable point of view. § 5. In the preceding remarks, we have had chiefly in view those general opinions which are termed speculative ; and which, although they in fact ultimately determine men's conduct, yet have not an immediate bearing upon practice. The extensive department of Practice, however, also involves a constant succes- sion of questions which cause a man to hesitate as to the course to be pursued, which give rise to diversity of opinions, and require the interference of a competent judge for their solution. y In many of the affairs of private life, it is customary to follow the advice of professional and other persons having had an appropriate training and peculiar experience in the subject matter. Thus a physician is consulted in questions of health, a lawyer in legal questions, an architect or engineer in questions of building, a gardener in questions of horticulture, a sailor in questions of navigation, and the like. There is likewise frequent occasion in the administration of justice, and the transaction of public business, for appealing to the opinion of persons of professional and special knowledge. In practical affairs, too, many opinions are formed upon the authority of the civil government, of public bodies and persons in conspicuous and responsible positions, of the heads of churches and religious bodies, of universities, academies, and places of learning, and of leaders of parties, and other volun- tary associations. For the present, we merely indicate these sources of author/ty, as influencing the opinions of numerous persons : and we merely point out, in general terms, the extent of the opinions accepted upon trust, and formed without independent investigation, or a 14 EXTENT OF OPINIONS FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. fcH. knowledge of the grounds on which they rest. We shall now attempt to distinguish the cases in which this mode of forming opinions is properly applicable, and thus to determine the proper province of authority. As a first step in this inquiry, it will be necessary to consider what are the marks by which trustworthy authority in matters of opinion may be recognised, and what are the qualifications of a competent guide in questions of speculative truth and practical conduct. in.] ON THE MARKS OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 15 CHAPTEE III. ON THE MARKS OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. § 1. In the first chapter, we adverted to the received distinc- tion between matters of fact and matters of opinion ; and we showed that, although this distinction may be wanting in scientific precision, it nevertheless classifies the objects of belief in a manner suitable to the purposes of this Esepy. Before, therefore, we pro- ceed to enumerate the marks of trustworthy authority in matters of opinion, it will be convenient to ascertain the marks of trust- worthy testimony in matters of fact, and to compare the qualifi- cations which render a person a credible witness with those which give weight to a person's opinion, as such, independently of his reasons. The credibility of a witness to a fact seems to depend mainly the four following conditions : viz. — 1 . That the fact fell within the range of his senses. 2. That he observed or attended to it. 3. That he possesses a fair amount of intelligence and memory. 4. That he is free from any sinister or misleading interest ; or if not, that he is a person of veracity. If a person was present at any event, so as to see or hear it ; if he availed himself of his opportunity, so as to take note of what passed ; if he has sufficient mental capacity to give an accurate report of the occurrence ; and if he is not influenced by personal favour, or dislike, or fear, or the hope of gain, to misreport the fact ; or if, notwitli standing such influence, his own conscience and moral or religious principle, or the fear of public opinion, deters him from mendacity, such a person is a credible witness. Upon considering these conditions for veracious testimony, we see that, with respect to statements of fact, everything depends on the source from which they emanate. They rest entirely on 16 ON THE MAKES OF [en. the credit due to known or assignable witnesses. But with argu- ments it is different. They have a probative force quite indepen- dent of the person by whom they are invented or propounded. They depend on the relation of premises and conclusion, of ante- cedent and consequent. For the truth of his premises the author of an argument may be personally responsible : but the sequence of his conclusion is a matter quite independent of his individual veracity. Logic, therefore, as a science, or art, of reasoning, has no concern with moral character ; all arguments, as arguments, and reduced to their bare logical elements, are equally conclusive, whatever may be the source from which they proceed. Thus, in judicial proceedings, an advocate may argue with equal force on either side of a question, though without any personal conviction on the subject. He may handle arguments (as a fencer handles his sword) with the skill of a practised disputant, regarding them merely as instruments for the attainment of his end, but without making himself responsible for the soundness of his conclusions.^ So a person may, as a rhetorical exercise, or for the purpose of eliciting the truth by the juxta-position of conflicting views, compose an argument on opposite sides of a question. Examples of this species of composition are afforded by all writings in the form of a controversial dialogue, such as the dialogues of Plato and Cicero and the Minute Philosopher of Berkeley. A person who produces an argument, produces something which can be judged without reference to himself, and which is not necessarily either confirmed or enfeebled by his individual qualities or cir- cumstances. A new demonstration of a mathematical problem would in no way depend on the character of its inventor. But the witness to a fact can only depose truly to that fact ; he can- not, like the arguer, choose his ground hypothetically ; and the credibility of his testimony depends solely on his own personal circumstances and moral character. § 2. Anonymous testimony to a matter of fact, is therefore wholly devoid of weight ; unless, indeed, there be circumstances ' ' Sir James Johnston happened to say that he paid no regard to arguments of counsel at the bar of the House of Commons, because they were paid for speaking. Johnson : " Nay, sir, argument is argument. You cannot help paying regard to their arguments, if they are good. If it were testimony, you might disregard it, if you knew that it were purchased. There is a beautiful image in Bacon upon this subject : •Testimony is like an arrow shot from a long-bow — the force of it depends on the strengtli of the hand that draws it ; argument is like an arrow from a crossbow, which has great force though shot by a child.' " ' — Bosw^ell's Johnson„xo\. viii. p. 281. ,„.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 17 which render it probable that a trustworthy witness has adequate motives for concealment, or extraneous circumstances may support and accredit a statement, which, left to itself, would fall to the ground. Thus an anonymous communication may put a man on his guard, or may induce him to make inquiries in a certain direc- tion, when it appears probable from the contents of the communi- cation, or from other circumstances, that it may proceed from some quarter in which secrecy is rendered inevitable by a powerful interest. Such was the letter to Lord Monteagle concerning the Grunpowder Plot ; such are threatening letters, or letters giving private information respecting the conduct of individuals, in a public or private capacity. Occasionally, it happens that impor- tant suggestions are conveyed in this manner ; but, for the most part, information given anonymously turns out, on investigation, to be utterly worthless. An anonymous work, too, may some- times exhibit internal evidence of truth ; that is, there may be certain marks in the writing which give it an air of veracity, though the author may have deemed it prudent to withhold his name from the public. It is in this manner that anonymous statements of facts in newspapers are authenticated : the periodical appearance of the newspaper and the character which its manage- ment may have acquired for correctness of intelligence, serving as guarantees for the truth of its statements.^ Statements in an anonymous publication may likewise acquire credibility from their remaining uncontradicted by persons who have an interest in contradicting them, and are acquainted with the facts of the case. It may be added that a work may be anonymous, from the loss of the author's name, though its original publication may not have been anonymous. For instance, the Acts of the Apostles, and many chronicles of the middle ages, are now anonymous, though there is no reason to suppose that the authors concealed their names from their contemporaries. With these exceptions — which are rather apparent than real — it is essential to testimony that we should know the witness as well as the fact, and be able to estimate his individual qualifica- tions, as a testifier or relator. Whereas, in the case of an argu- ment, its conclusiveness, considered without reference to the truth of its premises, and judged merely by logical rules, is wholly independent of its author. » See this subject further pursued in Chapter IX. C 18 ON THE MARKS OF [cii. This independence of an argument with respect to the cha- racter of its author, implies, however, both that its inferential force is thoroughly understood, and that the truth of its premises is conceded. Whenever this is not the case, the character of the person who advances the argument is a most material considera- tion ; and it is to cases of this sort that our present inquiry relates — that is to say, to cases where an opinion is accepted out of confidence in the person who holds it, and without any full comprehension of its grounds. § 3. It may be added that for all purposes of philosophical observation, a knowledge of the proper science, and a peculiar training of the senses, are requisite, and therefore that a witness who possesses these qualifications is far more credible than one who is destitute of them. For example, a scientific naturalist who reports that he has seen an undescribed animal or vegetable in a remote country, is far less likely to be mistaken than a common traveller, ig-norant of natural history. A skilled witness of this sort may be considered, in a certain sense, as a witness of authority, inasmuch as his previous study and habits of observa- tion give a peculiar weiglit to his report of the phenomenon. /^ § 4. The distinction between testimony, argument, and autho- rity, may be briefly summed up thus : — In questions of testimony, I believe a matter of fact, because the witness believes it. In questions of argument, I believe the conclusion to be true, because it is proved by reasons satisfactory to my r understanding. :^uestions of authority, I believe a matter of opinion, be- cause it is believed by a person whom I consider a com- petent judge of the question. § 5. Now, on looking at the qualities which render anyone a credible witness to a matter of fact, we may remark that they are of common occurrence. For testimony, nothing further is in general required than opportunity of observation, ordinary atten- tion and intelligence, and veracity. Almost every person of soimd mind, who has reached a certain age, is a credible witness as to matters which he has observed, and as to which he has no imme- diate interest in deception or concealment.^ For purposes of • For the administration of justice, it is important tliat there sliould be some recognised tests of the credibility of witnesses to facts in dispute before the court. In almost all systems of judicial procedure, an attempt has been made to lay down III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 19 scientific observation, indeed, (as has been remarked,) a certain skill and practice beyond that possessed by ordinary persons is requisite ; but when this has been acquired, no extraordinary qualifications are needed. The qualities which i-thers. Even in speculative subjects, a person whose time, or habits of thought and study, do not incline him to a particular department of knowledge, may reasonably adopt the views of persons who are conversant with it. In practice, however, where i special attainments and experience are necessary for a safe decision, y^ a man who prefers his own judgment to that of competent advisers certainly does not follow either a wise or a usual course. It sm'ely cannot be laid down as a general thesis, that a private individual is likely, in professional matters, to judge better than professional men. A person who thinks that in legal matters his own judg- ment is better than that of a lawyer, in medical matters better than that of a physician, in questions of building better than that of an architect, &c., is not likely to find that the rectitude of his practical decisions corresponds with the independence of his judg- ment. In such cases, (as we shall show more fully in a subsequent chapter,) reason does not forbid, but prescribes a reliance upon , authority. Where a person is necessarily ignorant of the grounds of decision, to decide for himself is an act of suicidal folly. He ought to recur to a competent adviser, as a blind man relies upon a guide. 46 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OE [ch. CHAPTER IV. ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. § 1. In the preceding chapter a description has been given of the process by which, in scientific matters, an agreement of the competent judges, and consequently a body of trustworthy au- thority, is gradually formed.^ In each subject, the first attempts at a scientific treatment are crude, imperfect, and alloyed with rash hypotheses ; and there is much hasty induction from single facts or partial phenomena. Numerous discordant opinions thus arise, and there are rival schools and sects, each with its own set of distinctive tenets. But, by degrees, some system or body of doctrine acquires the ascen- dancy ; there is an approach to agreement in important matters ; a progressive improvement, a gradual advance, are visible; the controversies begin to turn chiefly on subordinate points, and peculiar opinions are no longer handed down in schools by a succession of masters and disciples. Certain doctrines cease to predominate in certain countries ; they are no longer hereditary or local, but are common to the whole scientific world. They are diffused by the force of mere evidence and demonstration acting upon the reason of competent judges — not by persecution, or reward, or the influence of the civil government. A trustworthy authority is thus at length formed, to which a person, uninformed on the subject, may reasonably defer, satisfied that he adopts those opinions which, so far as existing researches and reflection have gone, are the most deserving of credit. § 2. This description, however, is not applicable to religion, or at least is only applicable to it within certain limits. All mankind, at all times, and in all countries, (with the ex- ' There is an Essay by Lord BolingLroke co7icerning Authority in matters of Bdigion, vols. vi. and vii. of his Works; hut its contents do not correspond with its title. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF EELmSOKi ^ '^' -'• - --^f ^ T ception, perhaps, of some of the lowest tribes orSB^Tages,) havfe^ Z^ agreed in recognising some form of religious belief. AH nations have believed in the existence of some supernatural and supersen- sual beings, whose favour they have sought to obtain, and whose displeasure they have souglit to avert, by sacrifices, prayers, and other ceremonies of worship. The argument of consensus gentium, applies with peculiar force to the belief in a divine power, and accordingly it has always been placed in the front rank by writers on Natural Religion. Thus Cicero, speaking of the existence of a supreme Grod, says, ' Quod nisi cognitum comprehensumque animis liaberemus, non tam stabilis opinio permaneret, nee confirmaretur diuturnitate temporis, nee una cum saeculis setatibusque hominum inveterare potuisset. Etenim videmus cseteras opiniones fictas atque vanas diuturnitate extabuisse Opinionum enim commenta delet dies, naturae judicia confirmat, '^ A passage from the Dissertations of Maximus Tyrius, a Grreek philosopher who lived in the age of the Antonines, has often been quoted by modern writers as a proof of the general diffusion of a religious belief among the ancient nations : — ' In the midst of universal disagree- ment and discord as to the divine attributes, and as to laws and customs, (he says,) one uniform maxim and doctrine may be seen in every land — that there is one Grod, the supreme governor and father of all, and many Gods, his sons and joint rulers. This the Grreek says — this the barbarian — this the dweller on the mainland and the dweller on the sea-coast — the wise and foolish.' ^ Among modern writers it is sufficient to cite the words of Bishop Burnet : — ' Tkat there is a God, is a proposition which, in all ages, has been so universally received and believed, some very few instances being only assigned of such as either have denied or doubted of it, that the very consent of so many ages and nations, of such different tempers and languages, so vastly remote from one another, has been long esteemed a good argument to prove that either there is somewhat in the nature of man, that by a secret sort of instinct does dictate this to him ; or that all mankind has descended from one common stock, and that this belief has passed down from the first man to all his posterity. If the more polite nations had only received this, some might suggest that wise men ' De Nat. J)eor. II. 2. 2 Diss. XVII. 5, vol. i. p. 316 ; Reiske. Compare Cudworth, Syst. Intellect, vol. i. p. 685; ed. Mosheim, 1773; and Leland, Advantage and Necessity of the Christian Revelation shown from the State of Religion in the Anoient World, vol. i. p. 422. 48 OIT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PUmCTPLE OF [ch. had introduced it as a mean to govern human society, and to keep it in order : or if only the more barbarous had received this, it might be thought to be the effect of their fear and their ignor- ance ; but since all sorts, as well as all ages, of men have received it, this alone goes a great way to assure us of the being of a Grod.' ^ It is, undoubtedly, true that, in the positive religions, and in the sacred rites, practices, and doctrines of the pagan world, the greatest diversity has existed ; and not only between barbarous or half-civilised tribes, but among the Grreek and Eoman philoso- phers, whose controversies on the nature of the gods were intermin- able.2 But in the substantial recognition of a Divine power, super-human and imperceptible by our senses, all nations have agreed. § 3. The agreement, moreover, does not stop here. All the civilised nations of the modern world, together with their colonies and settlements, in all parts of the earth, agree, not merely in believing in the existence of a God — a belief which they have in common with Mahometans, Hindus, and heathens generally — but in recognising some form of the Christian religion. Christendom includes the entire civilised world — that is to say, all nations whose agreement on a matter of opinion has any real weight or authority. § 4. When, however, w.e advance a step beyond this point, and inquire how far there is a general agreement throughout Christen- dom with respect to any particular form of Christianity, and whether all Christians are members of one church, recognising the same set of doctrines, we find a state of things wholly different. We perceive a variety of churches, some confined to a single country, some common to several countries, but each with its own ecclesiastical superiors and peculiar creed, and each condemning the members of other churches as heretics, schismatics, separatists, and dissenters, or, at least, as infected with grave errors, and sometimes not even recognising them as Christians.^ ' Exposition of the Thirty -nioie Articles. On Art, I. 2 Qui vero deos esse dixemnt, tanta sunt in varietate ac dissensione, ut eorum molestum sit dinumerare sententias. Nam et de figuris deorum, et de locis atque sedibus, et actione vitse multa dicuntur : deque his summa philosophorum dissensione certatur. — Cicero de Nat. Deor. I. 1. ^ For a complete account of the distribution of the several Christian communions over the world, the constitution and tenets of each cliurch, their mutual relations, and other characteristics, see the Kirchliche StatistiJc of Dr. Wiggers, 2 vols. 8vo. ; Ham- burg, 1842 and 1843, According to a calculation cited by him in vol. i. p. 22, the chief divisions of Christendom consist of the following numbers : — IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 49 § 5. Various causes have conspired to prevent a general agree- ment throughout the civilised world respecting the particular doctrines of Christianity. The Christian religion first assumed a dogmatic form in the hands of the later Greeks, who had received from their ancestors the inheritance of a subtle, refined, and ab- struse metaphysical philosophy. This instrument of reasoning and exposition they applied to the Christian religion, and particu- larly to its more mysterious portions ; such as the doctrine of the Trinity, the relations of the three Divine persons, and their com- mon essence or substance ; the union of the Divine and human natures in the Saviour; and the procession of the Holy Grhost. At a later time, the Christian theology, now reduced to a more systematic form, passed through the hands of the schoolmen, and was treated in the spirit of the scholastic philosophy.^ Afterwards, the Eeformation awakened new controversies, or gave increased importance to old ones, concerning the eucharistic sacrament, the communion of the laity in both kinds, and the alleged substantial change and real presence in the consecrated elements ; also as to the nature and operation of grace and good works, and the theory of original sin, regeneration, justification, and predestination. These, combined with other questions as to church authority, tradition, general councils, the power of the pope and of national churches, episcopal government, ecclesiastical ceremonies and vestments, monastic vows, ordination, celibacy of the clergy, auricular confession, purgatory, baptism, individual inspiration, &c., have served to divide Christians into numerous churches and sects, and to keep up continual controversies between their Roman Catholics 142,145,000 Protestants 62,785,000 Greek Church 57,110,000 Armenians, Copts, &c 5,850,000 ' ' It was gravely said by some of the prelates in tlie Council of Trent, where the doctrine of the schoolmen bare great sway, that the schoolmen were like astronomers, which did feign eccentrics and epicycles, and such engines of orbs, to save the pheno- mena, though they knew there were no such things ; and, in like manner, that the schoolmen had framed a number of subtle and intricate axioms and theorems to save the practice of the Church.' — Tiord Bacon, Essay XVII. In his Novum Organon he speaks of the Theologi Scholastici— ' qui cum theologiam (satis pro potestate) in ordinem redegerint et in artis formam effinxerint, hoe insuper efFecerunt, ut pugnax et spinosa Aristotelis philosophia corpori religionis plus quam par erat immisceretur.' — Lib. I. Aph. 89. Compare his Apophthegms, 274, 275, where a dictum of some Roman divines concerning the canons of the Council of Trent is reported ; ' that they were beholden to Aristotle for many articles of their faith,' 50 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [ch. respective advocates, which have never received any final settlement, and, when intermitted, are rather discontinued than decided. The difficulty of determining the controversies respecting the different questions to which the interpretation of the Christian records has given rise is, in great measure, owing to the fact that religion, as such, is conversant with matters which are neither the subjects of consciousness or intuition, nor within the range of the senses. This is necessarily the case with all questions concerning the nature of the Deity and his attributes ; his permanent rela- tions with mankind ; and the state of human existence after death. Upon these subjects, we have no experience, derived either from internal consciousness or external sensation, to guide us ; and, accordingly, not only the abstract reasonings of natural religion, but the interpretation of the records of revealed religion, give rise to questions, for the settlement of which it is difficult to find any decisive rule of judgment. § 6. Owing to the operation of these causes, the various Christian churches and sects into which the civilised world is divided continue to co-exist side by side with one another, and show little or no tendency to coalesce into a common belief, or to recognise a common organ of religious truth. Eeligious opinions thus become hereditary, and national or local ; they sometimes run on for centuries in parallel lines, without converging to a central focus of agreement. Opinions on scientific matters, although they may spring from different sources, and follow for a time distinct courses, at last flow together into one main stream ; whereas the distinctive tenets of the several Christian churches not only spring from different sources, but continue to run in different channels. The religious state of Europe since the Reformation bears witness to the truth of this description. The boundaries of re- ligion, which were fixed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, remain more unchanged than those of states.^ A peculiar form of Christianity is, in each district of Europe, handed down faithfully from one generation to another. National laws and constitutions, and forms of civil government, undergo fundamental changes. Even national manners and usages are modified by the reciprocal intercourse of persons and ideas which trade, literature, and news- papers promote, and by progressive inventions and improvements ' On this subject, see the remarks of Mr. Macaulay, Essays, vol. ii. p. 304. {On Lord Bacon.) IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 51 in the arts of civilised life. But national and local churches propagate their peculiar modes of faith and ecclesiastical discipline, without feeling the influence of the ideas which are moving in external spheres. Each continues to revolve in its own orbit, without altering its course, or approximating to other bodies.* We may discern a certain analogy between the perpetuation of a particular form of Christianity, and the perpetuation of a particular language. Both belong to a class of which the forms are various ; but each variety, having once arisen, is unchanging, and, when adopted by a nation, remains. Both prevail locally, and are transmitted, by a faithful tradition, from father to son. Moreover, it often happens that both are diffused by colonisation or conquest. The diversity of Christian creeds is the more apparent, when it is contrasted with the general uniformity upon moral questions which prevails throughout the civilised world. Amongst all civilised nations, a nearly uniform standard of morality is recog- nised : the same books on ethical subjects are consulted for the guidance of life ; and if the practice differs, the difference is not, in general, owing to a diversity of theoretical rules of conduct.^ It will be observed, that the great controversies between the Christian sects either turn upon questions which have no direct bearing upon human conduct, (such as the doctrines of the Trinity and transubstantiation,) or upon forms of church government and discipline, which are matters of positive institution. They rarely turn upon the moral doctrines which are involved in Christianity. Upon these, there is a prevailing tendency and approximation to an agreement.^ -Scientific opinions follow a certain law of progressive develop- ment. While error is gradually diminished, truth is established, by a continually enlarging consensus, like the successive circles made upon the surface of water. ^ Opinion, however, in the several • With respect to the fusion of the peculiar creed of each nation with its native institutions, and the present equilibrium of opposite forces in the Christian world, see the observations of Prof. Ranke, in Note A at the end of the chapter. "^ Compare the celebrated passage of Cicero, on the universality of the moral law as to time and place. — Be Rep. III. 22. ' Perhaps one of the most practical of the tenets controverted between the Roman and Protestant churches is that relating to marriage, with respect to its indissolubility and its contraction within certain degrees of affinity. The Predestinarian doctrines, as has been often remarked, exercise little influence upon conduct. B 2 52 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [ch. Christian churches, with respect to their distinctive tenets, is rather variable than progressive. It oscillates backwards and for- wards, but does not tend by a joint action to a common centre. This permanent diversity of religious opinions throughout Christendom, exists not only in spite of the attempts which have been made to produce uniformity of belief, but partly even in con- sequence of them. Governments have attempted to extirpate religious error by persecution, and to favour religious truth by endowment ; but as the governments of different countries adopted different creeds, that which was considered religious error by one government was considered religious truth by another. Hence, although governments have succeeded to a certain extent in pro- ducing uniformity of faith in their own territory by persecution, (as in Italy and Spain,) yet they have not been able to prevent other governments from encouraging the opinions which they dis- couraged. This has been the case with communities immediately contiguous to each other, and included even within the same national federation. Thus, after the thirty years' war, some of the Grerman States remained Protestant and others Catholic, and the mutual rights of the two confessions were guaranteed by solemn treaty. And the Catholic and Protestant Cantons of Switzerland remain as they were left by the great reformation. In other countries, as in Ireland, the faith of one sect has resisted all attempts of the government to produce uniformity, and the ancient landmarks of religion have been maintained in defiance of the endeavours of the civil power to obliterate them. § 7. Now, it must not be supposed that this diversity of re- ligious opinions, and the existence of heterodox sects within the pale of Christianity, has escaped the notice of the heads of the church. On the contrary, it has attracted the incessant attention of theologians and theological politicians for ages, as indeed is sufficiently apparent from the ineffectual attempts of governments to produce uniformity of religious belief, already alluded to. It has always been perceived and admitted that diversity of opinion, in religious as well as in scientific matters, is necessarily a mark of error, and that, of several conflicting or discordant opinions, one only can be true.^ It has, therefore, been the great aim of writers ' Cicero makes the following remarks upon the diversity of the religious opinions of his time : * Res nulla est de qua tantopere non solum indocti, sed etiam docti dis- sentiant ; quorum opiniones cum tam varise sint, tamque inter se dissidentes, alterum fieri profecto potest, ut earum nulla, alterum certe non potest, ut plus una vera sit.' — IV.] AUTHOEITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 53 on theology, to whatever sect or denomination they might belong, to discover one standard or canon of religious truth, which should be universally applicable to the Christian world, should serve as a decisive authority in matters of faith, and thus give unity to the church.^ All Christians, whatever might be their creed, would be e:lad to find any living person, or body of persons, whom they could conscientiously recognise as an infallible organ and exponent of religious truth. The general feeling on this subject is bluntly expressed by Dryden, in his Religio Laid, — Such an omniscient church we wish indeed ; 'Twere worth both Testaments, cast in the Creed. § 8. A large portion of the Christian world, viz., the Church of Eome and the Eastern Churches, together with that section of the Church of England which approximates to the Roman doctrine, make the standard of religious truth to consist in the teaching of the church. They profess to be able to lay down certain marks of the true church ; and having determined the true church by means of these marks, they hold that whatever this church teaches is true, and is entitled to belief without examination, simply because the church so teaches.^ § 9. But when these marks come to be examined, it will be found that they are so vague and obscure as merely to shift the ground of controversy, and that there is as much doubt and dif- ference of opinion respecting the determination of the marks, or their application to a particular church, as concerning the doctrines which that church teaches. De Nat. Deor. I. 2. Bossuet lays down the same maxim with respect to Christianity : ' Lorsque, parmi les Chretiens, on a vu des variations dans I'exposition de la foi, on les a toujours regardees comrae une marque de fausset6 et d'inconsequence (qu'on me per- mette ce mot) dans la doctrine exposee.' — Variations des Eglises Protestantes, Pref. § 2. * Sir T. More told his son-in-law and biographer, Roper, that if three things were well established in Christendom, he wished he were put into a sack and thrown into the Thame*. The second of these three wishes was, that ' whereas the church of Christ is at present sore afflicted with many errors and heresies, it were well settled in perfect uniformity of religion.' — Lord Campbeix's Lives of the Chancellors, vol. i. ch. xxxii. See also Lord '^a.con^s Essay on Unity in Religion, AXi&h.\ a Tract on Church Controversies, vol. ii. p. 28-60. '^ See Mohler's Symholik, § 37 ; Palmer's Treatise on the Church of Christ, Part I. c. ii. ; Burnet on Art. XIX. The marks of the true church, adopted by the Church of Rome, (see Catechismus Cone. Trid., Pars I. c. x.,) and retained by Mr. Palmer, are, that it is Una, Sancta, Catholica, and Apostolica. These marks are, as may be seen, too vague to characterise any church for a practical purpose. For example, every religious institute, not merely of Christendom, but of Mahometans and heathens, since the beginning of the world, has claimed to be ' holy.' 54 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PKINCIPLE OF [ch. In the first place, an attempt is made to determine the true church by representing it as ' catholic ' or ' universal.' But it cannot be disputed that, from the Apostolic age, there have been divisions among Christians, and separatist or heretical bodies, which prevented the universal reception of any one orthodox faith amongst the professors of the Christian religion.^ Even in the first centuries, there never was a universal or catholic church, in the strict acceptation of the word ; ^ and since the separation of the Eastern and Western Churches, and the great reformation of the 16th century, the non-existence of one universal chm'ch, having external communion and membership, and recognising common ecclesiastical superiors, is still more apparent. To assume, there- fore, that there is a really existing ' catholic ' or ' universal ' church, one and indivisible, which acts as a body, and is capable of pronouncing decisions and expressing opinions, implies a mani- fest disregard of notorious facts ; and to found practical conclusions ' ' The heretics, or secedcrs from the primitive church, were extremely various, at least in name, and there is no period in ecclesiastical history in which dissent has appeared under so many denominations as the earliest.' — Waddington, History of the Church, vol. i. p. 138 ; ed 2. These differences of opinion were, however, confined to small knots and sections of dissidents, who disappeared in the larger and more impor- tant heresies which came in the following centuries. ^ As to the origin of the name Catholic, which signified the prevailing and most widely spread church, as opposed to local and partial heresies, see Bingham's Antiquities of the Christia7i Church, B. 1. ch. i. § 7. Pearson on the Creed, Art. IX., (vol. i. p. 584, ed. Oxford,) explains the catholic- ism of the church to ' consist generally in universality, as embracing all sorts of persons, as to be disseminated through all nations, as comprehending all ages, as con- taining all necessary and saving truths, as obliging all conditions of men to all kinds of obedience, as curing all diseases, and planting all graces, in the souls of men.' Mr. Palmer states that the universality of tlie church 'does not suppose a physical and absolute universality, including all men,^ [sed qu. all Christians?] All that is meant is a ' moral universality,' which he explains to be a power of obtaining adher- ents in all the nations of the known world, and tb extend its limits in proportion as new nations and countries are discovered. — On the Church of Christ, Part I. ch. vii. Walter, Kirchenrecht, § 11, (ed. 9,) gives a similar explanation. He says that the church is called catholic or universal, because the work of salvation is destined for all nations and times, and the church has always made this her aim. Klee, Katholische Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 93, says, that the catholicity of the church refers to its being in- tended for mankind at all places and times, and its including everything holy on earth and in heaven. The catechism of the Council of Trent is more distinct in its definition of catholicti ecclesia. ' Neque enim, ut in humanis rebus publicis aut hsereticorum eonventibus, unius tantum regni terminis, aut uno hominum genere ecclesia definita est ; verum omnes homines, sive illi barbari sint sive Scythse, sive servi sive liberi, sive masculi sive femiuse, caritatis sinu complectitur. . . . Universalis etiam ob earn causam dicitur, quod omnes, qui salutem seternam consequi cupiunt, earn tenere et amplecti debeant.'— Pa?v/'. des: Variations, Pref. § 29, IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 59 council ; others require the concurrence of a council with the pope ; while others hold that a council without the pope is infallible.^ There are again further disputes as to what constitutes an oecu- menical or universal council ; as to the authority by which it is siunmoned, the members of which it is to be composed, the means by which it is to decide, and as to the necessity of a subsequent consent of the universal church to its decrees.^ ' There are so many questions ' (says Jeremy Taylor) ' concerning the efficient, the form, the matter of Greneral Councils, and their manner of proceeding, and their final sanction, that after a question is deter- mined by a conciliary assembly, there are perhaps twenty more questions to be disputed before we can, with confidence, either believe the council upon its mere authority, or obtrude it upon others.' ^ With regard to Greneral Councils, the Church of England holds that ' when they be gathered together, (forasmuch as they be an assembly of men whereof all be not governed with the spirit and word of Grod), they may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining unto Grod.' (Art. XXI.) The doctrine of the Church of England on the subject of church authority is contained in Article XX. : ' The church hath power to decree rites or ceremonies, and authority in matters of faith. And yet it is not lawful for the church to ordain anything that is contrary to Grod's word written ; neither may it so expound one place of Scripture, that it be repugnant to another.' In com- menting upon this passage. Bishop Burnet says — ' Here a dis- tinction is to be made between an authority that is absolute, and founded on infallibility, and an authority of order. The former is very formally disclaimed by our church, but the second may be well maintained, though we assert no unerring authority. . . . When any synod of the clergy has so far examined a point as to settle their opinions about it, they may certainly decree that such is their doctrine ; and as they judge it to be more or less important, » The infallibility of the pope is stated by the highest authorities to be still an unsettled doctrinal question in the Church of Rome. See Walter's Kirchenrecht, § 178. Compare Bossuet, Variations des Egl. Trot. XV. 165. That 'the church is infallible,' is a dogma" universally admitted in the Church of Rome. The same doctrine Is held by the Anglo-catholic school. See Palmer, Part IV. c. 4. But as soon as we proceed another step, and inquire how the infallible voice of the church is to be ascertained, the discordance of opinions, even within the Church of Rome, becomes irrecnncileable. See the quotations in Palmer, Part IV. c. 12. 2 Palmer, Part IV. ch. 7- " Liberty of Frophesying, § 6. See also Burnet and Tomline on Art. XXI., and Bret Schneider, Dogmatik, vol. I. § 43. 60 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PKINCIPLE OF [ch. they may either restrain any other opinion, or may require positive declarations about it, either of all in their communion, or at least of all whom they admit to minister to holy things. This is only an authority or order for the maintaining of union and edification ; and in this a body does no more, as it is a body, than what every single individual has a right to do for himself. He examines a doctrine that is laid before him, he forms his own opinion upon it, and pursuant to that he must judge with whom he can hold com- munion, and from whom he must separate. When such definitions are made by the body of the pastors of any church, all persons within that church do owe great respect to their decision This is due to the considerations of peace and union, and to that authority which the church has to maintain it. But if, after all possible methods of inquiry, a man cannot master his thoughts, or make them agree with the public decisions, his conscience is not under bonds ; since this authority is not absolute, nor grounded upon a promise of infallibility.' ' § 11. The argument in favour of establishing a true church, as a source of infallible authority, is further supported by an attempt to represent it as having maintained a continuous succession from the Apostles, and having handed down the true doctrines of Christianity, and the true interpretation of Scripture, by an unin- terrupted tradition.^ Here, again, we meet with the same method of proving incertum per incertius, and of solving one indeterminate problem by sub- stituting for it another equally indeterminate. There is no general agreement as to what constitutes authentic and catholic tradition ; or as to the distinction between the private opinions and inferences of the fathers of the chm'ch, by whom the doctrines are recorded, and tradition derived from an Apostolic source. The witnesses to whom reference is made often differ, and it cannot be proved that any constant and invariable oral tradition, ascending to the origin of Christianity, has continued to the present time.^ ' See, further, Tomline upon Art. XX., who agrees with Burnet. ' For the Koman and Anglo-catholic doctrine of church tradition, see Walter, Kirchenrecht, § 17 ; Klee, KathoUsche Dogmatik, vol. I. pp. 271-84 ; Mohler, Symholik, §§ 38, 39 ; and Palmer on the Church, Part II. e, 6 ; Part III. c. 3. * See J. Taylor's Lib. of Vrophcsying, % 5. As to the doctrine of the reformed churches, compare Bretschneider, Dogmatik, § 43. ' The custom is so universal amongst those who wrestle to support the strength of every opinion in religion, lo appeal to the judgment and the practice of the primitive times, that standers-hy are apt to believe that every one of the litigants know very IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIOION. 61 Besides, the Christian church never professed to be in possession of a secret and mysterious doctrine, inaccessible to the rest of the world, and preserved in its exclusive custody. It cannot, in this sense, be a tradux traditionum. The doctrines of Christianity have always been published and promulgated ; and there is no reason to suppose that a holy tradition would have been more faithfully preserved among the living members of the church than in the books and writings in which it was originally recorded. In fact, where there are contemporary records, the office of oral tradition ceases. Under such circumstances, oral tradition can only be supplementary to the written record ; where it agrees, the agree- ment gives little confirmation, on account of the superior certainty of an authentic contemporary record, and the unfaithfulness, imperfection, and liability to foreign admixture, of tradition; where it differs, its claim to a Divine origin cannot be admitted until it is proved by direct evidence equal to contemporary attestation. If the rule of faith is to consist both of Scripture and tradition, both of the written and the unwritten word of God, it is necessary that those doctrines which are referred exclusively to tradition as their origin, which are derived merely from the verbum Dei non scriptum^ should be distinctly traced to their source, and that the tradition should be proved, by authentic evidence, to be not of a subsequent growth, but to be founded on a contemporary recol- lection of the fact recorded.^ A historical event may be handed down by oral tradition as well as by a contemporary written re- cord ; but, in that case, satisfactory proof must be given that the well where to find the judge to whom he appeals; and yet there was never any diffi- culty reconciled and determined by that judicatory : nor in truth do the appellants well understand what themselves mean by the appeal they make ; nor would have reason to acquiesce in the judgment if they could receive it by agreeing upon it.' — Lord Clarendon, Essai/ on the Reverence due to Antiquity, p. 218. ' Van Espen, as quoted by Walter, uhi sup. § 176, affirms that this is the case : ' Indubitatum est ecclesiam Catholicam eandem semper et ubique fidem ex traditione apostolica sive scripto sive sine scrip to conservasse, nee circa articulos fidei quidquam novi post tempora apostolorum accidisse.' Compare Bossuet, Variations, Pref. § 26. This position is disputed by all the Protestant churches. For example, Protestants would not admit that such doctrines as purgatory, works of supererogation, transub- Btantiation, the sacrifice of the mass, and adoration of images, can be proved by authentic evidence to have been taught by Christ, and to be of apostolic institution. The theory of a gradual development of the Christian doctrines from certain seminal principles, which was propounded a few years ago by Mr. Newman, is, if not peculiar to himself, at all events quite inconsistent with the systems both of the Church of Rome and of Protestantism. 62 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [ch. tradition is derived from contemporary witnesses.* The mere pre- valence of a belief in a certain tenet within a church does not prove that tenet to have been derived from an authentic source, as Bossuet assumes ; ^ its pedigree must be deduced from the first ancestor, and it must be proved by positive evidence, not by general presumptions, to have formed a part of primitive and Apostolic Christianity. § 12. An additional support of the doctrines of an infallible universal church, and of an authoritative church-tradition, is sought to be derived from the distinction between Fundamentals and Non-Fundamentals, or (in other words) between matters of faith, to be held defide, and matters of mere opinion. It is affirmed, that the authority of the true church, and of church-tradition, is decisive with respect to fundamentals and matters of faith, but that, in other things, entire agreement is not necessary; so that a Christian who rejects any of the latter, does not incur the sin of heresy. But here, again, the difficulty is merely shifted, not solved ; it is transferred to another point, but it is not diminished. There is no received or certain test for distinguishing between funda- mental and non-fundamental doctrines — between matters of strict faith and matters of mere opinion. That which one divine or one church may consider fundamental, another may consider imma- terial, and the converse. We know from experience, that the most discordant views as to the character and extent of fundamentals have been taken by different theologians of authority in different countries, and under the influence of different general views on the Christian scheme. ' Unity in the fundamental articles of faith,' (says Dr. Water- land, who has treated this subject ex professo,) ' was always strictly insisted upon as one necessary condition of church-membership ; and if any man openly and resolutely opposed those articles, or any of them, he was rejected as a deserter of the common faith, and treated as an alien Hence it is, that we have almost as many different rules for determining fundamentals, as there are different sects or parties ; and that which might otherwise ' See Note B. at the end of the chapter. * • Toutes les fois qu'on trouvera en un certain temps une doctrine etablie dans toute r^glise catholique, ce ne sera jamais que par erreur qu'on croira qu'elle est nouvelle.'— Far. des lEgl. Trot. XV. 97. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 63 serve (if all men were reasonable) to end all differences, has itself been too often made one principal bone of contention.' ^ ' A distinction,' (says Burnet,) ' is to be made between those capital and fundamental articles, without which a man cannot be esteemed a true Christian, nor a church a true church ; and other truths which, being delivered in Scripture, all men are, indeed, obliged to believe them, yet they are not of that nature that the ignorance of them, or an error in them, can exclude from salvation.' ' Here,' (he continues,) ' a controversy does naturally arise, that wise people are unwilling to meddle with — what articles are fundamental, and what are not ? The defining of fundamental articles seems, on the one hand, to deny salvation to such as do not receive them all, which men are not willing to do. And, on the other hand, it may seem a leaving men at liberty as to all other particulars that are not reckoned up among the fundamentals.' ^ § 13. The attempt to give authenticity to religious opinions by defining the church, and to establish a living standard and canon for the right interpretation of Scripture, independently of the intrinsic grounds of the decision, never met with entire suc- cess ; inasmuch as there were heretical sects, who denied the authority of the predominant, or self-styled orthodox catholic church, from the earliest period of Christianity. Its failure was, however, rendered most conspicuous by the Reformation in the sixteenth century, when rival churches were set up, under the protection of the state, in the most civilised countries of Europe, contesting the pretensions of the Church of Eome, and, indeed, denouncing it as false and unchristian. The leaders of the Reformation, and the Protestant churches ' A Discourse of Fundamentals, Works, vol. VIII. p. 90. Waterland, however, proposes his own enumeration of fundamentals. Compare Palmer on the Church, Part I. ch. 5; App. Various writings on the subject of fundamentals are cited by Waterland ; others are mentioned in Bretschneider, Dogmatik der Lutherischevangel- ischen Kirche, vol. I. § 47. Mr. Gladstone, The State in its Relations with the Church, eh. 2, § 105 ; ch. 7, § 97, (ed. 4,) agrees as to the uncertainty of the definition of fundamentals. Dr. Hampden, Bampton Lecticres, p. 352, ed. 2, condemns the distinction as being a remnant of scholasticism. Klee, on the other hand, Katholische Dogmatik, vol. I. p. 60, (ed. 3,) considers it a Protestant invention, and rejects it as inconsistent with the Catholic doctrine. Compare Chillingworth, Works, vol. I. ch. 3. Hallam, Lit. of Eur., vol. II. ch. 2, § 31. 2 On Art. XIX., (p. 236.) 64 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [ch. in general, rejected the maxim that ' the church,' (however deter- mined,) is the decisive authority for religious truth ; and they laid little or no stress on the doctrines of tradition and Apostolic succession as guides in the interpretation of Scripture. For the most part, the Protestant churches framed certain authoritative summaries of their faith, (such as the Augsburg Confession, the Thirty-nine Articles, &c. ;) but they founded the authority of their creeds, and the obligation of Christians to adopt them, not on the teaching of their church, and its possession of an authentic tradition and an authoritative voice, but on their accordance with Scripture.^ The creeds of all the reformed churches are particularly ex- plicit on this point, which was, indeed, a fundamental and characteristic doctrine of Protestantism. Instead, like the Church of Eome, of recognising a compound rule of faith, which compre- hended both Scripture and oral tradition, and placed the two upon an equal footing, the Protestant churches, however they might differ in other respects, agreed in establishing a simple rule of faith, consisting exclusively of Scripture. This principle is ex- pressed in the clearest terms in the Articles of the Church of England, and, indeed, pervades their whole substance. Art. VI. states that ' holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation ; so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of faith, or to be thought requisite or necessary to salvation.' ^ Art. VIII. declares that the three creeds — the Nicene, Athanasian, and Apostles' creed — 'ought thoroughly to be received and believed,' not because they were received by the early church, and founded upon an authoritative tradition, but because ' they may be proved by most certain warrants of Scrip- ture.' So, again. Art. XX. lays it down that the church cannot ordain or decree anything contrary to holy writ, or enforce any- * With respect to the doctrines of the early reformers on Scripture and tradition, and their condemnation by the Council of Trent, see Sarpi, Hist, du Concile de Trente, 1. II. c. 43-6, 56, trad, de Courayer. Sarpi states that one of the members of the council urged their laying down, * that every Christian is bound to believe in the Church ; ' but that this proposition was unanimously rejected, partly on the ground that the heretics would pretend to be the true church, to which so much authority was given, c. 45. Compare Mohler, Symbolik, § 44-51 ; Bretschneider, Dogmatik, vol. I. I 33 ; Walter, Kirchenrecht, § 35. 2 See Burnet's commentary on this article, as to the antithesis between the doctrines of the church of Rome and that of England on this head. A similar view is taken by Bishop Tomline on the same article. I IV.] AUTHOEITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 65 thing beside the same, to be believed for necessity of salvation ; and Art. XXI. decides, that tilings ordained by General Councils as necessary to salvation have neither strength nor authority, unless it may be declared that they be taken out of holy Scripture.^ Again, Art. XXXIV. says that ' it is not necessary that traditions and ceremonies be in all places one, or utterly like, for at all times they have been diverse, and may be changed according to the diversity of countries and men's manners, so that nothing be ordained against (rod's word.' In all these passages, the reference to Scripture as the paramount and exclusive standard of faith is manifest. The distinctive theories of the Church of Kome and of the Protestant churches on this subject, may be stated thus : — According to the Church of Eome, there are certain marks by which the one true Christian church can be recognised. Those marks exist in the Church of Eome, and in no other. The true and genuine doctrines have been preserved by an un- interrupted tradition in the true church. Therefore, whatever the Church of Eome teaches is true, and her authority is a legitimate groimd of belief in things spiritual. All Christians who reject her authority in matters of faith are heretics, and without the pale of the church. On the other hand, the Protestant churches hold that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament contain everything which goes to make up Christianity, and that they are the exclusive and ultimate rule of faith. They deny the existence of any uninter- rupted and exclusive transmission of true doctrine in any church since the time of the Apostles. Each Protestant church lays down rtain doctrines, which it considers to constitute, in the aggregate, he true exposition of the Christian religion ; but it claims Divine authority to this body of doctrines, simply on the ground that they are all expressly contained in Scripture, or can be inferred from it by a legitimate process of deduction. It was on account of this exclusive reference to Scripture, that the Protestant divines laid more stress on the inspiration of the holy writings than the theologians of the Church of Eome ; and that the Protestants were accused of bibliolatry. Owing to this deposition of church authority, and to the * Commenting on this article, Burnet says of the early councils— '"We reverence those councils for the sake of their doctrine, but do not believe the doctrine for the authority of the councils.' L 66 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [ch. adoption of the maxim that ' the Bible only is the religion of Protestants,' ^ it has been commonly asserted that the reformed churches have admitted the right of pHvate judgment in religious matters. Now, in a certain sense, every church which possesses a fixed written confession of faith predetermines the most important articles of Christian belief, and therefore can hardly be said to leave a free scope to private judgment.^ But the reformed churches agree in making the Scriptures the exclusive canon of religious faith ; they admit that their creed is only entitled to acceptance so far as it is supported by Scripture ; and they do not assume that their church, in its collective capacity, is alone com- petent to decide on the correct interpretation of the Divine records. In this sense, therefore, the reformed churches admit the right of private judgment. They do not claim for the decrees of any church an authority independent of, or extraneous to. Scripture. It has been stated by an eminent text writer, that, when the two forms of belief are reduced to their elements, Catholicism is the complete recognition of the authority of the church ; while Protestantism is the negation of that authority, and the substi- tution of the private judgment of each individual.^ But although a Protestant denies the authority of the Church of .Rome, he recognises the authority of his own Church. The difference properly does not consist in the recognition of the principle of authority by one party, and the rejection of that principle by the other, but in the recognition of different authorities. § 14. On looking back to what has been said, it will be seen that no one church can justly make any claim to authority in matters of religious belief, upon the grounds on which opinions in matters of science acquire authority. There is no consent of com- petent judges over the civilised world. Inconsistent and opposite forms of Christianity continue to exist side by side. There is not ' Chillingworth, Beligion of Protestants, ch. 6, § 56, (vol. ii. p. 450.) ^ The Church of England declares that ' they are to be accursed that presume to say that every man shall be saved by the law or sect which he professeth, so that ho be diligent to frame his life according to that law and the light of nature,' (Art. XVIII.) This article, however, appears from its sequel to refer to heathens, or others not professing Christianity, and to be intended to exclude from salvation only those •who are not Christians. It does not affect those who claim to be Christians, tliough they may not be members of the Church of England. As to the sense in which Pro- testantism involved the principle of private judgment, see the remarks of Mr. Hallam, Literature of Europe, vol. i. ch. 6, § 33. 3 See Ktee, Kath. Bogm. vol. i. p. 312. V^ (jh THE ^ IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF KELKlI^.N I V E l^S IT any general agreement among divines of differenl^^^ftiJ^flSll^^j;^ there is among men of science as to their respective sul different countries ; and scarcely even any tendency to such an agreement.^ Attempts at mutual conversion on a large scale entirely fail ; while those which are limited in their numbers give rise to questions as to the motives of the converts, and add but little strength to the church which receives them.^ Even a government cannot safely adopt any authority in ecclesiastical matters, or assume the exclusive truth of any one form of Christi- anity. It must look mainly to the numbers of each religious persuasion, in deciding the question of endowments for religious and educational purposes ; and to the religion of parents in establishing the rules for determining the creed in which children, incapable of judging for themselves, are to be brought up.^ The Church of Eome makes boldly the claim of authority for its own decisions. But there is a large, and that not the least enlightened and intelligent, portion of the Christian world which peremptorily denies this claim. Moreover, even among its own members, there is great difference of opinion as to the organs of that authority. The ultramontane doctrines differ on this head from those of some of the national churches. Decisions, which some classes of Eoman-catholics consider as authoritative, others refuse to admit as genuine expressions of the voice of the church. Even if it is conceded that the teaching of the church carries with it an authority binding upon the consciences of all the faith- ful, yet there is no general agreement as to the extent of the church, or the communion signified by this term. The member of the Church of Rome limits the acceptation of church to his * Compare Note C. at the end of the chapter. ^ Lord Clarendon, in his Essay Against the Multiplying Controversies, remarks upon the fact, 'that all the conferences held, and all the books written, between those of the Roman and those of the reformed religion, for the space of above 150 years, by men of unquestionable knowledge and virtue, should not work upon any one man, for ought appears, to change the opinion he brought with him ; for of those who run from one communion to another, they are such who do not pretend to judge of arguments, or such who seldom give an account of their true inducements,' &c., p. 241, ed. fol. And in his History of the Rebellion, he says — ' Our observation and experience can give us few examples of men who have changed their religion, and not fallen into some jealousy and distrust, or disreputation, even with those with whom they side, that have made their futiire life less pleasant and delightsome; which, it may be, happens only because we have rare instances of men of extraordinary parts, or great minds, who have entertained those conversions,' vol. iv. p. 317, ed. 12mo. 3 On this subject, some further remarks are made in Chapter IX. F 2 8 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [ch. owii church ; Protestants include under it different ecclesiastical communities, agreeing only in the profession of the Christian faith, or agreeing in certain fundamental tenets, such as the Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity — or in a certain form of church government, such as episcopacy. Even as to the term ' Catholic church,' there is no general agreement in Christendom. The historical usage limits this term to the Church of Eome, which never was a universal church, in the sense of its including, de facto^ all Christians ; but was universal, or Catholic, only in the sense of its claiming to be orthodox, and therefore to include, de jure, all Christendom, and also as not being a merely national church, but comprehending several nations and countries. Pro- testant divines in general, however, extend the term Catholic church either to all Christendom,^ or they limit it by some con- dition, as to which there is a variety of opinion. The ' Catholic church,' or ' Catholic consent ' of the modern Oxford school, is a perfectly arbitrary standard, which can satisfy no marked denom- ination of Christians. Of what avail is it to imagine an invisible ideal church, formed of such heterogeneous and mutually repelling bodies, as the Church of Eome, the Grreek Church, and the Church of England ? What agreement exists, or can exist, between them, and how can it be defined or expressed ? The Church of Eome, by its authentic organs, proscribes the Church of England as heretical, and will hold no communion or church-membership with it. The Church of England lays it down, in an equally authentic manner, that the Church of Eome has erred in matters both of faith and discipline ; and authoritative divines of the Anglican Church teach that the Church of Eome is a churcli without a religion. Under these circumstances, no practical solution of sectarian differences can be derived by a reference to ' Catholic consent,' so determined. It follows that no person can accept the doctrines of the Chiu-ch of Eome, upon the mere authority of the rulers and doctors of that church, with the same well-founded security against error which he possesses for his belief in adopting the established truths of astronomy or mechanics, upon the mere credit of mathematicians and men of science. ^ As to the claim of the reformed churches to be members of the Catholic church, and the declarations on the subject in their confessions, see Klee, Kathol. BogmaWk^ vol. i, p. 98. See Bretschneider, Glauhenslehre, § 55, for the views of the modem German Protestants on the meaning of ' Catholic church.' As to Jurieu's doctrine, see Palmer, vol. i. p. 128. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 69 The same objection, founded on the absence of a general agreement, or tendency to agreement, among the principal theo- logians of Christendom, applies also to each of the Protestant creeds. The existence of the non-Protestant sects weakens the authority of the divines of the Protestant churches ; the existence of the non-Catholic sects weakens the authority of the divines of the Church of Eome. The authority of each Protestant church is, again, still further weakened by the existence of mutual differ- ences between Protestants as to their respective tenets.^ Besides which, the Protestant writers lay less stress on the authoritative teaching of the church ; they admit that national churches have erred ; and they hold that no doctrine of any church is binding, unless it can be proved by Scripture. The teaching of the church is not, as such, according to them, decisive ; it must be demonstrably founded on Scripture authority. Add to which, that while they refer to Scripture as their exclusive canon of religious truth, they scarcely claim to possess any rule of inter- preting Scripture, or of resolving doubts as to the signification of particular passages. For the interpretation of Scripture, each Protestant church relies upon the expositions of approved com- mentators, and, in doctrinal passages, principally on those of its own communion, but without setting up any infallible rule or standard of interpretation.^ § 15s On account of the intrinsic obscurity and transcendental nature of the leading ideas in theology, and of the difficulty of arriving, even with the aid of revelation, at distinct and intelli- gible conclusions on subjects lying without the domain of human consciousness or sensation, it would be extremely desirable, for the guidance of people in general, that a consentient authority in questions of Christian theology should exist. The attempts to remove error, to enlighten dissidents from the true faith, to create a trustworthy authority in things spiritual, and to produce a unity of the church, have been ill-devised and unsuccessful — but they have almost invariably been sincere. They have originated in a sense of the evils springing from diversity of religious opinion, without a common living point of reference, and of the advan- tages likely to accrue from uniformity of faith and church disci- pline. Instead, however, of resorting to conciliatory courses, and ' See Bossuet, Variations des Eglises Protestantes, Pref. sect. 16. 2 See the Protestant doctrine of Scripture-interpretation explained at large, by Jeremy Taylor, in the Liberty of Prophesying, sect. 4. 70 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [ch. of endeavouring to diminish differences by amicable explanations and mutual concessions, the teachers of theology and leaders of churches and sects have, in general, condemned diversities of opinion with asperity, and in a confident and intolerant spirit, which has provoked retaliation and perpetuated division. By seeking thus to propagate truth in a matter in which allowances ought peculiarly to be made for difference of opinion, divines have multiplied controversies beyond all reasonable limits ; so that the most patient student is bewildered in the labyrinth of dis- cussion, and the most deferential inquirer is at a loss to which authority he is to bow. When, however, a person, either from a firm reliance on the creed of the church in which he has been brought up, or from independent examination, is satisfied of the general truth of the doctrines of any particular church, he will naturally regard with respect the divines who are considered as authorities within that religious communion. In all controversies and discussions, too, carried on between members of the same church, the works of the received text-writers and leading divines of that church will be referred to as a common authority and standard of decision. It is in this sense that the Church of England, according to the opinion of the best expositors of its articles, claims authority in matters of faith, (Art, XX.) Its authority is limited to its own members. This is, in substance, the view of church authority which is taken by Hooker. In determining the Rule of Faith, he places Scripture in the first rank; and, in the next, such direct and manifest inferences from it as each person may make by his own unassisted judgment. The last place he assigns to the authority of the church, which he justly considers as more competent, in a corporate capacity, to decide doubtful questions than any of its individual members.^ § 16. On reviewing what has been said above on the state of religious opinion in Christendom, and the claim to authority ' ' Be it matter of the one kind or of the other [i. e., matter of order or of doctrine], what Scripture doth plainly deliver, to that the first place both of credit and obedience is due ; the next whereunto is whatsoever any man can necessarily conclude by force of reason ; after these the voice of the church succeedeth. That which the church by her ecclesiastical authority shall probably think and define to be true or good, must in congruity of reason overrule all other inferior judgments whatsoever.' — Eccl. Pol. b. V. ch, viii. § 2. Compare also Pref. c. iii. §§ 1, 2, and b. ii., where, confuting the ex- aggerations of the Puritans, he shows that human reason is the ultimate test in judging of Scripture. A similar view of church authority is taken by Dr. Hampden, Ba'Mptou Lectures, Lect. 8, p. 372, ed. 2. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 71 possessed by any one of its churches or sections, we are led to the following conclusions : — 1. That no agreement as to the distinctive or characteristic doctrines of the several Christian sects exists among the theo- logians of Christendom, and, consequently, that no church or denomination of Christians can claim assent to its tenets, and by its legitimate authority command the belief of a conscientious inquirer, on the grounds on whicli a reasonable deference may be paid to authority in secular matters. 2. That although there is no agreement as to the peculiar doctrines of any Christian church, there is an agreement among all civilised nations in accepting some form of Christianity, and in recognising the Christian revelation according to some con- struction of its effect and intent. The practical deduction from these results seems to be, that the mere authority of any church or sect cannot of itself reason- ably command assent to its distinctive and peculiar tenets, while the present divisions of Christendom continue ; and that a person bom in a Christian country can only with propriety adopt one of two alternatives — viz., either to adhere to the faith of his parents and predecessors, and that of the church in which he has been educated, or, if he is unwilling to abide by this creed, to form his own judgment as to the choice of his sect by means of the best in- dependent investigation which his understanding and opportunities for study enable him to make. This conclusion is, in the main, identical with the result at which Jeremy Taylor arrives in his Liberty of Prophesying, with whose words I will conclude this chapter. ' Although,' (he says,) ' we are secured in fundamental points from involuntary error, by the plain, express, and dogmatical places of Scripture, yet in other things we are not, but may be invincibly mistaken, because of the obscurity and difficulty in the controverted parts of Scriptm-e, by reason of the uncertainty of the means of its interpretation ; since tradition is of an uncertain reputation, and sometimes evidently false ; councils are contra- dictory to each other, and therefore certainly are equally deceived many of them, and therefore all may ; and then the popes of Home are very likely to mislead us, but cannot ascertain us of truth in matter of question ; and in this world we believe in part, and prophesy in part ; and this imperfection shall never be done away till we be translated to a more glorious state : either we 72 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [ch. must throw our chances, and get truth by accident or predestina- tion, or else we must lie safe in a mutual toleration, and private liberty of persuasion, unless some other anchor can be thought upon, where we may fasten our floating vessels, and ride safely.' — Sect. VII., ad fin. NOTES TO CHAPTER IV. Note A. (page 51.) ' It is, indeed, true that the prevalence of internal differences disturbed the unity of collective Christendom ; but, if we do not deceive ourselves, it is another universal law of human things that this disturbance prepared a higher and a larger development of the hmnan mind. ' In the press of the universal struggle, religion was conceived by diiferent nations after the different varieties of its dogmatical forms. The peculiar dogma adopted was incorporated with the feeling of nationality, as a possession of the community — of the state or the people. It was won by the sword — maintained amidst a thousand dangers ; it had become part of the life's blood of the nations. * Hence it has come to pass, that the states on either side have grown into gi'eat ecclesiastico-political bodies, whose individuality is marked — on the Catholic, by the measure of their devotedness to the Roman see, and of the degree of toleration or exclusion of non-Catholics ; but still more strongly on the Protestant, where the departure from the symbolical books adopted as tests, the mixture of the Lutheran and the Calvinistic creeds, the greater or less approx- imation to an episcopal constitution of the church, form so many striking and obvious distinctions. The first question in every country is — what is its pre- dominant religion? Christianity appears under various forms; but, however great be the discrepancies between them, no party can deny to another the pos- session of the fundamentals of faith. On the contrary, these several forms are guaranteed by compacts and bj^ treaties of peace, to which all are parties, and which are, as it were, the fundamental laws of a universal republic. Never more can the thought of exalting the one or the other confession to imiversal supremacy find place among men. The only consideration now is, how each state, each people, can best proceed from the basis of its own politico-religious principles to the development of its intellectual and moral powers. On this depends the future condition of the world.' — Ranke's Popes of Rome, vol. ii. ad Jin, Engl. Transl. Note B. (page 62.) The transmission of the evidence for an historical fact by oral tradition may be illustrated by the celebrated story of the ring, which the favourite Essex is said to have sent to Queen Elizabeth before his execution. This story was handed down by traxiition in the family of the Earl of Monmouth, and was first published, in an authentic form, by Mr. Birch, in 1749. The Countess of Nottingham, who appears as a principal party in the transaction, was IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 73 the wife of the Lord Iligh Admiral, and sister of Robert, Earl of Monmouth. Henry, Earl of Monmouth, son of Earl Robert, had a daughter Martha, who married John, Earl of Middleton. Lady Elizabeth Spelman was the daughter of the Earl and Countess of Middleton ; and from her report, (who was the great- granddaughter of the Countess of Nottingham's brother,) Birch published the particulars of the tradition in the reign of George 11. {Negotiations, p. 206.) The story had, however, obtained publicity at an earlier period ; it was known in the reign of Charles I. to Mr. Hyde, who disbelieved it — to Sir Dudley Carleton, who told it to Prince Maurice in Holland, (see Birch's Memoi?'8 of Queen JSlizabeth, pp. 481, 490,) and to Francis Osborn, who published it in his Traditional Memoirs on the JReign of Queen Elizabeth, in 1658, pp. 92-6. According to these versions of the story, the ring was sent by Essex to the Countess of Nottingham, to be given to the Queen ; but according to Lady Elizabeth Spelman's version, the ring was sent to Lady Scrope, and given by mistake to her sister. Lady Nottingham. Upon the evidence of the tradition published by Birch, the story has been accepted as true by Hume and other historians. Note 0. (page 67.) It is curious to compare the difficulties started by Lucian with respect to the choice of a particular sect among the several schools of ancient philosophy. The impossibility of personally investigating the doctrines of each sect, and the absence of all d. priori authority in favour of any, are urged by him with his usual ingenuity and power of sarcasm in the dialogue entitled Hermotimus, ?) irfpl a'ipfo-Kjji'. In this dialogue, Hermotimus, a Stoic philosopher, is pressed by his friend Lycinus to state his reasons for selecting the Stoic sect in preference to the others. The following is an outline of the argument : — Lycinus begins by asking Hermotimus what induced him, when there were so many philosophic schools, to prefer the Stoic sect, while he was still a common man, an ISiuiTtiQ, and ignorant of philosophy ? Were you (he says) directed to it by the voice of an oracle ? (c. 15.) Hennotimus answers that he made the choice upon his own judgment, and that, in choosing the true philosophy, he was guided by the nimiber$_ of its adherents. Being asked how he knew that the Stoics were more nmnerous than the Epiciu'eans or Peripatetics, and whether he counted them as at a public vote, (jcnQainp Ivralc x^i^poroviaic,^ he says that he guessed their nimiber. . Lycinus remarks upon the unsatisfactory nature of this test, and Hennotimus then adds that he had another reason ; he had heard every- body say that the Epicureans were addicted to pleasm-e, that the Peripatetics were fond of money, and the Platonics full of conceit ; but that the Stoics were enduring and wise, and that their followers were the only perfect men, (c. 16.) Having furnished this second test, he is forced to admit that he did not take this favourable character of the Stoics from the Stoics themselves, or the unfavour- able character of the other sects from those sects ; and he does not deny that he took it from the ignorant and illiterate. Upon Lycinus expressing his wonder that any one should have derived his opinions respecting philosophy from such an authority, Hermotimus tries another ground. He had always observed (he says) that the Stoics were decent and serious in their demeanour, properly clothed, holding a fit medimn between effeminacy and negligence, with their heads close shaven. Lycinus inquires whether we are to judge of merit merely 74 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PEINCIPLE OE [ch. by gra^-ity of deportment, dress, and long beards. Surely (he says) tliere must be some universal criterion to judge by ; and we are not left to decide wbetlier a man is a good or bad philosopher by his outward appearance, (c. 18, 10.) Lycinus, unable to obtain from his friend any satisfactory mark of the true sect, says that he will try to discover it for himself, (c. 21.) He proceeds to compare philosophy with a happy and well-governed city, and to represent himself as seeking the way to it. Many persons offer themselves as guides, and point out different roads — one leading to the east and another to the west ; one to the south and another to the north ; one passing through a pleasant country, others rough and laborious, but all supposed to bring the traveller to the same city, (c. 22-5.) ^ Thus I am still left in doubt and un- certainty, for at the entrance of every path I am met by a man, worthy no doubt of all confidence, who stretches out his hand and desires me to follow him, telling me that his is the only right way, and that all the other guides are wandering in ignorance, having neither come from the city themselves, nor being able to direct others to it. The next and the next I meet tells me the same story of his own path, and abuses the other guides ; and so will every one of them. It is this variety of ways which distracts and confounds us ; where each guide con- tends for and praises his own, I cannot tell which to follow, or how I am ever to arrive at this happy city,' (c. 26.) Hermotimus now says that he can remove all his friend's doubts : let him trust those who have gone the journey before him, and he cannot err. Lycinus, however, is not satisfied with this receipt : each guide (he says) praises his own road exclusively: one takes Plato's, another Zeno's, but no one knows more than his own, and it is impossible to be sure that the road leads, after all, to the right city : the guide may be mistaken, (c. 27.) Hermotuuus then assures him that he may go the whole round, but he will never find better guides than the Stoics. Let him follow Zeno and Chry- sippus, and they will lead him aright, (c. 29.) Lycinus repeats that this assurance is unsatisfactory, and that a similar one would be given by the Platonists and Epicureans of their leaders. Each thinks his own sect the best, and vaunts his own guide. Besides, you are only acquainted with your own doctrines, and you condemn those of the other sects witliout knowing them. Hermotuuus denies this. The Stoic teachers (he says) in their lectures always mention the tenets of the other scliools, and refute them, (c. 32.) Lycinus treats this argument as futile. The other philosophers would not (he replies) be content to be so judged. Your philosophers set up men of straw, in order that they may be easily knocked down. Such a controversy is no real conflict, but a sham fight, in which the victory is certain beforehand. ' In short, (concludes Lycinus,) while it remains uncertain which is the best sect in philo- sophy, I am resolved not to follow any one, as that would be an afiront upon all the rest,' (c. 34.) Hermotimus insists that it is needless to study the other philosophies. Truth (he says) may be learnt from the Stoics without going to all the other sects. If a man told you that two and two are four, it would not be necessary for you to suspend your belief imtil }■ ou had consulted all persons versed in arithmetical Bcience, (c. 35.) Lycinus denies the applicability of this argument. The subjects about which IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 75 the pliilosopMc sects differ are doubtful ; there is no mode of resolving the doubt, aud no common agreement, (c. 3G.) With regard to philosophy, the only man (he continues) in whom I can re- pose confidence is one vrho has mastered the doctrines of all the sects, has tried them all, and has chosen that which, by his own experience, he is satisfied is the only one which can guide him to true happiness. If we can meet with such a man, our labour is at an end. But such a man (says Hermotimus) cannot easily be found, (c. 46.) The two disputants then enter into a calculation as to the length of time which must be allowed for obtaining a familiar knowledge of the tenets of each sect, and they reckon ten sects at twenty years each, (c. 48.) Hermotimus re- marks that, make what reduction they will, very few persons would be able to go through all the sects, though they began as soon as they were bom. On this Lycinus repeats, that unless a man knows all the systems, he cannot select the best, except by chance ; he can only stmnble upon it accidentally in the dark, (c. 49.) Hermotimus complains that Lycinus requires impossibilities. He will neither accept the opinion of those who judge for themselves, unless they have lived the life of a phoenix, nor will he follow those who are satisfied with the consent of the multitude. Lycinus asks who are the multitude ? If it consists of men who understand the subject, one will suffice ; but if of the ignorant, their num- ber does not influence his belief, (c. 53.) Hermotimus then returns to self-judg- ment. It may be right (he admits) to inquire into the opinions of each sect, but the length of time assigned by Lycinus is excessive. A judgment may be formed from a portion or sample — ex ungue leonem. Lycinus replies that when the whole is known, it can be judged from a part ; but in this case the whole i» not known. If the philosophers had thought their principles simple and easy of acquisition, they probably would not have written so many thousand volumes^ (c. 54-6.) He adds, that if his friend is impatient of the time and labour neces- sary for examination, he had better send for a diviner, or draw lots for the best, (c. 57.) Hermotimus inquires if he is to give up the matter in despair, unless he can live a hundred years ? (c. 63.) Lycinus then undertakes to point out the quali- fications requisite for inquiring into the subject. These are acuteness of mind, long-continued labour and study, and perfect impartiality, (c. 64.) Even with these qualifications, a person is not secured against error. It is possible that all the different sects of philosophy may be in error, and that the truth has not yet been discovered, (c. 65, QQ.^ Ijycinus then proceeds to another objection. He asks his friend whether, in all the sects, there are not teachers who say that they alone understand the sub- ject, and that all the others are mere pretenders to knowledge. Hermotimus assents to this proposition, and admits that it is difficult to distinguish between the true philosophers and the impostors, (c. QS.) If, therefore, (says Lycinus,) you can meet with a master who himself knows, and can teach you the art of demonstration, and how to determine in doubtful cases, your labour is at an end, Ibr then what is good and true will immediately appear ; falsehood will be de- tected ; you will be able to make choice of the best philosophy — will acquire that happiness which you have so long been in search of, and possess everything that is desirable. Hermotimus is delighted with this view, and declares that he will 76 APPLICABILITY OF AUTHORITY TO RELIGION. [ch. instantly look out for such a guide, (c. 69.) Lycinus, however, immediately destroys his satisfaction by showing that this man, if foimd, could not be relied on, until another person was discovered, who could decide if he was a safe guide, and so on, to a third. His demonstrations, too, would be called in question; everything would revolve in a circle of uncertainty, and nothing would be deter- mined, (c. 70.) After some further arguments of Lycinus against the Stoic system in particu- lar, Hermotimus owns that he is convinced of his error, and declares his intention to renounce philosophy henceforth, (c. 83.) Lycinus adds that he should have used precisely the same arguments if his friend had belonged to any one of the other philosophic sects, (c. 86.) v.] UTILITY AND PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. CHAPTER V. ON THE UTILITY AND PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. § 1. It has been shown briefly in Chapter II., that a large portion of the opinions of mankind are necessarily derived from authority. Children necessarily imbibe the opinions of their parents and teachers ;i the time and means for the independent investigation of speciilativi^^ on al^ge^number^^iQu^ects are wanting ; and on questions of practice it is necessary for a man to' T)e guided by the advice of professional persons, having had a special training and experience in the matter. We have, in a subsequent chapter, attempted to trace the marks of a trustworthy authority in matters of speculation and practice, and have described the means by which trustworthy authority is gradually formed. This description, as we have further shown, does not apply, without considerable qualifications, to religious questions. We now turn to consider what are the proper uses of authority, and what are the circumstances in which it can be resorted to with advantage, for the guidance of opinion, and the management of the affairs of life, both private and public. As to speculative questions of science and philosophy, every person ought, as far as his leisure and opportunities for reading and reflection will permit, to attempt to form for himself an in- dependent judgment. Every person, however, will find in numer- ous subjects that he is unable to go through the processes neces- sary for forming such a judgment ; and, with respect to these, he ought, in the choice of his authority, to be guided by the maxims stated above. Vita hrevis, ars longa, says the old Hippocratean aphorism ; ^ and even when a person succeeds in mastering a great variety of subjects, the result is not always satisfactory. Men of ' Sec Hippoorat., Aphorism. I. § l,(tom. iv. p. 458, cd. Littre.) 78 ON THE UTILITY AND [ch. encyclopsediacal minds are not always perspicuous or precise ; still less often are they original and inventive. Multum legere^ non TTiulta, is a good maxim for all who desire to extend the bounds of a science, or to be sound practitioners in any art or profession. The division of scientific labour, like the division of mechanical labour, increases both its productiveness and its precision. Where the attention is concentrated upon the same intellectual object, the result is a performance at once more finished and more complete. It is, however, necessary that men of comprehensive minds should survey the whole circle of the sciences, should under- stand their mutual relations, and adapt them to each other, as, in the progress of discovery, they change their respective positions. Those who devote the chief part of their thoughts and studies to one science, ought to be aware of its place in the scientific system, and to appreciate the extent to which it may be influenced by the cultivation of other sciences. They ought to avoid that narrow- ing influence which is produced by restricting the mind to the r exclusive contemplation of one subject. Above all, every person i should, as far as his means extend, make himself master of the methods of scientific investigation, so as to be able to judge whether, in the treatment of any question, a sound and correct method, conformable to the precepts of a philosophical logic, has been observed. Provided with this organon or instrument for ' determining the truth, he may, after applying it to subjects lying out of his own special province, rest satisfied with a knowledge of the results, without attempting a verification of all the steps by ^hich they have been obtained.^ § 2. Even in cases where a person undertakes to form an in- dependent judgment for himself, by an examination of the appro- priate evidence, and by the proper logical processes, he ought to treat with respect the opinions of competent judges, and yield a reasonable deference to their authority. Upon all doubtful questions, in which the elements of decision are numerous and complex, and the evidence conflicting, the opinion of able and honest judges is entitled to great weight, and will cause any candid and cautious person, if he comes to an opposite conclusion, to distrust his own judgment, and enounce his own opinion with modesty and hesitation. Whenever a person, having formed an opinion upon grounds ' Compare Comte, Cours de Philosophie Positive, torn. i. pp. 29-32 ; torn. iv. p. 2U; torn. vi. pp. 462, 475 ; Whewell, Phil, of Ind. Sciences, b. XL c. 6, § 9. v.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 79 which appear satisfactory to himself, asserts it confidently, and adheres to it resolutely, without showing due deference to the authority of others, he is justly exposed to the charge of arrogance or presumption in judging.^ The opinion of experienced men, having a special acquaintance with the subject, is always entitled to weight, even if it be unsupported by argument.^ Hence, all young persons, who attempt to judge for themselves, either are, or appear to be, arrogant ; as they can scarcely fail to set at nought the opinions of persons more experienced and of greater authority than themselves. It is difficult for a young man, on account of the narrow circle of his experience, to discriminate between the cases in which he ought to judge for himself, and those in which he ought to defer to the opinions of others. He ought not to form, in youth, a habit of blind submission to autliority, such as the Jesuits inculcated upon their disciples ; but a spirit of docility, and respect for the opinions of their elders, undoubtedly becomes the young ; and it is certain that their opinions, especially on practical questions, however formed, will in general be of very little value to others,^ however important it * The appeal to authority is called by Locke argumentum ad verecundiam, be- cause it is thought a breach of modesty to question the opinion of men of authority. — Essay on the Understanding, b, iv. c. 17, § 19. '^ AeT Trpoo'exetv tuu iix-neifjuu Kol Trpeafivr^pcou fj (ppoyifiuv ra7s auairodeiKTOis (paffcai Kal 5o|ats ovx ^ttoj/ twv airoSei^ewy. dia yap rh ^x^^^ ^'^ ''"^^ ifiireiplas o/xfia bpuxTiv op0ws.— Abistot. Eth. Nic. VI. 12. The wisdom of the aged in council has been proverbial from antiquity downwards. Concerning ^ovKaX y€p6vT(av, see Eurip. Melanipp. fr. 23. 'Quod senior loquitur, omnes consilium putant,' says Publius Syrus, v. 672. Anciennet^ a autorite, is a French proverb in Leroux de Lincy, torn. ii. p. 173. Compare Cicero de Senect. c. 6 and 17. Apex senectutis est auctoritas . . . habet senectus, honorata prsesertim, tantam auctoritatem, ut ea pluris sit, quam omnes adolescentise voluptates. Wisdom in council belongs to age and experience, according to Hobbes, Leviathan, II. c. 25, p. 247. ' If the comparison do stand between man and man, which shall hearken unto other; sith the aged for the most part are best experienced, least subject to rash and unadvised passions, it hath been ever judged reasonable thai their sentence in matter of counsel should be better trusted, and more relied upon than other men's. . . Sharp and subtle discourses of wit procure many times very great applause, but being laid in the balance with that which the habit of sound experience plainly delivereth, they are overweighed.' — Hooker, Eccl. Vol. b. v. c. 7, § 1. 3 Young men understand geometry, &c., but arc not wise or prudent, because wisdom is concerned about particulars, which are derived from experience, and for experience a lapse of time is requisite.— Aristot. Eth. Nic. vi. 9. Compare I. 1, where he says that a young man is not able to understand social science, for it relates to human life and conduct, of which he is inexperienced. In Bhet. II. 12, § 14, he says that young men always violate the maxim, (xridev &yav — ne quid nimis. They love in excess, and hate in excess, and do everything in excess. For the same reason, 80 ON THE UTILITY AND [ch. may be to themselves to cultivate a habit of independent and conscientious judgment. Persons who have formed habits of independent thought and examination likewise generally subject themselves to the same reproach — inasmuch as they often attach an undue weight to a chain of reasoning which they have gone through in their own minds, as compared with the opinions of persons who appear to be entitled, by their experience, to pronounce authoritatively on the subject. It is no easy matter to define the point where pre- sumption, arrogance, and obstinacy end, and where firmness, resolution, and proper self-reliance begin. It is difficult, again, to discriminate between teachableness, humility, and reverence for high authorities, and a tame and passive submission of the understanding. Universally, indeed, it may be said, that no person ought to express a confident opinion upon speculative grounds, until he has ascertained, by careful investigation, the unsoundness of the reasons for a different opinion, held by practical and experienced men. If, however, after a due examination, he differs from their conclusion, he cannot, even if he be wrong, justly be taxed with arrogance. To persist in error after proper inquiry and reflection, is not presumptuous, although it may imply other moral or intel- lectual defects.^ § 3. Undoubtedly, it is to be desired that a man should be able to judge for himself; and he ought to avoid any undue reliance on the authority of others. The general soundness of opinions will be promoted by the prevalence of a free exercise of private judgment, in cases where the means of arriving at a cor- rect conclusion exist. But in a large number of subjects, and in multitudes of practical questions, an independent judgment is impossible, or inexpedient ; and a great part of practical wisdom consists in the judicious selection of authorities, and in a steady they think they know everything, and assert it with confidence. Hence the precept of Cicero: Est igitur adolescent! s majores natu vereri, exque his deligere optimos et probatissimos, quorum consilio atque auctoritate nitatur. Ineuntis autem setatis inscitia senum constituenda et regenda prudentia est. — De Off. I. 34. * On the want of humility charged to the Puritans, see some remarks of Dr. Arnold, Lectures on Modern History, pp. 209-10. ' The excellence of veneration (he says) consists purely in its being fixed upon a worthy object; when felt indiscrimin- ately, it is idolatry or insanity. To tax anyone, therefore, with want of reverence because he pays no respect to what we venerate, is eithfU* irrelevant, or is a mere con- fusion.'— p. 210. v.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 81 reliance upon their opinion. ' That man,' (says Hesiod,^ in some celebrated verses, which acquired in antiquity almost an oracular authority,) — 'that man is the most excellent, who can always think for himself. He, too, is a good man who will take sound advice from others. But. he who can neither think for himself, nor will listen to the sound advice of others, is a worthless man.' If a person has not the capacity, or time, or means, requisite for forming an independent judgment on any question, speculative or practical, his first endeavour ought to be, to select as his guides those who are most likely to have judged correctly for themselves, or to give him safe advice. If, as Hesiod says, he can neither form a correct opinion for himself, nor select as his guides such persons as are likely to judge soundly on the matter, his conclusion cannot but be erroneous. With respect to decisions having an immediate bearing upon practice, every man of sense and prudence will, in a large number of cases, defer to the opinion of others. On legal questions, he will consult a lawyer ; on medical questions, a physician ; on pecuniary questions, a banker, a broker, or a land-agent ; on the education of his children, a person engaged in tuition ; on the management of his garden, a horticulturist ; on the building oi his house, an architect — and so on. The advantage of taking professional advice in practical questions, requiring special know- ledge a nd experience, is attested by the universal habit of resorting , to it, w here the means of payment exist; and also by such proverbs as, 'He who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client.' ^ § 4. The practical convenience which results from the power of consulting a class of persons who make a particular subject their especial study and the business of their life, is also shown by the * Op. et Di. 291. Compare Herod, vii. 16; and Soph. Antig. 719-23. ' Sapien- tissimum esse dieunt eum cui quod opixs sit ipsi veniat in mentem ; proximo aceedere ilium, qui alterius bene invontis oLtemperet.' — Cicero, Cluent. c. 31. 'Sa^pe ego audivi, milites, eum primum esse virum, qui ipse consulat quid in rem sit ; secundum eum qui bene monenti obediat: qui nee ipse consulere, nee alteri parere sciat, eum extremi ingenii esse.' — Livy, xxii. 29. 2 Men obey willingly a person whom they consider wiser than themselves. For example, the sick are anxious to call in a physician to prescribe for them, and those in a ship gladly obey the steersman ; and travellers are reluctant to be left by those who know the ways better than themselves. — Xen. Cyrop. I. 6, § 21. * Aussi le nouveau Consul parut-il avoir sur toutes choses, ou nne opinion faite, ou une opinion qui se faisait avec la rapidite de 1' eclair, surtout apr6s avoir entendu les hommes speciaux, qui etaient les seuls qu'il ^coutat, et uniquement sur I'objet qui eon- cernait leur specialite.' — Of Bonaparte, Thiers, Hist, du Consulat et de V Empire, liv. j. (torn. i. p. 25.) G 82 ON THE UTILITY AND [ch. further subdivision of labour which takes place within a profession. Additional accuracy and skill is produced by an exclusive attention to a certain sub-department of a subject. Thus, in England, the medical profession is divided into physicians, surgeons, apothe- caries, accoucheurs, oculists, aurists, dentists ; the legal profession is divided into barristers practising in the common law courts, those practising in the courts of equity, conveyancers, special pleaders ; attorneys and solicitors. Similar subdivisions of labour take place in other branches of practice as civilisation advances, and the means of remunerating skilled advice increase. In disputed questions before courts of justice, involving pro- fessional or scientific knowledge, persons having the requisite acquirements are often called as witnesses, not as to the matter of fact, but to guide the court by their opinion. Thus, in questions of violent death by drowning, wounds, poisoning, or other means, medical men are examined ; in cases of value of property, survey- ors ; and in various branches of trade, the persons belonging to each. Witnesses of this sort are called by the Italians periti, and by the French experts ; there is no appropriate name for them in our law, but the practice equally prevails.^ The judgment of professional men, generally, is respected, as compared with unprofessional men, on their own subject. But, as compared with one another, the opinion of some professional men carries weight in the profession, and of others does not. Thus, in the legal profession, there are certain text-writers and eminent judges and jurists, to whose opinion the practising members of the bar would generally defer, and whose dicta they would cite in argument, as carrying authority ; ^ and in other professions, such • Cicero, in enumerating the circumstances which gire authority to testimony, places first, virtus, and afterwards, ingenium, opes, setas, fortuna, ars, usus, necessitas, and sometimes eoncursio rerum fortuitarum. With regard to the latter of these, he says — ' Sed reliquis quoque rebus, quamquam in iis nulla species virtutis est, tamen interdum confirmatur fides, si aut ars qusedam adhibetur, (magna enim est vis ad per- suadendum scientise,) aut usus ; plerumque enim creditur iis qui experti sunt.' — Topica, c. 19. 2 ' Lorsque les auteurs se contrarient, ce n'est pas toujours I'opinion du plus grand nombre qu'il convient d'adopter. Les opinions, en pareil cas, s'apprecient et ne se comptent pas. II peut se faire qu'un seul ait raison, pendant que dix autres auront erre. C'est alors, qu'aide du savoir et de I'erudition, I'esprit peut montrer tout ce que peut la sagacite et la justesse du raisonnement ; mais lorsque les auteui-s sont una- nimes, il faut etre bien sur de ses talens, poxir se flatter qu'on fera juger contre leur sentiment. Leurs suffrages accumules font comme un contrepoids qui I'emporte neces- sairement.' — Merlin, Repertoire de Jurisprudence, Art. Aiitorite. § 7 {of Opinions of Text-writers,) v.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 83 as the military, naval, medical, &c., a similar pre-eminence woald be conceded to certain persons by the general agreement of practical men. The advantage of taking professional advice, on certain classes of practical subjects, is so generally recognised as not to require proof. When cases of this sort arise, every man who is inops con- silii feels his own helplessness, and flies for advice to a person who has knowledge and experience in the matter. But many persons, in taking professional advice, forget that, by so doing, they virtu- ^ ally surrender their own independent judgment ; and instead of observing faithfully the course prescribed to them, pursue a track compounded out of the advice of the professional man and their own notions. Such a proceeding as this can, however, rarely lead to a good result, and is always contrary to the dictates of reason. The discretion of the layman — the IhcaTrjs — is to be exercised in the choice of the professional man whom he consults ; but having ' made his choice, he should give his confidence to his adviser, and follow the rules prescribed for his guidance. And if his choice has been carefully made, he should not (unless an urgent case may render a different course expedient) be ready to withdraw his con- fidence, and try a new adviser, even if the results of the advice should appear at first sight unsatisfactory, and should not corre- spond to the hopes which he originally entertained. It is par- ticularly in the choice of a medical adviser, that the levity of judgment which induces the trial of successive persons is observable. Patients labouring under incurable or chronic maladies expect a rapid cure ; and if this impossibility is not accomplished, they change their physician. On the other hand, it would be absurd to say that, where there has been a manifest error of judgment, or want of success in the treatment of a medical case, the patient should never resort to fresh advice. Perhaps one of the best practical rules is this ; that where a medical man proves on trial to have taken an erroneous view of a case, and does not perform what he imdertook at the commencement, a change of advisers should be tried ; but that his treatment should not be condemned, until his own promises and predictions can be compared with the event. ^ ^ Lord Bacon gives the following precepts respecting the choice of a physician : — ' Physicians are, some of them, so pleasing and conformable to the humour of the patient, as they press not the true cure of the disease ; and some other are so regular in proceeding according to art for the disease, as they respect not sufficiently the condition of the patient. Take one of a middle temper, or, if it may not be found in one man, G 2 84 ON THE UTILITY AND {en. § 5. Much discretion is requisite in the selection of advisers in professional and other matters requiring special qualifications, and in turning their advice to good account. When we see one man almost always selecting good advisers, and acting on good advice, and when we see another man always selecting bad advisers, and acting on bad advice, we may be sure that this difference is not owing to accident. There is sometimes as much practical wisdom in choosing good counsellors as in judging for one's self. The marks of a trustworthy guide in matters of practice are, indeed, (as we have shown in a previous chapter,) tolerably distinct ; but in the application of these, there is ample scope for the exercise of a discreet judgment. Hobbes, it must be admitted, exagger- ates the difficulty of this choice when he says, that we cannot safely select an adviser, without being able to judge of the sound- ness of his rules. ' To know (he says) who knows the rules almost of any art is a great degree of the knowledge of the same art ; because no man can be assured of the truth of another's rules, but he that is first taught to understand them.' ^ By pursuing the indications of a trustworthy adviser, which we have formerly adverted to, a selection may unquestionably be made with less labour than would be requisite for forming an independent judg- ment upon the rules of the art. The authentication of practition- ers by diplomas, and by other marks of public sanction, likewise serves as a guide to the unprofessional person.^ Nevertheless, the discrimination between sound and unsound counsellors, implies attentive thought and inquiry. Good advice, too, when given, does not always thrive in foolish hands. It is often misapplied, or misunderstood, or neglected. It is like good tools in the hands of an artisan ; though indispensable in itself, it cannot be used with- out skill. § 6. There is, or at least has been, much popular prejudice against the learned professions ; and this feeling has been fo- mented by satirists and writers of comedy, who have ridiculed their weaknesses and failings, such as their pedantry and their ground- less pretensions to science. It is thought that, as lawyers and combine two of either sort ; and forget not to call as well the best acquainted with your body, as the best reputed of for his faculty.' — Essay XXX., on Begimen of Health. * Leviathan, part ii. c. 30, p. 339. Cicero says nearly to the same effect — * Quod dicunt omnia se credere ei quern judicent fuisse sapientem; probarem si id ipsum rudes et indocti judicare potuissent. Statuere enimqui sit sapiens, vel maxime videtur esse sapientis.' — Acad. Prior. II. 3. * See further, on this subject, Chapter IX. § 17. v.] PKOPER PROVINCE OF AUTHOKITY. 85 physicians live upon the follies, the quarrels, and the diseases of mankind, they have an interest in augmenting the pabulum on which they subsist. But the truth is, that the legitimate and recognised end of these professions is to provide preventives and remedies for the ills to which human nature and human society are subject. The ills are inevitable ; but they can be mitigated by prudence and good management. Now this mitigation is what professional advice undertakes to provide, and, in fact, to a great extent does provide.^ It is not to be expected that all the mem- bers of a large profession should be morally perfect, or that there should not be cases in which their advice is prompted by an interested motive. But that the public is, on the whole, essen- tially benefited by the advice of professional men is apparent from the earnest and universal desire to obtain their services, and from, the pecuniary sacrifices made for the purpose of obtaining them. According to the Italian proverb — Quel consigli son prezzati, Che son cliiesti e ben pagati. A similar inference may be drawn from the provision made by governments for the gratuitous supply of professional advice, where it cannot be procured without charitable assistance. In almost all countries, medical attendance is provided in this man- ner for the poor, to a greater or less extent ; and, in certain cases, advocates are furnished at the public expense to enable poor litigants to recover their rights. § 7. A custom similar to that of professional advice is adverted to by Bacon, as having existed among the Romans. Speaking of the Wisdom of Business — that is, of the discreet management of private afiairs, he remarks as follows : — ' Of this wisdom, it seemeth some of the ancient Romans, in the sagest and wisest times, were professors ; for Cicero reporteth that it was then in use for senators that had name and opinion for general wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Lselius, and many others, to walk at certain hours in the place, and to give audience to those that would use their advice ; and that the particular citizens would resort unto them, and con- sult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing of a son, or of a purchase, or bargain, or of an accusation, and every other occasion incident to man's life. So as there is a ' * Legistes, docteurs, medecins, quelle chute pour vous, si nous pouviuns tons nous donner le mot de devenir sages!' — La Bbuyerb, c. 12. But until this change is effected, it is fortunate that there should be a substitute for individual wisdom. 86 ON THE UTILITY AND [ch. wisdom of counsel and advice even in private causes, arising out of an universal insight into the affairs of the world ; which is used, indeed, upon particular causes propounded, but is gathered by general observation of causes of like nature.' ^ The system of auricular confession and the direction of con- sciences, as practised in the Church of Rome, is founded on a theory similar to that on which the custom of professional consul- tations rests.2 The confessor may be considered as a vicarious conscience, in like manner as professional advice is vicarious prudence. If the penitent makes a full and true confession, the confessor or spiritual director pronounces or advises with a com- plete knowledge of the circumstances of . the case, probably with a knowledge of the penitent's character and position, and always with the impartiality of a judge — free from personal concern in the matter, and unbiassed by passion or interest. Seeing how blind and partial a judge each man is in his own case, and how unconsciously the moral judgment with respect to our own actions is perverted by the inclinations, it cannot be doubted that such a counsellor, in ambiguous cases of conduct, such a ductor dubitan- tium, would be generally beneficial, if the moral code which he administers was well framed, and if his opinion or advice was always honest and enlightened. Unfortunately, however, it hap- pens, that the system of moral rules which guides the discretion of the Catholic confessor is founded on a narrow-minded and some- what superstitious theology, so far as it proceeds upon the dis- tinctive tenets of the Church of Eome ; and that the desire of domestic dictation, and of regulating the affairs of families,^ so natural in an unmarried clergy, gives too often an improper bias to the influence of the spiritual director. The theory is alluring, but the practice disappoints the expectation. The only admissible substitute for self-judgment, in domestic affairs and questions of * Adv. of Learning, vol. ii. p. 260. Compare Cic. de Orat. III. 33, 34. ' See Malebranche, Recherche de la Verite, eel. 13, siir liv. iii. upoti the Consulta- Hon of Physicians and Confessors. 3 ' Je vols bien que le goiit qu'il-y-a a derenir le depositaire du secret des families, a se rendre necessaire pour les reconciliations, a procurer des commissions ou a placer des domestiques, a trouver toutes les portes ouvertes dans les maisons des grands, a manger souvent a de bonnes tables, a se promener en carrosse dans une grande ville, et a faire de delicieuses retraites a la campagne, a voir plusieurs personnes de nom et de distinction s'interesser a sa vie et a sa sante, et a menagerpour les autres et pour soi-meme tons les interets liumains ; je vois bien, encore une fois, que cela seul a fait imaginer le ^sp^cieux et irreprelaensible pretexte du soin des ames, et seme dans le monde cette pepiniere intarissable de directeurs.'— La Bruyere, Caracieres, ch. 3. v.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 87 private conduct, is the advice of relations and trustworthy friends.* To these a person can with safety and propriety unbosom himself, and from them he will receive the best advice which, under such circumstances, he can obtain. It may be here remarked, that an unjust prejudice has not unfrequently been raised in Protestant countries against the treatises which are prepared for the use of confessors in the Church of Eome. When confession, and the judgment of the confessor upon sins confessed, exists as an institution of the church, the office of the priest becomes judicial, and it is necessary, in order to prevent erroneous decisions, and to preserve consistency, that a system of rules should be laid down for the general guidance of his discretion. The more difficult and doubtful of the cases likely to come before the confessor have been discussed separately, and have given rise to the branch of practical divinity called castiistry,'^ . Casuistry is the jurisprudence of theology; it is a digest of the* moral and religious maxims to be observed by the priest, in ad- vising or deciding upon questions which come before him in con- fession, and in assigning the amount of penance due to each sin. As confession discloses the most secret thoughts and acts of the penitent, and as nothing, however impure, is concealed from the confessor, it is necessary that he should be furnished with a manual in which these subjects are discussed. Now such a manual, if properly considered, is not more justly obnoxious to the charge of gratuitous indecency, than a legal or medical treatise, in which similar subjects are expounded without any reserve of language. The necessity for treating the subject in this manner, and the. danger of suggesting what it is intended to discourage, may be reasons against the practice of confession ; but if the expediency of this practice is once admitted, the rest follows by a necessary consequence. § 8. One important part of the practical dealings of life consists in the purchase of such articles as each person requires ' ' Pliin'mum in amicitia aniicorum bene suadentium valeat auctoritas : eaque ad- hibeatur ad nionendum non modo aperte, sed etiara acriter, si res postulet.' — Cicero de Amic. c. 13. 'Monere et moneri proprium est verse amicitijB : et alterum libere facere, non aspere ; alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter.' — lb. c. 25. 2 For the history of casuistry, see the Art. Camistik in Ersch and Gruber's Ency- clop'ddie, vol. xxi. p. 117. Casuistical theology was not abandoned by the Protestant churches till a considerable time after the Reformation ; and several casuistical treatises were written by Protestant divines. Compare IluUam, Lit. of Europe, vol. III. c. 4, §§ 1-20. ( 88 ON THE UTILITY AND [en. for the use and consumption of himself and his family. If he is capable of judging for himself as to the quality and value of the goods which he purchases, he will thus avoid imposition. If he is not, he will (unless he calls in the advice of some competent judge) either be imposed upon, or he must pay what Mr. Babbage has called the Price of Verification.^ That is to say, he must deal only at shops whose honesty can be safely relied upon, and which, inasmuch as they take the trouble to verify their own goods, and guarantee the quality of them, charge an additional sum for this trouble and responsibility. The ad- ditional payment is a species of insurance against fraud and mis- take. A shop of this sort may be considered a shop of authority : the knowledge of its managers as to their trade, and their integrity, render it probable that their articles are of excellent quality, and induce the customer to pay an additional price on this account. Wanting the requisite knowledge himself, he is willing to pay a certain sum for authenticating the quality of the article which he buys. For example ; a person ignorant of jewels would give an additional sum in purchasing them from a jeweller of established character and reputation, lest, if he bought them of an unknown dealer, he might be cheated by the substitution of paste or glass for genuine stones. On the other hand, a person possessing this knowledge might rely on his own judgment, and spare himself the cost of throwing on others the task of verifica- tion. In like manner, a bookseller, by making a careful and judicious selection of the books which he publishes, might create so much confidence in the goodness of his publications, as to en- able him to charge an extra price for them. In some cases, the determination of value is so laborious and difficult a process, that it has given rise to a separate class of pro- fessional men, as land-valuers, surveyors, appraisers, &c. In these valuations, the price of verification is npt a small percentage, con- founded with the price of the article, but it is of sufficient import- ance to stand apart, and form a substantive item. § 9. Besides professional advice, there is another species of advice not less important, which is given with the grounds assigned, but in which the practical conviction is generally produced by a mixture of reasoning and authority. This is advice given in joint deliberation and consultation, or debate. • Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, c. 14. v.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 89 Deliberation is concerning a future practical conclusion ; it is an inquiry concerning a course of action to be adopted, in a matter undetermined and uncertain, but believed to be within the power of those whose conviction the adviser seeks to influence. It con- sists sometimes in recommending, sometimes in dissuading, a certain course, and occasionally in a mere statement and examina- tion of different courses. In oral deliberation, the end is attained by reaching the conviction of the hearer through his understand- ing or feelings; and a statement of reasons for the course indicated, or of incentives to it, is presented to his mind. On the other hand, in the cases of professional consultation noticed above, the advice is in general given absolutely, without reason assigned. Sometimes the reasons of professional advisers are even intentionally concealed, lest they should deter the ignorant or timid consulter from follow- ing the advice; as is usually the case in the practice of physicians. Professional advice is followed, as such, blindly, and without any comprehension of its grounds, upon the mere authority of the adviser, just as a stranger follows the advice of a native as to the choice between roads, in a country with which he is unacquainted. Deliberation takes place, in particular, on the most important practical conclusions of public interest, as it is with respect to these that men most distrust their own judgment. Thus, there are deliberations of legally-constituted bodies, as councils of state, parliaments, courts of justice, municipal bodies, and synods of divines ; in free countries, also, many questions of general or local concern are deliberated upon in voluntary meetings and associa- tions. In all organised political bodies, which have a corporate ! action, and a common place of meeting, and which decide by a majority of votes, the business is transacted by a joint deliberation and consultation of the members.* Deliberation may likewise take place among professional advisers, or friends of the parties, upon private affairs. Deliberation or consultation always has a practical end in view, and never mere speculative truth. We may discuss scientific ^ truths, but we do not deliberate or consult about them. This distinction may be illustrated by comparing a philosophical dialogue with a parliamentary debate. If a scientific society discuss a question of astronomy, geology, or natural histoiy, they do not deliberate ; but they may deliberate about the management * On this subject, see further, Chapter VII. § 12. 90 ON THE UTILITY AND [ch. of their funds, or the appointment of their officers. The exerci- tations of a rhetorical school, or the discussions of a debating society, are not deliberations.^ As discussion about abstract truths differs from deliberation or consultation about practical conclusions, so the qualities requisite for producing conviction differ in the two cases. In the former, mere intellect suffices ; a peculiar faculty for observation of facts, or for inductive or deductive reasoning from them, will alone render a man fit for discussing questions of pure science, without reference to his moral qualities or character. But in joint deliber- ation it is otherwise. In order that a man should convince in deliberation, he ought not merely to be able and experienced, but also honest ; and, moreover, the audience ought to feel that he is not indifferent to the welfare of the persons whom the decision is to affect, but that he has their interest at heart. By exhibiting these qualifications, he will acquire a weight and ascendancy in their counsels, and his advice will be adopted, partly on account of the reasons which he addresses to them, and partly on account of the authority which his opinion carries by itself. The amount of the confidence which his audience, or a large portion of it, may place in his opinion, independently of his reasons, is governed by a vast variety of circumstances, which it is impossible to enumerate, or bring under a general description. They are, in fact, as numerous and different as those which enable us to form an ■•estimate of a man's moral and intellectual worth» For example, with respect to the various reasons which may induce a council of state to place confidence in the advice of a particular minister, ^ The subject of deliberation (fiovKevcris) was carefully considered by Aristotle, to whom many of the remarks in the text are due. See Eih. Nic. iii. 5 ; vi. 8, 10 ; Magn. Mor. i. 17, 18; Eth. Eud. ii. 10 ; and RJiet. i. 3; and compare Quintilian, Inst. Or. iii. 8. Concerning the ends of deliberation in political matters, see Grotius, J. B. et P. II. 24, § 5. Deliberation, strictly speaking, may be confined to a single person ; it may signify the reflections of an individual upon the future practical conduct of himself or others. Thus, in the fine verses of Milton, applied by Sir J. Mackintosh to Mr. Pitt — Deep on his front engraven Deliberation sat, and public care. In the text, however, I have used deliberation exclusively with reference to oral deliberation in the presence of other persons. It is in this sense that we speak of deliberative oratory, a deliberative assembly, &c. Ilobbes, Leviathan, part I. c. 6, following Vossius, says that deliberation is so called, ' because it is a putting an end to the liberty we had of doing or omitting, according to our own appetite or aA^ersion.' But the word seems, in fact, to be derived from libra, a balance, and to signify weighing in the mind. v.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 91 a council of war to place confidence in the advice of a particular general, a legislative assembly to place confidence in the advice of a particular member, as such, independently of his reasons, — it can only be said, that their confidence is owing to their belief, founded on antecedent events, that his judgment is likely to be sound, and disposition honest.^ Addresses to a court of justice or a judicial body, by a paid advocate, although they tend to a practical conclusion, do not fall under the head of deliberative oratory. The advice is not given upon the personal credit and authority of the speaker, nor is he understood to speak his own convictions, but merely to follow his instructions, and to present the facts of the case and the applica- tion of the law to it, in the light most favourable to his client. Hence, a paid advocate speaks without moral weight, and his arguments merely pass at their intringic value, without deriving any additional force from the source from which they proceed. Whenever a lawyer, in pleading a case, attempts to strengthen it by throwing in the weight of his personal conviction and character, he exceeds his proper province ; he attempts to gain an advantage in argument, without, in fact, undertaking the responsibility which his assurance ought to imply, and, in so doing, he violates the principles upon which the very beneficial system of hired advocacy is founded. § 10. In all deliberations, we seek to determine the best mode of dealing with some practical question, which is as yet undecided, and, therefore, our consultation, as has been already remarked, concerns the future. Now it is the uncertainty of the future which is the main cause of the difficulty of judgment in practical decisions ; and, hence, in the cases where the future events are the most uncertain, and the least reducible to laws of regular sequence, we are most disposed to rely upon the advice of sagacious and honest counsellors — of persons whose foresight and clearness of mental vision has been proved by experience. * On the importance of moral character in deliberatire oratory, see Aristot. Bhet. ii. 1, § 3. In § 5, he enumerates the qualities which the deliberative orator ought to possess — viz., virtue, wisdom, and good inclination towards his audience. So Quin- tilian : 'Valet in consiliis auctoritas plurimum. Nam et prudentissimus esse haberi- que, et optimus is debet, qui sententiae suse de utilibus atque honestis credere omnes velit. In judiciis enim vulgo fas habetur indulgere aliquid studio suo : consilia nemo est qui neget secundum mores dari.' — Inst. Oral. iii. 8, § 12. See also Whately's BhrJoric, part II. ch. 3, §§ 4, 6. As to the qualifications of a good counsellor, see Hobbes, Lev. part II. c. 25. 92 ON THE UTILITY AND [cii. The subject of prediction is too extensive to be considered here at length ; besides, it belongs generally to the province of logic and scientific method, and specially to the respective sciences and arts conversant about each branch of knowledge and practice. A few remarks may, however, properly be introduced, with refer- ence principally to the peculiar difficulty of prediction which is supposed to be inherent in the moral sciences. In some departments of physical science, not merely hypo- thetical but actual problems consist of so few, so simple, and so well ascertained elements, that their solution can be completely effected. Whenever the data are the whole set of actual circum- stances, and the problem admits of solution, the future can be predetermined with certainty, and all the sequences of the phe- nomena exhausted by a preliminary view. This is eminently the case with the science of astronomy, which has now been brought to such a pitch of perfection that all the important events relat- ing to the motions of the solar system can be predicted with unerring precision. In consequence of the movement of these bodies being round a centre, the events of astronomy, and those dependent upon them, such as the course of the seasons, and the inequality of day and night on the earth, recur in constant cycles. In other departments of physics, also, the data of real problems can be reduced to so great simplicity, that future events, though not recurring in cycles, can be determined beforehand with a close approach to certainty. Thus, (with a small margin of allowance for the operation of those causes which we are compelled to group together under the name of chance,) we can predetermine the growth of a plant ; being able, from a knowledge of its habits, to suit our management to its nature. So, the elementary facts upon which the sciences of mechanics and chemistry are foimded are completely within our grasp, and we can command them for the futm-e, from our experience of the past. The experiments relating to the lever, the inclined plane, the wheel, and the pen- dulum, as well as those relating to the composition of water, gases, &c., can all be repeated at pleasure. So, our knowledge of the laws of optics is not only sufficient to enable us to foretell the principal phenomena of light, but also, by the help of this know- ledge, to construct telescopes, microscopes, and other optical instruments. Extensive, however, as our command over nature has become, and wide as is the domain of the useful arts, still every fresh in- v.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 93 vention, whether mechanical or chemical, is of uncertain success until it has been verified by actual trial and experiment. It is almost as difficult to predict the working of a new machine, as of a new law or social institution. When the problem is simple, calculation can master it ; but when the elements are numerous and complex, and when we are not sure that all the influencing circumstances are included, the result is uncertain, and requires verification by experiment, in physics as well as politics. The ablest writers on the physical sciences, however they may differ in many of their philosophical views, agree, indeed, in trying the soundness and value of a scientific theory, by its power of pre- dicting the future. Thus, Dr. Whewell says that 'it is a test of true theories, not only to account for, but to predict phenomena.'* M. Comte, in his Gouts de Philosophie Positive, lays it down re- peatedly, that prediction is the proper end of all science. Science, he says, proceeds on the assumption of the recurrence of phe- nomena in an invariable sequence ; and, if this sequence has once been determined completely for the past, the determination will hold good for the future. What distinguishes science from mere erudition or learning is, that the former aims at prevision, whereas the latter relates facts without reference to the future. Science leads to prediction, and prediction to action.^ Such, undoubtedly, is the goal which science strives to reach, but, in a large proportion of cases, its effort is unsucce.ssful.^ Every science attempts to predict, but its predictions are often mere approximations to the truth. A theory which has attained a high degree of perfection may, nevertheless, when it comes to be applied in practice, be under the necessity of dealing with so many data, that it may be unable to cope with the problem, and may furnish imperfect, and even inconsistent, predictions in the hands of different theorists. Notwithstanding the advanced state of mechanical theory, we know that engineers differ widely in their plans for constructions, machines, and other practical works, and that there are practical problems which mechanical science cannot effectually solve. Such are the limits upon prediction, even in those physical sciences which have reached a high degree of theoretical perfection. But there are other departments of physics in which observation 1 Aph. 12, concerning Science. Phil, of the Ind. Sciences, vol. i. p. xxxix. 2 See torn. i. pp. 62, 63 ; torn. ii. pp. 28, 401, 426, 428 ; torn. iii. pp. 10, 304, 407, 413; torn. vi. p. 723. 94 ON THE UTILITY AND [ch. is more difficult, in which many of the phenomena elude our powers of investigation, and whose theory, therefore, is not better ascertained than that of the moral sciences. Such, for example, is meteorology, which has for its subject the successive states of the earth's atmosphere, and of the vapours, moisture, &c., which it contains. The climate of each place can be reduced to certain laws, and the deviations from these can be brought within assign- able limits, so as to guide the works of the farmer and gardener ; but the temperature . of any place, and the nature of the weather on any given day, cannot be predicted with any approach to precision. An equal uncertainty besets the science of medicine. The functions of the living body, which physiology undertakes to describe, are in great part, so long as they are in action, with- drawn from the observation of the senses, and are not, like our mental processes, the subject of consciousness. These functions, therefore, even while the organs are in a healthy state, to a great extent defy our powers of observation ; when they assume a morbid action, the diagnostics of the disease are often obscure and ambi- guous ; and even supposing the nature and seat of the malady to be accurately determined, there is further uncertainty as to the mode of treating it — as to the influence of medicines, regimen, &c., upon the organs affected. Hence, the most experienced physicians are often unable to detect the source of a malady, to foretell its course, or to judge as to the effect of a complex set of influences acting on the human body. Still less are they in general able to determine the laws for the diffusion of an epidemic disease — to predict the course which it will take, or the time for which it will last. Although the average value of human life at successive ages can be approximatively calculated, yet it cannot be predicted with certainty how long any given person will live ; and it is only by a compensation of errors that companies for life-in- surances can subsist. In practical questions, lying within the scope of the moral and political sciences, prediction is always peculiarly difficult, partly ■v^j on account of the immense number of influencing circumstances ^"^ which it is necessary to take into consideration, and partly on account of the uncertainty which belongs to all events dependent ^on human volition. Not only do moral and political problems consist, in general, of more numerous and complex data than those which grow out of the physical sciences, but the matter to which they refer is different. The matter of a physical problem is either v.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 95 insentient, and follows an invariable and mechanical law of se- quence ; or, where it concerns animal and vegetable life, it deals only with a living organisation, destitute of the power of free moral volition and progressive intelligence. The matter of a moral and political problem, when it concerns practice, is always the human will ; and though the general tendencies of human nature can be determined, so that it is properly a subject of science,^ yet the operation of peculiar feelings, fancies, wishes, caprices, and inclinations, in individuals, and their influence upon others, are uncertain and incalculable. When a physical problem has been once solved, it is solved for ever. The theorems of Archimedes upon the lever, and the ob- servations of Aristotle upon animals, retain their truth, unaffected by the lapse of ages. If the habits of bees, which Virgil describes in his fourth Greorgic, had been true of the Italian bees in his own time, they would be true of bees at the present time. But bees, though a gregarious and (as they have been called) a po- litical, are not a progressive animal. Man alone, among organised! beings, possesses the moral and intellectual qualities which render one generation of human beings unlike another, and which enable him to alter his own condition and that of others by self-culture. Hence he alone, of all living beings, possesses a history; other tribes of animals are described by enumerating all the properties of their species or kind, and when this task has been completely accomplished, the problem is exhausted, except so far as varieties may be produced by domestication. One generation of elephants, or monkeys, or lions, has nothing to distinguish it from another. But man, in addition to that physiological character which he has in common with other animals, and which, like their physical type, is unvarying, has also attributes which distinguish one com- munity of men from another — and, again, one generation of the same commimity from another generation. It is the sum of the acts of a society, as they occur in succession, which constitutes its history, and distinguishes its state, not only from that of other societies, but also from its own states, both anterior and sul)- sequent. -^ With respect to the determination of the future in human affairs, there are two cases, which, though they do not admit of being very precisely distinguished from each other, yet require to be considered separately. ' See Mill's System of Logic, b. VI. c. 3. 96 ON THE UTILITY AND [ch. The first is, when, from a view of all those circumstances which, taken in the aggregate, constitute the actual state of any society, we predict its state at some definite future period. Although a philosophical survey of the course of history may lead to certain general results as to the progress of society, and the order in which certain political and social changes may be expected to follow one another, yet it is impossible to predict a future social state with any approach to certainty : ^ Prudens futuri temporis exitum Caliginosa nocte premit Dens. Such anticipations, even of the most sagacious judges, can have scarcely better claim to confidence than the predictions of a weather- almanac. For example, who, in the year 1788, could have predicted the social and political state of France and a large part of Europe at any period of the Eevolution, the Consulate, or the Empire ? That extensive and profound study of history did not necessarily give an insight into this futurity, is proved by the remark of Gibbon upon the early stages of that great change. ' How many years,' (said he, writing at the end of 1789,^) 'before France can recover any vigour, or resume her station among the powers of Europe ! ' And even if he had then predicted the great development of popular and military energy which ensued in France upon the invasion of the French territory, and the attempts to restore the royal authority, his prediction must have been founded on such uncertain and arbitrarily chosen grounds, as to deserve little more than the name of a guess. Who, in January, 1848, could have predicted the series of events which have occurred on. the continent of Europe since that period ; and who, if he had happened ta conjecture something near the truth, could have ventured to say that his prediction was derived from sure data ? But, secondly, in the practical management of affairs, the problem for our solution presents itself in a less intricate and more tractable shape. We are commonly called upon to predict tlie effects of some given cause, viz., of some proposed legislative or administrative measure, or of a treaty or war with a foreign country. Predictions of this sort, with respect to the body politic, are analogous to the predictions of the effects of a certain medicine ' Upon the meaning of ' a state of society,' and the extent to which it can be pre- dicted, see Mill's Syst. of Logic, b. VI. c. 10. - Milman's Life of Gibbon, p. 338, v.] PKOPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 97 or diet witli respect to the body natural. They are also analogous to predictions with respect to the working of a new and untried machine, or instrument. Having been framed by means of in- ferences from observed and generalised facts, they approximate more or less closely to the truth ; but the plan requires a process of verification before its actual working can be securely ascertained. In human affairs, whether relating to public or private in- terests, such predictions, (as Mr. Mill has truly remarked ^) can never be absolute ; they must be limited to the affirmation of tendencies^ and not venture to lay down ^positive effects. In deal- ing with human actions, we can only presume to say that a certain cause, if not counteracted^ will produce a certain effect ; and that, therefore, its tendency is to produce that effect. But those future miscellaneous causes which we cannot calculate, and which we are forced to set down to the account of chance, are so numerous, as to prevent us from saying that it will produce that effect. Even~l our predictions of tendencies, moreover, in the great majority of cases, can only be made by empirical maxims — by propositions not true universally, but qualified by considerations of time and place. P or example, the expediency of a new legislative proposal must be judged by very different criteria in England and in Hindostan. The differences of climate, race, religion, degree of mental and moral culture, political habits and institutions, state of the useful arts, and other determining circumstances, would necessitate the application of different rules of judgment, and different canons of prediction, in the one case, from those applic- able in the other. ^ It may be remarked, that those things which are comprehended under the denomination of news — which are collected in news- papers, and circulated in tliis shape, for the information of the public — belong in general to the class of events to which our powers of prediction apply either imperfectly, or not at all. Some- times a newspaper may describe the appearances of an eclipse, or other remarkable celestial phenomenon, which astronomers have foreseen ; but no newspaper informs its readers of the course of the seasons, the succession of day and night, the rising and setting of the stars, or the alternation of the tides. Storms, hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and other similar incalculable events in the realm of nature, together with the acts and fortunes System of Logic, vol. ii. pp. 623, 565. H 98 ON THE UTILITY AND [ch of men, both in a political and a private character — battles, re- volutions, debates of senates, trials by courts of justice, accidents, crimes, voyages, births, marriages, deaths, &c. compose the intel- ligence which a newspaper furnishes. The avidity for news is owing to the difficulty or impossibility of foreseeing the events : in proportion as the events are important and unexpected, is our curiosity to learn them. Even, however, with the assistance of all those means which the admirable inventions of modern science have contrived for the accelerated despatch of intelligence, we are hardly ever, in any complicated case, informed at the moment of decision and action with respect to all the contemporaneous events. Circumstances are changing, more or less, at every instant ; and we are left to infer the present state of things from their state at a recent period. Hence the necessity, according to the just remark of Turgot, of predicting the present : our belief as to the immediate present must always be founded, to a certain extent, upon conjectures derived from an antecedent period. A general, for example, when he issues his orders successively in a battle, cannot know the state of things, at each moment, so exactly and completely as he may ascertain them after the battle, from the information of different persons and the comparison of their several accounts. § 11. Now in the attempt to predetermine the future, with \ reference to some practical measure, the deliberation of competent judges affords the best security ; though we see, especially from the debates of legislative assemblies, to what an extent their judgments and predictions conflict with respect to practical affairs. 4 Do what we will, the future, to a great extent, eludes our grasp, in all matters dependent upon the volitions of other men. Never- theless, by careful deliberation and the adoption of prudent counsels, and by a rigid adherence to a sound method of observa- tion and reasoning — or by following the advice of persons who — themselves adhere to such a method, we can reduce the amount of uncertainty ; we can eliminate many elements of chance, and, to a considerable extent, bring the future under our control. From time to time, undoubtedly, great catastrophes occur, whicli no prudence could have anticipated, and whose consequences, not having been guarded against, must be endured. Such great moral convulsions are like storms and hurricanes in the physical world, which, though doubtless they have their appropriate and constant laws not less than the equable course of the weather, yet defy the 1/ V Of i JfJO- v.] PKOPER PEOVINCE OF AUTHORIT^J^C^ > vv;', "'99. predictions of the meteorologist. But, in the ordinary course of human affairs, the future can, to a great extent, be anticipated for practical purposes ; care, prudence, sagacity, practical wisdom, and good counsel, can be recognised by their • good fruits ; neglect, rashness, folly, shortsightedness, and bad counsel, can be recognised by their bad fruits. § 12. In proportion, therefore, as men's conduct in doubtful l^^ — questions of practice is influenced by reason, they will defer to the opinion of the most competent advisers where their own judgment / is at fault. By these means they will, as far as is practicable, subject the future to their control. If they are ignorant and superstitious, they will be impatient of merely human advice, and unwilling to resign themselves to the guidance of a judgment . which does not lay claim to infallibility. They then fall into the hands of diviners and soothsayers, who undertake, by supernatural aid, and by some occult method, to prognosticate the future.^ Hence the prevalence of the arts of divination by auguries, auspices, omens, oracles, dreams, necromancy, evocations of spirits, judicial astrology, cabbala, magic, palmistry, second-sight, &c., which at one time flourished among the civilised nations of Europe,^ and still exercise a potent sway over the Oriental and savage nations. The desire to penetrate into the future by supernatural means is particularly manifested upon the eve of uncertain events of great moment ; hence, in antiquity, diviners always accompanied armies, and were consulted before a battle. These arts of foretelling the future doubtless, in part, owe their success to the fallacy of attending only to the lucky, and neglect- ing the unlucky predictions ; of counting the hits, and not count- ing the misses ; ^ in part, also, to the use of an obscure and ambiguous phraseology, which can be accommodated to the event however it may turn out.** But — granted the desire to know the ' See Adelung, Geschichte der Menschlichen Narrheit, vol. ii. p. 27. ^ The belief in divination is ably defended by Q. Cicero, according to the Stoic doctrine, in the first book of Cicero's Dialogue de Divinationc. 3 See Mill, System of Logic, b. V. c. iv. § 3. Compare Wachsmuth, Hellenische Alterthumskunde, II. ii. p. 270. * See Aristot. Rhet. III. v. § 4, where he remarks that diviners do not individual- ise objects, but describe them by generic terms. Ambiguity and indistinctness are the general characteristics of the ancient oracular prophecies. Compare Cic. de Divin. II. 54. It is scarcely necessary to refer to such predictions as Kpuiaos"A.\vv Siafihs /jieydX7}v apxV SiaXvcrei, and ' Aio te ^acida Eomanos vincere posse.' See also Ade- lung, ut sup., on the obscurity of the predictions of Gauricus and Nostradamus, two astrologers of the sixteenth century, vol. ii. p. 261; vol. vii. pp. 125, 135. Compare H 2 100 ON THE UTILITY AND [ch. future — their chief foundation is a belief in the supernatural character of the source from which they emanate, which induces the consulters of the oracle to resort to any shift for saving its honour, in case its predictions do not prove true. § 13. As it is the part of prudence and wisdom to follow, in practical questions, the advice of good counsellors, so is it incum- bent on those who assume the office of counsellor to discharge it with a due sense of the moral responsibility which they undertake. In all matters of professional or deliberative advice, the counsellor ought to look exclusively to the benefit of the persons whose interest is in question, and by whom he is consulted. As trust is reposed in his practical judgment,^ he ought to advise without any view to his own advantage, and upon a full knowledge of the circumstances of the case. It is only by complying with these conditions, and by a consciousness of the binding nature of the obligation which he contracts, that the professional man, in advising his client — or the deliberative counsellor, addressing a council of state or a legislative assembly, can acquire authority for his opinion, independently of his reasons. § 14. It would be improper to close this chapter without adverting to the marks of trustworthiness in a historian ; inasmuch as his province does not distinctly fall under any of the heads above considered. Before, however, we attempt to assign the qualifications of the trustworthy historian, it will be necessary first to settle what is his proper province ; for the progress of knowledge, the extension of literature, and the increased habit of recording successive changes in the same object, have of late given an enlarged and somewhat indefinite meaning to the term History. By History, is properly understood a narrative of the acts of a political community, or nation, as represented by its government, and of events important to it in its collective capacity. The works of the great historians of antiquity — as Thucydides and Tacitus — which have served as the types of history since the revival of letters, describe the Greek and Eoman States in action; their wars, negotiations, treaties, intestine tumults, public deliber- ations, legislation — vol. iv. p. 212. Some further remarks on this subject will be found in Note A. at the end of the chapter. ' It was on account of the importance of this trust, and the obligations growing out of it, that the sacredness of counsel was proverbial from an early time among tin Greeks, (l^phv ^ cvix^ovKi], Zenob. IV, 40, cum not.) y.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 101 Res gestae regumque ducumque et ta:istia bella. These form the proper subject-matter of history. Greographical and ethnographical descriptions,* accounts of the social state of the people, of its wealth, manners, literature, religion, and the like, — however interesting and instructive they may be in themselves, cannot be considered as forming strictly an integral part of politi- cal history, and ought only to be introduced incidentally, as illus- trating the course of the narrative. History is essentially dramatic :*^ it describes a series of actions ; and is distinguished from biography in taking for its subject a nation, not an individual.^ Hence, history has been considered a species of composition peculiarly suited to an orator, because he is able to describe a succession of events with perspicuity and vividness.^ j An historical narrative, so understood, is usually conceived as] following the chronological series of events, and as comprehending a sufficient portion of them to be interesting and instructive. If the number of events be small, or confined to a particular class or subject, the work is considered rather as materials for history than as history itself ; and falls into the subordinate category denomin- ated by the French, Mevfioires pour servir a. VhistoireJ^ On the-r^ other hand, a history may narrate events connected only by i clironological co-existence or sequence, and not linked together by any mutual dependence. In this respect, a history diifers ' The ancient historians, on account of the defective knowledge of geography then existing, and the total want or comparative scarcity of geographical treatises, were forced to introduce geographical descriptions into their works to a greater extent than modern historians. See Polyb. III. c. 36, 37- '^ According to the definition in Gellius, N. A., V. 18, history is 'rerum gestaruni narratio.' The office of history is to narrate, according to Plin. Epist. V. 8. Lucian, Quom. Hist, sit conscrih. c. 55, sai^s that with the exception of the proem or intro- duction, history is nothing but a long narration. Tlie following definitions from modern dictionaries present the same leading idea : — • Storia : Diffusa narrazione di cose seguite.' — Voc. della Crusca. ' Histoire : Narration des actions et des choses dignes de memoire.' — Diet, de VAcademie. ' History: A narration of events and facts, delivered with dignity.' — Johnson's Diet. ' L'histoire est 1' exposition ou la narration,. temper^e quant a la forme, et savante quant au fond, liee et suivie des faits et des eveneraens memorables les plus propres a nous faire conuaitre les hommes, les nations, les empires, etc' — Diet, des Syno7iymes de la Lavgue Fran^aise, eel. G-uizot, tom. i. p. 469. All these definitions are wanting in precision ; thoy all, for example, include biography as well as history. The word la-ropta first occurs, in its modern sense, in the Poetic of Aristotle, c. 18; 38, ed. Tyrwhitt. ' According to Cicero de Leg. I. 2. History is ' opus oratorium maxime.' Com- pire De Orat. II. 12. * According to Bacon, 'memorials' are ' history unfinished,' 'the first or rough draughts of history,' or 'preparatory history.' — Adv. of Learning, vol. ii. p. 106. 102 ON THE UTILITY AND [cii. (according to the remark of Aristotle ^) from an epic poem, which must relate to a complete and connected action, f History, again, if it be worthy of the name, ought to be com- ::»» posed with a due regard to impartiality, and with a requisite amount of sobriety and calmness I5f judgment. Without these attributes, it becomes a mere party pamphlet, or the pleading of an advocate. History, like science, ought to be treated without any view to a practical application, and merely for its own sake. It ought to narrate, and illustrate its narrative by appropriate ^^ comments ; but to abstain from all precepts. Such appear to be the essential constituents of our idea of history ; and, to a person who writes such a composition, we properly give the appellation of a historian. But the use of the . term has been extended beyond these bounds ; and almost any narrative describing the successive changes in any object may be called a history. Thus, there are histories of philosophy and literature ; of languages ; of the mathematical and physical sciences ; of the useful and the fine arts ; and of particular in- ventions, as of the printing-press, the steam-engine, &c. ; of nautical discovery, commerce, and geography. There may even be histories of the changes in the earth's surface. In political , history, the nation and its government, considered as a moral person and agent, is the central point of the narrative : in the other sort of histories, the subject is a science, for example, or an art, or a mechanical invention, round which, as a centre, the narrative turns, and whose successive changes, under the influence of different men and minds, are described. Accordingly, histories of the latter sort belong more properly to the special subjects about wliich they are concerned, than to the general province of the historian. Thus, a history of languages is the work of a philologist ; a history of mathematics is the work of a mathema- tician ; a history of medicine, the work of a physician ; a history of the earth, the work of a geologist ; political history alone is \ f ' the work of the historian, properly so called.^ f~ ' Poet. c. xxxviii. ed. Tyrwhitt. 2 See Whewell's PhUosoph?/ of Induction, b. X. c. i.; Bacon, Adv. of Learning, vol. ii. p. 102. The term 'Natural History' may have assisted in extending the applica- tion of the word history to the physical sciences, but it had a special and accident}'! origin, quite imconnected with the latter use of the word. Aristotle's work on Animals was entitled irepl rS>v ^(fwv iaropiat, ' Inquiries (or Researches) concerning Animals,^ which has, in the modern editions, been literally rendered into Latin, as NaturaUs Historia. The encyclopsediacal work of Pliny, too, was called by the comprehensive v.] PEOPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 103 The following remarks, therefore, will be confined to the political historian ; leaving the other class of historians to be dis- tributed under the departments of their respective subjects. A historian, then, as so understood, may, in the first place, be looked upon as a chronicler and recorder of contemporary events, of which he is either a direct and personal witness, or of which he collects the evidence himself from original witnesses.^ The original witnesses, from whose information the contempor- ary historian builds up his narrative, cannot themselves be styled historians, although their materials are necessary for his work. They are, to the historian, what the quarryman and mason are to the architect. A short -hand writer, who reports a parliamentary debate, or the proceedings before a court of justice; a person who procures intelligence for newspapers ; a collector of statistical facts, such as those relating to population, public revenue and expen- diture, military and naval force, exports and imports, currency, &c. ; also heralds and framers of pedigrees ; registrars of births, deaths, and marriages, and other civil facts; keepers of judicial records and journals of parliament ; compilers of proclamations, laws, charters, deeds, wills, state-papers, treaties, and other authentic documents ; copiers of inscriptions and coins ; — all belong to that useful class of persons, who prepare the materials out of which the framework of political history is constructed. Such functions do not, indeed, themselves deserve the name of history ; but we ought not to forget that it is to these obscure, though important, services that we owe the superior certainty and completeness of modern, as compared with ancient history. Every- thing in history depends upon the accuracy and fulness of the con- temporary records — upon the sufficiency of the means adopted by title of Naturalis Historia, ' A Description {or Exposition) of Nature,^ On account of the titles of these two celebrated works, the term Natural History has been applied to a scientific description of animals and other natural objects. But (according to a just remark of Mohs, cited by Dr. Whewell, Hist, of Ind. Sciences, vol. iii. p. 486), 'Natural history, when systematically treated, rigorously excludes all that is historical, for it classes objects by their permanent and universal qualities.' The essence of history, properly so called, is, that it narrates a series of successive states, all differing from one another. In this sense, the history of a science or an art is properly a history; but not a description of the species of animals, and of their characteristic differences- and resemblances. -* * Gellius, N. A., V. 18, mentions an opinion that historia, as distinguished from annales, is a narrative of events by a contemporary witness : ' Earum proprie rerum sit historia, quibus rebus gerendis interfuerit is qui narret.' He remarks, however, that this limitation was not consistent with the received use of the term. 104 ON THE UTILITY AND [ch. the original witnesses for perpetuating the memory of the events. Without an authentic memorial derived from the actors in the events, or from contemporary observers, history is a fiction, more or less specious. Without this solid foundation of well-attested fact, it is, at the best, but an historical romance, in which a genera] probability of manners, institutions, and state of society, is maintained. A faithful registrar of contemporary events is like a painter of portraits or landscapes after nature : the author of fictitious history is like the painter of an ideal history-piece, which may resemble the truth, but does not portray it. The first approach to contemporary history, properly so called, is the composition of diaries, journals, and personal memoirs ; narratives of events in which the writer plays a part himself, or of which he is merely a passive spectator. When these are confined to a particular transaction — as a siege, a battle, the negotiation of a treaty, the deliberations of a synod, the formation or overthrow of a government — they hold, in general, an intermediate place between the materials for history and history itself. When, how- ever, they include a long series of memorable events, affecting the destinies of one or more nations, they rise to the dignity and amplitude of history. As examples of the latter class, it will be sufficient to mention such periodical works as the Annual Eegister, and other previous publications of the same sort — and such histories as those of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, Sallust, Caesar, Tacitus, Froissart, Comines, Sleidan, Gruicciardini, Thuanus, Sully, Clarendon, Burnet, &c. Works of this sort are valuable as original testimon}^, and constitute the materials out of which other histories are formed, not less than mere collections of state papers or documents. Their most essential quality, there- fore, is veracity, and contemporary historians are mainly to be considered as witnesses and relators of events. They may have other good qualities besides veracity ; they may show discretion in selecting, and skill in arranging facts ; their style in narration may be perspicuous and impressive ; they may judge events and charac- ters with sagacity and penetration ; but it is principally as authen- tic witnesses and recorders of contemporary facts that they are important.^ If we did not consider their testimony as true, we ^ Sinoe the time of Thucydides, (see I. 21, 22.) the essence of history has been made to consist in its veracity. Thus, Cicero says that History is ' testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoriae, magistra vitse, nuncia vetustatis.' — De Oral. II. 9. Again: ' Quis nescit primam esse historiae legem, ne quid falsi dicere audeat ? delude, ne quid v.] PROPEE PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 105 should pay no regard to their writings. ' It is the true office of history (says Lord Bacon) to represent the events themselves, together with the counsels, and to leave the observations and con- clusions thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every man's judg- ment.' ^ In ol'der to determine how far a historian of this class is trust- worthy, we should apply to him the tests which are used for trying the credibility of -testimony. This process may lead only to un- certain results, and there may be, as in evidence before a court of justice, conflicting considerations on the question ; but the con- temporary historian and annalist is mainly to be regarded as a witness, or a collector of original evidence, and to be estimated as such. There is, however, another class of historians, who are not them- selves witnesses, or the original collectors and reporters of the oral testimony of others. For the most part, they are not contemporary with the events which they describe ; and when they are, it is usually as narrators of the history of foreign countries, in which case they have to deal with what Madame de Stael called ' con- temporary posterity.' These are what may be termed the Learned Historians : who compile history from the recorded testimony of jriginal witnesses, and the contemporary monuments and accounts. Among the Grreeks^ — Ephorus, Timseus, Diodorus, Dionysius, Plutarch, and Arrian : among the Latins — Livy, Cornelius Nepos, and Quintus Curtius; among the moderns — Machiavel, Raleigh, Muratori, Giannone, Mariana, Hume, Robertson, Gribbon, Rollin, veri non audeat? nequa suspicio gratiae sit in scribendo? ne qua simultatis? hsec icilicet fundamenta nota sunt omnibus.' — lb. c. 15. So Lucian {Qicom. Hist, sit con- ■icrib. c. 9.) lays it down that the end of history is utility, which arises from truth alone. The two principal qualifications of a historian (he says) are penetration and jiidgment in political atfairs, and a good style of writing (c. 34); moreover, a his- torian ought to haA^e had some civil and military experience. Truth is the goddess to whom alone he must sacrifice ; and he must be impartial, independent, and incorrupt, so as not to distort facts either from fear or favour, (c. 37-41.) Polybius likewise says, that as an animal is rendered useless by the loss of its sight, so history, without truth, is an idle tale, (I. 14, § 6.) In another place he says, that the end of tragedy is to produce emotion by fiction — the end of history is to convey instruction by truth, (II. 56, § 11.) Dr. Arnold, in his Lectures on Modern History, (lect. viii.,) also lays it down that ♦ the one great qualification in a historian is an earnest craving after truth, and utter impatience, not of falsehood merely, but of error,' (p. 293.) He adds, that these qualities ' are intellectual as well as moral, and are as incompatible with great feeble- ness of mind as they are with dishonesty,' (p. 297.) ' Advancement of Learning, vol. ii. p. 114. 106 ON THE UTILITY AND . [ch. Sismondi, Niebuhr, &C.5 may serve as examples. Their business consists in collecting and collating the evidence of the original witnesses, either preserved by contemporary writers, or handed down by a faithful oral tradition ; in balancing inconsistent or contradictory accounts ; in illustrating past events and past states of society by the light of subsequent experience and knowledge ; 5 and in tracing the successive steps in which the progress of man- ' kind consists. It is to this class of historians that we principally .^ owe that which is styled philosophical or setiological history ; that is to say, history accompanied witli deductions of causes and . effects, often extending over long periods of time, and therefore only possible upon a retrospect of past ages. Writers of this class, having no value as witnesses or original reporters of events, seem peculiarly required to comment upon the transactions which they describe; and being, as judges, exempt from the passions and interests of contemporaries, and necessarily free from all personal bias, their comments ought, on this account, to be the more enlightened and impartial. For success in this difficult and important department of his- tory, a writer ought to possess qualifications similar to those indi- ^M cated above with respect to science ; he ought to have studied the subject with attention for a considerable time ; he ought to have " ability sufficient to master it, and also an honest desire of arriving at the truth, and not perverting the evidence to suit his own in- terests or inclinations. r Looking to the unsettled state of many portions of the moral and political sciences, and to the unpractical nature of the reveries in which speculators on an ideal commonwealth have indulged, it is natural that writers of history should be the chief guides of opinion on questions of government. As the historian's subject \i keeps him in perpetual contact with facts, his general conclusions always possess some value, and represent some fraction of truth, even when they are founded on an imperfect induction, or derived from a mass of contemporary facts not sufficiently dissected and decomposed. Besides, if the facts are fully and faithfully stated, his conclusions may be corrected and limited by his premises, which is never the case where the forms of an ideal state are con- structed out of first principles, according to what Mr. Mill has styled the Geometrical Method of Political Eeasoning. The in- creased tendency of modern times to historical studies, to the collection of a well-ascertained body of facts respecting the succes- v.] PEOPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. lOT" sive states of a civil community, and to their philosophical appre- ciation, as illustrating the progress of society, corresponds with the tendency to careful observation and induction in the physical sciences.^ Hence, with the exception of the writers on the law of nations, on positive law, and on political economy, historians are now the great teachers of political wisdom— of civilis scientia.'^ And it is only by a close examination of the results obtained by trustworthy and enlightened historians, and by a careful generali- sation from them, assigning each effect to its proper cause, that Political Philosophy can ever be placed on a sound basis. i NOTE TO OPIAPTER V. Note A. (p. 100.) Some of the numerous guesses of diviners have, as is not wonderful, hit the truth with great exactness. Thus John Oario, the astrologer of Joachim L, elector of Brandenburg, published in the year 1522 a Prognosticatio, constructed according to the rules of the art, in which he predicted a destructive inundation, famine, pestilence, and civil and ecclesiastical troubles, for the year 1524,^ and the birth of Antichrist for the year 1693. But the year 1789 was to be the most terrible of all. In this year, there were to be great and marvellous events,- changes and catastrophes. Adelung, who reports this prediction in a volume ' See the just remarks of M. Comte, Cours cle JPhil. Pos. torn. iv. p. 284 upon the benefits to be anticipated from the historical tendency of the present age. ^ The following remarks of Bacon illustrate the applicability of history to practical politics : — ' The form of writing which of all others is fittest for this variable argument of negotiation and occasion, is that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for govern- ment — namely, discourse upon histories or examples ; for knowledge drawn freshly, and in our view, out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again ; and it hath much greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upom the example, than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance ; for when the example is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it is set down with all circumstances, which may sometimes con- trol the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it as a very pattern for action ; whereas the examples alleged for the discourse's sake are cited succinctly, and without particularity, and carry a servile aspect toward the discourse which they are brought in to make good.' — Adv. of Learyiivg, vol. ii. p. 266. Legal precedents, in like manner, are of little value, unless the case cited has been reported fully, so that it can be seen whether the rule of law, said to have been laid down, was necessarily involved in the decision of the case. 8 It seems that the astrologers had predicted the destruction of the world by in- imdation in 1524, and that some persons had provided themselves with ships in order to be prepared against the calamity.— Bodix. de Ecp. IV. c. ii. 108 ON THE UTILITY AND [ch. published in 1787, does not doubt that the astrologer will prove to be as much mistaken with respect to the year 1789, as he had already proved to be with re- spect to the year 1693. — Geschichte der Narrheit, vol. iii. p. 118. There is likewise a curious prediction of the extinction of the independence of Venice, in the Satire of Luigi Alamanni, an Italian poet, who died about the middle of the sixteenth century, and whose poems were published at Lyons in 1532-3. In Satira xii. is the following address to Venice : — Se non cangi pensier, I'un secol solo Non contera sopra'l millesimo anno Tua liberta, che va fuggendo a volo. Ginguene, who first called attention to this passage, (Hist. Litteraire d'ltaliej torn. ix. p. 144, ed. 2,) remarks, that the election of the first doge faUs in 697 ; and that if to this epoch we add 1100 years, we obtain the year 1797, which is the precise year next after that in which Venice ceased to be independent. Few predictions, however, were so lucky as those of Carlo for the year 1789, and of Alamanni for the year 1 796 ; and, accordingly, it was in general necessary to alter them after the event, in order to produce a close agreement between the prediction and the thing foretold. Thus in the Quatrains of Nostradamus, first published in 1565, there was the following stanza : — Gand et Bruxelles marcheront contre Anvers, Senat de Londres mettront a mort lem' roy : Le sel et vin luy seront a Fenvers, Pour eux avoir le regne en desarroy. After the execution of Charles I., this passage of Nostradamus was applied in France to the striking event, and it was long considered by his admirers as a strong proof of his prophetic power. Adelung, however, considers the supposed prophecy as taking its origin in the troubles in Flanders, which were contem- porary with its composition ; and he refers ' leur roy ' to the Flemish cities, not to the senate of London. He understands Nostradamus to have meant, that the English government would put to death some supposed King of Flanders. — Ut sup, vol. vii. p. 133. Another more remarkable example of the subsequent perversion of a pro- phecy, in order to adapt it to an important event, may be added : — A German writer, named Gaspar Brusch, published the following prophetic verses in the year 1553 : — Post mille expletos a partu virginis annos, Et post quingentos rursus ab orbe datos, Octogesimus octavus mirabilis annus Ingruet : is secum tristia fata trahet. Si non hoc anno totus malus occidet orbis. Si non in nihilum terra fretumque ruent : Cuncta tameu mundi sursum ibunt atque deorsum Imperia, et luctus undique grandis erit. The most remarkable event of the year 1688 was the Spanish Armada. The prediction was forgotten for two hundred years, and was reprinted in the Mercure de France in the middle of the last centurv, with the substitution of 'septengin- V.J PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 109 tos' for ' post quingentos/ in v. 2, and a story about its having been found in the tomb of Regiomontanus, at Liska, in Hungary. Since the French revolution — which recalled attention to the supposed prophecy — the true origin of the verseS; and the nature of the fra*ud, have been pointed out. — Bioy. Univ. in Bi'us^h. It is singular that, by some similar adaptation, a Jacobite should not have applied it to the English revolution of 1688. Compare the remarks of Mr. Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. vi. p. 214, upon the flexibility of the Greek prophecies, and the manner in which they were moulded to suit any striking occurrence. We must not, however, suppose that all astrological diviners were conscious impostors, and intentionally fabricated their predictions in such a manner as to admit of no certain interpretation. Many, or perhaps most, of them doubtless believed, to a certain extent, in the reality of the art which they practised. Thus Andrew Goldmayer, who was offered the professorship of mathematics at Stras- burg in the year 1635, composed a chronicle of that city upon astrological prin- ciples. He complained that ordinary historians paid no attention to the state of the stars, in connection with the events which they narrated ; whereas these events could not be understood without their causes, and their causes could only be explained by astrology. He began, therefore, to compose, not only a history of Strasbiu-g, but also a universal history, according to this method, and believed that he would thus throw great light both upon astrology and history. For this purpose, he extracted the chief events out of chronicles : he calcidated the position of the stars backwards, and believed himself, by this process, to have discovered the true cause of every important event. — Adeltjng, ut sup. vol. iv. p. 215. The process here described is a scientific process, and was an attempt to found judicial astrology upon inductive reasoning. It therefore proves the good faith of the astrologer. Compare also Kepler's astrological doctrine in Bethune's Life of Keple?', c. vii. ; and the opinions of Bodinus de Rep. IV. c. 2. no NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [ch. CHAPTER VI. ON THE NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT, AS COMPARED WITH THE NUMBER OF THE REST OF THE COMMUNITY. § 1. It has been shown, in the preceding pages, that the men of special infornaation and experience, combined with the proper moral and intellectual qualifications, are the competent judges on each branch of knowledge, and therefore the legitimate guides of opinion. I^ow if we take each subject, whether of speculation or practice, in succession, these persons must always be a small section of the community ; in fact, a mere handful, as compared with the entire population. In sciences and arts, the persons versed in those particular departments of knowledge, — in history, historians; in general literatm*e, literary men and poets ; in practical questions of law, medicine, architecture, navigation, &c., the men of the re- spective professions — who form respectively the standard and canon of authority, are but few in number, if set against the body of their fellow-countrymen. Moreover, even with respect to each of these classes, it is principally the ablest, the most learned, the most ex- perienced, the most skilful, whose opinion constitutes authority. So long as we admit the maxim, ' Unicuique in sua arte creden- dum,' the class or body of persons competent to judge in each matter must be numerically insignificant in comparison with the whole people. If we divide the nation into two parts — one con- sisting of a profession, or body of persons specially conversant with a particular subject, the other consisting of the rest of the popula- tion, the numbers of the latter portion will immensely prepon- derate : The few, by nature formed, with learning fraught, Born to instruct, as others to be taught. § 2. In each subject, therefore, the opinion of the great bulk of the people is, taken as a standard of truth and rectitude, un- 7i:] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. HI • worthy of consideration, and destitute of weight and authority. It is the opinion of uninformed and inexperienced persons, whose incapacity to judge is not cured by the midtiplication of their numbers. The mere aggregation of incompetent judges will not-^^ produce a right judgment, more than the aggregation of persons who have no knowledge of a matter of fact will supply credible testimony to its existence.^ This is equally the case, whether the multitude agree in opinion with the few competent judges, or disagree with them. If they agree, the opinion of the unscientific or unprofessional \ many, whether right or wrong, can scarcely fail to be derived, ^ more or less remotely, from that of a few persons either being, or 1 considered to be, competent judges. Now, whether the opinion | ,* be sound or imsound, it is in general derived without any adequate process of examination or verification, and is held merely upon trust ; so that the concurrence of the multitude adds little or no weight to the judgment of the former.^ Thus, at present the New- tonian system of the world is accepted by the people at large, in all civilised countries, who therefore believe that the world moves round the sun. But they entertain this opinion merely on the authority of the agreement of scientific astronomers, and with no better knowledge of the grounds of their belief than their ances- tors, who recognised the Ptolemaic system, and believed that the sun moves round the earth. On the other hand, the agreement between men of science and the multitude may exist in cases where the opinion is erroneous ; and it may arise from the absence of original research and of an enlightened scepticism, from the passive retention of ancient errors and the blind adherence to tra- ditionary prejudices. Of this state of things, the history of the physical sciences in antiquity and the middle ages affords numer- ous examples, which it would be useless to particularise, and many examples might be cited from the moral sciences at the present time. ^ If they disagree, the preference is justly due to the opinion of ' the few competent judges, and the opinion of the iminformed and inexperienced multitude is inferior in authority to that of the 1 ' An quicquam stultius quam qnos singulos (sieut operarios, barbarosque,) con- temnas. eos esse aliquid putare unirersos ? ' — CftERO, Tusc. Quasi. V. 36. 2 ' Les hommes, en general, approuvent ou condamnent au hasard, et la verity memo est, par la plupart d'entre eux, re^ue comme I'erreur, sans examen et par prejuge.' — Helvetitjs de r Homme, sect. XI. ch. 8. 112 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [cir. select body. In cases where there is an agreement of opinion between the competent few and the incompetent many, the con- currence adds little or no weight to the opinion of the former. In cases where there is a conflict of opinion between the same two classes ot persons, rhe preference must be given to the latter, as a measure of truth, and a canon for the judgments ot others. So numerous are the cases in which the opinion of the mul- titude conflicts with that of the few competent judges, that a majority of voices has, in questions not involving a legal decision, been considered as a mark of error. ' Argumentum pessimi turba,' says the Latin proverbial verse, cited by Seneca.^ It has been said, not only that a majority of voices is no conclusive proof of rectitude, and that moral questions cannot be decided, like ques- tions in a legislative assembly, by a division of the ayes and noes — but that a person ought to be ashamed of finding his opinion or conduct approved by the multitude, and that the concurrence of the many raises a presumption of being in the wrong.^ ' Pessimum ' .' Est turba semper argumentum pessimi.' PuBLius Syrus, v. 190. That is to say, ' the concurrence of the crowd is a proof of the worst side.' Compare Seneca, De Vit. Beat., c. 1, 2, 'Sanabimur, si modo separemur a ccetu : nunc vero st^t contra rationem, defensor mail sui, populus. Itaque id evenit, quod in comitiis, in quibus eos factos prsetores iidem qui fecere mirantur, quum se mobilis favor circumegit. Eadera probamus, eadem reprehendimus : hie exitus est omnis judicii, in quo secundum plures datur. Quum de beata vita agitur, non est quod mihi illud dis- cessionum more respondeas : " Hsec pars major esse videtur." Ideo enim pejor est. Non tam bene cum humanis rebus agitur, ut meliora pluribus placeant : argumentum pessimi turba est.' There is likewise a verse of the old tragedian, Attius : * Probis probatum potius quam multis fore.' P. 201, ed. Bothe. Cicero gives the following description of the manner in which opinions were formed in his time : — ' The seeds of virtues are (he says) planted by nature in our minds ; but as soon as we are born, we are surrounded with false opinions, so that we almost imbibe error with our nurse's milk. As our education proceeds, we contract further errors from our parents and teachers, and we learn the fables of the poets, which take root in our mind : " Cum vero accedit eodem quasi maximus quidam magister, populus, atque omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo, turn plane inficimur opinionum pravitate, a naturaque desciscimus.'" Ttisc. Quasi . III. 1, 2. Compare a similar passage in Be Off". I. 32. 2 Plutarch relates a celebrated saying of Phocion, who, on receiving the applause of the people for a speech which he had made in the Athenian assembly, turned round to his friends, and expressed his fear. that he had said something which he ought not to have said. — {Phocion, c. 8.) Speaking of the Optimates, or aristocratic party in the Roman State, about the time of the Gracchi, Cicero says : ' Qui autem adversabantur ei generi [to the popular VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 113 omnium est augurium (says Lord Bacon) quod ex consensu capitur in rebus intellect ualibus ; exceptis divinis et politicis, in quibus suffragiorum jus est. Niliil enim multis placet, nisi imagina- tionem feriat, aut intellectum vulgarium notionum nodis astringat. Itaque optime traducitur illud Phocionis a moribus ad intellectu- alia ; ut statim se examinare debeant homines, quid erraverint aut peccaverint, si multitude consentiat et complaudat.' ^ This in- ference, however, holds good only in cases where the majority put themselves under the guidance of bad leaders, and reject the advice of the persons best qualified to form a sound judgment. It is only when the public array themselves against the opinion of the fittest counsellors, that they are more likely to be wrong than right. § 3. We have already had occasion to advert to the old adage — ' Unicuique in sua arte credendum ' — as expressive of the doctrine tliat the competent few, and not the incompetent many, constitute the standard of authority. There is another proverb, equally handed down to us from antiquity — ' Ne sutor ultra crepidam ' ^ — which forms, as it were, the complement of the other. As the former teaches us to place confidence in the qualified few, in sub- jects within their own province, so the latter warns us not to rely party], graves et magni homines habebantur : sed valebant in senatu multum, apud bonos viros plurimum ; multitudini jucundi non erant : suffragiis oflFendebatur ssepe eorum voluntas : plausitm vero etiamsi quis eorum aliquando acceperat, ne quid peccasset, pertimescehat. Attamen, si qua res erat major, idem ille populus horum auctoritate maxime commovebatur.' — Pro Sextio, c. 49. Plutarch, De Lib. Educ. c. 9, advises that youths should not be allowed to listen to popular speeches or discourses at the public festivals : tJ» yap roh -noXKols apetTKeiv, Tots / N. and N. I. 1, §§ 13, 14. Compare Note D. at the end of the chapter. ^ Ancient writers, both sacred and profane, concur in recommending plurality of counsellors. Thus, Proverbs, XI. 14 : 'In the multitude of counsellors there is safety.' XVI. 22 : ' Without counsel, purposes are disappointed ; but in the multitude of counsellors they are established.' So Apollon. Rhod. IV. 1336: iroXewv hi re firjris apelwv. Pliny the Younger says, in reference to the influence of an assembly upon the speaker who addresses it : ' In numero ipso est quoddam magnum collatumque con- silium; quibiisque singulis judicii parum, omnibus plurimum.' — Epist. VII, 17, § 10. Compare, however, the remarks above, in ch. 6, § 8. * ' Things will have their first or second agitation : if they be not tossed upon the arguments of counsel, they will be tossed upon the waves of fortune, and be full of in- constancy, doing and undoing, like the reeling of a drunken man,' — Bacon's Essay on Counsel. 'Rov\7)v &Travros trpayiiaros irpoXdfxfiape, is a verse attributed to Menander, Sentent, Sing. v. 70. Deliberandum est diu, quod statuendum est semel, — Deliberare utilia, mora tutissima est, are two proverbial verses of Publius Syrus, v. 166-7- But all such maxims as these must be taken with the limitation, that the deliberation ought to be long and full, where the case admits of delay, and there is no need of prompt action, as in military aflfairs. No one would call a council to deliberate what was to be done to save a burn- ing house or a sinking ship. VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 137 uninformed, and incautious judgments, founded upon partial data. ' We are all (says Locke) short-sighted, and very often see but one side of the matter ; our views are not extended to all that has a connection with it. From this defect I think no man is free. We see but in part, and we know but in part, and therefore it is no wonder we conclude not right from our partial views. This might instruct the proudest esteemer of his own parts how useful it is to talk and consult with others, even such as come short of him in capacity, quickness, and penetration ; for since no one sees all, and we generally have different prospects of the same thing, according to our different, as I may say, positions to it ; it is not inconsistent to think, nor beneath any man to try, whether another may not have notions of things which have escaped him, and which his reason would make use of if they came into his mind.' ^ Hence, when a plan, prepared by one or two persons, is submitted to a consultative body for discussion, the advantage of a number of counsellors is particularly seen, in the amendment of details, in the removal of partial blemishes, and the improvement of subor- dinate parts. Here numbers do not confuse, if the unity of the original plan is preserved.'^ The number of counsellors also pre- vents the decision from being determined by the caprices, and the personal friendships or dislikes, of an individual. With respect to an executive body it is likewise often important, that delibera* tions respecting the application to practice of any general enact- ment should be assisted by that knowledge of public feeling and expectation on the subject, and of the circumstances of different lo- calities, which is afforded by a plurality of counsellors.^ The deci- sions of an executive body may, therefore, be expected to carry more weight, to command more respect, and to be more in accordance * On the Conduct of the Understanding^ § 3. ^ * Eeason is of two parts, invention and judgment : — Judgment is most perfect in an assembly. Invention is most perfect in one man. In one man, judgment wants the strength which is in a multitude of counsellors. In a multitude of counsellors, invention is none at all.' Harrington's Political Aphorisms, Nos. 111-17, p. 522. ^ ' And though it were confessed that reason would be better discovered and stated, and conclusions easier made, by a few than by a greater number, yet when the execu- tion depends on the many, and the general interpretation so much depends on the success, and the success on the interpretation, we see those counsels most prosperous, whereof the considerations and deliberations have been measured by that standard which is most publicly acknowledged and received.' — Clarendon, Hist, of Reb. b. VII. vol. IV. p. 287, ed. 1 mo. r38 APPLICABILITY OF THE PKINCIPLE OP AUTHOEITY. [ch. with general sentiment, than those of a single functionary, and thus to meet with more ready obedience from the community. On the other hand, joint deliberation and consultation, and the process of reconciling discordant opinions by compromises and modifications of plans, lead to slowness, irresolution, vacillation, and inaction.^ Hence, in war, where rapidity of decision, and energy as well as unity of action, are indispensable for success, it is preferable to vest the chief command in a single person, and not in a plurality of generals.*^ Councils of war are proverbially said * Clarendon, Hist, of Beb. b. III. (vol. I. p. 319), after dwelling on the too great facility in admitting persons into the king's privy council, proceeds thus : — * By this means the number hath been increased, which in itself breeds great inconveniences, since a less number are fitter both for counsel and despatcli in matters of the greatest moment, that depend upon a quick execution, than a greater number of men equally honest and wise ; and for that and other reasons of unaptness and incompetency, com- mittees of dexterous men have been appointed out of the table to do the business of the table. . . . And though it hath been, and will be, always necessary to admit to those counsels some men of great power, who will not take the pains to have great parts, yet the number of the whole should not be too great, and the capacities and qualities of the most should be fit for business— that is, either for judgment and despatch, or for one of them at least — and integrity above all.' Hence the proverb : ' Deliberando ssepe perit occasio.' — Publ. Syrus, v. 165. A person is sometimes admitted into a consultative body, in order to neutralise his opposition, by advising with him in the first instance. A character such as that de- scribed by Tacitus is, unfortunately, not very uncommon : ' Consilii quamvis egregii, quod non ipse adferret, inimicus, et adversus peritos pervicax.' — Hist. I. 26. ^ Accordingly, Homer, who looked on a king chiefly as a commander in war, says : — ovK ayadhy iroXvKoipaviT] ' eTs Koipauos ecrru, eh fiaa-iXets. Iliad, II. 204. Compare the advice of Ilermocrates to the Syracusans concerning their fifteen generals, Thucyd. VI. 72, and the proverbial verse : — TtoWail (TTparriyol Kapiau kiruX^ffav. DiOGENIAN. VII. 72. In the year 309 tt.c, the consuls, T, Quinctius and Agrippa Purius, being sent on an expedition against the iEqui, the latter consented that the entire command should be entrusted to his colleague. Livy, describing this event, says : * In exercitu Komano quum duo consules essent potestate pari ; quod saluberrimiim in administratione mag- narum rerum est, summa imperii, concedente Agrippa, penes collegam erat.' — III. 70. Again, in 329 tj.c, three tribunes, with consular power, were sent against the Fiden- ates and Veientines, and their dissensions caused the expedition to fail, on which Livy remarks: ' Tres, delectu habito, profecti sunt Veios, documentoque fuere, quam plurium imperium bello inutile esset. Tendendo ad sua quisque consilia, quum aliud alii videretur, aperuerunt ad occasion em locum hosti.' — IV. 31. See the comment of Machiavelli, Disc. III. 15, upon these passages. He concludes thus : 'II che e contra- rio a quello che oggi fanno queste nostre repubbliche e principi, di mandare ne'luoghi, per ministrarli meglio, piu d'un commissario e piii d'un capo, il che fa una inestimabile VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 139 never to fight. ^ The same reason applies, indeed, to the entire organisation of the military and naval services, from the highest to the lowest. It is to be borne in mind, that unity of command does not exclude voluntary consultation with others. A military commander, having an undivided power, is not, indeed, encumbered with field deputies, whose consent he must obtain — or a council, in which the voices of others are equal to his own ; but there is nothing to prevent him from gathering the opinions of others, or asking advice from those competent to give it.^ From these few remarks, it will be seen that the governments of civilised nations act wisely in intrusting judicial and adminis- trative powers, sometimes to one person, and sometimes to a body of several persons, according to the nature of the functions to be performed. § 4. The advantages arising from a plurality of members, in- dicated above, exist also with respect to a legislative body ; but in this case there is another important reason for the adoption of the corporate constitution. Unless a Dictator, voluntarily chosen by confusione. E se si cercasse la cagione della rovina de li eserciti Italian! e Francesi ne'nostri tempi, si troverebbe la potissima cagioue essere stata qiiesta.' Compare also the rcmai'ks of Mr. Macaulay, Hist, of England, vol. I. p. 542, who refers to the well- known example of the Dutch deputies. Livy, in comparing the Roman captains with Alexander the Oreat, points out, among the disadvantages to which the former were subject, the short period of their command, and their liability to have their plans hindered by the incapacity or ill will of a colleague. * At, hercule (he continues) reges non liberi solum impedimentis omnibus, sed domini rerum temporumque, trahunt con- siliis cuncta, non sequuntur.' — IX. 1 8. The unity of command in war is at its maximum, when the general is not only unincumbered with a colleague or a council, but is also the sovereign of the country, and therefore receives no instructions from home. Now this state of things, as in the cases of Frederic the Great and Napoleon, is the most favourable for military siiccess. ' In the earliest, as well as, perhaps, the most interesting council of war which is on record — viz., that held before the battle of Marathon, the decision was carried in favour of fighting (as was stated in a previous note) only by the casting vote of the Polemarch Archon. Clive called a council of war before the battle of Plassy, which decided by a majority of thirteen to seven against fighting. Clive, however, disregarded the de- cision of the council, in which he had himself concurred, and commenced the action. On this occasion Orme remarks : ' It is very rare that a council of war decides for battle ; for as the commander never consults his officers in this authentic form but when great difficulties are to be surmounted, the general communication increases tlie sense of risk and danger, which every one brings with him to the consul- tation.' — Hist, of Hind. vol. II. p. 171. See Thornton's Hist, of the Brit. Empire in India, vol. I. pp. 235, 281. ^ Quid fieri debeat tractato cum multis : quid vero facturus sis, cum paucissimis ac fidelissimis, vel potius ipse tecum. — Vegetius de Be Mil. III. c. 26, who includes this rule among the general maxims of war. - 140 APPLICABILITY OF THE PEINCIPLE OF AUTHOKITY [ch. the people, is to be considered a popular form of government,^ without a corporate action of the supreme legislature, a popular constitution cannot exist. Whatever advantages, therefore, belong to a popular or non-despotic form of government, whether aristo- cratic or democratic, they can only be obtained by vesting the V supreme power in a body of persons. Without this arrangement, no government except a pure monarchy or despotism can exist. Supreme political bodies have, even in ancient times, generally delegated to single functionaries, or to small boards or tribunals, the chief part of their executive powers ; so that the only part of their power which they exercise constantly is their legislative power. y Now, in general, the necessity for imTnediate action does not exist » with respect to the making of laws ; and therefore a legislative body possesses the advantages of consultation which arise from a number of counsellors, without the disadvantage of hindering prompt and decisive action, which springs from the same cause. It may be added, that a sovereign body generally delegates to subordinate officers the power of making subsidiary laws, the nearest to practice, in which delay is most inconvenient, and which require the most frequent alterations.^ § 5. Now, whenever any deliberative political body, or col- legium, exists, whether its functions be legislative, judicial, or administrative, there arises a necessity of determining the manner in which its decisions are to be formed ; that is to say, whether ' See Grote, Hist, of Greece, vol. III. p. 130. In the Greek republics, such a dictator was called an alavfivfjrrjs. alperr] rvpavvis. — Aristot. Pol. III. 9, 10 ; of. IV. 8. 2 ' La difference qu'il y a entre la monarchic et les deux autres formes de gou- vernement, et qui rend la jpremiere beaucoup plus commode que les dernieres, c'est que> dans les democracies et dans les aristocracies, il faut qu'il y ait certains lieux regies* pour pouvoir deliberer et faire des ordonnances, c'est a dire, pour exercer actuellement I'autorite souveraine : au lieu que dans une monarchie, du moins lorsqu'elle est absolue, le souverain peut deliberer et donner ses ordres en tout temps et en tout lieu, de sorte que, comme le disoit un ancien, "Kome estpartout ou se trouve I'Empereur." En effet le peuple, et les s^nateurs, n'etant qu'un corps moral, ne peurent agir sans s'assembler. Au lieu que le monarque est une seule personne physique et individuelle ; et par con- sequent il a toujours un pouvoir prochain, d'exercer les actes de la souverainete,' — PuFFENDOEF, Droit de la Nature et des Gens, VII. 5, § 9 ; trad, de Barbeyrac. If this argument held good, the superiority of a purely monarchical to a popular form of government would be unquestionable. But the difficulty here indicated is, in limited monarchies and republics, obviated by a delegation of the executive power to single functionaries, the only power which requires to be exercised on a sudden. In general, no serious inconvenience arises from the necessity of convening an assembly ior the exercise of the legislative sovereignty. Even these rare exceptional cases are provided for in modern free constitutions. VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 141 the concurrence of all, or only of a portion, of the members, and if so, of what portion shall be required. § 6. In the case of a court of justice, or an administrative board, consisting of a small number of persons, it may be some- times possible to render unanimity necessary to its decisions. Trial by jury, as organised in England and the United States, affords an example of an unanimous decision by a judicial body of twelve persons; and a large part of the civil and criminal juris- diction of these countries is founded on this antique institution. It gives rise in practice to many inconvenient results, such as un- meaning compromises, tossing up for verdicts, the necessity of urging the jury to a decision by debarring them from food while they are in consultation ; but it has been found consistent with a regular, if not a very intelligent, administration of justice. In other countries, where trial by jury has been long practised or re- cently introduced, the rule of unanimity has not been followed, and the verdict of a simple majority, or some other proportion, of the jury has been received. According to the law of Scotland, the jury in criminal cases (except that of treason) consists of fifteen, and they decide by a simple majority. In Jersey and Guernsey the Eoyal Court, consisting of twelve jurats, also decides by a simple majority. In France, before the Eevolution of 1830, the jury, in criminal cases, consisting of twelve, decided in the same manner ; but, by an alteration made in 1831, a majority of two- thirds, or of eight to four, was required.^ The difficulty of obtaining an unanimous decision, even from small judicial and administrative bodies, is indeed so great, that (however desirable it might be to require unanimity) the almost universal rule is, that their decision is made by a simple majority. The necessity of unanimity in a small body, judicial or adminis- trative, does not, it may be observed, ensure a careful consideration, as the agreement may be the result of a blind reliance on the opinion of one or two of the members of the body, or it may be produced by a senseless compromise. Lord Campbell, in his Lives of the Chancellors^ says of Lord Eldon : ' I have heard him cite with great glee, a saying of Lord Thurlow— that the decrees of the Scotch judges were least to be respected when they were unanirrious, as in that case they probably, without thought, had followed the first of their number who had expressed an opinion ; » Code cCInstr, Crim. Art. 347. 142 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [ch. whereas, where they were divided, they might be expected to have paid some attention to the subject.' ^ § 7. In bodies belonging to, or composing, the supreme legis- lature, (such as the Ecclesia in the Grreek Kepublics, the Roman Senate, the Houses of Parliament in England, the Chambers in France, Belgium, &c., the various legislative bodies of the United States,) it has been the constant practice for the decision to be determined by a mere majority. The same rule likewise obtains in subordinate legislatures, as in colonial Houses of Assembly. In legislative assemblies, - as in judicial and administrative bodies, it would doubtless be desirable to obtain the concurrence of all the members to the decision. In many simple questions, and in which the feelings or interests of the members of the body are not involved, this unanimity is practicable, and often occurs. But in other questions, and those the most important, irreconcile- able differences of opinion always prevail among the members of such an assembly, aild unanimity of decision is therefore im- possible. To require unanimity for the acts of such a body, would be to renew the evils of the Tribunitian power of Rome, or the Liberum Veto of the Polish Diet ; ^ it would place the assembly at the mercy of any perverse, factious, or corrupt person, who hap- pened to be one of its members — as he might, by his single voice, arrest its action and paralyse all its proceedings. Entire unanimity, therefore, is plainly inconsistent with the habitual working of such a body ; and so great are the difficulties of obtaining the concur- rence of a large body of men, to a uniform plan of political man- agement, or even to a complex legislative measure, amidst the distractions and disturbances caused by the alternations of popular feeling, that it has been found inexpedient to require the consent of more than a majority in supreme legislative bodies, and the practice of deciding by a plurality of votes has met with universal acquiescence. It seems scarcely necessary to prove that, if the decision is not to be unanimous — if the concurrence of all the members of the body is not required — it must be made by a majority, and not by a minority, however determined. If a minority could prevail over the majority, those who were in favour of a proposition would vote ' Vol. Vn. p. 665. ' Concerning the Liberum Veto, see Lord Brougham's Political Philosophy, vol. II. p. 81. The United Provinces, on qiiestions of great importance, also admitted this mode of voting. See Barbeyrac's note on PulFendorf, VII. 2, § 15. VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 143 against it, or would abstain from voting, in order to insure a mi- nority to their side of the question. Besides, there would be no inducement to discuss a question, if, by converting a person to your opinion, you did not strengthen your side in the division when the votes came to be counted. It would be unprofitable to pursue this argument further, as it is obvious that the hypothesis of the minority of a political body prevailing, by their votes, over the majority, leads to all sorts of practical absurdities. § 8. Whenever the mode of deciding by a majority of votes obtains, whether it be a legislative assembly, a court of justice, or an administrative board, the opinion of the greater number of the members of the body, properly ascertained and authenticated, acquires the legal effect and power of the opinion of the entire number. ' This majority is, in general, any number greater than half the entire number: for example, 51 out of 100 votes. When the numbers on both sides are even, the president or chairman may have a casting vote,^ or the question may be lost,^ or (in the case of a judicial proceeding) the accused party maybe acquitted.^ Some- times a majority of two-thirds, or some number greater than a bare excess over a moiety, may be required.'' This has been the • A casting vote may mean either one of two things. It may mean that the presi- dent may give a second vote in case of equality ; or, that he may only give his one vote, in cases where, without his vote, the numbers are equal. Concerning a casting vote, see Eutherforth, ib. § 3. 2 The rule of the House of Lords, in case of equality of votes, is — • Semper prse- sumitur pro negante.' — Mat's Law of Parliament, p. 215. ' The rule that, where the votes were equal, the accused was acquitted, obtained both in the Athenian and Koman law. See JEsch. Eiim. 752-3; Eurip. El. 1268-9; Aristot. Problem. XXIX. 13 ; Dig. 42, t. I. 1. 38. Numerous reasons for this humane regulation are assigned by Aristotle, ibid. Also, Senec. Epist. 81, § 25. * Ecus sen- tentiis paribus absolvitur, et semper quicquid dubium est, humanitas inclinat in melius.' Compare Grotius, ib.% 18; Puffendorf, VII. 2, § 17 ; Eutherforth, ib. § 3. The Athe- nian legend supposed the last white ball, in the trial of Orestes by the court of Areopagus, to have been placed in the urn by Minerva, which vote rendered the num- bers equal, and thus Orestes was acquitted. As this vote decided the question, the r^rjcpos 'Adrjvas, or calculus Minervse, came to mean a casting vote generally. See Die Cassius, LI. 19. I cannot accede to the interpretation of Otfried Miiller, in his Dis- sertation on the Eumetiides, § 73, who supposes that the votes of the Areopagites are equal, and that Minerva gives the thirteenth vote. According to this view, Orestes would have been already acquitted before she gave her vote, and the all-important calculus Minervse would have decided nothing. The rule of acquittal by equality of votes is evidently understood to be in existence at the trial of Orestes ; and the de- cisive or casting vote was called the vote of Minerva by the Athenians, on account of her supposed decision on this celebrated occasion. « Grotius, ib. § 20. 144 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [ch. rule of voting in some confederations of States,* where, on account of the imperfect fusion of the members, the minority is unwilling to be bound by the act of tbe mere majority. According to the canon law, the pope is elected by the votes of two-thirds of the cardinals.2 A similar majority was required, in certain cases, for the votes of the Athenian judges, and is sometimes rendered neces- sary by our law in the voting of municipal bodies. In the con- stitution of the United States, this rule of voting occurs several times. Thus, a member of either house of congress may be ex- pelled by the votes of two-thirds of the members ; a bill which has been rejected by the president becomes a law, if it is passed, on re-consideration, by two-thirds of each house ; the president can make treaties with the consent of two-thirds of the senators present ; when two-thirds of both houses concur, a convention for making amendments in the constitution may be called, and these amendments may be made by three-fourths of the States. In reckoning the majority, the body may be considered as con- sisting of its en^^?"^ number of members, as the English grand jury, which is properly composed of twenty-three members, and, there- fore, a verdict of less than twelve cannot be received. Or it may be considered as consisting only of the members voting on tlie particular question. The latter is the ordinary rule ; but, in this case, a minimum number, or quorum, whose presence is necessary, is established.^ Thus it may be laid down that, in the case of a division, one-half, or some other proportion of the entire body, must be present and voting. According to the Eoman law, the act of a majority of a collegium was only valid when two-thirds of the entire body were present.'' In the English House of Commons, there must be at least forty members voting in a division. Moreover, the votes of the members actually present at the meeting of the body may alone be received, or absent members may be allowed to signify their vote in writing, or to vote by proxy, as in the House of Lords.® * For example, the G-erman and Swiss. 2 Walter's KirchenrecM, § 228. ' As to the reasons for establishing a quorum, see Story s Commentaries on the Constitution of the U. 8. vol. II. §§832-3. * Dig. III. 4, § 3 ; Cod. X. 32, § 46. According to the common law of England, the act of the major part of a corporation is esteemed the act of the whole 1 Blackst. Com. p. 478 ; and by 33 Hen. VIII. c. 27, the act of the * more part' of every college or other corporation is valid, notwithstanding that the local statutes may have given power to a single member to prevent such act. * Concerning the votes of absent members, see Grotius, ib. § 20 ; Rutherforth, ib. § 5. vn.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 145 § 9. Decision by a majority places all the members of the body upon the same footing, and gives an equal value to the opinion of each. It makes no distinction between them as to competency, but allows the same weight to the vote of the persons most able,j and of those least able to form a correct judgment upon the ques- tion to be decided. It therefore proceeds upon a principle directb opposed to the principle adopted voluntarily by those who are not] restrained by legal - rules — in guiding their practical conduct by the opinions of others, they look not to numbers, but to special fitness.' The necessity, however, of having recourse to this principle arises from the nature of political government, and the expediency of a coercive supreme power which it implies. Whenever the ultimate decision is vested in a body, there is, by the supposition, no ulterior authority which can, in case of difference of opinion, determine who are competent judges and who are not. There is, therefore, no other alternative than to count the numbers, and to abide by the opinion 'of the majority. The contrivance may be rude, but it is the least bad which can be devised.^ A decision by the majority of a political body is, in some re- spects, analogous to a battle between the armies of two indepen- dent nations. It settles a question which must be settled, and which cannot be settled in any other manner. The one is an appeal to physical force — the other is an appeal to moral force ; it ' Auacliarsis is reported to have expressed his wonder that, in the legislative assemblies of the Greeks, the wise spoke and the ignorant decided. — Plutarch, Solon, c. 5. Referring to a decision of the Roman senate, of which he did not approve, Pliny the Younger says : ' Sed hoc pluribus visum est. Numerantur enim sententise, non ponderantur : nee aliud in publico consilio potest fieri : in quo nihil est tam insequale quam aequalitas ipsa. Nam quum sit impar prudentia, par omnium jus est.' — Epist. II. 12. Cicero lays it down, not with reference to votes, that citizens must be weighed, and not counted. ' In dissensione civili, quum boni plus quam multi valent, expendendos cives, non numerandos puto.' — Be Bep. VI. 4. There is no reason for limiting this remark to times of civil war. Bodinue is of opinion, that the principle of decision by a majority is incurably de- fective. Arguing against the probability that the voices of the better citizens will predominate, either in an aristocracy or a democracy, he says : ' Utrumque imperio inutile est, propterea quod in omni coetu ae universitate, seu optimatum, seu populi totius, suffragia non ad pondus exiguntur, sed ad numerum ; ac optimorum bona pars semper a deteriore superatur : quo fit ut optimorum paucitas in magn4 multitudine, perinde ut salis scriptulus in lacu, nullam vim oxserere possit.' — De Bep. VI. 4, (p. 1103.) 2 See Note E at the end of the chapter. L 146 APPLICABILITY OF THE PEINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [ch. is the right of the stronger reduced to a legal expression. This view is implied in the verses of Prudentius, quoted by Grotius : Infirma minoris Vox cedat numeri, parvaque in parte silescat. Contra Symmach. I. 606-7. Nobody, however, supposes that such a decision does more tlian determine the legal question ; nobody imagines that it concludes - the moral question of what ought to have been the decision, more "^ than a battle decides the question as to the righteousness of the cause of the victorious army : * it hardly raises a presumption in favour of the winning side. No historian, in discussing the justice or propriety of any decision of a legislative body, or of a court of justice, thinks of defending the decision of the majority ^ by saying that it luas the decision of the majority. Hence, too, in the management of a popular assembly, there is a tactic which is beyond the mere argumentative defence or attack of a legislative measure, or course of policy. There is a skill analogous to that of the military commander ; and there is a triumph in success, which is not always dependent on the mere goodness of the cause. The same remark applies, though in a minor degree, to the arguments of advocates addressed to a judicial tribunal deciding by plurality of votes. A supreme political authority might, after having referred a question to several persons, be guided by the opinion of the most competent judges among them, disregarding the preponderance of numbers. In like manner, a court of appeal would natiu-ally be influenced in its decision by the character of the judges in the inferior court, and not merely by their number^ in case those judges were divided in opinion. But this discrimination is only possible, because these are subordinate and not supreme bodies.^ * ' Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil,' {Exod. xxiii. 2,) is an ancient maxim, which has never been disputed, however often it has been violated. * E faut faire comme les autres : maxime suspecte, qui signifie presque toujoiirs, ilfaut tnal faire, d^s qu'on I'etend au-delade ces choses purement 6xt6rieures quin'ont point de suite, qui dependent de I'usage, de la mode, ou des bienseances.' — La*Bruykre, Caracteres, ch. 12. The verse of Juvenal, (II. 46) — ' Defendit numertis, junctseque urabone phalanges ' — is the expression of the fact, not its justification. 2 It has been remarked, above, that the Pope is elected by two-thirds of the con- clave of cardinals. The canon law, however, adds that this rule does not apply to other churches, where the opinion, not only of the majority, but of those whose judg- ment is the soundest, is to prevail. Puffdndorf, Law of K and N. VII. 2, § 16, vii] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 147 § 10. The necessity of decision by a majority in a political body,^ whether its power be legislative, judicial, or admini strati ve^ is a defect inherent in the nature of corporate action. There is, indeed, no infallible security for the right decision of practical^ questions in politics, as in other matters. Unfortunately the judg- ment of the wisest counsellors is very far from infallible.^ But the decision of competent judges is less likely to be erroneous than that of incompetent ones ; and if any means of discriminating between them could exist, it would undoubtedly be desirable that the decision should be confined to those who are most able to form a sound opinion. § 11. There are, however, several circumstances, both in legis- lative and executive bodies, which, in spite of the principle just mentioned, tend to guide the body to a right decision, and to give a considerable degree of weight to the opinions of the more com- petent judges. First, in com'ts of justice, consisting of several judges, and in administrative bodies, joint consultation necessarily exists ; by which means the opinions of the ablest, the most experienced, and best informed members, will naturally be brought before the entire body, and will in general produce their effect in gaining the assent of the other members. In any tolerably numerous executive body, however composed, the persons of sound practical judgment, combined with the appropriate knowledge and experience, may be always expected to be in a minority ; but their opinion is likely to be voluntarily adopted by the majority. Moreover, the members of a judicial or administrative body generally divide the business among one another, according to their respective qualifications ; properly remarks, that this rule is only possible in cases where there is a superior to decide who are the persons having the soundest judgment. Walter, Kirchenrecht, § 226, stc^4:es that it is nolonier observed, as it would lead to interminable discussions. ' The remarks in the text are limited to political bodies ; but they apply equally to councils, synods, and other ecclesiastical bodies having the ultimate decision of questions of religious doctrine. Whatever claim they might make to a supernatural guidance, their decision has, in fact, been determined by the numerical majority of votes. See, on this subject, the dictum of Selden, in his Tahle-talJc, Art. Council. They apply likewise to voluntary societies — of a priA^ate nature — exercising for them- selves the power of decision, 2 ' Quanto sieno false molte volte le opinioni de li uomini, I'hanno visto e veggono coloro che si trovano testimoni delle loro deliberazioni, le quali molte volte se non sono deliberate da uomini eccellenti, sono contrarie ad ogni verita.' — Mach. Disc. II. 22. Bayle, CEuvres, t. III. p. 205, also has a passage on the erroneous decisions of popular assemblies, and remarks that the liability to err is not confined to those of antiquity, L 2 148 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OP AUTHORITY [ch. SO that each person is principally occupied about those questions with which he is most conversant.^ Secondly: wherever the members of courts of justice and ad- ministrative bodies are selected by the government, in a civilised State, the selection is made under circumstances which insure a considerable degree of fitness on the part of the person appointed. The choice, even in the European countries under a despotic government, is influenced by a sense of responsibility to public opinion, and often by a sincere desire to appoint a fit person, even if it is merely for the sake of facilitating the operations of the governing power. In many cases, too, the choice of the govern- ment is practically limited to persons having the requisite pro- fessional qualifications — as in the appointment of members of military or naval boards, or of courts of justice. Although the person appointed may not be absolutely the best whom the pro- fession might have supplied, yet he has the special qualifications suited to the office. Consequently, in an executive body, the number of persons qualified to form a correct opinion upon the questions submitted to it may be expected to be a large proportion of the whole — the quantity of dross, as compared with that of the purer metal, is likely to be small. § 12. In a supreme legislative body, the decisions are always preceded by joint consultation and debate ; and therefore (as in executive bodies) the opinions of the ablest and wisest members, particularly if they possess the gift of eloquence, or even of per- spicuous and forcible statement, are likely to influence the rest of the assembly. Hence, although each question is decided by the votes of the majority, the votes of the majority are generally de- termined by the opinions of the minority.^ The manner in which the opinions of the majority of a numer- ous legislative assembly are influenced by the opinions of the minority, depends upon its constitution and character. In the ' This is analogous to the reference, in a legislative assembly, of certain questions to select committees ; of which more will be said lower down, - Laplace, Essai Philosophique sur les Frohabilites, p. 158, ed. 5, admits that the probability of the decisions of an assembly cannot be subjected to calculation ; but he lays it down, as a general maxim, that if the question is of such a nature that it is more than an even chance that each member of the assembly will form an'erroneous opinion upon it, then the decision of the assembly will probably be wrong. Hence he concludes that numerous assemblies ought to decide only upon questions which are ■within the comprehension of the multitude. This reasoning entirely overlooks the fact, that members of an assembly who do not understand a subject may place them- selves under the guidance of persons on whose judgment they may safely rely. vii.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIEP. 149 assemblies of the ancient republics, which consisted of the entire body of citizens, the attendance was uncertain and infrequent, the numbers were large, and no system of political party could be or- ganised amongst the persons who met for the occasion. In Athens, and the Greek democracies generally^ the popular assembly was for the most part guided by some powerful leader and orator, whose influence was sometimes beneficial and sometimes mischiev- ous, but who swayed the judgment of the people by his counsels, and gave a practical effect to the principle of authority. At Eome, the great party leaders — by their military successes, their enor- mous wealth, and consequent means of acquiring popularity — were able to enlist numerous adherents to their cause, and to determine the elections of magistrates and the vote of the popular assembly, but their following was purely personal — the attachment was to Svlla, or Marius, or Caesar, or Pompey, and not to any public cause ; and the system was essentially unlike the party organisation of modern States.* The same was also the case, to a great extent, with the parties in the Italian republics. Although the Gruel fs and Grhibellines, the Bianchi and Neri, &c., professed to have a principle, in a short time they had only a name ; and the party divisions were mere struggles for political power under rival leaders. In the legislative assemblies of modern States, the system of/ political party is organised in such a manner, as to afford a more effectual assistance to the disposition of the majority, to defer to the opinions of the most competent judges within its own circle. Unlike the nmnerous and fluctuating assemblies of citizens in the ancient republics, a representative assembly consists of a limited and comparatively small number of persons — whose attend- ance is more or less regular, and who thus acquire a sort of pro- fessional acquaintance with the business and forms of legislation. They are thus able to form themselves into parties and knots of members, who are in the habit of consulting and acting together ; they likewise become aware of each other's characters and capaci- ties ; and they are able to estimate fairly the weight due to the opinion of each upon the subject to which it relates. The' person whom each party select as their leader guides their proceedings ' Speaking of the popular assemblies of the Eomans, Cicero says : ' Concio, qua ex imperitissimis constat, tamen judicare solet quid intersit inter popularem, id est, assentatorem et levem civem, et inter constantem, severum, et gravem.' — De Aviic. c. 25. 150 APPLICABILITY OP THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [ch. by his advice, appears as their organ in the public deliberations, and generally determines their vote by his opinion. If the leaders of the several sections and parties in the assembly are well selected, the inconveniences arising from the naked operation of the nume- rical principle of decision are powerfully counteracted. The system of parties in a legislative body leads to preliminary and separate discussions among its members, out of the chamber, upon the questions to be discussed within it, and to a prior settle- ment of the course which each party is to take. This renders the assembled body less accessible to the influence of speeches delivered in its debates, and prevents it from being carried away by the sudden and vehement impulse of an impassioned appeal to its feel- ings. A greater ascendancy is thus secured to calm and prudent counsels than in the ancient republics —where the citizens generally came together without any fixed opinion, and were convinced by the speech of the most eloquent demagogue. To a great extent, however, the proceedings of every legislative assembly are influenced (particularly after the debate) by the public discussions of its members ; and, in proportion as the ablest, the wisest, and the most competent to guide its counsels, take a prominent part in its deliberations, the greater is the probability of its decisions being correct, and its policy consistent and steady. It may be observed that the effect of deliberations, in inducing the bulk of the assembly to adopt the opinions of its ablest and wisest members, is materially assisted by the publication of the debates, through reports in the daily newspapers. The arguments advanced on both sides of a question can thus be sifted and compared at leisure by the public, out of doors ; the chances of justice being done to a really sound and well-supported argument are increased ; the nature of factious and dishonest votes is more generally under- stood, sind the conduiet of those who resist good advice is better appreciated. Unquestionably, the success of a representative system of government has been materially facilitated by the in- vention of printing. Another check upon the majority of a deliberative assembly is derived from the forms of its propeedings. These forms are gener- ally so arranged, as to sei3ure to the n^inority the power of stating their objections both to the principle and details of every measure proposed for adoption by the assembly, and of retarding its pro- gress by adverse criticism, and the moving of amendments. The forms of the English House of Commons are aypwedly contrived vii.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 151 for the protection of minorities ; and they are so effectual for their purpose, as frequently to defeat the will of the great body of the House, and to enable a few members to resist, at least for a time, a measure desired by the majority. The precise nature of the regulations for conducting the business of a deliberative assembly is not here in question ; but it is important to observe, that the securing of due weight to the opinions of the minority, and a limitation of the immediate action >« of the majority, listening to no compromise, and proceeding straight to its end — is admitted to be a legitimate object of the forms of such a body. Even the permission sometimes given to members of a minority to enter protests, in an authentic form, against the decisions of the majority is, to some extent, a security against im- proper or hasty decisions. In general, however, (as we shall see presently,) it is desirable that, when the decision has once been made, no steps should be taken for weakening its effect, and that it be considered as the decision of the whole, and not merely of a part of the body. Another contrivance in the proceedings of a legislative assembly, for obviating the evils of decision by an uninformed majority, and '^ securing due weight to the opinion of a few competent judges, is . the reference of subjects to the deliberation and examination of i' select committees of its members. The members of the body se- lected for acting on such committees are naturally those who are best qualified, by their experience, knowledge, and mental capacity, to form a right judgment on the matter. The opinion of such a committee, although consisting only of a small fraction of the entire body, generally carries weight with the majority, in pro- portion as the credit of its members stands high for good sense and intelligence, and for peculiar qualifications in the given case ; and also according as they have investigated the subject with diligence and impartiality. A further support to the minority of a legislative body is afforded by the institution of a double chamber, or what some v writers have termed bicamerism.^ Whenever the majorities of both chambers are agreed on any question, this effect is not produced ; but if they happen to differ, the majority of one chamber may support the minority in the other. If this state of things was permanent, or even frequent, the legislative power ' See this subject fully discuBsed 'm Story's Commentaries on the Const, of the U, S. IkIIL e.8. 152 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [ch. would be paralysed, the constitution would not work, and a revo- lutionary struggle would be the consequence ; but if the differences between the two houses are not serious or frequent, and (when they occur) are terminated by amicable compromises, some pro- tection to a minority in one of the houses may for a time be afforded. From these considerations it results that, although the decision by a majority, both in executive and legislative bodies, is opposed to the principle which we generally follow for obtaining rectitude of judgment, where our course is free, and unfettered by legal rules, nevertheless it is necessary for seciu-ing the advantages of corporate action ; and that the evils flowing from the plan of counting votes, without reference to their intrinsic value, are counteracted and neutralised, to a great extent, not only by the forms of business contrived for the purpose of controlling the direct and simple action of the numerical principle, but also by the spon- taneous homage of the individual members of the body to the principle of authority. § 13. In all cases where the act of the majority of any political body is valid, it is highly desirable that the decision, when come to, should be considered as the act of the entire body ; that the comparative numbers of the majority and minority should not be adverted to as a ground for impugning the decision ; and that the law or other act should be obeyed without any question of its vahdity, on the ground of the smallness of the majority by which it may have been carried. Decision by a majority is a mode of cutting a knot which cannot be untied ; it is, therefore, on every account expedient that the knot should be cut effectually. For a similar reason, it is fitting that any section of a delibera- tive body, who may be unable to induce the majority to adopt their propositions, should acquiesce in its decisions, and should continue to attend its meetings, without seceding, on the ground that their advice is disregarded. In every popular assembly there is a minority which is unable to carry its views ; and if such mino- rities were to be discouraged by the rejection of their motions, and to withdraw from their duties, the ultimate success of their opin- ions could never take place, at least, not in consequence of their exertions. Unless a defeated minority is willing to act upon this principle, the unity of the body is weakened and impaired, and a disruption is produced, similar to that which took place in the VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 153 Roman State when the Plebs separated themselves from the rest of the citizens, and seceded to the Mons Sacer.^ § 14. It is likewise fitting that the members of a majority should bear in mind, that their assent to the propositions of the leaders of the assembly is voluntary ; that the advice whicli is tendered to them by members of their body is merely advice, which they can reject or adopt, as they think fit ; and that, when any measure has been sanctioned by the deliberate vote of the as- sembly, it becomes the act of the entire body, whoever may have been its author and proposer. Unless this principle is kept in view, there is a tendency, when any measure has proved unsuccess- ful, (either from its own defects, or from untoward circumstances, or from the unskilfulness or neglect of the persons charged with its execution,) to throw the blame upon its originator, and to forget that it was deliberately approved and accepted by the entire body.^ § 15. It has been remarked above, that with respect to the ' At the congress of the Achaean League, in 198 b.c, when the proposal of an alli- ance with the Eomans was made, no one would speak. Aristsenus the prsetor, after urging them to deliver their opinions, concludes his exhortation thus : ' Ubi semel decretum erit, omnibus id, etiam quibus ante displicuerit, pro bono atque utili foedere defendendum.'— LivY, XXXII. 20. Compare Thirlwall, Hist, of Gr. vol. VIII. p. 301. In Polyb. V. 49, and Dion. Hal. A. E. XI. 56, there is likewise the expression of the same principle. Pliny states that, in the proceeding on a complaint of the Bithynians against Yarenus, their pro-consul, a question was decided in favour of Varenus by the senate, and was afterwards, on an appeal to the emperor, remitted by him to the senate for their re-consideration. "When the point was discussed on this re-hearing, most of the members who had voted against Varenus on the former occasion now voted for him ; alleging that they were bound by the act of the majority : — ' Sin- gulos enim, integra re, dissentire fas esse ; peracta, quod pluribus placuisset, cunctis tuendum.' — Epist. VI. 13. Mr. Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. IV. p. 478, remarks upon 'the admirable conduct of the five dissentient generals [at Marathon], when out-voted by the decision of the polemarch against them, in co-operating heartily for the success of a policy which they deprecated.' Story, Comm. on the Const, of the U. 8. § 833, also speaks of the ' baneful practice of secession.' ^ Xenophon, Sep. Ath. II. § 17, complains that, if any evil consequence results irom a measure agreed to by the people, they attribute it to the authors and advisers of the measure, who, they allege, persuaded them to it, contrary to their interest. Machiavel also remarks upon the tendency of the people to visit the failures caused by its own rash and foolish counsels upon the heads of its instruments. Disc. I. 53. He points out, in another place, the disposition of men to judge merely by the result, and the consequent danger of advising either a prince or a people ; for if the advice turns out ill, the blarne is imputed to the counsellor, even by those who voluntarily adopted it, having the power of rejection. Hence, he recommends every counsellor to give his advice with moderation and calmness, so that the people or prince who adopts it may seem to adopt it voluntarily, and not in consequence of the importunity of the adviser. —III. 35. 154 APPLICABILITY OF THE PKINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [ch. members of an Executive body, the mode of their selection offers a considerable security for their special fitness, and, consequently, for rectitude of decision by the majority. In cases, however, where the members of a supreme assembly are determined by the ^ choice of a popular constituency, the chances against a selection of fit persons are more numerous. The principle of decision by a majority is requisite, as well for the choice of a representative by a constituent body, as for the acts of an executive board or a legislative assembly. The same reasons apply in this case as in the case of smaller bodies, only with more force. Unanimity, in a body which may consist of several thousand persons, is plainly impossible ; decision by a majority is therefore necessary. But many of the securities for guiding the majority to a sound judgment, which exist in a legis- lative assembly, are here wanting ; joint deliberation is nearly im- possible, and the vote of each elector is frequently determined by accidental considerations, afiecting his individual position. The decision is accordingly formed by an imperfect process.^ * Cicero describes in strong terms the inconstancy of the people in the choice of magistrates, and the uncertainty of the event of an election in the comitia : * Non enim comitiis judicat semper popuhis, sed movetur plerumque gratia : cedit precibns : facit eos a quibus est maxime ambitus. Denique, si judicat, non delectu aliquo aut sapientia ducitur ad judicandum, sed impetu nonnunquam, et quadam etiam temeritate. Non est enim consilium in vulgo, non ratio, non discrimen, non diligentia: semperque sapientes ea, quae populus fecisset, ferenda, non semper laudanda duxerunt.' — Tro VlanciOy c. 4. Again, in the oration Vro Murena, c. 17, he dwells on the uncertain event of the popular choice: 'Quod enim fretum, quem euripum tot motus, tantas, tam varias habere putatis agitationes fluctuum ; quantas perturbationes et quantos sestus habet ratio comitiorum ? Dies intermissus unus, aut nox interposita, ssepe perturbat omnia ; et totam opinionera parva nonnunquam commutat aura rumoris, Ssepe etiam sine ulla aperta causa fit aliud atque existimamus, ut nonnunquam ita factum esse etiam popu- lus admiretur: quasi vero non ipse fecerit. Nihil est incertius vulgo, nihil obscurius voluntate hominum, nihil fallacius ratione tota comitiorum,' Compare also Seneca, de Vit. Beat. c. 1, cited above ; c. 6, § 3. ' Non ego ventosa jplehis sufFragia venor,' says Horace, Ep. I. 19, 37, who, in his first ode, speaks of the mobiles Quirites. Our word mob was abbreviated from the Latin, mohile vulgus, in the reign of Charles the Second, as we learn from North's Examcn. The expression seems to have been borrowed from the verse of Claudian: ' Mobile mutatur semper cum principe vulgus,' Be IV. Cons. Honor. 302, which certainly is a singular origin for a saying w^o\x jpoipular instability. For a curious illustration of the arts practised in canvassing a numerous con- stituency in ancient times, see the monitory tract Be Betitione Consulatus, addressed by Q. Cicero to his brother, when about to come forward as a candidate for the consul- ship. On the election of magistrates by the senate under the empire, see Pliny, Epist. in. 20. Mr. Macaulay says that the common people are constant to their favourites, but almost always choose them ill.— ^es^. of Engl. vol. I. p. 631. VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 155 The choice of a candidate by the majority of a popular con- stituency is thus subject to the same remark as the decision of a question by the majority of a popular assembly. It solves the practical problem, but leaves the question as to the real compara- tive merits of the candidates undecided. This imperfection is, however, inseparable from popular election, and it is counter- balanced by the advantages which result from the representation of apparent interests, and from the deference to the numerical principle in government. Moreover, in a popular constituency, the majority is practically influenced by the opinions and wishes of a minority, although this influence operates in a different manner from that in which a legislative assembly is acted upon. There is, again, another serious difficulty in the way of an en- lightened choice of representatives by a popular constituency, a difficulty, it may be observed, which extends to every mode of selection, and equally besets the choice of members of a house of peers by the Grown. The subjects which may be submitted to the decision of a supreme legislative assembly are unlimited, not only in number^ but also in kind. It has not, like an administrative board, a special department, but it exercises a general control over all the branches of the administration, and it superintends every function of the government. It is called on to decide questions involving relations with foreign states and dependencies, the management of the army and navy, the defences of the country, its trade, agricul- ture, and manufactures, its finances and currency, its religious and ecclesiastical concerns, the civil and criminal law, and the judicial procedure, the state of public health, the internal communications, and, in short, all the other interests of life. There is no depart- ment of knowledge which may not be put in requisition for guiding the decision of a legislative body. Consequently, no Special or professional training to fit a person to be a member of such an assembly is practicable ; and the choice of the popular constituency is not directed to any definite class or section of persons, or guided by any obvious and easily recognisable qualifications, such as those of a physician, a soldier, or an architect, in their respective lines.^ The possession of such varied and extensive knowledge and experience as would render a person competent to judge for him-- self upon all the questions which may be submitted to a legislative ' This subject is pursued further in ch. 8, § 2. y 156 APPLICABILITY OF THE PKINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [ch. assembly being impossible, the next best qualification is, general soundness of judgment and perspicacity of understanding. These will render a person least likely to err in the midst of the hetero- geneous multitude of practical questions, to the decision of which he may have to contribute. But the qualities just described are often not easily discerned, and, moreover, do not obtrude them- selves upon the public attention. Qualities of a more conspicuous and attractive character, particularly if accompanied with activity and energy, are likely to arrest the attention and obtain the favour of a popular constituency. Mere facility of elocution or impres- siveness of manner is likewise often mistaken for wisdom in counsel.^ A large aggregate of persons, acting together casually, and not forming a deliberative body, may likewise be captivated by earnest and often repeated, though insincere, professions of a regard for the public welfare, or their own peculiar interests.^ Notwithstanding these difficulties, the choice of fit representa- tives is, in itself, easier and less subject to error than the decision upon a long series of public measures ; and it must be admitted that a popular constituency is better qualified to discharge the former than the latter duty with success.^ Besides, there are cer- tain circumstances which tend to guide the choice of constituencies in the election of their representatives, and to induce them to give a preference to fit over unfit candidates. In the first place, no person who has not received a fair educa- ' Plato calls eloquence tpaivofiepr) (ro(pia. ' Bodinus, in his treatise De Bepuhlicd, maintJiius that the best and wisest men can never be chosen as rulers in any commonwealth. ' Quod si populum (he says) ad hsec ipsa virtutis suffragia cieri placeat, sui dissimiles, id est optimos, non seliget; sed quam maxime similes, id est, stultos, improbos, impudentes, cum boni ac sapientes viri, si modo sunt aliqui, minimum efficiant ubique civium numerum. Quid autem turpius, quam sapientium decus ad dignitatem pendere ab insipientium judicio dicam, an temeritate ? Demus tamen esse bonos aliquot ae sapientes in civitate viros, con- spectum certe fugient improborum ac desipientis multitudinis, nee si ad comitia venient, seipsos sapientes judicabunt.' — II. 6, (p. 340.) The experience of representative governments does not confirm these views. ' ' Le peuple est admirable pour choisir ceux a qui il doit confier quelque partie de son autorit^. II n'a a se determiner que par les choses qu'il ne pent ignorer, et des faits qui tombent sous les sens. . . Comme la plupart des citoyens, qui ont assez de suffisance pour elire, n'en ont pas assez pour etre elus ; de meme le peuple, qui a assez de capacite pour se faire rendre compte de la gestion des autres, u'est pas propre a gerer par lui-meme.'— Moxtesquietj, Esprit des Lois, 1. IL ch. 2. The broad dis- tinction is correctly taken in this passage ; but the facility of a choice of fit persons for a public trust is stated too strongly. See also a similar passage in 1. XL ch. 6 : ' II y avait un grand vice,' &c., where the superiority of the representative principle over the direct voting in the ancient republics is pointed out. VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 157 tion can, in the ordinary state of things, present himself as a candidate for the representation of a large popular body. The necessity of addressing the people, and of expounding his opinions orally, excludes any person who is unable, from defect of education or intelligence, to make such a statement as is suited to a tolerably critical audience. In the next place, the members of a legislative assembly, particularly of the more important ones, must make such sacrifices of time and money, as are scarcely compatible with the means of those who do not belong to the educated classes of society. Besides which, there is a disposition prevalent throughout a con- stituency, to select as their representatives persons who, from their social station, are distinguished from the mass, and are, on that account, better known and more conspicuous than persons of a humbler position in society.^ These safeguards for the discreet exercise of the power of selection by a popular constituency, may be expected to produce an assembly containing an amount of intelligence and wisdom beyond the average of the educated classes, in the country over which it presides. Besides, the variety of experience and inform- ation, which no one person can possess, is in some degree supplied by the presence in the assembly of members belonging to different professions and pursuits, and familiar with different branches of knowledge. In this manner, attention to each separate subject is insured, and some immediate professional advice. But it is to be borne in mind, that there is no security that the professional per- sons who become members of the assembly will be the most emin- ent in their respective professions ; and, after all, it will probably be necessary to consult professional men not members of the ' ' There is an unconquerable, and to a certain extent (in the present state of society at least) a beneficial proneness in man, to rely on the judgment and authority of those who are elevated above himself in rank and riches. From the irresistible associations of the human mind, a feeling of respect and deference is entertained for a superior in station, which enhances and exalts all his good qualities, gives more grace to his movements, more force to his expressions, more beauty to his thoughts, more wisdom to his opinions, more weight to his judgment, more excellence to his virtues. .... Hence the elevated men of society will always maintain an ascendancy, which, without any direct exertion of influence, will affect the result of popular elections ; and when to this are added, the capabilities which they possess, or ought to possess, from their superior intelligence, of impressing their own opinions on other classes, it will be seen that, if any sort of despotic control were justifiable, it would be superfluous for any good purpose.'— Batley's Bationale of Bepresent. Government, p. 269-70. It should not, however, be overlooked, that the feeling of deference to superior social rank (described in the above extract) is liable to be counteracted by a variety of political influences. 158 APPLICABILITY OF THE PEINCIPLE OF AUTHOEITY [ch. assembly. It may, moreover, happen, that a professional man of unsound judgment in an assembly, (particularly if he has a power of persuasive address,) may lead it to an erroneous decision, by in- ducing it to reject the advice of more competent judges, who, not being members of the assembly, cannot attend it in order to sup- port their own views. § 16. The objections to decision by a mere numerical majority, without reference to the competency or qualifications of the voter, have naturally presented themselves to politicians, both speculative and practical ; and various contrivances have been devised to modify and mitigate its operation, retaining, however, the corporate principle. One of these is the method of voting by composite units} Thus, when the Roman people were in Comitia Tributa, the votes of each tribe, which consisted of several thousand citizens, were taken separately, and the decision of the tribe was thus formed. The votes of the several tribes, considered as units, were then taken, and the ultimate decision depended on the majority of the tribes. Now, if some of the tribes were considerably smaller than others, and if the members of a particular order or section of the people were predominant in the small tribes, they would have a greater legal influence on the decision than the citizens included in the larger tribes. The influence of the Italians, when admitted to Roman citizenship by the Julian law, was at first neutralised by this contrivance. In the constitution of Servius, a similar result had been pro- duced by the distribution of the people into centuries : the cen- turies of the rich contained fewer persons than the centuries of the poor ; but the vote of each century (determined by a majority within its own body) reckoned as one. By this contrivance it was provided, (according to Cicero's expression), ' Ne plurimum vale- ant plurimi.' ^ The absolute numerical majority of the people did not prevail in counting the votes. A system of voting, founded upon the same principle, was adopted in some of the councils of the church. Inasmuch as the bishops from distant provinces did not attend a council in so large a number as those who came from the neighbouring provinces, a ' On this mode of voting, see Bodinus, De Eep. II. 7, p. 360. * Be Rep. 11. 22. Compere Livy, I. 43 : ' Non viritim suffragium eadem vi eodem- qne jiire promiscue omnibus datum est ; sed gradus facti, ut neque exclusus quisquara sufFragio videretur, et vis omnis penes primores civitatis esset.' fn^TiVEESIT VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BIDDIES. -ot-159^, v rule was established t!(iat the vote should be taken by nations — ^^^ that is to say, the bishops of each nation first decided the vote of the nation by a majority of voices ; and then the general decision was made by a majorii served at the councils y of nations. This mode of voting was ob- )f Constance and Basle. ' The votes of independent nations in a federal council have generally been regulatid in the same manner. Each nation has been taken as a unit, and has exercised one vote, whatever might be its power and importance as compared with others. In the Amphictyonic League, for example, the confederate States were all on an equality, so that Sparta and Athens had not more votes than the smallest town which was a member of the league.^ In the American confederation of 1781, each State was to be represented in Congress by not less than two nor more than seven members, but to have only one vote.^ But in the constitution which was ultimately adopted, a compromise between the national and federal principles was introduced. The members of the House of Representatives were determined by the population of each State ; but each State, whatever its size, returned two members to the senate. A similar principle has been established in the Facte Federal of the Swiss Cantons, as recently remodelled. The structure of the English House of Commons, and of other representative chambers, is partly arranged upon an analogous principle, in so far as each member is considered as exclusively representing his own constituents. For in apportioning the mem- bers to the several constituencies, a preference is given to certain classes of the people, or to certain parts of the country. § 17. Another contrivance for obviating the evils of a simple enumeration of the voters is the giving a plurality of votes to certain members of the body. This mode of voting was sometimes employed in the ancient Grreek republics ; and it is called by Aristotle the timocratic principle — that is, the government accord- ing to the j[^r)fxa, or assessment of property.'* Sometimes likewise, a » See Sarpi, 1. ii. c. 30. "- See Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. II. p. 325-6. ^ See Story's Commentaries, § 231. * See Eth, Nic. VIII. 12. Hermann, Pol. Ant. § 59, n. 8. Aristotle says that the democratic principle was, that the majority of all the citizens should decide ; the oligarchical principle, that the citizens having the largest valuation should decide. He proceeds to illustrate his meaning, as to the latter principle, thus : — There are ten rich and twenty poor ; six of the rich and five of the poor vote on one side ; four of 160 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [ch. federation of independent States was formed upon this principle. Thus, in a league between the city of Cibyra and three neighbour- ing towns, it was arranged that, whereas these latter had one vote each in the federal congress, the former should have two votes, on account of her furnishing a larger share of the federal army.^ The same was also the case with the league of twenty-three cities in Lycia, the largest of which had three votes ; those of middle size, two ; and the others, one — the contributions to the common federal treasury being in the same proportions.^ In modern times, like- wise, this principle of voting has been sometimes applied to a con- federation of States on account of their unequal importance : thus, in the Smalcaldic league, the electorate of Saxony had a double vote.^ In general, however, this principle has been confined to cases where the main purpose of the body is the administration of a common fund, and where the weight of each member is deter- mined by the amount of his contribution or share. Thus, in the poor-law of England, Scotland, and Ireland, this mode of voting has been established for the election of the managing body by the rate-payers, because the rate-payers are considered as interested in the management of a common fund for the relief of the poor. The same principle is recognised by our legislation for the election of managing bodies, in the case of town improvements and sanitary measures.'* The members of railway and other companies for pur- poses of public improvements likewise vote according to a property scale ; ^ and the same is the rule of voting for the Court of Pro- prietors of the East India Company. The equity of this arrangement for the administration of a joint stock is recognised by Grrotius,^ as well as by Dr. Eutherforth, who remarks, that ' The equity of the case seems to be on this side ; as it is equitable to allow each person a weight, in determining upon any question, proportionable to the interest which he has that the whole stock should be rightly managed. But (the same writer adds) the reason of the thing is on the other side ; since the rich and fifteen of the poor on the other ; then, if the valuations of each are added on both sides, that side is to prevail whose aggregate valuation is highest. — {PoL VI. 3.) » Strabo, yilll. ad fin- « Strabo, XIV. 3. » Grotius, note on Jus B. et P. 11. 5, 22. * See 10 and 11 Vic. c. 16, § 24. » See 8 and 9 Vic. c. 16, § 76. • J. B. ct P. II. 5, § 22. TH.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 161 there is no more likelihood that a man should judge rightly about the management of such stock because he has ten shares in it, than there would have been if he had been possessed of no more than one share.' ^ This last remark is often true, but it must be taken with many qualifications. For example, if two persons of equal wealth are joint contributors to a common fund, and if one contributes his entire fortune, while the share of the other is only a small part of his capital — it is manifest that the former has a stronger interest in a prudent and cautious management than the other ; for, if the entire fund was lost in some hazardous enterprise, the former would be deprived of his means of subsistence, whereas the loss of the latter would be inconsiderable in proportion to his means. Besides, the one can afford to forego all present income, and can postpone his returns to a distant period, whereas the other cannot. On the other hand, if the share of each person is sufficiently large to give him a strong interest in the proper management of the fund, there is no reason why he should not have an equal vote with those who have larger shares. The principle of the widow's mite seems equally applicable to the interest in a common fund. With regard to the distribution of political franchises and rights, the timocratic principle, so far as it rests upon the doctrine of a proportionate interest in a common object, cannot be admit- ted without large qualifications. All persons, whatever their amount of property, have in fact an equal interest in the well- being of the State, provided that interest be well understood. Nevertheless, the establishment of a property franchise, and the exclusion of all who do not possess it, is a virtual adoption of this principle. Suppose a body of a thousand persons, of whom four hundred possess a certain amount of property, and six hundred do not. According to the timocratic principle, each of the four hun- dred would have plural votes, and each of the six hundred would have one vote. But the same result is even more effectually at- tained, if each of the four hundred has one vote, and the others are not enfranchised. ' Institutes of Nattcral Lav, b. II. c. 1, § 4, (vol. II. p. 9.) Aristotle, Pol. III. 5, remarks, that this would be true if men formed a political society merely for the sake of property. But ho adds, that the end of a state is more extensive, and therefore the argument of the oligarchs in favour of timocracy is unsound. The principle of regulating the political franchises, exclusively by the amount of property, is examined at length in Bayley's Rationale of Political Representation, pp. 243-8. See also Lord Brougham's Pol. Phil vol. II. e. 10. M 162 APPLICABILITy OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHOEITY [ch. Owing to the importance of securing the rights of property, and the indistinct notions which exist on this subject among the working classes, a property qualification for political franchises has been found advisable in the European States having free constitu- tions. In the ancient democracies, this problem was to a great extent solved by the fact, that the working classes were slaves, and excluded, not only from political franchises, but from civil rights. § 18. It has been the main object of this chapter to show that, in the constitution of a Political Body, and in its mode of decision by a majorityof votes, the Principle of Numerical Equality among its members — which its constitution and mode of decision generally imply — is in practice counteracted and modified, to a great extent, by the Principle of Special Aptitude, which attributes a greater weight to the qualified few than to the unqualified many. It has been explained how, partly by subordinate legal regulations and rules of procedure and partly by voluntary arrangements on the part of the members of the body themselves, the direct and crude action of the one principle is neutralised and corrected by the other. It may, however, be objected, that any institution which is founded upon a conflict of opposite principles — whose predo- minant legal character tends in one direction, and whose practical working tends in another — labours under some inherent and in- curable defect. Why, it may be asked, do you first establish a principle, and then counteract it by another antagonist principle ? It would have been surely better, either not to establish the ori- ginal principle at all ; or, having established it, to give it free play, and encourage its full development. To this objection it may be answered, that, in moral and po- litical matters, nothing is more common, or more beneficial, than to establish a principle, on account of certain effects which it pro- duces, and, as far as regards these effects, to allow an unimpeded course to their action ; but with respect to other effects, which would, if permitted to arise without restraint, be productive of mischief, to try to neutralise and impede them by adverse and repressing influences. Upon this subject I may cite some judicious and discriminating remarks of Mr. Mill, in reference to the style of reasoning upon political questions which prevails among French writers and speakers. ' The common-places of politics in France, (he observes,) are large and sweeping practical maxims, from which, as ultimate premises, men reason downwards to particular VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 163 applications, and this they call being logical and consistent. For instance, they are perpetually arguing that such and such a measure ought to be adopted, because it is a consequence of the principle on which the form of government is founded — of the principle of legitimacy, or the principle of the sovereignty of the people. To which it may be answered, that if these be really practical principles, they must rest upon speculative grounds : the sovereignty of the people (for example) must be a right foundation for government, because a government thus constituted tends to produce certain beneficial effects. Inasmuch, however, as no government produces all possible beneficial effects, but all are at- tended with more or fewer inconveniences, and since these cannot be combated by means drawn from the very causes which produce them, it would be often a much stronger recommendation of some practical arrangement, that it does not follow from what is called the general principle of the government, than that- it does. Under a government of legitimacy, the presumption is far rather in favour of institutions of a popular origin — and in a democracy, in favour of arrangements tending to check the impetus of popular will. The line of argumentation so commonly mistaken in France for political philosophy tends to the practical conclusion, that we should exert our utmost efforts to aggravate, instead of alleviating, whatever are the characteristic imperfections of the system of institutions which we prefer, or under which we happen to live.' ^ An apt illustration of these remarks may be drawn from the Spartan State. The institutions and laws of Sparta were framed with a view of training the citizens into good soldiers, and of making the republic efficient for military purposes. Looking to the peculiar circumstances of Sparta, this policy might have been useful and commendable up to a certain point ; but a wise legisla- tor, having once established the principle, would have moderated its excesses by introducing institutions of a different tendency — instead of giving to the city of Sparta the character of a camp, of making its public education little more than a military drill, and of banishing literature and science, and all that tends to re- fine the taste and elevate the understanding ; which was the course actually pursued. The organisation of a modern army will serve as an additional illustration. It is the policy of a general to create among his ' System of Logic, vol. II. p. 618. M 2 164 APPLICABILITY OF THE PKINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY . [ch. soldiers a spirit of forward courage, and promptitude in attacking, harassing, and pursuing the enemy : on the other hand, it is neces- sary that this spirit should be controlled by an exact discipline, by a ready obedience to orders, and by a habit of unreasoning sub- mission to the will of the commander. It may be difficult to combine the courage of a hero with the regularity of a machine. Yet it is by the due admixture of these opposite qualities that the modern soldier is formed. Another striking exemplification of the same view is afforded by the institution of a poor-law : — The object of a poor-law is to relieve the various forms of destitution and want out of a fund created by compulsory taxation. Its principle is, to take the property of the wealthier classes, and to divide it among the poorer, upon the petition of the latter, and without obtaining from them any equivalent. Now, that the relief of severe distress is a legitimate object of public policy cannot be disputed ; it has, to a greater or less extent, and in one form or another, been recognised as such in all countries. The principle of a poor-law is, therefore, laudable and beneficial. But if this principle be carried beyond a certain limit ; if it be not carefully guarded by counteracting forces ; if precautions be not taken, with the ex- press intention of deterring applicants for the public bounty, and of keeping the numbers of the state-paupers within reasonable ""Dounds — a poor-law will become a system of legal spoliation, which will impoverish one part of the community in order to cor- rupt the remainder. In these, and many other cases, we set in motion a principle from which, while it is imder control, we derive signal advantage, but which, if it breaks loose, and follows its own tendencies un- checked, is highly dangerous ; of which we may say, as of fire, that it is a good servant, but a bad master. In the moral, as in the physical world, we perpetually act by the composition of forces ; and by repressing, governing, and guiding, an impetus which we have created. In almost all cases, the moral sentiments require to be impelled in a given direction, but to be restrained from pursuing that path beyond a certain point. They need, not simultaneously indeed, but at short intervals, both the spur and the bit. Courage must not be permitted to proceed as far as foolhardiness, or caution as far as timidity. Liberality must not degenerate into profusion, or frugality into parsimony. Firmness must not become obstinacy or churlishness, nor mildness and for- Ml.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 165 bearance become weakness. Even benevolence, though in itself it cannot be excessive, yet requires to be regulated by prudence and wisdom. It has, in fact, become a common-place of morality to say that extremes are to be avoided ; that moderation is virtue ; and that excesses are dangerous. There is scarcely any practical principle in politics or ethics, which (however good it may be in its general tendency, and when placed under proper regulation) may not be carried to a vicious excess. Sunt certi deniquo fines, Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum. In applying these remarks to the case of decision by a majority of votes, we may perceive that the principle of a body, invested with supreme political power, is attended with important advant- ages, and affords the best solution of the most difficult problem in government. For the action of such a body, decision by a major- ity, as a legal rule, is a necessary condition. Decision, however, by a majority is, as we have already seen, a very imperfect mode of arriving at a conclusion, and is, in general, opposed to the prin- ciple of judgment, which reason and usage equally prescribe. What, then, is the inference which a prudent politician, mindful of practical consequences, and regardless of an apparent logical consistency, will draw from these premises ? He will neither, on the one hand, rigorously follow out the principle of decision by a majority to all its most remote conclusions, and enforce them with inflexible consistency : nor, on the other, will he abandon the sys- tem of a political body, because it involves, as necessary to its working, a principle which, if logically developed, and fairly pur- sued to its ultimate results, would lead to practical inconveniences. But, having secured the establishmient of a political body on account of its important advantages, and, as a necessary condition for the action of such a body, recognised the principle of decision by a majority, he will seek to regulate and temper that principle ; he will encourage its good and mitigate its evil tendencies, and counteract the latter by subordinate influences and checks, derived from the adverse principle of special aptitude. Having recognised, as a rule of law, the principle of perfect numerical equality in the members of the body, and given the legal ascendency to the simple majority of votes, he will modify the practical operation of that principle by the principle of authority, and of the moral superior- ity of the most competent judges. y 166 APPLICABILITY OF THE PKINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [cii. NOTES TO CHAPTER VII. Note A. (page 133.) A coFiirsELLOR of King David is mentioned in 1 Sam. xxiii. 23, and counsellors of King Nebuchadnezzar in Dan. iii. 27 ; but such counsellors are meant as Histieeus was of Darius, (Herod. V. 24,) and not members of a council of state, having defined powers, and forming a constitutional check upon the royal omnipotence. The Persian king might sometimes summon mere consultative coimcils, par- ticularly on such an occasion as that described by Herod. VIII. 67-9, when a council of war was held before the battle of Salamis : it was, however, imder- stood that, even at such a crisis as this, the person who gave advice contrary to the supposed wishes of the king, gave it at the risk of his life. The debate of the seven Persian conspirators about the best form of government, and its de- cision in favour of monarchy, against aristocracy and democracy, by a majority of votes, as described by Herodotus, (III. 83,) are circumstances which he has borrowed from Grecian ideas, and which could not have had any foundation in reality. (Compare Grote, Jlist. of Gr. vol. IV. p. 300.) The same may be said of his account of long harangues in a council of Persian grandees, convened by Xerxes to deliberate upon his proposed invasion of Greece, VII. 8-11. Heeren, Ideen, I. 1, p. 469, remarks, that there was no council of state, properly so called, in the ancient Persian empire. A similar absence of organised political bodies prevailed throughout all the Asiatic nations of antiquity, so far as our accoimts reach, not even excepting Phoenicia ; and the primitive govermnent of Egypt was doubtless also formed upon the Oriental type. The Indian king is directed, by the laws of Menu, to appoint seven or eight ministers of state. ^ With them, (says Mr. Mill, Hist, of India, vol. I. p. 179,) he is commanded perpetually to consult on the affairs of his government : but a singular mode of deliberation is prescribed to him — not to assemble his council, and laying before them, as in the cabinets of European princes, the subject on which the suggestions of their wisdom are required, to receive the benefit arising from the mutual communication of their knowledge and views : a plan, ap- parently more artful and cunning, more nearly allied to the suspicious temper and narrow views of a rude period, is recommended — to consult them apart, and hear the opinion of each separately ; after which, having consulted them in com- mmi, when each man is swayed by the opinion he had formerly given in private, and has a motive of interest and vanity to resist the light which might be thrown upon the subject by others, the king himself is to decide.^ The plan of consulta- tion here descriljed is mainly dictated by the dread of corporate action on the part of an Oriental despot, and by the desire of preventing such a union among the members of his council as might lead to the formation of a check upon his power. — (See Institutes of Menu, VII. 54, 56, 57, ed. Haughton. Compare Bohlen, Altes Indien, vol. II. p. 63.) This very mode of consultation is, however, recommended by Bacon, even to European princes, in his Essay on Counsel : ' It is of singular use to princes if they take the opinions of their council both separately and together ; for private opinion is more free, but opinion before others is more reverend. In private, VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OE POLITICAL BODIES. 167 men are more bold in their own hmnoiirs, and in consort men are more obnoxious to others' himioiirs ; therefore it is good to take both : and of the inferior sort rather in private^ to preserve freedom — of the greater, rather in consort, to pre- serve respect.' Similar advice is also given by Hobbes, Leviathan, Part II. c. 25, p. 247 : ' Supposing the number of counsellors equal (he says,) a man is better counselled by hearing them apart, than in an assembly.' He proceeds to give detailed reasons for this precept, which, however, apply rather to a large popular assembly than to a small cabinet council. The modern king of Persia is absolute : there is no constitutional check upon his power; no assembly or council in his kingdom. — Malcolm's History of Persia, vol. II. p. 428-9. In some of the independent wandering tribes of the Persian territory, important judicial questions are entertained by a council of elders, and decided by a majority of votes. — lb. p. 459. The Turkish Divans are sometimes consultative councils of the Sultan or the Grand Vizier, (in which, however, no real freedom of discussion exists,) or they are occasions of public audience, for administering justice, or receiving officers of state and foreign ambassadors. See Dohsson, Tableau de rJB/njnre Othoman, torn. VII. p. 211-32. With respect to the meaning of the Arabic word divan, see d'llerbelot, Bibl. Or. in v. The Indian durbar appears to be its equivalent. The Emperor of China has two councils ; one, the great council of state — the other a select or privy council, (Davis's Chinese, vol. I. p. 211) ; but it can- not be supposed that these councils possess any legal powers, by which the acts of the Emperor are controlled. There are likewise six chief administrative boards, (ib.) which are, doubtless, merely executive departments, consisting of numerous members, but presided over by their proper heads. An account of an assemblage of the great officers of state in China, to do honour to the emperor, ib. p. 208. Note B. (page 134.) As to the character of the Homeric or heroic ecclesia, see Grote, vol. II. pp. 91-2 ; vol. III. p. 7. Aristotle, Pol. IV. 4, describes the people acting as a body, by comparing it with a monarch : Movap^os 6 brj^ios yiverai, avvOeros eh €k ttoXXmv' oi yap TToXXoI KvpioL elatv, ovx ^^ eKaaTos, dWa iravTes. He then goes on to ob- serve that, when Homer speaks of noXvKoipaver] being a bad thing, it is uncertain whether he means this sort of plurality of rulers, or where there are several rulers acting singly. It may seem presumptuous to decide a question of this sort, which Aristotle left in uncertainty ; but I can hardly doubt Homer's meaning to have been, that there should not be several kings acting independently of each other, especially as commanding in war. His poems contain no trace of a political body, (see Odyssey, VIII. 390, on the Phoeacian kings,) nor do they mention voting. As the Athenian courts decided by a majority in later times, ^schylus supposes the Areopagus to have voted on the trial of Orestes, (Eumen. 748-53 ;) thus carrying back this comparatively recent principle to the heroic age. Other cases of a similar prochronism occur. Thus, Ephorus (ap. Strab. IX. 2, § 4) tells a mythical story relating to Dodona, in which a vote of a judicial court, consisting of three men and three women, is introduced. Again, Myscelus of Argos, the founder of Crotona, is said to have been condemned to death, by the unanimous votes of the judges, for the crime of preparing to leave his native city. 168 APPLICABILITY OP THE PRINCIPLE OP AUTHORITY [cii. 'Hercules clianged the colour of the pehhles from black to white, and thus saved the culprit.— Ovid, Met. XV. 19-48 : Mos erat antiquus, niveis atrisque lapillis, His damnare reos, illis absolvere culpa. Where there was a board consisting of several functionaries, the ancient practice probably was, that the powers were divided among them, and that each exercised certain functions separately, as in the case of the Athenian archons. Aristotle lays it down generally, that the principle of decision by a majority applies to all republics, whether oligarchies or democracies : to S' ort av ho^rj rois Tvk€LO(nv, iv Trdaais virdpx^i' kcu yap Iv oKiyap^ia kcli iv dpicrTOKparia kol iv drjixois, ort av do^T] rc5 nXeiovi fxepei tcov fxerexoPTcov rrjs TroXire/ay, tovt ecrrl Kvpiov. IV. 8, cf. IV. 4. Ka\ yap iv rals oXiyapxtats kol navraxov to ifKeov fiepos Kvpiov. Also, VI. 2. For an example of this principle in a treaty between independent states, see Thucyd. v. 30 : dprjuevov Kvpiov elvai otl av to 7r\rj3os tcov (Tvp.p.dx(i)V ■\l/^r](f}io-T]Tai. Compare Grotius, de J. B. et P. II. 5, § 17 ; HI. 20, § 4, with Barbeyrac's notes. Before the battle of Marathon, the ten strategi were equally divided in opin- ion. The polemarch archon (who, Herodotus says, had from early times an equal vote with the generals) gave his vote in favour of fighting, and decided the question, upon which the minority acquiesced. — (Herod. VI. 109.) This is the earliest decision by a majority of votes recorded in authentic history. We Imow from Thucydides, that the Spartan kings had not each a double vote in the Council of Thirty, though such was the popular belief throughout Greece in his time. — I. 20. The five Spartan ephors decided by a majority of votes : hence, if three agreed, the consent of the board was obtained. — Xeist. Hellen. II. 4, § 29. The Greeks voted openly, by holding up the hand ; and in the Spartan as- sembly, by shouting. For secret voting, pebbles, potsherds, and sometimes leaves, were used. Note 0. (page 135.) In a German tribe, (according to Tacit. Germ. c. 11,) during peace, the supreme decision of its affairs was vested in a general assembly of the fighting men, the subjects having previously been considered in a smaller council of the chiefs. One of the chiefs addressed the general assembly, which expressed its opinion, not by a regular vote, but by a murmur, or a clashing of arms : the former, in token of disapprobation — the latter, of approbation. This state of things corresponds with the second form of the Greek ecclesia, after it had passed out of the Homeric stage, and had acquired a supreme, though not strictly defined power. It closely resembles the Spartan ecclesia, as described by Thucydides, in which the magistrates alone spoke, and which expressed its decision by shouting, and not by a division with counted votes. (Kpivovcn ^ofj Koi ov yjrrjcfia.—TjLVC. I. 87. See Miiller, Dor. III. 5, §§9, 10.) In the case referred to, the ephor, not satisfied with this rude method of voting, required the ayes and the noes to stand apart, in order that their respective numbers might be seen. As to the German concilia, see Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol, I, pp. 290-1 ; Ukert, Geogr. III. 1, p. 231 ; Grimm, D. R. p. 244; Mannert, Geschichte der alien Deutschen, vol. I. p. ()2, who says that coimting votes would have been too tedious a process : and observes that, in the Hungarian Diet, the ancient VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 169 mode of voting was still retained. As to the national assemblies of the early German empire, Eichhorn^ D. R. iind R. Geschichte, vol. I. §§ 137, 161, 220. There was likewise an assembly or concilimii in the tribes of Gaul in Caesar's time, as well as a senate.— -B. G. VI. 20, 23 ; Ukert, Geogr. II. 2, pp. 248, 250, 255. Concilia of the Cisalpine Gauls are also mentioned, Livy, XXI. 20. A congress of Gallic deputies was held at Bibracte, at which Vercingetorix was chosen commander by a majority of voices. — Cjssar, B. G. VII. 63. ^Multi- tudiuis sulfragiis res permittitur.' It is not unlikely that the practice of a regular vote may have been learned by the Gaulish tribes from their intercourse with the Greek and Koman republics in their vicinity. Thus, the Gauls bor- rowed from the Massiliots the important invention of alphabetical vvriting, and used Greek letters both for public and private purposes. — B. G. VI. 14. Note D. (page 136.) One important incident of a political body is, that it is preserved, by the per- petual substitution of new members in the vacancies as they occur, against the effects of natural death, and is kept in constant existence. Hence, there is no ground for holding that its acts have only a temporary force, or that treaties and other engagements made with it are not perpetual. (See Grot, de J. B. et P. n.9, §3.) There may, indeed, be a continual succession of single persons, and each newly-substituted individual may regard himself only as a link in a chain, and may be bound by the acts of his predecessors. But the doctrine of the English law respecting a corporation sole is only suited to a refined state of society, and in the succession of individual rulers the tendency in rude times has been to a different doctrine. In the Oriental Governments, the acts of a sovereign or minister are almost invariably set aside by a successor when it suits his purpose ; and the doctrine of mere personal responsibility in political matters is, in Asia, fully established. A similar doctrine obtained to some extent among the Greeks and Romans, particularly in the case of absolute princes, whose acts were gener- ally set aside when they were killed or dethroned. (Cic. ad Att. XIV. 6, 9. 14.) It is well known, that, in our early history, important laws made by one king were often expressly renewed by his successors. So treaties made with kings have been frequently disavowed by their succes- sors, on the ground that the engagement was merely personal. — See Grot, de J. B. et P. II. 16, § 16-, Vattel, §§ 183-97. The principle of Jieri nan debuit, factum valet, is of great importance in politics. When once a govermnent has been established, its acts are legal, how- ever unjust or inexpedient ; and although it may be displaced by a violent revo- lution, or other sudden change, it is desirable that its acts should be recognised and be only altered, when necessary, by legislative amendment. Note E. (page 145.) The reason for the rule of decision by a majority is thus given by Grotius : * Omnino ea credenda est fuisse voluntas in societatem coeuntium, ut ratio aliqua esset expediendi negotia : est autem manifeste iniqiium, ut pars major sequatur miuorem : quare naturaliter, et seclusis pactis ac legibus quae formam tractandis 170 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY Ich. negotiis imponunt, pars major jus habet integri.' — De J. B. et P. II. 5, § 17. This explanation amounts merely to saying, that it is natural and equitable that the vote of the majority should prevail over that of the minority. Dr. Ruther- forth is more explicit on the subject : ' The next question will be, whether it is more reasonable and more equitable that the minority should be bound by the act of the majority, or the contrary ? The answer to this question is obvious. It is plainly most consistent with reason, that the sentiments of the majority should prevail and conclude the whole ; because it is not so likely that a greater number of men should be mistaken, when they concur in their judgment, as that a smaller number should be mistaken. And this is likewise most consistent with equity ; because, in general, the greater number have a proportionally greater interest that the purposes of the society should succeed well, and have more at stake if those purposes should miscarry or be disappointed.' — Institutes of Nat. Laid, II. 1, § 1. Of the two propositions here laid down by Dr. Ruther- forth, the first is decidedly false. It cannot be afiirmed generally, either that a larger number of men is less likely to be mistaken than a smaller number, or that a smaller number is less likely to be mistaken than a larger number. The second proposition, with respect to the interest of the majority, is subject to the de- duction, that by interest must be understood their true interest as determined by competent judges, and not their interest as conceived by themselves. The truth is, that no explanation can be given of this rule, except that it is resorted to as the only possible expedient. The problem is well solved by Puifendorf, whose remarks exhaust the question : — ^ Dans toutes les assemblees, ce qui a passe a la pluralite de voix est regarde comme I'avis de chacun des membres ; nou que cela soit necessaire en vertu du droit naturel, mais parcequ'il n'y a presque point d'autre expedient pour tenuiner les affaires, et pour prendre quelques mesures ; quoique par la il arrive quelque- fois, que le sentiment le plus honnete et le plus avantageux a I'JEtat est rejete. Comme les affaires humaines sont souvent fort diversifiees et fort embrouillees, et que dans ces sortes d'assemblees etablies pour en decider, il u'est pas possible de trouver quelque voie qui soit sans aucun inconvenient, il faut prendre le parti ou il y en a le moins, et qui est d'ordinaire le plus avantageux. C'est done en vain qu'on objecte qu'il repugne a la nature, que I'avis des moins sage prevaille sur celui des plus sages, parceque ceux-ci se trouvent en plus petit nombre, et que les premiers meme puissent obliger les autres a faire, contre leur propre senti- ment, quelque chose de mal concerte. J'avoue qu'en matiere de verites specula- tives il faut peser les voix, et non pas les compter ; et que souvent merae Tap- probation de la multitude est regardee avec raison comme une marque d'erreur. Mais on ne sam*oit appliquer cette maxime a la decision des affaires, qui sont entre les mains d'une assemblee, dont les membres ont tons un droit egal. En efiet, qui decidera laquelle des deux opinions est la plus conforme aux regies de la prudence ? Oe ne seront pas les parties memes : car aucune ne voudra recevoir I'autre pour juge en sa propre cause. Et y a-t-il quelq'un qui ne se croie pas plus 6claire et plus habile que les autres ? ... II n'y a guere moyen non plus de s'en remettre au jugement d'un tiers: car on peut aisement contester sur I'habilete ou sur I'integrite de I'arbitre ; et alors voila une nouvelle dispute, pour la decision de laquelle il faudroit un autre arbitre, et ainsi de suite.' — hroit de la Nature et des Gens, trad, de Barbeyrac, VII. 2, § 15. See also Grot, de Imp. Summ. Pot. circa Sacra, cap. 4, § 6; Bayle, CEuvres, tom. III. p. 194. v.ii.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 171 CHAPTER VIII. ON THE RELATION OF THE PEINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY TO THE DEMO- CRATIC PRINCIPLE, AND TO THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. § 1. In the preceding chapter, we have considered the bearing of the principle of authority upon the action of a political body, and have shown how its mode of decision, though contravening that principle formally, is, in practice, brought more or less into conformity with it, and that the legal method of counting the votes is counteracted by many moral influences. It is proposed now to pursue the same subject further, and to inquire how far this principle serves as a basis for other political arrangements — and whether a similar conflict of forces may not be discerned in other departments of civil government.' The question as to the principle of special fitness, and its opposition to the principle of a simple arithmetical majority, is not confined to the action of political bodies, but it extends to some of the fundamental considerations affecting the structure and composition of a government, and the collocation of the sovereign power. In former chapters, we have contrasted the small number of the competent judges on each subject — the guides to opinion who constitute authority — with the large majority who are uninformed and inexperienced in the matter, and unfit to guide others by their judgment. Now, the opposition between these two classes has always been recognised with respect to fitness for exercising the powers of government. The antithesis, in its various forms, more or less distinctly conceived, of — The few wise, and the many foolish ; The few good, and the many bad ; The few learned, and the many ignorant ; The few philosophers, and the many anti-thinkers ; 172 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [ch. The few competent, and the many incompetent ; The few professional, and the many non-professional,* has been the foundation of all the arguments and instincts in favour of aristocratic as against democratic rule,^ so far as they have not had an interested origin, and have not arisen from a desire of retaining political privileges for a class to which the individual himself belonged. On this principle, the words, a*ya6oL, apiaroi, KaXoifca^aOol, sTTiSL/csh, iaffXoL, (TO(j>oi, ^sXticttol, 'yprjaroi, boni, optimi, optimates, were used by the Grreeks and Eomans to signify the governing few, while the majority, or mere people, were called KaKOL, irovTjpoi, BsiXol, mali cives, &c. By degrees, the former words lost their primitive moral acceptation, and came to signify merely the oli- garchical class.^ In like manner, the term dpiaro/cparia,'^ which originally, as used by Plato and Aristotle, signified the government of the best citizens, has come to mean the government of the Few, in a sense equivalent to oligarchy. Expressions similar to those just mentioned occur in more modern times, as the Grerman boni homines ^ and probi homines, or gude manner,' the Italian buon- uomini, the French prudhommes, and the Witena-gemot of the Saxons, as applied to magistrates and governing persons. The councils of old men in antiquity, i^jSovXr] ^ipowmv in Homer, the gerusia of Sparta, the senate of Kome,^) and the seniors and alder- Tnen of the Germanic nations,^ had likewise the same meaning ; inasmuch as wisdom, the fruit of experience, was considered the attribute of old age, and the peculiar characteristic of aged councillors. On the other hand, many words which denoted originally a low class in society have, by a reverse process, ac- quired in modern times a moral signification ; thus villain, rogue, * Or ihurai, according to the G-reek phrase. The word layman, \aiK6s, though properly opposed to a clergyman, is in English sometimes used in the general sense of non -professional. 2 Compare Lord Brougham's chapter on the Natural Aristocracy. — Pol. Phil. vol. XL c. 4. 3 See Welcker's Pref. to Theognis, § 9-17 ; Grote, Hist, of Greece, vol. III. p. 62. Pindar, Pyth. II. 160, calls the Few (as distinguished both from the One and the Many) ol aocpoi. * See Mr. Stanley on apiffTOKpaTia, Classical Museum, vol. IV. p. 286. * On the German boni homines, — Grimm D. Eechtsalterthiimer, p. 294. * BouA.^ y€p6vTav\ov. TaTov iv Tals TToXiTeiais, apX'^'-v tovs emeiKe^s dvap.apTr]Tovs ovras, p.r]8ev eXaTTOVfievov tov ttXtjOovs. In another place, the same philosopher points out the fallaciousness of an argument, founded on the supposed analogy between government and arts. It had been alleged, as an argument in favour of an arbitrary king, as opposed to a government according to laws, that a physician ought not to be bound by written rules, but should be left to his own discretion. To which Aristotle answers, that physicians gain their pay for curing a sick man, and have no motive of favour to deprave their judgment ; but that persons invested with political power do many 2 196 RELATION TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. [ch. things from grounds of affection or dislike. Even physicians, he says, when sick, call in other physicians, and trainers for the games employ other trainers, as dis- trusting their own judgment ahout themselves. — (Pol. III. 11.) Note D. (page 180.) The principle of numerical equality in government, as the characteristic of democracy, is clearly opposed to the principle of special worth or fitness by Aristotle, in the following passage : — TO dUauov TO drjfioTiKov to lo-ov exeti/ eVrt Acar' dpidfxov, aXXa fif) Kor* a^iav' TovTov 8' ovTOS Tov biKaiov, TO TrkrjOos avayKoiov eivai KVpiov, koi otl av do^rj toXs Trkeloo-i TovT^ elvai koi tcXos, koi tovt^ elvai to dUaioV (fiaa-l yap 8e2v Haov e^eti' eKaa-Tov Tav 7ro\iTa>v. Pol. VI. 1 ; and lower down he says, that to dUaiov to brjfioKpaTLKov is TO icrov ex^iu dnavTas kot' api6p.6v. IX.] PEOPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS. 197 CHAPTER IX. ON THE PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. § 1. New opinions, founded on a legitimate process of observa- tion and inference, are generally worked out in solitude by persons of studious and reflective habits ; and they are, when once accre- dited and established among men of science, expounded, illustrated, and diffused, by popular writers. The two provinces of discovery and diffusion are usually divided; for the power of original thought, and the power of perspicuous elementary exposition, are often not combined in the same mind. Respecting opinions so formed and so propagated, no general proposition can be laid down. Their character as to soundness will depend on the peculiarities of the several persons with whom they originate ; and the reception which they meet with from the public will be determined by its capacity to form a judgment on the matter. For example : the existence of a man with such mighty powers of discovery and demonstration as Newton, and the recognition of his doctrines among his contemporaries, depend upon causes which do not admit of being generalised. The same remark applies to individual writers belonging to professions, or specially conversant with any subject, who treat the question with the authority derived from their own appropriate knowledge and fitness. In this chapter, it is proposed to consider what are the chief permanent influences, in a modern civilised country, for the ' authentication of opinions ; from what authoritative sources opin- ions are chiefly diffused ; and what securities exist for rendering those guides of general opinion trustworthy. It may be observed, however, that in treating this question, it is difficult always to distinguish the diffusion of opinions by authority, from their diffusion by argument ; for that which is argument to one man, is often authority to another. A reasoned proof of a certain position (I 198 PEOPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [c«. is put forward in writing, or in oral discourse ; one person may be convinced by the reasoning, while another, who has not followed, or perhaps even become aware of the argument, adopts the con- clusion, because he has confidence in its promulgator. All opinions are diffused by a mixture of self-conviction and authority : B be- lieves a general truth, because A has proved it ; and C believes it likewise, because B is satisfied with the proof. Thus, in a battle, when one part of an army has yielded before an overwhelming attack, the other parts retreat — not because they are attacked, but because the remainder has been repulsed. 1 Independently of single writers (who cannot be brought under any general description,) the principal agents in the authorisation and diffusion of opinions may be classed under the four followicg heads : — I. The supreme civil government of a country, and the persons exercising public functions under it. II. The heads of an established church, and of other churches or religious bodies. III. Subordinate associations for political, scientific, literary, and other miscellaneous purposes, including universities and places of learning. IV. The periodical press : daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterlyT^ We will now attempt to ascertain how far each of the influences in question operates, and to what extent its operation is beneficial, or otherwise, for the purpose under consideration. § 2. I. Be I ore we can examine the influence of a government in authorising and propagating opinions, we have first to consider the preliminary question — how far is it the duty of a government to diffuse and encourage truth, and to repress and discourage error ? This question divides itself into two branches, — viz., the encourage- ment or discouragement of opinions on religion, and the encourage- ment or discouragement of opinions on secular subjects. In one sense, the province of a government is unlimited. There is no subject within the circle of human affairs and interests which it does not comprehend. The State is called omnipotent — that is to say, it can exercise for any purpose, and to any extent, the powers which are at its command. But although its province is theoretically unlimited, and its powers theoretically unbounded, there are in practice limits, not only to its powers, but to the purposes to which these powers can be applied witli propriety and ;x.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 199 advantage. There is no subject with which it cannot legally in- ,. terfere ; but there are many subjects with which it cannot fitly in- terfere. Now, when we speak of the duty of the State to interfere with any matter, there is no other criterion for trying this duty than the fitness of the interference. If the interference is likely to be attended with advantage to the community — if the end to which it is directed be good, and it be likely to promote that end, then the duty of the State is to interfere. But if, although the end is admitted to be good, the interference of the State is not likely to promote its accomplishment, and may even tend, on the whole, to counteract it, then it is not the duty of the State to in- terfere. For example, it may be conceded to be a desirable object that the maritime slave-trade should be suppressed all over the world. But whether it be the duty of any particular State to take active steps for the suppression of that trade, is a question which depends on the probable success which would attend the attempts made for this purpose, and their general result. The question as to the duty of the State, with respect to the encouragement of truth and the discouragement of error, must be decided on these grounds. Everybody admits that (provided his own standard of judgment be adopted) it is right and fitting to encourage truth and discourage error. About the desirableness of the end there is an universal agreement. That the promotion of this end lies, theoretically and legally, within the province of the State — that a government possesses powers which can be directed towards this object — is certain. It follows that, if the attempt is y likely to be attended with success, and to be, on the whole, ad- vantageous to the community, it ought to be made ; ^ but that, if the attempt is likely to fail, and the cause of truth is not likely to / be promoted by it, the State ought not to interfere. The question, therefore, which we have to consider is, whether the State is likely to succeed in promoting truth and repressing error. ' Burlamaqui, Principles of Nat. and Pol. Law, part III. c. 2, lays it down, that as men's opinions influence their conduct, and thus strongly contribute to the good or evil of the State, it is the duty of the sovereign to neglect nothing that can contribute to the education of youth, to the advancement of the sciences, and to the progress of truth. Further, he assigns to the sovereign a right of judging of the doctrines publicly taught, and of proscribing all those which may be opposite to the public good and tranquillity. Hence he infers, that it belongs to the sovereign alone to establish academies and public schools of all kinds, and to authorise the respective professors ; also to take care that nothing be taught in them, under any pretext, contrary to the fundamental maxims of natural law, or to the principles of religion or good politics — in a word, nothing capable of producing impressions prejudicial to the happiness of the State. 200 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch. In order to arrive at a solution of this problem, we will confine ourselves, first, to the influence of the State with respect to re- ligious truth — that portion of the subject upon which the greatest discrepancy of opinion prevails. § 3. In considering this question, we may limit ourselves to Christianity— the religion of the civilised world ; and we may begin by observing, that the government of every civilised com- munity may be expected to protect the ministers and congregations of all the recognised Christian sects in the public exercise of their religion, and to confer on them all the rights necessary for this purpose. It will, likewise, impose penalties upon certain acts which are condemned by all the different forms of Christianity, such as blasphemy, and the violation of the Lord's Day. An in- terference to this extent is implied in the general recognition of Christianity. In order, however, to ascertain how far the State is fit to per- form the function of encouraging religious truth, and discouraging religious error, we must confine our view to the distinctive marks of the several Christian confessions ; and by religious truth and error, we must understand the truth of the peculiar tenets of one sect as distinguiished from the errors of another sect. Now the fitness of the State for the performance of this function depends upon the efficacy of the means at its command, applicable to the purpose. These means may be reduced to the five following heads: — 1. Punishment for religious error. 2. Eeward for religious orthodoxy. 3. Endowment of clergy and of public worship. 4. Public instruction. 5. Censorship of the press. ^ Upon the efficacy of these means, or some of them, for the ' Mr. Gladstone gives the following enumeration of the modes in which it is possible for the State to lend aid to religion : — ' 1. By the example of its profession and worship. ' 2. By the adaptation of its laws to the rules of religion, wherever the same sub- ject matter is within the view of both. ' 3. By the constitutional recognition of a clerical estate as one of the great forces of fcociety, and suitable provision for its action in that capacity. ' 4. By supplying the temporal or pecuniary means for the propagation of the national creed. ' 5. By repressive measures, such as the laws against blasphemy. ' 6. By such general and indirect influences upon the quality of subjective religion, and^upon the permanency or purity of sacred institutions, as result from a connection IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 201 establishment of the true form of Christianity in a country, as opposed to erroneous, heterodox, and heretical forms, the question before us turns. § 4. Until the age of the Reformation, the received doctrine in Christian Europe was, that the State was bound to treat religious error as a crime, to legislate pro salute animce, and to punish heresy as it would punish homicide or theft. Every Christian State acted upon the received interpretation of the famous text, compelle entrare,^ and drove into the fold of the Church all sheep which had either strayed, or belonged to any other shepherd. Conformity, exile, or death, were the three alternatives which it presented to the heterodox believer, owning its allegiance, and resident within its territory. That the system of enforcing religious truth by punishment — the system which its enemies call religious persecution — has been, to a great extent, successful, cannot be disputed. It is impossible to doubt that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the pro- testant or reformed faith was greatly checked by the temporal power of the catholic governments. It was checked in two ways : by preventing its entrance into a country, (as in Italy and Spain,) and by expelling it from countries in which it had taken root, (as in Southern Germany, France, and Flanders. )2 The transportation of the Moriscoes from Spain, the expulsion of the Jews from several* countries, and the destruction of the Christians in Japan,^ afford other examples of the success of forcible measures for the extirpation of a creed which the government deemed erroneous. The protestants, being in general the weaker party in the age of the reformation, and having set the example of dissenting from the established faith protected by the State, were, both by their logical position and their interest, led to question the received between the Church and the State.' — The State in its Eelations with the Church, vol. I. eh. 4, § 65. The second, fifth, and sixth of these modes would be satisfied by a general recog- nition of Christianity, without giving a preference to any peculiar form of it. The first, third, and fourth, amount merely to the endowment of the clergy of a particular sect. ' St. LuJce, XIV. 23. See Bayle's Dissertation, (Euvres, torn. II. p. 357- Compare Mr. Gladstone, ih. vol. II. ch. 8, §§ 91-3, where the progress of legislation in Europe with respect to religion is accurately deduced. On the duty of a prince to punish lieretics, see Bayle, i6. p. 416 ; and on the degrees of severity with which religious error was repressed, ib. p. 414. 2 See Ranke's Popes. ^ See Bayle, Diet, art. Japan, note E. . ' 202 PKOPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch. doctrine as to the employment of force for the propagation of religious truth. Nevertheless, the ancient rule was upheld for a long time by protestant, as well as catholic governments ; and enlightened writers of protestant confessions called it in question with hesitation and fear. Thus, Jeremy Taylor, in his Liberty of Prophesying, (1647,) discusses the question, ' Whether it be lawful for a prince to give toleration to several religions ? ' (sect. 1& ;) and Grrotius, in his treatise De Jure Belli et Pads, (1625,) examines the similar question, ' Whether it be permitted to make treaties and alliances with those who are not of the true religion,' (II. 15, §§ 8-22.) It is remarkable, too, that, notwithstanding the com- plaints justly made by the presbyterians and puritans of England and Scotland, with respect to their treatment by the Established Church, they nevertheless, when they had the power, showed a similar disposition to enforce their own faith by penal sanctions.^' By degrees, a different standard of duty, with respect to the enforcement of religious truth by penal sanctions, was established, and more tolerant notions as to freedom of conscience and discus- sion, in questions of religion, became prevalent. It was seen that religious error could not be effectually suppressed by severity, in- asmuch as that which one nation regarded as error, another regarded as truth, and no common effort of the European governments would be made to put down or set up any one form of Christianity.^ Moreover, the principle of leaving opinion free, where it does not tend to some act immediately and manifestly detrimental to society, has been gradually gaining strength since the sixteenth century, and has included religious opinions in its operation. The attempt to propagate religious truth, and to crush religious error, by the criminal law and by penal inflictions, though it has, to a certain extent, met with a .very decided success, is subject to strong counteracting forces. A man who attests the sincerity of his religious faith by the sacrifice of his life, or of his native country, his worldly possessions, and his means of gaining a subsistence, is respected for his fortitude, dis- * Concerning the general reception of the maxim, that Christian princes are bound to enforce religion by the civil sword, see Palmer on the Church, part V. c. 5, who still upholds the maxim. Concerning persecution by Protestant princes, see Bayle, (Euvres, torn. II. pp. 411, 509, 554. And as to the general maintenance of this prin- ciple by the reformers, though with progressive remonstrances against it, see Hallam, Hist, of Lit. of Europe, vol. II. c. 1, §§ 29-32 ; vol. III. c. 2, §§ 50-2. ^ This comnction, brought about by the long continued miseries and devastations of the thirty years' war, was finally embodied in the treaty of Westphalia. IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 203 interestedness, and honesty, even by those who do not share his opinions. He is not regarded as a common malefactor, whose overt acts have been dangerous and pernicious to the security and peace of society, and have drawn down upon him the deserved punish- ment of the law. There is a sympathy with his sufferings, and a consciousness that the State, instead of gaining his conviction by the legitimate weapons of persuasion and reason, has, being the stronger, used its strength for causing its own opinion to prevail. A man who, like Gralileo, makes a feigned and insincere submission to the opinion of the supreme power, and reads his recantation under duress, is scarcely considered a free agent, and his conver- sion confers but little credit upon the coercing party.^ Hence, i^ the use of force to diffuse religious opinions, by admitting the ) failure of reason in the individual case, has seemed to raise a pre- ( sumption that reason was on the weaker side. Tr ue o pinions in a religion can, in the long run, only be propagated by reason, and I ^ that voluntary deference to authority which implies reason ; but false opinions in religion can be as weH ^'propagated by force as true ones. The sword, the stake, or the gibbet, are as good argu- ments in behalf of Mahometanism as of Christianity. In this way, the use of the civil power to repress religious error, has been ac- counted almost as an admission that the other side were in the right ; martyrdom has been regarded as a sign of truth as well as of sincerity ; and the infant church has been said to have been watered by the blood of its martyrs. From the combination of these causes, the system of enforcing religious doctrines by the civil sword, has been condemned by the general opinion of the civilised countries of Europe, and penal sanctions are no longer extended to the profession of a creed not authorised by the State. Both the reason and feelings of mankind are outraged, by applying to the diffusion of truth means which are used reluctantly and sparingly even for the punishment of overt acts against society. Cum ventiim ad yenim est, sensus morcsque repugnant, Atque ipsa utilitas, justi prope mater et sequi. The system of exterminating heresy by capital executions and wholesale deportation, may be considered as exploded in civilised Europe ; but the discouragement of religious error by civil disa- bilities — by exclusion from certain political rights — still maintains ' Upon the insincerity caused by religious persecution, see Bayle, ut sup. p. 399. 204 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch. its ground in some cases. Deprivation of civil rights is a species of penal infliction, and has been so considered in all systems of criminal law. The objection to its use for the purpose of repress- ing religious error, though less in degree, is therefore the same in principle. § 5. Penal measures for enforcing religious truth are, from their nature, directed exclusively against those who are without the pale of the orthodox church ; they are intended partly, by their direct operation, to reduce the obstinate heretic to a right course — and partly, by their example, to deter those who are within the pale from straying out of it. Remuneratory measures, on the other hand, tending in the same direction, leave the obstinate heretic in his error, but seek to allure the more flexible, or more interested, adherent of heterodoxy to the adoption of the true faith, by the attraction of temporal advantage. Such, for instance, would be pecuniary rewards to any member of an erroneous faith who adopted the orthodox faith ; or an offer of employment in the public service on the same terms. Of this nature were some of the measures in the penal laws against the Irish catholics ; such as that which enabled a son who changed his creed to take possession of his father's property. Measures of this sort are, however, con- sidered as a sort of seduction, or tampering with a man's consci- ence ; the witnesses to the truth so obtained are regarded as purchased by a species of subornation, and their testimony is not of much weight. As it has always been thought the part of a courageous and conscientious man, not to surrender his religious opinions at the dictation of superior force, so it has always been considered disgraceful for a man to become an apostate from his religion for pecuniary gain. Martyrdom for opinion's sake has ever been accounted honourable ; and proselytism effected by bribery is rarely eulogised, even by those who are members of the church into which the convert has been received. Hence the sense of honour, operating in a proscribed sect, holds its members together, and restrains them from swallowing the tempting baits held out to their cupidity by the State. The attempt to draw away persons from the camp of error by direct reward, and to induce them by a bounty to enlist under the banners of truth, obtains, therefore, only a limited and partial success. So far, however, as pecuniary temptations connected with the transmission of property, and rewards offered by a government in the way of IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 205 oflScial emolument and public honours, exercise any proselytising influence, the proselytes are chiefly to be found among the wealthier classes. If James II. had succeeded in giving the Eoman-catholics of England a monopoly of all public employments and distinctions, he would doubtless have gained over many converts in the upper ranks of society ; but the body of the people (as in Ireland, under a similar system) would have retained their religious convictions unchanged. § 6. But, besides punishment and reward, the State can like- wise employ Endowment as a means of encouraging religious truth. The endowment of the clergy, the provision of funds for the build- ing and maintenance of churches, or for the support of ecclesiastical seminaries, and other similar applications of the national property or income, may be considered as serving the double purpose of consolidating and confirming the religious community which is thus exclusively assisted by the State, and of attracting into it the members of the other unendowed churches. That an ecclesiastical endowment will diffuse religious truth, where apathy and indifference on religious matters exist, and where religion is untaught because there is no provision for teach- ing it, cannot be doubted. Where the ground is unoccupied, the endowed teacher will step into possession, and cultivate his allotted district. If he be industrious and skilful, his seed, being thrown into a field ready to receive it, will take root, and spring up and bear fruit. But it will be otherwise if the ground be already occupied by others, who contest the possession with him. In this case, his seed will be scattered to the winds, and there will be little or no harvest to gather into his garner. When an endowed clergyman supplies a void which otherwise would remain unfilled — when he affords religious instruction to persons who would otherwise be uninstructed — when he preaches religious doctrine to persons who would otherwise hear no religious doctrine, — his influence in the propagation of the opinions of his confession cannot fail to be felt, provided that he addresses persons of the requisite amount of intelligence and information. But if he comes into conflict with unendowed clergymen — if he addresses persons who already receive religious instruction from others, whose minds are preoccupied with the doctrines of a different sect, and whose conscience is bound to the practice of other religious rites and observances — his influence becomes less important, and may f 206 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch. perhaps be nearly imperceptible. If religion was a subject on which all men were agreed, or if there was any one living authority on religious questions to which they were willing to defer — if re- ligious opinions were not a matter of conscientious conviction, and maintained from a sense of moral obligation — if, when religious instruction and the means of religious worship were provided gratuitously by the State, every person might be expected to use them, rather than incur the expense of providing them for himself — if people flocked to the lessons of the endowed clergyman, as they would flock to the distribution of relief by the State, or as the Eomans went to the public games — if men looked upon religion as an article to be procured at the cheapest cost, and for which they would make no pecuniary sacrifice — then the influence of Endowment, in propagating the peculiar religious opinions of the endowed sect, would be decisive. But these necessary conditions for its success, as a means of gaining over converts from other confessions, are wanting ; and we accordingly find that it has failed, as an engine of proselytism. The most striking and deci- sive example is the case of the Irish Established Church — a com- plete system of exclusive endowment, founded on a territorial division of parishes, furnishing Protestant Episcopalian clergymen and churches, gratuitously, over the whole of Ireland, and intended to bring over the entire population to its creed. And yet, although it has existed since the Keformation, and has been assisted by active persecution and penal laws, it has never made any sensible impres- sion upon the Presbyterian and Eoman-catholic portions of the community, aad it cannot, even at present, reckon among its ad- herents a ninth part of the population. 1 Dr. Chalmers has pointed out, with great clearness, the error of supposing that, if religious instruction be left to the natural laws of demand and supply, it will be obtained like any other marketable commodity. He remarks that, in the case of food or clothing, or any other article of necessity or comfort, the want is felt the more keenly the longer it remains unsatisfied ; but that if a person has received no religious instruction, and is not in the habit of attending a place of religious worship, he does not require the services of any minister of religion, or seek to provide them for himself, if not provided for him by a public endowment. Hence, Dr. Chalmers speaks of the aggressive influence of an en- dowed clergy : he says that they must, by their teaching, create the very want which thqp^ satisfy ; and he adverts to the efforts of IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 207 missionaries, who are paid by the country which sends them out, not by the country which receives them.^ The arguments of Dr. Chalmers on this subject are undoubtedly sound, so far as an opening to the labours of an endowed clergy is afforded by religious indifference, or the absence of other religious teachers. But if the endowed ministers are of a creed different from that of the people among whom they are planted, their aggressive efforts will probably not produce conversions to their own faith, but will merely irritate their hearers by the revival of slumbering controversies, and create divisions and discord, without increasing the numbers of their own flock. The same remark applies to Christian missionaries in a heathen country. Without an endowment, temporary or permanent, they cannot exist ; but it is by no means certain that their efforts will be successful, or that their aggressions, even on the most mischievous and degrading forms of superstition, will be successful.^ More may be said in favour of the influence of endowment in imparting solidity and coherence to a religious body, in maintain- ing the consistency and purity of its doctrine, and in preventing defections from its ranks^. Even in this respect, however, its efficacy is probably less than is often supposed. There is, in general, a tendency to overrate the influence of wealth and power in giving currency to opinions.^ Reasoning and new doctrines have a sort of electric force ; they penetrate unseen from mind to mind, and give a shock to intelligences far removed from the origin of impulse. This subtle influence not only despises the seductions * See his lectures on National Churches, pp. 50-2, 72; On Endowments, pp. 113, 118. ^ According to Warburton, Alliance of Church and State, b. II., c. 3, the reasons of a public endowment for the ministers of a church are as follows : — • 1. To render the religious society, whose assistance the State so much wants, more firm and durable. ' 2. To invite and encourage the clergy's best service to the State, in rendering those committed to their care, virtuous. ' 3. And principally, in order to destroy that mutual dependency between the clergy and people, which arises from the former's being maintained by the voluntary contributions of the latter.' Warburton does not appear to consider the propagation of religious truth, by con- version, as one of the ends of a church endowment. ' Thus Pius VI., when he visited the Emperor Joseph at Vienna, in remonstrating against his measures of ecclesiastical reform, is reported by Botta to have used (among others) the following argument : ' Altra dover esser la condizione della chiesa ristretta, povera, e perseguitata, altra quella della chiesa estesa quanto il mondo, ricca, e trion- fante.'— ^^ men and speculative reasoners. It seems to them to involve tlie consequence that, by being neutral, the State declares its indiffer- ence to religious truth, or even its hostility to religion. They think that the State, by its omission to take a part in the con- troversy, implies an opinion that the question at issue is unim- portant. The abstinence of the State from identifying itself with ' Sully represented to the king — ' Qu'il y avait assez long- temps que la difference des religions donnait on France les scenes les plus tragiques ; qu'elle etait une source de calamites et de desordres, par I'a version qu'on iiispirait an peuple centre eeux qui etaient d'une croyance differente de la sienne: ce qui se pratiquait egalement de la part d'B catholiques et des protestans.' — Memoircs, liv. V. torn. V. p. 165. 214 rROPA(UTION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [cm. one of the rival churches, appears to them in the light of a sinful neglect of religious duty — or even a profession of religious unbe- lief. The following seems to be the train of thought by which they are led to this conclusion : — ^ ' The State is the highest, most important, and most compre- hensive of all societies. Its ends and its powers are unlimited. It embraces the whole circle of human interests. It commands the whole sum of human faculties and powers. The mind and the body, the hopes of a future, and the reality of the present life, are equally within the scope of its influence. All other societies are limited in their objects. A church is limited to religion, a muni- cipality to the care of its local interests, a university to learning, a mercantile company to trading, a scientific society to science, and so on. All other societies are limited likewise in their powers. They are all subordinate to the State ; they derive their legal rights from its grant, and are restricted by its control to a defined province. But a State is unlimited, both in its objects and its powers. It may select any end ; it may employ any means for compassing that end. It may assume any character ; it may, if it thinks fit, make the cultivation of literature, art, or science, one of its objects, and direct all its political agents and powers towards the attainment of that object. ' Now, the noblest and most exalted end of the State is, to make its citizens virtuous and happy, and to promote, not only their temporal, but also their eternal happiness. This object is ^ ^est accomplished by making them religious; and, therefore, if a State observes neutrality in religious affairs, and leaves them ex- ^ clusively to the care of the church — if it does not establish a political standard of truth, and a political conscience, in matters of religious faith, it abandons its highest duty, it desecrates its noblest functions, and it allows the largest powers, applicable to the most important object, to lie imused. The most valuable talent committed to its keeping is suffered, through its culpable neglect and indifference, to remain in the napkin. The State is not merely an institution for the protection of life and property : it comprehends higher interests ; it seeks to make men good, as well as safe and rich ; it seeks, not merely to protect their bodies, but also to improve their minds and benefit their souls — it aims at spiritual, as well as secular and temporal ends. At all events, . though its agencies be laic, it has a religious character, and ^' recognises religion as the basis of civil polity. It is a persona IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 215 rnoralis, and, as such, it lias a corporate conscience in affairs of religion.' § 11. Such appears to be a summary of the principal argu- ments used against the neutrality of the State in questions in- volving religious truth. Assuming it to be a correct representa- tion of their general tenor, I would remark- that, although the basis may be admitted to be sound, the superstructure is of very different materials. It is true that the State is not necessarily limited to the protection of life and property: its objects are un- limited, not less than the means at its disposal. There is nothing in the nature or essence of a State which would prevent it from making the promotion of religious truth one of its ends, and from seeking to attain that end by all the means in its power. Un- questionably, the State might propose to itself the same end, and assume the same duties as the church ; it might lay down articles of faith, regulate forms of worship, condemn propositions; in short, exercise all the spiritual functions which are exercised by the pope, if it thought lit so to do.^ In the middle ages, it was considered the duty of a Christian State to prevent Jerusalem from remaining in the possession of a Mahometan nation. It is com- petent to a State to adopt this, or any similar religious end, and to pursue it at any sacrifice of life, treasure, and temporal tran- quillity or prosperity, provided such sacrifice were needed for the attainment of the religious end. But, (as we have shown in the preceding remarks,) experience has proved that the State is not fit for the office of promoting re- ligious truth, and repressing religious error ; that these functions are not successfully discharged by the civil magistrate, and that they are better performed when left to the exclusive care of spiritual and ecclesiastical teachers.^ There is nothing in the ' The treatise of G-rotitis, De Imperio Summarum Pofestatum circa Sacra, has for its object to prove, that things sacred and spiritual are subject to the dominion of the sovereign of the State, and that the Church is not independent of the CiAnl power : see c. ] . and 8. It is directed against those writers of the Church of Rome who maintained the legal and temporal supremacy of the Church in things ecclesiastical and spiritual. As to the supremacy of the civil sovereign in things spiritual as well as temporal, see Burlamaqui, Principles of Nat. and Pol. Law, pai-t III. c. 3 ; Vattel, Law of Nations, §§ 139, 140. 2 Warburton, in his Alliance of Church and State, b. II. c. 1, lays it down, that ' the care of civil society extends only to the body and its concerns, and the care of re- ligious society only to the soul.' His whole theory is accurately summed up in Mr. Gladstone's treatise, On the Relations of Church and S^ate, ch. I. §§ 16, 17. Mr. Gladstone remarks upon it : ' It is a very low theory of S )\crnraent which teaches, y 216 PEOPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [en. constitution or essence of a State which is inconsistent with its being a judge of religious truth, but it discharges this duty ill. It is capable of doing the work of the church ; but the work is better done by the church without its assistance. The State ought to abstain from the assumption of a sectarian character, and from undertaking to decide on disputed questions of religious truth, for the same reason that it ought to abstain from carrying on trade or manufactures. It is capable of trading, but it makes a bad trader ; it is capable of manufacturing, but it makes a bad manufacturer. So the State i-5 capable of acting the part of a theologian, but it makes a bad theologian. Hence, it is a manifest sophism to infer that, because a person does not wish to see the State undertake to promote religious truth, he is indifferent or hostile to religion. As well miglit it be inferred that, because he does not wish to see the State engage in trade, he is hostile to trade. If he thinks the promotion of religious truth a function unsuited to the State. and suited exclusively to the church — if he thinks that it ought to be performed by an ecclesiastical, and not by a political agency, he cannot, supposing him to be friendly both to Church and State, desire to see it assumed by the latter. There is a constant tendency, not only among the contrivers of political Utopias and ideal commonwealths, Sut also among practical politicians, to over-estimate the capabilities of a govern- ment ; to assume that it can exercise .a greater influence over the community than it really possesses ; and to forget that it can only act within a sphere determined by certain conditions, and is en- dowed with legal omnipotence in no other sense, than that its powers have no legal limit. If the practical province of a State, in matters involving truth, had been considered with greater atten- tion — if facts, and not ideas, had been consulted, it would not have been invested with a character which is unsuited to it, and been loaded with so many n^oral obligations to which it is not properly subject, that it has only the care of the body and bodily goods, and might almost seem to imply that all physicians are more peculiarly statesmen.' Warburton, however, probably never meant to teach that the mind, considered with reference to its temporal and secular relations, was not within the legitimate province of the State. Warburton's doctrine is borrowed from Locke, who, in his Letters on Toleration, lays it down, that a commonwealth is instituted for civil interests, and that its care does not extend to the salvation of souls. — Works, vol. VI. pp. 10 and 120. Compare pp. 211-18, where he answers the objection that the State comprehends spiritual ends. Locke here resorts to his favourite resource of a fiction, by which the ends of the State aye limited. ^^ OK THE '^ .] CREATION OF TRUSTWOHTHY AUThBjOt]^. I V E 30 I T 1 The error of those politicians who exaggerate a!wMiisapprehend tlie powers of a government over the people may be compared, as to its results, with the error of those speculators who, in the middle ages, exaggerated their command over external nature. While the alchemists, the astrologers, and the practisers of occult sciences, undertook to transmute metals, to cure all diseases, to reanimate the dead, and to predict the course of the weather and the fates of men and empires, they overlooked, while engaged in the pursuit of these unattainable objects, the discovery of such processes of nature as lie within the reach of our faculties, and can be made available for our service. So political theorisers and statesmen, ^ who, from an ignorance of the true limits to the practical powers of a government, extend its action beyond its proper province, not only waste its resources in vain efforts, but withdraw its effect- ive powers from the subjects to which they are properly applicable, and thus diminish its efficiency in its own field. The aversion to the neutrality of the State in controverted questions of religion — the belief that it is bound to assume a re- ligious character, and to promote religious truth, may perhaps be founded on the assumption, that the State ought to use its powers for furthering all the good ends to which its powers are applicable, wlietlier its attempt is likely to be successful or not.^ The promo- tion of religious truth is a good end ; the State is capable of ap- plying its powers to the promotion of that end ; therefore, if it neglects so to apply them, it is guilty of a sinful omission, and of practical unbelief. Such is the simple argument on which many minds seem to rely ; but if they will extend the same mode of reasoning to other subjects, they will soon be startled by the con- sequences to which it will lead them, and will thus be brought to doubt of the soundness of their premises. If we only leave out of our calculation the probability of success, and require the State • Speaking of the speculators on a perfect or ideal pattern of civil goA'ernment, WarLurton says : ' The end of goyernment conning first under consideration, and the general practice of society seeming to declare this end to be only, (what, in trtith, it is,) security to our temporal liberty and property ; the simplicity of it displeased, and the plan appeared defective. They imagined that, by enlarging the bottom, they should ennoble the strnctixre, and therefore formed a romantic project of making civil society serve for all the good purposes it was even accidentally capable of producing. And thus, instead of givitig us a true picture of government, they jumbled together all sorts of societies into one, and confounded the religious, ihe literary, the mercantile, the convivial, with the civil.' — Alliance of Church and State, b. I. ch. 3. The f-pi'culators to whom Warburton allufles were, however, right in supposing, that the ii\Ate potentially includes all these objects. 218 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch. to undertake the promotion of all objects which are intrinsically good, whether they be attainable by it or not, we shall soon find it engaged in a multiplicity of impracticable pursuits, which might fill an academy of Laputa with envy. The State, like subordinate societies, and like individuals, is dispensed from the pursuit of unattainable goods. There is no moral obligation which binds a ruler to make an attempt, where success cannot reasonably be ex- pected. A forlorn hope may be sometimes necessary in war ; but it forms no part of the functions of a State, in the ordinary ad- ministration of its affairs. Writers who dwell on the religious functions of the State — who (like Dr. Arnold) almost identify the State and the Church, and merge the one in the other, are considered on that account as friends to religion ; while those who take a different view of the province of the State, are treated as hostile to religion and the «^ Church. But all experience shows that, where this intimate union of the Church and State exists, instead of the Church spiritualising the State, the State secularises the Church. Where the political and ecclesiastical powers are exercised by the same hands, the former are sure to prevail over the latter. Practically, the religious theory of government will end in perfect Hobbism ; and therefore no enlightened friend to religion will seek to confound the province of the State with that of the Church,^ or to confer upon the State spiritual, and upon the Church political, functions. § 12. Having arrived at the conclusion, that it is not the province of the State to diffuse religious truth and to discourage religious error, we need not dwell at equal length upon its duty in diffusing truth and discouraging error as to matters other than re- ligion. Even those who have attached the greatest importance to the enforcement of religious truth by the State, have not, in general, thought that it was the office of the State to diffuse truth on secular matters. It has rarely been maintained that, in questions of science, history, literature, art, &c., it is incumbent on the State to establish a standard of sound opinions, and to use its power for the purpose of maintaining and diffusing the truth. ^ ' ' Articles of faith, as well as all other spiritual matters, it is evident enough, are not within the proper department of a temporal sovereign, who, though he may be very well qualified for protecting, is seldom supposed to be so for instructing the people.' — Smith, Wealth of Nations, b. V. ch. 1, art. 3. ' The Ptolemaic system of the world was taught till a few years ago in the univer- sity of Salamanca ; but the prohibition of the Newtonian system was doubtless made nri rdiaiom grounds— in the same manner that the Jesuit editors of Newton's Principia IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 219 By founding universities, and other places of education ; by endow- ing professorships and lectureships ; by creating literary academies ; by patronising literature and science, and by assisting public in- struction, it has, indeed, contributed powerfully to the diffusion of opinions on many important subjects ; but it has left, in general, to the several professors and teachers the liberty of forming their own judgment as to the opinions which they would inculcate, and has not sought to induce them to make the matter of their teach- ing square with a prescribed standard. Without going the length of saying, that a government ought to be wholly indifferent to the character of the opinions diffused under its superintendence — without adopting the maxim. Si popu- lus vult decipi, decipiatur — we may affirm that, after it has taken effectual means for encouraging the diffusion of knowledge, and for promoting the selection of fit teachers, it ought to exercise extreme reserve in regulating the opinions of the persons so em- ployed. And we may here add that, if the State ought not to prescribe the opinions of endowed teachers of scientific, literary, and historical branches of knowledge — in most of which there are recognised standards, and a generally admitted authority — still less ought it to take a decisive part in religious questions, as to which there is no common authority generally received and re- spected by all the Christian sect?. It is by scientific and literary endowments, in connection with universities, places of learning, academies, observatories, botanical gardens, museums, public libraries, and similar institutions, that the best provision can be made for those men of science and letters, whoee pursuits are not of such a nature as to afford them the means of a decent and permanent subsistence.^ Poets, writers of found it necessary to declare that, in illustrating the propositions relative to the helio- centric theory, they treated it as a mere hypothesis, and they professed, with a grave irony, their submission to the decrees of the church against the motion of the earth : ' Cseterum latis a summis Pontificibus contra telluris motum deeretis nos obsequi pro- fitemur.' The works of Galileo and Copernicus were inserted in the index of prohibited books ; and to this day the Ptolemaic system is the oificial doctrine of the Church of Rome. ' Lord Bacon, Adv. of Lear^iing, vol. II. p, 94, speaks *of the defect which is in public lectures ; namely, in the smallness and meanness of the salary or reward which, in most places, is assigned unto them ; whether they be lectures of arts or professions. For it is necessary to the progression of sciences that readers [i.e. lecturers] be of the most able and sufficient men ; as those which are ordained for generating and propa- gating of sciences, and not for transitory use. This cannot be, except their condition and endowment be such as may content the ablest man to appropriate his whole 220 PROPAGATION OP SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch. fiction, and others, who can amuse and delight the public, may derive a profit from their literary works ; those, again, who digest and arrange existing knowledge for the instruction of their readers, may obtain considerable pecuniary rewards for their labours, in the present state of civilisation ; but those who originate new ideas, who explore the untrodden, and cultivate the waste tracts of science, cannot expect to reap any profit from their exertions. Un- less they possess the means of independent support, the best main- tenance for them is a literary endowment, of the sort just described ; professors, too, in a place of learning, who are remunerated for the lectures which they give, can study a subject in order to teach it, and devote their spare time to the composition of books.^ Why teachers should not be rewarded for their services, I can see no valid reason ; the objection of Socrates to the paid teaching of the Sophists of his time s^^ems to have been partly founded in his opin- ion, that their lessons were valuele3s, and partly in the Greek prejudice against illiberal arts.^ As has been just remarked, the State may, as with respect to religious instruction, interfere for the support and patronage of the secular instruction of the young, so as to give currency to certain opinions on subjects unconnected with religio'n. Aristotle,^ apparently, approves of the Lacedaemonian system, according to which all free children, after a certain age, were taken out of the care of their parents, and placed under the dis- cipline of the State. This system, however, had almost exclu- sively a military object.'* Though carried, for a long time, into labour, and continue his whole age, in that function and attendance; and therefore must have a proportion answerable to that mediocrity or competency of advancement which may be expected from a profession, or the practice of a profession.' ^ Mr. John Mill, in his Principles of Political Economy, vol. I. p. 468, throws out a doubt whether there is not ' sometliing radically amiss in the idea of authorship as a profession ; and whether any social arrangement, under which the teachers of man- kind consist of persons giving out doctrines for bread, is suited to be, or can possibly be, a permanent thing.' Compare Comte, Cours de Phi. Pos. tom. VI. p. 466. ^ Adam Smith was led, by the abuses of universities in his time, and by their lazy and unimproving spirit, to underrate the advantages of literary endowments, in pro- moting the cultivation of those branches of knowledge which are not useful, (in tlie vulgar sense of the word,) — that is, which do not yield an immediate return to the learner, by fitting him for a gainful occupation, {Wealth of Nations, b. V. ch. 1, art. 2). He admits, however, the advantage of an endowment for the instruction of the poor. See, with respect to this subject, the instructive work of Dr. Chalmers, On Endow- ments. The recent history of the German universities sufficiently proves, that literary endowments do not necessarily lead to the abuses adverted to by Adam Smith. 3 Eth. Nic. X. 10 ; Pol. vill. 1. * Aristot. Pol. VII. 2. Compare c. 14. IX. J CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 221 effect by the singularly rigid spirit of that little commonwealth, it was too extensive an interference with parental authority and natural affection for imitation, even by the most military republics of antiquity, such as the Eomans ; and, in modern times, no such entire substitution of the political for domestic control over children is likely to be seriously entertained. The chief patronage which the State, in modern times, gives to instruction, is by. appointing and endowing teachers, of different sorts and degrees, from universities and colleges, down to elemen- tary schools for the poor.' This assistance is afforded on the assumption, that some public contribution is requisite for enabling the parents to instruct and train their children in their respective callings and walks of life ; and that the State has an interest in the proper education, moral and intellectual, of its members. Aids afforded from the public pu. se, for the establishment and maintenance of astronomical observatories and botanical gardens ; for scientific voyages and travels ; for the formation of museums of natural history and antiquities, of public libraries, and of col- lections of vij^^rks of art ; for the publication of expensive books ; for the encouragement of literature ; and for the support or remu- neration of persons connected with these several institutions or purposes, fall under the same general head. Public expenditure of this sort is intended to afford to the cultivators of sound know- ledge and learning facilities which they could not derive, in an equal degree, either from their own means or from private patronage.'* § 13. In ever}^ case, however, in which the government inter- feres to assist and encourage science and learning, or to diffuse secular knowledge, it ought to avoid predetermining any set of opinions to be adopted by the teacher, or other object of its patronage. It ought to abstain from stereotyping any modes or formulas of thought; from imposing any test, or requiring an ' The cases in which the State maintains as well as teaches the scholar, and there- fore stands to him in loco parentis, are those in which a ch Id is destitute, through the death or desertion of his parents. The assumption of the parental authority by the State, in these cases, is not sought, but forced upon it. ' The establishment of the observatories of Paris and Greenwich, in 1667 and 1675, ' may be considered (says Dr. Whewell) to be a kind of public recognition of the astronomy of observation, as an object on which it was the advantage and the duty of nations to bestow their wealth.' — Vhil. of Ind.. Sci. vol. II. p. 432. See also his account of public observatories, of patronage of astronomy by governments, and of astronomic;il expeditions made at the public expense, in his Ilisfo yof the Inductive Sciences, b. VII. c. 6, §§ 2, i, and 5. 222 PEOPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch. adhesion to any party or section, scientific, literary, or historical. The persons who may be thus assisted by the State, ought merely to receive facilities for prosecuting an independent and unpreju- diced search after truth, but ought not to be expected to work up to a prescribed conclusion. The influence of a government, as an authority in matters of opinion and practice, is greatly enhanced by its confining itself to its legitimate province, and not attempting to pronounce on ques- tions which it is not competent to decide. A court of justice, which was highly esteemed for its judgments on questions of law, would render itself ridiculous, and shake its authority, even within its own sphere, if it attempted to determine questions of science or literature. If a government should suborn, as it were, its en- dowed teachers, by inducing them to take its own opinion, and not truth, as their standard, it would impair their influence with the public, and at the same time diminish its own authority upon questions, as to which its judgment would otherwise be respected and valued. § 14. For a government, although it cannot regulate opinion as it can fix the rates of the public taxes, the forms of judicial procedure, or the scale of legal punishments, can yet exercise a considerable influence upon its movements and direction. With- out undertaking to pronounce definitively a precise judgment upon disputed questions of speculation, or to enforce that judgment by its legal and coercive powers, a government possesses a moral authority, by which it can stamp a character of public approbation upon certain acts and certain opinions. It is placed on a high and conspicuous eminence ; its voice will be heard far and wide ; many people will incline to imitate its tendencies ; and its judgments, on subjects upon which it is competent to judge, will not fail to produce a powerful impression on the public. A government, considered as a source of authority, furnishes a model, or pattern, and does not act by compulsory and imperative laws. Its subjects fashion their actions, by a voluntary and self- imposed imitation, according to the cype which it places before them — like the pupils copying a model in a school of design. Tliey are not coerced into uniformity by the voice of command, like soldiers at drill. In absolute monarchies, the personal influence of the monarch, or of his court, in establishing a standard of manners and morals, as well as of taste, and in determining the aim and course of per- IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 223 soiial ambition in the numerous aspirers to honour and public employment, has often been mos^t extensive. In constitutional monarchies, and other free government?, the ruling power is more divided, and its influence less concentrated ; but, even here, its moral weight, in determining public opinion and conduct, is not inconsiderable. Bad examples set by rulers are almost invariably followed, to a greater or less extent, by their subjects. And, on the other hand, a good moral influence, in respect either of conduct or opinion, on the part of a government, can scarcely fail to produce a beneficial effect.i Indirectly, in the way of example and patronage, by the re- muneration of merit and the distribution of honours, a government, and persons in eminent stations, can do much to countenance sound opinions, to establish a correct standard of conduct, and to ' Tr6\is "yap iarrl irafra tS> ' T^yovpiivccv, arparSs re av/xiras- ol S' aKoafxavvris ^pOTUtv SiSaaKdKoov Xoyoicri yiyvoprai kukoI. (Soph. Phil. 386-8.) Cicero particularly dwells on the moral effect produced by the example of the chief persons in the State : ' Nee enim tantiim mali est peccare principes (quamqiiam est magnum hoc per se ipsum malum) quantum illud, quod permuiti imitatores principum oxistunt. Nam licet videre, si velis replicare memoriam temporum, qualescumque summi civitatis viri fuerint, talem civitatem fuisse : queecunque mutatio morum in principibus extiterit, eandem in populo secutam Pauci, atque admodum pauci, honore et gloria amplificati, vel corrumpere mores civitatis, yel corrigere possunt.' — De Leg. III. 14. Claudian applies the same sentiment to the imperial period : — Componitur orbis Regis ad exemplum ; nee sic inflectere sensus Humanos edicta valent, ut vita regentis. Mobile mutatur semper cum principe vulgus. {Be IV. Cons. Honor. 299-302.) Machiavel repeats these views, with examples derived from more recent times : ' Non si dolgliino i principi d'alcun peccato che facciano i popoli ch'egli abbiano in governo, perche tali peccati conviene che naschino o per sua negiigenza, o per esser egli macchiato di simili errori. E chi discorrera i popoli che no' nostri tempi sono st:ti tenuti pieni di ruberie e di simili peccati, vedra che sara al tutto nato da quelli che li governavano, che erano di simile natura. La Romagna innanzi cho in quella fussero spenti da Papa Alessandro VI. quelli signori che la comandavano, era un esempio d'ogni scelleratissima vita, perch^ quivi si vcdera per ogni leggiera cagione seguiro uecisioni e rapine grandissime, II che nasceva dalla tristizia di que' Principi, non dalla natura trista de li uomini, come loro dicevano,' — Lisc. III. 29, where the follow- ing verses of Lorenzo dei Medici are also quoted : — ' E quel che fa il Signor fanno poi molti, Cho nel Signor son tutti li ocehi volti.' \ 224 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch. encourage persons of genuine merit. But a government has little ' direct power of influencing opinion, except by preventing tlie free expression of thought, and by thus producing an intellectual stag- nation, such as prevails in Spain, and, to a certain extent, even in Italy. No government of a civilised country, for example, could now, either by punishment or reward, by persecution or endow- ment, restore a general belief in the Ptolemaic system of the world, or in judicial astrology, within its dominions. Adam Smith re- marks, that the most richly endowed universities have been the slowest in adopting improvements in the different branches of philosophy, and have been the most prone to retain exploded errors in their course of education.* Even if this statement were true, it would not prove that the endowment produced the effect of giving currency and authority to antiquated errors and obsolete systems. The probability is that the endowment, thus misapplied, would be merely wasted ; and that the doctrines taught would gain little or no acceptance among the public, if it was known that they were rejected by the competent scientific judges, and that they were still maintained by the university merely through the influ- ence of its endowed chairs. § 15. A government may likewise countenance sound opinions by upholding institutions which imply those opinions, and are founded upon them. A criminal law in which the definitions of crimes, and the gradations of their punishments, are derived from correct principles respecting the grounds of moral imputation and the measure of moral guilt, tends powerfully to establish a good ethical standard in the minds of the community. The same may be said of the civil law : its definitions of contracts, rights of property, fraud, &c., tend to fix and enlighten men's ideas as to honesty and good faith in their mutual dealings. The theory of the criminal and civil law, audits application in practice, when governed by sound principles, thus contribute materially to the establish- ment of a good code of morals for the public. In like manner, the observance of good faith by the government, in its relations with foreign countries, tends to accredit sound maxims of international law, and to inculcate their observance upon other nations. Every good system of municipal laws, faithfully administered — every steady observance of sound rules of international law— tends to ' Wealth of Nations, h. V. eh. 1, art. 2. On this subject, so far as regards tlio English universities, see the remarks of Dr. Whewell, Hist, of the Ind. 8cuiues, b. VII. c. 3, § 2. ijc.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 225 create a real, not an ideal, model of government, which serves for the imitation of other nations and future times. ^ On the other hand, a government, by adopting erroneous opin- ions as the basis of its legislation, may not only give them the currency arising from its countenance, but also that strengtli which arises from the existence of vested interests. This is par- ticularly perceptible with regard to the economical principles, which are involved in legislation upon commerce, navigation, tax- ation, public charity, &c. § 16. But although (as we remarked above) it has not been thought the duty of the State to take an active and impulsive part in propagating the truth upon secular subjects, it has not been held that the State could with propriety be equally passive with respect to the permission of error. The censorship of the press was, from the first invention of printing, exercised by all the European governments for preventing the circulation of dangerous and unsound opinions* As has been already stated, it was em- ployed, in the first instance, and principally, for the repression of religious error ; but it* has also been used for the prohibition of writings upon philosophical, political, and historical subjects. It was thought, at one time, that the government rendered itself responsible for the errors which it permitted to be propagated through the press ; and that one of its duties was to protect the public against the diffusion of false opinions by means of books, as it was its duty to adopt measures for preventing the diffusion of pestilential diseases, or the passing of false coins.^ There is no * Adam Smith adverts to the good moral influence exercised upon the character of the Romans, by the excellent constitution of their judicatories : ' The superiority of character in the Romans over that of the Greeks, so much remarked by Polybius, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, was probably more owing to the better constitution of their courts of justice, than to any of the circumstances to which those writers ascribe \t:— Wealth ofNationSi b. V. c. 1, art. 2. See Polyb. VI. 56. The influence of laws upon the morals and usages of a people is considered by Matter, in his treatise De VInfluence des Moeurs sur les Lois, et de VInfluence des Lois sur les Mceurs. (Paris, 1832.) Part III. ^ On the censorship of books, see Hoifmann's Treatise ; and Beckmann, Hisi. of Inv. vol. III. p. 93, art. Book Censors. In p. 98, a passage is quoted from a letter of Hermolaus Barbarus, written in 1480, in which he expresses an opinion favourable to the adoption of Plato's recommendation in his Laws, that no person should publish anything without previoiis examination and permission of persons appointed by the government. The present multitude of inferior books, he says, causes good authors to be neglected : ' Et quod calami tosissimum est, periti juxta im'peritique de studiis impune ac promiscue judicant.' The passage of Plato refers to poets exclusively, but supposes a regular censorship. — Leg. VII. p. 801, ' Q / 226 PROPAaATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch. doubt that this office was undertaken by the European governments with a sincere desire of purging the productions of the press from all peccant matter, and of performing a preliminary work of selec- tion, by authorising useful and suppressing pernicious books. But, as in the case of religion, experience has proved that the State cannot advantageously discharge the office of a censor of public discussion in matters of a secular character, and that society makes more progress towards the discovery and recognition of truth when it is unassisted by the well-meant, though ill-directed, efforts of a government censorship of the press. At present, it is only in the Italian States and Austria that philosophical and historical discus- sion is regulated by the censorship. In Prussia and the other German States, in which a censorship of the press has, until lately, subsisted, its practical exercise has been limited to the current political discussion of the day ; and it has, in fact, been used by the government only as a means of suppressing unfavourable criti- cism upon their own acts and policy. It was to this purpose that the censorship of the press was turned by Napoleon, who, however, did not content himself with suppressing all adverse criticism, but retained in the pay of the government all the writers whose articles were permitted to appear in the newspapers. By thus poisoning all the channels of information at their source, he rendered the periodical press the mere engine of his despotism ; and all securi- ties for truth of statement, and fairness or completeness of discus- sion, were thus, during his ascendancy, suspended in France.^ If the State be fitted at all for establishing a standard of opin- ion, there is no function which it can so properly assume as that of authorising printed works, or prohibiting their publication.^ In discussing the question of the iDvohibition of books at the Council of Trent, one of the members observed, that there had been alread}' too many books printed since the invention of printing ; and that it was better to prohibit a thonsand books which did not deserve it. than to permit one which deserved to be prohibited. — Sarpi, 1. VI. c. 5, (t. II. p. 139, ed. Courayer). ' For an account of the measures of Napoleon for regulating and managing the press, see Madame de Stael, Consid. sur la Revol. Frangaise, Part IV. ch. 4 and 16. * ' He [the king of Brobdignag] laughed at my odd kind of arithmetic, as he was pleased to call it, in reckoning tho auniLers of our people l)y a computation drawn from the several sects among us in religion and politics. He said he kuew no reason why those^who entertain opinions prejudicial to the public should be obliged to change, or should not be obliged to conceal them. And as it was tyranny in any government to require the first, so it was weakness not to enforce the second ; for a man may be allowed to keep poisons in his closet, but not to vend them about for cordials.' — Swift. A similar image is employed in the Bull of Leo X. against the abuses of tho press, IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 227 If it is ever to make itself tlie promoter of truth and tlie dis- courager of error, no less objectionable instrument than a censor- ship of the press can be devised. The practical abandonment of this system in all countries under a free government, and the~ general discredit into which it has fallen over the civilised world, afford a strong ground for thinking that the State is incapable of discharging the duty of a censor of opinion with success — that the accumulation of experience is adverse to the system, and that tliere is a radical defect in the theory which extends the dominion of the State over the regions of speculative truth. § 17. Not only may the State, by its patronage, assist in promoting the diffusion of soimd knowledge, both in the upper and lower strata of society ; but it may also authenticate certain persons, as possessing a competent amount of skill for the practice of a profession or calling. Thus it may, by proper examinations, ascertain the qualifica- tions of candidates to practise medicine or law ; and upon those who come up to the prescribed mark of fitness, it may conifer diplomas, or otlier authorities to practise. A similar process may be applied to schoolmasters and teachers of youth, to masters of merchant-vessels, and others who have difficult and important functions to perform. The granting of diplomas by universities, or other learned bodies, proceeds on the supposition, that the public require some assistance to their judgment in the choice of professional services, and that such an official scrutiny into the qualifications of practitioners is a useful security against the im- posture or incompetency of mere pretenders to skill. For the practice of medicine in particular, a public authentication, by a board of competent and disinterested examiners, cannot fail to be an important safeguard against imposture, inasmuch as the public are scarcely able to form an unassisted judgment as to the quali- fications of medical men.^ Such degrees or diplomas, however, do not of themselves import more than an authentication by duly appointed public officers ; they are like a public seal or stamp issued in the year 1515 : ' Nos itaque (the Pope says), lie id, qudd in Dei gloriam et fidei argumentum ac bonarum artium propagationem salubriter est inventum, in con- trariumconvertatur, ac Christi fidelium saluti detrimentum pariat, super librorum impressione curani nostram habendam fore duximus-, ne de cceiero cum bonis seminihus spina coaiescant, vel medicinis venena iniermisceantur.' — Hoffmann, tibi sup. p. 47. * See the remarks of Dr, Culleu upon the Value of medical degrees, in answer to Adam Smith, cited in note XX. to Mr. M'Culloch's edition of the Wealth of JS'afio7is, p. 587. Q 2 228 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [en, affixed to goods for the purpose of attesting their genuineness, or like the mark impressed on the coin of the State, in order to serve as a public guarantee of its weight and fineness. Hence, they are not necessarily licences to practise, and do not imply any exclusive right. In this country, for example, any quack doctor may legally practise medicine : the diplomas of the public bodies which preside over the medical profession merely serve as guides to the public in the choice of their medical advisers. M. Dunoyer, in his work On the Liberty of Labour, maintains, not only that medical diplomas ought to confer no exclusive right of practising medicine, but that they serve merely as screens for incapacity, and substitutes for real knowledge, and ought therefore to be discontinued altogether.^ But although the examinations and licences of artisans, and the exclusive rights of members of guilds, have been rightly abolished by modern nations, it does not follow that a public authentication of medical practitioners is either mischievous or superfluous. People in general can, by proper means, form a judgment as to the products of the useful arts without the assistance of the government : ^ the appointment of public weighers and measurers, the stamping and marking of goods before sale, and other legislative interferences between the buyer and seller, intended to prevent fraud, and to insure the quality of goods, are indeed, (except in such cases as those of coin and plate,) productive of more harm than benefit. But where intellectual fitness is concerned, the public may have less facility for guarding against imposture ; and they may be aided in the selection of their medical advisers by the certificate of a board of competent examiners, who have ascertained the qualifications of the practitioner, and given them a solemn and authentic attestation. § 18. II. With respect to the influence exercised by the heads of a church, or religious community, over opinion in religious and ecclesiastical matters, we refer generally to the remarks in Chapter IV, As has been there shown, no merely human authority is recog- nised by all the Christian churches. The authority of the heads and doctors of each church is confined to the members of their own communion, and does not pervade all Christendom. Each church or section of Christianity possesses its own authorities. * De la Liberie du Travail^ torn. III. p. 47-55. ' See above, p. 88. X.J .CREATION OF TRUSTWOKTHY AUTHORITy. 229 Thus, the Church of Roine appeals to some of the Grreek fathers, as Origen, Athanasius, and Chrysostom — and to the Latin fathers, as Lactantius, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine — to the leading schoolmen, as Thomas Aquinas and Peter Lombard, and to some later theologians, as Bellarmine. For the Lutheran Church, Luther ; for the Swiss or Eeformed Church, Calvin and Zwingli are the main guides. The Church of England considers as its chief luminaries those divines who have excelled among its own clergy ■ — as Hooker, Ussher, Hall, Jeremy Taylor, Pearson, Bull, Burnet, Butler, Waterland, &c. Among the Protestant Dissenters of England, Baxter, Wesley, Whitefield, and other leaders of later date, are the chief guides of doctrine. Each of these teachers has, however, a jurisdiction which is limited to the members of his own confession, and which other churches either wholly repudiate, or recognise only with large qualifications and restrictions. If they are quoted by writers of a different religious creed, it is prin- cipally in their character of recognised leaders and representatives of their own churches, and for purposes of controversy and refu- tation. Thus, a member of the Church of England, or any other Protestant church, would deny any decisive authority to a passage from Thomas Aquinas or Bellarmine ; and a polemical writer of the Church of Rome would probably think that he had made a large concession, in admitting that any Protestant divine was even a Christian. The Church of Rome, which formally prohibits the reading of all heretical books, places the writings of the Reformers in the Index Lihrorum ProkibitoruTn. Every Roman Catholic who reads a book included in this list, inciu'S the penalty of excom- munication latce sententicB^ The Protestant churches, in like manner, discourage the reading of heterodox and erroneous writings ; but they have never gone the length of publishing an Index of condemned books.^ § 19. An important influence is exercised by the heads of a church, or by certain members of it iiivested with a delegated power, in ascertaining the fitness of candidates for the Christian ministry or priesthood, and in stamping them with the public character of the sacred profession. The character conferred by the process of ordination is, in some churches, indelible by law, and in ^ See Sarpi, VI. 6. Excommunication lata sentcntice is the same as what, in our law books, is called excomnninieation ipso facto ; i.e., excommunication following im- mediately upon the oflfenco, without the sentence of a court. 2 See Palmer, On the Church, Part IV. c. 17. v/ 230 PEOPAGATION OF POUND OPINIONS BY THE [cu. nearly all by custom. It is accompanied, moreover, with a renun- ciation of many secular pursuits ; and, in the Church of Eome, the obligation of celibacy is likewise imposed upon ordained priests. The importance of the selection thus made mainly depends on the judicious exercise of the discretion confided to the ordaining parties, and on the qualifications which it guarantees. Whether the ordination is further sanctified by an uninterrupted succession from the Apostles, is a question upon which theologians and churches differ, and which does not belong to the present inquiry. In episcopal churches, the ordination is effected by the bishops — in presbyterian churches, by the presbyteries — and in other Pro- testant churches by boards, sometimes mixed, of ministers and laymen. Thus, Cromwell established a board of commissioners called Triers, whose business it was to examine candidates for ecclesiastical benefices, and to admit them, if deemed worthy of approbation.' § 20. III. We have next to consider the influence of Voluntary Associations for political, scientific, literary, and other purposes, in the diffusion and authentication of opinions. Both in England and the United States, it has been for some years (as has been before observed) ^ the practice to form voluntary associations for certain political objects. Such associations have generally an internal organisation — arrangements as to meetiugs, order of proceedings, committees, and the like, together with officers and funds of their own. Sometimes they are concerned in the party questions of the day, and seek to influence the govern- ment and legislature by appealing to and agitating public opinion against some existing law. At other times, their object is to procure the introduction of some philanthropic measure — as for abolishing slavery or the slave-trade, for improving education or health, for diffusing knowledge, for promoting public order and morality. Voluntary associations of this sort bring together persons who are interested in the pursuit of a common end ; they tend to create and foster, by the mutual communication and emulation of their members, a body of enlightened opinion and accurate information on the given subject ; and thus, independently of the arguments which they may lay before the public, they promote the formation of a centre of authority on the matter, which is likely to exercise an influence in various directions. It is ' See Neal's Hist, of the Puritans, vol. II. pp. 621 9. 2 Above, p. 182. IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 231 probable, indeed, that the active members of such an association may be prompted to the pursuit of their object by a zeal not suffi- ciently tempered with discretion, and that they may overrate the importance and utility of the end at which they aim ; still, with these deductions, the honest conviction of the leaders of such a body will scarcely fail to exercise an influence on some portion of the public. This effect is particularly perceptible in societies formed for scientific and literary purposes, whose proceedings are of a more tranquil and less controversial character than those of political or semi-political associations. The earliest of the learned societies is the Museum founded at Alexandria, in the third century before Christ, by Ptolemy Philadelphus, which was assisted by a public endowment, and encouraged by the royal patronage. Societies for the cultivation of literature, science, and the fine arts were, how- ever, first established on an extensive scale in modern Italy. The Italian Academies, which began even in the fifteenth century, directed their attention to every department of the field of know- ledge — from mathematics and physics to painting and music — and from them the learned societies afterwards established in the other European States, such as the Academic Franpaise and the Academic Eoyale des Sciences, the Society of Antiquaries and the Royal Society, the Berlin Academy, &c., were imitated. Some of the most important of these societies obtain pecuniary assistance from the government; but their number has, during the last century, been greatly multiplied by voluntary efforts, and their utility has been increased by the direction of their efforts to limited and definite subjects.^ Bodies of this sort concentrate a large mass of skilled opinion upon the subject to which their combination refers, and their cor- porate judgment accordingly carries with it a deserved authority among the public. For example, the Eeports of the French Academic des Sciences upon new w^orks and discoveries belonging to the department of physics, have obtained great weight in the scientific world. Dictionaries of the Italian, Spanish, and French languages have been published by academies — the Academia della Crusca, the Eoyal Academy of Madrid, and the Academic Franpaise ; ' Full details respecting literary and scientific societies may be found in tlie Penny Cyclopcedia, Arts. Acadewy and Societies, and in the Conversationslexikon, Arts: Akademie and Kunstschiden. Compare Hallam, Lit. of Europe, vol. I. p. 654 ; vol. II p. 502 ; vol. IV. pp. 89, 560-3. Betliune's Life of Galileo, c. 9. v 232 PKOPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch. it being thought that the combined opinion of such a body would give authority to their exposition of the usage and signification of words. For a similar reason, treatises or collections of papers published or circulated by learned societies, derive an additional weight from the patronage under which they appear, and the authentication which they thus obtain. The scientific congresses, which have grown up in Europe since the Peace, differ from the former societies with like objects, principally in having a more cosmopolitan character, and being independent of national divisions ; by which means the consent of their members, when they agree, is calculated to inspire greater confidence, as being free from all suspicion of local prejudice or partiality.^ Academies for the cultivation of the arts of design have, undoubtedly, contributed to promote that end, though they have been accused of a tendency to confine and pervert the natural taste and genius of the young artist. Academies of painting may, it is true, give authority and currency to a certain style and manner, which, by frequent repetition, and by the imitation of successive disciples, may degenerate into a sort of mechanical and insipid ideal, wanting the freshness, variety, and truth of nature. Such an effect of academic teaching is not, however, necessary ; and it must be considered an accidental abuse of the system, which might be prevented by a proper method of instruction — not a vice inherent in academies.^ § 21. The influence exercised upon opinion by universities and places of learning may be referred to the same head : these are bodies containing studious and learned men, competent to pro- nounce a judgment on the subjects which form a part of the academical course of reading and instruction ; and, by their collection in one place, concentrating a mass of light on these subjects. Every such body ought to be a luminous point, diffusing its rays in all directions to the rest of the com- • As to scientific societies, and their influence upon opinion, see the remarks of Dr. Whewell, Hist, of hid. Sciences, b. VII. c. 6, § 3 ; and as to their beneficial effects, Laplace, cited by Weld, Hist, of Royal Society, vol. I. p. 27. With respect to the scientific congresses, compare the observations of M. Comte, Cours de Phi . Pos. torn. VI. p. 478. - See the remarks of Mr. Payne Knight, upon the cramping influence of academies of painting, and the mannerism which they tend to generate. — Principles of Taste, Part II. c. 2, §§ 116-19. He admits, however, that if 'academical science and precision can be united with feeling and sentiment, there is no doubt that the result would be a degree of perfection hitherto unknown to the art.' IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHOffiH'.*!^ * ^ ^33 muuity.^ The efficiency of universities and other lCTfa3^^*S«;fe^^^ may be assisted and promoted by a public endowment, andby the countenance of the government, in the manner which has been already illustrated. § 22. Political parties likewise are, properly speaking, volun- tary associations for the promotion of certain opinions. This end they attain by their organisation, numbers, and activity, and by the ability, zeal, and character of their leaders. On the means by which they exercise a moral authority, some remarks have been made in a former chapter, in reference to the working of a poli- tical body ; and we shall have occasion to revert to the subject, in treating of the abuses to which tliat influence is liable.* § 23. IV. We have, lastly, to consider the influence of the Periodical Press, through its various organs, so far as it affects the belief and convictions of the public by the weight of its authority. The extensive circulation of periodical publications is a pheno- menon of comparatively recent date. The general diffusion of literary journals was prior, in point of time, to that of political newspapers ; but neither reached a considerable height until a long time after the invention of printing. A censorship of the press was, as we have seen, an institution universally estab- lished throughout Europe soon aft^r the introduction of printing ; and wherever a censorship of the press exists, political newspapers are restrained within narrow limits. A government, exercising a censorship over the press, may permit considerable freedom of discussion upon religion, philosophy, and the history of past ages ; but with regard to the events of the day, and its own acts, its enforcement of silence is in general inexorable. In England, the censorship of the press was substantially maintained until the reign of William III., and therefore it was not until after this period that political newspapers could assume any importance. A ' ' It may perhaps be worth while to remark, that if we except the poets, a few orators, and a few liistorians, the far greater part of the other eminent men of letters, both of Greece and Rome, appear to have been either public or private teachers — generally either of philosophy or of rhetoric' — Wealth of Nations, b. V. ch. 1, art. 3, near the end. This remark of Adam Smith's is more applicable to the Greeks than to the Romans. Dr. Chalmers also observes, that much more than half the distinguished authors of Scotland have been professors, (Ow Endowments,^. 'i^.) Respecting the English universities, and the readiness with Mhich they have adopted new opinions in science, see Whewell, ut sup. b. VII. c. 3, § 2. ' Above, ch. 8, § 3 ; below, ch. 10, § 7. 234 PEOPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY TEE [ch. great variety of flying sheets of news were, indeed, issued during the Civil War ; ^ but Milton in vain attempted to persuade the Long Parliament to abolish the licensing of books. Newspapers appear to have ]iad the same origin in all the countries of Europe. They were at first mere manuscript collec- tions of intelligence respecting the events of the day,^ which were compiled for the use of readers ; and either passed from hand to hand, or were exhibited in an office, where public notices and advertisements were sometimes also received and registered.^ In England, these manuscript papers were called news-letters ; and, after the institution of posts, copies of them were often sent into the country, like other letters. By degrees, these news-letters began to be circulated in print — at first at irregular intervals, then weekly, and at last daily ; but, till after the middle of the last century, they were confined to the statement of a few articles of news, of general interest, and such as could be obtained without much expense, or the maintenance of an extensive correspondence or staff of reporters.'* The names of newspapers (as News-letter^ Diurnal^ Journal, Giornale, Mercury, Gourant, Courier, Public Intelligencer, Intelligenz-hlatt, Postreiter, Relation, Corre- spondent, Zeitung) allude to their character as vehicles of intelli- gence concerning the passing events of tlie day — such as might be sent privately by correspondents through the post, or by a mes- senger.*^ Some periodical essays of a political character, as the Examiner, Freeholder, Craftsman, &c., were, indeed, published in England as early as the reign of Queen Anne, and even earlier ; ^ and a bill to restrain the licentiousness of the press was ordered to be brought into the House of Commons on the 2nd of ' See Chalmers' L?fe of Buddiman, pp. 102-24, and App. 6 ; Disraeli's Curiosities of Literature, p. 55 (ed. 10) ; Johnson's Life of Addison, vol. VII. p. 429. On the meaning of news, see above, p. 97. * Called at Venice notizie scritte, where they were first circulated, about the year 1563. The German Belationeoi were first published in the same centui-y, in the form of letters. The earliest known authentic newspaper printed in England is of the date 1619. See Knight's Political L>ictio7iary, art. Newspapers. ^ See Beckmann, Hist, of Inventions, vol. II. p. 481, ed. 8vo, (art. Papers for con- veying Intelligence.) Upon the combination of advertisements with newspapers, see the Idler, No. 40, (Jan. 20, 1759.) * Upon the news-letters, see Macaulay's History of England, vol. I. pp. 388-91. * Newspapers were sometimes printed so as to resemble manuscripts — Tatler, No. 178 (1710); or a blank page was left, on which a letter could be written. — Knight's Pol. Diet, ubi sup. * For this class of Essayists, see the account in Chalmers' Preface to the Guardian — British Essayists, vol. XVI. pp. xxvi.— xlvi. IX.] CEEATION OF TKUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 235 June, 1712, having for its main object the prevention of anony- mous publications,^ which was doubtless directed against writings of this class. But the importance of the daily newspapers, as vehicles of political discussion and as organs of political party, in addition to their function of registers of news, dates in this country from about the close of the American war.^ On the Continent, none of the political joiu"nals contained more than a mere state- ment of news before the era of the French Eevolution. The Allgemeine Zeitung, the first newspaper of Germany which added original discussion to reports of events, was established in 1798. Even, however, in England, where the licensingof publications had been abolished for a century, the intellectual character of the newspaper press was at a low ebb at the outbreak of the revolu- tionary war ; and it is principally since the Peace that the standard of its writers has been raised. From that time, it has been pro- gressively rising, and, for several years past, all the current poli- tical questions have been discussed in the daily and weekly papers with great ability, research, and intelligence. Daring the same period, its character as a vehicle of information has also been much improved. Not only domestic news, but full and accurate reports of important public proceedings, and accounts of contemporary events in all the countries of the world, furnished by competent correspondents together with criticisms of newly-published books, works of art, &c., are to be found in a well-conducted modern newspaper. § 24. The extraordinary cheapness of the newspaper, in propor- tion to the cost of its contents,^ the regularity as well as celerity of its publication, its circulation gratuitously, or at low rates of postage, through the Post-office, and the variety and interest of its information, and of its comments on passing events, cause it to be » 6 Pari. Hist. 1141. 2 With respect to English newspapers, considered as mere vehicles of intelligence, see the remarks of Johnson in the Idler, No. 7, 27 May, 1758. He there says — 'All foreigners remark that the knowledge of the common people of England is greater than that of raiy other vulgar. This superiority we undoubtedly owe to the riTulets of intelligence whicli are continually trickling among us, which every one may catch, and of which every one partakes.' As to the news-writors in Queen Anne's time, see Taller, No. 18, (by Addison.) On the avidity for news, Spectator, No. 452, (1712.) Compare No. 457. See also Coomoisseur, No. 45, (1754.) 3 The profit derived from the advertisements in a newspaper lowers its price to the public, and improves its quality. If there were no advertisements, the price of a news- paper of equal quality with the present must be greatly increased, and probably no such newspaper could be published. 236 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [en. diffused widely, and to be read by a large part of the public ; to whom it not only furnishes the materials out of which their opinions on the questions of the day are chiefly formed, but often \/^ suggests the opinions themselves. A newspaper affords every day the intelligence which each person wants, without the interruption of a visitor or messenger — and suggests opinions on political and other subjects, without the formality or apparent presumption of a personal adviser. It is a daily supply of information and discussion, of which everybody can take as much or as little as he pleases, and at the times most convenient to himself, without being guilty of any slight or breach of propriety. In every civilised country, therefore, in which the newspaper press is not strictly coerced by the government, it exercises a great influence upon the opinions of the community at large, in different (directions and by different means ; partly by supplying facts as the groundwork of opinions, partly by argumentative discussion, and partly by its mere authority. § 25. Now, in looking on the newspaper press as one of the principal guides of public opinion, and as an authoritative source of practical convictions to a large part of the community, the most prominent characteristic which strikes the observer is, that it is ^^ anonymous — that all the writers officially connected with a news- paper are unknown to the reader, and strictly maintain their incognito. This is certainly the general character of the news- paper press in all countries. The editorial articles are always anonymous in form, and generally anonymous in fact ; though, in some cases, their authorship may be disclosed in private, or may be ascertained upon inquiry. § 26. The anonymous character of the newspaper press is so important and distinctive a feature, and is so closely connected with the nature of its influence as an authoritative guide to opinion, that it is necessary to inquire what are the motives and causes, and what the operation of this system.^ It may be said, in general, that the author of a writing is desirous that his authorship should be known. If the composition contains nothing of which he is ashamed, there is no reason why he should not avow his own production. He probably thinks that the publicity of the fact will contribute to his reputation. There * Compare the i-emarks upon anonymous testimony above, cli. III. § 2. F IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 237 must, therefore, be some cogent reason for t?ie universal and studious concealment of authorship practised by newspaper writers. This reason is to be found in the facilities which it affords for the free expression of opinion on contemporary transactions. A news- paper writer undertakes the invidious oflQce of a public censor. He cites before his tribunal kings, potentates, statesmen, churchmen, demagogues, officers of the government, members of political bodies, and men in every variety of relation in which they play any public part, however exalted or however humble. The high are formidable by their influence and station — the low, by their numbers and powers of union. Having no powerful party or con- nections to support him in undertaking a conflict, in which the superiority of strength is so much against him, it is necessary that he should, by self-concealment, avoid the retaliation which he is sure to provoke. Being unequally matched against so great a pre- ponderance of force, he is compelled to fight in ambush in order to gain the victory. He throws down his gauntlet in the lists, and challenges all the world to the combat; but before he enters the field, he is forced to lower his vizor. Writers in newspapers resemble the guests at a masquerade, who, by disguising their faces, are able to comment with freedom, and without fear of consequences, upon the errors or toibles of their neighbours. They are, as it were, disembodied voices, admonishing people of their faults or omissions — like ' the airy tongues that syllable men's names,' which, in times of alarm and superstition, have been henrd to give w^arning of public danger. In this respect Junius, the magni nominis umbra, the mysterious monitor and castigator of men in high stations, who was never identified with any living person, is the prototype of the newspaper press. The anonymousness of newspaper writing rests on the same ground as the vote by ballot for electoral purposes — viz., the pro- tection against intimidation or undue influence which, in either case, the secrecy affords. Both in writing upon public events, and in giving a vote at a public election, secrecy is ' vindex tacitae libertatis.' Unless the writer concealed his name, he would in many cases be exposed to personal quarrels and threats, and, in still more, to personal solicitations and remonstrances, if he wrote with freedom. If, on the other hand, he avowed his authorship, he would find it necessary, or at least prudent, to suppress 238 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch. unpleasant truths, to spare certain individuals, to avoid giving ofiFence to the powerful, and, in short, to make the same sacrifices to personal feeling and interest, as are made by those who discuss openly the conduct and character of their contemporaries. That this would be the case is proved by the practice, not only of editors and the regular paid contributors to newspapers, but also of most of their casual correspondents, who write under assumed names. If the descendants of every celebrated person of a former age thought it their duty to defend their ancestor's memory, and to fasten a quarrel upon a historian who censured him without reserve, it would be necessary for historians of the past to conceal their names, not less than the contemporary chroniclers who write in newspapers. Bayle, who wrote at a time when it was dangerous for a man to discuss philosophical and religious subjects with freedom, resorted to various devices of false dates and ficti- tious prefaces, in order to divert suspicion and to conceal his authorship. As an example of the dangerous hostility which a free-spoken newspaper writer may excite, the case of Junius may be cited. Sir William Draper, when attacked with severity by Junius, called upon him to drop his anonymous character, and to decide the quarrel by arms. Junius declined this challenge, saying in reply, that ' it was by no means necessary that he should be exposed to the resentment of the worst and the most powerful men in this country ; ' and ' that while Sir William Draper would fight, there were others who would assassinate.' — (^Letter 25.)* Hence, a person attacked by a newspaper is in the same posi- tion as a knight in a tale of chivalry, who finds himself, through the arts of an enchanter, assailed by the blows of an invisible hand, which he feels without being able to perceive their author. Under cover of their concealment, these writers can pass every- where unimpeded : they can act as the privileged spies of the public, without being subjecl;. to the danger of being hanged, if caught within the enemy's lines. They have the same defence of obscurity which the goddess is described as conferring on ^Eneas and his companions, in order to enable them to enter the walls of Carthage with safety, and to scrutinize its inhabitants without being stopped or challenged by the guards. ' On Junius's concealment, see Johnson on the Falkland Llands, vol. VI. p. 204, IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 239 At Venus obscuro gradientes aere ssepsit, Et multo nebulse circum dea fudit amictu ; Cernere ne quis eos neu quis contingere posset, Molirive moram aut veniendi poscere eausas. The newspaper press, so far as it is an organ of opinion, is a political and moral censorship, assumed voluntarily, and exercised by concealed agents. Its operations may be considered as those of a modern Vehmic tribunal, adapted to a civilised state of society. It works by secret instruments, and its sentences are carried into effect with almost resistless force, but by unseen and unknown hands. In a certain sense, the public stands to the newspaper press in the same relation as that in which the government stood to the informers at Venice : it opens a lion's mouth, into which all public accusations can be thrown, without the disclosure of the complainant's name. The concealment of authorship by newspaper writers exempts them from many of the feelings which disturb the judgment of rival politicians, contending in the open arena of public life. For example, being withdrawn from public notice, they are free from personal vanity or rivalry, and from all love of distinction ; they cannot be actuated by a desire of display, or of personal triumph — by the love of power for its sordid advantages — or by a spirit of interested faction. It is only so far as they are connected with, or set in motion by, the leaders or followers of political parties, that newspaper writers can be influenced by these motives. That there must be strong reasons of expediency in favour of a practice so generally adopted, so firmly maintained, and so peaceably acquiesced in, cannot be doubted. On the other hand, it is an unquestionable evil that the public mind should, with respect to the events and public characters of the day, be guided to a great extent by persons who, writing in studied concealment, are exempt from the check of personal responsibility, and can gratify private resentment, private friendship, or any other private feeling, good or bad, at the expense of the public interest, or of the reputation and peace of individuals, without the prospect of moral accountability to any human tribunal — and even in the [ event of the conviction of the publisher for libel, with no fear of individual exposure.^ ' Some strong remarks on the evils arising from the anonymousness of the news- paper press, may be seen in Lord Brougham's Pol. Phil. vol. II. p. 41 ; vol. III. pp. 240 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY TKE [ch. The concealment of authorship likewise encourages, or permits, the adoption of a censorious tone of assumed superiority, of dis- interested regard for the public welfare, and of championship of the nation against the acts of the government, which would per- haps not be consistent with the writer's true position and character if he were known to his readers. In many cases, probably, the assumed is as unlike the real character of the writer, as the cha- racter of the tragedy-hero to that of the actor who represents him. It might be thouglit that, as the original articles in newspapers are all anonymous, they would pass merely for the intrinsic value of the facts and arguments which they contain, and that they would be devoid of any extrinsic and adventitious authority. Such, however, is not the fact ; newspapers are not like single anony- mous placards, issuing from an unascertained source. In some cases, indeed, the authority of a newspaper may even greatly exceed that of a statement or argument supported by the author's name. A newspaper, it is to be observed, by its continuous publication at the same office, and under the same title,' and by a unity of management under the same proprietary, acquires a species of individual character, similar to that of a corporation, or club, or regiment, or mercantile partnership, or other voluntary association, kept in existence by the per- petual succession and renewal of its members. It is, like them, a 'persona moralis ; and although its writers do not appear before the public in their personal identity, and in many cases, doubt- less, are unknown to one another, yet they all depend on a common centre ; they are selected and remunerated by a common employer ; their several movements are regulated by a common mind, and according to a uniform plan. In this manner, a newspaper can acquire a corporate character for accuracy and extent of intelii- g-ence, for correctness of statement, and even for soundness of judgment and strength of reasoning — which character is com- 122, 177. Compare also some observations on the same subject, in the collection of essays entitled 'Friends in Council,' p. 163. ''■ Any title or other mark by which a newspaper or other vendible article is dis- tinguished, is recognised by our law as the subject of property, and a court of equity ■will restrain all unauthorised persons from pirating it. Johnson, in liis Life of Addison, speaking of the newspapers published in England during the civil war, states, that ' when any title grew popular, it was stolen by the antagonist, who, by this stratagem, conveyed liis notions to those who would not have received him, had he not worn the appearance of a friend.' — Works, vol. VII. p. 429. The same fraud con- tinued to be practised in the next century : see Addison's Freeholder, No. 65. I IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 241 po?ite —the general result of its management ; and it is formf^d from the aggregate writings of its contributors, but is distinct from that of any one of them. Now, by taking advantage of this corporate character, but at the same time sheltering himself under the cover of anonymous authorship, the official newspaper writer secures the protection of secrecy, while he writes, nevertheless, with a ccmsiderable weight of authority. He obtains all the adventitious strength which may be derived from the character, connections, and influence of the newspaper, considered as a moral entity ; while he escapes from all personal responsibility, and is not known by, or accountable to, any one but his own employer. Another important incident of the corporate character Of d newspaper, and of its continuous existence, is, that it may be tlie organ of a certain political party or interest, and may thus come to be regarded as the authentic representative of their views. In this way, again, it may acquire an authority extrinsic3 to the mei'e anonymous effect of the arguments or opinions which it circulates. From the relation in which newspapers stand to the public—- being dependent on their sale for their very existence ^ — it is natural that they should seek to render their opinions acceptable to a large number of purchasers, and thus they often follow, as well as lead, public opinion. Even in these cases, however, they contribute to give it a more clearly marked form, and to turn it into a more definite course ; and their authority with their readers is enhanced, rather than diminished, by a dextrous adapta- tion of their suggestions and censures to pre-existing opinions or sentiments. We see, therefore, that by its continuity of character, by' ])ecoming a party organ, and by sometimes following as well as leading public opinion, a newspaper obtains a considerable authority, independent of the force of its reasoning, and that this authority is directed by Writers who, being anonjmousj are exempt from all sense of personal responsibility* Such is the reverse of the picture Which We have contemplated above. Such are the principal evils incidental to the anonymous authorship of newspapers. The system itself, however, rests, as we have seen, on a solid • It is true that the advertisements form a large part of the profits of a modern Eaglieh newspaper, but the number of advortisements depends chiefly on the extent of the eircuhition. 242 PKOPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [en. basis of expediency. The public has a paramount interest in the free expression of opinion upon passing events, and in the free censure of the public acts of contemporaries ; and, without anony- mous writing, this freedom cannot practically exist. Besides, any attempt to compel the true writers to disclose their names would be futile.^ The law can only compel some responsible party to undertake the paternity of a newspaper article; but it cannot make the paternity a question of fact. It can do nothing for creating a moral and personal responsibility in the real writers. It cannot get beyond the registered editor and the publisher. By these means, the author escapes, while the newsvendor suffers — reversing the proverbial fate of the great and little : Low skulks the hind beneath the rage of power, And leaves the wealthy traitor in the Tower. \ The conclusion at which we arrive is, that however liable to abuse the anonymous authorship of newspapers may be, the practice is necessary, in order to secure the most important purpose of a newspaper, and therefore ought to be acquiesced in, even if it could be easily prevented by law, which is not the case. The proper object, therefore, to be aimed at is, to provide securi- ties against the abuses of the system, and to obtain its advantages with as little admixture of evil as practicable — to extract all the honey, and to neutralise some of the poison. One important protection against the abuses of this anony- mous writing is derived from the vigilant watch which the several newspapers are led, by the spirit of competition, to keep up on one another. The rivalry of trade prevents them from combining for any common purpose ; and the censure which they cast on each other is at least as severe and unsparing as that which they direct against any member of the public. Tliis mutual rivalry of newspapers affords to the public many securities against the abuses, to which the absence of personal responsibility in the writers would otherwise give rise. The private feelings and interests of one writer are not shared by others ; and as the newspapers do not make common cause, both sides of a question can obtain a hearing through their columns. What one newspaper attacks, another defends ; what one asserts, * As was stated above, page 234, an attempt was made in Queen Anne's reign to compel anonymous writers to disclose their names ; but the bill introduced into parlia- ment for this purpose was dropped. IX J CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 243 another contradicts : there is argument against argument, decla- mation against declamation, ridicule against ridicule, invective against invective. All misstatements of fact, all misrepresen- tations and exaggerations, may be exposed ; all sophisms may be refuted ; by this rude but effectual process of pleading, the question at issue is fully discussed, even if the truth is not at last worked out ; and the sentence of the judicium populare is given after hearing the arguments of all parties. Hence, the competi- tion existing between the various newspapers raises their character, by rendering them careful in their statements and reasonings. Being constantly watched by rivals, who are not likely to treat their failings with tenderness, they seek to make their performances come up to their professions, and to furnish the accurate informa- tion and enlightened opinions which they undertake to propagate. If, for example, any newspaper were to falsify a document which it reprinted, in order to support a particular view of a political question, it would infallibly be exposed by other newspapers ; and its circulation would probably be diminished, by the want of con- fidence in the accuracy and honesty of its information which such conduct would create among the public. The deliberate falsifica- tions, as well as suppressions of truth, in which the Moniteur indulged under Napoleon's direction, could not have been at- tempted with a free press. The certainty of detection, as well as the disclosure of the truth from other sources, would have given to the public an effectual security against such a system of fraudulent misrepresentation, intended to mislead the people with respect to matters in which they were deeply interested. In this? manner, the mutual censorship of the newspapers — a censorship not less rigid than that which they exercise over the community at large ■ — increases their fitness to serve as guides of opinion, and raises their authority with the public, both as reporters of facts, and as judges of public affairs. It may be added, that the same newspaper, by inserting com- munications and documents on opposite sides of a question, and by reporting public discussions in which speakers of different opinions take a part, contributes to furnish materials for a fair judgment, and to neutralise the effect of a too exclusive advocacy. A news- paper thus often supplies both bane and antidote—' Una manua vobis vulnus opemque feret.' It is only in countries governed by popular institutions, that the newspaper press is free ; and in these countries, although the B 2 244 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch,- conduct of public men is constantly open to anonymous censure in the newspapers, they have an opportunity, in parliamentary and other legally-constituted assemblies, of explaining and justifying their own acts and opinions ; and as these statements are made by persons in a conspicuous and recognised station, and subject to the completest personal reponsibility, they outweigh, in authority, the remarks of antagonists who maintain their anonymous posi- tion, and do not come forward as accusers. When the accused appears in person, to defend himself against the charges of an unavowed accuser, he enjoys, at least, the advantage of a position of superior credibility and authority. Although he cannot retaliate upon unknown assailants, he has at least the command of the most effectual means of self-defence. Ultimately, therefore, the balance between an unacknowledged attack and an acknow- ledged defence may be fairly struck. Another preventive of the ill effects resulting from the anony- mous authorship of newspapers is to be derived from remembering, that they are merely the organs of the proprietors, and are written I by persons whom the latter employ — and that they are not invested j with a representative character. Without this caution, the ' abstract ' we ' of a newspaper — in this context, an impersonal pronoun of unknown reference — is likely to impose upon an unreflecting reader ; and, at all events, the concealment of the writer's name may, upon the principle of omne ignotum pro tnirifico, create an impression of some mysterious agency — an effect of secrecy similar to that which induced Walter Scott to conceal the authorship of his novels. Above all, a newspaper ought never to be considered as the exponent of national opinion, / nor, without decisive evidence, as the accredited organ of a govern- ^1 r^ent. Unless this caution be observed, the indiscretion of a single editor — writing without any due sense of personal responsi- bility — might, if his volunteer assumption of the representative character were recognised abroad, give deadly offence to foreign nations, and render his own government accountable for his opinions. The general results of the above remarks on newspapers may be summed up thus : — 1, That, in spite of their anonymous authorship, newspapers acquire an extensive influence over opinion, by the authority derived from their corporate character ; 2, That the anonymous authorship places the public under the direction of guides who have no sense of personal responsibility ; .X,] CEEATION OF TRUSTWOKTHY AUTHORITY. 245 but, 3, That this evil must be endured for the sake of insuring a free censure of passing events ; and that our main efforts should be aimed at the establishment of the best practicable securities against the incidental abuses of the concealment of authorship.^ § 27. With regard to Revieius and Magazines, the other important branch of the periodical press, the same observations as to their continuous character may be made as in the case of news- papers. They consist of a set of original critiques and essays, on literary, scientific, historical, political, and other subjects, which are written by contributors selected and employed by an editor, and are published at stated periods under his directions. The editor is in general unknown to the public ; but the previous management of the Eeview, and the character which it has thus acquired, afford a reasonable ground for expecting, that the selec- tion ot the papers for future numbers will be made on similar principles, and with equal discrimination. The early political journals, as we have already seen, contained mere announcements of news, without comment or discussion. The literary journals, on the other hand, from their first establishment, aimed at higher objects. Being less exposed to the jealousy and suspicion of the government, they were allowed to pursue a more unimpeded career. The literary reviews and miscellanies, which began to appear at the end of the seventeenth and commencement of the eighteenth century, gave not only accounts of books, but judgments upon them. They entered into free and intelligent criticism of the most important subjects of speculation, and they bound all the States of Europe into a republic of letters, by circu- lating through it a knowledge of all important works, wherever published. By these means — in which they were materially assisted by the recent institution of government posts — they helped to counteract the narrow repulsive spirit of political, sectarian, and national divisions.^ Periodical publications of this class are often devoted to a special department of literature or science, or to some professional subject, such as divinity, law, medicine, the military art, ' The views of M. Comte, upon the influence of the newspaper press, may be seen in his Cours de Phil. Pos. torn. VI. p. 410. ' The Journal des Savans was established in 1665 ; Bayle's Nouvelles de la Repuh- lique des Lettres, in 1684 ; Leclerc's Bihliotheque Universelle, in 1686 ; the Leipsic Acta Eruditorum, in 1682 ; the Gentleman' s Magazine and the London Magazine were not established till 1731 and 1732 ; the Monthly Review ^ in 1749. Upon the early reviews, see Hallani, Lit. of Eurojpe, vol. IV. e. 7, §§ 24-7 ; Disraeli, Curiosities of Lit. p. 4. 246 PEOPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch. agriculture, mathematics, &c. In this case, the periodical work has an authority, derived not only from its previous management, but also from its limitation to a definite department, and its possession of a professional character. There are likewise newspapers devoted to a special subject (as medicine or horticulture), but they are less numerous. Articles in Eeviews generally appear with the names of the authors, in France, Grermany, and the other continental countries. In England and the United States, reviews are almost always anony- mous ; but the secrecy of authorship is not so strictly maintained as in newspapers. In either case, an article appearing in a Review, possesses whatever authority it may derive from the previous character of the periodical work in which it is published.* A similar remark applies to the Transactions of learned societies. Such societies confer an authority upon the paper of a member or contributor, by selecting it for the honours of publica- tion, and giving it to the world under their auspices. All publications which appear successively in a connected Series involve the same principle : they imply a systematic and uniform management, and the deliberate selection of an editor or manager, whose endorsement gives a currency to each number. The celebrated collections of essays, which once had so large a circulation in, this country— from the Tatler and Spectator to the Mambler, Idler, and Connoisseur — were founded on this principle.^ There was unity of management, and the excellence of some numbers compensated for the inferiority of others, while the spirit of all was similar. The well-known series of theological tracts published by Mr. Newman and his friends, at Oxford, like- wise derived a portion of their importance from the circumstance, that they were all the authentic exponents of the opinions of a certain school, vouched for by their admission into the collection. ' Speaking of Young's optical discoveries, promulgated in the early part of this century, Dr. Whewell says — * There was in England no visible body of men fitted by their knowledge and character to pronounce judgment on such a question, or to give the proper impulse and bias to public opinion. The Eoyal Society, for instance, had not for a long time, by custom or institution, possessed or aimed at such functions. The writers of " reviews " alofie-^self-constituted and secret tribunals — claimed this kind of authority.' — Hist, of Jnd, Sci. vol. II. p. 431. ^ Upon the origin of the clasg of periodical publications, known by the name of the Essat/ists, see the remarks of Johnson, in his Life of Addison, and Chalmers' Preface to his collection. The Tatler combined the Essayist and the News-letter. IX.] CKEATION OF TRUSTWOETHY AUTHORITY. 247 It is from this principle that the collections of works published by societies (such as the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, and other similar associations) derive their importance.^ Encyclopaedias, arranged in an alphabetical order, are an im- portant class of publications, which have sprung up since the beginning of the eighteenth century, and have been formed in general by the contributions of numerous writers, each writing upon the subject with which he is best acquainted.^ The autho- rity of any such compilation is derived from a cause similar to that which gives authority to a periodical work — viz., the continuity of management, and the general discretion and consistency shown in the choice of writers and materials. § 28. It is scarcely needful to add, that those who assume to exercise the function of literary censors, through the periodical press, ought to exercise it with an honest and conscientious judg- ment, and that they ought not to abuse the privilege conferred by anonymous writing, for the purpose of unduly depressing or elevating a new work by unmerited praise or blame. Private friendship, private enmity, party feeling, literary jealousy, and the partialities of booksellers, however, frequently bias the judgment of critics. Even the sense of personal responsibility is no safeguard against the operation of such disturbing motives ; as we know from too many examples in literary history. The influence of such motives is more to be feared in anonymous writing, and ought to be carefully guarded against by a judicious and candid editor. Judges of literature and science, although they do not, like those who exercise a criminal and civil jurisdiction, decide on the lives and fortunes of men — nevertheless, by their arguments and authority, influence the reputation of authors, aud the fate of books and opinions, and thus affect the serious interests of society. Their function ought, therefore, to be discharged with a due sense of its importance ; their sentences ought to be given with inde- pendence, and without favour and affection, but, at the same time, in a spirit of fairness and candour, and without jealousy, malice, or love of detraction. The abuses of the system of literary puffing — a mischievous perversion of this power — having survived the well-known ridicule ' See Convcrsationslexikon, art. Vereine zur verhreitung cjutcr huchcr. ' For the history of encyclopaedias, see Macvcy Napier's Introduction to the Ency- clopcBdia Britannica, ed. 6. \y 248 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch. of Sheridan, have been argumentatively exposed by Mr. Macaulay, from whose able essay I borrow the following remarks (vol. I. p. 277): ' The opinion of the great body of the reading public is very materially influenced, even by the unsupported assertions of those who assume a right to criticise. Nor is the public altogether to blame on this account. Most, even of those who have really a great enjoyment in reading, are in the same state with respect to a book, in which a man, w^ho has never given particular attention to the art of painting, is wdth respect to a picture. Every man who has the least sensibility or imagination derives a certain pleasure from pictures. Yet a man of the highest and finest intel- lect might, unless he had formed his taste by contemplating the best pictures, be easily persuaded by a knot of connoisseurs that the worst daub in Somerset House was a miracle of art. If he deserves to be laughed at, it is not for his ignorance of pic- tures, but for his ignorance of men. He knows that there is a delicacy of taste in painting which he does not possess ; that he cannot distinguish hands, as practised judges distinguish them ; that he is not familiar with the finest models ; that he has never looked at them with close attention ; and that, when the general effect of a piece has pleased him or displeased him, he has never troubled himself to ascertain why : when, there- fore, people whom he thinks more competent to judge than himself, and of whose sincerity he entertains no doubt, assure him that a particular work is exquisitely beautiful, he takes it for granted that they must be in the right. He returns to the examination, resolved to find or imagine beauties ; and if he can work himself up into something like admiration, he exults in his own proficiency. 'Just such is the manner in which nine readers out of ten judge of a book. They are ashamed to dislike what men, who speak as having authority, declare to be good. At present, how- ever contemptible a poem or a novel may be, there is not the least difficulty in procuring favourable notices of it from all sorts of publications, daily, weekly, and monthly. In the meantime, little or nothing is said on the other side. The author and the publisher are interested in crying up the book. Nobody has any very strong interest in crying it down. Those who are best fitted to guide the public opinion think it beneath them to expose mere nonsense. ix.J CKEATION OF THUSTWOKTHY AUTHORITY. 249 and uomfort themselves by reflecting that suoh popularity cannot last.' § 29. We have now traced the principal centres from which opinions are diffused in the present state of society, and have en- deavoured to show how far the guides of opinion are invested with authority, and whence this authority arises. We have also at- tempted to indicate the means by which that authority may be rendered more trustworthy, and what are the limits within which v; it can be properly trusted. With respect to the influence of the government upon the opinions of the people, we have seen that one essential postulate for its wholesome operation is, that it should not outstep its proper province. A government may, as in the Oriental countries, . keep down its subjects by mere force ; it may, as has been done / / in some free States, conciliate support by corruption ; but both ^ these are short-lived expedients. The only stable foundation for a f - government is its moral authority. So long as it is looked up to with respect, confidence, and esteem, by the body of the people, it U stands on a rock. Now, for a government to acquire a real moral .Ir^ authority, it must fulfil two (among other) conditions. It must do well those things which it is fitted to do ; and it must abstain k from attempting to do those things which it is not fitted to do. In general, a government violates both these rules. It attempts many things which it is ill-qualified, if not wholly unable, to per- form ; and having wasted its force upon distant impossibilities, it omits to discharge those functions which lie close within its reach. If, however, it keeps steadily within its proper province, and within that province exercises its powers with ability, discretion, and public spirit, it can scarcely fail to acquire weight and authority with the people, and will thus be able really to guide their opinions, so far as it is competent to guide them. With respect to public instruction, ( whether it be controlled by learned bodies, or churches, or voluntary associations,) the cardinal maxim is, that as all men cannot be j udges of all things, the Iciii ncr should be instructed in the conclusions and results at which the most eminent authorities in each department of know- ledge have arrived, and should, as far as possible, be furnished with an instrument for testing the soundness of the method which each original inquirer may employ. To the application of this maxim there appears to be no limit. It may be extended from instruction 250 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch. in logic, and the methods of scientific investigation, to the cautions against current delusions and other impostures which may be given to the children of a village school; from the rules for the selection of counsellors on state affairs and of professional advisers, to the marks by which even the working-classes might be taught to dis- tinguish honest and well-intentioned guides, from persons who seek to make a profit by practising on their credulity. The newspapers, and other publications of the periodical press, though they may be conducted by persons writing under an im- perfect sense of responsibility, have nevertheless, both in this country and on the Continent, assumed a new character, and risen to a higher intellectual level, since the Peace of 1815. Indepen- dently of the opinions which they circulate, they furnish a large repertory of positive facts, authenticated by the endorsement of respectable publishing establishments ; and they form a powerful counter-influence to the superstitious fancies and flying rumours which prevail in countries destitute of an accurate daily chronicle of contemporary events. In attempting to find the means of giving currency to sound opinions, by the influence of a predominant authority, it is to be borne in mind, that there are certain classes of opinions which it is more important to diffuse among the community than others. In many cases, the knowledge of a subject may be confined to a few persons, and yet the public may derive as much benefit from it as if it were generally diffused. Provided that the knowledge is on record, and that it is not concealed from the public, it is immaterial that many persons should make themselves masters of the subject. It is to be wished that the knowledge should be ac- cessible to all the world; but not that all the world should actually possess it. Thus, when we say that a court of justice is open to the public, we do not expect that all the public will demand ad- mission. Most mechanical and other inventions connected with physical science, as well as remedies belonging to the practice of medicine, fall under this head. So long as the contrivance or work pan be produced, and it is not one of the artes deperditce ; so long a« the medical remedy or treatment is known ; it can be obtained by purchase, or by the employment of a professional man, without any knowledge or understanding of its principles. Little advantage would arise if the whole community understood the art of manu- facturing glass, or gunpowder, or of making watches. The diffusion of the practice of these arts would not tend to their perfection ; OF THE '^ I VEHS I T ix.l CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHO^nX' 251 it would not cheapen their products, or extend their^e ; on the .^ contrary, the diffusion of such practical knowledge would counter- act the division of labour, by which production is facilitated and cheapened. So, when the knowledge of the Koman formulae of actions, which had been kept secret by the patrician order, was divulged by the theft of the scribe Flavins, the public were bene- fited by the disclosure, though the number of persons who actually studied them was small. The knowledge of Sanscrit, likewise, was at one time preserved as an inviolable secret by the Brahmins ; at last it was divulged ; and the world has since obtained all the advantage which can be derived from a knowledge of Sanscrit, although the number of persons who have mastered the language has been very limited. But if the subject be one on which each person is required to act for himself, and he cannot procure what he wants by exchange from others, then it is important that correct opinions in relation to it should be diffused through the community, and that all people should be able to guide their judgment in the matter by a reference to a trustworthy authority. This is the case with most of the opinions by which men steer their course, both in public and private life. In all cases where a man is called upon to act, or to decide, he ought to have such a store of those opinions which immediately preside over practice, as will enable him to direct his own course with safety ; or, if he be not so provided, he ought to know how to chuse competent and honest guides. If, by a judicious combination of the means above indicated, this end could be approximately attained, the influence of impos- tors would be diminished ; violence would be more rarely resorted - to, especially by crowds and organised bodies ; the utility of a strict observance of law and order, for all classes, would be more generally recognised ; the evidence of positive facts and the light of experience would be more uniformly consulted ; reason would be more in the ascendant, and would constantly exercise a greater influence over a larger portion of the population ; and discussion of all sorts would be at once more free, more tolerant, more intel- ligent, and more fruitful of results. As a consequence of these influences, public opinion would be more enlightened and wary, and less prone to run headlong after an ephemeral object of admiration or hatred. Its general chai'acter would be less puerile and more manly. To whatever extent the changes which have been just indicated 252 PKOPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS. [ch. may ever actually take place, it is certain that the movement of Western Em-ope, but especially of England, during the last thirty- five years, has been in a direction coincident with this progressive tendency. The movement may have been retarded, counteracted, and crossed by numerous influences, some intentional, some fortuitous ; but such has been the constant inclination of its course, and such it may be expected to continue, perhaps with an accelerated velocity. X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 253 CHAPTER X. ON THE ABUSES OF THE PHINCIPLE Ot At/THOKlfY* § 1. In previous parts of this Essay^ an attempt has beell made to trace out the proper province of authority in matters of opinion — to show what are the cases in which we ought to be guided by the opinion of others, as well as to give practical tests for selecting the persons who are most competent to act as guides, in questions both of speculation and practice, and for dis- tinguishing them from impostors or pretenders to knowledge, who woidd only mislead their followers* If these indications are sufficient, they would operate as preservatives against abuses of the principle of authority ; if the right use and application of the principle is secured, its perversion is avoided. Nevertheless, the evils arising from a misdirection of confiding followers, by persons exercising an influence over their opinion, are so great and nume- rous, that it may be useful to exemplify in detail some of the more prominent forms of the abuse in question* § 2. It has been already shown, that great respect is dne to the opinions of persons who have devoted their lives to the study of sciences, have employed upon it the powers of an acute and vigorous intellect, and have been actuated by an honest desire of discovering and teaching the truth. This respect, however, should be the willing obedience of a freeman — not the blind sub- mission of a slave : the teacher to whose authority we bow ought to be regarded rather as an adv ise r and counsellor, than as a dicta tor and master . There may be an excessive reverence for scientific doctrines handed down from a former age, and received among existing philosophers, which may check the due freedom of investigation, perpetuate error, prevent originality of thought and the discovery of new truths, and maintain science in a stationary and unimproving state. 'Although (says Lord Bacon) the position 254 ABUSER OF THE PRINCIPLE OE AUTHORITY. [ch. be good, " oportet discentem credere," yet it must be coupled with this, "oportet edoctum judicare " — for disciples do owe unto masters only a temporary belief, and a suspension of their own judgment, until they be fully instructed — and not an absolute resignation, or perpetual captivity.' * Whatever deference is justly due to great names and competent judges, they are not to be regarded as infallible — as the oracles of a scientific religion — or as courts of philosophy without appeal. Those who come after the great discoverers of truth, and teachers of mankind, may, though endowed with inferior intellectual gifts, retread the same ground — they may verify what is correct, and reject what is erroneous or doubtful. They may remove subordinate defects, and complete parts which have been left imperfect, in systems which they could not have conceived. Although they could not have designed the plan, or laid out the foundations, they may assist in bringing the edifice to perfection. The great and successful insurrection against the authority of a defective scientific system, was in the two centuries which suc- ceeded the invention of printing — ^when the scholastic philosophy, founded chiefly upon the logical and metaphysical writings of Aristotle, and developed under the influence of the Church, was dethroned.^ This revolution, although it had been prepared by a long series of minor insurgents, as well as by the positive researches of Gralileo and Descartes, was mainly consummated by Bacon ; and he may be considered as the type of this great intel- lectual movement. According to the poetical tribute of Cowley, Bacon was the main author of this triumph of Eeason over Authority. Authority — which did a body boast, Though 'twas but air condensed, and stalk'd about, Like some old giant's more gigantic ghost, To terrify the learned rout — ' Adv. of Learning, b. I. (vol. I. p. 45.) Compare Cicero, De Nat. Deor, I. 5 : 'Quin etiam obest plerumqtie lis qui discere volunt auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur. Desinunt enim suum judicium adhibere : id habent ratum quod ab eo quem probant, judicatum vident.' See also Sir T. Browne's Vulgar Errors, b. I. c. 6 & 7. ' Oportet in ea re maxime, in qua vitse ratio versatur, sibi quemque confidere, suo- qUe judicio ac propriis sensibus niti ad investigandani et perpendendam v'eritatera, quam credentem alienis erroribus decipi,tanquamipsum rationis expertem.' — Lactant. Biv. Inst. II. p. 146; ed. Spark. 2 See Whewell's Philosophy of Inductive Sciences, b. XII. c. 7. Compare a passage from the preface to the first vol. of the Transactions of the Academy of Sciences at X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 255 With the plain magic of true Reason's light, He chased out of our sight ; Nor suffered living men to be misled By the vain sliadows of the dead : To graves, from whence it rose, the conqiiered phantom fled.* § 3. When, however, we speak of the triumph of Reason over Authority, accomplished by the establishment of the Baconian inductive method in the place of the scholastic philosophy, and adopt the received language on this subject, we must be careful not to confound, under the name of submission to authority, two distinct intellectual defects. A blind spirit of routine in philosophy, and a passive assent to existing dogmas, without verification, or a really independent scrutiny, is not identical with belief on the principle of authority. By Authority, we have in this Essay understood, in conformity with general usage, the influence which determines the belief-^., without a comprehension of the proof.^ But the scientific student, who servilely follows a beaten track, does not necessarily accept opinions upon the mere credit of his master, and without under- standing the evidence on which they rest. He may, on the contrary, have gone through all the reasonings propounded by his guide — may have perused and reperused all his writings — have commented select portions of them — interpreted the obscure, and illustrated the concise passages — and reproduced his doctiines in compends and epitomes. He may be a slavish follower, but a slave both voluntarily and upon conviction. Paris, quoted by Dr. Whewell, ib., vol. II. p. 428; also Hallam, Lit. of Eiirope, vol. II. c. 3. • ' Cowley's Epistle to the Royal Society. Compare Dryden's verses, in his Epistle to Dr. Charleton — The longest tyranny that ever swayed Was that wherein our ancestors betrayed Their freeborn reason to the Stagirite, And made his torch their universal light. * * * Among the assertors of free reason's claim Our nation's not the least in worth or fame. The world to Bacon does not only owe Its present knowledge, but its future too. Vol. XL p. lU; ed. Scott. 2 Thus, Cicero speaks of his belief being influenced, not merely by the arguments, but by the authority of great philosophers : ' Nee solum ratio ac disputatio impulit, ut ita crederem ; aed nobilitas etiam summorum philosophorum et auctorltas.' — De Seneet. c. 21. 7 256 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHOPJTY. [cii. Now the revolution in philosophy, which is represented by the name of Bacon, must be considered mainly as a change of scien- tific method, and the consequent substitution of a set of sound doctrines, of which the proof was understood, for a set of unsound doctrines, of which the proof was equally understood. The Arabian and scholastic philosophy, which had prevailed during the long stationary period after the extinction of Greek civilisation, was doubtless founded upon the writings of Aristotle ; but the scientific writers of that period did not bow to the authority of Aristotle, Without examining, understanding, and reproducing his reasons. They were, as Dr. Whewell has remarked,' distinguished by their commentatorial spirit — they translated the Aristotelian treatises, and illustrated them with elaborate expositions — they reduced the logical, physical, and metaphysical theories of their teacher into a connected system : but their assent was given to the argument, not to the conclusion without the proof. They repeated the Aristotelian philosophy as a system of deductive science, not as a series of axioms. In truth, the schoolmen adopted the physical tenets of Aristotle, as a modern astronomer adopts the Principia of Newton ; they studied the system, imderstood the proofs, and assented to the conclusions.^ Men such as Thomas Aquinas cannot be charged with a tame and sluggish acquiescence in con- clusions, without troubling themselves to examine their connection with the premises. The error of the schoolmen, in fact, consisted in the adoption of a defective scientific method — in the unin- quiring acceptance of first principles, false, indistinct, and unverified— and in reasoning deductively from propositions, whose truth had not been established by proper preliminary processes. They received the Aristotelic treatises as the sum of a perfect philosophical system, not as the provisional researches of a pro- gressive science. This error is not identical with a servile defer- ence to authority. The schoolman who drew all his lessons from Aristotle— the ' Maestro di color che sanno,' as he was called by Dante — might have believed nothing on the mere authority of the philosopher ; unless those first principles, which he doubtless considered as intuitive truths, may be considered as derived from ' See his account of physical science during the stationary period of the middle ages, in his Hist, oj the Ind. ScL b. IV. '■^ 'Almost the whole career of the Greek schools of philosophy — of the schoolmen of Europe in the middle ages— of the Arabian and Indian philosophers, shawls us that we may have extreme ingt-nuity and subtlety, invention and connection, demonstration and method ; and yet that out of these germs no physical science may be developed.'-^ Whkwktx, Hist, of Ind. Sci. vol. I. p. 8. X.] AEU8ES OF THE rRINCIPLP: OF AUTHORITY. 257 this source. He mastered the philosopliical system in vogue, and imderstood its logical connection ; but it was built upon an unsound basis — and into the sufficiency of this basis, owing to. the faulti- ness of his methods of investigation, he omitted to inquire. A modern student, who has access to the results of a better method, may exhibit equal want of originality of thought, and may merely repeat the deductions of his predecessors without verification or improvement; but if the conclusions are correct, he would not be censured for an undue submission to authority. On the one hand, then, a man who never adopts a speculative opinion without under- standing its grounds may, from sectarian prejudice or some other cause, be infected with the intellectual slavishnessof the scholastic or Arabian period, and may receive syllogisms as if they were the responses of an oracle. But, on the other hand, a man who is strongly imbued with the progressive principle of science — who verifies all results by a rigid scrutiny within a certain circle of subjects, may, with respect to other subjects, cherish the principle of authority, convinced that he has not time for all things. § 4. Bacon is very explicit and earnest in refuting the fallacy, which confounded a respect for opinions handed down from antiquity^ with the respect due to the opinions of the aged.^ At a time when a superstitious veneration for traditionary doctrines in philosophy still prevailed, there was a confusion between the age of a man and the age of the world ; and it was supposed that, as an old man is more experienced, and therefore more able to judge, than a young man, so a remote generation, as being more ancient, is wiser than the existing one. Bacon exposed this some- what ob\'ious fallacy by the pithy sentence : ' Antiquitas sseculi j liven tus mundi ' — justly remarking, that each generation is older than its predecessor, on the same principle that an aged man is older than a youth ; and that the latest generation ought to be the wisest, as being furnislied with the most ample stock of experi- ments and observations. The mistake arose from not perceiving ' See Adv. of Learning, vol. II. p. 46 ; Nov. Org. 1. I. aph. 83. The remark had been previously made by Giordano Bruno. See Whewell's Phil, of Ind. Sci. vol. II. p. 361. Compare Hallam, Lit. of Europe, vol. IV. oh. 9, § 45. Pascal, Pcnsecs, Part I. art. 1. Lactantius complains that the heathen religions wore maintained simply on account of their antiquity : ' Hse sunt religiones, quas sibi a majoribus suis traditas, pertina- cis.sime tueri ac defendere perseverant: nee considerant quales sint, sed ex hoc proba- ta s iitque veras esse confidunt, quod eas veteres tradiderunt : tantaque est auctoritas vetustatis, ut inquirere in earn scelus esse dicatur.'— Z>iy. List. II. p. 144. Compare above, p. 79. 8 258 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [en. that, in order to compare the age of the world with that of a man, we ought in each case to reckon dowmvards ; according to which mode of calculation, the nineteenth century is older than the six- teenth, and the sixteenth than the eleventh.^ Each successive generation enjoys the benefit of the experience and knowledge of its predecessors, together with its own ; and if science he in a pro- gressive state, the judgment of the most recent generation ought to be the maturest and best. It is by efforts which, being succes- sive, require time ; by the gradual rejection of errors, and dis- covery of new truths ; by the combined attempts at forming and perfecting a technical vocabulary and a philosophical arrangement, that sciences are advanced. Hence Truth may. with Bacon, be called the daughter of Time rather than of Authority.^ In an enlightened and progressive state of society, sound opinions gradually, in the long run, and in the majority of cases, prevail over error ; for, if they were not thus predominant, society wotdd cease to be progressive. Through the knowledge and skill of the steersman, they generally make at last a successful voyage down the great stream of time ; while false theories, though they may at first be driven on by a favourable gale, are allowed soon to drift upon the quick-sands and breakers, and to be lost in oblivion.^ ' The nature of this mistake may be illustrated by comparing two chronological eras — in one of which the yenTS are reckoned backwards, in the other, forwards: for example, the years before and after the birth of Clirist. "We must not suppose that, because the year 150 a.d, is later than the year 100 a.d., therefore the year 150 b.c. is later than the year 100 b.c. In like manner, we must not suppose that, because a man of sixty was born before a man of twenty, therefore the sixteenth century is older than the eighteenth. 2 Auctores vero quod attinet, summae pusillanimitatis est, auctoribus infinita tribu- ere, auctori autem auctorum, atque adeo omnis auctoritatis, Tempori, jus suum dene- gare. Recte enim Veritas, Temporis filia dicitur, non Auctoritatis. — Nov. Org. lib. I. aph. 84. ^ Lord Bacon expresses a different view on this point, which is scarcely consistent with his own dictum, as to Truth being the daughter of Time. ' Another error .... is a conceit that of former opinions or sects, after variety and examination, the best hath still prevailed, and suppressed the rest; ... as if the multitude, or the wisest for the multitude's sake, were not ready to give passage rather to that which is popular and superficial, than to that which is substantial and profound ; for the truth is, that time seemeth to he of the nature of a ri'rr or stream, which canneth down to us that which is light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that which is weighty and solid.' — Adv. of Learning, vol. II. p. 47. Compare Nov. Org. 1. I. aph. 77 : ' Sed temporibus insequentibus [after Cicero], ex inundatione barbarorum in imperium Romanum, post- quam doctrina humana velut naufragium perpessa esset, turn demum philosophise A ris- totelis et Platonis, tanquam tabula ex materia leviore et minus solidd, per fluctus tem- porum servatse sunt.' It seems to me that, if this view were correct, all improvement of mankind, in successive ages, would be impossible. X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OP AUTHOKITY. 259 § 5. Whatever errors may arise from a blind and fanatical submission of the judgment to the opinions of leaders of sects and parties — a subject to which we shall advert more at length presently — there is no danger, in the present age, of philosophic truth being obstructed, and error perpetuated, by a generally pre- vailing superstitious veneration for traditionary theories and the _ authority of great names. An habitual freedom, of thought exists throughout the scientific world ; a system of discussion concerning matters of science — not conducted in a controversial and acri- monious spirit, but directed mainly to the legitimate ends of science — has been established.' Every philosophic question is now, after a time, fairly tried upon its merits. It is principally in the domain of civil government and positive law that men's minds are now practically divided and embarrassed, as to the -- amount of respect due to antiquity and prescriptive authority. Now, with respect to political institutions and laws — if we look merely to their origin, the same remark holds good as with respect to philosophy. The generation which enacted a new law, or established a new institution, had no better means of judgment on the subject than ourselves ; on the other hand, we have not only their knowledge, but the experience of subsequent years and of our own time, to guide us. To speak of the wisdom of our ancestors, as if they had some peculiar means of knowledge beyond ourselves, or were more likely to be right than the present generation, is a manifest fallacy. The generation who lived in the time of George I. were not wiser than those who lived in the time of George III. ; nor were those who lived in the time of George III. wiser than the present generation.^ All laws were new when they were first made ; and when they were made, they were made by persons who were not wiser than succeeding genera- tions, and had, as to that untried law, no special experience to guide them. When we speak of an ancient institution, we may mean either one of two wholly distinct ideas. We may mean an institution no longer existing, which existed at a former period of history. In this sense, the Athenian ostracism, the Eoman tribunate or dictatorship, the mayor of the palace under the Merovingian ' See Whewell's Philosophy of Ind. Sciences, b. XII. c. 4. "' ' Nee quia nos illi temporibus antecesserunt, sapientia quoqiie antecesserunt ; qute si omnibus sequaliter datur, occupari ab antecedentibus non potest,' says Lictantiiis, referring to the preceding generations, Div. Inst, II. p. 146. s 2 260 ABUSES OF THE PKINCIPLE OF AUTHOEITY. [ch. kings, the podesta of the Italian republics, the Vehmic tribunals of Grermany, Alfred's law of mutual pledge, or the liberum veto of the Polish Diet, is an ancient institution. According to this acceptation of the term, any institution which existed at an earty date, however short its duration may have been, is an ancient institution. Or, we may mean an existing institution which dates back from a remote period, and has had a long continuous existence. In this sense, trial by jury in England is an ancient institution. Now, with respect to an ancient institution of the first of these two classes, its antiquity, as such, raises no presump- tion in its favour. The mere fact of an institution having existed at an early period, does not prove that it is suited to our present wants and circumstances. On the contrary, the desuetude of an ancient law may have arisen from the very fact of its un suitability to the actual state of things.^ But the other class of ancient institutions stand on a different footing. Having been long in existence, either with few or no intervals or suspensions, they have been tried by a long experience, and have, by a gradual and intelligent, though almost insensible process, been adapted to the interests, habits, and feelings of the community. Their good parts have been developed ; their bad parts eliminated or counte- racted ; usage and custom have reconciled people to their defects, and rendered theoretical absurdities, which shock the philosophical bystander and speculative reasoner, comparatively innocuous. By the mutual action of the people on the government, and the government on the people, they have been worked into a form which is more or less suited to the state of society, and with which the community have become familiar. They have thus acquired a sort of prescriptive title to their possession, and they are often cherished by the people with a feeling of veneration and affection, of which the mere utility of the institution is the condi- tion rather than the cause. In the domain of science, an opinion on a subject lying beyond ' ' D'ou vient que la loi ne plait pas egalement dans tous les temps, et qu'ainsi que la beaute, elle est sujette a vieillir ? Quand le sourerain Tetablit, son intention est certaineraent quelle suLsiste jusquVi co qu'il lui plaise de la r^voquer ; cependant, combien de lois n'avons-nous pas qui n'ont jamais et6 revoquees, et qui maintenant n'ont ni force ni vigueur, L'dge, au lieu de les /aire respecter, serable au contraire les avoir rendues ridicules, au point qu'on n'ose pas meme les citer, et encore moins les produire Ainsi des qu'une loi contrarie les moeurs actuelles, elle ^prouve un choc auquel elle ne peut resister. II semble que tous les esprits tombent d'accord pour ne la plus observer ; le souverain lui-meme se voit force de I'abandonner.' — Merlin, Rc^:ertoirc de JarispriuLnce ; art. Anforite, § 1. X.] ABUSES OF THE PEINCIPLE OF AUTHOKITY. 261 the range of our experience, may be handed down, through a series of generations, with implicit faith, but without undergoing any process of examination or verification, and consequently without acquiring any confirmation of its truth. For example, the Greeks, in their ^sopian fables, represented the lion as the king of beasts, and gave him the royal attributes of clemency, mercy, and magnanimity. This belief having been propagated through antiquity, was received and repeated in the middle ages, among nations which knew the lion only from books ; and it was not till late years that the observations of travellers and more accurate naturalists corrected the error, by showing that the lion is characterised by the ferocity, cowardice, and treachery, which are qualities common to all the feline tribe. An opinion such as this derives no authority from its antiquity, and its passive recep- tion by successive generations. But no law or political institution can remain in force for a long series of years, without being sub- jected to the test of a severe and searching experience. It can only be enforced by intelligent agents acting upon sentient beings ; and this process, when repeated on a large scale, for a long time, and in numerous cases, must produce a gradual adaptation to the state and feelings of the people. Those parts of the law which are felt as oppressive, or vexatious, or inconvenient, will be resisted, openly or passively, or counteracted, or evaded ; the voluntary contracts and agreements between private persons, and the settlements of property, will be arranged with a view of defeating these provisions : while the officers of the government, from a desire either to do good, to avoid unpopularity, or to save trouble, will often allow such portions of the law to remain unenforced, or, if enforced for a time, to fall at last into disuse. In a case of this sort, the executive functionaries sometimes stand to the legislature in the same relations as the soldiers described by Tacitus stood to their generals, who preferred 'jussa ducum inter- pretari quam exsequi.'^ On the other hand, full effect will be given to those enactments which are felt to be beneficial ; and in the enforcement of these, the public functionary will be assisted by the spontaneous action of the community. Some discretion in the administration of laws must necessarily be intrusted to the executive authorities ; and if this be exercised with wisdom, or even with ordinary judgment, it cannot fail to give to the new law a form as suitable to the wants of the people, and to the state of ' Hist, II. 39. 262 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [ch society, as the general directions of the legislature will permit.^ If the legislature be well-intentioned and vigilant, it will second these attempts at voluntary adaptation ; it will abrogate or amend those provisions which experience has shown to be bad ; it will extend and develop those which have proved beneficial, and suit- able to the wants of the people. Where the legislature is indifferent or unobservant, courts of justice, by forced interpreta- tions, by fictions of law, and other jurisprudential contrivances, frequently modify institutions rendered obsolete by changes of manners, or introduce new regulations required by new circum- stances. In countries, too, wliich have free constitutions, legislative measures are frequently, if not usually, the result of a compromise between opposite political parties — a mode of proceeding which, if not always defensible in strict argument, generally leads to an adjustment of conflicting claims, and the establishment of a medium state of things, favourable to tranquillity and stability. It is by a series of compromises of this sort that the balance of powers in a State is, in fact, maintained ; though no such exact mechanical equilibrium of political forces can be provided by the forms of a constitution, as some speculators on politics have brought themselves to believe. The celebrated apophthegm of Bacon — ' Naturse non imperatur nisi parendo ' ^ — is to a certain extent true of political govern- ment. A people can only be governed by adapting the laws to its circumstances, wants, feelings, and wishes ; and thus all ancient laws, having complied with this condition, may be presumed to be suited to the community. The experimental and tentative process of adaptation just described will be the more effectual and complete, in proportion as the government is mild and enlightened, and the people are inde- pendent and intelligent ; but it must go on, to a certain extent, even under the most rapacious and mutable Oriental despotism, and in the most passive and improvident community. Every ' ' When any gross absurdity has for any reason found its way into the frame of a government, there seems to be called forth a protective or prophylactic power in the system, analogous to that by which the natural body throws off any noxious or any extraneous matter introduced into it ; and if mischief cannot be prevented, there is exerted another power like the vis medicatrix of the natural frame — a power of mak- ing some secondary provision, which may counteract the mischievous effects of the malcon formation, and enable the machine to go on working, which otherwise must be stopped or destroyed.'— Lonn Brougham, Pol. Phil vol. II. p. 81. 2 A'oy. Org. I. aph. 129. X.J ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 263 institution, therefore, which has been long in existence acquires a certain presumption in its favour, by the process of adaptation to which it is necessarily subjected. No new and untried law can, by possibility, possess this recommendation ; and, to this extent, there is a certain authority in favour of all laws which have been in operation for a length of time, and have proved, on the whole, beneficial.^ It is the observation of this process which has influenced the jurists of the historical school ; who contend that all laws ought to spring from a historical basis of gradual deve- lopment, and not come fvdl-grown from the head of a legislator — who hold that there ought always, in legislation, to be a continued chain of connection between the past and the future, through the present. The same notion has been expressed, though in more obscure and metaphorical language, by those who have compared the gradual progress and development of political institutions with the growth of a tree. They have been struck by the process of adaptation which arises from the action of the people upon its laws and institutions, and they have therefore compared the gradual and coherent result of this action to the organism of vegetable growth. This quasi-organic creation they have con- trasted with the formation of a government or an institution by a single act of legislation, which is produced urio jiatu, as a metal statue is cast in a foundery. A similar contrast has been pointed out between the legends of mythology and a romance or tale of fiction. The former, it is said, are developed by the spontaneous and unconscious action of the popular mind, and are the natural and undesigned offspring of a certain religious belief : the latter are the conscious inventions of a single mind, formed upon a preconceived plan, for a definite ' ' The world will not endure to hear that we are wiser than any have been which went before. In which consideration there is cause why we should be slow and un- willing to change, without very urgent necessity, the ancient ordinances, rites, and long-approved customs, of our venerable predecessors. The love of things ancient dotli argue stayedness. but levity and want of experience maketh apt unto innovations. That which wisdom did first begin, and hath been with good men long continued, cliallengeth allowance of them that succeed, although it plead for itself nothing. That which is new, if it promise not much, doth fear condemnation before trial ; till trial, no man doth acquit or trust it, what good soever it pretend and promise. So that in this kind there are few things known to be good, till such time as they grow to bo ancient.' — Hooker, Eccl. Pol. V. 7, 3. It may be observed that, in this passage. Hooker has not kept quite clear of the confusion between old times and old men. ' Our venerable predecessors' are, in fact, no more entitled to our venei'ation than our contemporarieis, although they may have lived at an earlier period of the world's history. 264 ^ ABUSES OF THE PEINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [ch. purpose. But iu the case, both of mythological legends, and of political institutions which have been formed by a gradual accre- tion, each step in the process is the result of intelligence, and is prompted by a distinctly-understood motive ; though the end may be limited and immediate, and the person concerned may not contemplate the entire structure to which his work is a contribution. It may be added, as a further element in the authority of ancient institutions, that if they are, on the whole, beneficial, and have been really adapted, by the hand of the legislator and administrator feeling its way as it advances, to the interests, cir- cumstances, habits, and opinions of the generality, they have pro- bably acquired a hold on the affections of the people ; so that their maintenance is not a matter of mere calculation — of balance of individual gain and loss — but is exalted into a patriotic senti- ment, which prompts the citizen to action in the moment of need without waiting to consider consequences. § 6. In the management of public affairs, every legislative proposition for the removal of admitted or alleged evils is in general placed between two opposite and extreme parties ; which (if it were allowed to coin new words, in order to avoid cir- cumlocution) might be designated as the Panaceists and the Ruinists : the former underrate the authority of existing institu- tions, and overrate the probable effect of new legislative projects — the latter fall into the opposite errors. The panaceist, dis- regarding the minute but numerous and powerful ties by which existing laws are attached to the habits and feelings of the people, proceeds to the enactment of extensive and systematic changes, founded probably on some one principle, which he introduces everywhere, and which he expects to prove a complete and imme- diate remedy for numerous political ills of the most discordant natures.^ He does not see how much of the evil tendencies of existing institutions has been neutralised by the process above ' The following remarks of Lord Bacon upon panaceas for the human body, are equally applicable to panaceas for the State : — ' It is a vain and flattering opinion to think any medicine can be so sovereign and happy, as that the receipt or use of it can work any great eiFect upon the body of man. It were a strange speech, which spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaim a man from a vice to which he were by nature subject. It is order, pursuit, sequence, and interchange of application, which is mighty in nature ; which, although it require more exact knowle.'Ige in prescribing, and more exact obedience in observing, yet is recompensed with the magnitude of effects.' — Adv. of Learning, vol. II. p. 168. X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 265 described ; to what extent they have been counteracted by the vohintary action of the community. He therefore exaggerates the amount of evil produced by tlie laws in force, and, by a cognate error, he exaggerates the advantages, which, in a sanguine delusion, he anticipates from his own legislative panacea. It is this error which has imposed upon so many well-meaning authors of paper- constitutions and organic laws, and has led to their disappointment and that of the credulous persons who confided in them. On the other hand, the politician of the opposite school entertains a blind veneration for ancient institutions, witliout perceiving that the changes of manners, opinions, social state, international rela- tions, or mechanical inventions, necessitate corresponding changes in legislation. Hence, he sees nothing but ruin and destruction in measures of reformation prepared in a safe and prudent spirit ; and confidently predicts the most disastrous consequences from alterations suggested by the great innovator — Time. He forgets how great, according to his own theory, is the power possessed by a community, of adapting institutions to its wants ; he overlooks the fact, that the vis consewatrix reipubUcce, which has been employed in the digestion and assimilation of existing laws, will also operate upon laws to be made hereafter ; and he argues on the assumption that every tendency in a new law will proceed, unchecked and unresisted, to its full and natural development — as if men would always be willing instruments in the execution of laws which would really produce such effects as he anticipates. An established law is judged by its actual operation, and therefore according to its administration by intelligent persons, exercising a reasonable discretion as to the enforcement of its provisions. But a proposed legislative measure is in general judged by all the possible absurd consequences to which it might lead, if enforced by persons destitute of prudence and foresight, or e\en of common sense. Hence it generally happens, that not one tithe of the disastrous consequences anticipated of a law before it is passed really occur when it is carried into effect. It is by optimists and pessimists of these opposite sorts — by persons who think their own plans the best possible, and by persons who think the plans of others the worst possible — that the legitimate authority which'' belongs to existing institutions is misconceived ; unduly depre- ciated by one party, unduly magnified by the other. § 7. It has been remarked above, that the principle of venera- tion for antiquity, as such, does not now in general mislead the 266 ABUSES OF THE PEINCIPLE OF AUTEOEITY. [ch. philosophical world, though in politics much practical confusion of ideas exists on the subject. The factitious authority and importance which opinions derive from being the formulas and cries of parties, or the dicta of party-leaders, is a more besetting evil of modern times, and requires a separate consideration. When the party end is a good one, the facilities for attaining it which the party spirit and combination afford cannot fail to be beneficial. The increased ardour in the common pursuit, the co-operation, the division of labour, the mutual regulation, and submission to a common leader, when directed to a worthy purpose, must be instruments of good. So long as a party, formed for such an object, continues under the direction of virtuous and able leaders, the opinions which it accredits will be sound and useful in their tendency, and its authority will be employed in giving strength and circulation to these maxims. But in all parties, whether political or otherwise, there is a tendency to forget the end for which the combination exists, and to prefer to it the means ; to think only of the confederation and the body, and not of the purpose for which the body exists.^ Hence it sometimes happens, that the leaders who keep the proper end of the association steadily in view are after a time deposed, a*nd that others, who look merely to the party as a party, who care little about the general objects at which it professes to aim, are substituted for them. These latter persons are followed and admired, as adopting a course which is to strengthen and consoli- date the party union, and thus to make the party triumphant and powerful. Those, on the other hand, who urge that such a policy sacrifices the end to the means, and that the attainment of the purpose of the association is rendered secondary to the maintenance of the association itself, are disregarded and set aside. In political affairs, it is indeed often dangerous for a party- leader to give honest advice to his followers, and to turn the authority of his opinion in a good direction. For if, from the occurrence of untoward events (which perhaps defied all calcula- tion), the result of his advice proves unfortunate, or is even mis- understood and misrepresented, they attribute all the blame to > "When a part}^ abandons public and general ends, and devotes itself only to the personal interests of its members and leaders, it is called a faction, and its policy is said to hQ factious. See Bolingbroke, Dissertation on Parties. — Works, vol. III. p. 14 ; ed. 8vo. X.J ABUSES OF THE PJilNClPLE OE AUTHOKITY. 2()7 him, and visit the failure upon his head ; forgetting that they voluntarily adopted his recommendation, and were parties to his act.' This is a sort of revenge which the subordinates of a party inflict on their leader, for his eminence and their obscurity. They think that they are entitled to a compensation for their want of influence over the counsels of the party, in a comparative exemp- tion from responsibility for its acts. As long as things prosper, and turn out according to their wishes, they not only make the leader's views their own, and identify themselves with his opinions, but they glory in being his adherents. As soon, however, as a change takes place, and fortune becomes adverse, they often sepa- rate themselves from him, disavow all connection with his advice, and treat the former acts of the entire party as the acts of the individual leader. A paity-leader cannot reckon on the friends of his prosperity being always the friends of his adversity. Diffugiunt cadis Cum fgece siccatis amici, Ferre jxigum par iter dolosi. It is partly from a consciousness of the difficulty of inspiring into a large and unorganised body a sense of common responsi- bility — and partly from the greater facility of leading people where they are desirous of going, than where they ought to go, tliat party chiefs often become the flatterers and courtiers of the multitude, humour their caprices, encourage rather than check their evil tendencies, abstain from giving them good but unpala- table advice, and thus, in fact, end in being their followers rather than their leaders. Bad counsels are often acceptable ; the wise and safe course is not always the most specious and attractive ; prudence can often be decried as timidity or indolence ; and rashness may recommend itself under the guise of spirit and energy. 2 The moral authority of a party leader, arising from the confidence of his party, from his supposed desire to promote their interests, and from his peculiar knowledge of their proceedings, is great, whatever the extent or importance of the party may be : so long as he continues their leader, the prestige of his name must go for something ; and hence the obligation upon him of using his influence for good purposes, of consulting the lasting interests, both of his party and the public, and of not allowing his judgment to be perverted by objects of mere personal or corporate ambition. ' See above, ch. 7, § 14. ' See Mach. Disc. I. 53, .37 ; IE 22. 268 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [ch. This is the best return which he can make for the allegiance of his followers. Indeed, where the leader of a party, or founder of a sect, is influenced only by good motives, and his conduct is actuated by a conscientious sense of duty, he may sometimes become the object ot an excessive veneration on the part of his followers ; his very excellences tend to create an enthusiastic admiration of him, which carries his followers beyond the bounds of a reasonable deference and respect. In religion, a life of unspotted purity and ascetic devotion ; in philosophy, a penetrating, inventive, and comprehensive genius; in politics, a disinterested, steady, and patriotic career, may exalt the authority of a leader above the credit due to fallibility. Unfortunately, however, the excessive veneration of a leader is not confined to good leaders. Fanaticism, mysticism, and other forms of error, conscious and unconscious, often impose on the credulity of followers, and induce them to place in their guide an unlimited and unsuspecting confidence. Hence, if the chief of a party or sect has, by fair or unfair means, fascinated the minds of his adherents, they walk blindly in his footsteps, and refuse to listen to argument against his dicta — to question which is, in their eyes, almost an act of impiety. Thus the Pythagoreans decided all controversies by an appeal to the amos s(pa, the ipse dixit, of their great master ; ^ and Cato com- pared the Eomans to a flock of sheep, on account of their head- long and gregarious tendency to follow a leader, contrasted with the difficulty of guiding them when scattered singly.^ On the other side, the leader of a party or sect is sometimes unduly prejudiced in favour of his followers ; his opinions are reflected in them, and they repeat, circulate, and extol his doc- trines ; so that, by mutual praise and support, they inflame each other's self-esteem, and increase the tendency to sectarian exclu- siveness.^ Tendencies of this kind, if not repressed, may increase ' Nee vero probare soleo id quod de Pythagoreis accepimus : quos ferunt, si quid affirmarent in disputando, cum ex iis quseieretur, quare ita asset, respondere solitos, 'Ipse dixit:' ipse autem erat Pythagoras. Tan turn opinio prsejudicata poterat, ut etiam sine ratione valeret auctoritas. — Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1. 5. The avThs id. Student's Edition, crown Svo. 6j. People's Edition, 2 vols, crown Svo. 8^. Cabinet Edition, 4 vols. 24J-. Library Edition, 3 vols. Svo. 36^. Lord Macaulay's Works. Complete and uniform Library Edition. Edited by his Sister, Lady Trevelyan. 8 vols. Svo. with Portrait ^5. ^s. The History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada. By J. A. Froude, M.A. Cabinet Edition, 12 vols. cr. Svo. £1, \is. Library Edition, 12 vols. Svo. ;,^S. \%s. The English in Ireland in the Eighteenth Century. By J. A. Froude, M.A. 3 vols. Svo. £2.. 8x. Journal of the Reigns of King George IV. and King William IV. By the late C. C. F. Greville, Esq. Edited by H. Reeve, Esq. Fifth Edition. 3 vols. Svo. price 36J. The Life of Napoleon HI. derived from State Records Unpub- lished Family Correspondence, and Personal Testimony. By Blanchard Jerrold. In Four Volumes, Svo. with numerous Portraits and Facsimiles. Vols. I. to III. price iSj. each. The Constitutional His- tory of England since the Accession of George III. 1760-1870. By Sir Thomas Erskine May, K.C.B. D.C.L. Fifth Edition. 3 vols, crown Svo. iSj. Democracy in Europe ; a History. By Sir Thomas Erskine May, K.C.B. D.C.L. 2 vols. Svo. 325-. WORKS published by LONGMANS 6- CO. Introductory Lectures on Modern History delivered in 1841 and 1842. By the late Rev. T. Arnold, D.D. 8vo. price "js. 6d. On Parliamentary Go- vernment in England ; its Origin, Development, and Practical Operation. By Alpheus Todd. 2 vols. 8vo. price ;^i. 17^-. History of Civilisation in England and France, Spain and Scotland. By Henry Thomas Buckle. 3 vols, crown 8vo. 24^. Lectures on the History of England from the Earliest Times to the Death of King Edward IT. By W. Longman, F.S.A. Maps and Illustrations. 8vo. 15^. History of the Life & Times of Edward III. By W. Long- man, F.S.A. With 9 Maps, 8 Plates, and 16 Woodcuts. 2 vols. 8vo. 28.?. History of the Life and Reign of Richard III. To which is added the Story of Perkin Warbeck, from Original Documents. By James Gairdner. With Portrait and Map. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. los. 6d. Memoirs of the Civil War in Wales and the Marches, 1642-1649. By John Roland Phillips, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister- at-Law. Second Edition, in One Volume. 8vo. i6s. The Life of Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, with special reference to the Parliamentary History of his time. By G. W. Prothero. Crown 8vo. Maps, 9^. History of England un- der the Duke of Buckingham and Charles I. 1624-1628. By S. R. Gardiner. 2 vols. 8vo. Maps, 24^. The Personal Govern- ment of Charles I. from the Death of Buckingham to the Declaration in favour of Ship Money, 1628- 163 7. By S. R. Gardiner. 2 vols. 8vo. 24^-. Popular History of France, from the Earliest Times to the Death of Louis XIV. By Eliza- beth M. Sewell. With 8 Maps. Crown 8vo. 7^. 6d. The Famine Campaign in Southern India, (Madras, Bombay, and Mysore,) in 1876-78. By Wil- liam Digby, Secretary of the Madras Famine Committee. With Maps and many Illustrations. 2 vols. 8vo. 32^-. A Student's Manual of the History of India from the Earliest Period to the Present. By Col. Meadows Taylor, M.R. A. S. Third Thousand. Crown 8vo. Maps, 7^. 6d. Indian Polity ; a View of the System of Administration in India. By Lieut.-Col. G. Chesney. 8vo. 2Ij. Waterloo Lectures ; a Study of the Campaign of 1815. By Colonel C. C. Chesney, R.E. 8vo. loj. 6d. The Oxford Reformers — John Colet, Erasmus, and Thomas More ; a History of their Fellow- Work. By F. Seebohm. 8vo. 14^-. General History of Rome from B.C. 753 to A.D. 476. By Dean Merivale, D.D. Crown 8vo. Maps, price 7^. 6d. The Fall of the Roman Republic ; a Short History of the Last Century of the Commonwealth. By Dean Merivale, D.D. i2mo. 'js. 6d. Carthage and the Cartha- ginians. By R. BoswoRTH Smith, M.A. Second Edition. Maps, Plans, &c. Crown 8vo. los. 6d. History of the Romans under the Empire. By Dean Meri- vale, D.D. 8 vols, post 8vo. 48j-. The History of Rome. By WiLHELM Ihne. Vols. I. to III. Svo. price 45^. WORKS published by LONGMANS 6- CO. The Sixth Oriental Mo- narchy ; or, the Geography, History, and Antiquities of Parthia. By G. Rawlinson, M.A. With Maps and Illustrations. 8vo. i6j. The Seventh Great Ori- ental Monarchy ; or, a History of the Sassanians. By G. Rawlinson, M.A. With Map and 95 Illustrations. 8vo. 28j-. The History of European Morals from Augustus to Charle- magne. By W. E. H. Lecky, M.A. 2 vols, crown 8vo, ids. History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rational- ism in Europe. By W. E. H. Lecky, M.A. 2 vols, crown 8vo. i6i". The History of Philo- sophy, from Thales to Comte. By George Henry Lewes. Fourth Edition. 2 vols. 8vo. 32^-. Zeller's Stoics, Epicu- reans, and Sceptics. Translated by the Rev. O. J. Reichel, M.A. Cr. 8vo. 14?. Zeller's Socrates & the Socratic Schools. Translated by the Rev. O. J. Reichel, M.A. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. lOi-. dd. Zeller's Plato & the Older Academy. Translated by S. Frances Alleyne and Alfred Goodwin, B.A. Crown 8vo. i8j-. Epochs of Modern His- tory. Edited by C. Colbeck, M.A. Church's Beginning of the Middle Ages, 2s. 6d. 'Cox's Crusades, 2s. 6d. Creighton's Age of Elizabeth, 2s. 6d. Gairdner's Houses of Lancaster and York, 2s. 6d. Gardiner's Puritan Revolution, 2s. 6d. — ■ Thirty Years' War, 2s. 6d. Hale's Fall of the Stuarts, 2s. 6d. Johnson's Normans in Europe, 2s. 6d. Ludlow's War of American Indepen- dence, 2s. 6d. Morris's Age of Anne, 2s. 6d. Seebohm's Protestant Revolution, price 2s. 6d. Stubbs's Early Plantagenets, 2s. 6d. Warburton's Edward III. 2s. 6d. Epochs of Ancient His- tory. Edited by the Rev. Sir G. W. Cox, Bart. M.A. & C. Sankey, M.A. Beesly's Gracchi, Marius & Sulla, 2s.6d. Capes's Age of the Antonines, 2s. 6d. — Early Roman Empire, 2s. 6d. Cox's Athenian Empire, 2s. 6d. Greeks & Persians, 2s. bd. Curteis's Macedonian Empire, 2s. 6d. I hue's Rome to its Capture by the Gauls, 2s. 6d. Merivale's Roman Triumvirates, 2s. 6d. Sankey's Spartan & Theban Supre- macies, 2s. 6d. Epochs of English His- tory. Edited by the Rev. Mandell Creighton, M.A. Fcp. 8vo. 5^. Browning's Modern England, 1820- 1874, 9^. Cordery's Struggle against Absolute Monarchy, 1603-1688, gd. Creighton's (Mrs.) England a Conti- nental Power, 1066-1216, gd. Creighton's (Rev. M.) Tudors and the Reformation, 1485-1603, gd. Rowley's Rise of the People, 1215-1485, gd Rowley's Settlement of the Constitu- tion, 1688-1778, gd. Tancock's England during the Ameri- can & European Wars, 1778-1820, gd. York- Powell's Early England to the Conquest, is. Creighton's Shilling His- tory of England, introductory to the above. Fcp. 8vo. is. The Student's Manual of Modern History ; the Rise and Pro- gress of the Principal European Nations. By W. Cooke Taylor, LL.D. Crown 8vo. Js. 6d. The Student's Manual of Ancient History; the Political History, Geography and Social State of the Principal Nations of Antiquity. By W. Cooke Taylor LL.D. Cr. 8vo. 7^. 6^. WORKS published by LONGMANS &> CO. BIOGRAPHICAL WORKS. Memoirs of the Life of Anna Jameson, Author of ' Sacred and Legendary Art ' &c. By her Niece, Gerardine Macpherson. 8vo. with Portrait, price \2s. 6d. Memorials of Charlotte Williams-Wynn. Edited by her Sister. Crown price lOi". 6d. 8vo. with Portrait, The Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay. By his Nephew, G. Otto Trevelyan, M. P. Cabinet Edition, 2 vols, crown 8vo. 12s. Library Edition, 2 vols. Svo. 36^. The Life of Sir Martin Frobisher, Knt containing a Narra- tive of the Spanish Armada. By the. Rev. Frank Jones, B.A. Portrait, Maps, and Facsimile. Crown Svo. 6s. Gotthold Ephraim Les- »ng, his Life and Works. By Helen Zimmern. Crown Svo. los. 6d. The Life, Works, and Opinions of Heinrich Heine. By William Stigand. 2 vols. Svo. Portrait, 28^. The Life of Mozart. Translated from the German Work of Dr. LuDwiG NoHL by Lady Wallace. 2 vols, crown Svo. Portraits, 2is. Life of Robert Frampton, D. D. Bishop of Gloucester, deprived as a Non -Juror in 1689. Edited by T. S. Evans, M.A. Crown Svo. 10s. 6d. The Life of Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, with special reference to the Parliamentary History of his time. By G. W. Prothero. Crown Svo. Maps, ^s. Maunder's Biographical Treasury ; a Dictionary of Universal Biography. Latest Edition, thoroughly revised and for the most part re-written, with over Fifteen Hundred additional Memoirs, by William L. R. Gates. Fcp. Svo. 6^-. Felix Mendelssohn^sLet- ters, translated by Lady WALLACE. 2 vols, crown Svo. 5^. each. Autobiography. By John Stuart Mill. Svo. 7^. 6d. Apologia pro Vita Sua ; Being a History of his Religious Opinions by John Henry Newman, D.D. New Edition. Crown Svo. 6j. Isaac Casaubon, 1559- 1614. By Mark Pattison, Rector of Lincoln College, Oxford. Svo. i8j. Leaders of Public Opi- nion in Ireland ; Swift, Flood, Grattan, O'Connell. By W. E. H. Lecky, M.A. Crown Svo. *js. 6d. Essays in Ecclesiastical Biog-raphy. By the Right Hon. Sir J. Stephen, LL.D. Crown Svo. ^s. 6d. Caesar; a Sketch. By James Anthony Froude, M.A. formerly Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. With Portrait and Map. Svo. 16^. Life of the Duke of Wel- lington. By the Rev. G. R. Gleig, M. A. Crown Svo. Portrait, 6s. Memoirs of Sir Henry Havelock, K. C. B . By John Clark Marshman. Crown Svo. 3^. 6d. Vicissitudes of Families. By Sir Bernard Burke, C.B. vols, crown Svo. 21s. Two WORKS published by LONGMANS ^ CO. MENTAL and POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. Comte's System of Posi- tive Polity, or Treatise upon Socio- logy :~ Vol. I. General View of Positivism and Introductory Principles. Translated by J. H. Bridges, M.B. 8vo. 21s. Vol. II. The Social Statics, or the Abstract Laws of Hurnan Order. Trans- lated by F. Harrison, M.A. 8vo. 14^. Vol. III. The Social Dynamics, or the General Laws of Human Progress (the Philosophy of History). Translated by E. S. Beesly, M.A. 8vo. 21s. Vol. IV. The Theory of the Future of Man ; with Comte's Early Essays on Social Philosophy. Translated by R. CON- GREVE, M.D. and H. D. HuTTON, B.A. 8vo. 24s'. De Tocqueville's Demo- cracy in America, translated by H. Reeve, 2 vols, crown 8vo. i6j. Analysis of the Pheno- mena of the Human Mind. By James Mill. With Notes, Illustra- tive and Critical. 2 vols. 8vo. 28j-. On Representative Go- vernment. By John Stuart Mill. Crown 8vo. 2s. On Liberty. By John Stuart Mill. Post 8vo. 7^. 6d. crown 8vo. is. 4^/. Principles of Political Economy. By John Stuart Mill. 2 vols. 8vo. 30J. or I vol. crown 8vo. 5^. Essays on some Unset- tied Questions of Political Economy. By John Stuart Mill. 8vo. 6s. 6d. Utilitarianism. By John Stuart Mill. 8vo. 5j. The Subjection of Wo- men. ByJOHN Stuart Mill. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s. Examination of Sir Wil- liam Hamilton's Philosophy. By John Stuart Mill. 8vo. i6s. A System of Logic, Ra- tiocinative and Inductive. By John Stuart Mill. 2 vols. 8vo. 25J. Dissertations and Dis- cussions. By John Stuart Mill. 4 vols. 8vo. price £2. 6s. 6d. Philosophical Fragments written during intervals of Business. By J. D. Morell, LL.D. Crown 8vo. Ss. The Philosophy of Re- flection. By S. H. Hodgson, Hon. LL.D. Edin. 2 vols. 8vo. 21s. The Law of Nations con- sidered as Independent Political Communities. By Sir Travers Twiss, D.C.L. 2 vols. 8vo. £1. 13^. A Systematic View of the Science of Jurisprudence. By Shel- don Amos, M.A. 8vo. 18^. A Primer of the English Constitution and Government. By S. Amos, M.A. Crown 8vo. 6s. A Sketch of the History of Taxes in England from the Earliest Times to the Present Day. By Stephen Dowell. Vol. I, to the Civil War 1642. 8vo. 10s. 6d. Principles of Economical Philosophy. By H. D. Macleod, M.A. Second Edition in 2 vols. VOL. I. 8vo. I5J-. Vol. IL Part i. 12s. The Institutes of Jus- tinian ; with English Introduction, Translation, and Notes. By T. C. Sandars, M.A. 8vo. iSj. Lord Bacon's Works, col- lected & edited by R. L. Ellis, M.A. J. Spedding, M.A. and D. D. Heath. 7 vols. 8vo. 2^3. 13J. 6d. Letters and Life of Fran- cis Bacon, including all his Occasional Works. Collected and edited, with a Commentary, by J. Spedding. 7 vols, 8vo. £^. 4f. WORKS published by LONGMANS &- CO. The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, translated into English by R. Williams, B.A. Crown 8vo. price ys. 6d. Aristotle's Politics, Books I. III. IV. (VII.) Greek Text, with an English Translation by W. E. BOL- LAND, M.A. and Short Essays by A. Lang, M. A. Crown 8vo. p. 6d. The Politics of Aristotle ; Greek Text, with English Notes. By Richard Congreve, M.A. 8vo. iSs. The Ethics of Aristotle; with Essays and Notes. By Sir A. Grant, Bart. LL.D. 2 vols. Svo. 32^. Bacon's Essays, with An- notations. By R. Whately, D.D. Svo. IOJ-. 6d. Picture Logic ; an Attempt to Popularise the Science of Reasoning. By A. SwiNBOURNE, B.A. Post Svo. $s. Elements of Logic. By R. Whately, D.D. Svo. los. 6d. Crown Svo. 4-r. 6d. Elements of Rhetoric. By R. Whately, D.D. Svo. los. 6d Crown Svo. 4J. 6d. On the Influence of Au- thority in Matters of Opinion. By the late Sir. G. C. Lewis, Bart. Svo. 14J. The Senses and the In- tellect. ByA. Bain, LL.D. Svo. 15^. The Emotions and the Will. By A. Bain, LL.D. Svo. 15^. Mental and Moral Sci- ence ; a Compendium of Psychology and Ethics. By A. Bain, LL.D. Crown Svo. los. 6d. An Outline of the Neces- sary Laws of Thought ; a Treatise on Pure and Applied Logic. By W. Thomson, D.D. Crown Svo. 6s. Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy. By T. E. Cliffe Leslie, Hon. LL.D. Dubl. of Lin- coln's Inn, Barrister- at- Law ; late Ex- aminer in Polit. Econ. in the Univ. of London ; Prof, of Jurisp. and Polit. Econ. in the Queen's University. Svo. price los. 6d. Hume's Philosophical Works. Edited, with Notes, &c. by T. H. Green, M.A. and the Rev. T. H. Grose, M.A. 4 vols. Svo. 56^. Or separately. Essays, 2 vols. 22>s. Treatise on Human Nature, 2 vols. 2Si. The Schools of Charles the Great, and the Restoration of Education in the Ninth Century. By J. Bass Mullinger, M.A. Svo. price *js. 6d. MISCELLANEOUS & CRITICAL W^ORKS. The London Series of English Classics. Edited by John W. Hales, M.A. and by Charles S. Jerram, M.A. Fcp. Svo. Bacon's Essays, annotated by E. A. Abbot, D.D. 2 vols. 6s. or in i vol. without Notes, 2s. 6d, Ben Jonson's Every Man in His Humour, by H. B. Wheatley, F.S. A. Price 2s. 6d. Macaulay's Clive, by H. M.A. 2s. 6d. C. Bowen, Marlowe's Doctor Faustus, by W. Wagner, Ph.D. 2s. Milton's Paradise Regained, by C. S. Jerram, M.A. 2s. 6d. Pope's Select Poems, by T. Arnold, M.A. 2s. 6d. Miscellaneous Writings of J. Conington, M.A. Edited by J. A. Symonds, M.A. 2 vols. Svo. 2Sj. Selected Essays, chiefly from Contributions to the Edinburgh and Quarterly Reviews. By A. Hay- WARD, Q.C. 2 vols, crown Svo. 12s. WORKS published by LONGMANS 6- CO. Literary Studies. By the late Walter Bagehot, M.A. and Fellow of University College, London. With a Prefatory Memoir. Edited by R. H. HuTTON. 2 vols. 8vo. with Portrait, 28j-. Short Studies on Great Subjects. By J. A. Froude, M.A. 3 vols, crown 8vo. iSj. Manual of English Lite- rature, Historical and Critical. By T. Arnold, M.A. Crown 8vo. 7j. ed. Lord Macaulay's Miscel- laneous Writings :— Library Edition, 2 vols. 8vo. 21J. People's Edition, i vol. or. Svo. 45-. 6d. Lord Macaulay's Miscel- laneous Writings and Speeches. Student's Edition. Crown Svo. 6s. Speeches of the Right Hon. Lord Macaulay, corrected by Himself. Crown Svo. 3J-. 6d. Selections from the Wri- tings of Lord Macaulay. Edited, with Notes, by G. O. Trevelyan, M.P. Crown. Svo. 6s. The Wit and Wisdom of the Rev. Sydney Smith. Crown Svo. Si'. 6d. Miscellaneous and Post- humous Works of the late Henry Thomas Buckle. Edited by Helen Taylor. 3 vols. Svo. 52J. 6d. Miscellaneous Works of Thomas Arnold, D.D. late Head Master of Rugby School. Svo. 'js. 6d. German Home Life ; a Series of Essays on the Domestic Life of Germany. Crown Svo. 6s. Realities of Irish Life. By W. Steuart Trench. Crown Svo. 2s. 6d. boards, or 3^. 6d. cloth. Max Muller and the Philosophy of Language. By LUDWIG NoiRg. Svo. 6s. Lectures on the Science of Language. By F. Max Muller, M.A. 2 vols, crown Svo. \6s. Chip _ s from a German Workshop ; Essays on the Science of Religion, and on Mythology, Traditions & Customs. By F. Max Muller, M.A. 4 vols. Svo. £2. iSj. Language & Languages- A Revised Edition of Chapters on Lan- guage and Families of Speech. By F. W. Farrar, D.D. F.R.S. Crown Svo. 6s. The Essays and Contri- butions of A. K. H. B. Uniform Cabinet Editions in crown Svo. Recreations of a Country Parson, Three Series, 3^. 6d. each. Landscapes, Churches, and Moralities, price 3J. 6d. Seaside Musings, 3^. 6d. Changed Aspects of Unchanged Truths, 3^. 6d. Counsel and Comfort from a City Pulpit, 3^. 6d. Lessons of Middle Age, 3^. 6d. Leisure Hours in Town, 3^. 6d. Autumn Holidays of a Country Parson, price IS. 6d. Sunday Afternoons at the Parish Church of a University City, 3^. 6d. The Commonplace Philosopher in Town and Country, 3-r. 6d. Present-Day Thoughts, 35-. 6d. Critical Essays of a Country Parson, price 3^. 6d. The Graver Thoughts of a Country Parson, Three Series, 3^. 6d. each. WORKS published by LONGMANS 6- CO. DICTIONARIES and OTHER BOOKS of REFERENCE. Dictionary of the English Language. By R. G. Latham, M.A. M.D. Abridged from Dr. Latham's Edition of Johnson's English Dictionary. Medium 8vo. 24J. A Dictionary of the Eng- lish Language. By R. G. Latham, M.A. M.D. Founded on Johnson's English Dictionary as edited by the Rev. H. J. Todd. 4 vols. 4to. £t. Roget's Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases, classi- fied and arranged so as to facilitate the expression of Ideas, and assist in Literary Composition. Revised and enlarged by the Author's Son, J. L. RoGET, Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d. English Synonymes. By E. J. Whately. Edited by R. Whately, D.D. Fcp. 8vo. 3^. Handbook of the English Language. By R. G. Latham, M.A. M.D. Crown Svo. 6s. Contanseau's Practical Dictionary of the French and English Languages. Post Svo. price 7^-. 6d. Contanseau's Pocket Dictionary, French and English, abridged from the Practical Dictionary by the Author. Square i8mo. 3^-. 6d. A New Pocket Diction- ary of the German and English Languages. By F. W. Longman, Ball. Coll. Oxford. Square i8mo. 5j-. A Practical Dictionary of the German and EngUsh Lan- guages. By Rev. W, L. Blackley, M.A. & Dr. C. M. Friedlander. Post Svo. *js. 6d. A Dictionary of Roman and Greek Antiquities. With 2,000 Woodcuts illustrative of the Arts and Life of the Greeks and Romans, By A. Rich, B.A. Crown Svo. 7j. 6d. The Critical Lexicon and Concordance to the English and Greek New Testament. By the Rev. E. W. Bullinger. Medium Svo. 30J. A Greek-English Lexi- con. By H. G. Liddell, D.D. Dean of Christchurch, and R. ScOTT, D.D. Dean of Rochester. Crown 4to. 36j-. Liddell & Scott's Lexi- con, Greek and English, abridged for Schools. Square i2mo. 7^. 6^. An English-Greek Lexi- con, containing all the Greek Words used by Writers of good authority. By C. D. YoNGE, M.A. 4to. 2is. Mr. Yonge's Lexicon, English and Greek, abridged from his larger Lexicon. Square i2mo. Si-. 6d. A Latin-English Diction- ary. By John T. White, D.D. Oxon. and J. E. Riddle, M.A. Oxon. Sixth Edition, revised, i vol. 4to. 28s. White's College Latin- English Dictionary, for the use of University Students. Medium Svo. 15^. A Latin-English Diction- ary for the use of Middle-Class Schools. By John T. White, D.D. Oxon. Square fcp. Svo. 3^-. White's Junior Student's Latin-English and English- Latin Dictionary. Square i2mo. English-Latin Dictionary, $s.6d. Latin-English Dictionary, 7j.6ar. Complete, 12s. Mcculloch's Dictionary of Commerce and Commercial Navi- gation. Re-edited by Hugh G. Reid. With 1 1 Maps and 30 Charts. Svo. 63^. Keith Johnston's General Dictionary of Geography, Descriptive, Physical, Statistical, and Historical ; a complete Gazetteer of the World. Medium^ Svo. 42^-. The Public Schools Atlas of Ancient Geography, in 28 entirely new Coloured Maps. Edited by the Rev. G. Butler, M.A. Imperial Svo. or imperial 4to. 7^-. 6d. The Public Schools Atlas of Modern Geography, in 31 entirely new Coloured Maps. Edited by the Rev. G.Butler, M.A. Uniform, ^s. WORKS published by LONGMANS 6- CO, ASTRONOMY and METEOROLOGY. Outlines of Astronomy. By Sir J. F. W. Herschel, Bart. M.A. Latest Edition, with Plates and Dia- grams. Square crown 8vo. 12s. Essays on Astronomy. A Series of Papers on Planets and Meteors, the Sun and Sun-surrounding Space, Star and Star Cloudlets. By R. A. Proctor, B.A. With 10 Plates and 24 Woodcuts. 8vo. 12s. The Moon ; her Motions, Aspects, Scenery, and Physical Con- dition. By R. A, Proctor, B.A. With Plates, Charts, Woodcuts, and Lunar Photographs. Crown 8vo. ios.6d. The Sun ; Ruler, Light, Fire, and Life of the Planetary System. By R. A. Proctor, B.A. With Plates & Woodcuts. Crown Svo. I4J-. The Orbs Around Us; a Series of Essays on the Moon & Planets, Meteors & Comets, the Sun & Coloured Pairs of Suns. By R. A. Proctor, B.A. With Chart and Dia- grams. Crown Svo. 7^. 6d. Other Worlds than Ours ; The Plurality of Worlds Studied under the Light of Recent Scientific Re- searches. By R. A. Proctor, B.A. With 14 Illustrations. Cr. Svo. los. 6d. The Universe of Stars; Presenting Researches into and New Views respecting the Constitution of the Heavens. By R. A. Proctor, B.A. Second Edition, with 22 Charts (4 Coloured) and 22 Diagrams. Svo. price lOJ. 6d. The Transits of Venus ; A Popular Account of Past and Coming Transits. By R. A. Proctor, B.A. 20 Plates (12 Coloured) and 27 Wood- cuts. Crown Svo. Ss. 6d. Saturn and its System. By R. A. Proctor, B.A. Svo. with 14 Plates, 14s. The Moon, and the Con- dition and Configurations of its Surface. By E. Neison, F.R.A.S. With 26 Maps & 5 Plates. Medium Svo. 31J. 6d. A New Star Atlas, for the Library, the School, and the Obser- vatory, in 12 Circular Maps (with 2 Index Plates). By R. A. Proctor, B. A. Crown Svo. 5^. Larger Star Atlas, for the Library, in Twelve Circular Maps, with Introduction and 2 Index Plates. By R. A. Proctor, B.A. Folio, i^s. or Maps only, I2s. 6d. A Treatise on the Cy- cloid, and on all forms of Cycloidal Curves, and on the use of Cycloidal Curves in dealing with the Motions of Planets, Comets, &c. and of Matter projected from the Sun. By R. A. Proctor, B.A. With i6i Diagrams. Crown Svo. los. 6d. Dove's Law of Storms, considered in connexion with the Ordinary Movements of the Atmo- sphere. Translated by R. H. Scott, M.A. Svo. icy. 6d. Air and Rain ; the Begin- nings of a Chemical Climatology. By R. A. Smith, F.R.S. Svo. 24s. Schellen's Spectrum Analysis, in its Application to Terres- trial Substances and the Physical Constitution of the Heavenly Bodies. Translated by Jane and C. Lassell, with Notes by W. HuGGiNS, LL.D. F. R. S. Svo. Plates and Woodcuts, 2Ss. lO WORKS published by LONGMANS 6- CO. NATURAL HISTORY and PHYSICAL SCIENCE. Professor Helmholtz* Popular Lectures on Scientific Sub- jects. Translated by E. Atkinson, F. C. S. With numerous Wood Engrav- ings. 8vo. \2s. 6d. Professor Helmholtz on the Sensations of Tone, as a Physio- logical Basis for the Theory of Music. Translated by A. J. Ellis, F.R.S. 8vo. 36^-. Ganot's Natural Philo- sophy for General Readers and Young Persons ; a Course of Physics divested of Mathematical Formulae and expressed in the language of daily life. Translated by E. Atkinson, F.C.S. Third Edition. Plates and Woodcuts. Crown 8vo. 7^. 6d. Ganot's Elementary Treatise on Physics, Experimental and Applied, for the use of Colleges and Schools. Translated and edited by E. Atkinson, F.C.S. Eighth Edition. Plates and Woodcuts. Post 8vo. 1 5 J. Arnott's Elements of Phy- sics or Natural Philosophy. Seventh Edition, edited by A. Bain, LL.D. and A. S. Taylor, M.D. F.R.S. Crown 8vo. Woodcuts, 12s. 6d. The Correlation of Phy- sical Forces. By the Hon. Sir W. R. Grove, F.R.S. &c. Sixth Edition, revised and augmented. 8vo. 15J. Weinhold's Introduction to Experimental Physics ; including Directions for Constructing Physical Apparatus and for Making Experiments. Translated by B. LOEWY, F.R.A.S. With a Preface by G. C. Foster, F. R. S. 8vo. Plates & Woodcuts 31^. 6d. A Treatise on Magnet- ism, General and Terrestrial. By H. Lloyd, D.D. D.C.L. 8vo. ioj. 6d. Elementary Treatise on the Wave-Theory of Light By H. Lloyd, D. D. D. C. L. 8vo. 10*. 6d. Fragments of Science. By John Tyndall, F.R.S. Sixth Edition, revised and augmented. 2 vols, crown 8vo. i6s. Heat a Mode of Motion. By John Tyndall, F.R.S. Fifth Edition in preparation. Sound. By John Tyndall, F.R.S. Third Edition, including Recent Researches on Fog- Signalling. Crown 8vo. price ioj-, 6d. Researches on Diamag- netismand Magne-CrystallicAction; including Diamagnetic Polarity. By John Tyndall, F.R.S. New Edition in preparation. Contributions to Mole- cular Physics in the domain of Ra- diant Heat. By John Tyndall, F.R.S. Plates and Woodcuts. 8vo. i6.f. Six Lectures on Light, delivered in America in 1872 and 1873. By John Tyndall, F.R.S. Second Edition. Portrait, Plate, and Diagrams. Crown 8vo. ^s. 6d. Lessons in Electricity at the Royal Institution, 1875-6. By John Tyndall, F.R.S. With 58 Woodcuts. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. Notes of a Course of Seven Lectures on Electrical Phe- nomena and Theories, delivered at the Royal Institution. By John Tyn- dall, F.R.S. Crown 8vo. is. sewed, or IS. 6d. cloth. Notes of a Course of Nine Lectures on Light, delivered at the Royal Institution. By John Tyndall, F.R.S. Crown 8vo. is. sewed, or IS. 6d. cloth. Principles of Animal Me- chanics. By the Rev. S. Haughton F.R.S. Second Edition. 8vo. 21 j. WORKS publisJud by LONGMANS 6- CO. II Text-Books of Science, Mechanical and Physical, adapted for the use of Artisans and of Students in Public and Science Scliools. Small 8vo. with Woodcuts, &c. Abney's Photography, 3^. dd. Anderson's (Sir John) Strength of Ma- terials, 3x. 6d, Armstrong's Organic Chemistry, 3^. 6^/. Barry's Railway Appliances, 3^. 6^. Bloxam's Metals, 3^. 6d. Goodeve's Mechanics, 3^. dd. Mechanism, 3^. (>d. Gore's Electro- Metallurgy, ds. Griffin's Algebra & Trigonometry, 3/6. Jenkin's Electricity & Magnetism, 3/6. Maxwell's Theory of Heat, 3^. 6^. Merrifield's Technical Arithmetic, 3^. 6^. Miller's Inorganic Chemistry, 3^. (>d. Preece& Sivewright's Telegraphy, 3/6. Rutley's Study of Rocks, 4J. (yd. Shelley's Workshop Appliances, 3^ dd. Thome's Structural and Physiological Botany, 6j. Thorpe's Quantitative Analysis, 45-. 6^. Thorpe & Muir's Qualitative Analysis, price y. 6d. Tilden's Systematic Chemistry, 35. 6d. Unwin's Machine Design, 3^. 6d. Watson's Plane & Solid Geometry, 3/6. Light Science for Leisure Hours ; Familiar Essays on Scientific Subjects, Natural Phenomena, &c. By R. A. Proctor, B.A. 2 vols, crown 8vo. 7^. 6d. each. An Introduction to the Systematic Zoology and Morpho- logy of Vertebrate Animals. By A. Macalister, M.D. Professor of Com- parative Anatomy and Zoology, Univer- sity of Dublin. With 28 Diagrams. 8vo. los. 6d. The Comparative Ana- tomy and Physiology of the Verte- brate Animals. By Richard Owen, F.R.S. With 1,472 Woodcuts. 3 vols. 8vo. ;^3. 13J. 6d. Homes without Hands; a Description of the Habitations of Animals, classed according to their Principle of Constmction. By the Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A. With about 140 Vignettes on Wood. 8vo. 14J. Wood's Strange Dwell- ings ; a Description of the Habitations of Animals, abridged from 'Homes without Hands.' With Frontispiece and 60 Woodcuts. Crown 8vo. 'js. 6d. Wood's Insects at Home; a Popular Account of British Insects, their Structure, Habits, and Trans- formations. With 700 Woodcuts. 8vo. 14^. Wood's Insects Abroad ; a Popular Account of Foreign Insects, their Structure, Habits, and Trans- formations. With 700 Woodcuts. 8vo. 14J. Wood's Out of Doors ; a Selection of Original Articles on Practical Natural History. With 6 Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 7j. 6d. Wood's Bible Animals ; a description of every Living Creature mentioned in the Scriptures, from the Ape to the Coral. With 112 Vignettes. 8vo. 14J. The Sea and its Living Wonders. By Dr. G. Hartwig. 8vo. with numerous Illustrations, price los. 6d. Hart wig's Tropical World. With about 200 Illustrations. 8vo. loj. 6d. Hartwig's Polar World ; a Description of Man and Nature in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions of the Globe. Chromoxylographs, Maps, and Woodcuts. 8vo. 10s. 6d. Hartwig's Subterranean World. With Maps and Woodcuts. 8vo. los. 6d. Hartwig's Aerial World; a Popular Account of the Phenomena and Life of the Atmosphere. Map, Chromoxylographs, Woodcuts. 8vo. price los. 6d. 12 WORKS published by LONGMANS &> CO. Kirby and Spence's In- troduction to Entomology, or Ele- ments of the Natural History of Insects. Crown 8vo, 5J-. A Familiar History of Birds. By E. Stanley, D.D. Fcp. 8vo. with Woodcuts, y. 6d. Rocks Classified and De- scribed. By Bernhard Von Cotta. An English Translation, by P. H. Lawrence (with English, German, and French Synonymes), revised by the Author. Post 8vo. 14^. The Geology of England and Wales ; a Concise Account of the Lithological Characters, Leading Fossils, and Economic Products of the Rocks. By H. B. Woodward, F. G. S. Crown Svo. Map & Woodcuts, 145-. Keller's Lake Dwellings of Switzerland, and other Parts of Europe. Translated by John E. Lee, F.S.A. F.G.S. New Edition, en- larged, with 206 Illustrations. 2 vols, royal 8vo. ^2s. The Primaeval World of Switzerland. By Professor Oswal Heer, of the University of Zurich. Edited by James Heywood, M.A. F.R.S. With Map, 19 Plates, & 372 Woodcuts. 2 vols. 8vo. 16^. The Puzzle of Life and How it Has Been Put Together ; a Short History of Praehistoric Vegetable and Animal Life on the Earth. By A. NicoLS, F.R.G S. With 12 Illustra- tions. Crown 8vo. 3^. 6d. The Origin of Civilisa- tion, and the Primitive Condition of Man ; Mental and Social Condition of Savages. By Sir J. Lubbock, Bart. M.P. F.R.S. Svo. Woodcuts, I 8j. A Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art. Re-edited by the late W. T. Brande (the Author) and the Rev. SirG.W. Cox, Bart., M.A. 3 vols, medium Svo. S-^s. The History of Modern Music, a Course of Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution. By John HuLLAH, LL.D. Svo. 8j. 6d. The Transition Period of Musical History, from the Beginning of the 17th to the Middle of the iSth Century. A Second Series of Lectures. By the same Author. Svo. los. 6d. Loudon's Encyclopaedia of Plants ; comprising the Specific Character, Description, Culture, His- tory, &c. of all the Plants found in Great Britain. With upwards of 12,000 Woodcuts. Svo. 42J-. De Caisne & Le Maouf s System of Descriptive and Analy- tical Botany. Translated by Mrs. Hooker ; edited and arranged accord- ing to the English Botanical System, by J. D. Hooker, M.D. With 5,500 Woodcuts, Imperial Svo. 313'. 6d. The Treasury of Botany, or Popular Dictionary of the Vegetable Kingdom ; with which is incorporated a Glossary of Botanical Terms. Edited by J. LiNDLEY, F, R, S, , and T. MoORE, F.L.S. With 274 Woodcuts and zo Steel Plates. Two Parts, fcp. Svo. 12s. Rivers's Orchard- House ; or, the Cultivation of Fruit Trees under Glass, Sixteenth Edition, re-edited by T. F. Rivers. Crown Svo. with 25 Woodcuts, price 5^. The Rose Amateur's Guide. By Thomas Rivers. Latest Edition. Fcp. Svo. 4J. 6d. Town and Window Gar- dening, including the Structure, Habits and Uses of Plants; a Course of Sixteen Lectures given out of School- Hours to Pupil Teachei-s and Children attending the Leeds Board Schools. By Mrs. BucKTON, Member of the Leeds School Board. With 127 Woodcuts. Crown Svo, 2s. WORKS published by LONGMANS d. Lathes and Turning, Sim- pie, Mechanical, and Ornamental. By W. H. Northcott. Second Edition, with 338 Illustrations. 8vo. l2>s. The Theory of Strains in Girders and similar Structures, with Observations on the application of Theoiy to Practice, and Tables of the Strength and other Properties of Ma- terials. By B. B. Stoney, M.A. M. Inst. C.E. Royal 8vo. with 5 Plates and 123 Woodcuts, 36^. A Treatise on Mills and Millwork. By the late Sir W. Fair- bairn, Bart. C.E. Fourth Edition, with 18 Plates and 333 Woodcuts. I vol. 8vo. 25J. Useful Information for Engineers. By the late Sir W. Fairbairn, Bart. C.E. With many Plates and Woodcuts. 3 vols, crown 8vo. 3 1 J. (>d. The Application of Cast and Wrought Iron to Building Purposes. By the late Sir W. Fair- bairn, Bart. C.E. With 6 Plates and 118 Woodcuts. 8vo. 16^. Hints on Household Taste in Furniture, Upholstery, and other Details. By C. L. East- lake. Fourth Edition, with 100 Illus- trations. Square crown 8vo. 14^. Handbook of Practical Telegraphy. By R. S. Culley, Memb. Inst. C.E, Seventh Edition. Plates & Woodcuts. 8vo. price i6s. A Treatise on the Steam Engine, in its various applications to Mines, Mills, Steam Navigation, Rail- ways and Agiiculture. By J. Bourne, C.E. With Portrait, 2>7 Plates, and 546 Woodcuts. 4to. 42J. Recent Improvements in the Steam Engine. By J. Bourne, C.E. Fcp. 8vo, Woodcuts, 6s. Catechism of the Steam Engine, in its various Applications. By John Bourne, C.E. Fcp. 8vo. Woodcuts, 6s. Handbook of the Steam Engine, a Key to the Author's Cate- chism of the Steam Engine. By J. Bourne, C.E. Fcp. 8vo. Woodcuts, 9^. Examples of Steam and Gas Engines of the most recent Ap- proved Types as employed in Mines, Factories, Steam Navigation, Railways and Agriculture, practically described. By John Bourne, C.E. With 54 Plates and 356 Woodcuts. 4to. 'jOs. Encyclopaedia of Civil Engineering, Historical, Theoretical, and Practical. By E. Cresy, C.E. With above 3,000 Woodcuts. 8vo. 42^-. Ure*s Dictionary of Arts, Manufactures, and Mines. Seventh Edition, re-written and enlarged by R. Hunt, F.R.S. assisted by numerous contributors. With 2,604 Woodcuts. 4 vols, medium 8vo. £t. Js. WORKS published by LONGMANS d^' CO. 15 Practical Treatise on Me- tallurgy. Adapted from the last German Edition of Professor Kerl's Metallurgy by W. Crookes, F.R.S. &c. and E. Rohrig, Ph.D. 3 vols. 8vo. with 625 Woodcuts. £^. 19J. ftLiithracen; Its Constitution, Properties, Manufacture, and Deriva- tives, including Artificia^l Alizarin, An- thrapurpurin, &c. with their Applica- tions in Dyeing and Printing. By G. Auerbach. Translated by W. Crookes, F.R.S 8vo. 12s. On Artificial Manures, their Chemical Selection and Scientific Application to Agriculture ; a Series of Lectures given at the Experimental Farm at Vincennes in 1867 and 1874- 75. By M. Georges Ville. Trans- lated and edited by W. Crookes, F.R.S. With 31 Plates. 8vo. 2ij. Practical Handbook of Dyeing and Calico- Printing. By W. Crookes, F.R.S. &c. With numerous Illustrations and specimens of Dyed Textile Fabrics. 8vo. ^2s. Mitchell's Manual of Practical Assaying. Fourth Edition, revised, with the Recent Discoveries incorporated, by W. Crookes, F.R.S. Crown 8vo. Woodcuts, 3ij-. 6d. Loudon's Encyclopaedia of Gardening ; the Theory and Prac- tice of Horticulture, Floriculture, Arbori- culture & Landscape Gardening. With 1,000 Woodcuts. 8vo. 2 1 J. Loudon's Encyclopaedia of Agriculture ; the Laying-out, Im- provement, and Management of Landed Property ; the Cultivation and Economy of the Productions of Agriculture. With 1,100 Woodcuts. 8vo. 21^. RELIGIOUS and MORAL W^ORKS. Four Lectures on some . Epochs of Early Church History. By the Very Rev. C. Merivale, D. D. Dean of Ely. Crown 8vo. 5^. A History of the Church of England ; Pre-Reformation Period. By the Rev. T. P. Boultbee, LL.D. late Fellow of St. John's College, Cam- bridge. 8vo. 1 5 J. Sketch of the History of the Church of England to the Revo- lution of 1688. By T. V. Short, D.D. Crown 8vo. Ts. 6d. The English Church in the Eighteenth Century. By Charles J. Abbey, late Fellow of University College, Oxford ; and John H. Over- ton, late Scholar of Lincoln College, Oxford. 2 vols. 8vo. 36J. The Human Life of Christ revealing the Order of the Universe, being the Hulsean Lectures for 1877 ; with an Appendix. By G. S. Drev^, M.A. Vicar of Holy Trinity, Lambeth, 8vo. %s. An Exposition of the 39 Articles, Historical and Doctrinal. By E. H. Browne, D.D. Bishop of Win- chester. Eleventh Edition. 8vo. i6s. A Commentary on the 39 Articles, forming an Introduction to the Theology of the Church of England. By the Rev. T. P. Boultbee, LL.D. New Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s. Historical Lectures on the Life of Our Lord Jesus Christ By C. J. Ellicott, D.D. 8vo. 12s. Sermons preached most- ly in the Chapel of Rugby School by the late T. Arnold, D.D. Collective Edition, revised by the Author's Daughter, Mrs.W. E. Forster. 6 vols, crown 8vo. 30J. or separately, 5^. each. The Eclipse of Faith ; or a Visit to a Religious Sceptic. By Henry Rogers. Fcp. 8vo. 5j. Defence of the Eclipse of Faith. By H. Rogers. Fcp. 8vo. 3^. 6d, i6 WORKS published by LONGMANS 6- CO, Nature, the Utility of Religion and Theism. Three Essays by John Stuart Mill. 8vo. los. 6d. A Critical and Gram- matical Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles. By C. J. Ellicott, D.D. 8vo. Galatians, 8^. 6d. Ephesians, 8 J. 6d. Pastoral Epistles, \os. 6d. Philippians, Colossians, 8c Philemon, lOi-. 6d. Thessalonians, 'js. 6d. Conybeare & Howson's Life and Epistles of St. Paul. Three Editions, copiously illustrated. Library Edition, with all the Original Illustrations, Maps, Landscapes on Steel, Woodcuts, &c. 2 vols. 4to. 42^. Intermediate Edition, with a Selection of Maps, Plates, and Woodcuts. 2 vols. square crown 8vo. 2is. Student's Edition, revised and con- densed, with 46 Illustrations and Maps. I vol. crown 8vo. 9^-. The Jewish Messiah ; Critical History of the Messianic Idea among the Jews, from the Rise of the Maccabees to the Closing of the Tal- mud. By James Drummond, B.A. 8vo. I5>r. The Prophets and Pro- phecy in Israel ; an Historical and Critical Inquiry. By Prof. A. Kuenen, Translated from the Dutch by the Rev. A. MiLROY, M.A. with an Introduc- tion by J. MuiR, D.C.L. 8vo. 21s, Mythology among the Hebrews and its Historical Develop- ment. By Ignaz Goldziher, Ph.D. Translated by Russell Martineau, M.A. 8vo. 16s. Bible Studies. By M. M. Kalisch, Ph.D. Part I. The Pro- phecies Of Balaam. 8vo. loj-. 6d. Part II. The Book of Jonah. 8vo. loj. 6d. Historical and Critical Commentary on the Old Testament ; with a New Translation. By M. M. Kalisch, Ph.D. Vol. I. Genesis, 8vo. iZs. or adapted for the General Reader, 12s. Vol. II. Exodus, 15^. or adapted for the General Reader, 12s. Vol. III. Leviticus, Part I. i5j'. or adapted for the General Reader, Ss. Vol. IV. Leviticus, Part II. 15^. or adapted for the General Reader, 8j. j Ewald's History of Israel. Translated from the German by J. E. Carpenter, M.A. with Preface by R. Martineau, M.A. 5 vols. 8vo. 63J. Ewald's Antiquities of Israel. Translated from the German byH. S. Solly, M.A. 8vo. 12s. 6d. The Types of Genesis, briefly considered as revealing the Development of Human Nature. By A. Jukes. Crown 8vo. *js. 6d. The Second Death and the Restitution of all Things ; with some Preliminary Remarks on the Nature and Inspiration of Holy Scrip- ture. By A. Jukes. Crown 8vo. 3^. 6d. Commentaries, by the Rev. W. A. O' Conor, B.A. Rector of St. Simon and St. Jude, Manchester. Epistle to the Romans, crown 8vo. 3J. 6d. Epistle to the Hebrews, 4^. 6d. St. John's Gospel, los. 6d. Supernatural Religion ; an Inquiry into the Reality of Di- vine Revelation. Complete Edition, thoroughly revised, with New Preface and Conclusions. 3 vols. 8vo. 36j-. Lectures on the Origin i and Growth of Religion, as illus- trated by the Religions of India ; being the Hibbert Lectures for 1878,. delivered at the Chapter House, West- minster Abbey, in 1878, by F. Max MiJLLER, M.A. Second Edition. 8vo. price los. 6d. Introduction to the Sci- ence of Religion, Four Lectures de- livered at the Royal Institution ; with Two Essays on False Analogies and the Philosophy of Mythology. By Max Muller, M.A. Crown 8vo. price los. 6d. The Four Gospels in Greek, with Greek-English Lexicon. By John T. White, D.D. Oxon. Square 32mo. 5^. Passing Thoughts on Religion. By Elizabeth M. Sewell. Fcp. 8vo. 3j. 6d. WORKS published by LONGMANS &- CO. 17 Thoughts for the Age. by Elizabeth- M. Sewell. New Edition, Fcp. 8vo. 3^. 6d. Preparation for the Holy Communion ; the Devotions chiefly from the works of Jeremy Taylor. By Elizabeth M. Sewell. 32mo. 3^. Bishop Jeremy Taylor's Entire Works ; with~ Life by Bishop Heber. Revised and corrected by the Rev. C. P. Eden. 10 vols. ^^5. 5^. Hymns of Praise and Prayer. Corrected and edited by Rev. John Martineau, LL.D. Crown 8vo. 4^. 6d. 32mo. is. 6d. Spiritual Songs for the Sundays and Holidays throughout the Year. By J. S. B. Monsell, LL.D. Fcp. 8vo. 5J-. i8mo. 2s. Christ the Consoler; a Book of Comfort for the Sick, By Ellice Hopkins. With a Preface by the Bishop of Carlisle. Second Edition. Fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d. Lyra Germanica ; Hymns translated from the Gennan by Miss C. WlNKWORTH. Fcp. 8vo. $s. The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost ; or, Reason and Revelation. By Henry Edward Manning, D.D. Crown 8vo. 8j. 6d. Hours of Thought on Sacred Things ; a Volume of Ser- mons. By James Martineau, D.D. LL.D. Crown 8vo. Price 7^. 6d. Endeavours after the Christian Life ; Discourses. By James Martineau, D.D. LL.D. Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo. 7^. 6d. The Pentateuch & Book of Joshua Critically Examined. By J. W. CoLENSO, D.D. Bishop of Natal. Crown 8vo. 6s. Lectures on the Penta- teuch and the Moabite Stone ; with Appendices. By J. W. Colenso, D.D. Bishop of Natal. 8vo. I2J. TRAVELS, VOYAGES, &e. A Voyage in the ^Sun- beam,' our Home on the Ocean for Eleven Months. By Mrs. Brassey. Cheaper Edition, with Map and 65 Wood Engravings. Crown 8vo. 7^-. 6d. A Freak of Freedom ; or, the Republic of San Marino. By J. Theodore Bent, Honorary Citizen of the same. With a Map and 15 Woodcuts. Crown 8vo. 7j. 6d. One Thousand Miles up the Nile; a Journey through Egypt and Nubia to the Second Cataract. By Amelia B. Edwards. With Plans, Maps & Illustrations. Imperial 8vo. /\2s. The Indian Alps, and H ow we Crossed them ; Two Years' Residence in the Eastern Himalayas, and Two Months' Tour into the Interior. By a Lady Pioneer, With Illustra- tions. Imperial 8vo. 42^. Discoveries at Ephesus, Including the Site and Remains of the Great Temple of Diana. By J. T. Wood, F.S.A. With 27 Lithographic Plates and 42 Wood Engravings. Me- dium 8vo. 63^-. Memorials of the Dis- covery and Early Settlement of the Bermudas or Somers Islands, from 1 61 5 to 1685. By Major-General Sir J. H. Lefroy, R.A. With Maps, &c. 2 vols. Imp. 8vo. 6oj-. Eight Years in Ceylon. By Sir Samuel W. Baker, M.A. Crown 8vo. Woodcuts, 7^. 6d. The Rifle and the Hound in Ceylon. By Sir Samuel W. Baker, M.A. Crown 8vo. Woodcuts, ^s. 6d. i8 WORKS published by LONGMANS 6- CO. Guide to the Pyrenees, for the use of Mountaineers. By Charles Packe. Crown 8vo. 7j. dd. The Alpine Club Map of Switzerland, with parts of the Neigh- bouring Countries, on the scale of Four Miles to an Inch. Edited by R. C. Nichols, F. R. G. S. 4 Sheets in Port- folio, \2s. coloured, or 34^. uncoloured. The Alpine Guide. By John Ball, M.R.I. A. PostSvo. with Maps and other Illustrations. The Eastern Alps, \os, 6d. Central Alps, including all the Oberland District, 7^. 6d. Western Alps, including Mont Blanc, Monte Rosa, Zermatt, &c. Price 6s. 6d. On Alpine Travelling and the Geology of the Alps. Price is. Either of the 3 Volumes or Parts of the ' Alpine Guide ' may be had with this Introduction prefixed, is. extra. The Fenland Past and Present. By S. H. Miller, F.R.A.S. F.M.S.; and S. B. J. Skertchley, F.G.S. of H.M. Geological Survey. With numerous Illustrations and Maps. Royal 8vo. 31J. 6d. Large Paper, fcp. folio, 50J. half-morocco. AA^ORKS of FICTION. Novels and Tales. By the Right Hon. the Earl of Beacons- field, K.G. Cabinet Editions, complete in Ten Volumes, crown 8vo. 6s. each. Lothair, 6s. Venetia, 6s. Coningsby, 6s. Alroy, Ixion, &c. 6s. Sybil, 6s. Young Duke &c. dr. Tancred, 6s. Vivian Grey, 6s. Henrietta Temple, 6s. Contarini Fleming, &c. 6s. Tales from Euripides ; Iphigenia, Alcestis, Hecuba, Helen, Medea. By Vincent K. Cooper, M.A. late Scholar of Brasenose College, Oxford. Fcp. 8yo. 3^. 6d. Whispers from Fairy- land. By the Right Hon. E. H. Kn ATCHB ULL- H UGESSEN, M. P. With 9 Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 3^. 6d. Higgledy-piggledy; or, Stories for Everybody and Every- body's Children. By the Right Hon. E. H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, M.P. With 9 Illustrations. Cr. 8yo. 3j-. 6d. Stories and Tales. By Elizabeth M. Sewell. Cabinet Edition, in Ten Volumes, each contain- ing a complete Tale or Story :— Amy Herbert, 2s. 6d. Gertrude, 2s. 6d. The Earl's Daughter, 2s. 6d. The Experience of Life, 2s. 6d. Cleve Hall, 2s. 6d. Ivors, 2s. 6d. Katharine Ashton, 2s. 6d. Margaret Percival, 3J. 6d. Laneton Parsonage, 3^-. 6d. Ursula, 3^. 6d. The Modern Novelist's Library. Each work complete in itself, price 2s. boards, or 2s. 6d. cloth. By Lord Beaconsfield. Lothair. Coningsby. Sybil. Tancred. Venetia. Henrietta Temple. Contarini Fleming. Alroy, Ixion, &c. The Young Duke, &c. Vivian Grey. WORKS published by LONGMANS 6- CO. 19 THE MODERN NOVELIST'S LIBRARY— f^«/m«^fl'. By the Author of 'The Rose Garden.' Unawares. r By Anthony Trollope. Barchester Towers. The Warden. By Major Whyte-Melville. Digby Grand. General Bounce. Kate Coventry. The Gladiators. Good for Nothing. Holmby House. The Interpreter. The Queen's Maries. The Novels and Tales the Earl of Beaconsfield, K.G. extra, gilt edges, price 30J. By the Author of ' Mile. Mori.' The Atelier du Lys. Mademoiselle Mori. By Various Writers. Atherstone Priory. The Burgomaster's Family. Elsa and her Vulture. The Six Sisters of the Valleys. of the Right Honourable Complete in Ten Volumes, crown 8vo. cloth POETRY and THE DRAMA. Lays oi Ancient Rome; with Ivry and the Armada. By Lord Macaulay. i6mo. y. 6d. Horatii Opera. Library ^/ Edition, with English Notes, Marginal ^ References & various Readings. Edited by Rev. J. E. Yonge,'M.A. 8vo. 21s. Poems by Jean Ingelow. 2 vols. fcp. 8vo. 10^. First Series, containing 'Divided,' 'The Star's Monument,' &c. Fcp, 8vo. 5^. Second Series, 'A Story of Doom,' * Gladys and her Island,' &c. 5^. Poems by Jean Ingelow. First Series, with nearly 100 Woodcut Illustrations. Fcp. 4to. 21s. Brian Boru, a Tragedy. By J. T. B. Crown 8vo. 6s. Festus, a Poem. By Philip James Bailey. loth Edition, enlarged & revised. Crown 8 vo. 12s. 6d. The Iliad of Homer, Ho- mometrically translated by C. B. Cayley, Translator of Dante's Comedy, &c. 8vo. I2s. 6d. The -^neid of Virgil. Translated into English Verse. By J. CONINGTON, M.A. Crown 8vo. 9^-. Bowdler's Family Shak- speare. Genuine Edition, in i vol. medium 8vo. large type, with 36 Wood- cuts, 14-r. or in 6 vols. fcp. 8vo. 2ls. Southey's Poetical Works, with the Author's last Cor- rections and Additions. Medium 8vo. with Portrait, 14-f. RURAL SPORTS, HORSE and CATTLE MANAGEMENT, &e. Annals of the Road ; or, Notes on Mail and Stage-Coaching in Great Britain. By Captain Malet. With 3 Woodcuts and lo Coloured Illustrations. Medium 8vo. 21s. Down the Road ; or, Re- miniscences of a Gentleman Coachman. By C. T. S. Birch Reynardson. Second Edition, with I2 Coloured Illustrations. Medium 8vo. 21s. 20 WORKS published by LONGMANS 6- CO. Blaine's Encyclopaedia of Rural Sports; Complete Accounts, Historical, Practical, and Descriptive, of Hunting, Shooting, Fishing, Racing, &c. With 600 Woodcuts. Ivo. 2\s, A Book on Angling ; or, Treatise on the Art of Fishing in every branch ; including full Illustrated Lists of Salmon Flies. By Francis Francis. Post 8vo. Portrait and Plates, 15^. Wilcocks's Sea- Fisher- man : comprising the Chief Methods of Hook and Line Fishing, a glance at Nets, and remarks on Boats and Boat- ing. Post 8vo. Woodcuts, I2x. dd. The Fly-Fisher's Ento- mology. ' By Alfred Ronalds. With 20 Coloured Plates. 8vo. 14^. Horses and Riding. By George Nevile, M. A. With 3 1 Illus- trations. Crown 8vo. 6s. Horses and Stables. By Colonel F. FiTZWYGRAM, XV. the King's Hussars. With 24 Plates of Illustrations. 8vo. \os. 6d. Youatt on the Horse. Revised and enlarged by W. Watson, M.R.C.V.S. 8vo. Woodcuts, \2s. dd. Youatt^s Work on the Dog;. Revised and enlarged. 8vo. Woodcuts, 6^. The Dog in Health and Disease. By Stonehenge. With 78 Wood Engravings. Square crown 8vo. *]s. 6d. The Greyhound. By Stonehenge. Revised Edition, with 25 Portraits of Greyhounds, &c. Square crown 8vo. 15^. Stables and Stable Fit- tings. By W. Miles. Imp. 8vo, with 13 Plates, 15^. The Horse's Foot, and How to keep it Sound. By W. Miles. Imp, 8vo. Woodcuts, 12s. 6d. A Plain Treatise on Horse-shoeing. By W. Miles. Post 8vo. Woodcuts, 2s. 6d. Remarks on Horses' Teeth, addressed to Purchasers. By W. Miles. Post 8vo. is. 6d. The Ox, his Diseases and their Treatment ; with an Essay on Parturition in the Cow. By J. R. DoBSON, M.R.C.V.S. Crown 8vo. Illustrations, 7^. 6d. WORKS of UTILITY and GENERAL INFORMATION. Maunder's Treasury of Knowledge and Library of Refer- ence ; comprising an English Diction- ary and Grammar, Universal Gazetteer, Classical Dictionary, Chronology, Law Dictionary, Synopsis of the Peerage, Useful Tables, &c. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. Maunder's Biographical Treasury. Latest Edition, recon- structed and partly re-written, with above 1,600 additional Memoirs, by W. L. R. Gates. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. Maunder's Treasury of Natural History ; or, Popular Dic- tionary of Zoology. Revised and corrected Edition. Fcp. 8vo. with 900 Woodcuts, 6s. Maunder's Scientific and Literary Treasury; a Popular En- cyclopaedia of Science, Literature, and Art. Latest Edition, partly re-written, with above 1,000 New Articles, by J. Y. Johnson. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. Maunder's Treasury of Geography, Physical, Historical, Descriptive, and Political. Edited by W. Hughes, F. R. G. S. With 7 Maps and 16 Plates. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. Maunder's Historical Treasury; Introductory Outlines of Universal History, and Separate His- tories of all Nations. Revised by the Rev. Sir G. W. Cox, Bart. M.A. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. WORKS published by LONGMANS &* CO. 21 The Treasury of Botany, or Popular Dictionary of the Vegetable Kingdom ; with which is incorporated a Glossary of Botanical Terms. Edited by J. LiNDLEY, F.R.S. and T. Moore, F.L.S. With 274 Woodcuts and 20 Steel Plates. Two Parts, fcp. 8vo. 12s. The Treasury of Bible Knowledge ; being a Dictionary of the Books, Persons, Places, Events, and other Matters of which mention is made in Holy Scripture. By the Rev. J. *Ayre, M. a. Maps, Plates & Wood- cuts. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. A Practical Treatise on Brewing ; with Formulae for Public Brewers & Instructions for Private Fam- ilies. By W. Black. 8vo. los. 6d. The Theory of the Mo- dem Scientific Game of Whist. By W. Pole, F.R.S. Tenth Edition. Fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d. The Correct Card ; or, How to Play at Whist; a Whist Catechism. By Captain A. Campbell- Walker, F.R.G.S. New Edition. Fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d. The Cabinet Lawyer; a Popular Digest of the Laws of England, Civil, Criminal, and Constitutional. Twenty-Fifth Edition, corrected and extended. Fcp. 8vo. gs. Chess Openings. ByF.W. Longman, Balliol College, Oxford. Second Edition. Fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d. Pewtner's Compre- hensive Specifier; a Guide to the Practical Specification of every kind of Building- Artificer's Work. Edited by W. Young. Crown 8vo. 6s. The English Manual of Banking. By Arthur Crump. Second Edition, revised and enlarged. 8vo. iSs. Modern Cookery for Pri- vate Families, reduced to a System of Easy Practice in a Series of carefully- tented Receipts. By Eliza Acton. With 8 Plates and 150 Woodcuts. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. Fo od and H ome Cookery. A Course of Instruction in Practical Cookery and Cleaning, for Children in Elementary Schools, as followed in the Schools of the Leeds School Board. By Mrs. BucKTON, Member of the Leeds School Board. With 11 Woodcuts. Crown 8vo. 2s. Hints to Mothers on the Management of their Health during the Period of Pregnancy and in the Lying-in Room. By Thomas Bull, M.D. Fcp. 8vo, 2s. 6d. The Maternal Manage- ment of Children in Health and Disease. By Thomas Bull, M.D. Fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d. The Farm Valuer. By John Scott, Land Valuer. Crown 8vo. price 5^. Economics for Beginners By H. D. MACLEOD, M.A. Small crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. The Elements of Bank- ing. By H. D. MACLEOD, M.A. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo. 5^. The Theory and Practice of Banking. By H. D. Macleod, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. 26s. The Resources of Mod- em Countries; Essays towards an Estimate of the Economic Position of Nations and British Trade Prospects. By Alex. Wilson. 2 vols. 8vo. 2^. Willich's Popular Tables for ascertaining, according to the Carlisle Table of Mortality, the value of Life- hold, Leasehold, and Church Property, Renewal Fines, Reversions, &c. Also Interest, Legacy, Succession Duty, and various other useful tables. Eighth Edition. Post 8vo. 10s. The Patentee's Manual ; a Treatise on the Law and Practice of Letters Patent, for the use of Patentees and Inventors. By J. Johnson, Bar- rister-at-Law ; and J. H. Johnson, Assoc. Inst. C.E. Solicitor and Patent Agent, Lincoln's Inn Fields and Glas- gow. Fourth Edition, enlarged. 8vo, 10s. 6d. 22 WORKS published by LONGMANS 6- CO. INDEX Abbey &' Overtoil s English Church History 15 's Photography 11 Acton's Modem Cookery 21 Alpine Club Map of Switzerland 18 Alpine Guide (The) 18 Ames's Jurisprudence 5 Primer of the Constitution 5 Anderson's Strength of Materials 11 Armstrong's Organic Chemistry 11 Arnolds (Dr. ) Lectures on Modem History 2 Mi scellaneous Works 7 Sermons 15 (T. ) English Literature 7 Arnott's Elements of Physics 10 Atelier (The) du Lys 19 Atherstone Priory 19 Autumn Holidays of a Country Parson ... 7 Ayre's Treasury of Bible Knowledge 21 Bacon's Essays, by Abbott 6 ' by Whately 6 Life and Letters, by Spedding ... 5 Works 5 Bagehot's Literary Studies 7 Bailey's Festus, a Poem 19 Bain's Mental and Moral Science 6 on the Senses and Intellect 6 Emotions and Will 6 Baker's Two Works on Ceylon 17 i5d://'j Alpine Guides 18 i5arr)/ on Railway Appliances 11 ^m^c;^^/?^/!^?'^ (Lord) Novels and Tales ... 18 Beesly's Gracchi, Marius, and Sulla 3 Bent's Republic of San Marino 17 ^/laic'^'j Treatise on Brewing 21 Blackley's German- English Dictionary 8 Blaine's Rural Sports 20 Bloxam's Metals 11 Bolland and Lang's Aristotle's Politics 6 Boultbee on 39 Articles 15 's History of the English Church... 15 Bourne's Works on the Steam Engine 14 Bowdler's Family Shakespeare 19 Bramley-Moore' s Six Sisters of the Valleys . 19 Brande's Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art 12 Brassey's Voyage of the Sunbeam 17 Brian Boru, a Tragedy 19 Browne's Exposition of the 39 Articles 15 ^n?w/?/;/^ J Modem England 3 Buckles History of Civilisation 2 Posthumous Remains 7 Buckton's Food and Home Cookery 21 ' Health in the House 13 Town and Window Gardening... 12 Bulls Hints to Mothers 21 Maternal Management of Children. 21 Bullinger's Lexicon to the Greek Testa- ment 8 Burgomaster's Family (The) 19 ^ar^^'i Vicissitudes of Families 4 Cabinet Lawyer 21 Capes' s Age. of the Antonines 3 Early Roman Empire 3 Cayley's Iliad of Homer 19 Changed Aspects of Unchanged Tmths ... 7 Chesney's Indian Polity , 2 Waterloo Campaign 2 Church's Beginning of the Middle Ages ... 3 Colenso on Moabite Stone &c 17 's Pentateuch and Book of Joshua. 17 Commonplace Philosopher 7 Comte's Positive Polity 5 Congreve's Politics of Aristotle 6 Conington's Translation of Virgil's ^neid 19 Miscellaneous Writings 6 Contanseau's Two French Dictionaries ... 8 Conybeare and Howson's St . Paul 16 Cooper's Tales from Euripides 18 Cordery's Stmggle against Absolute Mon- archy 3 Cotta on Rocks, by Lawrence 12 Counsel and Comfort from a City Pulpit... 7 Cox's (G. W.) Athenian Empire 3 Cmsades 3 ' Greeks and Persians 3 Creighton's Age of Elizabeth 3 England a Continental Power 3 Shilling History of England ... 3 Tudors and the Reformation 3 Cresy's Encyclopaedia of Civil Engineering 14 Critical Essays of a Country Parson 7 Crookes's An\hr2icen 15 Chemical Analyses 13 Dyeing and Calico-printing 15 Crump'' s Manual of Banking 21 Culley's Handbook of Telegraphy 14 Curteis's Macedonian Empire 3 De Caisne and Le Maout's Botany 12 De Tocqueville' s Democracy in America... 5 Digby's Indian Famine Campaign 2 Dobson on the Ox 20 Dove's Law of Storms 9 Z^^TW^Z/j History of Taxes = 5 Doyle's ^^.) Fairyland 13 Drew's Hulsean Lectures 15 Drufnmond s ]e.\Y\zh Mess\3ih 16 Eastlake's Hints on Household Taste 14 Edwards's Nile 17 ^//?V^//' J Scripture Commentaries 16 Lectures on Life of Christ 15 Elsa and her Vulture 19 Epochs of Ancient History 3 English History 3 Modem History ,.;... 3 Ewalds History of Israel 16 Antiquities of Israel 16 Fairbairn s Ap-p]ic2iiions of Iron 14 Information for Engineers 14 Mills and Millwork 14 Farrar's Language and Languages 7 Fitzwygram on Horses and Stables 20 Frampton's (Bishop) Life 4 Francis's Fishing Book 20 Frobisher's lAiehy Jones 4 Froude's Ccesar 4 English in Ireland i . History of England i Short Studies 7 Gairdner's Houses of Lancaster and York 3 Richard III. & Perkin War beck 2 WOjRKS published by LONGMANS 6- C(9. 23 Ganot's Elementary Physics 10 ■ Natural Philosophy lo Gardiner s Buckingham and Charles 2 Personal Government of Charles I. 2 First Two Stuarts 3 Thirty Years' War 3 German Home Life 7 ■ Goldzihers Hebrew Mythology 16 Goodeve's Mechanics , 11 Mechanism 11 Gore's Art of Scientific Discovery 14 ———Electro-Metallurgy 11 Grant's Ethics of Aristotle 6 Graver Thoughts of a Country Parson 7 Greville s ]ouvna\ i Griffins Algebra and Trigonometry 11 Grove on Correlation of Physical Forces... 10 Gwilt's Encyclopaedia of Architecture 14 Hale's Fall of the Stuarts 3 Hartwig's Works on Natural History and Popular Science 11 ^ia!«^/^^(?«'j Animal Mechanics 10 //a^Wfzr^'j Selected Essays 6 Heer's Primeval World of Switzerland 12 Heine's Life and Works, by Stigand 4 Helmholtz on Tone 10 Helmholiz's Scientific Lectures 10 Herschel's Outlines of Astronomy 9 Hobson's Amateur Mechanic 14 Hodgson's Philosophy of Reflection 5 //i3/il/?zyj Christ the Consoler 17 Hoskold's Engineer's Valuing Assistant ... 14 Hullah's History of Modem Music 12 Transition Period 12 Hume'sEssays 6 Treatise on Human Nature 6 Mne's Rome to its Capture 3 History of Rome 2 Indian Alps 17 Ingelow's Poems 19 Jameson's Sacred and Legendary Art 13 Memoirs 4 yenkin's Electricity and Magnetism 11 Jerrold's Life of Napoleon i Johnson s Normans in Europe 3 Patentee's Manual 21 Johnston s Geographical Dictionary 8 "Jonson's (Ben) Every Man in his Humour 6 "Jukes's Types of Genesis 16 Jukes on Second Death 16 Aa/wA'j Bible Studies 16 Commentary on the Bible 16 Keller's Lake Dwellings of Switzerland.... 12 Kerls Metallurgy, by Crookes and Rohrig. 15 Kingzett's KSkaXxTxz.dA 13 Animal Chemistry 13 Kirhy and Spence's Entomology 12 Knatchbull-Hugessen s Fairy- Land 18 Higgledy-Piggledy 18 Kuenens Prophets and Prophecy in Israel 16 Landscapes, Churches, &c 7 Lathams English Dictionaries 8 Handbook of English Language 8 Lecky's History of England i European Morals 3 RationaUsm 3 Leaders of Public Opinion 4 Lefroy's Bermudas 17 Leisure Hours in Town 7 Leslie's Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy 5 Lessons of Middle Age 7 Lewes' s Biographical History of Philosophy 3 Z«cw on Authority 6 Liddellscad Scott's Greek-English Lexicons 8 Lindley and Moore's Treasury of Botany ... 21 Lloyd' s Mz%nt\!\'=>xn 10 Wave-Theory of Light 10 London Series of Enghsh Classics 6 Longmans (F. W.) Chess Openings 21 • German Dictionary ... 8 (W.) Edward the Third 2 Lectures on History of England 2 Old and New St. Paul's 13 Loudon's Encyclopaedia of Agriculture ... 15 Gardening 15 Plants 12 Lubbock's Origin of CiviUsation 12 Zz^flf/ow'j American War 3 Lyra Germanica 17 Macalister s Vertebrate Animals xx Macaulay's (Lord) Clive, by Bowen 6 Essays i History of England ... i Lays, lUus. Editions ... 13 Qheap Edition... 19 Life and Letters 4 Miscellaneous Writings 7 Speeches 7 Works I Writings, Selections from 7 McCulloch's Dictionary of Commerce 8 Macfarren on Musical Harmony 13 Macleods Economical Philosophy 5 Economics for Beginners 21 Theory and Practice of Banking 21 Elements of Banking 21 Mademoiselle Mori 19. Affx/^if'j Annals of the Road , 19 Manning's Mission of the Holy Spirit 17 Marlowe's Doctor Faustus, by Wagner ... 6 Marshman's\J\i&oi\idM€i.OQk. 4 Martineau s (Z\iX\%\Sain Life 17 Hours of Thought 17 Hymns 17 Maunder s Popular Treasuries 20 MaocwelTs Theory of Heat n Mays History of Democracy '. i History of England x Melville's (Whyte) Novels and Tales 19V Memorials of Charlotte Williams- Wynn 4 Mendelssohn's 'Letters 4 Merivale's Early Church History 15 Fall of the Roman Republic ... 2 General History of Rome 2 Roman Triumvirates 3 Romans under the Empire a Merrifields Arithmetic and Mensuration..* 11 Miles on Horse's Foot and Horse Shoeing 20 on Horse's Teeth and Stables 20 Mill (J.) on the Mind 5 MilTs(^. S.) Autobiography 4 Dissertations & Discussions 5, Essays on Religion 16 Hamilton's Philosophy 5 Liberty 5 Political Economy ^ Representative Government 5 24 WORKS published by LONGMANS 6- CO. MilTs (J. S.) Subjection of Women 5 System of Logic 5 Unsettled Questions 5 Utilitarianism 5 A/ifV/^r'j Elements of Chemistry 13 Inorganic Chemistry 11 5f Skertchley s YQVi\2in^ 18 Mitchells Manual of Assaying 15 Milton s Paradise Regained, by Jerram ... 6 Modem Novelist's Library 18-19 MonselVs Spiritual Songs 17 Moore s Irish Melodies, Illustrated Edition 13 Lalla Rookh, Illustrated Edition.. 13 Morelts Philosophical Fragments 5 Morris s Age of Anne 3 Mozart's Life, by Nohl 4 Mailers Chips from a German Workshop. 7 Hibbert Lectures on Religion ... 16 Science of Language 7 Science of Religion 16 Mullinger's Schools of Charles the Great ... 6 Neison on the Moon 9 Nevile's Horses and Riding 20 Newman's Apologia pro Vita Su^ 4 Nicolss Puzzle of Life 12 Noiri's Miiller & Philosophy of Language 7 Ncrthcott's Lathes & Turning 14 O' Conor s Scripture Commentary 16 Owen's Comparative Anatomy and Phy- siology of Vertebrate Animals II Packe's Guide to the Pyrenees 18 Pattison's Casaubon 4 Payen's Industrial Chemistry 14 Pewtner's Comprehensive Specifier 21 Phillips's Civil War in Wales 2 Pole's Game of Whist 21 Pope's Select Poems, hy Arnold 6 Powells Early England 3 Preece & Sivewright's Telegraphy 11 Present-Day Thoughts.., 7 Proctor's Astronomical Works 9 - Scientific Essays (Two Series) ... 11 Prothero's'Do.yioTAioxX. 2 Public Schools Atlas of Ancient Geography 8 Atlas of Modern Geography 8 Rawlinson's Parthia 3 Sassanians 3 Recreations of a Country Parson 7 Reynardson s Down the Road 19 /?zVA'j Dictionary of Antiquities 8 Rivers' s Orchard House 12 Rose Amateur's Guide 12 Rogers's EcUpse of Faith 15 Defence of Eclipse of Faith 15 Roget's Enghsh Thesaurus 8 Ronalds' Fly-Fisher's Entomology 20 /?