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 1 HE following sheets pretend to no merit in 
 composition, the writer pretends to no reputa- 
 tion as an author ; the subject must be interest- 
 ing to every British reader, and if the events 
 are faithfully recorded, the work will deserve 
 some attention. 
 
 Unaccustomed for a series of years to any 
 great or continued exertion upon the continent, 
 the people of England almost doubted their 
 power or means of supporting one. The genius 
 of Lord Wellington, the bravery of British 
 troops, have removed this doubt. 
 
 950056 
 
2 
 
 To the detail of the brilliant exploits by 
 which the early campaigns in Portugal and 
 Spain were distinguished, this work is dedi- 
 cated. The author has undertaken it, embold- 
 encdby the; consideration, that from the oppor- 
 tunities which he enjoyed of observing the trans- 
 actions in the Peninsula, in most of which he 
 was personally engaged, he has the means of 
 relating them correctly. 
 
 In the summer of 1808 the first deputies 
 from the Austurias arrived in England; they 
 were so rapidly succeeded by others from every 
 part of the Peninsula, that after a very short 
 time there remained no doubt that the great 
 people, whom they came to represent, were 
 determined to struggle for independence. 
 
 The British ministers did no more than echo 
 the sentiments of the nation when they de-^ 
 cided to give every support to this people; 
 and Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had been ap- 
 pointed to the command of a corps destined 
 
for a different service, was selected to Ifead the 
 first armament which should carry assistance 
 to Portugal and Spain. 
 
 The force under his orders sailed from Cork 
 in the beginning of July ; Sir Arthur Wellesley 
 himself proceeded in a single ship to Corunna. 
 The state of things upon his arrival at that 
 port was unfavourable to the Spaniards. The 
 Gallician army under Blake, and that of Castile 
 under Cuesta, had been defeated by a French 
 corps commanded by Marshal Bessi^res, in the 
 neighbourhood of Rio-Seco; and there appeared 
 no obstacle to the march of the enemy to Co- 
 runna. In this situation of affairs Sir Arthur 
 Wellesley hinted to the Junta, that if a request 
 to land his army for the protection of Gallicia 
 should be made to him, he would not hesitate in 
 acceding to it. The Junta, however, actuated 
 by a feeling of pride and jealousy which has 
 so often brought the affairs of Spain to the 
 brink of ruin, neglected to make this proposal. 
 Sir Arthur consequently proceeded to the coast 
 of Portugal, and arrived in Mondego Bay on 
 
 B 2 
 
the 26th of July. Leaving there the expedition 
 he commanded, he went to the mouth of the 
 Tagus, to procure information, and to combine 
 his operations with Admiral Sir C. Cotton. 
 When these objects were accomplished, he re- 
 turned to the Mondego, determining to land his 
 troops as soon as the corps which he expected, 
 either from Cadiz, under General Spencer, or 
 from England, under General Ackland, should 
 have arrived. The former joined on the 2d of 
 August; and Sir Arthur Wellesley immediately 
 disembarked his army. At this moment three- 
 fourths of Portugal were in insurrection 
 against the French. Junot, who had entered 
 the country in the November preceding, had 
 commanded a corps of 40,000 men, of which 
 about 10,000 were Spaniards; Oporto was oc- 
 cupied by a part of the Spanish troops, the 
 rest of them were at Lisbon. 
 
 At the commencement of the revolution in 
 Spain, Junot entertained so great a suspicion of 
 the Spaniards in that capital, and in its neigh- 
 bourhood, that, under pretence of sending them 
 
5 
 
 to other quarters, he succeeded in surrounding 
 and disarming them, and afterwards in placing 
 them as prisoners on board ships provided for 
 that purpose in the Tagus. As soon as the 
 intelligence of this event reached Oporto, 
 the Spanish garrison seized the few French 
 officers who were in the town ; invited the in- 
 habitants to follow the example of Spain, and 
 resist the French ; and themselves marched off 
 to join their companions in Gallicia. 
 
 The Portuguese had, however, before this 
 time, raised the standard of their prince. 
 The Bishop of Oporto assumed the govern- 
 ment of the northern provinces of Portugal ; and 
 General Frere and other persons took the lead 
 in the insurrection in the other parts of that 
 country. The old soldiers, who had been dis- 
 banded by the French, were called to arms; 
 and in a short time three armies were formed ; 
 one at Oporto, another at Coimbra, and the 
 third at Viseu. Officers had already been 
 despatched from England to ascertain the state 
 of the Oporto and Coimbra corps; and Sir 
 
Arthur Wellesley sent an officer to Viseu to 
 report to him the state of the force assembled 
 there mider General Barcellar. It is needless 
 to observe, that an army formed as the Portu- 
 guese had been, could not be very effective; 
 such as it was, however, it was hearty in the 
 cause of its country, and most anxious for 
 an opportunity of revenging the wrongs which 
 had been inflicted upon the nation. 
 
 The corps of Oporto was joined to that of 
 Coimbra, and was destined to act with Sir 
 Arthur Wellesley. The corps of Viseu was 
 sent to Guarda ; whence, in conjunction with 
 some Spaniards under the orders of the 
 Marquis of Valadares, it was directed to march 
 upon Abrantes, and from thence co-operate 
 in the meditated attack on Lisbon. There was 
 also a corps of Spaniards of some force col- 
 lected at Badajos under General Galluzzo, 
 which it was hoped might have given some 
 assistance to these confibinations, by a simul- 
 taneous operation in the Alemtejo. 
 
7 
 
 Such was the state of the allied force when 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley first landed his army on 
 the banks of the Mondego. The French were 
 in possession of Lisbon, and the country north 
 of it as far as Leyria, which had been recap- 
 tured from the Portuguese by a force under 
 the orders of General Margaron. On the entry 
 of the French into this town, they committed 
 the most atrocious acts of cruelty*. As an 
 
 * The cruelties committed by the French army in 
 this instance, and throughout the whole of its campaigns 
 in Portugal, had their origin in the nature of the war in 
 which it was now for the first time engaged. Till this pe- 
 riod, wherever the French soldiers had established them- 
 selves, whether by the defeat of the armies which defended 
 the country invaded, or otherwise, they found the people 
 submitting to their rule ; when, in Portugal, therefore, the 
 nation rose in hostility against them, they considered such 
 resistance as rebellion, and looked upon the inhabitants 
 taken in arms, as disturbers of the public peace, and 
 therefore entitled to no mercy or consideration. The 
 officers also hoped, by inflicting vengeance on the 
 patriots, to arrest the progress of an insurrection which 
 menaced their total overthrow. It would not be fair to 
 argue, from the conduct of the French in Portugal, that 
 in other situations they would be led to adopt similar 
 proceedings. 
 
8 
 
 instance of the brutality of a superior officer, 
 
 the of related of himself, that 
 
 upon entering the town, he met a woman with 
 a child at her breast, that the appearance of 
 the infant excited his pity, but " se rapellant 
 qu'il Halt soldatj' he pierced the two bodies 
 with a single thrust of his sword. When the 
 English advanced-guard arrived there, it found 
 in one of the convents the dead bodies of 
 several Monks, who had been killed by the 
 French soldiers; some of whom had dipped 
 their hands in the blood of their unfortunate 
 victims, and had daubed with it the walls of the 
 
 convent. 
 
 >' 
 
 To the southward of the Tagus, the French 
 had been unable to retain any part of the 
 Alemtejo. 
 
 About the end of July, Junot detached a corps, 
 under the orders of General Loison, to repress, 
 in the first instance, the insurrections of that 
 province; next, to give whatever assistance 
 might be wanted by the garrison of Elvas; and, 
 
lastly, to return by Abrantes to the north ctf the 
 Tagus, and to wreak a signal vengeance upon 
 Coimbra. General Loison, in execution of these 
 directions, marched to Evora, where the Portu- 
 guese had collected the force of the provinces^ 
 and, assisted by some Spaniards, resolved 
 to defend the town. General Loison attacked 
 it, and after meeting with a considerable resist- 
 ance, entered it, and delivered it over to pil- 
 lage. The inhabitants, threatened with indis- 
 criminate massacre, endeavoured to shelter 
 themselves in the churches and convents, where 
 they had been accustomed ^o look for protec- 
 tion ; but this was of no avail against their mer- 
 ciless enemies ; thousands of them were drawn 
 from their places of refuge, and fell victims to 
 a licentious soldiery, excited by the unre- 
 strained desire of plunder and revenge. 
 
 from Evora, General Loison marched to 
 Elvas, and from thence returned by Abrantes 
 to Thomar, where he was arrested in the 
 further execution of his instructions, by the 
 news that Sir Arthur Wellesley had landed. 
 
10 
 
 and was at Leyria, upon his march towards 
 Lisbon. 
 
 During this period Sir Arthur had pre- 
 pared for the campaign he was about to un- 
 dertake. 
 
 He had 13,000 British infantry and 300 ca- 
 valry; he selected 5,000 of the best Portuguese 
 troops that were assembled at Coimbra, and 
 with an army so composed, determined to move 
 forward. He was in daily expectation of a 
 corps of 5,000 men from England, and he was 
 also apprized that the body* of men who had 
 been under Lieut.-General Moore in Sweden, 
 had received orders to proceed to the Pe- 
 ninsula. 
 
 The Commissariat, under Sir Arthur Welles- 
 ley, was defective ; an army just landed must 
 necessarily be without the means of transport ; it 
 was, therefore, evident that it must depend en- 
 tirely upon its communication with the shipping 
 for its support throughout its operations : Sir 
 
11 
 
 Arthur Wellesley upon these considerations 
 determined to advance by the road nearest 
 the coast; by that movement he secured to 
 himself the advantages of being able to receive 
 his reinforcements at any time they should ar- 
 rive ; and in addition, he was not cramped by 
 any line of communication which it would be 
 necessary for him to maintain, or which he must 
 have defended, had the enemy (as was once 
 contemplated) made any demonstrations upon 
 his rear. 
 
 Before he quitted the Mondego, he left 
 instructions for the corps under General 
 Ackland to proceed along the coast to join 
 him. He also left a statement of the infor- 
 mation he had obtained, and of the opinions 
 he had formed, to be delivered to Sir John 
 Moore upon his arrival. Sir Arthur Wellesley 
 recommended, that the corps under that officer 
 should be landed in the Mondego, and marched 
 to Santarem, so as to operate to the southward 
 of the Tagus, if necessary, and to prevent the 
 enemy from retiring through the province of 
 
12 
 
 Alemtejo, in case he should be beaten by the 
 force which Sir Arthur was leading against 
 him. Other objects were in contemplation, but 
 these were the principal. 
 
 This proposed system of operations was 
 afterwards subjected to considerable discus- 
 sion ; it was objected to, and set aside. The 
 mind, however, which conceived it, would have 
 executed it with success, though in other hands 
 it might appear impracticable. The battle 
 of Vimiera, in which only half the force under 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley was engaged, proved the 
 correctness of his calculations, and warrants a 
 belief that if the whole campaign had been 
 directed according to his views, the result 
 would have proved more advantageous than it 
 did under a different arrangement. 
 
 On the 9th of August, Sir Arthur Wellesley 
 made his first movement from the Mondego, and 
 reached Leyria on the 10th; he halted two days 
 to make the necessary arrangements for his 
 advance, and to bring up the Portuguese who 
 
13 
 
 were at Coimbra. On the 13th he moved 
 to the ground about Batalha, where a patrole 
 of French, from the corps under General La 
 Borde, at Alcoba^^a, was first discovered. Ge- 
 neral Frere, who commanded the Portuguese, 
 here made an objection to advance any further, 
 stating, as his reason, the improbability of find* 
 ing provisions. Sir Arthur Wellesley was not 
 disconcerted by this defection : after attempting 
 in vain to alter General Frere's determination, 
 he decided to move forward, taking with his 
 army a detachment of 1,600 men, from the 
 force under that officer's command, which he 
 placed under the orders of Colonel Trant, and 
 which Sir Arthur undertook to provision. 
 These arrangements being made, he advanced to 
 attack the corps that occupied Alcobai^a ; the 
 enemy had, however, abandoned it in the night, 
 and the British army took up its position upon 
 the heights beyond it. The next day the army 
 moved forward to Caldas ; the advance, under 
 Brigadier General Fane, to Obidos ; where 
 some skirmishing took place between the light 
 troops under his orders, and the French rear. 
 
14 
 
 On the ] 7th Sir Arthur Wellesley moved to 
 attack General La Borde, who had not as yet 
 been joined by the force under General Loison, 
 which was marching by Alemquer, to effect 
 that object. General La Borde was posted 
 at Roli^a, in a strong position upon some 
 heights which covered the road from Obidos 
 to Lisbon. 
 
 Sir Arthur first formed his army in columns 
 of battalions, behind Obidos, from thence he 
 detached the light troops, under Brigadier- 
 General Fane, supported by Major General 
 Ferguson's brigade, along some heights which 
 led to the right of the enemy's position. The 
 rest of the army passed through Obidos, and ad- 
 vanced along the plain towards Roli«f a. 
 
 The enemy was first discovered, drawn up 
 at the foot of the hill, and in front of the po- 
 sition; but upon seeing our advance he re- 
 tired to the heights. 
 
 Sir Arthur, upon a close examination of the 
 
15 
 
 ground thus taken up, and wishing to prevent 
 the possibility of General La Borders retiring 
 upon the fortress of Peniche, determined to ad- 
 vance the right of his army as well as the left, and 
 thus to attack both flanks of the enemy's position. 
 The attack on the enemy's left was led on by 
 the brigade under Major General Hill, while the 
 45th and 29th Regiments under Major General 
 Nightingale were ordered to advance upon the 
 centre ; Major General Ferguson's brigade was 
 brought from the heights on the left into the 
 plain, to support this movement; by continu- 
 ing however its original direction, that corps 
 might have rendered more essential service, 
 since it would have fallen upon the French 
 right, and in conjunction with Brigadier Ge- 
 neral Fane's corps, would have decided the fate 
 of the action sooner : but some mistake hav- 
 ing arisen in an order delivered to it, this ad- 
 vantage was not obtained. 
 
 The 29th Regiment ascended the hill, by a 
 hollow way which led to the summit, and 
 eucpuuter.ed a most determined resistance on 
 
16 
 
 the height where the enemy was formed. The 
 path along which the regiment moved was 
 so narrow, as to admit but three or four 
 men abreast ; so that when it had reached 
 the ground upon which it was to deploy, 
 the soldiers were exposed to the fire of the 
 French corps which occupied the vineyards, 
 while they were unable to form any front, 
 from which to return it; the grenadier com- 
 pany, however, charged that part of the 
 enemy which was ypon the open, and by that 
 act of heroism, (although it was afterwards 
 driven back by the fire from the vineyards), gave 
 time to some of the companies behind it to form, 
 and to maintain the ground they had got posses- 
 sion of. In the mean time, the light troops, 
 under Brigadier General Fane, had got upon 
 the right of the position, and Major General 
 Hill had ascended the hill upon its left; so 
 that the enemy was obliged to abandon his 
 first line, and retire into the village of Zambu- 
 gera in the rear. 
 
 From this he was driven by a most gal- 
 
17 
 
 lant charge under the direction of Major 
 General Spencer, which terminated the action. 
 
 General La Borde continued to make some 
 resistance upon a height beyond the village, 
 only for the purpose of collecting, and form- 
 ing his troops in the plain behind it, which he 
 executed with considerable ability. After 
 having formed them upon two lines he retired, 
 filing from his left upon the road to Torres 
 Vedras. 
 
 Such was the first battle fought by British 
 troops in the great cause of the Peninsula : it 
 cost us some valuable lives, among whom Colo- 
 nel Lake, and Captain Bradford were the most 
 distinguished ; but it gave a sample of that 
 bravery and good conduct which have since 
 marked the progress of our arms, and have 
 raised the military renown of England to the 
 glorious eminence on which it at present stands. 
 The advantage which resulted from this action 
 was great. General Loison was marching to 
 join General La Borde, in the position of Roli^a; 
 
 c 
 
18 
 
 his columns, the next day, were distinctly per- 
 ceived in the direction of Torres Vedras, to 
 which place he was forced to retire, in conse- 
 quence of the action of the preceding morning; 
 but if the two corps had been at the battle of 
 Rolijpa, the British loss must have been con- 
 siderably greater, and the general operations 
 of the campaign proportionally delayed. 
 
 The following day, the 18th, Sir Arthur Wel- 
 lesley marched the army to Lourinhal, for the 
 purpose of bringing supplies from the shipping, 
 as also to receive the reinforcements which 
 were understood to be upon the coast from 
 England. 
 
 The 19th he moved to Vimiera, on which 
 day, the brigade under the orders of Ge- 
 neral Anstruther, landed, and on the morning 
 of the 20th marched up to the army. Sir Arthur 
 Wellesley had during the last two days sup- 
 plied his army with provisions, had received 
 part of his reinforcements, and directed ttie rest 
 which were in the offing, under Major General 
 
19 
 
 Ackland, to land in the course of the night ; he 
 determined, therefore, to move forward to 
 Mafra, and the orders to that effect werfe 
 given. 
 
 The enemy was known to have collected 
 his force at Torres Vedras ; his cavalry had 
 patroled about the British army during the pre- 
 ceding days, without being opposed ; the su- 
 periority of numbers in that arm was decided. 
 
 But Sir Arthur Wellesley conceived that by 
 moving along the coast road to Mafra, he should 
 turn the position which the French occupied, 
 and by that operation force them to retire 
 upon Lisbon. He was also of opinion, that from 
 the rapidity of his own march, he should ar- 
 rive in the neighbourhood of that town, be- 
 fore the enemy would be able to occupy, 
 with advantage, the ground which would de- 
 fend it, and upon which he should force them to 
 give him battle. On the evening of this day, 
 however, a frigate, on board which was Sir Harry 
 Burrard, arrived in Marciera Bay ; Sir Arthur 
 Wellesley immediately waited on that officer, 
 
 C 2 
 
20 
 
 to receive his orders, and to communicate 
 to him the plans he was about to pursue. 
 Sir Harry Burrard disapproved of them, di- 
 rected counter orders to be issued to the army, 
 to prevent its march in the morning, and deter- 
 mined to await the arrival of the corps under 
 the orders of Sir John Moore. Sir Arthur Wel- 
 lesley represented that the French army was 
 now so near, that it was impossible to prevent 
 an action; that the corps under his orders was 
 equal to the contest with it ; that the army of Sir 
 John Moore would be of infinitely more service 
 by marching upon Santarem ; and that the great- 
 est disadvantage would arise, from our changing 
 at once from an offensive to a defensive line of 
 operations. Sir Harry Burrard remained, how- 
 ever, fixed to his first intention ; the counter 
 orders were given, and a messenger was des- 
 patched to Sir John Moore, to direct him to 
 move down in his transports, to Marciera Bay. 
 Thus was the whole system of our campaign 
 changed in a moment. With the enemy col- 
 lected within three leagues of us, we were di- 
 rected to remain stationary, till a corps of which 
 we had, as yet, no tidings, should arrive. 
 
The event, however, proved what Sir Arthur 
 Wellesley had foretold. At nine in the morning 
 of the 21st, our advanced posts were attacked, 
 and the glorious battle of Vimiera evinced that 
 the British army was worthy of the confidence 
 which its General had reposed in it, in the dis- 
 cussion of the preceding evening. 
 
 Early on this day, Sir Arthur Wellesley had 
 been to the advanced posts, and had returned 
 to his quarters, when the first shots were 
 exchanged with the advance of the enemy, who 
 had passed from Torres Vedras, through the 
 defile in front of it, and had been marching 
 during the whole of the night. 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley had posted the light 
 troops and the 50th Regiment, under Brigadier 
 General Fane, upon a height near a windmill, 
 in front of the village of Vimiera. Briga- 
 dier General Anstruther was upon the right 
 of this corps, but a part of his brigade was de- 
 tached during the action, to occupy Vimiera ; 
 the left of the army was placed upon a ridge 
 
22" 
 
 of heights, which run eastward into the coun- 
 try, and across which the brigades of Major 
 General Ferguson and Major General Night- 
 ingale were placed in position. The rest of the 
 army was in reserve, upon heights in rear of 
 Vimiera, which in reality formed the position, 
 the one in which the action was fought being 
 only the advance of it. The French army was 
 divided into two divisions, under Generals La 
 Borde and Loison, and the reserve, composed 
 of the grenadiers and light infantry, together 
 with the cavalry, under General Kellerman. 
 
 Junot separated his army, to attack the po- 
 sitions of our right and left at the same mo- 
 ment, connecting his two wings by the force 
 tinder General Kellerman ; they were, how- 
 ever, at too great a distance from each other, 
 and their attacks were unconnected. 
 
 • 
 
 The left column was first engaged with the 
 brigade of Brigadier General Anstruther ; it at- 
 tempted to turn his right, but after a contest of 
 some duration, in which the superiority of the 
 
23 
 
 British fire, in the first instance^ and afterwards 
 of British bayonets, was completely proved, the 
 enemy was repulsed with great slaughter, and 
 forced to abandon his undertaking. The right 
 column (which had moved to the left of the Bri- 
 tish) began its attack upon the brigades of Major 
 Generals Ferguson and Nightingale, at the time 
 that the left had been beaten by Brigadier Gene- 
 ral Anstruther. It commenced with considera- 
 ble vigour, but the steadiness with which it was 
 received, soon stopped its career ; in less than 
 half an hour the column was beaten^ and pur- 
 sued beyond the heights ; General Bregnier 
 and six guns taken. A French regiment after- 
 wards rallied near the village of Ventoso, at the 
 extremity of the hill, and made an attack, in 
 column of mass, to recover the guns; but it 
 was completely routed, with great loss. The 
 attack upon the village of Vimiera, as the 
 decisive effort, was made by the reserve, in close 
 column, supported by artillery, but was most 
 gallantly resisted by the 50th and part of the 
 43d Regiments, who charged the flank of the 
 column and totally defeated it. Two squa- 
 
24 
 
 drons of the 20th Regiment of cavalry moved 
 upon it when broken, and cut down and took 
 prisoners a considerable number of those com- 
 posing it, who were escaping from the infantry. 
 
 A short time before the victory was decided. 
 Sir Harry Burrard arrived from the frigate, on 
 board which he had remained during the night; 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley was preparing to follow 
 up the advantages he had gained; and had 
 already brought up Brigadier General Bowes' 
 ^nd Major General Ackland's brigades, (who had 
 as yet been in the reserve and unengaged) with 
 which he had intended to pursue the enemy. 
 He had also directed Major General Hill to be 
 ready to move from his right along a road which 
 he was in possession of, and which led by the 
 nearest line to Torres Vedras. But Sir Harry 
 Burrard, conceiving that such a movement would 
 be attended with risk, desired Sir Arthur Welles- 
 ley to discontinue the pursuit, and to rest satis- 
 fied with the advantages that had been gained. 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley remonstrated on the. 
 
25 
 
 field against the order to halt, but it was of no 
 avail ; the decision was not to be changed or 
 modified; the enemy retired at his leisure; our 
 light troops even were not ordered to attend 
 his movements, and a part of the rear-guard 
 remained upon a hill within a short distance 
 of our position till the following morning. 
 
 Without wishing to cast any reflection upon 
 the conduct of Sir Harry Burrard, admitting 
 that (called upon to take the command of an 
 army already considerably advanced in the 
 operations it had undertaken, and so nearly 
 in contact with the collected force of the 
 enemy as to make an action inevitable), he 
 was placed in a situation of great difficulty; 
 yet it is impossible not to regret that the per- 
 son, in whose mind the plan of the campaign 
 originally was formed, was not allowed to exe- 
 cute it throughout. 
 
 The system which Sir Arthur Wellesley had 
 laid down had now been altered in three most 
 essential points. First, the not proceeding on 
 
 «^ 
 
26 
 
 the morning of the 21st to turn the left of the 
 enemy, by the movement he had ordered upon 
 Mafra ; thereby changing the operations of the 
 army from the offensive to the defensive. Se- 
 condly, the not pursuing the enemy after the 
 victory of Vimiera ; and, lastly, the having 
 changed the direction of Lieutenant General 
 Sir John Moore's corps, from its march upon 
 Santarem to its junction with the army of Sir 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 It may not be uninteresting to trace the 
 probable effects which these movements would 
 have produced. 
 
 • General Junot had taken the command of the 
 whole disposable force under his orders in 
 Portugal (amounting to 14,000 men), at Torres 
 Vedras on the 20th ; and presuming upon the 
 boasted superiority of French troops to those 
 of any other nation, he had resolved to attack 
 the left of the British army, thereby leaving it 
 no retreat if defeated, but to the sea- shore, and 
 to its transports, if it could effect its embarka- 
 
27 
 
 tion. With this intention he marched on the 
 night of the 20th by a road leading through a 
 most difficult defile, which brought him to the 
 eastward of Vimiera, near which place he ar- 
 rived soon after nine o'clock on the 21st. The 
 order which had been issued the day before 
 for the British army was to march at five 
 o'clock, by the road to the Ponte de Roll, and 
 from thence direct upon Mafra. This road 
 was separated about two leagues from that 
 upon which the French army was advancing, 
 and leading in a totally different direction; 
 divided also from it by a woody and almost 
 impervious tract of country ; so that if the 
 movement had been executed, the British army 
 would have been considerably advanced towards 
 Mafra, before the enemy had arrived at Vimeira. 
 
 If indeed this march had been discovered by 
 the French patroles, it would still have been 
 impossible to arrest our progress, from the 
 difficulty of getting to us; and in all probability, 
 the enemy would have had no other resource 
 than to have returned to Torres Vedras (where 
 
28 
 
 the whole of his baggage had remained), 
 and from thence tried to attack us at Mafra, 
 which would have been attempted under many 
 disadvantages; or to have marched in the 
 greatest haste by the Cabe^a de Montachique 
 to have covered Lisbon. To those who are ac- 
 quainted with the country I am speaking of, the 
 difficulty of such movements (with an army 
 which had already been marching since the 
 morning of the 20th), will be duly appreciated : 
 if the attempt to cover the capital had been 
 made, the confusion and hurry with which a 
 position must have been taken up would have 
 bid fair for the success of our attack upon it, 
 which could not have been delayed beyond the 
 23d; the proximity of Lisbon, which was ripe 
 for insurrection, must have added to the diffi- 
 culties of the enemy; and upon a review of 
 all the circumstances of the case, together with 
 the great talents which Sir Arthur Wellesley 
 has since displayed, we may be warranted in 
 believing that complete success would have 
 attended his operation ; and that the possession 
 of Lisbon would have been effected with a 
 
29 
 
 smaller loss, with greater advantages, and at a 
 much earlier period, than it was obtained by 
 the system which was adopted. 
 
 The next point to be considered is the effect 
 which would have been produced by following 
 up the enemy after the victory of Vimiera. 
 General Junot had advanced from Torres Ve- 
 dras by a circuitous road to Yimiera ; and after 
 his defeat the corps under Major General Hill, 
 which had taken no part in the action, was 
 in possession of the direct road to that place. 
 The ground about Torres Vedras is extremely 
 strong ; and it is the only good pass by which 
 the French army could have retired to Lisbon. 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley was convinced that Major 
 General Hill might have occupied the town 
 before the enemy could have reached it ; and 
 that he might have defended the positions 
 about it, till the army which was to have fol- 
 lowed the French should have been able to 
 communicate with him. 
 
 The great objection that was raised to thiis 
 
30 
 
 project was, that the British army was almost 
 destitute of cavalry, whilst the French had of , 
 that arm a force of at least 1,200 men; but 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley relied upon his own 
 genius to provide a remedy to this objection ; 
 our infantry was in the best order, and it has 
 too often since been tried in presence of a 
 superior cavalry, to leave doubt in the mind 
 of any British officer, that (if judiciously 
 managed and supported with artillery), it is 
 competent to advance in the face of cavalry. 
 If, therefore, Sir Arthur Wellesley's intentions 
 had. been carried into effect, the probability 
 is, that General Hill would have taken the ' 
 enemy's baggage at Torres Vedras ; that pur- 
 sued by the British army. General Junot 
 would have been unable to force the positions 
 about that town ; that he must, consequently, 
 have retired by some other road, and his army 
 have been subjected to considerable loss. 
 
 There remains only for us to consider the 
 effects produced, by bringing the corps under 
 the orders of Sir John Moore to Marceira 
 
31 
 
 Bay, instead of allowing it to proceed to San- 
 tarem. 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley had from the first con- 
 ceived, that the corps under his immediate 
 command was as considerable as could conve- 
 niently be employed upon the advance to Lis- 
 bon, and was of sufficient force to secure the 
 success of that operation; but he foresaw that 
 it would be impossible for him to prevent the 
 French army from retiring through the Alem- 
 tejo, to Elvas, unless he could bring a separate 
 corps to intercept it ; with that view he had 
 recommended the march of Sir John Moore 
 upon Santarera, and that excellent officer, upon 
 his arrival in Mondego Bay, disembarked a 
 considerable portion of his troops with the view 
 of executing that movement. 
 
 From the moment Sir Arthur Wellesley was 
 apprized of the determination of Sir Harry 
 Burrard to prevent that operation, and found 
 himself arrested in his pursuit of the enemy 
 after the battle of Vimiera, he gave up all hope 
 
of enclosing the French in Lisbon, or of pre- 
 venting their protracting the campaign (if they 
 thought fit to do so) by a movement into the 
 southern provinces of Portugal. 
 
 We must now proceed to the relation of 
 the events which took place after the battle 
 of Vimiera. 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley employed himself, in 
 the evening of the 21st, in getting stores and 
 provisions landed for the troops, and strenu- 
 ously urged an advance on the 22d ; but on 
 the morning of that day, he was informed that 
 Sir Hew Dairy mple was arrived in Marceira 
 Bay, and was landing, to take the command. 
 This officer soon afterwards reached Vi- 
 miera ; he gave directions for the advance of 
 the army on the next day ; but about three 
 o'clock in the afternoon, General Kellerman 
 arrived at the advanced posts, and requested a 
 conference with the English comfnander-in- 
 chief. Some officers were directed to conduct 
 him to head • quarters, with the persons who 
 
33 
 
 formed his suite ; and soon afterwards lie pro- 
 posed the terms to Sir Hew Dalrymple, upon 
 which General Junot was prepared to conclude 
 an armistice, with a view to his total evacuation 
 of Portugal. 
 
 General Kellerman insisted much upon the 
 still remaining strength of the French army ; 
 that 10,000 Russians were prepared to land 
 from the squadron which was in the port of 
 Lisbon, and to assist in the defence of Portugal; 
 that General Junot (in possession of the for- 
 tresses, and with his movements upon Elvas 
 undisturbed) was not in a situation to be dic- 
 tated to, as to the terms upon which he was 
 willing to evacuate the country ; that although 
 a part of the French army had been repulsed 
 from the position of the British, it still pos- 
 sessed considerable resources; that it had 
 the opportunity of occupying, undisturbed, the 
 positions which had been marked out for the 
 defence of Lisbon ; it therefore commanded 
 respect ; but that General Junot was willing to 
 surrender the entire kingdom, with the ports 
 
54 
 
 and fortresses, upon condition that the French 
 army should be sent, with its whole military 
 baggage, and at the expense of England, to its 
 own country. 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley had conceived from the 
 first, that the policy of Great Britain was, to 
 bring as early as possible to the assistance of 
 the Spaniards, who were now upon the Ebro, 
 the British army that was occupied in Portu- 
 gal. 
 
 The plan upon which he had commenced th« 
 campaign was formed with that intention ; the 
 hope of seeing it accomplished, by force of arms, 
 was now nearly at an end. The march of the 
 French Emperor into Spain was already talked 
 of; and there seemed to be no hope, if the French 
 were determined to protract the campaign in 
 Portugal, that a British army, after having 
 beaten them in the field, and besieged the 
 fortresses they occupied in the country, could 
 arrive in time to be of any assistance to the 
 Spaniards. If, on the contrary, the terms 
 
35 
 
 proposed for the evacuation of Portugal were. 
 agreed to, the embarkation of the enemy migl^t 
 be immediately effected, and the British army 
 might in a short time be marched to the 
 assistance of the Spaniards. 
 
 With this view of the various circumstances 
 of the moment. Sir Arthur Wellesley gave his 
 voice in favour of the principle of the armistice 
 proposed; the minor details of it were objected 
 to by him, particularly the wording of the ar- 
 ticle which related to the baggage, and which 
 might be construed into a permission to carry off 
 the plunder of Portugal ; but it was thought, 
 (after an understanding with General Kellerman, 
 that it included only the baggage *'' purement 
 militaire,'" ) that the most proper moment for its 
 correction, would be, in the arrangement of \h% 
 conventioEu 
 
 With this explanation Sir Arthur Wellesley, 
 in pursuance of Sir Hew Dalrymple's directions, 
 signed the Armistice. 
 
 P 2 
 
36 
 
 It would be needless to relate here the terms 
 of a document, which gave rise afterwards to 
 so much discussion in England, and which must 
 consequently be in the recollection of every 
 Englishman. The period of the armistice wa§ 
 two days, with twenty-four hours' notice of its 
 rupture, and it precluded the British army from 
 advancing beyond the line of the Zizandra, 
 To give an opinion upon its merits would be 
 presumption ; but if the opportunity which it 
 afforded of preparing the British army for its 
 advance into Spain, had been properly made 
 use of, and if the execution of this object had not 
 been so considerably delayed, by the tardiness 
 of the embarkation of the French, it is probable 
 that greater advantages would have resulted 
 from it, than have generally been brought into 
 consideration, in the discussions which it has 
 occasioned. 
 
 The morning after the signature of the armi- 
 stice, the British army advanced to Ramalhal. 
 Colonel Murray was sent into the French head- 
 quarters, to discuss the terms of the convention. 
 
37 
 
 and the French retired from Torres Vedras, t(> 
 their positions in the vicinity of Lisbon. After 
 the lapse of some days, the corps of Sir John 
 Moore arrived in Marceira bay, and w^as landed 
 near Vimiera. The following days it w^as ad- 
 vanced, and the v^hole army moved into Torres 
 Vedras. The second day from its entrance into 
 that place, Sir Arthur Wellesley was directed 
 to proceed with the corps with which he ori-' 
 ginally landed, to the town of Sobral, which 
 commanded one of the great passes to Lisbon ; 
 on his march to that place he received a 
 message from Sir Hew Dalrymple, informing 
 him that Colonel Murray had arrived with the 
 convention which he had signed, and that Sir 
 Hew was prepared to ratify it. 
 
 V 
 
 The feeling of the army which had fought 
 the battle of Vimiera, was at this time most 
 hostile to the armistice which had been agreed 
 upon. 
 
 The expression of a private in one of the 
 regiments which had most gallantly asserted 
 
38 
 
 the superiority of the British arms, deserves t<5 
 be recorded : whilst marching in his column to 
 Sobral, he appeared to be looking for something 
 which he had lost ; and upon being asked what 
 he was in search of, replied, ten days, which he 
 believed he should never find again. 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley took up the ground 
 about Sobral, with the corps which he coih- 
 manded; a patrole of French fired upon one of 
 his piquets, but upon its being returned, retired. 
 The second day. Sir Arthur Wellesley moved 
 on to Bucellas, where a line of demarcation 
 was drawn between the British and French 
 posts. 
 
 The corps under the orders of Sir John 
 Moore marched from Torres Vedras to Mafra. 
 The leading division, under Major General 
 the Honourable Edward Paget, had nearly 
 reached that place, when a French officer, 
 who commanded a piquet in the town, de- 
 sired that the English army would not advance, 
 as he had no orders to retire; the circum- 
 
S9 
 
 stance was reported to Sir Hew Dalrymple, 
 who attempted to persuade the French officer 
 to evacuate, but finding his efforts ineffectual, 
 and being desirous to avoid engaging in any 
 fresh hostilities, he ordered his troops to bivou- 
 aque, for the night, on the ground they occu- 
 pied. The next morning the French officer 
 sent word, that he had received orders to retire 
 with his 100 men, and that the British army 
 was at liberty to enter the town. This story 
 was the occasion of much witticism among the 
 soldiers. 
 
 From Mafra, Sir Hew Dalrymple removed his 
 head-quarters to Cintra; from thence to the 
 village of Acyras, near Fort St. Julian's ; and 
 * from thence to Aquinto, between Pa^o d'Aquas 
 and Lisbon, where he remained till the em- 
 barkation of the French army had been com- 
 pleted. 
 
 After the signature of the convention by Sir 
 Hew Dalrymple, at Torres Vedras, and not at 
 Cintra, as has generally been supposed, two offi- 
 
40 
 
 cers, Major General Beresford and Lord Proby, 
 were sent into Lisbon to superintend its execu- 
 tion. The hi&tory of their disputes with the 
 French would hardly be believed. It would be 
 interesting to record them, as instances from 
 which the characters of many of the individuals 
 belonging to the French army might be collect- 
 ed, and the value of their point of honour 
 appreciated. - 
 
 The first object to which the attention of the 
 British commissioners for the execution of the 
 convention was drawn, was to enforce the spirit 
 of that instrument, by preventing the French 
 from carrying off the plunder of Portugal. With 
 this view General Junot, after much opposition 
 on his part, was constrained to issue an order 
 to his army, requiring it to deliver up, into 
 the hands of the commissioners appointed 
 for that purpose, every species of plundered 
 property which it retained in its possession. 
 Within a few hours, however, of the issuing of 
 this order, information was brought to Major 
 General Beresford, that Colonel Cambyse, 
 
41 
 
 aide-de-camp to General Junot, had seized 
 upon the Prince Regent's horses, had carried 
 them from the royal stables, and was embark- 
 ing them as the property of General Junot. 
 
 The statement, upon being inquired into, was 
 found to be correct, and General Kellerman was 
 applied to, to prevent this robbery ; he im- 
 mediately attacked Colonel Cambyse with 
 great severity of language, and ordered the 
 horses to be restored. 
 
 The next day an attempt of the same sort, by 
 the same officer, was made upon one of the car-^ 
 riages belonging to the Duke of Sussex, which 
 was actually embarked ; Major General Beres- 
 ford, upon being made acquainted with it, sent 
 his aide-de-camp to Colonel Cambyse, to re- 
 monstrate with him (in terms not very agree- 
 able) upon the repetition of a conduct so 
 disgraceful to the character of an officer. 
 This lecture was, however, of but little avail, 
 for during the time that Major General Be- 
 resford's aide-de-camp was speaking, the 
 
4S 
 
 jiecond carriage belonging to the Duke of 
 Sussex was removed to the river, for the 
 same purpose of embarkation; both carriages 
 w^ere afterwards recovered, and Colonel 
 Cambyse threatened with a voyage to England 
 as a prisoner, if he continued a line of conduct 
 such as he had till then pursued. Various 
 other traits might be related of this officer, 
 
 but an act of General J 's, will be more 
 
 interesting, and more worthy of record : he 
 had carried off a considerable number of 
 pictures, and embarked them on board his 
 own vessel, from the house of the Marchioness 
 of Anjija; upon being required to give them 
 up, he answered, that they had been given 
 to him. This having been found to be incor- 
 rect, he denied all knowledge of the transaction, 
 and impeached a relation of his who was on 
 board the ship with him, but who immediately 
 proceeded to one of the transports, where he 
 hoped to remain concealed. A threat of pre- 
 venting the General from sailing, till the pictures 
 were disgorged, soon brought this gentleman 
 back to the frigate, and Captain Percy directed 
 
48 
 
 him to go on shore io give an account of the 
 transaction ; he refused, however, to acknow- 
 ledge the jurisdiction of the commissioners, and 
 declared his determination not to land. The 
 bayonets of the marines were called for, to 
 persuade him; they proved effectual, the gen- 
 tleman was landed, and soon after, the pictures 
 were returned. Another general officer, on the 
 day of his embarkation, carried off, from the 
 office of the commissioners, all the papers and 
 documents which he was able to collect, in a 
 short visit he made to it while the commissioners 
 were absent ; and if he haid not been driven 
 back to Lisbon by contrary winds, (when he 
 was forced to return them) would have involved 
 their proceedings in complete confusion. 
 
 On the 1 0th of September the French garrison 
 evacuated Lisbon, and General Hope was ap- 
 pointed Governor. 
 
 The joy of the inhabitants, when the national 
 flag was hoisted, is beyond any description ; 
 an universal shout re-echoed through the town ; 
 
44 
 
 innumerable banners, emblems of a new life of 
 liberty, were displayed from every corner of the 
 capital. The ships in the river, decorated with 
 the proud symbols of national independence, 
 proclaimed the triumph of the day, by repeated 
 discharges of artillery ; and for nine nights the 
 town was universally illuminated, in token of 
 the joy of the inhabitants at their deliverance, 
 and of hatred to the oppressors, who still wit- 
 nessed from their transports the detestation 
 which was manifested of them. » 
 
 Thus was ended the campaign in Portugal, 
 Parts of it are to be regretted, but the great 
 object for which it was undertaken was accom- 
 plished. Portugal was freed from the enemy 
 by the genius of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and the 
 bravery of British troops. Those means have 
 preserved it independent, and have since ac- 
 complished the deliverance of the Peninsula. 
 The succession of general officers to the com- 
 mand of an army considerably advanced in the 
 operations of a campaign, will rarely be attended 
 with advantage ; to cast any blame upon those 
 
45 
 
 who succeeded in this instance to the command 
 of the British army in Portugal, would be unjust; 
 but we may be permitted to observe, that thq 
 genius of a great commander was marked in 
 the first operations of tiie campaign ; whilst a 
 cold calculating policy conducted it to its final 
 issue. Sir Arthur Wellesley soon after em- 
 barked for England ; Sir Hew Dalrymple and 
 Sir Harry Burrard were recalled ; and the 
 British army was intrusted to the command 
 of Sir John Moore. 
 
 The events of the campaign in Spain had 
 been various, during the period of which we 
 have been speaking. 
 
 When the revolution first broke out in that 
 country, when the massacre of the 2d of May 
 had roused every patriot to revenge the murder 
 of his countrymen, the force of the French in 
 Spain was unprepared to repress so universal 
 an insurrection. A corps of 20,000 men was, 
 however, soon despatched, under the orders of 
 General Dupont, to relieve the French fleet at 
 
46 
 
 Cadiz, and to seize upon that important post. 
 General Dupont was too late ; the Governor 
 Solano, suspected of some attachment to the 
 French, was murdered by the people, and the 
 revolution was organized throughout Andalusia. 
 General Castanos was appointed Captain Gene- 
 ral, and was invested with the command of all 
 the troops in the south of Spain. 
 
 He had a considerable number of veteran 
 regiments, besides the volunteers who had at 
 that time hastened to enrol themselves under 
 the banners of their country. With an army so 
 composed, General Castanos marched to oppose 
 the progress of General Dupont. This officer 
 was waiting, at Cordova and Andujar, the junc- 
 tion of a corps under General Wedel, which was 
 marching to his assistance from Madrid; for 
 although General Dupont had not as yet been 
 opposed by any regular force, yet the universal 
 hostility he had met with from the peasants, as 
 well as the loss he had sustained by their desul- 
 tory warfare, made it dangerous for him to at- 
 tempt a further advance into the country. 
 
47 
 
 General Castanos resolved to meet the French 
 force before it should receive its expected re- 
 inforcements ; he arrived with rapidity upon 
 the Guadalquivir, opposite Cordova, and ad- 
 vanced upon Andujar. At the same time he 
 detached a considerable corps, under Generals 
 Coupigni and Reding, to pass the river higher 
 up, to place itself in rear of Dupont, and to in- 
 tercept his communications with Madrid. Thiu 
 object was effected ; the corps reached Baylen 
 on the 19th of July, and was placed between 
 the army of Dupont and the reinforcement of 
 6,000 men under General Wedel. General 
 Dupont had on the same evening determined to 
 break up from his position near Andujar, where 
 he had suffered considerably from the hostility 
 pf the peasants, as well as from the army of 
 Castanos, which was engaged in continual skir- 
 mishes with his troops. He marched during the 
 whole night towards Baylen, and arrived theri^ 
 in the morning ; he found, however, the Spanish 
 corps in position to receive him. General Du- 
 pont made immediate dispositions for attack; 
 but he was foiled in all his attempts to penetrate 
 
48 
 
 the Spanish lines. He expected the arrival of 
 General Wedel; but being at last exhausted, 
 and dreading an attack both in front and rear, 
 (as the corps of Castanos was following him), 
 he sent a flag of truce to the Spaniards about 
 two o'clock in the afternoon, and desired to capi- 
 tulate. While the terms were discussing, but 
 after some advantages had been seized over 
 General Dupont's army, the corps of General 
 Wedel began to appear in rear of the Spaniards ; 
 it soon after made an attack upon them, but 
 was repulsed ; and General Dupont was told, 
 that unless General Wedel was ordered to desist, 
 and unless his corps was included in the capi- 
 tulation, the whole of his army would be put to 
 the sword. General Dupont was obliged to 
 agree, and General Wedel was ordered to re- 
 main quiet, and to consider his corps as a part 
 of the army which was to surrender. General 
 Wedel feigned obedience to this order, but 
 finding his communication with Madrid was 
 open, he moved off in the course of the night, 
 and endeavoured to reach La Mancha. When 
 his march was discovered, the Spaniards an^ 
 
49^ 
 
 nounced to Dupont, that his whole army should 
 pay for the atrocities committed by the French 
 throughout Spain, and be immolated in the 
 morning, unless Wedel was brought back. 
 General Dupont had no means of preventing 
 the execution of so alarming a menace, but 
 complying with the alternative ; he sent a se- 
 nior officer in quest of Wedel, and brought him 
 back from Carolina, which he had already 
 reached : the whole of the two corps laid down 
 their arms the same day, in conformity to a ca- 
 pitulation entered upon for that purpose. 
 
 There never was a more singular extinction of 
 an army of near 25,000 men than that which has 
 been described. General Dupont was esteemed 
 the best officer in the French army ; yet he sur- 
 rendered a most effective corps to an army 
 but just formed, and in part composed of in- 
 experienced officers and soldiers. The results 
 were most fortunate for the Spaniards; the 
 kingdoms of Andalusia were freed from ene- 
 mies, and their armies rendered disposable 
 for the other operations of the war. 
 
 E 
 
50 
 
 About the time that Dupont had been de- 
 tached to Cadiz, General Moncey had been 
 Isent with 8,000 men to reduce Valencia to 
 obedience ; he marched for that purpose from 
 Madrid, and arrived without much opposition 
 within sight of the town. 
 
 Valencia is an old Moorish capital, sur- 
 rounded by ' a very high wall, and secure 
 against a coup de main. Moncey determined to 
 attack it; but, without a battering train, he 
 was reduced to the necessity of storming, 
 without having made any preparations for it. 
 'The assault was directed against the southern 
 gate, where the Spaniards had placed two 
 igutis, and secured them by some woi*ks which 
 \v6Te not easy to be carried ; the troops ad- 
 Vianced from one of the streets of the suburbs, 
 "along which the Spanish guns did great 
 execution, and at last obliged Moncey to 
 give up the attempt, and retire with a consi- 
 derable diminution of his numbers. The 
 Spanish corps that were without the town 
 menaced his retreat and Moncey was forced 
 
51 
 
 to march with great rapidity towards Alcira 
 and St, Phihppe, to secure a passage by a 
 different road from that by which he had 
 entered the kingdom. He was continually 
 harassed, but he succeeded in crossing the 
 river Xucar, and afterwards retired to Madrid 
 with about half the corps he had originally 
 taken from it. 
 
 The French were more successful in the 
 battle of Rio Seco, mention of which has already 
 been made in the first pages of this work, yet 
 they were unable to follow up their successes ; 
 and the noble resistance of Saragossa, under 
 the directions of Palafox, obliged them to march 
 a considerable corps to besiege it. 
 
 The events of this campaign were so destruc- 
 tive to the enemy, that Joseph resolved to quit 
 Madrid, and seek a safer and more concentrated 
 position behind the Ebro. The first columns 
 of his troops began to retire from the capital 
 upon the 30th of July, and it was totally aban- 
 doned on the 10th of August; the siege of 
 
 E 2 
 
52 
 
 Saragossa was also raised, and the head-quar- 
 ters of the French armies were established at 
 Vittoria. Such was the state of things when 
 Lieutenant General Sir John Moore was ordered 
 to carry the British army from Portugal to the 
 assistance of the Spaniards. 
 
 The Spanish troops were generally assembled 
 in two great corps ; the left, under the orders of 
 General Blake, in the provinces of Asturias and 
 Biscay ; the right, along the south bank of the 
 Ebro, at Logrono, Tudela, &c., and under 
 the command of Castanos ; Palafox commanded 
 the army of Arragon ; which, (although incor- 
 porated with that of Castanos), yet yielded 
 but an unwilling submission to his orders. The 
 Marquis of Romana, with the troops that had 
 been withdrawn from Denmark, had landed 
 in Gallicia, and was moving forward to take 
 the chief command of the troops of Blake and 
 the whole northern army. 
 
 Sir John Moore began his march from Lisbon 
 on the 27th of October ; he determined to as- 
 
53 
 
 «emble his troops at Salamanca ; but, from the 
 difficulties of roads, and of subsistence for 
 the army, he was induced to separate his corps, 
 and to march them at distances so great from 
 each other, that they no longer were of any 
 mutual support. The infantry arrived in good 
 order at Salamanca towards the end of Novem- 
 ber ; but the cavalry and artillery, which had 
 moved within a few leagues of Madrid, did not 
 reach that place till three weeks or a month 
 afterwards. Sir David Baird was sent from 
 England with a corps of 13,000 men to Corunna, 
 and was directed to place himself under the 
 orders of Sir John Moore, and effect his junction 
 with him as early as possible. This officer met 
 with considerable obstructions from the Junta 
 of Gallicia; he was, in the first instance, re- 
 fused the permission to land ; and afterwards 
 was subjected to great inconvenience in pro- 
 visioning his troops. 
 
 Soon after the arrival of Sir John Moore at 
 Salamanca, he was apprized that Buonaparte, 
 with a large army, was already in Spain ; and; 
 
54 
 
 that his first successes had been considerable ; 
 Sir John Moore seemed to think them deci- 
 sive. 
 
 The army of General Blake was beaten at 
 Espinora de los Monteros on the 10th and 11th 
 of November ; and the battle of Tudela on the 
 28th put to rout the army of Castanos. Sir 
 John Moore had a most difficult card to play. 
 His army was not assembled, his cavalry and 
 artillery had not formed their junction, and a 
 considerable distance divided him from the 
 corps of Sir David Baird. He resolved there- 
 fore to abandon offensive operations, and direct- 
 ing this last-mentioned corps to retreat to 
 Vigo, and "there embark for Lisbon, he himself 
 prepared to retire into Portugal. The direction 
 of the French army upon Madrid changed, 
 however, Sir John Moore's determination. He 
 stopped the movement of Sir David Baird, and 
 ordered him to advance his corps to Benavente ; 
 from whence it was his intention to combine an 
 operation with the whole British force upon the 
 rear of Buonaparte. 
 
55 
 
 General Soult commanded a corps of the 
 French army upon the Carrion ; Sir John 
 Moore determined to attack him, and moved 
 forward with that intention with the whole 
 force under his command, which he had as- 
 sembled on the 20th of December at Ma- 
 yorga, combined with the corps of Romana 
 upon his left. The British force amounted to 
 29,360 effective men. After severe marches, 
 Sir John Moore reached Sahagun on the 21st 
 of December, and prepared on the 23d to force 
 the position of General Soult. He received, 
 however, information that Buonaparte was 
 marching upon Salamanca, and was seeking to 
 surround his army. Sir John Moore instantly 
 gave up the offensive, and retired in the great- 
 est haste upon Benavente. When he arrived 
 there, he found the advanced guard of Buona- 
 parte's army at a short distance from the place; 
 and on the 29th of December, the British rear 
 guard of cavalry distinguished itself in an affair 
 with the cavalry of the imperial guard. 
 
 . The superiority of the British was manifest 
 
56 
 
 on this occasion ; they had in several preceding 
 actions given samples of their bravery and good 
 conduct ; Lieutenant General Lord Paget and 
 Major General the Honourable C. Stewart had 
 led them on to the most decisive successes, and 
 in an affair at Sahagun, on the 21st of Decem- 
 ber, had almost annihilated a regiment of French 
 cavalry. 
 
 The fall of Madrid, after an inconsiderable 
 resistance, had made a deep : impression upon 
 the mind of Sir John Moore ; he looked with 
 despondency upon the affairs of the Peninsula, 
 after its surrender ; and considered the great 
 cause of Spanish independence completely lost. 
 He had made one effort to relieve the southern 
 provinces of Spain from the irruption with 
 which they were threatened ; he succeeded in 
 diverting it against himself; and from that time 
 he conceived that his first duty was to with- 
 draw from the country. With that view he 
 commenced his retreat into Gallicia; he at first 
 determined to embark his army at Vigo ; he 
 afterwards led it to Corunna. It had been ex- 
 
ff:^ 
 
 57 
 
 pected that he would have defended the strong 
 ground he was passing over, but he continued 
 his retreat, and once only, on the 8th of Janu- 
 ary at Lugo, offered battle to his pursuers*. 
 The enemy was neither strong enough nor mad 
 enough to accept it ; and after a retreat, the 
 most disastrous for an unbeaten but brave 
 and gallant army that history records. Sir 
 John Moore arrived at Corunna on the 11th of 
 January 1809. He took up a position in front of 
 the town to await the arrival of the transports ; 
 fortunately they were not long delayed ; they 
 reached the harbour on the 14th; and Sir John 
 Moore prepared to embark his troops. Hap- 
 pily for the honour of the British army, though 
 we must lament the loss that ensued, the 
 French were too proud of the reputation they 
 had gained against other armies, to permit 
 
 * One of the principal causes of the uninterrupted 
 CQntinuation of this retreat was the total failure of the 
 Commissariat in the establishment of the Magazines 
 which had been directed to be formed on the line of 
 hiarch now pursued by the army. 
 
58 
 
 the embarkation to be unmolested. They at- 
 tacked the British corps, reduced by fatigue, 
 by loss upon the march, by sickness, and by 
 the absence of its cannon, which was already 
 on board the transports ; they attacked it when 
 mustering only 16,000 men, placed in a bad 
 position, with its retreat cut off if beaten ; 
 yet they were completely repulsed,with very 
 severe loss, and a part of the position which 
 they occupied before the action, was carried at 
 the point of the bayonet, and maintained. The 
 loss on the side of the British was considerable; 
 Sir John Moore fell in the arms of victory ; he 
 died a deathworthyof the character he had main- 
 tained through a long life of service and renown ; 
 he fell by a cannon-shot while directing a charge 
 against the enemy, and commanded the re- 
 spect, the admiration, and regret of his brother 
 soldiers and his countrymen. Sir David Baird 
 was severely wounded, and obliged to quit the 
 field, and the command devolved upon Sir John 
 Hope. This officer withdrew his troops from 
 the position, and embarked them in the course 
 of the night and succeeding day; the rear- 
 
P9 
 
 guard was commanded by Major General Be- 
 resford, and the whole army was embarked 
 without loss, and sailed on the 17th of January. 
 Thus ended the second campaign in which the 
 British troops had been engaged in the Penin- 
 sula. It would be a melancholy task to canvass 
 it • throughout ; the last action was worthy of 
 the men that have since delivered Spain from 
 its merciless invaders ; but the movements 
 which preceded it were far from being generally 
 approved. Great difficulties were indeed op- 
 posed to Sir John Moore ; but it would appear 
 that in his own mind they were too highly 
 rated. He discharged his duty to his country, 
 however, with his utmost zeal. He died fighting 
 to maintain its glory, and his name will ever be 
 ranked amongst its heroes. 
 
 During the period of Sir John Moore's cam- 
 paign in Spain, Sir John Craddock had been 
 appointed to the command of the British troops 
 in Portugal. Their number was small, and va- 
 ried considerably during the winter; some 
 detachments which had been sent to Sir John 
 
60 
 
 Moore returned without having effected their 
 junction, and many stragglers and sick from 
 that army found their way into Portugal, and 
 were formed into battalions. The brigade 
 under Major General E-. Stewart was also 
 incorporated with the army under the orders 
 of Sir John Craddock. 
 
 Before the retreat of Sir John Moore was known 
 in England, a corps, under the orders of Major 
 General Mackenzie, had been sent to Cadiz, with 
 the view of being admitted as the garrison of that 
 place. The conduct of the Spaniards, in refusing to 
 allow the British army to enter Ferrol, although 
 pressed by a superior enemy, made it necessary 
 Tor the Government of England to secure a point 
 of safety for its fleet and armies, before it could 
 consent to the further co-operation of any 
 British force in Spain. It therefore required, 
 as a condition to the employment of an army 
 for the defence of the southern provinces of 
 the Peninsula, that a British force should be 
 admitted within the walls of Cadiz. Much ne- 
 gotiation took place upon this point, but the 
 
61 
 
 Spanish Government at last refused the per- 
 mission, and thus put an end to the proposed 
 assistance of a British army. 
 
 The corps under Major General Mackenzie 
 sailed from Cadiz to Lisbon, and added to the 
 force under Sir John Craddock. 
 
 After the evacuation of Corunna, by Lieute- 
 nant General Sir John Hope, the French had 
 entered it w^ith two corps, those of Marshals 
 Ney and Soult ; the latter was detached, 
 about the beginning of February, to the at- 
 tack of Portugal. He succeeded, with little 
 opposition, in occupying the country to the 
 north of the Douro. In Oporto, the Portu- 
 guese force was collected to a considerable 
 amount ; but having neither discipline nor re- 
 gularity, it was unable to oppose more than 
 a feeble resistance to the French. Marshal 
 Soult, who was anxious to strike terror amongst 
 the inhabitants of Portugal, permitted his sol- 
 diers, after storming the town, and destroying 
 an immense number of people, to continue their 
 
6a 
 
 cruelties during several days. The plunder of 
 the place was accompanied with every descrip- 
 tion of outrage; but the measure only succeeded 
 in increasing the detestation in which the enemy 
 was held, without effecting the subjugation of 
 the country. 
 
 After the success of Buonaparte in the centre 
 of Spain, and the expulsion of the English army 
 from Gallicia, General Victor had been de- 
 tached against the Spanish corps of General 
 Cuesta, which was quartered about Medellin. 
 After some previous movements a general battle 
 was fought, in which the Spanish army was 
 completely routed ; it retired to the mountains 
 about Monasterio, where, with the assistance of 
 the reinforcements which were sent to it, it 
 made head against the French army. Victor at 
 this time concerted with Marshal Soult,in Oporto, 
 a combined attack upon the unconquered pro- 
 vinces of Portugal. Soult was to move through 
 Coimbra, upon Lisbon ; while Victor was to co- 
 operate from the Spanish frontier, through Por- 
 talegre, or Alcantara, upon Abrantes, and from 
 
63 
 
 thence to march upon the capital. Sir John 
 Craddock had collected the British force, which 
 had now become respectable from the different 
 reinforcements which had arrived, in positions 
 in front of Santarem, and upon the road to 
 Coimbra, so as to be prepared to move upon 
 either of the two French corps, which threat- 
 ened to advance upon him. But on the 22d of 
 April, Sir Arthur Wellesley (w^ho had been se- 
 lected for the command in Portugal) arrived 
 with som^ reinforcements, and assumed the 
 direction of the army. 
 
 He decided to proceed instantly against the 
 corps under Mar&hal Soult, in Oporto. He left 
 a division under Major General Mackenzie, 
 with the brigade of heavy cavalry under 
 Majoti- General Fane, at Abrantes, to watch 
 the corps of Marshal Victor: some Portu- 
 guese were placed to observe the bridge of 
 Alcantara, and with the rest of the army he 
 proceeded to the Douro. By the rapidity of 
 his movement. Sir Arthur Wellesley discon- 
 certed the plans of the French ; he drove theic 
 
64 
 
 advance guard, in three days, from the Vouga 
 to Oporto, and arrived on the Douro, opposite 
 to that town, upon the 1 1th of May. 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley had detached Marshal 
 Beresford, (who had lately been appointed to 
 the command of the Portuguese army,) to pass 
 the Douro, near Lamego, and to occupy Ama- 
 ranthe ; he had also directed General Silviera 
 with the troops under his command, to retain 
 possession of Chaves. By these movements 
 he had hoped to enclose the French corps, in 
 the north of Portugal. On the morning of the 
 12th he determined to cross the Douro, in face 
 of the enemy, and to attack the town of Oporto, 
 although the bridge had been destroyed, and 
 the boats (with the exception of two that con- 
 veyed over the first soldiers) had been removed 
 to the opposite side of the river. 
 
 No operation could be more difficult, or re- 
 quire greater bravery in the troops to execute, 
 or talent in the general to combine ; but com- 
 plete success attended it. Marshal Soult was 
 
65 
 
 surprised ; the British army passed the river in 
 spite of every obstacle, and of the superior 
 numbers which were brought to overwhelm 
 the first regiments that crossed ; and the French 
 army was driven, with the loss of its sick and 
 wounded, of great part of its baggage, and of a 
 considerable number of guns, from the town of 
 Oporto. Sir Arthur Wellesley pursued the 
 French on the following day; Marshal Beresford 
 had driven them from Amaranthe ; so that, being 
 pressed on all sides, they were obliged to aban- 
 don the whole of their guns and baggage, and 
 to fly the country by the mountain roads to 
 Orense; their rear was several times attacked, 
 but the main body could not be attained ; and 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley, unable any longer to pur- 
 sue an enemy who had abandoned every thing 
 which constitutes an army, and who fled 
 without artillery, baggage, or equipment, halted 
 on the 18th at Monte Alegre, and gave up the 
 pursuit. 
 
 This short campaign, of only ten days, is per- 
 haps the most brilliant that ever has been exe- 
 
66 
 
 cuted. Marshal Soult, represented as the best 
 officer in the French army, had occupied the 
 northern provinces of Portugal, for upwards of 
 two months; he had contemplated the entire 
 conquest of the country, and was employed in 
 organizing the necessary means. To defend 
 himself from any attack, he had the Vouga, and 
 the Douro, both formidable rivers, and the 
 advantage of the strongest country in the Pe- 
 ninsula ; he had a force equal in amount to the 
 British, or within very little of it, and in a 
 state of superior military organization. He had 
 a perfect knowledge of the country; he com- 
 manded its resources; and was in every way 
 formidable from his talents and his means. Yet 
 the genius of Sir Arthur Wellesley deprived 
 him at once of the advantages of which he was 
 possessed. In the space of four days he was 
 driven from Coimbra to the Douro ; and in six 
 days after, not having had the time or opportu- 
 nity of defending himself in a single position, 
 he was chased from the frontiers of Portugal. 
 
 The movements of the Portuguese about 
 
67 
 
 Chaves had disappointed the expectations of 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley, or his triumph would 
 have been more complete. He had entertained 
 the hope of surrounding the French army ; but 
 by the non-execution of a part of his plan the 
 individuals who composed it escaped ; but there 
 never was a more disgraceful escape; or a 
 retreat (if it deserve that name, and not a 
 flight) mor^ humiliating to the officer who con- 
 ducted it. 
 f ^ 
 
 Lieutenant General Paget, who had dis- 
 played the greatest talent and bravery in the 
 attacks he conducted, with the advanced guard 
 under his command, before his arrival upon 
 the Douro, passed that river with the first com* 
 pany of the Buffs; and having most gallantly 
 sustained the desperate attack of the enemy 
 upon the few troops under his orders, which 
 had as yet arrived upon the Oporto side of the 
 river, was unfortunately wounded in the arm, 
 and suffered amputation. Major Hervey also 
 lost his arm, in a most gallant charge of the 
 14th light dragoons, which he had led. 
 
 F 2 
 
6» 
 
 Whilst Sir Arthur Wellesley had been en- 
 gaged in the pursuit of Marshal Soult, Marshal 
 Victor had made a movement upon the bridge 
 of Alcantara, and had threatened to enter Por- 
 tugal in that direction; the bridge was de- 
 stroyed, and Marshal Victor made no further 
 advance; but Sir Arthur Wellesley, after 
 making the necessary dispositions for the se- 
 curity of the northern frontiers of Portugal, 
 brought back his army to the Tagus. The 
 state of the French in the Peninsula, at this 
 moment, was as follows. Marshal Ney was at 
 Corunna, Soult was retreating from Portugal, 
 and Mortier was at Valladolid ; these corps toge- 
 ther amounted to about 60,000 effective men, 
 and kept the provinces of Gallicia, Asturias, 
 Biscay, and Castile, in tolerable subjection. 
 There were other corps employed in those pro- 
 vinces, but the amount of force of which we 
 have spoken, was to a certain degree disposable. 
 In the centre of Spain, Victor was at Merida ; 
 Sebastiani in La Mancha ; and Joseph, with 
 Jourdan, at Madrid ; their force amounted to 
 50,000 men; Suchet was at Saragossa, in occu- 
 
69 
 
 pation of Arragon, with a corps of 20,000 men. 
 The French force in Catalonia was considerable, 
 but, from the state of that province, it could 
 not be disposable for any offensive operations. 
 
 The distribution of the Spanish force 
 was. General Cuesta at Monasterio, with 
 40,000 men, mostly recruits; Vanegas, with 
 25,000 in the Carolina; Romana, with 25,000 
 in different parts of Gallicia ; and General 
 Blake, with 20,000 in Valencia. There ^were 
 several other corps in different quarters, of 
 small amount, but which could not be con- 
 sidered as efficient for the duties of a campaign. 
 In Portugal, the army of Sir Arthur Wellesley 
 consisted of about 22,000 effective infantry, 
 and 2,500 cavalry. The Portuguese, under 
 Marshal Beresford, were as yet backward 
 in organization, but amounted to about 15,000 
 men, collected and ready to take the field; 
 besides the troops in garrisons, dep6ts, ^x. 
 According to this estimate, the French had a 
 force of 130,000 effective men, while that op- 
 posed to them was about 150,000. 
 
70 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley, upon his arrival on 
 the Tagus, determined, if possible, to liberate 
 Madrid. To effect this object, he proposed to 
 bring the greater part of his own force, with 
 that under General Cuesta, and the corps under 
 General Vanegas, amounting in the whole to 
 near 90,000 men, to operate upon the forces 
 of Joseph, Victor, and Sebastiani, estimated at 
 50,000. He proposed to leave Marshal Beres- 
 ford, in conjunction with the Duke del Parque, 
 to watch Soult, from the neighbourhood of 
 Ciudad Rodrigo ; and he hoped that the troops 
 under Romana would give sufficient employ- 
 ment to Marshal Ney, in Gallicia. 
 
 During the month of June, Victor, (in conse- 
 quence of the successful operations of Sir Arthur 
 Wellesley against Soult, and his return upon the 
 Tagus) withdrew his corps from the neighbour- 
 hood of Monasterio, crossed the Tagus at the 
 bridge of Almaraz, and took up a position at 
 Talavera de la Reyna; General Cuesta followed 
 him to that place, but finding him in position, 
 retired to Almaraz, where he remained, with 
 
71 
 
 his advance corps, under the Duke of Albu- 
 querque, at Arzobispo. Towards the end of 
 the same month, Marshal Soult arrived with 
 the corps under his command, at Puebla di Se- 
 nabria, from whence he marched to Zamora and 
 Salamanca. 
 
 In this state of things. Sir Arthur Wellesley 
 (after having received the most distinct decla- 
 rations from the supreme Government of Spain 
 that his army should be supplied with provi- 
 sions) advanced on the 25th and 26th of June, 
 from Abrantes, towards Placencia. Marshal Be- 
 resford moved at the same time to the neighbour- 
 hood of Ciudad Rodrigo. Sir Arthur Wellesley 
 went on the 12th to the head-quarters of Gene- 
 ral Cuesta, at Casas del Puerta, near the bridge 
 of Almaraz, to concert with him the operations 
 of the campaign. He proposed as the first ob- 
 ject, to occupy in strength the positions of 
 Banos and Bejar, which commanded the only 
 road from Upper Castile into Estramadura, and 
 the country about Coria, and Placencia. Sir 
 Arthur Wellesley, (aware that his own army 
 
72 
 
 was the only one that was efficient for the 
 operations of a campaign,) recommended that 
 a corps of Spaniards should be destined for 
 this service. 
 
 It has since been known, that amongst the 
 numberless intriguers who at this moment sought 
 to disunite the counsels of the allies, one of the 
 most busy had awakened the jealousy of General 
 Cuesta upon this poiiit, and had represented 
 to him, that the English general, with a view of 
 weakening the Spanish force in the field, would 
 recommend him to make a considerable detach- 
 ment from his army. When the recommenda- 
 tion was given, therefore. General Cuesta was 
 convinced that the information he had received 
 was correct ; and from the violence of his own 
 nature, could not easily repress his resentment 
 at a proposal, which he thought was intended to 
 reduce his army, for the purpose of diminishing 
 his share of glory in the expulsion of the French 
 from Madrid ; a result which he anticipated 
 from the movements about to be carried into 
 execution. General O'Donaju, the adjutant- 
 
73 
 
 general of the Spanish army, prevailed upon him, 
 however, to agree to the arrangement, but Ge- 
 neral Cuesta never carried it fairly into effect. 
 The small force he afterwards sent to Bejar 
 was incompetent to any resistance, and was 
 totally unprovided, even with ammunition. 
 
 The remainder of Sir Arthur Wellesley'splan 
 was, that his army should join that of General 
 Cuesta, and should advance in the first instance 
 to the attack of Victor at Talavera. By a 
 movement in co-operation. General Vanegas 
 was ordered to break up from the position in 
 La Mancha, about Madrilejos ; to march upon 
 Pembleque and Ocaiia, and pass the Tagus at 
 Fuente Duefias; where he was to arrive on the 
 same day, the 22d of July, that the armies 
 under Sir Arthur Wellesley and General 
 Cuesta, were to arrive at Talavera, and attack 
 the corps of Victor. General Vanegas received 
 this order, and agreed to its execution. Sir 
 Arthur Wellesley removed his army from Pla- 
 cencia, according to the plan which had been 
 arranged; passed the Tietar, and arrived at 
 
74 
 
 Oropesa on the 20th of July ; where he effected 
 his junction with the army under the orders of 
 General Cuesta, amounting to 35,000 effective 
 men. The next day, the Spanish army ad- 
 vanced towards Talavera ; and on the 22d the 
 British corps moved forward to the same place. 
 While upon his march. Sir Arthur Wellesley 
 received several messages from General Cuesta, 
 stating that the enemy was disposed to attack 
 him. Sir Arthur Wellesley pushed forward, 
 but upon reaching the ground, found only two 
 squadrons of French, who had come from 
 Talavera to reconnoitre the position of the 
 Spaniards. 
 
 The light troops of both armies advanced 
 upon the rear-guard of the French, the Spanish 
 cavalry attempted to charge it, but without 
 effect, and the whole French army took up a 
 position upon the heights, to the eastward of 
 the Alberche. The British and Spanish armies 
 occupied the ground about Talavera with their 
 advance upon the right of the same river. Sir 
 Arthur Wellesley had expected to hear from Ge- 
 
75 
 
 neral Vanegas •: according to the orders which 
 had been sent to him, he should have been at 
 Fuente Duenas upon the 22d ; but from every 
 information which could be obtained, no move- 
 ment appeared to have been made by him. The 
 history of the defection of his corps deserves to 
 be recorded. When General Vanegas received 
 the orders from General Cuesta to move upon 
 Madrid, he returned for answer, that he would 
 do so; he despatched, however, at the same 
 time, a courier to the supreme Junta, communi- 
 cating to it the orders he had received. That 
 body replied, that he was not to execute the 
 movement, but to await its further commands 
 in the positions which he occupied. These di- 
 rections, (which were neither announced to 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley nor to General Cuesta), 
 arrived in time to stop General Vanegas. 
 It was difficult to explain the motive of 
 this conduct; but it was afterwards disco- 
 vered that the supreme Junta, amongst other 
 reasons, was not anxious that General Cu- 
 esta should enter Madrid. He was sup- 
 posed to entertain sentiments hostile to many 
 
76 
 
 of those who composed it, and not friendly to 
 the whole body ; the Junta, therefore, feared, 
 that if he reached Madrid, he would effect a 
 counter-revolution, and place himself at the 
 head of the government ; or at least overturn 
 the Junta's power. This explanation of its 
 motive gained considerable weight from the 
 conduct of that body, when it received Gene- 
 ral Cuesta's despatches, stating that he had 
 formed his junction with Sir Arthur Wellesley 
 at Oropesa, and was proceeding to Madrid. 
 The Junta then, with as much alacrity as it had 
 sent counter-orders before, directed General 
 Vanegas to move forward, and constituted him 
 Captain-General of the province of Madrid; 
 so that, upon his arrival there, he would be 
 superior to General Cuesta, under whose orders 
 up to that moment he had been placed. Al- 
 though by this conduct the general effect of the 
 plan proposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley was de- 
 stroyed, yet he resolved to attack the corps of 
 Marshal Victor, and on the morning of the 23d 
 moved his columns for that purpose into a wood 
 close to the Alberche, and stretching along the 
 right of the French army. 
 
77 
 
 The plan of the movement which he deter- 
 mined upon, was to cross the river, attack the 
 right of Marshal Victor with the whole of the 
 British infantry, move the whole cavalry upon 
 the centre of the enemy, and engage their left 
 with the Spanish infantry. •- 
 
 The corps of Marshal Victor was 22,000 men; 
 the allied army was 50,000. The troops of 
 which it was composed were not all of equally 
 good materials ; but the number of English 
 only would almost have secured success if the 
 attack had taken place. General Cuesta, 
 however, refused to march till the following 
 morning; and Sir Arthur Wellesley with con- 
 siderable reluctance was constrained to yield 
 to his determination. Some alterations were 
 made in the course of the night in the disposi- 
 tion of the troops. General Bassecour, with a 
 Spanish division, was ordered to the left of 
 the British, and was to have passed the Al- 
 berche in the rear of the enemy. Sir R. Wilson, 
 who commanded a corps of light troops, Spa- 
 nish and Portuguese, was also ordered still 
 
78 
 
 'further along the banks of the Alberche to 
 Escalona. 
 
 Marshal Victor, however, gut information of 
 the intended attack, and retired from his posi- 
 tion in the night. Nothing could have been 
 more unfortunate for the allied army ; infinitely 
 superior in numbers, it v^as at the point of 
 making a combined attack upon him, from 
 which it would seem almost impossible he 
 should have escaped without considerable loss ; 
 by his retreat unhurt, the nature of the cam- 
 paign was changed, and the bright prospects 
 of the allies destroyed. 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley, since his arrival at 
 Talavera, had complained of the total failure 
 on the part of the Spaniards in the supply of 
 his army with provisions. The necessities of 
 the British troops made it impossible to advance ; 
 and after the retreat of the French army. Sir 
 Arthur Wellesley was compelled to remain at 
 Talavera till supplies should arrive to him : 
 but recommended the Spaniards, who had 
 
79 
 
 not the same deficiencies, to move upon 
 Cavalla, upon the road to Toledo, and endea- 
 vour to communicate v^ith General Vanegas, 
 who was still supposed to have made some 
 movement in La Mancha. General Cuesta, 
 however, without communicating with Sir 
 Arthur Wellesley, took the road to Sta. Olalla, 
 where he arrived with the whole Spanish army 
 on tKe moniing of the 25th. From this place 
 he gave notice of the defection of the corps of 
 Vanegas. 
 
 On the morning of the 26th General Cuesta's 
 advance was attacked by the advanced guard 
 of the French army. It appeared that Joseph 
 had called General Sebastiani from La Mancha 
 to Toledo; that with all the force he could 
 withdraw from Madrid, he had marched him- 
 self to join him; and that he had formed a 
 junction with these two corps and the corps 
 of General Victor, at or near Torrijos ; that he 
 had immediately advanced upon General Cues- 
 ta; and was in hopes of beating him before 
 he should be joined by the British. General 
 
80 
 
 Cuesta, however, upon learning the force of the 
 enemy, retired to Talavera. Sir Arthur Wel- 
 lesley had endeavojired to find a situation 
 in which to fight a battle in front of the Al- 
 berche ; but not having succeeded, determined 
 to take up a position, the right upon the town 
 of Talavera, the left upon some heights, about 
 a mile to the northward of it. The Spanish 
 army retired during the 26th and 27 th, and 
 took up the ground marked out for it about 
 the town of Talavera. On the morning of the 
 27th Sir Arthur Wellesley sent a brigade of 
 cavalry and two brigades of infantry, the 
 whole under the orders of Major General 
 Mackenzie, to watch the enemy upon the left 
 of the Alberche, and to protect the retreat of 
 the Spaniards. 
 
 Towards two oclock in the afternoon the 
 French advance of cavalry began to skirmish 
 with the British. Major General Mackenzie 
 soon after retired, and about four o'clock passed 
 the Alberche with the whole of his corps. He 
 took up a position in a wood upon the right 
 
81 
 
 bank of it, from which he could observe the 
 movements of the enemy. 
 
 Joseph had brought the v^hole of his army 
 to the opposite side of the river ; and beUeving 
 (from the small number of troops that were to 
 be seen upon the right bank,) that the allies 
 were retreating, he determined to push in 
 their advanced guard immediately, with the 
 hope of falling upon their army on its march 
 to the bridge of Almaraz ; to which place 
 alone, after abandoning the line of the Al- 
 berche, he thought it could be retiring. The 
 French infantry passed the river ; the bri- 
 gade of Colonel Donkin, which was posted to 
 defend it, was to a certain degree surprised. 
 The river was fordable at all points, and the- 
 French advanced guard fell upon this brigade 
 and caused it considerable loss. Sir Arthur Wel- 
 lesley (who had just arrived upon the ground) 
 ordered the whole of Major General Mac- 
 kenzie's division to retire from the wood, and to 
 fall back upon the position in the rear, into 
 which the army was at this time moving. 
 
82 
 
 The French, elated with their first , successes, 
 pushed forward as rapidly as the passage of 
 their troops would allow, and threw their right 
 forward, with the view of turning the town of 
 Talavera. The Duke of Albuquerque shewed," 
 however, so good a front with the cavalry under 
 his orders (which was in a plain upon the left of 
 the British,) that this movement was consider- 
 ably delayed. Sir Arthur Wellesley was 
 tempted, (while a part only of the French army 
 had passed the Alberche), to attack it with the 
 whole of the allies ; but upon considering the 
 lateness of the hour, he continued his move- 
 ment to the position he had fixed upon. 
 The British advanced guard retired under 
 cover of the cavalry, and took up the ground 
 allotted to it. The French continued to press 
 forward; and, at last, when it was nearly dark, 
 brought a battery of six guns, supported by a 
 considerable corps of infantry, to some high 
 ground opposite the height upon which the left 
 of the British was to rest. The troops destined 
 for this point had not at that moment reached ' 
 it. Colonel Donkin's brigade, which was re- 
 
83 
 
 tiring near it, was ordered to form at the foot 
 of the hill upon the left of the Germans under 
 General Sherbrooke. But the French, supported 
 by their guns, attacked these corps, drove them 
 from the ground they occupied, and carried the 
 height. Lieutenant General HilPs and Major 
 General R. Stewart's brigades were at that 
 moment ascending it from the other side ; their 
 advance found the French upon the top. The 
 battalion of detachments under Colonel Bun- 
 bury wheeled into line, charged, and retook the 
 hill. The French, however, returned to the at- 
 tack, but were finally driven to the foot of it. 
 The action upon this point was severe ; Major 
 General Hill was at one moment mixed with the 
 French soldiers ; several men of both armies 
 were killed or wounded with the bayonet, but 
 the gallantry of British soldiers, and the intre- 
 pidity of their officers, prevailed. 
 
 During this attack, the Spanish troops were 
 alarmed by the fire of the French, who were fol- 
 lowing the British cavalry in its retreat through 
 the centre of the allies; they immediately began 
 
 G 2 
 
84 
 
 a fire which was taken up by the whole of the 
 first line. Several of the officers of the Guards 
 who were standing in front of their men, and 
 many of the light troops of the Germans who 
 were posted in advance, were killed or 
 wounded by this fire. The French, however, 
 were checked by it, and remained without 
 making any further attack during the night. 
 It appeared afterwards that the French officers 
 discovered that the whole army was in front of 
 Talavera, only from the firing which has just 
 been described ; they were ignorant of any 
 position about that town, and, therefore, till 
 then, h^-d given out to their soldiers that the 
 allied army was retiring. 
 
 At day-break on the 28th the French recom- 
 menced their attack with 14,000 men, by as- 
 saulting the hill from which they had been 
 driven the' night before. Their troops had 
 been collected during dark, and were formed at 
 the bottom of the height; they moved at a signal 
 given, and succeeded in ascending to a consi- 
 derable distance before they were checked by 
 
85 
 
 the fire of the British. From the conical shape 
 of this hill it was difficult to form any consi- 
 derable number of men to defend it : but the 
 regiments which were on it charged the French 
 troops with an impetuosity they were unable 
 to resist, and drove them, with considerable 
 loss and in total confusion, beyond the ground 
 from which they had moved to the attack. 
 
 ' The British cavalry had been ordered up 
 to charge the French right as they were re- 
 tiring, but unfortunately it was at too great a 
 distance to effect this object. 
 
 •• 
 After the failure of this attempt upon the 
 hill, the French continued to cannonade the 
 British line for a considerable time; but the 
 fire ceased at length on both sides, and perfect 
 tranquillity reigned throughout the opposing 
 armies. During this interval, Sir Arthur Wel- 
 lesley communicated with General Cuesta near 
 a house in the centre of the lines, and after- 
 wards slept, till some fresh movements in the 
 enemy's camp were reported to him. 
 
86 
 
 Joseph, having been defeated in the several 
 efforts he had made upon the British left, 
 determined to try his fortune upon the centre 
 of the allied army. The attack which follow- 
 ed was made under cover of a wood of olives, 
 and fell principally upon the brigade command- 
 ed by Major General Alexander Campbell ; 
 this officer had taken advantage of some high 
 banks which intersected the ground he occu- 
 pied, and through the means of which he was 
 enabled, with a very inferior for<ie, to arrest 
 the progress of the enemy's principal column. 
 Being at one time, however, driven from one 
 of these banks, he rallied the regiment which 
 was retiring, charged the column which was 
 pursuing him, drove it from the ground of 
 which it had taken possession, and took twelve 
 pieces of artillery; at the same time some 
 squadrons of the Spanish regiment of cavalry 
 
 of the King, charged the head of a French 
 column of infantry' which was advancing 
 through the wood (in pursuit of some Spanish 
 infantry that had given way,) and cut up a 
 considerable part of it. Thus terminated the 
 
87 
 
 second attack of the memorable 28th of July ; 
 the enemy was completely repulsed, with the 
 loss of seventeen pieces of artillery upon dif- 
 ferent points, and a very considerable number 
 of his best troops. His failures seemed de- 
 cisive of the day ; another pause ensued, con- 
 siderable movements on the part of the enemy 
 were observed, and for some time were con- 
 strued by the allied army as indicative of a 
 retreat ; but the severest action was yet to 
 come. 
 
 The whole 6tat major of the French was 
 x)bserved to have collected in front of the 
 left of the British; after some consultation 
 amongst the officers who composed it, they 
 appeared to have decided upon a new arrange- 
 ment of their army. The aides-de-camp were de- 
 spatched in different directions, and soon after 
 the French divisions were observed to be moving 
 to their new destinations. It now seemed to 
 ibe the intention of the enemy to bring the great 
 body of his force to act upon that part of 
 the British line which was occupied by the 
 
88 
 
 Guards ; and, at the same time, to move with 
 three columns of infantry and a regiment of 
 cavalry, along the valley which extended 
 under the height which formed the left of the 
 British line. These columns were supported 
 by some light infantry, which the enemy had 
 thrown upon the chain of hills which run west- 
 ward beyond the valley, and which were des- 
 tined to turn the British left and attack it upon 
 the flank and rear. 
 
 To meet this movement Sir Arthur Wellesley 
 directed the cavalry (which was concealed in 
 the valley) to be prepared to charge the 
 columns of infantry, as soon as they should 
 have extended their formation, and exposed 
 their flank. He also directed the guards to be 
 prepared for the attack which was going to be 
 made upon them, and upon no account to 
 move from the ground they occupied. 
 
 The French columns of infantry which had 
 moved into the valley, were more advanced 
 than those destined for the attack upon the 
 
89 
 
 Guards ; they had halted near a house within 
 gun-shot of the British left, and appeared to 
 be waiting for orders to advance. Major 
 General Payne, who commanded the British 
 cavalry, seized this opportunity to attack 
 them; the enemy, observing the forward move- 
 ment of the cavalry, formed himself against 
 the side of this house in solid column ; he had 
 a deep ravine, or water-course, along his front, 
 of which the British cavalry was not aware, 
 and he was besides supported by sixteen guns. 
 The charge of the cavalry was thrown into 
 confusion by this ravine ; many of the horses 
 fell into it ; and the portion which got over it 
 was so divided and broken as a body, that the 
 effect of the charge was completely done away. 
 The bravery of the British soldier was not, how- 
 ever, to be daunted by this check. The Ho- 
 nourable Major Ponsonby led the men who were 
 near him upon the bayonets of the enemy ; but 
 their valour could not compensate for the total 
 confusion into which they had been thrown. 
 The bravery of individuals could effect nothing 
 against a solid body of infantry ; the soldiers 
 
90 
 
 who were repulsed by the French columns 
 gallopped forward upon the regiment of ca- 
 valry which supported them, and in a short 
 time the whole plain was covered with British 
 dragoons dispersed in all directions, and totally 
 without formation. In this state they were 
 charged by some French regiments which were 
 in reserve ; many of them were taken, the re- 
 mainder passed through the intervals in the 
 French columns, and those that escaped their 
 fire, (of whom Lord William Russel was one), 
 retired within the British lines. 
 
 In this attack the 23d Light Dragoons lost 
 two-thirds of its number ; its charge was in- 
 judicious; the ground in front had not been 
 reconnoitred, and the French infantry was 
 too strongly posted to promise it success. 
 The order for the cavalry was to charge when 
 the French columns had extended and exposed 
 their flank. They had done neither when the 
 attack was made, but the bravery with which 
 it was conducted, put an end to the movements 
 which the enemy had intended on that side; 
 
91 
 
 and he never stirred afterwards from the ground 
 upon which he was formed. 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley observed this hesita- 
 tion, and profited by it, in detaching the 48th 
 Regiment, (which he had called for the defence 
 of the height when it was threatened with 
 an attack), to support the movement which 
 the guards had at this moment made upon the 
 enemy. These troops, with a part of Major' 
 General Cameron's brigade, had been attacked 
 by the whole reserve of the French army; 
 but they had received it with so tremendous 
 afire, that they forced it to give way; charged 
 it with great impetuosity; and pursued it into 
 a wood. They had not proceeded to any great 
 distance, however, when the enemy brought so 
 considerable a number af guns to bear upon 
 their flank, that in a very few moments all their 
 mounted officers were killed or wounded and 
 near 500 of their men. In this situation the 
 Guards were forced to fall back in considerable 
 confusion: they passed through the intervals of 
 the 48th Regiment, which had just arrived to 
 
92 
 
 support them, and which checked the advance 
 of the enemy. The attack was most severe 
 upon this regiment; it maintained its ground in 
 the most gallant manner, till the guards had 
 re-formed, and moved forward to its support. 
 When the French perceived these troops ad-* 
 vancing, they retired; the Guards instantly 
 huzza'd ; the cry was echoed along the whole 
 line; the enemy continued their retreat; and 
 thus ended the last achievement of the battle 
 of Talavera. The enemy was soon perceived 
 to be moving to the rear ; he shewed a con- 
 siderable force of cavalry, and maintained a 
 heavy cannonade to cover the retreat ; and at 
 the close of the day he had already passed a 
 portion of his troops across the Alberche. 
 
 There never was a more extraordinary battle 
 than the one which has now been described : 
 the French brought into the field a force of not 
 less than 47,000 men, and the whole of their 
 attacks, with the most trifling exception, were 
 directed against the British army, not exceed- 
 ing 18,000 infantry, and 1,500 cavalry. Yet 
 
9S 
 
 the British general had nerve to maintain the 
 contest, and ability to baffle the efforts of the 
 enemy. The army displayed a courage and 
 perseverance, which did justice to the confi- 
 dence vv^ith which its commander had relied 
 upon it ; and proved to Spain and to the world, 
 what the dauntless spirit of the British soldier 
 is capable of effecting, when under the direc- 
 tion of such an officer. 
 
 The enemy did justice to the talent of Sir Ar- 
 thur Wellesley, and to the unrivalled bravery 
 of his troops ; Marshal Victor admitted to an 
 English officer who was taken prisoner, that 
 much as he had heard of the gallantry of 
 English soldiers, still he could not have be- 
 lieved that any men could have been led to 
 attacks so desperate as some that he had 
 witnessed in the battle of Talavera. The glory 
 of the British arms shone forth in brighter 
 colours on this memorable day than it had ever 
 done amidst its countless triumphs of years pre- 
 ceding. The soldiers struggled against pri- 
 vations of every description ; as well as against 
 
94 
 
 a force which seemed calculated to overwhelm 
 them ; their native valour spurred them on to 
 conquest, and stifled every feeling which could 
 arrest or make it doubtful. 
 
 On the morning of the 29th, the light division 
 of 3,000 men, under Major General Crav/ford, 
 joined the army from Oropesa ; it was imme- 
 diately ordered to form the advance, and take 
 up a position in the front of the field of battle. 
 The allies were employed in attending their 
 wounded, and burying or burning the dead of 
 both armies. 
 
 The British loss was 5,000 men in killed or 
 wounded ; the loss of the Spaniards was much 
 inferior. The French loss was estimated by 
 themselves at 14,000 men. Joseph retired in 
 the course of the 29th with the greatest part 
 of his army, to Sta. Olalla; a rear guard of 
 6,000 men was left at Casas Leguas, to cover his 
 retreat, but it retired on the night of the 30th, 
 and joined the corps to which it belonged, near 
 Toledo. 
 
9S 
 
 The army of General Vanegas, which had ad- 
 vanced from Madrilejos, m obedience to the 
 orders of the supreme Junta, had arrived upon 
 the Tagus, near Aranjuez and Toledo on the 
 28th. The advance of his corps pushed on 
 in the night to within a short distance of 
 Madrid, and took some patroles which had 
 been sent out from the garrison ; but Ge- 
 neral Vanegas having heard that the French 
 army was retreating towards the capital from 
 the field of Talavera, recalled the parties that 
 had crossed the Tagus, and abandoned any 
 further offensive operations. Sir Arthur Wel- 
 lesley (who was still unable to advance, from 
 the total want of provisions in which the 
 Spaniards kept him) recommended to General 
 Cuesta to form a junction with General Vane- 
 gas ; but while this movement was in contem- 
 plation, information was brought from Pla- 
 cencia, that the corps of Soult was moving 
 upon that town, and that the troops at Bejar, 
 hearing of its advance, had abandoned that 
 position, and left the road open to its march. 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley could hardly believe that 
 
96 
 
 the strong positions about Bejar had been so 
 hastily given up; the corps of Marshal Beres- 
 ford was ready to have assisted the troops in oc- 
 cupation of them, and a brigade of British, under 
 the orders of Major General Catling Crawford, 
 was within a few days' march, and would have 
 assisted in their defence. But the intelligence 
 being soon after confirmed. Sir Arthur Well esley 
 decided to carry the British army to attack 
 General Soult ; and proposed to General Cuesta 
 to remain in the position of Talavera, to cover 
 the movement of the English upon Placencia. 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley also proposed to leave 
 his wounded in charge of General Cuesta, to 
 whose kindness and generosity he intrusted 
 them, with a solemn promise from him, that if 
 any thing should oblige the Spanish army to 
 retire, his first care should be, to move the 
 British to a place of safety. General Cuesta 
 was delighted with the plan which was proposed 
 to him. He felt that his own army was unequal 
 to any contest with the French in an open 
 plain, and that it must be to the British only, 
 that he could look for the expulsion of the^ 
 
97 
 
 enemy from his rear; he also expressed him- 
 self most particularly gratified by the confidence 
 which Sir Arthur Wellesley reposed in him, in- 
 trusting the wounded to his care. 
 
 ^'The necessary arrangements being made, and 
 Major General Mackinnon placed in the com- 
 mand of the hospitals at Talavera, Sir Arthur 
 Wellesley marched on the morning of the 3d of 
 x4ugust for Oropesa. A short time after his ar- 
 rival at that place, he learnt that the advanced 
 guard of Soult's army was arrived at Naval 
 Moral, and that the Spaniards, who had retired 
 from Bejar, had crossed theTagus at Almaraz, 
 and destroyed the bridge; he determined, 
 however, to move upon the French, and was in 
 hopes of finding them the following day. Ge- 
 neral Bassecour, with a Spanish division, was 
 moving along the Tietar, and was destined to 
 act upon the left and rear of the French. 
 About four o'clock in the afternoon, however, 
 a despatch arrived from General Cuesta, an- 
 nouncing to Sir Arthur Wellesley, that, from 
 intelligence upon which he could rely, he was 
 
 H 
 
98 
 
 persuaded that the corps of Marshal Ney had 
 evacuated Gallicia, and formed a junction with 
 the corps of Marshal Mortier, from Valladolid ; 
 that the two were united with Marshal Soult; 
 and that the amount of the collected force upon 
 the rear of the allied army, could not be less 
 than 55,000 men ; that Marshal Victor was at 
 no great distance from Talavera, upon the other 
 side; that he (General Cuesta) apprehended 
 an attack from him ; and had in consequence 
 determined to break up immediately from that 
 town, and join Sir Arthur Wellesley at Oropesa. 
 This information was as disastrous as it was 
 unexpected: the letter from General Cuesta 
 further stated, that his movement was already 
 begun, and that his army would form its junc- 
 tion with the British in the course of the night : 
 there remained, therefore, no hope of prevent- 
 ing or delaying it, and the whole plan, upon 
 which Sir Arthur Wellesley had undertaken 
 his operation, was at once destroyed. 
 
 The bridge of Almaraz was no longer in 
 existence ; the bridge of Arzobispo was exr 
 
99 
 
 posed, by the abandonment of Talavera, to 
 the corps of Victor, and the whole allied 
 army, if it advanced, might be cut off 
 from any retreat across the Tagus, while 
 its movement upon Portugal must depend 
 upon the success of its attack upon the 
 combined army of Ney, Soult, and Mortier. In 
 this situation of affairs Sir Arthur Wellesley 
 did not hesitate to give up offensive operations^ 
 and retire across the Tagus, by the bridge of 
 Arzobispo. 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley had every reason to 
 complain of the conduct of General Cuesta ; 
 he had abandoned the position intrusted to him, 
 without any ground for so doing ; for it after- 
 wards appeared that Victor was at some distance 
 from Talavera, and not occupied in a movement 
 upon the corps of General Cuesta ; but, at 
 any rate, the Spaniards evacuated the post in- 
 trusted to them, and abandoned the British 
 wounded, with a precipitancy that nothing but 
 the actual presence of ^n enemy could jus- 
 tify. If General Cuesta was actuated by a 
 
 H 2 
 
100 
 
 desire of bringing his army to the assistance of 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was about to attack 
 a force which he had reason to believe was 
 superior to him, he ought to have waited a few 
 hours, till he had communicated with him, and 
 in the mean time, he should have given assist- 
 ance to the removal of the British wounded. If 
 he thought that the return of a messenger from 
 Oropesa (a distance of only five leagues), would 
 have exposed him by too much delay, he 
 ought at least to have left a corps to check the 
 enemy in his front, and to have protected the re- 
 treat of the hospitals. And, last of all, it was his 
 duty, to which he had also pledged himself in 
 the most solemn manner, to have given all the 
 means in his power to facilitate the removal of 
 the British wounded. He did, however, the 
 direct reverse : he abandoned his position with 
 his whole army, without communication with Sii 
 Arthur Wellesley ; (indeed, he precluded the 
 possibility of any, by stating in his letter that 
 his army was in march) ; and to the wounded, 
 instead of every assistance he could command, 
 he gave but four carts, for the whole 4,000 
 
101 
 
 men. It is impossible to conceive, that the im- 
 portance of the occupation of Talavera, to the 
 movement of Sir Arthur Wellesley, should have 
 escaped the observation of General: Cufe^ta'":, 
 the ground about that town afforded the Qniy;' 
 situation in which the advance of the French 
 army upon the rear of the British, while moving 
 upon Soult, could possibly be resisted ; the rest 
 pf the country was plain, and offered no defen* 
 sive position ; so that in abandoning it. General 
 Cuesta exposed the whole allied army to an 
 attack, in front and rear. In short, it is very 
 difficult to discover a sound or equitable reason 
 for the precipitancy with which this movement 
 was executed ; but the total disregard which 
 was shewn to the British wounded, the paltry 
 number of four carts which was afforded them, 
 by an army that was provided with them to 
 excess, remains a stain upon the character 
 of General Cuesta, that no time will ever 
 efface* 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley moved his army, upon 
 the morning of the 4th of August, to the bridge 
 
^ 102 
 
 of Arzobispo ; the nature of the campaign was 
 changed; Gallicia was delivered fromtheFrench; 
 and the corps of Romana was now in peace- 
 able possession of it, with the opportunity of 
 ;;.f; augmenting its own numbers, and improving 
 ' its discipline ; the whole province was in a 
 situation to dispose of its military means, and 
 to create, in a short time, a powerful diver- 
 sion, upon the rear of the enemy assembled 
 upon the Tagus. The north of Spain was al- 
 most entirely in the same situation as Gallicia. 
 The French had abandoned it, with very few 
 exceptions, to concentrate their force against 
 the British army; and Sir Arthur Wellesley 
 conceived, that although he had been foiled in 
 his attempt to rescue Madrid, yet he had 
 restored independence to Gallicia, and in great 
 part to the provinces adjoining it; which might, 
 in the end, prove most advantageous to the 
 cause of Spain. This opinion has since been 
 proved to be correct ; Gallicia retained its 
 freedom, and the other northern provinces were 
 never afterwards but in partial subjection to 
 the enemy. 
 
103 
 
 As soon as Sir Arthur Wellesley had crossed 
 the Tagus at Arzobispo, he detached Major 
 General Crawford, with the light division, to 
 occupy, with as much rapidity as possible, the 
 pass at Almaraz; where it was to be feared 
 the enemy, whose advanced guard had seen 
 the passage of the allies at Arzobispo, might 
 push a force across the Tagus, and endeavour 
 to intercept the British army on its march upon 
 Deleytosa. Major General Crawford arrived, 
 however, in time to prevent that operation; 
 the movement of the army was undisturbed; 
 General Cuesta remained at Arzobispo ; and the 
 British moved to Deleytosa. The Spaniards 
 were, however, attacked a few days after by 
 the French at Arzobispo ; their advanced guard 
 was driven from the bridge; and their whole 
 army retired to Deleytosa, whilst Sir Arthur 
 Wellesley moved to Jaraseco. 
 
 The force under General Vanegas had re- 
 mained since the battle of Talavera, in the 
 neighbourhood of Toledo, but to the southward 
 of the Tagus. General Cuesta was in com- 
 
104 
 
 munication with it, and apprized Vanegas of 
 his retreat from Arzobispo. He directed him 
 in consequence to fall back to the positions 
 about Madrilejos, from which he had originally 
 moved, and upon no account to risk an action 
 with the enemy, but to keep his corps ready 
 to make any movement, in co-operation with 
 the allied army, that might afterwards be de- 
 termined upon. General Vanegas prepared to 
 carry these orders into execution, and retired 
 a considerable distance through La Mancha ; 
 but, from a fatality which has never been ex- 
 plained, he was induced to move forward again, 
 over some of the ground which he had passed, 
 and to engage his corps in a general action with 
 the French under Sebastiani, at Aim on acid. 
 The Spaniards w^re completely routed in this 
 battle ; their best troops were engaged in it, 
 and many of the corps behaved with great gal- 
 lantry and good conduct; but they were de- 
 feated with considerable loss, and were driven 
 to the Sierra Morena. This disaster was se- 
 verely felt ; the dispersion of the troops that 
 could be most depended upon, and who were 
 
105 
 
 intrusted with the defence of the great pass 
 into Andalusia, was an event that could not 
 easily be repaired ; and, in addition, it destroy- 
 ed all confidence in the movements of the 
 Spaniards; they were no longer to be depended 
 upon, for the most trifling operations : when 
 they were required to act, they remained un- 
 moved ; when intrusted with a position, as at 
 Talavera, they deserted it without reason; 
 when directed to avoid an action, which, if 
 successful, could be of no benefit to their cause, 
 they seemed to court one ; and when engaged, 
 exposed themselves to the most disastrous de- 
 feats. With this battle terminated the cam- 
 paign, which had been undertaken for the 
 relief of Madrid, and the expulsion of the 
 enemy from the central provinces of Spain. 
 The corps under Sir Robert Wilson re- 
 tired through the mountains from Escalona 
 to Bejar, where it was attacked and routed 
 by the advanced guard of Marshal Ney, who 
 was returning from the Tagus to the neigh- 
 bdurhood of Salamanca. 
 
106 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley remained at Jaraseco, 
 till the French, who had collected upon the 
 Tagus, had dispersed their corps ; and till the 
 total failure of supplies obliged him to retire 
 to the frontiers of Portugal, from whence alone 
 he could secure the provisioning of his army. 
 
 He placed his head-quarters at Badajoz, his 
 advance at Merida, and the rest of his army in 
 cantonments, upon the frontiers of Spain and 
 Portugal. The supreme government of Spain 
 was thrown into considerable consternation by 
 this movement, of which it had been the sole 
 and entire cause. The individuals who com- 
 posed it sought, notwithstanding, to throw the 
 blame from themselves, upon those who had the 
 most materially suffered by their misconduct. 
 
 The Marquis Wellesley, who was at this time 
 the British representative in Spain, complained 
 most bitterly of their inattention and neglect 
 to an army, which had so valiantly fought 
 in their defence ; and whose blood had been 
 
107 
 
 so profusely spilt, in supporting the great 
 cause in which they were engaged ; but these 
 complaints were only too ably urged. The 
 Spaniards (proud of their former glories) can 
 but ill brook the interference of foreign powers ; 
 their pride and haughty independence prompt 
 them to spurn the assistance or control of 
 foreigners; and when their government was 
 justly accused of neglect, and even treason 
 to Spain herself, yet as that reproach was 
 from a foreign hand, they rallied round that 
 government, and repelled the accusations, by 
 the most idle and unfounded attacks upon 
 those who made them, and who had full reason 
 to complain of their unjust and unfriendly 
 conduct. A spirit of hostility was thus raised 
 between the allied nations, and for some time 
 there was much of that unpleasant feeling 
 which is generated by mutual accusations. 
 The magnanimous conduct of the British go- 
 vernment, however, soon set those jealousies 
 at rest, and by degrees acquired for itself 
 the unbounded confidence of the Spanish 
 nation. ' 
 
108 
 
 The supreme government of Spain had dis- 
 placed General Cuesta from the command of 
 his army, during the time that Sir Arthur 
 Wellesley, (now become Lord Wellington) 
 remained at Jaraseco, and General Eguia was 
 intrusted with that important situation. This 
 officer was soon after directed to move the 
 Spanish army, (leaving only the Duke of Albu- 
 querque with a small corps in Estremadura) 
 and to form a junction with General Vanegas, in 
 the Sierra Morena, and in the neighbourhood of 
 La Carolina. This operation was dictated, in 
 no small degree, by a feeling of jealousy to- 
 wards the English. The Spaniards wished to 
 keep their army separate from the British, be- 
 cause they believed it could be rendered more 
 subservient to their own views. While it 
 remained in presence of so distinguished an 
 officer as Lord Wellington, it was curbed, and 
 restrained in the movements it might be di- 
 rected to undertake ; his advice must neces- 
 sarily be listened to, and it is not too much 
 to say, that some of the rulers of the country 
 were not at that time unwilling to see their 
 
109 
 
 armies directed by weaker counsels than 
 such as would be derived from him. There 
 was another reason for the movement of that 
 army. It was believed, by many persons in the 
 direction of affairs in Spain, that Lord Welling- 
 ton was determined to evacuate the country, 
 and retire into Portugal ; they thought, how- 
 ever, that by removing the Spanish army from 
 Estremadura, they should shift the defence of 
 that province upon the shoulders of Lord Wel- 
 lington ; by which means they flattered them- 
 selves, they should retain him against his will. 
 Lord Wellington was not so easily to be over- 
 reached : he stated to the Spanish government, 
 that he should remain at Badajoz so long 
 as he felt he could be serviceable to its 
 cause, but without neglecting the first object 
 which he was directed to attend to ; namely, 
 the defence of Portugal. He pressed the go- 
 vernment to make such arrangements as would 
 secure the provisioning of his army, if he was 
 enabled again to take the field ; but above all, 
 he recommended it to preserve the Spanish 
 armies from being harassed, or on any account 
 
no 
 
 risked with the French, excepting ill such opera- 
 tions as should be agreed upon, according to a 
 general combination of all the forces that could 
 be brought against them. The army of the 
 Marquis of Romana was moved from Gallicia 
 to Ciudad Rodrigo; where it was placed under 
 the orders of the Duke del Parque. 
 
 A state of tranquillity now succeeded to the 
 active operations of the preceding months ; the 
 French armies had been in almost constant 
 movement since the entrance of Buonaparte into 
 Spain, in the month of November. When he 
 quitted the country to prepare for the Ger- 
 man war, he had left his armies in possession 
 of all the north of Spain ; Soult afterwards 
 added the north of Portugal. Victor was ad- 
 vanced to the confines of Andalusia, near 
 Monasterio ; and Sebastiani occupied La Man- 
 cha ; Suchet was in force in Arragon, and St. 
 Cyr was employed in the siege of the fortresses 
 in Catalonia. The situation of these corps was 
 now considerably changed. The north of Spain 
 and Portugal was almost entirely free from the 
 
Ill 
 
 incursions of the French ; the province of Es- 
 tremadura was relieved from them ; and a great 
 portion of La Mancha was in the occupation of 
 the Spanish armies. The French had therefore 
 lost considerably during the last months ; and, 
 notwithstanding their activity and military ta- 
 lents, they had been forced to retire from the 
 provinces which they had subdued, and to con- 
 centrate for their own defence, in a country 
 which they believed, after the capture of Madrid, 
 they had totally subjected. When Buonaparte 
 re-crossed the Pyrenees, he directed his im- 
 perial eagles to be placed upon the towers of 
 Lisbon ; he proclaimed his empire in the Pe- 
 ninsula, and boasted that there no longer ex- 
 isted any force that was capable of obstructing 
 the accomplishment of his imperial mandate. 
 But the strength of patriotism in a whole peo- 
 ple was as yet unknown to him. The con- 
 stant reduction of his forces, the ever succeed- 
 itig evacuation of apparently conquered pro- 
 vinces by his troops, the never-ending conflicts 
 in every corner of the Peninsula, have since 
 convinced him that a great people with one 
 
112 
 
 intent and one resolution, with patriotism as 
 their guide, are too powerful to be subdued, 
 though they have neither armies nor military 
 science to oppose to the invaders. 
 
 The British troops had been also in con- 
 stant activity since the arrival of Lord Welling- 
 ton in Portugal, they therefore required rest. 
 It became then the interest of both French and 
 English to preserve that state of tranquillity 
 which had succeeded since the passage of the 
 Tagus. 
 
 The state of Spain about this time, was 
 most extraordinary ; the whole people were 
 hostile to the French, yet their exertions 
 at the commencement of their struggle had 
 so far surpassed any former efforts they had 
 been called upon to make, that they now 
 reposed in security, confiding their cause to 
 the means which they had already provided, 
 and sheltering themselves from any further 
 calls, by the loud and re-echoed declara- 
 tions that they were invincible. It was in 
 
113 
 
 vain to combat against this argument; if a 
 doubt as to its validity w^as started, the in- 
 stances of Moncey's retreat from Valencia and 
 of Ney's from Gallicia, were thought sufficient 
 to remove all apprehensions, and to silence 
 for ever the discussion of the subject; the 
 best informed amongst the Spaniards were car- 
 ried away by feelings so congenial to their 
 haughty spirits, and so well adapted to the 
 indolence of their natures. The defence of 
 Saragossa and of Gerona convinced them that 
 the attempt to conquer Spain would be una- 
 vailing, and they sunk at once into a security 
 for which they since have most dearly paid. If 
 at Granada, you questioned the public authori- 
 ties as to the preparations they were making to 
 bring new armies into the field, they answered 
 by an account of what had already been pro- 
 duced. If in Valencia, the defeat which the 
 French had already sustained there was a 
 guarantee of the destruction which would 
 await a second corps, that should attempt the 
 invasion of their country ; Murcia could boast 
 the terror with . which it had . inspired the 
 
114 
 
 enemy, since he had never ventured to attack 
 it; and in this manner every part of Spain 
 relied with confidence upon the levies which 
 it had already produced, and looked upon its 
 entire deliverance from a foreign yoke, as 
 within little of being accomplished. 
 
 During the period of which we have been 
 speaking, Marshal Ney commenced an opera- 
 tion against the corps of the Duke del Parque : 
 that officer had collected his troops in a strong 
 position at Tamanes ; the French made a despe- 
 rate assault upon him, but were repulsed with 
 considerable loss. This action confirmed the 
 Spaniards in the belief that they were invin- 
 cible ; and a general feeling was raised, that 
 their armies should advance upon Madrid, and 
 that the successes of Baylen would shrink be- 
 fore the glories that awaited them in the 
 neighbourhood of the capital. 
 
 The disastrous termination of the German 
 war seemed in no degree to shake the confi- 
 dence of the Spanish nation ; proud of its own 
 
115 
 
 feats, it disdained a feeling of dependancei 
 upon any other people for the success of its 
 cause. 
 
 The government partook of the same senti- 
 ment; and, most singular to relate, during the 
 period of this eventful repose from active ope- 
 rations, made not the slightest effort to pre- 
 pare for the struggle which was to succeed. 
 
 The army of Lord Wellington which was 
 cantoned upon the Guadiana became ex- 
 tremely sickly ; and numbers of the officers 
 and men fell victims to the disorders gene- 
 rated by the noxious exhalations of that 
 rker, and to the fatigues which, amidst tha 
 greatest privations, they had previously under- 
 gone. The Spaniards made no exertions 
 to secure provisions for the army; so that Jt 
 was incapable of active operations. 
 
 The Spanish government seized this oppor- 
 tunity to attempt a scheme, which will ever 
 .stand unrivalled in absurdity and folly. The 
 
 I 3 
 
116 
 
 Spanish army which was assembled at the Ca- 
 rolina formed an effective force of 48,000 men ; 
 it had been placed under the orders of General 
 Eguia, when he marched with the greatest 
 proportion of his army from Estremadura ; but 
 it had afterwards been entrusted to the com- 
 mand of General Arisaga, a very young and in- 
 experienced officer; he was only a brigadier 
 when he was appointed to this important sta- 
 tion, but was advanced to the rank of a major- 
 general upon assuming it. 
 
 It appears that this officer was befriended 
 by a strong party of the ministers at Seville, 
 who had considerable influence with the su- 
 preme government, although their views were 
 hostile to it. He was appointed for the pur- 
 pose of carrying their objects into effect ; and 
 every officer senior to him was removed, to 
 enable him to assume the command. The 
 other Spanish corps which communicated with 
 the central one, were commanded by the Dukes 
 of Albuquerque and Del Parque, both of su- 
 perior rank to General Arisaga ; it was, there- 
 
117 
 
 fore, the object of his employers to prevent 
 their co-operation with him, lest by taking 
 upon themselves the direction of the forces, to 
 w^hich they were entitled by their rank, they 
 should prevent the execution of the project the 
 ministers had in view. 
 
 These persons conceived that it was possible 
 to enter Madrid ; and they are supposed to have 
 purposed, in so doing, to effect a revolution, to 
 displace the government of the Junta Suprema, 
 and to seize it for themselves. 
 
 The capital was believed to be the most ad- 
 vantageous place for the execution of these 
 projects; first, because the triumph of its suc- 
 cessful deliverance would secure popularity to 
 those who had effected it; and next, because 
 the existing government had ever been most 
 unpopular in that city. With these views, 
 therefore. General Arisaga was ordered to 
 break up at once from his position at La 
 Carolina, and to march directly upon Madrid. 
 This order was neither communicated to Lord 
 
118 
 
 Wellington, nor to any of the Spanish generals 
 in the command of other corps. 
 
 General Arisaga, in conformity with his in- 
 structions, moved with considerable rapidity 
 through the whole of La Mancha, and arrived 
 on the 8th of November upon the Tagus, 
 in the neighbourhood of Ocana. The French 
 (who were surprised at the boldness of this 
 operation), concentrated their troops behind 
 the Tagus, and after a sharp rencontre with 
 the Spanish advanced guard, upon the 12th, 
 they passed that river, and attacked the 
 Spanish army. General Arisaga had placed 
 his whole force in two columns of battalions, 
 separated by a ravine, and with a corps in 
 advance of considerable strength, which was 
 in possession of a village which covered his 
 front. The French began the engagement by 
 the attack of this village ; but, under cover of 
 some ground about it, they turned the right 
 column of the Spanish army, charged it, and 
 in a very short time totally dispersed it. The 
 left column was as yet untouched, but Gene- 
 
119 
 
 ral Arisaga was so confounded by the de- 
 struction of his right, that he does not ap- 
 pear to have made any disposition for its 
 retreat, or for the support of the attack that 
 was coming upon it. The Spanish cavalry, 
 which was retiring with considerable precipi- 
 tation, first threw this corps into confusion by 
 gallopping through a considerable portion of it ; 
 the French, who were fast coming up with the 
 remainder of it, completed its dispersion; and 
 thus destroyed in a few hours the whole army 
 that had been marched against them. The 
 Spaniards lost their guns, their baggage, their 
 equipments, and out of 45,000 stand of arms, 
 not more than 13,000 were brought back to 
 the Carolina. The loss in killed, wounded, and 
 prisoners, was immense; a great portion of 
 the soldiers, who had dispersed during the 
 action, never returned to the army ; so that the 
 greatest number that was ever collected, of 
 individuals who had been present at Ocaiia, 
 did not amount to more than 25,000 men. 
 
 So decisive a defeat produced great con- 
 
 X\ 
 
120 
 
 sternation throughout the country; the only- 
 considerable army that remained to fight 
 for the cause of Spain had been totally de- 
 stroyed ; and to enlightened and unprejudiced 
 minds, it was no longer doubtful that the 
 French might at any time march, unresisted by 
 any military force, to the walls of Cadiz. This 
 opinion was far, however, from being general 
 in Spain. All true Spaniards were yet bound 
 to believe that the battle of Ocaiia was un- 
 fortunate from some unforeseen accident ; that 
 such was never likely to happen again ; and that 
 the forces which were collected at the Carolina 
 would yet form an impenetrable barrier to the 
 advance of the French armies, and protect the 
 Andalusias, till the necessary numbers should 
 be collected to fall with certain destruction 
 upon the forces of the invader. If a doubt 
 was started upon any part of this position, one 
 general answer was given, that a cat could 
 not pass through the defile of Despeiia Perros, 
 much less a French army. Thus you were 
 requested to be convinced, that no force the 
 enemy could bring would ever succeed in pene- 
 
121 
 
 trating to the southward of the Sierra Morena; 
 or in subjugating the people of Andalusia. 
 
 Marshal Soult, who had been appointed 
 Major- General of the French armies, a short 
 time before the battle of Ocana, seized the op- 
 portunity, which was offered by the destruc- 
 tion of the central army of Spain, to detach 
 a considerable corps against the Duke del 
 Parque, who had lately succeeded in occupy- 
 ing Salamanca. The French were fortunate 
 enough to bring his army to action at Alba de 
 Tormes, and, in spite of the good conduct of 
 some of his troops, entirely to disperse it. 
 The defeat of this corps laid the north of 
 Portugal open to the incursions of the French ; 
 the whole of Castile fell into their possession ; 
 Salamanca became a dep6t, from whence they 
 could prepare the means of a powerful attack ; 
 and there no longer remained a force that could 
 oppose or delay their operations. 
 
 Lord Wellington saw the absolute necessity 
 of removing his army to the north of the Tagus, 
 
122 
 
 to oppose the invasion which was thus pre- 
 paring. He had no longer any Spanish armies 
 that he could co-operate with ; the only two, 
 of any considerable force, with which he was 
 in communication, had brought destruction 
 upon themselves, without either listening to his 
 counsels, or communicating to him their move- 
 ments ; they were now no longer in a state to 
 be of any assistance to him, nor could he pro- 
 tect them against the powerful reinforcements 
 which were arriving from Germany to the 
 French, and which bid fair to over-run the 
 whole of the Peninsula. The system of war 
 was now to be completely changed. When 
 Lord Wellington entered Spain, the Spaniards 
 had an army of considerable strength, with 
 which he had hoped to co-operate with effect 
 against a comparatively small and extended 
 force of French. The tables were now re- 
 versed ; the Spanish armies could scarcely be 
 said to have any military existence ; they had 
 proved that, while in strength, they were not to 
 be depended upon, much less were they to be 
 looked to for any assistance in their present 
 
123 
 
 state. The French were marching an army of 
 more than 100,000 men into the country; so 
 that a defensive war was the only one which 
 could be carried on against them. Lord Wei- 
 lington was convinced that the hostility of the 
 Spaniards to the French was not to be over- 
 came : although their armies were beaten from 
 the field, yet the determined opposition of 
 the people repelled the yoke which was at- 
 tempted to be forced upon them. The nature 
 of the country was favourable to a protracted, 
 desultory warfare ; and its extent and poverty 
 seemed to bid defiance to a subjection, which, 
 to be made complete, would require a more 
 considerable force than France seemed able to 
 afford, or Spain could produce the means of 
 supporting. As far as experience could lead 
 to any conclusion as to the future, in the new 
 warfare which the Spanish nation was waging 
 against its invaders, there appeared no advan- 
 tage to the enemy from the occupation of any 
 part of the country, for any period of time. 
 The moment a province was evacuated, it rose 
 ia more determined hostility, than it had 
 
124 
 
 shewn before its invasion. No advantage ac- 
 crued to the French from either violent or con- 
 ciliating measures ; they v^ere always looked 
 upon as enemies ; and, after months of peace- 
 able occupation, if they exposed themselves 
 unprotected by numbers in the provinces which 
 they had considered as subdued, they were 
 sure of meeting with the same hostility they 
 had from the first experienced. 
 
 With this state of things to direct Lord Wel- 
 lington in the system of warfare upon which 
 he was called upon to decide, he felt no hesi- 
 tation in prescribing to himself, and to the allies, 
 a conduct which should protract the war; should 
 lead the enemy to extend his forces ; should 
 encourage the whole people of the Peninsula 
 to intercept his communications ; and should 
 give the governments of the countries engaged 
 in the contest, the opportunity of increasing 
 and improving the more regular means of re- 
 sistance or attack. 
 
 . Lord Wellington moved his army in the be- 
 
125 
 
 ginning of December, from the neighbourhood 
 of Badajos to the North of the Tagus. It ar- 
 rived, in the first weeks of January, in the new- 
 cantonments which had been prepared for it ; 
 they extended from Coimbra to Pinhel, while 
 a corps, under Lieutenant General Hill, was 
 left at Abrantes. In this position the army 
 went into winter-quarters : it was abundantly 
 supplied, and was employed only in recruiting 
 itself from the dreadful effects of the preceding 
 campaign, and the sickness which had followed 
 it. Head-quarters were placed at Viseu. 
 
 While Lord Wellington was employed in this 
 movement. Marshal Soult concentrated the 
 French armies in La Mancha ; for the purpose 
 of making an irruption into the southern pro- 
 vinces of Spain. 
 
 The British officers who had been at the 
 Carolina were satisfied, that, notwithstanding 
 the boasted impossibility of forcing the Spanish 
 army at the pass of Des Pena Perros, there was 
 in reality nothing easier. The pass itself was 
 
126 
 
 strong, but no fortifications, which deserved that 
 name, had been thrown up to defend it. The old 
 road from Madrid, by the Puerto del Rey, was 
 almost unobserved ; and the force which was 
 employed to defend the position of the Sierra 
 Morena, which was fifty leagues in extent, did 
 not exceed 25,000 men, most of them the un- 
 fortunate fugitives from the battle of Ocafia. 
 With such an army, it would have been impos- 
 sible for the most able commander to have 
 defended the entry into Andalusia ; but even 
 that chance was denied the Spaniards, for 
 they still had General Arisaga at their head. 
 The Junta Suprema was urged to make some 
 exertion to recruit the Spanish forces, and to 
 prepare for the struggle which was fast ap- 
 proaching ; but that body could only prove its 
 patriotism by echoing the national cry, that 
 Spaniards were invincible. Several nuns, who 
 believed themselves inspired prophetesses, 
 were produced to the loyal inhabitants of 
 Seville, to assure them, that if ever the French 
 should see the walls of that town, the fire of 
 heaven would fall upon them, before they 
 
U7 
 
 should reach its gates. In many other towns 
 the same prophetic inspiration descended upoBt' 
 the nuns ; they foretold in every instance the 
 destruction which awaited the invaders; but 
 the misfortunes they were themselves to suffer, 
 appear not to have been so correctly foreseen 
 by them. The preparations of the French in La 
 Mancha seemed, however, at last to have roused 
 the Junta from its state of apathy ; Seville and 
 the world were called as witnesses of its new 
 vigour, by a decree for the fabrication of 
 100,000 knives, to be distributed amongst the 
 voluntary defenders of the country. This 
 piece of absurdity will hardly be credited by 
 those who were not at Seville at the mo- 
 ment ; yet it is a fact which stands recorded 
 amongst the vigorous measures of the Junta, 
 and will hereafter be a standard to judge of 
 the hands to which the defence of Spain was 
 at that time intrusted. The credit of the 
 Junta, which had been fast declining, was 
 completely destroyed by the promulgation of 
 this decree ; to raise itself again in the estima- 
 tion of the public, it published an order for th^ 
 
assembling of the Cortes ; but its race was 
 nearly run, all confidence in it was gone, and 
 a few days more completed the term of its 
 existence. 
 
 Marshal Soult had terminated his prepara- 
 tions for the invasion of Andalusia, towards the 
 end of December ; he had collected a force of 
 50,000 men, and commenced his movements in 
 two columns ; the more considerable one, with 
 the whole of his artillery, he destined to the at- 
 tack of the principal pass by the Carolina ; the 
 other was directed to move by the mountain- 
 road upon Cordova ; neither of these corps ex- 
 perienced any resistance : the much-talked-of 
 pass of Des Peiia Perros was abandoned with- 
 out a shot, and the Spanish army which was to 
 defend it, retired toward Jaen. The corps 
 which moved upon Cordova was equally suc- 
 cessful. Marshal Soult directed a part of his 
 army to pursue the Spaniards upon Jaen, which 
 had been fortified at very great expense, 
 but which surrendered a few hours after it 
 was summoned. With the remainder of his 
 
129 
 
 army he moved with great rapidity upon 
 Seville. 
 
 When the Junta Suprema was made acquainted 
 with the successful irruption of the French, its 
 first object was to escape to a place of safety, 
 and it made choice of Cadiz for this object; 
 but its members had considerable apprehen- 
 sions, lest the populace, who were enraged 
 against them, should impede their flight. They 
 fell, however, upon a most extraordinary ex- 
 pedient to save themselves: — A bulletin was 
 published by authority, and distributed through- 
 out Seville, stating, that a courier to the Bri- 
 tish Minister had arrived, bringing dispatches 
 from Lord Wellington, who was moving wtih 
 the British army upon Salamanca, and was 
 left with his advance within a few leagues of 
 that place ; that the courier had passed through 
 the armies of the Dukes del Parque and Albu- 
 querque, who were within a short distance of 
 each other, and were about to fall upon the 
 flank of Marshal Soult. Under cover of this 
 communication (the whole of which was false, 
 
 K 
 
130 
 
 for no courier whatsoever had arrived at the 
 British Minister's, nor were any of the move- 
 ments making by any of the corps which were 
 mentioned), the individuals who composed the 
 Junta, began to escape to Cadiz ; the populace 
 of Seville were not long, however, in discover- 
 ing the imposition which had been practised 
 upon them ; and a pursuit of the Junta imme- 
 diately commenced ; many of its members were 
 seized upon the road to Cadiz, and imprisoned in 
 the convent of theCartjuo,near JTere^; they were 
 afterwards carried to the Isla de Leon, where 
 they were required to abdicate their authority, 
 and appoint a Regency. They concurred in these 
 directions, and named General Castanos (who 
 was but just released from the confinement in 
 which they had placed him) the president of a 
 board of Regents, who were to govern the 
 country in the name of Ferdinand the Seventh. 
 
 While these changes were effecting, the peo- 
 ple of Seville reinstated the former Junta 
 of their province, and added the Marquis of 
 Romaua, the Duke of Albuquerque, and some 
 
131 
 
 English to its number ; but this body had not 
 time to act; Marshal Soult was already within 
 a few days' march of the town : it constituted, 
 however, the Marquis of Romana Captain- 
 General of Estreniadura ; and directed the 
 Duke of Albuquerque, who had brought his 
 corps with him from Estremadura, to take up 
 a position at Carmona, to defend the approach 
 to Seville. The army which the duke com- 
 manded was, however, too weak to resist the 
 French; he therefore fell back upon their 
 approach ; and, in spite of their efforts to 
 prevent it, retired to the Isla de Leon. To 
 this place Marshal Soult pursued him, and 
 thus, in one movement, without a single 
 action, reduced the whole of the southern 
 provinces of Spain to the subjection of France 
 He extended his army to the walls of Gibraltar ; 
 he occupied Malaga, Granada, Jaen, Cordova, 
 and Seville, and he prepared for the siege of 
 Cadiz, which was the only bar to the complete 
 reduction of Andalusia. 
 
 This operation was as rapid and as success- 
 
132 
 
 ful, as it was possible to execute. The great 
 resources of the Spanish monarchy were re- 
 duced at one blow; the riches of Andalusia 
 were abandoned to the enemy without a 
 struggle; and the great nursery of the Spanish 
 armies, the provinces from which innumerable 
 bands of patriots might have been drawn, were 
 at once delivered into the hands of the invader. 
 Some persons thought, that, in the tame re- 
 linquishment of these treasures, they perceived 
 a readiness in the Spaniards to abandon the 
 cause for which they had, till that moment, so 
 gloriously been struggling ; but the fallacy of 
 that opinion has since been proved. The 
 revolution in Spain had found that country 
 merged in all the vices of its former weak 
 and imbecile governments. Spain had not 
 for many years been called into any exten- 
 sive warfare; it was without any military 
 organization ; it was unused to great exer- 
 tions; yet the people were proud of their for- 
 mer exploits ; and, without adverting to the 
 changes which had taken place, believed them- 
 selves and their armies as invincible, as they 
 
133 
 
 had been during the most brilliant periods of 
 their history. The nation had been long sunk 
 in ignorance and oppression ; it had no military 
 science, no commanders to whom it could look 
 for assistance, no army that could defend it; 
 yet it had universally risked a contest with 
 the greatest military power the world had ever 
 seen ; and which had armies, more powerful 
 than any the nation could oppose to them, 
 within its territory. Elated by the first suc- 
 cesses at Baylen and Saragossa, the Spaniards 
 afterwards sunk into their former habits of in- 
 dolence. Pride dictated to them a feeling of 
 security, which reason would have made them 
 doubt ; but their succeeding reverses never 
 changed their first opinions; although the 
 total want of confidence, in their generals or 
 their governments, made them little anxious to 
 place themselves under their directions. The 
 Supreme Junta, which had been established to 
 rule the country in circumstances of the greatest 
 difficulty, was totally unable to call forth the 
 energies of the nation. The same intrigues, which 
 had existed under the long reign of the Prince 
 
134 
 
 of the Peace, continued under its auspices. 
 The want of money was soon felt throughout the 
 country, the Junta was unacquainted with the 
 means of obtaining it, and was not very scrupu- 
 lous in the application of the sums it received. 
 The army was unpaid, and was consequently 
 without discipline. The generals were unsup- 
 ported by the government, which was too 
 weak to uphold them in the execution of their 
 duty. The Juntas of the different provinces 
 yielded but a limited obedience to the central 
 one ; they were composed of persons who 
 looked most to their own advantage in the 
 high situations to which they had been called, 
 and who were unwilling to make exertions, 
 the burthen of which would fall upon them- 
 selves. In this state of things, the declaration 
 that Spain was invincible, was the readiest 
 mode of abstaining from those efforts which 
 were necessary to make her so, but which ac- 
 corded too little with the character of the people 
 who were to make them. Andalusia was in 
 consequence totally unprepared for the blow 
 which was struck at her, her population how- 
 
135 
 
 ever was not the less hostile to the in- 
 vaders; there was no point round which it 
 could rally in the hour of danger, the people 
 sunk under the power of their enemies, but 
 they still were Spaniards; they moaned the 
 cruel fate which had attended them, but they 
 remained steadfast through all their misery 
 to the great cause of their nation and their 
 independence. 
 
 While Marshal Soult was employed in over- 
 running the southern provinces of Spain, Ge- 
 neral Suchet (who in the month of June had 
 defeated the army of General Blake on the 
 heights of Santa Maria), marched with a consi- 
 derable corps to reduce the kingdom of Valen- 
 cia. He reached, with little opposition, the 
 walls of that capital ; but the resistance of the 
 people was there so determined, and the means 
 he brought with him so inadequate to the task 
 imposed upon him, that he retired from the 
 country without having effected any object for 
 which he had commenced his operation ; he re- 
 sumed his position in Arragon, and afterwards 
 
136 
 
 employed himself in the siege of the fortresses 
 of Catalonia. 
 
 The first act of the new regency of Spain 
 was to request Lord Wellington to afford 
 some assistance from his army, for the garri- 
 son and defence of Cadiz. Lord Wellington, 
 in compliance, detached to that place a force 
 of 3,000 men, which arrived there after a 
 short passage from Lisbon, and which contri- 
 buted materially to its defence. The siege 
 was begun under the directions of Marshal 
 Soult, in the end of January, 1810; and it 
 lasted almost without interruption till August 
 1812. 
 
 The great body of reinforcements that about 
 this time arrived to the French armies in Spain 
 took the direction of Salamanca : it became 
 therefore evident that an attack on Portugal 
 was determined upon. Marshal Ney placed the 
 advance of his corps upon the Agueda, and 
 threatened to invest Ciudad Rodrigo ; but the 
 difficulty of obtaining provisions in the winter 
 
137 
 
 season prevented him from undertaking that 
 operation till later in the year. A detachment 
 from the French army attacked a part of the 
 British rifle corps, under Colonel Beckwith, at 
 Barba delPuerco, but was repulsed with consi- 
 derable loss. This was the first affair which 
 took place between the army, which was entitled 
 that of Portugal, and the British corps des- 
 tined to defend that kingdom; it was a 
 sample of what its whole body was after- 
 wards to meet with. Marshal Ney, commanded 
 in chief at Salamanca ; General Junot was se- 
 cond to him. These officers were anxious to 
 engage Lord Wellington to break up from his 
 winter-quarters, and, if possible, to draw him 
 into the open country of Castile. With this view 
 General Junot was detached to Astorga, to un- 
 dertake the siege of that town. Lord Welling- 
 ton was not induced to depart from the system 
 ' which he had prescribed to himself, by the move- 
 ments of the enemy ; he felt, that however im- 
 portant the possession of Astorga might be to 
 the cause he was employed in defending, yet 
 it was more essential to maintain his army in 
 
138 
 
 the positions it occupied, and to preserve it 
 unbroken for the great contest which, he fore- 
 saw, it would soon be called upon to maintain. 
 He remained, therefore, in perfect quiet, re- 
 cruiting his army, and giving the Portuguese 
 the opportunity of forming and improving their 
 troops. Astorga was taken after a defence of 
 five weeks, and Junot returned with his corps 
 to the neighbourhood of Salamanca. Marshal 
 Soult detached General Regnier with his corps 
 to operate in Estremadura against the Spanish 
 troops, of which the Marquis of Romana had the 
 command. Lieutenant General Hill, who had 
 been left at Abrantes with a corps of 13,000 men, 
 British and Portuguese, advanced to Portalegre, 
 to co-operate with them, and to prevent the 
 investment of Elvas or Badajos. He was di- 
 rected, however, not to engage in offensive ope- 
 rations. General Regnier effected little. He 
 had several engagements with parts of the Mar- 
 quis of Romana's corps, but none of them were 
 productive of any decisive results. 
 
 In the beginning of May, Lord Wellington 
 
139 
 
 was apprized of some movements in the French 
 army, which indicated an advance in strength 
 upon Ciudad Rodrigo ; he lost not a moment in 
 putting his army in motion, and placing it 
 on the frontiers of Portugal. He establish- 
 ed his head-quarters at Celorico, and his di- 
 visions at Pinhel, Alverca, Guarda, Trancoso, 
 and along the valley of the Mondego, as far as 
 Cea, and upon the opposite bank of that river 
 at Fornos, Mangualde, and Viseu. He deter- 
 mined in this position to await the movements 
 of the enemy; he could decide from it, in 
 security, either to co-operate in the defence of 
 Ciudad Rodrigo, or to attack the French army 
 if an opportunity was given him. Marshal 
 Ney moved, however, but a small corps to the 
 neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo ; the roads 
 from Salamanca were still extremely bad, 
 <and impracticable for a train of artillery ; he 
 gave up therefore any further object. Marshal 
 Massena was at this time sent by Buona- 
 parte to take the command of the army 
 of Portugal, and he arrived at Salamanca 
 in the end of May. The corps of General 
 
140 
 
 Regnier was added to his army, which was 
 now composed of the 6th corps under Ney, 
 the 8th corps under Junot, and the second 
 corps under Regnier. Massena brought this 
 latter corps from the south of the Tagus to the 
 neighbourhood of Coria, from which place it 
 was in communication with him ; and Lieutenant 
 General Hill, who had been directed to observe 
 it, made a corresponding movement, crossed 
 the Tagus at Villa Velha, and established his 
 head-quarters at Sarzedas. Marshal Mortier 
 was detached by Soult to supply the place 
 of Regnier in Estremadura ; and the Marquis 
 of Romana remained in observation of the 
 corps which that officer had brought with him. 
 A reinforcement of some regiments which had 
 returned from the Walcheren expedition, was 
 sent about this time, under Major General 
 Leith, from England. As the men were ex- 
 tremely sickly. Lord Wellington did not choose 
 to bring them to the army; they were em- 
 bodied with some regiments of Portuguese ; 
 and placed upon the Zezere, where General 
 Leith commanded the whole corps. The force 
 
141 
 
 of the allied army destined for the defence of 
 Portugal, may be computed at the following 
 amount: — 
 
 Men. 
 
 The Corps with Lord Wellington .... 30,000 
 The Corps with Lieutenant General Hill 14,000 
 The Corps with Major General Leith 10,000 
 
 54,000 
 
 In co-operation with this force was a 
 
 corps of Portuguese Militia 10,000 
 
 The corps under the Marquis Romana 12,000 
 
 Making a total of 76,000 
 The French force under Massena was 
 
 Men. 
 
 The Infantry of the 2d, 6th and 8th corps 62,000 
 
 The Cavalry 6,000 
 
 The Artillery, &c 4,000 
 
 Total 72,000 
 
142 
 
 To this were afterwards joined two Divisions of 
 
 The 9th corps under Count Erlon 10,000 
 
 The remaining division of this corps 
 
 under General Claparede 8,000 
 
 The corps of Marshal Mortier which co- 
 operated to the south of the Tagus, 13,000 
 
 Making a total of 103,000 
 
 These numbers are the very lowest at which 
 the French army can be calculated. Buonaparte 
 always called the force under Massena alone 
 100,000 men; and the French officers, before 
 the invasion of Portugal, gave the same account 
 of the numbers with which they were to lover- 
 whelm us. 
 
 In comparing the amount of the two ar- 
 mies, the description of force of which they 
 were composed should be taken into con- 
 sideration. The Portuguese had as yet been 
 perfectly untried ; and their militia was so de- 
 fective in organization as to be evidently unfit 
 for the operations of a campaign. Yet Lord 
 
143 
 
 Wellington was not alarmed at the disparity of 
 numbers, or the superior organization of the 
 troops of the enemy ; he relied upon his own 
 genius to baffle their efforts, and combined his 
 plans with reference to the troops he had to 
 command. 
 
 In the latter part of the year 1809, while 
 Lord Wellington was still at Badajos, he had 
 contemplated the possibility of his being at- 
 tacked in Portugal by a superior force; he had 
 considered the nature of the country he should 
 have to defend, as well as the system of war- 
 fare which would most tend to support the 
 contest in the Peninsula: he looked upon the 
 preservation of his own army as the guarantee 
 of the future triumph of the cause he was to 
 maintain: the extension of the enemy, in the 
 occupation of distant provinces, must be a 
 source of weakness to him; the lengthening 
 his communications must add considerably to 
 his embarrassments. Lord Wellington, there- 
 fore, fixed upon the heights of Sobral and 
 Torres Vedras, as the best positions in which 
 
144 
 
 he could collect his army, and offer battle to 
 the superior forces of his enemy. 
 
 With such a determination, he spared no 
 pains in fortifying and strengthening these 
 places ; the range of positions connected with, 
 them extended from the Tagus at Alhandra, to 
 the sea at the mouth of the Zizandra ; the 
 accessible points were occupied with forts; 
 and every resource was employed to make a 
 line of defence, in which so eventful a contest 
 was to be decided, as formidable as art, com- 
 bined with its natural advantages, could render 
 it. The early decision of Lord Wellington was 
 supported by the events which succeeded each 
 other in the early parts of the year 1810. The 
 great force of the enemy which menaced Por- 
 tugal, and the total destruction of all the effec- 
 tive Spanish armies which could co-operate ' 
 with the British in defence of it, confirmed 
 Lord Wellington in the wisdom of his plan of 
 retreat. The French had a force in Spain of 
 not less than 300,000 men ; this army was dis- 
 tributed over almost every part of the country; 
 
145 
 
 Gallicia, Valencia, and Murcia, were the only- 
 provinces that were free, the rest were in the oc- 
 cupation of the enemy. The amount of this force, 
 when collected, was sufficient to overwhelm 
 the small numbers of the allies that were in 
 a state of military organization in the Peninsula ; 
 but from great extension, it became unequal to 
 the task imposed upon it. It was employed in 
 completing the subjugation of the provinces that 
 had been conquered ; and yet that object was 
 not advancing, although the force was frittered 
 away in seeking to accomplish it. The animo- 
 sity of the people was working in silence the 
 destruction of the French armies. Every 
 succeeding day brought reports of skir- 
 mishes, or individual rencontres, in which the 
 enemy were worsted, and no account represent- 
 ed any part of Spain as diminishing in its hos- 
 tility, or as being treated with more confidence, 
 or relied upon with greater security, by the 
 French. 
 
 The army of Marshal Massena, while at- 
 tempting the conquest of Portugal, could lend 
 
146 
 
 no aid towards the reduction of the people in 
 the Peninsula : as long as it was in observation 
 of the British troops, whether on the Spanish 
 frontier or in the lines of Lisbon, it could as little 
 assist the views of Buonaparte in reducing the 
 country to obedience ; the destruction of Lord 
 Wellington's army could alone enable Massena 
 to fulfil the objects of his Imperial Master. 
 The preventing that catastrophe formed the 
 basis of Lord Wellington's plans for the cam- 
 paign. He was neither strong enough, nor 
 had he any wish, to undertake offensive opera- 
 tions : the state of Spain was not such as to 
 make them advisable ; they must necessarily 
 be commenced at considerable risk against a 
 superior army ; and if they were unsuccessful, ' 
 the cause of the Peninsula was lost. By the 
 plan which Lord Wellington had determined, 
 upon, he promised to preserve his army, to^ 
 increase its discipline, to augment its numbers, * 
 to draw the French into a country where their-^ 
 means of subsistence would be confined, and 
 where their force would not be sufficient to 
 maintain even their communications with the 
 
147 
 
 dep6ts, which must necessarily be placed at a 
 distance from them. 
 
 Massena advanced from Salamanca in the 
 beginning of June, to commence the siege of 
 Ciudad Rodrigo ; he brought with him a con- 
 siderable train of artillery, and expected the 
 place would surrender upon being summoned. 
 But it was defended with considerable ability 
 and valour, and was only yielded into the hands 
 of the enemy upon the 18th of July, after the 
 breaches were practicable and the principal 
 defence© destroyed. Many persons at the time 
 conceived that Lord Wellington had seen the 
 fall of this fortress with considerable indiffer- 
 ence, since he had made no movement to 
 relieve it ; but it is only necessary to point out 
 the results of victory or defeat to the different 
 armies, to shew the propriety of Lord Wel- 
 lington's determination not to risk a general 
 action. To attack the French he must have 
 crossed the Coa and the Agueda; if he had 
 been defeated, he would have had great diffi- 
 culty in repassing those rivers, and saving th« 
 
 L 2 
 
148 
 
 wrecks of his army ; , he would no longer have 
 been able to provide for the defence of Portu- 
 gal with a beaten army; he must have eva- 
 cuated the country. If he beat the French 
 they would have retired npon reinforcements, 
 and would have been prepared to advance upon 
 him again in a very short time. Lord Welling- 
 ton would have had to lament the brave men 
 he must have lost in an action, which would 
 but have relieved Ciudad Rodrigo for a short 
 time, as he must afterwards have abandoned 
 it to the superior numbers of the enemy. His 
 army must also have been considerably weak- 
 ened ; and most likely would have been un- 
 equal to the task afterwards to be imposed 
 upon it, in the defence of Portugal. 
 
 Soon after the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, the 
 British advanced guard, under Major General 
 Crawford, retired from the fort of La Con-- 
 ception, and was placed in a position under 
 the walls of Almeida. Lord Wellington di- 
 rected this corps to fall back across the Coa;, 
 but, from some misapprehension, these orders 
 
149 
 
 were not executed, and it was attacked upon 
 the 24th of July. The French had the whole 
 corps of Ney engaged in this affair ; it ma- 
 noeuvred under cover of its cavalry upon the 
 right of Major General Crawford, who did not 
 decide upon his retreat until it had gained his 
 flank. The British and Portuguese troops 
 behaved with great gallantry, but they could 
 not cope with numbers so superior to their 
 own ; they retired across the bridge over the 
 Coa, in some confusion, but formed to defend 
 it, and repulsed the repeated attacks of the 
 enemy to gain possession of it. Major Ge- 
 neral Crawford had been previously, for a con- 
 siderable time, with his advanced guard close 
 to the French army. During the siege of 
 Ciudad Rodrigo, he had maintained a commu- 
 nication with the place, and had assisted Don 
 Gillian Sanches in his successful effort to leave 
 it. This officer, who had for a long time com- 
 iiianded a corps of Guerrillas, and who had 
 been most fortunate in his enterprises against 
 the enemy, was enclosed within the walls of 
 this fortress, by the rapidity with which the 
 
150 
 
 French had invested it. Massena was aware 
 of the circumstance, and vowed vengeance 
 against this chief of banditti (as he was pleased 
 to designate him). But Don Julian determined 
 to force his way through the besieging army. 
 He formed his corps in close column, placed 
 his wife by his side at the head of it, and left 
 the town soon after dark. As soon as he was 
 challenged by the French sentries, he moved 
 at full gallop upon them; cut down those that 
 he met with, and continued his course till he 
 had passed through the army. He arrived in 
 safety at the quarters of Major General Craw- 
 ford, and soon after retaliated upon several of 
 the enemy the vengeance they had threatened 
 to inflict upon him. 
 
 On the day on which Ciudad Rodrigo sur- 
 rendered, General Crawford, while making a 
 reconnoissance, fell in with a strong patrole 
 from the French army ; he engaged in a^i affair 
 with it, which did not turn out successfully ; 
 the French infantry repulsed three successive 
 charges of the British cavalry, in one of which 
 
151 
 
 Colonel Talbot, of the 14th Light Dragoons, 
 waskilled ; and, profiting by a mistake amongst 
 our own troops, who took each other for ene- 
 mies, it retired with little loss to the corps 
 which was supporting it: the cavalry which 
 accompanied it was taken. 
 
 Marshal Massena invested Almeida on the 
 ' 24th of July, immediately after the affair under 
 the walls of that place with the corps of Major 
 General Crawford. Lord Wellington retired 
 from Alverca (where he had placed his head- 
 quarters during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo) 
 to his former station at Celorico ; he also drew 
 back the divisions that were at Pinhel and 
 Trancoso, and placed them in rear of Ce- 
 
 J * lorico, along the valley of the Mondego ; he 
 was thus prepared to commence his retreat 
 upon the lines, in case the enemy had deter- 
 
 '^ " mined to push forward, before the capture of 
 Almeida. Massena preferred, however, the 
 surer game, and commenced the siege of that 
 place. He was considerably delayed in his 
 operations by the nature of the ground, and 
 
152 
 
 was not able to open his fire upon it till the 
 23d of August. Lord Wellington determined 
 to assist the place in its defence, although he 
 did not choose to risk an action to relieve it; he 
 moved up his whole army as soon as the firing 
 had commenced from the trenches, and, on the 
 27th of August, had determined to place it 
 upon the banks of the Coa. In the course of 
 that day, however. Lord Wellington, while re- 
 connoitring, was surprised to find that all firing 
 had ceased about Almeida. The telegraph, by 
 which he communicated with it, no longer 
 sent him any information, and he was afraid 
 it had surrendered; he observed a person 
 walking upon the glacis, which, confirmed his 
 suspicions, and he was informed of a con- 
 siderable explosion which had taken place the 
 night preceding. Lord Wellington immedi- 
 ately ordered his army to be ready to fall back 
 to its positions in the rear, but the place re- 
 commenced its firing about ten o'clock at night; 
 it ceased^ however, at twelve ; and the follow- 
 ing morning, in a skirmish with the enemy's 
 cavalry, a German serjeant, in the French ser- 
 
153 
 
 vice, called to a dragoon of the 1st German 
 hussars, and told him to apprize his General 
 that Almeida had surrendered. The order for 
 the retreat was soon after given; and the allied 
 army was again placed in its position, in the 
 valley of the Mondego. 
 
 The loss of Almeida, after only three days 
 firing, was a severe mortification to Lord Wel- 
 lington ; he found afterwards, that an order 
 which he had given when he visited the place in 
 the February preceding, to remove the great 
 magazine from the centre of the town to one of 
 the casemates, had not been executed ; that a 
 shell having fallen near the door of this dep6t, 
 while some men were employed in getting pow- 
 der, the whole provision of that article for the 
 garrison had been blown up ; the town had been 
 nearly destroyed by the explosion ; the ram- 
 parts had been materially injured; and the place 
 had been left without the means of defence. In 
 this situation the governor. General Cox, en- 
 deavoured to capitulate, upon being allowed to 
 retire with his garrison ; but the Portuguese 
 
154 
 
 officer, who was sent to negotiate (and who is 
 the only instance of a traitor among the 
 officers of that nation, who have acted with the 
 British army), betrayed the disastrous situa- 
 tion of the place, and refused to return within 
 it. Marshal Massena insisted upon uncondi- 
 tional surrender, which Brigadier General Cox 
 refused ; the firing recommenced, as has been 
 already stated, but at midnight the town was 
 surrendered. 
 
 The Marquis de Alorna, who was with the 
 French army, desired the Portuguese garrison 
 to enter the service of France, and to become 
 a part of a Portuguese legion, "of which he was 
 to be the commander ; but the whole of the 
 men and officers refused. They were then 
 threatened with every sort of persecution; 
 they were menaced with the utmost rigour 
 of the law as traitors to their country ; but 
 if they would enlist under the French banners, 
 they were promised protection and advantage. 
 Seeing no other mode of escaping from a 
 treatment so contrary to every principle of 
 
155 
 
 justice, the garrison consented to serve under 
 the Marquis de Alorna ; but its object was 
 the reverse of what the French expected ; the 
 moment the individuals were restored to li- 
 berty, they planned the means of returning to 
 their army ; and, on the third day from the 
 time of their enlistment, there remained with 
 the French out of the whole 20th Regiment, a 
 squadron of cavalry and a company of artil- 
 lery, but thirty men and a few officers, who had 
 been detected at the moment they also were 
 escaping. These troops were immediately 
 re-formed, upon their return to Portugal ; 
 and the 20th Regiment particularly distin- 
 guished itself throughout the campaign that 
 followed. 
 
 An incident which took place on the night of 
 the surrender of Almeida, deserves to be men- 
 tioned, to shew the hostility of the Portuguese 
 peasantry to the French. Colonel Pavetti, the 
 chief of the gens d'armerie of France, in Spain, 
 had gone to Almeida with Marshal Massena, 
 when he left his head-quarters at the fort of 
 
156 
 
 La Conception, to induce the garrison to sur- 
 render ; when the firing recommenced, Colonel 
 Pavetti (who was unwell) set out upon his re- 
 turn to his quarters ; he was accompanied by 
 a Lieutenant-Colonel, a Captain, and twelve 
 men; the night was extremely dark and stormy, 
 and he lost his way. He met with a Portuguese 
 shepherd, whom he took for his guide, and 
 who promised to conduct him (the vengeance 
 of these Frenchmen hanging over him) to 
 the fort of La Conception. But this peasant 
 could not resist his feelings of animosity ; he 
 found courage to mislead the party ; and 
 under the pretence of having missed his 
 way, brought it to his own village. He pur- 
 suaded Colonel Pavetti to put up for the night 
 in the house of the Jues de Fora, and pretended 
 that he would procure provisions for him. In- 
 stead, however, of employing himself in that 
 way, he collected the inhabitants, fell upon 
 the French, killed them all, except the colonel, 
 whom he beat most severely, and his ser- 
 vant who stated himself to be a German. 
 The next day the colonel was brought, with 
 
157 
 
 two ribs broken and other damages, to the 
 head-quarters of Lord Wellington ; where he 
 was attended to, and afterwards sent prisoner 
 to England. 
 
 To appreciate this event, it must be remem- 
 bered that it took place in the middle of an 
 army of 60,000 Frenchmen ; that their revenge 
 awaited those who were concerned in it; but 
 that, notwithstanding, the animosity of the 
 Portuguese was too strong to be resisted by 
 any calculations of the retaliation which was 
 likely to follow the act that was committed. 
 
 It will not be uninteresting to cite a trait of 
 the character of Colonel Pavetti. Lord Wel- 
 lington treated him with great kindness ; bought 
 the horse which had belonged to him of the 
 peasants ; returned it to him, and asked him 
 to his table. While at dinner, this officer took 
 an opportunity of stating to Lord Wellington 
 that the Duchess of Abrantes was with her 
 husband Junot ; he added, " Qu'elle 6tait 
 '' grosse, et qu'elle comptoit faire ses couches 
 
158 
 
 ** dans son duche'^." Lord Wellington took 
 little notice of this impertinence ; but General 
 Alava, a Spanish officer, who was attached to 
 the British head-quarters, answered, '' Qu'il 
 " ferait bien de faire savoir k madame la 
 *' duchesse, qu'elle eut garde de ces messieurs 
 *' habilles en rouge, car ils etaient de tr^s 
 ** mauvais accoucheurs.*' 
 
 During the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Al- 
 meida, General Regnier had continually made 
 movements with his corps upon Castel Branco, 
 Pena-Macor, (^c, with a view of inducing 
 Lieutenant General Hill to leave the positions he 
 occupied, and to expose himself to an attack, 
 which was meditated upon him from a part of 
 the force under Massena, as well as from 
 Regnier. It was also hoped that Lord Welling- 
 ton might be induced to venture an attack upon 
 Regnier s corps, which seemed exposed, but 
 
 * Abrant6s was at that time 150 miles behind our army, 
 and throughout the whole succeeding campaigns, it was 
 uever taken by the enemy. 
 
159 
 
 which Massena was prepared to support with 
 his whole army. Lord Wellington, however, was 
 faithful to the system he had prescribed to him- 
 self; no artifice could draw him from the posi- 
 tion which made his retreat secure; and Mas- 
 sena was at last obliged to come into Portugal, 
 to seek him upon the ground he had chosen for 
 his operations. Detachments of French were 
 also sent upon Lord Wellington's left, with the 
 same view of engaging him to break up from 
 the positions he occupied ; but all these move- 
 ments failed in their object. 
 
 From the neighbourhood of Almeida there 
 are three roads which lead directly to the 
 centre of Portugal ; that on the right by Tran- 
 coso to Viseu, the* centre by Celorico to 
 Fornos Mangualde and Viseu; the third by 
 Celorico, Villa Cortes, Pinhancos, Puente de 
 Marcella, and from hence to Coimbra and 
 Thomar; from Viseu the road also leads by 
 Busaco to Coimbra. The right and centre 
 roads were extremely bad ; so much so, that 
 Lord Wellington condemned a considerable 
 
160 
 
 part of them as improper for artillery; he 
 chose the road to Puente de Marcella as the 
 fittest for his operations, and bestowed the 
 greatest pains in improving it. After the fall 
 of Almeida, he had placed the infantry of 
 his own corps along this road with the rear 
 divisions, as far back as Puente de Marcella. 
 The corps of Major General Leith was moved 
 from the Zezere to Thomar, so as to be within 
 reach for any assistance that might be required 
 from it ; and Lieutenant General Hill was 
 kept at Sarzedas to cover the road along the 
 Tagus upon Abrantes and Lisbon ; but was 
 directed to be prepared to move by the road 
 of Formosa and Pedragoa Grande, to Puente 
 de Marcella, in case Lord Wellington should 
 require him to do so. The cavalry was in 
 front of the whole army, and had its ad- 
 vanced posts at Alverca. 
 
 Massena commenced his march into Por- 
 tugal upon the 16th of September; his army 
 advanced in three corps ; the 8th corps under * 
 Junot, moved by Pinhel upon Trancoso, the 
 
161 
 
 6th corps under Ney, upon Alverca ; and ttie 
 2d corps, under Regnier, upon Guarda; the 
 British cavalry retired to Celorico. The next 
 day the two latter corps moved into Celorico ; 
 from which place they were observed to take 
 the road to Fornos. As soon as Lord Welling- 
 ton was persuaded that the enemy had made 
 choice of that road, and that no part of their 
 army was moving upon the road by the Tagus, he 
 sent directions to Lieutejiant General Hill to 
 break up from Sarzedas, and to move by Pedra- 
 goa Grande, to the Puente de Marcella; he 
 moved the corps of Major General Leith to the 
 same place from Thomar, and he withdrew his 
 own divisions with the view of collecting the 
 whole army upon the Sierra of Busaco. 
 
 Marshal Massena had commenced his ope- 
 rations with the hopes of turning the left of 
 Lord Wellington, and of reaching Coimbra 
 before the British army could be collected to 
 oppose him ; he had been induced to believe 
 that Lord Wellington had prepared to meet 
 him at the Puente de Marcella ; but he hoped 
 
 M 
 
162 
 
 that by this movement on the right of the 
 Mondego, he should turn that position, 
 and find Lord Wellington unprepared to 
 assemble in any other. He was miserably 
 deceived ; Lord Wellington was aware of the 
 nature of the roads the enemy had fixed upon 
 for his movements; he calculated the delays 
 he would meet with, and arranged his plans 
 accordingly. He directed a portion of the 
 militia that was at l^amego under the orders 
 of Colonel Trant to march upon Sardao ; the 
 rest was directed to move upon Trancoso 
 and Celorico, upon the rear of the enemy, 
 to intercept their communication with Al- 
 meida. 
 
 Marshal Massena arrived at Viseu upon the 
 19th of September; his artillery had suffered 
 so much from the badness of the roads that he 
 was obliged to remain there for some days to 
 repair it. General Junot joined him at this 
 place from Trancoso, so that the whole French 
 army was collected there. On the 23d the 
 advanced patroles of the British and French 
 
]63 
 
 armies met each other near St. Comba 
 de Dao. The bridge over the Cris, by 
 which the great road to Coimbra passes, 
 was blown up ; but the following day the 
 French advanced guard passed that river, 
 and the greatest part of the British retired 
 to the heights of Busaco, where the whole 
 army was collecting. On the 25th Mar- 
 shal Massena joined his advanced guard, and 
 on the 26th pushed forward to the foot of the 
 position which was occupied by Lord Wel- 
 lington. 
 
 The ridge of heights upon which the British 
 army was posted runs nearly north and south, 
 from a point about four miles to the north of 
 Busaco, to the confluence of the river Alva 
 and the Mondego; the extreme points are 
 nearly fifteen miles distant. Two great 
 roads to Coimbra cross over this Sierra, the 
 one close to the convent of Busaco, the other 
 four miles to the southward of it, at St. An* 
 tonio de Cantaro. The corps of Lieutenant 
 General Hill which had made a most ra- 
 
 M 2 
 
164 
 
 pid though difficult march from Sarzedas, 
 arrived upon the Mondego on the evening 
 of the 26th, and was directed to move into 
 the right of the position of Busaco early 
 on the following morning. Lord Wellington 
 had made a road along the heights, by which 
 his flanks communicated, and in this situation 
 he awaited the attack of the enemy. 
 
 We may be allowed for a moment to consider 
 the brilliancy of the movement by which the 
 allied army had thus been collected. Massena 
 conceived that he should surprise his antagonist 
 by the rapidity of his march upon his flank ; the 
 British officers generally thought that it would 
 be impossible to oppose him before he had pos- 
 sessed himself of Coimbra; and the corpsof Lieu- 
 tenant General Hill was universally thought to 
 be totally beyond the reach of the army of Lord 
 Wellington. Marshal Massena for a long time 
 disbelieved the fact of its junction at Busaco ; 
 and after he had been convinced of it, denied 
 the possibility of its having marched from 
 Sarzedas. Yet Lord Wellington, in spite of 
 
165 
 
 the difficulties opposed to him, of the able 
 movements intended to surprise him, and 
 of the triumphant predictions of his adver- 
 sary, collected his force from situations in 
 which it seemed totally divided from him, 
 and was prepared to fight the enemy with the 
 whole strength of the allied army, without 
 having lost a single man in the attainment of 
 his object. The corps of militia under Colonel 
 Trant, which had been ordered to Sardao, 
 from whence it was to have moved into the 
 Sierra of Caramula, was the only one which 
 had not reached the ground assigned to it; 
 this failure was occasioned by some false 
 information as to the possession of a pass by. 
 the enemy, which obliged that corps to move 
 by a circuitous road through Oporto. It ar- 
 rived upon the Vouga on the 28th, but too late 
 to effect the object for which it was intended. 
 
 On the morning of the 27th of September the 
 whole French army was arrayed in front of the 
 British position, from whence every part of it 
 was distinctly to be seen. The corps of Mar- 
 
166 
 
 ishal Ney was forrtied in close columns at the 
 foot of the hill opposite the convent of Busaco. 
 The corps of General Regnier was opposite the 
 third division of British under Major General 
 Picton, and prepared to advance by the road 
 to Coinlbra, which passed over the height by 
 St. Antonio de Cantaro. The corps of Gene- 
 ral Junot was in reserve with the greater part 
 of the cavalry, and was posted upon some rising 
 ground about a league in the rear of Marshal 
 Ney. 
 
 The battle commenced by a fire from the 
 light troops of both armies, in advance of the 
 position which was occupied by the allies ; a 
 detachment from the corps of Marshal Ney 
 niekt made an attack upon k village in front of 
 the light division, which was ceded with little 
 opposition; this village, although of import- 
 ance to the allied army, was without the posi- 
 tion in which Lord Wellington had determined 
 to receive the enemy's attack; he therefore 
 abandoned it, choosing rather to suffer some 
 annoyance from its possession by the enemy. 
 
167 
 
 than risk the chance of an action to main- 
 tain it, in less advantageous ground than the 
 position he had fixed upon. Marshal Mas- 
 sena was now convinced that he must fight 
 Lord Wellington upon his own ground; he 
 therefore directed General Regnier to advance 
 to the assault of the position in his front, while 
 the 1st division of Marshal Ney's corps, sup- 
 ported by the other two, and a great proportion 
 of artillery, was ordered to establish itself upon 
 the heights occupied by the light division. 
 General Regnier first brought his corps into 
 action ; the British regiments opposed to him 
 had not reached the positions that were as- 
 signed to them ; and, for a moment, a consider- 
 able column of French possessed itself of a 
 point within our line. Major General Picton 
 instantly marched against this column with a 
 few companies which he had collected; Ma- 
 jor General Lightburne's brigade, directed by 
 Lord Wellington, moved upon its right, while 
 the 88th, 45th, and Colonel Douglass's Regi- 
 ment of Portuguese, attempted to gain its left; 
 the troops with Major General Picton, how- 
 
168 
 
 ever, first dislodged the enemy by a most bril- 
 liant attack with the bayonet, driving him, 
 though infinitely superior in numbers, from the 
 strong ground he had got possession of; the 
 other regiments came up in time to harass 
 him in his retreat ; and the arrival of Major 
 General Leith's division, which took place at 
 this moment, convinced General Regpier that 
 he had better discontinue a contest, in which 
 he had so little prospect of success. He with- 
 drew his divisions, therefore, and formed upon 
 the ground from which he had originally moved. 
 During this attack. Marshal Ney formed a part 
 of his corps in column of mass, and directed 
 it to ascend the height upon the right of the 
 village, of which he had before obtained pos- 
 session. The ground was extremely steep, 
 and the column was but little annoyed in its 
 ascent; as soon, however, as it had gained 
 the summit, the guns attached to the light 
 division opened a most destructive fire upon 
 it, and the division charged it with the bayo- 
 net. The column was overthrown in an in- 
 stant; the riflemen charged its flanks while 
 
169 
 
 Major General Crawford pursued it down the 
 hill; the foremost regiments of the column 
 were almost totally destroyed, General Simon 
 wounded and taken, and the whole division 
 completely routed. The expression of a French 
 soldier engaged in this attack, who was after- 
 wards taken, " Qu'il se laissa rouler du haut 
 " en bas de la montagne, sans savoir comment 
 " il echappa," best explains the mode in which 
 the remnants of this column escaped. The 
 allies pursued it across the valley, and thus 
 put an end to the sanguine expectations of the 
 enemy, and to their boasted promise, of driving 
 us like sheep from our position. The rest of 
 the day was occupied by an incessant fire be- 
 tween the light troops of the two armies ; 
 Marshal Massena had placed a considerable 
 number of battalions in the road, which ex- 
 tended along the ravine, at the foot of the ridge 
 on which we were formed ; and he had hoped 
 to induce Lord Wellington to reinforce the 
 troops that were engaged with these battalions, 
 and by that means to get him into an action 
 of some consequence, out of the position which 
 
170 
 
 he occupied. This system had frequently 
 been successful to the French ; the com- 
 manders who have been opposed to them have 
 been unwilling to allow their too near approach 
 to their army, and have continued to reinforce 
 the advanced posts, till the greater part of their 
 troops had been drawn into an action, away 
 from the ground on which they had decided to 
 accept a battle ; but Lord Wellington was not 
 thus to be imposed upon ; he directed the light 
 troops, when pressed, to retire, and to give the 
 enemy an opportunity of attacking his position, 
 if he could persuade himself to do so. At 
 the approach of night. Marshal Massena having 
 lost all hopes of succeeding against the allies, 
 withdrew his troops from the advanced positions 
 he occupied, and placed them at some distance 
 in the rear, near the ground which was oc- 
 cupied by General Junot. Major General Craw- 
 ford then sent to the officer who commanded 
 in the village, which had been ceded in the 
 morning, telling him that the possession of it 
 was necessary to his corps, and therefore di- 
 recting him to abandon it. The officer refused, 
 
171 
 
 with a declaration that he would die in defence 
 of the post he was intrusted with. Major Ge- 
 neral Crawford immediately ordered six guns 
 to open upon him, and some companies of the 
 43d and Rifle Corps to charge the village. The 
 French were instantly driven out of it, and the 
 advanced post of the light division put in pos- 
 session of it. 
 
 The battle of Busaco was thus terminated. 
 The French lost 10,000 men killed, wounded, 
 and prisoners, in the course of the day ; and 
 Marshal Massena was first enabled to form an 
 estimate of the talents of the General, and the 
 bravery of the troops which he was directed 
 to drive headlong into the sea. 
 
 Oft the morning of the 28th, the two armies 
 maintained their respective positions ; towards 
 jthe middle of the day, however, the French 
 were observed to be retiring ; they set fire to 
 the woods to conceal their movement, but 
 the height of Busaco so commanded the whole 
 country, that their march was distinctly seen. 
 
172 
 
 Lord Wellington had been extremely anxious 
 for the arrival of the corps of militia, under 
 Colonel Trant, upon the Sierra of Caramula, 
 the road over which communicated from Viseu 
 to the great road from Oporto to Coimbra, near 
 Sardao, Bamfiela and Avelans. This was the 
 only pass by which the positions of the Sierra 
 of Busaco could be turned, and there were 
 parts of it so extremely difficult, that if this 
 corps of militia had had the necessary time to 
 destroy the bridges, and to avail itself of the 
 positions afforded by the ravines which intersect 
 the road, it might have opposed a most decisive 
 resistance to the advance of the enemy. Lord 
 Wellington did not choose to detach any part 
 of the force which he considered as his effective 
 army, to execute his object in this Sierra; such 
 a corps might be cut off from him, or might 
 have great difficulty in rejoining him ; and he 
 was resolved never to depart from his deter-^ 
 mination, that the great contest for the pos- 
 session of Portugal should be fought by his 
 whole army, and in a position which should 
 leave the event as little doubtful as was pos- 
 
173 
 
 sible in military operations. The corps of 
 Colonel Trant did not form a part of the force 
 which Lord Wellington had decided to- keep 
 with him; he intended it for the defence of 
 Oporto, to which place its retreat was not 
 likely to be interrupted from the Sierra of 
 Caramula; it had therefore been ordered to 
 occupy the latter position ; but Lord Welling- 
 ton would not supply its absence by any other 
 detachment. 
 
 As soon as Lord Wellington perceived the 
 retreat of the enemy, he suspected that his 
 object was to pass by the road just described. 
 Colonel Trant had arrived upon the Vouga, 
 late on the 28th; Lord Wellington was already 
 aware, that a considerable corps of the enemy 
 was by that time in possession of the Sierra i 
 he therefore gave up the hope of seeing it oc- 
 capied, and in the same night withdrew his 
 whole army from Busaco, moving with his own 
 corps into Coimbra, and directing Lieut.-Gene- 
 ral Hill to move by Thomar to Santarem. The 
 cavalry was placed in observation of the enemy, 
 
174 
 
 and was directed to cover Lord Wellington's 
 movement to the rear. Colonel Trant was or- 
 dered to post his corps along the north bank of 
 the Vouga ; and a part of the militia from La- 
 mego was ordered to enter Viseu in the 
 enemy's rear. 
 
 The situation of the French army began at 
 this time to wear a less promising appearance; 
 its communication with Spain was totally cut 
 off; its supply of provisions was nearly ex- 
 hausted ; it had no means of obtaining sub- 
 sistence but from the country ; and the 
 total evacuation of it by the inhabitants, of 
 which, according to the French accounts, they 
 had not seen twenty since their entry into Por- 
 tugal, made this last resource extremely pre- 
 carious. The allies, on the contrary, had beat 
 the whole French army ; they had gained con- 
 fidence in themselves ; the Portuguese troops 
 had behaved with great bravery; the army 
 relied with implicit faith on its commander; 
 and it felt that, notwithstanding his movement 
 to the rear, he was not afraid of encountering 
 
175 
 
 the enemy, but was leading it to stronger po- 
 sitions than the one in which he had already- 
 beaten him. 
 
 Marshal Massena appears at this time to have 
 felt the difficulty of his situation : he had two lines 
 of conduct open to him ; either to rest satisfied 
 with the progress he had made, and to endeavour 
 to re-establish his communications with Spain, 
 or to push forward in pursuit of the allies. The 
 first would have been ^extremely difficult ; he 
 would have weakened his army by detaching to 
 his rear; he would have suffered considerably 
 from want of provisions, till the supplies should 
 have reached him ; and he would have exposed 
 himself to an attack from Lord Wellington, 
 while reduced in numbers. He was, besides, 
 assured that there were no positions which the 
 allies could take up in the vjcinity of Lisbon ; 
 and he hoped, by a vigorous pursuit, to put 
 into execution the orders of his master. He 
 decided upon this operation. 
 
 Lord Wellington evacuated Coimbra on the 
 
176 
 
 approach of the enemy, upon the 1st of October ; 
 the town had generally been quitted by the 
 higher classes of inhabitants during the preced- 
 ing days ; a considerable proportion, however, 
 still remained, hoping that the enemy might yet 
 be prevented from getting possession of it. But 
 about ten o'clock on the morning of the first, 
 there was suddenly an alarm that the enemy 
 was approaching ; the report was soon magni- 
 fied into his having entered ; and at one burst 
 the whole of the remaining inhabitants ran 
 shrieking from the town. The bridge, which 
 is very long and narrow, was at once choked 
 by the crowds which were pouring upon it; and 
 the unhappy fugitives, who found their flight 
 impeded, threw themselves into the river, and 
 waded through it. The Mondego was fortu- 
 nately not deep at this time, the dry season 
 had kept it shallow ; but there were three or 
 four feet of water in many of the places where 
 the unfortunate inhabitants passed it. In the 
 midst of all the horrors of this scene ; of the 
 cries of the wretched people who were separated 
 from their families ; of those who were leaving 
 
177 
 
 their homes, their property, their only means 
 of subsistence, without the prospect of pro- 
 curing wherewithal to live for the next day, 
 and of those who believed the enemy (with his 
 train of unheard-of cruelties) at their heels ; 
 the ear was most powerfully arrested by the 
 screams of despair which issued from the gaol ; 
 where the miserable captives, who saw their 
 countrymen escaping, believed that they should 
 be left victims to the ferocity of the French. 
 
 The shrieks of these unhappy people were 
 fortunately heard by Lord Wellington ; who sent 
 his aide-de-camp, Lord March, to relieve them 
 from their situation; and thus the last of the 
 inhabitants of Coimbra escaped from the enemy. 
 
 It is not in the nature of this work to dwell 
 upon scenes of misery, such as have been now 
 described ; but the recollection of them will 
 last long on the minds of those who witnessed 
 them. The cruelties of the French had made 
 an impression upon the Portuguese, that no- 
 thing could efface; it seemed to be beyond 
 
178 
 
 the power of man to await the eiiemy*s ap- 
 proach. The whole country fled before him; 
 and if any of the unhappy fugitives were dis- 
 covered and chased by a French soldier, they 
 abandoned every thing to which the human 
 mind is devoted, to escape from what they 
 looked upon as more than death, the grasp 
 of their merciless invaders. — Innumerable in- 
 stances of these melancholy truths might be 
 detailed ; but it would waste the time of the 
 reader, and the relations of the horrid acts 
 committed by the French would be too shock- 
 ing to dwell upon. 
 
 When Lord Wellington retired to Coimbra, 
 he passed his divisions to the rear, and placed 
 them in echellons upon the road to Leyria. As 
 soon as he was convinced of Massena's ap- 
 proach, he directed each division to move one 
 march in retreat, and he fixed his head-quar- 
 ters at Redinha. The cavalry which covered 
 the army skirmished with the French in the 
 plains of the Mondego, and obtained some ad- 
 vantages over those who attempted to pass the 
 
179 
 
 river. The following day. Lord Wellington 
 moved to Leyria, where he remained till the 
 enemy marched upon him. Massena had hoped 
 to have overtaken some part of Lord Welling- 
 ton's infantry, when he advanced to Coimbra ; 
 but having failed, he pushed forward on the 
 evening of that day to Condeixa ; still he was 
 deceived ; Lord Wellington's columns were not 
 to be overtaken ; and he was obliged to halt 
 for three days. His army was fatigued with 
 the severe marches it had made; his provisions 
 were exhausted; he was obliged to sack the 
 town of Coimbra, to collect what the inhabi- 
 tants had left ; and he was constrained to make 
 some arrangement for his sick and wounded, 
 who amounted to 5,000 men, and who were 
 too numerous to be carried with bim. Mas- 
 sena's intercepted despatch to Buonaparte, 
 proves how strongly he felt the difficulty of his 
 situation : he says, that he is unable to leave a 
 guard of any strength to protect his wounded^ 
 as it would weaken his army ; and that th^ * 
 best security he can afford them, is by pur?^ 
 suing the allies with the whole of his force. 
 
180 
 
 and driving them from the country. It is sur- 
 prising, that the French officers should still 
 have entertained this hope. In a letter from 
 Marshal Ney to his wife, he says, that every 
 thing is going on better than could be ex- 
 pected; that the English are flying before the 
 French army, and that they appear to have no 
 other object in view than to escape to their 
 transports, and to carry away as great a num- 
 ber of the youth of Portugal as they can en- 
 trap, by way of didommagement, for the great 
 expenses of the war. 
 
 On the 4th of October Massena closed his 
 divisions to his advanced guard at Pombal, 
 and early on the 5th pushed forward with 
 great rapidity on Leyria, hoping to reach some 
 part of the allied army, but he was again de- 
 ceived ; Lord Wellington had placed his troops 
 in echellons to the rear, and as soon as he was 
 apprized of the movement of the French, he 
 directed them to fall back ; the advanced guard 
 of the British cavalry had a sharp rencontre 
 with the enemy, where three French officers 
 
181 
 
 and a considerable number of dragoons were 
 taken ; this was the only reward Marshal Mas- 
 sena derived from the rapidity of his advance. 
 
 Lord Wellington moved to Alcobai^a, the 
 next day to Rio Mayor, the next to Alemqner, 
 and on the 8th of October he entered a part of 
 his lines at Arruda. The French army pressed 
 forward during these days with very great 
 exertion, but by the able arrangements of 
 Lord Wellington it was unable to overtake any 
 part of his troops ; several skirmishes took 
 place between the cavalry of the two armies ; 
 they were universally in favour of the British, 
 who closed their operations by bringing in a 
 squadron of French. The rains set in on the 
 8th ; the allied army did not suffer from them, 
 as it entered its positions on the 9th, and was 
 generally placed in villages and under cover ; 
 "the French were materially annoyed by them ; 
 Ihe roads became extremely bad ; their horses, 
 which had been short of forage, and had made 
 some most distressing marches, were in many 
 instances unable to get forward with the artil- 
 
182 
 
 lery ; great numbers of them perished, and the 
 troops who were without cover, suffered most 
 severely from the inclemency of the weather. 
 
 We have thus conducted the British army to 
 the termination of one of the most extraordi- 
 nary operations which was ever carried into 
 effect ; the boldness of the original conception, 
 as well as the perseverance and success with 
 which it was executed, will command the admi- 
 ration of all military men. The ascendency 
 w^hich the character and talents of Lord Wel- 
 lington had obtained over the minds of all 
 those who were within his guidance or control, 
 could alone have enabled him to effect a plan 
 which involved in it such fearful consequences. 
 To have persuaded a foreign government and 
 army, but lately subjected to his direction, 
 to abandon the greater proportion of their 
 country almost without a struggle, to the ra- 
 vages of an invader ; to see his approach to the 
 capital without fear or hesitation, speaks of 
 itself a confidence in the talents of the com- 
 mander which is without example. Not less 
 
183 
 
 extraordinary was the mode in which a move- 
 ment in retreat was executed from Almeida 
 to Torres Vedras, a distance of 150 miles, 
 in presence of a suptirior army, whose object 
 was, by every exertion in its power, to harass 
 the corps opposed to it; yet not a straggler was 
 overtaken ; no article of baggage captured ; no 
 corps of infantry, except where the invaders 
 were routed at Busaco, was ever seen or 
 molested. Of all the retreats which have ever 
 been executed, this deserves most to be ad- 
 mired. The steady principle on which it was 
 carried into effect could alone have secured its 
 success. Lord Wellington never swerved 
 from his purpose ; the various changes which 
 every day occur in war, made no impression on 
 his determination. The great event of a battle, 
 such as that of Busaco, won over an enemy 
 who was surrounded by an hostile nation, never 
 induced him to change the plan of operations 
 which he was convinced would in the end pro- 
 duce the most decisive advantages. Guided by 
 such a principle. Lord Wellington was enabled 
 triumphantly to execute his plan ; the successes 
 
184 
 
 which have smce attended his career are the 
 best evidences of its wisdom. It is a singular 
 circumstance, that when in his turn Massena 
 had to conduct his army in retreat over nearly 
 the same ground to the frontiers of Spain, 
 although he had the advantages of making his 
 preparations in secret, and of disguising the 
 moment of putting it into execution, yet he 
 was constantly overtaken ; the corps of his 
 army beaten and harassed ; and in every action 
 which he was compelled to fight, he was driven 
 with loss and disaster from his positions. 
 
 Lord Wellington placed his army on the 
 ground marked out for it in the course of the 
 8th, 9th, and 10th of October. The lines, as 
 they have been termed, extended from Al- 
 handra to the mouth of the Zizandra ; the whole 
 distance may be computed at about twenty-five 
 miles from right to left. The term of lines 
 was but little applicable to them ; the defences 
 procured by art were confined to closed re- 
 doubts placed upon the most essential points, 
 and calculated to resist, although the enemy's 
 
185 
 
 troops might have established themselves in 
 their rear. They were thus,enabled to protect 
 the formation of the army upon any point 
 attacked, before the enemy could bring cannon 
 in operation with the troops which he might 
 have pushed forward between them. 
 
 These forts were occupied, (with very few 
 exceptions), jiot by the regular army destined 
 to act in the field, but by the militia, of which 
 . that of Lisbon formed a part, mixed up with 
 a certain number of troops of the line. Their 
 defence was thus intrusted to a description 
 of force, capable of the service imposed upon 
 it, but which would have been of trifling as- 
 sistance in a field of battle. Each redoubt 
 was provisioned for a certain time, and was 
 supplied with the ammunition, S^c, necessary 
 for its protracted defence. The post of Al- 
 handra, which formed the right of the whole 
 position, was strong by nature, and was, be- 
 sides, fortified by several redoubts; its de- 
 fence was assisted by the gun-boats in the 
 Tagus. The corps under the orders of Lieu- 
 
186 
 
 tenant General Hill occupied this part of the 
 position. It defended the great approach to 
 Lisbon, and its possession was of the greatest 
 importance. Lieutenant General Hill commu- 
 nicated by his left, which was placed on the 
 ground at the back of Arruda, on the Sierra de 
 Monte Agraipa, with the corps of the centre, 
 which occupied the heights above Sobral. 
 These heights, over which passed the second 
 great road to Lisbon, having been fortified as 
 much as the nature of the ground would admit, 
 formed the principal point of defence on this 
 part of the line. From this place towards the 
 left, and in the vicinity of Ribaldiera, there 
 were several passes into the main position, all 
 of which were fortified; and the principal force 
 of the army was concentrated in rear of them. 
 The next points of importance were Runa and 
 Undesquiera, supported by the line of heights 
 in their rear ; they were upon the road . leading 
 from Sobral to Torres Vedras, and were of the 
 most essential consequence, since they com- 
 manded the only pass to the latter place within 
 the Monte Junto ; an advantage important to 
 
187 
 
 the strength of the whole position, and which 
 never could with Safety be abandoned. These 
 posts were well fortified; were occupied by 
 a considerable corps, and s\ipported by the 
 force under Major General Picton at Torres 
 Vedras. 
 
 It is necessary to give some description of 
 Monte Junto, which has just been mentioned ; 
 for, although it was without the position, yet 
 it was one of the main features which contri- 
 buted to its general strength. This mountain 
 runs directly north from Runa, for a distance 
 of twelve or fourteen miles ; there are no great 
 roads or communications leading over it ; the 
 valley to the eastward, which divides it from 
 Sobral, is impassable; it prevents, therefore, 
 all military communication for an army from 
 that town to Torres Vedras (excepting that 
 stated as being occupied,) but round its north- 
 ern point, and thus requiring a march of at 
 least two days. The difficulty of passing across 
 this mountain was so great that two corps 
 separated by it could have carried no assist- 
 
188 
 
 ance to each other, if either had been at- 
 tacked. There were therefore two portions of 
 the British position, one that might be assailed 
 from the east of Monte Junto, the other, (of 
 which Torres Vedras was the right, and the 
 sea at the mouth of the Zizandra the left) which 
 might be attacked from the west. Lord Wel- 
 lington's communication from one to the other 
 of these branches of his whole position was 
 perfectly safe and eas^; and in a few hours 
 the greater part of his troops could be trans- 
 ported to the defence of either ; whereas the 
 direct contrary was the case, as has been 
 shewn, with the enemy. This formed one 
 of the main features of the strength of the 
 lines. 
 
 Torres Vedras and the ground about it was 
 strongly fortified; forts were continued, at 
 intervals, to the sea; and, although this part 
 of the position was never menaced, yet it 
 was occupied by garrisons, and was pre- 
 pared to resist any attack that should be made 
 upon it. 
 
189 
 
 In rear of this line of positions was a second, 
 extending from the back of Alverca to Bucel- 
 las, thence along the Sierra di Serves and the 
 Sierra di Barca to Montachique, from whence 
 by the park wall of Mafra to the rear of Gradel, 
 and along the line of heights to the mouth of 
 the St. Lorenzo. Betwixt these two lines of 
 positions,' there were strong works at "Enxara 
 di Cavalhieros, at Carasquiera, and Mattacores, 
 covering the communication between them. 
 To the south, and on the other side of the Tagus, 
 the heights which commanded the town and 
 anchorage of Lisbon were also fortified, and a 
 corps of 10,000 men, partly marines from the 
 fleet, were destined to defend them ; they 
 extended from Almada to the fort called 
 Bugia, opposite Fort St. Julian s. These last 
 defences were carried into effect with a view 
 to resisting any force the enemy might bring 
 through the Alentejo against the capital, which 
 at one time was menaced by the corps under 
 Marshal Mortier, then assembled on the fron- 
 tier of that province. 
 
190 
 
 Masseiia arrived with the 6th and 8th corps- 
 of his army at Sobral on the 10th, 11th, and 
 12th of October. The 2d corps followed Lieu- 
 tenant General Hill upon Alhandra. These 
 troops were considerably fatigued with the 
 forced marches they had in vain been making 
 to come up with Lord Wellington's army ; the 
 rain which had fallen since the 8th instant had 
 rendered the roads extremely bad, particularly 
 about Sobral; so that the men, and particu- 
 larly the horses, were almost exhausted when 
 they arrived in front of our positions. 
 
 Massena occupied himself the first days with 
 reconnoitring the ground on which Lord Wel- 
 lington had placed his army; the task was 
 difficult ; it was so concealed behind the hills 
 that a very small part of it could be disco- 
 vered ; enough, however, was perceptible to 
 convince him that an attack was no easy under-*f 
 taking. Lord Wellington occupied a redoubt 
 at the foot of the great height above Sobral ; 
 the French established one at a short distance, 
 
191 
 
 and opposite to it. After several reconnoitres, 
 Massena determined to carry the British re- 
 doubt. The troops which occupied it were 
 commanded by Colonel the Honourable H. 
 Cadogan, of the 73d Regiment. Massena placed 
 himself on a hill to see the success of his first 
 operation against our lines. He was disap- 
 pointed, his chosen troops were repulsed, and 
 in sight of both armies the French redoubt was 
 carried and maintained. From this moment no 
 event of any consequence took place for a 
 considerable length of time. Skirmishes in 
 the rear of the French army, and particularly 
 from the village of Ramalhal, where the brigade 
 of British cavalry under Major General De 
 Grey was posted, were almost the only military 
 events which took place. These were chiefly 
 brought about by parties of the French, who,, 
 in search of provisions, were continually met 
 by Lord Wellington's patroles, and in which a 
 number of prisoners were taken. 
 
 It is of consequence here to take a general 
 view of the situation in which the French army 
 
192 
 
 was placed. Massena, when he entered Por 
 tugal, commanded a force of 72,000 effective 
 men* The plan of operations he adopted was 
 to break in at once upon Lord Wellington's 
 defences ; to pursue him till he forced him to a 
 battle; to allow no circumstances to arrest this 
 decision, and finish thus at one blow the cam- 
 paign intrusted to his conduct. In pursuance 
 of his system, he marched, with all the corps of 
 his army concentrated, into the heart of Por- 
 tugal, taking his line direct upon Coimbra, at 
 which place, by turning Lord Wellington's left, 
 he hoped to have arrived almost without resist- 
 ance. In effecting this movement, he left no 
 garrisons behind him ; he occupied no posts to 
 secure even his communication with Spain, or 
 to ensure him any supplies or protection from 
 the rear of his army. Such considerations were 
 all sacrificed to preserve his greater numerical 
 force for the battle by which he hoped at once 
 to decide the fate of Portugal. The first inter- 
 ruption to this arrangement of the campaign, 
 was the assembling of the whole British army at 
 Busaco, and the subsequent defeat of the 
 
193 
 
 French. On the day on which this took place, 
 Massena s communication with Spain was cut 
 off by a force of Portuguese militia, upon the 
 frontiers near Pinhel and Celorico. He deter- 
 mined, however, to continue his original move- 
 ment ; and, hoping to conceal his march through 
 the Sierra of Caramula, expected again to turn 
 Lord Wellington, and fight a battle to advan- 
 tage in the open country, between Busaco and 
 Coimbra. These hopes were frustrated. Per- 
 ceiving the difficulties into which the enemy was 
 plunging, Lord Wellington retired through Coim- 
 bra, and abandoned to him that deserted town 
 and country. Arrived at this point. Marshal 
 Massena must have begun to feel the difficulties 
 of his situation. He was encumbered with 5,000 
 wounded from the battle of Busaco ; he was 
 without the security of any supply of provisions, 
 in the midst of a most inimical and exasperated 
 population ; he was without the means of com- 
 municating with Spain. If he remained where 
 he was, the boasted conquest of Portugal in a 
 campaign was at an end ; the difficulties to 
 which he must have exposed himself, by the ex- 
 
 o 
 
194 
 
 tension of his s^rmy to procure provisions, must 
 also have had weight with him ; and the uncer- 
 tainty as to our real object in so rapid a retreat, 
 must have induced him to expect some great 
 result from the bolder measure of pursuing the 
 allied army. In conformity to this feeling, 
 without leaving any protection for his rear, or 
 even for his wounded. Marshal Massena con- 
 ducted his army to Sobral. His progress here 
 was totally arrested. 
 
 The strength of the position occupied by us 
 was such, as, with the recollection of Busaco 
 fresh upon him, Massena dared not attack ; he 
 was, therefore, reduced at once to the defen- 
 sive ; his mighty vengeance was conducted 
 harmless to this unpromising position. 
 
 The first news, which must have been un- 
 pleasant to Marshal Massena, was the capture 
 of Coimbra, with all the French wounded, by 
 a corps of Portuguese militia, under Colonel 
 Trant. The loss of the troops was not alone 
 to be lamented in this case ; it brought with it 
 
195 
 
 the disastrous conviction, that the French army 
 was insulated on the ground on which it stood ; 
 no line of communication, no extent of country 
 in subjection, from which to draw resources, 
 remained to it. Wherever a Frenchman stood, 
 for the moment, he commanded and desolated 
 the spot ; removed from it, all was in hos- 
 tility against him. The march of the French, 
 through Portugal to the lines, was most singular. 
 The troops seldom saw an inhabitant; they 
 could procure no guides; deserters from them, 
 or prisoners, could never state the towns or 
 villages from whence they came, though, in 
 some instances, they had been weeks in the 
 same places ; they had seen no native to in- 
 struct them in their names. In this state of 
 things, the French army began early to suffer 
 from privations of every sort ; its foraging par- 
 ties were scouring the country in the rear, and 
 ;Upon their success depended chiefly the provi^ 
 sioning of the troops. The fatigue and sick- 
 ness, consequent on this mode of living, were 
 considerable. The French soldiers were gene- 
 rally bivousicqued along the line they occupied, 
 
 o 2 . 
 
196 
 
 which, without shelter in the rainy season, in^ 
 creased the misery of their situation. By these 
 causes, their army gradually diminished ; while, 
 on the contrary, that under Lord Wellington, ex- 
 cellently provided with all that was necessary, 
 and mostly under cover in the villages within 
 the position, was gaining strength and im- 
 proving in discipline every day. The Spanish 
 corps, under the orders of the Marquis of Ro- 
 mana, had joined the allied army from the fron- 
 tiers of Estremadura; so that the force at this 
 time, (the end of October and beginning of 
 November) within the lines, was considerably 
 greater than that of the enemy. Under these 
 circumstances. Lord Wellington saw there was 
 an opportunity of attacking Massena with ad- 
 vantage. The problem, whether it were wise 
 to do so or not, engaged his most serious at- 
 tention. He was persuaded, that if he attack- 
 ed, he could secure a victory ; to attempt it 
 he was induced by every personal considera- 
 tion ; the glory which would have accrued to 
 him in success would at that time have been 
 immense ; in England the word of Buonaparte, 
 
197 
 
 that his eagles should be planted on the towers 
 of Lisbon, was generally looked upon as a de- 
 cree which no talent or ability could avert ; to 
 have learnt at such a time that our army 
 had defeated the boasted instruments 6f this 
 prophesying emperor, would have carried 
 the man who executed such a plan to the pin- 
 nacle of greatness. Yet this inducement, as 
 well as the anxious wish of the whole army 
 to attack, had no effect. Lord Wellington was 
 persuaded that the sounder line of conduct 
 was to wait with patience, and in safety, the 
 mischief, which he was satisfied would be 
 brought upon the enemy by want and sick- 
 ness, and by the continual hostility of the na- 
 tives. He therefore decided steadily to pursue 
 that plan ; he was ever watchful to profit by any 
 advantage which should be afforded ; but unless 
 a decided one was given him, he determined 
 to remain on the defensive. 
 
 About the beginning of November, Massena 
 found his sick so fast increasing, and his means 
 of obtaining provisions so much diminished. 
 
• 
 
 198 
 
 that he was obliged to detach General La Borde's 
 division of the 6th corps, to form a garrison at 
 Santarem for the protection of an hospital, as 
 well as to assist the foraging parties in that 
 quarter. Lord Wellington made a correspond- 
 ing movement to prevent the passage of the 
 Tagus, by detaching Major General Fane with 
 a brigade of cavalry into the Alemtejo to as- 
 semble opposite to La Borde. In this situa- 
 tion the armies remained in perfect tranquillity 
 till the 15th in the morning, when it was found 
 that during the night the whole French army 
 had retreated . This movement had been carried 
 into effect in such silence, that no suspicion 
 of it had been entertained. 
 
 It was the great triumph of Lord Welling- 
 ton's skill and foresight, that, without exposing 
 a single man in action, he had since the 10th of 
 October retained at first a superior army in 
 inactivity before him ; he had seen it diminish 
 in numbers every day ; and, in the end, without 
 its having effected a single purpose, he had 
 obliged it to retire, oppressed with fatigue and 
 
199 
 
 sickness. Towards reducing the country it oc- 
 cupied, it had not made the slightest progress ; 
 the provisions of the British army were drawn 
 from the northern provinces in its rear ; Co- 
 imbra continued occupied by the Portuguese 
 mihtia ; Abrantes by the Portuguese garrison ; 
 so that it may truly be described as command- 
 ing only the ground on which it stood. 
 
 The state of Lisbon during the period when 
 the enemy was hardly twenty miles distant 
 from it, deserves to be mentioned. Massena 
 had expected that his near approach would 
 have caused tumult and a revolution ; but far 
 from this, as a proof of the extraordinary con- 
 fidence entertained of Lord Wellington, no 
 town was ever in more perfect quiet; there 
 never appeared in it the slightest symptom of 
 fear or apprehension. The ordinary occupa- 
 tions were continued, although the enemy was 
 but a single march from it. Yet total ruin was 
 known to await the town, if Massena, by suc- 
 ceeding against the allied army, forced an entry 
 into it. The apprehension of such a catastrophe 
 
200 
 
 was, however, at no time entertained ; implicit 
 reliance on the skill of their chief, and the bra- 
 very of the troops, was the universal sentiment 
 of the Portuguese. 
 
 The persons whose property had been 
 surrendered to be laid waste by the enemy, 
 shewed the same feelings ; the poor peasants, 
 who had abandoned every thing they possessed, 
 were alike persuaded that all was done for the 
 best; and in the whole country there was not a 
 dissenting voice in giving unlimited confidence 
 to Lord Wellington. 
 
 As soon as the retreat of the enemy was 
 known, the allied army was put in motion to 
 follow him ; his movement was, however, so 
 rapid, that he was not overtaken till within a few 
 miles of Santarem. The rear guard was pushed 
 over the bridge in front of that place, where it 
 took up a strong and formidable position. 
 
 Lord Wellington had not pursued the enemy 
 with the whole of his force; suspecting, that it 
 
201 
 
 might, in the first instance, be the intention of 
 Massena to move round Monte Junto, he re- 
 tained Major General Picton's division in its po- 
 sition at Torres Vedras ; he afterwards detached 
 Lieutenant General Hill with the corps under his 
 orders across theTagus at Valada, with a view of 
 communicating with Abrantes, which it might 
 be the intention of the French to attack, and 
 also to protect the Alemtejo from any offensive 
 operation. 
 
 The rest of the army was brought opposite to 
 Santarem. Lord Wellington having received a 
 report from Major General Fane, that the bag- 
 gage of the French army was retiring towards 
 Thomar, conceived that Massena was altogether 
 falling back ; with this idea he determined to 
 attack what appeared to be his rear guard, which 
 was placed upon a small river, the Rio Mayor. 
 A disposition with this view was made; a part 
 of Brigadier General Pack's brigade was to 
 have passed, supported by a detachment of ca- 
 valry, on the right of the French position, about a 
 mile beyond it ; Sir William Erskine's brigade^ 
 
202 
 
 supported by the Guards, was to have stormed 
 the bridge; while Major General Crawford, with 
 the light division, was to have attacked the ene- 
 my's left, and along the Tagus to have menaced 
 the rear of his advanced position. The rain, 
 which had been very heavy during the precede 
 ing days, had, however, so much swelled the 
 river where Brigadier General Pack was to have 
 passed, that it was found impracticable ; the 
 enemy also appearing in considerable force, the 
 operation was given up ; Lord Wellington still 
 determining to adhere to his defensive system, 
 and deciding rather to fall back again upon his 
 lines than seek the French army, or give it an 
 opportunity of meeting him upon any thing like 
 equal terms. 
 
 Massena continued the succeeding days to 
 strengthen his position at Santarem ; Lord 
 Wellington retained only his light division in 
 front of it, and placed the rest of his army in 
 echellons to the rear. The head-quarters were 
 placed at Cartaxo ; Sir Brent Spencer, with the 
 Guards and Major General Cameron's brigade. 
 
203 
 
 in the same place ; Lieutenant General Cole's 
 division at Azambujo; Major General Leith's 
 at Alcoentre ; Major General A. Campbell's 
 at Aleraquer; Major General Picton's at Tor- 
 res Vedras, and the Spaniards at Villa-Franca. 
 Massena threw a bridge over the Zczere at its 
 confluence with the Tagus, as if with the inten- 
 tion of passing a corps for the siege of Abrantes ; 
 he was contented, however, with reconnoitring 
 that place, which he never after molested. He 
 placed his army in cantonments stretching as far 
 back as Thomar, Torres Novas, and Alcanede ; 
 and in this situation, protected by the position 
 at Santarem, remained in quiet, apparently 
 awaiting reinforcements and orders how to pro- 
 ceed. Lord Wellington saw this with perfect 
 indifference ; he was persuaded that the more 
 the enemy was reinforced the greater would 
 be his suffering, and the less the general ad- 
 vantage to his cause in the Peninsula. He 
 determined, therefore, to undertake no opera- 
 tion to prevent it, nor any other which could 
 either cause him risk, or could draw him from 
 his general system of defensive measures. 
 
204 
 
 From this period, the 12th of November 1810, 
 to the 4th of March, 1811, both armies retain- 
 ed their respective positions ; the only events 
 of any importance, were the arrival of the 9th 
 corps of 10,000 men, commanded by General 
 Cte. Erlon, which was placed by Massena to 
 protect his right at Leiria ; and the junction of 
 5,000 men, who were brought by General Foy 
 upon his return from Paris, where he had been 
 sent by Massena, soon after his arrival opposite 
 our lines, to render an account of the operations 
 of the French army, and of its situation. Buo- 
 naparte received the relation of these events 
 with much indifference; and observed upon the 
 excuses General Foy was directed to make, for 
 the loss of the battle of Busaco, " Ah bah ! les 
 Anglais de tout temps ont battu les Frani^ais/' 
 
 General Gardane, in attempting to carry a 
 corps of 3,000 men to join Massena, was driven 
 back by some Portuguese militia. General 
 Claparede posted himself, with a corps of 8,000 
 men, in the environs of Guarda ; from whence 
 he had several actions with the irregulars in 
 
205 
 
 that part of the country, by whom the com- 
 munication of the French army with Spain had 
 been totally cut off. 
 
 During the whole of this period, the French 
 subsisted solely on the plunder of the country 
 they occupied. The irregular manner in which 
 this mode of obtaining supplies was conducted, 
 led to the perpetration of the most revolting 
 atrocities. Torture inflicted upon the inhabit- 
 ants, to extract from them the secret of their 
 dep6ts of provisions and property, was one of 
 the expedients most common to the French 
 soldiery. The murder of the peasantry seemed 
 to be committed without remorse; the cap- 
 ture of the women was converted often into a 
 source of profit. Nothing more revolting to 
 the mind of civilized man can be produced, 
 than the list of horrors committed during this 
 lamentable period. 
 
 Buonaparte directed Massena to continue his 
 occupation of Portugal, till he could operate 
 with Marshals Mortier and Soult, (to.,whom he 
 
206 
 
 had given orders to advance into the Alemtejo,) 
 and thence combine their movements for an 
 attack on Lord Wellington. In conformity with 
 these views. Marshal Mortier arrived in the 
 beginning of January in Spanish Estremadura ; 
 he soon after captured Olivenza, and laid siege 
 to Badajos. Lord Wellington, upon the first 
 notice of these movements, had detached the 
 Spanish corps which had joined him in the 
 lines, to reinforce the corps of General Mendi- 
 zabel, which was already destined to the pro* 
 tection of these places ; he, at the same time, 
 strongly recommended that officer not to fight 
 a battle, but, by taking up a defensive position, 
 (which he pointed out to him,) to give every 
 assistance to the defence of Badajos, and the 
 other fortresses in that quarter. 
 
 Unfortunately for Spain, for the interests of 
 the allies, and for those persons who, acquaint- 
 ed with the Marquis of Romana, loved and che- 
 rished him for the virtues which adorned his 
 character, he had expired in the beginning of 
 January ^.t Cartaxo ; less able hands were now 
 
207 
 
 intrusted with the army he had commanded. 
 On the 19th of January, General Mendizabel 
 was attacked in a position close to Badajos by 
 the French army which was besieging it, and 
 totally defeated. Mortier, from that moment, 
 pushed on without interruption the operations of 
 the siege. The place surrendered on the 11th of 
 March, notwithstanding the governor was in- 
 formed by telegraph that a strong corps of the 
 allied army was coming to his relief, and that 
 Massena was already on his retreat from San- 
 tarem. It is a fact worthy of remark, that, in 
 the articles of capitulation for this place, it was 
 stipulated that the garrison should march out by 
 the breach; but when this came to be examined, 
 it was found so far from practicable, that it was 
 necessary to employ some time to make it fit 
 for the passage of the troops. The garrison 
 was stronger than the corps which besieged it ; 
 so that taking all the circumstances into con- 
 sideration, the giving up this important fortress 
 was as extraordinary as it was disastrous. 
 
 Throughout the month of February, Lord 
 
208 
 
 Wellington had been looking out with great 
 anxiety for a reinforcement from England, 
 which was coming to him, and which, by the 
 unfavourable state of the weather, had been 
 unusually delayed, and did not arrive till the 
 7th of March. The distressed state of the 
 French army, as well as the menaced move- 
 ment of Soult and Mortier, had determined 
 him, upon the arrival of this reinforcement, 
 (which amounted to 7,000 English,) to attack ; 
 and his plans for this purpose were already 
 decided upon. 
 
 The night of the 4th of March, however, put 
 an end to this project : Massena broke up from 
 all his positions, and commenced his retreat. 
 The country he had occupied was totally ex-, 
 hausted ; his army could no longer subsist in it» 
 The sickness and misery the French had suf- 
 fered, together with the hostility of the peasants, 
 had considerably reduced their numbers. Lord 
 Wellington had triumphed in his calculations ; 
 without the loss of a single man, he had obliged 
 the enemy, weakened and disheartened, to 
 abandon all his objects. 
 
209 
 
 Massena, after having previously moved off 
 his sick and baggage upon the road to the Peunte 
 de Marcella, directed his effective army upon 
 Pombal, where it appeared he had intended to 
 fight a battle ; some altercation is stated to have 
 taken place here, between him and the Count 
 Erlon ; that officer having received instructions 
 to act in Spain, insisted upon being allowed to re- 
 tire from Portugal, and immediately commenced 
 his movement to effect that object. Lord Wel- 
 lington had on the 11th, concentrated a part 
 of his army opposite Pombal ; the enemy was 
 driven from it, and the next day was attacked 
 at Redinha, from the positions about which 
 place he was also obliged to retire with consi- 
 derable loss : from thence he was pushed upon 
 Condeixa, where, appearing to take up his 
 ground as if to defend it, Lord Wellington in- 
 stantly detached a corps to menace his left, 
 and his communication with Miranda do Corvo. 
 This had the desired effect; Marshal Ney, who 
 commanded the French rear-guard, retired 
 upon Miranda, thus abandoning the chance of 
 occupying Coimbra (which was without de- 
 
210 
 
 fence,) or of retaining any advanced position in 
 Portugal. 
 
 To the activity and vigour with which Lord 
 Wellington pushed the French army, this ad- 
 vantage was entirely due ; Massena conceived 
 that an officer who, for so long a period, had 
 acted with so much caution, would never seri- 
 ously venture to disturb his retreat ; he had> 
 therefore, relied upon being able to conduct it 
 at his own discretion : when he found, on the 
 contrary, that he was most vigorously attack- 
 ed, he was obliged to precipitate his move- 
 ments. To this alone can be attributed his 
 having been unable to ascertain that there was 
 no garrison in Coimbra, a position to which it 
 appears he was anxious to have led his army. 
 
 Lord Wellington pursued the enemy, and 
 obliged him precipitately to abandon Miranda 
 do Corvo, leaving a great part of his baggage, 
 and destroying, at Foz d'Arouse, a consider- 
 able number of his carts and baggage-horses. 
 Ney took up a position on the Ciera ; but 
 
211 
 
 having left a considerable part of his advanced 
 guard on the left bank of that river, it was vi- 
 gorously attacked by the allies, and, in complete 
 disorder, and with great loss, driven into the 
 main position. A French eagle was taken in 
 the river, into which, in the hurry of defeat, a 
 considerable nuipber of the enemy had been 
 precipitated, and drowned. 
 
 On the 17th, Massena formed his army in a 
 strong position behind the Alva, occupying the 
 Puente de Marcella, and the heights along the 
 banks of that river. Believing himself secure 
 in this formidable position, he had sent out de- 
 tachments from the different corps, to collect 
 provisions ; but Lord Wellington passed the 
 Alva on the left of the French army, and 
 obliged it to retire without having reassembled 
 the parties sent out to forage, a considerable 
 number of which were taken. 
 
 The whole of these operations were conduct- 
 ed with the most transcendent skill and ability ; 
 whenever the enemy halted to defend himself 
 
 p 2 
 
212 
 
 he was out-manoeuvred, and driven from his 
 ground ; he was constantly attacked and 
 beaten. Besides the loss in battle, his stragglers, 
 his sick and wounded, and a considerable part 
 of his baggage, became a prey to the allied army. 
 
 Lord Wellington was now obliged, for a mo- 
 ment, to give up the active pursuit he had hi- 
 therto maintained. His army had out-marched 
 its supplies; he was forced to give time for 
 them to join him ; he had besides been obliged 
 to detach a considerable force into the Alemtejo, 
 which, having reduced his numbers below those 
 of the enemy, forced him to proceed with 
 caution. 
 
 When Massena commenced his retreat, 
 Lord Wellington had decided to send the second 
 British division, together with that of General 
 Hamilton of Portuguese, with the 13th Light 
 Dragoons, and a Portuguese brigade of cavalry, 
 to protect the Alemtejo, and to oblige Mortier 
 to raise the siege of Badajos ; a part of this corps 
 having, however, passed to the north of theTagus 
 
213 
 
 at Abrantes, and driven the enemy from the 
 Zezere at Punhete, its march to the southward 
 was delayed till Lord Wellington, receiving 
 intelligence of the surrender of Badajos, was 
 obliged to add to this force the 4th division, 
 under Lieutenant-General Cole, and the heavy 
 brigade of British cavalry, under Major- General 
 De Grey. This immense detachment from his 
 army was rendered necessary from the very 
 great importance of defending the southern 
 frontier of Portugal, while the remainder of 
 his forces pursued the enemy in the north. It 
 was intrusted to the command of Marshal 
 Beresford, and began its march towards Por- 
 talegre and Campo Mayor on the 17th. Lord 
 Wellington considered the possession of Badajos 
 as of the greatest importance to his future ope- 
 rations; and therefore directed Marshal Beres- 
 ford, if possible, to invest it before the enemy 
 should have had time to repair the fortifications, 
 and provision it. This object was unfortu- 
 nately not accomplished ; and the recapture of 
 that fortress, at a later period, was most dearly 
 purchased. 
 
214 
 
 After a few days' halt upon the Alva, the 
 allied troops continued the pursuit of Massena's 
 army ; it had taken a position at Guarda, where 
 it appeared determined to defend itself. The 
 ground about that town is extremely strong ; 
 being at a considerable height, it commands the 
 country around it, and is most difficult of ac- 
 cess. Massena had availed himself of these ad- 
 vantages, and hoped to maintain his army, 
 protected by them, within the frontier of Por- 
 tugal. He had held out this hope to Buonaparte, 
 and therefore made every disposition within his 
 means to secure his object; but Lord Wellington, 
 on the 27th, in the morning, had manoeuvred with 
 seven columns, so as to turn him on every side, 
 and having gained possession of his position, to 
 force him to a precipitate retreat; a brigade 
 of French infantry, under General Maucune, 
 was near being taken, and the whole French 
 army was driven across the Coa. Massena 
 here made a last effort to maintain some footing 
 within the frontiers of the country, of which he 
 had so triumphantly predicted the entire con- 
 quest ; he placed his army along the Coa, and 
 
215 
 
 in occupation of Sabugal ; he was attacked, 
 however, on the 2d of April ; his hopes were 
 blasted; he was driven into Spain. Lord Wel- 
 lington had directed the light division to pass 
 the Coa on the left, and in rear of General 
 Regnier's corps, while two divisions attacked 
 in front ; from the badness of the weather, a 
 battalion of the Rifle Corps, under Colonel Beck- 
 with, was deceived in the ford at which it was to 
 cross, and got engaged alone for a considerable 
 time with almost the whole of the French force. 
 Colonel Beckwith, at the moment of being 
 charged by the French cavalry, took advantage 
 of a stone enclosure, from whence he defended 
 himself with the most distinguished gallantry ; 
 an opportunity offering, he charged and took 
 a howitzer, which he maintained ; and, after 
 having caused a severe loss to the enemy, was 
 relieved by the arrival of the rest of the light 
 division, and afterwards of the other corps 
 which had been destined to the attack. Regnier 
 was obliged to retire with great precipitation, 
 leaving a considerable number of killed and 
 wounded, and losing many prisoners on his 
 
march to Alfaiates, where he entered the Spa- 
 nish territory. 
 
 Thus were the last of Massenas troops 
 chased from the country, of which they still 
 maintained the pompous appellation. '* The 
 Army of Portugal," was yet the title they were 
 distinguished by, though they could boast of 
 that country but as the scene of disaster and 
 defeat; and out of which, with the loss of half 
 their numbers, they had been driven headlong, 
 "leaving only the sad remembrance of the atro- 
 cities they had committed. 
 
 Lord Wellington having reconnoitred Al- 
 meida, decided immediately to blockade it ; 
 having appointed the corps for that purpose, 
 and distributed the rest of his army in canton- 
 ments, he went to the Alemtejb, to visit the 
 army commanded by Marshal Beresford. This 
 force had arrived at Campo Mayor on the 25th 
 of March ; the town had, two days before, after 
 a spirited resistance, surrendered to the enemy, 
 but the wretched state of its defences obliged 
 
Marshal Mortier to abandon it on the approach 
 of the allies. The advanced-guard, composed of 
 the 13th Light Dragoons, and some Portuguese 
 cavalry, came up with the enemy's convoy, 
 protected by a corps of cavalry, three batta- 
 lions of infantry, and a brigade of artillery, as 
 it was retiring to Badajos ; Colonel Head 
 charged the French cavalry, defeated it, and 
 drove it to the gates of Badajos; from the walls 
 of which place the 13th Light Dragoons suffered 
 some loss, having, in the ardour of the pursuit, 
 exposed themselves to the fire from them. 
 
 The heavy brigade of British cavalry, com- 
 posed of the 3d Dragoon-Guards, and the 4th 
 Dragoons, came up to the French infantry soon 
 after this charge had taken place ; but at the 
 moment of attacking it, were halted by Marshal 
 Beresford, who, in doubt of the event of the 
 charge made by the 1 3th, did not venture to 
 expose the rest of his cavalry to any risk. This 
 infantry therefore was allowed to move off 
 without molestation ; and in the night the French 
 were enabled to carry into Badajos a great part 
 
218 
 
 of the guns, stores, and ammunition, which, in 
 the charge of the 13th Dragoons, had been taken 
 in the morning. The result of this affair, after 
 so brilliant a commencement, was unfortunate ; 
 the return of the infantry was a considerable 
 reinforcement to a garrison we were about to 
 attack ; and the artillery, stores, and provi- 
 sions were objects of the first necessity to its 
 defence. 
 
 The French having thus been driven over the 
 Guadiana, Marshal Beresford sought as early as 
 possible to pass that river, to invest Badajos, 
 according to the instructions he had received. 
 He was delayed, however, by the state of the 
 river, and his unwillingness to risk its passage, 
 without having previously secured his after 
 communications across it ; so that he did not 
 effectually establish himself on the left bank, 
 till the 6th and 7th of April, by which time the 
 enemy had provisioned and repaired the place, 
 and Marshal Mortier (leaving it in a state of 
 defence,) had retired with his corps towards 
 Seville. 
 
219 
 
 The blockade of Badajos was immediately 
 established ; and Lieu tenant-General Cole was 
 directed to conduct the siege of Olivenza, ' 
 which, having only a garrison of 370 men, was 
 surrendered at discretion on the 15th. > 
 
 Immediately after this event, and while 
 Marshal Beresford was preparing for the attack 
 of Badajos, Lord Wellington arrived. He was 
 strongly impressed with the importance of this 
 fortress to his future plans, in the new system 
 of warfare which the late events had laid opei? 
 to him. Snatched from him at the moment all 
 his other calculations had triumphed, it had 
 already been most detrimental to his general 
 success. By the large detachment he had been 
 obliged to make from his army, in consequence 
 of its fall, it had prevented his more vigorous 
 pursuit of Massena, and had destroyed his hope 
 of undertaking the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo 
 (as well as that of Almeida,) before it could be 
 re- victualled, and placed in a state of defence ; 
 and it still menaced, as long as it remained in 
 the hands of the French, to curb all his ofFen- 
 
220 
 
 sive movements into Spain, by protecting their 
 positions in the south of the country, and by 
 enabling them at all times to threaten the 
 southern provinces of Portugal. 
 
 Lord Wellington found the army of Marshal 
 Beresford in possession of the whole of Estre- 
 madura ; an affair of cavalry which had taken 
 place at Usagre, in which the 3d Dragoon 
 Guards had most gallantly charged and defeat- 
 ed the French, had terminated their attempt to 
 maintain themselves within it. Lord Welling- 
 ton immediately reconnoitred Badajos with two 
 battalions of infantry, and some Portuguese 
 cavalry ; a sharp affair was engaged by these 
 troops with part of the garrison, but he effect- 
 ed -his purpose, and decided to besiege the 
 place, and fixed upon such points to attack as 
 he hoped would lead to the capture of the for- 
 tress within fourteen or sixteen days. He had 
 neither the means nor the time to undertake a 
 regular siege ; besieging artillery, stores, and 
 ammunition could all be but very inefficiently 
 supplied from Elvas, the only dep6t from 
 
221 
 
 whence they could be drawn ; and it was evi- 
 dent that Soult would make every effort to 
 prevent the capture of the place, and that he 
 would, in about three weeks, be able to collect 
 an army strong enough to attempt its relief. 
 
 The heights of St. Christobal, on the right of 
 the Guadiana, seemed to oifer a favourable em- 
 placemmt for the establishment of batteries to 
 protect an attack on the old castle ; it was there- 
 fore decided to carry, if possible, the fort which 
 occupied them, and afterwards, from that posi* 
 tion, to endeavour to destroy the defences of the 
 castle, while its walls should be breached from 
 the batteries in the plain below, and on the left 
 of the river. Preparations were immediately 
 made to carry this plan into effect, which Lord 
 Wellington hoped would be in operation on the 
 24th. The movements of Massena recalled him 
 to the north ; he therefore left the prosecution 
 of the siege to Marshal Beresford, recommend- 
 ing, if the enemy attempted to disturb him, to 
 fight a battle, rather than be driven from his 
 object. 
 
222 
 
 The commencement of the siege was most 
 unfortunately delayed by the swelling of the 
 Guadiana on the 24th, and the consequent de- 
 struction of the bridge across it, till the 8th of 
 May, when Major- General Lumley completed 
 the investment on the right of that river, Major- 
 General Sir W. Stewart having previously ef- 
 fected it on the left. The means provided for 
 the siege were found very unequal to the under- 
 taking ; before any progress could be made. 
 Marshal Soult had collected his army as had 
 been anticipated ; on the night of the 15th, the 
 attack of the place was discontinued, and the 
 troops marched to Albuhera, where, on the 16th, 
 Marshal Beresford obtained a signal victory 
 over the French army. 
 
 Lord Wellington returned to his head-quarters 
 at Villa Formoso on the 28th of April. Mas- 
 sena had collected his army at Ciudad Rodrigo ; 
 it consisted of the 2d, 6th, 8th, and 9th corps, 
 with the cavalry and artillery which belonged to 
 them, and of 1,500 cavalry of the Imperial 
 Guard, commanded by the Duke of Istria. The 
 
223 
 
 whole force amounted to 40,000 men, the rem- 
 nant of the arjtny of Portugal, which, six months 
 before, had counted above 90,000 rank and file. 
 
 Lord Wellington saw the approach of the 
 enemy without dismay ; the French force was 
 supehor to his own,-— its object, the relief of 
 Almeida. To thwart this attempt it was ne- 
 cessary to accept a battle ; and, from the situa- 
 tion of Almeida, on the right of the Coa, the 
 position to defend the approach to it must ne- 
 cessarily betaken up in front of the town, thus 
 having the river in rear of the allied army. 
 The banks of the Coa are extremely steep ; 
 there are few fords at which it can be passed, 
 none in the part of it near Almeida serviceable 
 for an army : the bridge over it, under the 
 guns of that fortress, is extremely narrow, and 
 at the time was nearly impassable. The bridge 
 at Castel de Bom was also a most difficult 
 communication. From Ciudad Rodrigo a road 
 leads to Sabugal, where there is another bridge 
 over the Coa, which, in case of defeat, might 
 have served the allied army to retire over. 
 
224 
 
 Lord Wellington (though not entirely from his 
 own conviction) determined to take up a de- 
 fensive position, covering both the approach to 
 Almeida, and the road to Sabugal. He perceived, 
 from the beginning, that this double object w^as 
 more than the forces he had with him might be 
 able to maintain; the extension to the road 
 above mentioned weakened his position; where- 
 as, he was persuaded that, by confining himself 
 to the protection of Almeida alone, he could 
 bid defiance to the enemy. The object, how- 
 ever, of defending the entry by Sabugal into 
 Portugal, and of securing a second road to 
 retire upon, was not without mature considera- 
 tion to be given up ; and Lord Wellington felt 
 convinced, that if the necessity of so doing 
 should arise, he could always withdraw his 
 army to the more concentrated position. 
 
 With these views Lord Wellington took up 
 the ground along the Duas Casas. He placed 
 the fifth division on his extreme left, near the 
 fort of La Conception, to defend the great 
 road to Almeida, which crosses the river at 
 
325 
 
 a ford immediately in front of that fortification. 
 The light and sixth divisions he placed opposite 
 to the village of Almada ; the first, third, and 
 seventh, were placed in rear of Fuentes d'Honor, 
 with the light infantry of the third division and 
 of the brigades of Major-Generals Nightingale 
 and Howard occupying the village, supported 
 by a battalion of the German Legion, the 2d 
 battalion of the 83d, and the 71st and 79th 
 Regiments. A Spanish corps, under Don Julian 
 Sanchez, was posted on the extreme right, at 
 Nava d'Aver. Brigadier-General Pack, with a 
 brigade of Portuguese infantry and the 2d Bri- 
 tish or Queen's Regiment, blockaded Almeida. 
 
 Massena advanced from Ciudad Rodrigo on 
 the 2d of May; and our troops having retired 
 from the Agueda, he arrived, on the 3d, opposite 
 to the position occupied by the allied army. 
 In the evening he made a desperate attempt to 
 carry the village of Fuentes d'Honor; but after 
 a severe contest, most gallantly maintained, his 
 troops were totally repulsed. Defeated with 
 considerable loss in his first attempt, he spent 
 
226 
 
 the whole of the 4th in reconnoitring our po- 
 sition. Lord Wellington penetrated his inten- 
 tion of attacking the right of the allied army, 
 and in the night moved the seventh division to 
 Porco Velho, the only ford at which the enemy 
 could cross the Duas Casas, and where the 
 banks of that river opposed but a trifling ob- 
 stacle to his advance. 
 
 On the morning of the 5th, the eighth corps 
 was discovered opposite to this village, and 
 preparing to attack it; Lord Wellington moved 
 the light division to support the seventh, while 
 he directed the first and third divisions to oc- 
 cupy some high ground between the Turon 
 and Duas Casas rivers; thus observing the 
 6ixth and ninth corps of the French army, 
 which had made a movement to their left, and 
 had approached the ground occupied by the 
 eighth corps. 
 
 Massena began the action of this day by an 
 attack on the advanced guard of the seventh 
 division ; which, overpowered by numbers, was 
 
^27 
 
 obliged to retire, giving up the village of Porco 
 Velho. The French cavalry, under General 
 Montbrun, (which had already driven Don 
 Julian Sanches from Nava d'Aver) charged 
 with a very superior force the cavalry of the 
 allies, and though (in the first rencontre) its 
 advance was driven back, yet it afterwards 
 succeeded in penetrating to the infantry, which, 
 supported in the most gallant manner by the 
 artillery, received the French cavalry and re- 
 pulsed it with considerable loss. At this mo- 
 ment Lord Wellington decided to withdraw his 
 army into the more concentrated position, to 
 which from the beginning he had felt inclined 
 to confine himself. 
 
 He directed the light and seventh divisions, 
 supported by the cavalry, to retire and to take 
 up the ground extending from the Duas Casas 
 towards Frenada, on the Coa. This movement, 
 as bold as it was decisive, was executed with 
 the greatest precision ; the enemy could make 
 no impression on the allied columns while on 
 their march, and the new position, at right 
 
 Q ^ 
 
^28 
 
 angles with the old one, was taken up with 
 perfect regularity. Massena declined making 
 any attempt on the troops now formed on their 
 new alignement; he confined his efforts for the 
 remainder of the day to successive attacks, 
 made by the sixth corps, upon Fuentes d'Honor ; 
 the contest was most severe in this quarter, and 
 lasted till night, when, with great loss on both 
 sides, the allied troops, having completely re- 
 pulsed the enemy, retained possession of this 
 Vmost obstinately disputed village. 
 
 So terminated this memorable action, the 
 only one throughout the whole war in which the 
 enemy had to boast of a momentary success 
 against the allies ; the ground at Porco Velho, 
 from which the advance of the seventh division 
 was obliged to retire, afforded no decisive po- 
 sition, and if the French infantry had been 
 attacking at the moment of the charge of ca- 
 valry under General Montbrun, our loss in the 
 retreat to the new alignement might have been 
 considerably greater. Not such, however, as 
 the French officers assert; the novelty of an 
 
229 
 
 advantage to them was so great, that on our 
 change of position they predicted the entire 
 destruction of the allied army ; and although 
 these hopes were so blasted, that they dared not 
 afterwards make a single movement in attack 
 upon us, yet they still persuaded themselves, 
 that if the proper moment had been seized, we 
 were in total confusion, and must inevitably 
 have been defeated. 
 
 The British army can seldom be calculated 
 upon to verify such predictions ; if the French 
 liad attempted to pursue, they would, as on 
 other occasions of the same nature, have had 
 more to repent than to boast of*. The message 
 of General Foy to Buonaparte, before the action 
 of Waterloo, '' that in the whole war in the 
 Peninsula, the French had never once beaten 
 
 ^ See Book the 5th, Chapter 1st. of Sir Walter 
 Raleigh's History of the World, " where, in deciding this 
 controversie, whether the Macedonian or the Roman 
 were the best warriors," he answers, **the Enghshman," 
 and quotes the French historian, who says, " The English 
 comes with a conquering bravery, as he that was accus- 
 tomed to gain every where without any stay." 
 
230 
 
 the British infantry," would have been as true 
 in its application to any attack made at the 
 moment above alluded to, as it proved to be 
 in the tremendous battle of Mont Saint Jean. 
 
 Defeated in all his projects, Massena, on the 
 morning of the 6th,vv^ithdrev^ his troops from the 
 front of the allied position, and, having given up 
 all hope of forcing his way to Almeida, confined 
 his views to a simple communication with the 
 place, directing General Brenier to evacuate 
 and destroy it. The French army remained in 
 a position opposite the allies till the 10th, when 
 it retired to Ciudad Rodrigo. Lord Wellington 
 had employed the time since the battle of the 
 5th, in entrenching his new position, and had ren- 
 dered it so strong that the enemy did not make 
 any attempt against it. Marshal Marmont 
 arrived on the 7th, and soon after superseded 
 Marshal Massena in his command. 
 
 As soon as the French army had retired. Lord 
 Wellington made arrangements to secure Al- 
 meida ; aware of the distressed situation of 
 
231 
 
 that place, he detached General Campbell, on 
 the 10th, to resume the blockade, and to relieve 
 Brigadier-General Pack. In the night of the 
 same day, however, at 11 o'clock, General 
 Brenier, having previously destroyed the de- 
 fences of the place, marched out at the head of 
 his garrison, and, taking the road to Barba del 
 Puerco, forced his way through the pickets of 
 the allies, and with the loss of not more than 
 200 men escaped to the French army. There 
 were a variety of circumstances which favoured 
 this undertaking. The order for the march of 
 the 4th Regiment upon Almeida had been de- 
 layed by Sir W. Erskine ; the 2d queen's Regi- 
 ment, not believing the enemy had escaped, 
 remained on their position ; the orderly drummer 
 of the 36th Regiment was not at General Camp- 
 bell's quarters to give the alarm, and this regi- 
 ment did not, in consequence, overtake the 
 enemy so soon as it otherwise might have done. 
 Brigadier General Pack, having been relieved 
 by General Campbell, had gone from his 
 quarters, and, during his absence. Colonel 
 Campbell had marched his brigade to more dis- 
 
232 
 
 tant villages; when Brigadier General Pack 
 returned, he found General Campbell in posses- 
 sion of the house he had occupied, but as it 
 was 9 o'clock he remained there for the night ; 
 he joined the pickets of his brigade, which 
 were still on duty, on the first alarm, and at 
 the point where the enemy had forced the 
 chain. He immediately pursued with from 30 
 to 40 men, but this force was^ totally insufficient 
 to give any serious disturbance to the enemy. 
 The 4th and 36th Regiments did not arrive at 
 Barba del Puerco till day-light : at this moment 
 Brenier was passing the bridge, and immedi- 
 ately afterwards joined the French corps which 
 was stationed there to receive him. 
 
 By this event the operations in Portugal were 
 brought to a close ; that country was delivered 
 from the enemy, and was freed for ever after 
 from his odious oppression. 
 
 The glorious and transcendent services of 
 Lord Wellington were duly appreciated through- 
 out the kingdom ; his name was blest, and to 
 
233 
 
 the latest posterity will be handed down in that 
 country with grateful recollection. He was 
 hailed as one to w^hom a whole people owed 
 their emancipation. The governors vied with 
 the governed in expressing to him their admira- 
 tion of the exalted achievements which had im- 
 mortalized his name, and which had sustained 
 the honour of the combined armies. 
 
 Lord Wellington, immediately after the cap- 
 ture of Almeida, detached two divisions to the 
 southern army, and soon after proceeded him- 
 self to join Marshal Beresford. 
 
 He arrived at his head-quarters after the 
 battle of Albuhera had been fought, and as soon 
 as the means could be collected, commenced a 
 second time the siege of Badajos. 
 
 The detail of these events which followed the 
 deliverance of Portugal, does not, however, 
 belong to the present work. To describe the 
 capture of the important fortresses of Ciudad 
 Rodrigo and Badajos, in the face of superior 
 
 •# 
 
234 
 
 armies, and the destruction of that of Ahnaraz, 
 by which the armies of Marmont and Soult were 
 connected ; to follow Lord Wellington through 
 the brilliant operations which led to the battle of 
 Salamanca, and to the re-conquest of Madrid and 
 all the southern provinces of Spain ; to trace 
 the execution of that magnificent movement, by 
 which, all the French defences in the northern 
 provinces of Spain being turned without a blow, 
 their armies were completely overthrown, with 
 the loss of all their cannon and baggage, at the 
 battle of Vittoria, and Spain, like Portugal, was 
 delivered from foreign rule — these glorious 
 transactions must be left to others to record. 
 They will be handed down, with the rest of 
 those great events which have distinguished the 
 triumphant career of Lord Wellington, as a 
 beacon to guide hereafter all military men in the 
 pursuit of fame, combined with justice, with 
 moderation, and with virtue. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 r^ndon : Printed by W. CLOWES, 
 
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